296 

In other words, rational forms of language and thought are acquired through-
among other things-mature examples of the use of actual argumentative linguistic 
forms in acknowledged texts. These linguistic forms are themselves printed in bold 
type and so are immediately brought into your focus without a chance to be 
overshadowed by the interesting topic in which they occur. One learns them 
visually without effort and without having to understand any theory or rules. One 
simply learns to use them. 

Summing up: this is an understandable and probably quite effective collection 
of experiences and wisdom concerning good arguments. Chances are high that this 
approach (to one familiar situation, the situation of uncertain writers) will bring 
many a writer to a higher level of maturity. The book is probabbly not meant for the 
mature readers of this journal, but their students would fall under the intended 
readership. 

E. M. BARTH 

ARGUING.' EXCHANGING REASONS FACE TO FACE 
By DALE HAMPLE. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2005. 
Pp. xiii + 369. ISBN 0-8058-4854-1. US $99.951 Special Discount Price $39.95. 

Arguments do not, and cannot, occur without people. They are not naturally 
occurring things like rocks or bumblebees that are simply out there in the world 
waiting to be discovered; they depend completely and entirely on humans for their 
existence. So much is incontestable. Once, however, we move beyond that rather 
uninteresting point of agreement we reach a wide range of differentiation. Some 
theorists, such as Willard (1976), claim that arguments cannot be understood in 
isolation from the actual, particular argument as it happens and where it happens. 
At the other extreme we have Johnson (2000) who sees written arguments as 
presented in an editorial or an essay as the "distillate" of argumentation (168). 
Between these two extremes there is vast continuum of positions regarding the 
degree to which arguments must be situated and viewed in context in order to be 
understood and properly analyzed. 

Dale Hample, in his book, Arguing: Exchanging Reasons Face to Face, makes 
it clear in his sub-title where his position lies. Arguments are not only created by 
people who are arguing, but can only be understood in that context. While static 
arguments are by no means dismissed or discarded, it is the nature of arguing as it 
occurs in its natural setting that fascinates Hample. The roots of the very notion of 
argument are familiar to all of us: "An argument is a conclusion supported by 
reasons" (1), Hample writes on his very first page. So the traditional root notion of 
an argument as found, say, in informal logic is not challenged, though past that 
point the connections to the familiar become more strained. The focus of Hample's 
book is not so much argument structure, but the motivations we have for arguing, 
and the psychological and social tools we use for creating and editing arguments. 
Why do people argue? How do they create their arguments? How do they receive 
arguments? 

© Informal Logic Vol. 25, No.3 (2005): pp. 296-300. 



Book Reviews/Compfes Rendus 297 

Hample undertakes in this book to both review and use contemporary work in 
communication theory and social psychology to inform the reader of the available 
data and theories, on the one hand, and, on the other, to present a person-centred 
theory of argument that is at once dialectic, rhetorical and interactive. As the book 
covers a great deal of territory, bringing the reader from an introductory level to a 
sophisticated understanding of the issues, I will not endeavour to touch all the 
bases that Hample does. Rather, I want to focus on one or two matters that might be 
of special interest to those in informal logic. This is not to say that there are parts of 
the book that are not of interest to everyone in any area of argumentation theory. To 
the contrary. The book is actually a fascinating and fine addition to the literature, 
and, aside from an occasionally annoying penchant for short sentences, fairly well 
written. 

Several of the matters that Hample raises would not have made sense to informal 
logicians working thirty or so years ago, but today far fewer of those issues will be 
dismissed by far fewer argumentation theorists. Nonetheless, the approach he 
describes crosses various lines that informal logicians might find uncomfortable. 
Consider, as an example, the idea of argument editing (85 ft). Here Hample makes 
clear the difference between the concerns of informal logicians and his own 
communication theory/social psychological approach. The issues here concern 
how messages are created, and, especially with regard to how we decide what is 
said and not said. As a result, for example, issues of politeness and relationship 
maintenance are relevant and important factors for Hample, while for the usual 
informal logic approach these matters not only are irrelevant, but do not even exist. 
Forming a conclusion that is easy for an antagonist to accept by avoiding doing 
damage to her position may be considered polite by an informal logician, but may 
also open one up' to a charge of equivocation or worse. The Ideal Arguer, from the 
point of view of informal logic, is one who puts forward the strongest and most 
direct arguments that the evidence can support. Presumably, two Ideal Arguers in 
more or less similar situations would offer the same arguments. But even ideal 
arguers have diverse interests, needs, and, most importantly, goals. 

