Book ReviewslComptes rendus 309 

THINKING CRITICALLY, 4th edition 
by John Chaffee 

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994. Softcover. 642 pages. Index. ISBN: 
o 395 67546 4. 

Reviewed by Anthony Oluwatoyin 

This latest edition of Chaffee's text is "designed to serve as a comprehensive 
introduction to the cognitive process while helping students develop the higher-
order thinking abilities needed for academic study and career success" (xv ).1 There 
are 12 chapters--on such interrelated topics as "Thinking", "Thinking Critically", 
"Perceiving", "Reporting, Inferring, Judging". Each chapter is interlaced with 
readings, including student essays, treating such topical issues as teen pregnancy, 
the death penalty, racist speech, femininity, Malcolm X and, my favorite, a mar-
vellous "flat earth" piece by Alan Lightman (Ch. 5). 

There are numerous "thinking activity" exercises and "thinking passage" exer-
cises based on the readings. Students will identity, analyze, synthesize, respond 
to issues. They will describe goals to be achieved and explain the reasoning proc-
ess leading to the selection ofthat goal (p. 5). They will write and evaluate writ-
ings. There are "questions for analysis" throughout. 

Chaffee's text will certainly keep students busy. And more than one freshman 
will find himselfin the student essays. Practice tethered to one's own sense and 
experience can only be further sharpened. There is raw grist for the ratiocinative 
mill here. 

Still, problems deep and aplenty make it the case that we cannot recommend 
the work. Our review follows a familiar tripartite: first we look at Chaffee's 
handling of the sorts of things we expect to cover in a basic critical thinking 
course. Next we look for new, insightful contributions to the enhancement of 
student learning. We wrap things up with an overview of the field: where do we 
go from here? Can Chaffee help? 

Critical Thinking/Introductory Logic texts typically cover a large dose of in-
formal fallacies, some common deductive patterns and some inductive proce-
dures. The deductive-inductive distinction is always crucial, particularly in sepa-
rating invalid arguments from inductive ones. Neither involves the conclusive-
ness or necessity of validity, and arguers could well have intended the conclu-
sions of invalid arguments to follow at least with the probability that character-
izes inductivity. 



3 10 Informal Logic 

Chaffee defines deductive arguments as ones "in which one reasons from 
premises known or assumed to be true to a conclusion that follows logically 
from these premises" (563). Trouble. In what way do invalidly drawn conclu-
sions follow "logically"? Is Chaffee identifying validity and deductivity (as so 
many of our students are wont)? In a footnote we are told that the term validity is 
"reserved for deductively valid arguments in which the conclusions follow nec-
essarily from the premises" (549, fn.). Conclusions that follow invalidly, then, 
follow non-necessarily but still logically? That is exactly what we say ofprob-
ability with regard to inductive arguments. So wherein lies the invalid/inductive 
distinction? 

Chaffee says invalid arguments are ones "in which the reasons do not support 
the conclusion so that the conclusion does not follow from the reasons offered" 
(549). More trouble. How can an unsupported conclusion that "does not follow" 
from the premises nevertheless follow "logically"?! If Chaffee is saying that 
invalid conclusions do not follow with necessity, we still need to know the sense 
in which following non-necessarily is (non-inductively) "logical". This is espe-
cially worrisome since Chaffee goes on to refer to invalidity as fallacious (551), 
adding that "we will investigate fallacious reasoning in Chapter 12". He does that 
a lot--<ieferring issues. It will wear student patience thin. Worse, all too often 
one turns to the additional material but finds no further help, as I will now show 
regarding invalidity, inductivity, non-necessity, etc. 

In Chapter 12 we are told that inductive reasoning is "reasoning from premises 
assumed to be true to a conclusion supported (but not logically) by the premises" 
(582). Inductive reasoning is not logical? Now this is news. Does Chaffee mean 
that inductive reasoning is "illogical"? If so, wherein lies the distinction between 
fallacious, invalid reasoning and illogical, inductive reasoning? Or, perhaps Chaffee 
considers inductive reasoning "non-logical". No more talk of "inductive logic". 
Just like that. Invalid, faJIacious reasoning can be logical. But even the best, not 
at all fallacious inductive reasoning is ruled out ofthe category of logic-by 
definition. And perhaps two new (?) divisions emerge within reasoning: logical 
and non-logical. 

In a work on critical thinking, Chaffee has a chapter on "thinking critically" 
(Chapter 2) and another on "reasoning critically" (Chapter 12). There is yet an-
other distinction then perhaps between "thinking" and "reasoning". Reasoning, 
Chaffee tells us is a "type of thinking that uses arguments" (537). Inductive rea-
soning then is argumentative but non-logical thinking? Invalidity is argumenta-
tive but fallaciously so, non-necessitating but logical thinking? Fallacies are non-
argumentative-or fail as arguments? Introductory students anyway will not have 
an easy time grasping these distinctions-or, indeed the underlying motivation. 
Chaffee wants to clarify key points of departure in the field (e.g., different modes 
of thinking). Afortiori: keep the confusion to a minimum. 

