Introduction: 
The Epistemological Approach to 
Argumentation-A Map 

CHRISTOPH LUMER University of Siena, Italy 

Abstract: An overvic\\ of tht: episte-
mological approach to argumentation. 
explaining \\hat it is. justifying it as better 
than a rhetorical or a consensual ist approach. 
systematizing the main directions and 
theories according to their criteria for good 
argumentation and presenting their 
contributions to major topics of argu-
mentation theory. Also. an introduction to 
the articles of the two special issues of 
Informal Logic about the epistemological 
approach to argumentation. 

Resume: On decrit l'approche 
epistemologique de I' argumentation. la 
compare aux autres approches. systematise 
scs directions principales et ses theories 
selon ses criteres d 'un bon argument, 
presente les contributions des theoriciens de 
cette approche sur les sujets majeurs de la 
theorie d·argumentation. Entin. on resume 
les articles de ce numero special d' Informal 
Logic ainsi que ceux du prochain. 

Keywords: epistemological approach. good argumentation, function ofargumcntation. 

justified belief. acceptability. epistemic accessibility. prosbatic criteria. plausibility 
criteria. relativism. fallacies. begging the question 

This introduction explains what an 'epistemological approach to argumentation' 
is, comparing it to other approaches (section 1), systemizes the main directions 
and theories within the epistemological approach according to their criteria for 
good argumentation (section 2), and presents contributions by epistemological 
argumentation theorists to major topics of argumentation theory (section 3). Finally, 
the articles of this and the following special issue of Informal LogiC are incorporated 
into the map plotted so far (section 4). 

1. What is the Epistemological Approach to Argumentation and Why 
Is It Better Than Its Rivals? 

Three full-fledged approaches can be distinguished in the current theory of 
argumentation on the basis of what they (explicitly or implicitly) assume to be the 
main purpose or standard function of argumentation. I 1. Rhetorical argumentation 
theories aim at persuasion, i.e., the output that should be reached by argumentation 
is to cause or increase the addressee's belief in the argument's thesis. The theories 

© Informal Logic VoL 25, No.3 (2005): pp. 189-212. 



190 Christoph Lumer 

of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and of Hamblin are paradigmatic. 2. Consensus 
theories of argumentation see argumentation as a means for reaching (under certain 
restrictions) consensus, i.e., shared beliefs, in an argumentative discourse. The 
most prominent consensus theories are van Eemeren and Grootendorst's Pragma-
Dialectics and Habermas's discourse theory. 3. According to epistemological theories 
of argumentation, the standard output of argumentation is knowledge or justified 
belief in the epistemological sense (Biro 1987, 69; Biro & Siegel 1992, 92; 96; 
Siegel & Biro 1997,278; 286; Lumer 1990, 43f.; 1991, 100; Goldman 2003, 58). 
Similar expressions for this goal are: "rational persuasion" (Johnson 2000, 189 2), 
"to increase the degree of reasonable confidence which one has in the truth of the 
conclusion" (Sanford 1972, 198), "to provide good reason to believe the conclusion" 
(see Feldman 1999, xiii; 12; 24), "to show another person ... that the other person 
... has a reason to believe something" (Sinnott-Armstrong 1999, 181). Apart from 
fulfilling the standard function and producing the standard output, argumentation 
can be used for other functions specific to argumentation, in particular also for 
individually inquiring about the truth of hypotheses (Meiland 1989, 186f.; Lumer 
1990, 49f.; 2005, sect. 4).3 That the three approaches are "full-fledged" shall 
mean that their inherent determination of a purpose or function is the kernel of a 
scientific paradigm because it makes it possible to systematically develop answers 
to all important questions of argumentation theory on this basis. For example, 
although Toulmin's theory is very influential, it is not full-fledged in this sense. 

Rhetorical theories have been the target of philosophical critique since antiquity, 
in particular ever since Socrates' and Plato's famous attacks. The most important 
criticism is: Since rhetoric does not strive for truth and knowledge it will often lead 
to false beliefs, i.e., disorientation about how the world is, and thus to false decisions 
with tremendously negative consequences (e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 25ge-262c; Gorgias 
452e-455d; 458e-460a; Philebus 58a-59b). And this has always been true. 4 Socrates' 
and Plato's second most important criticism of rhetoric consists in rejecting 
probabilistic reasoning, which, according to them, leads only to something similar 
to truth (Plato, Phaedrus 272d-273c; Timaeus 29bc). This, however, is false. The 
probable is not similar to truth, it may be true and mostly is, but sometimes is not. 
To forgo justified probabilistic beliefs would have disastrous consequences because, 
for instance, all assumptions about the future and thus about the various 
consequences of our options cannot be certain, with the consequence that trying 
to decide without justified probabilistic beliefs would leave us without any guidance. 
Therefore, we have to expand our epistemic goal from truth to acceptability (i.e., 
truth, high probability or verisimilitude), in spite of the risk that the acceptable may 
be false. But in order to guarantee that propositions believed to be acceptable are 
really acceptable (and thus approaching the truth as closely as possible), the 
respective beliefs have to be justified. Finding criteria for arguments that lead to 
justified acceptable beliefs is an important task for the epistemological approach. 

Epistemological argumentation theories are based on epistemological criteria 
for truth or acceptability of propositions and thus are bound to truth. Therefore, 



Introduction: Map of Epistemo!ogica,! Approach 191 

they fare much better in the respect of providing orientation. Argumentation designed 
according to epistemological standards provides a sufficiently extensive wealth of 
acceptable beliefs, i.e., (more or less) correct pictures of the world, hence good 
orientation, and thus helps us to make optimum choices. A somewhat inconspicuous 
feature that contributes significantly to this success is that epistemologically 
conceived argumentation does not only aim at acceptable belief but at justified 
belief, which implies the belief's acceptability but then adds subjective justification 
to this belief. This subjective justification (i) presupposes that one arrives at one's 
belief by checking whether some acceptability criteria of this belief are fulfilled 
(cognizing process) and (ii) it consists in remembering the kernel of this kind of 
genesis (subjective justification), e.g., from what premises a conclusion was 
inferred. A correct cognizing process obviously guarantees the belief's acceptability. 
The subjective justification helps in cases in which one arrives at inconsistent 
(justified) beliefs. This can happen because uncertain justification, of course, does 
not guarantee truth, and thus justified beliefs sometimes are false. In such cases, 
with the help ofthe memory (subjective justification), first, the more weakly justified 
belief can be identified and given up and, second, other beliefs that were based on 
it can be identified and given up as well. Thus subjective justification helps revise 
one's beliefs towards more truths. (Lumer 1990,30-43; 1991, 100.) 

