Indiana Law Review


Imliaiia Laiiv Revieiv
Volume 9 March 1976 Number Z

Kes Jiidieata in Federal Civil Hi^Iits Actions

J. W. TORKE*

Frequently, a federal civil rights action challenging state

laws or a state official's conduct follows or is even concurrent

with related litigation in state courts. Despite the increasing

frequency of this pattern,^ the effect, as res judiciata, to be given

the state litigation remains unsettled. This uncertainty is re-

flected in the inconsistent approaches found not only betv/een the

circuits but as well within a single circuit. Such a state of affairs,
especially as it touches so intimately the problem of federal-state

relations to which the Supreme Court has of late appeared so
sensitive, calls for resolution.

A special tension arises, of course, between an increasingly
voracious res judicata,^ and a sense that federal civil rights actions

present demands so special as to overshadow the policies'* en-
forced by res judiciata principles.^

^Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Indi-
anapolis. B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1963; J.D., University of Wisconsin,

1968.

'The increase in federal civil rights actions is well known and is re-

ported in any number of sources. See, e.g., H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The
Federal Court-s and the Federal System 51 et seq. (2d ed. 1973). Insofar as a
constant proportion of these cases involves prior state litigation, it is assumed

that an increase in the pattern of cases discussed has occurred.

^Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expansion, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 357

(1974). The author notes a modern procedural trend toward larger units

of litigation of which the broadening reach of res judicata is but a part. The

most obvious expansion occurs in the enlargement of the concept of "same

cause of action'' and in the decline of mutuality. The author goes so far as

to suggest the estoppel of even nonparties to the first action under certain

circumstances.

^These policies, expressed as well in Cleary, Res Judicata Re-examined,

57 Yale L.J. 339 (1948), as anywhere else, are said to include: prevention
of a danger of double recovery; promotion of stable decisions; protections

against repeated vexatious litigation; and promotion of court economy. See

also IB Moore's Federal Practice ^0.405 (2d ed. 1974).
'*For the most part I will use the terminology favored by the American

543



544 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

In the pages that follow I will portray the confusion that

exists in the federal courts, describe the several patterns in which
the problem is most apt to surface, and then examine various ap-
proaches to solution of the problem.

I. The Present State of Affairs

A, Confusion Below/Silence Above

In the course of foreclosing access to a federal court, at least

until related state proceedings were completed, Justice Rehnquist,
in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,^ admitted that at the moment of
completion of the state proceedings, "normal rules of res judicata

and judicial estoppel [might well] operate to bar relitigation in

actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the federal issues aris-

ing in state court proceedings."^ If such is the case, the initial

rebuff in fact locks the federal court door for all time. However,

Law Institute in the Restatement of the Law of Judgments. "Res judicata"
refers to a bundle of doctrines: "bar," "merger," "direct estoppel," and "col-

lateral estoppel."

If a valid and final personal judgment for money is rendered
in favor of the plaintiff, the cause of action is merged in the judg-
ment, and he cannot thereafter maintain an action (see §47). If

a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the

defendant on the merits, the original cause of action is barred by
the judgment (see §48). . . . Where, therefore, the second action is
based upon the same cause of action as that upon which the first
action was based, the judgment is conclusive as to all matters which
were litigated or might have been litigated in the first action.

Where, however, the subsequent action is based upon a different
cause of action from that upon which the prior action was based,
the effect of the judgment is more limited. The judgment is con-
clusive between the parties in such a case only as to matters

actually litigated and determined by the judgment. The judgment
is not conclusive as to matters which might have been but were not
litigated and determined in the prior action. (See § 68).

A judgment, therefore, has not only a direct effect upon the cause
of action in which the judgment is rendered was based, by way of
merger or bar, but also has a collateral effect upon other causes of
action involving the same parties, by way of . . . "collateral estoppel."

Restatement of Judgments, Introductory Note, at 158-59 (1942). Thus bar,
merger, and direct estoppel apply where the subsequent case is the same as
the first, while collateral estoppel concerns different claims with some com-
mon issues.

Use here is also made of Professor Vestal's nomenclature. "Claim pre-
clusion" is essentially synonymous with bar and merger and "issue preclusion"
with collateral estoppel. See Vestal, supra note 2.

M20 U.S. 592 (1975).
^/rf. at 606 n.l8.



1976] RES JUDICATA TAT>

since res judicata had not been raised specifically/ the Court was
not required to advance beyond the following speculation of
Justice Powell, dissenting in Ellis v. Dyson:''

The Court has never expressly decided whether and
in what circumstances § 1983 can be invoked to attack col-
laterally state criminal convictions. The resolution of this
general problem depends on the extent to which, in a

§ 1983 action, principles of res judicata bar relitigation in

federal court of constitutional issues decided in state

judicial proceedings to which the federal plaintiff was a
pai*ty.' ^

This same postponement can be found in Preiser v. Rodriguez,'^
in which Justice Brennan observed

:

[W]e have never held that the doctrine of res judicata
applies, i!i whole or in part, to bar the relitigation under

§ 1^83 of questions that might have been raised, but
were not, or that were raised and considered in state court
proceedings. The Court correctly notes that a number of
lower courts have assumed that the doctrine of res
judicata is fully applicable to cases brought under § 1983.

But in view of the purposes underlying enactment of the
Act—^in particular, the Congressional misgivings about
the ability and inclination of state courts to enforce fed-
erally protected rights, . . .—^that conclusion may well be
in error."

In the face of such a lack of guidance, the lower federal

courts have indeed gone in many directions. A clear majority,
however, have assumed that civil rights actions provide no special

exceptions to the triumphant principles of res judicata. For

example, the Second Circuit barred a federal challenge to a state

law limiting hours of outside work for policemen following an
unsuccessful attack in state court with the stern comment that
**[t]he Civil Rights Act, unlike federal habeas corpus, does not

Ud. at 607-08 n.l9.

M21 U.S. 426, 437 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). Here, too, the ques-
tion was avoided.

9/d. at 440.

^°411 U.S. 475 (1973). See aUo Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124 (1971).
The inconsistency in the lower federal courts is described in the text follow-
ing, and has already been noted by other commentators. See, e.g., Vestal,
Res Jvidicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Cowt^,
66 Mich. L. Rev. 1723 (1968).

^^11 U.S. at 509 n.l4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).



546 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

permit a second bite at the cherry."^ ^ A variety of courts have
been as explicit in rejecting the contention that civil rights stat-

utes provide some sort of exception to res judicata principles;'^
and the greater number apparently have assumed that res judicata
is inexorable.'^

A few courts, notably in the Fifth Circuit, achieve the same
results by treating the federal suit as a quest for appellate review,
and, as such, beyond the jurisdiction of the district court. For
example, where a school teacher's discharge was unsuccessfully
challenged in the Louisiana state courts, the teacher's resort to

the federal district court claiming racial discrimination was treated
as an invitation to review the work of the state courts.'^ The
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was pinioned on Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co.,'^ a case in which the Supreme Court repulsed
a bill seeking to have an Indiana judgment declared void as con-
travening various constitutional safeguards. Justice Van Devanter
characterized the bill as a prayer for appellate review—a jurisdic-
tion, of course, not vouchsafed to the district courts. Other re-

cent cases have also bowed to Rooker,'^ but as Judge Rives has
noted, such an approach is probably, in light of Bell v. Hood,'^ an

^ ^Lackawanna Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Balen, 446 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir.

1971).

''See, e.g., Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.),
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ; Bricker v. Crane,

468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972) ; Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963) ;

Paima v. Powers, 295 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. 111. 1969).

''See, e.g., Rios v. Cessna Fin. Corp., 488 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1973);

Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Fisher v. Civil Serv.

Comm'n, 484 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1973) ; Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation

Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1973); Metros v. United States Dist.

Court, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1970) ; Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431
F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970); Howe v. Brouse, 422 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1970);
Rankin v. Florida, 418 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Deane Hill Country Club,
Inc. V. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1967) ; Jenson v. Olson, 353

F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Hamilton v. Ford, 362 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Ky.

1973) ; Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Reimel, 266 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Cal.
1967); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ohio 1959), affd, 279

F.2d 685 (1960).

'^Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 363 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.
1966).

'^263 U.S. 413 (1923).

'^See, e.g.. Jack's Fruit Co. v. Growers Marketing Serv., Inc., 488 F.2d
493 (5th Cir. 1973); Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert, denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974) ; Community Action Group v. City of
Columbus, 473 F.2d 966 (.5th Cir. 1973) ; Brov/n v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012

(.5th Cir. 1969). See also O'Connor v. O'Connor, 315 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1963) ;
Kay V. Florida Bar, 323 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1971).

^«327 U.S. 678 (1946).



1976] RES JUDICATA 547

anachronism/' It is probably true that the effect of res judicata
should be the dispositive factor. Nevertheless, whether the fed-
eral suit fails because of res judicata or because it is characterized
as a quest for a reviev7 not available, the result is the same—loss
of access to a federal forum for the purposes of factfinding.

