

## From the Editors

The articles in this issue all originated as papers delivered at the Third International Symposium on Informal Logic, held in June 1989 at the University of Windsor. All the contributors are new to these pages, and we are delighted to welcome them.

Professor E. M. Barth has enjoyed a distinguished career as a logician in Holland and indeed in Europe. In "In the Service of Human Society: Formal, Informal or Anti-Logical?" Barth discusses the role of logic in human affairs. In this discussion she uses as her focal point an exchange between her mentor—Evert Willem Beth—and Alonzo Church, this from a time when Beth served on the editorial board of the *Journal of Symbolic Logic*. We think our readers will be surprised and gratified to learn of Beth's concern for the role of logic in human affairs—an interest which prefigures the recent development of informal logic.

Charles Willard is a much respected author in the speech communication scholarly community. In this paper, "Authority," Willard analyzes the role of authorities within disciplines. He argues that our dependence on authority poses a dilemma: it is rational to argue from authorities and to acknowledge their expertise, yet deference to authorities has the effect of

foreclosing debate and argumentation. One solution to this dilemma is blocked, Willard argues: we cannot demand that individuals themselves achieve epistemic mastery.

Jerome V. Bickenbach was the 1989 winner of the Bora Laskin Fellowship in Canada. In "The 'Artificial Reason' of the Law," Bickenbach develops the view, stemming from John Wisdom, that the process of argument is not best understood as a chain of demonstrative reasoning but rather as presenting and representing those features which severally cooperate in favour of the conclusion.

Erik C. W. Krabbe has distinguished himself as a logician with particular interest in dialogue logic. In "Inconsistent Commitment and Commitment to Inconsistencies," Krabbe shows how dialogue logic handles the phenomenon of inconsistency, following and extending the work on inconsistency done by Rescher and Brandom, and the work of Hamblin on dialogue logic. Krabbe tables a distinction between fallacy, weakness or blunder, and quandary. Some difficulties with how to classify inconsistency are discussed.

Finally, we are pleased to publish Derek Allen's carefully drawn Critical Study of Trudy Govier's landmark monograph, *Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation*. □