Indiana Law Review Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Product Liability Law Joseph R. Alberts' James Petersen** Introduction The 2006 survey period' was important for Indiana judges and product liability practitioners, particularly because of some insightful and well-reasoned decisions by the Indiana Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In the twelve years since the Indiana General Assembly amended the Indiana Product Liability Act ("BPLA")^ in 1995, Indiana judges and product liability practitioners have made significant progress in refining its scope. The 2006 survey period was no different. This survey does not attempt to address in detail all of the cases decided during the survey period that Indiana product liability practitioners might fmd interesting.^ Rather, it examines selected cases that address important, * Litigation Counsel, Dow AgroSciences LLC, Indianapolis; B.A., cum laude, 1991, Hanover College; J.D., magna cum laude, 1994, Indiana University School ofLaw—Indianapolis. Chairman, Product Liability Section, Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana (1999-2001); Board of Directors, Defense Trial Counsel of Indiana (2002-Present). The authors thank Hilary Buttrick for her assistance with this Article. ** Partner, Ice Miller LLP, Indianapolis; B.A., 1970, Illinois State University; M.A., 1973, University of Illinois; J.D., magna cum laude, 1976, Indiana University School of Law—Bloomington. Past Co-Chair, Product Liability Section, Indiana Defense Lawyers' Association. 1. The survey period is October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2006, though there are a few cases that this survey article addresses that courts decided after September 30, 2006. 2. This survey article follows the lead of the Indiana General Assembly and employs the term "product liability" (not "products liability") when referring to actions governed by the IPLA. 3. Courts issued several important opinions in cases in which the theory of recovery was related to or in some way based upon "product liability" principles but the appellate issue did not involve a question implicating substantive Indiana product liability law. Those decisions are not addressed in detail here because ofspace constraints even though they may be interesting to Indiana product liability practitioners. See Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc., 452 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2006) (deciding res ipsa loquitur and related evidentiary issues); Patrick Indus., Inc. v. ADCO Products, Inc., No. 3:05cv0616 AS, 2006 WL 2579642 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2006) (determining the burden imposed by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 56 to defeat application of statute of limitations); Thomburg v. StrykerCorp.,No. l:05-cv-1378-RLY-TAB,2006WL 1843351 (S.D. Ind. June 29, 2006) (burden imposed by Federal Civil Procedure Rule 56 to show that a defendant sold, leased, or otherwise placed an allegedly defective product into the stream of commerce); Downey v. Union Pac. R.R., 41 1 F. Supp. 2d 977 (N.D. Ind. 2006) (reviewing the negligence duty associated with supplier of chattel); Parks v. Guidant Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D. Ind. 2005) (federal officer removal); Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 2006) (analyzing the relationship between workers' compensation recovery and necessity of proving a product liability case); Alii v. Eli Lilly & Co., 854 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (applying Michigan substantive product liability law after 1008 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: 1007 substantive product liability issues. This survey also provides some background information, context, and commentary when appropriate. I. The Scope OF THE IPLA The Indiana General Assembly first enacted the IPLA in 1978. It originally governed claims in tort utilizing both negligence and strict liability theories. In 1983, the General Assembly amended it to apply only to strict liability actions.'* In 1995, the General Assembly amended the IPLA to once again encompass theories of recovery based upon both strict liability and negligence.^ In 1998, the General Assembly repealed the entire IPLA and recodified it, effective July 1, 1998.^ The 1998 recodification did not make substantive revisions; it merely redesignated the statutory numbering system to make the IPLA consistent with the General Assembly's reconfiguration of the statutes governing civil practice. The IPLA, Indiana Code sections 34-20-1-1 to -9-1, governs and controls all actions that are brought by users or consumers against manufacturers or sellers for physical harm caused by a product, "regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought."^ When Indiana Code sections 34- 20-1-1 and -2-1 are read together, there are five unmistakable threshold requirements for IPLA liability: (1) a claimant who is a user or consumer and is also "in the class of persons that the seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused";^ (2) a defendant that is a manufacturer or a "seller . . . engaged in the business of selling [a] product";^ (3) "physical harm caused determining Indiana substantive product liability law did not apply); Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc. V. Mayberry, 854 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding issues involving jurisdiction and extent of protective order); Paris v. AC&S, Inc., 842 N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (deciding procedural and loss of consortium issues). In addition, because product liability cases often turn on the admissibility, credibility, and persuasiveness of expert opinion witnesses, Ervin v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 2:04CV0205- JDT-WGH, 2006 WL 1529582 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2006), is likewise a case in which product liability practitioners may be interested. 