We rarely, Hample says, argue just for the heck of it: "People argue to accomplish 
things in their daily lives, and the pursuit of these accomplishments is what is 
salient to the actors. Arguing is an essentially instrumental activity, done with a 
practical object in mind and almost never done for its own sake ... " (35). Of course, 
as philosophers and argumentation theorists, we tend to argue more than most 
people, but that comes with the territory; (more on this below). Generally, when 
people enter into an argument, it is in order to secure some instrumental objective; 
however, it also necessarily involves juggling a variety of secondary and relational 
goals. Since we do not argue in a vacuum, but with other people, who those people 
are and what their feelings are become factors in the process. 

In addition to the myriad goals that can influence how an argument is formed, 
there are also questions of expertise and how one understands the very idea of 
communication. Hample puts this issue in terms of "frames," of which there are 
three. The first frame is the instrumental goal (34); the second involves the goals of 
the other person[s] involved in the argument; the third involves reflecting on the 
process of arguing itself. That is, the third frame "involves recalling argumentative 
experiences and abstracting general principles from them" (51). The frames, then, 
describe different levels of awareness on the part of the protagonist: the greater 



298 

awareness one has of the other person involved in the argument, and the greater 
awareness one has of the process itself as a common communicative endeavour, 
the higher the level of the frame one is in. These frames echo Barbara O'Keefe's 
(1988) theory of Message Design Logic [MDL], wherein arguers subscribe to one 
of three ways of conceiving communication: the Expressive MDL sees 
communication as an essentially unedited, artless means of saying what one is 
thinking; the Conventional MDL understands that communication is a cooperative 
enferprise that follows rules and procedures; the Rhetorical MDL appreciates that 
messages can portray personalities, change situations, and create communicative 
possibilities. Each frame, each MDL, will create different arguments for different 
people, meaning that there is no one argument, no individual core that is a "good" 
argument or a "bad" argument. Argument will simply mean different things to 
different arguers. 

Arguments are created by people, and people vary in a multitude of ways. 
Different arguers will have, as mentioned, different outlooks on what they are doing 
when they communicate, but also different imaginations, intelligences, creative 
impulses, and personal needs. When these different arguers produce messages, 
they all draw on a vast array of distinct histories and perspectives. Hample writes: 

A message is not a static production but a dynamic one, and this dynamic 
nature makes editing such an important topic. Often in studying 
arguments, researchers look at a written passage or a few paragraphs 
from a speech, which tempts them into the unexamined assumption that 
the argument simply popped out, more or less as it appears in print. As 
introspection reveals, however, the production of an utterance or a 
sentence is a process that often involves micromomentary impulses, 
decisions, and changes of direction. (106) 

Perhaps this explains why Johnson re'fers to written argument as the "the 
distillate of argumentation" of argumentation (2000, 168). The supposition is, perhaps, 
that once an argument is preserved in text and removed from the dynamics of 
discourse, then all of the activities Hample describes can be ignored. And, of course, 
on can do just that: one can analyse an argument as if it were not created by a 
human being in the cauldron of the creative process of message production. 
However, can one really understand it, even critique it, in isolation from that context, 
that background? Hample's work would suggest not, as witnessed in the following 
quote. 

Redressing the emotional sterility of argumentation studies for the last 
two millennia is a prospect that should be welcome. Arguing is a human 
activity, and people are moved by their urges, suffer epiphanies and 
depressions, and orient to other's emotional expressions during and 
because of their arguments. To ignore this is to miss a great part of what 
makes arguing a distinctly personal and humanizing accomplishment. 
(175) 

So, while one can analyze and examine arguments isolated from the source of 
their production, and while that might have certain value, there is a great deal that 
can be lost, that can be missed, by doing so. The tools Hample is offering us are 
different than those you are most familiar with, but, surely, the larger the toolbox, 
the more flexibility there is in the construction of an analysis. 



Book Reviews/Comptes Rendus 299 

There is also something of the guilty pleasure of being a voyeur in reading this 
book. As a philosopher and informal logician, I have the feeling of peering into 
someone else's yard to watch how a different family undertakes tasks similar to 
those with which I am familiar. Indeed, I have often wished I had a communication 
theory assistant who could rush out and do empirical experiments to verify so many 
of my speculations about argument. Hample does that in many ways. He reports to 
us about such matters as TCP, which stands for taking conflict personally, and trait 
argumentativeness,TA, which measures one's general motivation to argue. These 
factors influence just how someone perceives arguing as an undertaking. "Individuals 
high on argumentativeness saw arguing as a way of reducing conflict, whereas 
those scoring low regarded it as something that escalates disagreements" (28). 

