Indiana Law Review Indiana Law Review Volume 8 1974 Number 2 Women Executives, Managers and Professionals in the Indiana Criminal Justice System Julia C. Lamber* Victor L. Streib** [T~\he system of criminal justice must attract more peo- ple and better people—police, prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, probation and parole officers, and corrections officials tvith more knowledge, expertise, initiative and integrity. ' The experience of the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad- ministration has demonstrated that the full and equal participation of women and minority individuals in em- ployment opportunities in the criminal justice system is a necessary component to the Safe Streets Act's program to reduce crime and delinquency in the United States.2 I. Introduction Indiana's Criminal Justice System (ICJS) is in constant need of quality people as employees within its various agencies. The thesis of this Article is that the ICJS should select these quality people from a pool of candidates who are "people" and not just "white men." Women are seeking, and at times demand- ing, 3 employment within criminal justice systems. To some de- *Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. B.A., De Pauw University, 1969; J.D., Indiana University, 1972. **Assistant Professor, Department of Forensic Studies, Indiana Uni- versity. B.I.E., Auburn University, 1966; J.D., Indiana University, 1970. 1 President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration op Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society vi (1967). 228 C.F.R. §42.301 (a) (1974). 3In August 1973 the United States Department of Justice filed a civil suit against the Chicago Police Department to enforce equal employment op- portunity regulations. Chicago employs approximately 13,500 police officers, 297 298 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 gree they are being accommodated. 4 The Police Foundation has backed a major study of policewomen on patrol,5 and women are entering law schools and the legal profession in significantly in- creasing numbers.6 However, rarely do women reach executive, professional, or managerial positions within the ICJS. 7 In con- trast, more and more women are moving into similar positions in business and industry.8 The basic question addressed by this Article is : Do statutory employment requirements, express or implied, discourage or pre- clude applications by women for or promotion of women to execu- tive, professional, or managerial positions within the Indiana Criminal Justice System? The answer given is necessarily of limited scope. At this initial stage, only one category of factors affecting the entire Indiana Criminal Justice System is consid- ered—Indiana's statutes and their implications as well as issues raised in sex discrimination cases. An examination of informal agency policies and other organizational considerations is left to a later study. Although this Article is confined to the Indiana Criminal Justice System, that system is not unique and the problems dis- cussed have implications for other criminal justice systems. Within the ICJS are included the state, county, city, and town agents and agencies designated to detect criminal offenses, to apprehend crim- inal offenders, to prosecute, defend, and adjudicate accused per- sons, and to "correct" those who are convicted of committing crimes. While this is designated as a singular system, it is recog- nized that the ICJS is more accurately viewed as a collagenous assembly of town marshals, supreme court justices, state troopers, city judges, attorneys general, and private defense attorneys. As of which 115 (0.85 percent) are women. See LEAA Newsletter, November •1973, at 24. 4Some agencies are actively seeking women for entry level criminal justice positions. See Pogrebin, The Working Woman, Ladies Home Journal, September 1973, at 36. 5 P. Bloch & D. Anderson, Policewoman on Patrol (1974). 6The 1973 enrollment of women in law school is nine times the 1963 enrollment, 1,883 to 16,760. Women now comprise 15.6% of the total en- rollment in approved law schools. Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School En- rollment is Portia, 60 A.B.A.J. 182 (1974). 7Reference to the Appendix will indicate the very few women in the ICJS. See also Ellett, Monroe Has Only Female Deputy Prosecutor in State, Bloomington-Bedford Sunday Herald-Times, Dec. 9, 1973, at 2, col. 1; Scutt, Woman Wields Gavel in Superior Court, Bloomington-Bedford Sunday Herald- Times, Nov. 26, 1972, at 22, col. 3. &See generally Orth & Jacobs, Women in Management: Pattern for Change, 49 Harv. Bus. Rev. 139 (July-Aug. 1971). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 299 incongruous as such a collage may be, this "system" does have a singular concern—crime and society's public response to it. To further narrow its scope to a manageable dimension, this Article focuses upon those federal and state laws affecting the ICJS positions of concern. Some of these laws explicitly exclude certain classes of persons ; others impliedly include certain classes of persons; others are a combination of these approaches. In any event, this Article is concerned with the legal environment of these ICJS positions. Its conclusions are directed toward changes in the law or changes in practice to more closely comply with present laws. Moreover, the ICJS positions of interest here are profes- sional, managerial, and executive positions. Generally, the au- thors have defined these positions as those requiring advanced training and education, involving mental rather than manual work, requiring primarily the control or direction of others, or involv- ing the administration of a collection of several functions. 9 Specifically, this study includes such Indiana law enforce- ment officials as town marshals, chiefs of police, sheriffs, the state police superintendent, and middle-management positions within larger law enforcement agencies. Also included are county prosecutors and their deputy prosecutors as well as the Indiana Attorney General and those members of his (no woman has ever held the post) staff who deal with criminal prosecutions. Public defenders and private attorneys who handle a significant number of criminal cases are covered as are judges with criminal juris- diction, such as town, city, and county judges, judges of the court of appeals, and supreme court justices. In the corrections field the study encompasses state institution heads, state division heads and other middle-management positions, local jail supervisors, county probation officers with adult criminal probationers, and state parole officers with adult criminal parolees. Those ICJS positions not mentioned above are excluded from this study but cannot be ignored. For example, if police chiefs are chosen from the law enforcement agency's lower ranks and agency entrance is possible only at the patrol officer level, then there will be no women police chiefs if there have been no women patrol officers. The study also excludes consideration of such posi- tions as bailiffs, justices of the peace, and prison guards. The various juvenile justice positions are also not covered unless they incorporate criminal justice responsibilities as well. The next section discusses the general phenomenon of women and employment in 1974. Following is an examination in detail of the specific statutory requirements for employment within the 'Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language 1437, 1095, 639 (2d ed. unabridged 1967). 300 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 ICJS. The fourth section examines the discriminatory effect of these specific statutory requirements. The Article closes with a description of the authors' recommended ICJS affirmative ac- tion plan. II. Women and Employment Criminal justice systems, including the ICJS, are not very different from other institutions in terms of employment policies and practices pertaining to professionals, executives, and man- agers. Many of the same limitations, restraints, and roadblocks which have prevented women from being employed in or pro- moted to such positions in other institutions are found in the ICJS. Therefore, before turning to the ICJS material this sec- tion explores some general notions about women and employment. First, it examines the dimensions of women in employment, gen- erally, and in professional positions. Secondly, it introduces the legal environment surrounding women in employment. The problems of equal rights and employment opportunities for women are pervasive. In 1973, there were over 34.8 million women in the work force, comprising 38.5% of the total labor pool. 10 Of these women, 18.5 million, representing 59%, were married and living with their husbands. There is a concentration of women in low-paying, dead-end jobs. As a result, the average woman worker earns about three-fifths of what a man earns, 11 and a fully employed woman high school graduate receives less income on the average than a fully employed man with less than eight years of schooling. These figures must be understood in the context of the rea- sons why women work. Most women work because of economic need; two-thirds of all women workers are single, divorced, wid- owed, or separated, or have husbands who earn less than $7,000 a year. 12 About one out of nine families is headed by a woman, and among poor families, almost two out of five. Approximately three out of ten black families are headed by a woman; the ratio in poor black families is almost three out of five. Other women 10 Statistics mentioned in this section are from the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor. n In 1971 the median incomes for full-time, year-round work were: white men, $9,373; minority men, $6,598; white women, $5,490; and minority women, $4,674. 12The working wife's income frequently raises the family above the poverty level. In 1970 classified as poor were those non-farm families of four with total income of less than $4,000. In husband-wife families, fourteen percent are poor if the wife does not work; four percent are poor if the wife does work. 1974] WOMEN IN THE 1CJS 301 work because of other, non-monetary needs, that is, for the same reasons many men work—psychological fulfillment, ego-gratifi- cation, and a desire to succeed. Moreover, not only are women working in increasing numbers but they have also begun to break out of traditionally female occupations. 13 Women are moving into "executive suites" in increasing num- bers. For example, women are being promoted to supervisory and managerial positions by manufacturing companies. Banks are moving women from teller positions to branch managers. Insur- ance companies have encouraged women to assume positions in sales. 14 And there has been a small increase in the number of women with graduate degrees during the past decade. 15 How- ever, the percentage of women in particular fields has declined since the 1920's. Today women constitute about one percent of all engineers, 3.5 percent of all lawyers, seven percent of all phy- sicians, eight percent of all scientists, and nine percent of all full professors in the field of academics. 16 Generally there exists a scarcity of information about women in the professions. What is available often is outdated and does not take into account the effects of recent legislative changes or of the revitalized women's movement. The first congressional committee hearings concerning discrimination on the basis of sex, however, provided an opportunity to gather descriptive informa- tion and to make public the breadth, depth, and pervasiveness of sex discrimination in education, the labor market, the professions, government, and even in the law itself. 17 By describing the status ,3 Steinem, If We're So Smart, Why Aren't We Rich, 1 Ms. 37, 127 (June 1973). MBralove, Where the Boys Are, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 18, 1974, at 1, col. 6. 15The number of women graduate and doctoral business students has increased from 3.1% to 5.5% of all such students in five years. Bralove, supra note 14. Law school enrollment of women in 1973 was nearly nine times the enrollment of women in 1963. Ruud, supra note 6. There has also been a similar increase in the number of women lawyers but as a percentage of all lawyers their number has only barely increased. Discrimination Against Women, Congressional Hearings on Equal Rights in Educa- tion and Employment 502 (C. Stimpson ed. 1973) (statement of attorney Margaret Laurance) [hereinafter cited as Stimpson]. 16Stimpson, supra note 15, at 4 (comment by subcommittee chairperson Edith Green). wId. at ix, x (foreword by Edith Green). The special subcommittee hearings were based on a consideration of H.R. 16,098, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. §805 (1970), directed at discrimination against women. The bill provided for four changes in equal opportunity laws: (1) amendment of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in federally assisted programs; 302 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 of women in various professions we may better understand the professional women in the criminal justice system and incidentally dispel the "popular wisdom" that women are already powerful and "more equal." Information available in 1970 showed that women constituted more than forty percent of all white collar workers. However, only one out of ten working women was in a management posi- tion and only one out of seven professional jobs was filled by a woman. The resulting gap in earnings was such that in 1968 only three percent of the women workers had incomes of at least $10,000, whereas among men twenty-eight percent earned at least that much. 18 Or to describe the situation in another way, ninety- four percent of all jobs which pay at least $15,000 a year are held by white men; women and minority men hold the remaining six percent. 19 One professional area studied was business. Given business' overall concern for productivity and profits one might anticipate that it would be far easier for a woman to be successful there if she were good. However, a recent survey of twenty top organiza- tions 20 showed that not only do women face substantial barriers in their rise to the top, but the need to constantly caution firms to hire only "qualified" women belied the firms' commitment to individual worth. One never sees the caution "hire only qualified men." Of course, one would expect a firm to hire and promote on the basis of ability and qualifications; to assume it would not do so in regard to women employees or applicants is only one illustration of the fact that women are considered in a different way, in a different light, from men. The survey of twenty prominent employers included ten in- dustrial companies from among the top one hundred companies on the Fortune "500" list. Five of the ten surveyed were among the top twenty. The other ten organizations, such as diversified financial institutions and retailers, were on the Fortune "50 (2)' removal of the educational institution exemption from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e; (3) removal of the exception of executive, administrative, and pro- fessional employees from the equal pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and (4) authorization of the Civil Rights Commission to study discrim- ination against women. Although this particular House bill was defeated in 1970, by 1972 the aims of section 805 had been realized. See text accompanying note 46 infra. 18 Stimpson, supra note 15, at 502-03 (statement of Margaret Laurance). 19 Steinem, supra note 13, at 126. 20Fretz & Hayman, Progress for Women—Men Are Still More Equal, 51 Harv. Bus. Rev. 133, 134 (Sept.-Oct. 1973). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 303 largest" list. In these twenty corporations, which employed ap- proximately two million people, women represented thirty-six per- cent of the total work force. On the other hand, women officials, managers, and professionals accounted for less than one percent. 2 ' Not only were attitudes of employers reflected in this study but also mirrored was the fact that men are still considered better risks for managerial training positions. 22 Further, "equal pay for equal work," although always a stated policy, was rarely a prac- tice. 23 The study concluded from all the available data that women professionals perform on an equal level with men professionals. However, it showed that bias against women still exists. For example, women were not judged as seriously as men, or the judg- ment of a woman's performance was affected by the negative atti- tudes of her colleagues. The authors listed three sources of nega- tive reactions : other supervised women, men who feel threatened by a woman's advancement, and minority group employees who may fear being slighted or ignored because of the company's con- cern about women.24 Because of the stereotyped attitudes of their colleagues, many women in management must tread carefully. On the one hand, a woman cannot show emotion for fear of being labeled tempermental and must remain low-keyed to halt subordi- nates' ideas that she is "shrill." On the other hand, if a woman manager is timid, hesitant or nervous, she has confirmed the female stereotype.25 Employment under these contradictions and traps is a strain; most men are allowed a wider range of accept- able emotions and more personality variations are successfully tolerated. Another profession studied was science and engineering. The National Research Council recently completed a survey of the na- tion's doctorate-level scientists and engineers, 26 detailing unem- ployment levels, salaries, and types of employment positions. For the 244,900 doctoral scientists and engineers, in 1973 the unem- ployment rate was 1.2 percent. Women, who constituted nine per- cent of the doctoral population, reported an unemployment of 3.9 percent while that of men was only 0.9 percent. The 1973 median annual salary was $20,890; the highest median salary, $22,490, was in engineering, the area with the lowest percentage of women. The women's median salary was $17,620, $3,500 less than that of 2} ld. 22Id. at 133. 23Id. at 137. 24Id. at 140. 25Bralove, supra note 14. 26The survey was sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences in 1973. A complete copy of the report is on file at the Office of Research and Advanced Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. 304 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 the men. Of the various employment positions, approximately sixty percent of the working population studied were employed by educational institutions; more than twenty percent held posi- tions in business and industry. Over forty percent of those work- ing were engaged in research and development and its adminis- tration; an additional thirty-eight percent were in teaching. Seventy-five percent of the women were concentrated in the areas of biosciences, psychology, and social sciences. Because the woman doctoral scientist or engineer often fits also into the category of women doctorates as academicians, one should consider some of the attitudinal problems these women face in the context of academics. For example, a 1969 study of the woman doctorate by Helen Astin dealt in part with obstacles en- countered in a professional woman's career development. In Astin's sample of 1460 women doctorates, nine out of ten were working, although over half were married and had families.27 In fact, the problem of adequate and dependable help, housekeeper or baby- sitter, was considered the greatest obstacle encountered by these women. Unexplained salary differentials, tenure, and promotion policies, which included mandatory maternity leaves, and the usual subtle types of discrimination which prove harder to assess28 were forms of perceived employer discrimination mentioned by the women surveyed. Interestingly, the percentage of degrees earned by women has not continually grown since the turn of the century but in fact peaked during the 1930's and 1940's. At the bachelor degree level, women received nineteen percent of the degrees at the turn of the century, forty percent in the early 1960 , s and forty-three percent during the latter part of that decade. At the master's degree level, women accounted for nineteen percent of the degrees at the turn of the century, thirty-eight percent in 1940 and thirty- two percent in the early 1960's. At the doctorate degree level, women earned six percent in the early 1930,s, thirteen percent in 1940 and eleven percent in the 1960's.29 In 1969-1970, there were 29,866 doctoral degrees granted; women accounted for 3,976, or approximately thirteen percent.30 Since graduate training is essential to an academic career, it is apparent that women in higher education have been losing 27H. Astin, The Woman Doctorate in America (1969), reprinted in Stimpson, supra note 15, at 449. ™Id. at 451. 29 Rossi, Discrimination and Demography Restrict Opportunities for Academic Women, 48 College and University Business 74 (Feb. 1970), reprinted in Stimpson, supra note 15, at 455. 30U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Digest of Educational Statistics 90 (1971). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 305 ground. In 1870, one-third of the faculty in the country's col- leges and universities were women. Today women comprise only about one-fourth of the total. At prestigious universities in the "Big Ten," women hold ten percent or less of the faculty posi- tions. 3 ' For example, in 1973 at Indiana University, Bloomington, only one out of thirty-five distinguished professors was a woman. Thirty-three full professors, 38 associate professors, 64 assistant professors and 6 instructors were women out of totals of 555, 405, 405, and 29 respectively,32 making up a total of 143 women out of 1429 positions. In defense of these statistics it is often alleged that there is a lack of qualified women who hold doctorates in certain areas. Defenders also point to the fact that a higher percentage of women doctorates go into college or university teaching than do similarly educated men.33 But, while women earn 24% of the English doc- toral degrees awarded nationally, 28% of the English degrees from the fifteen top schools, and 21% of the English degrees at Indiana University, women faculty members comprise only 8.3% of the total English faculty at Indiana University, Bloomington. 34 Similar proportions exist in other disciplines. Once hired, women faculty are not immune from the unequal pay for equal work problem. One author places a good deal of responsibility upon typical departmental chairmen who have difficulty distinguishing between women on their respective faculties and their own home- maker wives.35 Also contributing to the problem are department chairmen who see nothing wrong with paying a woman less than a man if she is married because she does not need as much, or if she is not married, because she can get by on less. 36 Another professional area examined was medicine. Estimates by the Public Health Service indicate that by 1975 this country will need over 100,000 more physicians than are presently active.37 Since fewer than 8,000 physicians were graduated in June, 1967, the problem in this profession is slightly different from the mar- 31 Stimpson, supra note 15, at 415 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler). "Figures from the Office of Institutional Research, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. These totals exclude lecturers, visiting appointments, and other "academic" appointments such as counselors or research associates. In the fall of 1973 there were sixty-three tenured women faculty members. 