“FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!”: EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE-OF-THE-ART, TECHNOLOGICAL AND COMMERCIAL FEASIBILITY, AND THE RESTATEMENT’S REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN REQUIREMENT RICHARD C. AUSNESS* INTRODUCTION Of course Wilbur never told Orville to fasten his seat belt. Not only did the first Wright Flyer have no seat belts, it did not even have seats! Orville steered1 the Wright Flyer I from a prone position, not sitting up. Nor was the Wright2 brothers’ flying machine equipped with such useful safety features as brakes, landing gear, a radio, ailerons, or even much of a tail. In fact, if the truth be3 told, the Wright brothers’ airplane was a flying deathtrap. The good news for both modern pilots and their passengers is that aircraft technology, including safety technology, has progressed enormously since 1903. Aircraft manufacturers have now incorporated many forms of technology, such as radar, global positioning navigation systems, transponders, radios, anti-lock braking systems, and fire-resistant insulation in order to make their products safer. Unfortunately, progress has not been as impressive in other areas. Consider punch presses. Notwithstanding the fact that these machines cause hundreds of injuries in the workplace each year, many punch presses continue to employ Rube Goldberg-like devices such as “pullbacks” to protect punch press operators from serious injury.4 Why has safety technology improved so dramatically over the last hundred years for airplanes while punch press safety technology apparently has not? One explanation for this curious result is that product manufacturers effectively control the pace of technological development, including the development of safety-related technology by deciding how much to invest in research and development. At the same time, the experience of aircraft and punch press5 * Dorothy Salmon Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A., 1966, J.D., 1968, University of Florida; LL.M., 1973, Yale University. The author would like to thank the University of Kentucky College of Law for its financial support for this Article in the form of a summer research grant. 1. The Wright brothers did not install seats in their aircraft until 1908. See T.K. DERRY & TREVOR I. WILLIAMS, A SHORT HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO A.D. 1900, at 401 fig. 199 (1961) (depicting Orville Wright lying prone on the Wright Flyer). 2. See id. (illustrating the Wright brothers’ 1903 flying machine). 3. See id. 4. See Buzzell v. Bliss, 358 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (describing safety devices). 5. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 548 (N.J. 1982); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight?, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325, 340 (1998); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 670 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 manufacturers suggests that some manufacturers are willing to invest more aggressively in product safety technology than others. What can be done to encourage manufacturers who lag behind to devote more effort to the improvement of product safety? One solution may be for courts to adopt tort rules that impose liability on manufacturers who fail to develop safety technology for their products. This sort of logic led the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. to conclude that asbestos6 manufacturers would have a greater incentive to discover health risks associated with their products if knowledge of scientifically undiscoverable risks was imputed to them. Other courts have endorsed this reasoning as well.7 8 However, this reasoning assumes that manufacturers can exercise almost complete control over the pace of technological development within their industry. This assumption may in fact be true when technological development is linear in nature. Linear technological development is largely independent of technological developments in other areas. However, technological development is often interdependent. For example, developments in one technology may9 influence developments in another and vice versa, in what might be called a ping- pong model. Another form of development, which is analogous to the path of a pinball, occurs when technological progress flows from a number of different sources. In both of these situations, manufacturers will not be able to10 significantly affect the pace of technological development outside of their industry and no amount of tort liability will change this. A particular technological innovation, whether safety-related or not, must also be successful in the marketplace. However, in some cases, popular acceptance takes many years and in other cases, it never happens at all. There are a variety of reasons why a particular technological innovation may not succeed commercially, including cost, lack of demand, resistance by competitors or workers in other industries, social or cultural resistance and lack of a supportive infrastructure. Although manufacturers can try to encourage public acceptance of new products and designs by advertising or engaging in other 435, 484-85 (1979); Tyrus V. Dahl, Jr., Comment, Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and Related Negligence Concepts, 14 TULSA L.J. 338, 353-54 (1978). 6. Beshada, 447 A.2d 539. 7. Id. at 545-48. 8. See, e.g., Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw.), certifying questions sub nom. In re Asbestos Cases, 829 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1987). 9. The idea for this comes from the BBC television series Connections, which aired in the United States in the late 1970s on many PBS stations. These highly informative and entertaining programs were written and hosted by science historian, James Burke. Connections (PBS television broadcast 1978). For background on Connections, see Connections, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/ title/tt0078588/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2012). 10. See JAMES BURKE, THE PINBALL EFFECT: HOW RENAISSANCE WATER GARDENS MADE THE CARBURETOR POSSIBLE—AND OTHER JOURNEYS THROUGH KNOWLEDGE 3-6 (1996) [hereinafter BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT]. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 671 promotional activities, there is no assurance that these efforts will succeed. Is there a legal concept that will encourage manufacturers to make reasonable investments in product safety without punishing them for failing to achieve the impossible? One promising solution is the “state-of-the-art” concept. Although state-of-the-art has a number of different meanings, in design defect cases, it11 should normally come into play only when a plaintiff tries to prove that a product is defectively designed because an alternative design would have prevented or reduced injury. In such cases, the defendant should be allowed to defeat the12 plaintiff’s claim by showing that his or her proposed alternative design was not within the state-of-the-art when the product was sold. This Article begins by examining some of the case law involving the state-of- the-art concept and finds that it is principally concerned with technological feasibility. It also concludes that most cases do not treat state-of-the-art as conclusive on the design defect issue; rather, they merely consider it one of several factors that the fact finder may take into account when deciding whether a product’s design is defective or not. Part II is concerned with technological development. This part examines two basic patterns of technological development and provides a number of historical examples for each. The first is a linear pattern, exemplified by violins and clipper ships. The second pattern includes development involving the interaction of two different technologies, as exemplified by the progress of shipbuilding and naval gunnery technology during the sixteenth century, as well as more complex interactions among a number of seemingly unrelated technologies. Examples of this include printing with movable type, railroads, and motor vehicles. Part III discusses the concept of commercial feasibility. It identifies some of the conditions that often lead to prompt commercialization of new technology. These include sudden changes in the physical environment, depletion of natural resources, military competition among nations, popular dissatisfaction with the state of existing technology, as well as changing demographic and social conditions. At the same time, the Article points out that a particular technological innovation may not succeed commercially because of high cost, lack of demand, resistance by competitors or workers in other industries, social or cultural resistance, and lack of a supportive infrastructure. Finally, the conclusion offers suggestions on how the state-of-the-art doctrine in design defect cases could be made more rational and coherent. First, state-of- the-art is not a useful concept when applied to the defendant’s existing design. Instead, it should only be applied to evaluate a safer, alternative design proposed by the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must be required to prove that his or her proposed alternative design was technologically and commercially feasible at the time the product was sold. Third, the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design can be hypothetical and does not have to be actually adopted by others in the industry. Fourth, the defendant should be allowed to dispute the plaintiff’s claim by offering evidence that the proposed alternative design was not technologically 11. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 10.4 (2d ed. 2008). 12. Id. § 10.4, at 711-12. 672 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 or commercially feasible at the time the product was sold. Fifth, the defendant should be able to argue that the technology involved was interdependent and, therefore, it could not control the pace of its development. Sixth, technological and commercial feasibility should not be treated merely as factors for the jury to take into account; rather, they should be regarded as essential to the plaintiff’s case. Consequently, a plaintiff who fails to prove that a proposed alternative design is technologically and commercially feasible should lose. Finally, even if the plaintiff proves that his or her proposed design is technologically and commercially feasible, the defendant should still be able to offer reasons, such as convenience, price, or consumer choice, to explain why its existing design should not make its product defective. I. STATE-OF-THE-ART A. Doctrinal Foundations Courts have traditionally distinguished between three types of product defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and inadequate warnings or instructions. These categories are also recognized by legal commentators and13 14 are embodied in the Products Liability Restatement as well. A manufacturing15 defect exists when a product fails to conform to its intended design. A design16 defect, on the other hand, occurs when a product-related risk exists which could be reduced or eliminated by an “alternative design” and the failure to do so makes “the product not reasonably safe.” A failure-to-warn claim is based on17 an assertion that the manufacturer has failed to provide “reasonable instructions or warnings” which cause the product to be “not reasonably safe.” While there18 is general agreement that the state-of-the-art concept is not relevant to cases involving manufacturing defects, it is potentially applicable to both design19 13. See, e.g., Lantis v. Astec Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 1118, 1120 (7th Cir. 1981); Piper v. Bear Med. Sys., Inc., 883 P.2d 407, 410-11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Hurley v. Heart Physicians, P.C., 898 A.2d 777, 783 (Conn. 2006); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. 2006). 14. See OWEN, supra note 11, § 6.2; Jerry J. Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317, 342 (1978); William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 782 (1983). 15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 16. Id. § 2(a). 17. Id. § 2(b). 18. Id. § 2(c). 19. See Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1982); Singleton v. Int’l Harvester Co., 685 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1981); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44-45 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), overruled by Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 589 P.2d 896, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). But see Indianapolis Athletic Club, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 709 N.E.2d 1070, 1074-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that statutory state-of-the-art defense applied to manufacturing 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 673 defect and failure-to-warn cases.20 1. Failure-to-Warn.—In many cases, particularly those involving toxic substances or prescription drugs, manufacturers have attempted to defend against failure-to-warn claims by contending that the risk in question was undiscoverable given the state of scientific knowledge at the time the product was manufactured. Some courts have rejected these attempts to invoke state-of-the-21 art as a defense in failure-to-warn cases, while others have been more receptive. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. is illustrative of the former position,22 while Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories represents the latter approach.23 In Beshada, the plaintiffs were injured as the result of exposure to asbestos insulation products in the workplace between 1930 and 1980. They claimed24 that the defendants failed to provide warnings on their products about the health hazards of asbestos exposure. The defendants responded that the medical25 profession did not become aware of the potential danger of exposure to low concentrations of asbestos until the 1960s. However, the New Jersey Supreme26 Court characterized state-of-the-art as a “negligence defense” and refused to allow the defendants to raise it. Instead, the Beshada court declared that under27 strict liability in tort, liability was based on the condition of the product rather than what the defendant knew or could have known about the product’s inherent risks. The court supported its decision to reject the state-of-the-art defense by28 maintaining that it would advance various goals of products liability such as risk spreading, accident cost avoidance and facilitating the fact finding process in litigation. In addition, the Beshada court emphasized that imposing liability on29 producers of dangerous products would encourage them to discover risks and improve product safety more rapidly. 30 Although a few courts agreed with the Beshada court’s hindsight approach and concluded that manufacturers had a duty to warn about scientifically unknowable risks, the reaction of legal commentators to the New Jersey court’s31 defects). 20. Reed, 697 F.2d at 1196; Brady, 589 P.2d at 899. 21. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984); Beshada v. Johns- Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 545-46 (N.J. 1982). 22. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 546-47. 23. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 386. 24. Beshada, 447 A.2d at 542-43. 25. Id. at 542. 26. Id. 27. Id. at 546. 28. Id. 29. Id. at 547-49. 30. Id. at 548. 31. See Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp., 783 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw.), certifying questions to sub nom. In re Asbestos Cases, 829 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1987); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 462 N.E.2d 273, 277-78 (Mass. 1984), abrogated by Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998); Elmore 674 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 decision was largely critical. Many of them argued that the hindsight approach32 imposed an impossible burden on manufacturers, that it would cause financial hardship on producers, lead to unnecessary bankruptcies, and encourage undesirable corporate behavior.33 An opposing view is reflected by Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,34 ironically decided by the same New Jersey court that had decided Beshada two years earlier. In Feldman, a young girl’s teeth became discolored as the result of taking Declomycin, a prescription tetracycline antibiotic manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff sued the drug manufacturer, claiming that it should35 have warned about the risk of discoloration when the drug was first marketed in 1959. The defendant, on the other hand, insisted that the risk of tooth36 discoloration in humans did not become known until several years after the plaintiff was exposed to the drug. After finding that strict liability applied to37 manufacturers of prescription drugs, the court declared that the reasonableness38 of the defendant’s conduct was a factor to consider in determining liability. 39 Moreover, the Feldman court concluded, the scientific knowledge available to the defendant was relevant to measuring the reasonableness of its conduct. 40 Although it refused to expressly overrule Beshada, the court restricted that case “to the circumstances giving rise to its holding,” whatever those might have been. However, in a minor concession to Beshada, the New Jersey Supreme41 Court declared that the defendant had the burden of proving that information about the particular product risk was not available and, therefore, it had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the need for a warning.42 The Feldman court’s foresight approach has been adopted by a majority of courts and is also reflected in the Products Liability Restatement. Although43 44 v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984). 32. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 273-80 (1990); Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 901-05 (1983); John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 754-56 (1983). 33. See OWEN, supra note 11, § 6.2; Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 736 (1985). 34. 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). 35. Id. at 376-77. 36. Id. at 377-78. 37. Id. at 377. 38. Id. at 380-84. 39. Id. at 385. 40. Id. at 386. 41. Id. at 388. 42. Id. at 388-89. 