Indiana Law Review


Indiana Law Review
Volume 27 1994 Number 3

ARTICLES

Cooperative Dissent:
Dissenting Shareholder Rights in Agricultural

Cooperatives

David C. Crago*

Introduction

Corporate law has long recognized the right of dissenting shareholders to

obtain the appraisal of their shares upon the occurrence of certain extraordinary

events in the life of the corporation. ' Stock holders in agricultural coopera-

tives,^ however, have consistently been denied this protection. Although

courts^ and commentators'* have asserted several justifications for different

treatment of cooperative shareholders, none of the arguments sufficiently

distinguish corporate cooperatives from other corporate forms of business so

as to justify denying their shareholders the same protection available to all

other shareholders. There is no analytical basis for treating cooperative

corporations differently from other corporations. Thus, shareholders in

cooperatives should be able to obtain appraisal of their shares under the same

circumstances that trigger appraisal rights in other corporations.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University. A.B., 1974, Duke University;

J.D., 1977, University of Michigan. I wish to thank my research assistants for 1992-93, Amy
Austin, Jeff Buckley and Kim Wyss, for their diligence and effort.

1. All jurisdictions grant dissenters' rights in merger situations. Other transactions which

generally trigger appraisal rights are compulsory share exchanges, the sale or exchange of assets

other than in the regular course of business, and when certain enumerated amendments to the

articles are adopted. Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Appraisal Remedy, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

829, 831-33 (1984) (footnotes omitted).

2. Cooperatives can be organized either as a corporation or an unincorporated association.

The analysis contained in this article is limited to corporate cooperatives. Many variations on
equity investment, however, have been developed by cooperatives. See Terence J. Centner,

Cooperatives: A Search for Equitable Relieffrom the Equity Redemption Problem, 7 J. of Agric.

Tax'n & L., 120, 136-38 (1985).
3. See, e.g., Pearson v. Clam Falls Coop. Dairy Ass'n, 10 N.W.2d 132 (Wis. 1943);

Weise v. Land O' Lakes Creameries, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1971) (dictum); Denes v.

Countrymark, Inc., 580 N.E.2d 1135 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).

4. Kathryn J. Sedo, Cooperative Mergers and Consolidations: A Consideration of the

Legal and Tax Issues, 63 N.D. L. Rev. 377, 397-400 (1987).



496 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

I. The Structure of Corporate Cooperatives

Cooperatives began as creatures of state law^ and remain so today/

Initially, cooperatives were viewed as implementing farmers' drive of working

together to benefit all members. ^ Many of the early promoters of cooperatives
viewed them as "small groups of growers who are neighbors, who have
confidence in one another, [and] who belong to the same churches, schools, or
other neighborhood institutions."^ To these apostles of cooperation, this form

of business represented more a way of life than an economic entity.

The cooperative movement does not represent a business system alone

though it must, of course, develop the highest form of business

efficiency to justify its continuance. It involves, also, a very intimate,

human quality whose roots are deeply implanted in the social nature

of men, and whose expression leads them to work willingly and

unselfishly together.^

This understanding of cooperatives led to the adoption of several federal

statutes designed to encourage cooperatives' growth and give them special

protection.
'°

Today, cooperatives are large and sophisticated. Instead of "the small

local farmer organizations generally prevalent in the 1920's, many cooperatives

have evolved and consolidated into large regional, national, and international

business organizations."" The largest agricultural cooperatives now exceed
$1 billion in annual sales,'^ and frequently engage in complex business

5. See, e.g., Mass. St., 1866, c. 290; Pa. Public Laws 1868, Act. 62; Ohio Laws, 1884,

p. 54; Kansas, Laws 1887 c. 116; Raymond J. Mischler, Agricultural Cooperative Law, 30 Rocky

Mtn. L. Rev. 381, 381-83 (1957).

6. James R. Baarda, U.S. Dep't ofAgric, Cooperative Principles and Statutes, ACS Rep't
30, at 5-9; 15-18 (1986). For a brief synopsis of federal statutory efforts to encourage

cooperatives, see Wendy Moser, Selective Issues Facing Cooperatives: Can the Customer Continue

to be the Company?, 31 S.D. L. REV. 394, 395-96 (1986).

7. Frost V. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515, 536-37 (1929) (Brandeis,
J. dissenting).

8. National Agricultural Conference, H.R. Doc. No. 195, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1922).

9. Id. at 78.

10. Terence J. Centner, Legislative Provisions for Agricultural Cooperatives: Adjusting

to Changed Circumstances, 33 Drake L. Rev. 325, 325-27 (1984). See also Fairdale Farms, Inc.

V. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1040-44 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981),

and cert, denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).

11. Centner, supra note 10, at 327.

12. At least a dozen agricultural cooperatives were included in a Fortune article on the

500 largest industrial corporations in the United States. Fortune's 500 Largest U.S. Industrial

Corporations, Fortune, April 20, 1992, at 212-42. All twelve of these cooperatives had sales in

excess of $500 million with the four largest (Farmland Industries: $3,652 billion; Agway $3,490
billion; Land O'Lakes: $2,458 billion; and Mid-America Dairymen $1,742 billion) exceeding one

and a half billion dollars in sales.



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 497

arrangements with non-cooperative corporations.'"' Much of this growth has
been the result of mergers and acquisitions of other cooperatives. '"* With vast

amounts of equity,'^ large market shares,'^ and professional management,

today's cooperatives are quite similar to other corporations.'^

A cooperative is, in its broadest sense, merely a voluntary "organization
designed to carry on any lawful business for the benefit of its members."'*

Because most cooperatives are organized as corporations, they can only be

distinguished from other corporations by virtue of certain operating con-

cepts.'^ The principles most commonly thought to distinguish corporate

cooperatives from other corporations are: (1) democratic control by members,

(2) "non-profit" nature, and (3) returns based on patronage, not investment.
^°

13. See Myron J. Fleck, Cooperatives—Accounting and Tax Developments, 1 1 J. of Agric.
Tax'n & L. 86 (1989); John D. Reilly, An Overview of the Use of Subsidiaries by Agricultural
Cooperatives, 13 J. OF AGRIC. & Tax'n & LAW 197 (1991).

14. The process of consolidation has been ongoing for several decades. See Mischler,

supra note 5, at 383. The number of cooperatives have been steadily declining while their

business volume has been steadily increasing. The total number of marketing, farm supply, and

related service cooperatives declined from 6,211 in 1981 to 4,663 in 1990. Agricultural

Cooperative Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric, 1990 Farmer Cooperative Statistics 4-5 (1991).

15. Robert C. Rathbone, U.S. Dept. of Agric, Cooperative Financing and Taxation, ACS
Report 1, § 9, at 3-4 (1991). In 1990, the combined net worth, or member and patron equity, of

farmer cooperatives exceeded $13 billion. Agricultural Cooperative Service, supra note 14,

at 43.

16. See, e.g., Alexander v. National Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1192 (8th Cir. 1982),

cert, denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); Fairdale Farms, Inc., 635 F.2d at 1041. Indeed, the creation

of large market shares for cooperatives has been viewed by some courts as both a goal of

government policy and as a necessity by cooperatives. Id. at 1040-44. The effect of this growth

in market share, however, can be the creation of oligopolistic markets where agricultural producers

have little choice but to use cooperatives. Centner, supra note 2, at 123.