More substantive suggestions are in order at least with regard to Chaffee's 
"logical" but invalid, fallacious thinking. In Chapter 12 he turns to informal falIa-



Book Reviews/Comptes rendus 311 

cies. They had been mentioned in Chapter 5 but again deferred for 400 pages. 
The fallacies are the standard sort (appeal to authority, etc.). Now remember that 
informal fallacies have no invalidating power. Consider: 

1. If the bible says murder is right, murder is right. 

2. The bible says murder is right. 

3. Murder is right. 

The argument is valid though it appeals to authority (premise 1). Conclusion 
derivability is procedural, having nothing to do with argument content. What 
underscores this point is that the fallacy-the weight of biblical authority-at 
least prima facie might seem convincing. Premise 2, on the other hand, is 
outrightly false. Still validity is intact. 

So in treating argument processes and properties, we need to be very clear 
about the distinction between formal fallacies involving invalid moves from 
premises to conclusions and false premises or premises guilty ofinformal falla-
cies like appealing to authority. Both issues are crucial to argumentative co-
gency. Conclusions must be adequately supported by relevant premises which 
are also acceptable ("true"? warranted, justified, believable) for arguments to be 
cogent. 2 It does not follow from that, however, that a violation of one cogency 
condition constitutes a violation ofthe other. In fact, the real challenge for criti-
cal thinking students is provided by just those arguments that seem not to violate 
either condition of cogency because they subtly do not violate one ofthe condi-
tions. For all his specious distinction-making, Chaffee not only fails to shed new 
light, he blurs old vision. 

II 

These sorts of problems continue to bedevil Chaffee's attempts to enhance stu-
dent understanding when we tum to other topics, topics under-treated or over-
looked by others. Take questions. 

Surely the matter of questions is something of a mystery-and downright 
embarrassing-in the critical thinking field. The "best seller" texts don't even 
index the topicP The topic is hopelessly undertreated. Yet the very process of 
thinking seems to be a questioning one: asking questions, sorting them out (which 
apply to the issue at stake, which don't), the most troubling as opposed to negligi-
ble ones, etc. 

We need to look quite systematically at types of questions: the main ones; 
their similarities, differences; conflicts between them-in debates, in the very 
formulation of issues; resolving the conflicts. The idea would be to apprentice 
our beginning student in the vocabulary of questions, in the articulation and man-
agement ofthe idiom such that cross-disciplinarily-especially where they are 
least informed-they learn at least how to raise issues, to tease out possible 
responses; then perhaps they can attempt to determine which issues apply, which 
issues are significant, how to unpack resolution possibilities, etc. 



312 Informal Logic 

What does Chaffee offer on the topic of questions? About 10-15 pages-
mostly in Chapter 2-in the massive text are devoted to the matter. Again, this is 
more than most works offer. Still, one must take issue with Chaffee's exact for-
mulation. He speaks of questions offact, interpretation, analysis, synthesis, evalu-
ation and application. He admits that his discussion ofthem is ''very general" 
(64) the categories "overlap" (65) but apparently cover the "right" (64) ques-
tions, the "relevant" (64) ones. That's the problem. Chaffee's questions are all 
species of questions of relevance. But there are relevant questions and there are 
relevant questions. Further: if tension rises between different types of relevant 
questions, which should prevail? Why? Further still: what about other question-
types? They seem to have been left out altogether. For instance: questions of 
significance. A bit more on these points. 

"Just the facts, Ma' am". Are factual questions more relevant than questions 
of interpretation? What if the two collide? For instance: is the sex act in rape, 
not necessarily involving any violence, more relevant to an understanding of 
whether a rape has occurred than interpretations ofthe act in terms of "power" or 
control? Which is (more) relevant to the key matter of consent? Violence would 
seem to violate consent. But what if we speak of "date" rape involving friends or, 
indeed, marital rape? And what if both individuals (the "couple") were known to 
favor "deviant" or "deviantly rough" sex? Which questions of relevance would 
still tease out consent? "Just the facts"? The bare facts might argue for consent 
where none was exactly given ("she never exactly said no", "she never exactly 
resisted in a manner inconsistent with her usual participation in rough sex"). And 
questions of interpretation speaking to subtle complexities ("the overall rela-
tionship was an abusive one", "the woman felt intimidated", ... ) might, in a crimi-
nal case anyway, be deemed inadmissible, irrelevant. 

Now such irrelevant or marginally relevant issues are often significant. So a 
further criterion of cogency is in order, viz., significance.4 Warnick and Inch 
note in their Critical Thinking and Communication: "[ m lore frequently than any 
other issue, significance is the deciding issue in a debate."5 In fact, various con-
tests emerge: between marginally relevant, highly significant questions and con-
siderably relevant, less significant ones; between moderately relevant, moder-
ately significant issues and highly relevant but utterly negligible ones. At least 
some controversies will tum on taking seriously the idea that one should lie (dis-
tort the issues) in order to salvage significant issues that may be of dubious rel-
evance. 

