INFORMAL LOGIC 

XII.3, Fall 1990 

Towards a Research Agenda for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking 

MARK ,,'EINSTEIN Montclair State College 

This paper recommends that the recent 
concern with informal logic and critical 
thinking be redirected from its general 
philosophical focus and towards a greater 
appreciation of the particulars of practice 
in the various domains of human under-
standing. The redirection recommended is 
prompted by the central role that critical 
thinking and informal logic can be seen to 
play in meaningful educational reform, 
especially at the undergraduate level. Such 
a central role is implicit in many of the texts 
and theoretic discussions within the expand-
ing field, and has been made explicit in the 
writings of some of the most thoughtful ad-
vocates of critical thinking. In order to 
render the recommendation plausible, the 
paper will sketch an image of informal logic 
and critical thinking that places the field 
within three significant contexts. These con-
texts include the circumstances within which 
the field was first developed, some theoretic 
assumptions common in the field's 
understanding of itself, and finally, the 
educational framework within which the 
field's endeavors take place. Relative to in-
formal logic, the recommendation is that 
argument analysis should evolve into what 
has been called "applied epistemology." I 
Critical thinking, similarly, should be 
redirected from concerns typical of 
philosophers and towards issues and ap-
proaches more representative of critical 
thinking both within and across the wide 
range of disciplines represented by the 
course of undergraduate studies. 

A number of quite particular conse-
quences will result from the position 
developed in the paper. Among them is the 
view that the seminal work of Stephen 

Toulmin has been too hastily criticized and 
seen as lacking, and that Toulmin's analysis 
of the structure and function of argument 
should be placed at the center of work in 
informal logic. Next, that the current con-
cern with ordinary argument needs to be 
moderated by a deepening appreciation of 
what I call "stylized" argument, that is, 
argument within the various special 
disciplines. 2 Last, that informal logicians 
and critical thinkers, working within 
undergraduate education as proponents of 
educational reform, must develop col-
laborative approaches that draw the 
members of all of the academic disciplines 
into an ongoing dialogue in which all par-
ticipants are equally valued contributors. 

1. Informal logic and 
applied epistemology 

Recent concern with informal logic 
begins against the backdrop of the teaching 
of aspects of symbolic and traditional logic 
as a standard undergraduate course in 
philosophy. First level logic courses, with 
their typical mixture of fallacies, fragments 
of formal logic, linguistic analysis and 
rudimentary scientific method were 
presented in order to accomplish at least two 
educational objectives. The first of these 
was to offer an analysis of argument and 
the beginning of a method of argument 
assessment and the second to furnish some 
foundational knowledge and help develop 
basic reasoning skills. The latter objective 
was based on a vague, but traditional no-
tion, that the teaching of logic is relevant 
to the teaching of thinking. The former was 



122 Mark Weinstein 

based on the equally venerable notion that 
argument analysis is relevant to argument 
assessment and that skill in argument assess-
ment enables students to, in some sense, 
develop the skills and even dispositions of 
reasonable persons, traits and abilities now 
commonly identified with critical thinking. 3 

It was the inability of the then standard 
introductory logic courses to achieve these 
ends, and the compelling nature ofthe ends 
themselves, that furnished the impetus for 
informal logic. 4 Thus, informal logic stands 
between formal logic on the one hand and 
critical thinking on the other. And as such, 
informal logic is subject to two opposing 
tensions. The first of these prompts concern 
with analogues to formal principals, con-
text independent criteria for identifying and 
assessing arguments. The second demands 
that informal logicians offer an educational 
program that is of general utility, enabling 
students to better assess arguments both in 
their courses of study and in their every-
day lives. 

The logical aspect of the informal logic 
project has been taken to include a theory 
of argument structure (functionally 
analogous to syntax in formal systems) 
through the circle arrow diagrams, now 
commonly accepted as the most adequate 
means of representing arguments, and ap-
paratus that addresses the acceptability and 
unacceptability of inferential relations 
(analogous to semantics). The latter has 
been, for the most part, limited to fallacies, 
both traditional and newly defined. 

The model of formal logic and the deep-
ly rooted tendency of philosophically trained 
informal logicians to search for purely 
general and, hopefully, a priori principles 
(or at least principles that require no more 
than an analysis of language and common 
sense) has resulted in a predisposition that, 
as I shall hope to convincingly argue, 
creates problems for the satisfactory ap-
plication of informal logic as a tool for 
critical thinking. 

Critical thinking is, whatever else, an 
educational ideal of great breadth and pro-

fundity. It has been identified with 
reasonableness in general, as in Harvey 
Siegel's definition of the critical thinker as 
one who is "appropriately moved by 
reasons."5 And it has been identified with 
the most all-embracing notion of the 
intellectual virtues, as in Robert Ennis' 
characterization of critical thinking as 
"reasonable and reflective thinking focused 
on deciding what to believe or do". 6 

It is such very general objectives that, 
so it seems to me, require that informal logic 
move beyond the logical in order to embrace 
what might be called applied epistemology: 
that is, the study of the epistemologies in 
use in the various domains of human 
understanding in order to ground the assess-
ment of arguments as they occur within 
them. Notice, that I am assuming that there 
are distinguishable domains of human 
understanding, that the domains of human 
understanding have epistemologies, and that 
these need to be made explicit, if informal 
logic is to lead to critical thinking. 7 Needless 
to say, my claim is controversial, since, for 
among other reasons, it implies that pure 
epistemology is insufficient to the task of 
critical thinking. That is, I maintain that 
epistemology that is purely philosophical 
and independent of the various domains of 
inquiry cannot effectively result in critical 
thinking in the broad sense required by the 
educational ideal sustained in its name. 8 

Notice also that this implies that the domains 
of human understanding are generally rele-
vant for' 'deciding what to believe or do." 
My position is that domain specific 
knowledge, including knowledge of the 
epistemologies of domains, is relevant for 
critical thinking both within and across do-
mains, and in relation to ordinary affairs: 
those "realHfe problems" that have been 
the focus of much of the theory and prac-
tice of informal logic. 9 

The need for an applied epistemology 
is grounded in the nature of informal logic 
itself. For if the assessment of arguments 
is to be seen through the analogy with for-
mal logic, what is required is both a theory 



of premise acceptability (analogous to say, 
a Tarskian definition of truth) and some ac-
count of how acceptability is transmitted 
from premises to conclusions (analogous to 
semantic entailment).10 The theory of 
fallacies, in such an image, shows how 
various fallacious moves block acceptability 
from being transmitted through the chain 
of argument from premises to conclusions. 
But notice an important asymmetry between 
a theory of fallacies and a theory of semantic 
entailment. Fallacies shows how the chain 
of argument is broken, not how the chain 
is validated. The asymmetry is sufficient to 
account for the attractiveness of deductivism 
in informal logic, since if all appropriate 
arguments are deductive than no semantics 
other than that of the preservation of truth-
like properties is required. 

Unfortunately for generalist tendencies 
in informal logic, the deductivist solution 
has been generally seen to be unattractive, 
at least if we mean the sort of deductivism 
that makes all arguments analytic or nomic 
entailments. Trudy Govier's careful argu-
ments found most recently in Problems in 
Argument Analysis and Evaluation, 11 seem 
compelling when she points out, both by 
abstract reasoning and persuasive examples, 
the inappropriateness of the very general 
universalizations that would be required if 
deductivism is to be sustained in the con-
texts of argumentation that informal logic 
is most concerned with. There is, however, 
another sense of deductivism that needs to 
be distinguished from the one just mention-
ed. That is the notion of deductivism that 
is parasitic on the minimal conditional. As 
has been noticed by almost everyone who 
has discussed the issue, to present premises 
PI through Pn and conclusion q is to assert 
at least the material conditional if PI and 
... and Pn then q. Thus, elementary deduc-
tive relations of the sort captured by modes 
ponens and modes tollens are built into the 
very fabric of argumentation. In this sense 
deductive moves are always included in 
argumentation and the correlative deductive 
fallacies are always appropriate means of 

Research Agenda 123 

critique. But again, as Govier has argued, 
the minimal conditional in no way extends 
the force of the argument beyond the stated 
premises and thus, in no way guarantees the 
stronger sense of analytic or nomic entail-
ment that is required if the premises are to, 
non-trivially, imply the conclusion. By 
'non-trivially' I mean imply them without 
the addition of the minimal conditional 
generated ad hoc. 