17. Douglas Fee & Allan C. Hoberg, Potential Liability of Directors of Agricultural
Cooperatives, 37 Ark. L. Rev. 60, 61 (1984).

18. General Principles and Problems ofCooperatives: An Introduction, 1954 Wis. L. Rev.

533; see also Farmer Cooperative Service, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Legal Phases of
Former Coop., at 2 (1976).

19. Mischler, supra note 5, at 383; General Principles and Problems, supra note 18, at

534; some of the large cooperatives have "emasculated" these cooperative principles. Centner,

supra note 10, at 327. The diminished significance of these principles in today's cooperatives has

been cause for alarm among some observers. See Neil D. Hamilton, Cooperative Member

Relations and Members ' Rights in Retained Equity—Setoffs and Other Approaches, 6 J. of Agic
Tax'n & L. 603, 620 App. A (1984). To the extent that these organizations ignore these
principles, the entity is indistinguishable from other types of corporations and there can be no

justification for denying appraisal rights.

20. Mischler, supra note 5, at 383; Mary Beth Matthews, Recent Developments in the Law
Regarding Agricultural Cooperatives, 68 N.D. L. Rev. 273 (1992); RICHARD L. KOHLS & JOSEPH
N. Uhl, Marketing of Agricultural Products 226 (7th ed. 1985). Henry W. Ballantine,
Cooperative Marketing Associations, 8 MiNN. L.R. 1, 4 (1923). The Internal Revenue Service has

also focused on these criteria to define corporations that are "operating on a cooperative basis" so



498 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

These operating principles, however, do not change the fundamental corporate

nature of a cooperative organized with capital stock?'

Corporate cooperatives are organized as any other corporation.^^ Each

cooperative has a board of directors, officers, and employees who handle the
cooperative's business affairs. Cooperatives' capital structure generally

includes both voting and non-voting common stock. ^' As in other corporate
enterprises, holders of voting stock vote on a board of directors. ^"^ In

cooperatives, the board of directors make all decisions as to matters of policy

and as to any substantial matter outside the routine affairs of the coopera-

tive.^^ The stockholders of a cooperative have little or involvement with the

day-to-day management of the cooperative.^^

Not only are cooperative corporations structured as other corporations,

they are also generally treated as general corporations for purposes of

as to allow it to take advantage of favorable tax treatment of its earnings. I.R.C. § 1381(a)(2)

(1992) and Treas. Reg. § 1.521-1 (1965). See generally Reilly, supra note 13, at 202-05; Robert

J. Lamont, Farmers' Cooperatives: Obtaining and Maintaining the Tax Exempt Status of Section

521, 53 N.D. L. Rev. 519 (1977).

21. Schoenburg v. Klappemick, 300 N.W. 237, 239 (1941).

22. State laws regulating the organization of cooperatives lack the general uniformity

present in most state corporation statutes. See Centner, supra note 10, at 330-32. In 1936 a

"Uniform Agricultural Cooperative Association Act" was adopted the Commissioners on Uniform

State Laws. The Act received little acceptance and was withdrawn seven years later. Handbook

ofthe National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 289-309 (1936); Handbook
OF THE National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 66 (1943). The

incorporation of the general corporation law by most state cooperative statutes, however,

minimizes this problem of lack of uniformity to some extent. See infra note 42 and accompanying

text.

23. Wisconsin's cooperative statute exemplifies the typical capital stock provisions:

(2) A cooperative organized with capital stock may issue the amount of
stock stated in its articles. Such stock may be divided into 2 or more classes

with such designations, preferences, limitations, and relative rights as shall

be stated in the articles, except that:

(a) Stock as such has no voting power . . . ;

(b) Stock without par value shall not be authorized or issued;

(c) The rate of dividends upon stock shall not exceed 8% of its par value for
any year, but dividends may be cumulative.

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 185.21(2) (West 1992).

24. Shareholders in the cooperative elect the board of directors, who manage the

corporation by determining corporate policy and appointing officers to execute such policy.

Separation of ownership (in the shareholders) and management (in the board of directors and

officers), is inherent the management structure of a corporation. Noble v. Farmers Union Trading

Co., 216 P.2d 925, 929 (Mont. 1950).

25. Israel Packel, The Organization and Operation of Cooperatives 129 (4th ed. 1970).

26. Id. at 1 16; Terence J. Centner, Retained Equities ofAgricultural Cooperatives and the

Federal Securities Acts, 31 U. Kan. L. Rev. 245, 270 (1983).



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 499

corporate law. For example, cooperative stockholders can bring derivative

actions on behalf of the corporation, subject only to the statutory requirements

for such actions.^^ Officers and directors of cooperatives are subject to the

same fiduciary standards imposed on other corporate officers. ^^ In other

words, despite the distinctive operating principles of cooperatives, the rules,

rights, and duties of shareholders, officers, and directors have been understood

to be governed by the same principles applicable to all corporations.

Cooperatives frequently limit both the amount of voting stock that can be

held by any one person and the holder's ability to transfer the stock.^^ This

limitation allows cooperatives to retain a semblance of the "one member—one
vote" notion that permeated early cooperatives.^^ Regardless of this limita-

tion, in the use of voting and non-voting common stock to effect control
cooperatives are no different than many other corporations.^'

Many cooperatives issue preferred stock. Preferred stock is usually non-
voting and may be held by anyone, whether a member or non-member.^^

27. See Clinton Hudson & Sons v. Lehigh Valley Coop. Farms, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 420, 428-
29 (E.D. Pa., 1977); Parish v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 242 A.2d 512,

538-46 (Md. Ct. App., 1968), qff'd after remand. 111 A.2d 19, 48 (Md. Ct. App. 1971), cert,

denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971); Fee & Hoberg, supra note 17, at 104-05. The statutes of some states
allow both member and non-member stockholders to bring derivative actions on behalf of the

cooperative. See, e.g.. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 185.93 (West 1992).

28. Parish, 111 A.2d at 48. Matthews, supra note 20, at 275; Fee & Hoberg, supra note
17, at 63-75. This result is frequently achieved by means of the incorporation of the general

corporation statute into the state's cooperative legislation. Centner, supra note 10, at 346 n.l27;

Matthews, supra note 20, at 275.

29. Packel, supra note 25, at 30. Voting and transfer restrictions are sometimes mandated

by statute. See, e.g.. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 185.21(3)(a) (West 1992); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 499.22,

499.28 (West 1991). N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-20(2) (1985). Limitations on the transferability

of stock, however, do not distinguish cooperatives from other corporations. Compare Del. Code
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 202, 342 (1991).

30. Henry H. Bakken, Principles and Their Role in the Statutes Relating to Cooperatives,

1954 Wis. L. Rev. 549, 554-56. This concept of member democracy, however, has steadily eroded

with the growth of cooperatives. Kohls & Uhl, supra note 20, at 237-38.
31. Compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 151(a) (1991). Although typically used by closely

held companies to effectuate control agreements, the use of non-voting stock became a common

takeover defense during the 1980's. Such stock has been issued by a variety of the nations largest

companies. See generally Exchange Act Release Nos. 25891 and 25891A Fed. Sec. L. Rep.

(CCH)
II 84,247, at 89,215-217 (1988).