33Stimpson, supra note 15, at 415 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler). 34Figures from the Office of the Dean for Women's Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. 35Rossi, supra note 29, at 77, reprinted in Stimpson, supra note 15, at 457. 36Stimpson, supra note 15, at 417 (statement by Dr. Bernice Sandler). 37Women's Bureau, U.S. Department op Labor, Facts on Prospective and Practicing Women in Medicine (1968), reprinted in Stimpson, supra note 15, at 464. The following information is from that report. 306 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 ket academics face. In 1965-1966 women accounted for nine per- cent of the applicants and almost nine percent of the acceptances in medical schools. In that same year, of the women who applied, 47.7% were accepted; the figure for men was 48.2%. The study showed that women, who comprised 6.1% of the total active phy- sicians, tended to prefer practice in hospitals, teaching, preven- tive medicine, administration, or research rather than private practice. In 1965, at least ten percent of all physicians engaged in anesthesiology, pediatrics, physical medicine and rehabilitation, preventive medicine, psychiatry, public health, and pulmonary diseases were women.38 The results of a survey studying attitudes of members of the medical profession toward women physicians demonstrated no substantial difference from attitudes expressed by other profes- sionals toward their female colleagues.39 Women were basically suspect characters and carefully screened to ensure their commit- ment to medicine. The survey also revealed a strong reluctance to deal with or provide for pregnancy and childbearing situations. Finally, consideration is given to the status of women in the legal profession. 40 There were in 1970 over 8,000 women lawyers in the United States. Although the federal government is deemed the most nondiscriminatory employer of women, the percentage of women attorneys holding federal positions declined from 7% in 1959 to 6.2% in 1969. Women tend to be hired at a lower grade and remain there longer than men. In other positions, such as judges and hearing examiners, the situation is worse.41 In law firms the situation is no less questionable. For example, a survey of forty major law firms in six different cities indicated there were only 186 women out of 2,708 attorneys.42 Once employed by a firm, a woman is likely to make much less money than her male colleague and will more often engage in trusts and estates, do- mestic relations, and tax work. Given these circumstances she is also less likely to become a partner.43 38When grouped in five categories women comprised the following per- centages of total physicians in each category: general practice, 5.2%; medical specialties, 8.6%; surgical specialties, 3.5%; psychiatry and neurology 11.5%; and other specialties, 7.4%. Id. at 474. 39H. Kaplan, Studying Attitudes of the Medical Profession Toward Women Physicians: A Survey Sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health (1969), reprinted in Stimpson, supra note 15, at 482. 40The material in this section is from a statement submitted to the Special Subcommittee on Education by Margaret Laurance, reported in Stimpson, supra note 15, at 502. 41 In 1970, only one percent of federal judges were women. Id. 42Id. at 505. 43An interesting and repeatedly quoted study is White, Women in the Law, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1051 (1967). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 307 The attitudes of members of the legal profession toward women are predictable as well as illustrative of attitudes held by other professionals. Law firms are concerned that a woman will marry and leave work, or if already married, will have children and quit. Women do marry but rarely cease working for that reason. 44 Women also have children and do sometimes stop work- ing on that account, although this withdrawal from work may be, and in fact usually is, temporary. This career interruption is re- lated to and affected by maternity leave provisions and problems of child care which will be discussed later. If a woman is already married and has older children, some employers will hesitate to hire her because they believe she is too old to train or does not have enough "productive" years left to make their investment worthwhile. Another concern expressed by law firms and a reason cited for considering a woman attorney "unqualified" is that cli- ents will not accept advice from a woman. Finally, there is the belief in almost all the professions that a woman's character and personality will handicap her performance. In the case of an at- torney it is often believed that she is not tough or analytical enough to be "successful." Although all these professions are for the most part covered by equal employment opportunity laws which are outlined below, the status of women as professionals is not equal to that of men. This inequality results, as has been pointed out, from traditional attitudes, acceptance of stereotypes, and a general belief that women are innately unqualified. In a survey of 163 companies45 some of the suggestions offered to foster compliance with equal opportunity laws and to overcome the above listed obstacles in- cluded the adoption of effective affirmative action programs, a national emphasis on hiring and promoting women, and the use of role models. The authors agree. Some of the ideas and infor- 44Id. at 1066. 45In December, 1971, the Bureau of National Affairs conducted a study among the BNA's Personnel Policies Forum and received responses from 163 nationwide companies. There were ninety-eight large companies with one thousand or more employees, fifty-eight percent of which were manufacturing, twenty-eight percent non-manufacturing, and fifteen percent non-business. In a majority of these firms women accounted for five percent or less of the first level supervisors, middle management, and professional staffs. How- ever, fifty-eight percent of the companies stated that they had more women in management positions than ever before. Three-fourths of the companies had no women in top management. Cited as obstacles for women were lack of qualification and education and stereotyped roles or prejudices. Most companies perceived more discrimination against women in the industry as a whole than within their own companies. Fair Empl. Prac. Manual, Com- pany Policies and Practices 490:601. 308 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 mation presented in this Article are intended to simplify attain- ment of these objectives. Several federal and state laws and regulations are relevant to women and employment practices within the ICJS. At the federal level these include the equal opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,46 the Fair Labor Standards Act,47 Executive Order 11,246 relating to employment by federal contractors,48 and provisions of the United States Constitution. 49 At the state level there are the Indiana Civil Rights Law50 and local ordinances which regulate employment practices in cities and counties.5 ' The following is a brief introduction to the relevant portions of each. An analysis of frequently raised issues is deferred until later. Basic to any understanding of equal opportunity laws is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.52 Not only does it provide that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual because of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, but also it bans discrimination in compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.53 More importantly, Title VII was amended in 1972 to include state and local governments as well as educational institutions in their 4642 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. Ill, 1973) [here- inafter referred to as Title VII]. 47Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970) ; Equal Pay Amend- ments of 1972, id. § 213(a) (Supp. Ill, 1973) ; Fair Labor Standards Amend- ments of 1974, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 615, 619 (1974). 4eExec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). A9E.g., U.S. Const, amend. XIV. S0Ind. Code §§22-9-1-1 to -12 (Burns 1973). 5] E.g., Bloomington, Ind., Municipal Code §§2.60.010 to .100 (1972). 5242 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. Ill, 1973). Since the July 2, 1965, effective date there has been a wealth of articles ex- plaining the ramifications of this statute, detailing various case law de- velopments, and recommending future changes. For a fairly complete pre- 1972 amendment article, see Developments in the Law: Employment Discrim- ination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196U, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments']. A fairly detailed bibli- ography may be found in 1 Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 78 (Winter-Spring 1972- 73). 5342 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (a)(1) (1970). The Act further provides that it is unlawful for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em- ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in- dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. §2000e-2(a)(2) (Supp. Ill, 1973) (emphasis added). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 309 roles as employers. 54 One particular provision of Title VII which affects most sex discrimination cases is the section dealing with the bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq).55 This provision allows an employer to hire or to employ persons on the basis of their sex only in those limited circumstances in which the em- ployee's sex is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 56 However, this exception has been very narrowly construed by the courts57 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as well.58 54 Id. § 2000e(b) defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal- endar year. . . ." An "employee" is defined as an individual employed by an employer, except that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political sub-division of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the pre- ceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political sub- division. Id. §2000e(f) (emphasis added). 55 Id. §2000e-2 (e)(1). 56Id. 57The first test of the EEOC's position and guidelines, see note 58 infra, was Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), which held that an employer must show a factual basis for his belief that women as a class would be unable to perform the job, which in that case involved lifting weight over thirty pounds. However, the Weeks decision did not go as far as it should have since the court would apparently uphold the rule if "substantially all" women could not perform. This standard is still based on characteristics associated with one sex, not individual capabilities. For other weight and hour limitation cases, see Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969) ; Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219 (CD. Cal. 1968), affd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). Another case interpreting the bfoq is Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), which held that customer preference was irrelevant in determining whether men were suitable for the job of flight cabin attendant. Essential to the court's holding was a very narrow definition of the job. A narrow interpretation of the bfoq exception is necessary if Title VII is to retain its force since it provided a potential loophole for employers who wish to continue discriminatory practices. Although inconsistent decisions were common during the first years of litigation, most courts accept the notion that the proof of a bfoq cannot be made by a commonly held stereotype. 58Title VII created the EEOC which is charged with the responsibility of administering the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970), as amended, (Supp. Ill, 1973). The Commission has the duty to seek voluntary conciliation of disputes; to bring civil actions against noncomplying employers, unions, and 310 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 The bfoq provision and the apparent need for its continual interpretation illustrates that the law generally, and equal oppor- tunity laws in particular, must deal with many myths about women workers. For example, women are often considered emotionally unstable and physically weak; hence, it is deemed necessary to protect them from physical and moral hazards. Or, since women really do not need to work, they are unlikely to be long-term employees. These and other traditional attitudes and stereotyped notions about women do not form the basis for a valid bfoq ex- ception. "Sex" itself is the occupational qualification. "It is only where the intrinsic attributes of one sex or the other are a neces- sary qualification for the job that the bfoq clause should come into play." 59 The policies expressed in Title VII and the EEOC's employment agencies, id. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. Ill, 1973); and to promul- gate guidelines, id. §2000e-12(a) (1970). In the nine year history of the EEOC, the Commission has twice changed its position on the bfoq, especially in relation to state protective laws. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b), (c) (1966); 29 C.F.R. §1604.1 (b)(1), (2) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1973). Today its position is very clear. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1973) states: The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels —"Men's jobs" and "Women's jobs"—tend to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other. (1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational quali- fication exception: (i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment character- istics of women in general. For example, the assumption that the turnover rate among women is higher than among men. (ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive sales- manship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally at- tributed to the group. (iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the pref- erences of the coworkers, the employer, clients or customers except as covered specifically in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph. 59Developments, supra note 52, at 1179. See generally id. at 1176-86. The nature of the bfoq exception is more easily demonstrated if one re- members that Congress chose to ignore race-defined differences. An examina- tion of examples of religion and national origin bfoqs also reveals the meaning of the exemption. A theology professor at a religious college was a common example before the 1972 amendment which exempted all employ- ment decisions by religious institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (Supp. Ill, 1973). This amendment, however, raises serious first amendment problems. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 311 guidelines lead to the rejection of stereotyped employment deci- sions. Sex is to be considered irrelevant except in only rare cir- cumstances. Curiously, the overall policy expressed by this part of the civil rights legislation is one which is both conservative and traditional: the "work ethic." That is, if someone wants to work, no one should put artificial barriers in his or her way. A second federal statute which relates to women and employ- ment is the Fair Labor Standards Act.60 Of primary importance is the 1963 Equal Pay Act61 amendment which mandates equal pay for equal work regardless of sex. The most difficult problems posed by the statute are encountered in determining whether male and female workers are actually doing substantially the same work, and if so, whether any pay differential which exists is based on factors other than the employee's sex. Within the ICJS, such problems might arise in the context of whether a woman jail matron should receive the same compensation as a male turnkey. In 1972 the Equal Pay Act was amended62 to extend its coverage to professional, executive, and administrative personnel. Obvi- ously, the question of whether two executives are doing substan- tially the same work will pose even more difficult problems. The 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act63 extend its coverage to include individuals employed by state or local govern- ments subject to a rather typical exclusion of elected officials and policy makers.64 Thirdly, there are the provisions of Executive Order 11,246 65 which prohibit certain federal contractors from discriminating against any employee or applicant on the basis of sex, as well as race, religion, or national origin. This Order also requires "af- See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The example given in Congress was an Italian chef in an Italian restaurant. 110 Cong. Rec. 2549, 2583-93 (1964). This example should be refined to include only those cases in which the patrons are aware of the chef's nationality and feel that it is important. 6029 U.S.C. §§201-19 (1970), as amended, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 615 (1974). 61 Act of June 10, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, §3, 77 Stat. 56, amending 29 U.S.C. §206 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970)). 62Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(1), 86 Stat. 375, amending 29 U.S.C. §213 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §213 (Supp. Ill, 1973)). "Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 615 (1974), amending 29 U.S.C. §§201-19 (1970). b4 Id. § 6(a) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 619 (1974). See also 42 U.S.C. §2000e(f) (Supp. Ill, 1973). 65 3 C.F.R. 402 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) ; Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 446 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). The Order covers those con- tractors who receive more than $10,000. 312 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 firmative action" 66 by employers to ensure that applicants are em- ployed and that employees are treated equally during employment, without regard to their race, sex, religion, or national origin. A fourth federal standard relevant to employment policies and practices of governmental employers is the Constitution. The due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend- ment provide some degree of protection against arbitrary dis- crimination for women who work for state and local governments or their agencies. 67 The employer not only must provide "equal protection" but must also allow the woman employee her first amendment freedoms. Before the recent federal amendments to Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act, these constitutional protections were very important, although limited somewhat in their reach. 68 66For a detailed discussion of affirmative action, see text accompanying note 339 infra. Although the Department of Labor, Office of Federal Con- tract Compliance (OFCC) has primary authority for enforcement of the Executive Order, the OFCC has, in many cases, delegated that authority. In the present case, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has been designated. See note 341 infra. 67The extent of protection provided government employees is presently unsettled and depends upon the particular issues and facts. Recently the Supreme Court struck down mandatory maternity leaves for public school teachers primarily on the basis of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) ; denied fifth amendment due process claims by federal employees, Arnett v. Kennedy, 94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974); Sampson v. Murray, 94 S. Ct. 937 (1974); and dis- tinguished fourteenth amendment claims of untenured college professors, Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). The Court also upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2) (1970), in United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). How- ever, the Court let stand a circuit court decision which held that the dis- missal of non-civil service public employees on the basis of membership in or support of a political party violated the employees' fourteenth amendment rights, Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 410 U.S. 908, 943 (1973). For a critique of the use of federal courts as forums for employment- due process suits, see Mohr & Willett, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of Employee Access to the Federal Courts: Promotion and Termination, 8 Valparaiso L. Rev. 303 (1974). 68 It is more certain that a government employer must provide its em- ployee "equal protection." Section 1983 has been the usual mode for raising such fourteenth amendment constitutional questions: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 1974] WOMEN IN THE 1CJS 313 Relevant state statutes which regulate employment practices are the Indiana Civil Rights Law69 and various local ordinances. The Indiana Civil Rights Law provides for equal opportunity in employment as well as in education, housing, and public conveni- ences and accomodations in order "to eliminate segregation or separation based solely on race, religion, color, sex, national origin or ancestry/' 70 Under the Indiana Law an "employer includes the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, and any person employing six or more persons within the state," 71 and an employee is defined as "any person employed by another for wages or sal- ary." 72 This Act also contains authority for cities and counties to set up their own local equal opportunity commissions.73 These laws, although their origins differ, are consistent in the demands they place upon employers. Their basic aim is to en- courage, indeed force, employers to review employment practices and to insure that decisions are made on the basis of individual capacities and capabilities rather than on stereotyped images and characteristics. Of course, these statutes and regulations may be affected by the "police powers" limitation or their status made dependent upon the legislative authority of the city, town, or county which enacts them, but they are, the authors believe, crucial. 74 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970). Thus, when state or individual action deprives persons of rights secured by the federal Constitution or a federal statute, section 1983 provides a cause of action for damages and injunctive or other equitable relief. For some representative cases, see text accompanying notes 286, 293 infra. But just as the Supreme Court had been hesitant to declare classifications based on sex unconstitutional until recently, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the lower courts have exhibited the same reluctance to apply section 1983. It is curious that the Supreme Court changed its position at about the same time that Title VII was extended to government and educational employees and the Equal Rights Amendment was submitted to the states. 69Ind. Code §§22-9-1-1 to -12 (Burns 1974). 70Id. § 22-9-1-2. 7 'Id. § 22-9-1-3 (h). 72 Id. § 22-9-1-3 (i). 73 Id. § 22-9-1-12. For example, Bloomington's Human Rights Commission is patterned directly after the Indiana Commission and uses the same language in its ordinance with similar definitions of "employer" and "employee." Bloomington, Ind., Municipal Code §§ 2.60.010 to .100 (1972). 