INFORMAL LOGIC 

XI.l, Winter 1989 

The Human Image System and 
Thinking Critically in the Strong SenseI 

JAMES B. FREEMAN Hunter College-CUNY 

The purpose of this paper is to see 
whether the concept of the image system 
throws light on the enterprise of thinking 
critically in the strong sense. To do this, 
we shall first sketch what strong sense 
critical thinking involves, according to its 
major proponents. We shall then examine 
the concept of the image system together 
with its growth and dynamics. This will 
prepare us to deal explicitly with our prin-
cipal task-developing the connections be-
tween the image system and strong sense 
critical thinking. We shall conclude with 
certain practical and philosophical con-
siderations, in particular considerations on 
teaching people to be strong sense critical 
thinkers. 

1. Critical Thinking in the Strong Sense 

What is perhaps common to a number 
of authors who have concerned themselves 
with the general area of strong sense critical 
thinking is the view that critical thinking is 
not simply a skill or technique, but concerns 
dispositions and the affective side of a per-
son. For example, in "Goals for a Critical 
Thinking/Reasoning Curriculum," Robert 
H. Ennis lists a number of dispositions in-
cluding seeking reasons, trying to be well 
informed, taking into account the total situa-
tion, being openminded-respecting other 
points of view, reasoning as cogently as 
possible from premises one does not accept, 
withholding judgement when evidence is in-
sufficient, allowing the weight of evidence 
to determine one's position. 2 Similarly, in 
"Educating Reason: Critical Thinking, 

Informal Logic, and the Philosophy of 
Education," Harvey Siegel defines a critical 
thinker as "one who is appropriately mov-
ed by reasons: she has a propensity or 
disposition to believe and act in accordance 
with reasons; and she has the ability to 
assess the force of reasons in the many con-
texts in which reasons playa role."3 Besides 
the skill to properly assess reasons, then, 
critical thinking involves "the willingness, 
desire, and disposition to base one's actions 
and beliefs on reasons, that is, to do reason 
assessment and to be guided by the results 
of such assessment. ., the critical attitude or 
critical spirit component of critical think-
ing."4 A critical thinker values, nay has a 
passion for, clear thinking and good 
reasoning. 5 

The expression "critical thinking in the 
strong sense" is most typically associated 
with the name of Richard Paul. 6 Paul of-
fers a distinctly richer conception of strong 
sense critical thinking than either Ennis or 
Siegel. For Paul, learning to be a critical 
thinker is not a matter of simply acquiring 
certain habits and dispositions, like learn-
ing to hit a tennis ball properly. It is not 
simply a matter of acquiring certain loves, 
as one might acquire a love of 
Shakespearean poetry. Someone who has 
no disposition one way or the other, to play 
tennis well or badly, may acquire by dint 
of effort a disposition to play effectively. 
Likewise, a person with no feelings one way 
or the other about Shakespeare may, by pro-
per refinement of taste, acquire a love of 
Shakespearean poetry. In both models, 
someone who was neutral acquires a 
positive disposition or affect. But for Paul, 



20 James B. Freeman 

a person' 'naturally" has certain blocks or 
resistances against thinking critically. We 
have egocentric and sociocentric tendencies, 
habits of thought which impede critical 
thinking. These result in our holding pre-
judices and stereotypes, in our suffering 
from blind spots, in our having tendencies 
to self-deception. No one may be able to 
escape from these completely. Being a 
critical thinker may be a matter of degree-
we cannot separate persons into critical 
thinkers and non-critical thinkers. But the 
project of growing as a critical thinker in-
volves outgrowing these blocks to critical 
thinking. 

Whence come these blocks? Humans are 
engaged in life projects which define them 
as persons, which give them an identity. A 
particular individual's life project affects 
and determines, in a unique way, how that 
individual interprets and conceptualizes his 
world, what he values in it. It gives him 
interests-better vested interests, stakes, and 
perceptions. 7 1t gives him, in short, a point 
of view, a world view in fact. Human be-
ings are furthermore social creatures, and 
society-centrally contemporary society-
exerts a profound affect on one's world 
view. In particular, it furnishes ready made 
a system of categories for interpreting one's 
experience which is simply accepted un-
critically. Paul sees the problem going 
deeper than merely accepting this material 
without critical scrutiny: 

My view is that people as they are now 
largely constituted ... are deeply irrational, 
acting habitually on the basis of first prin-
ciples, concepts and assumptions, to which 
they have not given, and could not give, 
free, conscious, and deliberate assent. .. 
They lack skills of primary categorization, 
little sense of what it would be to question 
the basic labels and categories on the basis 
of which they multiply inferences of 
divergent logical types ... They have no con-
scious congnizance of what it would be to 
decide for themselves on the basis of rational 
reasons which fundamental labels ought to 
be attached in a primary, inference-
determining way to which situations, per-
sons, and events. 8 

Taking the frameworks which our in-
dividual life projects and our cultural 
backgrounds give us as real, committing 
ourselves to them to such a degree, even 
if unconscious, Paul regards as an expres-
sion of egocentricity or sociocentricity. 

For Paul, becoming a critical thinker 
means developing the ability to transcend 
one's point of view. A critical thinker sees 
an issue not only from his own viewpoint, 
but can entertain the viewpoints of others, 
discerning what is true or of value in them, 
and modifying his claims and reasoning ac-
cordingly. For example, by recognizing 
how an argument is connected with advan-
cing an interest, "we can, by imaginative-
ly entertaining a competing interest, con-
struct an opposing point of view and so an 
opposing argument or set of arguments. It 
is by developing both arguments dialectical-
ly that we come to recognize their strengths 
and weaknesses. "9 This attempting to enter 
another's point of view, to think dialectical-
ly or dialogically about an issue, is the key 
to becoming a critical thinker as Paul sees it. 

Clearly, there is much room for further 
articulating a view which sees critical think-
ing as inherently involving the project of 
transcending our egocentric and sociocen-
tric biases through dialectically entertain-
ing and reasoning from the points of view 
or world view of others. What does egocen-
tricity and sociocentricity mean? How are 
they manifested? What is a point of view 
or world view, and what exactly does 
dialogical, multi-point -of-viewed thinking 
involve? Whatever can shed light on these 
issues will deepen our understanding of 
strong sense critical thinking, as Paul has 
protrayed it. Furthermore, in presenting this 
conception of critical thinking, Paul makes 
certain claims which are definitely open to 
challenge: Are human beings "naturally" 
egocentric? Do they tend toward egocen-
tricity or sociocentricity? Do self and socie-
ty foster a set of categories by which we 
impose an interpretation on the world? That 
is, do self and society both give us inter-
pretive categories which it is a mistake to 
count as "reality"? 



Paul's emphasis on dialectical thinking 
as the way to transcend native egocentrici-
ty and sociocentricity also raises another 
question: Is this the only way to transcend 
this condition in the direction of critical 
thinking? Could one, by gaining insight into 
the dynamics of one's egocentricity and socio-
centricity, be liberated from their retardant 
effects on one's critical thinking? As psycho-
analysis aims to free a patient from the con-
stricting effects of some neurosis by insight 
into the dynamics of his neurotic conflict, 
may we be freed from our egocentricity by 
insight into its operation? Or is this just one 
mode of dialogical thinking-albeit a mode 
deserving special emphasis and attention? 

We cannot address all these questions 
within the scope of this paper. In particular, 
we cannot develop the notion of dialectical 
or dialogical thinking here. lO Rather, we 
shall focus in this paper on the notions of 
world view, point of view, egocentricity, 
and sociocentricity. It is our contention that 
the concept of the image system, as 
developed by several authors especially in-
terested in human communication, can shed 
valuable light on these notions and their in-
terrelations. In particular, these concepts 
should help us answer a number of the 
critical questions we have outlined above. 
But what is an image? What is meant by 
the image system? 

2. The Human Image System: Its Nature 

As the name of Richard Paul is intimate-
ly connected with the concept of critical 
thinking in the strong sense, so several 
names are connected with the notion of the 
image or image system. Kenneth E. 
Boulding presented the concept in The Im-
age: Knowledge in Life and Society. II 
Clevenger and Sproule have amplified the 
view. 12 All three of these authors specifical" 
ly use the term "image" to indicate the con-
cept they are developing. Walter Lippmann 
in Public Opinion 13 speaks rather of 
stereotypes. However Lippmann's views on 

The Human Image System 21 

stereotypes provide valuable insights into 
the nature of the image system. 

Boulding begins by distinguishing 
various types of images which may enter 
into a person's image system. First, there 
is the spatial image. Each person pictures 
himself in some spatial location. Not only 
does he see certain objects in front of him 
and know he should see others if he look-
ed in the proper direction, but he has a pic-
ture of what he considers lies geographically 
beyond his immediate purview. This pic-
ture involves not just specific geographical 
features-mountains begin beyond the out-
skirts of the city-but global, even cosmic 
features. At one time, many humans pic-
tured the world as one flat level in a three-
storeyed universe. Contemporary 
westerners picture it as round in an open 
universe of galaxies. Beside the spatial im-
age is the temporal image. We can picture 
our personal past and project events in our 
future. The temporal image also includes 
global aspects. Is time cyclical or linear? 

