Indiana Law Review


Computer Crime: The Law in '80

Michael Gemignani*

I. Introduction

Although various devices to speed numerical computations and

the processing of data have existed for many centuries/ the elec-
tronic stored program, general purpose computer was not invented

until the latter half of the 1940's.^ The first computers were enor-

mous, slow, and unwieldy devices compared to today's machines,

dependent as they were upon bulky and inefficient vacuum tubes.
The coming of transistors provided a major impetus to computer
technology. Today, more efficient and exotic forms of ''hardware"
presage future computers that are smaller, faster and more power-
ful.^

There is scarcely anyone in the United States, no matter how
poor or isolated, whose life is not touched significantly by com-
puters. Now that there are rather powerful, general purpose com-
puters which are sufficiently small, inexpensive, and easy to use to

be practical for use at home,^ and with electronic funds transfer

looming on the horizon,^ computers are certain to have an even

greater impact on society in the future.

Chairman of the Mathematical Sciences Department, Indiana University-Purdue
University at Indianapolis (lUPUI); Acting Chairman of the Computer Sciences Sec-
tion, Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis. A.B., University of

Rochester, 1962; M.S. & Ph.D., University of Notre Dame, 1964 & 1965; J.D., Indiana
University School of Law-Indianapolis, 1980.

The author expresses his gratitude to Associate Professor Henry Karlson for

many helpful discussions.
Terhaps the earliest computational device, apart from fingers, is the abacus,

which is fully 5000 years old. For a short history of computing machines, see 4 En-

cyclopedia Britannica 1046-47 (1974). Useful texts include A. Chandor, A Dic-
tionary OF Computers (1970); Readings From Scientific American, Computers &
Computation (1971); F. Scheid, Introduction to Computer Science (1970); A. Tanen-
baum. Structured Computer Organization (1976).

^The Princeton mathematician John von Neumann is generally credited with the
invention of the stored program computer. 4 Encyclopedia Britannica 1047.

^Innovations may cause legal problems. For example, computer abuse legislation
may be framed in terms of "electronic computers," but many computers of the future
may not be electronic at all. See text accompanying notes 133-35 infra.

^Complete computer systems, including a wide variety of accessories, are

available for less than $2000, and the price is almost certain to fall. A basic home com-
puting system can be purchased for less than $1000.

^See R. Freed, Computers and Law 634 (1976). See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §
659.062 (West Supp. 1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 524.803 (West Supp. 1979-80); Me. Rev.
Stat. tit. 9-B, §§ 131(14), (35), 334 (West Supp. 1979).

681



682 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

Computers have brought about a revolution in our century com-
parable to the industrial revolution of the previous century. Just as

the industrial revolution necessitated a rethinking of much of the
law of its time, so too the computer revolution poses legal questions

today that must be addressed and answered. This Article will at-
tempt to explore a limited number of those questions as well as
some suggested answers. The emphasis herein will be on computer
"abuse," and, in particular, "crimes" which present special problems

under existing law.

A. General Forms of Abuse Involving Computers

Donn Parker of the Stanford Research Institute, probably the
foremost expert today on the technical aspects of computer abuse,
classifies forms of abuse involving computers under four headings:^

1) The computer itself is an object of attack or some abusive act,
as, for example, firing a bullet into a computer or bombing a com-
puter center.^ This form of abuse can almost always be treated

under the standard law governing crimes or torts against property

and generally presents no substantially new legal issues,® -.
2) The computer creates a unique environment for the abuse or

forms the source of a unique type of asset. For example, someone
familiar with the operating system of a particular computer might

attempt to erase valuable files in the computer's memory, or cause
the system to "crash,"^ often with major inconvenience and expense

to the computer operator and the user of the machine. Yet another
example of this form of abuse occurs when one business infiltrates
the computer system of a competitor in order to steal trade secrets

*D. Parker, Crime by Computer 17-22 (1976). Parker summarized this classifica-

tion in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures
in June 1978 when the subcommittee was considering S. 1766, the Federal Computer
Systems Protection Act. Federal Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearings on S.

1766 Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Laws & Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978) (statement of Donn Parker) [hereinafter cited

as Hearings].

''See D. Parker, supra note 6, at 18 for accounts of four instances of assaults upon

a computer with a gun. The most tragic episode, involving a bombing of a

computer, resulted in the death of a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin.

For an account of both this episode and the bombing of a Pentagon computer, see

Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Problems
Associated with Computer Technology in Federal Programs & Private Industry
107 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as Problems].

*A fiction writer might come up with a plot involving a program which causes a

computer to destroy itself. In actual practice, programs designed to cause trouble can

only destroy, alter, or copy other data or programs, that is, they really affect software

rather than hardware. This problem is discussed in the next section.

^Hearings, supra note 6, at 56.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 683

or data which provide an edge in bidding on a contract. Abuses

under this heading often present significant new legal questions.
3) The computer can be the instrument of the abuse. Crimes that

might be classified under this heading range from murder perpe-

trated by causing a deliberate malfunction of a computer which

governs a life support system^" to the theft of computer time

through the unauthorized use of a machine. Here again, novel legal

issues may be presented.
4) A computer may be merely a symbol used in fraud, intimida-

tion or other unsavory activity. Someone who falsely advertises that
he is able to accurately predict the behavior of the stock market by

means of a unique computer program, when he has no computer or
computer program and is merely guessing what will happen, is in-

dulging in this form of abuse. A collection agency which threatens a
debtor by telling him that it will transmit his file from its computer

to the computers of government agencies would be attempting to

exploit the debtor's worst fears of what a computer can do. Despite

the fact that the computer makes these practices possible, they do
not generally raise significant new legal issues. ^^ The computer is
merely a tool of the tort or the crime.

B. The Computer

A computer is a machine which processes data.^^ What the com-
puter does with data is determined by instructions given it by the
user. Very simplistically, a computer may be thought of as a huge
array of switches, each of which is either on or off. Some of the
switches are set in accordance with the manufacturer's design of the

computer. Other switches are set by the individual user according to

the specific task he wants the computer to perform. The process of
setting the switches is called "programming." Setting those switches
which ''bring the machine up" and prepare it to accept data and in-
structions from various users involves an "operating systems pro-

gram." Once the machine is "up," a user then sets other switches to
prepare the machine to do his particular job; generally, the user
does this by means of an "applications program" written in one of
the higher level computer languages such as FORTRAN or COBOL;

'"Destruction of life can also occur through misapplication of air traffic control

computers and computers governing military weapons. Id. at 59.

"If someone actually has a computer, but no valid means of predicting the
behavior of the stock market, the usual rules of law concerning fraud, deceit,

negligence, and breach of warranty, would apply.

'^he definition of a computer is not so obvious. See notes 151-53 infra and accom-

panying text.



684 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

such a program is called a "source program."^^ The fully program-
med computer may be thought of as a machine especially designed
to take the data given it by the user and process that data accord-
ing to the directions embodied in the applications program.

Even though the computer is a machine, it is quite different
from virtually every other machine previously known to mankind. In
the first place, the computer works at speeds which defy the im-

agination. Even an extremely slow computer can perform tens of
thousands of computations in a single second. The speed of a com-
puter provides its real utility; there is nothing that a computer can

do that cannot be done manually given enough manpower and
enough time. But the computer can compress man-years of work into
minutes and digest libraries of information at virtually the speed of

light.

A second important aspect of a computer is that each time it is
used, it is, in effect, redesigned internally. The internal design,
however, is often impossible to observe and difficult to check. Both

the operating systems program and the source program for some
particular job may be so complex that no human being could
reasonably check the accuracy of each and every switch setting to

be certain that the computer was properly prepared to do the task
that the user set for it, even assuming that the programs

themselves are logically correct and stated in a form that will lead

the machine to produce the intended result. Furthermore, the switches

of a computer are not like lightbulbs; one cannot tell if they are on

or off by simply looking at them; indeed, most of them are too small
to be seen with the naked eye.

Consider a black box within which is a small genie who will
answer any question asked provided it is posed in exactly the right

way. Someone who has a particularly difficult question tries very
hard to phrase it in precisely the form that the genie will under-

stand. The dilemma is compounded by the fact that the genie will
always provide an answer when asked any question, even questions
which are improperly worded. After a great deal of hard work, the

questioner places his question in a slot at one end of the box and

receives an answer from a slot at the other end. He receives the
answer to his question if it was entered in exactly the right form;
otherwise, what he receives is worthless. What credence should he
place in the answer? This parable illustrates but one of the many
problems associated with the use of computers.

*'A source program is written in a high-level language such as FORTRAN (For-
mula Translation) or BASIC (Beginner's All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code). This
source program is translated inside the computer by means of a "compiler" into an ob-
ject program written in machine language which actually sets the switches.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 685

C. Abuses Peculiar to Computers

Some of the forms of abuse peculiar to computers are beginning
to take shape. For example, the incredible speed coupled with the

vast quantities of data processed can enable small crimes to pay rich

dividends. One form of theft by computer is known as the "salami
technique." This involves taking a small amount, like thin slices of a

salami, from a large number of sources. The computer of a large
bank may handle tens or hundreds of thousands of accounts.^* The
perpetrator of a theft employing the salami technique would arrange

for the computer to transfer very small amounts of money from ran-
domly selected accounts into an account which he controls. Only $.10
may be transferred in a given month from any one account, and the
number of accounts affected at any one time would be but a fraction
of the total accounts the bank services, but the overall amount of
money siphoned off would be sizable.

Banks usually find it more convenient simply to credit an ac-
count alleged to be short $.10 if a customer complains; and, of

course, most customers will simply assume that they made some er-
ror, write off the loss when reconciling their checkbooks, and never
notify the bank at all. The small patch of program which effects the
transfers will probably be skillfully concealed in an enormously

large and complex program or made a part of the operating system
of the computer, thus defying easy detection.

Because the perpetrator in this case would presumably have ac-

cess to, and intimate knowledge of, the bank's computer system, he

could destroy or modify the program as necessary if he found that a
detailed audit was about to take place. In actual fact, however, the
bank would almost certainly find it cheaper to just pay the small

sums and not even conduct the time-consuming and expensive in-
vestigation needed to confirm that a theft was taking place. Note
that the theft takes place at high speeds and totally automatically,

untouched by human hands and unseen by human eyes. Such a
scheme would be totally impractical, or at least much more risky
and much less profitable, if the perpetrator had to transfer such
amounts manually and personally keep all of the records in balance.

D. Difficulties in Prosecution

The blunt fact is that few prosecutions ever result from com-
puter crime. Even the scope of the problem is not entirely clear.
Donn Parker in his exhaustive study of computer abuses has found

"For an account of a theft using the salami technique, see Hearings, supra note 6,

at 62-63.



686 INDIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13:681

only several hundred cases, and not all of these have been con-

firmed.^^ Many of the instances found by Professor Parker do not in-
volve abuse integrally linked to the special characteristics of a com-

puter.^^ Nevertheless, the average loss per instance of computer

abuse, not counting the massive Equity Funding caper, ^^ is
$450,000,^® more than five times the amount of the average loss sus-
tained in 1971 from more traditional embezzlement schemes. ^^ Ob-
viously, any single computer-aided swindle can result in the loss of

billions of dollars. Considering the prevalence of computers^^ and the

apparent opportunities for improper gain, there are surprisingly few

reported cases of computer crime. Many computer systems have
significant crosschecks, audit trails, and other safeguards which

serve to deter abuse, or at least make it more difficult, but even in
cases where a thief has been caught red-handed, employers have
often been unwilling, for various reasons, to prosecute. First, there

is the embarrassment that an employer would suffer from publicly

acknowledging that someone has cheated him and his customers us-
ing his own, supposedly reliable, computer. Second, many pro-
secutors and judges do not like to handle cases involving computers

for the same reason that many students avoid mathematics courses:
they simply do not understand them. For example, there is the prob-

lem of effecting a search of a computer even with a valid warrant.