Some of the most nuanced attempts to obscure the relevance/significance 
distinction have to do with fundamental assumptions and starting points.6 In real 
life debates, the very things we take for granted are often ascribed a weight they 
cannot bear. But these are notoriously difficult to tease out ("suppressed 
premises", "hidden assumptions"). So students will need to grapple with yet more 
question-types. E.g., questions of motivation: "Just where are you coming 
from?", "Exactly what are you getting at?" Or, questions that do not arise: "In 



Book Reviews/Comptes rendus 313 

the end are you really simply insisting that Hiroshima bombings cannot be justi-
fied; given a 'real' reverence for life-as you see it-the question does not arise?" 

Something of a symbiotic relationship seems to obtain between the question-
types, then. Still it would be procrustean to group them all under relevance. That 
would seriously obscure conflicts between and within question-types as well as 
the manner in which such conflicts lead us to appeal to matters that go beyond 
mere relevance. So Chaffee's failure to illuminate various question-types is a 
serious one indeed. 

1Il 

Where do we go from here? I have intimated anyway that questioning skills are 
the primer in critical thinking development. Chaffee and others need to go back 
to that most natural starting point where questions are the pivot of the pursuit of 
factual details; the construction of arguments, deductive or inductive assessments, 
etc. 

Chaffee's text shows finally why the old symbolic logic, chock-full of infer-
ence rules, proved such a prob lem for the transferability of analytic skills across 
disciplines. The rules seemed too specialized even for the non-philosophy teachers 
our students would run into. Questions provide a broader idiom still deepened in 
the rigor (drawing distinctions, establishing connections, unpacking applications) 
that is our trademark. 

Notes 

1. Parenthetical page references are to the cited edition. 
2. See Johnson, R.H. and Blair, J. A., Logical Self-Defense, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-

Hill Ryerson, 1993), p. 49; Kahane, H., Logic and Contemporary RhetoriC, 6th ed. 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1992), p. 8. 

3. E.g.: Moore, B.N. and Parker, R., Critical Thinking, 3rd ed. (Mountain View, CA: 
Mayfield, 1992); Kahane, H., Logic and Contemporary RhetoriC, 6th ed. (Belmont, 
CA: Wadsworth, 1992); Dauer, F.W., Critical Thinking (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1989); Copi, LM. and Cohen, c., Introduction to Logic, 8th ed. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1990). 

4. The absence of significance from cogency criteriallists (note 2, supra) is another critical 
thinking curiousity. "True but trivial," is a most familiar riposte. Experts must be conflating 
cogency with a criterion much more strictly formal. We need premises to be "illuminat-
ing," to deepen intuitions, to capture our sense of the issues at stake, not merely meet the 
procedural test of a well-formed argument. Significance addresses this more substantive 
element. Otherwise, an argument would be "cogent" simply because it is not invalid and 
contains no obvious fallacies. Acceptable premises, no less than relevant ones, are not all 
on a par. 

5. New York: Macmillan, p. 309. 



314 Informal Logic 

6. The classic exchange in this regard involves Nozick' s attack on Williams's celebrated idea 
of equality. A distribution of medical care on the strict ground of ill-health would be an 
ideal of quality, Williams claims. Anything else, e.g., discriminating on the basis of ability 
to pay, would be irrelevant, irrational. (See Williams, B., ''The Idea of Equality" [1962] in 
P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman, eds., Philosophy, Politics and Society, 2nd Series, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1964, 110-131.) "Need a gardener allocate his services to those 
lawns which need him most?" Nozick snaps. (See Nozick, R., Anarchy, State and 
Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974,234.) One does not amputate a wealthy man's 
healthy leg. But even "General" hospitals discriminate (prioritize?) in terms of teaching! 
research needs. These can be weighty (epidemics, terminal illnesses, personnel needs in 
disadvantaged areas). Sprucing up the Rose Garden (of the White House) may involve 
matters (national image, visting dignitaries) that may outweigh the needs of neglected 
lawns in Washington, D.C. ghettoes. Do parents act improperly when they spend time 
with their children, totally "neglecting" the orphan next door? Williams simply assumes a 
basic, relevant need not defeasible. Students need to understand conflicts between rel-
evant factors as well as the significance of matters not immediately at stake. 

Anthony Oluwatoyin, P. O. Box 4936, Vancouver Main P.O., 
Vancouver, Be V6B 4A6 

AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC, 2nd edition. 
by Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel 

Edited and introduced by John Corcoran. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub-
IishingCompany, 1993. Pp.xlix+232. ISBN: 0-87220-144-9. Pa-
per. US $14.95. 

Review by Don S. Levi 

I have my doubts about the value ofteaching formal logic, but I don't have the 
same doubts about teaching this text, which first appeared in 1934. Even if it has 
limited value as a logic text, and even though it first appeared more than sixty 
years ago, it is worth teaching because of the philosophy in it, which is done by 
two of the most distinguished American philosophers of the twentieth century. 

This text is not recommended for use in teaching logic. Some of its topics are 
of interest to philosophers, but not to many logic teachers: the ontological status