By virtue of kinship and friendship ties, 
the social roles I play, and the offices I fill, 
I am related to other human beings and can 
picture what this means in terms of the reac-
tions of others to me. A teacher, by virtue 
of her role, expects certain behavior from 
her students. That is part of her image of 
herself as teacher. All these are elements 
in the image of personal relationship. In ad-
dition to personal relationships, we have an 
image of mechanical or mechanistic rela-
tions. Our picture of the world is of one 
which displays causal regularities, condi-
tional dependencies, relatively constant se-
quences of occurrences, and which may be 
influenced or manipulated in various ways. 
"If I do A, B will occur." 

All of these images concern self and 
world. They go to building up a picture of 
my world and my place in it. It is also part 
of that picture that I react affectively to the 
world, that I experience different emotional 
reactions to different objects at different 
times. In addition, I have an image of the 
value of the various objects in my world, 



22 James B. Freeman 

an "ordering on the scale of better or worse 
ofthe various parts of the whole image. "14 
Finally, our image system contains a pic-
ture of what is real and what is unreal. For 
many, the physical objects we see and touch 
are regarded as real; what we dream or im-
agine is not. 15 

Implicit, perhaps, in Boulding's discus-
sion, but brought out more clearly by 
Clevenger, is that our image system in-
cludes images of the particular objects in 
space and events in time into which our ex-
perience is organized. We do not simply ex-
perience sense impressions, but rather we 
have experiences of objects in our world. 

When we say that experience is organized, 
we mean that separate stimuli are linked to 
other stimuli, past and present, in such a 
fashion that the occurrence of one leads us 
to infer or predict the occurrence of others ... 
For each of us experiences become organ-
ized around certain foci. That is, the in-
numerable stimuli to which we are subjected 
are not randomly connected with one 
another but are clustered around a much 
smaller number of central nodes. 16 

This clustering includes not only what may 
pertain to some object proper, but the 
various associations related to or connected 
with it. Clevenger's example is "The 
Automobile. " Not only does this node in-
clude the ability to identify automobiles 
when we see them and differentiate various 
types, but also such related associations as 
traffic officer, car pool, and death on the 
highways. 17 We may, then, distinguish not 
only the spatial, temporal, relational im-
ages, but the images of particular objects 
within space and time. As Clevenger defines 
it, "the image of a thing is the complex of 
associations that it arouses within an in-
dividual." 18 As Sproule makes explicit, 
these associations may include not only 
specific beliefs about an object, but attitudes 
toward it as well. 19 

What may we say, then, is the image 
system according to these conceptions we 
have been examining? Although it may be 
unfair to say that the very categoreal scheme 

of space, time, relation is proper to the im-
age system, certainly what is pictured to fill 
in that framework is. The image system 
gives us an organized world, with organized 
particular objects, related in various ways 
and dimensions. The image system is our 
system of images of what the spatial, tem-
poral, relational dimensions of the world are 
like, which objects and events are related 
in those dimensions, and what value dif-
ferent elements of the world have for us. 

Lippmann's discussion of stereotypes in 
Public Opinion adds further detail to this 
image of the image system. Our images of 
countries may include pictures of their em-
bodying certain moral qualities and values, 
besides images of their geographical details. 
Wartime propaganda may especially 
cultivate this aspect of national images. 
Besides images of personal relations, we 
have images of persons in relation. "Great 
men, even during their lifetime, are usual-
ly known to the public only through a fic-
titious personality. "20 Not only great heroes 
but notorious villains may be imaged. 

If everything good was to come from 
Joffre, Foch, Wilson, or Roosevelt, 
everything evil originated in the Kaiser 
Wilhelm, Lenin and Trotsky. They were as 
omnipotent for evil as the heroes were omni-
potent for good. To many simple and 
frightened minds there was no political 
reverse, no strike, no obstruction, no 
mysterious death or mysterious conflagra-
tion anywhere in the world of which the 
causes did not wind back to these personal 
sources of evil. 21 

Here we have a striking example of what 
may be a component in someone' s personal 
relation image. 

Lippmann furthermore makes some 
striking comments on how our images or 
stereotypes are bound up with perception 
and import meaning into what we experience. 

For the most part we do not first see, and 
then define, we define first and then see. In 
thc great blooming, buzzing confusion of the 
outer world we pick out what our culture 
has already defined for us, and we tend to 
perceive that which we have picked out in 
the form stereotyped for us by our culture. 22 



• 

I 

• 

What does this mean? On Lippmann's view, 
when we perceive something we experience 
some sign, and then fill out our perception 
with preconceived images of what that sign 
signifies. 

The signs stand for ideas, and these ideas 
we fill out with our stock of images. We do 
not so much see this man or that sunset; 
rather we notice that the thing is man or 
sunset, and then see chiefly what our mind 
is already full of on those subjects ... We 
notice a trait which marks a well known 
type, and fill in the rest of the picture by 
means of the stereotypes we carry about in 
our heads. 23 

So, on Lippman's view, much of what we 
perceive we actually bring with us to the 
perceptual situation. Many of the features, 
factors, properties we might ascribe to an 
object perceived are elements in our image 
of the object rather than attributes actually 
seen. 

Stereotypes provide principles for inter-
preting far more than what we experience 
first hand. We get much information, many 
reports about affairs beyond our immediate 
purview. But our picture of what is going 
on is determined largely by our stereotypes. 

Of the great men who assembled at Paris to 
settle the affairs of mankind, how many 
were there who were able to see much of 
the Europe about them, rather than their 
commitments about Europe? Could anyone 
have penetrated the mind ofM. Clemenceau, 
would he have found there images of the 
Europe of 1919, or a great sediment of 
stereotyped ideas accumulated and harden-
ed in a long and pugnacious existence? Did 
he see the Germans of 1919, or the German 
type as he had learned to see it since 1871? 
He saw the type. 24 

What has this brief review of Lipp-
mann's views added to our conception of 
the image system? Besides giving greater 
detail, this consideration has underscored 
how the image system has a dynamic of its 
own. It is not merely a reflection ofthe ex-
ternal world, but a principal determinant of 
our world, especially as a system of mean-
ingful elements or elements which bear 

The Human Image System 23 

meaning. Our images give us the world we 
inhabit. 

Whence comes the image system? In 
Public Opinion, Lippman emphasizes that 
the image system is a pseudo-environment 
inserted between a person and his or her ac-
tual environment. How did that environ-
ment come to be there? From what sources 
did it arise and what forces maintain it? 
These questions are central to comprehen-
ding why the concept of the image system 
is important for understanding and develop-
ing the enterprise of critical thinking in the 
strong sense. They concern the sources and 
dynamics of the image system, which we 
discuss in the next section. 

3. The Human Image System: 
Its Sources and Dynamics 

How does the image system develop and 
evolve? What forces foster its growth? This 
is an important question, and one which has 
a distinct import for critical thinking. We 
may identify three sources which feed the 
human image system. The first is the ex-
perience of each individual. What we ex-
perience of particular objects, persons, 
places gives us raw material for their im-
ages. My image of San Francisco is due, 
at least in part, to the experiences I have 
had there. If two visitors had very similar 
experiences of San Francisco, arriving and 
departing together, visiting the same places, 
seeing the same sights, we should expect 
their images to be quite similar. If their ex-
periences were different, their images of 
San Francisco might also be different. This 
has lead Sproule to claim that each person's 
image of something is unique to that per-
son. Although two person's images of an 
object may converge to a great extent, they 
most likely will not be identical,25 This fact 
is also behind Boulding's calling our im-
age of something the totality of our subjec-
tive knowledge of it. 26 

Our experience of something need not be 
direct to contribute to our image of that thing. 



24 James B. Freeman 

None of us has seen George Washington. 
But we all have an image of the man-based 
on what we were told in school, the legends 
we have heard, the pictures we have seen 
and the associations they evoke. Likewise 
few of us have seen Antarctica. Yet we all 
have images of that continent based on 
various reports-verbal and pictorial. 
Reports, stories, pictures, all such secon-
dhand information may contribute to the im-
age system. 

The mention of George Washington 
brings us to the second main source of 
images-society itself. For many 
Americans' image of George Washington 
is not simply the image of an historical 
figure but of an epic personage. Society has 
transmitted that aspect of the image. 
Boulding speaks of the public image. 