'®D. Parker, supra note 6, at 23-40. For an extensive study of computer abuses

within government, see Problems, supra note 7, at 76-117. A moderate litany of com-
puter abuses is recited in J. Carroll, Computer Security (1977). The number of
reported cases involving computer abuse, however, is miniscule.

'®0f the cases which Parker found, 37% fall under headings 1 and 4 which generally
do not involve new questions of law. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. Of
course only a fraction of the cases under the other headings will actually involve novel

legal issues.

^''See D. Parker, supra note 6, at 118-74. Certain officers of Equity Funding

created fictitious insurance policies and sold them at a discount to other insurers. They
paid the premiums to the purchasers of the bogus policies from premiums on
legitimate policies they held for Equity. The scheme collapsed when the income from
real policies could not meet the increasing obligations generated by the bogus ones.

There is some question whether this was really a computer crime, but there is no

doubt that it would have been impossible without the capability of computers for pro-

cessing large amounts of information.

'*D. Parker, supra note 6, at 28.

'7d. at 32.

^In 1977, the government had more than 10,000 computers in use. Staff of

Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Staff Study of
Computer Security in Federal Programs 6 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Security]. In 1977, there were some 500,000 computer systems made by American-
based companies in use throughout the world; it is estimated that there will be some

1,100,000 such computers in use in 1981. Amicus curiae brief for CBEMA at 17-18,
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 687

There is simply nothing that can be seen by observing the computer

itself that would provide any evidence against an embezzler. The
prosecutor would have to bring along a team of computer experts

familiar with the machine who could "dump" the files and then inter-
pret them.^^ Furthermore, the clever programmer who is stealing a
fortune in nickels and dimes seems far less a danger to society than

violent criminals. In some instances, computer criminals fired for
dishonesty from one job go right into another position of even

higher trust and responsibility. Others have been hired at large

salaries as security consultants to help catch less clever crooks.^^

The technology of computers is changing so rapidly that the fast
and efficient machines of today will soon seem as unwieldy and slow
as the machines of two decades ago seem today .^^ With more power-
ful machines come better opportunities for security, but also more
exotic opportunities for abuse. Because human beings remain the ar-
chitects of all phases of computer operations, at least in their initial

phases, it is doubtful that a theftproof system can ever be devised.

With the advent of electronic funds transfer and increased intercom-

munication among computers, the potential for theft on a truly ma-
jestic scale will be more of a temptation than many experts will be
able to resist.

This Article will examine the legal weapons available for use
against computer criminals, including a brief summary of existing
state and federal law, a consideration of the few reported cases in-

volving computer abuses, and a discussion of new and proposed
legislation addressed specifically at computer abuse. The Article will
conclude with a review of the situtation in Indiana, including a re-

cent trial in Marion County involving a fascinating instance of com-

puter crime, and a proposal for statutory revisions aimed at control-

ling computer crime.

"For an account of a case in which such a search was conducted, see D. Parker,
supra note 6, at 85-96. For a copy of the search warrant itself and the property receipt,
see R. Freed, Computers & Law 483-84 (5th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Freed].

*^The most notorious example in this regard is Jerry Schneider, who used Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Company's computer to rob it of equipment. The total take
may have been in the millions. Jerry might never have been caught if he had not been
turned in by a disgruntled employee. He served 40 days and paid a $500 fine. He had
to repay the telephone company some $8500, but he is making more than $100,000 per
year now as a security consultant. His story is told in D, Parker, supra note 6, at
59-70.

"^^Semiconductor technology is progressing so rapidly that the cost of computation

is decreasing by a factor of 10 every 5 years. Sugarman, On Foiling Computer Crime,
Inst, of Electrical & Electronic Engineers. Spectrum, Jul. 1979, at 31, 33.



688 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

II. Existing State and Federal Laws

A. Previous Surveys

At least two in-depth studies have been made concerning ex-
isting state laws that might be used to combat computer abuse. One
of these reports was written by Ms. Susan Nycum as part of a study
of Infonet^^ sponsored by the General Services Administration.^^ Ms.

Nycum's legal analysis appears both in a Senate committee print^*
and, in a somewhat expanded form, in a law review article.^^ Though
it deals with most forms of computer abuse, it surveys the legisla-
tion of only eleven "computer intensive" states.^^

Mr. David Bender published an exhaustive study in 1970 con-
cerning trade secret protection of software.^^ An updated, but less
comprehensive, version of his important work appeared in 1977.^°

The entire field of computer law is changing quite rapidly so that
any survey of legislation and case law concerning computers is likely

to be at least partially obsolete by the time it appears.^^ For exam-

ple, at least two states have already passed statutes dealing explic-
itly with computer-related crime,^^ but none of this specialized

legislation is dealt with in either study. A further caveat that must
be observed in dealing with state statutory and common law is that
generalizations are often impossible, or at least somewhat risky,
because each state has its own distinctive interpretation of what the
law is within its borders.

^*Infonet is the largest administrative data processing (ADP) firm supplying such

services to the government. There was some concern for the security of the system

because certain inmates at Leavenworth Prison had access to the system. The

prisoners were working under a contract with the Internal Revenue Service.

^^he report was done under the general direction of Donn Parker of the Stanford

Research Institute. Ms. Nycum is a partner in a San Francisco law firm, a collaborator
with Mr. Parker in studies involving law and computers, and one of the nation's

foremost experts' in computer law.

^'Security, supra note 20, at 195.

"Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse: Part I: State Penal
Laws, 5 Rutgers J. of Computers & L. 271 (1976).

^^California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts,

New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. Id. at 271.
"^Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 909 (1970).

^"Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, Computer L. Serv. § 4-4, Art. 2

(1977).

^'By way of example, Indiana, which had no trade secret statute at the time Mr.
Bender wrote his article, passed such a statute even before the article appeared in

print. IND. Code §§ 35-17-31-1 to -5 (1976, repealed 1977). Recently, Indiana repealed

that statute in favor of one which includes trade secrets in a list of items which can

constitute the res of larceny. Id. § 35-41-1-2 (Supp. 1979). Despite this legislative

activity, Indiana seems to have no reported cases dealing with theft of trade secrets.

"'Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2316 (1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 815.01-.06 (1978).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 689

Ms. Nycum has also prepared a complete survey of existing
federal legislation that might be used to prosecute computer

criminals.^^ As is the case with state legislation, only a handful of
statutes have ever actually been used to prosecute anyone for a

computer-related crime, so much of what can be done with these
statutes remains conjectural. New federal legislation addressed
specifically to computer crime has been introduced by Senator

Abraham Ribicoff;^^ this proposed statute will be discussed later in
this Article.

The use of federal penal statutes requires a basis for federal
jurisdiction. Because this Article is focused on abusive acts rather

than jurisdictional issues, this question will not be pursued herein,

but it is, of course, something that must be considered in any poten-
tial prosecution.^^ In certain instances, state legislation is assimilated

into the federal criminal code, thus permitting federal prosecutions

which would have been questionable under the federal statutes

alone.^®

B. Theft

Traditional forms of offenses against tangible property can

almost always be dealt with without difficulty under existing law,

even if a computer is somehow involved in the offense. If someone
fires a bullet into a computer or burns down a computer center,
there are no special legal problems presented. Difficulties in coping

with computer abuse arise because much of the property involved
does not fit well into categories of property subject to abuse or

theft; a program, for example, may exist only in the form of electric

^^Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse, Part II: Federal
Criminal Code, 5 Rutgers J. of Computers & L. 297 (1976).

''The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1979, S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. S645 (Jan. 25, 1979). The predecessor of S. 240 was S. 1766. See
note 6 supra.

^^See Nycum, supra note 33, at 298.
The traditional method of defining federal criminal offenses not based

upon . . . territorial jurisdiction or clearly devoted to the direct vindication of

some weighty federal interest . . . has been to authorize federal punishment
not for the familiar types of wrongdoing themselves but for the use of
federal channels in connection with such wrongdoing.

Levine, The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code: A Constitutional and Jurisdic-
tional Analysis, 39 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 9 (1972).

'^18 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) extends state law into various territories located within a

state but otherwise exclusively subject to federal jurisdiction. These areas of special

jurisdiction are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1976). The most important area is the federal
enclave, that is, land acquired by the federal government with the consent of the state
legislature for use in certain federal areas of concern, such as the construction of a

fort.



690 INDIANA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

impulses or a magnetic pattern on a tape. Also, even when a pro-
gram of substantial commercial value is misappropriated, the person
from whom it is "stolen" almost always remains in possession of the
original." Indeed, the original program may not have been moved so
much as a single inch while being illicitly copied. It may be
duplicated exactly via electronic signals over a telephone line from

one computer to another without altering the original program in

any way, even while the original is actually running.

The principal reason someone might wish to steal a computer
program is to save the time, trouble and expense of writing the pro-
gram himself. Computer programs can, of course, be both long and
complex;^^ they may take months, or even years, to write and
"debug."^^ Because it is uncertain presently whether programs can

be validly copyrighted or patented,^" and because, even if they can

be, these traditional forms of protection are not well suited to com-

puter technology, the most effective source of protection for

valuable software is statutory and common law trade secret protec-
tion.-*'

"By using "trapdoor" or "Trojan Horse" techniques, a skilled computer thief can
even cause a proper use of a program to be the trigger for its illicit and automatic

transfer to his own control. In addition to more prosaic methods of copying programs
such as photography and various copy processes, there are more exotic methods such
as using the electromagnetic waves generated by a computer to "tap" its contents.

See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 23, at 32.

^Tor example, the SABRE program employed by American Airlines in making
plane reservations contains more than one million instructions and cost more than $30
million to produce. Burck, "On Line" In "Real Time," Fortune, Apr. 1964, at 145.

^^"Debugging" is the process of removing errors from a draft program. A com-
puter is very unforgiving of mistakes; one misspelled word or a single misplaced com-
ma in a program may cause the program to fail (not run at all), or to give an incorrect
result. Debugging may be more arduous than writing the program in the first place.

^''Although the Copyright Office accepts computer programs for copyright under a

general policy of accepting anything for registration that might be copyrightable, there

is a serious question whether such a copyright would hold up if challenged. Even if it

is valid, it is not clear what real protection it confers. Patents are even more problem-

atic. For recent and fairly comprehensive treatments of this complex question, see

Davis, Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 Rutgers J. OF Com
PUTERS «& L. 1 (1977); Gemignani, Legal Protection for Computer Software: The View

from '79, 7 Rutgers J. of Computers, Technology & L. 269 (1980); Bigelow,
Copyrighting Programs— 1978, [1978] 3 Computer L. Serv. § 4-3 Art. 4; Ross, The
Patentability of Software and Firmware, [1978] 3 Computer L. Serv. § 4-2, Art. 5.

"In the 1960's, the fear arose that federal law had preempted state trade secret

law. This fear was based upon Supreme Court decisions in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395

U.S. 653 (1969); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); and
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). More recent decisions have
made it clear that the Court still recognizes the validity of state trade secret protec-
tion. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546 (1973).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 691

There is no federal trade secret legislation, although the need

for such legislation has been recognized."^ Nor does every state have
trade secret legislation. Even in those states which do have such
laws, misappropriation of a trade secret may not rise to the level of
a crime. When a trade secret is taken, the form of the taking is
often critical in determining whether prosecution is possible. This

point will be dealt with in the sections below.

1. State Larceny Statutes. — In some instances, theft of com-
puter programs is punishable as larceny. Common law larceny is the
"felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of
another with intent to deprive the owner of his property
permanently.""^ Special problems arise in applying this definition to

misappropriation of computer programs with respect to the nature

of the property taken, whether the property is carried away, and

whether the owner is "permanently" deprived of something he re-
tains possession of after his program is illicitly copied. Although
many states by statute have altered the common law notion of
larceny, one or more of these problems may still remain because
statutory interpretation often involves application of common law
principles.