While a distinct minority, some courts have softened the
impact of res judicata, either by discerning policies of equal
moment competing vi^ith, or by regarding section 1983 and similar
provisions as exceptions to, normal principles of res judicata.
Ney V. CalifornioJ^^ is among the more notable cases according
section 1983 exceptional status. While there vi^as some doubt as to
whether issues raised in Ney's section 1983 action had been de-
termined in his prior state criminal conviction, the Ninth Circuit
suggested that, even so, the Civil Rights Act would become a dead
letter if parties were estopped by earlier state litigation. "" Simi-
larly, the Second Circuit, in Lombard v. Board of EdMcation,^^
refused to apply res judicata to bar a litigant's section 1983 claim

following two previous state proceedings in which plaintiff, a
public school teacher, challenged his discharge but failed to raise

certain federal constitutional issues now^ central to his quest for

relief. The court worried that to apply res judicata undiluted,
especially where the plaintiff's failure to raise the federal issue
in the state court precluded federal court review of the state

court decision and where, had the plaintiff originated his litiga-

tion in the federal district court the likelihood of abstention was
high, would be tantamount to a repudiation of the wisdom of
Monroe v. Pape^^ that the federal civil rights remedy is supple-
mentary to state remedies. To guard against abuse, however, the
court was willing to inquire whether the federal plaintiff's failure

to raise his federal claims in the state court constituted a waiver

in the constitutional sense. ^^ There have been also a handful of

"Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J.,
dissenting). - .

2°439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971).

^'This view surfaces in other cases as well. For example, the court

in Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert, denied, 401 U.S. 960 (1971), allowed a due process challenge in federal

court to the fairness of a state license revocation, the impartiality of vvhich

had been upheld in Florida courts.
2^^502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).

2^365 U.S. 167 (1961).

^''Other voices, some only in dissent, have suggested that section 1983
actions ought to be freed of the bindings of res judicata. See, e.g., Thistleth-
waite V. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.) (Cakes, J., dissent-
ing), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d
138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert, denied, 416 U.S. 906



548 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

decisions which, while less explicit in their rejection of res

judicata, have applied it with a unique sensitivity sug-gestive of a
half-way step to outright rejection."

B. Basic Patteims in Which the Res Judicata Problem Arises

The great increase in federal civil rights litigation,^* the
significant number of these cases in which related state litigation
is implicated, and the lack of uniformity which prevails in the
lower federal courts, all call for authoritative discussion of the

problem by the Supreme Court.^^ Indeed, the problem is a real
one, touching an area of sensitive federal/state relationships, an

area of recent especial concern of the Supreme Court, and lately
magnified by developments in the area of abstention and federal
equitable relief.

In order more fully to appreciate the federal civil rights
plaintiff's potential problem, it is helpful to describe the basic

patterns that exist wherein prior state litigation is implicated

in federal civil rights claims. Of course, the federal plaintiff, in
order to be barred or estopped, must have been a party in the
state litigation: either as a civil plaintiff, a civil defendant, or as

a criminal defendant.

The plaintiff in the federal court who has also appeared as
a plaintiff in the state court is perhaps the least worthy sup-

plicant for relief from the full force of res judicata. A typical
situation involves a litigant who has unsuccessfully challenged

(1974) ; Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J.,
dissenting) ; Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969) ; Wecht v. Marstel-
ler, 363 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Pa. 1973) ; Howard v. Ladner, 116 F. Supp.

783 (S.D. Miss. 1953).

^^See, e.g., Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert,

denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.

1974) ; Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir. 1970) ; Bell v. School Bd.,

321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Duncan v. Town of Blacksburg, 364 F. Supp.

643 (W.D. Va. 1973) ; Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973) ;
Olson V. Board of Educ, 250 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).

"^^See H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 75-76 n.4
(1973) [hereinafter cited as H. Friendly].

^''Some of the Justices themselves have recognized the need and have

advocated action. For example, in Florida State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack,

401 U.S. 960 (1971), Justice White and Chief Justice Burger dissented

from the denial of certiorari to a suit in which the Fifth Circuit Court of

Appeals refused to give res judicata effect to prior state court proceedings.

Mack V. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970).
See also Lauchli v. United States, 405 U.S. 965 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-

senting), denying cert to 444 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1971).



1976] RES JUDICATA 549

state conduct—for example, liquor license revocation,^* profes-
sional license revocation,^' or discharge from public employment^''
—in a state court and seeks to have the federal court examine the
state activity afresh. However, even this basic pattern may have
variations. First, the state litigation may have involved the same
essential claims, including the constitutional charges, which are
now set before the federal court.^' A second variation involves state
litigation attacking the same essential course of conduct but with-
out the constitutional imprecations now made the center of at-
tack. ^^ These cases, at least superficially, call for the application
of the doctrines of bar, merger, or direct estoppel" as the two
claims, federal and state, are essentially the same. A third strain of
cases involving a state plaintiff occurs where the conduct chal-
lenged in the federal court is, at least in part, the state process in

which the plaintiff has met with failure. ^"^ This last model may
breed greater sympathy than the usual case of a two-time plaintiff
because the alleged offender is the state tribunal itself.

Alternatively, the federal plaintiff may have participated in
the state courts as a defendant in civil litigation. In Duke v.
TexaSy^^ appellees were the target of a state court injunction from
which they sought relief in a section 1983 action in federal court.

The federal plaintiff may have been a defendant in a landlord's
action seeking possession,^ ^ or a party opposing foreclosure,^^ or

28See, e.g., Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Reimel, 266 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.
Cal. 1967).

29Mack V. Florida State Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970),

cert, denied, 401 U.S. 960 (1971); Flynn v. State Bd. of Chiropractic Ex-

aminers, 418 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1969).

3°Lombard v. Board of Educ, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).

^'See, e.g., Angel v. BuUington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) ; Johnson v. Depart-

ment of Water & Power, 450 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1971) ; Deane Hill Country
Club, Inc. V. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1967) ; Norman Tobacco

& Candy Co. v. Gillette Safety Razor Co., 295 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1961)

;

Hamilton v. Ford, 362 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Ky. 1973); International Prisoners'

Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973).

^"^See, e.g., Rios v. Cessna Fin. Corp., 488 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1973)

(counterclaiming defendant in state court becomes federal plaintiff) ; Wilke

& Holzheiser, Inc. v. Reimel, 266 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
^^For a general discussion of these doctrines, see Restatement of Judg-

ments §§47 (merger), 48 (bar), 45(d), 49(b), 52(d), 52(g) (1942).
3^See Lombard v. Board of Educ, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974); Brown

V. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24

(9th Cir. 1969).

^M77 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Community Action Group v.
City of Columbus, 473 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1973).

^^See, e.g.. Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261 (1st Cir. 1974).

^^See, e.g., Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d



550 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

annexation.'^ The possibilities are myriad. The importance of the
distinction between the several postures the federal plaintiff as-
sumed in the state court is yet to be discussed. However, whether
the stultifying- effects of res judicata ought to apply in fullest
force, or not at all, may vary with the federal plaintiff's earlier
posture, that is, with whether he chose to be in state court or not.
As plaintiff, of course, he did; as a defendant, he likely did not.
Surely, he did not as a state criminal defendant. The claimed
estoppel following a state prosecution can flow from a guilty
plea'' or from matters put in issue and litigated—in a motion to
suppress' ° or upon a verdict."*'

Whatever the posture of the party in the state litigation,
surely he will benefit from knowledge of the effects the present
litigation may have upon his subsequent efforts in a federal
forum. Even the state plaintiff should know the full '*costs" of
his choice to litigate in the state courts. Likewise, the civil de-

fendant may have several tactics at his disposal—-counterclaim,
defenses, removal—the wisdom of resort to which will be affected
hy the extent to which later federal litigation will be influenced

by their present use in the state court. The choice to forego rais-
ing the constitutional issues in the state forum in order to pre-
serve them for federal exposure is most stark for the state crim-
inal defendant, whose very freedom frequently is at stake. He is
put to the hardest choice, which, without some notion of the con-

sequences, is all the more cruel.^^

C. Res Judicata Problems Arising from. Abstention and Related

Doctrines

The somewhat incalculable diffidence of the federal courts

when constitutional challenges to state law are presented, especially

536 (10th Cir. 1973) ; Hardy v. Northwestern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 254
F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

^^See Duncan v. Town of Blacksburg, 364 F. Supp, 643 (W.D. Va. 1973).
2'5ee, e.g., Metros v. United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir.

1970).

^°See Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973).
"^'See Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420

U.S. 909 (1975); Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1972).

''^Courts have recognized this Hobson's choice in ameliorating the impact

of res judicata in a subsequent section 1983 action. See, e.g., Moran v. Mitchell,
354 F. Supp 86 (E.D. Va. 1973). See also Comment, The Collateral Estoppel

Effects of State Criminal Convictions in Section 198S Actions, 1975 U. III.

L.F. 95; 88 Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1974). Of course, the convicted defendant may
have the habeas corpus avenue left open, but this does not compensate for

the loss of the damage remedy provided by the civil rights acts. See Preiser
V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), for consideration of the relationship

between habeas corpus and section 1983.



1976] RES JUDICATA 551

as part of a quest for injunctive or declaratory relief, a diffidence

loosely grouped under the "abstention doctrines," further con-
founds the potential civil rights litigant. For example, a state
plaintiff protesting a discharge files a claim in federal court and
is met v^ith abstention, the federal court deeming the matter one
of unsettled state law a clarification of which might avoid the
federal constitutional questions. Relegated to the state court, the

state plaintiff makes the mistake of litigating ail his claims, federal
and state. When, upon losing in the state court, he returns to the
federal forum, he is likely to be met with the defense of res
judicata.^^ Of course, such a party has a chance of federal court
review, if only by certiorari. But the federal fact-finding forurn
has been lost.