Consensus theories of argumentation, like rhetorical theories, aim at the other's 
unqualified belief in certain propositions, leading to the same problem as the rhetorical 
approaches. This time, however, one has to share the other's respective belief. But 
this restriction does not change the problem. Now consensus is put before truth. 
What help can a consensus provide if the shared belief is false? The truth of a 
belief simply does not depend on someone else's sharing this belief, but on fulfilling 
the truth conditions of the proposition in question. Even the idea of consensus 
theorists that the road towards consensus has to be regulated by rules that again 
are jointly accepted does not help, as long as this consent is not based on objective 
criteria for truth and acceptabi I ity. j 

Of course, there are also objections to the epistemological approach to 
argumentation (see, e.g., Hoffmann's and Huss's contributions to this issue, as 
well as Feldman's reply to Huss). One objection is that the epistemologist is only a 
participant in the discussion like everybody else; he has no particular authority for 
deciding debates. This is true, but it is not an objection. First, the epistemologist as 
such is not interested in winning discussions. He proposes and justifies criteria for 
epistemicly valuable arguments. Ifsomeone decides to adopt them he will have the 
advantages listed above; if he decides against them he will not have these advantages. 
Of course, even the suggestions made by epistemologists sometimes are wrong, 
bad or not optimum. However, what is important is not that an epistemologist has 
made a suggestion but that this suggestion is good and justified. A further objection 
to the epistemological approach is that truth and believing cannot be distinguished; 
so insisting on objective truth as one of the conditions for argumentative validity is 
superfluous and illusive. But of course, the truth of some proposition p is different 



192 Christoph Lumer 

from believing that p. The first is defined by the truth conditions of p, whereas 
believing is a subjective state. On the other hand, the truth of p is epistemically 
present only in the form of one's own believing at the very moment that p is true. 
However, this does not amount to a collapsing of truth into belief. One can well 
distinguish, though only in a fallible way, between s's believing at time t that p and 
the truth of p. if s is not identical to oneself, or if t is not identical to the respective 
moment, and if our present belief in the truth of p is sufficiently justified. 

Many objections to the epistemological approach to argumentation are inspired 
by relativistic ideas. This is a too big topic to be dealt with here. 6 What is important, 
though, in responding to this kind of objection is to underl ine the necessity and 
existence of clear and efficient, epistemologically justified truth definitions and 
criteria as well as procedures for cognizing the truth and the criteria for good 
argumentation based on them. Only this can cut off the seemingly eternal general 
objection that some people believe this, other people believe that, where the relevant 
question is: Which beliefisjustified? And here a big research task is still waiting for 
the champions of the epistemological approach, namely to enlarge and further 
elaborate the arsenal of such epistemologica1\y justified instruments. 

2. Directions within Epistemological Argumentation Theory 

2.1. Argumentation Theories that are Epistemological in a Broad Sense 
and l0ere Epistemic Approaches 

Nowadays. with the strong influence of cognitive sciences, there is also much talk 
of "epistemic" or "epistemological" conditions, "(social) epistemology" or 
generation of "knowledge". Not every argumentation theory that participates in 
this discourse or consi('ers itself to be "epistemic" or "epistemological" is 
epistemological in the strict sense just explained. In particular it is not, if, for 
example, the term "knowledge" is used in a different sense than in normative 
epistemology, for instance to refer to the current stock of expert opinions. One 
case in point is Willard 1983. An argumentation theory that is epistemological in 
the strict sense does not only share the above outlined idea that the central purpose 
or standard function (or similar) of argumentation is to lead to knowledge and 
justified belief, it must also understand these terms in a strict normative 
epistemological sense, which relates knowledge and justified belief to objective 
truth conditions. Thus, merely considering that good argumentation has to take 
into account the addressee's epistemic situation or that argumentation stimulates 
inferences and epistemic procedures does not yet amount to an epistemological 
theory of argumentation in the strict sense. 

An illuminating case is Pinto's theory (Pinto 2001). Pinto's theory is clearly 
epistemological in a broad sense because it sees argumentation as aiming at true 
belief (ihid. 23), as inviting inferences (ibid. 36f.) and because it sees argument 
appraisal nearer to epistemology than to logic (ibid. 21 f.; 31) and seeks "epistemic 



Introduction: Map of Epistemological Approach 193 

standards" that argumentation should fit (ibid. 135). But Pinto's important 
contributions to clarifying argumentation notwithstanding, the core of his theory 
is not epistemological in the strict sense. This holds not only because of his relativistic 
ideas regarding the ultimate standards of argument appraisal (ibid. 31; 136),7 which 
is barely compatible with an objective conception of truth, but even more because 
of his discourse-theoretic conception of such standards and of truth: their 
"objectivity" is equated with interpersonal validity (ibid. 133; 135), i.e., the fact 
that they can be sustained in dialectical interchange within the broader cognitive 
community (ibid. 135; 136). This conception of discursive justification is purely 
formal and consensualistic 8 in that it takes the purpose of such standards again to 
be to settle questions about what good arguments are (ibid. 136, fn. 11). So any 
reference to objective truth and truth conditions ultimately referring to the state of 
the world is missing. And this does not fit with the ideas expressed in the justification 
of the epistemological approach, namely to provide true and acceptable bel iefs that 
help us orient ourselves in the world. 

2.2. Types of Criteria for Good Argumentation Used in Epistemological 
Argumentation The01~V 

Here several directions within epistemological argumentation theory (in the strict 
sense) shall be distinguished according to the type of criteria of good argumentation 
they propose. In order to do so, it will be helpful to first introduce such types of 
criteria in a pure form without much comment and then to present the major ideas 
behind the choice of each set of criteria. 

Hamblin (1970, 224-252) has introduced several sets of criteria for good 
argumentation, which in any case answer the same questions from a different 
perspective. The two most important subjects of these criteria are the qual ity of 
the reasons and the relation or inferential link between the reasons and the thesis. 
The following exposition focuses on these two aspects only and slightly modifies 
Hamblin's exposition. 

A: Alethic criteria: AI: The argument's reasons are true. A2: The reasons logically 
imply the conclusion (ibid. 234). 

E: Epistemic criteria: E 1: The addressee knows the reasons to be true. E2: The 
thesis follows clearly from the reasons (ibid. 236f.). 

RH: Rhetorical criteria: RH 1: The addressee accepts the reasons. RH2: The passage 
from the reasons to the thesis is of a kind accepted by the addressee (ibid. 245).') 

Because "knows" in E I is meant in the strict sense, which implies truth of the 
known, the epistemic criteria are stronger than the alethic criteria and imply them. 

Hamblin is content with the rhetorical criteria (ibid. 245), whereas from an 
epistemological point of view none of these sets of criteria is satisfactory. There 
are three problems, which then have to be resolved in an epistemologically 
satisfactory set of criteria of good argumentation. Or put positively, from an 



194 Christoph Lumer 

epistemological standpoint criteria for good argumentation have to fulfil (at least) 
three conditions of adequacy: 

AQl: Guarantee of acceptability: Fulfilment of the criteria of good argumentation 
should imply that the thesis is (at least) acceptable because good argumentation 
should lead to justified belief for the sake of having true, probable or truthlike 
beliefs. The rhetorical criteria do not fulfil this requirement. 

AQ2: Inclusion of plausible reasoning: In order to provide sufficient orientation, 
criteria for good argumentation must not be too narrow and permit only certain 
arguments; uncertain arguments with a merely plausible or acceptable thesis must 
be included as well (see the criticism of Plato in section 1). The alethic and the 
epistemic criteria do not fulfil this condition. So what Hamblin has called "epistemic 
criteria" is epistemic in a very strong sense. And we have to look for weak epistemic 
criteria. 

AQ3: Accessibility: Mere truth, acceptability, logical implication, etc., do not help; 
the argument's user must also have access to them. For example, the addressee 
must believe in the premises' truth in order to come to believe in the conclusion via 
inference. The alethic criteria do not satisfy this condition. 

So none of the sets of criteria considered so far fulfils all three adequacy 
conditions. Therefore, epistemological argumentation theorists have introduced 
new sets of criteria for good argumentation, which can be categorized as follows. 
(The following descriptions are not intended to represent the precise conditions 
developed by any single author, which of course are much more elaborate and 
sophisticated, but to reflect the main idea behind such criteria.) 