32. Farmer Cooperative Service, supra note 18, at 31; The provisions of the Iowa statute

are indicative of the general status of cooperative law:

Preferred stock shall bear cumulative or noncumulative dividends as fixed by the

articles, not exceeding eight percent per annum. It shall have no vote. It shall be

issued and be transferable without regard to eligibility or membership, and be

redeemable on terms specified in the articles and as provided for in this chapter. The

directors shall determine the time and amount of its issue.



500 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

Although some observers have asserted that a cooperative must be wholly

owned by its members, " the ability to issue non-voting common or preferred
stock permits the cooperative to acquire capital from investors outside the

cooperative's membership.^"* The issuance of non-membership stock permits

cooperatives to raise capital based on investment motives instead of patron-

age"

While the management structure of cooperative corporations is similar to

other corporations, cooperatives can avail themselves of several capital raising

methods unavailable to non-cooperative corporations. In addition to selling

stock directly to members and outside investors, cooperatives frequently "sell"

equity to members instead of returning them cash.^^ Capital is largely

accumulated by retaining a portion of the cooperative earnings. ^^ These net

proceeds become dividends, a large percentage of which, instead of being paid

out in cash, are retained by the cooperative in order to increase capital.^^ The

retained equity reflects the patron's ownership interest in the cooperative. This

system of raising equity capital creates three possible types of cooperative

shareholders: (1) members; (2) patrons; and (3) investors.
^^ An individual

may play one, or any combination of these roles within a cooperative
corporation.^^ However, each of these relationships imposes its own
obligation on the cooperative."*'

II. APPRAISAL Rights Within the Corporate Context

The majority of state statutes authorizing the creation of cooperatives

incorporate the state's corporation law for cooperatives organized with capital

stock."*^ Included within these general corporation statutes are the provisions

Iowa Code Ann. § 499.24 (West 1991). A few states allow the use of voting preferred. See, e.g.,
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 2- 10-9 1(e) (Michie 1990).

33. General Principles and Problems of Cooperatives: An Introduction, supra note 18,
at 536.

34. Indeed this was the purpose of much of the federal legislation dealing with

cooperatives. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.

35. Compare Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56. 66-70 (1990) with B. Rosenberg &
Sons, Inc. v. St. James Sugar Coop., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d

1213 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992).

36. Note, The Patronage Rejund, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 549, 551 (1951).

37. Centner, supra note 2, at 121; Matthews, supra note 20, at 274.

38. J. W. Looney et al.. Agricultural Law 468-69 (A.B.A. 1970). Centner, supra note
2, at 122. These retained equities may be evidenced by a variety of instruments including capital

stock. I.R.C. § 1388(b) (1992); Centner, supra note 2, at 134.

39. Charles E. Nieman, Multiple Contractual Aspects ofCooperatives ' By-Laws, 39 Minn.

L. Rev. 135, 139-48 (1955); Mischler, supra note 5, at 383.

40. Nieman, supra note 39, at 147.

41. Id. at 139-48.

42. Sedo, supra note 4, at 380; Centner, supra note 2, at 121-22; Mischler, supra note 5,

at 385; Matthews, supra note 20, at 304-05.



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 501

for appraisal rights on the part of dissenting shareholders/"' Although the

events giving rise to the right to an appraisal vary widely among the

statutes/'* every state provides this remedy for certain enumerated events/^

Dissenters' rights developed as a means of resolving the conflict between

the need for corporate management to have the ability to engage in transac-

tions affecting both the nature and character of the corporation and the early

common law rule that "unanimous shareholder consent was a prerequisite to
fundamental changes in the corporation.'"*^ The common law view was
predicated upon the belief that the corporate charter was contractual in nature

and that a merger or other fundamental change, without unanimous shareholder

approval, constituted a contract modification without the shareholder's

consent.''^ The law assumed "that the stockholder had purchased a portion

43. Only four states expressly provide appraisal rights for dissenting cooperative

shareholders. See Iowa Code Ann. § 499.65 (West 1991); MONT. CODE Ann. § 35-16-21 1 (1991);
Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-39 (1988); Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 1061 (1984). In all other
states, dissenting shareholder rights must be gleaned from the general corporation laws. Several

states do provide for appraisal of a member's equity interests upon withdrawal from the

cooperative. See, e.g., COLO. REV. Stat. §§ 7-55-103 (1986); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1609

(1988). Even these statutes, however, have been interpreted to make payment of the value of the

member's stock discretionary with the board of the cooperative. See Claassen v. Farmers Grain

Coop., 490 P.2d 376, 380 (Kan. 1971). These statutes also often provide that the Z>oa/-<i determines

the value of the equity. Moreover, they explicitly only apply to members. As a result, persons

who are only patrons or investors {See Nieman, supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text) are

excluded from these statutes' protection.

44. One commentator recently summarized the status of appraisal statutes by concluding

"[t]here are almost as many varieties of appraisal statutes as jurisdictions." Hideki Kanda & Saul
Levmore, 77?^ Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 429, 430
(1985). See also Stephen H. Schulman & Alan Schenk, Shareholders' Voting and Appraisal
Rights in Corporate Acquisition Transactions, 38 BUS. LAW. 1529 (1983). The mechanics for

asserting the claim also vary from state to state. For a review of the procedure under the RMBCA
see Henry F. Johnson & Paul Bartlett, Is a Fistful of Dollars the Answer? A Critical Look at
Dissenters' Rights Under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 12 J.L. & COM. 211, 216-
21 (1993).

45. Seligman, supra note 1, at 831-33 (1984). All states provide some version of appraisal

for dissenting shareholders upon a merger. Additionally, nearly all of the states provide for

appraisal upon the sale of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets. Half the states also

make the remedy available for certain charter amendments. ALI, Principles of Corporate

Governance 950-51 (Final Draft, March 1992); see generally 12B WILLIAM M. FLETCHER,

Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations § 5906.20 (Rev. Vol. 1993). Compare Rev. Model

Bus. Corp. Act §§ 13.01-13.31 (1993).

46. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941). The requirement

of unanimous shareholder consent persisted in some states until late in the nineteenth century. See

People V. Ballard, 32 N.E. 54, 59-60 (N.Y. 1892).

47. William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and

Business Purposes, 1980 A.B.F. Res. J. 69, 78-79. Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers:

A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 626-30 (1981). Whether this development was

thought to be constitutionally mandated is a matter of debate. Compare Manning, infra note 55,



502 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

of a going concern, and his approval was necessary to divest him of that which

he had purchased.'"*^

While clearly protecting minority interests, the need for unanimous

shareholder action created the potential for minority shareholders to extract

large premiums for their stock by arbitrarily refusing to approve proposed

transactions."*^ Moreover, a single shareholder, who for any reason (no matter
how capricious) decided to oppose a transaction and who refused to sell his
stock, could block the corporate action regardless of how beneficial it might
be to the corporation. The common law rule thus created enormous tension
between a corporation's need to respond to changing business circumstances

and the sometimes arbitrary or greedy wishes of stockholders.

Initially, courts resolved this conflict by allowing a common law recovery
of the value of stock to shareholders who opposed a transaction favored by the
majority.^° In addition, legislatures responded by creating statutory/ appraisal

rights.^' This genesis of dissenters' rights was summarized recently by the

Delaware Court of Chancery:

An appraisal is method of paying a shareholder for taking his
property. It is a statutory means whereby the shareholder can avoid

the conversion of his property into other property not of his choosing.

