Indiana Law Review An Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 1999* Kevin W. Betz** Mark A. Lindsey*** In 1999, the Indiana Supreme Court continued to battle with a hefty docket of mandatory criminal appeals.* Although the court increased its number of discretionary cases over last year's number, it still finds itself bogged down in mandatory criminal appeals.^ The court issued 170 written opinions, 101 * The Tables presented in this Article are patterned after the annual statistics ofthe U.S. Supreme Court published in the HarvardLaw Review. An explanation ofthe origin ofthese Tables can be found in The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 93, 301-02 (1968). The Harvard Law Review granted permission for the use of these Tables by the Indiana Law Review this year; however, permission for any further reproduction ofthese Tables must be obtained from the HarvardLaw Review. We thank Barnes & Thomburg for its gracious willingness to devote the time, energy, and resources ofits law firm to allow a project such as this to be accomplished. As is appropriate, credit for the idea for this project goes to Chief Justice Shepard; but, of course, any errors or omissions belong to his former law clerk. We also thank WESTLAW® for its kind willingness to allow us free access to its computer resources and assistance in preparing these Tables. ** Attorney at Law, representing employees and professionals and practicing in the appellate area, 1997-present. Former Chief Counsel and Deputy Commissioner, Indiana Department of Environmental Management, 1995-97. Associate, Krieg DeVault Alexander & Capehart, Indianapolis, 1990-95. Law clerk for ChiefJustice Randall T. Shepard, Indiana Supreme Court, 1988-90. B.A., 1982, Indiana University; M.S., 1984, Northwestern University; J.D., 1988, Indiana University School ofLaw—Bloomington. *** Associate, Barnes&Thomburg, 1996-2000; B.A., 1993, Indiana University; J.D., 1996, Indiana University School of Law— Indianapolis. 1. MANDATORY DISCRETIONARY TOTAL 1991 109(53%) 98(47%) 207 1992 64(41%) 93(59%) 157 1993 60(44%) 77(56%) 137 1994 60(45%) 73(55%) 133 1995 46(38%) 76(62%) 122 1996 68(59%) 48(41%) 116 1997 100(58%) 71(42%) 171 1998 84(63%) 50(37%) 134 1999 101(59%) 69(41%) 170 2. The court fought this battle against an overwhelming number of mandatory criminal cases in 1998. The court is fighting the battle again. See Kevin W. Betz & Andrew T. Deibert, An Examination ofthe Indiana Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 1996, 30 IND. L. Rev. 933 (1997); see also Randall T. Shepard, Changing the ConstitutionalJurisdiction ofthe Indiana Supreme Court: Letting a Court ofLast Resort Act Like One, 63 iND. L.J. 669 (1988); Randall T. Shepard, Foreword: Indiana Law, the Supreme Court, and a New Decade, 24 iND. L. Rev. 499(1991). 1110 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33 : 1 1 09 mandatory and 69 discretionary. The amendment to the Indiana Constitution to decrease this overload ofmandatory criminal appeals will be put to voters in the coming state-wide election in November 2000. Another point of interest was Justice Selby's resignation from the court in 1999. Justice Selby was replaced by Justice Rucker.^ The following is a description of the highlights from each table. Table A. Justice Boehm proved himself to be by far the most productive member ofthe court in terms ofthe number ofopinions written. He produced 64 written opinions—^the most overall, the most criminal, and the most civil. He authored 23 more opinions than Justice Sullivan, who was the second-most productive with 41 opinions. The court as a whole issued 132 criminal opinions and 48 civil opinions. Each of the Justices either continued at his or her same level ofproduction or increased dramatically. For example, Justice Boehm went from 43 opinions in 1998 to 64 opinions in 1999. Justice Sullivan went from 29 opinions in 1998 to 41 opinions in 1999. The court also increased its number of dissents from an 8-year low of 23 in 1998 to 38 in 1999. The largest number of dissenting opinions were written by two justices—^Justice Dickson with 16 and Justice Sullivan with 11. Table B-1. For civil cases, Justice Boehm and Justice Selby were the two justices most in agreement at 87%. Justice Boehm and Chief Justice Shepard were next at 84.8%. Overall, Justices Boehm and Shepard individually were the most aligned with their colleagues and Justice Sullivan was the least aligned. Table B-2. For criminal cases. Justices Boehm and Selby were again the two justices most aligned at 96.8%. The two justices least aligned were Selby and Sullivan. Overall, Justice Boehm was most aligned with his colleagues, and Justice Sullivan was the