Ms. Nycum believes that there are but two instances in which
theft of a program may not be prosecutable as larceny."" The first
occurs when the actor copies the program onto his own materials,
for example, film, paper, or cards, but does not carry off the

original."^ In this instance, the original program is never brought
under the direct or indirect control of the actor, and may not even
be touched."^ An indictment for larceny may also fail if the only
thing taken is something as intangible as electronic impulses."^ As
Mr. Bender observed: 'The nature of the entity which must be
taken in order to constitute the crime is critical, and the precise

wording and interpretation of the statute in question will determine

whether the taking of a trade secret may constitute larceny."^»48

"See, e.g., Keefe & Mahn, Protecting Software: Is It Worth All the Trouble?, 62
A.B.A.J. 906, 906-07 (1976).

"Fletcher v. State, 231 Md. 190, 192, 189 A.2d 641, 643 (1963), quoted in Bender,
supra note 29, at 942.

"Nycum, supra note 27, at 275.
*^Even though the act may not be prosecutable in some jurisdictions, it may be in

others, particularly those in which the subject matter of larceny is anything of value.
See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (Supp. 1979).

"See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
"See Ward v. Superior Court, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 206 (1972), discussed at

text accompanying notes 67-72 infra.
"Bender, supra note 29, at 942.



692 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

Mr. Bender divides the fifty states and the District of Columbia

into four groups according to the kind of property which can be the

res of larceny or theft of a trade secret. The first group consists of
those states which "follow the common law definition in defining the
res as property, or by using some like phrase.""^ Mr. Bender offers
little guidance as to what would happen concerning any purported
theft of a trade secret in those states.^"

Other states, those making up the second group, modify or ex-
tend the notion of property by providing lists which indicate what is

to be considered "property ."^^ Because laws dealing with criminal

acts are to be interpreted strictly, the usual reading of these

statutes would indicate that if a certain object could not be placed

among the listed items, that object could not be the subject matter
of theft.

The third group of jurisdictions is composed of those which hold
the res of larceny to a "thing of value."^^ Computer programs ob-

*Hd. Because Bender cites no authority for his conclusion, it is difficult to know
how he arrived at it. A check of current state statutes dealing with theft and the
definition of property relative thereto seems to reduce the list to two jurisdictions,

Alaska and Idaho. Alaska Stat. § 01.10.060(8) (1972); Idaho Code § 18-4601 (1972). But
see Idaho Code § 55-102 (1972).

^There is so little case law in this area that speculation on the outcome of future

cases is futile.

"Bender lists the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut,

Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Bender,
supra note 30, at 15 n.53. According to a more recent search of the statutes, "list"

state statutes include Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 30 (West Supp. 1979); Mich.
Gen. Laws Ann. § 750.10, .356 (1968); Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-41 (1972); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 193.010 (1973); N.C. Gen. § 12-3 (1969); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 103 (1958);

R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-1 (1970); S.C. Code § 16-13-30 (1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
2501 (1974); W. Va. Code § 2-2-10 (1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 943.20 (West 1958 & Supp.
1979-80). In addition, a number of states use both a list and a definition of property as
a "thing of value," or the like. Relevant statutes include: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2201

(1976); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-401 (1978); Hawah Rev. Stat. § 708-800 (1976 & Supp.
1978); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17A, § 352 (1979); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.52 (Supp.

1979); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-2-101 (1974 & Supp. 1977); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
637:2 (1964 & Supp. 1973); N.Y. Penal Law § 155.00 (McKinney Supp. 1979-80); N.D.
Cent. Code § 12.1-23-10 (1960 & Supp. 1979); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-1-2 (1979);
Tex. Penal Code Ann. tit. 7, § 31.01 (1974 Vernon); Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-101 (1977).

Arizona has recently passed special legislation specifically addressed to computer

crime. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2310(E) (1978). See text accompanying notes 157-61

infra. Prosecution for the same criminal act can, of course, often be pressed under

more than one statute.

^^he jurisdictions listed by Bender include the District of Columbia, Florida,

Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, and Virginia. The exact

phrase "thing of value" is not necessarily used in all of these jurisdictions, but Bender

believes the respective phrases used are similar enough to mean the same things. Once
again, Bender gives no authority. A search of statutes seems to indicate that "thing of



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 693

viously fit rather well under this rubric. Mr. Bender notes two prob-

lems which must be addressed not only in "thing of value" jurisdic-
tions, but in those in the first two groups as well. The first problem
arises when something is taken without an intent of permanently
depriving its owner of possession, for example, when it is taken with
the intent of replacing it after a copy has been produced. The intent
to return, or the actual return of the object taken, may, in some
jurisdictions preclude a charge of larceny, or might require that a

lesser charge be filed. A second problem is establishing the value of
the item taken. In Hancock v. Texas,^^ the value assigned to a set of
misappropriated copies of programs was their commercial value as
evidenced by expert testimony, but the defendant was prosecuted
under a trade secret statute and not under the Texas larceny

statute. If the value of the- thing stolen is taken to be the value of

the underlying material object, for example, the computer paper on

which the program is printed, then someone stealing a program hav-
ing a commercial value in the millions of dollars might be chargeable

with only a trivial offense.

In addition to the two problems cited above, there is also the
problem of the manner of theft. If the actor fails to make off with
the program, or even move it, he has not deprived the owner of its
possession, even for a brief moment. If the actor relies only on elec-
tronic signals, he may not have even made a tangible copy of the
program. Of course, someone who misappropriates a copy of a pro-
gram has by his action deprived the owner of something, specifi-
cally, the secrecy attached to the program as well as the potential
commercial gain that might have been realized through the sale or

licensing of the program. But not all courts would be willing to

recognize secrecy or potential gain as property capable of being

value" is actually used in the following: Ala. Code § 13A-8-l(10) (Supp. 1979); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-105(27) (1956 & Supp. 1978); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-401 (1973 &
1978 Repl.); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-118(l) (West 1972); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §
877(4) (1974); D.C. Code Encycl. § 22-2201 (West 1967); Fla. Stat. § 812.012(3) (1976 &
Supp. 1979); III. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 15-1 (1973); Ind. Code § 35-41-1-2 (1979); Iowa
Code § 702.14 (1976 & Supp. 1978); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3110 (Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 514.010(5) (1975); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:67 (West 1974); Md. Ann. Code art.
27 § 340(h) (Supp. 1979); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 570.010 (Vernon 1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. §
28-509 (1943 & Supp. 1978); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2c:20-2(g) (West Supp. 1979); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 30-16-1 (1978); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.01 (Page 1975); Or. Rev. Stat. §
164.005(5) (1979); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3901 (Purdon 1972); Tenn. Code Ann. §
39-4201 (1975); Tex. Penal Code Ann. tit. 7, § 31.01 (Vernon 1974); Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-401(1) (1978); Va. Code § 18.2-95 (1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A. 04.110(21)
(1974). In addition, a number of statutes used both a list and "thing of value" to
characterize property subject to theft. See note 49 supra.

^M02 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Hancock v. Decker, 379
F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967).



694 INDIANA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

stolen, though interference with these rights may well form the
basis for an action in tort.

The case of Lund v. Commonwealth^* is instructive. Charles
Lund, a doctoral student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State

University (VPI), was convicted of grand larceny for use of VPI's
computer without proper authorization. Lund's thesis research re-

quired the use of the computer, but, through an oversight, his ad-

visor failed to provide an account for him. Lund began using ac-
counts assigned to other persons and departments without their per-

mission. The director of VPI's computer center estimated that by
the time Lund was caught, he may have used as much as $26,384.16
in unauthorized computer time. The director also admitted that the
value of the cards and paper obtained from Lund was "whatever
scrap paper is worth."^^

Lund admitted that he used the computer without specific
authority, but he and four faculty members, including his depart-
ment chairman and advisor, testified that the work was for his
thesis and he would have been given authorization had he requested

it. Lund appealed his conviction on the grounds that there was no
evidence that the articles in question were stolen, or that they had

a value of $100 or more, and, in any case, computer time and ser-

vices were not the subject of larceny.
One of the Virginia statutes in question provided:

Any person who: (1) Commits larceny from the person of
another of money or other thing of value of five dollars or
more, or

(2) Commits simple larceny not from the person of
another of goods and chattels of the value of one hundred

dollars or more, shall be deemed guilty of grand larceny . . . .^^

Another statute stipulated: "If any person obtain, by any false
pretense or token, from any person, with intent to defraud, money
or other property which may be the subject of larceny, he shall be
deemed guilty of larceny thereof . . . .""

The court found that "[a]t common law, labor or services could
not be the subject of the crime of false pretense because neither
time nor services may be taken and carried away."^® Even though
some states had amended their criminal codes to make obtaining

"217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977).

''Id. at 690, 232 S.E.2d at 747.

''Id. at 690, 232 S.E.2d at 747 (quoting Va. Code § 18.100 (1950) (currently codified
at Va. Code § 18.2-95 (1975))).

"M at 690, 232 S.E.2d at 747 (quoting Va. Code § 18.1-118 (1950) (currently
codified at Va. Code § 18.2-178 (1975))).

"217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 748.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 695

services by false pretenses a crime,^® Virginia had not done so. Also,

the unauthorized use of a computer was found not to be the subject

of larceny because it did not involve the "taking and carrying away
of a certain concrete article of personal property."**' The court also
would not accept the Commonwealth's argument that the value of

the print-outs should be measured by the cost of production. The
court concluded that where there is no market value for an article

that has been stolen, the prosecution must prove its value.*^ The
print-outs had no ascertainable value to VPI or the computer center.
Lund's conviction was reversed and the indictment quashed.*^

2. State Trade Secret Legislation. — A group of states have
passed legislation which deals specifically with trade secrets. At the
time of Mr. Bender's first survey,*^ eighteen states had passed such
legislation; six years earlier none had.®^ By the time of his updated
article in 1977,*^ twenty-one states had such legislation.** The fact

'*See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Code § 165.15 (McKinney, Supp. 1979-80); N.J. Rev. Stat. §
2A:111 (1969) (currently codified at N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:208 (Supp. 1979)); Cal. Penal

Code § 487 (West 1970).
'«'217 Va. at 692, 232 S.E.2d at 748.

''Id.

"7^. at 693, 232 S.E.2d at 749. The result in this case seems entirely just and
reasonable, but suppose Lund had been playing "Startrek" instead of working on his
thesis, or using the VPI computer for private gain, perhaps doing other students' pro-
gramming assignments for pay?

^^Bender, supra note 29.

"/d. at 947 n.200.

^^Bender, supra note 30.

"^Bender lists Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,

Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and
Wisconsin, finally citing some authority for his statements. Specific statutes are listed
in Bender, supra note 30, at 17 nn.64-67. The state law is often difficult to classify. The
situation in Indiana illustrates this point. In 1969 the Indiana General Assembly added

§§ 35-17-3-1 to -5 to the Indiana Code. These statutes described theft or embezzlement

of an article representing a trade secret as well as copying an article representing a

trade secret. They required an intent to deprive the owner of the secret of its control,
or an intent to appropriate the secret to the actor's use or to the use of a third party.

Return or intent to return was no defense. Nevertheless, in these statutes, the defini-

tions of "article" and "copy" both implied some tangible object. In the 1976 revision of

the criminal code, this separate chapter dealing with trade secrets was repealed, and

trade secrets were incorporated into the definition of "property" listed in IND. Code §
35-41-1-2 (Supp. 1979). Although § 35-41-1-2 describes property as "anything of value,"

it also names various types of property with some specificity. Thus, there is an am-

biguity as to whether the specific is intended to prevail over the general inasmuch as

there are articles which have value which do not seem to fit under any of the

headings. In accordance with the usual strict interpretation of criminal statutes, it

would seem that the more restrictive meaning of property should govern. But, by the



696 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

that a state has a statute which makes criminal a misappropriation
of a trade secret does not preclude prosecution under other laws,

such as the larceny statute, for the same offense.

