ANNOUNCEMENTS 

At the meetings of the Western APA (Chicago, May 7-10), there will be a 
panel discussion of the relationship between formal and informal logic. 
The organizer and chair of the panel is John Hoaglund (Christopher Newport 
College). The discussants are: Ralph Johnson (Windsor), Gerald Massey 
(Pittsburgh) and John Woods (Lethbridge). The abstract for Johnson's 
presentation and Woods's presentation are below, Massey's was not available as we went to press. 

Title: Informal Logic's Indispensable Formality 

Presenter: John Woods 
University of Lethbridge 

Contemporary theorists interested in a rapproachment between formal and 
informal logic might find it instructive to examine the example of the 
father of logic. It is significant that Aristotle had, and sought, no 
theory of necessitation or argument-validity. What he wanted was a 
wholly general theory of argument and a wholly general theory of 
deductive reasoning. To these ends, he fashioned a core logic, the 
logic of syllogisms. Syllogisms are valid arguments cut down by 
restrictions which make their theory a relevant intuitionistic logic. 
The main restrictions are that a syllogism's premisses must not be idle 
(relevance and nonmonotonicity), that conclusions not repeat premisses 
(premiss- consistency), and that conclusions not be multiple 
(intuitionism). Although Aristotle had no doctrine of logical form, it 
is clear that the logic of syllogisms is a formal theory. Although 
Aristotle's interest in syllogisms was motivated by his interest in 
argument and reasoning, syllogisms are neither pragma-dialectical nor 
psychological, or cognitive, structures. They are thoroughly 
acontextuaL Even so, Aristotle chose to theorize about syllogisity 
rather than validity, because syllogisity- principles adapt in a natural 
way, though not the very same way, to pragma-dialectical rules for 
argument and psychobiological conditions on inference. Neither the 
general theory of argument nor its counterpart for inference is, or 
could be, a formal theory. Aristotle was the first informal logician. 

Title: The Relationship between Formal and Informal Logic 

Presenter: Ralph H. Johnson 

University of Windsor 

Abstract: The issue of the relationship between formal and informal logic 
depends strongly on how one understands these two designations. While 
there is very little disagreement about the nature of formal logic, the 
same is not true regarding informal logic, which is understood in various 
ways (often incompatible) by various people. After reviewing some of the 
more prominent conceptions of informal logic, I will present my own, 
defend it and then show how informal logic, so understood, is complementary to formal logic.