The basic bond of any society, culture, sub-
culture, or organization is a "public im-
age," that is, an image the essential 
characteristics of which are shared by the 
individuals participating in the group ... An 
enormous part of the activity of each socie-
ty is concerned with the transmission and 
protection of its public image; that set of im-
ages regarding space, time, relation, evalua-
tion, etc., which is shared by the mass of 
its people. 27 

But over against these two sources-
experience and society-which are basically 
external to the individual, there is another 
factor in the development of the image 
system-an individual's own needs, desires, 
motivations, affects. Two needs are prin-
cipal here. As we have noted, our image 
system gives meaning to our experience. 
This function of the image system answers 
to a distinct subjective human need or 
motivation. Humans want to make mean-
ing of their world. As Daniel Katz points 
out in "The Functional Approach to the 
Study of Attitudes," desire for knowledge 
in the sense of organizing principles, prin-
ciples which, in John Dewey's words, will 
introduce definiteness and distinction and 
consistency and stability of meaning, is a 
distinct human motivation. People want ex-
planations and our images provide them. 

They want an adequately structured, mean-
ingful, organized, clear and consistent 
universe, and our stereotypes give them 
what they want. 28 Thus, something may 
become part of our image based on our sub-
jective need to have an explanation, to know 
what something means. This need for mean-
ing may be itself fed by deep urges. The 
threat of meaninglessness is one of the ex-
istential threats to the self. What gives 
meaning may be accepted to allay this basic 
anxiety. Not just a positive interest in mean-
ing, but this basic anxiety may drive us to 
seek explanations and form images and 
stereotypes. 

But speaking of a threat to the self leads 
directly to a second subjective need the 
image system may serve-the ego-defensive 
need. There are more threats to the ego than 
existential anxieties. We may need to hide 
from our inner conflicts, unacceptable im-
pulses, and external threats in general, and 
to avoid the anxiety these factors arouse. 
We need to save our egos or self-images, 
and our image system may serve this func-
tion. Typical here are attitudes of superiority 
towards some minority group. They may 
stem from our own feelings of inferiority 
and the threat these feelings pose to our ego. 
By seeing some group as inferior to us, we 
assuage our feelings of inferiority. These 
attitudes, then, are ego-defensive and their 
inclusion, strength, and position in the image 
system indicates its ego-defensive function. 
In Public Opinion, Lippman points out how 
stereotypes can serve both these functions: 

A pattern of stereotypes is not neutral. It is 
not merely a way of substituting order for 
the great blooming, buzzing confusion of 
reality. It is not merely a short cut. It is all 
these things and something more. It is the 
guarantee of our self-respect; it is the pro-
jection upon the world of our own sense of 
our own value, our own position and our 
own rights. The stereotypes are, thereforc, 
highly charged with the feelings that arc at-
tachcd to them. They are the fortress of our 
tradition. and behind its defenses we can 
continue to feel ourselves safe in the posi-
tion we occupy. 29 



p 

r 
! 

.. 

That the image system serves the 
knowledge and ego-defensive needs is cen-
tral to understanding its dynamics. What do 
we mean by dynamics? Our image systems 
exert a profound affect on how incoming 
messages affect each of us. All of the 
authors we have been examining emphasize 
this point. A incoming message is not simp-
ly received by a listener. Incoming infor-
mation may not produce belief. A message 
intended to change attitudes may not have 
that effect. The message must interact with 
the listener's image system and its overall 
effect will be determined not just by its con-
tent but by that image system. By the 
dynamics of the image system we mean the 
forces it brings to play in this interaction. 
What are these forces? As Clevenger points 
out, "Images affect response to incoming 
messages in three ways: They influence at-
tention, interpretation, and acceptance. "30 
The images in a person's image system 
maybe ordered on a salient-latent scale. 
Salient images are those which are arous-
ed, brought to consciousness, quite easily, 
while those which are latent may come to 
consciousness only with much stimulation. 
One will pay far more attention to a message 
concerned with an image salient in his or 
her image system than to one which is la-
tent. We should note that not only are par-
ticular images salient or latent as a whole, 
their various components or elements are 
salient or latent in different degrees in dif-
ferent image systems. Not only will 
messages dealing with the salient features 
of an image gain more attention than those 
dealing with latent features, this saliency or 
latency of the elements also affects how 
messages are interpreted. What we think 
someone is saying is influenced heavily by 
the saliency of the elements in the images 
his or her message arouses. The message 
that Hemingway enjoyed bullfights may be 
interpreted quite differently, depending on 
what elements of the image of 
bullfighting-blood and death or the 
matador's skill and the bull' s courage-are 
salient in an auditor. 31 

The Human Image System 25 

But the most important effect, from the 
point of view of critical thinking, that our 
image system has on incoming messages is 
its affect on whether they are accepted. One 
striking feature of the image system is its 
conservatism-it is resistant to change 
through experience. It seeks to preserve 
itself. This means we tend to reject 
messages which are at variance with our im-
age system, and accept those in harmony 
with it. Messages which confirm, 
strengthen, or enhance our already existing 
images will be accepted. Those which 
threaten the image system will be actively 
rejected and resisted. 

The image system fosters various kinds 
of selectivity to let us ignore threatening 
messages. Some we may avoid altogether. 
If they are contained or developed in a 
newspaper story, we just don't read the 
story. If we do read it, we promptly forget 
the whole article, or pay attention just to 
those messages that confirm our image. If 
we do pay attention to the imcompatible 
messages, we may interpret them so as to 
confirm our image. For example, suppose 
we picture Muammar Qaddafi as a mad 
dog, as President Reagan once described 
him. Suppose we hear that Qaddafi is a man 
of compassion-genuinely aggrieved at 
human suffering, visiting hospitals to com-
fort the sick and wounded, their sight leav-
ing him deeply troubled. Instead of rejec-
ting this message, we might reinterpret it 
by asking-Are these crocodile tears? Is this 
the master stroke of propaganda-looking 
compassionate while underneath plotting 
terror just for the sake of human suffering? 
Again this renders us immune to the force 
of the message as evidence of Qaddafi' s 
character. 32 

Lippmann has a very nice illustration of 
selectivity caused by the American 
stereotype of progress. This stereotype was 
framed in terms of physical expansion or 
development. Whatever had grown, gotten 
bigger, developed was an instance of pro-
gress. And progress surely is good. This 
stereotype let Americans see all the advan-



26 James B. Freeman 

tages but none of the disadvantages of how 
their society was evolving. 

They saw the expansion of cities, but not 
the accretion of slums; they cheered the cen-
sus statistics, but refused to consider over-
crowding; they pointed with pride to their 
growth, but would not see the drift from the 
land, or the unassimilated immigration. 
They expanded industry furiously at reckless 
cost to their natural resources; they built up 
gigantic corporations without arranging for 
industrial relations. They grew to be one of 
the most powerful nations on earth without 
preparing their institutions or their minds for 
the ending of their isolation. 33 

To use a good psychological term, a 
stereotype sets us to see what confirms the 
stereotype and to overlook what conflicts 
with it. This dynamic of the image system 
is a direct consequence of its serving the 
meaning and ego-defensive functions. 
Disturbing an image risks attacking the 
meaning fabric of our world and our place-
including what we may picture to be our 
privileged place-in it. As Lippmann puts 
it, to disturb the stereotypes is to attack the 
foundations of the world, our world at least. 34 

Of course, not all discordant messages 
will be rejected. The image system can be 
weakened and ultimately modified by new 
information. Repeated messages at variance 
with an image may introduce tension into 
the image. Our picture will no longer be 
consistent. Once there are tensions in the 
image, then it may be far more open to 
modification. 35 Enough tension producing 
messages and we may significantly revise 
the image. But for the purpose of understand-
ing the implications of the image system for 
critical thinking in the strong sense, the ef-
fect of images on messages, the fact that the 
image system has a great effect on how we 
accept the messages we receive is para-
mount. We shall develop the implications 
of this dynamic in the next section. 

4. Implications for Strong Sense 
Critical Thinking 

In section one we posed a number of 

questions concerning strong sense critical 
thinking. What is a point of view or world 
view? Do humans impose categories of in-
terpretation on their world or their ex-
perience which are creations, artifacts, and 
which should not be regarded as "real"? 
What do egocentricity and sociocentricity 
involve? Are humans naturally egocentric 
or sociocentric? If human beings are 
egocentric and sociocentric, can this con-
dition be transcended by analyzing the 
egocentricity and sociocentricity? It should 
be clear at this point that our consideration 
of the human image system in the last two 
sections has provided much material for 
answering these questions. Reflections on 
the image system provide evidence for and 
insights into a "natural" human condition 
which is inimical to strong sense critical 
thinking. They also suggest ways in which 
we may grow as critical thinkers. In this 
section we want to develop answers to the 
questions we have posed, and make plain 
these implications of the human image 
system. 

What is a person's world view? What 
is a point of view? This question can now 
be answered quite easily. A person's world 
view is his or her image system, the totali-
ty of one's spatial, temporal, relational, per-
sonal, evaluative images in their interrela-
tions. If our image systems give each of us 
our world as organized, with meaning and 
value, then our world view is really our im-
age system. Sometimes point of view means 
the same as world view. Frequently, to 
speak of a point of view on some question 
is to indicate that problem, question, issue, 
aspect of the world, viewed in the light of 
some particular interest. Given our discus-
sion of the image system, we may widen 
this conception. Not only one's interest in 
the sense of value commitments and emo-
tional attachments, but also the whole 
system of one's images as they pertain to 
some question, that aspect or portion of our 
world view which bears on that issue, 
determines or constitutes one's point of 
view on it. 