4. Act of Apr. 21, 1983, 1983 Ind. Acts 1814. 5. Act of Apr. 26, 1995, 1995 Ind. Acts 4051. See Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 487 n.2 (Ind. 2001). 6. The current version of the IPLA is found in Indiana Code sections 34-20-1-1 to -9-1. 7. Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1 (2004). 8. Indiana Code section 34-20-1-1 identifies a proper IPLA claimant as a "user" or "consumer." Indiana Code section 34-20-2-1(1) requires that IPLA claimants be in the "class of persons that the seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by the defective condition." 9. Indiana Code section 34-20- 1 - 1 (a) identifies proper IPLA defendants as "manufacturers" or "sellers." Indiana Code section 34-20-2-1(2) provides the additional requirement that such a manufacturer or seller also be "engaged in the business of selling the product," effectively excluding comer lemonade stand operators and garage sale sponsors from IPLA liability. 2007] PRODUCT LIABILITY 1009 by a product"; ^^ (4) a product that is in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous to [a] user or consumer" or to his property;'^ and (5) a product that "reach[ed] the user or consumer without substantial alteration in [its] condition."'^ Indiana Code section 34-20-1-1 makes clear that the IPLA governs and controls all claims that satisfy these five requirements, "regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought."'^ A. ''User" or ''Consumer" The language the General Assembly employs in the IPLA is very important when it comes to who qualifies as IPLA claimants. Indiana Code section 34-20- 1-1 provides that the IPLA governs claims asserted by "users" and "consumers." For purposes of the IPLA, "consumer" means: (1) a purchaser; (2) any individual who uses or consumes the product; (3) any other person who, while acting for or on behalf of the injured party, was in possession and control of the product in question; or (4) any bystander injured by the product who would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably expected use. ^"^ "User" has the same meaning as "consumer."^^ Several published decisions 10. IND. Code § 34-20-1-1(3) (2004). 11. Id. §34-20-2-1. 12. Id. § 34-20-2-1(3). Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction 7.03 sets out a plaintiffs burden of proof in a product liability action. It requires a plaintiff to prove each of the following propositions by a preponderance of the evidence: 1 . The defendant was a manufacturer of the product [or the part of the product] alleged to be defective and was in the business of selling the product; 2. The defendant sold, leased, or otherwise put the product into the stream of commerce; 3. The plaintiff was a user or consumer of the product; 4. The product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to users or consumers (or to user's or consumer's property); 5 . The plaintiff is in a class of persons the defendant should reasonably have foreseen as being subject to the harm caused by the defective condition; 6. The product was expected to and did reach the plaintiff without substantial alteration of the condition in which the defendant sold the product; 7. The plaintiff or the plaintiffs property was physically harmed; and 8. The product was a proximate cause of the physical harm to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs property. 13. iND. Code § 34-20-1-1 (2004). 14. Id. § 34-6-2-29. 15. Id. § 34-6-2-147. 1010 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: 1007 in recent years construe the statutory definitions of "user" and "consumer." ^^ A literal reading of the IPLA demonstrates that even if a claimant qualifies as a statutorily-defmed "user" or "consumer," he or she also must satisfy another statutorily-defined threshold before proceeding with a claim under the IPLA. That additional threshold is found in Indiana Code section 34-20-2-1(1), which requires that the "user" or "consumer" also be "in the class of persons that the seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by the defective condition."^^ Thus, the plain language of the statute assumes that a person or entity must already qualify as a "user" or a "consumer" before a separate "reasonable foreseeability" analysis is undertaken. In that regard, the DPLA does not appear to provide a remedy to a claimant whom a seller might reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by a product's defective condition if that claimant falls outside of the IPLA's definition of "user" or "consumer." On February 7, 2006, the Indiana Supreme Court decided Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (West Virginia), Inc.,^^ further defining and narrowing who qualifies as a "user" or "consumer" for purposes of bringing an action under the ffLA. In that case, Daniels Company ("Daniels") designed and built a coal preparation plant at a facility owned by Solar Sources, Inc. ("Solar"). ^^ Part of the design involved the installation of a heavy media coal sump.^^ An out-of-state steel company manufactured the sump that Daniels designed and sent it, unassembled, to the facility.^^ Stephen Vaughn worked for the construction company that Daniels hired to install the sump.^^ During the installation process, Vaughn climbed onto the top of the sump to help connect a pipe. The chain he was using to secure the pipe in 16. See Butler v. City of Peru, 733 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 2000) (mentioning that a maintenance worker could be considered a "user or consumer" of an electrical transmission system because his employer was the ultimate user and he was an employee of the "consuming entity"); Estate of Shebel v. Yaskawa Elec. Am., Inc., 713 N.E.2d 275, 279 (Ind. 1999) (holding that a "user or consumer" includes a distributor who uses the product extensively for demonstration purposes). For a more detailed analysis of Butler, see Joseph R. Alberts & David M. Henn, Survey ofRecent Developments in Indiana Product Liability Law, 34 iND. L. REV. 857, 870-72 (2001). For a more detailed analysis of Estate of Shebel, see Joseph R. Alberts, Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Product Liability Law, 33 iND. L. REV. 1331, 1333-36 (2000). 17. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-1 imposes liability when a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any user or consumer or to the user' s or consumer's property . . . if . . . that user or consumer is in the class ofpersons that the seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm caused by the defective condition. 18. 841 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind. 2006). 19. /J. at 1136. 20. Id. 21. Id. 22. Id. 2007] PRODUCT LIABILITY 1011 place gave way, causing Vaughn to fall and sustain injuries.^^ Vaughn did not wear his safety belt when he climbed onto the sump.^"^ Vaughn and his wife sued Daniels, alleging, among other things, "negUgent design, manufacturing, and maintenance of the sump and the processing plant," as well as a "strict Hability" claim. The trial court granted summary judgment to Daniels, concluding that Daniels owed no duty of care to Vaughn and that Vaughn was not a "user" or "consumer" under the IPLA.^^ The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for Daniels on the negligence claim, but reversed on the product liability claim based upon an expansive view of the terms "user" and "consumer."^^ The Indiana Supreme Court held that Daniels could not be liable under the IPLA because Vaughn was not a "user" or "consumer."^^ Vaughn could not be considered either a purchaser of the sump or a person "acting for or on behalf of the injured party."^^ Although the Vaughn court recognized that "use" of a product might include "installation or assembly" if the manufacturer intends the product "to be delivered to the ultimate purchaser in an unassembled state," such was not the case here because Solar ordered an "assembled and installed product."^^ Because the "product" was not assembled and installed at the time of Vaughn's accident, "neither Vaughn nor anyone else was a user of the product at the time it was still in the process of assembly and installation."^^ Practitioners should recognize here that the court addresses Vaughn' s design defect product liability claim against Daniels as if it was a "strict liability" claim.^^ The court's unfortunate use of the term "strict liability" in such a context might confuse those who seek to interpret the opinion consistent with the IPLA's requirements. To the extent that Vaughn asserted a product liability claim employing a design defect theory, it is not a "strict liability" claim because the IPLA requires Vaughn to prove, among other things, that Daniels "failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product."^^ 23. Id. 24. Id. 25. Id. 26. Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (W. Va.), Inc., 777 N.E.2d 1110, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), clarified on reh'g, 782 N.E.2d 1062 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), vacated, 841 N.E.2d 1 133 (Ind. 2006). For a more detailed analysis of the court of appeals' decision in Vaughn, see Joseph R. Alberts & Jason K. Bria, Survey of Recent Developments in Product Liability Law, 37 iND. L. Rev. 1247, 1250-57 (2004). 27. Vaughn, 841 N.E.2d at 1 133. 28. Id. at 1139. 29. Id. 30. Id. 31. Mat 1138-43. 32. See iND. CODE § 34-20-2-2 (2004); see also infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 1012 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: 1007 B. "Manufacturer'' or ''Seller*' For purposes of the IPLA, '"[m]anufacturer' . . . means a person or an entity who designs, assembles, fabricates, produces, constructs, or otherwise prepares a product or a component part of a product before the sale of the product to a user or consumer."^^ "'Seller' . . . means a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing a product for resale, use, or consumption."^"^ Indiana Code section 34- 20-2-1(2) employs nearly identical language when addressing the threshold requirement that liability under the IPLA will not attach unless "the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product."^^ Sellers can be held liable as manufacturers in two ways. First, if the seller fits within Indiana Code section 34-6-2-77(a)'s definition of "manufacturer," which expressly includes a seller who: (1) has actual knowledge of a defect in a product; (2) creates and furnishes a manufacturer with specifications relevant to the alleged defect for producing the product or who otherwise exercises some significant control over all or a portion of the manufacturing process; (3) alters or modifies the product in any significant manner after the product comes into the seller's possession and before it is sold to the ultimate user or consumer; (4) is owned in whole or significant part by the manufacturer; or (5) owns in whole or significant part the manufacturer.^^ Second, a seller can be deemed a statutory "manufacturer" and, therefore, be held liable to the same extent as a manufacturer in one other limited circumstance. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4 provides that a seller may be deemed a "manufacturer" "[if the] court is unable to hold jurisdiction over a particular manufacturer" and if the seller is the "manufacturer's principal distributor or seller."^^ 33. IND. Code § 34-6-2-77 (2004). 34. Id. § 34-6-2-136. 35. Id. § 34-20-2-1(2); see, e.g., W^illiams v. REP Corp., 302 F.3d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that Indiana Code § 33-1-1.5-2(3), the predecessor to Indiana Code § 34-20-2-1, imposes a threshold requirement that an entity must have sold, leased, or otherwise placed a defective and unreasonably dangerous product into the stream of commerce before IPLA liability can attach and before that entity can be considered a "manufacturer" or "seller"); Del Signore v. Asphalt Drum Mixers, 182 F. Supp. 2d 730, 745 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (holding that although the defendant provided some technical guidance or advice relative to ponds at an asphalt plant, such activity was not sufficient to constitute substantial participation in the integration of the plant with the pond so as to deem it a "manufacturer" of the plant); see also Joseph R. Alberts & James M. Boyers, Survey ofRecent Developments in Indiana Product Liability Law, 36 iND. L. REV. 1 165, 1170-72(2003). 