43. See, e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (4th Cir. 1986); Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777, 783-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); Gourdine v. Crews, 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 675 this approach has much to recommend it from a fairness perspective, it is sometimes difficult to apply in practice because knowledge of a particular fact may be hard to pinpoint. For example, in Feldman, knowledge of the risk of tooth discoloration from ingestion of tetracycline evolved over a period of at least seven years. The first study on the subject, published in 1956, revealed “that45 tetracycline accumulated in mineralized portions of growing bones and teeth of mice.” Another study, published in 1957, reported that laboratory animals46 developed yellow fluorescents (not staining) in teeth and bones after receiving dosages of tetracycline. Studies in 1959 and 1960 also revealed fluorescents,47 but not staining, in patients with cystic fibrosis following massive doses of tetracycline. The link between tetracycline and permanent tooth discoloration48 in humans was not clearly established until 1963, when the manufacturer began to receive complaints from doctors that Declomycin (a tetracycline antibiotic) was causing tooth discoloration in patients. The court let the jury determine at49 what point the manufacturer of Declomycin should have discovered the connection between tetracyclines and tooth discoloration.50 It appears that the Feldman court’s foresight test has carried the day. Since manufacturers do not have to warn about scientifically discoverable risks, state- of-the-art evidence will be critical to the issue of whether a particular risk was scientifically discoverable at the time the product was sold. 2. Design Defects.—The concept of state-of-the-art also applies to product design. In the early years of products liability, however, many courts refused to allow manufacturers to introduce evidence that a safer design was not within the state-of-the-art. The reason for excluding state-of-the-art evidence was that it51 was only relevant to the reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct—not to the product’s condition. Thus, according to these courts, state-of-the-art evidence might be admissible in a negligence action but was irrelevant in a strict liability action where the focus was solely on the condition of the product. 52 955 A.2d 769, 781 n.10 (Md. 2008); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 641 (Md. 1992); Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 922-24 (Mass. 1998); Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 63-65 (Wash. 1996). But see Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 746-47 (Wis. 2001). 44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998). 45. See Feldman, 479 A.2d at 378-79 (noting evolution of discovery from 1956-1963). 46. Id. at 378. 47. Id. 48. Id. 49. Id. at 379. 50. Id. at 392-93. 51. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881-82 (Ariz. 1985); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 686-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 499 A.2d 326, 330-31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 52. See, e.g., Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 381 N.E.2d 715, 723-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 396 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. 1979); Matthews v. Stewart Warner Corp., 314 N.E.2d 676 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 Nowadays, many courts require plaintiffs to establish that the defendant’s design is defective by showing that an alternative design was potentially available to the defendant that would have prevented the plaintiff’s injuries or at least have reduced the severity of those injuries. When this occurs, it becomes important to know exactly what state-of-the-art means and what kind of evidence is necessary to determine whether an alternative design is, or is not, within the state-of-the-art. B. The Various Meanings of “State-of-the-Art” in Products Liability Law A number of courts and commentators have pointed out that state-of-the-53 54 art has various meanings and this had led to much confusion in the law. At various times, courts have defined state-of-the-art to include the following: (1) custom or common practices within an industry; (2) standards promulgated by55 independent standards development organizations like the American National Standards Institute (ANSI); (3) standards embodied in statutes and56 governmental regulations; and (4) technical, mechanical or scientific knowledge57 reasonably feasible when a product is manufactured. In addition, a number of58 states have enacted statutes that purport to define the meaning of state-of-the- 683, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Gelsumino, 295 N.E.2d at 113; Cryts, 571 S.W.2d at 689; Carrecter, 499 A.2d at 329. 53. See, e.g., Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1345 (Conn. 1997); Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1994) (Ternus, J., concurring). 54. See OWEN, supra note 11, § 10.4, at 706-07; Patrick R. Buckler, State of the Art Evidence in Products Liability Suits in Maryland, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 117, 120 (1998); Gary C. Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982); Frank J. Vandall, State-of-the-Art, Custom, and Reasonable Alternative Design, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1994). 55. See Smith v. Minster Mach. Co., 669 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1982); Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Alaska 1991); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), overruled by Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 151 (N.J. 1979), superseded by statutes as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990). 56. See, e.g., AC&S, Inc. v. Asner, 686 A.2d 250, 254-55 (Md. Ct. App. 1996). 57. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1976). 58. See, e.g., Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365, 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), opinion vacated in part by 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987); Indianapolis Athletic Club, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 709 N.E.2d 1070, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Falada v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 642 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 2002); AC&S, Inc., 686 A.2d at 254; Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Soc. Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Johnson v. Salem Corp., 477 A.2d 1246, 1251-52 (N.J. 1984); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. N. Propane Gas Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1016 n.2 (App. Div. 1980); Boatland of Hous., Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984). 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 677 art.59 1. Custom or Practice Within an Industry.—“Custom of the industry” is defined as the “usual practice of the manufacturer” or others within a particular60 industry. While a few courts have declared industry custom to be equivalent61 to state-of-the-art, most have recognized that the two concepts are different. 62 63 According to these latter courts, custom of the industry evidence describes what manufacturers within an industry have actually achieved, while state-of-the-art evidence is concerned with what is feasible for manufacturers to achieve, whether they have done so or not. At the same time, some of these courts have64 acknowledged that industry custom may be offered as evidence of what the state- of-the-art is.65 In a negligence case, a product is considered to be negligently designed when a manufacturer fails to exercise reasonable care when designing the product, thereby failing to make it safe for its intended uses. Evidence of a custom or66 practice within an industry is usually admissible in a negligence action. This67 is because one who acts like others in a trade or industry is arguably exercising reasonable care in that respect. On the other hand, compliance with the custom68 59. For an excellent discussion of these statutes, see DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 10:7, at 661-68 (3d ed. 2000). 60. Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983). 61. See Gosewisch, 737 P.2d at 370; Falada, 642 N.W.2d at 250; Hughes v. Massey- Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294, 295 (Iowa 1994); Chown v. USM Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa 1980); Lenhardt, 683 P.2d at 1099. 62. See Smith v. Minster Mach. Co., 669 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1982); Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Alaska 1991); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), overruled by Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140, 151 (N.J. 1979); see also Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595, 600 (7th Cir. 1973) (characterizing expert’s testimony relating to practice of the trade as “state-of-the-art” evidence). 63. See Carter, 716 F.2d at 347-48; Gosewisch, 737 P.2d at 370; Falada, 642 N.W.2d at 250; Hughes, 522 N.W.2d at 295-96; Chown, 297 N.W.2d at 221-22; Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 640-41 (Md. 1992); Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (Neb. 1979); Boatland of Hous., Inc., 609 S.W.2d at 748; Lenhardt, 683 P.2d at 1099; Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839, 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, Reporters’ Note, at 81-84 (1998). 64. Carter, 716 F.2d at 347 & n.6. 65. See Hughes, 522 N.W.2d at 296; Hancock, 283 N.W.2d at 35. 66. See Mather v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp., 533 P.2d 717, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). 67. See Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979); Collins v. Ridge Tool Co., 520 F.2d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 1975); Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Iowa 1994); Spieker v. Westgo, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 837, 843-44 (N.D. 1992). 68. See Rexrode v. Am. Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 1982); Garst v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 P.2d 47, 61 (Kan. 1971). 678 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 of the industry is not conclusive evidence of reasonable care. As Judge Learned69 Hand observed many years ago, industry custom is not necessarily determinative of due care because “a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.”70 This principle is illustrated by Hillrichs v. Avco Corp. The plaintiff in that71 case was injured when his hand was caught in the rollers of the husking bed of a twenty-year-old cornpicking machine manufactured by the defendant. The72 plaintiff sued under negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability, alleging that the cornpicker’s design was defective because the machine was not equipped with an emergency stop device. The first trial resulted in a jury verdict for the73 manufacturer. The plaintiff appealed and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed in74 part, but remanded the case back for a new trial on the plaintiff’s negligence claim based on the enhanced injuries he suffered as a result of not being able to turn the machine off quickly enough. At the second trial, the defendant75 contended that its design was consistent with the custom and practice of the farm implement industry because no cornpicker on the market was equipped with an emergency stop device. However, the plaintiff responded by pointing out that76 at the time the cornpicker was manufactured, an emergency stop device could have been installed for less than fifty dollars and that other machines that used rollers, such as printing presses, were already equipped with such devices. 77 Declaring that compliance with industry custom was not the same as compliance with state-of-the-art, the court affirmed the lower court’s judgment for the plaintiff on his enhanced injury claim.78 There is less agreement on the role of industry custom when the plaintiff’s case is based on strict products liability instead of negligence. A number of courts allow defendants to introduce evidence of industry custom in strict liability cases. As with negligence cases, such evidence is not conclusive on79 69. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), overruled by Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Gregg, 554 N.E.2d 1145, 1155-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266, 276 (Ind. App. 1972); Garst, 484 P.2d at 61; Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 70. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). 71. Hillrichs, 514 N.W.2d 94. 72. Id. at 96. 73. Id. 74. Id. 75. Id. 76. Id. at 98. 77. Id. at 97. 78. Id. at 100-01. 79. See Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir. 1984); Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 1983); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), overruled by 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 679 the issue of defectiveness, but is only a factor for the jury to consider. 80 In Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, for example, several plaintiffs who were injured in a rear-end collision brought suit against Audi, the manufacturer of their automobile. The crash caused the car’s doors to be81 wedged shut and also caused the fuel tank to burst into flames. The plaintiffs82 alleged that the automobile was defectively designed because the fuel tank was placed where it could be easily punctured by the trunk contents when struck from behind. The jury found in favor of the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed.83 84 In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the trial court erroneously allowed the defendant to introduce evidence of customary fuel tank design to prove that their design complied with the “state-of-the-art.” The defendant, on85 the other hand, contended that evidence of the custom and practice within the industry was relevant in a strict liability case to determine the expectations of the ordinary consumer. The appeals court agreed, pointing out that since the86 plaintiffs had introduced evidence of fuel tank designs in other motor vehicles to show that such alternative designs were feasible, the defendant should be allowed to rely on industry custom to establish the expectations of the ordinary consumer.87 In contrast, other courts maintain that evidence of industry custom and practices is irrelevant in a strict products liability case and distracts the jury’s attention from the condition of the product to the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. For example, in Holloway v. J.B. Systems, Ltd., a federal88 appeals court, applying Pennsylvania law, concluded that evidence of industry custom was not admissible. In that case, the plaintiff was struck in the head by89 a bolt which broke loose from a tanker truck as it was being pressurized to Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985); Murphy v. Chestnut Mountain Lodge, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 818, 823-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Iowa 1994); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 850-51 (N.H. 1978). 80. See Smith v. Minster Mach. Co., 669 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1982); Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Alaska 1991); Sturm, Ruger & Co., 594 P.2d at 45; Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (Neb. 1979). 81. Robinson, 739 F.2d at 1482-83. 82. Id. 83. Id. at 1483. 84. Id. 85. Id. at 1485. 86. Id. 87. Id. at 1485-86. 88. See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1994); Holloway v. J.B. Sys., Ltd., 609 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1979); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Uxa v. Marconi, 128 S.W.3d 121, 131-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., Duff-Norton Co., Inc., 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Wash. 1984). 89. Holloway, 609 F.2d at 1073. 680 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 discharge its fuel. In a strict liability case against the manufacturer of the tank,90 the plaintiff argued that the manufacturer should have provided a warning that the tank should not be subjected to internal pressurization. At trial, the plaintiff91 objected to testimony that the defendant, in not providing a warning with the tank, had merely conformed to the custom of the industry when the tank was manufactured six years before the accident.92 On appeal, the court held that it was improper to admit testimony regarding trade custom to the effect that virtually no other tank manufacturer in 1969 provided a warning about pressurization. Although the court ultimately93 concluded that the lower court had not committed reversible error, it affirmed that “negligence concepts such as ‘trade custom’ or ‘reasonable care’ have no place in suits brought under [Restatement §] 402A as that section has been interpreted by the Pennsylvania courts.” 94 2. Industry Standards.—Courts sometimes include industry standards within the meaning of state-of-the-art, while others distinguish the two concepts, typically concluding that industry standards are not as demanding as state-of-the- art requirements. A Maryland court in AC&S, Inc. v. Asner defined “industry95 standards” as follows: “Industry standards are the practices common to a given industry. They are often set forth in some type of code, such as a building code or electrical code, or they may be adopted by the trade organization of a given industry.” Industry standards fall into two basic categories: those that are96 formulated by the industry itself, often through trade associations; and those that are promulgated by independent standard development organizations like the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Underwriters Laboratories (UL) or the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). Although standards created by97 industry trade associations are sometimes weak or self-serving, standards98 formulated by independent standard development organizations tend to be more 90. Id. at 1070-71. 91. Id. at 1071. 92. Id. at 1072. 93. Id. at 1073. 94. Id. 95. See Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 622 (Iowa 2000); AC&S, Inc. v. Asner, 686 A.2d 250, 254-55 (Md. 1996); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839, 840 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 96. AC&S, Inc., 686 A.2d at 254-55 (quoting Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986)). 97. See, e.g., Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 525, 533 (D.N.J. 2001). Other standard setting organizations include the American Standards Association (ASA); the National Safety Council (NSC); the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE); and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). See OWEN, supra note 11, § 2.3, at 83. 98. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding blasting cap manufacturers and their trade association liable for developing inadequate safety standards with respect to warnings on blasting caps). 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 681 rigorous. These organizations require that their standards be technologically up to date, that they be developed in a transparent manner and that they reflect the consensus view of all interested parties.99 As is the case with industry custom and practice, evidence of compliance with industry standards is usually admissible in negligence actions as proof that a manufacturer exercised reasonable care in the design of the product. 