A related snare involves the state plaintiff who, anticipating
abstention in the federal court and the res judicata effect of
prior state litigation, goes first to the state forum but explicitly
reserves his federal questions for federal treatment. Again,

normal principles of bar or merger will cut off any chance for a
federal airing of his federal claim.^'^ Such a litigant, not having

injected the federal question in the state case, lacks even the

solace of possible Supreme Court review. Justification of initial
and full resort to state courts by contending that resort to federal

court would have been hollow since the federal court would have

abstained in any case apparently will not succeed.^^ However, at

least one federal court has expressed sympathy with a plaintiff's
initial resort to state court when abstention is to be anticipated,
suggesting that such a process is timesaving in that one step,

initial resort to federal court, is cut out."^^

Nevertheless, whatever its efficiency, the formula laid down
over a decade ago by the Supreme Court in Englomd v. Louisimia
State Board of Medical Examiners'^'^ remains the rule. That is, if
upon resort to the federal court, abstention seems proper, the court
is, with rare exception,""® to retain jurisdiction but send the litigants

to the state court where the federal questions are to be reserved.
In the state court the federal issues should be exposed only to give

the state court the benefit of knowing the full range of issues impli-

^^See, e.g., Fisher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 484 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1973).

"-^See, e.g., Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Reimel, 266 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.
Cal. 1967).

^^See Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321

(6th Cir. 1967).

^*Lombard v. Board of Educ, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), noted in 88

Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1974).
^^375 U.S. 411 (1964).

"^^See, e.g., Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975).



552 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

cated. But, "if a party freely and without reservation submits
his federal claim for decision by state courts,*'^' then he has
elected to forego return to the federal court.

Unless, then, some soft form of res judicata is to apply to
civil rights actions, a litigant desiring an original federal forum
for his federal claim must always resort first to the federal
court even if abstention will likely postpone his federal hearing,

and he must take care to comply with the strictures of England.
State court defendants, civil or criminal, have no such oppor-
tunities, except as removal might provide—a provision which in
the case of a criminal defendant is, at best, a remote possibility.
In effect, then, state court litigants face an exhaustion require-

ment in the state courts, which when capped by res judicata de-
prives them of a federal forum/°

This problem is further exacerbated by the increasing re-

straint which the Supreme Court has laid upon lower federal
courts in which injunctive relief is sought. The developments in
this area in the constellation of cases surrounding Younger v.
Harris^^ have been carefully traced elsewhere." It is sufficient for
present purposes to relate that while section 1983 of the Civil

Rights Act was recognized as an exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act" which forbids federal courts to enjoin state court proceed-
ings, the Court made it clear that only in the most unusual cases,
cases of egregious bad faith, would enjoining pending state crim-

inal cases be permissible. A similar restraint is to control the
grant of declaratory relief affecting pending criminal actions.

When state prosecution is not pending, but only threatened, the
opportunity for federal injunctive or declaratory relief, while

still a sensitive matter of equity and federal/state comity, is

greater,'^ but in any case, the discretionary element always present

in the grant of declaratory or equitable relief may leave the federal
plaintiff without a federal forum until it is too late.

^'375 U.S. at 419.

^°See H. Friendly, supra note 26, at 101-07.

^'401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) ; Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971)

;

Boyle V. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) ; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).

^^See generally H. Friendly, supra note 26, at 96-100; McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Con-
stitutional Protections, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1, 250 (1974).

"28 U.S.C. §2283 (1970). See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
^^Steffel V. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), suggests that in such a

case, declaratory relief should emanate under the normal discretionary con-
siderations for the granting of such relief. Likewise, injunctive relief will

issue upon a showing of irreparable harm. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965).



1976] RES JUDICATA 553

Latest developments in this area threaten further to confound

the litigant. Any hope that the showing required by Younrjer to
ignite federal injunctive or declaratory relief in the face of pend-

ing state criminal litigation v^ould be minimal vv^as put to rest

in the last Term/^ In fact, the impact of Younger was significantly
extended to state noncriminal proceedings as well as to state

prosecutions begun soon after the federal civil rights claim has

been commenced.

In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,^^ local state officials, pursuant to
a state public nuisance statute, instituted proceedings to seize ap-

pellee's film as obscene as well as to close down appellee's theater.
The state court found the film to be obscene. Rather than appeal
the state decision, the appellee instituted a section 1983 action at-

tacking the statute and its application. A three-judge federal court
granted relief, but the Supreme Court, through Justice Rehnquist,
held the principles of Younger to govern. While recognizing that
the state proceedings were civil in nature, the Court understood

them to be in many respects akin to criminal proceedings, so
much so that the federal court interference would have the same
impact as the enjoining of state criminal actions. More startling,

however, was the Court's response to appellee's contentions that

since the state proceedings were completed, the state interests

promoted by Younger had vanished. To the contrary, "we believe
that a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party . . . must

exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the

District Court.""' .

Moreover, the appellee was admonished that this extension

of Younger could not be avoided "by simply failing to comply

with the procedures of perfecting its appeal""® within the state

judicial system. The implication left is that if the appellee has

failed to perfect an appeal in a timely fashion, the appellee is out

of luck at all turns. But even if he has exhausted his remedies in

the state system, what succor may be found in the federal court
if normal principles of res judicata apply? Again, in Huffman
the Court suggested, but did not confirm, the possibility that

res judicata will foreclose federal court consideration of his

federal claims."^ Therefore, as the federal courts are required to

shunt more cases to the state system, the cost will be the loss

"See, e.flr., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975).

"420 U.S. 592 (1975). Three justices dissented.

^Ud. at 608.

^Hd. at 611 n.22.

"Vd. at 606 n.l8, 607-08 n.l9.



554 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

of a federal fact-finding forum^°—unless normal principles of
res judicata are found not applicable.

In Hicks v. Miranda,^^ Younger principles were extended
to federal civil rights actions begun before any state prosecu-
tion, at least where the federal litigation has not progressed
beyond an embryonic state, that is "before any proceedings of
substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court."^^

As suggested by Justice Stewart in dissent, such a rule 'is an
open invitation to state officials to institute state proceedings in

order to defeat federal jurisdiction."^^ If res judicata applies

fully, the ''defeat'' is total, unless a basis for habeas corpus relief

exists.
^^

II. The Role of Statutory Full Faith and Credit

The fundamental pattern with which we are concerned in-
volves state court litigation followed by related federal court civil

rights litigation. The question to be resolved is what effect or
credit is to be given the state action in the subsequent federal

action. At least superficially, it appears that Congress had under-
taken to provide an answer to that question.

Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings [of any

State, Territory, or Possession of the United States] or

copies thereof . . . shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and its

Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken.^^

•^^The Supreme Court recognized this interest as real in England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964).

^M22 U.S. 332 (1975). See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922

(1975).

"422 U.S. at 349.
^^Id. at 357 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

^"The relationship between habeas corpus and section 1983 remedies is

somewhat hazily drawn in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). If one
is attacking custody, then habeas corpus, which requires exhaustion of state

remedies, is the proper mode; if damages for the conditions of custody are
sought, then section 1983 is open—as long as the federal court does not
abstain. Dangers, however, inhere in the pursuit of both remedies at once:

the efforts to exhaust state remedies as a precondition to habeas corpus may
result in state judgments estopping the section 1983 claim if the conviction
underlying the custody has not already done so.

^^28 U.S.C. §1738 (1970). The first two paragraphs of the statute
provide:

The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession
of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be authenticated by af-



1976] RES JUDICATA 555

The statutory full faith and credit provision is an old law.
Its essential provisions have remained virtually unchanged for 185

years/^ The force of statutory full faith and credit was early
litigated in Mills v. Duryee,^^ in which Francis Scott Key's con-

tention that sister state judgments need only be credited as evi-

dence was rejected by the Supreme Court through Justice Story.
That sister state judgments worthy of full faith and credit are en-

titled to be viewed as res judicata and to receive the same force
and effect as they would in the courts of the state where they were
rendered was thus established as the intendment of the full faith
and credit statute. Supreme Court holdings in this regard have
been generally consistent to the present. Justice Story's view was
reiterated by Justice Marshall in Hampton v. McConnel,^^ the hold-
ing of which was described as essentially intact in 1942.'' Nothing
has occurred since Hampton to disturb the general rule.

Essentially, the statute makes ''that which has been adjudi-
cated in one state res judicata to the same extent in every other. "^°

It seems correct to say that the "full faith and credit implemented

by federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 1738) is the means by which state
adjudications are made res judicata."^' Moreover, as the statute
by its terms demands, the usual rule where full faith and credit is
due is "that the precise extent to which a judgment rendered in

another state is conclusive as to both the rights of the parties and
the facts involved, is determined by the law of the state in which

fixing the seal of such State, Territory, or Possession thereto.

The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any
such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved

or admitted in other courts within the United States and its Terri-

tories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the

court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge

of the court that the said attestation is in proper form.

^^The provision was first enacted in 1790, Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat.
122; slight modifications occurred in 1804, Act of March 27, 1804, 2 Stat.
298, and again in 1948, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947. See
generally Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV
of the United States Constitution, 4 Colum. L. Rev. 470 (1904) ; Jackson,
Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum.
L. Rev (1945). Debate at the Convention, and in the ratification debates
was brief, cryptic, and uninformative. Only The Federalist, No. 42 makes brief
mention of the constitutional clause. Nevertheless, it was widely deemed an
essential aspect of a firm union.

^ai U.S. (7 Cranch) 302 (1813).
^n6 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 110 (1818).
^^Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 (1942).
7°Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943).
^^Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Co., 503 F. 2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974). See

generally Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied i}i
Federal Court, QQ Mich. L. Rev. 1723 (1968).