G: Gnostic or weak epistemic criteria: G 1: 1. The argumentation's addressee 
justifiedly believes in the argument's reasons. 2. And he has no further information 
that would defeat that argument. G2: It is reasonable for the addressee to proceed 
from believing in the reasons to believing in the argument's thesis.lo Note that 
these criteria speak of an argument and an addressee and more implicitly of a time 
too. So they define 'good argument' (or 'good argumentation') as a triadic notion: 
'a at time t is a good argument for person s' (or 'to address argument a at time t to 
person s is good argumentation '). 

PL: Plausibilist criteria: PL I: 1. The argument's reasons are true or, in uncertain 
arguments, acceptable on some database d. 2. In uncertain arguments, the reasons 
respect all the relevant information of the database d. 11 PL2: The reasons' truth or 
acceptability, according to an effective epistemological principle, implies the thesis's 
acceptability. Such epistemological principles, e.g., are deductive and inductive 
implication, probability calculus and definition of 'expected utility'. Plausibilist 
criteria define 'good argument' as a dyadic notion: 'a is a good argument on 
database d', where the reference to the database can be omitted for certain 
arguments. 

P R: Prosbatic criteria (Greek "prosbatos" means accessible): PR 1: 1. The addressee 
justifiedly believes in the argument's reasons. 2. In case of uncertain arguments, 



Introduction: Map of Epistemological Approach 195 

his database must be identical to that of the argument. PR2: 1. The addressee (at 
least implicitly) knows the argument's underlying epistemological principle, and 2. 
its application in the argument is clear to him. Prosbatic criteria define 'good 
argumentation' as a quadradic notion: 'to address argument a (with database d) at 
time t to person s is good argumentation', where reference to the database may be 
omitted in case of certain arguments. 

RE Responsibilist criteria: RE 1: 1. The arguer justifiedly believes in the reasons. 
2. In case of uncertain arguments the arguer does not dispose offurther information 
relevant to the implication. RE2: 1. The arguer justifiedly believes that the reasons' 
acceptability, according to an effective epistemological principle, implies the thesis' 
acceptability. 2. Because of these beliefs the arguer believes in the thesis. 

Some implications: Fulfilment of the plausibilist criteria always implies the thesis's 
acceptability (PL ~ AQl), whereas fulfilment of the gnostic and the responsibilist 
criteria nearly always implies the thesis's acceptability (G; RE -> AQ1). Obviously, 
all four sets of criteria are designed to include plausible reasoning (G; PL; PR; RE 
~ AQ2). Fulfilment of the gnostic and ofthe prosbatic criteria in each case implies 
accessibility for the addressee and thus fulfilment of the rhetorical criteria (G; PR 
~ AQ3&RH). This is the lesson epistemologists have learned from rhetoric. 
Fulfilment of the responsibilist criteria, on the other hand, implies accessibility for 
the arguer (RE ~ AQ3), and it mostly implies acceptability for the arguer (RE -> 
AQ1). Plausibilist and prosbatic criteria taken together imply the gnostic criteria 
(PL&PR ~ G), whereas the opposite does not hold because the former criteria 
are much more specific about the argument's structure. 

Some ideas behind these types of criteria are as follows. All four sets of criteria 
use concepts such as 'justified belief', 'acceptable', 'epistemological principle', 
i.e., weakenings with respect to 'knowledge', 'true' and 'deductive implication', 
and include special conditions for encompassing uncertain, plausibilist argumentation 
as well. The gnostic criteria then try to fulfil the other two adequacy conditions, 
i.e., acceptability and accessibility, in one go. Therefore, gnostic criteria have to be 
situational; they do not define the 'goodness of argument (as such)'. of course 
from an epistemological point of view, but only 'goodness of an argument in a 
certain situation (which is characterized by a person and a specific time)'. Gnostic 
criteria do not establish direct conditions for the argument's structure, and they 
lean heavily on the concepts 'justified belief' or 'reasonable', which have to do the 
main work to provide restrictions for the argument's structure. This has several 
disadvantages. The criteria for good argumentation do not help in constructing 
arguments; they do not help in explaining how argumentation leads to justified 
belief; they do not tell us if the argument may, perhaps, be useful in another situation. 

Plausibilist and prosbatic criteria, on the other hand, belong together in that 
for good argumentation both sets of criteria have to be fulfi lied. They accommodate 
the two adequacy conditions in two steps. Satisfying the plausibilist criteria 
guarantees acceptability; satisfying the prosbatic criteria guarantees accessibility. 



196 Christoph Lumer 

The plausibilist criteria are structural and refer only to the argument (and a database), 
whereas the prosbatic criteria are situational and refer also to the addressee and 
time. So both sets of criteria taken together make up a structural-situational theory. 12 
The structural, plausibilist criteria may be considered as defining an instrument, 
i.e., the argument, that in principle is apt to fulfil the standard function of 
argumentation. The situational, prosbatic criteria, on the other hand, can be seen 
as rules for using this instrument: In which (epistemic) situation can the instrument 
be used to really fulfil the standard function? 

This kind of subdivision into two sets of criteria has several advantages. I. It 
immediately makes clear how the two adequacy conditions are fulfilled. 2. The 
structural criteria give precise indications on how to construct an argument. 3. 
And these arguments are designed in such a way as to describe what the addressee 
has to examine for cognizing the thesis's acceptability. So they can guide the 
addressee's process of cognizing. The prosbatic criteria only guarantee that the 
addressee can really undertake this examination. 4. This kind of division of labour 
also makes clear why good argumentation is not relativistic, even though it is 
adapted to the addressee: the argument is objective, but the prosbatic choice as to 
which argument to use reflects the addressee's epistemic situation. 5. The 
subdivision makes clearer why some argumentation is fallacious, and it also 
subdivides fallacies into fallacies of the argument itself and fallacies of usage. So it 
can reveal that the argument itself may be good and useful in some other situation, 
even though it was not good to use this argument for convincing this particular 
addressee. (See Lumer 2005, sect. 6.) 

Responsibilist criteria are situational (like the gnostic criteria). But they differ 
from both the gnostic and the plausibilist-prosbatic criteria in a much more 
fundamental way, namely with regard to the way of argumentations 'functioning 
for which they are designed. To provide justified belief is the standard function of 
all kinds of epistemologically conceived argumentation, but the sets of criteria 
differ as to how they make it fulfil this function. Plausibilist-prosbatic and gnostic 
criteria design argumentation in such a way as to lead to justified belief by gUiding 
the addressee~' cognizing: The argumentation invites the addressee to infer the 
thesis from the premises and the addressee follows this invitation (Pinto 2001, 
36f.). More precisely, what happens is this. The argument's reasons state the 
fulfilment of a set of acceptability conditions of the thesis, e.g., that certain premises 
are true and that they logically imply the thesis, which together imply that the 
thesis is true, hence acceptable. The addressee now examines whether these 
conditions are fulfilled (i.e., if the premises are true and if they imply the thesis) 
and then if their fulfilment amounts to the thesis' acceptability. For this second 
part of his examination the addressee must know the epistemological principle on 
which the argument is based-in our example it is the deductive principle, which 
says that a proposition is true if it is logically implied by true premises-and he 
must find out if the conditions stated in the argument's reasons are a concretization 
of this principle; and 'the thesis c is true if the reasons r

l
, ••• , r" are true and 



Introduction: Map of Epistemological Approach 197 

logically imply c' obviously is a concretization of the deductive epistemological 
principle. If these examinations yield a positive result, the addressee has confirmed 
the thesis's acceptability and he can rationally believe in it. In a nutshell, "guiding 
the addressee's cognizing" means: the argument (truthfully) states sufficient 
acceptability conditions for the thesis to be fulfilled; and the addressee checks 
whether this is so-thus following the course of the argument's reasons in his 
cognizing. (Lumer 1990, 45-48: 280-281; 1991, 102-104; 2005, sect. 5.) 