The unavailability of deductivism has 
serious consequences for informal logic as 
a tool for argument assessment. For. as just 
mentioned, the fallacies merely show why 
arguments fail, and so, what is needed is 
additional apparatus to demonstrate how 
arguments succeed. This opens the door for 
what I have called applied epistemology. 
For I will claim that the assessment of the 
strength of support premises afford conclu-
sions can only be assessed when the domain 
within which the argument is presented is 
taken into account. To use a distinction I 
owe to Rob Grootendorst,12 fallacies are 
norms for argumentation that cannot be 
violated, if it is to be reasonable, but they 
do not afford criteria that allow us to assess 
the degree of success with which a set of 
premises support a particular conclusion. 
That is, assessing the success with which 
premises support conclusions requires, in 
the words of Tjark Kruiger, another 
member of the Amsterdam school, appeal 
to "mutually accepted testing procedures," 
and a "mutually accepted system of 
logic," 13 in my terms, accepted principles 
of methodology and substantive generaliza-
tions and analytic hypotheses. 14 

2. Toulmin and stylized argument 

The rejection of a thoroughgoing deduc-
tivism has consequences for the assessment 
of arguments, for if the relation between 
premises and conclusion is not deductive, 
then some sense must be made of the claim 
that particular premises offer varying 
support for the conclusion. This can 



124 Mark Weinstein 

not be accomplished through argument 
diagramming alone, especially if diagrams 
are limited to identifying premises and 
conclusions. But even where diagrams are 
complicated by a more sophisticated notion 
of the roles of premises in argumentation, 
difficulties with levels of support still 
persisLI5 

This can be most easily seen if we 
accept Toulmin's model as a plausible ac-
count of the complex roles of premises in 
arguments. 16 For as Toulmin maintains, the 
structure of functional roles he identifies is 
dependent on particular methodological 
principles in the domains within which 
argumentation occurs. The notion of war-
rant serves as a telling example. Toulmin 
sees warrants as sentences that show the 
relevance of grounds to claims. In science, 
for example, a warrant might be a cover-
ing law showing a functional relationship 
between data and some predicted out-
come.17 But as many of Toulmin's early 
critics maintained, data can be challenged 
in other ways. In particular the data may 
be relevant in the sense that they are ap-
propriate to some generalization, but yet 
may be methodologically suspect. IS The 
data may be challenged, not only in respect 
of their relevance, but also as regards their 
factidty. But, how are such challenges to 
be distinguished, how are warrants 
presented in response to such concerns to 
be identified? The answer seems obvious 
to me, such differing warrants can only be 
identified if substantive knowledge of the 
domain within which the argument takes 
place is brought to bear on the issue. Fur-
ther, how can such warrants be assessed? 
How do the different considerations render 
the conclusion more or less worthy of 
belief? It seems to me that only a sense of 
the basic epistemological issues in the field 
could possibly help. How well entrenched 
are the generalizations, how canonical is the 
methodology, what latitude is acceptable in 
practice? Clearly these are domain specific 
issues, and not merely issues of fact, but 
rather, issues that refer to substantive 

methodological assumptions that govern 
inquiry in the domain. 

It might be countered that even if 
Toulmin's model of argument is correct as 
an analysis of arguments in the stylized con-
text of the special disciplines, it is irrele-
vant to the practice of informal logic in 
respect of its most essential domain of ap-
plication, that is ordinary argumentation. 
I now turn to that concept. 

The distinction that the concept of or-
dinary argumentation was seen to make, 
contrasted ordinary arguments with the 
argument samples that were frequently 
presented in logic textbooks. Turning sam-
ple arguments into overt and formally ex-
pressed implications requires that the argu-
ment samples offered be treated as con-
stituted, at least in their essential aspects, 
by those formal renderings that become the 
textbook's exercises in derivation and 
proof. Translation, the rendering of or-
dinary arguments as formal proofs has been, 
thus, a significant component of introduc-
tory logic texts. The artificiality of this pro-
cess prompts two separate quasi-deductivist 
moves, first, the concern with missing 
premises as a necessary addition to ordinary 
arguments if arguments are to be rendered 
as valid; 19 second, the attempt at alternative 
reconstructions based on core notions of 
validity so that arguments can be assessed 
holistically without regard to the strength 
of individual premises. A characteristic ex-
ample of this sort is the possible world in-
terpretation that utilizes the notion of a 
counterexample to validity claims as an 
essential core, while relinquishing the 
details of logical reconstruction. 20 

As evidenced by the recent literature, 
both of these strategies create as many prob-
lems as they resolve. 21 But there is a more 
fundmental problem with these typical 
quasi-deductivist accounts. Contrasting or-
dinary arguments with those in formal 
languages obscures a more relevant distinc-
tion. That is, the distinction between or-
dinary argumentation as contrasted with the 
more stylized argumentation common in 



specific subject domains. Argumentation 
seen in relation to an enhousing domain and 
discourse community exhibits differing and 
characteristic styles of argument, specific 
"inference tickets" (warrants), particular 
epistemologies (backing), and individual re-
quirements for closure. 22 This for me is the 
insight Toulmin's position affords. 

Seeing argumentation as occuring within 
paricular domains, does not, however, 
mean that a given argument need be limited 
to some particular domain. Many of 
Toulmin's critics appear to confuse the 
former view with the latter, and therefore 
see the unavailability of a uniquely iden-
tifiable domain for particular argument 
fragments as a problem for Toulmin. It is 
not. But, more importantly, such criticism 
has resulted in a pernicious non-sequitor 
that seems implicit in the views of many 
informal logicians and critical thinking 
theorists. That is, if no particular enhousing 
domain is identifiable, the argument needs 
to be assesssed by the growing sub-discipline 
of philosophy, informal logic and critical 
thinkingJ3 This, if my view is right, is a 
disaster for any argument that requires do-
main specific considerations for its 
appropriate analysis and assessment. 
Arguments can, in general, be presented 
and developed in different ways in many 
fields. Short argument samples may have 
been abstracted from discussions in a field 
(if they are real and substantial), but in the 
textbook they stand alone. If they are ex-
amples representative of a vast number of 
sample argument used in texts, they are 
available to many fields. Arguments can be 
framed by many different kinds of consider-
ations. Doubtful claims can be addressed 
from many disciplinary points of view and 
many combinations of disciplinary perspec-
tives. The question is, which fields and 
which approach yields what kinds of suc-
cess in analyzing and developing the salient 
aspects of the argument, finally, offering 
an adequate assessment of the various con-
siderations put forward as arguments in 
respect of the points at issue. 

Research Agenda 125 

3. Critical thinking across the disciplines 

The sense that there is an internal rela-
tionship between arguments, argumentation 
and domains of knowledge persists despite 
attempts to show relevant and useful notions 
of critical thinking that are generally 
available for instruction and neutral in 
respect of the disciplines. The resolution of 
the issues generated by these competing 
views, requires that reflective practitioners 
of the disciplines, students of the history of 
ideas, methodologists and specialists in 
teaching increasingly engage in the task of 
generating and organizing the data upon 
which an informed and adequate notion of 
critical thinking across the disciplines must 
be based. 

My own research responds to such an 
agenda. Increasingly, my interest involves 
working with colleagues from a variety of 
disciplines attempting to analyze and con-
trast methods in the various fields, what has 
been called by John McPeck and others, the 
"epistemology of the disciplines. "24 If the 
locus of critical thinking is to be found in 
the particulars of disciplinary language and 
modes of inquiry, then critical thinking, at 
the undergraduate level at least, will require 
a focus different from the common concern 
with topic neutral skills and dispositions. 
At Montclair State College some of us are 
attempting to grapple with the reformula-
tion of the focus of critical thinking through 
the study of the disciplines in an "ecological 
perspective. ' '25 This requires a systematic 
exploration of the continuities and dif-
ferences in language and inquiry across the 
various fields; the relation of particular 
disciplines to multi-field concerns; and the 
application of disciplinary knowledge to 
broad, "real world," problems. 

The ecology of the disciplines develops 
a stance in relation to real-world multi-
logical issues. We accept the fact that 
methods within the disciplines are frequent-
ly inadequate to problems that transcend 
narrow disciplinary frames. But we insist 
that information drawn from within these 



126 Mark Weinstein 

frames is necessary, if the multi-logical prob-
lems are to be addressed in an informed and 
responsible fashion. Further, we maintain 
that information from the fields includes 
substantive methodological principles, prin-
ciples of epistemological and logical 
relevance that are drawn from the practice 
of the disciplines and that are not available 
in the general characterizations of 
methodology developed by philosophers 
working in abstraction from practice. The 
ecology of the disciplines also includes a 
perspective that sees methodological insight 
to be garnered from the comparision of 
methodological principles in the various 
disciplines, This requires the detailed 
description and assessment of disciplinary 
practice from the points of view of diverse 
disciplines. Such a cross-disciplinary 
perspective certainly includes methodology 
drawn from the work of philosophers, but 
philosophy is not uniquely relevant to this 
study. Philosophers work in specific ways, 
perhaps in ways that are useful as con-
trasting points of methodological perspec-
tive, but so do sociologists, art historians 
and chemists. 26 There is no a priori argu-
ment that I accept that substantiates the 
claims of any discipline to methodological 
priority. 

The lack of arguments that demonstrate 
a priori precedence of any argument style 
or disciplinary approach should not be con-
fused with the argument that shows the a 
priori necessity of some argument or other 
required for even the most abstract rational 
disputes. Forthe latter, as demonstrated by 
Plato in the Theatetus and reiterated by 
Harvey Siegel, shows the availability of a 
non-question begging argument to be a 
necessary condition for rational justification 
within disputes in general. 27 Siegel employs 
his version of Plato's argument in a varie-
ty of ways and against a variety of targets, 
but he shows particular concern with a view 
that is a cousin of the one argued here: the 
emphasis on disciplinary particulars as 
essential for epistemological concerns. But 
we still must distinguish the two points, for 

a concern with disciplinary norms, does not 
preclude interdisciplinary assessment. 
Siegel is clearly correct in maintaining that 
inter-disciplinary assessments must be based 
on good reasons, but it is equally clear that 
there is no reason to suppose that such stan-
dards for assessment must be drawn from 
philosophical epistemology whether as cur-
rently understood or as understood by some 
future heir of the contemporary philoso-
phical tradition. 28 For, contrary to Siegel, 
I maintain that it remains to be seen whose 
methodological practice is best suited to 
constitute the forum within which particular 
cross-disciplinary assesssments are to be 
made. Historically, philosophers, being 
concerned with the most abstract principles 
of inquiry have played the role-frequently 
self-appointed-of court of last resort in 
methodological disputes. Certainly, the 
practice of assessing methodology at the 
highest level of abstraction can be called 
philosophy with historical and philological 
warrant. But that is not the issue. The issue 
for me is, rather, to identify the domains 
from which the most adequate 
methodological concept set is to be drawn. 
Call the result philosophy if you will, the 
issue is still from whose practice is 
epistemological warrant to be drawn, and 
in which cases. Is the a priori practice of 
philosophers to be the model, or is it rather 
the hermeneutic analysis of literary 
theorists; is it the narrative explanations of 
historians, or the descriptive and analytic 
offerings of sociologists, the axiomatic prac-
tice of mathematicians, the theory bound 
derivations of physics, or is it, perhaps, the 
inductively generated accounts common in 
the social sciences? Which of these. and in 
which combination, in respect of what 
aspects, and on which particular occassions? 