74Title VII, the Indiana Civil Rights Law, and the Bloomington Human Rights Commission ordinance have similar procedures, including specific time limitations, and have established broad remedial powers such as the power to order affirmative action, reinstatement, upgrading and compensatory dam- ages. The state and municipal commissions are further empowered to issue cease and desist orders which are enforceable through appropriate courts. There are, in addition to those cited, other laws which regulate discrimination in employment. For example, age discrimination laws exist at both the federal 314 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 III. ICJS Employment Requirements In light of this background concerning women and employ- ment and the general legal environment thereof, this section turns now to the specific statutory requirements for certain ICJS execu- tive, managerial and professional positions. In the next section these specific requirements will be analyzed for their possible discriminatory effects on women. A. Law Enforcement Officials The notion of women in law enforcement is not a new con- cept in this country. The Los Angeles Police Department began hiring women for full-time police service in 1910. 75 Historically policewomen were hired to assist with adult women and juvenile suspects. 76 Despite media rhetoric to the contrary, the police- woman's role today has not changed much from those early years. 77 Particularly noteworthy, though, is the increasing use of police- women in rape cases.78 There has been increasing public interest in the status of women in law enforcement in Indiana. 79 College coeds in Indiana and state level. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1970) ; Ind. Code §§ 22-9-2-1 to -11 (Burns 1974). Furthermore, if a union is involved an employer may be under other constraints, including a duty of fair representation analogous to the one under the National Labor Relations Act. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Finally, one commentator has advanced the argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) may properly be invoked in a suit for sex discrimination and is indeed preferable. See Stanley, Sex Dis- crimination and Section 1981, 1 Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 2 (Spring 1973). In most of the following discussion we will focus on the specific require- ments and legal interpretations of Title VII since it is the most inclusive and has the most case law development. 75E. Graper, American Police Administration 226 (1921) ; C. Owings, Women Police: A Study of the Development and Status of the Women Police Movement 99 (1925). 76E. Graper, supra note 75, at 228-29. 77P. Bloch & D. Anderson, supra note 5, at 49; President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Administration, Task Force Report on the Police 125 (1967). 78In 1973 the New York City Police Department established the Sex Crimes Analysis Unit within the Detective Bureau to handle sex crimes. This unit is staffed by twenty-six female detectives and is headed by Lt. Mary L. Keefe. Cottell, Rape—The Ultimate Invasion of Privacy, 43 F.B.I. LAW Enf. Bull. 2 (May 1974). For a description of Miami's experience, see Garmire, Female Officers in the Department, 43 F.B.I. Law Enf. Bull. 11 (June 1974). 79See, e.g., Indiana Daily Student, Mar. 8, 1974, at 5, col. 3 (Professor Backs More Policewomen) ; Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Mar. 2, 1974, at 8, col. 1 (Opportunities Are Limited in Criminal Justice Field for Women) ; id., Feb. 22, 1974, at 10, col. 7 (Ginny Wasser Is County's 1st Female Candidate for Sheriff) ; Indianapolis Star, Aug. 8, 1973, at 34, col. 7 (Use of Policewomen in New Jobs Indicated). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 315 are considering law enforcement careers in increasing numbers.80 In contrast, the Indiana State Police has no female officers and until 1973 accepted applications only from men. 61 Although some women applicants have passed preliminary screening by the In- diana State Police, 82 none has yet become Indiana's first state policewoman.83 Nationwide, women not only are entering law en- forcement at the patrol level but also are beginning to move into positions such as investigators, desk sergeants, and commanders, as well as into other middle-level executive and management posts. 84 The scarcity of women at these levels in Indiana seems to be a phenomenon rare within the ICJS.85 Thus, this study turns to a survey of the legal qualifications for such middle and upper level ICJS law enforcement positions to determine if the impedi- ments lie there. On March 9, 1945, Indiana's State Police Department was created by statute86 under the administration, management, and control of the State Police Board with a governor-appointed Super- intendent of the State Police. The Superintendent is the executive officer and has general charge of the work of the department. The express statutory qualifications provide that: The superintendent shall be selected on the basis of train- ing and experience, and shall have served at least five (5) years as a police executive, or have had five (5) years' experience in the management of military, semi-military or police bodies of men, to equip him for the position ^Approximately twenty percent of upperclass female undergraduates majoring in forensic studies at Indiana University, Bloomington in Septem- ber of 1973 indicated that they plan to seek employment in law enforcement occupations. V. Streib, Forensic Studies Students and Their Evaluation of Forensic Studies, October 1973 (unpublished survey report in Department of Forensic Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana). 8 'Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, June 20, 1973, at 2, col. 1; Louis- ville Courier-Journal, Aug. 19, 1973, at A2, col. 1. The Indiana Civil Liberties Union has recently filed suit on behalf of an unsuccessful female applicant challenging the state police height requirement as discriminatory, Grose v. Bowen, Civil No. 74-396 (S.D. Ind., filed July 22, 1974). On September 16, 1974, the Indiana State Police Board voted three to two to eliminate the 5 foot 9 inch minimum. The minimum, if any, to be substituted was not revealed. The action by the Board presumably was in reaction to Crose. Indianapolis Star, Sept. 17, 1974, at 12, col. 1. 82Indianapolis Star, Sept. 8, 1973, at 24, col. 7. 63 Id., Oct. 19, 1973, at 21, col. 2. 84P. Bloch & D. Anderson, supra note 5, at 53; Pogrebin, supra note 4, at 36. 85 The Appendix to this Article reveals the extreme rarity of women in law enforcement in Indiana. 86Ind. Code § 10-1-1-1 (Burns 1973). 316 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 and shall possess training in police affairs or public administration. 87 The general tenor of the qualifications indicates that a male superintendent is contemplated. As noted above, Indiana's State Police Department has no female officers so of course no women have served five years as a police executive in that department. Almost as rare are women who have had five years of experience in the management of any military, semi-military or police bodies of men. Thus, the pool of prospective superintendent candidates with sufficient experience is noticeably short of women. The statute's training requirement for superintendents seems to be met by all state police employees,88 since no police employee is assigned to regular active duty until successful completion of training school. 89 The Superintendent, with the approval of the State Police Board, 90 determines the qualifications and prerequi- sites for the various middle-management positions 91 and appoints persons to those positions. 92 Thus, as is common in police agen- cies, state police employees enter at the "patrol" level and work their way up through the ranks. In Indiana the office of county sheriff has existed as a con- stitutional office since November 2, 1948.93 Sheriffs serve four year terms and may not serve more than eight years in any twelve year period. 94 As county officers, sheriffs are elected by the voters of the respective counties. 95 Moreover, a candidate for sheriff must be an elector of the county and an inhabitant of the county "during one year next preceeding his appointment."96 Sheriffs have general police powers within the county, manage the jail and prisoners therein, and serve court processes.97 They may appoint deputy sheriffs98 or county policemen99 and, with the approval of the sheriff's merit board if one exists, 100 determine 67Id. 88A police employee is an employee of the State Police Department who is assigned police work as a peace officer. Id. §10-1-1-2(3). °9Id. § 10-1-1-5. 90 Id. § 10-1-1-1. 9 Ud. § 10-1-1-3. "Id. § 10-1-1-4. 93Ind. Const, art. 6, § 11. 94Id. 95Id. art. 6, §2; Ind. Code §17-3-5-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §49-2801, Burns 1964). 96Ind. Const, art. 6, § 4. 97Ind. Code §§17-3-5-2, -3 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§49-2802, -2803, Burns 1964). 96Id. §§17-3-71-2, -13-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 49-1002, -2805). "Id. §§17-3-14-3, -6 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§49-2823, -2825). W0 Id. §17-3-14-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §49-2821). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 317 the qualifications and prerequisites for the various middle-man- agement positions and appoint persons to those positions.' ' Since the office of sheriff is elective in Indiana, working up through the ranks is not the sole means of access to that position. Although most successful sheriff candidates probably have had experience in law enforcement, the only mandatory requirement other than those mentioned above is election by the voters. Township constables are elected for four year terms102 and act as general conservators of the peace 103 throughout their re- spective counties' 04 with power to arrest fugitives anywhere in the state. 105 Township constables must reside and keep their of- fices within their respective townships.' 06 As with sheriffs, town- ship constables are elected, so the qualifications for office are primarily determined by the voters. The most prominent category of law enforcement officials for purposes of this study is chiefs of city police departments. Chiefs are appointed by the mayor with approval of the board of public safety in first class cities 107 of which in Indiana there is only one—Indianapolis. In Gary, 108 Evansville, 109 Michigan City, 1 ' and Hammond,'" the mayor has the sole power to appoint the police chief. Otherwise, police chiefs are appointed by the board of public safety in larger cities" 2 and by the board of metropoli- tan police commissioners" 3 in most smaller cities. A police chief of any city over 10,000 population must have had at least five years of continuous service with that city's police department im- mediately prior to appointment." 4 The Indianapolis police chief must be chosen from the ranks of lieutenant and above in that department," 5 and in Hammond the chief normally must be chosen from the ranks of captain or above." 6 In Evansville and Michi- ,01 7d. §17-3-14-6 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §49-2825). 102 7d. §3-1-18-1 (Burns 1972). y03 Id. §17-4-36-2 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §49-3403, Burns 1964). State v. Clements, 215 Ind. 666, 22 N.E.2d 819 (1939) ; Wiltse v. Holt, 95 Ind. 469 (1884); Vandeveer v. Mattocks, 3 Ind. 479 (1852). 104Ind. Code §17-4-36-5 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §49-3407, Burns 1964). ' 05Id. §17-4-36-7 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §49-3409). 106Ind. Const, art. 6, § 6. ,07 7d. §§ 19-1-7-1, -7 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§48-6204, -6210, Burns 1963). }06 Id. §§19-1-21-1, -3(b) (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§48-6241, -3(b)). 109 7d. §§ 19-1-29-1, -3(d) (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§48-6250, -6252(d)). U0Id. ' uId. §§19-1-14-1, -6 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§48-6260, -6265). 112 7d. §18-1-11-2 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6102). ,13 7d. §19-1-34-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6302). 1M7d. §§18-2-1-1.5, 19-1-27-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§48-1201, -6157). " 5Id. § 19-1-7-7 (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 48-6210). 116 7d. §19-1-14-6 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6265). 318 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 gan City, the appointment to chief can come from any rank,' 17 as in most smaller cities. 118 Promotion to any rank other than chief requires at least two years of continuous service with that city's police department im- mediately prior to promotion. 119 Under Indianapolis' merit sys- tem mental and physical qualifications, habits, conduct, service, and promotion school grades are considered in promotion selec- tions. 120 In Indianapolis, the captain of traffic, the chief of detec- tives, and the inspectors of police are chosen by the Board of Public Safety upon nomination by the chief of police from the ranks of lieutenant or above. 121 Evansville and Michigan City have an elaborate statutory scheme for promotion. In rating for pro- motion purposes, the grade received on a written examination is fifty percent of the rating, past performance record is forty per- cent of the rating, and seniority is ten percent of the rating. 122 Promotions to any rank for detective candidates are made from the rank of corporal. 123 Since promotion to an executive or managerial law enforce- ment position requires prior service with that law enforcement agency, 124 the fundamental screening takes place at the entry level. Employment for women at the entry level is outside the scope of this study but will be considered briefly since it is the first hurdle for would-be Indiana police executives and managers. Typically new appointees to large Indiana city police departments must meet residency, age, police record, education and various examination requirements. 125 " 7Id. § 19-1-29-3 (d) (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 48-6252 (d) ). ]]&Id. §19-1-34-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6302). u9Id. §19-1-27-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6157). }20Id. §19-1-7-3 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6206). 12, Jd. §19-1-7-7 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6210). 122M §19-1-29-3 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6252). 123 Jd. §19-1-29-3 (b)(3) (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 48-6252 (b) (3)). In Ham- mond, promotion is based upon seniority (40%), written examination (40%), past performance (10%), and personal interview (10%). Id. §19-1-14-14 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6273). Political affiliation is expressly irrelevant to the promotion decision. Id. §19-1-14-17 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6276). 124M §19-1-27-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6157). ' 25E.g., id. §§19-1-2-1, -7-1, -21-4, -14-8, -29.5-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§48- 6106, -6204, -6244, -6267, -6288, Burns Supp. 1974). Typically, pros- pective officers must: (1) reside in the city of which an appointee, (2) be be- tween twenty-one or twenty-three and thirty-three years of age, (3) have no felony convictions, (4) be certified for participation in the pension plan, (5) pass a preliminary physical and aptitude examination, (6) successfully complete police candidates' school, and (7) pass an examination covering the police candidates' school plus physical condition, mental alertness, character, habits, reputation, aptitude and general fitness. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 319 As early as 1905 Indiana statutorily provided for women in policing—at least as police matrons. 126 Police matrons' duties in- clude the search and care of all women prisoners and children who are arrested and detained in jail or at the station house. Her duties also include attendance at proceedings involving women or children. Although the police matron has all the authority of a police officer, the qualifications for the position are unique: Such police matron shall not be under thirty-five (35) years of age, shall be fully qualified and shall be of good moral character. Before appointment, she must be rec- ommended in writing by not less than twenty (20) women and five (5) men, all of whom shall have been residents of such city for at least five (5) years next previous to such appointment. 127 In 1919 a statute was passed expressly empowering the Indianap- olis Board of Safety to appoint women as regular members of the police force.' 28 Moreover, the Indiana Supreme Court held in 1935 that a second class city board of public safety had the au- thority to appoint a woman to serve in a capacity other than a police matron. 129 With the exception of the special situation of the police ma- tron, statutory requirements for police applicants apparently do not discriminate against women and at least in one case expressly establish women as appropriate candidates. Similarly, there is no explicit sex discrimination in the qualifications for promotion to the various ranks, including that of chief. Further analysis of these laws will be found in the next section of this Article. B. Court Officials Indiana court officials—prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges—are extremely powerful agents within the Indiana Crim- inal Justice System. Of course, these officials are lawyers, and the discrimination against women which has long pervaded the legal profession in this country 130 has had its effect on the role of women in the courts. Although women are entering Indiana law schools in record numbers, women law graduates who become criminal prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, or criminal court judges ]26 Id. §18-1-11-17 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6123, Burns 1963). ,27 /d. 128 /d. §19-1-17-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §48-6203). ,29Snowden v. Stackert, 207 Ind. 442, 193 N.E. 586 (1935). 1 30Dinerman, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession, 55 A.B.A.J. 951 (1969) ; Kass, A Woman's View of Law School, 15 Student L.J. 4 (1969) ; Sassower, The Legal Profession and Women's Rights, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 54 (1970) ; White, supra note 43. 320 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 are still exceptionally rare. 131 Again this section will examine Indiana's laws to see if the reason lies there, looking at the quali- fications for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and then judges at each political subdivisional level. Women prosecutors are uncommon132 and often are seen as appropriate primarily for cases involving crimes against women, particularly rape. 133 At the state level, the Indiana Attorney Gen- eral represents Indiana in all criminal cases before the Indiana Supreme Court. 134 By statute, the Attorney General must be a citizen of Indiana, licensed to practice law in Indiana, and elected by Indiana voters. 135 The Attorney General can select and appoint Deputy Attorneys General who must be citizens of Indiana licensed to practice law in the state. 136 In each judicial circuit the voters elect a prosecuting attorney. 137 Prosecuting attorneys must have been admitted to the practice of law in Indiana prior to the elec- tion and must reside within their circuits. 138 The office is con- stitutional 139 and the prosecuting attorney can appoint deputies. As with the office of sheriff, women qualified to be Attorney Gen- eral or prosecuting attorney must be elected. No woman in Indi- ana has ever met that test. Another court-official position in the ICJS is the defense at- torney. Any woman admitted to the Indiana Bar is a criminal defense attorney from that moment on if she wishes to be. Al- though several states, notably California and New York, are ac- tively involved in specialization programs to certify only qualified attorneys as criminal law specialists, 140 Indiana still admits all 13 'See Appendix. 1 32Apparently Monroe County has the only woman serving as the chief deputy to a county prosecutor in Indiana. See Ellett, supra note 7. }33E.g., id.; Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Feb. 22, 1974, at 6, col. 1 (Female Prosecutors Get Rape Convictions). 134Ind. Code §4-6-2-1 (Burns 1974); State v. Sopher, 157 Ind. 360, 61 N.E. 785 (1901); Stewart v. State, 24 Ind. 142 (1865). 135Ind. Code §§4-6-1-2, -3 (Burns 1974). 136/d. §§4-6-1-4, -5-1, -5-2, -5-6, -5-6-1-1. 137Ind. Const, art. 7, §16; Ind. Code §33-14-1-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §49-2501, Burns 1964). 138Ind. Const, art. 7, § 16; State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. Moritz, 244 Ind. 156, 191 N.E.2d21 (1963) ; State ex rel. Howard v. Johnston, 101 Ind. 223 (1885). 139State ex rel. Neeriemer v. Daviess Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 624, 142 N.E.2d 626 (1957); State ex rel. Pitman v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355 (1874). 140The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York is informally certifying lawyers considered eligible for appointment to defend accused persons under the Criminal Justice Act, and the State Bar of California issues certificates of specialization in criminal law. See Note, Chief Justice Burger Proposes First Steps Toward Certification of Trial Advocacy Specialists, 60 A.B.A.J. 17 (1974). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 321 new lawyers to the general practice of law. 14 ' An applicant for admission to the Indiana Bar must (1) be at least twenty-one years of age; (2) be a citizen of the United States; (3) be of good moral character; (4) be a graduate of an approved law school; (5) successfully complete the bar examination; (6) be a bona fide resident of Indiana; and (7) have the intent to practice law in Indiana.' 42 In addition, non-Indiana attorneys can be admitted on foreign license, 143 and occasionally applicants are admitted on mo- tion without examination for military reasons. 144 The Indiana Supreme Court appoints another important offi- cial in the ICJS, the State Public Defender, who must be an Indi- ana resident and a practicing lawyer for at least three years. 145 Circuit court judges of certain larger counties also have the au- thority to appoint public defenders, 146 request the State Public Defender to provide a defense, 147 or contract with a local attorney or attorneys to regularly provide for the defense of indigent ac- cuseds. 148 A particularly interesting provision is relevant when the State Public Defender is requested by a circuit court judge to provide a defense for a particular case: the Public Defender may defend the case personally, assign a deputy, or appoint "any prac- ticing attorney who is competent to practice law in criminal cases" to defend the case. 149 This is the only statutory reference to the notion that criminal defense work may be a recognizable specialty not held by all practicing attorneys in Indiana. Thus, a woman could be a criminal defense attorney so long as she is admitted to the practice of law in Indiana and is selected by a criminal client or appointed by a judge. However, Indiana women lawyers are rare and Indiana women criminal defense law- yers are more uncommon still. 150 The one striking exception is Mrs. Harriette Bailey Conn, the present State Public Defender of Indiana. 