36. iND. Code § 34-6-2-77(a). 37. Id. § 34-20-2-4. Kennedy v. Guess, Inc., 806 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. 2004), is the most recent case interpreting Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4 and specifically addressing the circumstances 2007] PRODUCT LIABILITY 1013 There is one other important provision about which practitioners must be aware when it comes to liability of "sellers" under the IPLA. When the theory of liability is based on "strict liability in tort,"^^ Indiana Code section 34-20-2-3 provides that an entity that is merely a "seller" and cannot be deemed a "manufacturer" is not liable and is not a proper IPLA defendant.^^ Thomburg v. Stryker Corp.,^^ is the only published decision from the survey period addressing whether or not a particular defendant is, in fact, a manufacturer or seller under the IPLA. In that case, the plaintiff, Vickie Thomburg, underwent hip replacement surgery and subsequently filed product liability and medical malpractice claims against defendants Stryker Corporation ("Stryker") and Howmedica Osteonics Corp. d/b/a Stryker Orthopaedics ("HOC")."^' Stryker moved for summaryjudgment, contending that it did not manufacture or sell the under which entities may be considered "manufacturers" or "sellers" under the IPLA. See also Goines v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 99-CV-4307-JPG, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070, at *14-*15 (S.D. 111. Jan. 8, 2002). The court, applying Indiana law, examined the "unable to hold jurisdiction over" requirement of Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4. Id. at *9. The plaintiff assumed that "jurisdiction" refers to the power of the court to hear a particular case. The defendant argued that the phrase equates to "personal jurisdiction." The court refused to resolve the issue, deciding instead to simply deny the motion for summaryjudgment because the designated evidence did not clearly establish entitlement to application of Indiana Code section 34-20-2-4. Id. at *14-*15. 38. The phrase "strict liability in tort," to the extent that the phrase is intended to mean "liability without regard to reasonable care," appears to encompass only claims that attempt to prove that a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous by utilizing a manufacturing defect theory. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-2 provides that cases utilizing a design defect or a failure to warn theory are judged by a negligence standard, not a "strict liability" standard. 39. IND. Code § 34-20-2-3 (2004). In Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 2001), the court cited what is now Indiana Code section 34-20-2-3 for the proposition that sellers in a product liability action may not be liable unless the seller can be deemed a manufacturer. Id. at 725-26. Applying that reading of what is now Indiana Code section 34-20-2-3, the court held that defendant Glidden could not be liable pursuant to the IPLA because the plaintiff failed to designate sufficient facts to demonstrate that Glidden had actual knowledge ofan alleged product defect (lack of warning labels) and because Glidden did not meet any of the other statutory definitions or circumstances under which it could be deemed a manufacturer. Id. There is an omission in the Ritchie court' s citation to what is now Indiana Code section 34-20-2-3 that may be quite significant. The statutory provision quoted in Ritchie leaves out the following important highlighted language: "[A] product liability action [based on the doctrine ofstrict liability in tort] may not be commenced or maintained." Id. at 725 (emphasis added). The Ritchie case involved a failure to warn claim against Glidden under the IPLA. Indiana Code section 34-20-2-2 makes it clear that "liability without regard to the exercise of reasonable care" (strict liability) applies now only to product liability claims alleging a manufacturing defect theory. Claims alleging design or warning defect theories are controlled by a negligence standard. See, e.g., Burt v. Makita USA, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899 (N.D. Ind. 2002); see also Alberts & Boyers, supra note 35, at 1 173-75. 40. No. 1:05-CV-1378-RLY-TAB, 2006 WL 1843351 (S.D. Ind. June 29, 2006). 41. /J. at*l. 1014 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: 1007 device that Thomburg alleged caused her injuries."^^ Thomburg cited only Stryker's status as HOC's parent company to support her claims against Stryker.'^^ According to the court, such evidence "alone is ineffectual because it ignores the 'general principle of corporate law . . . that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries.'"^"^ The record was otherwise "bereft of any evidence that Stryker sold, leased, or otherwise placed the allegedly defective hip replacement system into the stream ofcommerce.'"^^ Consequently, the court held that Thomburg' s evidence did not satisfy her summary judgment burden and granted summary judgment in Stryker's favor."^^ Fellner v. Philadelphia Toboggan Coasters, Inc.^^ also addressed the extent to which a plaintiff could maintain a product liability claim against a defendant. In that case, Tamara Fellner was killed when she was ejected from a wooden roller coaster train operated as an attraction at Holiday World, an amusement park in southern Indiana."^^ Defendant Philadelphia Toboggan Coasters, Inc. ("PTC") developed and manufactured the cars."^^ Defendant Koch Development Corp. ("Koch") owns and operates both Holiday World and the roller coaster involved.