The preceding remarks offer an argu-
ment scheme applicable to the vast majori-
ty of critical thinking skills identified in lists 
of critical thinking concepts. So, for exam-
ple, whose notion of causality is most rele-
vant to critical thinking, the historians' , the 
literary critics', the quantum physicists' or 



the educational psychologists'? Or is it 
rather some philosophers' and if so which 
of those available in a rich and varied 
literature? Analyses of causation, judging 
from classic and contemporary philoso-
phical texts, include a host of related but 
distinguishable notions. Looking at prac-
tices in the various disciplines increases the 
available models for understanding causali-
ty. To ask, as do some critical thinking 
theorists, that students be helped to ad-
judicate which of various causal claims is 
most adequate, is to require that students 
be familiar with the various ways that causal 
claims are grounded in the various domains 
of inquiry. There is just no univocal analysis 
of causation that stands as the final court 
of appeal. 29 The same is true of other cen-
tral epistemological concepts. Whose no-
tion of observation is most salient to a given 
multi-logical dispute, the art critics', the 
neuro-physiologists', the cognitive scien-
tists' or the chemists'? What standards for 
authority are required, the sociologists', the 
political scientist's or the theologian's? 
Whose requirements of clarity should be 
sustained, the poet's, the bio-chemist's or 
the geometer's? Such issues, I maintain, can 
only be joined by contrasting available con-
cept sets and looking to our epistemological 
purposes. The various domains of 
knowledge all have particular insights to of-
fer. These domains include philosophy as 
a member. Philosophy does not, however, 
exhaust the available methodological in-
sights, neither through its method nor 
through its concepts. 

The focus I have been describing, an 
ecological perspective on the disciplines, 
shifts both the normative and descriptive 
core of critical thinking. The concern is less 
with the general concepts of informal logic 
and more with the concept maps that govern 
assessment of information in the fields. 
Most importantly, an ecological approach 
leaves open the possibility that abstract 
epistemological arguments drawn from the 
work of philosophers are not the court of 
last resort, that successful practice in the 

Research Agenda 127 

various disciplines has normative force, and 
that critical thinking must be closely tied 
to sound educational policies consistent with 
an adequate knowledge base in the various 
domains. 

4. Critical thinking and the language 
of the disciplines 

The preceding is, perhaps, most per-
suasive to those who already share my con-
victions. What is missing is a deeper 
theoretic analysis that exhibits the general 
structure of argument in a fashion that ex-
poses its disciplinary underpinnings. I 
believe that such a theory is available, and 
in fact, grows out of an analysis of argu-
ment that sees an intimate relationship be-
tween argument and language. Language, 
in such a theoretic analysis must, however, 
be seen in its full complexity, especially 
when the focus is on language as it is 
employed within the context of inquiry in 
the various disciplines. What I will now tum 
to is the beginning of a sketch of language 
in use that will point to the deep connection 
between language, argument and inquiry. 
But first a word about critical thinking. 

As is by now, perhaps, well known, The 
Institute for Critical Thinking takes critical 
thinking to include the skillful, self-
corrective and context-sensitive use of 
criteria. Critical inquiry thus requires the 
identification and reasonable application of 
criteria appropriate to the context of in-
quiry.30 But where are these criteria to be 
found and how is the notion of critical in-
quiry related to the language in which it is 
embedded? It should not be surprising, 
given the perspective outlined above, that 
the answer to these questions should be 
found in the particular role that the 
disciplines playas a crucial context for in-
quiry. To see this, it is necessary to explore 
the relation between the disciplines as the 
locus of inquiry, and the languages within 
which inquiry takes place. 

Language as related to the disciplines 



128 Mark Weinstein 

can be differentiated into three essential 
aspects. The first two are general; the last 
addresses the disciplines in their relation to 
undergraduate education. These three 
aspects of language are: 

1. Language as a "language game, " to 
use Wittgenstein's pregnant phrase. Ex-
pressive of a "form of life," language in-
cludes a set of paradigmatic practices that 
underlie the particular concepts and argu-
ment types characteristic of a discipline. 31 
Language as "language game" relates the 
overt language in use to the lived reality of 
practitioners of the discipline, and draws 
from the historical experience that gives 
each discipline its characteristic profile. 

2. Language as a specific set of concepts 
and argument prototypes: particular 
vocabulary and characteristic modes of 
organizing disciplinary content, that reflect 
practice, permit disciplinary communica-
tion, and set the stage for the development 
of appropriate tasks that initiate new 
members into the field. 

3. Language as a set of basic competen-
cies required of students and assessed 
through tasks deemed necessary, if students 
are to demonstrate understanding of the 
discipline and the information and pro-
cedures that it includes. 

Such a schematic representation remains 
opaque without a few telling examples. 
Perhaps the following will offer some sense 
of how the specifics of various disciplines 
point to the need for a careful look at the 
particulars of disciplinary inquiry as related 
to the three aspects of language presented. 

4.1 Language as the expression of a "form 
of life" 

To take an example: In Philosophy a 
central paradigm shows a marked discon-
tinuity with an analogue in Chemistry. 
Philosophers take the practice epitomized 
by Socrates as a basic model for inquiry. 
That is, the practice of doing Philosophy 
includes at its core, careful and pointed 
questioning whose purpose is to elicit and 
clarify concepts that are thought to be 

already available to the philosophical 
thinker, either as intuitive knowledge or 
perhaps as the result of the internalization 
of conceptual frameworks and linguistic 
structures. It is evident from such practice 
that philosophers maintain that basic 
philosophical concepts are available to 
reflection and can be clarified through 
dialectic. 

In Chemistry, on the other hand, the 
central paradigm is based on the procedures 
of classic chemists such as Lavoisier and 
Dalton. These procedures are quite specific: 
weighing, heating and combining in sim-
ple proportions, and are a small sub-set of 
the possible procedures that could be ap-
plied to material substances. The success 
of these initial methods of inquiry leads 
chemists to look to analogous procedures. 
This reflects the field's fundamental 
assumption that complex chemical 
phenomena are best explained when shown 
to be the result of analogues of these primor-
dial practices (analysis in terms of mass, 
measurement of electrical resistance and the 
like). 

4.2 Language as concepts and arguments. 
Language in this sense offers an even 

clearer image of the' differences that 
characterize inquiry in the disciplines. Each 
discipline includes both a set of concepts 
and a logic-a set of tacit or explicit rules 
governing how discourse is to be organized 
for presentation, challenge and defense. In 
Classical Economics, for example, typical 
concepts include value, exchange and 
market. Their variants pervade Economics 
as a discipline and importantly define a pro-
totypical argument type: the explanation of 
economic behavior in terms of subjective 
preferences and descriptions of market force 
deemed relatively objective and describable 
in quantitative terms. 

A far removed example of similar struc-
ture is the analysis of harmony in Music in 
terms of Dominant and Tonic. Both musical 
analysis and composition reflect this in 
prototypical dominant-tonic relations, these 



include harmonic substitutions (G#min7, 
C#7 in C major) and large formal analogues 
(Sonata-Allegro principle). 

4.3 Language as a set of student 
competencies. 

This involves the set of student skills re-
quired in the disciplines, and helps to 
specify student tasks and grounds the assess-
ment of student achievement. Analogous to 
reading and writing, such skills are grouped 
around information gathering and informa-
tion use. These vary in obvious ways: 
understanding and producing laboratory 
reports in Physics, and reading and writing 
short stories in English. There are more 
subtle distinctions as well. Take as an ex-
ample, the contrast between analyzing a 
classic philosophical text to draw out its 
main points and writing an analytic essay 
showing where crucial philosophical dif-
ficulites lie, on the one hand, as compared 
to reading original documents to develop 
a sense of an historical period, and using 
documents to argue for a particular perspec-
tive or interpretation of an era, on the other. 