141 Ind. Rules of Proc, Rule A.D. 3 (Burns Supp. 1974). }42 Id., Rules A.D. 13, 17, 21. Some of these requirements have been chal- lenged as discriminatory on the basis of the equal protection clause, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). However, there is no evidence to believe that these requirements have a disparate effect on women and should therefore be illegal on the basis of sex discrimination. For further discussion of the nature of the "disparate effect" argument, see text accompanying note 287 infra. ,43Ind. Rules of Proc, Rule A.D. 6 (Burns Supp. 1974). 144 /d., Rule A.D. 19. 145Ind. Code §33-1-7-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §13-1401, Burns 1956). yAbId. §35-11-1-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-3501, Burns Supp. 1974). 147/d. §33-9-11-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-3504). 148 /d. §33-9-10-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-3509). 149 itf. §33-9-11-2 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-3505). 1505ee Appendix. 322 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 Since courts are the center of the Indiana Criminal Justice System, the judges of those courts are powerful agents within that system. Women are infrequently judges 151 for many unarticulated reasons, but an analysis of Indiana's legal requirements for judges reveals no explicit bar to women. Qualifications for the judicial offices of the Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, cir- cuit courts, superior courts, criminal courts, county courts, mag- istrates courts, city courts, and municipal courts—all of which are involved in the Indiana Criminal Justice System in varying de- grees—are the next subject of examination. Since 1953 all Indi- ana judges at both the state and county levels must have been duly admitted to practice law in Indiana or have had previous experience as an Indiana judge. 152 Of course, if the judicial office is elective the prospective judge must meet the qualifications de- manded by the voters. Beyond these general judicial qualifications, certain judicial offices may have specific requirements. The Indiana Supreme Court has the power to review all ques- tions of law in criminal cases and to review and revise sentences imposed. 153 Thus, justices of this court are professionals within the ICJS. The justices are nominated by the Judicial Nominating Commission, 154 appointed by the governor, 155 and then approved or rejected by the voters every ten years. 156 Constitutional re- quirements for nomination are United States citizenship and either admission to the practice of law in Indiana for not less than ten years or service as an Indiana county judge for at least five years. 157 Statutory criteria to be considered by the Commission include legal education, legal writings, reputation in the practice of law, physical condition, financial interest, public service activi- ties, and any other pertinent information which the Commission feels is important in selecting the most highly qualified individ- uals for judicial office. 156 The Indiana Court of Appeals is also a 151 Scutt, supra note 7. Judge Sue Shields, Hamilton County Superior Court, is described as the highest woman judge in Indiana. See Appendix to identify the few women judges within the ICJS. 152 Ind. Code §33-13-9-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-6905, Burns 1968). 153Ind. Const, art. 7, §4. ' 55Id. art. 7, § 10. ]56Id. art. 7, §11. ' 57Id. art. 7, § 10. 158Ind. Code §33-2.1-4-7 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-7807, Burns Supp. 1974) provides that the Commission shall consider the following specific criteria: (1) Legal education, including law schools attended and post-law school education, and any other academic honors and awards achieved. (2) Legal writings, including but not limited to legislative draftings, legal briefs, and contributions to legal journals and publications. (3) Reputation in the practice of law, as evaluated by attorneys 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 323 part of the ICJS, since an absolute right of one appeal plus re- view and revision of sentences is provided in all criminal cases. 159 Constitutional requirements and statutory considerations 160 are the same for the judicial offices of the court of appeals as for the supreme court, with the additional requirement that court of ap- peals judges reside in the geographic district to which they are appointed. 161 These qualifications indicate no express sex discrimination, unless "physical condition" or "any other pertinent information" are interpreted to allow consideration of the candidate's sex. Of course, the experience qualification may well have a discrimina- tory effect on women since, as mentioned above, comparatively few women have attended law school or accumulated extensive experience as trial lawyers or judges. As with law enforcement agencies, 162 Indiana's judicial system normally assumes entry at a lower level judicial office followed by several years of satisfac- tory service before "promotion" to the supreme court or the court of appeals. This factor cannot be ignored in its impact upon women candidates. Indiana's circuit court judgeships are constitutional offices 163 with criminal jurisdiction. 164 Constitutional qualifications for the office are residence within the circuit and admission to the prac- tice of law in Indiana. 165 Circuit court judges are elected by the voters of the circuit. 166 No other statutory qualifications exist for circuit court judges, again leaving broad discretion with the voters. and judges with whom the candidate has had professional contact, and the type of legal practice, including experience and reputation as a trial lawyer or trial judge. (4) Physical condition, including general health, stamina, vigor and age. (5) Financial interests, including any such interest which might conflict with the performance of judicial responsibilities. (6) Activities in public service, including writings and speeches concerning public affairs and contemporary problems, and efforts and achievements in improving the administration of justice. ,59Ind. Const, art. 7, §6. ' b0Id. art. 7, §10; Ind. Code §33-2.1-4-7 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-7807, Burns Supp. 1974). 161 Ind. Const, art. 7, §10; Ind. Code §33-2.1-2-3 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-7713, Burns Supp. 1974). 162See text accompanying notes 75-129 supra. 163 Ind. Const, art. 7, § 1. 164 7d. art. 7, §8; Ind. Code §33-4-4-3 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-303, Burns 1968). 165Ind. Const, art. 7, §7. 166M; Ind. Code §3-4-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1974). In Vanderburgh County, elections occur only after a rejection of the incumbent at the primary election. Id. 324 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 More populous counties in Indiana have superior courts, 167 typi- cally with judges elected by the voters of that county. 168 In the counties of Allen, 169 Lake, 170 Saint Joseph, 171 and Vanderburgh,172 superior court judges are appointed by the governor after nomi- nation by the Judicial Nominating Commission. To be eligible for nomination, a person must be domiciled in the county, be a United States citizen, and be admitted to the practice of law in Indi- ana. 173 Eligible persons are evaluated by the Judicial Nominating Commission on statutory criteria similar to those employed in the selection of appellate court judges. 174 Political affiliations are ex- ]67E.g., Ind. Code §33-5-10-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-801, Burns 1968) (Clark County Superior Court); id. §33-5-8-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-601) (Bartholomew County Superior Court). Xb *Id. §33-5-8-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-601) (Bartholomew County); id, §33-5-9-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-701) (Boone County). 169Ind. Code §§ 33-5-5.1-30, -39, -41 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§4-530, -539, -541, Burns Supp. 1974) . }70 Id. §§33-5-39-28, -39 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§4-1928, -1939, Burns Supp. 1974). 17, /d. §§33-5-40-33, -50, -44 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§4-2634, -2651, -2645). W2 Id. §§33-5-43.5-3, -10, -12, -14 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§4-2995, -2995g, -2995i, -2995k) . W3 Id. §§33-5-5.1-38 (a), -29.5-36 (a), -40-41 (a), -43.5-11 (a) (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§4-538(a), -1936(a), -2642(a), -2995h(a)). ]74Id. §§ 33-5-5.1-38 (b), -29.5-36(b), -40-41(b), -43.5-ll(b) (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 4-538 (b), -1936(b), -2642(b), -2995h(b)) specify the following criteria. (1) Law school record, including any academic honors and achieve- ments ; (2) Contributions to scholarly journals and publications, legislative draftings, and legal briefs; (3) Activities in public service, including: (i) writing and speeches concerning public or civic affairs which are on public record, including but not limited to cam- paign speeches or writing, letters to newspapers, testimony before public agencies; (ii) government service; (iii) efforts and achievements in improving the administration of justice; (iv) other conduct relating to his profession. (4) Legal experience, including the number of years of practicing law, the kind of practice involved, and reputation as a trial lawyer or judge; (5) Probable judicial temperament; (6) Physical condition, including age, stamina, and possible habitual intemperance ; (7) Personality traits, including the exercise of sound judgment, ability to compromise and conciliate, patience, decisiveness and dedication ; (8) Membership on boards of directors, financial interest, and any other consideration which might create conflict of interest with a judicial office; 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 325 pressly exempted when considering eligible candidates for nomi- nation. 175 Elected superior court judges are subject to the expec- tations of voters. The nomination and appointment procedure does provide express factors for consideration, none of which are ex- pressly related to the sex of the candidate. Marion County's Criminal Courts 176 and Hancock County's County Court' 77 represent other county courts with criminal jur- isdiction. As with most other county court judges, these offices are elective, 178 with no particular qualifications save admission to the practice of law in Indiana. 179 First, second, third, and fourth class cities have city courts 180 with criminal jurisdiction. 181 City court judges are elected by voters of the city182 and typically must have been residents of the county in which the city is located for at least one year preceding the election. 183 Indianapolis has a municipal court 184 with criminal jurisdiction. 185 Municipal court judges are appointed by the governor after nomination by the Judicial Nominating Commission. 186 An eligible candidate must be admitted to the practice of law in Indiana, be a United States citizen, have been a practicing attorney or judge in Indiana for at least five years, and have been a resident and practicing attorney or judge in Marion County for at least the three years prior to appointment. 137 Of the fifteen municipal court judges, only eight can be affiliated with the same political party. 188 No mention of sex is made in any of the express factors for consideration of candidates. Although not part of the criminal justice system, the Lake and Marion County juvenile court judges may appoint at least three referees, and in the event that such officials are appointed, one shall be a woman189 in addition to (9) Any other pertinent information which the commission feels is important in selecting the best qualified individuals for judicial office. 75Id. §§ 33-5-5.1-38 (d), -29.5-36 (d), -40-41 (d), -43.5-11 (d) (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 4-538 (d), -1936(d), -2642(d), -2995h(d)). 76Id. §33-9-1-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-5701, Burns 1968). 77Id. §33-5.1-1-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-6401, Burns Supp. 1974). 7aId. §§33-5.5-1-1, -9-9-2 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§4-6401, -5725). 79Id. §§33-5.5-1-2, -13-9-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§4-6402, -6905, Burns 1968). &0 Id. §18-1-14-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-6001). d 'Id. §18-1-14-5 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-6002). 82/d. 63E.g., id. §33-13-11-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-6017). a4Id. §33-6-1-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-5801, Burns Supp. 1974). a5Id. §33-6-1-2 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-5802). a6Id. §33-6-1-12 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §4-5814). a7 Id. § 33-6-1-30 (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 4-5814 (a)). a0Id. a9Id. §33-12-2-17 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-3116). 326 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 being a United States citizen and a practicing attorney for a period of three years. 190 However, the sex of a candidate for judge of a court with criminal jurisdiction is not an express factor to be found within the laws of Indiana. C. Correction Officials The qualifications for executive, managerial, and professional positions within the ICJS corrections subsystem are much more explicit and detailed than for similar positions in other ICJS sub- systems. The Indiana Department of Correction 191 controls most of this correctional subsystem in the typical modes of probation, parole, and institutionalization. High educational achievement and several years of experience are typically required for upper level positions. Consideration turns first to the various mana- gerial and executive positions within the Department of Correc- tion, then to the officers of the various correctional institutions, and finally to probation and parole officers. 1. Department of Correction Officials The Board of Correction 192 determines department policy193 and is composed of seven members, including a practicing attor- ney, a social worker or sociologist, an educator, a psychologist or psychiatrist, someone familiar with the problems of juveniles, and two lay members. 194 Board members are appointed by the gov- ernor, 195 may not be officials of the state in any other capacity, and must be "qualified for their position by demonstrated in- terest in and knowledge of correctional treatment." 196 No more than four out of seven of the board members may belong to the same political party. 197 The Commissioner of the Department of Correction is its executive and administrative head. 198 Appointed by the gov- ernor, 199 the Commissioner must meet combined requirements of education and managerial and correctional experience 200 which are 1907d 191M ,927d 1937d ,94 7c? 1957d 1967d 1977d 198 7eZ '"Id 2007d §§11-1-1.1-1, -3 (Burns 1973). § 11-1-1.1-4. § 11-1-1.1-7. § 11-1-1.1-6. § 11-1-1.1-5. §11-1-1.1-4. § 11-1-1.1-5. § 11-1-1.1-9. § 11-1-1.1-11. § 11-1-1.1-12 provides that the Superintendent must meet the fol- lowing specific criteria. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 327 common to most of the executive and managerial positions within Indiana's Department of Correction. The Executive Officer of the Department is chosen by the Commissioner subject to the approval of the Board of Correc- tion. 201 Also chosen in this way are the Executive Director of Adult Authority, who has direct supervision of the heads of adult correctional institutions, 202 and the Executive Director of Youth Authority who has direct supervision of the heads of juvenile or youthful offender institutions. 203 To be eligible for these positions candidates must (1) "have . . . graduated with a bachelor's de- gree from an accredited college or university, and preferably be the recipient of an earned graduate degree" and (2) "have had eight years full-time paid experience in a correctional system, [at least five of which] must have been in a responsible super- visory or administrative capacity." 204 Graduate training in any behavioral science, administration, or other field appropriate to correctional work may be substituted on a year-for-year basis for general experience, not to exceed two years.205 The Department's Division of Probation exercises general supervision over the ad- ministration of probation in all Indiana courts and is headed by a Director. 206 The Director is employed by the Commissioner with the Board's approval, is directly responsible to the Director of Adult Authority, and must possess the same qualifications as the executive directors, except that only three years of supervisory or administrative experience are required. 207 The Director of the Department's Division of Classification and Treatment, 208 em- ployed by the Commissioner and approved by the Board, must be "qualified by training and experience to organize and direct (1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university and preferably be the recipient of an earned graduate degree; (2) He shall have had responsible administrative or supervisory experience in a correctional system for a minimum of five (5) years; (3) He shall have had ten (10) years full-time paid experience in correctional institutional work, parole, probation or social work; (4) Graduate training in any behavioral science, administration or other fields appropriate to correctional administration work may be substituted on a year-for-year basis for general experience not to exceed three (3) years. 201 /d. §11-1-1.1-15. 207Id. §11-1-1.1-16. 203 Id. §11-1-1.1-17. 204 Id. §11-1-1.1-49. ™5Id. 706 Id. §11-1-1.1-18. 207 Id. § 11-1-1.1-19. For further discussion of probation positions see text accompanying note 275 infra. 208Ind. Code §11-1-1.1-24 (Burns 1973). 328 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 programs of classification, general and vocational education and other programs of treatment and training designed to promote the rehabilitation of offenders." 209 Other specific qualifications for this directorship are provided by statute.210 The qualifications for the Director of Industries and Farms,211 also chosen by the Commissioner with Board approval, are tailored to the unique duties of the position. 212 The Division of Medical Care and Treatment must be headed by a licensed physician "qualified by training and experience to supervise and direct the medical care and treatment of the inmates. ,,213 This division di- rector must also be appointed by the Commissioner and approved by the Board of Correction.214 The Director of the Division of Research and Statistics must be "qualified to organize and direct a staff of professional, technical, and clerical personnel engaged in collecting, recording, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting statistical and research data."215 Additional specific qualifications for this directorship, reflecting the unique duties of the position, ™9Id. §11-1-1.1-25. 2WId. The statute provides that: (1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree in any behavioral science from an accredited college or university and preferably be the recipient of an earned graduate degree; (2) He shall have had eight (8) years full-time paid experience in correctional institutional work, parole, probation, social work, or related fields; (3) Five (5) of these years shall have been full-time paid work in a correctional system, three (3) of which shall have been in a re- sponsible supervisory or administrative capacity. Graduate training in education or any behavioral science may be substituted on a year-for-year basis for general experience, not to exceed three (3) years. Note the specific requirement for behavioral science education and the more liberal policy in substituting graduate education for general experience. 2U Id. §11-1-1.1-36. 2,2 7d. §11-1-1.1-37 provides: (1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree in busi- ness administration, accounting, industrial management or a suitable equivalent, and preferably be the recipient of an earned graduate degree ; (2) He shall have had six (6) years full-time paid experience in industrial sales or production, three (3) years of which shall have been in a responsible administrative or supervisory capacity. Note the fixed requirement for work experience without provision for sub- stitution of graduate education. 2,3ta §11-1-1.1-30.5. 2,4 Id. 215 Jd. § 11-1-1.1-33. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 329 are statutory. 2 ' 6 The Director of the Division of Administrative Services 2 ' 7 is employed by the Commissioner with approval by the Board. Qualifications for this position are also set by statute.218 The last division with duties relevant to the Indiana Crim- inal Justice System is the Adult Parole Division within the Adult Authority. 219 The Supervisor of the Adult Parole Division is di- rectly responsible to the Executive Director of the Adult Author- ity. 220 The Supervisor of the Adult Parole Division, as well as the Director of Work Release,221 must meet the same general qualifications as the executive directors of the Adult Authority and the Juvenile Authority.222 2. Institutional Officers The Indiana Youth Center, a medium-security institution for first offender male felons between the ages of fifteen and twenty- (1) He shall have been graduated with a master's degree from an accredited college or university and preferably be the recipient of an earned doctor's degree; (2) He shall have had five (5) years of research or statistical re- lated work experience; (3) His academic and experimental background should suggest an extensive knowledge of theory and methods of statistical research and analyses, sources of potential data and methods of presentation, as well as a demonstrated ability to design and conduct basic research. Graduate training in any behavioral science, administration, or sta- tistics may be substituted on a year-for-year basis for the required work experience, not to exceed two (2) years. Id. 2wId. §11-1-1.1-34. 2,8J& §11-1-1.1-35. (1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree in busi- ness administration, accounting, or a suitable equivalent, from an accredited college or university and preferably be the recipient of an earned graduate degree; (2) He shall have had eight (8) years of full-time paid experience above the clerical level in a public or private agency or business or- ganization in accounting, budgeting, auditing, purchasing, institu- tional administration, or personnel management. Three (3) of these eight (8) years shall have been in a responsible administrative or supervisory capacity. (3) Graduate training in business or a related area may be substituted on a year-for-year basis for general experience not to exceed three (3) years. 219 /d. §11-1-1.1-54. 770 Id. 22, /d. § 11-1-1.1-47. 222 7d. § 11-1-1.1-49. For further discussion of parole positions, see text accompanying note 281 infra. 330 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:29.7 five, 223 except those sentenced to death or life imprisonment,224 is a part of the ICJS correctional subsystem. The Superintendent of the Center is employed by the Commissioner with approval by the Board, subject to the statutory mandate that such employment be on the basis of merit only and "without regard to race, sex, color, creed, place of national origin, or political affiliation." 225 Express qualifications for the position are the same as those for the executive directors. 