FROM THE EDITORS 
If there is a theme to the papers in this dou-
ble issue it is: "Setting Things Right." 

"An 'enthymeme' is an argument--or 
at least a syllogism-with an unexpressed 
premise. Or so said Aristotle." Right? 
Wrong, on all three counts. Or, if not en-
tirely wrong, certainly not exactly right. So 
says Antoine Braet, in a paper that breaks 
new ground in the puzzle of just what ex-
actly Aristotle meant by an "enthymeme." 

Douglas Walton thinks the right tack to 
take in giving a sound account of the vex-
ing concept of relevance in dialectical ar-
guments aimed at persuading one's inter-
locutor is by using the model of the for-
ward and backward chaining of premises. 
Walton explains his solution, considers 
possible objections, and shows how the 
model works in assessing an actual argu-
ment taken from Canadian parliamentary 
debates. 

Michael J. Wreen has written a series of 
papers on the ad baculum fallacy, but Don 
Levi doesn't think he's gotten it right. Far 
from it. Levi explains what he contends is 
wrong with Wreen's account, and sets out 
what he argues is the right account of ad 
baculum. 

Percy is the student who doesn't get 
the idea of supporting one's contentions 
with arguments. Sharon Bailin argues that 
Robert Ennis and Harvey Siegel, in their 
respective accounts of critical thinking, 
haven't quite put their finger on what's 
wrong with Percy. The aim of her paper is 
to give the right analysis of the problem 
with Percy, and explain the important peda-
gogical implications of that account. 

Our university is quite typical in its ap-
proach to teaching critical thinking and 
composition, at least in the courses dedi-
cated exclusively to those objectives: the 
critical thinking course is taught by Philoso-
phy and composition is taught by English. 
Wrong way to do it, says Donald Hatcher. 
Hatcher describes the method of teaching 
the two in combination tried at Baker Uni-
versity, and the results of the empirical test-
ing carried out there that convince him of 
the superiority of the combined approach. 

Brian MacPherson tries to show how 
the feminist critiques of formal logic by Nye 
and Plumwood haven't got the right ac-
count of the object of their criticism. He is 
much more sympathetic to the feminist cri-
tiques of informal logic by Ayim and Govier, 
which call for repair, rather than abandon-
ment, of the object of their criticism. 

In Volumes 6 and 7 of Informal Logic, 
Stephen Thomas and John Nolt engaged in 
a disagreement about induction. Thomas 
maintains his position in the latest (4th) 
edition of his textbook, Practical Reason-
ing in Natural Language. In his paper in 
this issue, David Hitchcock tells us who is 
right (and why). 

Not content to settle the Thomas-Nolt 
dispute, Hitchcock also corrects Dan 
Goldstick's Note (Informal Logic, 19.1) 
about the origin of the technical concept of 
logical "soundness." 

Upcoming Issues 

With the next issue, Volume 20, No.1, due 
out in April, we inaugurate our new feature, 
the Teaching Supplement, which will be 
added onto each regular issue. The editor 
of the Teaching Supplement, Claude 
Gratton, reports a gratifYing response to his 
call for teaching material to be shared with 
our readers, but he can always use more: 
course syllabi. Send (hard copy and dis-
kette): examples of assignments, tests, ex-
ams; individual examples for classroom use 
(with, or without, your analysis of them); 
discussions of textbooks and how best to 
use them; teaching tips for particular top-
ics; teaching problems (with, or without, 
your solutions); notices of resources: 
upcoming conferences, workshops, other 
journals with useful material; ideas about 
faculty training or peer coaching; etc. Send 
material to (or contact) Dr. Claude Gratton, 
Department of Philosophy, University of 
Nevada--Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland 
Parkway, Box 455028, Las Vegas, NV 89154-
5028, U.S.A. Email: grattonC@neveda.edu; 
Tel. 702.895.4333; Fax. 702.895.1279. 

For articles, see the Back cover.