Responsibilist criteria, on the other hand, are fit to regulate a different manner 
of argumentation leading to justified belief: authority-based cognizing. By 
expounding the argument the arguer presents himself not only as informant (about 
the thesis) but also as someone who has cognized the thesis's acceptability relying 
on the expounded reasons (see Goldman 1999, 132f.). Now, the responsibilist 
criteria do not require that the addressee justifiedly believe in the reasons, etc So 
let us assume that he does not. What then happens is this. The addressee cannot, 
on the basis of his knowledge, confirm that the reasons are acceptable; perhaps he 
cannot even follow exactly the course of the argument because he does not have 
sufficient knowledge about this type of argument (e.g., the epistemological principle) 
or because the single steps are too difficult for him or because of similar reasons. 
But the addressee gets a favourable impression of the argument and of the arguer's 
competence in these matters. Therefore he accepts the arguer as an authority in 
this field, the argument as probably good and the thesis as acceptable. The rationale 
behind his reasoning is a statistical inference: an authority in this field will mostly 
rely on good arguments, and the authority'S opinions will mostly be true, therefore 
the thesis is probably true (Goldman 1999, 133). It is characteristic for authority-
based cognizing that in his cognizing the addressee does not (really) follow the 
course of argument; 13 he cannot really check it. In place of this, he relies on the 
arguer's competence. This burdens the arguer with a particular epistemic 
responsibility with respect to the addressee. If the arguer wants to do justice to 
this responsibility, he has to fulfil the responsibilist criteria. 

As the statistical argument shows authority-based cognizing is epistemically 
rational, in particular in situations where a (relative) lay audience is confronted 
with complex expert reasoning, e.g., TV viewers listening to an expert debate, 
parliamentarians, judges or jury members listening to expert witnesses. And because 
of this rationality the addressee's resulting belief in the thesis is justified. However, 
the justification is weak and secondary, namely based on the authority'S primary 
cognition. The addressee's (hearer's) subjective probability of the thesis (claim) 
should be identical to that of the arguer (speaker) multiplied by the addressee's 
estimate of the arguer's reliability (i.e., the addressee's rational degree of trust): 
Ph(c) = P,Cc).Ph(r), with PJr)<I, of course. So after authority-based cognizing 
the addressee's rational probability of the thesis must be lower than that of the 
arguer, whereas argument-guided cognizing leads, on the average, to the same 
probability of the thesis as that of the arguer (the probability may be higher, for 
instance, if the addressee attributes higher probabilities to the reasons than the 



198 Christoph Lumer 

arguer, and it may be lower in the opposite case). Authority-based cognizing, 
unlike argument-guided cognizing, does not really exploit the argument's potential 
for providing the opportunity to check the thesis' acceptability. In this respect it is 
an improper use of arguments; in extreme cases the same result can be achieved 
by some argumentative hullabaloo, though with the risk that the addressee detects 
some parts of it as being false or senseless and therefore distrusts the arguer 
completely. (In this respect the safest argumentative "magic" is sound arguing 
itself.) 

In addition to regulating argumentation aimed at authority-based cognizing, 
responsibilist criteria of good argumentation may serve as complementing conditions 
for argumentation aiming at justification transmission (Goldman 1997, 161 f.). 
Guiding the addressee's cognizing the thesis by itself presupposes only fulfilment 
of the gnostic or plausibilist-prosbatic criteria but not fulfilment of the responsibilist 
criteria. For example, possibly the arguer does not believe in some of the argument's 
reasons or does not have a justification for them, or he may formulate only a 
hypothetical argument, or (in case of solipsistic argument invention and 
argumentation used for inquiry) there is no arguer at all; all this does not undermine 
the addressee's cognizing the thesis (see Feldman 1994, 170). However, if an 
arguer wants to transfer knowledge or justified belief as such, he has to fulfil the 
responsibilist criteria in addition to the gnostic or plausibilist-prosbatic criteria. 
Why? Apart from the mere semantic reason that otherwise there would not be any 
transfer of justified belief, the deeper rationale is that of an interpersonal enterprise 
of knowledge improvement. If someone's argumentation (addressed to another 
person) is, as the arguer knows, good for the addressee (the gnostic or plausibilist-
prosbatic criteria are fulfilled) but not for the arguer (the responsibilist conditions 
are not satisfied), then the arguer must have some relevant information that the 
addressee does not have. To improve the addressee's epistemic situation, the arguer 
should introduce this piece of information in the discourse and hence change his 
argument. 

2.3. Epistemological Argumentation Theorists and Their Criteria of 
Good Argumentation 

The last subsection has provided a rough map of the physical geography of general 
epistemological argumentation theories. Now human locations and political 
boundaries have to be plotted on it. 

Feldman and Pinto have developed gnostic criteria for good argumentation. 
Feldman defines: "An argument is a good argument for person S if and only if: 
[G 1.1 F] (i) S is justified in believing the conjunction of all the premises of the 
argument; [G2F] (ii) S is justified in believing that the premises are "properly 
connected" to the conclusion; and [G 1.2F] (iii) the argument is not defeated for 
S." (Feldman 1994, 179.) [Note: The insertions in square brackets are mine 



Introduction: Map of Epistemological Approach 199 

(Christoph Lumer), and indicate to which of the above criteria Feldman's criterion 
corresponds. For example, "G 1.1 F" means: Feldman's version of the gnostic 
criterion G 1.1.] Condition (ii) (=G2F) does not really fit in that it aims only at 
acceptability (AQ 1) but not at accessibility (AQ3). Pinto formulates weak epistemic 
conditions for good argumentation: "[G 1 P] (WE 1) The premisses must be 
reasonable to believe. [G2P] (WE2) It must be reasonable to infer the conclusion 
from the premisses" (Pinto 2001, 23). Unfortunately, "reasonable" is very, very 
vague; it should cover acceptability as well as accessibility. 

Johnson and Lumer adhere to structural-situational criteria of good 
argumentation. Johnson defends a mixture ofalethic and plausibilist criteria together 
with prosbatic criteria: A I J: The premises are true (see Johnson 2000, 198). PL2J: 
The premises are adequate and provide sufficient support for the conclusion (ibid. 
204). PRI. IJ: The addressee has rationally accepted all the premises (ibid. 1.95). 
In addition, Johnson requires "relevance" (ibid. 200-204), which is not very clear 
and may be interpreted as serving several functions: PL 1.2: taking into account all 
the relevant information of the database; PR 1.2: the addressee has no further relevant 
information. Aside from the fact that Johnson's criteria do not include a version of 
PR2, the insertion of an alethic requirement for the premises is problematic. It 
excludes for example arguments with explicitly probabilistic premises. 

Lumer proposes a plausibilist-prosbatic criterion for good argumentation. He 
defines 'argumentatively valid argument' (which is his generalized concept of a 
sound argument) in plausibilist terms and adds prosbatic adequacy criteria to this 
for their use for rational convincing. (Lumer 1990, 58 f.; 1991, 104; 2000, 410-
412.) (These criteria are a bit long to be quoted here in full; but they are included 
in this issue: Lumer 2005, sect. 8.) An interesting feature of these criteria is that 
they do not conceptualize the relation between the argument's reasons and the 
thesis in terms of'inference' or '(logical) implication' but they use the more general 
concept of cognizing as checking whether the conditions of an acceptability criterion 
for the proposition in question are fulfilled. Lumer calls the general versions of 
such acceptability criteria of a certain type of propositions "epistemological 
principles" and distinguishes types of argumentation according to the epistemological 
principle they are based on. Such epistemological principles are identical to or have 
to be justified with reference to truth definitions for various types of propositions. 
(Including these epistemological principles in the argument's reasons would not 
turn the argument into a deductive argument because the fulfilment of such principles 
usually cannot be positively proved.) This more general approach makes it possible 
to cover also argument types that usually are neglected in current argumentation 
theory, e.g., practical arguments based on definitions of 'expected utility', 
probabilistic arguments or arguments for empirical theories. 