226 The Reception and Diagnostic Center,227 which is part of the Indiana Youth Center, processes various classes of felons and recommends the most appropriate correctional institution and the type of program of correction and training for each offender.228 The Center is administered by a director who is appointed by the Board of Correction and who must have been trained in and have had experience in the field of penology and correction, including at least three years of satisfactory administrative experience in such field.229 The Center's Classification Board evaluates the di- agnostic report and then recommends the institution and program to the Board of Correction which makes the final decision. 230 Members of the Classification Board are selected by the Board of Correction 231 with no specific qualifications expressed in the statutes. The Youth Rehabilitation Facility232 operates conservation work camps233 on state property234 with custody of males not over twenty-five years of age 235 transferred to the facility by the Board of Correction from another institution.236 The Director of the Youth Rehabilitation Facility is appointed by the Board.237 He must have the same qualifications as the executive directors.238 The Rockville Training Center is a minimum security institu- 223Ind. Code §§11-1-2-9, -3-6-1 (Burns 1973). 224Id. §11-3-6-1. 225 Id. §11-1-1.1-48. 226/d. § 11-1-1.1-49. 227Id. §11-3-6-5. 22 *Id. § 11-3-6-10. 229Id. § 11-3-6-5. The statute also provides that the director have grad- uated from an accredited college or university and during his college or uni- versity training have majored in the field of education or social sciences. 230Id. § 11-3-6-10. 23, 7d 232Id 233Id 234Id 235Id 23bId 237Id 23aId § 11-3-5-1. § 11-3-5-2. § 11-3-5-4. § 11-3-5-2. § 11-3-5-6. § 11-3-5-3. § 11-1-1.1-49. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 331 tion 239 for males fifteen to twenty-five years old who have not previously been convicted of a felony, except those sentenced to life imprisonment or death.240 The Superintendent of the Rock- ville Training Center is appointed by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction with the recommendation of the Indi- ana Youth Authority's Advisory Council.241 By statute the Super- intendent must be a graduate of an accredited college or univer- sity and have had six years of experience in correctional insti- tutional work, parole, probation or social work, four of which shall have been in a correctional system. Of the latter four years, three must have been in a responsible supervisory or administra- tive position in a correctional institution.242 The Department of Correction may establish and operate community correctional centers as part of the state correctional system. 243 Superintendents of such centers are appointed by the Commissioner with approval of the Board.244 As with all super- intendents of the various other correctional institutions, employ- ment is on the basis of merit without regard to race, sex, color, creed, place of national origin, or political affiliation. 245 Educa- tional and experience qualifications are the same as those for the executive directors. 246 The ICJS has four other correctional institutions for boys and male adults. The Indiana State Prison incarcerates males con- victed of treason or murder in the first or second degree, all convicted male felons thirty years of age or older, and all males transferred thereto. 247 The warden of the prison is employed by the Commissioner, with approval by the Board of Correction, 248 on the basis of merit only and without regard to race, sex, color, creed, place of national origin, or political affiliation. 249 The In- diana Reformatory incarcerates males between the ages of six- teen and twenty-nine who are convicted of felonies other than treason or murder in the first or second degree. 250 The Indiana 239/<£ § 11-3-7-2. 74Q Id. §§ 11-1-2-9, -3-7-1. 241 id. §§ 11-1-2-11, -1-2-12, -3-7-3. 242 7d. § 11-3-7-3. The statute provides that graduate training in any behavioral science, administrative or other field, appropriate to correctional work, may be substituted on a year-for-year basis, not to exceed two (2) years. 243 Id. §11-1-5-1. 244 /d. §11-1-5-4. 2A5Id. § 11-1-1.1-48. 246 /d. §11-1-1.1-49. 747 Id. §11-2-3-2. 248 7d. §11-1-1.1-47. 249 /d. § 11-1-1.1-48. 2S0 /d. § 11-2-3-1. 332 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 State Farm251 is charged with custody of males over eighteen years of age. 252 The Indiana Boys School253 accepts commitment of boys between twelve and eighteen years of age254 and confines them until they reach the age of twenty-one unless released sooner.255 The qualifications for the Warden of the State Prison and the superintendents of the three latter institutions are the same as those for the executive directors. 256 Two correctional facilities for girls and women exist in In- diana, the Indiana Women's Prison, 257 which incarcerates women over eighteen 258 who are convicted of criminal offenses and sen- tenced to imprisonment,259 and the Indiana Girls School,260 which accepts commitment of girls between twelve and eighteen years of age and confines them until they reach the age of twenty un- less released sooner. 261 The qualifications for the superintendents of both institutions are the same as for the executive directors. 262 Counties may certify homes for friendless women,263 but no statu- tory mention is made of qualifications of supervisors. Additionally each county in Indiana is required to maintain a county prison or jail264 under the direction of a county sheriff.265 The grand jury, at each term of the circuit court, inspects the county jail and reports complaints or recommendations to the county's board of commissioners.266 The Indiana Department of Correction formulates and prescribes rules and regulations for county jails to be adopted and enforced by the circuit court.267 Counties may also establish and maintain a county workhouse.268 If established, the workhouse is to be managed by a superinten- dent, who must be "some proper person" employed by the county board of commissioners. 269 25 ] Id 252M 753Id 254Id 255 Id, 256Id 257M 75aId 759Id 7b0Id 7bUd 262Id 7b3Id 764Id 765Id §§11-2-5-4, -3-1-2. §§ 11-3-1-1, -3-1. §§11-3-1-2, -1-3, -1-4, -2-3. §§ 11-3-1-8, -2-8, -4-2. §§ 11-1-1.1-48, -49. § 11-4-1-1. §§ 11-4-5-1, -4-7-3. § 11-7-3-2. § 11-4-1-1. § 11-4-5-1. §§11-1-1.1-48, -49. § 11-4-8-1. § 11-5-1-1. § 11-5-1-3. The qualifications for sheriff are discussed in the text accompanying note 93 supra. 266Ind. Code §11-5-1-2 (Burns 1973). 267 /d. § 11-5-3-2. 266 /d. § 11-6-1-1. 269/d. § 11-6-1-2. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 333 Qualifications for police matrons have been earlier mentioned but the position is more properly placed in the correctional sub- system. The prison matron is appointed by the county sheriff270 and must be "at least twenty-one years of age, able bodied, fully qualified and of good moral character/'2 71 Although no direct qualification of female sex can be found in the statutes, the re- peated use of pronouns "her" and "she,"272 the term "matron," and the comparison of prison matrons to women officials in other institutions 273 indicate that the legislature assumed that the prison matron would be a woman. Indeed if the county has no police matron, it must still employ a person to receive, take charge of, search, and properly care for, at the county jail, city prison or other detention centers within the county, all female prisoners and all children under the age of fourteen (14) years, who have been arrested and detained in the county jail, city prison, or other detention centers. 274 3. Probation and Parole Officers Probation officers are appointed by and serve under the judges of circuit courts, criminal courts, city courts, and munici- pal courts. 275 The Division of Probation of the Department of Correction prescribes minimum standards for the operation of probation practices, selection of probation personnel, and estab- lishment of salary levels.276 More precisely, a probation practices and standards committee277 prepares minimum qualifications for entering probation work.276 Members of the committee are ap- pointed by the Director of the Division of Probation and the com- mittee must consist of two judges with juvenile jurisdiction, one chief probation officer with administrative responsibility for an adult probation department, one chief probation officer with ad- ministrative responsibility for a juvenile probation department, and one probation officer from an adult probation department.279 To be eligible for appointment as probation officers, candidates 270Id. § 11-5-4-6. 271M § 11-5-4-5. 772 Id. §§ 11-5-4-1 to -6. 273Id. § 11-5-4-7. * 74 Id. § 11-5-4-1. 775E.g., id. §§ 35-7-2-3, -2-6, -3-1 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §§ 9-2212, Burns Supp. 1974, -2214a, Burns 1956, -2214b, Burns Supp. 1974) ; Noble County Council v. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709 (1955). 276Ind. Code § 35-7-5.1-5 (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-2919, Burns Supp. 1974). 277 Id. § 35-7-5.1-6 (Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-2920). 27dId. §35-7-5.1-7 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-2921). 279 /d. §35-7-5.1-6 (Ind. Ann. Stat. §29-2920). 334 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 must meet the minimum qualifications established by the proba- tion practices and standards committee and successfully complete a competitive examination conducted by the Division of Proba- tion. 280 The Adult Parole Division maintains a staff of parole offi- cers for parolees from adult institutions, employed "only on the basis of merit." 281 Thus, parole agents work for the Indiana De- partment of Correction and are employed through the merit sys- tem for state employees. These probation and parole positions are particularly important since they may serve as entry level jobs for women seeking employment in corrections. It should be noted that these positions do have a substantial number of women as compared to other ICJS positions.282 IV. Discrimination in ICJS Employment With the preceding exposition of statutory qualifications for various ICJS executive, managerial, and professional positions as a foundation, this section now examines those qualifications for implicit discriminatory effect. While it appears that none of these statutes expressly prohibit or hinder women from serving in those positions, some of the requirements may implicitly dis- criminate against women. Furthermore, implicit employment dis- crimination against women in a subtle, personal mode may be discerned. In sum, the authors believe that women have been discriminated against in the employment of ICJS executives, man- agers, and professionals—not formally through statutory qualifi- cations but rather by subtle and informal beliefs and judgments. This section will describe a few of the ways in which this dis- crimination may occur. In applying federal and state employment statutes to specific positions in the ICJS, it is apparent that almost all of the posi- tions in this study are covered by each of the laws. At the law enforcement level all line officers are covered except elected sher- iffs who are exempt.283 While it might be argued that the chief of police could be included under the relatively recent "policy 2&0Id. §11-1-1.1-20 (Burns 1973). 281 /d. § 11-1-1.1-56. 262See Appendix. 263See note 54 supra. However, neither Executive Order 11,246 nor the Indiana Civil Rights Law specifically exempts elected officials or their staff. While the employer of an elected official may be the electorate, which is not mandated to avoid discrimination, the personal staff of such as elected official would seem to be covered. Thus the distinction drawn in this section would be applicable only if Title VII was the sole law relevant to a particular case. Since Title VII is the most pervasive and well-known, most of our comments will be directed toward its coverage, language, and judicial interpretation. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 335 maker" exemption of Title VII,284 the exemption is, by its lan- guage, directed toward members of a politician's personal staff and should not be read to include the chief of police. In the court officials section of the ICJS the county prosecuting attorney is exempt from Title VII since the office is elective; however, prob- lems arise as to the status of the position of deputy prosecuting attorney. On the one hand, a deputy could arguably be considered "an appointee on the policy making level" with respect to impor- tant decisions about tactics or decisions as to whether to prose- cute various kinds of cases. On the other hand, to accept such an argument in this instance could lead to an unwarranted enlarge- ment of the exemption since almost all employees must make de- cisions which ultimately affect his or her employer's policies. The exemption should be narrowly construed. For example, in coun- ties with rather large staffs in the prosecutor's office, the chief deputy may be directly involved with policy decisions and thus be exempt; however, other deputies with lesser responsibilities would not come within the exemption. At the state level, a simi- lar analysis could be made with respect to the Attorney General's staff. Obviously, there is nothing to prevent the state, county, prosecuting attorney, or Attorney General from pursuing an equal opportunity program; the question is whether or not it is mandatory. ICJS judges are both appointed and elected. While elected judges are exempt, appointed judges are not and are therefore "employees" under Title VII. Likewise, the public defender and staff are included in the coverage of Title VII. The catch-all cate- gory of practicing attorneys is covered at three levels: the law schools' responsibilities, the state bar's testing and admissions programs, and law firms' employment and promotion practices. Finally, the positions in the corrections field discussed in this Article are all covered by the equal opportunity laws. As with line officers in law enforcement, equal employment oppor- tunity for these positions is crucial since promotion to top execu- tive and administrative jobs is dependent upon experience at lower levels.285 Given the applicability of equal opportunity laws to most po- sitions in the ICJS, the relevant case law should be of interest to those charged with employment decisions. Although there are very few cases which raise direct questions about employment of 284Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 619 (1974), amending 29 U.S.C. §§201-19 (1970). 265See text accompanying note 124 supra. 336 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 women in criminal justice positions,286 there are several which are applicable to women and employment in any field. Often these cases deal with the issues of seemingly neutral standards, except in cases of explicitly separate job lines. The concept of unlawful discrimination implicit in neutral standards is crucial to under- standing employment in the ICJS, since the exclusion of women is not by formal or overt decisions. One neutral standards issue involves the legality of height and weight requirements imposed for law enforcement officers and sometimes informally for persons at correction institutions. 287 Although height and weight requirements are neutral on their faces and do not explicitly exclude women, the effect of such re- quirements may have a discriminatory impact which also violates equal employment opportunity policy. For example, if a law en- forcement agency has a height requirement of 5 feet 9 inches for 286In addition to cases discussed here, several cases have been filed alleg- ing general sex discrimination. The Suffolk County Police Department has been charged by the National Organization for Women with discrimination in recruiting, testing, hiring, and promotion and in terms, conditions and privi- leges of employment. Spokeswoman, Mar. 15, 1964, at 3. The Justice Depart- ment has filed suit against the Chicago and Buffalo, N.Y., municipal police departments, alleging discrimination against women in employment oppor- tunities and conditions of employment. LEAA Newsletter, November 1973, at 24. In City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commw. 506, 287 A.2d 703 (1972), a trial court decision for the woman plain- tiff who had been denied the opportunity to apply for a job with the park police was reversed. The court ruled she must first apply to be a regular police officer and hinted separate job lines—policewoman-policeman—would be subject to challenge. Apparently park patrol was considered to be a police- man's job. In Wood v. Mills, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1347 (S.D.W. Va. 1973), the court upheld an "equal pay" complaint by a woman deputy sheriff (jail ma- tron) who was paid less than a male jailor. An injunction against further differentiation issued but the court denied any back pay award. There are also a few cases involving procedural issues. Wright v. Nichols, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 196 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (class action, section 1983 challenge survived motion to dismiss even though named plaintiff resigned) ; O'Brien v. Shrimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. 111. 1973) (section 1983 cause of action stated when sheriff refused to consider women for position of deputy sheriff). 267Although not found in Indiana statutes, height and weight require- ments are commonly used by ICJS law enforcement components. See e.g., Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, June 20, 1973, at 2, col. 1 (emphasis added) : The Indiana State Police have announced that applications are now being accepted from men who want to become troopers. . . . Applicants must be U.S. citizens, age 21 to 34, height 5 feet 9 inches to 6 feet 5 inches .... See note 81 supra. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 337 all police officers, the fact that promotions are always from within, coupled with the fact that approximately ninety-five percent of the female population falls below 5 feet 9 inches,283 means that women are effectively excluded from pursuing careers in law enforcement. That a height standard is neutral on its face is irrelevant to equal opportunity laws since its effect is exclusion and discrimination. One of the Supreme Court's first Title VII cases, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,™9 involved the legality of seemingly neutral job requirements. The plaintiff in Griggs alleged that the em- ployer violated Title VII by requiring a high school diploma and a satisfactory intelligence test score for certain jobs. In revers- ing the lower court, which had found no impermissible discrimi- nation, the Supreme Court held that both the diploma and test score standards violated Title VII since neither was shown to be significantly job related. The Court rested its decision upon a finding that both requirements operated to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants. Thus the Griggs test provides that once a plaintiff has established that a pre- employment standard has a "disparate effect" on a Title VII pro- tected group, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant employer to show that the standard is job related. In order for the em- ployer to satisfy the job related standard, he or she must prove that the requirement substantially increases the likelihood of suc- cess on the particular job. Obviously, in order to predict the chances of success on a job, one must know what the job requires, how success is to be measured, and what qualities are needed for successful job performance. This proof must be specific and not based on general allegations of the test's ability to improve the overall quality of the work force290 or upon general notions of stereotyped abilities or characteristics. 291 Correspondingly, the issue in height and weight requirement cases is whether or not 288Note, Height Standards in Police Employment and the Question of Sex Discrimination: The Availability of Two Defenses for a Neutral Employment Policy Found Discriminatory Under Title VII, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 585, 588 n.13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Height Standards}; Smith v. City of East Cleve- land, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (N.D. Ohio 1973). 289401 U.S. 424 (1971). 290 Id. at 431. 29}See Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D. Ohio 1973) ; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1973) ; Height Standards, supra note 288, at 603-05. 338 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 they are job related. 292 This question was directly faced in Smith v. City of East Cleveland. 293 Smith involved a black woman plaintiff who brought a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 294 challenging various aspects of police hiring including a height and weight minimum of 5 feet 8 inches and 150 pounds. After considering evidence for fifteen days, the court carefully detailed its conclusion that the skills, defined in relation to the police function, were not positively re- lated to the height and weight requirements presently imposed but rather were based solely on the stereotype of the large male police officer. 295 The defendants argued that the most physically taxing and dangerous of the police duties, the felony related func- tions, required physical strength, fitness, and agility, long reach of the arms, as well as the abilities to view crowds, drive a car, absorb blows, and impress others with physical prowess.296 The court carefully analyzed each function as it related to the height and weight minimums and perceived no relationship. For exam- ple, the court found that in most cases the kind of physical strength required of a police officer was leverage strength—the use of body mass at a particular angle in order to lift or direct—rather than brute strength—from mass alone. Since leverage strength, which is the preferred method of exercising force as a police of- ficer, 297 has little to do with height and weight but depends rather on conditioning and fitness,298 the requirements were found dis- criminatory because they failed to meet the job related test. 292There have been occasional lapses of proof on the plaintiff's side in neglecting specific allegations and illustrations of the disparate effect. See Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). However, the statistics are available. Secondly, there are evidentiary problems involving statistical meth- ods to determine what percentage of exclusion violates Title VII. For a thor- ough analysis see Height Standards, supra note 288, at 596-602. 293363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973). 294Alleging violation of her fourteenth amendment rights, the plaintiff did not use Title VII. The court's standard of review was basically constitu- tional, inquiring as to whether the requirements of height and weight were rationally related to a valid state interest under the recent holdings of Fron- tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which the court found in this case to mean that the 5 foot 8 inch and 150 pound minimums must be demonstrably related to job performance. 363 F. Supp. at 1136-38. 295363 F. Supp. at 1138. 296 /d. at 1141. 797Id. at 1139. Brute force is more likely to result in injury to the officer and the person restrained. 29BId. at 1138-39. In fact where there is a relationship between height and leverage strength it is negative, that is, the taller person is at a disadvantage because of less effective leverage. 