5. Critical thinking as an 
educational goal 

Given the apparent discipline specifici-
ty of the languages presented above, the ob-
vious question is: Is critical thinking, and 
its supporting discipline, informal logic, as 
currently conceived, sufficient to engender 
critical thinkers in particular fields and at 
various educational levels? Before we con-
tinue, however, it should be immediately 
conceded that much of what is included in 
the current conception of critieal thinking 
is general, discipline neutral and relevant 
to aspects of instruction in a variety of col-
lege courses, as well as to arguments that 
can be characterized as involving issues of 
daily life. But are those aspects, conceived 
as general and subject neutral, adequate to 
educational objectives consistent with the 
goal of critical thinking and appropriate to 

Research Agenda 129 

undergraduate education?32 
A procedure for testing the current no-

tion is available from Harvey Siegel's ac-
count of the ideals underlying critical think-
ing found in Educating Reason. And so the 
question is: How far does the current con-
ception go towards addressing "respect for 
students as persons ... self-sufficiency and 
preparation for adulthood ... initiation into 
the rational traditions ... (and) ... democratic 
living"?33 The answer seems to be: Not 
very far at all. Although critical thinking 
instruction may furnish students with a 
budget of concerns, it is not clear that these 
concerns are readily translated into the com-
plex contexts of their other courses or their 
ordinary affairs. Nor is it clear that such 
concerns are equally relevant to substantive 
disputes, especially given the level of 
abstraction (or caricature) with which such 
concerns are represented in most texts in 
the field. 34 

Siegel, accepting the need for attention 
to the specifics of disciplinary knowledge, 
what he calls' 'pluralism, " follows McPeck 
by recommending that critical thinking pay 
attention to the "epistemology of the 
disciplines." That is, critical thinking 
should include in its purview the standards 
that govern "good reasons" in disciplinary 
efforts to substantiate claims in their field. 35 
This conception of knowledge in the fields 

does not sit comfortably with a position such 
as Paul's that sees disciplinary thinking as 
artificial and too narrow to address multi-
logical and ethical issues. Nevertheless, 
even if we agree with Paul that social and 
political concerns transcend narrow 
disciplinary focus, it seems plausible that 
information from the fields may be relevant 
to the amalgam of information necessary to 
address cross-disciplinary concerns and real 
world problems. How can a student be 
helped to evaluate and apply information 
from a variety of fields when responding 
in an informed fashion to multi-logical 
issues? How can students be helped to 
critically assess information within the 
range of subjects that they are required to 



130 Mark Weinstein 

master, and how can they be helped to apply 
such knowledge to the rich multi-
dimensional issues that characterize social 
and political argument and decisions in 
everyday life?36 

This raises a number of specific ques-
tions that define a research agenda for 
critical thinking conceived as relevant across 
the disciplines and at the undergraduate 
level. Do the procedures neutrally 
characterized by critical thinking theorists 
retain sufficient continuity when translated 
into the languages in use in the various 
fields? Do they retain significant similari-
ty when instantiated in the various pro-
cedures that govern inquiry in the domains 
of knowledge? Are critical thinking skills, 
undifferentiated by disciplinary specifics, 
adequate to the analysis of real world pro-
blems at a level of sophistication that is ap-
propriate to educated members of a con-
cerned citizenry? These are not trivial ques-
tions. They have been a concern of critical 
thinking theorists for almost a decade. But 
they have been addressed, for the most part, 
on a level of generality and through 
philosophical arguments that seem to me in-
adequate for their clarification and resolu-
tion. I maintain that an adequate response 
to the issues such questions reflect, requires 
careful analysis of the particulars of the 
various disciplines. The brief account of the 
diversity of the languages of the discipline, 
offered above, points to a framework of 
argument that is relevant to the dispute. For 
if the various disciplines are embedded in 
relevantly dissimilar practices, and if these 
practices support and require argument 
structures and epistemological norms that 
are substantive, in the sense that good 
reasons are warranted through them, then 
the claim to significant generality and sub-
ject neutrality is weakened. 

The consequences of such a research 
agenda are crucial to the relevance of critical 
thinking across the disciplines. For if my 
argument is sound, critical thinking across 
the disciplines will only become a reality 
when the normative function, heretofore 

reserved for philosophers, shifts to include 
the realities of concepts and practices that 
warrant the central role the disciplines play 
in furnishing much of what is worth know-
ing about the world around us. 

One more point before we move on. Our 
earlier consideration of the sufficiency of 
critical thinking as currently conceived, 
points to the analagous notion of necessi-
ty. And so we might well ask: Is there some 
core to the notion of critical thinking that 
is a necessary aspect of education in the 
various fields, given the ends for which 
critical thinking is envisioned? Here too, the 
question requires careful analysis of actual 
practice. For even if there is some definable 
core, necessary for thoughtful practitioners 
in the various fields, does this core require 
a common set of educational strategies to 
be included in schooling in the various do-
mains? Or are the particulars of disciplinary 
study sufficient to engender critical think-
ing skills and dispositions without a 
systematic focus on the skills and disposi-
tions themselves? 

These crucial questions require a 
response from critical thinking theorists 
concerned with undergraduate education 
across the disciplines. As mentioned earlier 
it is my conviction that working towards an 
appropriate response requires a research 
agenda that is more concerned with actual 
disciplinary practice and less with abstract 
epistemological or logical arguments. In this 
I see continuity with the tendency that 
motivated the movement from formal logic 
to informal logic and the shift from abstract, 
frequently formal philosophy of science, to 
the analysis of case studies drawn from the 
history of science. These tendencies raise 
profound questions as to the locus of 
epistemic wisdom. It is my sense that, in-
creasingly, insights into epistemological 
adequacy must be drawn from successful 
practice and be couched in terms that reflect 
the complexity and sophistication of stylized 
argument. That is my intuition; its defense 
ultimately relies on the research agenda 
recommended here. But the intuition is 



afforded prima facie support by the analysis 
of language offered above. It is reinforced 
by my sense that critical thinking skills, 
characterized as general and topic neutral, 
gives the form of the concerns, but none 
of the necessary substance. And it is 
rendered more persuasive by examples of 
disciplinary particulars of the sort offered 
above. But that is to repeat my convictions. 
Additional support must wait upon the 
careful analysis of critical thinking skills as 
instantiated in the various domains. This, 
of course, is the reason for my call for the 
research agenda outlined here. But even at 
the level of these programmatic remarks, 
there is more to the issue of the adequacy 
of critical thinking as currently understood, 
to the notion of critical thinking across the 
disciplines and at the college level. 

6. Critical thinking in its 
institutional setting 

The impact of the critical thinking move-
ment as a practical vehicle for educational 
reform raises additional considerations rele-
vant to the reform of actual educational in-
stitutions. 37 I claim that if critical thinking 
is to be effective as a vehicle for reform the 
issues raised must be seen within three 
essential contexts: 
1. The theoretic context of the various 

disciplines. 
2. The pedagogical practices appropriate to 

education in the fields. 
3. The pragmatic context generated by 

overarching institutional concerns. 

6.1 The theoretic context. 
Even if it is ultimately seen that critical 

thinking is generally available and neutral 
in respect of the methodological standards 
in particular disciplines, it is not apparent-
ly so, once the relevance and diversity of 
disciplinary languages is acknowledged. 
Critical thinking and the epistemological 
and logical criteria that are espoused in its 
name are not obviously identical with or 

Research Agenda 131 

readily translated into correlative principles 
in the various fields. Neither are the 
philosophical analyses afforded within 
critical thinking and informal logic un-
problematic in themselves or in application 
to cases. A sobering example for critical 
thinking advocates is all too available from 
the fifty years of rational reconstructionist 
attempts in philosophy of science alluded 
to above. The attempts at logically based 
general analyses of scientific practice were 
seen as both logically suspect and descrip-
tively inadequate by philosophers them-
selves. Both within and among the 
disciplines, faithfulness to scientific prac-
tice points up the inadequacy of the available 
general accounts of scientific method, of 
causation, of induction and of the nature and 
role of observation and its relation to theory. 

But there is more to the problem, for the 
judgment of philosophers is not the only insti-
tutionally relevant judgment, if critical think-
ing is to reach across the disciplines. Scholars, 
researchers and teachers in all of the fields 
to be touched by critical thinking must, 
themselves, see the relevance of any given 
account of critical thinking to their efforts. 

6.2 The pedagogic context. 
Given the concern with educational 

reform, an acount of critical thinking of-
fered as relevant to disciplinary issues must 
be appropriate and effective in teaching 
across the curriculum. Critical thinking 
theorists have questioned pedagogical prac-
tices that are common throughout 
undergraduate education. The use of lec-
ture, didactic teaching, objective examina-
tions and grading are all brought into ques-
tion by critical thinking advocates who see 
dialogical and multi-logical pedagogy at the 
core of critical thinking instruction. 38 This 
becomes an issue for any discipline whose 
practice supports didactic models as most 
appropriate for instruction in the field. The 
epistemological basis of critical thinking has 
barely been explored; its relation to theories 
oflearning is nowhere near resolved. Stan-
dard pedagogical practices, on the other 



132 Mark Weinstein 

hand, are supported by tradition and prac-
tice and have been addressed in a systematic 
way by educational psychologists and 
specialists in teaching. Although the critical 
thinking movement is not without plausi-
ble pedagogical recommendations and a 
growing body of successful educational 
practice, paradigms for critical thinking in-
struction have been drawn from philosophy 
and some few other academic subject areas. 
It is just not obvious to me that Socratic 
discussion, so at home in the philosophy 
class, is equally pertinent to teaching 
calculus, or that group problem solving 
strategies so useful in mathematics instruc-
tion are relevant to literature, or that writing 
process approaches are helpful in teaching 
economics or sociology. Clearly what is 
needed is further exploration, open-
mindedness and careful analysis. That is to 
say, wherever else critical thinking is re-
quired, critical thinking about critical think-
ing is a necessity. 