The statutory right is given the shareholder as compensation for the

abrogation of the common law rule that a single shareholder could
block a merger.

"'

By the 1930's, appraisal statutes had become common place in the United
States."

at 246-47 with ElSENBERG, infra note 51, at 75-76.

48. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 782 (Ohio 1987). Fletcher, supra

note 45, at § 5906.10.

49. Voeller, 311 U.S. at 535 n.6; Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really

Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1235, 1285 (1990).

50. Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 42, 45-46 (1858); State v. Bailey, 16 Ind.

46, 51-52 (1861); International «& G.N.R.R. Co. v. Bremond, 53 Tex. 9, 119 (1880). Pennsylvania

apparently still retains a common law right of appraisal in circumstances not covered by statute.
Troupianksy v. Henry Disston & Sons, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 609, 611 (E.D.Pa. 1957).

5 1

.

Statutory appraisal provisions seem to have been first adopted by the Ohio legislature

in the early 1850's. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation 75 (Little Brown

1976).

52. Francis I. DuPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 343 A.2d 629, 634 (Del. Ch.
1975) (citations omitted). Accord Solomon Bros., Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d 650,

652 (Del. Ch. 1989).

53. Irving J. Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15

Cornell L. Rev. 420, 421 (1930). The remedy, however, is not limited to the United States. For

example, dissenting shareholders of Canadian corporations are entitled to an appraisal of their

shares upon a wide range of corporate transactions. See Deborah A. DeMott, Oppressed but Not

Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment ofCanadian Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Other

Corporate Constituents, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. Probs. 181, 187-88 n.24 (Winter 1993).



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 503

Despite this long-standing recognition of appraisal rights, these statutes

have been criticized,^'' Professor Manning, in a well-known article, began

this assault.^^ Although he accepted the historical understanding of the

development of appraisal statutes, he challenged the effectiveness of the

statutes to implement the policies they purport to reflect.'^

These criticisms led to efforts to scale back the availability of appraisal

actions. The principal change was the enactment of "stock market exception"

provisions to appraisal statutes. ^^ Accepting the premise that a legally created

market for dissenting shareholders is unnecessary where an actual trading

market in the shares exists,^* legislatures exen^pted dissenting shareholders

in corporations listed on national exchanges from the coverage of the appraisal

statutes.
^^

Both critics and advocates of appraisal statutes, however, have consistently

recognized their utility in corporations without an active market for securi-

ties.^° Shareholders in these types of corporations are not only particularly

susceptible to abuse by the majority, but they frequently become shareholders

for reasons unrelated to investment. Unlike investors in publicly traded

companies, these shareholders become participants in a particular enterprise,

not mere investors seeking the highest return on their investment.^' In this

54. See generally Kanda & Levmore, supra note 44. Cyril Moscow, Aspects of
Shareholder Rights, 18 Wayne L. Rev. 1003, 1023 (1972) ("appraisal rights do not protect anyone

who needs protection") (footnote omitted).

55. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,

72 Yale L.J. 223 (1962).

56. Id. at 260-62. The specific goals and supporting rationale of appraisal actions remain

the subject of scholarly debate. See Stout, supra note 49, at 1287 nn.284-86. Within the context

of cooperatives, however, the traditional rationale is particularly applicable. See infra notes 81-82.

57. Note, A Reconsideration ofthe Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder 's

Right of Appraisal, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1023, 1031-32 (1976).

58. Manning, supra note 55, at 261; Stout, supra note 49, at 1286.

59. In 1969 the Model Business Corporation Act was amended to eliminate appraisal

rights when the shares were listed on a national exchange. Several states adopted this change, but

in 1978 the drafters reversed their field and deleted this exception. The change resulted from the

recognition that the stock market was an imperfect indicator of value. Alfred F. Conard,

Amendments ofModel Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 33 Bus. Law. 2587,

2595 (1978); Stout, supra note 49, at 1286-89. Today, shareholders in all but the largest

corporations retain their right to appraisal. See, e.g., DEL. CODE Ann. tit. 8, § 262(b) (1991).
60. Manning, supra note 55; Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 79. Critics have concluded that

"[t]he soundest view of appraisal rights is that they are a guarantee of liquidity of minority

shareholders' investments in the event of major corporate changes, not a guarantee of values for

shares." Moscow, supra note 54, at 1027. This guarantee is particularly appropriate when no

market is available for the shares. Recent analysts have also concluded that appraisal rights add

value to stock of public companies as well as protect minority shareholders in those corporations.

Daniel R. Fishel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 A.B.F. RES. J. 875.

61. Revised Model Business Corp. Act, Close Corp. Supp. § 11, Official Comment (1993).



504 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

regard cooperatives are analogous to privately held corporations. Although

cooperatives generally have more members than a close corporation, both types

of entities usually limit shareholder eligibility, frequently limit voting rights,

and restrict the transfer of shares.^^ Not only is there little or no market for

the stock of agricultural cooperatives, but the member/patron stockholders

generally allow a particular entity to use their capital because of the stockhold-

er's relationship with the cooperative. Absent an appraisal mechanism,

stockholders who no longer desire to support the cooperative, because of a
transaction working a fundamental change in its operations, have no way to
recover their capital. While the individuals may cease to be members or
patrons, this change in status has little effect since the cooperative retains their

investment.^^

Although some states have restored appraisal rights to shareholders of

public as well as private corporations,^'* this restoration has come with a

price. The appraisal remedy has come to be viewed as the exclusive remedy

for shareholders who dissent from the action of the majority. ^^ Absent very
flagrant conduct by insiders which taints the entire transaction with fraud or

self-dealing, courts have viewed the options available to dissenters as limited:

seek appraisal or go along with the majority.
^^

The rationale for making appraisal a dissenter's exclusive remedy can be

traced back to the origin of the appraisal statutes. As noted earlier, the statutes

were adopted to allow corporations to engage in a variety of transactions

without being subject to the views of a single or small number of shareholders.

If shareholders were allowed to continue to seek other remedies (principally

injunctions), then a primary purpose for the creation of the appraisal remedy

would be substantially undercut.

This view of exclusivity can be commended, of course, in terms of

efficiency and flexibility on the part of corporations to respond to opportunities

for growth and expansion. However, the side effect of the limitation on

remedies is that, absent the availability of an appraisal action, shareholders

who do not wish to continue their investment in the changed entity are without
any remedy. Therefore, in corporations with little or no market for their stock,

like cooperatives, denial of appraisal rights creates captive equity.

62. See supra note 29; compare Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 341-356 (1991).

63. The ability of cooperatives to retain former members' equity for lengthy periods

subject to the discretion of the board has been recognized by several decisions. See supra note

43.

64. Carney, supra note 47, at 96.

65. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 782 (Ohio 1987); Schloss Assoc.

V. Arkwin Indus., Inc., 460 N.E.2d 1090 (N.Y. 1984); supra note 45, at § 5906.30. See also

Revised Model Business Corp. Act § 13.02(b) (1993).

66. James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77

Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1191, 1207-08 (1964); Fishel, supra note 60, at 898-901.