100 However, there is a split of authority over whether such evidence should be admissible in a strict liability case. A large number of courts allow evidence of industry standards, particularly those that have been promulgated by independent standard development organizations, to be admitted in order to establish that a product is not defective. 101 Some courts exclude evidence of industry standards in strict liability cases because they believe that such evidence unduly focuses attention on the conduct of the manufacturer instead of the condition of the product. The Pennsylvania102 Supreme Court’s decision in Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Division, Duff-Norton Co.103 exemplifies this approach. The plaintiff in that case was injured while operating an overhead electric chain-hoist to lift into position a carriage assembly component of a machine being manufactured by his employer. The hoist could104 be stopped and started by means of a “control pendant,” which included a control box leading to a hoist motor overhead. While attempting to fix a stuck chain,105 the plaintiff “stumbled and fell, causing his thumb to strike the ‘down’ button on the control box.” This, in turn, caused the carriage assembly to swing forward106 and hit the plaintiff in the legs. The plaintiff brought a strict liability action107 against the manufacturer of the hoist, claiming that the control box was 99. See Robert H. Heidt, Damned for Their Judgment: The Tort Liability of Standards Development Organizations, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1227, 1263-64 (2010). 100. See AC&S, Inc., 686 A.2d at 255; Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978). 101. See Sappington v. Skyjack, Inc., 512 F.3d 440, 454 (8th Cir. 2008); Murphy v. L & J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407, 411 (8th Cir. 1977); Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Clement v. Rousselle Corp., 372 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 447 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); AC&S, Inc., 686 A.2d at 256; Back, 378 N.E.2d at 970; Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., 609 A.2d 487, 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); Vermett v. Fred Christen & Sons Co., 741 N.E.2d 954, 971 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Hansen v. Abrasive Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 831 P.2d 693, 697 n.5 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 856 P.2d 625 (Or. 1993). 102. See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 36 F.3d 278, 286-87 (3d Cir. 1994); Rexrode v. Am. Laundry Press Co., 674 F.2d 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 1982); Matthews v. Stewart Warner Corp., 314 N.E.2d 683, 691-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). 103. 528 A.2d 590 (Pa. 1987). 104. Id. at 590-91. 105. Id. at 591. 106. Id. 107. Id. 682 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 defectively designed because it did not have a guard or other protective feature to prevent the hoist from being accidently activated.108 The trial court granted the plaintiff’s in limine motion to exclude an ASME publication which set forth standards for electric hoists and other industrial lifting equipment. The court also ruled that the defendant could not present109 evidence that at least ninety percent of the control boxes made in the United States did not have guards over their activating buttons. The jury rendered a110 verdict in the plaintiff’s favor and the defendant appealed, claiming that it was error for the lower court to exclude evidence of industry standards.111 The Pennsylvania court declared that in order to determine the admissibility of evidence, it must first consider the relevance of the evidence to the issue in question. Finding that industry standards were only relevant to the112 reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, and not to the condition of the product, the court stated that the introduction of this sort of evidence would have improperly brought concepts of negligence law into the case. Furthermore, the113 court concluded that “such evidence would have created a strong likelihood of diverting the jury’s attention from the appellant’s control box to the reasonableness of the appellant’s conduct in choosing its design.” 114 Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court’s judgment for the plaintiff.115 3. Government Regulatory Standards.—Government standards may also serve as a measure of state-of-the-art. Government standards have traditionally been admissible in negligence cases as evidence of reasonable care although the approach is asymmetrical. In the majority of states, failure to comply with116 applicable regulatory standards constitutes negligence per se, that is, the defendant’s conduct is deemed to be negligent as a matter of law. On the other117 hand, compliance with applicable regulatory standards is considered to be merely evidence of reasonable care and not conclusive. The reason for this anomaly118 is that many courts believe that government regulations often do not establish optimal standards of care. For example, standards may be obsolete or119 108. Id. 109. Id. 110. Id. 111. Id. at 592. 112. Id. 113. Id. at 594. 114. Id. 115. Id. 116. See Richard C. Ausness et al., Providing a Safe Harbor for Those Who Play by the Rules: The Case for a Strong Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 115, 117. 117. See Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 691 P.2d 630, 634 (Cal. 1984). 118. See Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025, 1028 (1st Cir. 1973); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1142 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Blasing v. P.R.L. Hardenbergh Co., 226 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. 1975); Feiner v. Calvin Klein, Ltd., 549 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693 (App. Div. 1990); Sherman v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143-44 (App. Div. 1967). 119. See Mark DeSimone, Comment, The State of the Art Defense in Products Liability: 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 683 substantively inadequate and, therefore, not reflective of an appropriate120 standard of due care. Although there are exceptions, most courts acknowledge that government121 standards involving products are relevant to the issue of defectiveness. 122 However, because they regard regulatory standards as no more than minimums, violations are treated differently than compliance. In some cases, a product that fails to comply with government standards is regarded as defective per se. On123 the other hand, while manufacturers may introduce evidence that their products complied with government standards, this evidence is seldom conclusive. 124 Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp. provides a good illustration of these125 principles. The case arose out of a tragic airplane crash in 1970, in which many members of the Wichita State University football team and some of its supporters were killed. The chartered plane crashed into a mountain in Colorado while126 traveling to a football game in Logan, Utah. During the crash, seats in the127 aircraft broke loose from their floor attachments and blocked the exit. When128 the aircraft caught fire, many of the passengers were unable to escape because of the blocked exit. As a result, thirty-two of the forty passengers and crew were129 killed.130 Injured passengers and personal representatives of some of those killed in the accident brought suit against Martin-Marietta, the manufacturer of the airplane. 131 Their negligence and strict liability claims alleged that the airplane was not crashworthy because the seat attachments were inadequate and the airplane “Unreasonably Dangerous” to the Injured Consumer, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 915, 923 (1980). 120. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1147, 1151 (1988). 121. See Sheehan v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., 555 A.2d 1352, 1354-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (providing the admission of OSHA regulations). 122. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976); Clement v. Rousselle Corp., 372 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 443 N.E.2d 575, 577-78 (Ill. 1982); Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1084-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Iowa 1994); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Or. 1978). 123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 4(a) (1998); OWEN, supra note 11, § 6.4, at 396-98; see also Stanton v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 569-71 (3d Cir. 1983); Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, 965 (E.D. Wis.), opinion amended by 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981). 124. See Bruce, 544 F.2d at 446; Moehle, 443 N.E.2d at 578; Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54, 63 (N.M. 1995). 125. Bruce, 544 F.2d 442. 126. Id. at 444. 127. Id. 128. Id. 129. Id. 130. Id. 131. Id. 684 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 lacked proper fire protection features. To support their design defect claim132 with respect to the passenger seats, the plaintiffs offered evidence that at the time of the crash there were seats in use that would have withstood the crash. In133 response, the defendant alleged that when the aircraft was manufactured in 1952, it met or exceeded “all applicable design requirements, safety requirements and other criteria prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration and was manufactured and certificated in accordance with specified CAA regulations.”134 The plaintiff argued that state-of-the-art evidence was not relevant in a strict liability case. Accordingly, evidence that the aircraft complied with CAA135 requirements in 1952 had no bearing on whether it was defective in 1970. In136 the plaintiffs’ view, “a showing of a design defective in 1970 establishes that the plane was defective in 1952, the time of the original sale, absent a subsequent alteration of the plane.” However, the court rejected this argument, declaring137 that compliance with CAA regulations in 1952 was evidence that the aircraft design complied with the state-of-the-art at that time. Furthermore, the court138 concluded that an ordinary consumer would not expect an airplane manufactured in 1952 to necessarily have the safety features of one that was made in 1970. 139 Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s summary judgment for the defendant.140 4. Technological Feasibility.—Many courts agree that technological feasibility is the principal focus of the state-of-the-art concept as it applies to product design. Some state statutes also define state-of-the-art in terms of141 available technology at the time of manufacture. Technological feasibility142 132. Id. 133. Id. at 446. 134. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 135. Id. at 447. 136. Id. 137. Id. 138. Id. at 446-47. 139. Id. at 447. 140. Id. at 449. 141. See, e.g., Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365, 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), opinion vacated in part by 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987); Indianapolis Athletic Club, Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., 709 N.E.2d 1070, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Falada v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 642 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa 2002); AC&S, Inc. v. Asner, 686 A.2d 250, 254 (Md. 1996); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Soc. Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Johnson v. Salem Corp., 477 A.2d 1246, 1251-52 (N.J. 1984); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. N. Propane Gas Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1016 n.2 (App. Div. 1980); Boatland of Hous., Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Wash. 1984). 142. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(10) (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (2011). 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 685 would seem to involve more than a mere knowledge or understanding of basic scientific principles, although such knowledge or understanding is an essential first step. For example, as Heron of Alexandria’s “Sphere of Aeolus” illustrates, the ancient Greeks understood that steam could be used as a power source to operate machinery. However, they were unable to put this knowledge to143 practical use because they did not have the technology to construct even the simplest steam engine. Almost two thousand years elapsed before steam144 engines made an appearance.145 Technological feasibility also requires more than an ability to conceptualize in general terms how a particular device may be designed or constructed. For example, Leonardo da Vinci produced a number of clever drawings of helicopters and flying machines in the late fifteenth century. However, without146 an internal combustion engine or some other lightweight power source, none of Leonardo’s flying machines would have gotten off the ground had he tried to construct one. In other words, manned flight in heavier-than-air machines was147 not technologically feasible in Leonardo’s time and would not become so for another four hundred years. Even the construction of working models may not be enough to constitute technological feasibility because scaling up can present serious challenges. Anyone who has watched the popular television series Mythbusters has no148 doubt observed that full-scale devices do not always behave like smaller-scale prototypes. For this reason, at least one court has refused to recognize a small- scale model of a proposed safety device as evidence that a full-scale version is technologically feasible. In Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co. the plaintiff149 lost control of a tractor trailer rig loaded with logs, causing it to jack-knife and overturn. The plaintiff claimed that the vehicle was negligently designed150 because the manufacturer failed to equip it with a device that would have 143. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 313 (noting that Heron used a jet of steam to rotate a wheel). 144. See generally id. at 312-20 (describing the beginnings of the steam engine). 145. See id. at 321. 146. See id. at 396. 147. See id. (“Leonardo da Vinci’s inquiries and speculations about the problems of flight represent only a renaissance intensification of an interest . . . .”). 148. See generally Mythbusters, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (query “Mythbusters”) (providing a variety of background information on the series). For example, in a recent episode, the Mythbusters, Jamie Hyneman and Adam Savage, scaled up a model of a Newton’s Cradle device in which five metal balls are suspended in a row from a frame. See Mythbusters: Newton’s Crane Cradle (Discovery Channel television broadcast Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://dsc. discovery.com/videos/mythbusters-newtons-crane-cradle/. The scale model transferred energy from the first ball to the last with ninety-eight percent efficiency. Id. However, this efficiency dropped to less than forty percent when the Mythbusters built a twenty foot version of the device with five one-ton balls. Id. 149. 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo. 1974). 150. Id. at 833. 686 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 jettisoned the trailer during an emergency. At trial, the plaintiff’s expert151 witnesses acknowledged that no manufacturer within the trucking industry had ever employed such a breakaway device. Therefore, in order to bolster his1 5 2 testimony, one of the plaintiff’s experts submitted a drawing of a proposed breakaway device, along with a small-scale model to show how the device would work. However, the trial court rejected this proffer of evidence and granted1 5 3 summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer on the negligent design count. 154 This was affirmed on appeal, where the court declared that “[t]here was no safer design available at the time this unit was manufactured and there is absolutely no evidence of feasibility or any testing [of an alternative design].”155 Of course, a device may be technologically feasible for one use, but not for another. For example, the steam engines of the early eighteenth century were adequate to pump water out of coal mines, but they were too large, heavy and inefficient to be used for transportation purposes. It was not until almost a hundred years later, and after many improvements in steam engine technology that steamships appeared, and another twenty years passed before steam engines that were suitable to transport of passengers and freight on land were developed.156 Most courts allow both plaintiffs and defendants to raise the issue of technological feasibility in design defect cases, particularly when the risk-utility test is used. The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the relationship157 between technological feasibility and risk-utility analysis in O’Brien v. Muskin Corp. Mr. O’Brien was injured when he dove into an above-ground swimming158 pool manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the bottom of159 the pool was lined with slippery vinyl material which caused his outstretched hands to slide apart instead of breaking the force of the dive. As a result, he160 151. Id. 152. Id. at 834. 153. Id. 154. Id. at 835-36. 155. Id. at 836. 156. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 331-37. 157. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979), superseded by statute as stated in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000); Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 737 P.2d 365, 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), opinion vacated in part by 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987); Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294, 296-98 (Iowa 1994); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Soc. Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Mass. Ct. App. 1979); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. N. Propane Gas Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1016 (App. Div. 1980); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 969, 974 (App. Div. 1979); Boatland of Hous., Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex. 1980); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 158. 463 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990). 159. Id. at 301. 160. Id. at 302. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 687 struck his head of the bottom of the pool and suffered severe injuries. The161 plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, contending that vinyl should not have been used to line the pool bottom. The trial court removed the design162 defect issue from the jury’s consideration and the jury rendered a verdict for the defendant. An intermediate appellate court reversed and the defendant163 appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court.164 The O’Brien court affirmed that risk-utility analysis was appropriate “when the product may function satisfactorily under one set of circumstances, yet because of its design present undue risk of injury to the user in another situation.” After enumerating some of the factors that were relevant to a risk-165 utility analysis, the court acknowledged that “[b]y implication, risk-utility analysis includes other factors such as the ‘state-of-the-art’ at the time of the manufacture of the product.” The court then defined state-of-the-art as “the166 existing level of technological expertise and scientific knowledge relevant to a particular industry at the time a product is designed.”167 The court observed that state-of-the-art was relevant to both sides of the risk- utility equation. According to the court, the risk side of the equation focuses168 on product-related risks that the manufacturer knew or should have known about, as well as the adequacy of any warnings that may have been provided. On the169 other hand, the utility side is concerned with the necessity of the product and the feasibility of alternative designs. At the same time, the court declared that a170 product could comply with the state-of-the-art but still be considered defective if its overall risks outweighed its utility.171 Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, the court held that even though there was no evidence that it was technologically feasible to use some other material to line the bottom of the pool, it was still possible for a jury to conclude that the swimming pool was defective if it determined that the risk of injury outweighed its utility. Consequently, the O’Brien court affirmed the172 intermediate appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case back for a new trial on the design defect claim.173 One of the more controversial aspects of the O’Brien decision was that it 161. Id. 162. Id. at 302-03. 163. Id. at 301-02. 164. Id. 165. Id. at 304. 166. Id. at 304-05 (citing Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’g Co., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978), overruled by Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1978)). 167. Id. at 305 (citing Robb, supra note 54, at 1, 4-5 & n.15). 168. Id. 169. Id. 170. Id. 171. Id. 172. Id. at 305-06. 173. Id. at 308. 688 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 authorized the jury to hold the manufacturer liable if it concluded that the risks of the pool as designed outweighed its overall utility, even if there was no safer material available to line the bottom of the pool. This approach has largely174 been rejected. Instead, the majority of courts expect the plaintiff to propose175 a safer alternative design with risks and utility which can then be compared with those of the original design. In such cases, defendants may claim that a176 proposed alternative design is not technologically feasible. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck provides a good illustration of this. The decedent in Beck was177 killed in 1973 when his Caterpillar 944 front-end loader rolled over an embankment and crushed him. The decedent’s widow contended that her178 husband would not have been killed if the loader had been equipped with a roll- over protective shield (ROPS). The parties disagreed about whether it would179 have been feasible for Caterpillar to have installed a ROPS when the front loader was manufactured in 1964. The plaintiff’s expert testified that auxiliary180 manufacturers began selling ROPS as early as 1961, thereby implying that these protective devices were technologically feasible at the time the front-end loader was manufactured. 181 The defendant, however, argued that these after-market ROPS did not have sufficient structural integrity to protect operators against rollovers. According182 to the defendant, it began testing ROPS for its own vehicles in 1966 and first installed them on front loaders in 1969. On appeal from a judgment for the183 plaintiff, the Alaska Supreme Court declared that the jury should consider a number of factors in its risk-utility analysis, including “the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an alternative design.”184 The feasibility of the plaintiff’s alternative design was also an issue in 174. See id. at 305-06; see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1316 (1991) [hereinafter Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier]. 175. See, e.g., Jones v. Amazing Prods., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1248-51 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Parish v. Jumpking, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 543-45 (Iowa 2006). Indeed, the O’Brien case itself was promptly superseded by statute. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-3(3) (2012); Henderson & Twerski, Closing the Frontier, supra note 174, at 1315 & n.195. 176. See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1079-93 (2009). 177. 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), superseded by statute as stated in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000). 178. Id. at 874-75. 179. Id. at 875. 180. Id. 181. Id. 182. Id. at 876. 183. Id. 184. Id. at 886 (quoting Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978)). 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 689 Murphy v. Chestnut Mountain Lodge, Inc. The plaintiff, who was injured in185 a skiing accident, argued that the skis provided by the lodge were defective because they did not have an anti-friction device allowing the bindings to release when the skier’s legs were twisted during a fall. The plaintiff’s expert testified186 that anti-friction devices were feasible at the time of the accident. However,187 the defendant’s expert claimed that he had tested several of the anti-friction devices in development at the time and found that they were either not feasible or not effective. Upholding a lower court judgment for the defendant, the188 Illinois Appellate Court held that testimony regarding the feasibility or infeasibility of the plaintiff’s proposed safer design was admissible.189 5. Commercial Feasibility.—Most definitions of state-of-the-art focus solely on the technological aspects of feasibility and ignore the commercial aspects of technological development. However, new technologies should not be judged190 solely on whether or not they work, but also whether they find acceptance in the marketplace. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey is one of the few cases to191 take commercial feasibility into account when discussing state-of-the-art. In192 Boatland, the decedent was killed while operating a sixteen-foot bass boat manufactured the defendant. The plaintiff was thrown from the boat when it193 “struck a partially submerged tree stump.” The boat circled back and hit the194 decedent, killing him. The decedent’s wife and children sued Boatland,195 claiming that the boat was defectively designed because it was not equipped with a “kill switch,” which would have automatically shut off the engine when Bailey was thrown into the water. A jury verdict for the defendant was reversed by196 an intermediate appellate court and the plaintiffs appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.197 The Texas Supreme Court declared that when the plaintiff claimed that a product was defective because it did not have a particular safety feature, the focus should be on whether the manufacturer had the ability “to provide the feature without greatly increasing the product’s cost or impairing usefulness.” 198 185. 464 N.E.2d 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). 186. Id. at 820-21. 187. Id. 188. Id. at 821. 189. Id. at 823-24. 190. See discussion supra Part I.B.4. 191. 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). 192. See Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 2003); Artis v. Corona Corp. of Japan, 703 A.2d 1214, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1997); McDaniel v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 749, 757 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 193. Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 745. 194. Id. 195. Id. 196. Id. at 746. 197. Id. at 745. 198. Id. at 746. 690 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 According to the court, the feasibility of a safer alternative could be shown by evidence that it was used by or available to, the industry at the time of manufacture. The plaintiff could also show that a safer alternative design was199 feasible by providing evidence that the industry had the economic and technological capacity to develop this alternative.200 In Boatland, the plaintiff’s experts stated that the concepts behind kill switches were not new and that homemade kill switches had been used on racing boats for more than thirty years. However, the defendant responded that kill201 switches for boats were not commercially available at the time at the time of the accident. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that while it was202 technologically possible to fabricate a kill switch at the time of the accident, it was not feasible for the defendant to have installed one on Bailey’s boat at the time of sale because they were not available for purchase to the trade at that time. Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court reversed the intermediate203 appellate court and affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the defendant.204 Although the Boatland court’s holding about commercial feasibility seems correct, it should be noted that the defendant in that case was a retail seller, not a manufacturer, and apparently assembled boats to meet the needs of individual customers. Therefore, unlike large-scale boat manufacturers, Boatland2 05 probably could not have developed a kill switch on its own, but instead had no choice but to wait for them to become available commercially. C. Procedural Effects One of the most basic procedural issues is whether a court will admit state- of-the-art evidence at all. As discussed earlier, some courts consider state-of-the- art to inject negative principles and as a result, have refused to allow the parties to use such evidence in strict liability cases, even when defined in terms of technological feasibility. Presently, however, the great majority of courts206 permit either party to submit state-of-the-art evidence to prove that a product either was, or was not, defectively designed. A number of state statutes also207 199. Id. 200. Id. 201. Id. at 747. 202. Id. 203. Id. at 749. 204. Id. at 750. 205. Id. at 752 (Campbell, J., dissenting). 206. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 881-82 (Ariz. 1985); Matthews v. Stewart Warner Corp., 314 N.E.2d 683, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Gelsumino v. E.W. Bliss Co., 295 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Carrecter v. Colson Equip. Co., 499 A.2d 326, 329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 207. See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1198 (4th Cir. 1982); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979), superseded by statute as stated in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000); Gosewisch v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 691 provide for the admission of state-of-the-art evidence.208 Nevertheless, courts differ on how state-of-the-art evidence may be used. For example, some courts only allow defendants to introduce state-of-the-art evidence to rebut testimony by the plaintiff. Thus, in Murphy v. Chestnut209 Mountain Lodge, Inc., the court ruled that once the plaintiff alleged certain anti- friction devices for skis were available and within state-of-the-art, the defendant would be allowed to rebut this claim by showing that the devices proposed by the plaintiff were ineffective. Other courts seem to put the burden on the210 defendant to prove that its product complied with state-of-the-art at the time it was manufactured. This is also true of some state statutes. 211 212 Placement of the burden of proof, as opposed to the burden of production, seems to depend on whether compliance with state-of-the-art is regarded as an affirmative defense or not. Under the traditional approach, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the product is defective. If the plaintiff makes a prima213 facie case, usually by submitting evidence of a safer alternative design, the defendant will usually respond by arguing that the proposed alternative design is “not within the state of the art.” Failure on the part of the defendant to214 effectively respond to the plaintiff’s evidence of feasibility will probably result 737 P.2d 365, 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), opinion vacated in part by 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987); Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294, 296-98 (Iowa 1994); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Soc. Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. N. Propane Gas Co., 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1016 (App. Div. 1980); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 422 N.Y.S.2d 969, 974-75 (App. Div. 1979); Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 749; Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839, 841 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979). 208. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.1257 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946 (West 2012), recognized as unconstitutional by White v. Smith Kline Beecham Corp., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Mich. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-10.1 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28- 105 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050 (West 2012). 209. See Murphy v. Chestnut Mountain Lodge, Inc., 464 N.E.2d 818, 823-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 749; Cantu, 603 P.2d at 841. 210. Murphy, 464 N.E.2d at 823-24. 211. See O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990). But see Fabian v. Minster Mach. Co., 609 A.2d 487, 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (holding that plaintiff has the burden of proving nonconformity with state-of-the-art). 212. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59(3) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.764(2) (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-g (2011). 213. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 181-82 (Mich. 1984) (declaring that “the plaintiff must, in every case, in every jurisdiction, show that the product was defective”). 214. See Boatland, 609 S.W.2d at 749; Cantu, 603 P.2d at 841. In addition, a number of states have enacted statutes that create a state-of-the art affirmative defense, thereby requiring the defendant to prove that a proposed alternative design was not within the state-of-the-art. See supra note 212. 692 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 in a verdict for the plaintiff. 215 Furthermore, most courts hold that compliance with state-of-the-art is not a complete defense, but merely a relevant factor for the jury to consider. As far216 as proof is concerned, an Arizona court in Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co. identified several forms of proof that a defendant could offer to determine217 state-of-the-art. Gosewisch involved a three-wheeled All Terrain Cycle (ATC), which flipped over and injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued the ATC was218 defectively designed because it was equipped with very low-pressured, collapsible tires, it lacked a mechanical suspension, was inherently unstable because of its high center of gravity, had weak front forks, and its front brake was prone to accidental engagement. The court declared that the manufacturer2 1 9 could show state-of-the-art by offering evidence about the thoroughness of its testing and research prior to manufacture. The manufacturer presented220 evidence that the ATC model in question was thoroughly tested in the laboratory and with test riders, including novices, who rode the vehicle over “some of the most diverse terrain in the world.” The court also pointed out that state-of-the-221 art can be established by demonstrating the infeasibility of each of the testing and design alternatives proposed by the plaintiff.222 In this case, the defendant offered evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s claims that it should have used computer simulations to test the safety of its ATC. The223 defendant responded by showing “that computer simulations could not account for the variables involved in a rider-active vehicle.” The plaintiff also224 maintained that mechanical suspension should have been included in the ATC. 225 However, the defendant’s experts tested ATCs with the type of mechanical suspensions suggested by the plaintiffs and concluded that their handling was inferior to the defendant’s vehicles. In addition, the front forks in the original226 design proved to be stronger than the replacement forks proposed by the 215. See Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 381 N.E.2d 715, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 396 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. 1979). 216. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979), superseded by statute as stated in Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 14 P.3d 990 (Alaska 2000); O’Brien, 463 A.2d at 305; Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Patterson v. Ravens-Metal Prods., Inc., 594 N.E.2d 153, 161-62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Owens- Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. District Court (Caldwell), 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1991). 217. 737 P.2d 365 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), opinion vacated in part by 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987). 218. Id. at 367. 219. Id. 220. Id. at 370. 221. Id. 222. Id. 223. Id. 224. Id. 225. Id. 226. Id. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 693 plaintiff. Finally, the defendant provided comparisons of its tires with those227 suggested by the plaintiff. All of this state-of-the-art evidence persuaded the228 jury to conclude that the ATC was not defective.229 The various applications of the state-of-the-art concept discussed above are confusing to say the least. The best approach to use would seem to be the following: The Plaintiff must show that the product is defective in design by proposing an alternative design that is technologically feasible. The defendant can then try to rebut the plaintiff’s claim by showing that the alternative design is not technologically or commercially feasible. D. Products Liability Restatement Section 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement, which defines defective design, does not specifically mention state-of-the-art. Commentary in section 2 does discuss the state-of-the-art concept, but its analysis is somewhat unclear. After acknowledging that the term state-of-the-art has a number of different meanings, the comment declares that if the defendant can show the existing design of “its product was the safest in use at the time of sale, it may be difficult for the plaintiff to prove that an alternative design could have been practically adopted.” In other words, the quality of the defendant’s design is offered as230 proof that the plaintiff’s alternative design was not feasible. However, the comment then seems to equate state-of-the-art with industry practice by declaring that “[t]he defendant is thus allowed to introduce evidence with regard to industry practice that bears on whether an alternative design was practicable.” 231 Commentary also suggests that industry practice may be relevant to the issue of whether the defendant’s failure to adopt a safer alternative design caused the product to be “not reasonably safe.” It is also suggested that evidence of232 industry practice is admissible, but not necessarily dispositive. According to233 the commentary, if the plaintiff introduces expert testimony that a reasonable alternative design was practical and could have been adopted by the defendant, then the trier of fact may seemingly conclude that the product was defective even though no one in the industry had adopted, or even considered adopting, the alternative design at the time of sale. Further commentary lists the various factors that the fact-finder may take into account in determining whether a proposed alternative design is reasonable. 234 For the most part, these factors are not weighted in any way and appear to be 227. Id. 228. Id. 229. Id. at 367. 230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d, at 20 (1998). 231. Id. 232. Id. 233. Id. 234. Id. cmt. f. 694 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 nothing more than a laundry list, originally formulated by Dean John Wade235 that courts have taken into account to determine whether a product’s utility, as designed, outweighs its risks. In its discussion of these factors, the Restatement notes that the relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as designed, and as it could have been designed, may be considered, including the effects of an alternative design on longevity production, maintenance, and repair costs. 236 The listing of these factors seems to suggest that any alternative design proposed by the plaintiff must feasible in order to meet the Restatement’s reasonableness requirement. II. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPM ENT The foregoing discussion concluded that courts generally associate state-of- the-art concept with technological feasibility. The issue of technological feasibility often arises in connection with evidence of a safer alternative design offered by the plaintiff. Although courts generally agree that an alternative design must be technologically feasible in order to be within state-of-the-art, they also point out that an alternative design does not necessarily have to be in existence when the product in question is originally marketed, so long as it was technologically feasible to produce it at that time. However, this approach may be inappropriate when technological development in a particular area is dependent upon developments in other industries. In other words, it is not always correct to assume that industry necessarily controls the pace of technological development. The following discussion will describe the various ways in which technology develops. A. Linear Development With the exception of products that are discovered entirely by accident, such as penicillin or vulcanized rubber, most technologies develop over time in237 238 either a linear fashion or an interdependent fashion. The linear model usually involves an established technology that is further developed over time without significant interaction with any other technology. Some examples of this239 model include violins from Brescia and Cremona and mid-nineteenth century clipper ships developed for the China tea trade. 1. Violins.—One example of linear development comes from the golden age of violin making in northern Italy from 1550 to 1750. Violin makers (or240 luthiers) of that period changed the basic design of the violin only slightly, 235. See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). 236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2, cmt. f, at 22-25. 237. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 118-19. 238. Id. at 46. 239. See supra pages 670-71 and accompanying footnotes. 240. See William Bartruff, The History of the Violin, BARTRUFF, http://www.bartruff.com/ history/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (providing a history of early violin makers) [hereinafter Bartruff]. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 695 although they did experiment with various woods, glues, and varnishes to improve the quality and sound of their instruments. The oldest existing241 instrument is one of a set of twelve constructed by Andrea Amati for the French King, Charles IX, in 1560. To the casual observer, this violin looks very much242 like a contemporary instrument. The basic sound of the violin did not change dramatically over the years either. Nevertheless, the luthiers of Brescia and243 Cremona did make changes in the construction of their instruments. For244 example, Andrea Amati’s sons, Antonio and Girolamo, perfected the shape of the violin’s f-holes in the early seventeenth century. In the late seventeenth245 century, Antonio Stradivari began to cut a more distinct bevel and also began to outline the heads of his instruments in black. Later, Stradivari began to make246 his violins in a larger pattern than before and also began to use a darker, richer varnish to improve the appearance and tone of his instruments. As these247 examples suggest, violin technology was perfected by Italian craftsmen over the course of two centuries by small incremental changes without any significant technological innovation. 2. Clipper Ships.—Another example of linear technological development is the evolution of the clipper ship. In 1833, the East India Company lost its monopoly over the China tea trade, thereby creating an opportunity for the ships of other countries to transport tea from China to Great Britain. Since the tea-248 drinking public of that time believed that tea was better when it was fresh, speed became a greater consideration than it had been previously. The design for tea249 241. See id. 242. Id. 243. For example, it is interesting to note that violin virtuoso, Ole Bull, used an instrument built by Gasparo da Salo in 1574 in thousands of concerts between 1840 and 1880. See History of the Violin, CLASSIC VIOLINSHOP.COM, http://classicviolinshop.com/ArticleView.asp?Article ID=1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). The sound of Bull’s sixteenth century instrument apparently did not sound out-of-place to the ears of his nineteenth century audience. See id. (noting the popularity of da Salo’s violin). 244. See Bartruff, supra note 240. 245. Amati Family Violins, THE OLD VIOLIN, http://www.collectibleviolins.com/amati.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 246. Marshall C. St. John, Chapter Two, Stradivari’s Violins, ANTONIO STRADIVARI, http:// www.cello.org/heaven/hill/two.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 247. See id. 248. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 367. 249. See id. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, tea and other commodities from the Far East were transported by East Indiamen. These well-armed sailing ships averaged only five or six knots an hour. See STEPHEN TAYLOR, STORM AND CONQUEST: THE CLASH OF EMPIRES IN THE EASTERN SEAS, 1809, at 58 (2007). Furthermore, they often “snugged down” by reducing sail during the night. DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 367; see also BRIAN GARDNER, THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: A HISTORY 98 (1971). As a result, it took almost two years to complete a voyage from the Far East to Great Britain. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 365 (noting ships “would complete three voyages in six years”). 696 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 clippers may have originated in two-masted schooners developed in the United States for privateering during the War of 1812. In any event, by the mid-250 nineteenth century, clipper ships were much larger—exceeding 2000 tons and were built to get the most out of the light winds of the China seas. The Ariel,251 which sailed from China to London in ninety-nine days, provides a good example of mid-nineteenth century clipper ship design. The ship had three masts with252 four sails on the foremast, five sails on the mainmast, and four sails on the mizzenmast. It was 197 feet long with a beam of about thirty-four feet. It253 254 was “built of teak planking laid over iron frames” and relied on iron masts to support the pressure exerted on its sails. The Ariel averaged fourteen knots per255 hour at full sail. During the heyday of tea clippers, American and English256 shipbuilders competed with each other to build the fastest ships. However,257 they did not change the clipper’s basic design and most of their improvements were subtle and barely noticeable. 258 B. The Ping-Pong Model Sometimes two technologies develop in tandem, with one reacting to the other. For example, this sort of interaction occurred in the sixteenth century between warships and naval artillery. At the beginning of the sixteenth259 century, the carrack represented the ultimate in shipbuilding technology. The260 carrack was about 100 feet long with a beam of forty feet and a displacement of 600 to 800 tons. It was a three-masted, fully rigged vessel with a foremast and261 250. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 367. 251. Id. at 368. 252. See id. 253. Id. fig.172. 254. Id. 255. Id. at 368-69. 256. Id. at 368. 257. See id. at 364-70. 258. See id. 259. See ANGUS KONSTAM, SOVEREIGNS OF THE SEA: THE QUEST TO BUILD THE PERFECT RENAISSANCE BATTLESHIP 128 (2008). 260. Another vessel, popular at this time, was the caravel. Of Islamic origin, the caravel was used by Portuguese explorers in the fifteenth century to map the west coast of Africa. See ARCHIBALD R. LEWIS & TIMOTHY J. RUNYAN, EUROPEAN NAVAL AND MARITIME HISTORY, 300- 1500, at 159 (1985). Carvel-built, the caravel usually had two masts that were fitted with lateen sails. Id. The ship was small, but maneuverable and easy to operate. Id. Two of the ships that accompanied Columbus on his first voyage to America, the Niña and the Pinta, were caravels of fifty to sixty tons displacement. Id. The larger Santa Maria was probably a nao, a larger vessel, also of Portuguese origin, that was somewhat similar to a carrack. See KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 176. However, it should be noted that some historians believe that the Santa Maria was actually a carrack. See, e.g., LEWIS & RUNYAN, supra, at 159. 261. See KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 38. Carracks could be either clinker-built or carvel- 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 697 mainmast, fitted with square mainsails and topsails, and a mizzenmast, which carried a triangular lateen sail. Carracks typically also had a bowsprit sail on262 front and they were known for their very high forecastle and sterncastle263 structures.264 Their roomy hulls and wide beams made carracks excellent cargo vessels, but they were also used as warships. In the fifteenth and early sixteenth century,265 carrack warships were usually equipped with a few breech-loading iron cannons, along with a much larger number of smaller weapons mounted on the forecastle and sterncastle decks. The heavy guns of this period were not very powerful266 because their principal function was to assist in boarding enemy ships by disabling their rigging rather than trying to sink them. Heavy cannons of the267 day were made of wrought iron bars welded together into a tube and reinforced with iron hoops. They were breech loading because it was not possible at that268 time to fabricate muzzle loading cannons without casting them. These iron269 cannons generally fired stone cannonballs and had an effective range of only seventy-five yards.270 Several developments of significance occurred in the early sixteenth century that eventually led to the replacement of the carrack by its more effective successor, the galleon. The first innovation was the gunport. This involved271 the cutting of ports or openings (with waterproof covers) into the hull of the ship, as opposed to the superstructure, so that heavy cannons could be placed on the main deck. This not only allowed ship designers to add more guns, it also27 2 enabled them to use heavier artillery pieces without adversely affecting the vessel’s stability. During the same time period, two other developments273 greatly increased the firepower of large guns. First, ship designers began to phase out breech-loading wrought iron cannons and replaced them with muzzle- loading cast bronze guns. These weapons had a range of 400 yards and could274 built. See id. at 40. 262. Id. at 69. Some carracks had a fourth mast, known as a bonaventure mast, which also carried a lateen sail. Id. 263. See LEWIS & RUNYAN, supra note 260, at 158. 264. See KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 38. 265. See JAMES BURKE, CONNECTIONS 189 (1978) [hereinafter BURKE, CONNECTIONS]. 266. For example, when Henry VII’s warship, Sovereign, was launched in 1488, she was equipped with thirty-two heavy wrought iron cannons and 110 swivel guns designed for close range anti-personnel use. See KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 41. 267. Id. at 43-44. 268. See CARLO M. CIPOLLA, GUNS, SAILS AND EMPIRES: TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE EARLY PHASES OF EUROPEAN EXPANSION 1400-1700, at 23 (1965). 269. Id. at 24 n.1. 270. See KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 41. 271. See JEREMY BLACK, TOOLS OF WAR 72 (2007). 272. Id. 273. See CIPOLLA, supra note 268, at 82. 274. See BLACK, supra note 271, at 90. 698 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 fire up to a sixty pound shot. Firepower was also increased by the replacement275 of stone shot with iron cannonballs, which had much greater penetrating power.276 However, even with these improvements in ship design and armament, the carrack had serious deficiencies as a warship. First of all, the improvements in gunnery made carracks easy targets because of their high profile. Moreover,277 their height also made them top-heavy and vulnerable to rolling, which reduced the accuracy of their gunfire. Finally, carracks, with their high superstructures,278 were difficult to handle “as the wind tended to push them to leeward as they sailed,” making it difficult to keep a straight course. 279 In the 1530s, Spanish and Portuguese shipbuilders searched for a design that would combine “the speed and maneuverability of the [caravel] with the cargo capacity of the” carrack. The result was that icon of pirate movies, the Spanish280 galleon. Unlike the carrack, the galleon was purpose-built as a warship, primarily to protect Spanish treasure ships returning to Europe from the Americas. Galleons were narrower than carracks, with a typical length-to-281 beam ratio of 4-to-1, as compared with the 3.5-to-1 ratio for carracks. This282 made for greater speed and better handling. The earliest galleons were rather283 small, about 350 tons, but gradually increased in size during the course of the sixteenth century.284 The next development in ship design occurred in England (which was not yet Great Britain) in 1570 when a master shipwright, Richard Chapman, teamed up with an ex-pirate and slave trader, Sir John Hawkins, to produce the first race- built galleon, a 300-ton vessel called the Foresight. The ship had a sleek hull,285 275. See KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 43. These bronze cannons came in various sizes. For example, a curtow could fire a sixty pound ball; a demi-curtow could fire a thirty pound ball; and a culverin could fire a twenty pound shot. Id. 276. See BLACK, supra note 271, at 90. 277. KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 175. 278. Id. 279. Id. 280. Id. at 176. 281. Id. at 180. The need for protection was demonstrated by an encounter off the southwest coast of Portugal in 1523. Three Spanish caravels, sailing without an escort and loaded with treasure from South America, were overhauled and captured by French privateers, resulting in a severe financial loss to the Spanish Crown. Id. at 177-78. 282. Id. at 181. 283. See id. 284. Id. at 181-82. Portuguese galleons tended to be larger, sometimes reaching 1000 tons displacement. Id. at 182. 285. Id. at 188. In 1568, while commanding an ancient carrack, the Jesus of Lubeck, Hawkins, accompanied by his young cousin, Francis Drake, had an opportunity to compare first hand the fighting qualities of these two kinds of ships and barely escaped with his life. See ERNLE BRADFORD, DRAKE 45-59 (1965). Many crewmembers were forced to surrender to the Spanish after the ship was destroyed. Id. at 57. One of the scenes from Errol Flynn’s 1940 film, The Sea 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 699 with a relatively deep draft, a low superstructure, a long beak in front, and a narrow stern. The foremast was placed farther forward than normal and slanted forward slightly, which improved the vessel’s handling. Heavily armed for its286 size, the Foresight carried twenty-eight heavy bronze muzzle-loading cannons arrayed on one continuous gundeck. Faster, more maneuverable, and more2 8 7 heavily armed than Spanish warships, race-built galleons proved their worth when war finally broke out between England and Spain in 1588.288 C. The Pinball Model Technological development often follows a path where changes are interdependently linked. In other words, technological change does not occur in a vacuum, but relies on developments in other fields. Three historical289 examples help to illustrate this process: the printing press, the railroad, and the automobile. 1. Printing.—The development of printing required innovations in at least four areas, the press, paper, oil-based ink, and movable metal type. The290 printing press itself was easily adapted from the linen and paper presses of the time. However, another innovation, paper, was also necessary to the2 9 1 development of printing. Prior to the introduction of paper in Europe, the only material available was parchment, which was made from the skins of sheep. A 200 quarto-page codex would require the skins of twelve sheep, which was very expensive and also hard on the sheep. Of Chinese origin, paper was introduced292 into Spain by the Moors in the twelfth century, and had spread to the rest of Europe by the fourteenth century. High-quality paper could be made from293 discarded linen. Fortunately, most of the population was able to afford linen undergarments by the fourteenth century because the Black Death had caused wages to rise sharply. This meant that worn out linen clothing could be294 collected by itinerant “rag-and-bone” men and sold to paper mills. Paper,295 Hawk, was loosely based on this incident. For general information regarding The Sea Hawk, see The Sea Hawk, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0033028/ (last visited May 1, 2012). 