6.3 The institutional context per se. 
Although frequently disregarded as 

"political, " institutional issues must be 
dealt with if critical thinking is to playa 
meaningful role in educational reform. The 
education of undergraduates takes place in 
a holistic context. The various elements in-
cluded in the curriculum are required to 
amplify each other, enabling the student to 
achieve his or her professional goals while 
responding to the more idealistic aims of 
humanistic education and the liberal arts 
tradition. The relation of critical thinking 
to the complex of interlocking course re-
quirements and professional accreditation 
must be taken into account if critical think-
ing reform is to be effective in under-
graduate education seen as a whole. Critical 
thinking across the disciplines requires a 
careful effort to educate faculty in the par-
ticulars of the field and to the desirability 
of critical thinking outcomes. This, more 
likely than not, requires a complex and 
long-term program in faculty development. 
Issues of the autonomy of the disciplines, 

of research vs. teaching, and of institutional 
and disciplinary reward structures are con-
founding variables in any program of institu-
tional reform in the name of critical thinking. 
Student expectations,39 patterns of assess-
ment and the demands of particular fields of 
study are all serious roadblocks to meaningful 
institutional change. And all of these must 
be resolved within the complex of personal-
ities and politics that characterize colleges. 

The concerns that each of these contexts 
contribute cannot be overlooked if critical 
thinking across the disciplines is to become 
a reality. For those of us who see critical 
thinking as more than a particular course, 
as more than the perspective of a particular 
discipline, critical thinking must be seen 
within the total institutional context, within 
the realities of teaching and within the 
perspective of disciplinary practice, if 
critical thinking is to be effective at all. 

The ecological focus that I have sketched 
here has an additional yield in the institu-
tional contexts within which we strive. It 
makes critical thinking a central concern of 
the entire educational community and af-
fords an invitation to' practitioners of all 
disciplines to join with philosophers in the 
epistemological enterprise. Most importantly, 
for educational reform, it offers a framework 
for the totality of college studies that re-
quires synthesis and significance, flexibility 
and creativity. An ecological framework for 
critical thinking across the disciplines offers 
a real possibility of educational reform, 
since it gives credence to the entire range 
of methodological alternatives, is open to 
the pedagogical demands of the various 
fields, and welcomes all members of the 
college community as equal participants in 
the task at hand. If we accept the relevance 
of higher education for the larger objectives 
for which the reasonable life is deemed best, 
such an approach equips our students for 
their lives as citizens, as decision makers 
and as rational persons, for it is no less than 
equipping our students with what seems best 
in the realm of reasons as warrants for their 
judgments and as backing for their practices. 



Research Agenda 133 

Notes 

I The tenn "applied epistemology" is gaining in-
creased currency in discussions of informal 
logic and critical thinking. One plausible use, 
by analogy with "applied ethics," denotes ap-
plications of concepts drawn from philosophical 
epistemology to extra-philosophical discourse 
that results in knowledge claims. My use, 
although not inconsistent with the preceding, 
refers to the identification and analysis of extra-
philosophical epistemological concepts in use 
within substantive knowledge generating prac-
tices, most essentially the sciences and other 
disciplines that are paradigmatic of the most 
reliable and sophisticated knowledge claims 
humans have made to this point. By "extra-
philosophical" I intend concepts that are not 
available within the philosophical literature, per 
se, and that reflect the experience derived from 
the exploration of particular subject matters in 
specific ways. 

I would argue that my sense of "applied 
epistemology" has a rich philosophical history, 
and, in fact, lies behind some of the major 
philosophical epistemologists who drew heavily 
from, for example, the scientific practices of 
their time. 

2 I have introduced the teml "stylized argument" 
in Weinstein (199Oe) where I use it to distingush 
arguments in specialized fields from arguments 
couched in ordinary language on the one hand, 
and formal arguments on the other. What 
characterizes stylized argument is both special 
vocabulary and regularized procedures, in-
cluding inferential apparatus specific to the field 
and particular patterns of argument. An exam-
ple of specific inferential apparatus would be 
chemical fonnula as used in support of explana-
tions of chemical reactions. Patterns of argu-
ment include, for example, limits on the sorts 
of evidence appealed to, as in behaviorist 
psychology, and even such broad patterns of 
claim and challenge as standards for publica-
tion in professional journals. 

3 The idea goes back, of course, to Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle. The recent movement relies 
heavily on the work of Robert Ennis whose in-
itial explication of critical thinking as, "the cor-
rect assessing of statement" (Ennis, 1962) 
foreshadows what remains at the heart of his 
conception: a long list of dispositions and 
abilities, which in its enumeration of critical 
thinking abilities resembles notl1ing more than 
an index to the sort of comprehensive logic texts 

that has defined the field for decades (Ennis, 
1987). 

4 The story has been told in a number of places. 
A recent version is by Alex Fisher (1988). 

5 Siegel (1988), p. 8. Although Siegel's defini-
tion is acceptable as it stands. it leaves open the 
question of how such a concept is to be ar-
ticulated in practice. See Weinstein (199Od) for 
a discussion of this issue. 

6 Ennis (1987), p. 12. Ennis' definition has been 
widely accepted, although little effort has been 
expended in confronting just how difficult 
changing students' beliefs may be. See Wein-
stein (199Oa) for a review of some of the prob-
lems identified in recent work in cognitive 
psychology. 

7 The notion that understanding can be differen-
tiated into domains is justifiably viewed with 
suspicion. The discussion surrounding P.H. 
Hirst's attempt at a similar project: forms of 
knowledge (Hirst, 1965), points to the difficulty 
of rigorously distinguishing the components of 
human understanding (Phillips, 1971). If I were 
to hazard an account it would begin with the 
following: Domains can be distinguished as a 
weighted function of subject matter and 
methodology (weighted differently in different 
cases). The basic insight is that various aspects 
of the world have been best seen to respond to 
different strategies for explanation, prediction 
and comprehension. Of course, at any given 
period many aspects of the world are under-
stood in competing or even incommensurable 
ways. Further, different aspects of the world, 
respond to similar methodological approaches. 
This makes life difficult since, for example, 
some areas of the academic subject area called 
psychology are methodologically closer to 
quantitative sociology than they are to other 
areas of psychology which are, in turn, meth-
odologically similar to, say, various areas of 
literary criticism. Thus, domains do not fit 
neatly into the standard subdivisions of 
academic practice. 

This creates problems for critical thinking 
theory construed as applied epistemology, while 
pointing to the enormous need for the project 
that my view recommends. For a rational 
understanding of subject matter across the cur-
riculum requires that some articulation of 
methodological similarities and differences both 
within and across the academic disciplines be 



134 Mark Weinstein 

attempted, that is, if we agree that the ideal of 
critical thinking requires that students under-
stand the information in eourses within a nexus 
of justifieation and application. On such a view, 
courses in particular academic disciplines need 
to provide their students with a range of dif-
ferent considerations supporting their practice: 
frequently such considerations are mcthod-
ological and metaphysical, as frequently they 
involve historical and social concerns, and 
almost always they involve consideration of the 
needs of practice, utility and understanding. But 
all disciplines owe their students an account of 
why their procedures are deemed best, and how 
their procedures appeal to the concerns of 
humans. 

Such a schematic presentation may be less 
than persuasive to those epistemological uniform-
itarians who focus on underlying similarities. 
I rely heavily on examples to make my case for 
the central epistemological role of disciplinary 
specifics. This creates two sorts of problems. 
The first is the Plato-like demand for general 
descriptors. I prefer the Wittgensteinian mode: 
"assembling reminders for a particular pur-
pose" (Wiltgenstein, 1956, 127). A general 
argument is subject to a philosophical analysis 
in terms of necessity and sufficiency. This fre-
quently obscures more than it illuminates, by 
permitting countcrexamples that although com-
pelling to the logical mind, arc of little relevance 
to the points at issue. Recall in this regard, the 
cottage industry of counterexample and revi-
sion characteristic of the philosophical literature 
on D-N models of explanation (see Eberle, 
Kaplan and Montague, 1961 and Hempel, 
1965). Rather than necessity or sufficiency, I 
prefer a salient common core of similarities 
and differences, an interesting "family 
resemblance." This raises the second Objection: 
examples prove nothing, since apparent dif-
ference does not guarantee essential difference. 
Examples do not prove the case; rather, their 
function is to shift the burden of proof onto 
those who would disregard apparent differences 
in the name of underlying continuities. For 
given the salience of differences, it is up to the 
advocate of underlying similarities to show how 
the similarities are at least as illuminating as 
the differences for the understanding of inquiry. 

Here are the sorts of examples, in question 
form, that press me into arguing for the 
discipline specifieity of key epistemological 
concepts: How is the adequacy of a causal ac-
count assessed in literature as opposed to 
chemistry? What counts as an adequate obser-

vation of say, DNA through an electron 
microscope as opposed to observations by an 
historian? What standards of rigor are required 
in laying out first principles, a geometer's or 
an economist's? Whose standards for deduction 
apply to the arguments of a mathematical 
physieist, to those of an evolutionary biologist? 
How do inductions differ in a domain that 
studies uniform natural kinds, e.g., geology, 
from induction in a domain such as social 
psychology? How are statistics employed in 
quantum mechanics as opposed to population 
genetics, as opposed to educational psychology? 
(They all satisfY the axioms of probability, but 
what ice does that cut?) How does narrative sup-
port analysis in literature, as opposed to case 
study analysis in the social sciences, as opposed 
to philosophical essays? And how does such 
analytic prose contrast with technical papers in 
an engineering science, or research reports in 
quantitative social science, or molecular biology 
or mathematics? 

What is the point of these examples? People 
receive, present, analyze and assess informa-
tion in widely different ways. And these ways 
are relevant if our students are to under-
stand the material put before them. Critical 
thinking, and the assessment of arguments, for 
which informal logic is deemed relevant, must 
penni! students to see what they learn as respon-
sibly based on warrants and that the warrants 
are appropriately backed by the historical 
dialectic reflected in the methodology of the 
various fields. Information must also be 
presented so that its relevance to the domain 
of its application is apparent and the goodness 
of fit (as well as strategies for adjustment) be-
tween principles and application is identifiable 
for evaluation. 