1974] WOMEN IN THE 1CJS 339 Another example of the court's inquiry was its evaluation of the police department's most crucial argument: the unmeasurable advantage of height in its ability to impress others. The police department considered the advantage of its requirement to be the psychological impact of having all officers over 5 feet 8 inches. The department theorized that if an officer were taller than the person being controlled or arrested, the shorter person would be deterred from assaulting the officer by his or her apparent physi- cal superiority. According to the court the facts offered by the department did not substantiate these claims and in fact indicated size was no deterrence.299 Although Smith is not the only case300 which deals directly with height and weight requirements for law enforcement officials, it closely follows the reasoning and stan- dards of proof these issues raise in other areas. 30 ' Because of its careful analysis, Smith deserves special attention. Another issue which often arises in employment discrimina- tion cases which are applicable to women in the ICJS involves pregnancy and maternity leaves. Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or childbearing is clearly discrimination based on sex since only women can become pregnant and bear children.302 Al- 299/d. at 1140. 300Contra, Hardy v. Stumpf, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1078 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda County 1972), in which the court held all requirements, including height and weight, were not unreasonable and were directly and reasonably connected and necessary to the normal performance of duties of police patrol- men. However, the invaluable detail and analysis of Smith is not evidenced in Hardy. Therefore, the authors believe Hardy is subject to attack for failure to review stereotyped rationalization for classifications based on sex. Appar- ently the police force in Hardy was segregated. See text accompanying note 327 infra. 30 'See EEOC Decision No. 74-25, Sept. 10, 1973, in 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide fl 6400 (municipal fire department's 5 foot 7 inch minimum held illegal under Title VII) ; Dominquez v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, in 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide fl5199 (1973) (Illinois Fair Employment Practice Com- mission held police department's 5 foot 8 inch height minimum illegal under state act) ; Pa. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 57, in 2 CCH Empl. Prac. Guide fl 5177 (1973) (state police 5 foot 6 inch minimum suspended until demonstrated to be job related) ; Moore v. City of Des Moines Police Dep't, in 2 CCH Empl. Prac Guide fl 5184 (July 11, 1973) (Iowa Civil Rights Commission held police department's 5 foot 9 inch height minimum illegal under state act) ; EEOC Decision No. 72-0284, Aug. 9, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions fl 6304 (1973) (5 foot 6 inch minimum for airline flight purser violated Title VII) ; EEOC Decision No. 71-2643, June 25, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions fl 6286 (1973) (employer's 5 foot 7 inch minimum violated Title VII) ; EEOC Decision No. 71-1529, April 2, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions fl 6231 (1973) (employer's 5 foot 7 inch minimum violated Title VII) ; EEOC Decision No. 71-1418, Mar. 17, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions If 6223 (1973) (5 foot 5 inch factory worker requirement invalid). 302See LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ, 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) ; Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 340 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 though the specific employment requirements in the ICJS do not deal with pregnancy or leaves, the question of how to deal with pregnant women workers is invariably raised in a discussion of the general characteristics and problems of women workers. In fact, it often appears that this one distinctive biological feature of women is uppermost in employers' minds. Given traditional attitudes about women and "their proper place" it is not surpris- ing that once a woman becomes pregnant the conflict between home and work is resolved by the employer in favor of the for- mer. What is surprising is that women are often penalized or considered unqualified because they might become pregnant.303 For example, it is not inconceivable that an employer would argue that a woman does not fulfill the "general physical fitness" re- quirement of some criminal justice positions304 since she may be- come pregnant. However, to deny a woman a job on this basis is clearly unacceptable and illegal unless the employer also denies jobs to men who may become temporarily disabled.305 In 1972 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued new guidelines which deal with fringe benefits as well as pregnancy and childbirth.306 The provisions state that a refusal Civil No. 73-339 (D. Ore., Apr. 25, 1974). Contra, Cohen v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Educ, 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974). 303T. Hayden, Punishing Pregnancy: Discrimination in Education, Employment, and Credit 1 (ACLU Reports 1973), a comprehensive pre- LaFleur case study of pregnancy and employment policies. 304See text accompanying notes 125 (police officers), 153 (candidates for supreme court and court of appeals), and 174 (candidates for superior court judge) supra. 305 Of course, the problem is even more crucial when a woman applicant or candidate is already pregnant. Most employers refuse to consider such an applicant; the question is whether or not the employer also never considers men with present, temporary disabilities, such as a hernia. See T. Hayden, supra note 303, at 58. 30629 C.F.R. §1604.10 (1973) provides: (a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which ex- cludes from employment applicants or employees because of pregnan- cy is in prima facie violation of title VII. (b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan avail- able in connection with employment. Written and unwritten em- ployment policies and practices involving matters such as the com- mencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 341 to hire an applicant because of pregnancy violates Title VII and may be justified only under the bona fide occupational qualifica- tion exception. They further provide that pregnancy is to be treated as any other temporary disability is treated by the em- ployer and thus in most cases a paid leave of limited but ade- quate duration must be available.307 The authors suggest that discussion concerning whether pregnancy is properly defined as an illness, whether it is voluntary, or whether a pregnant worker will defraud her employer is irrelevant and useless. If an em- ployer has a policy which covers its employees' temporary physi- cal conditions, such a policy should be extended to the physical condition of pregnancy. Although these guidelines have not, as yet, been subject to Supreme Court challenge, 308 they were recog- nized in the latest relevant Court case. (c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily dis- abled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity. Id. § 1604.9 provides in part: (a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (b)It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits. (d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees where the same benefits are not made available for the husbands and families of female employees; or to make available benefits for the wives of male employees which are not made available for female employees; or to make available benefits to the husbands of female employees which are not made available for male employees. An ex- ample of such an unlawful employment practice is a situation in which wives of male employees receive maternity benefits while female employees receive no benefits. (e) It shall not be a defense under title VII to a charge of sex dis- crimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other. 307See, e.g., Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, Civil No. 73- 339 (D. Ore., Apr. 25, 1974) ; T. Hayden, supra note 303, at 58. One woman police officer is suing the Chicago Police Department for back pay withheld during her pregnancy. Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan. 10, 1974, at 5, col. 1. 308 There have been lower court challenges in which the guidelines were upheld and applied. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974). 342 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,309 the Court struck down mandatory maternity leave policies for public school teachers in two school districts as violative of the teachers* four- teenth amendment due process rights.310 Although the nature of the leave policies varied in the cases before the Court, as had policies subject to earlier lower court decisions,311 both provided a mandatory leave for a specified number of months, without pay, and with little job security. What is relevant for the purposes of this Article is that the Court found administrative convenience unacceptable as a basis for so dealing with pregnant employees. Such a view should likewise be adopted by ICJS employers. They should trade in their stereotyped notions about pregnant workers, and women generally because of their possibilities of becoming pregnant, and replace them with individual determinations. The fact of pregnancy or even the presence of children should not in itself disqualify a woman from any position in the ICJS.312 A third instance of a seemingly neutral ICJS employment requirement which may be unlawfully discriminatory involves educational requirements. Although most cases which have held educational requirements illegal unless specifically validated have involved race, it may be possible to find sex discrimination if one sex has been substantially excluded, formally or informally, from the required educational experience. For example, in the court officials positions in the ICJS, lawyer status is almost al^ ways a prerequisite, yet in the past women have been effectively excluded from law schools and thus comprise only three percent of the lawyers in this country. 313 The resolution of a potential 309414 U.S. 632 (1974). 310The Court did not decide whether the leave should be paid. It should be remembered that these cases were brought before the public educational employees amendment to Title VII and thus relied upon the Constitution for jurisdictional basis. Therefore, the specific issue of Title VII and its guide- lines was not decided, although obviously the Court recognized the analogous nature of its opinion. See id. at 638-39 n.8. 3 "See, e.g., Bravo v. Board of Educ, 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. 111. 1972); Health v. Westerville Bd. of Educ, 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972) ; Wil- liams v. San Francisco United School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972) ; Sinks v. Mays, 332 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ga. 1971). For other examples of dif- ferent policies, see T. Hayden, supra note 303, at 37-38. 3120ne highlighting example to illustrate the opposite point of view is found in T. Hayden, supra note 303, at 28 : A senior portfolio analyst at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith reports that she was told by her supervisor (a woman) that she must take maternity leave, as coming to work in a maternity dress would be like coming to work in dungarees, a "blemish upon the de- partment." You cannot perform in a man's job while acting like a woman. 3 ^ 3See White, supra note 43, at 1051. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 343 charge of sex discrimination is not to eliminate the requirement that to be qualified for a job one must be a lawyer but rather for the employer to establish that lawyer status is job related. That is, an employer should prove that a court official's job is per- formed significantly better by a lawyer. If this standard can be met there will be no violation of Title VII or any other equal employment legislation. However, there may yet be a need to establish an "affirmative action" policy314 to encourage more women, if that is the underrepresented sex, and it is in this ex- ample, to enter law school, the necessary prerequisite to becom- ing a lawyer. Without this second step the relative position of women in the system would be excruciatingly slow to change. The other step, admission to the bar, must also be a sex-less process and its job-relatedness should also be specifically established.315 Another form of the discriminatory use of educational re- quirements is to be found in the employment of informal stan- dards in hiring practices. For example, an employer may for- mally require as a minimum that all persons have a high school diploma but informally never consider a woman with less than a college degree. 316 Obviously, such a procedure is illegal, but its opponents may face an evidentially difficult burden of proof. Re- lated to the problem of educational qualifications are work experi- ence requirements which, although neutral on their faces, can re- sult in discrimination. Again, the principles in this area have come from cases involving race,317 but they are applicable as well to sex, and the reasoning that should be followed is similar to that used above in analyzing the effect of educational require- ments. A key example of this potential problem in the ICJS is in the field of corrections. To varying degrees, professionals in the corrections subsystem of the ICJS must meet a minimum edu- cational requirement and have had a certain specified number of years of experience in corrections work. This experience may be gained by work in correctional institutions, in parole, probation, or social work, or by experience in a related field. 313 Additionally, 314For further development of affirmative action requirements and legal bases, see text accompanying note 339 infra. 315For a critique of typical bar examinations, see Bell, Do Bar Examina- tions Serve a Useful Purpose?, 57 A.B.A.J. 1215 (1971). 316Such informal discrimination is reflected in admission standards in the military. Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A.J. 1013, 1018 (1973). 3uE.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) ; Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) ; cf., Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). See also Developments, supra note 52, at 1145-50. 318£ee notes 200, 210, and 242 & accompanying text supra. 344 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 a certain minimum number of years must be in positions admin- istrative in nature. 319 Although neutral on its face, this work experience requirement may have a disparate effect on women if they have been effectively excluded from the fields considered preparatory. In Indiana several women have positions in proba- tion, parole, or social work,320 but few have administrative posi- tions and thus could not qualify. Again, the next step is to estab- lish the job related character of these requirements and, even if successfully shown, encourage development of affirmative action policies to substantially increase the pool of available women. This same work experience argument can be applied to the entry level police office position since it also qualifies persons for adminis- trative and professional positions in the field of law enforcement.321 A fourth area of pre-employment inquiry is testing. There has been considerable literature concerning culturally biased test- ing which adversely affects Blacks and other minorities,322 but there have also been occasional allegations of cultural biases ad- versely affecting women.323 Specifically, in the ICJS, tests are used for various law enforcement positions, both at the entry level and for promotions.324 It is essential that these tests be legally and psychologically valid once it is shown that members of a protected group score significantly and disproportionately lower than others. This disparate effect is most common in aptitude or general intelligence tests commonly used for law enforcement po- sions. Such tests have rarely been validated.325 The validation ^Id. 320The chart appended to this Article reveals approximately fifty-seven women in ICJS probation and parole work. 321 jSee notes 120, 122, and 125 & accompanying text supra. 322The most exhaustive article is Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1598 (1969). See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); E. Ghiselli, The Validity op Occupational .Aptitude Tests (1966) ; R. Kirpatrick, Testing and Fair Employment (1968) ; Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 691 (1968) ; Developments, supra note 52, at 1120-40. 323In Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), the court did not rule on the allegation that promotion tests discrim- inated against women since too few women had taken the test. See also Mur- ray, Sex Discrimination and a Legal Education, 22 Brief/Case 7, 8 (Dec. 1972). 324See notes 118, 120, 122, and 125 supra. 32SSee Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973) (police) ; Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (police) ; Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721 (D. Minn. 1972) (fire); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in relevant part by an equally divided court, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (police). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 345 procedure to be followed is essentially the same utilized in evalu- ating any other apparently neutral requirement, with special at- tention given to proper job analysis, which more effectively en- ables the testmaker to determine what to test for.326 Another problem which has arisen in other law enforcement agencies is the use of separate job lines and thus separate lines of promotion. For example, there may be policeman and police- woman positions, open only to men and women respectively, which involve different kinds of tasks. 327 The legal issues involved are not the rationality of separate job classifications or whether their use is a good management technique, but rather the exclusion of one sex from a particular job and the present effect of this past exclusion once the lines are sexually or racially integrated.328 Ob- viously, since the effective date of Title VII and other equal em- ployment opportunity statutes and regulations, an applicant may not be denied a job on the basis of sex, unless the employer estab- lishes a bfoq exception. Since it is unlikely that a bfoq exception could be established for law enforcement positions329 or for court and correction officials, sex-segregated job lines must be abol- ished. The next step is to deal with the present effect of past exclusion, an issue which arises in determining promotion qualifi- cations. For instance, if four years of experience at the patrol entry level is required in order to qualify to take the sergeant's exam, does four years of experience as a "policewoman" count? Although this question has been answered variously in cases involving women police,330 industrial cases dealing with previously discrimi- 326Cooper & Sobol, supra note 322, at 1665-69. 327E.g., this separation appears typical in New York. See Button v. Rocke- feller, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973), and cases cited in note 330 infra. 328See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Guidelines on Dis- crimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1973). 329Height Standards, supra note 288, at 621. 330In Shpritzer v. Sang, 17 App. Div. 2d 285, 234 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1962), the court ruled the woman plaintiff qualified to take the sergeant's exam even though the duties of a policewoman and policeman differed. The primary force behind the court's decision, it appears, was the desire to avoid con- stitutional questions. But see Berni v. Leonard, 69 Misc. 2d 935, 331 N.Y.S.2d 193 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 701, 336 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 933, 300 N.E.2d 734, 347 N.Y.S.2d 198, cert, denied, 94 S. Ct. 551 (1973), which held that one could not take the sergeant's exam until the applicant had served four years as a patrolman. The question of whether a woman could be come a "patrolman" was left unresolved as an issue not before the court. It is the authors' contention that the Berni case is wrong and in fact the question of whether the qualifying job was open to women was essential to the resolution of the case. 346 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 natory seniority systems are basically consistent.331 Typically "plantwide" or "employer" seniority is used for those employees affected by a previously discriminatory system. 332 However, new employees, hired into desegregated positions, are given job senior- ity and are promoted on the same basis as other employees. For the most part, the issue of present effects of past discrimination is one affecting only a small number of employees but for whom a remedy, carefully and narrowly defined, is essential. One final issue, which must be raised involves the use of and reliance on "reputation" or personal references as a job require- ment. Although references are commonly requested for most jobs, there is particular mention of this requirement in Indiana for judicial positions filled by persons nominated by the Judicial Nom- inating Commission.333 In general, requests for references or eval- uations of reputation in determining whether to hire a particular person are perfectly lawful and indeed a sensible policy since pre- sumably the more information an employer has about a person the better the decision-making process. However, the subjective na- ture of these evaluations should be recognized and taken into account when weighing their value. In some cases the references may be used in order to further a nepotistic-like policy. 334 If a disparate effect can be shown be- cause of a nepotistic or extreme anti-nepotistic policy, the courts have not hesitated to abolish the requirement since nepotism is in no way job-related.335 In other cases stereotyped characteri- zations constitute the problem. Since bias has not been eliminated from society, it is possible to foresee a situation in which a woman or a Black does not have a reputation or references equal to a white man simply because of the lesser values which some mem- bers of society place upon a woman's achievements.336 Once again, 33] E.g., in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), a sex separate seniority system was ruled a violation of Title VII. Racially segregated systems have also been ruled illegal. Local 189, United Paper- makers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) ; Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). 337See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 322, at 1615-36; Developments, supra note 52, at 1158-64; and cases cited in note 331 supra. 333See text accompanying note 158 supra. 334Developments, supra note 52, at 1150. 335Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Utah 1970). Anti-nepotism policies, particularly at universities, which have an ad- verse effect on women are suspect. See U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Office for Civil Rights, Higher Education Guidelines, Executive Order 11246, at 8 (1972). 