566 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

the judgment was rendered."'^ That is, "[w]hether the judgment
of a state is res judicata [in a federal court] is a question of
state law."^^ Thus, in American Surety Co. v. Baldwin/^ a surety
on a supersedeas bond called upon to pay its principal's judgment
challenged unsuccessfully the entry of judgment against it in
Idaho state courts. The company then sought relief in federal
district court, raising, among other things, the constitutional
fairness of the state proceedings—a matter not raised in the state
courts. Justice Brandeis answered: "[T]he federal remedy was
barred by the proceedings taken in the state court which ripened
into a final judgment constituting res judicataJ*^^ Moreover, the
determination of the effect of the judgment as res judicata was
to be guided by Idaho law.^*

The proper scope and application of section 1738 is, therefore,
not unduly clouded. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the con-

struction of statutory full faith and credit has survived apparently
unchanged from Mills/'' as Justice Jackson noted about the parallel
constitutional clause, "judges not infrequently decide cases to

which it would apply without mention of it."^® Occasionally, the
failure to attend the statute arguably breeds the wrong result

—

as in Hoivard v. Cadner/'' where the court's half-truth—that res
judicata is a matter of federal law°°—led it to ignore prior related
state litigation. Equally perplexing is the discussion in Parker v.

^^H. Goodrich & E. Scholes, Conflict of Law 408 (4th ed. 1964). See
also Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §§94-97 (1971).

''^Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 11
(1939) (Hughes, C.J., concurring) .

^^287 U.S. 156 (1932).

''Id. at 164.

7*7d. at 166. See also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).

''See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) ; St. John v. Wisconsin

Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 411 (1951) ; United Nat'l Bank v. Lamb,

337 U.S. 38 (1949) ; Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942) ;
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) ; Treines v.

Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32

(1938); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S.
Ill (1912); Union & Planters' Bank v. City of Memphis, 189 U.S. 71
(1903); Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900); Embry v.
Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1882); McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 270

(1839).

''^Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer's Clause of the Consti-
tution, 45 CoLUM L. Rev. 1, 3 (1945).

^'116 F. Supp. 783 (S.D. Miss. 1953).

°°0f course the scope of section 1738 is a matter of federal law, but it

refers to state law, with federal law supplying some kind of outer limits.

Within those limits, the law of the first forum controls.



1976] RES JUDICATA 507

McKeithen,^^ in which the court described itself as uncertain as
to whether the effect of prior state litigation is to be governed
by principles of collateral estoppel or the vStrictures of section
1738. Presumably, as the prior discussion indicates, the statute

controls and guides one to the application of state collateral estop-
pel principles.

Most frequently, a court, whose decision may be otherwise
unobjectionable, proceeds without mention of the statute, often

citing federal cases for the determination as to the proper scope

of res judicata,®^ Even the Supreme Court is not free from this
oversight.®^ Whatever the reasons for the frequent inattention
to the statute, by its express terms, it appears to control the
question of the extent to which prior state litigation is to be
honored in related federal litigation. Therefore, one arguing that

res judicata ought not to apply in federal civil rights actions must
confront the meaning and compulsion of section 1738.

As Justice Douglas has reminded us, ''res judicata is not a
constitutional principle."®^ At the same time, the statutory com-
mand of full faith and credit contains no express exceptions. Hence,
the question is whether an implied exception to section 1738 can

be justified. Not a few jurists and commentators have recom-
mended that indeed civil rights actions are, or ought to be, excep-
tions to section 1738. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting from a de-
nial of certiorari, thought it clear that collateral estoppel principles

are as inappropriate in civil rights actions as in habeas corpus

proceedings.®^

«^488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974). In Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511

F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Metropolitan Dade County v.
Aerojet-General Corp., 96 S. Ct. 210 (1975), the court held that the law of

the jurisdiction rendering the decision urged as res judicata governs its

effect. Hence if the first litigation was in a federal court, even in diversity,
federal law is held to govern its future effect. This pattern raises unique Erie
problems.

«25ee, e.g., Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974) ; Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City
of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1967) ; Frazier v. East Baton Rouge
Parish School Bd., 363 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Chesapeake Indus., Inc. v.
Wetzel, 265 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1959).

"See, e.g., Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); Phelps

v. Harris, 101 U.S. 370 (1879).

®^England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,
429 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).

^^Lauchli v. United States, 405 U.S. 965 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting),
denying cert, to 444 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ; Lombard v. Board
of Educ, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) ; Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257



558 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

Those who would find federal civil rights actions as excep-
tions to the full faith and credit statute argue from the unique
nature of the nineteenth century civil rights acts. In recognizing

section 1983 as an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act/^ the Su-
preme Court in MitcJmm v. Foster^^ described the legislative history
of the Civil Rights Act of 1874, of which the present section 1983

w^as section 1, as revealing Congress' intent to alter significantly

"the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to

the protection of federally created rights"; that, in fact, the

antipathy of state officers, including state judicial officers, could

only be avoided by access to a federal forum; and that section

1983, inter alia, must be considered a unique federal remedy, sup-
plementary to other traditional remedies that might be available.®^

From the Court's view of section 1983, a view that can be fairly
described as orthodox, it is said to follow that a special or no

type of res judicata ought to operate in federal actions based upon

the section.

It is not necessary here to describe in detail nor to evaluate the

special nature of civil rights statutes. It is sufficient for the

purposes of this discussion to note it, and to further note that
the rationale of cases such as Mitchum carries plausibly over to
the problem with which we are concerned—the effect of res
judicata and of section 1738 in civil rights actions. Many agree that
the matter should be settled,®' one way or another.

The remainder of this Article will consider the developed
contours of section 1738, with an eye to sketching alternative ra-

cist Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Thistlethwaite v. City of

New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert, denied,
419 U.S. 1093 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d
1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting) ; McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Pro-
tections, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1, 250 (1974); 43 Fordham L. Rev. 459 (1974); 88
Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1974) ; 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1180. Perhaps note should

also be made of comments, such as those appearing in England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964), which recognize

the lack of an adequate substitute for federal factfinding.

«^28 U.S.C. §2283 (1970).
^^07 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).

^^See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961); McNeese v. Board of Educ, 373 U.S. 668 (1963). Mc-
Cormack, supra note 85, contains a valuable and comprehensive discussion
of the impact of section 1983 upon the federal balance. See also Averitt,
Federal Section 1083 Actions After State Court Judgments, 44 U, COL. L. Rev.
191 (1972).

^''See, e.g., Florida State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960 (1971)
(Burger, C.J. & White, J., dissenting), denying cert, to 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.
1970).



1976] RES JUDICATA 559

tionales for making civil rights actions total or partial exceptions to
the normal effect of the section. Such an examination may reveal
that there exist already sufficient precedent and doctrinal bridge-
work to justify treating civil rights actions specially—either Vjy
ignoring any res judicata effect of prior state litigation or by ac-
cording it only limited force.

III. Exceptions to Section 1738

A. General Considerations

As was noted earlier, res judicata is not a "constitutional
principle.*''" It is generally conceded that overriding public policy

or the peril of injustice may mitigate or banish the effects of
res judicata. As Professor Moore states, res judicata is a salu-
tary principle, ''but at times there is considerable truth in the

observation that res judicata renders white black, the crooked

straight.
'*''

Despite statements of the Supreme Court that "we are aware
of no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection

by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata/''^^ as
the following discussion will demonstrate, there are several recog-

nized exceptions or qualifications to the effects of res judicata

as applied through full faith and credit. For example, considering
the obligation to accord full faith and credit to a state tax judgment
that was arguably penal in nature, the Court declared

:

Such exception as there may be to this all-inclusive
command [of full faith and credit] is one which is implied
from the nature of our dual system of government, and
recognizes that consistently with the full faith and credit

clause there may be limits to the extent to which the
policy of one state, in many respects sovereign, may be
subordinated to the policy of another.'^

Surely, if one state's policy may justify rejection of another's
judgment, then "well-defined federal policies, statutory or con-

stitutional, may compete with those policies underlying section
1738.'"^

Almost three decades ago. Professor Cleary remarked that
the frequent apologies that accompany res judicata applications

'°See text accompanying note 84 supra.
''IB Moore's Federal Practice ^0.405 [12], at 787 (2d ed. 1974).
'^Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946).
'^Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935).
'^American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.), cert,

denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).



560 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

suggested a need for re-examination of the principles.'^ For the
most part, of course, his call has not been heeded. Quite to the
contrary, res judicata's preclusionary tide has been rising.'^ Never-
theless, where special circumstances suggest the need, at least
in one narrow inlet, to pull against that tide, Cleary's insight into
the underlying rationales of res judicata is worth rehearsing. He
found four major needs which the doctrine was supposed to serve:
(1) avoiding a danger of double recovery, (2) promoting stability
of law, (3) protecting against vexatious litigation, and (4) sup-
porting efficient use of the courts.

Each of these is a worthwhile end, which at times may be
outweighed by competing values, such as the assurance of a real
day in court, or may be subserved as well by a more discriminating
application of res judicata. For example, if the evil to be avoided
is double recovery, the second court may examine the record to
see if double recovery is indeed sought. If not, at least one justifi-

cation for barring the second action may be set aside. In consider-
ing the extent to which a federal court must attach conclusive
effect to prior state court proceedings, it is well to keep in mind
that what is involved is a federal question'^ enwrapping a state law
question in the same fashion as in the determination of the law
to be applied in diversity suits. That is, while section 1738 com-

mands reference to state law principles of res judicata, federal

law governs the timing and scope of that command and fixes the
outer limits permitted to a state's preclusionary rules. Therefore,

the weighing and choosing of competing values is, in the first

instance at least, a federal equation in which the state rules of

res judicata operate as a known component.
A frequent proposal made by courts'^* and commentators'' is

that federal civil rights actions should operate as exceptions to

section 1738, or, at the least, call forth a more discerning and sensi-

tive approach to the question of the preclusionary effect of prior

related state court litigation. What are the recognized exceptions
to section 1738 and the application of res judicata?