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 505

III. Appraisal Rights Should be Extended to

Cooperative Shareholders

Although cooperatives are recognized as engaging in a variety of

transactions making a fundamental change in the cooperative, stockholders in

corporate cooperatives have generally been viewed as outside the protection

of appraisal statutes/^ This conclusion has most often been supported by the

assertion that cooperatives are different from corporations, thus, cooperative

stockholders should not be treated the same as other stockholders/^ Many
cooperatives today, however, have only the dimmest memory of the unique
organizing principles cherished by the early leaders in cooperatives/^

Moreover, even if the organizing principles of cooperatives do distinguish

them fi-om general corporations, these differences do not justify denying

stockholders appraisal rights/^ There is no conflict between cooperative

principles and appraisal rights. Consequently, dissenters' actions should be

available to cooperative shareholders in all states.

A. Distinctions Between Cooperatives and Other Corporate

Forms Do Not Support the Denial ofAppraisal
Rights to Cooperative Shareholders

Some observers and courts have asserted that allowing appraisal rights
would curtail mergers among cooperatives by hampering the ability of the

successor corporation to survived' This result would supposedly derive from

the increased cost of the merger and the reduction in equity capital available

to the survivor.^^ As the Pearson court argued, "[i]f a minority could insist

on being paid in cash, they could wreck the plans for consolidation."^^ This

claim is neither derived from any of the operating principles of cooperatives,

nor does it distinguish cooperatives from any other corporation.

67. Packel, supra note 25, at 120-21. The index to the USDA's most extensive treatment

of cooperative law does not even contain a reference to dissenting shareholders in cooperatives.

See Farmer Cooperative Service, supra note 18.
68. Sedo, supra note 4, at 398-99.

69. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

70. Although concluding that dissenters' rights in agricultural cooperatives are "controver-

sial," a recent observer appears to have reluctantly recognized that unless the provisions of a

state's corporate law are somehow "inconsistent" with the cooperative statute (or perhaps

principles), appraisal rights for cooperative shareholders would be determined in the same fashion

as for stockholders in any other corporation. Matthews, supra note 20, at 304-06.

71. Sedo, supra note 4, at 397-403. Pearson v. Clam Falls Coop. Dairy Ass'n, 10 N.W.2d

132, 134 (Wis. 1943).

72. This argument is simply the echo of the general response of cooperatives and some

economists that any form ofjudicially required equity redemption program would adversely impact

on cooperatives economic viability. See Centner, supra note 2, at 124-25.

73. /*ea/-5on, 10N.W.2d at 134.



506 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

The "threat to the coqjorate enterprise" argument has been raised by critics

of dissenters' rights in non-cooperative corporations.

Even a relatively modest number of shareholders claiming the

appraisal remedy may constitute a severe economic threat to the
corporate enterprise. . . If [some] shareholders go the appraisal road,.

. . a sudden and largely unpredictable drain is imposed upon the

corporation's cash position. This demand for a cash pay-out to

shareholders often comes at a time when the enterprise is in need of

every liquid dollar it can put its hands on.^"*

75
The merits of this argument have been rejected explicitly by commentators,

and implicitly by the drafters of the Revised Model Business Act,^^ the

American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Govemance,^^ and the
legislatures of all fifty states which have retained the remedy. The costs and

capital drain of appraisal claims simply have not been thought onerous enough

on corporations to overcome the perception of fairness to the minority.
^^

Many cooperatives today possess financial resources to rival the nation's
largest industrial corporations.^^ It is unlikely that they would be any more

dissuaded than any other corporation ^° from pursuing a transaction by virtue

of the possibility of an appraisal action. Of course, some transactions by
cooperatives may not occur in the face of a significant number of dissenting
shares. It is not clear, however, why transactions opposed by patrons with
enough capital in the cooperative to cause a severe capitalization problem for

the new entity should proceed.

This is even more true in cooperatives than other type of corporations.

The refusal to allow dissenters' rights is directly contrary to the concept of a

cooperative as a voluntary association.^' Denial of appraisal rights to

stockholders in cooperatives transforms a "voluntary" association into an

involuntary investment by those who dissent.
Appraisal rights originated, at least in part, to prevent precisely this result:

74. Manning, supra note 55, at 234.

75. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 70-71.

76. Revised Model Business Corp. Act §§ 13.01-13.31 (1993); Conard, supra note 59, at

2592.

77. ALl, Principles of Corp. Governance, supra note 45, at §§ 7.21-7.25.

78. Fishel, supra note 60, at 881-82. Fishel, while somewhat skeptical of the survival

argument in favor of appraisal rights, concludes that either the costs of such actions must be low,

or the benefits (value) must be high for the action to have survived. Because an empirical measure

of costs is not available, he is unable to conclude what level of benefit was evidenced by the

continued legislative approval of the action.

79. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.

80. Seligman, supra note 1, at 829-30.

81. Centner, supra note 2, at 130.



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 507

[I]t is predictable that corporate law would permit a majority, or at

least a high majority, to make structural changes even over the

objection of minority shareholders. But just as a veto power might be

intolerable in a corporation, so might be an unrestricted power in the

majority to make structural changes, unless some method was

provided whereby minority shareholders would not be locked into the

restructured enterprise over their objections. The minority, in other

words, should have the right to say to the majority, "We recognize
your right to restructure the enterprise, provided you are willing to

buy us out at a fair price if we object, so that we are not forced to
participate in an enterprise other than the one contemplated at the

outset of our mutual association. " Seen from this perspective, the

appraisal right is a mechanism admirably suited to reconcile, in the

corporate context, the need to give the majority the right to make

drastic changes in the enterprise to meet new conditions as they arise,

with the need to protect the minority against being involuntarily

dragged along into a drastically restructured enterprise in which it has

no confidence.^^

Although Professor Eisenberg spoke of general corporations, this rationale for

dissenters' rights, based on allowing shareholders to withdraw their financial

support when the nature of the enterprise changes, is entirely consistent with

the traditional principles underlying cooperatives.*^

The claim that allowing appraisal rights would be contrary to the

majoritarian democratic principles of cooperatives*"* simply misses the mark.

Appraisal frees the majority to proceed with the fundamental change; it does

not limit its ability to act.*^ Moreover, dissenters' rights to withdraw further

the notion that cooperatives are voluntary associations of persons working for

their mutual benefit. The inability of the cooperative shareholder to transfer

his stock without the consent of the cooperative board makes the investment

illiquid in the face of fundamental change in the cooperative. Even critics of

82. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 78 (emphasis added). This rationale for appraisal rights

eliminates any distinction between "membership" shares and other types of stock in the

cooperative. See discussion infra part C.

83. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.

84. Sedo, supra note 4, at 398-99.

85. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 78; see also supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.

For example, a body of case law has developed holding that cooperatives may not enforce bylaw

changes adopted by a majority of the board against a minority member. See, e.g., Lambert v.

Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc., 297 A.2d 566, 570-71 (N.J. 1972); Loch v. Paola Farmers' Union

Coop., 287 P. 269 (Kan. 1930). The availability of appraisal rights to dissenters, however, should

free the majority to proceed with by-law amendments or other structural changes while protecting

those who dissent.



508 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

appraisal, however, have conceded that this remedy is necessary in circum-

stances where there is no active market for the stock.^^

Unless the policy of the state cooperative statutes is to give the majority

the power to compel the minority to invest in a cooperative not of its choosing,

the criticism of granting appraisal rights to cooperative shareholders collapses.