As one might expect, California and New York, because of their
size and the complexity of their technology and industry, have trade

secret statutes. California, in fact, has one of the most detailed such

statutes in the nation.^^ This statute provides in part:

(b) Every person is guilty of theft who, with intent to
deprive or withhold from the owner thereof the control of a
trade secret, or with an intent to appropriate a trade secret

to his own use or to the use of another, does any of the
following:

(1) Steals, takes, or carries away any article representing
a trade secret.

(2) Fraudulently appropriates any article representing a

trade secret entrusted to him.

(3) Having unlawfully obtained access to the article, with-

out authority makes or causes to be made a copy of any arti-
cle representing a trade secret.

(4) Having obtained access to the article through a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence, without authority and in

breach of the obligations created by such relationship makes
or causes to be made, directly from and in the presence of

the article, a copy of any article representing a trade

secret.^®

The statute further proscribes conspiracy to obtain a trade secret,^^

doctrine of plain meaning, it could also be argued that the list of objects is merely il-

lustrative and not exhaustive. Which Bender category fits Indiana? Is Indiana a "thing

of value" state, one which has a list, or one which has specific legislation addressed to

trade secrets by virtue of its listing trade secrets explicitly in its criminal code? There

is now some guidance in this area because of the Thommen case which is discussed
later.

The law in Indiana concerning valuation of property and the sort of asportation

required to sustain a conviction for theft is also unclear. In Warnke v. State, 89 Ind.
App. 683, 167 N.E. 138 (1929), the conviction of an inept chicken thief who fled the coop
leaving his bag of chickens behind was upheld. Id. at 686, 167 N.E. at 139. Early In-

diana cases indicate that the collective value of all items stolen may be totaled to make
the actor liable for larceny of a higher degree than he would have been for the theft of

any individual item. E.g., Edson v. State, 148 Ind. 285, 47 N.E. 625 (1897). Concerning

value, the new Indiana Criminal Code requires only that whatever is taken have some
value. Ind. Code § 35-41-1-2 (Supp. 1979). The extent of the value may not have to be
proved. See text accompanying note 178 infra.

"'Cal. Penal Code § 499c (West 1970 & Supp. 1979).
''Id. § 499c(b).

"7^. § 499c(c).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 697

and explicitly declares that the return or intent to return the article

representing the trade secret is not a defense.^"

Despite its precision and comprehensiveness, the California

statute leaves possible loopholes for the computer thief because

both "article" and *'copy" as defined elsewhere in the statute seem

to refer only to tangible objects.^^ Furthermore, even though the

conspiracy portion of the statute may cover a situation where an
employee memorizes a program, copies outside his place of employ-

ment what he has memorized, and then delivers it for consideration
to a third party, the law does not seem to forbid the employee from
using the memorized program for his own personal benefit.^^

Theft of a trade secret may also be prosecuted under the
California larceny statute.^^ Even though the larceny statute does
not explicitly state that trade secrets may be the object of larceny,
California case law indicates that prosecution for theft of a trade

secret may be maintained under the larceny statute provided that
the secret is represented by some tangible object which has been
carried away.^^ The valuation used is the commercial value and not
the intrinsic value of the underlying object.^^

In Ward v. Superior Court,''^ Ward, an employee of a computer
service bureau," used a telephone to transfer a secret program from

a competitor's computer to that of his employer. He then caused his
employer's computer to print a copy of the stolen program, which he

carried to his office.^^ He was charged under both the trade secret^^
and grand theft statutes®" of California. The court found that the

''Id. § 499c(d).

"For example, "article" is defined as "any object, material, device or substance or

copy thereof, including any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample, specimen, pro-

totype, model, photograph, micro-organism, blueprint or map." Id. § 499c(a).

"See Bender, supra note 29, at 947-50.

^^Cal. Penal Code § 484a (West 1970).
'Teople V. Dolbeer, 214 Cal. App. 2d 619, 29 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1963). Dolbeer in-

volved a prosecution under the larceny statute for theft of lists of telephone

subscribers. It was important to the court that some tangible object was taken. In-
deed, the court stated that had the lists been merely copied in some manner, but not
carried off, the prosecution could probably not have been upheld. Id. at 623, 29 Cal.

Rptr. at 575.

''Id. at 622-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75.

'"3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 206 (1972).
"A computer service bureau is a firm which supplies computer services, including

actual machine use, to its clients.

^*In doing so. Ward fraudulently used another client's account number. It appears
that charges were not pressed on these grounds. If the client whose number was used
actually incurred charges due to the fraudulent use. Ward might have been prosecuted
for theft from, or fraud upon, that party as well. 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. at 210.

''Cal. Penal Code § 499c(b) (West 1970 & Supp. 1979). See text accompanying
note 68 supra.

"Id. § 487.



698 INDIANA LAWREVIEVv [Vol. 13:681

"article" taken must be tangible, "even though the trade secret

which the article represents may itself be intangible J" ^^ Although
the electronic impulses representing the stolen program were not

sufficiently tangible to constitute an article of theft,®^ Ward had
gone beyond merely transferring electronic impulses from one com-

puter to another. His act of making a tangible copy of the program

and then carrying the copy even the short distance to his office suf-

ficed to establish the elements necessary for prosecution. Further-

more, merely making the copy in itself was a violation of the trade

secret statute.®^ The court also concluded that the enactment of the

trade secret statue made a trade secret property which is subject to
theft. Therefore, a misappropriation of any trade secret, or article

representing a trade secret, can also be charged as a theft of prop-

erty under the larceny statute.^* The lesson for potential computer

thieves, at least in California, is that they should not make tangible
copies of the programs they steal. If Ward had merely transferred
the competitor's program to his computer and used it, possibly to

his great profit, without bothering to print it, he might not have

been subject to prosecution.

The New York larceny statute includes both trade secrets and
"secret scientific materials."*^ Copying is itself an offense prosecut-
able apart from, or in addition to, stealing.^^ New York also appears
to have a very broad notion of property which may be subject to
theft.®^ A New York court described a prior, similar statute as
follows: "It is difficult to conceive a definition more comprehensive
than this, for it includes intangible property, as well as tangible,

written instruments, as such, and everything, except real property,

that is capable of being owned or transferred."®^ New York seems to
follow the same valuation rule as California and Texas, that is, the
commercial value of the object taken governs.®^

3, Model Penal Code. — The Model Penal Code has virtually as
broad a definition of property as does New York,^° but the notion of

"'S Computer L. Serv. Rep. at 208.
''Id.

«'Cal. Penal Code § 499c(b)(3) (West 1970 & Supp. 1979). See note 68 supra and
accompanying text.

^'S Computer L. Serv. Rep. at 210-11.

«^N.Y. Penal Law § 155.30(3) (McKinney 1975).
^''Nycum, supra note 27, at 279.

«'N.Y. Penal Law § 155.00(1) (McKinney 1975).
""In re Bronson, 150 N.Y. 1, 5, 44 N.E. 707, 711, 110 N.Y.S. 949, 954 (1896) (Vann,

J., dissenting).

"'See, e.g., People v. Irrizari, 5 N.Y.2d 142, 156 N.E.2d 69, 182 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1959).

•"Model Penal Code § 223.0(6) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 699

theft includes depriving the owner of either the property or some
legal interest therein, either permanently or for some extended
period of time.^^ If the right to secrecy or the right to payment for
use of a program is "property" in the sense the Code intends (and it

quite reasonably could be so interpreted), misappropriation of a pro-

gram could be prosecuted as theft under the Code. The Code also
has a section which defines the offense of theft of services which

might be stretched to prosecute someone who knowingly or
fraudulently obtains computer services of any sort without any in-

tent of paying for them.^^ The value of property stolen is taken to be
the "highest value, by any reasonable standard" of that property;^^

thus, the commercial value of a purloined program would certainly

be admissible.

•4. Federal Laic. — The principal federal statute related to theft,
section 641 of title 18 of the United States Code, is quite com-

prehensive concerning the acts covered and the res required.^^ For-

bidden activity includes embezzling,^^ stealing, knowingly converting

to the use of the actor or a third party, as well as selling, disposing

of, or conveying without authority "anything of value" which

belongs to the United States or any department or agency thereof,

or even any property which has been made or is being made under
contract for the United States or any of its departments. The
statute also proscribes receiving and hiding stolen property if it is

known to have been stolen.
Stealing is a narrower notion than conversion. The Supreme

Court has drawn the following distinction:

To steal means to take away from one in lawful possession
without right with the intention to keep wrongfully ....

''Id. §§ 223.0(1), (5), .2(1).

^Hd. § 223.7.

''Id. § 223.1(2)(c).

®*The statute provides for a fine and imprisonment for:

[Whomever] embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or

the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of . . .

anything of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof,

or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or
any department thereof, or whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same
with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been em-

bezzled, stolen, purloined or converted ....

18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).

^^Embezzlement is fraudulent or felonious conversion or appropriation of property

which has rightfully or lawfully come into the converter's possession. For a fairly com-
prehensive discussion of embezzlement and § 641, see United States v. Powell, 294 F.

Supp. 1353 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 413 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1969).



700 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

Conversion, however, may be consummated without any in-
tent to keep and without any wrongful taking, where the in-
itial possession by the converter was entirely lawful. Conver-
sion may include misuse or abuse of property.^96

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interprets the Supreme
Court as saying that section 641 applies when anyone obtains a
wrongful advantage from the property of another .^^ Section 641 has

also been used to successfully prosecute an army officer who used
the services of government employees for his own personal gain.^®

The phrase "of the United States or of any department thereof
"

is to be interpreted with great latitude as well. For example, if the

government has a license for the use of certain programs, theft of
the programs would suffice to invoke federal jurisdiction. "In its

broadest interpretation, any misappropriation of software which is

subject to some measure of government control, custody, or owner-
ship is a violation of section 641."^^ The measure of value of any item
misappropriated is the "face, par, or market value, or cost price,

either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater ."^°° This implies that

the commercial value of a stolen program would be accepted by a
court as a measure of its worth. If the program were completely lost

to its owner, the cost of rewriting it might be acceptable.

Other federal statutes also apply to theft-related offenses. Sec-
tion 659 of title 18, for example, deals with theft from an interstate

common carrier, and applies regardless of who owns the goods
stolen: "The interstate character of a shipment commences at the
time that the property is segregated for interstate commerce [such
character continuing] until the property arrives at its destination

and is there delivered either by actual unloading or by being placed
to be unloaded."^"^ The particular act proscribed by this statute is
more limited than that covered by section 641. Although the re-
quired intent is the same as that for conversion, the act in question
must be theft or embezzlement.^°^ The act does not seem to cover
unauthorized copying. Section 2314 of title 18 also forbids interstate

transportation of stolen property. The stolen article must actually
cross state lines to trigger this statute. In United States v. Lester,^^^

^Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271-72 (1952) (citing Irving Trust Co. v.

Leff, 253 N.Y. 359, 364, 171 N.E. 569, 571 (1930)).

^^United States v. Crutchley, 502 F.2d 1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 1974).

^^Burnett v. United States, 222 F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1955).

''Nycum, supra note 33, at 306.

^ns U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
'"^United States v. Astolas, 487 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1973).

^"^This interpretation is strongly implied by the language in United States v.

