

FROM THE EDITORS

If there is a theme to the papers in this double issue it is: "Setting Things Right."

"An 'enthymeme' is an argument—or at least a syllogism—with an unexpressed premise. Or so said Aristotle." Right? Wrong, on all three counts. Or, if not entirely wrong, certainly not exactly right. So says Antoine Braet, in a paper that breaks new ground in the puzzle of just what exactly Aristotle meant by an "enthymeme."

Douglas Walton thinks the right tack to take in giving a sound account of the vexing concept of relevance in dialectical arguments aimed at persuading one's interlocutor is by using the model of the forward and backward chaining of premises. Walton explains his solution, considers possible objections, and shows how the model works in assessing an actual argument taken from Canadian parliamentary debates.

Michael J. Wreen has written a series of papers on the *ad baculum* fallacy, but Don Levi doesn't think he's gotten it right. Far from it. Levi explains what he contends is wrong with Wreen's account, and sets out what he argues is the right account of *ad baculum*.

Percy is the student who doesn't get the idea of supporting one's contentions with arguments. Sharon Bailin argues that Robert Ennis and Harvey Siegel, in their respective accounts of critical thinking, haven't quite put their finger on what's wrong with Percy. The aim of her paper is to give the right analysis of the problem with Percy, and explain the important pedagogical implications of that account.

Our university is quite typical in its approach to teaching critical thinking and composition, at least in the courses dedicated exclusively to those objectives: the critical thinking course is taught by Philosophy and composition is taught by English. Wrong way to do it, says Donald Hatcher. Hatcher describes the method of teaching the two in combination tried at Baker University, and the results of the empirical testing carried out there that convince him of the superiority of the combined approach.

Brian MacPherson tries to show how the feminist critiques of formal logic by Nye and Plumwood haven't got the right account of the object of their criticism. He is much more sympathetic to the feminist critiques of informal logic by Ayim and Govier, which call for repair, rather than abandonment, of the object of their criticism.

In Volumes 6 and 7 of *Informal Logic*, Stephen Thomas and John Nolt engaged in a disagreement about induction. Thomas maintains his position in the latest (4th) edition of his textbook, *Practical Reasoning in Natural Language*. In his paper in this issue, David Hitchcock tells us who is right (and why).

Not content to settle the Thomas-Nolt dispute, Hitchcock also corrects Dan Goldstick's Note (*Informal Logic*, 19.1) about the origin of the technical concept of logical "soundness."

Upcoming Issues

With the next issue, Volume 20, No. 1, due out in April, we inaugurate our new feature, the *Teaching Supplement*, which will be added onto each regular issue. The editor of the *Teaching Supplement*, Claude Gratton, reports a gratifying response to his call for teaching material to be shared with our readers, but he can always use more: course syllabi. Send (hard copy and diskette): examples of assignments, tests, exams; individual examples for classroom use (with, or without, your analysis of them); discussions of textbooks and how best to use them; teaching tips for particular topics; teaching problems (with, or without, your solutions); notices of resources: upcoming conferences, workshops, other journals with useful material; ideas about faculty training or peer coaching; *etc.* Send material to (or contact) Dr. Claude Gratton, Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada--Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland Parkway, Box 455028, Las Vegas, NV 89154-5028, U.S.A. Email: grattonc@nevada.edu; Tel. 702.895.4333; Fax. 702.895.1279.

For articles, see the Back cover.