Though Biro and Siegel have not developed explicit general criteria for good 
argumentation they defend a conception (mainly elaborated for capturing question-
begging arguments) that stresses the importance of "objective", i.e., plausibilist 



200 Christoph Lumer 

criteria (Biro 1977; 1984; 1987; Biro & Siegel 1997,278; 2006). Although they 
recognize that a good (according to objective, plausibilist criteria) argument may 
be used in a pointless or circular way (Biro & Siegel 2006, section 2)-this is their 
tribute to accessibility (AQ3)-they tend to go along with the plausibilist criteria 
alone as far as possible and do not formulate prosbatic criteria. Though this strategy 
is unobjectionabl~ in principle, as long as the need for a prosbatic complement is 
acknowledged, it has caused misunderstandings. An attempt to spell out 'good 
argumentation' in terms of plausibilist criteria for arguments alone, of course, 
would be a non-starter. Probably the current debate would give rise to fewer 
misunderstandings if Biro and Siegel said this more prominently and worked out 
prosbatic criteria. 

Goldman has developed a combination of (mainly) responsibilist and prosbatic 
criteria: RE1.IG: The arguer justifiedly believes in the premises; RE2.2G: he believes 
in the conclusion; PL2G: and the (explicit and implicit) premises jointly provide 
strong support for the conclusion (Goldman 1999, 134; 1994. 34). Originally he 
also added four conditions. RE2.1 G: The arguer justifiedly believes that the (explicit 
and implicit) premises (together) strongly support the conclusion (1994, 34f.; 36). 
The audience does not believe in the conclusion (1999, 136) 14 RHIG. but in the 
premises (1999, 137; 1994,37). PR2.2G: the premises-conclusion relationship is 
explained in a fashion that promotes its comprehension by the audience (1999, 
138).15 And PR1.2G: the audience has no defeater for the argument (ibid., 139).16 
Apart from some lacunae (RE1.2, PR1.l, PR2.1) and blends of conditions from 
different criteria series (PL2G instead of or in addition to RE2.1 G; RH 1 G instead 
of PR 1.1), two things are surprising about Goldman's criteria. The first is the lack 
of plausibilist criteria. Although he mentions them (1999, 135; 1994,27), he does 
not include them in his list of criteria for good argumentation. And second, above 
all, is the combination of more or less responsibilist criteria with more or less 
prosbatic criteria. The latter is surprising because these two kinds of criteria are 
designed for different ways in which persuasive argumentation can achieve its 
purpose: responsibilist criteria suit authority-based cognizing, prosbatic criteria 
are one half of the criteria suited to argumentation-guided cognizing (see above, 
sect. 2.2). (Feldman has claimed that the responsibilist criteria were not necessary 
for rational persuading (Feldman 1994, 170).) Indeed, Goldman seems to mix 
these two ways of functioning. On the one hand, he compares argumentation-
based cognizing with information by a testimony and its veritistic value (1999, 
132f.); on the other hand, he refers to the usual, cognition guiding way offunctioning 
(ibid., 137f.), which though, apart from the prosbatic criteria, also requires plausibilist 
criteria. This kind of mixing is a bit astonishing because Goldman himselt~ in 
another publication, nicely distinguishes between what here has been called "guiding 
cognizing by argumentation" (Goldman calls it "justification creation") and 
justification transmission, i.e., guiding cognizing by argumentation plus the arguer's 
adherence to the justification (Goldman 1997, 161f.). (On this occasion, for 
regulating argumentation that guides cognizing he uses Feldman's (1994, 179) 



Introduction: A1ap of Epistemological Approach 201 

gnostic criteria (Goldman 1997, 1600.) So it is not clear why he later requires 
fulfilment of the responsibilist criteria for all kinds of good argumentation. 

3. Contributions of the Epistemological Approach to Various Topics of 
Argumentation Theory 

Even though the epistemological approach is a full-fledged approach to argumentation 
such that its systematic elaboration should provide answers to all questions of 
argumentation theory much of this elaboration is still missing. The following list 
tries to sketch a bit of what supporters of the epistemological approach have done 
in various fields of argumentation theory beyond developing general criteria for 
good argumentation on the basis of a function analysis (see sect. 1; 2.2.-2.3). 
Implicitly this will also be a list of desiderata for further research. 

Aims of argumentation theory and methodology: Battersby (1989) and Weinstein 
(1994)17 see critical thinking as "applied epistemology" (analogously to "applied 
ethics"); consequently they have centred their respective research on finding truth 
criteria in different areas. Although this may hold for critical thinking and 
argumentation theory urgently needs appl ied epistemology as its basis, it does not 
capture the specialities of argumentation. Johnson gives a rather generic 
characterisation of "informal logic" (which may be treated as his term for 
"argumentation theory") as: "branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal 
standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation. evaluation, criticism 
and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse" (Johnson 1999, 270). 
(The restriction to everyday discourse seems to be :lrbitrary. and to call it a "branch 
oflogic" presupposes an understanding of "logic" that is quite different from the 
usual.) Lumer outlines more specific tasks for argumentation theory as a theory 
that is based on logic and epistemology: determining aims and Illethodology of 
argumentation theory, function analysis of argumentation, criteria for deductive 
and other types of argumentation, fallacy theory, interpretation of argumentation. 
embedding of argumentation in discourses (Lumer 1990, 1-7; 2000b, 58-69). In 
addition he proposes (and then applies) a precise double methoJology for 
argumentation theory: 1. an idealizing hermeneutics, which tries to elicit the desired 
information from ideal forms of argumentation, and 2. an instrumentalist 
methodology, which designs criteria for good argumentation as instruments fulfilling 
the standard function of argumentation (1990, 7-21; 1995). A ithough Pinto. too. 
recognizes the superiority of an instrumentalist approach. he then uses an intuitionist 
methodology (Pinto 200 J, 23). A sophisticated intuitionist methodology is also 
used by Siegel & Biro, who look for the best explanation of our prl'-theoretic 
judgemems about argumentation (Siegel & Biro 1997, 28). 