^^ The personal representative of Fellner' s estate sued PTC for "the design and manufacture of the cars" and also sued Koch "for the operation of the roller coasters."^' Plaintiff sought to "hold Koch liable for negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranties. "^^ Arguing that it was not a "seller" of a product for purposes of the IPLA, Koch moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' strict liability and breach of implied warranties against it, as well as plaintiffs' punitive damages claims.^^ The court agreed that those claims should be dismissed.^"^ There is no doubt that plaintiff sought by the so-called "strict liability" count to pursue Koch based upon 42. Id. 43. Id. at *4. 44. Id. (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 60 (1998)). 45. Id. 46. Id. 47. No. 3:05-cv-218-SEB-WGH, 2006 WL 2224068 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2006). 48. Id. at*l. 49. Id. 50. Id. 51. Id. 52. Id. The negligence claim against Koch appeared to assert that Koch: "( 1 ) failed to ensure that Fellner was safely and properly secured by the restraints . . . ; (2) failed to properly hire, train and supervise ride attendants; and (3) failed to properly test, inspect, and maintain the restraints." Id. The so-called "strict liability" claim appeared to assert that Koch failed to "provide proper and adequate warnings" about the roller coaster. Id. There was also an allegation that Koch "failed to comply with local, state, and federal regulations, ordinances, rules, and statutes applicable to amusement park rides[.]" Id. It was difficult to determine whether such an allegation was intended to support an IPLA-based theory of recovery or a common law negligence theory of recovery. 53. Id. 54. Id. at *4. 2007] PRODUCT LIABILITY 1015 manufacturing and warning defect theories. As such, those allegations are covered by the IPLA because they arise out of physical harm a product (the roller coaster in this case) caused. The IPLA, however, does not permit Koch to be sued under its provisions for physical harm caused by the roller coaster car because it was not the "seller" of the car at issue. Citing Marsh v. Dixon,^^ the court determined that an "an amusement park [that] sells tickets to individual purchasers is not the 'seller' of a product for purposes of the [IPLA]."^^ It is important for the sake of clarity to point out that the Fellner decision employs the term "strict liability" as if it is synonymous with all IPLA-based product liability claims. It may have done so because plaintiff pursued a self- styled "strict liability" count against Koch based upon both manufacturing and warning defects. Regardless, as Indiana Code section 34-20-2-2 makes clear, product liability claims relying upon an improper design or inadequate warning theory of recovery must be evaluated using a negligence standard. Warning defect claims are not subject to "strict" liability to the extent that "strict" liability means liability absent the exercise of "all reasonable care in the manufacture and preparation of the product" (i.e., liability without "fault").^^ Accordingly, regardless whether Koch was a seller of the roller coaster, plaintiff could not pursue a "strict liability" claim against Koch based upon a warning defect theory in the first instance because such claims require proof of negligence and are not "strict" in the sense that liability can be proved without regard to fault. C. Physical Harm Caused by a Product For purposes of the IPLA, "physical harm" means "bodily injury, death, loss of services, and rights arising from any such injuries, as well as sudden, major damage to property."^^ It does not include "gradually evolving damage to property or economic losses from such damage."^^ For purposes of the IPLA, "product" means "any item or good that is 55. 707 N.E.2d 998, 1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). 56. Fellner, 2006 WL 2224068 at *4. 57. iND. Code § M-lO-l-l (2004); see infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 58. Ind. Code §34-6-2-105(a) (2004). 59. Id. § 34-6-2- 105(b); see, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 749 N.E.2d 492, 493 (Ind. 2001) (holding that "personal injury and damage to other property from a defective product are actionable under the [IPLA], but their presence does not create a claim under the Act for damage to the product itself); Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ind. 2001) (holding that there is no recovery under the IPLA where a claim is based on damage to the defective product itself); Miceli v. Ansell, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (denying a motion to dismiss a case determining that Indiana recognizes that pregnancy may be considered a "harm" in certain circumstances); see also Great N. Ins. Co. v. Buddy Gregg Motor Homes, Inc., No. IP 00-1378-C-H/K, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7830, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 29, 2002) (holding that there was no recovery under the IPLA in a case involving a motor home destroyed in a fire allegedly caused by a defective wire in the engine compartment). 1016 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: 1007 personalty at the time it is conveyed by the seller to another party."^^ "The term does not apply to a transaction that, by its nature, involves wholly or predominantly the sale of a service rather than a product. "^^ D. Defective and Unreasonably Dangerous Only products that are in a "defective condition" are ones for which IPLA liability may attach.^^ For purposes of the IPLA, a product is in a "defective condition" if at the time it is conveyed by the seller to another party, it is in a condition: (1) not contemplated by reasonable persons among those considered expected users or consumers of the product; and (2) that will be unreasonably dangerous to the expected user or consumer when used in reasonably expectable ways of handling or consumption.