Our discussion of Lippmann's views on 
how the stereotypes in our world view are 
bound up with perception suggests that 
humans do, in large part, impose interpreta-
tions on their world. Humans may ex-
perience signs. But what they see, perceive 
are what their stereotypes tell them these 
signs signifY. As we have pointed out, Lipp-
mann regards persons' experience thus in-
terpreted, or this system of interpretation, 
as not their environment but a pseudo-
environment. Our discussion of how the im-
age system serves the meaning and ego-
defensive functions gives further evidence 
that the image system is a construct. As Katz 
points out in discussing ego-defensive at-
titudes, "The objects and situation to which 
they are attached are merely convenient 
outlets for their expression ... The attitude 
is not created by the target but by the in-
dividual's emotional conflicts. And when 
no convenient target exists the individual 
will create one. ' , 36 If it is our deep needs 
which feed the image system, we should not 
be surprised if our images tell us more about 
ourselves than about our environment. If 
because of some need for meaning or need 
to protect our self-image or some aspect of 
the public image, we have pictured the 
world in some way, that picture will be our 
picture, our interpretation of the situation. 
And since this interpretation is fed by sub-
jective needs and built from stereotypes con-
ceived before the experiences they interpret, 
we should not be surprised to find that it 
is a distinct mistake, a grievous confusion, 
to call this interpretation "reality." We 
shall discuss this explicitly when we take 
up the issue of why egocentricity is a liabili-
ty for critical thinking. Our discussion of 
the image system, then, gives ample 
evidence that Richard Paul's claim is true, 
that humans do impose an interpretation on 
their environments, which it is a mistake 
to regard as "real." 

Can we regard this imposing of an in-
terpretation on our experience as a 
manifestation of egocentricity? If we each 
take our image system as "real," are we 

The Human Image System 27 

being egocentric or sociocentric? And if this 
attitude towards the image system is 
widespread, pervasive, the norm, does this 
mean that, as Richard Paul suggests, 
humans are egocentric (and sociocentric) by 
nature? To answer this question, we must 
first determine what "egocentricity" 
means. 

In "Piagetian Insights and Critical 
Thinking," A.J.A. Binker and Marla Char-
bonneau offer a definition of "egocentrici-
ty" based on the work of the child 
psychologist, Jean Piaget. According to 
Binker and Charbonneau, "The defining 
characteristic of egocentrism is the inabili-
ty of the individual to see his point of view 
as a point of view; rather he continually con-
fuses it with reality. "37 On Piaget' s view, 
a young child is completely egocentric. He 
cannot distinguish his own experience from 
reality, and so the question of there being 
other points of view than his own does not 
arise for him. As the child grows, he begins 
to identifY with others. However, this does 
not so much free him from his egocentrism 
as transform it into sociocentrism. The in-
terests, desires, beliefs, preconceptions of 
his immediate group become or are incor-
porated into his world view. He does not 
recognize this as a world view, but assumes 
(naively) that people generally share this 
point of view. Binker and Charbonneau see 
this egocentricity manifested in many dif-
ferent ways in the thought processes of the 
child, and, in each case can identify 
analogies in adult thinking. 

Given this understanding of egocentrism 
and sociocentrism, the evidence that humans 
impose interpretations on reality which we 
have just discussed becomes evidence that 
humans suffer from egocentricity. Whether 
it shows or constitutes proper evidence that 
human beings are egocentric or sociocen-
tric by nature is a further, deep question into 
which we cannot enter here. What we can 
say is that the analyses of the image system 
we have been examining suggest that we 
have ample evidence that egocentrism and 
sociocentrism are widespread. 



28 James B. Freeman 

Is egocentrism a liability for critical 
thinking? We think our reflections on the 
image system and its attendant egocentricity 
and sociocentricity indicate that humans are 
in a situation they desperately need to trans-
cend, from the point of view of strong sense 
critical thinking. We want to make this 
plain. In section one, we sketched certain 
aims ofthe critical thinker, as portrayed by 
various authors. Ennis points out that 
critical thinkers will respect other points of 
view, that they will seek to reason, as 
cogently as possible, even from premises 
with which they disagree. This is the anti-
thesis of egocentrism. As both Ennis and 
Siegel point out, critical thinkers want 
reasons. And by "reasons" surely they 
must mean more than mere rationalizations. 
They want reasons which will lay claim-
some claim at least-to our rational accep-
tance. Siegel points out that critical thinkers 
will assess reasons, and Ennis adds that they 
will base their conclusions on the weight 
of evidence. So in seeking reasons, critical 
thinkers are not concerned with finding their 
reasons, but finding reasons which will have 
some probative force, at least for other 
critical thinkers. 

But if we are egocentric, if we impose 
our images on the world, why should we 
expect such interpretations to be justified 
by good reasons? That the human image 
system is an artifact, that it is not a simple, 
straightforward reflection of the environ-
ment raises the question of how justified we 
are in accepting its picture of the world. Our 
considerations of the dynamics of the image 
system give us ample reason to see that in 
many cases good reasons need not be forth-
coming for accepting the image as "reali-
ty. " If our image system is fed by subjec-
tive needs, the need for meaning and the 
need for ego-defense, what reason have we 
to think that the beliefs and attitudes incor-
porated into these self-serving images are 
in anyway justified, that we have any good 
reasons for accepting them? That our 
stereotypes foster prejudgmental thinking-
quite literally prejudiced thinking in the 

etymological sense of that term-means our 
judgments will be based on stereotyped ex-
pectations, not on evidence. We see what 
we are set to see, what our stereotypes tell 
us is there. We can only hope that a judg-
ment which precedes the evidence will be 
a judgment for which we can give genuine 
reasons. The resistance ofthe image system 
to change further indicates what now is 
obvious-that we should not expect in 
general that its representations will be 
justified by good reasons. By seeking to 
avoid the impact of incoming messages at 
variance with the image system, if not to 
avoid such messages altogether, the image 
system cuts us off from the evidence on 
which good reasons are based. It further 
fosters an attitude of dogmatism directly op-
posed to the critical spirit. Instead of being 
moved by the weight of evidence, we are 
moved by the strength of our needs. Clear-
ly, the image system constitutes a distinct 
liability for critical thinking. 

Does our discussion of the image system 
suggest ways in which its liabilities may be 
transcended? First, we should point out that 
it is the egocentrism associated with our im-
age system, the egocentric identification of 
our image system with "reality" which 
must be transcended. Although our image 
system may pose a distinct liability for 
critical thinking, we may argue that we can-
not do without it. Indeed, Lippmann does 
just this. 

The real environment is altogether too big, 
too complex, and too fleeting for direct ac-
quaintance. We are not equipped to deal 
with so much subtlety, so much variety, so 
many permutations and combinations. And 
although we have to act in that environment, 
we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model 
before we can manage with it. To traverse 
the world men must have maps of the world. 38 

Again, "But there are uniformities suffi-
ciently accurate, and the need of economiz-
ing attention is so inevitable, that the aban-
donment of all stereotypes for a wholly in-
nocent approach to experience would im-
poverish human life. "39 



-

• 

Rather, we must replace the attitude of 
egocentric dogmatism and absolutism 
toward our image system with one of ten-
tatitiveness. This attitude is what the 
philosopher Brand Blanshard calls the ra-
tional temper. It is to regard the image 
system and its stereotypes as a system of 
hypotheses, defeasible by future experience. 
Although with this attitude we may have ex-
pectations about how our world will behave, 
about how it is structured, what sort of per-
sons, places, and things are in it, and what 
values all these have, expectations which 
we may not be able to justify fully, we shall 
still be open to disconfirming experiences, 
contrary, challenging information. We shall 
seek to revise and refine our image system 
in their light. We shall be far more willing 
to confront and assimilate challenging 
messages, even if this should mean revis-
ing the image system. Instead of demanding 
that the world agree with our preset ideas, 
we recognize those ideas for what they 
are-preset ideas. We may have prejudices, 
but we shall acknowledge that they are pre-
jUdices. We shall seek to be aware of their 
origin, their genesis, using this as a further 
antidote to dogmatism. We shall try to 
determine how faithful our images are to 
"reality" and to keep mindful of their 
degree of faithfulness. 