286. KONSTAM, supra note 259, at 188-89. 287. Id. at 189. 288. See id. at 198-203. 289. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 36. 290. DIANA CHILDRESS, JOHANNES GUTENBERG AND THE PRINTING PRESS 60 (2008) (describing Gutenberg’s contributions to the printing press). 291. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 236. 292. See id. at 232. In ancient times, sheets of parchment were sewn together to produce lengthy documents, which were then rolled up for storage. Id. Around the second century A.D. scribes began to fold rectangular sheets of parchment into pages and then bound them together to form a codex or book. Id. 293. Id. at 232-33. 294. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 100. 295. See id. 700 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 produced by water-powered mills, was much cheaper than parchment. 296 Another piece of the puzzle was the invention of movable metal type by Johann Gutenberg in the mid-fifteenth century. Prior to that time, wood blocks had been used in Europe to print playing cards, calendars and prayers. 297 However, wood blocks were expensive to carve and wore out quickly. 298 Gutenberg’s solution was to manufacture a movable type that was durable, that would be uniform in size and that would lie side-by-side in a holder so as to produce an even line of print. Furthermore, movable type could be used299 repeatedly, and when a letter wore out, a new one could be reproduced in a mold. Interchangeability of type required standardization of the size and shape300 of the letters, greatly enhancing readability. Not surprisingly, printing spread301 rapidly throughout Europe during the late fifteenth century. 302 The final requirement for the commercialization of printing was the development of a suitable ink. At first printers used a water-based ink similar to that used by scribes to copy manuscripts. However, because of its low303 viscosity, this type of ink made a poor impression on the absorbent paper that was required for printing. As a result, the impression was often smudged and304 showed through the opposite side of the page. Fortunately, these problems305 were eventually solved with the introduction of an oil-based ink which was made by combining linseed oil with lampblack or powdered charcoal.306 2. Railroads.—The development of the railroad was made possible, first and foremost, by the invention of the steam engine. Originally developed to pump water from coal mines, this versatile device was adapted for many uses in the nineteenth century. However, the steam engine took a long time to develop307 and many other technologies were essential to its use as a power source for railroads. The first requirement was an understanding of the principles of atmospheric pressure and vacuums. The second was to apply these principles308 to a piston and cylinder mechanism in order to produce power. The third309 296. For example, as early as 1300, paper sold for one-sixth of the price of parchment. Id. at 101. 297. See id. 298. Id. 299. Id. at 102. To create a letter of type, a steel punch was used to hammer the letter’s impression into a copper matrix. Id. A lead alloy was poured into a mold in order to produce a piece of typeface that was raised on a shoulder and stalk of uniform height. Id. 300. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 237. 301. See id. 302. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 274. 303. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 235. 304. Id. at 235-36. 305. Id. 306. Id. at 236. 307. See id. at 312. 308. Id. at 323-25. 309. Id. at 324-25. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 701 breakthrough was the lathe-type boring machine and other machine tools (borrowed from clockmakers) that were necessary to fabricate steam engine parts to the precise specifications necessary to generate power efficiently. The last310 requirement was the sun-and-planet gear, developed by James Watt, that converted the up-and-down motion of the piston to a rotary motion that could be used to drive wheels.311 The story begins in the mid-seventeenth century when scientists discovered that a vacuum could be produced when air pressure was allowed to drop in an enclosed space. This discovery was prompted by the fact that European silver312 and iron mines were being flooded because the suction pumps of the day could not lift water more than thirty-two feet. Subsequent experiments by Otto von313 Guericke suggested that if a device could be made that would repeatedly create a vacuum, atmospheric pressure that could be used to operate a pump. Some314 years later, Denis Papin put this principle to work by constructing a machine which used steam power to move a piston up and down in a cylinder. In 1712,315 Thomas Newcomen applied this piston and cylinder concept to construct a steam powered pump that was installed at a coal mine in Straffordshire, England. 31 6 Finally, in 1765, James Watt greatly improved the efficiency of the Newcomen steam engine by adding a condenser so that water did not have to be sprayed directly into the cylinder to condense the steam. 317 The steam engine might have been limited to pumping water out of coal mines if it had not been for two other developments in the eighteenth century. The first was the invention of the sun-and-planet gear by James Watt in 1784. 318 This device allowed vertical motion of the piston and cylinder to be converted into a rotary motion, enabling steam engines to turn wheels carrying belts and 310. Id. at 322. 311. Id. at 323. 312. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 75. 313. See id. at 72-73. Experiments by Evangelista Torricelli and Gasparo Berti in the 1640s established the existence of atmospheric pressure and showed that the weight of the air pressing down on a pool of water at the foot of a mineshaft prevented the water from rising more than thirty- two feet. BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 133. Then in 1648, a group of French scientists climbed a mountain with a tube of mercury suspended in a dish of mercury. See id. at 134. As they climbed higher, the mercury level in the tube fell, indicating that atmospheric pressure was lessening. Id. This was expected; however, the scientists were surprised to find a space between the mercury and the top of the tube. Id. Since air could not enter the tube because it was blocked by the mercury, they concluded that the mysterious space in the tube could only be a vacuum. Id. 314. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 314. 315. Id. at 315. 316. CHRISTOPHER MCGOWAN, RAIL, STEAM AND SPEED: THE “ROCKET” AND THE BIRTH OF STEAM LOCOMOTION 39-40 (2004). 317. DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 320-21. 318. Id. at 323-24. 702 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 thereby operate machines in mills, breweries, and ironworks. The second319 major innovation was John Wilkinson’s lathe-type boring machine, originally developed in 1774 to bore bronze cannons. The cylinders in Watt’s 1765320 versions of steam engines needed to be constructed with great precision. However, this was not possible until 1775, when Wilkinson adapted his machine to bore cylinders for Watt’s steam engines. This set the stage for the321 development of railroads, steamships and steam-powered farm machinery in the nineteenth century. The origins of the railroad can be traced to Richard Trevithick, who built a “steam carriage” known as Captain Dick’s Puffer in 1801. Unfortunately, the322 vehicle exploded four days after its debut because Trevithick forgot to turn off the boiler. In 1803, he built another steam carriage for use in London, but it323 was unable to cope with the poor roads of the time. This caused Trevithick to324 turn his attention to rail travel. The next year, he constructed a locomotive3 2 5 which transported a ten-ton load of cast iron from the Pen-y-darren Iron Works to the Glamorganshire Canal nine miles away at a speed of five miles per hour. 326 Trevithick’s last project was the 1808 steam locomotive Catch-me-who-can which briefly carried passengers along a circular track in London’s Euston Square.327 Meanwhile, responding to the high cost of horse fodder caused by the Napoleonic wars, coal mine owners and textile manufacturers began to envision the railroad as a cheaper alternative to horse-drawn transportation. The first328 public railroad was the Stockton & Darlington Railway Company, founded in 1824 to transport coal from the Durham coal mines to the wharves of Stockton on the River Tees, about thirty miles away. Several years later, the Liverpool329 & Manchester Railway was formed to ship cotton goods from Manchester to the 319. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 24. 320. Id. at 250. 321. DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 350. Unlike other steam engines, Watt’s did not have a water seal on top of the piston because it would have cooled the cylinder down and reduced the steam engine’s power; however, this meant that the cylinder and piston had to fit perfectly in order to prevent steam from escaping. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 175. 322. See Richard Cavendish, Richard Trevithick’s First Steam Carriage, 51 HISTORY TODAY (2001), available at www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/richard-trevithicks-first-steam- carriage; see also MCGOWAN, supra note 316, at 49-50. In 1769, Nicholas Cugnot, a French military officer, constructed a steam-powered wagon to haul field artillery. Id. at 50. It worked, but was so slow and inefficient that it was soon abandoned. See id. 323. Id. 324. Id. at 52. 325. Id. 326. Id. at 57-58. 327. Id. 328. See MCGOWAN, supra note 316, at 86. 329. See id. at 2-3. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 703 seaport of Liverpool. Liverpool and Manchester held a series of trials at the330 village of Rainhill, near Liverpool, in October 1829 to determine who would supply them with locomotives. The winner of this competition was a331 locomotive named Rocket, built by George Stephenson. The secret of332 Rocket’s success was a system of copper tubes that Stephenson designed to carry hot water from the boiler through the hot gases escaping up the chimney from the firebox. The tubes provided a much greater heating surface and consequently333 generated more high pressure steam to drive the engine’s cylinders than the competition. The Liverpool & Manchester Railway began operation on334 September 15, 1830 with the Duke of Wellington as its reluctant guest of honor. 335 Although the steam engine was critical to the development of the railroad, there were other elements as well. For example, developments in track construction greatly aided the development of the railroad. At first, railroads used cast iron rails, which had been developed for use in coal mines during the eighteenth century. However, cast iron rails were brittle and did not hold up336 well, leading to their replacement by wrought iron rails in 1830. Eventually,337 iron rails were replaced by steel rails. In addition to rail construction, the338 invention of the telegraph made it possible to safely run trains in opposite directions along the same track. Contemporaneous advances in bridge-339 building, such as the fabrication of iron and steel bridges, and developments in tunnel construction techniques also contributed to the commercial success of railroads in the nineteenth century.340 3. Motor Vehicles.—Like the printing press and the railroad, a number of technological developments had to occur before motor vehicles could be successfully introduced into the stream of commerce. Among these developments were the internal combustion engine, the carburetor, the spark plug, pneumatic rubber tires and gasoline fuel. The motor vehicle’s most important feature is the internal combustion engine. Unlike a steam engine, which burns fuel externally in a firebox, an internal combustion engine burns fuel inside its cylinders. First, a mixture of341 330. See id. at 4. 331. See id. at 6-7, 221. 332. Id. at 221-22. 333. Id. at 181-82. 334. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 70. 335. See MCGOWAN, supra note 316, at 73, 244-45. The Duke was not fond of rail travel. See id. at 73 (“[H]e abhorred the very idea of locomotives.”). 336. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 377-78. 337. Id. at 378. 338. Id. at 381. 339. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 29. 340. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 448-62. 341. Id. at 602. 704 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 gasoline and air is sprayed into the cylinder and compressed by a piston. At342 the point of maximum compression, an electrical spark ignites the fuel. The343 explosion produces hot gases which push the piston down. These combustion344 gases are then vented and more of the fuel-air mixture is injected to run a second stroke. Valves control the intake of the fuel-air mixture and vent exhaust gases345 at the appropriate time in the cycle.346 The basic concept of the internal combustion engine was not new at the turn of the nineteenth century. As early as the seventeenth century, Denis Papin (mentioned earlier in connection with the development of the steam engine) experimented with a device to produce power from exploding gunpowder. It347 was not much of a success. In 1859, Étienne Lenoir invented a stationary348 internal combustion engine that used an electric spark to ignite a mixture of coal gas and air. Finally, in 1876, Nikolaus Otto patented a four-stroke engine349 which he modestly called the Otto Cycle Engine. This engine, with subsequent350 improvements developed by Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach, became the standard power source for gasoline-powered motor vehicles in the twentieth century.351 However, a number of other inventions also contributed to the successful operation of motor vehicles. One such device was the carburetor, invented by Maybach in 1893, used to spray the right amount of air and fuel into the cylinder. This gadget was based on mid-nineteenth century perfume atomizers,352 which used a drop in air pressure to convert a liquid into a fine mist. This353 phenomenon is known as the Venturi Effect. Another invention was the spark354 plug, which can be traced back to Alessandro Volta’s eudiometric pistol. This355 device, developed in 1776, consisted of a glass pistol-like container filled with gas and corked at one end. A spark resulted inside the pistol when Volta356 touched one of two electrically charged wires, inserted into the pistol, while making contact with the other wire and the pistol’s electrophore lid. Volta357 unknowingly made another contribution to the development of the automobile by 342. Id. 343. Id. 344. Id. 345. Id. 346. Id. 347. Id. at 600. 348. See id. 349. Id. at 601-02. 350. Id. at 602-03. 351. Id. at 605. 352. BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 109-10. 353. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 181-82. 354. Id. 355. See id. at 178-79. 356. Id. 357. Id. at 178. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 705 inventing a chemical fuel cell, the prototype of the rechargeable car battery.358 Another vital component to the development of the motor vehicle was the pneumatic rubber tire. In 1839, Charles Goodyear discovered the process of vulcanization by which natural rubber was toughened by being heated in a mixture of sulfur and white lead. In 1846, Thomas Hancock began359 manufacturing solid rubber road tires for horse-drawn carriages. Pneumatic360 rubber tires also appeared at this time, but were not a commercial success. In361 1888, J.B. Dunlop, an Irish surgeon, developed pneumatic rubber tires for bicycles. Dunlop’s invention came along at just the right time to serve the362 needs of the newly-developed automobile.363 The final requirement was to find a suitable fuel to power the automobile’s internal combustion engine. The solution was a petroleum product called gasoline. Oil was first discovered by Edwin Drake in Pennsylvania in 1859. 364 It could be distilled into various components for use in heating, lighting or lubrication. At first, the lighter, more volatile products of the distillation3 6 5 process were thrown away as waste. However, toward the end of the366 nineteenth century, this waste product, now known as gasoline, was found to be the perfect fuel to power the newly-developed automobile. More than a36 7 century later, gasoline-powered motor vehicles remain the principal means of transportation in the world. 4. Modern Technologies.—The interdependent model of technological development is not limited to the nineteenth century and earlier; it is also applicable to more modern inventions such personal computers, cellular telephones, and global positioning systems. Various technologies have contributed to the development of the personal computer. For example, computers require one or more Central Processing Units (CPU) or microprocessors in order to execute software instructions. Software368 includes application software which is used to carry out tasks such as word processing, sending and receiving e-mail, internet browsing, faxing, and playing computer games. In addition, computers also require system software, which interfaces with hardware to support application software. All of this software369 358. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 146-47. 359. Id. at 46. 360. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 528-29. 361. Id. at 529. 362. Id. at 392. 363. Id. 364. BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 179. 365. Id. at 179-80. 366. Id. at 180. 367. See id. 368. The Central Processing Unit, COMPUTER SPECIALIST, http://www.ispcp.org/the-central- processing-unit.html (last visited May 2, 2012). 369. See How Computers Work—Software, STAN. U., http://www.stanford.edu/class/cs101/ how-computers-work-software.html (last visited May 3, 2012) (discussing programs and operating 706 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 relies on a language system of ones and zeroes called binary code. Binary code was derived from office tabulators and calculators, which in turn adapted it from the Jacquard loom. The computer keyboard is descended from the typewriter370 keyboard. The monitor was originally based on cathode ray tube technology,371 which was also used in television and medical monitoring machines. 