336« i-phg men aj. the top replicate themselves . . . affinity is all-school affinity, industrial affinity, club affinity, social class and economic affinity. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 347 the solution is not to eliminate the requirement of references or the evaluation of reputation but rather to be cognizant of the potential discrimination. The issues which arise in evaluating employment practices are many and varied.337 Some present subjective problems diffi- cult to resolve speedily, while others are only problems until em- ployers are conscious of the discrimination. Title VII and other equal opportunity laws and regulations require a great deal from employers. They are forced to evaluate all tests and other stan- dards employed, since all such devices and criteria are presumed illegal, i.e., discriminatory, until proven lawful, i.e., validated. Furthermore, employers are mandated to examine their entire employment process which amounts even at best to educated guess- ing. However, viewed from a different perspective, these laws do encourage employers to make employment decisions on as rational a basis as possible. Their aim is to force employers to review their employment policies to insure that decisions are made on the basis of individual capacities and capabilities rather than on stereotyped images and characteristics. Although the legal man- date may appear unwarranted to those who feel the goals are impossible, it is the authors' belief that the goals are feasible and, in fact, will result in a more effective and responsive crim- inal justice system. However, the process will require a revision of the system's perceptions as to who is qualified. Within the ICJS one should not hear the following: One personnel chief summed up the [Wall] Street's anti- woman version of Catch 22 by saying, "You can't be feminine in this business [stock market] . We're looking for people who must excel, must win. They must be very competitive and have strong egos. The popular con- Women are commonly seen as outsiders.' " Whol, What's So Rare as a Woman on Wall Street, 1 Ms. 82, 127 (June 1973). See also Murray, supra note 323, at 8-9; Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Guidelines on Dis- crimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1) (1973). 337A different kind of problem can be seen in the suitation described in Wohl, supra note 336, at 127: Merrill Lynch, a prominent stock-brokerage firm, has only 150 women among 5,200 brokers because of the lack of "qualified women." Merrill Lynch seeks "winners" and believes " 'the true winner seldom has a wife who works, for his ego requires that he be the full suport of the family.' " And a personality test given to all Merrill Lynch applicants asks whether the candidate objects to "your wife working outside the home." Obviously a woman cannot be a "winner" on that ques- tion. Moreover, men who need dependent wives as ego props are unlikely to view the few women who do get hired as equals. They would hardly be likely even to view the woman applicant as qualified. 348 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 ception is that women who have these qualities are neu- rotic. Who wants to hire a neurotic woman?"333 V. Recommended ICJS Affirmative Action Plan In the previous sections of this Article, the authors have asserted their belief that women are discriminated against in the employment of ICJS executives, managers, and professionals, and have detailed a few of the ways in which this discrimination has been effected. This section describes affirmative action pro- grams needed to counteract this situation. All ICJS employers should develop and adopt affirmative action plans. These plans must be tailored to particular employment situations and, thus, although it is possible for the state, the counties, the cities, and the towns to adopt system-wide affirmative action programs to cover all their respective employees, it is suggested that fur- ther refinement is required within each unit in order to facilitate specific but consistent programs. 339 Affirmative action programs are designed to effectuate equal employment opportunity policies as expressed in various laws and regulations. Such programs reduce reliance on a case-to-case basis for enforcement, provide faster, more effective relief to affected employees or potential employees, and generally make equal opportunity a reality, not simply rhetoric. They key to an affirmative action program is its mandate of a continuing pro- gram of employer self-evaluation. Plans are written on the basis of an employer's own requirements, policies, and collected data. Affirmative action obligations are twofold. First, an employer must eliminate all present discriminatory practices and conditions. That is achieved by complying with present equal opportunity laws. Secondly, an employer must take further affirmative steps to increase minority group and female participation in the par- ticular work force. This latter obligation is analogous to a rem- edy, for it seeks to overcome the present effects of past discrimi- nation. Thus, a plan is designed to aid not only future or poten- tial employees but also present employees. The suggested adop- tion of such plans has a firm foundation ; they are required by law. 338Wohl, supra note 336, at 127. Note the confusion of woman and feminine. 339Obviously excluded from any criminal justice system affirmative action plan are elected officials, such as prosecutors, sheriffs, and judges. This exclusion does not, however, indicate any opinion for or against these offices remaining elective. A more specific delegation is also apparent in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's equal opportunity guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 42.301 (1973), discussed at note 342 infra. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 349 The authority for requiring affirmative action plans by ICJS employers comes from several sources. Of primary importance is Executive Order 11,246, 340 which prohibits certain federal con- tractors from discriminating against an employee or applicant on the basis of sex, as well as race, religion, or national origin. The Order also requires employers to take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race, sex, religion, or national origin. The Secretary of Labor is designated as the ad- ministrator of these programs but may delegate this responsi- bility to other agencies. 341 In 1973 the Law Enforcement Assis- tance Administration (LEAA) of the United States Department of Justice issued specific guidelines requiring an "Equal Oppor- tunity Program" relating to employment practices affecting mi- nority group persons and women from each LEAA assistance re- cipient which has fifty or more employees and has received grants in excess of $25,000. 342 Authority for affirmative action plans also comes from the remedy provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Often, before entering into a conciliation agreement with an em- ployer charged with a violation, the Equal Employment Oppor- tunity Commission will require an affirmative action plan.343 In addition, the Act itself gives the federal courts broad remedial powers, including ordering "such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 344 If an employer has an implemented affirmative action plan, the likelihood of conciliation with the EEOC and of relatively minor, if any, damage awards in court increases. 3403 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). 341 For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has responsibility for educational institutions and hospitals. The Department of Treasury has responsibility for banks and other lending institutions. 342Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. §42.301 (1973). The guidelines include the further requirement that the "recipient" be located in a geographic area where the available minority workforce is three percent or more of the total workforce. Id. § 42.302(b). It is unclear whether a written plan would be required under these guide- lines if the minority population in a given area was below three percent but the female population was significant. One could argue a plan is neces- sary since the employer engages in separate analyses of each. It is also possible for an affirmative action plan to be required under other regulations even though a unit may not be covered under LEAA. 34342 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b) (Supp. Ill, 1973). 344 Id. §2000e-5(g). Such remedies have been ordered in several police and fire departments for minorities. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) ; Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973) ; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). 350 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 Apart from the legal considerations involved in the imple- mentation of affirmative action programs are the practical bene- fits that will flow to an ICJS employer. One immediate result of a viable plan will be an increase in the total number of per- sons in the applicant pool, thus broadening the base from which employees come. Additional applicants will afford the employer more alternatives and increase the likelihood of finding desirable employees. The reevaluation of employment techniques such a program entails will also promote better selection practices within the system. For example, if a pre-employment or promotion test has not been validated, it may not be furnishing the employer with any useful information. Test administration is time con- suming and expensive ; if a test has no predictive value, then both the time and money expended have been wasted. In fact, such a test or other nonvalidated pre-employment inquiry may well cost the employer qualified employees.345 In short, because an affirma- tive action plan requires a systematic review of all terms and con- ditions of employment, policies and practices will be examined for their effectiveness, a valuable objective regardless of equal opportunity demands. The specifics of an affirmative action plan can be quite com- plex; however, detailed guidelines from appropriate agencies are available. 346 Basic to all affirmative action plans is an evaluation of the employer's present work force, including the total number of employees in each position as well as the number of women and minorities in each. Further, all recruitment and selection procedures should be examined, and an analysis made by race, sex, and national origin of the number of persons applying for employment, accepting employment, applying for promotion, re- ceiving promotion, and terminating, both voluntarily and invol- untarily. Finally, information should be gathered to determine the community and area labor force characteristics, e.g., total population, work force population, existing unemployment, all with information as to sex, race, and national origin. For example, if a city police department recruits city-wide, county-wide, or region- wide, labor force characteristics from that area are needed. Ad- ditionally, if an employer requires certain educational achieve- 345Recent research indicates policemen are typically ranked higher in categories such as "strong" and "aggressive" while policewomen are thought to be more "understanding" and "compassionate." P. Bloch & D. Anderson, supra note 5, at 10. However, women police executives as a group may exhibit more strength in leadership-associated personality traits than do male police executives as a group. Price, A Study of Leadership Strength of Female Police Executives, 2 J. Pol. Sci. & Admin. 219 (1974). 346See note 342 supra; 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1973). 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 351 ments for employees, as do many in the ICJS, those people with the appropriate training need to be ascertained. Once these data have been collected, areas of disproportionate employment are easily detected. It then becomes the obligation of the employer to examine those areas of disproportion to deter- mine if the employment of women and minorities is inhibited by any internal or external factor. If so, the employer must set about to remedy the situation. Secondly, once the data is known, the employer can establish goals and timetables which reflect his or her decision as to how many women and minority employees are an adequate balance and predict when these goals will likely be reached. Finally, a plan should also indicate what positive steps an employer plans to take to achieve these self-imposed goals.347 At this point, it should be emphasized that it is an essential characteristic of the 1970's affirmative action plans that the goals and timetables are determined internally by individual employers and not imposed externally by governmental agencies. Secondly, since the employment problems for women and minorities differ substantially, there should be a separate analysis and a separate response for women and for minorities. In the past the typical problem in terms of employment for women has been under- utilization; for minorities, cultural biases are usually the key. As with any recommendation, there are criticisms of affirma- tive action which need to be explored. First, an issue exists as to whether "goals" is a euphemism for "quotas." All official literature carefully avoids the use of "quota," but often employ- ers act as if any distinction is only one of semantics. However, in a legal sense there is a difference between goals and quotas, although both can take the form of concrete numbers. For exam- ple, a county probation department may set its employment goal at three women and three men officers when its present compo- sition is one woman and five men. It is later unable to attain its goal as a result of having only one vacancy or because after extending offers to several women, none accept due to locale, so- cial factors, etc. Such a situation would not be a violation, since the department could establish its good faith efforts in pursuing its affirmative action program. On the other hand, quotas are neither flexible nor subject to a "good faith" defense. The as- sumption that goals and quotas are identical can in fact have detrimental effects for both employees and employers. Quotas en- 347As indicated above, all terms and conditions of employment as well as recruitment are covered by an affirmative action plan. For example, plans include analysis of grievance procedures, maternity leaves, testing, and pay. See also the discussion of legal issues in text accompanying notes 283- 388 supra. 352 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 courage employers to hire by sex, race, or national origin alone — according to body, not ability. Thus, there is in quotas the danger of hiring unsuitable people who then become dissatisfied employees because they cannot, for whatever reason, do the job. This idea that affirmative action will result in a lower qual- ity of employees forms a second criticism. As indicated above, correctly written affirmative action plans take into account valid qualifications. In fact, affirmative action can have the reverse effect and raise employee quality, since there is an expanded pool from which to draw. In assessing this criticism one should not overlook the troublesome nature of the concept of "quality" itself. That is, how is "quality" to be determined and how can it be freed from sex-based notions. A third criticism of affirmative action is that it is unfair to white males and thus illegal and undesirable as reverse dis- crimination. 348 First, once an affirmative action plan is in effect, there is nothing to prevent an employer from hiring a white male, but the deck may no longer be stacked in his favor. Secondly, to hire or to promote only on the basis of sex—either sex—is unlawful. 349 Reverse discrimination is discrimination. Finally, it is possible that in the past some unqualified people were hired or promoted. To the extent that is true, the adoption of affirma- tive action may have an adverse impact on these types of people. Once an affirmative action plan is adopted, it is important that it be communicated and explained to all employees. In order to deal with the inevitable anxieties of present employees, the person responsible for equal opportunity must be given sufficient authority. Furthermore, compliance with the plan by employees should be recognized in any reward system of the employer as is any other action which promotes the agency. Although initially an affirmative action plan results in considerable expenditures of 348The legality of a more strict affirmative action plan was upheld in Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971) (Philadelphia Plan with specific ranges imposed by the government). A modern test did not yield a definitive result in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974). However, many commentators see Justice Douglas* dissent as predictive. For a discussion of the constitutionality of affirmative action plans, see Getman, The Emerging Principles of Sexual Equality, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 157, 166-73 (1972) ; Developments, supra note 52, at 1279-80. 349A common misunderstanding is that "sex" means "woman" and "race" means "Black." It is true that affirmative action policies are a response to particular problems, primarily underutilization of women and minorities in the work force. However, discrimination against a man because of his sex or against a Caucasian because of race is illegal. There seems little likelihood that employers will only hire women and Blacks once one examines the progress of equal employment during the last ten years. 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 353 administrative time, the monitoring, once established, becomes in- stitutionalized and less time consuming. Some day the need for this particular remedy will dissipate. However, for the moment its benefits outweigh any anxieties. VI. Summary and Conclusions Women are increasingly seeking executive, managerial, and professional positions in business, industry, government, and acad- emia as well as almost any other area imaginable. Traditionally, they have been explicitly denied these positions on the basis of their sex and the commonly-held stereotyped notions about their sex. In the past decade, explicit sex discrimination in employment has faded because of an adverse legal environment, a revitalized women's movement, and a recognized need to identify the highest qualified prospective employees. However, in many instances sex discrimination continues, changing only from overt to covert tac- tics. Moreover, the bases of this discrimination, stereotyped no- tions and attitudes, remain in the minds of many employers. The authors submit that employment in the ICJS is not un- like employment in other fields. Although express requirements for executive, managerial, and professional ICJS positions do not refer to the sex of candidates, the educational, physical, health, work experience, testing, and general reputation requirements can covertly discriminate against women candidates. Further, it is suspected that criminal justice systems are bastions of classic male chauvinism which operate in a variety of unspoken ways to effectively exclude women executives, managers, and professionals. It is most strongly recommended that all ICJS agencies de- velop and implement affirmative action programs, so clearly needed by the society it serves and so clearly commanded by the legal environment in which it operates. As a legal system, it is most prudent for the ICJS to comply with the law. As a system operated by people with financial support from the general pub- lic, the ICJS has an undeniable need for the best people available to fill its positions of responsibility and trust. Moreover, since the ICJS asks the society it serves to have respect for law and agents of the law, the ICJS should serve as a model of legal pro- priety. Affirmative action programs, coupled with candid, honest evaluations of present agency attitudes and policies, are steps in the right direction. 354 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 * 05 CM 03 § • I-H -M O CD U u o O 00 o w O b « S £ rH O to t- „_•an teas rt h © C S ^ d 53 w 'O O <3> d T3 a o ffl 0) f-H o I •2£ .2 ^ •!-. b- P w _2> "3 lei . cos> o ta o < o rH 0) +3 8 o H-J rQ rH 0) (3 0) . so a s •S OQ ^J 0Q «Q W 15 W g U kT rH .St) t) B£2" S J 8 5 £5 I a> M ^ M 13 £ T*» M H tji CO OS IQ M 03 B a o O CO rH >> r-3 -p 00 co § •rH d CO CD TO § CD O g «3 ft s. CD o3 <© 4J ^ A "S S *h To "5 t .h a ft § O < Q d 6 8 *% Q 'g ^ .52 ft ft rH d o U «H O a> Tfi 2 -t-> cu r-l M 3 ft o 3O 03 o O +3 S3 a s CD ej rH o rJ 03 • rH (— s t! rH CD CD g O o o 2 B !> rs fe o 2O I> g rQ ft | _ -M CO N f^ H H t- o O b- O0 +S «D CNJ O I o ^*^ > +i ^-v hV> t-J 13. CO rH u 00 03 CD -t-> H-> 9 -a «3 U) • rH c rH 00 H co v-' TJ . • T3 CO rn CO rH CD H-J o CM rC 'rH o O a a « •rH -t3 w -p bJO 03 rH 0) •rH rH 03 • rH CD O CD CD CD rG ft o o CS r—i Q W ,.l Q O S-1H-i ctf CJ + HJ> 03 ft rH rH C 03 CD > • rH T3 rC ZJ CO CD 4^ fc» 03 S •rH ,/_. &J0 w r2 d o a 00 rH 3 CD O ft » r«» d ^ r5 Cft CD 00 <© iH Tj< OS 00 1974] WOMEN IN 1 LAW ENFORCEMENT 'HE 1'CJS LAWYERS /COURTS 355 CORRECTIONS County. City or Tovn(a) Mice: Cape. LC. Sgt. Corp. Patrol <*nd Recruits) Sheriff Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting A tiny. Dep. Aast. Public efendei (e) Private Dep. Attn> Court Judges; Probation Officers Dep. (d) jailer. and herons Dep, or toftsChief Dep. &SSC. m (e) X m (22) (2W) 1 Clr. X Cltlea-' ' il9mf citi«».. (lJ70) m_ 1 ass: chief <1) .. (8445) (4395) Decatur (i) P) (8) (1) (1)_ lownt: (1100) (584) Geneva -- (622) Monroe 0.) ALLEN CO. (1) 1 najor (4) (5) (14) (79) (1H) (D(l)ch dep. (4 invot.) (10) (I) 3 invest 8*. (7) (359) ' (9W) (l)Cir. (6) Sup. a)admn.(8)1 (l)adran.(l): (I) intake i .0.-3 pec. s up.W H (4)nat up. ; 15 P.O. ona 5W Cities: (177,671) (92,895) Ft. Wayne (i) (5) (10) (16) (,66) (215) (7W) (I) " — (5,728) (2,945) (i) (1) (1) (4) tt> - (688) X <» „ Towna: (570) Grablll (i) (775) Runtertovn (i) (1353> (720) pt. time (1) I ma- jors (IS) tafc spec, ) (1) (4) (Dd) invatg. (I) (1) (57) (2W) (l)Cir. (l)Sup. (1>P0 (1) Aast -1W (5) (2W) (27,141) Cltiei: (14,268) Coluobaa (1) (1) aast. (4) (4) (14) (28) (1) OX— (275) Clifford (1) (4906) (2521) Idinburg (1) (1) (1) (4) (519) Ellzobethtovn (1) (434) Harteville <« (1603) (844) Hope <« (1) (202) Jonesvilla BBO0H CO.: <» (1) (» (81) :i)Cir. (1 W) (1 w) tow, < 300> Ambia (1) (996) Boavell (1) (478) Garl Park .. (2643) „ , (1407) Towler (1) (3) + 2 PT (899) Otterbeln (1098) Oxford (1) JSIAOTORD CO.: (X) (1) (1) (8) CDCir. (1) (1 W) (3465) Cltlea: <1828 ) Dunkirk See J ly Co. (8251) (4331) Hartford City X (1) (1) (2093) (1087) Mootpeller (1) (2) (1) (1) BOOSE CO.: (1) (4) (1) (28) (1W) [l)Cir. (l)Sup. (1) (1W) (1W) * uJW (1) (3) (2) (3) (6) (1) (1) loiraa: (561) Advance (1) (938) Janeatom (1) (4) (1399) «. . < 728 > Thorntown (1) (1) (138) Dlen — . „ (569) Whitestown (1) (1) (1857) (1) (1) 356 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 LAW ENFORCEMENT LAWYERS /COURTS CORR ECTIONS County. City or Town Police Cape. Lt. sE t. Corp. Patrol (and Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Private Attnys. Court (Judges: Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and Matrons Dep. or Asst. Chief Dep. Asst. Public Defendet Dep. CU X (1) (10) (2W) (l)Cir. X (527) Town: Nashville (1) — : (15) (1W)CARROLL CO. : (1) X (1) (l)Cir. (1) X (2582) City: (1373) Delphi X (1) (685) Towns: Burlington <1> (577) Camden (1) mm (1001 Flora (1) ffdf . (1) (25) (2W) (l)Cir. (1) (1W) (1 asst. W) City- (19,255)Mt'' (10,254) Logansport (1) (1) detec- tive (5) (10) :orp. (aSio (5) (1) (1) (672) Town: (1284) Galveston (1) (111) Onward (1) (987) ni (1054) (575) (i) CLARK CO.: ._. (IW) Towns: (105) Alfordsvillo (149) Connelburg (873) Elnora (1) (411) Montgomery (1) (1433) (750) Odon N (1W) (538) Plainville (1) . pgARBORN CO. (1) X (1) Jt. :ir. with )hio Co. (22) (l)Clr. jt. X ' Cities- (4,293) Cities. (2,2«) Aurora (1) (7) (1) (1) (4,636) (2,382) X (1) (1W) Town: (840) Dlllsboro (1) W (3783) ~ (1974) Greendale (1) (5) (263) Hardlnsburg .. — (616) Moores Hill (1) (435) St. Leon (1) (395) West Harrison DECATUR CO. (1) (4) (1) (14) (l)Cir (1) (2W)ct hs (2W) jail (8,620) Cities: j(5.596) Greensburg (1) (2) (3) (6) (1) (1) Iwn* : (187) Melford (1) (252) Millhouse __ (381) New Point (1) (785) St. Paul (117U) (618) Westport (1) D&KALB CO. (1) (6) (1) (1) (26) (2W) (l)Cir. (I) (IW) Cities I (7,388) (3,867) (1) ...