In short, we must develop a critical at-
titude toward the image system. Our image 
of the image system must not picture it giv-
ing absolute or final truth but providing at 
best a practically or pragmatically useful 
way of getting around in the world. Lipp-
mann contrasts these two attitudes nicely 
when he says: 

What matters is the character of the 
stereotypes, and the gullibility with which 
we employ them. And these in the end de-
pend upon those inclusive patterns which 
constitute our philosophy of life. If in that 
philosophy we assume that the world is 
codified according to a code which we 
possess, we are likely to make our reports 
of what is going on describe a world run by 
our code. But if our philosophy tells us that 
each man is only a small part of the world, 

The Human Image System 29 

that his intelligence catches at best only 
phases and aspects in a coarse net of ideas, 
then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend 
to know that they are only stereotypes, to 
hold them lightly, to modify them gladly. 40 

How do our considerations of the image 
system, its nature, sources, and dynamics, 
suggest how this critical attitude might be 
cultivated? 

First, just recognizing that we have an 
image system, that it filters and transforms 
incoming information about our environ-
ment into a constructed picture of the world, 
and that confusing this picture with the 
world itself is a distinct liability for critical 
thinking, should be a first step toward 
replacing egocentric attachment with a more 
detached attitude. How can we change our 
attitude toward our image system, how can 
we recognize that we have to outgrow 
egocentrically identifying it with reality 
unless we are first aware of the problem? 
We must first recognize that we have this 
liability for critical thinking before we can 
deal with it. 

Once we recognize this, our account of 
why egocentric attachment to the image 
system is a liability for critical thinking 
should begin to inject a sense of healthy 
skepticism into our attitude. Recognizing 
that through preset ideas and resistance to 
change our image system tends to cut us off 
from the evidence on which good reasons 
are based certainly should foster skepticism 
toward the images of the system. Again, the 
fact that an image was accepted to satisfy 
some subjective need should cause us to 
question the image. In addition to these con-
siderations, the fact that a significant part 
of our system consists of a stock of images 
transmitted to us by society, that this is a 
major source of our images, should further 
our critical attitude. If society has simply 
transmitted these images, we most likely 
have picked them up uncritically. Does the 
fact that society has transmitted some im-
age constitute a sufficient reason, 
significantly weighty evidence, to regard 
that image as so true to reality that it is 



30 James B. Freeman 

beyond need of any revision? 
Recognizing that ego-defensive needs 

drive the development of the image system 
should lead to a further step in freeing us 
from egocentricity. That our image system 
is fed by such needs suggests that we may 
grow as critical thinkers by confronting 
these needs. Surely if our holding certain 
images is part of our solution to some in-
ner conflict, then we would not expect these 
images to be given up unless these conflicts 
were resolved. For example, if maintain-
ing some illusion of power or superiority 
is necessary to shore up our egos, then we 
shall not ordinarily abandon such an illu-
sion unless our needs for power and 
superiority were worked through. If the im-
ages were abandoned absent these 
therapeutic changes, we should expect them 
to be replaced by other images satisfying 
these same needs and so accepted just as 
uncritically. To cease clinging to such im-
ages, we need to become strong enough to 
do without them. But this involves an 
analytic process of recognizing these needs, 
the factors that brought them into being, and 
their consequences for our overall growth 
as persons, including our growth as critical 
thinkers. So the Socratic maxim "Know 
thyself" is crucial for strong sense critical 
thinking, as it is crucial for wisdom in 
general. To develop as critical thinkers, we 
must outgrow these egocentric needs. But 
conversely, should there be some commit-
ment to critical thinking, and some 
familiarity with the skills of thinking 
critically, we should expect that overcom-
ing these ego-defensive needs would ad-
vance our development as critical thinkers 
in the strong sense. 

Is confronting, analyzing our egocentric 
needs an assay in dialectical or dialogical 
thinking? Can we also say this of recogniz-
ing that we have image systems and that 
they pose liabilities for critical thinking? Is 
this to adopt some other point of view, or 
do we rather have additional ways to grow 
as critical thinkers here? To give an ade-
quate answer, we should have to go into 

detail about dialectical thinking, and that is 
beyond our scope in this paper. But we can 
make this point. To confront our ego-
defensive needs, to see their origin, current 
function, and effect, is to take a radically 
different stance toward these needs than to 
identify with them. It is to look at these 
needs with a measure of detachment. 
Likewise to recognize that we have image 
systems is to in some sense break our iden-
tification with them. We may not be adop-
ting a viewpoint determined by a competing 
need or interest, it is not clear that this is 
to adopt a competing world view, but it does 
mean that we shall be looking at these needs 
and images of ours from a radically different 
angle. Whether this should count as dialec-
tical thinking depends upon further articula-
tion of what dialectical thinking is. What 
we can say is that our reflections on the im-
age system and its connection with critical 
thinking have shown that self-knowledge is 
a way, and a necessary way, of growing as 
a critical thinker. 

So far, we have discussed how 
awareness of the image system and its 
dynamics can lead to changes in our attitude 
toward our own image system. It can also 
lead to greater ability to enter into someone 
else's point of view. It gives us further 
specific questions for engaging in dialec-
tical or multi-logical thinking. Besides ask-
ing what rival, competing interests others 
might have in a given situation and how this 
might give rise to alternative points of view, 
we might ask what images others entertain, 
how are they trying to make meaning, deal 
with conflicts. 

Not only can we use such considerations 
to evaluate the strength of our claims in the 
light of rival points of view, we can use such 
considerations to make ourselves more open 
to others and their points of view. Suppose 
certain statements, arguments, behavior 
seem inexplicable, if not outrageous, to us. 
If we are aware of the image system and 
its all important role in shaping one's pic-
ture of the environment-in creating a 
pseudo-environment, to use Lippmann's 



> 

term again-which determines how persons 
react, then we shall have a series of con-
siderations which may help us explain this 
behavior. At least, these considerations 
should indicate where to look for such an 
explanation. Consider, for example, the 
anti-American pronouncements of radical 
Moslem fundamentalists, or the Soviet 
Union's shooting down of Korean Air Lines 
Flight 007 on September 1, 1983. In the 
light of our discussion, can we simply 
dismiss these Moslem fundamentalists as 
crazy and the Soviets as evil? We can rather 
ask-What image do these Moslem fun-
damentalists have of the West and of the 
United States in particular? What 
stereotypes have formed that image? What 
needs does it satisfy? Again, KAL Flight 
007 invaded Soviet air space. That much 
is fact. What did this mean to the Soviets? 
What did their images, stereotypes, 
preconceptions bring to their perception of 
this event? From their point of view, i.e. 
from the perspective of their image system, 
was their shooting down of this plane an 
act of moral turpitude? Clearly, this is 
reasoning from the Moslem fundamentalist 
or Soviet point of view. 

This is not to say that such dialectical 
reasoning will convince us that all such 
behavior is acceptable. Even when we 
reason from someone' s point of view, even 
allowing that point of view to be viable, his 
or her claims or behavior may not be 
justifiable. Certain behavior may be wrong, 
even from someone' s point of view . We 
may also find that although what someone 
has said or done seems perfectly appropriate 
from his or her point of view, that point of 
view is mistaken. Here again, we may not 
find the behavior acceptable, but will we 
judge the person to be evil, stupid, deprav-
ed? Will we not rather admit that here an 
element of human tragedy enters the situa-
tion? Morally appraising such situations is 
of course complex. But our consideration 
of the image system suggests how issues of 
judging others must be tempered by con-
siderations of how they perceive their ac-

The Human Image System 31 

tions. Lippman points out that overcoming 
our egocentric attachment to our image 
system is a prerequisite for taking this more 
tolerant attitude. Without it, we cannot con-
ceive that someone else perceives and bases 
his behavior on a different set of facts, and 
that this explains why he is "different." 

Such an explanation we avoid, because it 
saps the very foundation of our own 
assurance that we have seen life steadily and 
seen it whole. It is only when we are in the 
habit of recognizing our opinions as a par-
tial experience seen through our stereotypes 
that we become truly tolerant of an oppo-
nent. Without that habit, we believe in the 
absolutism of our own vision, and conse-
quently in the treacherous character of all 
opposition. 41 

Hence consideration of the image system 
not only helps us reason dialectically, it lets 
us be more human. By asking questions 
about the images of others, we seek to foster 
human understanding, even if those whose 
ways seem strange, threatening, well nigh 
abhorrent. By overcoming our egocentrici-
ty, we shall regard fewer persons as "the 
enemy." 

The possibility of transcending our 
egocentricity and sociocentricity through 
appreciation of the image system raises 
some significant issues for teaching critical 
thinking in the strong sense. How can 
educators incorporate these insights into 
teaching critical thinking? 

5. Pedagogical Considerations 

The central pedagogical problem that 
has emerged from our discussion is how do 
we help students overcome their egocen-
tricity and sociocentricity or, what is the 
other side of the same coin, how do we 
foster the rational temper, the tentative at-
titude to our image system?42 Our discus-
sion in the previous section contains cer-
tain proposals for advancing this goal. The 
first is simply making study of the image 
system and its stereotypes part of the critical 



32 James B. Freeman 

thinking curriculum. To become critical 
thinkers, we need to become aware of the 
image system about which we are trying to 
cultivate this tentative, open attitude. This 
means being aware of our stereotypes as 
stereotypes, indeed becoming aware that our 
thinking is permeated by principles of in-
terpretation and evaluation which we have 
made ourselves and imposed on experience, 
and which are subject to critical scrutiny. 