9-Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale L.J. 339 (1948).

^^See, e.g., Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law
Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MiCH. L. Rev. 172 (1968) ; Vestal, Res Judicata/

Preclusion: Expansion, S. Cal. L. Rev. 357 (1974).

9^566, e.g., Adams v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938); Cheatham, Res
Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.

Hunt, 44 COLUM. L. Rev. 330, 341 (1944).

9'5ee, e.g., Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971), and cases

cited notes 24 & 85 supra.
^'iSee, e.g., Averitt, siipra note 88.



1976] RES JUDICATA 5^A

B, Some Established Exceptions to Res Judicata in Section.
17S8 Cases

Of course, it has long been textbook law that the second
forum may examine the jurisdictional bases of the first forum
and that a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is not entitled
to credit. '°° On the other hand, if jurisdiction has been or
could have been litigated in the first forum, later litigation

typically will be precluded.
'°'

Having noted these general principles, and granting that
the "explicit direction [of section 1738] should be disregarded

by the Supreme Court only on very strong grounds,*" °^ we may
turn to an examination of exceptions.

In Durfee v. Duke,^°^ a suit to quiet title to river bottom land

was commenced in a Nebraska court. The court's power depended
on the situs of the land, which in turn depended on whether the

river had shifted course by avulsion or accretion. The Nebraska
court found it had jurisdiction. The disappointed party then
sued in a Missouri court to quiet title, claiming the land to be

in Missouri. Upon removal, the federal district court thought the
issue concluded by the first suit. The Eighth Circuit reversed.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Stewart noted first the general
rule:

Full faith and credit thus generally requires every state

to give to a judgment at least the res judicata effect which
the judgment would be accorded in the State which ren-
dered it'°"

Yet, the Justice continued, in some cases, although Durfee was
not one of them, countervailing considerations may be present
which justify a subordination of the res judicata principles:

that is, the policies underlying res judicata may be outweighed
by that against permitting the court to act beyond its jurisdic-

tion.'°^ Thus Durfee introduced the notion that there are inter-

'°°See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Armstrong
V. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) ;
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866).

'°'See, e.g., Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.

371 (1940) ; Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522

(1931); McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 192 (1825).
'°2Cheatham, supra note 97, at 374. See also Annot., 88 L. Ed. 389 (1944)

.

i°^375 U.S. 106 (1963).

^°^/d at 109.

^^^Id. Sit 114, citing, inter alia, Restatement of Judgments § 10 (1942)

;

Restatement of Conflict of Laws §451(2) (Supp. 1948). For a statement
of the general rule, see United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607, 614 (3d Cir.

1948).



562 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

ests sufficient to override the preclusive effect of prior state

litigation, interests of unique federal concern, touching not only

upon the limited role of article III courts, but as well, for example,
upon patents. Thus, in Mercoid Corp, v. Mid-Continent Invest-

7nent Co.,'°^ the Court refused to accord the full bar of res judicata

where to have done so would have involved the Court in "placing
its imprimatur on a scheme which involves a misuse of the patent
privilege and a violation of the anti-trust laws."'°^

Perhaps the best known of cases in which competing policies
submerge those of res judicata is Commissioner- v. Sunnen.^^^ In
Sumien, the Supreme Court explicated the peculiar problems
created by the undiluted application of res judicata in tax cases.

Where collateral estoppel would promote inequality betv/een simi-
larly situated, even competing, taxpayers, the general principles

of res judicata must give way.^°' The special predicament of tax

cases was well enough known so that the lower federal courts,
even before the major exposition of Svmnen, had recognized the

need for special preclusive rules.
^'° For example. Judge Magruder

had noted that a rigid adherence to res judicata may in fact spawn
litigation—as when the Commissioner insisted that a taxpayer be
bound by a prior judgment despite supervening legal developments

which benefitted such taxpayers. Had the Commissioner admitted
the insubstantial role to be accorded res judicata in tax cases,

the taxpayer would never had been compelled to sue.''' Cases

recognizing the legitimacy of the forum's revulsion to enforce-

ment of another sovereign's penalties also acknowledge the pro-

priety of weighing competing interests against those of res

judicata."^

^°^320 U.S. 661 (1944).

^°^Id. at 670. The consideration of the countervailing federal interest

which may supersede the state res judicata principles is not unlike that in-
volved in certain problems of choice of law in diversity cases. See, e.g., Byrd

V. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) ; Sola Elec.

Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).

'°^333 U.S. 591 (1947).

'"""See, e.g., United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 255 (1927).
"°5ee, e.g., Henricksen v. Seward, 135 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1943).

"'Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, 147 F.2d 63 (1st Cir. 1945).

''^See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935);
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888). Compare cases such as
Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903),
in which New York's refusal to enforce an Illinois judgment, a refusal
premised on the fact that New York law did not allow suits against foreign
corporations, was upheld.



1976] RES JUDICATA 503

A recurring casebook selection, Spilker v. Hankin,'^' refused
to estop a defendant from raising claims of overreaching in de-
fense to actions upon a series of notes which she had executed
in favor of plaintiff, a lawyer, as payment for legal services.
The plaintiff had already sued successfully on one of the series
of notes. Although recognizing that ordinarily she would be

precluded from raising the defense, the court thought the special
fiduciary position of the plaintiff and the unique interest which

courts have in the propriety of such relationships amounted to

sufficient countervailing conditions justifying abrogation of the

normal res judicata bar. Spilker, then, more than many other
cases refusing to accord full effect to prior adjudications, makes
explicit the factor of injustice to a party, rather than a sovereign

policy, as worthy of account in the calculus of successive related

cases.

Despite Spilkery the strongest cases for exceptional treatment

of prior litigation are those in which a distinct national policy

can be discerned and articulated. Such a case is Batiste v. Furnco

Co7istruction Corp.'^"^ Seeking relief from alleged employment dis-

crimination,'^^ the plaintiffs had filed a complaint with the state

commission empowered to remedy such wrongs. The state com-
mission had awarded plaintiffs jobs and back pay. Defendant

argued that because state law accorded full res judicata effect

to the decisions of the state commission, the federal court, under

the compulsion of section 1738, must do likewise.
The court acknowledged the usual force and command of

section 1738, but found to be overriding "a strong Congressional

policy that plaintiffs not be deprived of their right to resort to

federal court for adjudication of their federal claims under Title
VII." "^ This conclusion, however, was not based solely on the
importance of the federal rights involved, nor upon a recognition
that the post-Civil War civil rights acts, such as section 1981,
skewed the federal balance, but rather upon the text of section
2000e-5(b) of title 42, in which recourse to the relevant state
tribunal is called for, but final responsibility, according ap-

propriate weight to the state findings, rested upon the federal
courts. The court discerned a license to apply rules of preclusion
cautiously and sparingly.

The unique federal interest, however, more often is dis-
cerned in the statutory treatment of jurisdiction. If Congress

has prescribed the matter as being exclusively for the federal

"^88 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
"^503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974).

"^The federal actions were premised on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 2000e (1970).
^^^503 F.2d at 450.



564 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

courts, the federal interest can be considered of unique weight

—

at least as compared with the policies of res judicata. The fore-
most of these cases is Kalb v. Feuerstein.^^^ In Kalb a state judg-
ment of foreclosure and a subsequent sale were held void be-
cause at the time of the judgment the possessor of the land had
filed a petition in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court considered the
congressional power over bankruptcy to be sufficient to oust a
state court of jurisdiction over a petitioner's property and con-
strued the pertinent provision of the Bankruptcy Act to place

a farmer-debtor within the exclusive reach of the federal courts.

Hence the state proceedings were entitled to no credit—^they were,
in fact, a nullity.

The force of res judicata was likewise dissipated when a
lessee of Indian lands, sued for lease royalties, succeeded in estab-

lishing a counterclaim against the United States.^ ^° In a sub-

sequent suit, the counterclaim was put forth as res judicata. The
plea was rejected because the first court was without jurisdiction
to hear claims against the United States.

Similarly, a recent action by the Government under the Eco-

nomic Stabilization Act''' raised the question of the Act's applica-

tion to state employees. '^° State officials pled in bar a prior state

court judgment. Aside from serious doubts as to the validity of

the state judgment, it, in any case, had to give way before the
national interest which called for exclusive federal court jurisdic-

tion. Thus, when Congress has provided for exclusive federal court
jurisdiction, state judgments are a nullity.

Of course, the great number of civil rights actions are not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. State couii:s

are fully competent to hear section 1983 actions, for example.

Thus, the preceding discussion, while providing further illustra-

tion of the proposition that section 1738 is not inexorable when a
unique national interest exists, is incomparable to the extent

that Congress has never implied its disdain for related state ad-

judication by providing for exclusive federal jurisdiction. In fact,
there are cases holding that when a plaintiff institutes a state

"^308 U.S. 433 (1940),
^^^United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506

(1940).

''n2 U.S.C.A, § 1904 note (Cum. Supp. 1976).
'=°United States v. Ohio, 487 F.2d 936 (Temporary Emer. Ct. App.