Astolas, id. at 279. See also Nycum, supra note 33, at 307.
'"^82 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1960).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 701

a conviction was upheld even though the defendant had merely

transported misappropriated copies of commercially valuable

geological survey maps across state lines. ^°^ This decision implies
that section 2314 could perhaps be invoked if someone carried an

unauthorized copy of a computer program across state lines. Other

federal laws, such as that which covers conversion by a government

employee of property entrusted to his care/°^ may also be helpful in
curbing computer crime in certain carefully defined situations."106

C. Other Federal and State Statutes

Although theft of software constitutes one of the largest poten-

tial sources of loss due to computer crime, there are other ways to
lose than by theft and other ways to misappropriate things than by
simply carting them off. A common problem at university computing
facilities, for example, is unauthorized use of the machine, that is,

misappropriation of computer time and resources. Because these are

"things of value," it is likely that, even in this case, many state
larceny statutes might be applicable. There are usually other state

statutes which could be used to handle this situtation, at least if a

court can be convinced to interpret such statutes in a reasonable,

though possibly broad, manner. For example, even an unauthorized

user must usually provide an account number to which his use of
computer resources will be charged. Furnishing this information is,

in effect, fraudulently tendering a credit card because the account

the user is tendering is not his own.^°^ This practice can lead to pros-

ecution under a credit card fraud statute. ^°^

Damaging information that is stored on magnetic tape, for exam-
ple, garbling the information by passing it through a strong

magnetic field, is almost certainly prosecutable under a malicious

mischief statute, provided that the court can be apprised of the

precise nature of the damage done.^"^ If anyone breaks and enters a
computer facility with the express purpose of doing substantial

damage or committing some other felony, he is, of course, subject to
prosecution for burglary as well.^^°

Some states have ''telephone abuse" statutes which might be used
to prosecute someone who attacks a computer or its contents from a

'''Id. at 754-55.

'"^8 U.S.C. § 654 (1976).

'""See 18 U.S.C. §§ 285, 655-57, 1707, 2113 (1976).

'"If a false name or identification is used, forgery might also be involved. This
raises the question of what constitutes a "signature" in dealing with a computer. The
question is not without importance in view of the arrival of electronic funds transfer.

'''See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-43-5-4 (Supp. 1979).
'""See, e.g., id. § 35-43-1-2.

""Criminal trespass might also apply. See, e.g., id. § 35-43-2-2.



702 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

remote site via a telephone line. Although the laws of each state are

different, there is no state which does not already have a substantial

arsenal of statutes dealing with larceny, fraud, and invasion of

privacy which can be used against the computer criminal. Other

statutes dealing with credit card fraud, fraudulent destruction of

recordable instruments,"^ or tampering with records"^ might also

prove to be valuable weapons.

Other federal laws besides those related directly to larceny can

also be employed against computer crime."^ The two principal
statutes which deal with abuse of federal channels of communication

are sections 1341 (mail fraud) and 1343 (wire fraud) of title 18. Both

statutes have two essential elements: 1) the actor must use the mail

(wire) for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, 2) a

fraud or scheme to obtain money or property under false pretenses.
Fraud has been liberally interpreted by the federal courts, and it is

likely that they would find fraud in a scheme to obtain an

unauthorized copy of a program. All cases tried to date under the

wire fraud statute have involved calls which have crossed state

lines.
"^

One such wire fraud case was United States v. Seidlitz}^^
Seidlitz, who operated his own computer business in Virginia, had
obtained access codes to the computer of a former employer. Op-

timum Services, Inc. (OSI), located in Rockville, Maryland. OSI had
developed a sophisticated program that Seidlitz misappropriated for
his own personal gain. He obtained the electronic signals which
represented the program through interstate telephone lines. Once
the transmission had been made, he could, of course, print copies of

the program from the stored information. Seidlitz also had a com-
puter terminal in his home in Maryland. As events turned out, he
would have been better off had he stolen the programs using that
terminal. Seidlitz's thievery was discovered, as are most such com-
puter crimes, purely by accident.

•"Model Penal Code § 224.3 (1962).
'''Id. § 224.4.

"^Nycum classifies the federal statutes under seven broad headings: 1) theft and

related crimes, 2) abuse of federal channels of communication, 3) national security of-

fenses, 4) trespass and burglary, 5) deceptive practices, 6) malicious mischief and

related offenses, and 7) miscellaneous other statutes. Nycum, supra note 33, at 305.
This general order will be followed here.

"'Nycum, supra note 33, at 311-12.

"*This is an unreported case discussed in Security, supra note 20, at 234. The
report and analysis of this case were submitted to the Committee on Governmental

Operations by Mr. Jervis Finney, U.S. Attorney for the District of Maryland, the

jurisdiction within which the crime occurred.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 703

Mr. Jarvis Finney, in a report to the Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs, pointed out some of the serious problems
associated with trying to win a conviction in this kind of case under

existing state and federal law."^ First, there is the problem of prov-

ing that Seidlitz actually called the computer from which he was

stealing programs. Having established this, "it is also incumbent to

establish, with precision, what material is being retrieved from the

computer. Unless the victim company has certain specialized equip-
ment available, this may pose an extreme burden which can seriously
hamper any attempt to obtain a search warrant.""'

If it had been determined that Seidlitz had indeed phoned OSFs
computer and that OSI knew precisely what information had been
transmitted to Seidlitz's phone, a search of his premises may have
revealed no identifiable copies. The evidence could have been en-
tirely concealed on magnetic tapes or in invisible electronic switches

at the heart of his computer. The program could have been scrambled
in such a way that only Seidlitz could decode it by means of another
secret program; hence, an exhaustive search of his home and
business might have revealed no clear evidence of any crime, even if

the entire contents of his computer's memory had been "dumped"
and given to a computer specialist to read."^ Such a blanket seizure

and examination of all of Seidlitz's records and all of the information

stored in his computer, however, might have run afoul of the fourth

amendment.
If Seidlitz had not transmitted the programs to Virginia, the

wire fraud statute would have been useless. Moreover, a charge of

interstate transportation of stolen property was^smissed due to a
lack of asportation. The programs that Seidlitz misappropriated
were not really carried off; they still resided inside OSI's computer.
Seidlitz had merely reproduced them by means of an electronic
signal over the phone. The case was thus distinguishable from those
in which a copy had first been made and then transported in-
terstate.

A conviction for what must appear to most sensible people to be
a crime was nearly avoided because what was stolen was not carried
off. Whether the court would have found asportation if he had erased
the program in OSI's computer at the same time he copied it into

"^Unfortunately, many prosecutors faced with similar difficulties would not have
attempted any prosecution, perhaps suggesting a suit in tort as a remedy for the in-
jured party.

"^Security, supra note 20, at 235.

"^Inasmuch as computer systems can hold information equivalent to miles of
printed copy, the sheer task of searching for the evidence is like looking for the pro-

verbial needle in the haystack.



704 INDIANA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

his own is a matter of conjecture. It would certainly seem that the
gratuitous destruction of OSI's program should not be required to

classify Seidlitz's act as a theft. The courts would do well to reex-

amine the concept of asportation in situations such as this.

There are rather specialized statutes which relate to national
security."* The broadest of these, section 793(f) of title 18, seems to
proscribe virtually any malfeasance having to do with information or

documents related to national security, including the knowing
failure to report the loss of such a document.^^°

Federal statutes concerning trespass and burglary refer to

specialized areas, such as banks and post offices, and not to the

more general notion of "federal enclave."^^^ It appears that section
2113(a) of title 18, which deals with robbery of a bank, refers only to

common law larceny^^^ and not to a more extensive notion that might
enable a court to find larceny in misappropriation of a trade secret.

The Supreme Court, moreover, has held that federal criminal law in
this respect is not to be interpreted in the light of state law.^^^ Thus,

these statutes are not as helpful in prosecuting computer crime as
they may first appear. The Assimilative Crimes Act, however,
adopts state penal law to fill in the gaps in federal law for each

federal enclave in the state. ^^^ Thus, even though federal law may be
deficient when considered in isolation, state law may remedy that
deficiency.

Several federal statutes relate to deceptive practices, ^^^ but by

far the most comprehensive of these is section 1001 of title 18.^^^ All
that section 1001 requires is some "false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement, knowingly and willfully made." The statute applies to
both oral and written representations. ^^^ Because an entry of a

'"18 U.S.C. §§ 793-95, 797-99, 952 (1976).

''"Id. § 793(f).

*"See Id. § 'l for the definition of federal property for purposes of the criminal

code.

•"The statute was so construed in United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 437 (4th

Cir. 1961).

•''^Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 106 (1943).

''*See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
•=^^8 U.S.C. §§ 912, 1001, 1005, 1006 (1976).

'^^Section 1001 provides in part:

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency

of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up

by any trick, scheme or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious,

or fraudulent statements or representations or makes or uses any false

writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or

fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined ....

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).

'"United States v. Zavala, 139 F.2d 830, 831 (2d Cir. 1944).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 705

password or authorization code into a computer is a statement that

the one who enters it is entitled to what he orders the computer to
give him, this statute would seem to be a likely weapon with regard
to misappropriation of computer services or information stored in a

computer in any case in which the actor misrepresents his identity

or his status.

An instructive case relating to computer abuse by fraud is
United States v. Jones.^^^ Through a sophisticated scheme, again
discovered solely by chance, the defendant's brother had a computer

generate checks payable to the defendant which should have been

payable to the defendant's employer. Because the payor on these

checks was Canadian, the defendant was charged with transporting
foreign commerce checks valued at more than $5,000, knowing the
checks had been taken by fraud, ^^^ and of unlawfully converting

these checks knowing them to be fraudulent. ^^° The defendant moved
that the indictments be dismissed on the grounds that the checks in

question were actually forgeries and, therefore, did not fall under

the provisions of the statutes under which she was charged. ^^^ The
district court held that the checks were indeed forgeries and

dismissed the indictments;^^^ the government appealed.
The legal issue on appeal was whether "the alteration of ac-

counts payable documents fed into a computer which resulted in the

issuance of checks payable to an improper payee constituted a 'falsely

made, forged, altered, counterfeited or spurious' security ."^^^ The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court,

holding that the acts which caused the computer to print the

fraudulent "checks did not constitute the making of a false writing,
but rather amounted to the creation of a writing which was genuine
in execution but false as to the statements of fact contained in such

writing."^^*

The prosecuting attorney pointed out that if the checks had
been found to be forgeries, and the indictments had been dismissed,

then there would probably have been no federal statutes under

which the defendant could have been charged. ^^^ The mail fraud

'^'^SSa F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977). This case is dis-

cussed in Security, supra note 20, at 236-37.

''ns U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).

'''Id. § 2315.

^^^The statutes did "not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, counterfeited or

spurious representation of an obligation or . . . promise to pay ... by a bank or cor-

poration of any foreign country." 553 F.2d at 352 n.2.

''^'United States v. Jones, 414 F. Supp. 964, 971 (D. Md. 1976).
'^'553 F.2d at 354.

'''Id. at 355.

'^^Security, supra note 20, at 238. See note 103 supra.



706 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

statute might have been the only other possibility, but it would

have required some proof that checks were placed in the mail in a
scheme to defraud, whereas no checks might have been sent through

the mail. "Thus, there may be instances where computer-related
criminal activity has no criminal sanction."^^^

Federal statutes which deal with the destruction of property

seem well-styled to handle a broad spectrum of possible offenses;^^^
section 1361, which deals with the malicious destruction of govern-

ment property, is the widest in its scope. It has been used in a case
in which blood was poured on selective service records. ^^® In that
case, the value of the property injured was taken to be the cost of
restoring the damaged records. ^^^

Despite the seeming availability of statutory protection, prosecu-

tion of computer "criminals" is often difficult. This point is il-

lustrated by testimony given by Ms. Susan Nycum before a Senate
subcommittee in which she related a personal experience concerning

computer abuse which might not have been prosecutable.^**^ While

Ms. Nycum was in charge of a computer center, one of her staff
detected a user attempting to erase the volume table of contents for

the system. The destruction of this master file would have created
havoc in the computer operations. According to Ms. Nycum's
estimate, it would have cost $50,000 to recreate the file. The at-
tempt at destruction was made from a terminal outside the com-
puter center itself using intrastate telephone lines and was
frustrated only because of prompt action taken to disconnect the

caller. Despite the large amount of damage and incovenience that
would have resulted had the attempt succeeded, local law enforce-

ment agencies were not sure that there was any law under which
they could prosecute. The best they could do was suggest that the
perpetrator be charged with making an obscene phone call. No
charges were filed. Though state authorities were involved in the in-
cident, it is not clear that under the circumstances federal

authorities would have had an option of prosecuting even for an

obscene phone call.