least aligned. Table B-3. For all cases. Justices Boehm and Selby were obviously the two most alignedjustices at 93 .6%. The two least aligned were Justices Sullivan and Selby at 78.4%, and Justices Dickson and Sullivan were close behind at 79.4%. Overall, Justices Boehm and Shepard were individually the most aligned with their colleagues while Justice Sullivan was the individual justice least aligned with all of his colleagues. Table C. The court's level of unanimity remained high, at 87%, just below the 3. The voting alignment among justices reflected in Tables B-1, B-2, and B-3 does not include statistics on the alignment of the court's newest member, Justice Rucker, with his peers. Statistics on Justice Rucker were omitted due to the limited number of opinions in which he participated, in this, his first year on the court. Justice Rucker participated in at least 15 opinions during 1999. 2000] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 1111 court's 1998 level ofunanimity of88%. Once again this high level ofunanimity was primarily attributable to the less-divisive mandatory docket of criminal cases. Table D. The number of3-2 opinions tripled to nine in 1999 from a low ofonly three in 1998. The now retired Justice Selby was in the majority the most often, having been in the majority in eight of the nine opinions. Table E-1. The court affirmed almost 80% of the mandatory criminal appeals, and it affirmed only 18% of the discretionary civil appeals. Table E-2. The court increased the number of civil petitions it transferred from 32 in 1998 to 35 in 1999. The number of criminal petitions it transferred decreased slightly from 23 in 1998 to 22 in 1999. The greatest percentage change in petitions denied was in the area ofjuvenile cases. The court did not grant any petitions to transfer in juvenile cases, denying all 38 petitions it considered in 1999. A civil petition to transfer stood about a 10% chance of being granted, and a criminal petition to transfer stood about a 5% chance of being granted. Both of these rates are consistent with those in 1998. Table F. The area that drew the sharpest increased attention from the court was medical malpractice. The court disposed of 12 medical malpractice cases in 1999 after handing down zero such cases in 1998. The court also issued 1 1 negligence or personal injury cases following the issuance of only 4 last year. Once again, the court discussed Indiana Constitutional issues in 2 1 cases in 1 999. 1112 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1109 TABLE A Opinions" OPINIONS OF COURT" CONCURRENCES'^ DISSENTS" Criminal Civil Total Criminal Civil Total Criminal Civil Total Shepard, C.J. 23 8 31 3 3 6 2 4 6 Dickson, J. 19 19 1 1 2 5 11 16 Sullivan, J.' 30 11 41 8 8 16 7 4 11 Selby, J 11 13 24 7 1 8 1 1 Boehm, J* 48 16 64 8 4 12 3 1 4 Per Curiam 1 39 40 Total 132 87 219 27 17 44 17 21 38 * These are opinions and votes on opinions by each justice and those that were in per curiam in the 1999 term. The Indiana Supreme Court is unique because it is the only supreme court to assign each case to a justice by a consensus method. Cases are distributed by a consensus of the justices in the majority on each case either by volunteering or nominating writers. The chiefjustice does not have any power to control the assignments other than as a member ofthe majority. See MelindaGann Hall, OpinionAssignment Procedures and Conference Practices in State Supreme Courts, 73 JUDICATURE 209, 209 (1990). The order ofdiscussion and voting is started by the mostjunior member ofthe court and continues according to reverse seniority. See id ^ This is only a counting of ftill opinions written by each justice. Plurality opinions that announce the judgment of the court are counted as opinions of the court. It includes opinions on civil, criminal, and original actions. Also, the following four miscellaneous cases are not included in the table: Walker v. Campbell, 719 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. 1999) (order granting transfer and dismissing appeal); State v. Klein, 719 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1999) (dissent from denial ofpetition to transfer); State v. Linck, 716 N.E.2d 892 (Ind. 1999) (vacating order granting petition to transfer); Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sports, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 555 (Ind. 1999) (denying petition to transfer and striking appellant's brief in support of petition to transfer for its "scurrilous and intemperate attack on the integrity of the Court of Appeals"). " This category includes both written concurrences and votes to concur in result only. ** This category includes both written dissents and votes to dissent without opinion. Opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part or opinions concurring in part only and differing on another issue are counted as dissents. ' Justices declined to participate in the following four non-disciplinary cases; ChiefJustice Shepard declined to participate in Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child & Family Services, Inc., 718 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. 