1973). The Government sought to enjoin the State of Ohio from violating
Executive Order 11695, which arose out of the Economic Stabilization Act.
The Order was revoked on June 18, 1974, by Executive Order 11750. See also
Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir.
1950), rev*d on other grounds, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) (recognizing the im-

portance of congressional intent in determining the impact of res judicata).



1976] RES JUDICATA 5C5

law action and then a federal action seeking recovery for the
same conduct but upon a federal remedy exclusively for federal
cognizance, the plaintiff will be bound by the state judgment. He
will be deemed to have elected his remedy despite the fact that the
federal claim could not have been brought in the state court and
hence was not, strictly speaking, available. Thus the results of a
state court action under state antitrust laws barred a later federal

antitrust action. ''' If federal courts are willing to preclude a

party for selecting a state court where the federal action was not
available, surely they might be more willing to preclude a plain-
tiff who resorts to a state forum but fails to include an available
federal action. ^

A separate, but related, problem involves the effect to be
given to state couii: determinations of issues normally within

exclusive federal reach but emerging in state law actions, most
often as defenses. It is generally conceded that nothing pre-

vents state courts from resolving the federal issue as it affects the
case before it.^^^ Thus a parallel to our present problem is present:
What effect is to be given to the determination of these issues in
subsequent federal litigation when the same issues re-emerge?

Judge Hand, in his well-known opinion in Lyons v. Westing-
hoicse Electric Corp.,^^^ concluded, despite precedent to the con-

trary, ^^^ that the resolution of the federal issue, although effec-

tive in the state suit, cannot be deemed binding in the later fed-
eral action. Thus, the resolution of the defense to a state action

of raising tiie claim that plaintiffs had conspired illegally to re-

strain trade was held not binding in a subsequent federal anti-
trust action in which defendant sought damages. '^^ The strong
federal policies presumably implicit in the jurisdictional exclusivity

and a need for uniformity impelled Judge Hand's conclusion.

^2'Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1964). Cf. Inter-
national Ry. of Cent. Am. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert,
debited, 387 U.S. 921 (1967) ; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61.1,
comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). See also Singer v. A. Hollander & Sons,
202 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49 (N.D.

Ohio 1959), noted in 69 Yale L.J. 606 (1960); Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 154
F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954).

^^^See, e.g., MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402
(1947); Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of
Prior State-Court Determinations, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1360 (1967).

^23222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 345 U.S. 923 (1955).

'^^See, e.g., United States v. Silliman, 167 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Straus
V. American Publishers' Ass'n, 201 F. 306 (2d Cir. 1912), appeal dismissed,
235 U.S. 716 (1914).

'^^Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 68.1, comment e (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1973) ; Restatement of Judgments § 71 (1942).



566 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

The foregoing examples illustrate that section 1738 is some-
thing less than an inexorable command; when substantial federal
policies would be imperilled by a rigid application of the prior
state court determination, the latter, although not itself void, will

not be credited.

C. Habeas Corpits

Habeas corpus provides the most well-established exception to
the usual binding effect of prior state court litigation. Further-

more, the writ is designed to remedy invasions of constitutional
liberties, the same type of wrong at which federal civil rights acts
are aimed. In fact, of course, the blending of function between

habeas corpus and section 1983 actions has spawned much dis-
cussion, at the center of which is the case of Preiser v. Rodriguez.^^^

Preiser involved civil rights actions by prisoners seeking

restoration of good time. Although the habeas corpus route was
open, the advantage in the civil rights action was that no exhaus-
tion of state remedies was required. The Supreme Court held
that if habeas corpus was available and potentially efficacious, it
was the proper remedy. '^^ The entire Court, despite fundamental
disagreement on the role of section 1983 vis-a-vis habeas corpus,

agreed that ''[p]rinciples of res judicata are, of course, not wholly

applicable to habeas corpus proceedings."
^^^

The justifications for such exceptional treatment have been
examined elsewhere, ^^' and many of them harmonize with a
parallel easing of res judicata in section 1983 actions. For ex-

ample, in Fay v. Noia,^^° Justice Brennan stated:

[T]he familiar principle that res judicata is inapplicable

in habeas proceedings ... is really but an instance of the

'=M11 U.S. 475 (1973).

'^^The Court recognized that damages were not available in habeas
corpus. Therefore, if damages rather than custodial adjustments were the
goal, section 1983 was presumably available as an alternative, or even sup-
plemental, remedy.

In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall,
argued that the potential for simultaneously pursuing split remedies—habeas
corpus for release and section 1983 for damages—would tend to magriify con-
fusion and federal/ state conflict, especially insofar as doubt remained about the
res judicata effect of state court litigation in subsequent civil rights actions

—

a matter upon which the majority and dissenters disagreed. Compare 411
U.S. at 493-94, with id. at 509 n.l4.

'^^Id. at 497.

^^'^E.g., Note, Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 1038, 1113 et seq. (1970).

^^^372 U.S. 391 (1963).



1976] RES JUDICATA mi

larger principle that void judgments may be collaterally
impeached.'^'

And at least since Brown v. Allen,' ^^ the "voidness" of which
Justice Brennan spoke stems from a deprivation of constitutional
rights, the same claim that is made in a federal civil rights action.
Of course, there are differences betv^een habeas corpus and civil
rights actions; among them, the history of the Great Writ has
always made it an exceptional proceeding, in part, at least, be-
cause of the serious burden—deprivation of liberty—under which
the petitioner suffers.

The habeas procedure, expounded first by the Supreme
Court' ^^ and then by Congress,' ^^ does not ignore wholly the state
proceedings. It may be said that res judicata operates in habeas
corpus, but in a severely diluted fashion. Briefly, the state find-

ing is presumptively correct unless it is shown or it appears that
the state proceedings were inadequate, insufficient, truncated, or

otherwise not fully satisfactory. If such is the case, the federal

court is to conduct its own factual hearing. Even if the state court
proceedings appear adequate, the federal court may, in its discre-

tion, conduct a fact hearing, although the petitioner's burden in

such an instance is to establish error '*by convincing evidence."
'^^

The real significance of federal court factfinding, so honored
in present habeas corpus procedure, has concerned the Court in

other contexts as well, notably litigation involving a claim of

deprivation of constitutional rights. The supportive references
in such cases to the habeas mode are telling. '^^ These comments
arise in the context of abstention—formally a temporary and
limited deferral by the federal to the state court system. While

some recent signs suggest that the Court will encourage even
greater diffidence by the federal courts in abstention cases,'

^^

presumably a federal plaintiff faced with abstention may still
preserve a chance for a federal fact hearing by reserving the

federal claims during his state court sojourn.'''® What is pre-

'^Ud. at 423.

^3^344 U.S. 443 (1953).

i^^Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
^^^28 U.S.C. §2254 (1970).
'3^M § 2254(d).
'^^England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,

417 n.8 (1964).

'^^See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) ; Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S 922 (1975).

^^®The federal plaintiff who seeks to enjoin state proceedings and
cannot surmount the Younger hurdles, is, unlike the true abstention case plain-
tiff, hit with dismissal and with no promise of returning to federal court
(except the Supreme Court on review).



568 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

served then, in abstention cases as well as habeas corpus cases, is

a shot at the federal forum so long as that chance is not waived
either by failing to reserve the federal question, or, in the habeas

corpus context, by freely and voluntarily foregoing available state

procedures capable of considering petitioner's constitutional claim.

D. A Special Res Judicata

The waiver technique has been applied by at least one court
to the central problem presented in this Article: state litigation
followed by a federal civil rights action. In Lombard v. Board of
Education,^ ^'^ the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, impressed with
the supplementary character of section 1983, searched the state
proceedings leading to the plaintiff's discharge from employment
as a public school teacher to determine if his failure to raise the

constitutional issues constituted a waiver. While such an ap-
proach does not make clear how a state litigant wishing to get
a federal fact hearing could do so without having waived his
chance to present his constitutional claims, the case does il-

luminate the possibility of a sensitive look at the state proceed-

ings rather than an inflexible application of res judicata with-
out regard to the unique federal interests involved.

In other words, the strong federal interest may be respected
by mitigating the effects of res judicata rather than by a total
rejection of these doctrines, which do, after all, serve valid pur-

poses. The notion of "special res judicata" when federal civil
rights are at stake has been suggested by some federal courts, '^°

as well as by commentators,^^' as an alternative to treating all

state court judgments containing constitutional error as void, a

proposition somewhat contrary to entrenched precedent. '"'^

When one assays the dilemma of certain state court litigants,
particularly state criminal defendants, there is more reason to em-
brace, at the least, a sensitivity toward application of principles

of res judicata. Although many have noted the trend toward

'^'502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).

'^°See, e.g., Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert,

denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). Pelham Hall Co. v. Hassett, 147 F.2d 63 (1st Cir.

1945), and Henricksen v. Seward, 135 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1943), are

indicative of a special caution in some tax cases.

^'^^See, e.g., Averitt, supra note 88, at 208; McCormack, supra note 85.
One commentator has suggested that the preclusionary principles of habeas
corpus simply be resorted to in civil rights actions. Comment, The Collateral
Estoppel Effect of State Criminal Convictions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975

U. III. L.F. 95.

'^""See, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 187 (1947). The excep-
tional nature of habeas corpus is thus highlighted.



