Indiana Law Review An Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 1998* Kevin W. Betz** Mark A. Lindsey*** In 1998, the Indiana Supreme Court's docket, dispositions, and voting were again overwhelmed by its mandatory criminal appeals—the highest percentage in the eight years of this study. Because of this crush of mandatory appeals, the court also issued its lowest number of discretionary civil appeals.' Faced with this type ofdocket, the court's members have also decreased their productivity and have the highest percent of unanimous opinions in the period of this study. Fortunately, the court is nearing a constitutional change in its mandatoryjurisdiction. Pursuant to the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana General Assembly must pass this change for the second time in this year's session and then it will be placed on the state-wide ballot.^ * The tables presented in this Article are patterned after the annual statistics of the U.S. Supreme Court published in the Harvard Law Review. An explanation of the origin of these tables can be found at Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, J 967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 301 (1968). The Harvard Law Review granted permission for the use ofthese tables by the Indiana Law Review this year; however, permission for any further reproduction of these tables must be obtained from the Harvard Law Review. We thank Barnes & Thomburg for its gracious willingness to devote the time, energy, and resources of its law firm to allow a project such as this to be accomplished. As is appropriate, credit for the idea for this project goes to Chief Justice Shepard; but, of course, any errors or omissions belong to his former law clerk. We also thank WESTLAW® for its kind willingness to allow us free access to its computer resources and assistance in preparing these tables. ** Attorney at Law, representing employees and professionals and practicing in the appellate area, 1997-present. Former Chief Counsel and Deputy Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Management, 1995-97. Associate, Krieg DeVault Alexander & Capehart, Indianapolis, 1990-95. Law clerk for Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, Indiana Supreme Court, 1988-90. B.A., 1982, Indiana University; M.S., 1984, Northwestern University; J.D., 1988, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington. ** Associate, Barnes & Thomburg, 1 996-present; B.A., 1993, Indiana University; J.D., 1996, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis. 1. MANDATORY DISCRETIONARY TOTAL 1991 109(53%) 98(47%) 207 1992 64(41%) 93(59%) 157 1993 60(44%) 77(56%) 137 1994 60(45%) 73(55%) 133 1995 46(38%) 76(62%) 122 1996 68(59%) 48(41%) 116 1997 100(58%) 71(42%) 171 1998 84(63%) 50(37%) 134 2. The court fought this battle against an overwhelming number of mandatory criminal cases in 1988. The court is fighting the battle again. See Kevin W. Betz & Andrew T. Deibert, An Examination ofthe Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 1996, 30 IND. L. Rev. 933 (1997); see also Randall T. Shepard, Changing the ConstitutionalJurisdiction ofthe 600 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:599 The following is a description of the highlights from each table. Table A. In 1998, the supreme court issued 141 opinions that were authored by an individual justice. This is a decrease from last year's 171 opinions authored by an individual justice. Ofthe 141 opinions issued in 1998, only 35 were civil opinions and 106 were criminal. This is the fewest number of civil opinions since 1990. The court as a whole issued 40 per curiam opinions—^38 civil and 2 criminal. Almost all 38 civil opinions were attorney discipline matters. The only individual justice that did not decrease in productivity was Justice Boehm who issued the same number of opinions as last year—43. He issued 25 criminal opinions, which was roughly even with the other justices' output of criminal opinions; but he also rendered 1 8 civil opinions, which is more than triple the number of civil opinions issued by any other justice. Chief Justice Shepard was next with 30 opinions; Justice Sullivan issued 29; Justice Dickson authored 20; and Justice Selby wrote 19. The court also issued the fewest number of dissents in the 8 years of this study—^23. Justice Sullivan, as in the past, had the most dissents with 9. Justice Dickson, as in the past also, was next with 7. Table B-1. For civil cases. Justices Selby and Shepard were the two justices most aligned at 97.2%. Justices Selby and Boehm were next at 94.1%. As in the past. Justices Shepard and Sullivan were the least aligned at 84.4%. Justice Selby was the most aligned with other justices, and Justice Sullivan was the least aligned overall. Table B-2. For criminal cases. Justices Shepard and Boehm were the most aligned at 96.3%, which is the same as last year. Justices Sullivan and Dickson were the least aligned at 89.8%, which is also the same as last year. As for criminal cases overall. Justice Shepard was the most aligned with his fellow justices. Table B-3. For all cases. Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Boehm, and Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Selby, are the most aligned pairs ofjustices—each pair in agreement 95.1% of the time. This is nearly identical to last year's results. The two least aligned justices, also the same as last year, were Justices Sullivan and Dickson at 89.3%. Overall, Chief Justice Shepard was the most aligned with his fellow justices. Table C. As seen last year, the court's unanimity increased because ofthe less- divisive mandatory docket of cases. In 1998, the court was either unanimous or unanimous with concurrence in 88% of its opinions. This is equal to last year's Indiana Supreme Court: Letting a Court ofLast Resort Act Like One, 63 IND. L.J. 669 (1988); Randall T. Shepard, Foreword: Indiana Law, the Supreme Court, and a New Decade, 24 iND. L. REV. 499(1991). 1 999] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 60 1 percentage, which is the highest in the eight years of this study. Table D. The court issued only 3 split decisions that were composed of only a three-justice majority. This is by far the lowest number of such split opinions in the history ofthis study—if not in the history of the court. Last year was the next lowest number of 3-2 opinions with 6 such decisions. Chief Justice Shepard was the author of 2 of the 3 split opinions. Table E-1. The court affirmed almost 90% of the mandatory criminal appeals, which was also the majority of its docket. This is compelling evidence in support of a move to change the court's jurisdiction. Obviously, if the jurisdiction were changed, the court would not even have decided the vast majority of these appeals. Table E-2. The court decreased the number of civil petitions it transferred from 45 in 1997 to 32 in 1998. Interestingly, in 1997 there were no petitions to transfer in juvenile cases, but in 1998 there were a total of 24 and 3 were granted. A civil petition to transfer stood about a 10% chance of being granted, and a criminal petition stood about a 6% chance of being granted. Table F. The court continues to demonstrate its interest in the Indiana Constitution with 14 opinions involving such issues, although this, too, is a drop from last year where there were 24 such cases. There were also only 9 death penalty cases reviewed, which is on par with recent years except last year when the court reviewed 18 death penalty cases. The court reversed only 1 of those 9 death penalty cases. 602 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:599 TABLE A Opinions" OPINIONS OF COURT* CONCURRENCES'^ DISSENTS'^ Criminal Civil Total Criminal Civil Total Criminal Civil Total Shepard, C.J. 22 8 30 1 1 1 1 Dickson, J. 17 3 20 1 1 2 3 4 7 Sullivan, J.' 24 5 29 1 1 2 6 3 9 Selby, J 18 1 19 3 3 2 2 Boehm, J." 25 18 43 1 1 2 2 4 Per Curiam 2 38 40 Total 108 73 181 7 2 9 13 10 23 These are opinions and votes on opinions by each justice and in per curiam in the 1998 term. The Indiana Supreme Court is unique because it is the only supreme court to assign each case to a justice by a consensus method. Cases are distributed by a consensus of the justices in the majority on each case either by volunteering or nominating writers. The ChiefJustice does not have any power to control the assignments other than as a member ofthe majority. See Melinda Gann Hall, Opinion Assignment Procedures and Conference Practices in State Supreme Courts, 73 JUDICATURE 209 (1990). The order of discussion and voting is started by the most junior member of the court and follows reverse seniority. See id. at 210. '' This is only a counting of full opinions written by each justice. Plurality opinions that announce the judgment of the court are counted as opinions of the court. It includes opinions on civil, criminal, and original actions. Also, the following 7 miscellaneous cases are not included in the table: Winkler v. Winkler, 699 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. 1998) (dissent from denial of transfer); Davenport v. State, 696 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. 1998) (denial of petition to reinstate convictions); Pruitt v. City of Lake Station, 695 N.E.2d 123 (Ind. 1998) (order dismissing appeal as moot); Town of St. John v. State Bd. ofTax Comm'rs, 695 N.E.2d 123 (Ind. 1998) (order granting petitions for review and setting oral argument); Worldcom Network Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 694 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind. 1998) (order denying petition to hold appellee in contempt); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n V. Carlberg, 694N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1998) (dissent from denial of rehearing); National City Bank, Ind. v. Shortridge, 691 N.E.2d 1210 (Ind. 1998) (denial of motion for retroactive disqualification of supreme court justice). / " This category includes both written concurrences and votes to concur in result only. ^ This category includes both written dissents and votes to dissent without opinion. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part or opinions concurring in part only and differing on another issue are counted as dissents. " Justices declined to participate in the following non-disciplinary cases: Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. 