1999), Weinberg v. Bess, 111 N.E.2d 584 (Ind. 1999), and Halbe v. Weinberg, 717 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. 1999); Justice Sullivan declined to participate in Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, 715 N.E.2d351 (Ind. 1999)). 2000] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 1113 TABLE B-1 Voting Alignments for Civil Cases, Not Including Judicl\l or Attorney Discipline Cases^ Shepard, C.J. Dickson, J. Sullivan, J. Selby, J. Boehm, J. 35 35 36 39 Shepard, C.J. S D 2 37 1 36 36 39 N 46 45 43 46 P 80.4% 80.0% 83.7% 84.8% 35 32 38 40 Dickson, J. S D 2 37 1 33 38 40 N 46 48 46 49 P 80.4% 68.8% 82.6% 81.6% O 35 32 33 35 Sullivan, J. s D 1 36 1 33 33 3 38 N 45 48 45 48 P 80.0% 68.8% 73.3% 79.2% 36 38 33 40 Selby, S D 36 38 33 40 J. N 43 46 45 46 P 83.7% 82.6% 73.3% 87.0% 39 40 35 40 S 3 Boehm, D 39 40 38 40 — J. N 46 49 48 46 P 84.8% 81.6% 79.2% 87.0% t i 3 9 I ^ This Table records the number of times that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for only civil cases. For example, in the top set of numbers for Chief Justice Shepard, 35 is the number oftimes ChiefJustice Shepard and Justice Dickson agreed in a full majority opinion in a civil case. Two justices are considered to be in agreement whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of ajustice in the body of his or her own opinion. In the Table, twojustices are not treated as having agreed ifthey did notjoin the same opinion, even ifthey agreed only in the result ofthe case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement. "O" represents the number ofdecisions in which the twojustices agreed in opinions ofthe court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. "D" re|>resents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. "N" represents the number ofdecisions in which bothjustices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N." 1114 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1109 TABLE B-2 Voting Alignments for Criminal Cases, NOT Including judicial or Attorney Discipline Cases* Shepard, C.J. Dickson, J. Sullivan, J. Selby, J. Boehm, J. 120 114 84 116 Shepard, C.J. S D 120 2 116 84 116 N 132 132 94 132 P 90.9% 87.9% 89.4% 87.9% 120 110 84 117 Dickson, J. S D 120 — > 110 84 3 120 N 132 132 94 132 P 90.9% 83.3% 89.4% 90.9% O 114 110 76 109 Sullivan, J. S D 2 116 110 76 109 N 132 132 94 132 P 87.9% 83.3% 80.9% 82.6% 84 84 76 85 Selby, S D 84 84 76 6 91 J. N 94 94 94 94 P 89.4% 89.4% 80.9% 96.8% 1 116 117 109 85 •fi s 3 6 Boehm, D 116 120 109 91 J. N 132 132 132 94 P 87.9% 90.9% 82.6% 96.8% * This Table records the number of times that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for criminal cases. For example, in the top set of numbers for Chief Justice Shepard, 120 is the number of times Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Dickson agreed in a full majority opinion in a criminal case. Two justices are considered to be in agreement whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of a justice in the body of his or her own opinion. In the Table, two justices are not treated as having agreed ifthey did notjoin the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement. "C* represents the number ofdecisions in which the twojustices agreed in opinions ofthe court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. represents the number ofdecisions in which bothjustices participated and thus the number ofopportunities for agreement. represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N." 'D' 'N' 2000] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 1115 TABLE B-3 Voting Alignments for All Cases, Not Including Judicial or Attorney Discipline Cases'* Shepard, CJ. Dickson, J. Sullivan, J. Selby, J. Boehm, J. O 155 149 120 155 Shepard, C.J. S D 2 157 3 152 120 155 N 178 177 137 178 P 88.2% 85.9% 87.6% 87.1% O 155 142 122 157 Dickson, J. S D 2 157 1 143 122 3 160 N 178 180 140 181 P 88.2% 79.4% 87.1% 88.4% O 149 142 109 144 Sullivan, J. S D 3 152 1 143 109 3 147 N 177 180 139 180 P 85.9% 79.4% 78.4% 81.7% 120 122 109 125 Selby, S D 120 122 109 6 131 J. N 137 140 139 140 P 87.6% 87.1% 78.4% 93.6% O 155 157 144 125 S 3 3 6 Boehm, D 155 160 147 131 — J. N 178 181 180 140 P 87.1% 88.4% 81.7% 93.6% ~ ^ This Table records the number of times that one justice voted with another in full-opinion decisions, including per curiam, for all cases. For example, in the top set ofnumbers for ChiefJustice Shepard, 155 is the total number oftimes ChiefJustice Shepard and Justice Dickson agreed in all full majority opinions written by the court in 1999. Two justices are considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the reporter or the explicit statement of a justice in the body of his or her own opinion. In the Table, two justices are not treated as having agreed if they did notjoin the same opinion, even if they agreed only in the result of the case or wrote separate opinions revealing little philosophical disagreement. "O" represents the numberofdecisions in which the twojustices agreed in opinions ofthe court or opinions announcing the judgment of the court. "S" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in separate opinions, including agreements in both concurrences and dissents. "D" represents the number of decisions in which the two justices agreed in either a majority, dissenting, or concurring opinion. "N" represents the number ofdecisions in which bothjustices participated and thus the number of opportunities for agreement. "P" represents the percentage of decisions in which one justice agreed with another justice, calculated by dividing "D" by "N." 1116 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1109 TABLE C Unanimity, Not Including Judicial or attorney Discipline Cases' Unanimous^ Unanimous With Concurrence'' Opinions With Dissent Total Criminal Civil Total 101 30 131(72.8%) Criminal Civil Total 17 9 26(14.4%) Criminal Civil Total 13 10 23(12.8%) 180 ' This Table tracks the number and percent ofunanimous opinions among all opinions written. If, for example, only four justices participate and all concur, it is still considered unanimous. It also tracks the percent of overall opinions with concurrence and overall opinions with dissent. ' A decision is considered unanimous only when all justices participating in the case voted to concur in the court's opinion as well as its judgment. When one or more justice concurred in the result but not in the opinion, the case is not considered unanimous. '' A decision is listed in this column if one or more justice concurred in the result but not in the opinion of the court. A decision is also listed in this column if one or more justice wrote a concurrence, and there were no dissents. 2000] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 1117 TABLE D 3-2 Decisions' Justices Constituting the Majority 1 . Shepard, C.J., Selby, J., Boehm, J. 2. Shepard, C.J.. Sullivan, J , Selby, J. 3. Shepard, C.J., Dickson, J., Selby, J. 4. Shepard, C.J., Sullivan, J., Rucker, J. 5. Dickson, J., Selby, J., Boehm, J. 6. Sullivan, J., Selby, J., Boehm, J. Total" Number of Opinions" ' This Table concerns only decisions rendered by full opinion. It does not include the case of In re Lahey, 716 N.E.2d 362 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam), which although a 3-2 decision, is not a full opinion and is instead an order granting petition for reinstatement in an attorney discipline proceeding. An opinion is counted as a 3-2 decision iftwo justices voted to decide the case in a manner different from that of the majority of the court. "" This column lists the number of times each three-justice group constituted the majority in a 3-2 decision. " The 1999 term's 3-2 decisions were: 1. Shepard, C. J., Selby, J., Boehm, J.: Yoon v. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 1999) (Boehm, J). 2. Shepard, C.J., Sullivan, J., Selby, J.: Hernandez v. State, 7 1 6 N.E.2d 948 (Lnd. 1999) (Sullivan, J). 3. Shepard, C.J., Dickson, J.. Selby, J.: Shane v. State, 716 N.E.2d 391 (Ind. 1999) (Selby, J); Ellis V. Luxbury Hotels, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 1999) (Selby, J.). 4. Shepard, C.J., Sullivan, J., Rucker, J.: Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707 (Ind. 1999) (Shepard, C.J). 5. Dickson, J., Selby, J., Boehm, J.: Riley v. State, 711 N.E.2d 489 (Ind. 1999) (Dickson, J); Palmer V. State, 704 N.E.2d 124 Ond. 1999) (Dickson, J). 6. Sullivan, J., Selby, J., Boehm, J.: In re Reed, 716 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. 1999) (per curiam); Journal- Gazette Co. V. Bandido's, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446 (Ind. 1999) (Sullivan, J). 