Considering this information, I suspect that the majority of philosophy majors 
and scholars are somewhat low in TCP and high in TA: we can argue without 
getting upset, and find arguing fairly enjoyable and not stressful. Most of us, in 
fact, have to learn early in our careers that the techniques and the hair trigger move 
to argue do not carry over well into family and, frequently, non-collegial social life. 
We, as a group, consider failure to examine and argue every statement we hear, to be 
at best sloppy and at worst condescending. We learn, usually the hard way, that 
our spouses, partners and friends do not always share that perspective. More 
seriously, people with a high TCP and a low TA score will be reluctant to argue 
unless there is some strong motivation. Consider, if you will, what impact this has 
on other theories, such as Johnson's dialectical tier. What happens when one has 
a responsibility to argue and consider various options and critiques, but one is 
emotionally loathe to do so. Similarly, in the Pragma-Dialectic model, one is often 
obligated to respond according to a rule of critical discussion, but one may not, out 
of fear rather than out of malice or even error. E.g., according to one study cited by 
Hample, "The largest number of arguments appeared when an actor high in 
argumentativeness conversed with a person low in argumentativeness, and the 
lowest number appeared when two people low in argumentativeness interacted" 
(180). In the first case, there was little to stop the high trait argumentativeness 
individual from making many arguments, and in the second there was no 
encouragement from either side. As a further example, Hample cites his own informal 
in-class survey: "Suppose ... that you were in an argument with a romantic partner, 
and you were losing badly even though you knew you were right. Something 
occurs to you that would absolutely win the argument, but would hurt your partner's 
feelings a lot. Would you say it anyway" (228)7 The result in the class is usually 50-
SO, with half willing to put forward the argument and the other half not. 

Of course, there is always a question about the research and the data. One 
cannot review a book on communication theory and social psychology without at 
least mentioning the potential for well-known errors and traps that await researchers. 
So much of what we know about the world is based on white, middle class university 
students who have been enticed into experimental participation. I am pleased to 
report that Hample is aware of this, and distinguishes in a variety of places where 
the samples used varied with respect to background, and where they did not. This 
does not eliminate the problem, but highlights it when necessary. 

A final point I would mention has to do with the perennial issue of eristic 
arguments. If, as some would fear, communication theory and social psychology 
only gauge effectiveness, then what is the moral status of argument as construed 



300 

as a rhetorical enterprise? Hample is quite clear that, "Effectiveness ... should never 
be a solitary consideration. A good argument must also be ethical and moral" (55). 
But, he admits, "In an argumentative exchange two of the more effective things a 
person can do are to lie or to threaten" (54). What, however, is to drive the ethical 
and moral imperative if the rhetorical ideal of effectiveness is not to be completely 
dominant? Interestingly, it is the very idea of being effective that comes with its 
own limits. When we are presented with arguments, we are not merely passive 
listeners. We are also judges and evaluators. 

What conclusions can be drawn about people's construal of others' 
arguments? First, individuals are (or at least can be, when properly 
motivated) very sensitive to content. All the research gives a prominent 
perceptual place to reason and evidence. An immediate and salient feature 
of an incoming message is whether it is coercive or manipulative, and 
whether it makes an affiliative appeal. .. , whether it is polite, and whether 
it is pointed or open ended. Third, these and other studies give some 
evidence that others' arguments are received as immediately agreeable 
or disagreeable .... This judgment is based partly on sociality and prior 
attitude but also partly on the degree to which the content of the message 
seems forcible and probative. (199) 

In short, the quality of an argument is one of the things that makes it effective. We 
are, mostly, not impressed by arguments that are bullying, rude, or that ignore 
evidence. This also provides motivation for education regarding arguments and 
what makes them good and bad. As Hample concludes, "The arguers, not the 
arguments, possess the energy for public transformation. An argument can be a 
vehicle for change, but the changers are always, and only, the arguers" (334). 

I am pleased to recommend this book, no, urge its reading by all those working 
in argumentation theory. If you are not already familiar with the results and research 
going on in the empirical fields of communication theory and social psychology, 
then it will be an eye-opener, and a careful one at that. If you are in that field then 
Hample's application of the material to argumentation as a process undertaken by 
arguers will be a useful addition to your repertoire. We have been fortunate in 
argumentation theory that a number of valuable books have been produced in the 
last 10 or 15 years, and I am pleased to say that Hample's book is an important 
contribution to that production. 

References 

Johnson, R. H.: 2000, iv/ani/est rationality: a pragmatic theory of argument. 
Mahwah, N.J. ; London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. ISBN: 0805821740. 

O'Keefe, B.: 1987, "The Pursuit of Multiple Objectives in Face-to-Face Persuasive 
Interactions: Effects of Construct Differentiation on Message Organization." 
Communication Monographs 54:396-419. 

Willard, C. A.: 1976, "On the Utility of Descriptive Diagrams for the Analysis and 
Criticism of Arguments." Communication Monographs 64:308-319. 

M. A. GILBERT York University