^^ Recent cases confirm that establishing one of the foregoing threshold requirements without the other will not result in liability under the IPLA.^"^ Claimants in Indiana may prove that a product is in a "defective condition" by asserting one or a combination of three theories: (1) the product has a defect in its design (a "design defect"); (2) the product lacks adequate or appropriate warnings (a "warnings defect"); or (3) the product has a defect that is the result of a malfunction or impurity in the manufacturing process (a "manufacturing defect").'' 60. IND. Code § 34-6-2-1 14(a) (2004). 61. /J. § 34-6-2-105(b). 62. Id. § 34-20-2-1(1); see also Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Wood Fibers, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-178-TS, 2006 WL 3147710 at *5 (N.D. Ind., Oct. 31, 2006). 63. Ind. Code § 34-20-4-1 (2004). 64. See Baker v. Heye-Am., 799 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) ("[UJnder the IPLA, the plaintiff must prove that the product was in a defective condition that rendered it unreasonably dangerous." (citing Cole v.Lantis Corp., 7 14 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999))). 65. See First Nat'l Bank & Trust Corp. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp. {Mow II), 378 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2004); Westchester Fire Ins., 2006 WL 3147710 at *5; Baker, 799 N.E.2d at 1 140; Natural Gas Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Troutner v. Great Dane Ltd. Partnership, No. 2:05-CV-040-PRC, 2006 WL2873430 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 5, 2006), provides additional authority confirming that a plaintiff s product liability claim will fail as a matter of law if he or she does not articulate a legitimate manufacturing, design, or warning defect. In that case, the plaintiff was a semi-truck driver who fell and suffered head injury when a grab bar mounted on his trailer gave way. Id. at * 1 . The plaintiff sued the companies that manufactured and sold the trailer and the grab bar, alleging that they placed a trailer with a grab bar into the stream of commerce in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. Id, The case was removed to federal court, and both manufacturing defendants moved for summary judgment, pointing out that plaintiffs' own expert testified that the most likely cause of the failure of the grab bar was inadequate and negligent maintenance. Id. at *3. The plaintiff did not file a response to either 2007] PRODUCT LIABILITY 1017 Although claimants are free to assert any of those three theories for proving that a product is in a "defective condition," the IPLA provides explicit statutory guidelines identifying when products, as a matter of law, are not defective. Indiana Code section 34-20-4-3 provides that "[a] product is not defective under [the IPLA] if it is safe for reasonably expectable handling and consumption. If an injury results from handling, preparation for use, or consumption that is not reasonably expectable, the seller is not Uable under [the IPLA]."^^ In addition, Indiana Code section 34-20-4-4 provides that "[a] product is not defective under [the IPLA] if the product is incapable of being made safe for its reasonably expectable use, when manufactured, sold, handled, and packaged properly."^^ In addition to the two specific statutory pronouncements identifying when a product is not "defective" as a matter of law, Indiana law also defines when a product may be considered "unreasonably dangerous" for purposes of the IPLA. A product is "unreasonably dangerous" only if its use "exposes the user or consumer to a risk ofphysical harm . . . beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases [it] with ordinary knowledge about the product's characteristics common to the community of consumers."^^ A product is not motion. Id. at *1. Because, under such circumstances, no reasonable jury could find for plaintiff on the product liability claims, the court granted summary judgment. Id. at *3. 66. IND. Code § 34-20-4-3 (2004). One recent case discussing "reasonably expectable use" is Hunt V. Unknown Chemical Mfr. No. One, No. IP02-389-C-M/S, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20138, at *28-*32 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2003) (Homeowner tore down and burned a deck that was made from lumber treated with chromium copper arsenate. He then spread the ashes as fertilizer in the family garden. Judge Larry McKinney held that homeowner could not pursue product liability claim because his use of the lumber was not, legally speaking, foreseeable, intended, or expected.). 67. iND. Code § 34-20-4-4. 68. Id. § 34-6-2-146; see also Baker, 799 N.E.2d at 1 140; Cole v. Lantis Corp., 714 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). In Baker, a panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals wrote that "[t]he question whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is usually a question of fact that must be resolved by the jury." 799 N.E.2d at 1 140 (emphasis added). Those panels also seem to favor jury resolution in determining reasonably expected use. Indeed, the Baker opinion states that reasonably expectable use, like reasonable care, involves questions concerning the ordinary prudent person, or in the case of products liability, the ordinary prudent consumer. The manner of use required to establish 'reasonably expectable use' under the circumstances of each case is a matter peculiarly within the province of the jury. Id. It would seem incorrect, however, to conclude from those pronouncements that there exists something akin to a presumption that juries always should resolve whether a product is unreasonably dangerous or whether a use is reasonably expectable. Indeed, recent cases have resolved the defective and unreasonably dangerous issue as a matter of law in a design defect context even in the presence of divergent expert testimony. In Burt v. Makita USA, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind. 2002), the plaintiff was injured when a blade guard on a circular table saw struck him in the eye after one of his co-workers left the guard in what appeared to be in the installed position. With respect to the defective design claims, plaintiffs expert opined that the saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous by its design, suggesting that the saw could be designed 1018 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: 1007 unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law if it injures in a way or in a fashion that, by objective measure, is known to the community ofpersons consuming the product.