Introduction: 
Deep Disagreement Reexamined 

Nearly twenty years ago, in this journal, Robert Fogelin made radical and shocking 
claims: 

... deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for 
they undercut the conditions essential to arguing. (1985, p. 5: this issue p. 8) 

... there are disagreements, sometimes on important issues, which by their 
very nature, are not subject to rational resolution. (1985, p. 7: this issue p.ll) 

Cannot be resolved through argument? Not subject to rational resolution? How 
could that be? Fogelin seemed to be rejecting a major presupposition of the informal 
logic movement (and its popular classroom application, critical thinking). If he 
was right, what would become of the field? Even more importantly, arguably, 
what could be done about deep disagreements themselves? The field and all of the 
good it meant to accomplish seemed to be threatened all at once. 

Fogelin's view has at times been attacked and defended (Lugg, 1986; Davson-
Galle, 1992), but for the most part, it has not been met head on by the community 
of scholars working on informal logic, critical thinking, or argumentation theory. 
Was Fogelin that obviously wrong? Or did we not know what he was talking 
about? Or 1S there a degree of denial here? Or have we simply had no answer? Or 
what? 

In this special issue, we reexamine Fogelin's challenge, and we hope to thereby 
spark renewed reflection on these sorts of fundamental questions. Fogelin's original 
paper comes first, followed by some attempts to weigh, cast new light upon, 
clarify, and apply some of his claims.! Feldman argues that while there is much to 
be said for Fogelin's "pessimistic" view, one need not treat deep disagreements as 
irresolvable, since even "suspendingjudgment" can be a resolution of a sort. Turner 
and Wright contend that once appropriately developed, Fogelin's modest 
conclusion-that there are deep disagreements-can be defended against criticisms 
leveled against it by Lugg (1986). With respect to Fogelin's more radical 
conclusion-that such disagreements cannot, in principle, be resolved rationally-
they remain unconvinced. 

Campolo's paper comes closer to granting both Fogelin's modest and radical 
claims about deep disagreement. The well-meaning attempt to find common ground 

© Informal Logic Vol. 25, No.1 (2005): pp. 1-2. 



2 Turner and Campolo 

at higher levels of generality, he argues, involves substantial risks to our reasoning 
skills themselves. Thus, sometimes resolution shouldn't even be attempted! On a 
more constructive note, Friemann shows how the scientific study of emotion can 
contribute to the diagnosis of deep· disagreements, and how psychotherapeutic 
techniques can be used to address them. Finally, Adams considers several recent 
controversies in bioethics that seem to be prime candidates for deep disagreements 
to explore the crucial epistemological question: How do we know when a seemingly 
intractable controversy is, in fact, a deep disagreement? 

Note 

Dale Turner and Chris Campolo 

Guest Editors 

I The references to Fogelin's paper above, and in the articles in this issue of Informal Logic, cite 
the page numbers of the original 1985 printing. In the reprint ofFogelin's 1985 paper that foHows 
on pages 3-11 below, for the convenience of readers who want to check those references, we have 
inserted a boldface number in brackets at the point where the page by that number began in the 
original 1985 printing.