Some miscellaneous federal crimes with which a computer
criminal could be charged include aiding and abetting a criminal, ^^^

assisting the actor after the commission of the crime as an accessory

after the fact,^*^ and conspiracy. ^''^ A government employee can be

'^^Security, supra note 20, at 238.
•^^18 U.S.C. §§ 81, 1361, 1363, 2071, 2153, 2155 (1976).

''^United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969).

'''Id. at 1013.

'*°Hearings, supra note 6, at 70.
"'18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).

'*'Id. § 3.

•"/rf. § 371.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 707

charged with disclosure of confidential information if he discloses

secret software in government custody, even if the software is owned
by a private party and not the government. ^^^ In addition, the notion

of fraud upon the government is very broad and does not imply
pecuniary loss to the government. ^^^ It is somewhat odd that there is
no general federal statute which states that it is a crime to defraud

the government; thus, as Ms. Nycum points out, the conspiracy
statute makes criminal an act of planning to do something which is
itself not criminal.

^^^

III. New Legislation

There are already a respectable number of state and federal
laws which can be used to combat computer crime. The unique
nature of computers, however, poses certain problems in the applica-

tion of these laws in certain instances. At least two states have
passed special legislation to deal with computer abuses, and Con-

gress, along with several states, is considering such legislation. Con-

sideration of this legislation forms the concluding part of this Arti-

cle.

A. Federal Computer Systems Protection Act

Florida and Arizona have each passed laws specifically directed

against computer crime; similar legislation is under consideration

elsewhere, ^''^ and a "Federal Computer Systems Protection Act o£
1979" is before the United States Senate.'^' The Senate bill
describes the proscribed acts as follows:

(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully, directly or indirectly
accesses, causes to be accessed or attempts to access any

computer, computer system, computer network, or any part

thereof which, in whole or in part, operates in interstate

'"Haas V. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910).

'*^Nycum, supra note 33, at 320.
1461

147 (

'18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).

''See, e.g., California DP Crime Bill Delayed for Redraft, Computerworld, Mar.
12, 1979, at 14; Whitemarsh, Colo. Crime Bill Expected to Pass, and DP Crime
Legislation: A State-by-State Scorecard, Computerworld, May 21, 1979, at 1. For ex-
amples of recent computer crime legislation, see Ala. Code § 13A-8-10(b) (1979); Cal.
Penal Code § 502 (West 1979); 1979 111. Legis. Serv. P.A. 81-548 (West); 1979 N.C.
Adv. Legis. Serv. No. 7, C. 831; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-701 to -704 (Supp. 1979).

"«S. 240, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. S709 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1979). This
was originally Senate Bill S. 1766, the "Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of
1977." Although most witnesses at the hearings on this bill felt that new legislation
was needed, almost no one was satisfied with the bill itself. Senator Ribicoff redrafted
the bill, incorporating certain suggestions of then Assistant Attorney General Ben-
jamin Civiletti. Cong. Rec. at S719-24. See Hearings, supra note 6.



708 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

commerce or is owned by, under contract to, or in conjunc-
tion with, any financial institution, the United States

Government or any branch, department or agency thereof,
or any entity operating in or affecting interstate commerce,

for the purpose of:

(1) devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud,
or

(2) obtaining money, property, or services, for themselves or

another, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations or promises, shall be fined a sum not more than two
and one-half times the amount of the fraud or theft or impris-
oned not more than 15 years or both.

(b) Whoever intentionally and without authorization, directly
or indirectly accesses, alters, damages, destroys, or attempts

to damage or destroy any computer, computer system, or
computer network described in subsection (a), or any com-

puter software, program or data contained in such computer,
computer system or computer network, shall be fined not

more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years or
both.^^^

The bill continues with an extensive and fairly complex list of
definitions. ''Access" is defined so broadly that it could include the

use of almost anything having something to do with a computer.^^°

On the other hand, the definition of "computer" is both too narrow
and too broad. It is limited to electronic devices which manipulate

data via electronic or magnetic impulses, thus excluding some of the
major new forms of computers,^^^ yet the definition is not restricted
to general purpose machines, thus opening the way for rulings that
electronic watches and automated traffic signals are covered by the
bill.^^^ Moreover, because the notion of computer is extended to "all

input, output, processing, storage, software, or communication

facilities which are connected or related to such a device in a system

"'125 Cong. Rec. at S709.

*^'''"Access' means to approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve

data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of, a computer, computer system,
or computer network." Id. at S710.

^^^Hearings, supra note 6, at 67 (testimony of D. Parker).

^^'^See id. Apparently the Senate Criminal Justice Subcommittee found the defini-

tion too broad as well. In the version voted out of that committee on November 6,
1979, automated typewriters, home computers and hand-held calculators were
specifically exempted. In place of the many paragraphs of definitions dealing with com-
puters, computer systems, computer networks, and so forth, the committee defined a

computer as "a device that performs logical, arithmetic and storage functions by elec-

tronic manipulation and includes any property and communication facility directly

related to or operating in conjunction with such a device." DP Crime Bill Progresses
in Senate, Computerworld. Nov. 19, 1979, at 2, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as DP Crime
Bill].



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 709

or network,"^^^ it appears that software and even telephones are to

be treated as part of the computer itself. Yet, despite this seeming

breadth, it appears that one of the most serious potential sources of

loss, illicit photocopying of a printed program, is not covered at all.

The Senate bill is inadequate for two reasons. First, the proposed
legislation duplicates much existing legislation. Second, and almost
antithetical to the first conclusion, this bill ranges so broadly and is

written so unclearly that it is hard to say with any degree of cer-

tainty exactly what the bill proscribes. Because its penalties are
rather severe — up to fifteen years in prison for perhaps twenty-five
cents worth of misappropriated computer time — the legislation
should be more specific concerning what actions it covers.

The scope of federal jurisdiction is one of the most striking
features of the bill. It seems even broader than section 641 of title

18, which is quite broad indeed. ^^* For example, a state university

computer which is used, even in small part, to process data in con-

junction with some federally funded research project, would ap-
parently be protected by the bill. Thus, a student having no connec-

tion with any federal program might be subject to federal prosecu-
tion and fifteen years in jail for causing such a computer to print out

some obscene comment on a terminal. There is scarcely any com-
puter operation of any size which is not likely to fall under the pro-

tection of the bill. Carried to its extreme, this bill will cover a theft

of an electronic wristwatch in interstate commerce, and might even

cover running a red traffic light.^^^

Another serious problem is the bill's ambiguity regarding what
actions constitute a crime. It is common practice within computer
operations to attempt to devise ways to beat the system, cause it to
"crash," or obtain data to which they are not entitled. Some com-
puter operations tolerate such antics, even though the consequences

can be annoying, because it helps them locate and correct security
flaws. It is virtually standard practice as well, particularly with

university systems, for students to play unauthorized games such as

-^^25 Cong. Rec. at S710.

^^*See notes 94-100 supra and accompanying text. The Senate Criminal Justice Sub-

committee's version submitted to the full Senate Committee on the Judiciary now
"covers all computers used by the federal government, by financial institutions or in

interstate commerce." DP Crime Bill, supra note 134, at 2, col. 2. This version is still
very broad.

^^^An automated traffic light, particularly one which is attached to a computer

which counts cars and times the cycle of red and green, is part of a computer system

as defined by this bill. If the traffic light controls traffic on a heavily traveled in-

terstate route, it is arguably operating in interstate commerce. Absurd as it may
seem, a driver who runs a red light could be charged with unauthorized access to, or
alteration of, the system. The Senate Subcommittee which considered S.240 did try to
make some changes that addressed some of these problems. See note 152 supra.



710 INDIANA LA WREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

"Star Trek," print "Snoopy" calendars or pictures of the Mona Lisa,
compile statistics for bowling leagues, or do other jobs that the

rules of the system definitely forbid. These rules, however, are vir-

tually unenforceable, and abuses are sometimes winked at to en-

courage students to gain greater experience in the use of the com-

puter. Punishment of a $50,000 fine and fifteen years in jail for such

pranks clearly seems excessive. ^^^ It is also doubtful that the bill

could survive a constitutional challenge on the grounds of

vagueness.

B. The Arizona Statute

The definition of the relevant computer-related terminology in
the Arizona statute^^^ is quite similar to that of Senate bill 240 and

thus suffers from the same defects. The main body of the legislation
creates a new crime, computer fraud:

A. A person commits computer fraud ... by accessing,
altering, damaging or destroying without authorization any
computer, computer system, computer network, . . . with the

intent to devise or execute any scheme or artifice to defraud
or deceive, or control property or services by means of false
or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.

B. A person commits computer fraud ... by intentionally
and without authorization accessing, altering, damaging or
destroying any computer, computer system or computer net-
work or any computer software, program or data contained
in such computer, computer system or computer network.^^*

Although the scope of this statute is not quite as broad as the
Senate bill, it suffers from many of the same ailments. It is not clear
what acts are specifically forbidden, and the Arizona Attorney
General has admitted that student use of computer time without
authorization would be a violation. He would rely on prosecutorial
discretion to avoid abuse of the law.^^^ As was the case with Senate
bill 240, the law does not seem to make unauthorized copying of a
program a crime under many common circumstances.

The Arizona law suffers from yet another defect. Some of the
terms in the new law are defined in pre-existing statutes. The com-

'*^he latest version of the bill (amended in subcommittee) reduced the penalties to

a fine "of two times the amount lost or $50,000, whichever is higher and/or five years

in jail," to bring them into line with the federal wire and mail fraud statutes. DP
Crime Bill, supra note 152, at 2, col. 2.

'"Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2316 (1978).

^^^Hearings, supra note 6, at 143.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 711

puter fraud statute speaks of the "intent to . . . control property ."^*°

In section 13-1801, which deals with definitions related to theft,

"control" is defined as an act by a defendant which excludes an

owner from using his property except on the defendant's own
terms.^*^ In stealing a copy of a program for personal use, an actor
would not control the program in this sense. Arizona courts will

have to determine whether the new law has actually extended the
notion of control.

C The Florida Statute

Florida has chosen to use definitions similar to those proposed

by the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the largest
organization of computer professionals in the world.^®^ "Computer" is
defined in the Florida Crimes Act^^^ as "an internally programmed,
automatic device that performs data processing."^*^ Similar to the

ACM definition, the definition is, unfortunately, not the same. It ob-
viates the "electronic" limitation of Senate bill 240, but it lacks the

important provision of "general purpose." Thus, it appears that

Florida law could also find computer crime in unlikely places such as

wristwatches. The Florida law defines three categories of offenses:
offenses against intellectual property, offenses against computer

equipment and supplies, and offenses against computer users. ^^^

Offenses against intellectual property include knowing and
unauthorized modification, alteration, or destruction of programs,

data, or supporting documentation, as well as the taking ^f

computer-related documents which are trade secrets.^*® Presumably,
this latter category would include the unauthorized taking of a copy

of a secret program. Offenses against computer equipment include
taking, injuring, or damaging the tangible objects associated with a
computer system.^®^ The heart of the section on offenses against
computer users is the following paragraph:

Whoever willfully, knowingly, and without authorization ac-
cesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer sys-
tem, or computer network; or whoever willfully, knowingly,
and without authorization denies or causes the denial of com-

puter system services, . . . which, in whole or part, is owned

'""Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2316 (1978).
''Ud. § 13-1801.
1621
^Hearings, supra note 6, at 136.