One caveat, I have no quarrel with a view 
such as Paul's when he claims that the world 
as well as our conceptual schemes, "can be 
classified in indefinitely many ways" (Paul, 
1985, p. 40). Rather, I would claim that there 
are classifications of the world and of the do-
mains that are optimal for critical thinking con-
ceived of as applied epistemology The thrust 
of this paper is that informal logicians and 
critical thinking advocates should begin paying 
more attention to what such a task requires. 

8 My claim may contend with a straw man alone. 
Pure epistemology, in the sense of epistemology 
that is indifferent to discipline specific concerns, 
and general in respect of disciplinary practices, 
may be no one's cup of tea, although Siegel is 
clearly pointed in that direction (Siegel, 1988a, 



especially chapter 2, 1987; and also, 1980). 
Clarification is clearly needed. Although Siegel 
has offered arguments for the need for an 
epistemological analysis at the highest level, he 
offers few examples of what he has in mind. 
And so we might ask ourselves as a preliminary: 
What role do the following classic positions have 
to play in critical thinking across the disciplines 
and in relation to meaningful application in 
ordinary life? (substitute your own list of 
epistemological positions, if you will; but the 
rhetorical thrust requires that it be an actual list 
with real candidates): Sense data theory? Or 
perhaps modem discussions of the Gettier 
counterexample? Humean empiricism? Carte-
sian rationalism? Plato's doctrine of 
reminiscence? Positivism? Which of these tradi-
tions is sufficient to help students to understand 
their education and their lives? Would combin-
ing them help? How much of them should be 
taught? And instead of what? How do these in-
terface with critical thinking as standardly con-
ceived? What is their relation to the 
methodological core of the other courses that 
students take? (For a more elaborate list of par-
ticulars see Weinstein, 1990c). 

9 This is argued in a number of ways throughout 
the remainder of the paper. See Weinstein 
(l99Oc) for more elaborate presentations of this 
last point as well as other issues raised in this 
paper. 

10 If deductivism is not to reduce to the minimal 
conditional (see below in the text). some sense 
of the strength contributed by premises must 
be assessed. This requires that the relation be-
tween premises and conclusion be analyzed in 
other than truth functional terms. That is. that 
the internal connections between terms in 
arguments be put forward. The most reliable 
class of entailments, those warranted by scien-
tific theories, the constructions of which they 
are comprised, and the analytical postulates that 
define terms and point to conceptual connec-
tions, can only be analyzed and assessed 
through information from within the area do-
mains of particular disciplines. We do not, after 
all, get knowledge written in some ideal 
language composed of primitive predicates and 
logical connectives, and even if we did there 
is no uniform account of the implication rela-
tions required. Arguments in the various 
disciplines do not come complete with the 
associated Ramsey sentences and a theory of 
implication, and neither do arguments in or-
dinary language. Thus, what is required. if 

Research Agenda 135 

some modified form of deductivism is to be 
salvaged. is a richer and more robust notion of 
entailment. A beginning sketch of such a model, 
reflecting some of the work of this paper, is 
found in a paper recently read at the Second 
International Conference on Argumentation. 
June 1990 (Weinstein, 1990b) The anonymous 
referee reminds me of Hintikka (1989). 

11 Govier (1987), chapter 5. Govier's critique of 
deductivism relies heavily on the unavailabili-
ty of natural and plausible deductive reconstruc-
tions of actual arguments. There have been 
other quarrels with deductivism, for example 
Harman (1977), chapters 10 and 11. Most rele-
vant, given our concern with the educational 
role of critical thinking and informal logic, are 
trends in cognitive psychology that point away 
from the usefulness of formal deductive or prob-
abilistic logic for understanding actual reason-
ing. I have explored these issues in Weinstein 
(1988a), citing many of the seminal works in 
the bibliography. A recent work that offers a 
radical reconceptualization of the structure and 
function of logic based reasoning, offering a 
theoretic synthesis of recent work in cognitive 
science, is Margolis (1987). 

The relation between philosophical norms 
and empirical discoveries has been the focus of 
much discussion; one of the most salient discus-
sions is found in Cohen (1981) and the 
responses that it prompted. The issue to me 
seems to be centered around which practice 
should be normatively central, the heuristics 
employed by ordinary people, the a priori prac-
tice of philosophers, or the standards implicit 
in the practice of the various disciplines, science 
most typically. It is such issues that applied as 
contrasted with pure epistemology brings to the 
foreground. The "ecological approach" to 
critical thinking that is described below opera-
tionalizes this concern through the model 
developed at Montclair State (section 3 below; 
n. 25 and n. 37.) Obviously, this paper is a 
call for allies in this effort, which includes. 
among other things, some determination of the 
normative priorities given underlying tensions 
in the theory of reason. 

I2 The position is to be found in Grootendorst 
(1989). 

13 Kruiger, (1989) read at TISIL An abstract of 
the paper can be found in Informal Logic, voL 
11 (1989) p. 50. 

14 The beginning of an analysis sufficient to sup-
port this claim is found in section 4, below, 



136 Mark Weinstein 

where I begin an account of the language of the 
disciplines. The upshot is that methodology is 
carried by both practices and maxims, aspects 
of language that are internalized when learn-
ing a field "from the inside. " It is my conten-
tion that students should be helped towards ex-
plicit knowledge of such methodological par-
ticulars as they learn discipline-bound 
knowledge. 

As far as the term "substantive generaliza-
tions" is eoncerned, think of the role of dif-
ferential equations in Physics. They tell you 
what the relationships between entities are, but 
also limit the available descriptions of data, the 
acceptable manipulations, and point to areas of 
connection with related issues both within and 
outside of the domain of inquiry. Knowledge 
that is built right into the equations limits what 
and how we can say and do things in the field, 
therefore the term' 'substantive generalizations." 

15 Freeman (1988) offers such an elaborated 
model. What seems to be required in addition 
to Toulmin's apparatus is a supporting theory 
of entailment, general in respect of the par-
ticulars, but yet sensitive to the actual context 
of argumentation (Weinstein, 1990b). 

16 Toulmin (1969) and Toulmin, et a1. (1979). 

17 Using Toulmin to make my point is question 
begging enough to give me pause. Toulmin is, 
admittedly, the philosopher in the infornIallogic 
movement who best represents the sorts of con-
cern with the disciplines that I advocate. But. 
although that gives my position little enough 
support, something else does. Toulmin is also 
the individual who has offered the most detailed 
account of argument analysis to date, especially 
if you permit me to beg the question once again, 
by pointing to Toulmin's historical works that 
outline the course of argument using actual 
cases from the history of science (Toulmin and 
Goodfield, 1961, 1962, 1965). What I see in 
the disciplines, and find reflected in Toulmin's 
historical work, are arguments of considerable 
complexity, arguments that are invariably 
sensitive to the methodological context and the 
particulars of the problem situation at the time. 
If what is required is an account adequate to 
the phenomena, Toulmin is the most likely 
candidate in a field of one. He is not only 
complex but thoughtful, a student of the history 
of science and a philosopher of insight. 

Toulmin's model of argument analysis has 
worked for me in workshops with teachers of 
writing and with reading specialists, with social 

scientists and historians, physical scientists and 
teachers of the applied arts and sciences. For 
one such experience, see Weinstein (1989). The 
newsletter, Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across 
the Disciplines has an ongoing record of 
workshops with Montclair State College facul-
ty, the overwhelming majority of which use 
aspects of Toulmin's account. 

The testimony is clear; Toulmin's 
framework speaks directly to faculty and their 
discipline-bound understanding. The model 
makes connections with how they see their 
disciplines, and through its use, they can ap-
preciate what I am about as a critical thinking 
advocate in the context of undergraduate educa-
tion. In addition, my own work in the analysis 
of scientific argument finds Toulmin's struc-
ture furnishing an illuminating perspective and 
an available tool (Weinstein, 1990e). 

18 Manicus fl966). Johnson (1981), perhaps 
Toulmin's most detailed critic, argued against 
Toulmin's model based on the difficulties of 
distinguishing warrants and backing in the ex-
amples offered in Toulmin's introductory text 
(Toulmin, et al., 1979). Certainly this difficulty 
renders Toulmin's text difficult to use. But the 
problem seems to me to be general in respect 
of informal logic textbooks whose exercises are 
readily rendered ambiguous if the arguments 
are reconstructed within differing contexts 
(Weinstein, 1982). The problem seems to be 
less the analytic framework employed, and 
more a function of the artificially simplified 
arguments in most logic texts, presented devoid 
of significant context. 

19 The reason for the phrase "quasi-deductive" 
is to mark the issues of concern as equally rele-
vant to formalized inductive argument (prob-
abilistic argument). Although informal logicians 
have generally not involved themselves in 
discussion of formal theories of inductive in-
ference, the classic discussions of Bayes's 
theorem show structural continuity with prob-
lems of deductive reconstruction. So, for ex-
ample, the discussion of Suppes (1966) points 
to the need for contextually sensitive reconstruc-
tions of formal inductive argumentation, even 
in the context of mathematically sophisticated 
apparatus. 