Once we recognize our stereotypes, we 
may foster the critical attitude toward them 
by considering their origin and justification. 
We have already developed this point to a 
great extent in the last section. If an image 
is the outgrowth of subjective needs, why 
should it give us a justifiable picture of the 
world, one we can claim with rational force 
should be accepted by others? Although 
some images are based on personal ex-
perience, how wide is a person's ex-
perience? Surely, by nature, it is limited. 
Do we know even our intimate acquain-
tances through and through? Do we know 
even ourselves? Can we say with any con-
fidence that we have taken all the relevant 
facts into account when fixing some image? 
Surely awareness of our limitations as 
humans should foster tentativeness towards 
our stereotypes. This should only be 
heightened by recognizing that our 
stereotypes further limit our awareness by 
creating blind spots, by leading us to 
register only what conforms to our image 
system. We can similarly question the 
justification of stereotypes inherited from 
our culture. Why should our culture give 
us a justified picture of the world? What was 
the origin of these images? How limited was 
the experience they were based on? What 
sociocentric needs,. what societal bias do 
they serve? Is this their fundamental source? 

In this connection, the study of 
stereotypes prevalent in other cultures or 
at other historical times might be quite ap-
propriate. Studying how we are prejudiced 
might at first be too close for comfort. 
Studying how someone else was prejudiced 
may be sufficiently removed from our per-

sonal core and its subjective needs to 
permit objective study. This may be, if the 
situation studied is not too obviously 
analogous to our own. In particular, study-
ing how propagandists build up image 
systems by exploiting latent conditions in 
the audience, including ego-defensive needs 
and needs for knowledge-and there is a 
vast amount of material here intimately 
related to the themes of strong sense critical 
thinking-may give us insight into the origin 
and development of stereotypes, and may 
make more trenchant the question of their 
rational justification. But ultimately, such 
study should throw some light onto the 
development of our own image systems and 
cast doubt on their absolute reliability. 

It should throw some light-but again, 
because of our resistances, it may not. We 
may be able to see how the other fellow is 
prejudiced, how he should take a more hum-
ble attitude towards his image system, but 
our stereotypes remain unassailed. Indeed, 
we may be left feeling even more superior, 
for now we have an explanation for the 
other person's irrationality without register-
ing how that explanation applies to our 
own.43 Our stereotypes remain unassailed. 
They remain unassailed because the subjec-
tive needs which fed their development and 
maintain their strength have not been touch-
ed. How can we have an attitude of ten-
tativeness to our image system, to our 
stereotypes, if they are heavily invested in 
serving powerful subjective needs, especial-
ly ego-defensive needs? 

This brings us to our central pedagogical 
question. How can this freedom be fostered 
in the classroom? Indeed can such libera-
tion be fostered there? Is there something 
fundamentally wrong headed in thinking we 
might do this as classroom teachers? Is this 
change a matter of therapy rather than for-
mal education? This is a deep question 
which ultimately cannot be answered 
without a theory, an account of what this 
liberation means. What we can only hope 
to do here is highlight the difficulty of the 
issue and suggest how we might meet this 



challenge in the classroom. The difficulty 
is that we are talking about something which 
goes to the core of each student's personali-
ty, and are seeking to bring about personal 
change. Is there thus a therapeutic aspect 
to developing as a critical thinker and is 
it dangerous to proceed without thera-
peutic competence and therapeutic 
sensitivity? 

I think there is this therapeutic aspect. 
But I also think critical thinking instructors 
can gain important clues from the writings 
of psychologists on how to proceed here. 
In particular, material on how attitudes and 
stereotypes serving the knowledge and ego-
defensive functions are changed is quite 
relevant. Factors of our image system which 
serve the knowledge function are modified 
when they no longer adequately supply 
meaning, when a person is aware of a suf-
ficient number of facts which they do not 
explain, with which they are inconsistent. 44 
Can we, as critical thinking instructors, pre-
sent information at odds with any prevalent 
stereotypes, the very sort of information 
which would cause their revision? If we can, 
then wouldn't this be a powerful illustra-
tion of why the image system must be open 
to modification? 

The real challenge, I believe, comes 
with changing attitudes and stereotypes 
serving the ego-defensive function. This 
may well cause the most difficult intran-
sigence to deal with. Yet we can have 
change even here. Katz points out that ego-
defensive attitudes may possibly be chang-
ed with insight into the mechanisms of 
defense. "Information about [a person's] 
functioning may have an influence, if 
presented without threat, and if the defenses 
do not go too deep into the personality ... "45 
As critical thinking instructors we are 
developing these insights through making 
our students aware of stereotypes and their 
defensive role. Making students aware of 
the whole structure and dynamics of the im-
age system, especially developing its 
dynamic of serving egocentric needs, fosters 
these insights. Our reflections in this paper, 

The Human Image System 33 

then, have very direct practical implications 
for teaching critical thinking in the strong 
sense, and for what should be taught. 

6. Philosophical Considerations 

Our discussion of how egocentricity is 
a liability for critical thinkers in section four 
has made one philosophically controversial 
presupposition. We have said that critical 
thinkers want good reasons, i.e. reasons 
which will lay claim to rational acceptance. 
We have also developed in both sections 
four and five how the image system poses 
a threat to critical thinking in that it fosters 
making judgments based on stereotypes, 
satisfying some internal need, rather than 
making judgments based on good reasons. 
The presupposition here is that some 
reasons are objectively good reasons. Such 
reasons are not merely good from some 
perspective or in accordance with some 
world view. Rather such reasons have an 
epistemic, normative force. Anyone who 
entertains them as a rational discussant 
should appreciate this force. We should be 
able to justify that they are good reasons 
by appealing to criteria which should be ac-
cepted by any genuine participant in the 
discussion. 

We should emphasize that when we 
speak of good reasons here, we mean 
"good" in the sense of "logically cogent." 
Rhetoricians, in appraising arguments, 
distinguish various standards, including the 
effect standard and the validity standard. 46 
Effect deals with the persuasive force of 
arguments. Validity incorporates issues of 
logical cogency. Now if from the point of 
view of effect, a good argument or a good 
reason is one which moves, persuades the 
audience to accept the conclusion, there is 
no doubt that what will be a good reason 
for one audience will not be good for 
another. What will move one audience to 
accept a conclusion may have exactly the 
opposite effect on another, or leave that au-
dience unmoved. Persuasive force is au-



34 James B. Freeman 

dience relative. But that is not the sense of 
"good" in which we speak of good reasons. 
Good reasons are good because they are 
logically cogent-they give us reason to ac-
cept some conclusion which has logical and 
epistemic force, and this force, we presup-
pose, is not relative to audience or in-
dividual, but objective. 

But can we simply presuppose this? 
Surely of the many forms of relativism,47 
there is one which denies just this-that we 
can objectively evaluate reasons. Such a 
relativist can even use our terminology to 
formulate his or her challenge. There is no 
such thing as an objectively good reason-
there are just images of good reasons. What 
criteria a person might offer for good 
reasons are simply articulations of his im-
age of a good reason. We simply have im-
ages of good reasons, nothing more. True, 
the images of many persons may converge 
on what they regard as the central 
characteristics of a good reason. We may 
have a public image of a good reason, but 
it is an image nonetheless. If someone does 
not agree with us that a reason is good-or 
bad, and the disagreement is not the pro-
duct of some confusion, then we can only 
say that he has a different image of what 
a good reason is, not that he is wrong 
epistemically. Reasons are not good; they 
are just good for certain persons, meaning 
that they are in accord with the criteria con-
stituting their image of a good reason. 

Such a relativist position is endorsed by 
Hartry Field in [1982]. Field points out that 
a relativism with respect to values does not 
entail a relativism with respect to truth. One 
can hold that statements are true or false 
simpliciter, not true or false for some per-
son, while holding that values, including 
such epistemological values as being 
justified, are relative. For Field, 
epistemological relativism is 

the doctrine that the basic epistemological 
properties are not such properties as that of 
belief B being justified, but rather such 
relativized properties as that of belief B be-
ing justified relative to evidential system E. 