Single argument types: Even if the general criteria for good argumentation in 
principle are sufficient in a certain sense for designing and evaluating all types of 
argumentation, doing this is, by no means, a trivial task. It is not triVial because the 
general criteria do not identify the various epistemological principles used in the 



202 Christoph Lumer 

different types of arguments (the plausibilist criteria contain only an existential 
quantification over epistemological principles (see PL2), and the gnostic criteria 
are still less informative in this respect (see G2)); and establishing and justifying 
such principles often is a good piece of theoretical work. Weinstein (1994, 142 f.; 
149) has stressed this point. Therefore, for all practical purposes it is nearly 
indispensable to use quality criteria for single argumentation types that are based 
or specific epistemological principles. Criteria for different argumentation types at 
the moment have been elaborated in epistemological argumentation theory to a 
highly varying extent. Criteria for good deductive arguments have been developed 
by Feldman (1999, 61-80; 94-100) and Lumer (1990, 180-209). Although a general 
theory of probabilistic argumentation is still missing, criteria for certain subtypes 
have been developed: for genesis of knowledge arguments (which try to show that 
the thesis has been correctly verified by someone), which include arguments from 
testimony and from authority (Goldman 1999, 103-130; Feldman 1999, 216-232; 
418; Lumer 1990, 246-260), for interpretative arguments (which try to establish 
the causes for known facts and circumstantial evidence through inference to the 
best explanation based on Bayes's Theorem) (Lumer 1990, 221-246), for some 
statistical types of arguments (Feldman 1999, 232-327). Criteria for the truth of 
scientific theories have been proposed by Weinstein (2002; 2006) and Goldman 
(1999,238-250), and Feldman proposes criteria for arguments to causal relations 
(Feldman 1999, 277-327). Practical arguments about the desirability of states of 
affairs and about optimum courses of action have been proposed by Feldman 
(1999, 351-354; 420) and Lumer (1990, 319-433). Pascal arguments are 
applications of practical arguments; they are based on rational decision theory and 
are arguments under complete uncertainty in favour of treating a thesis as true; 
criteria for Pascal arguments have been developed by Lumer (1997). A strategy 
for developing non-cognitivist ethical arguments for fundamental moral principles 
has been proposed by Lumer (2000c, 30-46). 

Interpretation of argumentation: Epistemologically designed criteria for good 
argumentation, in the first place, describe ideal arguments and their use. In order 
to be able to assess everyday argumentation by these standards the expressed 
arguments have to be brought in an ideal form by interpretation. Tools for interpreting 
arguments have been elaborated by Feldman (1999, 113-166) and Lumer (2003). 

General fallacy theory: According to the epistemological approach, fallacy 
theory is only the negative counterpart of the positive criteria for good argumentation. 
Fallacies, roughly, are arguments or uses of arguments violating these standards. 
Because there are some diverging main directions in positive epistemological 
argumentation theory (see above, section 2) corresponding lines in fallacy theory 
can be developed. Fogelin & Duggan, e.g., propose agnostic definition of 'fallacy' 
as: "general procedure (or what have you) used for the fixation of beliefs that has 
an unacceptably high tendency to generate false or unfounded beliefs relative to 
that procedure for fixing beliefs" (Fogelin & Duggan 1987,257).18 Siegel & Biro 



Introduction.' Map of Epistemological Approach 203 

have criticized this characterization from a plausibilist viewpoint: it binds fallacies 
to irrelevant psychological features and disregards plausibilist criteria ofthe thesis' 
acceptability (Siegel & Biro 1997, 279). According to their own approach (ibid., 
285-289), "fallacies fail as arguments because they fail, for systematic reasons, to 
render belief in their conclusions rational" (ibid., 285). Unfortunately, Siegel & 
Biro do not specify this idea that much. Lumer proposes a plausibilist-prosbatic 
theory, and hence distinguishes two big classes of fallacies, fallacies of what he 
calls "argumentative validity", i.e. structural fallacies of the argument itself(Lumer 
2000a, 412-418), and fallacies of adequacy, which regard the situational use (ibid., 
418-420); and he defines dozens of classical and new fallacies as specific violations 
of his general criteria of good argumentation. 

Special fallacy theory. Begging the question: Begging the question is the special 
fallacy that has gained the most attention among epistemological argumentation 
theorists, and there is a lively debate about its definition. The reason for this is that 
begging the question clearly shows that alethic and plausibilist criteria are not 
sufficient for defining 'good argumentation' and that epistemic conditions have to 
be fulfilled as well. Sanford (1972; 1981; 1988), Goldman (1999,151; 2003, 54) 
and Sinnott-Armstrong (1999) defend gnostic criteria, which define 'begging the 
question' in situational terms of the user's justified beliefs. A typical definition is: 
an argument formulated for s' benefit begs the question either if s believes one of 
the premises only because he already believes in the conclusion or if s would 
believe one of the premises only if he already believed the conclusion (Sanford 
1972, 189). Biro and Siegel propose plausibilist criteria, which define 'begging the 
question' as a structu(al feature of the argument itself, namely, along the lines that 
it generally (and not only for a specific person) is impossible to justifiedly believe 
in one premise without already justifiedly believing in the conclusion (Biro 1977; 
1984,242; 1987, 67f.; Biro & Siegel 1992; 2006). lacquette (1993,322) and 
McGrath (1995, 351) have developed similar definitions. Biro and Siegel criticize 
Sanford's criterion as psychologistic and neglecting the argument's objective 
features. Sanford replies that Biro's criterion in a grossly counterintuitive way (i) 
counts some question begging argumentations as impeccable and (ii) some instances 
of good argumentation as begging the question (Sanford 1988, 33-35). Lumer 
proposes a plausibilist-prosbatic criterion, which distinguishes two kinds of begging 
the question: the strict petitio is a fallacy of the argument itself and it is defined 
similar to Biro's & Siegel's 'begging the question' (Lumer 2000a, 417); the soft 
petitio is a fallacy of the argument's use, namely (approximately) that the addressee 
does notjustifiedly believe in (at least) one of the argument's reasons and that his 
most obvious attempts to cognize this reason go via the thesis (Lumer 2000a, 
418f.) The strategy to distinguish strict and soft petitio could resolve the dispute 
between Sanford and Sinnott-Armstrong on the one hand and Biro and Siegel on 
the other insofar as the extensions of what both parties regard as 'begging the 
question' may turn out to be identical. '9 



204 Christoph Lumer 

Special fallacy theory. otherfallacies: Several other fallacies (or alleged fallacies) 
have been discussed from some epistemological point of view e.g.: argumentum 
ad homiliem (Siegel & Biro 1997, 285-289; Goldman 1999, 152 f.), argument 
from authority (Lumer 1990, 256f. (246-260); Siegel & Biro 1997, 285-289; 
Goldman 1999, 150f.), affirming the consequent (Korb 2003), argumentum ad 
ignorantiam (Oaksford & Hahn 2004), argumenfum ad populum (Korb 2003) . 

. incorporation of Q/y,wnentation in argumentative discourse. The epistemological 
approach to argumentation treats argumentation mainly as instruments guiding 
cognizing for gaining knowledge or justified belief. Cognizing essentially is an 
individual activity. So the foci of the epistemological approach have been monological 
argumentation directed towards an audience and solipsistic inquiry by argumentation. 
This, of course, does not imply that the epistemological approach does not regard 
or has nothing to say about the usc of argumentation in dialogues and discourse. 
Goldman proposes rules for argumentation in dialogues, which shall guarantee the 
most effectIve cooperative search for truth, (Goldman 1999, 139-144) and examines 
the cultural cI imate necessary for the social dissemination of such a practice (ibid., 
144-149). Lumer specifies rules for disputations, i.e. argumentative dialogues 
directed at collectively finding the truth and makingjustified belief more certain by 
eliminating cognitive errors through criticism and collectively extending one's 
database for finding defeaters (Lumer 1988). 

Miscellanies. Siegel (e.g., 1987; 1999) has strongly criticized epistemic relativism 
and defended the epistemological approach as leading to objective knowledge and 
justified belief. Freeman (2005) has elaborated a theory of acceptability of premises, 
in particular of premises not based on argumentation guided cognizing. 

4. The Contributions to the Present and the Following Issue 

The pr<::sent and the follovving issue of informal Logic are entirely dedicated to the 
epistemological approach to argumentation. Some of the contributions were invited 
(Battersby, Biro & Siegel, Feldman, Lumer, Weinstein) the others (Freeman, Hahn 
& Od;';'~ford, Hoffmann, Buss, Weinstock) were selected from among the papers 
submitted on a call for papers (Informal Logic 24.1 (2004». They contribute to 
four topics: I. (jeneral Defense Against Criticism of the Epistemological Approach, 
II. Particubr Argument Types, II l. Fallacy Theory, I V. Psychological Aspects. 