No justification for preferring fundamental corporate change to appraisal rights
has been articulated by these commentators and courts. ^^ The existence of

dissenters' rights provides a significant counterbalance to the majority's wishes

and should encourage the board to obtain the best deal for the largest number

of shareholders (not just a majority) so as to minimize the cost of potential

appraisal proceedings. ^^ The result of extending appraisal rights to sharehold-

ers in agricultural cooperative should be increased support for the successor

cooperative, not the wholesale withdrawal of capital.

Some opponents of appraisal rights for cooperative shareholders have
asserted that the issue is essentially the same as when cooperatives are

confronted with a demand for redemption of equity outside of the appraisal

context.^^ Many cooperatives simply retain the equity with no program for
redeeming these securities. ^° Because of the restrictions on transfer of

cooperative's stock, the holders of these equities are unable to recover their

investment through market transactions. Absent statutory mandates, courts

have refused to force cooperatives to buy back patrons' stock.
^'

The charters of most cooperatives provide that the redemption of

outstanding equity held by patrons is within the discretion of the board of

directors.^^ Although several systems for retiring these equities have been

86. Moscow, supra note 54, at 1027.

87. In the case of a former member seeking redemption from an ongoing cooperative, one

court did conclude that "[t]he paramount concern is the continuation of the cooperative." Sanchez

V. Grain Growers Ass'n of California, 179 Cal. Rptr. 459, 460 (1981). Whatever may be the

merits of this policy choice in the case of an ongoing cooperative {See Centner, supra note 2, at

142-43), the decision is inapplicable to cases involving fundamental changes to the corporation that

trigger appraisal. By definition the dissenting stockholder did not choose to become member,

patron or investor in the transformed cooperative.

88. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 83-84.

89. Sedo, supra note 4, at 399 n.l26. The analogy to equity redemption cases actually

supports the cooperative shareholder's right to appraisal in one regard: appraisal and payment of

the value of the patrons equity position does not violate the cooperative principle of returns based

on use. This issue in the redemption cases is not whether appraisal and payment are proper within

the cooperative concept, but rather whether the cooperative can be judicially compelled to

repurchase the stock when its charter makes this act discretionary with the board.

90. Centner, supra note 2, at 123 n.20.

91. Christian County Farmers Supply Co. v. Rivard, 476 N.E.2d 452 (111. Ct. App. 1985).

This issue has repeatedly been litigated within the bankruptcy context. Holders of cooperative

equities have frequently responded to claims for debts owed to cooperatives by attempting to set

off the amount of securities owned against the claim. Courts, however, have consistently refused

to allow the set off Hamilton, supra note 19, at 610-17.

92. Centner, supra note 10, at 345-47.



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 509

proposed, these systems generally reserve the ultimate timing of redemption

to the board in the bylaws or articles. Relying on a contractual understanding

of their charter, then, cooperatives have successfully resisted most efforts to

compel redemption.
^-^

In deciding these cases, courts have examined the impact of contractual

relationship between the continuing cooperative and its members on the nature

of the equities held by patrons.^"* In all of these cases, it was the equity

owners' relationship with the cooperative that had changed. Appraisal rights,

however, are given to shareholders only on events which work a fundamental

change in the corporation.^^ By definition, then, appraisal rights would only

be available when the cooperative has changed in a way that impacts on its

charter contract with its investors. The contractual analysis of the equity

redemption cases leads to the conclusion that appraisal rights should be

available to cooperative dissenters. Historically, the contractual view of

corporate charters formed the basis for the creation of appraisal rights.
^^

Moreover, the events triggering the right to appraisal are derived from statute.

They cannot contractually be made contingent on the discretion of the board

of directors.^^ Regardless of the decisions on equity redemption by former

or bankrupt members of continuing cooperatives, cooperative stockholders

should be given the same dissenters' rights as other corporate shareholders

have upon fundamental changes in the corporation.

B. The Non-Profit Charaterization of Cooperatives is an

Invalid Basis for Denying Appraisal Rights

to Cooperative Shareholders

One early observer of agricultural cooperatives concluded that "[t]he profit

incentive is the mainspring of commerce, but it is the antithesis of coopera-

tion."^^ Some states have gone so far as to statutorily designate cooperatives

93. Id. at 344. In those rare instances when the charter can be read as limiting the

director's discretion, the courts have sometimes found for the "preferred stock" shareholder. See

Collie V. Little River Coop., Inc., 370 S.W.2d 62 (Ark. 1963).

94. See Universal Coop., Inc. v. FCX, Inc., 853 F.2d 1 149, 1 154 n.5 (4th Cir. 1988), cert,

denied, 489 U.S. 101 1 (1989); Atchison County Farmers Union Coop. Ass'n v. Tumbull, 736 P.2d

917, 921 (Kan. 1987); Weise v. Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Iowa

1971) (return of equity credits upon cooperative merger is discretionary with the board).

95. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.

96. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.

97. Compare Waters v. Double L, Inc., 755 P.2d 1294, 1303 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989), af'd,

769 P.2d 582 (Idaho 1989) (stating that corporation's compliance with a contractual stock

repurchase agreement does not prevent shareholder appraisal claims). There does not appear to

be any state which allows parties to contract away their appraisal claims in advance. See Fishel,

supra note 60, at 881 n.22.

98. Gerard C. Henderson, Cooperative Marketing Associations, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 91, 111



510 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

as "non-profit."^^ A few states have gone even further and incorporated the
provisions of their non-profit corporation law into the cooperative statute.

'^°

This designation is a statutory attempt to recognize the traditional notion that

cooperatives return any earnings to their patrons. '°' While the principle of

returning earnings to patrons is not inconsistent with appraisal rights for

dissenting shareholders, legislative efforts to describe this principle by

designating cooperatives as non-profit have created additional confusion

regarding shareholders rights. In fact, state classification of cooperatives as

non-profit has sometimes been relied upon to deny appraisal rights to

cooperative stockholders.
'°^

Even if designated as non-profit, cooperatives are economic institutions

operated to generate a profit. '°^ Cooperative corporations are not eleemosy-

nary; rather they are designed to make money for their patrons. '°'' Not only

do cooperatives strive to generate profits for their members but, perhaps more

importantly for purposes of dissenters' rights, they "[differ] from other [non-

profit corporations] in that members . . . have investments in the organiza-

tion.'"^^

The original cooperative concept simply required that the entity's earnings

be passed through to the patrons. Today's elaborate system of equity retains,

however, has altered the traditional concept of the "profits" being returned to

(1923).

99. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1602 (1988). One authority concludes that, absent

specific statutes, cooperatives can incorporate under the provisions of a state's non-profit

corporation law. Packel, supra note 25, at 57-58.

100. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1729.27 (Anderson, 1992). Other states incorporate

corporation codes that include provisions applicable to both non-profit corporations and profit

corporations. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1628 (1988).

101. Farmer Cooperative Service, supra note 18, at 221 n.9.

102. Denes v. Countrymark, Inc., 580 N.E.2d 1135, 1139-40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).

103. Kohls & Uhl, supra note 20 at 226-27; First Wisconsin Nat'l Bank of Milwaukee v.
Wisconsin Coop. Milk Pool, 1 19 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941)

(Cooperatives' "sole motive is pecuniary gain."). This motive was even recognized by the early

judicial apologists for cooperatives. See Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 278 U.S.