(An evidential system is, roughly, a bunch 
of rules for determining under what condi-
tions one is to believe various things; a belief 
is justified relative to an evidential system 
in certain circumstances if the rules license 
the belief under those circumstances.)48 

The epistemological relativist cannot ad-
mit that among the values E ranges over is 
the true evidential system, that a belief may 
be justified relative to this system. "For that 
would amount to saying that the belief is 
justified relative to that evidential system 
which declares a belief justified just in case 
it is justified; and since the last use of the 
term 'justified' is unrelativized, the 
epistemological relativist cannot say this. "49 
"Being justified" must always be relativiz-
ed. What the epistemological relativist can 
do is to talk about factual properties of 
evidential systems. The reliability of an 
evidential system, its tending to lead to a 
certain proportion of truth over falsity, is 
a factual property of the system. So the 
epistemological relativist can say not only 
that belief B is justified relative to some 
system E, but can also say that B is justified 
relative to a highly reliable system E*. In 
saying this, he gives B "epistemological 
praise" 50 just in case he values reliability. 
He need not say that all evidential systems 
are equally good. Some are better than 
others. One system is better than another 
just in case it better serves or preserves his 
values. One might hold all sorts of values 
vis-a- vis evidential systems. Besides 
reliability, someone may also value the 
power of an evidential system, how much 
the system allows us to believe. An eviden-
tial system which licensed us to believe only 
tautologies would be highly reliable but 
have little power. How do we trade off 
power and reliability? Different believers 
will do it differently and so there will be 
different evidential systems. "There is no 
'correct' set of goals or 'correct' trade-off 
formula among them. "51 And so there is 
no "correct" evidential system, a system 
which would certify certain reasons as be-
ing genuinely good simpliciter. 



p 

What may we say to this relativist? The 
first thing to admit is that we have this pro-
found disagreement with him. We are us-
ing "good reasons" in a non-relativist 
sense, and understand them to be good ob-
jectively or absolutely. And we believe such 
anti relativism is shared by many in the 
critical thinking movement. Witness first of 
all the quotes from Ennis and Siegel about 
the goals of a critical thinking education 
which begin section one. In books and 
papers, most notably in Relativism Refuted, 
Siegel has attacked a great variety of 
relativist positions. When informal logicians 
present such criteria for logical cogency as 
acceptability of the-premises, their relevance 
to the conclusion, and their supporting it 
with adequate weight,52 they intend these 
to be genuine criteria for good arguments 
and so good reasons. They are not simply 
articulating their evidential system. Hence, 
we see this philosophical stance as not uni-
que to us, but one receiving significant sup-
port in the critical thinking movement. 

What can we say in reply to the 
epistemological relativist? We should first 
note that Field's object in [1982] is not to 
argue for epistemological relativism, but 
simply to articulate his view and to argue 
for its viability, "to make believable that 
it is a coherent and platable doctrine." 53 
Now epistemological relativism is not the 
received philosophical view, supported by 
a wide consensus in the philosophical com-
munity, the way a Kuhnian paradigm might 
be received in some scientific community. 
It is not part of philosophical common 
knowledge, nor is it self-evident. Nor can 
we "see" it in some other immediate way. 
Hence, we cannot say that there is a 
presumption for it, but rather that the 
burden of proof rests with the relativist to 
argue for his view. 

But it is precisely here that the relativist 
comes into significant difficulty. Should he 
accept the challenge and take up the burden 
of proof, on his own grounds he must first 
answer this question: With respect to whose 
evidential system will I justify epistem-

The Human Image System 35 

ological relativism-my own or my 
challengers'? If my challengers are anti-
relativists, is it likely that I can justify my 
relativism with respect to their evidential 
system? If my challengers are agnostic on 
the issue of epistemological relativism, 
again how likely is my justifying relativism 
on their system? Unless I know what my 
challengers' evidential system is, these 
questions are posed so abstractly as to be 
impossible of answering. But do I know 
what my challengers' evidential system E' 
is, as opposed to my system E? Is my best 
bet simply to argue for epistemological 
relativism by putting forth reasons good ac-
cording to my evidential system E and hop-
ing E is sufficiently congruent with E' that 
my challengers will accept my reasons as 
good reasons also? 

Let's assume the relativist takes this 
tack. Let's suppose he can produce a good 
case for his relativism from the point of 
view of E but not E'. His reasons are not 
counted good reasons by his challengers. 
Can he accept a burden of proof to show 
that E' should be modified in the direction 
of E, to make it more congruent with E? 
But then what evidential system should he 
adopt as a standard for this argument? It 
looks like we are at the beginning of an in-
finite regress here. Or are evidential systems 
beyond justification? Can we take up no 
challenges to our system? It is precisely here 
that we make contact with Siegel's critique 
of Field's position in [1987]. Siegel says 

The obvious question to be put to Field's 
brand of relativism is: can rival, incompat-
ible evidential systems themselves be non-
relatively or objectively or rationally 
evaluated? .. If rival, incompatible E's can-
not be non-relatively evaluated, then it is dif-
ficult to see how any belief, no matter how 
bizarre, can be ruled out or evaluated 
negatively, for some E which will sanction 
it could always be constructed ... The notion 
of epistemic justification will be not simply 
relativized, but trivialized; to say that a belief 
is justified will be not to praise it at all. 54 

But it is Field's very position that rival, 
incompatible E's can only be relatively 



36 James B. Freeman 

evaluated. True, it is open to the relativist 
on Field's account to say that one system 
is more reliable than another or more 
powerful than another, or has a different 
trade off between reliability and power than 
another. It is also open to the relativist to 
say that because of this, one system is bet-
ter than another. But-in Field's own 
words-' 'the evaluation of one evidential 
system as better than another is dependent 
on what characteristics we value in eviden-
tial systems, and different people may dif-
fer considerably in the characteristics they 
value. "55 So when a consistent relativist on 
Field's view says that one evidential system 
is better than another, he means only bet-
ter in realizing his values, "better in achiev-
ing certain goals ... and there is no 'correct' 
set of goals or 'correct' trade-off formula 
among them. "56 

If two relativists disagree on their 
epistemic goals, we should expect them to 
accept different evidential systems. Even if 
they agree on their epistemic goals, 
relativists might not accept the same eviden-
tial system. For to justify the claim that one 
evidential system better serves some 
epistemic value or goal than another, we 
must appeal to evidence, and such an ap-
peal presupposes an evidential system. So 
if two relativists agreed on their epistemic 
goals but disagreed on their current eviden-
tial systems, their evaluations of those 
systems (or of any others they might con-
sider) could be distinctly different. 

The upshot of these considerations is to 
see that Field's epistemological relativism 
ultimately renders rational discussants 
dialectically impotent,57 at least in many of 
the possible situations they might enter. If 
two persons are to settle some disagreement 
of opinion by an argumentative interchange, 
trying to get at the truth by a series of 
challenge and response exchanges, then 
there must be agreement in particular on 
what challenges and what responses ad-
vance the interchange toward its goal. That 
is, there must be agreement on an eviden-
tial system. Now one can imagine that the 

participants could simply adopt a common 
evidential system for the sake of further-
ing the discussion. But such a move is 
counter to the spirit of dialectic, where the 
participants are genuinely seeking to resolve 
a dispute. Would seeing that a claim were 
justified on the basis of certain evidence 
with respect to an evidential system one did 
not accept constitute much reason to accept 
that claim? Would seeing this provide a 
resolution of the question at issue? But 
Field's view leaves it quite open that 
disagreements of opinion could arise be-
tween persons with wildly differing 
epistemic values and wildly differing 
evidential systems. How could they enter 
into dialogue with one another in any ge-
nuine, non-artificial sense? 

Field might want to argue that this ex-
aggerates the potential differences between 
rational participants in a dialogue. For he 
holds that there are "intuitively desirable 
goals that we would like our evidential 
systems to satisfy," 58 that among them 
presumably is reliability. 59 If this be the 
case, then there might not be as much varie-
ty in actually held evidential systems as is 
logically possible. Participants in a rational 
discussion will presumably subscribe to cer-
tain of these intuitively desirable goals. 
Given this, resolution of disagreements 
might be more tractable than one would at 
first think. But talk about intuitively 
desirable goals is very problematic on 
Field's view. On what are these intuitions 
based? Is there anything epistemically nor-
mative in these intuitions? Are they simp-
ly a matter of taste? It is hard to see how 
one could regard them as normative and still 
be a strict relativist. If there is something 
normative in these intuitions, then we do 
have some epistemic standards independent 
of particular evidential systems. But if they 
are not normative, then is it not possible for 
someone simply to dismiss them as his 
epistemic goals? And so it is quite possible 
that epistemic goals and evidential systems 
can vary in the extreme. But if this be so, 
can there be genuine argumentative 



interchange between persons holding such 
differing goals and evidential systems? 
Can one person genuinely attempt to 
rationally convince another of the rightness 
of his view? If epistemic goals and 
evidential systems differ widely enough, 
then over a range of questions at least 
there can be no rationally resolvable 
agreement. 

We can give a very concrete example 
of this problem. Above we alleged that the 
burden of proof was on the epistemological 
relativist to argue for his relativism. But we 
could imagine an epistemological relativist 
refusing to admit that the burden of proof 
was on him., to justify, argue for 
epistemological relativism. For according 
to his evidential system, epistemological 
relativism needs no defense. His evidential 
system simply includes a principle specially 
certifying that epistemological relativism 
carries an undefeated presumption. Accord-
ing to his system, epistemological relativism 
is as sure as self-evident, in effect a basic 
axiom. Hence, he will not argue for his 
view because there is no need to argue for 
it on his evidential system, although he con-
cedes that others will take a different view 
of the matter. But he can only genuinely 
argue from his own pespective, not theirs. 
And so he is apparently incapable of enter-
ing into any genuine dialogue to resolve this 
disagreement over relativism. 