1976] RES JUDICATA 569

a spreading of preclusionary rules/ ^^ there has been as well a
willingness to compare the present and former trial environments
to determine if the matters assertedly settled were in fact con-
sidered in any real or complete sense. '^'^ If the environments be-
tween the actions differ significantly, preclusionary rules may
then be wielded with a more delicate touch.

The state defendant, particularly the state criminal defendant,
is in a singularly sympathetic position. Faced with a tribunal

not of his choosing and possibly not to his liking, he nevertheless

must present his constitutional defenses, which are the stuff of
his future civil rights action, or stand mute in the face of the
state's case. Yet, having raised constitutional defenses, he will be

bound by their resolution—if preclusion principles are applied in
full—and thus be precluded from an effective federal hearing.
The chances of removal or review in the Supreme Court are little
consolation. Even habeas corpus, while available to an unsuccess-
ful criminal defendant, will not provide any kind of reparation. '^^

What, furthermore, of the state civil defendant who has not con-
stitutional defenses, but a counterclaim of constitutional stature

and of a compulsory nature? Presumably, he is forced to litigate

in the state forum without any hope of removal. Similarly, ab-
stention doctrines and the cases in the Younger line have taught

some potential plaintiffs the futility of initial recourse to federal
courts.

It has been thought that a state litigant, even a state plain-

tiff who could not obtain relief in the federal courts because of
abstention or the reluctant equity prescribed by Younger, ought

not to be precluded from later recourse to the federal court. At
least one federal court has commented that requiring initial
resort to federal court only to face abstention, causing a trek

to the state court where, if practical, the federal question is re-

served, followed, finally, by a return to the federal court, is a

ludicrous price, even if squandered in the interests of a balanced

federalism. '^^ At the very least, it has been suggested, such a
federal plaintiff should be entitled after his state court journey

to a consideration of whether, had he initially resorted to the

^"^^E.g., Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied
in Federal Courts, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1723, 1741-42 (1968).

^^"^See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973).

'"^^A curious question arises as to a criminal defendant who successfully
petitions for habeas corpus and then seeks compensation in a section 1983
action. Will the state proceedings or the habeas proceedings determine issues

which re-emerge?

^^*Lombard v. Board of Educ, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974).



570 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

federal court, he would have been rebuffed. If so, a lesser penalty,

or none, ought to be attached to the results in the state forum.

An additional, although not so severe, dilemma is presented
by the state plaintiff who fails to join a related federal cause be-
cause the latter is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal

courts. Upon institution of the federal action, he is likely to be
rebuffed. '^^ It is this unwilling state litigant who has received
the sympathy of commentators/ ^'^ Thus, it has been suggested
that, at the least, if the federal plaintiff has not chosen the state

forum, but has by the very exigencies of the case or by pro-
cedural rules been forced to litigate aspects or all of his civil rights

claim in a state court, traditional preclusion principles should not

apply.

Thistlethwaite v. City of New York^'^'^ affords an illustration
CI the central dilemma of the party forced to litigate in the state
forum. Appellants had been convicted for distributing pamphlets
in Central Park without permits. Their quest for a dismissal
on the basis of the ordinance's invalidity was unsuccessful. Further
review in the state court system was unavailing. Appellants did
not seek Supreme Court review but filed a section 1983 action in
the federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

on the basis that the ordinance requiring a permit was facially un-
constitutional and, when read in conjunction with the permit-
dispensing provisions of related ordinances, was unconstitutional
as applied. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, over Judge
Oakes' dissent, held that the appellants were precluded by the
state proceedings from attacking the constitutionality of the
ordinance under which they were convicted. ^^°

The existence of the 1983 claim, underlying which are values
of unique federal import, prompted Judge Oakes, but not the
majority, to take a more restrictive view of res judicata than
might be appropriate in other cases. Judge Oakes' more intricate
examination of the state proceedings noted the following prob-

lems. The attack in the state courts was upon the face of the

'"^^See Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954).
^^'^See, e.g., Averitt, supra note 88; Vestal, State Court Judgment as Pre-

clusive in Section 1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 185

(1974) ; Comment, supra note 141; 88 Harv. L. Rev. 453 (1974).
^^'497 F,2d 339 (2d Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974), noted

in 59 Minn. L. Rev. 623 (1975), and 1974 V/iS. L. Rev. 1180.
'^°Although the court held that appellants were precluded whether or not

their litigation in state court was voluntary, the opinion suggests that the
appellants' having insisted on forging ahead despite the prosecutor's willing-
ness to forget the matter could be accounted as a choice to litigate in the
state forum. The court also opined that habeas corpus v/as probably available
to appellants—a view subject to some doubt.



1976] RES JUDICATA 571

ordinance, while the federal suit attacked the ordinance as applied

and as part of the entire permit-dispensing system. The other
ordinance added, at least as characterized by plaintiffs, additional
infirmities. Furthermore, the federal suit properly could be
characterized, at least in part, as seeking prospective relief in

regard to future pamphleteering.

Of course, cases arise in which the state issue, for example,
illegal search or seizure decided upon a motion to suppress, is
more clearly identical with the federal quest: for example, a suit
for damages for violation of the plaintiff's fourth amendment
rights.'^' In such a case, the res judicata question is purer: Ought
civil rights actions be exceptions to section 1738, at least where
the federal plaintiff was an involuntary state litigant?

As the exceptional treatment of res judicata in habeas corpus
proceedings has been pinioned on specific defects in the state

proceedings, so, if the special nature of civil rights actions are

to prompt a milder preclusion, certain factors in the state pro-
ceedings may be defined as appropriate considerations in de-
termining the effect as res judicata to be given the prior judg-

ment. As has been described above, the posture of the federal
plaintiff in state court seems pertinent; that is, the extent to

which the state forum was chosen by the federal plaintiff ought
to be considered. In addition. Professor McCormack has sug-
gested the following elements as sufficient to dilute the usual

preclusive effect commanded by section 1738: (1) a state court
or agency had an institutional interest in the state decision; (2)
the constitutional claim relates to the manner of state decision
rather than aspects of the substantive dispute; (3) the issue

at stake involves a question of the relationship between the

individual and the state; (4) as in habeas corpus, the fact-finding

process in the state forum was inadequate, presenting a special
need for federal factfinding.^" In such circumstances, not only

is the weighty interest represented by the constitutional dimensions

of the claim tugging against preclusion, but certain of the values

promoted by res judicata are of lesser moment than usual: for
example, the relatively greater resources of the state as litigant

considerably reduce the fear of harassment.

In Brown v. Chastain,'^^ the parties had been divorced, custody
of the child having been awarded to the mother. This custody de-
cision was upset five years later at the father's behest. The mother,
seeking to appeal her loss of custody but finding herself unable to
afford a necessary transcript, petitioned the state courts that a

^^^See, e.g., Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Va. 1973).
^^^McCormack, supra note 85, at 276.
153416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969).



572 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

transcript be provided. Her petition, and an appeal therefrom
having been denied, she claimed in a federal civil rights action

that she had been denied equal protection. The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held her barred from relief, characterizing her
quest in the federal district court as essentially a quest for re-

view of a state court judgment, a power not granted to the lower
federal courts.'^'*

Judge Rives dissented. He explained that plaintiff really was
not seeking relief from a final order and it was doubtful whether
the order was of such a sort as to permit review in the Supreme
Court.'" The issue was collateral to the main state proceedings,
and, as it involved custody, seemed to Judge Rives to parallel
habeas corpus even more closely than the usual section 1983 action.

Whether Judge Rives* analysis is correct or not, his willing-
ness to analyze the propriety of applying a bar illustrates the type

of analysis in which one convinced of the special nature of civil

rights actions might engage. Other courts and judges similarly

inspired have, at a minimum, sparingly applied preclusion prin-
ciples, demanding, for example, strict mutuality and co-identity
between issues. ^^*

On the other hand, a sensitive analysis of the state proceedings
may reveal that, despite the civil rights nature of the action, ap-
plication of the bar is quite appropriate. In Mastracchio v. Ricci,^^^

the plaintiff, having been convicted of murder, brought a section

1983 action against certain police officers, contending that their

perjury had convicted him. The circuit court felt the perjury
issue must be deemed to have been encompassed in the affirmance
of plaintiff's conviction unless the perjured testimony was not
essential to the conviction, in which case the plaintiff could not
show damages. In closing dictum, however, the court distinguished
the case from one in which the civil rights suit raised a depriva-
tion peripheral to the conviction, for example, invasions of pri-

vacy. The court hinted that in the latter instance, it would be
less willing to regard such issues as subsumed by a guilty plea or
conviction, even though technically they would be. So, too, in
Engelhardt v. Bell & Howell Co.,^^^ close analysis of the prior ac-

''^Id. at 1018-19 (Rives, J., dissenting).

'"iSee, e.g., G & M, Inc. v. Newbern, 488 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Tang
V. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting),
cert, denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974) ; Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.
1963); Olson v. Board of Educ, 250 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); Illinois
Cent. R.R. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 135 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Miss.
1955).

'"498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975).
'^327 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1964).



1976] RES JUDICATA 673

tions revealed a plaintiff who had instituted three previous state
court actions based upon violation of state antitrust laws, each

action having been removed to the federal court, where plaintiff
failed to amend to raise the related federal claims which he now,
in a fourth and federal action, contended should not be barred.