372 Mobile telephones, especially modern smart phones, also incorporate many distinct technologies. The most important of these technologies is voice radio transmission, which originated with ship-to-shore transmissions by Reginald Fessenden in the early twentieth century. All mobile telephones are powered373 by a rechargeable battery, which can be traced back to Alessandro Volta’s experiments with chemical batteries in the late eighteenth century. Mobile374 telephones also have a CPU similar to that of a computer to run all of the telephone’s software. Additionally, modern smart phones rely on many other375 technological innovations to play music, take photographs, download video and audio data, send and receive text messages and email, and access the Internet. 376 Obviously, if these technologies had not already been in place when mobile telephones came on the scene, the mobile telephone that emerged would look very different from today’s version. The global positioning system (GPS), maintained by the United States Government, provides highly accurate location and time information for airplanes, cars, boats, submarines and even pedestrians. The system was377 developed in 1973 and became fully operational in 1994. The technologies378 systems). 370. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 108-13. 371. See TYPING THROUGH TIME: KEYBOARD HISTORY, DASKEYBOARD, http://www. daskeyboard.com/blog/?page_id=1329 (last visited May 3, 2012) (discussing the transition from typewriters to modern computer keyboards). 372. See Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Monitor, HIST. OF COMPUTERS, http://history-computer. com/ModernComputer/Basis/cathode.html (last visited May 3, 2012). Modern computer screens are now generally based on liquid crystal display technology. See Liquid Crystal Display (LCD), HIST. OF COMPUTERs, http://history-computer.com/ModernComputer/Basis/lcd.html (last visited May 3, 2012). 373. Courtney Livingston Quale, Note, Hear an [Expletive], There an [Expletive], But[t] . . . the Federal Communications Commission Will Not Let You Say an [Expletive], 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 207, 214 (2008). 374. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 146-47. 375. See Bonnie Cha, Smartphones Unlocked: Understanding Processors, CNET (Aug. 8, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/8301-17918_1-20088704-85/smartphones-unlocked- understanding-processors/ (describing the various processors used in cell phone technology). 376. See Smartphone Features, PC MAG., http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/ 0,1237,t=smartphone+features&i=6433,00.asp (last visited June 21, 2012). 377. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: A SHARED NATIONAL ASSET: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TECHNICAL IMPROVEMENTS AND ENHANCEMENTS 13-14 (3d ed. 1997) (describing the government’s role in the creation of GPS systems). 378. Id. at 13-14, 16. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 707 that were needed to create the GPS system included those associated with satellites, rockets, radios, radar, semiconductors, solar batteries, computers and atomic clocks.379 III. COM M ERCIAL FEASIBILITY Although the issue has not arisen very often, it would seem that the state-of- the-art concept should include commercial as well as technological feasibility. Some technological innovations achieve immediate commercial success. For example, printing was quickly accepted by literate consumers in fifteenth century Europe. By 1480, printing presses were located in at least 110 towns. By380 1500, there were more than 35,000 editions and 20 million individual books in print. Railroads were also an immediate success, both in Great Britain and in381 the United States. For example, in its first full year of operation, the Liverpool382 & Manchester Railway carried about 445,000 passengers and 43,000 tons of freight. By 1860, railroad companies had laid down nearly 15,000 miles of383 track in Great Britain and 30,000 miles of track in the United States. In more384 recent times, personal computers and cell phones also achieved commercial success relatively quickly. For example, personal computer sales went from 48,000 in 1977 to more than 300 million in 2008. Mobile telephones were385 386 even more successful as cell phone subscribers increased worldwide from 12.4 million in 1990 to more than 4.6 billion in 2010. 387 379. See generally Real-World Relativity: The GPS Navigation System, OHIO ST. U. (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.astronomy.ohio-state-edu/~pogge/Ast162/Unit5/gps.html (providing background on GPS technology). 380. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 105. 381. See BURKE, PINBALL EFFECT, supra note 10, at 274. Book sales were boosted by the practice, pioneered by the Venetian printer, Aldus Manutius, of publishing inexpensive octavo- sized editions that could be easily carried in a customer’s saddlebag. See id. 382. Construction began on the first railroad in America, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad in 1826. See Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse Than the Disease? Taxation and Finance Provisions in State Constitutions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 965-67 (2003); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1570 n.4 (2008). 383. See MCGOWAN, supra note 316, at 265. 384. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 302 (“The length of the railways [in the United States] grew in that time from 10,000 to 30,000 miles, which was more than twice the entire network of the United Kingdom.”). 385. Disruptive Technology Stocks for Smart Small-Cap Investors, MONEY MORNING (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.moneymorning.com.au/20120406/disruptive-technology-stocks-for-smart- small-cap-investors.html. 386. See Worldwide PC Shipments in 2008, ZDNET (Mar. 16, 2009, 4:56 AM), http://www. zdnet.com/blog/itfacts/worldwide-pc-shipments-in-2008/15672 (listing total 2008 shipments at 302,207,500). 387. The Birth of the Mobile Phone, CISCO COMMUNITIES (Jan. 12, 2012, 10:52 AM), 708 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 A. Catalysts to the Commercialization of Technology There are a number of events or conditions that can create a receptive environment for new products and technologies, including sudden changes in the physical environment, depletion of natural resources, military competition among nations, popular dissatisfaction with the state of existing technology, as well as changing demographic and social conditions. Many of these changes are beyond a manufacturer’s control. 1. Environmental Changes.—Over the centuries, changes in the physical environment have often provided an economic incentive for the introduction of new products and technologies. For example, in the fourteenth century a drop in temperature caused by the Little Ice Age led to the invention of fireplaces and chimneys to provide better home heating. Also, the introduction of knitting388 and buttons during that period enabled tailors to make warmer clothing. In our389 own century, concern about global warming has generated a potential market for the development of “green” technologies like recycling, solar power, and alternative fuels for cars and trucks. 2. Depletion of Natural Resources.—Depletion of natural resources also creates a demand for substitute products. The destruction of English forests in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries due to glassblowing and shipbuilding activities triggered improvements in coal mining technology when coal replaced wood as a fuel source in many industries. In the nineteenth century, the390 excessive killing of African elephants led to a shortage of natural ivory and thereby created a market for celluloid billiard balls and other ivory substitutes. 391 In the twenty-first century, the depletion of fossil fuels has encouraged the development of alternative fuel technologies for both transportation and power generation. 3. Military Competition.—An arms race can also provide a ready market for new technologies. For example, in the mid-nineteenth century, when392 exploding shells fired by rifled guns took the place of smooth-bore cannons and solid shot, navy officials realized that they needed to replace slow-moving wooden sailing ships with something better. As a result, they were receptive393 to the introduction of ironclads and iron-hulled steam powered warships once they became available. During this same period, European and American394 armies were also quick to abandon their traditional smoothbore muskets for more https://communities.cisco.com/community/solutions/sp/mobility/blog/2012/01/12/the-birth-of-the- mobile-phone. 388. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 157-59. 389. Id. at 161. 390. DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 145-47. 391. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 279. 392. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 278. 393. See JOHN BEELER, BIRTH OF THE BATTLESHIP 70-71 (2001). 394. See id. 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 709 rapid firing breech-loading rifles. Later, military strategists spotted the395 potential of airplanes. Within eight years of the Wright brothers’ first flight in 1903, the Italian Army employed airplanes to bomb Turkish positions during the Italian-Turkish war. In more recent times, radar, rocket, helicopter and jet396 engine technology developed at an increased pace during World War II.397 4. Dissatisfaction with Existing Technology.—Dissatisfaction with existing technology creates opportunities for those who can “build a better mousetrap.” 398 As mentioned earlier, printed books were commercially successful because they were much cheaper and much easier to read than hand written codices. Likewise, railroads quickly replaced stage coaches because they were faster, cheaper to operate, safer and more comfortable than horse powered transportation. Railroads also offered a better means of transporting bulk goods than canals and eventually put most of the canal companies out of business. Ocean-going steamships replaced wooden sailing ships for the same reason. Unlike sail powered packet ships, steamships could maintain fixed schedules because they were not dependent on the wind. After the introduction of compound-expansion engines, high-pressure boilers, iron and steel hulls and the screw propeller, steamships became larger, faster and more reliable than sailing ships and almost entirely replaced them by the latter decades of the nineteenth century. Another example of the triumph of one technology over another involves illumination. Originally, homes and factories were illuminated by candles, oil399 lamps, and later by coal gas. However, once electric lighting appeared on the scene, it displaced these other forms of illumination because it was safer, more convenient to use and provided more illumination. Finally, the gasoline powered automobile not only supplanted the horse and carriage, it also displaced electric and steam powered vehicles, which were more expensive and less convenient than their gasoline powered competitors.400 5. Demographic Changes.—Demographic changes may also encourage commercial acceptance of new products. For example, in the late fourteenth 395. See BLACK, supra note 271, at 111-12. 396. Id. at 154. 397. See BLACK, supra note 271, at 174-76 (radar); id. at 188 (jet fighters); ERNST KLEE & OTTO MERK, THE BIRTH OF THE MISSILE: THE SECRETS OF PEENEMÜNDE 10-24 (T. Schoeters trans., 1965) (German rockets); J. GORDON LEISHMAN, PRINCIPLES OF HELICOPTER AERODYNAMICS 1-49 (2d ed. 2006) (helicopters); 20th Century and Beyond, NASA, http://www. grc. nasa.gov/WWW/k- 12/rocket/BottleRocket/20thBeyond.htm (rockets) (last visited June 21, 2012). 398. Ralph Waldo Emerson is generally attributed with saying, “If you build a better mousetrap, the world will beat a path to your door.” Thomas Cooper & Tom Kelleher, Better Mousetrap? Of Emerson, Ethics, and Postmillennium Persuasion, 16 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 176, 176 (2001). 399. See generally Walter Hough, The Development of Illumination, 3 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 342 (1901) (providing history of illumination). 400. See William W. Bottorff, What Was the First Car? A Quick History of the Automobile for Young People, AUSTIN BUS. COMPUTERS, INC., http://www.ausbcomp.com/~bbott/cars/carhist. htm (last visited May 3, 2012). 710 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 century, population losses from the Black Death caused wages to increase, thereby creating a demand for linen undergarments (made cheaper by the invention of the horizontal loom and the spinning wheel). Later, in Western401 Europe, an increase in population during the nineteenth century created a need to produce more food and, thus, stimulated an interest in mechanized farm equipment like steam tractors and reapers. Increased population also led to402 greater urbanization, which made it possible to popularize gas lighting and movie theaters. 403 6. Social Changes.—Finally, changes in social conditions may create a demand for new products and technologies. For example, increases in the literacy rate during the Renaissance fueled a strong demand for inexpensive books just at a point in time when printing by means of movable type was invented. The expanding number of female drivers contributed to the404 commercial success of the self-starter for automobiles when it was introduced in 1912. In more recent times, the phenomenon of the two-earner household has405 no doubt helped to sustain a ready market for household gadgets.406 B. Impediments to Commercial Acceptance of Technology However, sometimes an otherwise promising technology does not catch on right away. There can be many reasons for this, including high cost, competition from other products or technologies, lack of demand for the product or technology, resistance from special interest groups, cultural resistance or opposition from religious groups, and lack of existing infrastructure support. These conditions are also largely beyond a manufacturer’s control. 1. High Costs.—In some cases, an innovative product may be too expensive in either absolute or relative terms to achieve commercial success when it is first introduced. A product that is too expensive in absolute terms is one which the public would like to purchase, but cannot afford. For example, when automobiles were built to order, only comparatively wealthy persons could afford them. Eventually, however, mass production techniques were introduced which made automobiles more affordable. Likewise, prior to World War II, air travel407 401. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 98-100. 402. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 70-74. 403. See id. at 278. 404. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 105-06. 405. See THE AUTOMOBILE AND AMERICAN CULTURE 139 (David L. Lewis & Laurence Goldstein eds., 1983). 406. See Steven Lugauer et al., The Effect of Household Appliances on Female Labor Force Participation: Evidence from Micro Data, 17 LABOUR ECONS. 503 (2010); Susan Guibert, Increase in Number of Working Woman Due to Appliance Ownership, Notre Dame Study Shows, NOTRE DAME NEWS, Jan. 19, 2011, http://newsinfo.nd.edu/news/18152-increase-in-number-of-working- women-due-to-appliance-ownership-notre-dame-study-shows. 407. See JULIAN PETTIFER & NIGEL TURNER, AUTOMANIA: MAN AND THE MOTOR CAR 173 (1984). 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 711 was very expensive and only the wealthy could afford to fly. After the War,408 as passenger planes became larger and faster, flying became cheaper and more popular with the general public. The same may be occurring today with regard409 to space travel. Recently, Virgin Galactic has begun to take reservations on its spaceship WhiteKnightTwo for space flights. Unfortunately, the cost is410 $200,000 per passenger. Although this cost may eventually come down, space411 travel will probably not become an established means of mass transportation anytime soon. 2. Competition.—A product may also encounter resistance in the marketplace because it is more expensive to purchase or operate than its competition. For example, ocean-going steamships did not supersede wooden sailing ships until the middle of the nineteenth century in part because they consumed too much coal in relation to the amount of power that they generated. It was not until compound-expansion engines were installed, along412 with more efficient boilers, iron and steel hulls, and screw propellers, that oceangoing steamships were able to compete successfully with sailing ships. 413 A similar problem seems to have stymied the commercialization of electric cars in the twenty-first century. Due to the high cost of rechargeable batteries, it is estimated that an electric automobile costs at least $5000 more than a comparable gasoline powered vehicle. For this reason, the public has been slow to414 embrace electric cars although this may change if the price of gasoline increases dramatically. 415 3. Lack of Demand.—Lack of demand may also be based on the perception that the product or technology is not needed. For example, carriage owners shunned pneumatic tires in the 1840s, though they readily purchased solid rubber tires, because they felt that the suspension system of existing carriages was adequate to handle bumpy road conditions. It was not until bicycles (which416 had no suspension systems) came into vogue in the 1880s that the market for 408. See CARL SOLBERG, CONQUEST OF THE SKIES: A HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL AVIATION IN AMERICA 221 (1979) (declaring that “[t]he well-to-do flew”). 409. Id. at 345 (stating that “[s]tarting around 1948, commercial flying began to turn into the kind of travel that the general public could afford”). 410. See Mark Flores, Blast Off?—Strict Liability’s Potential Role in the Development of the Commercial Space Market, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1-2 (2010). 411. See id. at 4. 412. See BEELER, supra note 393, at 32. 413. See id. at 54-60. 414. Press Release, J.D. Power & Assocs., Future Global Market Demand for Hybrid and Battery Electric Vehicles May Be Over-Hyped; Wild Card Is China (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://businesscenter.jdpower.com/news/pressrelease.aspx?ID=2010213. 415. See id. 416. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 529 (“But in the same decade of the 1840’s a patent was taken out for pneumatic rubber tyres [sic] with an outer casing of leather: these ‘aerial wheels,’ as they were called, were tested in Hyde Park and ran successfully for as much as 1,200 miles; they even spread to New York, yet the invention was soon forgotten.”). 712 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 pneumatic tires improved. 417 4. Resistance from Special Interest Groups.