20 Noh (1984). 

21 The most notorious problem involves the so 
called' 'principle of charity. " For a comprehen-
sive discussion see Govier (1987), chapter 7. 
For problems with the possible worlds approach 



see, Kahane (1964); Thomas (1964), 

22 Toulmin (1969); Toulmin, etaI. (1979). The 
tcnn .. inference ticket," is Ryle' s (Ry Ie, 1949, 
p, 121). The most elaborate use of the term in 
a sense relevant to science is in Toulmin (1953, 
chapter 3,) 

23 Informal logicians, as evidenced by textbooks 
and pedagogical discussions in the field, 
generally reflect a common focus on first level 
undergraduate courses in argument analysis or 
critical thinking that purport to offer students 
general and subject neutral strategies that in-
clude a common core of epistemological con-
cepts, logical skills and student traits taken as 
central to the enterprise, 

The textbooks in the field, in addition, point 
to a domain of application for the abilities and 
dispositions developed through their use. The 
majority of available texts draw material from 
the popular press, from media and from political 
discourse. Less frequently, material is drawn 
from student level philosophy texts, but these 
text fragments are rarely, if ever, systematically 
explored. Rather, materials offered as examples 
or in exercises, are abstracted from their con-
text and presented within a fonnat that addresses 
the skill or concept they are taken to exemplify. 
Short fragments, whether newspaper editorials, 
or short passages drawn from some non-
technical discipline such as history, do little to 
represent argument as it occurs in the domain 
from which it has been abstracted. Rather, in-
formal logic and critical thinking texts present 
for the student short segments of reasoned 
discourse in order to afford the opportunity for 
the presentation and application of a particular 
informal logic concept This impression, 
garnered from most available texts, is rein-
forced by the statements of advocates of critical 
thinking. The claim, characterisitic of most 
members of the field, is that critical thinking 
is generally applicable and subject neutral. This 
has been most apparent in the responses of 
members of the informal logic community to 
John McPeck's challenge in Critical Thinking 
and Education (McPeck, 1981), McPeck faulted 
the movement on the grounds that general and 
subject neutral critical thinking was vacuous, 
Critical thinking, he argued, requires a subject 
domain for its appropriate application, and 
varies in accordance with the methodological 
principles that characterize inquiry in the 
various areas of knowledge, Rather than rejec-
ting subject neutrality as an essential 
characteristic of critical thinking, infonnal logic 

Research Agenda 137 

theorists offered arguments for the relevance of 
subject neutral skills to the objectives for which 
critical thinking instruction was envisioned 
(Weddle, 1984; Paul, 1985; Ennis, 1989). 

Richard Paul, for example, argued that 
discipline neutrality is crucial since the most im-
portant problems for which critical thinking is 
required are not resolvable within the academic 
disciplines, Paul maintained that the most 
crucial domain of application for critical thought 
is problems that are "multi-logical" and 
"dialogical," problems that are inimical to 
discipline specific perspectives and training, in-
volving issues that require a variety of perspec-
tives for their analysis and assessment, as con-
trasted to issues that can be adequately dealt 
with within a particular framework (Paul, 
1982). This became a common theme in discus-
sions of McPeck and reflects a position that has 
been generally accepted by the field: critical 
thinking includes a generalizable set of skills 
applicable to the complex and frequently ilI-
structured problems of daily life, closely iden-
tified with aspects of infonnal logic. 

24 The phrase "epistemology of the disciplines" 
has been used by McPeck (1981). My use of 
the concept goes back to my work on the "Map 
of Knowledge." See Weinstein (J 985). 

25 Weinstein (l988b) offers the briefest 
preliminary sketch of what an "ecological 
perspective" includes. It includes a distinction 
between two senses of "normative" relevant 
to critical thinking across the disciplines. First, 
"normative" in the sense of disciplines that 
traditionally take a normative stance that is 
meta-disciplinary, including disciplines as 
diverse as fonnal and inforrnallogic, argumen-
tation theory, various theories of discourse 
analysis, cognitive and educational psychology, 
curriculum theory and theories of educational 
institutions, as well as theories that support 
social, cultural and political critique, and 
sociology of knowledge of many sorts, Second, 
"normative" in the sense of nonnatively con-
stituted and constituting practices within a 
discipline itself: that is, the disciplinary "stan-
dards in use that govern knowledge production, 
transmission and evaluation" (ibid., p. 8.). 

26 For the relationship between philosophy and 
critical thinking, and a portrayal of philosophy 
as a discipline that reflecl~ a commitment to par-
ticular styles of analysis and argumentation, see 
Weinstein (1988c; 1988d). 

27 Siegel (1987, chapter 1), 



138 Mark Weinstein 

28 Siegel (1980; 1987; 1988, chapter 2) seems to 
sustain, without developing the position in any 
detail, the relevance, if not superiority of 
philosophical epistemology in some ge~eral 
philosophical sense. We have looked at thIs In 
some detail in n. 8. An anonymous referee 
sees my argument as "unconvincing," claim-
ing that it falls most naturally to philosophy to 
"chart the course of such questions as 'Do dif-
ferent subject matters admit (or require) 
significantly different epistemological treat-
ment?''' The referee does, however, seem to 
agree with my position in that he or she claims 
that the answer to the queslionjusl quoted, "has 
been YES since Aristotle's time." How "con-
vincing" my argument is, of course, remains 
to be seen. Nevertheless, the reviewer seems 
to confuse the historic role of philosophy as an 
essential forum within which fundamental 
methodological and epistemological questions 
are raised, and the saliency of philosophical ap-
proaches to furnishing answers for such ques-
tions. As I have tried to show in the papers cited 
in n. 26, philosophers, although focusing on 
foundational questions of the most general kind, 
structure and respond to such questions in par-
ticular ways, and in a fashion distinguishable 
from how such questions are construed in other 
similarly foundational disciplines. The unique 
relevance of philosophical perspectives is cur-
rendy disputed by scholars who reject :te a 
priorism of most recent and tradItIOnal 
philosophy. The question cannot be resolved by 
calling attention to the historic role of 
philosophy in regards fundamental issues 
without begging the very point at issue. 

The referee also suggests that I offer ex-
amples of' 'applied epistemologies" incompati-
ble (incommensurable'?) with each other and 
with "pure" epistemology." A recent exam-
ple of applied epistemology is Stephen Jay 
Gould's Wonderful Life, where the essentIal 
role of substantive empirical and method-
ological issues, specific to paleontology, 
are shown to qualify the most fundamental 
aspects of evolutionary theory, aspects that had, 
heretofore, been decided on a prioristic grounds 
(Gould, 1989). Is Gould's work incompatible 
or incommensurable with purely philosophical 
epistemology'! A preliminary question must be 
answered first. Could a philosopher, utilizing 
concepts drawn from traditional or contem-
porary epistemolgy have seen what Gou:d 
describes? Similar points could be made 10 
respect of the profound effect of quantum in-
determinancy on philosophical discussions of 

causation, the consequences of recent literary 
theory on the availability of objective analyses 
of texts (Eagleton, 1983) and the movement 
within the history of ideas that sees social and 
historical contingencies as essential for 
epistemological understanding (See, for exam-
ple, Bernstein, 1983, for a synthesis of recent 
socially and historically sensitive views of cen-
tral relevance to epistemology). 

29 Robert Swartz and David Perkins (1989), in an 
extremely useful book that speaks to teachers 
at all educational levels, offer a "Map of Causal 
Explanation. " It consists of four question that 
are intended to direct inquiry: "1. What are the 
possible causes of the event in question? 2. 
What could vou find that would count for and 
against the likelihood of these possibilities? 3. 
What evidence do you already have, or have 
you gathered that is relevant to determining.the 
cause? 4. What possibility is rendered most like-
ly, based on the evidence'? (p. 77)." Wh~t is 
clear to me is that it is, in general. impOSSIble 
to answer these questions without substantive 
knowledge from domains within which a given 
causal explanation is offered. By substantive 
knowledge I don't only mean "facts," but prin-
ciples that determine what sort of weight is to 
be assigned to the considerations that support 
a given causal claim and the principles that sup-
port the strength and reliability of the assign-
ment of weights themselves. Kahane (1979) of-
fers a similarly schematic account that raises 
similar issues. The fallacy of Questionable 
Cause is assigned, he says, "if we label a given 
thing as the cause of something else on the basis 
of insufficient or inappropriate evidence." 
Again one feels the need to touch methodo-
logical ground. By what criteria are kinds of 
evidence deemed insufficient or inappropriate? 
Is there a general account of such criteria'? And 
if not, where but into the disciplines are we to 
go for our answer'? And so it. seems that it is 
only within the various domams that the rele-
vant alternatives can be identified, their ade-
quacy relevantly assessed and judgments of in-
sufficiency and inappropriateness made. 

It is reasonable to complain that the open-
textured examples of analyses of causation by 
informal logicians and critical thinking 
specialists that I choose unfairly represents the 
analyses available in the current literature. 
Kahane, who I cite above, spends only two 
pages on the causal fallacy, wherea~ Johnson 
and Blair (1983) spend ten, and GovIer (1985) 
spends perhaps as many as four of her chapters 
on factors relevant to causal claims. These 



authors offer rich and complex argument types, 
patterns and distinctions for their students to 
consider. But we may ask: What characteristic 
limits do these analyses and examples include? 
Are they, for example, relevant across the 
disciplines students learn within the courses they 
take in their undergraduate education? 

Johnson and Blair, as is their practice, draw 
examples from complex causal issues in daily 
life. Two questions arise: first, can the struc-
tures they identify illuminate issues within the 
disciplines and second, can issues of the type 
they present be adequately assessed without 
disciplinary knowledge, and with an appropriate 
level of sophistication. (See Weinstein, 1990c 
for a hopefully provocative analysis of a light-
hearted example of Perry Weddle's.) 