This reiterates that epistemological 
relativism leads to dialectical impotence. 
Epistemological relativism leads to the posi-
tion that where evidential systems differ, 
one may very well be incapable of convin-
cing others, of genuinely entering into 

The Human Image System 37 

dialogue with them. Is this not too high a 
price for relativism? We thus have a reply 
to those who would fault our account of the 
liabilities the image system poses for critical 
thinking. Our account does make a 
philosophically debatable presupposition, 
that there are good reasons. But we are not 
ashamed to claim that there are genuinely 
good reasons, reasons which are 
epistemically normative. The epistemo-
logical relativist alternative leads to dialec-
tical impotence. 

7. Summation 

We have now shown the importance of 
the human image system for the enterprise 
of thinking critically in the strong sense. 
Our account of the image system suggests 
that the natural human condition contains 
serious liabilities for critical thinking. One 
does not simply receive messages from the 
world, but messages which are filtered 
through an image system. This system serves 
egocentric needs and predisposes us to make 
prejudiced, uncritical judgments. However, 
there is reason to believe that this situation 
can be transcended through insight into the 
image system and its growth and dynamics. 
It is for these reasons that I commend studying 
the image system to those interested in 
strong sense critical thinking. By developing 
and further understanding these issues, in 
particular how the image system can be ap-
prehended and insight into its dynamics pro-
moted, we may make a contribution to 
developing critical thinking in the strong 
sense. 

Notes 

1 The original version of this paper was prepared 
for The Fourth International Conference on 
Critical Thinking and Educational Reform, 
Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Criti-
que, Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park, 
California, August 1986. We wish to thank an 
anonymous referee of Informal Logic for a 

number of valuable suggestions for strengthen-
ing this paper significantly. 

2 Ennis, [1988], p. 1. 

3 Siegel, [1985], p. 11. 

4 Siegel, [1985], p. 11. 



38 James B. Freeman 

5 This is as Prof. Siegel has amplified these ideas 
in [1988]. He also expresses this view in [1980], 
p.9. 

6 To the best of my knowledge, Paul introduced 
this concept of "critical thinking in the strong 
sense" in [1982]. He has developed the notion 
in numerous further papers. See [1985], [1987]. 
Paul presents a bibliography of previous work 
in [1987]. 

William Maker, working apparently in-
dependently of Paul, has presented a very 
similar view of critical thinking in [1982]. 
Maker sees the informal logic course as a uni-
quely apposite way of advancing certain cen-
tral objectives of teaching philosophy: "intellec-
tualliberation, " "the emancipation of thought 
from authoritarianism, unreflective orthodoxy 
and intolerance," training students "to 
recognize how assumptions, beliefs and pre-
judices ... guide and shape our thinking, our at-
titudes, and the ways in which we relate to the 
world, ourselves and to other individuals." 
([1982], p. 18) Over against this "natual" mode 
of thinking, the informal logic course can pre-
sent criteria of rationality which seek to foster 
and are justified by fostering freedom from 
"confusion, distortion, one-sidedness and 
aperspectivism." ([1982], p. 18) Aperspec-
tivism, what Paul means by egocentricity, is at 
basic enmity with the free, liberated thought 
Maker wants to foster. Aperspectivism takes its 
own viewpoint as self-evidently correct, refuses 
to accord any respect to differing points of view, 
and is ignorant of the need to justify viewpoints 
and of their conditioning by various social and 
personal forces. One's perspective is not just 
a perspective but the way things really are, and 
no one else has any right to differ from it. The 
goal of the informal logic course, as of 
philosophical instruction and liberal arts educa-
tion in general, is "intellectual emancipation 
from aperspectivism through critical and 
mutually constituted communicative under-
standing." ([1982], p. 19) 

7 Paul, [1982], p. 4. 

8 Paul, [1985], p. 11. 

9 Paul, [1982], p. 5. 

10 The first two sections of Stephen Toulmin's 
essay, "The Layout of Arguments," included 
in The Uses of Argument, [1958], give signifi-
cant insight into the structure of dialectical 
thinking. For our application and development 
of these notions, see [1985] and [19_]. 

11 See Boulding, [1956], especially Chapters I, IV, 
V, and XI. 

12 See Clevenger, [1966], Chapter Five, and 
Sproule, [1980], Chapter 7, especially pp. 
221-44. Although Clevenger discusses images, 
he does not mention Boulding by name. 

13 See Lippmann, [1922], especially Parts I and 
III. 

14 Boulding, [1956], pp. 47-48. 

15 Boulding distinguishes certain other aspects of 
the image system which, for our purposes here, 
we need not discuss. See [1956], pp. 48ff. 

16 Clevenger, [1966], p. 82. 

17 See Clevenger, [1966], pp. 82-83. 

18 Clevenger, [1966], p. 83. 

19 Sproule, [1980], pp. 222-25. 

20 Lippmann, [1922], p. 7. 

21 Lippmann, [1922], pp. 10-11. 

22 Lippmann, [1922], p. 81. 

23 Lippmann, [1922], p. 88, 89. 

24 Lippmann, [1922], pp. 81-82. 

25 See Sproule, [1980], pp. 221-22. 

26 Boulding, [1956], p. 6. By using the word 
"knowledge," Boulding does not mean to claim 
that the elements of each person's image are 
true or veridical representations of the world. 
Rather, they are what is believed true. 

27 Boulding, [1956], p. 64. 

28 Compare Katz, [1960]. See p. 21 of reprint. 

29 Lippmann, [1922], p. 96. 

30 Clevenger, [1966], p. 90. 

31 See Clevenger, [1966], p. 91. 

32 This illustrates the four types of selectivity 
fostered by the image system identified by 
Sproule in [1980], pp. 237-40: selective ex-
posure, selective recall, selective attention, and 
selective interpretation. 

33 Lippmann, [1922], p. 110. 

34 Lippmann, [1922], p. 95. 

35 For a discussion of how messages affect im-
ages, see Boulding, [1956], pp. 7-12, and 
Clevenger, [1966], pp. 93-98. 

36 Katz, [1960], in Beisecker and Parson, [1972], 
p.23. 



.. 

37 Binker and Charbonneau, [1983], p. 12. 

38 Lippmann, [1922], p. 16. 

39 Lippman, [1922], p. 90. 

40 Lippmann, [1922], pp. 90-91. 

41 Lippmann, [1922], p. 126. 

42 The problem of dealing with egocentricity has 
already been addressed by Binker and Charbon-
neau in [1983]. Their discussion contains at 
least one specific proposal for dealing with 
egocentricity which could be applied in ac-
complishing one of the pedagogical goals outlin-
ed in this section. We argue that just recogniz-
ing that we have an image system can be a way 
ofloosening its hold. Binker and Charbonneau 
point out that some images involve associations. 
Advertisers build images by building 
associations-coffees, gasolines, furniture are 
all given "personalities." We can identify these 
images by thinking of associations we and 
others make, and can begin to dissolve their 
power by considering whether judgments bas-
ed on these associations are justified. 

Harry P. Reeder in [1984] also addresses 
dealing with egocentricity and sociocentricity, 
indicating how certain rhetorical strategies can 
be helpful in opening the audience to consider-
ing other points of view. 

43 We wish to thank the anonymous referee of 
Informal Logic for this point in particular. 

44 See Katz, [1960], p. 31. 

45 Katz, [1960], p. 29. 

The Human Image System 39 

46 See Sproule, [1980], pp. 74-92 for a discussion 
of the various standards for criticizing 
arguments. 

47 In [1987], Harvey Siegel discusses many forms 
of epistemological relativism and indicates other 
types such as ethical. We shall make contact 
with Siegel's critique of this form of relativism 
shortly. 

48 Field, [1982], p. 563. 

49 Field, [1982], p. 563. 

50 Field, [1982], p. 564. 

51 Field, [1982], p. 566. 

52 These criteria are endorsed in texts by Govier 
[1985], Johnson and Blair [1977], and myself 
[1988]. At Conference 88 on Critical Think-
ing, Christopher Newport College, Newport 
News, VA, I sensed a growing consensus on 
these three criteria. 

53 Field, [1982], p. 562. 

54 Siegel, [1987], pp. 26, 27. 

55 Field, [1982], p. 565. 

56 Field, [1982], p. 566. 

57 Compare Siegel, [1987], pp. 20-21 for a discus-
sion of the impotence of relativism. 

58 Field, [1982], p. 566. 

59 Field, [1982], p. 564. "An epistemological 
relativist can want, and presumably will want, 
to bring his belief-forming behavior into accor-
dance with some reliable evidential system." 

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JAMES B. FREEMAN 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
HUNTER COLLEGE, CUNY 
695 PARK AVE. 
NEW YORK, NY 10021 D