'"Tla. Stat. §§ 815.01-.07 (Supp. 1979).

''*Id. § 815.03(3).

"Yd. §§ 815.04-.06.

'""Id. § 815.04.

"7d. § 815.05.



712 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

by, under contract to, or operated for, on behalf of, or in con-

junction with another commits an offense against computer

users/®*

In its attempt to define and address computer abuse and to ad-

dress special computer-related questions which are not likely to be

answered by existing law, the Florida statute is unquestionably the

best of the three laws considered. Knowing and willful alteration of
the program of another so that it will not run is a crime under
Florida law. One need not argue the value of the damage done, the
cost of correcting the damage, or whether the owner was deprived
of control. The alteration can be prosecuted as an offense against in-
tellectual property.

An ideal computer abuse bill should be general and flexible
enough to lend itself to rapidly exploding computer technology and

new uses to which computers might be put, yet narrow enough to
exclude watches, traffic signals and pocket calculators. It should ad-

dress those special questions that computers raise without un-

necessarily infringing on areas already covered by existing legisla-

tion. Finally, it should specify exactly which acts constitute crimes

under the law and which do not.

At least two approaches are possible. The first is to draft
statutes which expand common law notions of property and asporta-
tion, at least in the case of computer-related items, to enable acts of

computer abuse to be treated under existing penal statutes. The sec-
ond alternative is to draft laws specifically creating new offenses
related to computer abuse. The advantage of the first approach, of
course, is that it takes advantage of existing law, law with which

courts and attorneys have already had experience. The following is
a suggested example of this type of statute: For purposes of applica-
tion of any statute in which the taking of, or damage to, property is
an essential element, property shall include computer programs,
whether internal or external to, a computer. A computer program
will have been asported or taken if an unauthorized copy is made, it
being sufficient that the copy, if not reduced to tangible form, is em-

bodied internal to a computer system, even though the owner of the
program thus copied remains in possession and control of his
original. If the value of such program asported is to be established,
it shall be the commercial value of the program as established by ex-
pert witness.

As an example of model legislation embodying the second ap-
proach, this writer recommends the Florida statute slightly modified
by using the ACM definitions throughout. ^^^

''^Id § 815.06.

"The ACM definitions are given in Hearings, supra note 6, at 54. The relevant
portions of the Florida legislation are reprinted. Id. at 136-38.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 713

IV. Indiana Law

A. The Case of John Thommen

A recent Indiana case^^° dealt with virtually all of the legal
issues raised by computer abuse. The defendant, John Thommen,
was convicted of theft, which the Indiana Code defines as
"unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent

to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use."^^^

John Thommen was a statistician in the Indiana Department of
Mental Health. Because of the nature of his work, he was given one
of a limited number of TSO (time-sharing option) terminals in use on
the Indiana Central Data Processing Network. TSO terminals per-
mit the user to modify programs he is running as well as receive

data. Central Data Processing (CDP) ran two IBM 370/168 computers
in tandem and served more than fifty state agencies, including the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, various licensing and registration boards,
and the Department of Public Welfare.

Because so many different agencies used the same network,
there was an operating systems program which was designed to pre-
vent any user from obtaining access to any file or program to which
his job did not entitle him. Because Thommen had a TSO terminal
and was able to obtain the name of this systems program and the
special program which enabled him to print a copy, he was able to
modify the program to permit him to access any program or file of
any kind anywhere on the system. Thommen kept an altered version
of the security program in his own files. When he wanted to access
files which the original security program would not have permitted
him to have, he replaced that security program with his own, obtained
the files or information he wanted, and then reinserted the correct

security program into the system. Anyone checking the security
program, except during those times when he had his own version in
operation, would have found nothing amiss.

Thommen's duties for the Department of Mental Health included
generating reports and creating statistical data. He had no program-
ming responsibilities, and he certainly did not have authorization
from his superiors to embark on a full-scale exploration of CDP. As

''"State V. Thommen, No. 79-424B (Crim. Ct. Marion Co. Feb. 14,' 1980).
'"Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) (Supp. 1979). Most of the information concerning the case

of John Thommen was gained in a two hour interview on March 6, 1980, with Sgt.
James Smith of the State Police Data Processing Section, who was the principal in-
vestigator on the Thommen case. Sgt. Smith also allowed the author to read in his of-
fice certain reports written as a result of his investigation. State Police regulations

prevented the author from removing this material from Sgt. Smith's office or making

copies. See Statistician Convicted in Computer Case, The Indianapolis Star, Feb. 14,

1980, at 26, col. 1.



714 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

a computer user in the Indiana CDP network, he had been assigned
an identification code (ID) which identified him and his department,

and which also permitted the system to keep track, to a limited ex-

tent, of how much he used the computer and what programs he used.
The ID also served as the key in the security program to determine

what files or programs he could legitimately access. Whenever
Thommen's ID was used to "log on" to the system, CDP automati-
cally made a record of it. There was, however, no means of confirm-
ing that it was Thommen personnally who was using that ID, or that
Thommen at times was not actually doing computer work under
someone else's ID. There was not even a way to determine which
terminal was being used under Thommen's ID or where it was

located. This, of course, presented a serious identification problem in

trying to tie Thommen to any illegal computer uses. Anyone familiar
with Thommen's ID and certain other easily accessible information

could have been using the system as well as he.

Again, the fact that something was amiss was discovered com-
pletely by chance. Each user in the CDP network is assigned a sup-
port team, essentially a group of consultants. One member of a sup-
port team visiting the Department of Mental Health was helping
Thommen with a problem with one of his statistical programs when
the support team member happened to notice a "print-out" lying in
plain view on Thommen's desk; the print-out, the consultant realized,
was of a highly confidential security program to which even the con-
sultant did not have access.

The consultant reported his discovery to his superior, who was
equally surprised to find that Thommen had a copy of such a
restricted program. They were not yet aware of the extent to which
Thommen had actually compromised what security there was in
their network or how much unauthorized use Thommen had made of
files to which he supposedly had no access.

The State Police were called in to investigate the irregularities,
although Thommen did not, at that time, realize that his activities
were attracting attention. The investigation was conducted primarily
by Sgt. James Smith of the Data Processing Division of the Indiana
State Police. Compiling evidence took literally hundreds of hours of

Sgt. Smith's time because he had to familiarize himself with the

CDP system as well as print and sift through volumes of computer
print-outs concerning terminal and computer usage involving Thom-
men's ID and other IDs used in the Department of Mental Health.
The investigation was also complicated by the fact that CDP had no
adequate method of keeping track of computer usage. Smith had to
meticulously cull through piles of records to find what accesses had
been made on Thommen's ID and what particular systems programs



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 715

or files were called during that access. If the program or file called

had no relationship to Thommen's work, it was considered an
unauthorized access. More than 3,700 such unauthorized accesses
were found. Sgt. Smith estimated that Thommen was spending at
least twenty percent of his working time dealing with material

which was not related to his job functions with the Department of
Mental Health. Sgt. Smith's investigation continued from May 27,
1978, until May 4, 1979, when CDP, alarmed at the potential conse-
quences of Thommen's manipulations of their system, invalidated his
access code. Denial of access to the computer alerted Thommen that
he was under investigation. He was then able to destroy whatever
*'hard copy" evidence there may have been to link him with the
abuses with which he was later formally charged. Any chance of
determining exactly what modifications Thommen had made in the
computer system, or what, if any, personal gain he had received

from his efforts were lost.
The prosecutor seeking an indictment and later a conviction

against Thommen was faced with important problems of evidence
and procedure. In the first place, it was impossible to determine
whether Thommen had used the computer to take money. Thommen
had accessed a highly sensitive program in the Department of Public
Welfare which was designed to make payments automatically to
qualified individuals and services. He also had the capability to
make the computer issue checks to fictitious accounts, an action
almost impossible to detect with the audit procedures then in use.^'^

The prosecutor tried to frame an indictment so that if theft of funds
was discovered later, prosecution would not be barred by double
jeopardy. This problem was solved by charging Thommen with theft
of computer time, specifically, nine separate instances of unau-
thorized access to programs.^^^

There was the additional problem of tying Thommen to the
unauthorized uses. All that was known initially was that someone
somewhere, using Thommen's ID, was using the computer. There
was no direct evidence that the person using Thommen's ID was

"''C/. Fraud Scheme at SSA Office Nets $500,000, Computerworld. Mar. 3, 1980,
at 1, col. 1 (computer fraud involving Social Security disability claims).

"*One of these counts was based on playing computer games; the remainder were
based on more substantial activities. Sgt. Smith reported receiving several phone calls
from local industry complaining that the Thommen conviction might unduly frighten
computer operators who had indulged in such relatively innocuous activities as game
playing on the company computer. Sgt. Smith indicated that no prosecutions for such
activity were planned and that the Thommen case was unusual because of the scope of
the abuse involved. Interview with Sgt. James Smith, Indiana State Police Data Pro-
cessing Section, in Indianapolis (Mar. 6, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Interview].



716 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

Thommen. Thommen solved this problem for the prosecution by ad-
mitting that he was the unauthorized user of the computer during

the times in issue. He claimed, however, that he was merely
sharpening his skills and that he had never been given any instruc-

tions as to what he could or could not do with the computer. If

Thommen had not admitted he was the one who made improper use
of the computer, it may have been impossible to convict him.

One of the most serious evidentiary problems was the highly
technical nature of the evidence.^^^ Persons who are not knowledge-
able in computer use may find it hard to understand why, if Thom-
men could *'caH" certain files stored in the computer, he could not
look at certain other files. ^^° The swapping in and out of the com-
puter's operating system of the program which allowed Thommen to
read files to which he should not have had access was used to prove
intent. Also relevant was Thommen's effort to hide what he was do-
ing until he was finally confronted by the police.

The Indiana Criminal Code states: *'A person who knowingly or
intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another

person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its

value or use commits theft, a Class D felony ."^^^ Because Thommen
did not have permission to access the files he dealt with or to

engage in programming apart from his statistical analyses in con-
junction with his job, his actions constituted unauthorized control

over property of the State of Indiana.^^^ A more difficult question
was the value of what was taken. Because only nine of some 3,000
unauthorized accesses were in issue, most of the exhaustive analysis
that Sgt. Smith had done to try to put a value on the total work
time and computer usage devoted to non-work-related activities was
held inadmissible. The prosecution did manage to convince the jury
that something of value was taken.^^®

In his defense, Thommen argued that there were no explicit

"*Even the judge commented that the testimony was so technical that he "had

trouble following it." The Indianapolis Star, supra note 171, at 26.
"^Could a public library restrict a patron to books on specific shelves? Could it pros-

ecute him for looking at books on the forbidden shelves?

"«lND. Code § 35-43-4-2(a) (Supp. 1979).

"'State V. Thommen, No. 79-424B (Crim. Ct. Marion Co. Feb. 14, 1980). Sgt. Smith
indicated that neither the prosecution nor the defense seemed to have been aware of

that section of the Indiana Code that defines "unauthorized." Interview, supra note

173. Unauthorized control is defined as control exerted, inter alia, "(1) without the

other person's consent; (2) in a manner or to an extent other than that to which the

other person has consented." Ind. Code § 35-43-4-l(b) (Supp. 1979).

"'State V. Thommen, No. 79-424B (Crim. Ct. Marion Co. Feb. 14, 1980). Note that
the statute in question does not require proof of a specific value, only that the object

has some value. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (Supp. 1979).



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 111

rules prohibiting his access to the files in question; that he did not

deprive the State of anything;^^^ and that what he did was job
related because it sharpened his skills as a computer operator.