1118 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1109 TABLE E-l Disposition of Cases Reviewed by Transfer AND Direct Appeals" Reversed or Vacated "^ Affirmed Total Civil Appeals Accepted for Transfer 37 (82%) Direct Civil Appeals Criminal Appeals Accepted for Transfer 1 8 (75%) Direct Criminal Appeals 2 1 (2 1 %) 8(18%) 2(100%) 6 (25%) 78 (79%) 45 2 24 99 Total 76 (44.7%) 94(55.3%) 170" ° Direct criminal appeals are cases in which the trial court imposed a sentence of greater than 50 years. See IND. Const, art. VII, § 4. Thus, direct criminal appeals are those that come directly from the trial court. A civil appeal may also be direct from the trial court. See iND. R. App. P. 4(A). See generally iND. Original Action Rules. All other Indiana Supreme Court opinions are accepted for transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals. See iND. APP. R. 1 1(B). The court's transfer docket, especially civil cases, has substantially increased in the past five years, but declined significantly last year. See Randall T. Shepard, Indiana Law, the Supreme Court, and a New Decade, 24 iND. L. REV. 499 (1991). ^ Generally, the term "vacate" is used by the Indiana Supreme Court when it is reviewing a court of appeals opinion, and the term "reverse" is used when the court overrules a trial court decision. A point to consider in reviewing this Table is that the court technically "vacates" every court of appeals opinion that is accepted for fransfer, but may only disagree with a small portion ofthe reasoning and still agree with the result. See iND. App. R. 1 1(B)(3). As a practical matter, "reverse" or "vacate" simply represents any action by the court that does not affirm the trial court or court of appeals opinion. '' This does not include 37 attorney and judicial discipline opinions and two opinions related to certified questions. These opinions did not reverse, vacate, or affirm any other court's decision. This also does not include seven opinions which considered petitions for post-conviction relief, five opinions which considered petitions for rehearing, one order setting the date for execution of a death sentence, or one opinion which considered an interlocutory appeal in a capital punishment case. 2000] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 1119 TABLE E-2 Disposition of Petitions to Transfer TO Supreme Court in 1999' Denied or Dismissed Granted Total Petitions to Transfer Civil' 300 (89.6%) 35(10.4%) 335 Criminal' 396 (94.7%) 22 (5.3%) 418 Juvenile 38 (100%) 38 Total 734 (92.8%) 57 (7.2%) 791 ' This Table analyzes the disposition ofpetitions to transfer by the court. See IND. R. APP. P. 1 1 (B). This Table is compiled from information provided by the Indiana Supreme Court in a report entitled, "Grant and Denial ofCases in Which Transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court Has Been Sought." ' This category also includes petitions to transfer in tax cases and worker's compensation cases. ' This category also includes petitions to transfer in post-conviction relief cases. 1 120 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33: 1 109 TABLE F Subject Areas of Selected Dispositions WITH Full Opinions" Original Actions Number • Certified Questions 2" • Writs ofMandamus or Prohibition • Attorney and Judicial Discipline 33* • Judicial Discipline 4" Criminal • Death Penalty 9^ • Fourth Amendment or Search and Seizure 4^ • Writ of Habeas Corpus Emergency Appeals to the Supreme Court 3" Trusts, Estates, or Probate Real Estate or Real Property 2** Personal Property Landlord-Tenant 3" Divorce or Child Support 3'^'* Children in Need of Services (CHINS) Paternity Product Liability or Strict Liability \" Negligence or Personal Injury 1 1"^ Invasion of Privacy Medical Malpractice \2^ Indiana Tort Claims Act 1^ Statute of Limitations or Statute ofRepose 1 " Tax, Department of State Revenue, or State Board ofTax Commissioners 1^ Contracts Corporate Law or the Indiana Business Corporation Law Uniform Commercial Code 1*^ Banking Law Employment Law Insurance Law 1" Environmental Law Consumer Law Workers Compensation Omin Arbitration Administrative Law First Amendment, Open Door Law, or Public Records Law 1 nn Full Faith and Credit Eleventh Amendment Civil Rights ^oo Indiana Constitution 21PP " This Table is designed to provide a general idea of the specific subject areas which the court discussed or ruled on and how many times it did so in 1999. It is also a quick-reference guide to court rulings 2000] INDIANA SUPREME COURT 1121 for practitioners in specific areas ofthe law. The numbers corresponding to the areas of law reflect the number ofcases in which the court substantively discussed legal issues about these subject areas. ^ Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change V. Baldwin, 714 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 1999); UnitedNat'l Ins. Co. V. DePrizio, 705 N.E.2d 455 (Ind. 1999). " In re Litz, 721 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1999); In re Razo, 720 N.E.2d 719 (Ind. 1999); In re Graddick, 7 1 9 N.E.2d 1 245 (Ind. 1 999); /« re Bell, 7 1 8 N.E.2d 1115 (Ind. 1 999); In re Benjamin, 7 1 8 N.E.2d I i 1 1 (Ind. 1999); In re Puterbaugh, 716 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. 