1. Dejcllses and Criticisms of the tpistemological Approach to 
Argumentation 

l.umer defines what an 'epistemological theory of argumentation' is, namely 
one that sees providing justified be! ief as the principal aim of argumentation, and 
justifies it instrumentally as an approach that designs argumentations in such a 
way that they lead to more true beliefs than argumentations designed by competing 
approaches. I n addition to this more general part, he presents his particular theory, 



Introduction: Map of Epistemological Approach 205 

a structural-situational theory, which separates plausibilist criteria for the argument 
itself from prosbatic, accessibility criteria for its use, and he tries to show its 
superiority over mere situational ("subjectivisC), gnostic theories. The basis for 
this defense is an analysis of how argumentation functions in rational convincing: 
the addressee uses the argument as a guide for his cognizing. 

Hoffmann is critical of the stronger epistemological theories of argumentation 
(Biro, SiegeL Lumer, Feldman, Goldman), which aim at objective criteria for deciding 
on the quality of argumentation. He distinguishes three forms of an argumentation's 
quality being relative: it depends on the addressee's knowledge about the argument's 
reasons, on his background knowledge (in case of uncertain arguments), and on 
his values (in case of practical arguments). While these three dependencies are 
also underlined by 'the empistemologists', Hoffmann objects that the criteria for 
argumention evaluation themselves might be relative to culture, etc., too and that 
the three dependencies hold also for any evaluator of an argumentation. 

Huss criticizes the epistemological approach to argumentation from the 
standpoint of van Eemeren's and Grootendorsfs consensus theory. He maintains 
that the epistemological approach cannot give advice for good argumentation because 
the "advice" it can give, namely to use only propositions that are justified in the 
epistemological sense, is empty: we cannot do otherwise. If epistemologists want 
to give more advice they can do so only as participants in a discourse who propose 
something, which, in order to be effective, has to be approved by the other 
participants. So consensus theory, one might summarize, necessarily is the frame 
theory of argumentation. 

Feldman responds to Huss's criticism (in this issue) of the epistemological 
approach. Feldman argues that the epistemological approach, of course, can give 
good advice and, as respective textbooks show, such advice from an epistemological 
viewpoint actually has extensively been given. On the contrary, consensus theories 
cannot give good advice because they are restricted to the recommendation to 
only rely on commonly accepted premises and argument schemes, which may be 
poor or false. Feldman concludes by criticizing consensus as the goal of 
argumentation, among others with the argument that this may lead to false and 
irrational consensus. 

II. Particular Types of Arguments from an Epistemological Perspective 

Hahn & Oabford deal with probabilistic argumentation. They make a case for 
using Bayesianism as a theory of argument strength, explain how Bayesian 
probability theory can be used for reconstructing (open and hidden) probabilistic 
argumentation and defend its use in argumentation theory against criticism, in 
particular the criticism that everyday arguments do not contain numerical 
probabilities. In their opinion, advantages of such an approach are that degrees of 
beliefs as well as argumentations' dependence on prior beliefs can be captured and 



206 Christoph Lumer 

that epistemically good and bad instances of classical fallacies can be distinguished. 
They try to show this for arguments from ignorance, circular and slippery slope 
arguments. 

Freeman, on the other hand, proposes a heterodox probability theory as a model 
for conceptualzing the validity of non-deductive arguments and of the strength of 
such arguments, namely L. J. Cohen's theory of"ampliative probability". Freeman 
justifies this choice by claiming some inadequacies of orthodox probability theory 
and sketches Cohen's theory, which assigns probability to a strictly general 
hypothesis in proportion to the number of canonical tests with different variables 
undertaken so far that confirm the hypothesis. Freeman goes on to apply this 
model, coming from physical sciences, to psychological generalizations, legal 
contexts and evaluations. 

Battersby inquires into criteria for (arguments on) causal claims. His paper is a 
continuation of his project of applied epistemology. He takes causal claims in 
epidemiology as paradigm cases because in epidemiology it is particularly difficult 
to establish causal claims so that they have to be defended argumentatively, and 
because epidemiologists are usually well-trained in methodology. The fruit of his 
bottom-up inquiry of criteria for causal relations used in epidemiology are some 
lists of such criteria, which then are compared with criteria proposed by 
argumentation theorists, namely Walton and Hitchcock. 

Weinstein, apart from two introductory sections with criticisms of Freeman's 
and Pinto's theories, deals with general theoretical claims in empirical theories. He 
proposes a truth definition for the respective propositions, according to which 
such propositions are true if they are implied by the-historically in the long run-
most comprehensive theory. Weinstein's paper is part of his general project of an 
applied epistemology. But, as opposed to Battersby, he uses a top-down 
methodology. 

III.Epistemological Fallacy Theory 

Biro & Siegel first defend the epistemological approach to argumentation as an 
approach that sees providing good reasons for believing the thesis as the aim of 
argumentation. This conception then becomes the basis for dealing with their main 
topic: begging the question. They criticize gnostic, "subjectivist" epistemological 
definitions of 'begging the question', defend their own plausibilist, "objective" 
approach and develop an improved version of their criterion. They make some 
concessions: fallaciousness is no longer seen as a property of arguments as such 
but as a "property of arguments in a context"; and they admit that good arguments 
may be used in a circular way. However, their central criterion remains as it was: 
impossibility of justifiedly believing in the premises without believing in the 
conclusion. 



Introduction: Map of Epistemological Approach 207 

IV Epistemologically Conceived Argumentation and Psychology 

Weinstock reports some interesting results of psychological research on 
constructive as well as critical argumentative skills and personal epistemologies, 
i.e., people's explicit knowledge of criteria for good argumentation and justified 
belief. Knowledge about justification requirements is related to skilled argumentation. 
Three levels could be identified where the highest roughly corresponds to what 
epistemological argumentation theories require. This shows the practical importance 
of epistemological argumentation theory and it is an encouragement for the further 
development of standards of good argumentation on this basis. 

Acknowledgements 

I would like to thank the editors of Informal Logic, in particular Christopher Tindale, 
for their enthusiasm about this project, the generous freedom they gave me for 
working it out and their substantial help. Many thanks to all the authors for their 
efforts and contributions. Thanks a lot to the many reviewers, whose work has 
contributed considerably to improving this issue. Last but not least, warm thanks 
go to Harvey Siegel and Richard Feldman for their friendly and valuable advice. 

Notes 

I Arguments are abstract entities. As such they cannot have aims. But they can be defined in such 
a way as to fulfil a certain standard function, which does not exclude their fulfilling other functions 
as well, in particular functions near to the standard function. 
2 Previously, Johnson defended a rhetorical approach (e.g., Johnson & Blair 1977), which he 
criticized later (Johnson 1990,271). 
3 Some philosophers prefer to define the aim of argumentation in broader terms than 'believing', 
e.g., as 'acceptance' or 'recognition of validity claims', which should include practical attitudes 
(first of all intentions) and emotional attitudes (e.g., Habermas 1981,35; 38; Pinto 200 I, 10-20). 
However, this idea does not really open an alternative to aiming at belief states; therefore this 
broader characterization has not been included here. (Of course, an arguer can - successfully - aim 
at practical or emotional attitudes by presenting an argument. However, the question is if the 
further attitudes are secondary effects of a rational belief change (regarding the argument's thesis) 
induced by the argumentation or if they can be achieved directly. I. The first way, of course, is 
possible. However, an analysis of argumentations' way offunctioning (e.g., Lumer 2005, sect. 5) 
speaks against the second possibility. Arguments are designed to make people check acceptibility 
conditions for a thesis, the result of which (if everything goes smoothly) is justified belief. The 
defenders of the view in question have not provided an alternative function analysis ofargumentation 
which would show how the arguments envisaged by them are supposed to work. Of course. 
argumentation should also influence action and emotion. Given the limits just emphasized, the 
best way to do so is to look for beliefs that exercise an influence on practical attitudes. 