Such a plaintiff hardly attracted the court's sympathy.'^'

E. A Note on Full Faith and Credit

As noted above, there was a time when argument was made
to the Supreme Court that full faith and credit requires only
that judgments of sister states operate as evidence. The conten-
tion was rejected. '*° Ever since, it has been assumed that judg-
ments must be given the same effect as they w^ould be entitled to
in the forum where rendered. This brocard has been considered
as requiring the second forum not only to bar an attempt to
relitigate the same claim, but also to accord binding effect to
litigated components of the first judgment in subsequent, but
different, suits. Thus if issue A is resolved in the first case, and
the same issue re-emerges in a second case, a case different both
in content and forum, it has generally been thought that the
second forum is bound by the first forum's resolution of A. This
is so by operation of the principles commonly called collateral
estoppel.

While the rule that courts in a federation honor each other's

judgments seems essential, a requirement that each fact determina-

tion made by one tribunal be honored by another seems less com-
pelling—at least when the fact arises in a different context. The
first requirement is a necessary binding—that the sovereign's
final resolution of a dispute be respected; the second, while per-

haps promoting the principles underlying res judicata—cessation
of harassment and judicial economy—^hardly seems to implicate the
profounder values of union underlying full faith and credit.

The distinction to be made is between a case deciding the
rights of parties, and an intermediate and somewhat conditional
determination of a contested issue. The difference is to some ex-
tent illustrated by cases in which state courts have decided issues
normally arising in cases of exclusive federal cognizance. For
example, in Becker v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc,,^^^ the plain-
tiff, seeking to enjoin a state court action, contended that certain

issues arising in the state court were typical component-s of a

'^'^See id. See also Singer v. A. Hollander & Sons, 202 F.2d 55 (3d Cir.
1953); Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64 (D. Del. 1954).

'^°Mills V. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 302 (1813)
^^'279 U.S. 388 (1929).



574 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

patent infringement action, a matter solely for the federal courts,
and, therefore, ousted the state courts of competence. The Court
rejected this contention:

That decrees validating or invalidating patents be-
long to Courts of the United States does not give sacro-
sanctity to facts that may be conclusive upon the question
in issue.

^^"^

That is, while patent cases are for the federal courts, aspects of
patent cases may arise in and be decided by state courts. More-
over, if Judge Hand v^as right, the resolution of those federal is-
sues, while binding for the limited purposes of the state case,

should not bind the federal courts should the cause of action

within exclusive federal jurisdiction present the same issues.'"
Cases such as Becher suggest a distinction between the ''case,"

a peculiar combination or complex of issues, and the individual
issues which may arise in a variety of contexts, a distinction
paralleling that between a judgment and intermediate resolution
of component facts. This parallelism suggests that while full faith
and credit may demand a fairly strict observance of bar and
merger, these demands dissipate where the preclusionary rule af-
fects only issues, not claims—^that is, what is commonly called col-
lateral estoppel.

Distinguishing between a judgment and its component issues
is especially significant when it is recognized that the federal
civil rights plaintiff most frequently in a sympathetic position is

the one whose state court involvement was involuntary-—usually
as a defendant, and, hence who will be precluded, if at all, by col-
lateral estoppel, not bar or merger principles.

In its general application, full faith and credit is not a
monolith. There is room for consideration of competing interests

—

of the forums and the parties. This seems especially true when the
choice of law devolves upon the common law rather than the
statutory law of the first forum. '^'^ This point is underscored by

Williams v. North Carolina,^ ^^ a case in which the Supreme Court
permitted North Carolina to re-examine the question whether a

'^Vd. at 391. See also Pratt v. Paris Gas & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897).
'^^Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 188-89 (2d Cir.),

(Hand, J.), cert, denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). Restatement of Judgments sec-

tion 71 agrees with the Lyons case.
'''^See generally Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268

(1935); Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S.
186 (1900) ; Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW
& CONTEMP. Prob. 706 (1963) ; Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Lav), 44 lOWA L. Rev. 449 (1959).

'^=325 U.S. 226 (1945).



1976] RES JUDICATA r^ir,

defendant charged with bigamy had estabhshed domicile for di-
vorce in Nevada despite the Nevada decree's finding of domicile.
While in earlier related litigation/^* the Court had held North
Carolina bound to honor the Nevada decree, assuming the Nevada
domicile, Williams II, recognizing significant North Carolina in-
terests, and the fact that the state had not been a party to the
Nevada divorce action, permitted the state to satisfy itself as to
domicile. Again, we see implicit a distinction between the case and
its components.

The recognition of the second forum's interest as overriding
res judicata is not unlike that present in diversity cases, where
a choice of law—state or federal—has to be made. If the federal
interest is high, the federal rule will control. ^^^ In such cases, as

well as in normal conflict of laws problems, a dichotomy, perhaps

more conclusory than resolutionary, between procedural and sub-
stantive law is often recognized, the forum having greater leeway
to apply its own procedural rules. Matters concerning the conduct
of litigation, for example, are properly, if only roughly, called

procedural. Collateral estoppel operates more nearly as a rule
of evidence—precluding proof on an issue as having been already
resolved. Unlike its interest if its judgments are to be disregarded,
a state's interest in later issue estoppel is surely of lesser dimension.

So long as a state's judgment is respected and entitled to enforce-

ment, it is difficult to see why a state's claim to infallibility on
each particular issue merits honor. ^^^

Thus, it appears that when issue and not claim preclusion is
concerned, significantly different matters are at stake. The
special federal interest in civil rights has been assumed. Playing

against this is a state interest of somewhat lesser moment than
is present v/hen its judgments are threatened with dishonor. The
extent of issue estoppel ought to be treated as is any other choice
of law question.'*' Doing so will neither upset important values
underlying full faith and credit nor cause undue affront to the
state's interest.

IV. Conclusion

This Article was not designed to resolve the fundamental
question as to whether civil rights actions should be exceptions

^^^Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
'^^See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525

(1958); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
^^®See Carrington, Collateral Estoppel ayid Foreign Judgments, 24 Ohio

St. L.J. 381 (1963), for a similar contention, more fully explored.
'*'A similar suggestion is made in Note, Collateral Estoppel in Multistate

Litigation, 68 CoLUM. L. Rev. 1590 (1968).



576 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:543

to the requirements of res judicata as implemented by statutory
full faith and credit. Rather, it is intended to portray inconsistency
in the federal courts, to highlight the federal civil rights litigant's

dilemma stemming from prior state litigation, and to call for
some resolution of this pressing problem. The refusal of the
Supreme Court to resolve the issue has bred a double inconsistency
in lower courts : first, in the willingness or not to suspend normal
res judicata principles in federal civil rights actions; second, in

the failure of so many courts to acknowledge the critical role of
full faith and credit as implemented by section 1738.

Of course, the mere recognition of the central role of full
faith and credit does not determine the exact dimensions of res

judicata in the second federal action. For it is clear that there
are many situations in which competing interests have been
deemed momentous enough to overcome the values promoted by
preclusionary rules. There is, thus, ample precedent for creating

exceptions to section 1738—whether the exception is to take the
form of complete disregard of state adjudication, as is the case in
matters of exclusive federal jurisdiction, components of which

may turn up in a state forum, or the form of a softer res judicata,
an extreme example of which is presented by habeas corpus.

Habeas corpus, of course, presents an attractive and apt

analogy to civil rights actions. In habeas proceedings the values

promoted by preclusionary principles have been frankly subordi-

nated to the constitutional values at stake. Yet the Supreme Court's
insistence on maintaining a distinction between habeas corpus and

section 1983 actions suggests that the extreme, though not total,

disregard of state litigation fashioned for habeas proceedings may
not be acceptable in civil rights actions. Nevertheless, the special

nature of the rights involved could call forth a special examination

of the state litigation to ascertain the extent to which the federal

plaintiff was forced into a tribunal not of his choosing and the
extent to which that tribunal can be considered an adequate sub-
stitute for the federal forum he now seeks. The adequacy would
depend not only on the state forum's competence, which is normally

to be assumed, but the extent of state interest riding against plain-

tiff and the extent to which the environment in the state case was

conducive to and inducive of a full-scale consideration of the fed-

eral claim. Upon such factors as these, the federal judge might
fashion a custom-crafted set of preclusionary rules which account

for the unique federal civil rights interest.

The special nature of federal civil rights actions and the

special role of the federal courts in enforcement has been recog-

nized and cannot be gainsaid. Therefore, at the least, a specially



1976] RES JUDICATA 577

flexible and sensitive application of res judicata may be called for
—an application which examines closely the environment in the
state court to make certain that the special federal interest is not
ignored or given inadequate attention.

As it turns out, those situations in which the federal plaintiff
is most apt to appear in a sympathetic light are those in which
he appeared involuntarily in the state forum. In such a circum-

stance, the preclusionary principle apt to despoil the civil rights

claim is one of collateral estoppel, not bar or merger. Neither the

state's interest nor that of the federal union are affronted by

granting less than preclusive effect to an intermediate fact de-

termination. Such disregard has hardly the insult attached to

simply disregarding a judgment of a state.
What have been portrayed, then, are a variety of circum-

stances in which related state litigation raises questions of res

judicata in not at all abnormal federal civil rights actions. The
federal plaintiff's need for guidance, if not sympathy, may vary
with his posture in the state courts, but is potentially a problem

whether he was a state plaintiff or defendant. Additional uncer-
tainty stems from the increasingly subtle rules of abstention and
federal equity.

Whatever may be the appropriate resolution of the issue, it
ought to be resolved. This is particularly so as it concerns
federal/state relationships of a sort in which the Supreme Court
has recently claimed to have a special interest. Moreover, the
Court's own recent contributions to abstention and federal equitable
principles have made the question of the effect of state litigation
even more pressing.