Nevertheless, the jury found Thommen guilty on all nine counts. ^®°

The implications of this case for Indiana's CDP, and other com-
puter systems, are staggering. Apart from Thommen's legal guilt or
innocence, this case demonstrated that the security of CDP, which
serves virtually all State agencies and offices, was so weak that
someone at one terminal in one department could compromise the
entire system, read and alter programs and files throughout the

system at will, and even cause large sums to be paid to himself in a
manner that was all but undetectable. It showed that CDP had no
adequate means to determine who was using its system, that there
was no adequate billing procedure to determine the value of any
work done on the system, and that there were no clear rules govern-
ing the conduct of those whose jobs gave them access to the system.
There were no alarms that alerted authorities when a user accessed
a particularly sensitive program, and no way to check whether any
of the systems programs or files stored in the system had been

altered. Sgt. Smith voiced a fear that Thommen may have put a
"time bomb" into the system which will ''explode" in months by
sending him a check for $1 million. ^^^ At the present time, there is
no way to detect the existence of that time bomb.^*^

"^he CDP computer was, after all, running all of the time anyway. It could be
argued that Thommen's use of the machine really took nothing away and caused the
state no added expenses.

''"State V. Thommen, No. 79-424B (Crim. Ct. Marion Co. Feb. 14, 1980).
'"Interview, supra note 173.

''^Needless to say, the State CDP has installed far stricter security checks in the
system and taken other strong measures to prevent a repetition of the Thommen af-
fair. The following recommendations came out of the Thommen trial and some have
already been implemented:

1) There must be better communication between the users of the system and

manufacturers of software for the system, that is, CDP. A more formal and reliable
procedure must be established between CDP and the user for passing on vital informa-
tion.

2) All terminal operators must be given a formal interview in which they are

given a detailed description of their job and the scope of access they are to have

within the system. They should be required to sign an agreement indicating that they
have been given this knowledge and that they realize the penalties for refusing to

abide by it.

3) There must be a better billing system for the network so that accurate records

can be kept of how much use each department and user is making of the network, and
for what purposes the computer is being used.

4) All areas of sensitive information must be protected from shared access.

5) CDP must closely monitor systems usage and notify appropriate authorities
promptly when something happens that is suspect.



718 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

The Thommen case is undoubtedly one of the more complex and
interesting instances of computer abuse in recent years. It is

frightening to consider what Thommen could have done in the way
of personal gain or damage to records which are vital to the govern-
ment of Indiana. It is not known, however, how much he really did.
He may even have performed a substantial service by alerting the
State to the ease with which the CDP network on which it had
become so dependent could be compromised. A future Thommen will
find the work much more difficult; it is doubtful that he will find it
impossible.

There are interesting questions which could have arisen in the

Thommen case but did not; they could easily arise in a later case.
First, if Thommen had not confessed, it may have been impossible to
tie him to the unauthorized use of computer time. All that was
known was that someone using Thommen's ID had done certain
things. It was also known that Thommen had occasionally used
someone else's ID; such a practice is not unknown in computer usage
and there are sometimes good reasons for it. The computer had no
means of tracing a use under Thommen's ID to Thommen's terminal.

Second, if Thommen had stored evidence in a small home com-
puter linked to CDP computing by a telephone line, another problem
would have been created. The evidence that could have been glean-
ed from use records available directly from CDP would have been
entirely circumstantial and could not have linked Thommen directly
to the abuses. Could CDP have "searched" Thommen's home com-
puter without a search warrant sometime when Thommen was link-
ed to the CDP machine; that is, could the State have used the same
vehicle to read Thommen's computer files stored in his own com-
puter at home that Thommen was using to read State files, or would
a search warrant have been required?^®^ The answers to these ques-
tions are not clear, but they are certain to arise in some future case.

6) All CDP users, such as the Department of Mental Health, must know and
periodically review the rules of the computer network. When Thommen was com-
promising the network, many users did not have any idea what was or was not permit-
ted, even according to law.

7) All CDP users must assume strict responsibility for monitoring the computer
use of those who work for them. One reason that Thommen was able to do so much
questionable work was that no one was checking on him to see what he was doing. It

was purely by accident, and because Thommen was careless, that his unauthorized
altering of the systems security program was detected. Interview, supra note 173.

There remains as well the question of what effect federal wire tap legislation, 18

U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970), might have on these issues. This question is beyond the

scope of this Article.

'^'Associate Professor Henry Karlson of Indiana University School of Law—
Indianapolis proposes as an alternative that an authorized copy be considered owned

by the owner of the original from which the copy was made.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 719

B. Recommendations

If Thommen's conviction is upheld on appeal under theories
which are genuine tests of Indiana's criminal code, if CDP is careful
to plug the huge gaps in security through which John Thommen
wandered almost at will, if other computer users are also security
conscious, and if new technology presents no problems beyond those
covered in the current criminal code, then Indiana may not require
special legislation dealing with computer crime. If, however, new
legislation is called for, the author has made suggestions in the ap-
pendices to this Article.

The proposed statutory revisions in Appendix A build upon the
current Indiana Code by adding certain computer-related concepts

to the definition of property that may be subject to coversion. Ap-
pendix B, on the other hand, contains a new section that deals
specifically with computer crime. John Thommen was convicted
because the jury was convinced that he took ''something of value,"
but the actual value was never shown. Someone who "practices"
computer skills by printing a Snoopy calendar also takes something

of value in the same sense that Thommen did. Under current law,
both are equally subject to prosecution. Appendix B takes into ac-
count the special nature of computer abuses and classifies them ap-
propriately.

Computer crime is the crime of the future that is rapidly becom-
ing the crime of the present. Its limits are bounded only by the size
and speed of the machines and the skill and imagination of those

who use them to subvert the law. The Thommen case indicates the
scope of the problem. The alternative to ignoring the problem is to
leave both government and industry, as well as the general public,
open to theft on a scale that dwarfs all previous forms of white col-

lar crime and to losses that must become an intolerable burden for
society to bear.



720 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

Appendix A

Proposed amendments to existing sections of the Indiana
Criminal Code, IND. CODE tit. 35, (1976 & Supp. 1979), which might
clarify certain issues involving computer crime include the items

listed below. The additions are italicized.
In § 35-41-1-2: "Property" means anything of value; and includes,

but is not limited to, a gain or advantage or service or anything that

might reasonably be regarded as such by the beneficiary ....

Add to § 35-41-1-2: The ''value " of any property shall be its com-
mercial value, reasonable retail value or cost of production,

whichever is greatest.

In § 35-43-4-l(a): As used in this chapter, "exert control over prop-
erty" means to obtain, take, copy, alter, carry, drive ... or extend a
right to property. If property is copied or altered, control is exerted

through the act of copying or altering, and it is not required that

the actor in such an instance exclude the property in question from
the possession, control, or use of its owner. A copy or alteration
need not be tangible if such copy or altered property may be re-
duced to tangible form.

Add to the definition of "credit card" in § 35-43-5-1: This defini-
tion shall be construed to include account numbers, project

numbers, passwords or similar signs, symbols or devices by which

the holder gains access to goods or services or other property, in-

cluding, but not limited to, the use of computer services, computer

programs, files or data, in any medium.

With the above proposed clarifications and additions, the follow-
ing sections may be used to combat computer crime:

35-43-1-2 (criminal mischief)

35-43-4-2 (theft)

35-43-4-3 (criminal conversion)

35-43-5-4 (fraud)

Other sections such as 35-43-2-2 (criminal trespass) and 35-44-3-4

(tampering) may also be applicable in certain situations.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 721

Appendix B

The following is offered as a possible additional section to the
Indiana Criminal Code to deal specifically with various forms of com-

puter abuse. It is modeled after the Florida statute.

As used in this section, unless the context clearly indicates
otherwise:

"Intellectual property" means data including programs.
"Computer program" means an ordered set of data representing

coded instruction or statements that when executed by a computer
cause the computer to process data.

"Computer" means an internally-programmed, general purpose,
automatic device that performs data processing.

"Computer software" means a set of computer programs, pro-
cedures, and associated documentation concerned with the operation

of a computer system.

"Computer system" means a set of related, connected or uncon-
nected, computer equipment, devices, or computer software.

"Computer network" means a set of related, remotely connected
devices and communications facilities including more than one com-
puter system with capability to transmit data among them through
communications channels.

"Computer system services" means providing a computer
system or computer network to perform useful work.

"Property" means anything of value as defined in section
35-41-1-1, and includes, but is not limited to, financial instruments,

information, including electronically reproduced data and computer

software and programs in either machine or human readable form,
or any other tangible or intangible item of value.

"Financial instrument" means any check, draft, money order,
certificate of deposit, letter of credit, bill of exchange, credit card,

or marketable security.

"Access" means to approach, instruct, communicate with, store
data in, retrieve data from, or otherwise make use of any resource
of a computer, computer system, or computer network.

The "value" of property is its commercial value, reasonable
retail value, or cost of production, whichever is greatest. The assess-
ment of "value of damage" to property is determined by the cost of
restoring the property to its condition immediately prior to being

damaged.

Offenses against intellectual property —

1) Whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization
modifies data, programs, or supporting documentation residing or
existing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or
computer network commits an offense against intellectual property.



722 INDIANA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:681

2) Whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization
destroys data, programs, or supporting documentation residing or

existing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or

computer network commits an offense against intellectual property.

3) Whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization
discloses or takes data, programs, or supporting documentation

which is a trade secret, or is confidential as provided by law,

residing or existing internal or external to a computer, computer

system, or computer network commits an offense against intellectual

property.

4) An offense against intellectual property is a Class B misde-
meanor. However, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor if the value
of the property acted upon is at least two hundred fifty dollars

($250) but less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500), and a
Class D felony if (i) the value of the property acted upon is at least
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500), (ii) the damage causes a
substantial interruption or impairment of utility service rendered to

the public, (iii) the owner of the property is a bank or financial in-
stitution, or (iv) the offense involves property which is confidential

as a matter of law.

Offenses against computer equipment or supplies —
1) Whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization

modifies equipment or supplies used or intended to be used in a
computer, computer system or computer network commits an of-
fense against computer equipment or supplies.

2) An offense against computer equipment or supplies is a
Class B misdemeanor. However, this offense is a Class A misde-
meanor if the cost of restoring the equipment or supplies to their
condition immediately prior to modification is at least two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) but less than two thousand five hundred dollars

($2500), and a Class D felony if (i) the cost of restoration is at least
two thousand five hundred dollars ($2500), (ii) the modification
causes a substantial interruption or impairment of utility service

rendered to the public, (iii) the equipment or supplies belong to a
financial institution or bank, or health care facility, or (iv) the

modification poses an unreasonable danger to other property or to

human life.
3) Whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization

destroys, takes, injures, or damages equipment or supplies used or
intended to be used in a computer, computer system, or computer
network; or whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization
destroys, injures or damages any computer, computer system, or
computer network commits an offense against computer equipment
or supplies.



1980] COMPUTER CRIME 723

4) The penalties for the offense described in (3) shall be the
same as those described in (4) of the section concerning offenses
against intellectual property.

Offenses against computer users —
1) Whoever willfully, knowingly and without authorization ac-

cesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or

computer network; or whoever willfully, knowingly and without
authorization denies or causes to be denied computer system ser-

vices to an authorized user of such computer system services, which,

in whole or part, is owned by, under contract to, or operated for, on
behalf of, or in conjunction with another commits an offense against

computer users.

2) An offense against computer users is a Class B misde-
meanor. However, this offense is a Class D felony if (i) the act causes
a substantial interruption or impairment of utility service rendered

to the public, (ii) interferes with the operation of a bank, financial in-

stitution, or health care facility, or (iii) involves an intent to devise

or execute any scheme to obtain by fraud property the value of
which exceeds one thousand dollars ($1000).

Chapter not exclusive — Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
preclude the applicability of any other provision of the criminal law
of this state which presently applies or may in the future apply to
any transaction which violates this chapter, unless such provision is

inconsistent with the terms of this chapter.

If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any per-

son or circumstance is held invalid, it is the legislative intent that

the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the

act which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or ap-

plications, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared

severable.