Book Reviews/Comptes rendus 97 

Aristotle's Rhetoric. An Art of Character. 

EUGENE GARVER 

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Pp.334. 

ISBN 0-226-28424-7(c1oth). ISBN 0-226-28425-5(paper). Cloth US $53.95. 

Paper US $18.95. 

Reviewed by Michel Meyer 

Eugene Garver's book is bound to become a classic before long, and not merely 
because of the amplitude of the analysis offered. It simultaneously sticks to the text 
and makes constant comparisons with modem authors. A full examination of Aristo-
tle's grounding book had not been produced for a long time probably because many a 
commentator has felt that the three parts of Aristotle's Rhetoric were without deep 
structural relationships and could not be dealt with in a unitary way. 

Ethos, pathos and logos: the orator, the audience and the discursive link be-
tween them are in fact the subject-matter of the three books of Aristotle's Rhetoric. 
They give rise, respectively, to the three well-known rhetorical genres singled out by 
Aristotle. The role and the character of the orator, the adequacy of what he or she says 
to what he or she is, make the justness, the "ethics" of his or her discourse. This 
delineates the forensic genre of rhetoric. The passions--or emotions--define the re-
ceptivity of the audience to the arguments put forth. It is the realm of the pathos, 
studied by Aristotle in the second book of the Rhetoric. We face here the deliberative 
genre, which, being predominantly political, is more passionate than any other type of 
rhetorical relationship. As to logos, it can be studied as a function of the arguments or 
of the style, i.e. the arrangement of propositions. Logos covers the discursive link 
between ethos and pathos, between the orator and the audience. It can be 1) logical, 2) 
dialectical when argumentative, or 3) epidictic when literary or merely formal. The 
form, in rhetoric, gives rise to the epidictic genre, whereas, in logic, form would rather 
define syllogistic reasoning. When the subject-matter, the matter of the question, is 
relevant, the logos becomes dialectical or argumentative. Form has then two counter-
parts (antistrophos), logic and rhetoric, the apodictic syllogism of science and logic 
and the enthymeme, or the rhetorical inference. 

Is it possible, or justified, to analyze rhetoric by reducing one's analysis to one 
of those three dimensions, ethos, pathos or logos, let alone by giving greater place to 
one or the other genre? In fact, it has always been done so in the past. Plato, for exam-
ple, considered rhetoric from the sole viewpoint of the pathos, i.e. as manipulative of 
the audience. From this, he deduced a ethos and a logos corresponding to a manipula-
tive rhetorical relationship. Rhetoric, therefore, could not be conceptualized as such, 
i.e. as the negotiation of the distance between an orator and an audience on a given 
question (ethos-pathos-logos are, on this definition, on an equal footing), but was seen 
by Plato as evil, because of the sophistic intention of the orator exerted upon (the 
passions of) the audience. Logos and epidictic genre have also, in tum, played the 



98 Informal Logic 

leading role at some periods in the history of rhetoric. Literary rhetoric, for instance, as 
developed by the French from the Eighteenth Century onwards (Dumarsais, Fontanier, 
Roland Barthes, etc.) was based on the sole relevance of the logos. Here, we have a 
restriction or a reduction of rhetoric to the epidictic genre, as if rhetoric were merely 
literary rhetoric. As result, it developed into a catalogue of figures of speech, often 
arbitrary in its structure, if any. Argument theory became absorbed into the realm of 
logic and the passions, in tum, into that of psychology. 

A rhetoric based on the ethos has also been developed, as unilateral as any other 
resting upon the pathos or the logos. Here, it is the speaker who counts, and such a 
rhetoric can as much give rise to a pragmatic rhetoric, developed by the linguists, as to 
a rhetoric based on the ends of the speaker. Ethics and expertise are the key-words 
here. Prudence, too. 