1999); In re Corbin, 716 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 1999); In re Reed, 716 N.E.2d 426 (Ind. 1999); In re Deets, 716 N.E.2d 366 (Ind. 1999); In re Wilson, 715 N.E.2d 838 (Ind. 1999); In re Van Rider, 7 1 5 N.E.2d 402 (Ind. 1999); In re Gole, 7 1 5 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1 999); In re Cable, 7 1 5 N.E.2d 396 Ond. 1999); In re Davis, 715 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1999); In re Cherry, 715 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 1999); /«re Conn,715N.E.2d379 (Ind. 1999);/nre Welling, 715N.E.2d377 (Ind. 1999);/« re CaldweII,715N.E.2d 362 (Ind. 1999);/AirgKummerer,714N.E.2d653(Ind. 1999);/«reBrown,714N.E.2d630(Ind. 1999); State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. ofTax Commr's, 714 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1999); In re Halcarz, 712 N.E.2d 964 (Ind. 1999); In re Contempt of Houston, 711 N.E.2d 33 (Ind. 1999); In re Schneider, 710 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 1999); In re Warren, 708 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. 1999); In re Siegel, 708 N.E.2d 869 (Ind. 1999); In re Norman, 708 N.E.2d 867 (Ind. 1999); In re Contempt ofCrenshaw, 708 N.E.2d 859 (Ind. 1999); In re Eager, 708 N.E.2d 584 Gnd. 1999); In re Snyder, 706 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind. 1999); In re Samai, 706 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. 1999); In re Heppenheimer, 705 N.E.2d 996 (Ind. 1999); In re Fleener, 705 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. 1999). " /«reBybee,716N.E.2d957(Ind. 1999);/nreJacobi,715N.E.2d873(Ind. 1 999); /n re Johnson, 715 N.E.2d 370 (Ind. 1999); In re Public Law 16-1995, 714 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. 1999). ' Dyev.State,717N.E.2d5and. 1999);Benefiel v. State,716N.E.2d906(Ind. 1999);Trueblood V. State, 715 N.E.2d 1242 (Ind. 1999); Statev. Price, 715 N.E.2d 331 Gnd. 1999);Rondonv.State,711N.E.2d 506 (Ind. 1999); Conner v. State, 711 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind. 1999); Harrison v. State, 707 N.E.2d 767 (Ind. 1999); Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149 (Ind. 1999); Rouster v. State, 705 N.E.2d 999 (Ind. 1999). ^ Wise V. State, 719N.E.2dll92Gnd. 1999); Vehomv.State,717N.E.2d869(Ind. 1999);Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 1999); Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 1999). - Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Wills, 717 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. 1999); GTE Corp. v. Indiana Util. Regulatory Comm'n, 715 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. 1999); Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v. Indiana Util. Regulatory Comm'n, 715 N.E.2d 351 (Ind. 1999). •* Camahan v. Moria Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 1999); Dibble v. City of Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269 (Ind. 1999). " Johnson V. ScandiaAssocs, 717N.E.2d24(Ind. 1999);Schuman v. Kobets, 716N.E.2d355 (Ind. 1999); Vernon v. Kroger Co., 712 N.E.2d 976 (Ind. 1999). ^ Glass v.Oeder. 716 N.E.2d 413 (Ind. 1999); Cowartv. White, 711 N.E.2d 523 (Ind. 1999); Yoon V. Yoon, 711 N.E.2d 1265 (Ind. 1999). "^ Estate of Shebel v. Yaskawa Elec. Am., Inc., 7 1 3 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1 999). " Serviss v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 721 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1999); Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1999); Conder v. Wood, 716 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. 1999); Ross v. Cheema, 716 N.E.2d 435 (Jnd. 1999); Ellis v. Luxbury Hotels, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 1999); Tipmont Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Fischer, 716 N.E.2d 357 (Ind. 1999); Carrie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853 Ond. 1999); Pelo v. Franklin College, 715 N.E.2d 365 (Ind. 1999); L.W. v. Western Golf Ass'n, 712 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. 1999); Vernon v. Kroger Co, 712 N.E.2d 976 (Ind. 1999); Delta Tau Delta, Beta Alpha Chapter v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1999). «8 Emergency Physicians v. Pettit, 7 1 8 N.E.2d 753 (Ind. 1 999); Halbe v. Weinberg, 7 1 7 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. 1999); Weinberg v. Bess, 717 N.E.2d 584 (Ind. 1999); Poehlman v. Feferman, 717 N.E.2d 578 (Ind.