1998); Shell Oil Co. v. Lovold Co., 705 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1998); Walker v. State, 694 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1998) (Justice Sullivan); McClain v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314 (Ind. 1998); Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 1998); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1 034 (Ind. 1 998) (Justice Boehm). 1 999] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 603 TABLE B-1 Voting Alignments for Civil Cases' Not Including Judicial or Attorney Discipline Cases Shepard Dickson Sullivan Selby Boehm O 33 27 35 31 Shepard, C.J. S D ... 33 27 35 31 N 36 32 36 34 P 91.7% 84.4% 97.2% 91.2% 33 27 34 30 Dickson, J. S D 33 1 28 34 30 N 36 32 36 34 P 91.7% 87.5% 94.4% 88.2% 27 27 28 26 Sullivan, J. S D 27 1 28 28 1 27 N 32 32 32 30 P 84.4% 87.5% 87.5% 90.0% 35 34 28 32 Selby, s D 35 34 28 32 J. N 36 36 32 34 P 97.2% 94.4% 87.5% 94.1% 31 30 26 32 S 1 Boehm, D 31 30 27 32 — J. N 34 34 30 34 P 91.2% 88.2% 90.0% 94.1% ^ This table records the number oftimes that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for civil cases only. For example, in the top set of numbers for Chief Justice Shepard, 33 is the number oftimes ChiefJustice Shepard and Justice Dickson agreed in a full majority opinion in a civil case. Two justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of ajustice in the body of his or her own opinion. The table does not treat two justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement. "O" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in opinions of the court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. "D" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. "N" represents the number of decisions in which both justices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N." 604 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:599 TABLE B-2 Voting Alignments for Criminal Cases Not Including Judiclvl or Attorney Discipline Cases* Shepard Dickson Sullivan Selby Boehm O 103 101 102 104 Shepard, C.J. S D 103 101 102 104 N 108 108 108 108 P 95.4% 93.5% 94.4% 96.3% 103 97 99 101 Diekson, J. S D 103 . _— 97 99 101 N 108 108 108 108 P 95.4% 89.8% 91.7% 93.5% 101 97 97 99 Sullivan, J. S D 101 97 1 98 1 100 N 108 108 108 108 P 93.5% 89.8% 90.7% 92.6% O 102 99 97 100 Selby, S D 102 99 1 98 100 J. N 108 108 108 108 P 94.4% 91.7% 90.7% 92.6% 104 101 99 100 S 1 Boehm, D 104 101 100 100 — J. N 108 108 108 108 P 96.3% 93.5% 92.6% 92.6% ^ This table records the number oftimes that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for criminal cases only. For example, in the top set of numbers for ChiefJustice Shepard, j 103 is the number of times Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson agreed in a fiill majority opinion in a j criminal case. Two justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of a justice in the body of his or her own opinion. The table does | not treat two justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the i result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement. ' "O" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in opinions of the court j i or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. ) 'S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, | including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. j 'D" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, | dissenting, or concurring opinion. j 'N" represents the number of decisions in which both justices participated and thus the number li of opportunities for agreement. 1 'P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, i calculated by dividing "D" by "N." 1999] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 605 TABLE B-3 Voting Alignments for All Cases Not Including Judicial or Attorney Discipline Cases'* Shepard Dickson Sullivan Selby Boehm O 136 128 137 135 Shepard, C.J. S D 136 128 137 135 N 144 149 144 142 P 94.4% 91.4% 95.1% 95.1% O 136 124 133 131 Dickson, J. S D 136 ... 1 125 133 131 N 144 140 144 142 P 94.4% 89.3% 92.4% 92.3% O 123 124 125 125 Sullivan, J. S D 128 1 125 1 126 2 127 N 140 140 140 138 P 91.4% 89.3% 90.0% 92.0% O 137 133 125 132 Selby, S D 137 133 1 126 132 J. N 144 144 140 142 P 95.1% 92.4% 90.0% 93.0% O 135 131 125 132 S 2 Boehm, D 135 131 127 132 — J. N 142 142 138 142 P 95.1% 92.3% 92.0% 93.0% ^ This table records the number oftimes that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for all cases. For example, in the top set of numbers for Chief Justice Shepard, 136 is the total number of times ChiefJustice Shepard and Justice Dickson agreed in all fiill majority opinions written by the court in 1998. Two justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of a justice in the body of his or her own opinion. The table does not treat two justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement. "O" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in opinions of the court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. "D" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. "N" represents the number of decisions in which both justices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N." 606 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:599 TABLE C Unanimity