Govier's text is strong on causal arguments. 
The chapter in which she deals specifically with 
causal issues connects them to "social life" and 
so the examples include social science issues. 
when they do not reflect "daily life." This, to 
me, is a step in the right direction; her ter-
minology reflects central issues in the domain 
she explores, e.g. correlation, and the questions 
her exercises and examples raise, reflect social 
knowledge at a degree of sophistication that is 
rightly required of college undergraduates. Her 
choice of topic is, however, telling. First, she 
chooses one topic among many relevant to 
causal analysis; second, she chooses a topic that 
is rich in its relevance to many ordinary con-
cerns and is thereby likely to acti vate students' 
prim knowledge and prompt additional 
research. This raises two questions: First, how 
much knowledge of facts. of appropriate 
theories and of method, above and beyond the 
informal logic structures she provides, is 
smuggled into a classroom discussion or 
homework assignment adequate to the 
phenomena presented for analysis and assess-
ment? That is, how much of what she teaches 
is functioning essentially, and how much of the 
success of her enterprise is based on what the 
students bring to the forum she provides? 
Second, would similar exercises from the wide 
range of areas students study in college be as 
available to their untutored analysis? This raises 
the issue of division of labor. an issue that 
Govier is particularly sensitive to (Govier, 
1987, chapter II). To what extent do critical 
thinking outcomes require that informal logic 
be a mere beginning to a process that must con-
tinue throughout many, if not all, of the courses 
students take? And if such an outcome is re-
quired, what is the role that critical thinking 

Research Agenda 139 

advocates and informal logicians must play in 
institutional reform at the undergraduate level 
in particular? (See sections 5 and 6, below, and 
n. 37.) 

30 Lipman (1988). 

31 The idea of a language game has exercised 
philosophers since it was introduced in the 
Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 
1953). Seeing language as essentially tied to 
use, and language use as embedded in practice, 
ties reasoning, and therefore critical thinking, 
to the justificatory context from which analysis 
and assessment take their substance. Such a no-
tion rejects a priorism and rather looks to a 
foundation in socially constituted and historical-
ly validated practice. This is obviously tied to 
inquiry in the sense of Dewey (1933) and has 
a deep affinity with anti-formalist tendencies in 
logic and philosophy of science. The connec-
tion oflanguage use with the deep and perplex-
ing notion of form of life reinforces this inter-
pretation. Besides for the oft -cited occurence 
of "form of life" in the Investigations 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, paragraphs, 19,23 and 248, 
and pp. 174,226), see 142 for a telling instance, 
also 144-6; 198-9. I find related comments in 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
(Wittgenstein, 1956) particularly illuminating, 
especially Part I, paragraphs 142-155. The sec-
tion on translatability and proof on Part II, 
paragraphs 65-76 are also relevant, emphasizing 
the constructive nature of proofs and difficulties 
with translatability of proofs to languages that 
reflect different practices. Also relevant are sec-
tions of On Certainty, (Wittgenstein, 1969) par-
ticularly the paragraphs surrounding the sug-
gestive use of "acting" in paragraph 204 and 
similarly seminal analyses in paragraphs 348. 
475, 519 and 609. 

32 This raises a crucial question that has been rare-
Iy, if ever. discussed in the critical thinking 
literature: How do argument analyses typical 
of informal logic or critical thinking look from 
the perspectives of the various disciplines 
through which we want to inform students, or 
remediate their cognitive deficits, or clarify 
issues, or support cogent reasoning? How does 
the practice of informal logic look to fields that 
have their own standard for the presentation and 
the elaboration of argumentation and especial-
ly for assessing students' ability to understand 
and manipulate argumentation appropriate to the 
subject area the student is called on to master? 

33 Siegel (1988) pp. 54ff. 



140 Mark Weinstein 

34 Perhaps I am too harsh, relying on my ex-
perience with early texts in the field, where I 
found the combination of a blatant political 
agenda with superficial analyses both unsupport-
able and inadequate to the task of hclping 
students develop even a modest competence in 
dealing with complex actual issues (Weinstein, 
1982). Textbooks have certainly improved since 
the earliest (but still bcst selling) offerings in 
the field. And, perhaps, simple distinctions, 
even caricaturcs, are helpful as memorable 
"first approximations." Perry Weddle never 
fails to give me pause by reminding me that 
even as rough and ready a distinction as that 
betwecn correlation and causc can serve to 
make students pausc in their consideration of 
indefinitely many claims about the world around 
them. This is certainly valuable; critical think-
ing courses may serve the students well if they 
do no more than develop a budget of reminders 
relevant to their daily and academic lives. 

But my concern pcrsists. My problem is 
similar to that which prompted Richard Paul's 
rejection of "weak scnse" critical thinking 
(Paul, 1982), although I am less concerned with 
the facile rcjection of positions that students find 
unappealing, than with the sophomoric rejec-
tion of positions worthy of careful considera-
tion, aided and abettcd by the standard treat-
ment of fallacies through decontextualized ex-
amples in infonnaI logic tcxts. Distinctions such 
as that between correlation and cause are cer-
tainly essential, but they play no role unless the 
student has a sense of what, for example, counts 
towards supporting a causal claim as opposed 
to a mere correlation. It is my contention that 
this cannot be decided in general, and in a man-
ner indifferent to the way that causal claims are 
constituted in the particular domains within 
which causal arguments occur. Rather they re-
quire substantive generalizations from various 
relevant fields, complete with the methodo-
logical and theoretical apparatus necessary for 
causal argument in the particular fields 
involved. (See note 29.) 

The anonymous referee questions the im-
plications of my view for the" instructional pro-
gram" generated by recent concern with critical 
thinking, reminding me that" CT -ers have peo-
ple for 13 weeks in their freshman or sophmore 
years." This echoes Trudy Govier's call for a 
division of academic labor, limiting informal 
logic and critical thinking to . 'those aspects of 
arguments which are universal, universal within 
a sub-class, or at least relatively common" 
(Govier, 1987, p. 231). Obviously, no one 

argues that critical thinking encompasses all of 
the knowledge required for evaluating claims 
across the college curriculum, although defini-
tions such as Ennis's, and programs such as 
Siegel's, invite just the sort of broad objectives 
that Govier foreswears. The question for ad-
vocates of educational reform through critical 
thinking is to identify the optimal strategy for 
utilizing the thirteen weeks at their disposal, and 
more to the point, to develop strategies for 
enlisting the support of instructors of other 
disciplines in the task at hand. It is not enough 
to fall back on the fact that we can do very lit-
tle, when we claim to do a great deal. It is even 
worse to claim to do a great deal that is doable 
with a concerted effort involving many friends 
and co-workers, while limiting oneself to go-
ing it alone on the grounds of academic turf or 
methodological purity. 

35 Siegel (1988), pp. 28ff. For his advocacy of 
pluralism, see Siegel (1987), especially chapter 8. 

36 I share the concern expressed by Paul, (1985) 
that undergraduate students not be taught to be 
narrow specialists, or think that real problems 
are completely resolvable by "specialized 
knowledge," or feel that they have to "suspend 
judgment and/or defer to experts." Where we 
may differ is in regards to the desirability and 
the educational devices required if students are 
to become, what Paul disparagingly calls 
"specialists on specialists," that is a person who 
can access and meanirigfully employ specialists' 
knowledge. I also may differ with Paul on the 
role that I assign to specialist's knowledge, for 
I see special knowledge within the disciplines 
as offering the best available accounts of those 
aspects of the world that fall within their do-
main of expertise. (This, of course, includes the 
specialized knowledge of philosophers. infor-
mal logicians and critical thinking theorists.) 
And so I see a major task of critical thinking 
to be helping students understand that special 
knowledge is required, what aspects of com-
plex problems are amenable to which special 
knowledge, and how best to assess the claims 
of specialists, both in terms of appropriate 
criteria in relevant fields, and in terms of the 
context of application. If we add to this that 
students begin the process of understanding the 
appropriate criteria for choosing between 
various sorts of specialized claims to both fac-
ticity and relevance, and that students under-
stand and apply the criteriological considerations 
that support such claims, by drawing from par-
ticular fields, including broadly relevant Helds 



such as philosophy and infonnallogic, we have 
a model for critical thinking adequate to the 
education of undergraduates, and one that re-
quires a broadly based and energetic program 
of institutional and educational reform. 

37 The faculty development project of the Institute 
for Critical Thinking at Montclair State Col-
lege is described in Weinstein and Oxman-
Michelli (1989). 

38 Pedagogical issues have been aptly summa-
rized in Paul (1988); Siegel (1988) addresses 
issues of relevance in chapters 6 and 7; Govier 

Research Agenda 141 

(1987) has much to say in chapter 12. For me 
the locus classicus of the complaint is Lipman, 
et al. (1980). 

39 Problems involving students' expectations and 
their concomitant resistance to critical thinking 
are all too familiar to converts to critical think-
ing pedagogy who watch their student evalua-
tions fall as students respond to the unilateral 
breaking of the tacit contract underlying 
undergraduate studies: Professors profess, 
students regurgitate. See Oxman (1989) and 
Perry (1968) for relevant analyses. 

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MARK WEINSTEIN 
INSTITUTE FOR CRITICAL THINKING 
MONTCLAIR STATE COLLEGE 
UPPER MONTCLAIR, N.J. 07043 fJ