—Commercial competitors and workers have also occasionally blocked the introduction of new technology. For example, in the early nineteenth century, canal companies lobbied hard to prevent the construction of railroad lines. Concern about the effect of new technology418 on existing labor patterns also may delay the introduction of technology. For instance, the Emperor Vespasian opposed the use of waterwheels in the Roman Empire because he believed that it might cause unemployment. In the419 eighteenth century, the silk weavers of Lyons rioted for the same reason when the Jacquard loom was introduced. 420 5. Cultural or Religious Opposition.—Religious or social opposition may delay a new technology or prevent its introduction altogether. For example, during the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church banned (without much success) the use of crossbows and gunpowder. More recently, religious groups have421 opposed the use of birth control pills and other contraceptive devices. New4 2 2 technology may also clash with social or cultural norms. For example, when automobile manufacturers first introduced automatic transmission, the response from the driving public was not very enthusiastic. Years later, there was423 considerable reluctance by some demographic groups to use seat belts until laws were passed to make seat belt use mandatory. On a smaller scale, for many424 years, professional baseball players resisted using batting helmets because it conflicted with their macho image.425 6. Lack of Infrastructure.—Finally, commercial success may elude a new technology because no infrastructure exists to support it. The electric light bulb 417. Id. 418. See David E. Lilienthal & Irwin S. Rosenbaum, Motor Carrier Regulation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenience, 36 YALE L.J. 163, 187 n.95 (1926). 419. DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 252. 420. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 111. 421. See JOHN NORRIS, ARTILLERY: A HISTORY 4 (2000). 422. See Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 749-55 (2005); Kate Spota, Comment, In Good Conscience: The Legal Trend to Include Prescription Contraceptives in Employer Insurance Plans and Catholic Charities’ “Conscience Clause” Objection, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084-87 (2003). 423. See Preston Taylor, History of the Automotive Automatic Transmission, DIABLO TRANSMISSIONS, http://www.diablotransmissions.com/history_automatic_transmission.html (last visited June 21, 2012). 424. See Tina Wescott Cafaro, You Drink, You Drive, You Lose: Or Do You?, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2006); Barry L. Huntington, Comment, Welcome to the Mount Rushmore State! Keep Your Arms and Legs Inside the Vehicle at All Times and Buckle Up . . . Not for Your Safety, but to Protect Your Constitutional Rights, 47 S.D. L. REV. 99, 101 n.14 (2002) (stating that fewer than fifteen percent of drivers used seat belts when they were first introduced in the 1950s). 425. See ROBERT M. GORMAN & DAVID WEEKS, DEATH AT THE BALLPARK: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF GAME-RELATED FATALITIES, 1862-2007, at 10-12 (2009). 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 713 was a commercial success because Thomas Edison and others constructed power stations and power lines to supply electricity to their customers. Infrastructure426 also contributed to the success of the gasoline-powered automobile. In contrast to the early nineteenth century, when the pothole covered roads of London thwarted the efforts of Richard Trevithick to introduce steam carriages to Regency England, by the end of that century a macadamized road system existed, at least in urban areas that ensured the success of gasoline-powered automobiles. In addition, oil refineries were already in operation making427 kerosene and lubricating oil when automobiles were first introduced. The428 distillation process being used in these refineries could be readily adapted to manufacture gasoline. In contrast, electric cars failed to catch on at the4 2 9 beginning of the twentieth century, at least in part, because of the lack of charging or battery swapping facilities outside of urban areas.430 IV. RETHINKING THE STATE-OF-THE-ART CONCEP T State-of-the-art is a confusing concept in the law of products liability. Its rationale is indeterminate; its meaning is muddled; and, its procedural effects are highly variable. Accordingly, this portion of the Article will offer some suggestions for clarifying the state-of-the-art concept and defining its proper role in products liability litigation. A. Rationale The principal function of the state-of-the-art doctrine is to provide a practical limit to the concept of defectiveness and, thereby, limit the scope of strict products liability. Almost fifty years ago, the drafters of section 402A declared that liability would only be imposed on sellers for injuries that were caused by defective products. This defectiveness requirement has also been retained by431 the Products Liability Restatement. For this reason, a manufacturer should not432 be held liable simply because the plaintiff has proposed a safer alternative design. Instead the state-of-the-art concept requires the plaintiff to prove that it was actually possible for the manufacturer to have adopted the proposed design when the product was sold. This same principle supports a requirement that any433 426. See DERRY & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 615-21. 427. This new process for paving roads was developed by James McAdam in the 1820s and 1830s. Id. at 432-36. 428. See BURKE, CONNECTIONS, supra note 265, at 180. 429. See id. 430. See Robert Bryce, Five Myths About Green Energy, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/23/AR2010042302220.html (discussing unreliability of electric car batteries). 431. See OWEN, supra note 11, § 6.1, at 343. 432. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998). 433. See id. 714 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 alternative design submitted by a plaintiff be commercially feasible. A434 requirement that plaintiffs show that their proposed alternative designs are commercially feasible helps to ensure that manufacturers are not punished for making efficient design decisions. B. Terminology At the present time, the term state-of-the-art has no fixed meaning in products liability law. To some courts, it refers to customs or practices of the industry. Other courts take a broader view and include safety standards435 promulgated by trade associations, independent standards development organizations, or government regulatory agencies within the state-of-the-art concept. A third alternative defines state-of-the-art as that which is436 technologically feasible. Finally, a few courts have included commercial437 feasibility within the definition of state-of-the-art.438 Considering that there is no consensus about the meaning of state-of-the-art, it might be better to avoid the phrase entirely and rely instead on terms like “technological feasibility” and “commercial feasibility,” which have more generally accepted meanings. Under this approach, technological feasibility would include: (1) knowledge of the underlying scientific principles; (2) the ability to convert these scientific principles into working models and prototypes of the product or safety device in question; and (3) the capacity to manufacture the product or safety device on a commercial scale. In some cases,439 technological feasibility would also include the ability to purchase necessary raw materials or component parts from other vendors. Commercial feasibility, on the other hand, means that: (1) there is an existing or potential consumer interest in the product or safety device; (2) the manufacturer has the resources to market and distribute the product or safety device to the public; and (3) the technology has developed to the point where the product or safety device can be offered for sale at an affordable price. 440 C. The Procedural Effect of State-of-the-Art Evidence in Product Liability Litigation Until recently, defendants often relied on state-of-the-art evidence to establish that their product designs were not defective. However, requiring a441 434. See id. 435. See id. 436. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 437. See OWEN, supra note 11, § 10.4, at 710-11. 438. See, e.g., Boatland of Hous., Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980). 439. OWEN, supra note 11, § 10.4, at 711-12. 440. Id. 441. See O’Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 305 (N.J. 1983), superseded by statute as stated in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239 (N.J. 1990); Crispin v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 591 A.2d 966, 973 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); Patterson v. Ravens- 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 715 manufacturer to prove that its product conforms to the state-of-the-art is the wrong approach. On one hand, if conformity with state-of-the-art is equivalent to feasibility, then any product that was produced and sold commercially would be “feasible” and, therefore, would conform to the state-of-the-art. Such a test would be meaningless. On the other hand, if conformity with the state-of-the-art requirement meant that the defendant’s design had to reflect the highest level of technology available, many products would fail to meet this standard. However, this standard seems wrong because a product’s design does not have to be the best or the safest; it simply has to be non-defective.442 The Product Liability Restatement’s approach is more logical. Section 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement requires the plaintiff to prove that a product is defectively designed by showing that a reasonable alternative design would have prevented or reduced his or her injuries. Arguably, for a design to be443 “reasonable,” it must be technologically and commercially feasible. Of course,444 once the plaintiff offers proof by expert testimony that his or her proposed alternative design was technologically and commercially feasible at the time of sale, the defendant will then need to rebut this claim with evidence that the plaintiff’s proposed design was not in fact technologically or commercially feasible at that time.445 How does a defendant go about rebutting the plaintiff’s claim that a proposed alternative design is technologically and commercially feasible? This will be difficult to do if some or all of the defendant’s competitors have already adopted the plaintiff’s alternative design at the time of sale. However, if the alternative design was not in use at the time of sale by the defendant, but some or all of the defendant’s competitors have adopted it since then, the defendant would have little choice but to argue that the design was not technologically feasible at the time of sale. If the alternative design had not been adopted by any of the446 Metal Prods., Inc., 594 N.E.2d 153, 161-62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. District Court (Caldwell), 818 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. 1991). 442. See Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Colo. App. 1985) (holding that tractor was not defective because it was not equipped with rollover protective device even though such devices were available). 443. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). 444. See OWEN, supra note 11, § 10.4, at 737. 445. See Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 381 N.E.2d 715, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 396 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. 1979). 446. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 446-47 (10th Cir. 1976) (rebutting evidence that passenger planes were equipped with better seats when accident occurred in 1970 by arguing that these seats were not in use when the airplane was manufactured in 1952); Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 589 P.2d 896, 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (responding to evidence that mobile homes were currently equipped with smoke detectors and pop-out windows by pointing out that no manufacturer provided these safety features ten years earlier when the mobile home in question was manufactured); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (excluding evidence of safer windshield glass that was adopted by the automobile industry two years after the accident). 716 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:669 defendant’s competitors, but had been adopted by other industries at the time of sale; the defendant would likely contend that it was not possible to transfer the technology from one industry to another. Finally, if the plaintiff’s alternative447 design is purely hypothetical and has not been adopted by anyone, either at the time of sale or the time of trial, the defendant would likely argue that the proposed design either was not commercially feasible, but like Leonardo’s helicopters, would have to await additional developments before it would become technologically feasible.448 D. A Statutory Approach Assuming that these observations have merit, what is the best mechanism for changing the existing state-of-the-art doctrine? The best approach would probably be to codify this version of the state-of-the-art doctrine by statute. A number of states have already adopted statutes that purport to protect products sellers from liability when their products have been designed in accordance with the prevailing state technological development in the industry at the time of sale. Some of these statutes require that the defendant be able to conform to449 the state-of-the-art or they make conformance to the state-of-the-art an affirmative defense. Others provide that products that conform to the state-of-450 the-art are presumed to be non-defective. Finally, a few statutes have adopted451 the Product Liability Restatement’s approach and require the plaintiff to offer proof of a feasible alternative design. 452 I believe that any statutory codification of the state-of-the-art doctrine should 447. See Boatland of Hous., Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (concluding that evidence of use of kill switches in racing boats did not necessarily prove that such devices were within the state-of-the-art for bass boats). But see Hillrichs v. Avco Corp., 514 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa 1994) (allowing plaintiff whose hand was caught in rollers of corn husking machine to present evidence that manufacturers of printing presses equipped their machines with emergency stop devices). 448. See, e.g., Stanczyk v. Black & Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565, 566-68 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (excuding proposed safer design that had not been tested for feasibility); Maxted v. Pac. Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 834 (Wyo. 1974) (refusing to allow as evidence drawings and model of a safety device for tractor-trailers that had never been tested or constructed at the time of manufacture). 449. See OWEN, supra note 11, § 10.4, at 734-36. 450. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683 (2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.59 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2948(3) (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1-63(b) to (c) (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.764 (2012); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25- 21,182 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-g (2011). 451. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(1) (West 2012); IND. CODE § 34-20-5-1 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (West 2011). 452. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56; MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58c-3 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. 99B-6 (West 2011); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.005 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030 (West 2012). 2012] “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT, ORVILLE!” 717 contain the following provisions. First, the statute should make it clear that a state-of-the-art analysis should only be applied to evaluate a safer alternative design proposed by the plaintiff. Second, although the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design does not have to be actually adopted by others in the industry, the plaintiff must prove that the proposed alternative design was technologically and commercially feasible at the time of sale. Third, the defendant is allowed to rebut the plaintiff’s evidence by offering evidence that the proposed alternative design was not technologically or commercially feasible at the time the product was sold. Fourth, the defendant should be allowed to prove that the plaintiff’s proposed alternative design was not technologically feasible by alleging that it could not control its development. If the plaintiff fails to prove that his or her proposed alternative design is technologically and commercially feasible, the case against the defendant must be dismissed. On the other hand, even if the plaintiff proves that his or her proposed design is technologically and commercially feasible, the defendant should still be able to avoid liability by showing that its existing design is not defective because it is more aesthetically pleasing or offers more convenience or consumer choice. CONCLUSION It seems inherently unfair to hold a manufacturer liable for failing to do something that is beyond the scope of existing technology. At the same time, it is desirable to have a liability rule that encourages producers to make optimal investments in product safety. The state-of-the-art concept is one device to induce manufacturers to achieve what is technologically and commercially possible in the area of product safety. However, some courts and statutes incorrectly focus on the technological and commercial feasibility of the manufacturer’s design choices instead of looking at the feasibility of alternative designs. Ideally, the plaintiff should be required to prove that the defendant’s product is defectively designed by offering evidence of a safer alternative design. The defendant should then be allowed to show that the proposed design was not capable of being produced and marketed using the technology that was available at the time.453 Furthermore, the defendant should be permitted to show that the technology behind the plaintiff’s proposed design is interdependent in nature and, therefore, not solely within the defendant’s control. In the event a safer design was technologically feasible at the time the product was sold, the manufacturer should be allowed to argue that the design was not commercially feasible at that time. Finally, even if the plaintiff proves that his or her proposed design is technologically and commercially feasible, the defendant should still be able to show that its design is cheaper, more convenient, or offers a greater range of consumer choice. 453. See Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 2003); Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1346-47 (Conn. 1997).