Not Including Judicial or Attorney Discipline Cases' Unanimous Opinions Unanimous^ With Concurrence' With Dissent Total Criminal Civil Total Criminal Civil Total Criminal Civil Total 91 29 120(83.3%) 6 1 7(4.9%) 11 6 17(11.8%) 144 ' This table tracks the number and percent of unanimous opinions among all opinions written. If, for example, only four justices participate and all concur, it is still considered unanimous. It also tracks the percent of overall opinions with concurrence and overall opinions with dissent. J A decision is considered unanimous only when all justices participating in the case voted to concur in the court's opinion as well as its judgment. When one or more justices concurred in the result, but not in the opinion, the case is not considered unanimous. r '' A decision is listed in this column if one or more justices concurred in the result, but not in the opinion of the court or wrote a concurrence and there were no dissents. 1 999] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 607 TABLE D 3-2 Decisions' Justices Constituting the Majority Number of Opinions'" 1. Shepard, C.J., Dickson, J., Boehm, J. 2. Shepard, C.J., Dickson, J., Selby, J. 1 2 Total" 3 ' This table reflects only decisions rendered by full opinion. An opinion is counted as a 3-2 decision if two justices voted to decide the case in a manner different from that of the majority of the court. "" This column lists the number of times each three-justice group constituted the majority in a 3-2 decision. " The 1998 term's 3-2 decisions were: 1. Shepard, C. J., Dickson, J., Boehm, J.: Gamer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 101 1 (Ind. 1998) (Shepard, C.J.). 2. Shepard, C.J., Dickson, J., Selby, J.: Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 698 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. 1998) (Shepard, C.J); Jackson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 53 (Ind. 1998) (Dickson, J.). 608 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:599 TABLE E-1 Disposition of Cases Reviewed by Transfer AND Direct Appeals" Reversed or Vacated ^ Affirmed Total Civil Appeals Accepted for Transfer Direct Civil Appeals Criminal Appeals Accepted for Transfer Direct Criminal Appeals Total 46(34.3%) 88(65.7%) 134^ 26 (78.8%) 7(21.2%) 33 9 (52.9%) 8(47.1%) 17 11(13.1%) 73 (86.9%) 84 " Direct criminal appeals are cases in which the trial court imposed a sentence of greater than 50 years. See IND. CONST, art. VII, § 4. Thus, direct criminal appeals are those directly from the trial court. A civil appeal may also be direct from the trial court. See Ind. R. App. P. 4(A); see also Ind. Orig. Act. Rs. All other Indiana Supreme Court opinions are accepted for transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals. See Ind. R. App. p. 1 1(B). The court's transfer docket, especially civil cases, has substantially increased in the past five years, but declined significantly last year. See Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard, Indiana Law, the Supreme Court, and a New Decade, 24 iND. L. REV. 499 (1991). ^ Generally, the term "vacate" is used by the Indiana Supreme Court when it is reviewing a court of appeals opinion, and the term "reverse" is used when the court overrules a trial court decision. A point to consider in reviewing this table is that the court technically "vacates" every court of appeals opinion that is accepted for transfer, but may only disagree with a small portion ofthe reasoning and still agre.e with the result. See Ind. R. App. P. 1 1(B)(3). As a practical matter, "reverse" or "vacate" simply represents any action by the supreme court that does not affirm the trial court or court of appeals opinion. *• This does not include 37 attorney and judicial discipline opinions, 3 writs of mandamus or prohibition, or 1 opinion related to certified questions. These opinions did not reverse, vacate, or affirm any other court's decision. This also does not include 6 opinions that considered petitions for post-conviction relief 1 999] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 609 TABLE E-2 Disposition of Petitions to Transfer TO Supreme Court in 1998"^ Denied or Dismissed Granted Total Petitions to Transfer CiviP Criminar Juvenile Total 673 (92.0%) 58 (8.0%) 731 292 (90.1%) 32 (9.9%) 324 367 (93.9%) 23 (6.1%) 383 21 (87.5%) 3 (12.5%) 24 ' This table analyzes the disposition of petitions to transfer by the court. See Ind. R. App. P. 1 1(B) This table is compiled from information provided by the Indiana Supreme Court in a report entitled, "Grant and Denial of Cases in Which Transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court Has Been Sought." * This also includes petitions to transfer in tax cases and worker's compensation cases. * This also includes petitions to transfer in post-conviction relief cases. 