At first, Garver's reading may sound unilateral too. But he defends his case 
masterfully, comparing Aristotle with contemporary thinkers as much as he carefully 
leads us into the three books of the Rhetoric where he follows the common thread 
imposed by the role he ascribes to the ethos. In fact, Garver justifies his viewpoint by 
relating Aristotle's Rhetoric to a view of ethics and politics that recurs throughout 
history: the care for prudence or judgment under uncertainty. Garver is already well-
known for a book on Machiavelli and the History of Prudence (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1987). Rhetoric is then a practical problem, whose basic question 
is to know how we deliberate on a given question, in which some end is contained and 
a human relationship involved. Goods, i.e. ends, are multiple, as much as humans. 
Human beings are constantly confronted with questions of choice, with alternative 
goals and desires, whose consequences, if adopted, are difficult to perceive thoroughly. 
The desires and ends of the others increase the problematicity of the good choice, for 
oneself and for society at large. In a sense, life renders purposeful action problematic 
and rhetoric is the discourse that bears witness to that fact. Everything can then be-
come an object of discussion, slowly or violently moving the soul towards its own 
end, as defined by some major passion or emotion. This outlook justifies, in Garver's 
eyes, all the weight he puts on the role of the ethos. "Rhetoric, he says, is necessary 
because not everything can be settled by laws and rules" (p.107). In fact, rhetoric ~ 
reasoning beyond method, it is a careful and prudent attitude towards the uncertainties 
of life, which aims at reaching conclusions based on the wide variety of implicit 
infonnation on a given question, or on their paucity, because, too much, here, means 
too little. 

As to the pathos, or the passions, they have to be taken into account in order to 
adequately convince an audience, and as a consequence, to account for the mecha-
nisms of suasion. The passions reflect the various problems an audience have and feel: 
to be persuaded means to have an answer to one's problem. Garver, however, does not 
resort to that "problematological" language and he fails to see that passions are, for 
Aristotle, what consciousness will be for Descartes later on, namely the image of our 
relationship with someone else, and as a result, an image of ourselves in reaction to the 
others. Passion is the measure of the gap between individuals, what makes them differ-
ent and also, the condition of their possible identity, as reflected by the notion of agree-
ment. Passion is then the expression of our individuality, i.e. of our difference, as 



Book Reviews/Comptes rendus 99 

much as it embodies our receptivity towards the answers coming from those who 
generate our passions in life. What is interesting, however, in Garver's analysis is the 
link he establishes between emotions and motion, confirming the fact that the trigger 
of Aristotle's whole endeavour was to explain movement in terms of being, as part of 
it, and therefore human movements. "Aristotle in the Rhetoric shows how rhetorical 
argument can be energeia; the appropriate sense of completeness here is precisely 
what distinguishes an activity that is complete in itself from a kinesis or movement that 
is complete only when it is over"(p.144). Rhetoric is a movement whose key is the 
evaluation of identity and difference; hence, the recourse to figures of amplification 
and minimization, that are meant to appreciate our relative position with respect to 
others in a given situation that poses, then, a determinate problem. The orator always 
wants to minimize the problematic or increase a (pre-) agreed solution deemed to be 
shared by the audience, at least when some agreement on (the necessity of) a conclu-
sion is sought after. The value of such an agreement is defined by the ethos: it is what 
makes agreement valuable, and more generally, an end which is desirable for its own 
sake. "The end of rhetoric, "says Garver", is belief and trust, and belief and trust 
attach primarily to people whom we trust, and only derivatively to propositions which 
we believe" (p.146). I am not sure it is always the case, and on that ground, that ethos 
should receive preeminence. If we usually trust the people we have trust in, it is 
because there is no reason to think the contrary, i.e. because no question arises as to 
their credibility. Questioning seems here again the key-word to analyze rhetoric, even 
Aristotle's. 

In spite of my reservation-ethos being the key to the unity of Aristotle's dispa-
rate three parts of the Rhetoric, subordinating pathos and logos-Garver's book is 
undoubtedly one of the most intelligent readings of Aristotle I have ever seen. It is full 
of historical and philosophical comparisons, of analogies, of contemporary examples, 
which makes Aristotle more alive than ever, in spite of the difficulty of his Rhetoric. In 
fact, Garver's book is a great book, not only because he has renewed the approach to 
Aristotle's Rhetoric, but also because he opens new paths of thinking in rhetoric at 
large, by focusing on the political importance of rhetoric. It is a delight to read him and 
follow his arguments in detail, always full of insights and suggestions, which more 
than one philosopher will have to pursue sooner or later. 

MICHEL MEYER 
PROFESSOR OF RHETORIC 

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS 
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRE 

FOR THE STUDY OF ARGUMENT 

D