208 Christoph Lumer 

Epistemologically conceived practical arguments follow this strategy (see Lumer 2005, sect. 7). 
2. It is not clear what the "thesis" of an argumcnt should be if argumentation directly aimed at 
something different than (justified) belief. According to the usual understanding, the thesis of an 
argument is a proposition or statement, i.e., thc meaning of a declarative sentence; but acceptance 
of a statcment is a belief.) For an extensive discussion of the object of argumentation and a critique 
of Haber mas' "acceptance programme'" see: Lumer 1990, 141-158. 
4 Criticism from an epistemological point of view: of Perelman's & Olbrechts-Tyteca's "Nouvel 
rhetorique": Lumer 1990, 287-289; of Hamblin: Johnson 1990. 
5 Criticism from an epistemological point of view: ofPragma-Dialectics: Siegel & Biro 1997.281-
285; Biro & Siegel 1992,89-91; ofllabermas' discourse theory: Lumcr 1990, 150-158: 291-296; 
316[;401-404. 
(, For an extensive critique of relativism from an epistemological point of view see: Sicgcl 1987. 
7 Of course, any epistemological theory of argumentation has to take into account the persons' 
epistemic situation, which implies that an argument that is good for rationally persuading a 
person at a given time may not be good for rationally persuading another person because, e.g., the 
latter as opposed to the former. docs notjustifiedly believe in some premise of the argument. But 
this situational adjustment of good argumentation does not amount to a strong relativism in the 
sense that ultimate and rational standards of argument appraisal are interpersonally different. 
, The proximity of these ideas to Pragma-Dialectics and even morc to Habermas' discourse 
theory, i.e. consensus theories of argumentation, is amazing. 
"Hamblin calls this group of criteria "dialectical", allegedly using the Aristotelian term for them 
(Hamblin 1970, 241). But Aristotle's dialectical argumentations arc based on premises that are 
"cndoxa'", i.e., something like the best expert opinion (Aristotle, Topics I OOa27-b23), and not on 
simple acceptance by the addressee. So dialectical argumentations arc epistemologically much 
more ambitious than what Hamblin has in mind, which is clearly rhetorical. 
III It is difficult to find a formulation for the inference condition that covers both the acceptability 
and the accessibility condition. "Reasonable" is not quite clear in itself but is intended here to do 
both jobs. All the criteria that I found in the literaturc have some problems in this respect. 
II This condition is stronger than: the database docs not contain a defeater of the argument. Unlike 
the former, the latter condition, does not renect the possibility that the database, though not 
containing a de/eater for the argument, might contain stronger support for the argument so that the 
thesis' posterior probability co:dd be higher than what the argument suggests. Such a too weak 
argument would not be good either. 
12 What I have called "situational" liS. "structural" in the currcnt debate is sometimes referred to 
as "subjective" vs. "objective" (Ritola 2004; Biro & Siegel 2006). Apart from being much less 
specific and precise, the latter terms are a bit loaded and misleading bccause plausibilist ("objective") 
criteria reasonably always have to be complemcnted by prosbatic ("subjective'") criteria, so that 
the compound is also subjective in some way. 
I) This is also different from cognizing guided by genesis of knowlcdge arguments. In these 
arguments the arguer reports how the thesis has been cognized and how this knowledge has 
reached him (Fcldman 1999,216-232; 418; Lumer 1990,246-260). With a sufficiently detailed 
report, the addressee in principle would rechcck fulfilment of the thesis' acceptability conditions, 
as the witness has donc; so the addressee would follow the witness' course of cognizing. But the 
problems, as compared to direct argumentation, are, first. that the report necessarily is quite 
incomplete, so that for the missing parts the addressee has to fill in probabilistic hypotheses and, 
second, that the addressee usually has to accept a big part of the report only on the basis of the 
arguer's say-so. 
14 This condition has no counterpart among the criteria listed above because these were restricted 
to conditions for reasons and for the reasons-thesis relation. 
15 Earlier version: Through the arguer's argumentation the audience recognizes that the premises 



Introduction: Map of Epistemological Approach 209 

provide strong support for the conclusion (Goldman 1994,37). But this is an effect and not a rule 
of behaviour for the arguer. 
16 In addition to these conditions, Goldman proposes conditions for good dialogical argumentation 
(Goldman 1999,139-144; 1994,420, which among others prescribe extended argumentative 
discourse. i.e., to anticipate possible objections to one's view. 
17 Weinstein's programme is described and defended in: Weinstein 2003. 
I' See also Goldman's gnostic characterization: "Fallacious patterns of argumentation are ones 
with no reliable tendency to issue in true conclusions." (Goldman 1999. 150.) 
I' Such a solution would require that Biro and Siegel admit-and it should be no problem for them 
to do so-that, apart from what they define. there are also cases of soft petitio. Adding the soft 
petitio would remedy Sanford's criticism (i) by declaring more instances of argumentation as 
fallacious. Sanford's criticism (ii) instead seems to rest on two mistakes, one by Sanford, and one 
by Biro and Siegel. First, if Sanford has found an argument that initially seemed to be question 
begging in Biro's and Siegel's sense but later turns out to be usable in a non-question begging way. 
then it must be possible to cognize the argument's reasons without cognizing the thesis. But then 
the argument should not be question begging. according to the characterization of Biro's and 
Siegel's criterion given above. in contrast to what it first seemed to be. So both parties would 
classify the case as not question begging. Second, for this solution Biro and Siegel. however, 
would have to give up the "objectivist" characierization of the strict petitio as not depending "on 
what particular arguers happened to know or believe" (Biro 1984.245) or the general "objectivist" 
characterization of fallacies: "Fallaciousness is a property of arguments in a context and is 
independent of the beliefs of their users." (Biro & Siegel 2006. beginning of section 2) If a 
particular user of the argument happens to be the only one who has acquired justified belief in the 
reasons independent ofajustified belief in the thesis this implies the possibility of such belief and 
thus makes the argument not question begging. It is difficult to define the 'possibility of a belief' 
independent of 'beliefs in possible worlds'. which of course include the actual world. The real 
difference in the main directions in defining fallacies is not between subjectivist versus objectivist 
definitions but between pure situational. gnostic accounts versus structural-situational. plausibilist-
prosbatic accounts. (A mere structural, plausibilist account, which considers only acceptability 
and not accessibility for a particular addressee, instead is, I repeat, a non-starter.) The extension 
of question-begging arguments could be identical for both accounts (of course depending on the 
right definition of'justified belief' in both), whereas the intensions would still be different. with 
the structural-situational definition having the advantage of being able to distinguish strict and 
soft petitio and thus explaining better what is wrong. In addition, within the structural-situational 
account there might also be competing definitions as to exactly where University of Sienathe 
border between strict and softpetitio should be drawn. But again the extensions of both types of 
petitiones together could be identical in these theories. 

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Christoph Llimet' 
C'nil'ersity of Siena 

Department of Philosophy 
fia Roma. or 
53100 Siena 

Italy 

/lImer@lInisi.it 

-