6 1 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:599 TABLE F Subject Areas of Selected Dispositions WITH Full Opinions" Original Actions Number • Certified Questions V • Writs ofMandamus or Prohibition 3"^ • Attorney Discipline 64* • Judicial Discipline V Criminal • Death Penalty 9^ • Fourth Amendment or Search and Seizure 3'" • Writ of Habeas Corpus l" Emergency Appeals to the Supreme Court Trusts, Estates, or Probate ' Real Estate or Real Property 2" Personal Property Landlord-Tenant ibb Divorce or Child Support 3'''' Children in Need of Services ("CHINS") Paternity Product Liability or Strict Liability Negligence or Personal Injury 4"^ Invasion of Privacy Medical Malpractice Indiana Tort Claims Act 2" Statute of Limitations or Statute ofRepose 0_ Tax, Department of State Revenue, or State Board of Tax Commissioners 3^ Contracts 2"" Corporate Law or the Indiana Business Corporation Law 1" Uniform Commercial Code Banking Law P Employment Law V^ Insurance Law 2" Environmental Law Onun Consumer Law 1 nn Workers Compensation "yoo Arbitration, Mediation, Alternative Dispute Resolution Administrative Law JPP First Amendment, Open Door Law, or Public Records Law \m Full Faith and Credit Eleventh Amendment Civil Rights Indiana Constitution _ 14" " This table is designed to provide a general idea ofthe specific subject areas upon which the court ruled or discussed and how many times it did so in 1998. It is also a quick reference guide to court rulings 1999] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 611 for practitioners in specific areas ofthe law. The numbers corresponding to the areas of law reflect the number of cases in which the court substantively discussed legal issues in these subject areas. A citation list is provided in a footnote for each area. " Koval V. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. 1998). ^ State ex rel. W.A. v. Marion County Superior Court, Juvenile Div., 704 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. 1998); State ex rel. New Haven v. Allen Superior Court, 699 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. 1998); State ex rel. Bishop v. Madison Circuit Court, 690 N.E.2d 1 173 (Ind. 1998). " In re Ragland, No. 49S00-9608-DI-565, 1 998 WL 432963 (Ind. July 24, 1 998); In re Nienaber, 704 N.E.2d 457 (Ind. 1998); In re Rabb, 704 N.E.2d 117 (Ind. 1998); In re Bender, 704 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1998); In re McNeil, 704 N.E.2d 1 14 (Ind. 1998); In re Comer, 704 N.E.2d 1 12 (Ind. 1998); In re Tew, 703 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. 1998); In re Goebel, 703 N.E.2d 1045 (Ind. 1998); In re Brown, 703 N.E.2d 1041 (Ind. 1998); In re Campbell, 702 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. 1998); In re Szarwark, 702 N.E.2d 351 (Ind. 1998); In re Robinson, 701 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1998); In re Salter, 701 N.E.2d 576 (Ind. 1998); In re Hoffman, 700 N.E.2d 1 138 (Ind. 1998); In re Riddle, 700 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. 1998); In re Golding, 700 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 1998); In re Knobel, 699 N.E.2d 1 142 (Ind. 1998); In re Towell, 699 N.E.2d 1 138 (Ind. 1998); In re Puterbaugh, 699 N.E.2d 1 133 (Ind. 1998); In re Minnette, 699 N.E.2d 1 133 (Ind. 1998); In re Horine, 699 N.E.2d 270 (Ind. 1998); In re Anonymous, 698 N.E.2d 808 (Ind. 1998); In re Makin, 698 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. 1998); In re Johnston, 698 N.E.2d 313 (Ind. 1998); In re Radford, 698 N.E.2d 310 (Ind. 1998); In re O'Brien, 697 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. 1998); In re Newell, 697 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. 1998); In re Ballantine, 697 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 1998); In re Ragland, 697 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1998); In re Quinn, 696 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. 1998); In re Szarwark, 696 N.E.2d 46 (Ind. 1998); In re Brooks, 695 N.E.2d 920 (Ind. 1998); In re Blumberg, 695 N.E.2d 1 14 (Ind. 1998); In re Pope, 695 N.E.2d 1 12 (Ind. 1998); In re Hawkins, 695 N.E.2d 109 (Ind. 1998); In re Merideth, 695 N.E.2d 1 10 (Ind. 1998); In re Astbury, 695 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1998); In re Chovanec, 695 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1998); In re Fletcher, 694 N.E.2d 1 143 (Ind. 1998); In re Martenet, 694 N.E.2d 1 143 (Ind. 1998); In re Cohen, 694 N.E.2d 1 143 (Ind. 1998); In re Brooks, 694 N.E.2d 724 (Ind. 1998); In re Puterbaugh, 694 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 1998); In re Bolden, 693 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. 1998); In re Putsey, 693 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. 1998); In re Thonert, 693 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1998); In re Contempt of Mittower, 693 N.E.2d 555 (Ind. 1998); In re Barratt, 693 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1998); In re Cushing, 693 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1998); In re Haecker, 693 N.E.2d 529 (Ind. 1998); In re Taylor, 693 N.E.2d 526 (Ind. 1998); In re Antcliff, 693 N.E.2d 525 (Ind. 1998); In re Appointment of a Temporary Prosecuting Attorney in Knox County, 692 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. 1998); In re Catt, 692 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. 1998); In re Barnes, 691 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1998); In re Dinius, 691 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 1998); In re Fisher, 691 N.E.2d 1221 (Ind. 1998); In re Colman, 691 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 1998); In re Verma, 691 N.E.2d 121 1 (Ind. 1998); In re Neswick, 691 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. 