515, 537 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

104. Although some commentators prefer to characterize the earnings of cooperatives as

"excess revenue" {see Sedo, supra note 4, at 379) instead of profit, cooperatives have consistently

been held not to be traditional non-profit corporations. Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Coop. Milk

Ass'n, 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932); Diekmann v. Evansville Producers Comm'n Ass'n, 40 N.E.2d

327, 329 (Ind. 1942); Missco Homestead Ass'n v. United States, 185 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1950).

See also NotQ, Involuntary Bankruptcy—Cooperative Marketing Associations, 19 Hastings L.J. 362,
363-64 (1968). Cf. Burley Tobacco Growers' Coop. Ass'n v. Rogers, 150 N.E. 384, 386 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1926); and Mutual Orange Distrib. v. Black, 287 S.W. 846 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926) (holding that

cooperatives were not subject to license requirements for foreign corporations because of their non-

profit nature).

105. Marilyn E. Phelan, Nonprofit Enterprises: Law & Taxation § 20.01, at 2 (1989)
(footnote omitted).



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 511

the producers. Although the system allows these earnings to be taxed at the

patron level,
'^^

the receipt of these funds is frequently deferred for extended

periods of time.' °^ These equity accounts reflect ownership interests of the

cooperatives' patrons, '°* a concept totally foreign to typical non-profit

corporations.

Most state statutes also allow cooperatives to sell stock to investors

regardless of their member or patron status. These stocks generally pay a
specified dividend and have certain liquidation preferences. Some cooperatives
are also allowing management to participate in "profits" by adopting stock

incentive plans designed to give a portion of the increased value of the

cooperative to management. '°^ In short, cooperatives may have a variety of
non-member owners with substantial ownership and investment interests. Such

a capital structure would be unheard of in conventional non-profit corpora-

tions.
"°

The statutory designation of cooperatives as non-profit corporations causes

confusion regarding appraisal rights in cooperatives in at least two ways.

Modem non-profit corporations can merge and engage in a variety of
transactions which would trigger appraisal rights in business corporations.

Because members of typical non-profit corporations generally "have no

economic interest in their corporation," they have no right to appraisal of their

shares upon a merger of their corporation.''' Stockholders of cooperatives,

in contrast, have investments in the cooperative. Thus, the rationale for

denying appraisal rights in the non-profit context is not available to coopera-

tives. Rather, the general corporation laws' protection of minority investors

from compulsory capital contributions to the changed enterprise"^ should

prevail and allow dissenting cooperative owners appraisal.

Additionally, many state statutes limit voting in non-profit corporations to
members. Because appraisal rights are frequently tied to voting rights,"^ the

use of the non-profit statutes would limit the ability of non-member stockhold-

ers to obtain appraisal of their cooperative shares. State law generally requires

106. I.R.C. § 1385 (1992).

107. Centner, supra note 26, at 255.

108. Nieman, supra note 39, at 139-48.

109. Fleck, supra note 13, at 87-88.

110. Elaborate equity investment by patrons and substantial investment by non-patrons or

management cause efforts to distinguish "entrepreneurial profit" from cooperative earnings to fail.

Packel, supra note 25, at 6-7. The use of management stock incentive plans is entirely

entrepreneurial. Many successful cooperatives' stock have book values substantially in excess of
par. Farmer Cooperative Service, supra note 1 8, at 3 1

.

111. Rev. Mod. Non-Profit Corp. Act § 11.01 Official Comment (1988).
1 12. See supra note 51.

113. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(a) (1991); Rev. Mod. Bus. Corp. Act § 13.02 (Supp.
1991).



512 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

only the vote of the members of a nonprofit corporation to effect a merger.

This limitation is not the result of a legislative determination that the

nonmember shareholders of a nonprofit corporation should not be allowed to
vote, but rather is because nonprofit corporations do not have non-member

shareholders in the first place. There are simply no non-member investors

whose interests require the protection of voting rights in the merger of a

traditional nonprofit corporation.

The issue, then, is not whether cooperatives are deemed to be nonprofit,

but whether cooperatives should be treated as nonprofit corporations for the

specific purpose of appraisal rights. This issue can only be resolved by an

analysis of the reasons the appraisal provisions of general corporate statutes

and non-profit statutes differ, as well as an analysis of the capital structure of

the two types of corporations. Because cooperatives more closely resemble

commercial corporations in their capital and investment structure, the

provisions of a state's general corporation codes should govern on the question

of appraisal.

C Appraisal Rights Should Not be Limited to
Shareholders with Voting Shares

Although the American Law Institute has concluded that shareholder
voting and the appraisal remedy should not be linked,""* dissenters' rights

statutes generally require that the shareholder seeking appraisal has voted his

shares against the transaction."^ The capital structure of most cooperatives,

however, includes a vast array of equity investments,"^ but only a limited

number of voting shares. Limiting the availability of appraisal to voting

membership shares would make the remedy relatively meaningless in the

context of cooperatives."^ Not only would members be limited in their

claims, but holders of non-voting patronage or preferred stock, along with the

owners of equities not constituting stock, would be entirely excluded from the

appraisal action.

114. A.L.I., Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 45, at 945. Unless a court is

willing to impose appraisal as a remedy in situations beyond those enumerated by statute, see

supra note 50, only those shareholders entitled to vote on the corporate transaction at issue will

generally be entitled to appraisal. Because of the capital structure of most cooperatives {see supra

notes 29-38 and accompanying text), this may limit the amount of equity investment which may

be appraised.

115. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(a) (1991); Rev. Mod. Bus. Corp. Act § 13.02 (Supp.

1991).

116. Centner, supra note 2, at 136-38.

117. Although some courts have allowed appraisal for membership shares, because these

shares represent only a minuscule amount of the equity in a cooperative, the efficacy of this

remedy is extremely limited. In fact, the Eighth Circuit recently noted that membership shares are

relatively worthless. Farmers Coop. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 822 F.2d 774, 779

n.6 (8th Cir. 1987).



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 513

Recognizing the variety of equity instruments that exist in cooperatives,

the states that have adopted statutes providing for appraisal of cooperative

investments have generally included all types of equity owned by the

dissenter."^ At least one of these states extends this protection only to

members,"^ while others require only that the dissenter be a shareholder.'^^

Neither of these approaches provides any relief for the non-member patron

whose equity position contains no stock.
'^'

Absent legislation, courts have not allowed non-voting equity interests to

be appraised. '^^ In reaching this conclusion, the courts have ignored the

provisions of state corporate law that provide for voting rights upon issues of

fiindamental change. Within the context of fundamental corporate change, the

right to vote encompasses more than just the holders of voting common stock.
Generally, all stockholders, including owners of non-voting common and
preferred stock, are permitted to vote on fiandamental changes which affect

their position with the corporation.'^^ Thus, the body of shareholders

entitled to seek appraisal frequently includes the owners of non-voting stock.

Corporate law has long distinguished between the more routine decisions

affecting the operation of a corporation and fundamental changes that reach the

very nature of the organization in which the shareholder owns an equity

interest.
'^"^ This distinction has been recognized in cooperative corporations

as well. Some fundamental changes or matters which are generally voted upon

by the members are the number of shares or number of members of the

cooperative, incurrence of long-term indebtedness, and decisions to end the

cooperative reorganization, merger and consolidation.'^^

Democratic control of the cooperative by its members, however, has been

viewed as one of the traditional concepts that separates corporate cooperatives

118. These statutes are not limited to determining the value of the dissenter's stock. Rather,

they provide for the determination of "the net value of [the stockholder's or member's] equity"

(Mont. Code Ann. § 35-16-211 (1991)) or for the value of shareholders "property interest" (Vt.

Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 1061(2) (1984). Although these terms are not defined, they presumably

encompass more than stock. Van Der Maaten v. Farmers Coop. Co., 472 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa

1991).

119. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 1061(2) (1984).

120. Mont. Code Ann. § 35-16-211 (1991); Utah Code Ann. § 3-1-39 (1988).
121. Of course, the approach advocated here (i.e. applying existing corporation law to

agricultural cooperatives) would not protect these owners in any state whose appraisal statute was

specifically limited to "shares" or "stock." To provide for these individuals, legislative action

would be necessary.

122. Denes v. Countrymark, Inc., 580 N.E.2d 1135, 1141 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).

123. Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 298 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1980); Rev. Model Bus.
Corp. Act § 13.02 Official Comment (Supp. 1991).

124. See generally William A. Klein & John C. Coffee, Jr. Business Organization &
Finance 206-07 (Foundation Press 1993).

125. Packel, supra note 25, at 118-21.



514 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

from other types of corporations.
'^^

To the extent that state law requires the
dissenters' shares to have been voted against the transaction, the requirement

of "member" control might be viewed as the reason for denying holders of

stock (other than voting member common stock) appraisal rights. This
dilemma takes on added importance because member control has been thought
to be crucial to an entity's ability to claim many of the statutory advantages
of cooperatives. If non-members cannot vote their cooperative stock without

eliminating the cooperative status of the entity, extending appraisal rights to

holders of non-membership stock would be highly problematic.

Member control of the cooperative is a factor in determining whether a
cooperative will be exempt from the antitrust laws under the Capper-Volstead

Act,'^^ whether a cooperative is eligible to borrow from federally-chartered

cooperative banks under the Farm Credit Act,'^^ and whether the cooperative

will qualify under the Agricultural Marketing Act.'^^ In addition, it deter-

mines whether the cooperative will be eligible for special treatment as a tax-

exempt organization under § 521 of the Internal Revenue Code'^° or

whether it will qualify under Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code.'^'
However, each of these statutes contemplates that the cooperative will have

"non-member", "non-patron" voting shareholders, as well as members who
own non-voting stock. '^^

For example, the Capper-Volstead Act extended an antitrust exemption to

cooperatives organized with capital stock:

Only non-stock organizations were exempt under the Clayton Act, but

various agricultural" groups had discovered that, in order best to serve

the needs of their members, accumulation of capital was required.

With capital, cooperative associations could develop and provide the

handling and processing services that were needed before their

members' products could be sold. The Capper-Volstead Act was

passed to make it clear that the formation of an agricultural organiza-

tion with capital would not result in a violation of the antitrust laws,

and that the organization, without antitrust consequences, could

perform certain functions in preparing produce for market.'"

126. Kohls and Uhl, supra note 20, at 208-09.

127. 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1988).

128. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2121-2149 (1988).

129. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1 141-1 141j (1988).

130. 26 U.S.C. § 521(b)(2) (1988).

131. 26 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1388 (1988).

132. See, e.g.. West Central Coop. v. United States, 758 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1985), cert,

denied, 474 U.S. 1000 (1985). See also Nieman, supra note 39, at 139-48.

133. National Broiler Mktg. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 824-25 (1978).



1994 COOPERATIVE DISSENT 515

Thus, a principal reason for the Capper-Volstead Act was to permit coopera-

tives to raise fiinds in the capital markets from non-members. '^'' Moreover,

all of these federal statutes recognize a right for investors, whether they are

members or non-members, to receive a return on their investment in the form

of dividends.
'^^

Allowance of appraisal rights to all shaireholders would not jeopardize the

corporations favorable tax and antitrust treatment.
'^^

For example, the recent

antitrust decisions'" focused only on non-producers roles as "members" of

the cooperative. In no way did these cases limit the right of non-member (or
non-voting) shareholders to vote on extraordinary transactions effecting

fundamental change in the life of the cooperative.
'^^

At most, the Court has

given tacit recognition for this right by limiting the prohibition for "control and

policy making."

Recognition of the general corporate law provisions regarding voting on

fundamental change in the cooperative would not be inconsistent with the

concept of member control. These questions go far beyond "policy"; they

reach the very substance of the entity itself. Moreover, the incorporation of

the general corporation law provisions regarding voting on organic changes by

otherwise non-voting stock would not be inconsistent with cooperative statutes.

The transactions would simply need to be approved by the board and members

as set out in the cooperative statute, plus any other stockholders that are

entitled to vote under the general corporate law.

134. 60 Cong. Rec. 365 (1920) (statements of Senator Walsh); 62 Cong. Rec. 2271 (1922)

(statements of Senator Walsh); 62 CONG. Rec. 2273 (1922) (statements of Senator Norris).

135. 26 U.S.C. § 521(b)(2) (1988); 12 U.S.C. § 1141j(a) (1988); 12 U.S.C. § 2129(a)(2)

(1988).

136. Indeed, far from jeopardizing a cooperative's antitrust protection, allowance of

appraisal rights may help insulate a merger of cooperative from antitrust scrutiny. See Donald F.

Turner, Address to the National Conference of Fruit and Vegetable Bargaining Cooperatives

(1966), in Harl, 14 AGRICULTURAL Law § 137.06[9] n.l97 (1992). For a recent summary of the
status of agricultural cooperatives tax and antitrust exceptions, see Matthews, supra note 20, at

288-96.

137. See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co., Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 394-96

(1967), reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 930 (1968).

138. At least two states require approval of two-thirds of the preferred shares in the

cooperative voting as a class before any change can be made in the preferences granted the stock.

See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 421-1 1(e) (1985) and Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1912(5) (West, 1981).

These provisions are derived from the former Uniform Agricultural Cooperative Act. See supra

note 22. Other states require holders of the affected stock to approve any changes in a class vote,

but limit shareholders to one vote regardless of the number or value of shares owned. Wis. STAT.

Ann. §§ 185.52, 185.61(3) (West 1992).



516 INDIANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 27:495

V. Conclusion

Regardless of whether cooperatives are viewed as unique entities

representing groups of producers working together or simply an agri-business

variation on large industrial corporations, dissenting cooperative shareholders

should be entitled to the same protection afforded shareholders in other

corporations. Appraisal rights are consistent with the traditional operating

principles underlying cooperatives; they further the goals of democratic control

and voluntary association. The policies sought to be achieved by appraisal

rights would also be furthered by applying these statutes to cooperatives.

Only a few states have expressly adopted legislation giving this right of

action to cooperative shareholders. Even these statutes, generally limited to

members, are inadequate to protect the wide array of equity investments in

cooperatives made by patrons and investors. Incorporation of the appraisal

provisions of states' general corporations laws, while reaching any shareholder,

also misses the valuation of various forms of cooperative equity not represent-

ed by stock. Thus, even though appraisal should be judicially recognized

under current law in any circumstance in which it is available to shareholders

of other corporations, legislative action is required to make the remedy fully

efficacious for cooperative owners whether they be members, patrons or

owners.