(.1W) (2,394) Butler (1) (2) (1) (1) (4;7l5) (2,468) Garrett (1) (1) (1) (3) (1) (1) Towns: (269) Altona .. am Ashley (1) (1) (359) Cocunna (1) (537) Hamilton (1) (1) (564) St. Joseph (1876) (982) Waterloo (2) (1) DELAWARE CO. (1) maj. (3) (5) (13) (1) (l)(l)in- vestg.(l ch. dep. (4) «5 (98) (4W) tDCir. (2)Sup, (1) (4) (4W) Cities: (80,028) (3«,312) Vnncie fl) m p ins -re nks & m (h) fl)* Toms: <*. 293> (1,196) _ , Albany (1) (2) Eaton (6) 358 INDIANA LAVl 1AW ENFORCEMENT 7 REVIEW LAWYERS/COURTS [Vol. 8 CORR :297 EC'flONS Cotntty. City or Town -ToUce: Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol Recruits) Sheriff Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Public Oefendei Dep. Private Attnys. Court (Judges! Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and Matrons Dep. or Asst. Chief Sep. Asst. (928) Gaston (1) (890) Sum _ (1.673) (850) (1) (1) Ci (jt Ma cult tin) XMBOIS CO. (1) (2) jo (1) wi nt c: hMai rcule tin Co. (14) (1W) (2W) Cities: (2t335) Huntingburg X • (1) (1)W (8,641) (4,488) Jasper (1) 9 rank unknot n (1) Town* : (404) Dubois X (1,432) (719) Ferdinand (1) (2) (17,171) „ . (9.1W)Goshen (1) (2) Crodra (4) (6) (9) - (6) (1) (1) (4,159) (2,170) (1) (1) (5) (1) (1) Toms: (1,100) (590) (1,055) (560) , . Middleburv (1) . (618) Millersburg (1) (1,160) (602) Wakarusa (1) (2) TAYETTE CO. (1) (3) (3) (1) (13) DClr (1) (DW "" City: (4,631) Rochester (1) (5) (1) (1) AkTOQ (1)' (2) (372) Fulton (1)W (530) Kevanna - eusoN co. (1) X (1) (18) IDClr X Citita: (3,289) (1,755) Oakland City <1> (S) (1) (1) (7.431) (4,005) X U> (1) "iown.' ""tiVSSS) (1,318) •Tort Branch (2) Tow (621) Francisco (1) (1.171) (620) Haubscadc (1) (1) (416) Hazelton (1) (121) Maeke; - (1,056) (567) - (529) Patoka (1> :i)Cir :2)suP (313) SonmerviJ.le (1) (1) chief (6) (3H) GRAMT CO. (1> (10) (1W) UHegal advisor C2)W inve (2) tg. (1) (62) 8 male (lW)matr n ' Cities: (5,742) (2,974) Gas City X (1) (1) (39,607) (20,306) Marlon (1) (2) (10) (1) (16) (4) (42) (1) (1) (1,771) Fairmounc (» (3) +6 h irly (337) Povlerton (» (2,466) (1,266) Jonesboro (1) (728) Mathews (1) U.073) (552) Svayzee (1) (1,076) (556) Sveetser (1) (3,202i Upland ' (2) (1,057) (561) 6RKKRE CO, (1) (2) (1) (14) (1W) (l)Cir (1W) (DW Cities: (2,335) (1,231) -JMorwilla ' (1) (2) (1) (5,450) (2,951) Linton (1) (7) (1) - Towns: (2,565) (1,408) Bloomfield (1) (3) (702) Lyons - (295) SevberTy ~ (301) , , Switz Citv - (1,691) (903) Worthinpton (D* HAMILTON CO. (1) (11) (1) +2 leg. interns (l)ci (1) .dep. (1) (61) (5W) (DClr (DSup 1W (1) (2)jaUer 2W (1PT) I Cityj (7,548) (3,990) Noblesville (1) (1) (2) (1) (7) (1) (1) Tovns: (1,338) (684) « Arcadia (1) (620) Atlanta (1) 360 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 LAM ENFORCEMENT LAWYERS /COURTS CORRECTI0NS r.nunty. City or Town Police: Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol (.3rd Recruits) Sheriff Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Public )efende: Dep. Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and Matrons Dep. or Asst. Chief Dep, Asst. >rivate Attnys. Court (Judges! (10,653) (3,388) (1) (1) (1) (7) (1) fl) (1,378) (710) Cicero (1) (3)p (628) Fishers (3) (1,837) (960) Westfield (1) (1) HANCOCK CO. (1) (5) (1) (28) (2W) (DCir (DSup (i)Cou (D t? Court,, (1) IV (5W) Cities: (9,986) Greenfield X (1) ~ Towns: (1,478) Cumberland (1) (2.46U) (1,295) Fortville (1) (863) (1) _ (958) Shirley (2) (263) Spring Lake (1) (480) Wilkinson ?" HARRISON CO, u> (1W) (1) Joint with cire *awf it rd Co. (12) (DCir (30 1 (1W) (1W) loims: (2,719) (1,440) (1) (188) Crandall (195) Elizabeth ~ (641) Laconia - (586) Lanesvitle (« (119) Hauckport - Milltown see also under Crawfoi 1 Co. <» (32) - (133) New Middletow l - (483) Palmyra (1) HENDRICKS CO.. (1) (7) (1) (45) (1W) (DCir (DSup (DCir. Ct (l)Supar.C . (2) (lW)matr (1W) in Towns : (422) (1) [him Brownsburg " (736) Clayton (1) (453) Coatesville (1) . .(3,771) (2.021) Danville w (1) (4) (1) (397) Lizton- (1) (601) North Salem (1) (867) Pittsboro " (4,221) Plainfield (1) (352J Stilesville (1) HBNRY CO. (1) EA(4 (1W) (1) (2) <30)b (DCir (DCir. Ct (1H) City (21,215) (11,098) New Castle (1) U) (5) .(4).. (5) (26) (2U1 m Towns: (220) Blountsville (1) (207) Cadiz (1) (1) (200) • ' Dunreith 1974] WOMEN IN 1 LAV EHF0RCEMEKT nHE iICJS LAWYERS/COURTS 361 CORRECTIONS pountv. City or Town VoUce!" :«pt. Lt. Sgt. :orp. f Patrol (am* ecruits) 1 Sheriff larshall Dep. Prose- Dep. cuting or Public Attny. As§t.)efender Private Court Dep. Attnys. (Judge"! Probation Officers Jailer* end Dep. Matrons t ««». hlef Dtp. or PWff a>- «m ' t - (225) - (518) - ' " " (2.456) (1,322) (1) (3) CM (530) (1) - ' " (2,033) (1,071) (1) (1) (1) (1) (495) Mooreland (1) (395) Mt. Summit - (958J Shirley (2) (957) (236) (329) (1) (387) HOWARD CO. 1 maJo - (1) (6) (1) (17) (1W) ,,,(Dch.i >«(l)invi 4 2) stg. (1) (2) (70) (2W) (l)Cir (DSup (1W) Dir. (4) '(2W)--u. pd ' ten (3W) ' Lliau M. P.O. " "Cityt (44,042) (23,019) Kokomo (1) (2) (9) (10) (28) (57) (2H) (1) (1) — w Toms: (870) (981) Greentoun (1) (844) Russlaville (1) (1) BUNTINGTON CO. (1) (4) (1) (l)inves (1) :g. (26) (2W) (DCir (1) (1W) "City: (16,21/) (8,570) Huntington X (1) (1) Towna: (1,207) (609) Andrevs ~ (963) Markle (1) (1) (164) fl) (858) (1) (1,229) (667) fl) JACKSON CO. (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) inve9 K. (18) (1W) (l)Cir (1) (1H) (IS) City: (13,352) (7,030) P) Cno f info) (1) (1) Towns: (2,376) (1,266) Browns town (1) (1,663) (843) (788) Medora JASPER CO. (1) (3) 3 n.t. (1) (1) (14) (DCir X (3)Jailer (3)p.t. j (lW)oatro i illeie City; (4,688) (2,515) Rensslaer X (1) (1) Towns: (1,697) (838) DeMotte (1) (1) 11,127) (600) Kernington (1) (Dn (713) Vheatfield (1) JAY CO. (1) X (1) (9) (DCir X Cities: (3,465) (1,828) Dunkirk (1) (5) (1) (1) (7,115) (3,794) Portland (1) (2) (4) + 1 in h£. stg. (1) (1) Towns: (320) Bryant (1) (798) . Pennvllle (1) (1,667) Redkey <875) - 362 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 UVI ENFORCEMENT lAWYERS/COURTS CORRXCTI0NS .County, City or Town Police; Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol (s~l Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Public )efendei Dep. Private Attnys. Court (Judges; Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and MatronsJAY CO. con't Chief Dep. Asst. Asst. (162) - " JEFFERSON CO. 'City: (4.582) (2,452) North Vernon X ~ - (1W) (1W) Town: (440) (1)* • JOHNSON CO. (1) ' (3) (7) (1) (1) (4) (48) (1W) (l)Cir (l)Sun (1) (1) Cities: (11,477) (6,086) Franklin X (1) (1) (11,408) (5,945) (1) (3) (7) (?) (7) (1) «)* Towns : (373) : . Bargersville (1) (2,521) ' (4,906) (4,200) (2,098) (1) O) (597) (1) . (1) (457) Trafalgar post vacant (1,492) (760) Whiteland (1) KNOX CO. (1) (11) (1) (29) (l)CIr (l)Sup (1) (1) (1W) Cities: (3,/l/) (2,021) BIcknell X (1) (1) (19,867) (10,187) ?incennes X (1) (1) Towns: (627) - (268) Decker (1) (482) Edwardsporc " (603) Monroe Citv - (726) Oaktown (1) (1) (528) (562) Wheatland (1) . KOSCUISK0 CO. - (1) X (1) (31) sw (DCir IUSup X Cities: (4,159) Nappanee Se * wide : Elkh irt Co (7,506) (3,999) Warsaw supt (1) . (1) (1) (3) (10) (1) (1) towns: (210) Brukett (1) (468) ClaypooX (1) (516) Etna. Green (1) (561) Leesbure m (1.264) (672) Melford (i) . (830) Mentou (i) (1) (456) North Webster (i) (1,175) < 621> Pierceton (i> (2) 1974] WOMEN IN 1 LAW ENFORCEMENT "HE 1rCJS LAWYERS /COURTS 363 CORRECTIONS County. City or Town 1 Police Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. Asst. Public )of cndei Dep. Private Attnyi Court (Judges! Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and MatronsKOSCOTSKO CO. con't Chief Dep. Asst. or Asst. (179) (1) (588) (1) ' (1,546) (788) (1) (3) (2,811) (1,466) Winona Lake (1)' LAGRANGE CO. (1) (3) (1) (8) (DCir (1) (1W Towns i (448) Shipshewana (1) (677) Topeka (1) (915) Wolcottville (1) IDnf . LAKE CO. ( ( Dmaj Dchie (8) (6) (13) Decec tive (14) (104) 2W (1) (1) 4invs (l)ch.dep (1) trial (40 . 1W mp. (1) Dch.de (4) (46) (12W) (l)Clr (10)Sup (1) DR. (l)asst.DR 8)p.( 4 p. 3fed . X (lw) Cities: (10,931) (5,639) (1) (6) (9) (1) (1) (46,982) (23,814) 'East Chicago X (1) (1) (1) (3) (10) (1) (1) (175,415) (90,737) Gary no posit* on or rank i .ifo. (1) (1) (mi, mi (54,819) Hammond k (1) U> <2l,48S) (10,858) HobarC X (1) (l) (7,247) Whiting X (1) (i) Towns; (7,589) (3.457) Cedar Lake (i) (1) (1) (6) (1W) (2,521) Dyer (2) +(2)spec. (3,663) i (1,846) acnerervi^e (4) (2) +(i-)P.T. (1) (426) LaPORTE CO. (1) (5) (17) (1) (1) (7) (53) (1W) (l)Cir. (2) Sup. (1) (3) 2W (3) 1W (W) Cities: (22,140) (11,645) LaPorte (l) (39) un- ranked (1) (1) (39,369) (19,54«) ' Mchiiw City _1U-. (7) (9) (12) (64) (2W) (1) (1) (1) Town*! (3l4) Kingsbury (1) (1200) (637) Kingeford Heights (1) (696) LaCross .. (2740) (1416) ! Lone Beach (1) (6) (449) Hichiana Shores (1) (1) (374) Pottawattomie Park (1) (2697) (1334) Trail Creek (1) (1) (773) Wanatah (1) (2614) Westvllie (1) (8) 364 INDIANA LAW UH ENFORCEMENT 7 RE'VIEW LAWYERS /COURTS [Vol . 8:297 eomcnoNS County. City or Town Police. Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol «rad Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Public Jefendei Dep. Private Attnys. Court (Judges Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and Matrons Dep. or Asst. Chief Dep. Asst. (1) (°> m (21) DCir. CD Sup. (D clr. extra (1! fimmatro Cities: (".700) (7,014) X (1) (1) (4092) (2176) Mitchell (1) O) (1) (1) Xowns: (1155) (620) Oolitic (1) MADISON CO. BSSt. <3) (2) (2) (8) (1) (1) (l)invst 1)IS) s?iw) (100) (7W) (DCir. ;2)Sup. (D n (4) iB #2 (3) 1W <3W Cities : (5600) (2678) Alexandria (1) (i) (2) (6) + * ex- tra help (1) W (70,511) (36,940) Anderson ii)' (i)* <7>* 1-2 ins (7)* >ectr (33? la (84)* (1) (1)* (D* (D* (ir,T9b) (5,900) (i) (i) (1) (1) 0) (7) (1) (D Towns: (3001) (1526) (1) (31 (118) (2326) (1167) (1) (1796) (912) (1) (6) Glmco City (1) (880) (1) (1725) (874) Lapel (1) . (1) («7) Markleville ; - (519) Orestes (1) (1) (2243) (1180) Pendleton (1) chief (2) (27) River Forest (1) (573) Sunmitville (1) Tdv5 (1W)« .MARION CO. 1 LtC L (4) mR. > (5) (19) (74) (2K) (44) (178) (15W) (1) (1) (3) chiefs* (66) (2W) (10) (1W) (1774) (68 W) 15)Mu. (IZKD<*i (7W) >ec. ease work* Cities: d*700) (7017) X (1) - (743,155) (387,270) Indianapolis X (1) - (16,646) (8,488) Lawrence (1) (1) (2) (5) (1W) (17) (1) .. (2,505 (1,287 Southport (1) (4) .(D Xowns: (l83) Castleton (1) (1423) Clermont (100) (1) <1478) Cumberland See ider I incock Co. <33) Highwoods - (964) Hooecroft (1) . (1850) Meridian Hills (» (3) p.t. (50) N. Crows Nest - (656) Ravensvood — (1192) Rocky Ripple .. (15056) (7848) Speedway (1) (1) (5) w (13) (1W) (22) Spring Hills -- Warren Park -- (485) Williams Creek (1) 1974] WOMEN IN IAV ENFORCEMENT THE ICJS LAWYERS/COURTS 365 CORRECTIONS ! Count*. Cicv or Town 'Mice: Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol («««' Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asat. Public 3ef andoi Dep. Private Attny*. Conrt (Judges! Probation Officers Dap. Jailers and Matrons Dtp. or Asst.Chief Dap. AJSC. (124) « MARSHALL CO. W « (2) (1) (1) (1) lnvstg. (1) __: (26) (1W) l)Clr. (l)Sup. (1) fun (1W) City: WW7 (4018) Plymouth CM <2) (9) (1) .fl>_ Xomti (1393) (718) Argos (1) (1)" (IWfc) (877) Bourbon (1) (1) (3487) (1865) Bremen (1) (6) way (929) Culver (1) (2) (604) (1) MARTI* CO. (1) X (1) joint circuit ' Dubois C 1th (3) (l)Clr. Jt. it City: (2953) (1536) Loosootee X (1) (1) Towns : (339) Crane (1) (1039) (550) Shoals (1) MUMICO. (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) lnvst (1) (1) (13) (l)Clr. (i) (2) Jailer (1W) matr s on " Citvi *"•"*> Vaea (1) (D (1) (3) (6) (14) (1) (1) Town*: <473) (1)""^ (956) Banker Hill (1) (1163) (583) Converse (1) (566) Denver " (273) X*CT -" (107) north Crove " KOHR01 CO. w <2) (1) det. (11) (1) (1) (') i vestg. LW + (1)P '"(2) , (1W) (1) a) (100) (7W) (l)Cir. (2) Sup. (i) (i) asst. 1W (2) (2) jail- ers (1W) City: (42,890) (22,121) 59. io ran t (3W) (1) (1) lown: (1617) Bllettsvllle (1) (291) Stinesvilla (1) fl> (3) (1) (1) (24) (l)Cir. (1) initials (2W) fed? (3)turnke (2W) ma- trons ' (2) 'T tar keys "City: (13,842) (7072) Crawfordsvilla (1)* (D* (5)* (6)* (15)* , o» m Tonne: (145) (802) Darlington (1) (1099) (601) Ladoga (1) (713) Under (1) (640) New Market (1) (381) New Richmond -- (318) __ Hew Bees -- (557) woveland (1) (993) Uavnetown (1) (437) - . Vlneate (1) _M0RGAH CO. (1) (5) (1) (l) (1) lnvstg . 1) + lW)i: tern (1) (23) (l)Cir. (l)Sup. (l)Cir.Ct. (l)Sup.Ct. (3) & rad op.(lW) matron (2W) metro IS' City: (9723) (5172) . MgtSagams Towns: (i2i) Betbaqy (1) (2) (8) (1) (1) ~ 366 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 LAW ENFORCEMENT LAWYERS /COURTS CORRECTION Police: Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol Recruits) Sheriff Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Public ef endet Private Dep. Attnya Court Judges Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and Matrons Dep. or Asst. Chief Dep. Asst. (911) (1) (5000) (2961) (1) . (8) (1W) (l)Cir. (1134) (592) (1) (1) NEWTOH CO. (1) (1) (3) (1) (1) (11) X (HO Towns: (919) ..(«...,. (1864) (607) Goodland (1) " (msr (671) Morocco (1) (1) (194)' (1) (1) X (1) {") [l)Cir. X City: (6838) (3577) (1) (?) (4) + 6PT (1) (1H) ^^TMT- (1603) Ligonier (1) (3) + IK (I) .- "Towns: (1498) (770) Albion (!) (1) :» PT (881) m W (475) Cromwell (i) (1) (1354) (680) Rods City (« ;i) Cir (JO (915) Wolcottville See u ider L iGrang Co. X OHIO CO. (i) (1) (1) join :ir. with : Co. (3) (1W) City: (2305) (1240) Rising Sun m (3) (1) ORANGE CO. (i) (3) (1) (7) (1W) ;l)Cir. (1W) Cir. Ct. (1W) Towns: (2059) (1039) French Lick -- (1934) (957) (i) (1) (1) PT (3281) (1740) Paoll (i) (3) (930) West Baden Springs (i) OWBM CO. (i) X (1) (12) (l)Cir. X Towns: (692) Gosport (i) (2423) (1309) Spencer «* (3) m n* (8) :i)Clr. ..... (Ho- (In) ,.._ Towns » (391) Bloomingdale (1) (35) Judson (365) Marshall _. (1192) (651) Kontezuma (1) (2820) (1542) Rockville (1) (1) (3) (817) Rosedale (1) (263) Spring Lake See inder )ancoc t Co. PERRY CO. (1) (2) (l) (10) [l)Cir. rn (1W) (W) Cities ("92) (2280) Cannelton (1) (2) + (1) PT (i) (1) (7933) (9119) Tell City (1) (i) (6) (i) (1) (575) Troy PISE CO. (1) (1) (i) (i) st; pd. (8) (l)Cir. (i) (1W) 1974] WOMEN IN THE ICJS 367 • LAW ENFORCEMENT LAWYERS /COURTS CORRECTIONS tounty, City or Town Police: Capt. Lt. sec Corp. Patrol (o-rtdL Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. Asst. Public cfender Dep. Private Attnya Court Judges! Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and MatronsPECK 00. (cont.) Chief Dep. Asst. or Asst. City! <2697 > * (1448) (1) (4) (1) en Towns : (285) SpuxKeoa (1) (1030) (561) Winslow (93) (3W) (l)Clr. (2)Sup. (4) (1W) PORIBR CO. (1) (1) 28) 3W) (1) (1) invstg. (8) (2W) (D (1) (3)m jail (l)W matr rs n Cities: (19.127) (9511) Portage (1) (2) (6) (7) (13) (1) (1) (20,020) (10,233) Valparaiso (1) (1) (3) (1) (2) (3) (20) + 4 hwy (1) (1) Toms: (946) Beverly Shores (618) Bums Harbor (1) (2) (6U7) (3184) Chesterton (4) (1) (4) (1) (1) (301) Ouna Acres (1624) (819) Hebron (1) (1) (1388) (721) (1)- ' * ^ (1361) (662) — ' (1) L8PT AW (3058) (1499) (1) (3) ;8)pi „ POSE? CO. (1) (1) (2) (1) (» (1Q) (l)Cir. (1W) clx. ct. (1W) * (3554) Mt. Vernon (» W (7) (1) Towns; (793) Cvnthlana (1) (178) Griffin (1) (971) Hew Harmony (1) UuJi) (539) Poseyville (1) P0LASKI CO, (1) (1) (1) (1) (5) (l)Cir. (1) PT (1W) Towns: (1015) (538) Francesville (732) Madaryville (268) Monterey (1) (2341) (1262) Winamac (1) PUTNAM CO. (1) m fl4) (l)Clr. X City: (8852) (4600) Towns: (703) Bainbridee (870) Cloverdale (1) (1) (1004) Roachdale (1) (390) Ruasellvllle (1) RANDOLPH CO. (1) X (i) (i) invstg. (2) (1W) (18) (1W) (l)Cir. (1) (Bl) Cities: (3995) (2052) Union City CD (4) +(2) PI (1W) (1) (1) (5493) . (2896) Winchester (!) [3) spec. pol.(5) (1) (1) Towns: (1262) (671) _ Farm! and (1) (1) (212) Losantville . (1) (1360) (734) Lynn (1) (1) light (275) Modoc (1) (599) Parker (1) 368 INDIANA LAW LAW ENFORCEMENT RE1riEW LAWYERS /COURTS [Vol 8 CORK :297 ECT10NS pountv. City or Tovn '"police: Capt. Lt. Sgt. Corp. Patrol (and- Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Public Defender Dep. Private Attnya. Court ( Judges) Probation Officers Dep. Jailer* and Matrons Dep. or Asst. Chief Dep. Aset. (924) (2) (406) Saratoge (1) . (14) (l)Cir.RIFLE* CO. (1)' (2) (1) (1) (1) City: (3799) (1972) Batesville See inder 'rankl .n Co. Towns: (1260) (676) Milan (1) (282) Napoleon (1) (1346) (721) Osgood .. (707) (1) (1) (1020) (540) Versailles (1) RUSH CO. (1) X (1) (16) (l)Cir. X City: (6686) (3561) X (1) (1) Towns: (946) Carthage (1) (452) ! Co. (2) (7) I14JL (68) (OT) (1) (1) (1) (9) (3) (289) <4W) ;i)Cir. 5) Sup. .. (1) . (3) (4W) .. Cities: (35,517) (18,659) Miehewaka X (1) " (125,580) (65,822) South Bend X (1) Towns: (86) Indian Village .. (712) Lakevllle (1) (1434) (761) New Carlisle (1) (2) (663) North Liberty (1) (3) (16«), (792) Osceola (1) <1> :« :6)pt (895) Roseland (1) (2006) (1023) Walkerton (1) (5) SCOTT CO. (0 (2) ;i)n (1) (9) (l)Cir. (1W) (IB) City: (4,791) Scottsbure ...m. (7) (1) „ Town: (4902) Austin* 2468) (1) . SHELBV CO. (1) X (1) (35) [DCir. ;i)suP . X City: (15,094) (7976) (23) total no r mkB g .ven (1) (1W) Towns: (838) Morristovn (785) St. Paul See inder lecatu Co. SPENCER CO. (1) X (1) (10) <2W) ;i)Cir. X City: (2565) (1332) Rockport X (1) (1) Chrisney «I endet Dep. Private Attnya Court (Judges Probation Of f Icera D-'p. Jailers and MatronsChl«£ Dap. Mat. oc Aast. Twraaj (761) (1) W (1738) (902) (1) (id 6)PT fl> _.£172_ ;i)Clr. (D (iw) City: (5117) (2169) Angola _i.iL (6) (1) (D Towoa: (271) Clear Lako (1) (1043) (551) Fraaont ' .. (537) H—tllton See u ider I> sKalb !o. (464) mm («7) Orland (1) sullivah co. (1) (3) (1) (12) (1W) (l)Cir. X City: (4683) (2577) Sullivan (1) (1) (1) (5) (1) -- ' Towns (714) Carl lata' „ (UiU) (605) „ (962) Faroaaburg (1) (907) (1) . (»5) Merc* (1281) (658) Shalburn (1) (1463) (998) Vevay (1) (2)1 ;2)pi SHrrZBSLAHD CO. • (1) (2) (1) joint clr (1) ult 1 ith Jef iereor (3) eo. [l)Cir. Ot.) (1) (1W) Inns (216) Patriot (1) TIPPECANOE CO. (1) (1) f4) m (19) (l\f) (1) + (1) invst. (4) (1W) (1) (ill) <3W) (l)Cir. (2)Sup. (2) (W) (1) Jailer (3) W Cities: (44,955) . (23,557) (1) (1) (8) (1W) :9> + 6 det (47) m (11 (8,743) . West Lafavetta ft) (3) (6) (16) (i) (1) Tom*: (818) fi) (741) Clarke Hill (i) (889) T_TOB CO. (i) X (l) (10) max. X City: (5176) (2682) Tipton (I) (1) (3) (3) (l) (D Toima: (469) Eaootoa (i) (672) Sharpsvilla (i) (946) Windfall (i) OTIOH CO. (i) (1H) joint ci (1) cult with Fr inklir (8) Co. (l)Cir. (Jt.) (1) (Djaller (1)W PT Tom: (975) (1831) liberty (709) Watt College Cornar (i) .VATOBTOCHCO. (1) (2) (9) (6) det. (49) (5W) m (l)ChAdm' (7) + (3)ir at. IV (2) + " 2 in- vat. (185) (4W) (l)Cir. (4)Sup. (D(i} ) ch. dep.-lH (D 8-2W City: (138,746)y (73,924) .BvansvUle (1) (1) + (3) In- .ap. (11) (15) 17-IW >5det 1W (140) (10W) (1) (DPT (1) (2) (1) PT TORKrLLHnr CO, (i) (3) (1) (1) (1) (8) (l)CIr. (D (IW) City: (5340) (2876) Clinton X (1) (D Towns: (1090) (579) Coxae* -- 370 LA 4 Effit IN ECEMB DIAl IT sfA LAVV REVL i EW JWYERS/«XWRIS [VoI. s CORK >:297 EcnoKS pountv. City or Town "Pol Chief [ce: Dep. Aset. Capt. It. Sgt. Corp. Patrol (and Recruits) Sheriff or Marshall Dep. Prose- cuting Attny. Dep. or Asst. Public 3ef endei Dep. Private Attnys, Court I Judges Probation Officers Dep. Jailers and Matrons Sep. or Asst. (720) (1) (1067) (540) Fairview Park (1) (708) Newport (1) (510) Perrysville (1) (462) Universal VIGO CO. (1) (1) (3) (3) (1) (1) (17) (1>'+U)ch dep + 1 invest. (6) (1W) (D+ (1) in- vest. (1) (83) (3W) ;i)Cir. [2) Sup. (2) (2W)matro (2M)turnk IS W City: .(70,286) (35,456) Terre Haute (1) <3> (9) (18) (7) (69) (1) (1) Towns: <&>i (1) (1195) (624) (1) (2704) (1409) (1) UABASH CO. (1) X (1) (17) (1W) (l)Cir. X City: (13.379)7 (7048) . (1) fl> (3) (5) (16) 12 recruits (1) (1) (1) . (1) (2) (4) + 2 PT (D* (1) Towns: (2032) (1061) Chandler (1) (2^ ;4)pi (834) Klberfeld (1) (556) Lynnville (1) ' (23027 (1173) Newburgh (1). asst. (2) (7) (hrly) (1) (2) Tennyson (335) .. Washington (1) X (1) (10) (1) Cir. X (5041) C«y: (2711) Salem (1) (1) (1) (2) (3) (1) (1) Towns: (678) Campbell aburg (1) (207) Frc-dricksburg " (191) Little York " Livonia (120) (1) (1) Towns: (1528) (773) Churubusco <«' <4> PI Larwill (324) .(1362) (723) South Whitley (2) TOTALS .95 69 164 3«I 183 18 608 S.H 115° 2422 66 W 438 4H, 453% 14 W 217 2W SUP* 203 4inv. 2 W 36 1W 4 lovst 17 4907 172 W 278 8 W 154 40 W 21 7 W 39 jailei 86 natroi • s 3W Notes to Appendix (a) There are 92 counties, 114 cities, and 450 towns in Indiana. (b) Most of the information in the chart is taken from the 100R report filed by each county, city, and town available from the State Board of Ac- counts, 912 State Office Building, Indianapolis, Indiana. Since these reports 372 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:297 contain at the best, first and last names of employees and since Equal Em- ployment Opportunity forms which compile statistics according to sex are not public, the numbers of women indicated are the ones positively identified. There may be others but the percentage of women would not change sub- stantially. The figures indicate total employees within each category and the indication of women (W) shows how many of the total are women. Other information is from the Roster of state and local officials of the State of Indiana from the State Board of Accounts. Still other information, particularly concerning towns, is from the files of the Indiana Association of Cities and Towns. This latter information is provided on a voluntary basis by cities and towns. (c) Number of attorneys is derived from the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary List, October 1972-73. Since there is no record of the type of practice in which attorneys are engaged, these figures represent total num- bers of attorneys registered according to county and indicate the total number of women in each total. Again, this designation according to sex was derived from given names. (d) By statute, county sheriffs manage county jails and thus function in a "corrections" capacity. (e) X indicates no information was available. (f) The first number is total population; the second is total female popu- lation for the political unit. Figures from the 1970 census. (g) No attempt was made to distinguish full-time and part-time em- ployees unless the 100R report stated specifically part-time. (h) * indicates sex was indeterminable, usually because the report con- tained only the initials of the employees. (j) E.E.A. employees are employed through emergency employment funds available from the federal government and are indicated as such when so re- ported on 100R. Use of such funds to increase the number of women employees is notable since the federal money is not permanently available.