^^ In cases alleging improper design or inadequate warnings as the theory for proving that a product is in a "defective condition," recent decisions have quite clearly recognized that the substantive defect analysis (i.e., whether a design was inappropriate or whether a warning was inadequate) should /6>//ow a threshold analysis that first examines whether, in fact, the product at issue is "unreasonably dangerous."^^ The IPLA provides that liability attaches for placing in the stream of commerce a product in a "defective condition"^^ even though: "(1) the seller has exercised all reasonable care in the manufacture and preparation of the product; and (2) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller."^^ What the IPLA bestows, however, in terms of liability despite the exercise of "all reasonable care [i.e., fault]," it then removes for design and warning defect cases, replacing it with a negligence so that the guard could be attached without tools or that the tools could be physically attached to the saw. Id. at 900. The court rejected the claim, holding that the plaintiff and his expert had "wholly failed to show a feasible alternative design that would have reduced the risk of injury." Id. See also Miller v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. IP 98-1742 C-M/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20478, at *l-*4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2002) (holding that Honeywell's design specifications for planetary gears and gear carrier assembly within the engine of an Army UH-1 helicopter were not defective as a matter of law at the time the specifications were introduced into the stream of commerce). 69. See Baker, 799 N.E.2d at 1 140; see also Moss v. Crosman Corp., 136 F.3d 1 169, 1 174 (7th Cir. 1998) (writing that a product may be "dangerous" in the colloquial sense, but not "unreasonably dangerous" for purposes of IPLA liability). An open and obvious danger negates liability. "To be unreasonably dangerous, a defective condition must be hidden or concealed [and] evidence of the open and obvious nature of the danger . . , negates a necessary element of the plaintiffs prima facie case that the defect was hidden." Hughes v. Battenfeld Glouchester Eng'g Co., No. TH 01-0237-C T/H, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17177, at *7-*8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2003) (quoting Cole, 714 N.E.2d at 199). In Hughes, the plaintiff injured his hand while separating and rethreading plastic film through a machine called a secondary treater nip station. Plaintiff admitted that he knew about the dangers associated with using the nip station because he observed co- workers who were injured performing similar tasks. Id. at *4. Plaintiff testified that he was aware of the alleged defect that caused his accident, and on two previous occasions he had filed written suggestions with his employer requesting that it reduce the risk of injury involved. Id. at *3-*4. Judge Tinder held that the dangerous condition of the nip station was open and obvious as a matter of law and entered summary judgment. Id. at *17. 70. Indeed, mBoumev. Marty Gilman, Inc.,No. 1:03-CV-01375-DFH-VSS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15467, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 20, 2005), aff'd 452 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2006) (involving an alleged design defect) and Conley v. Lift-All Co., No. 1 :03-CV-01200-DFH-TAB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15468, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 25, 2005) (involving an alleged warnings defect). Judge Hamilton followed that precise approach. 71. Ind. Code §34-20-2-1(1) (2004). 72. M§ 34-20-2-2. 2007] PRODUCT LIABILITY 1019 standard: [I]n an action based on an alleged design defect in the product or based on an alleged failure to provide adequate warnings or instructions regarding the use of the product, the party making the claim must establish that the manufacturer or seller failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in designing the product or in providing the warnings or instructions.^^ The statutory language is, therefore, clear; it imposes a negligence standard in all product liability claims relying upon a design or warning theory to prove defectiveness, while retaining strict liability (liability despite the "exercise of all reasonable care") only for those claims relying upon a manufacturing defect theory7"^ Thus, just as in any other negligence case, a claimant advancing design or warning defect theories must satisfy the traditional negligence requirements—duty, breach, injury, and causation^^ Despite the DPLA's unambiguous language and several years worth of authority recognizing that "strict liability" applies only in cases involving alleged manufacturing defects, some courts unfortunately continue to employ the term "strict liability" when referring to IPLA claims, even when those claims allege warning and design 73. Id. 74. See Mesman v. Crane Pro Servs., 409 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Under Indiana's products liability law, a design defect can be made the basis of a tort suit only if the defect was a result of negligence in the design."); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Corp. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp. {Mow II), 378 F.3d 682, 690 n.4 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Both Indiana's 1995 statute (applicable to this case) and its 1998 statute abandoned strict liability in design defect and failure to warn cases. Hence, unlike manufacturing defects, for which manufacturers are still held strictly liable, claims of design defect and failure to warn must be proven using negligence principles."); Conley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15468, at *12-*13 ("The IPLA effectively supplants [the plaintiff s] common law claims because all of his claims are brought by a user or consumer against a manufacturer for physical harm caused by a product. Plaintiffs common law claims will therefore be treated as merged into the IPLA claims."); Bourne, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 5467, at *9 n.2 ("[PJlaintiffs may not pursue a separate common law negligence claim [for design defect]. Their negligence claim is not dismissed but is more properly merged with the statutory claim under the IPLA, which includes elements of negligence."), qff'd 452 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Birch v. Midwest Garage Door Sys., 790 N.E.2d 504, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Miller v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., No. IP 9-1742-C-M/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20478, at *38 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2002), qff'd, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15261 (7th Cir. 2004); Burt v. Makita, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899-900 (N.D. Ind. 2002). 75. E.g., Conley, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15468, at *13-*14 ("To withstand summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must come forward with evidence tending to show: (1) Lift-All had a duty to warn the ultimate users of its sling that dull or rounded load edges could cut an unprotected sling; (2) the hazard was hidden and thus the sling was unreasonably dangerous; (3) Lift-All failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances in providing warnings; and (4) Lift-All's alleged failure to provide adequate warnings was the proximate cause of his injuries."). 1020 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40: 1007 defects and clearly accrued after the 1995 amendments took effect^^ 1. Design Defect Theory.—Decisions that address substantive design defect allegations in Indiana require plaintiffs to prove the existence of what practitioners and judges often refer to as a "safer, feasible alternative" design.^^ Plaintiffs must demonstrate that another design not only could have prevented the injury but that the alternative design was effective, safer, more practicable, and more cost-effective than the one at issue^^ One panel of the Seventh Circuit (Judge Easterbrook writing) has described that a "design-defect claim in Indiana is a negligence claim, subject to the understanding that negligence means failure to take precautions that are less expensive than the net costs of accidents."^^ Stated in a slightly different way, "[t]he [p]laintiff bears the burden of proving a design to be unreasonable, and must do so by showing there are other safer alternatives, and that the costs and benefits of the safer design make it unreasonable to use the less safe design."^^ Indiana's requirement of proof of a safer, feasible alternative design is similar to what a number of other states require in the design defect context. Indeed, that requirement is reflected in Section 2(B) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the related comments.^' In the specific context of the IPLA, it is clear that design defects in Indiana are judged using a negligence standard.^^ As such, a claimant can hardly find a manufacturer negligent for adopting a particular design unless he or she can prove that a reasonable manufacturer in the exercise of ordinary care would have adopted a different and safer design. The claimant must prove that the safer, feasible alternative design was in fact 76. E.g., Burt, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 900; Whitted v. Gen. Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Vaughn v. Daniels Co. (W. Va.), Inc., 841 N.E.2d 1 133, 1 138 (Ind. 2006) (cause of action accrued on December 12, 1995); Fellner v. Philadelphia Toboggan Coasters, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-218-SEB-WGH, 2006 WL 2224068, at *1, *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 2, 2006) (cause of action accrued on May 31, 2003); Cincinnati Ins. Cos. v. Hamilton Beach/Proctor Silex, Inc., No. 4:05 CV 49, 2006 WL 299064, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2006) (cause of action accrued on June 30, 2003). 77. In cases alleging improper design to prove that a product is in a "defective condition," the substantive defect analysis may need to follow a threshold "unreasonably dangerous" analysis if one is appropriate. E.g., Bourne, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15467, at *10-*20. 78. See Burt, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 900; Whitted, 58 F.3d at 1206. 79. McMahon v. Bunn-O-Matic Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1998). 80. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Wood Fibers, Ind., No. 2:03-CV-178-TS, 2006 WL 3147710, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 31, 2006). Another recent Seventh Circuit case postulates that a design defect claim under the IPLA requires "applying the classic formulation of negligence: B [burden of avoiding the accident] < P [probability of the accident that the precaution would have prevented] L [loss that the accident if it occurred would cause]." Bourne v. Marty Oilman, Inc., 452 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2006). See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Judge Learned Hand's articulation of the "B