1998); In re Light, 691 N.E.2d 906 (Ind. 1998); In re Wright, 690 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1998); In re Romero, 690 N.E.2d 707 (Ind. 1998); In re O'Neil, 690 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. 1998). y In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 1998). " Coleman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. 1998), affg (post-conviction relief); Miller v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1053 (Ind. 1998), affg (post-conviction relief); Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 1998), affg (post-conviction relief); Rogers v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1 172 (Ind. 1998), affg (direct appeal); Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1 132 (Ind. 1998), affg (post-conviction relief); Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745 (Ind. 1998), a#'^ (post-conviction relief); Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925 (Ind. 1998), affg and remanding for resentencing (direct appeal); Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. 1998), affg (post-conviction relief); Johnson v. State, 693 N.E.2d 941 (Ind. 1998), affg (direct appeal). " Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 1998); Cox v. State, 696 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. 1998); Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 1998). "" Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86 (Ind. 1998). 612 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:599 " Board ofZoning Appeals, Bloomington, Ind. v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. 1998); Ragucci v. Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n, 702 N.E.2d 677 (Ind. 1998). '''' Collier v. Collier, 702 N.E.2d 351 (Ind. 1998); Pond v. Pond, 700 N.E.2d 1 130 (Ind. 1998); Lea V. Lea, 691 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. 1998). " Hanson v. Saint Luke's United Methodist Church, 704 N.E.2d 1020 (Ind. 1998); Robinson v. Wroblewski, 704 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 1998); Biereichel v. Smith, 704 N.E.2d 456 (Ind. 1998); Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. 1998). " Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. 1998); Budden v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 698 N.E.2d 1 157 (Ind. 1998). 8« State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Town of St. John, 702 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind. 1998); State Bd. ofTax Comm'rs v. L.H. Carbide Corp., 702 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. 1998); State Bd. ofTax Comm'rs v. Mixmill Mfg. Co., 702N.E.2d701(Ind. 1998). ^ Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Curtis, 704 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. 1998); Trimble v. Ameritech Publ'g, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1 128 (Ind. 1998). " Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 1998). ii Kirchoff V. Selby, 703 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. 1998). ^ McClain v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 693 N.E.2d 1314 (Ind. 1998). " Foster v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 657 (Ind. 1998); Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auto- Owners Ins. Co., 698 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. 1998). ™" Shell Oil Co. v. Lovold Co., 705 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1998); Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962 (Ind. 1998). "" McKinney v. State, 693 N.E.2d 65 (Ind. 1998). "" Walkup V. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 702 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. 1998); Walker v. State, 694 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1998). pp Indiana Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co. v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 695 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. 1998). "•i WTHR-TV V. Cline, 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1998). " Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985 (Ind. 1998); Bufkin v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1 147 (Ind. 1998); Robinson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 1 146 (Ind. 1998); White v. State, 699 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. 1998); Anderson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. 1998); Budden v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 698 N.E.2d 1 157 (Ind. 1998); Sylvester v. State, 698 N.E. 2d 1 126 (Ind. 1998); Parker v. State, 698 N.E.2d 737 (Ind. 1998); Seay v. State, 698 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. 1998); Klein v. State, 698 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. 1998); Wilson v. State, 697 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. 1998); Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. 1998); Ratlifif v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1998); WTHR-TV v. Cline, 693 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 1998).