INFORMAL LOGIC XU, Winter 1989 Abstracts of Papers Presented at The Third International Symposium on Informal Logic* Held at The University of Windsor, June 15-18, 1989 Jonathan Adler (Brooklyn, CUNY) "Self- Criticism with Continued Commitment. " The paper defends a seemingly non-controversial claim: Self-criticism of a position one holds is possible. My first task is to argue that there are a number of over-looked difficulties with self- criticism of a belief one holds. I then take up an argument that seeks to show that self- criticism of one's belief (without rejecting that belief) either amounts to a pallid fallibilism or is incoherent. I challenge this argument by showing that what is true in the argument depends upon problems in the formulation and expression of self-criticism with continued com- mitment (SCCC), but not with any real epistemic incoherence. Given that SCCC is coherent, it is next wondered why SCCC is rare, especially in our current atmosphere with its heightened consciousness of opposing views. A clue lies in the rejected argument: SCCC is prob- lematic to express. The reason is that it is a feature of our assertions that we implicitly claim that (a) we are wholly responsible for them and (b) our holding them is solely epistemically motivated. SCCC violates these assumptions. I then argue that these assumptions hold for the expression of SCCC, but we can easily recognize that they do not fully govern our beliefs and commitments. Even though strictly false, they generate powerful social expectations whose aim is to facilitate healthy dialogue and criticism. They contribute to the search for truth under normal conditions. But in our current situation of shrill, abnormal public discourse, they can work against us. Alasdair MacIntyre holds that the explanation for the shrillness of our moral debates lies in our reluctant recogni- *These abstracts were submitted by the authors, and were originally printed in the conference programme booklet. They are here presented in alphabetical order by the authors' last names. tion that there is no basis for our moral posi- tions. MacIntyre's explanation just assumes, wrongly, I argue, on the basis of our above reasoning, that our justificatory standards are proper. In the current situation, the expression of SCCC should be encouraged while recogniz- ing that it is all the more difficult. As a suggest- ion for future work, I observe the crucial role of SCCC in any account of rational change of belief. Derek Allen (Toronto) "Assessing Arguments. " It is agreed that a logically good argument has a sound inference. And it is stand- ardly held that an argument's inference is sound if and only if the argument's premise(s) and con- clusion are soundly connected. I shall challenge this view of inferential soundness on the ground that there are arguments whose premise(s) and conclusion are not soundly connected but whose inferences are nevertheless impeccable. I shall then propose an alternative criterion of inferen- tial soundness and evaluate it in the light of re- cent work in the theory of argument criticism. Maryann Ayim (Western Ontario) "Supportive Criticism. " In this paper, the author develops the view that the standard negatively critical ap- proach to argument analysis gives the wrong emphasis, and that a positive supportive ap- proach is more conducive to the achievement of both better understanding and better arguments. Analogies are drawn with ordinary discourse, and comparisons of gender trends evident in such language are made; the author uses these empirical findings in an attempt to illustrate and support her view that more valuable logical lessons are to be gleaned from the traditional speech patterns of females than males. Sharon Bailin (Manitoba) "Criticism as Creative. " This paper will argue that criticism .. has a creative dimension. It will demonstrate how this creative dimension is manifested in In- formal Logic and will explore the implications for pedagogy. The paper will begin with an exploration of the nature of creativity and how it relates to criticism. It will be argued that creativity in- volves the generation of results which are not only new but also of value and that such genera- tion is constrained by critical standards. Further- more, criticism necessarily involves the genera- tion of ideas and possibilities. Thus generation and criticism are closely tied together. The above analysis will then be applied to each of the areas which is the concern of Infor- mal Logic: the interpretation, the evaluation, and the construction of arguments. First it will be shown that interpretation has a creative dimension. Providing a faithful rendering of an argument involves filling in unstated premises and reconstructing the structure of the argument. This means generating possible meanings, an undertaking which clearly requires the imagina- tion. Yet in order to be a faithful interpretation, the possibilities generated must he constrained by various criteria and principles (eg. principle of charity). Thus the critical and the creative dimensions are both evident and closely intertwined. A creative aspect is also evident in the evaluation of arguments. Uncovering assump- tions, finding counterexamples and devising alternative explanations are all aspects of argu- ment evaluation which require invention con- strained by critical criteria. Moreover the critical assessment of debates regarding controversial issues in real situations generally involves comparing conflicting arguments and coming up with one's own view which synthesizes the soundest aspects of the various arguments under consideration. It in- volves constructing arguments and this is clearly a creative process. This analysis suggests the need to emphasize more strongly the creative dimensions to criticism in the teaching of Infor- mal Logic. What is necessary, in addition to the skills of argument analysis, is an understanding of the critical and creative nature of the develop- ment and assessment of knowledge. E.M. Barth (Groningen) "In the Service of Human Society: Formal, Informal. or Anti- JogicaJ?" So far as the formal-informal divide in logic goes, I say simply: there ought to be TISIL Abstracts 47 formal logic and there ought to be informal logic, and both ought to be attuned to human affairs. I do not see any incompatability between the two. However, I have the impression that in certain argumentation circles, especially in speech communication, there is not a mere anti- formal attitude. but an anti-logic attitude. The latter is much more serious and should not ex- ist unattended. The dialogically oriented philosophy of the Dutch philosopher and logician E.W. Beth (1908-1964) is one of the basic sources of argumentation theory in Europe (along with the work of Chaim Perelman, Louise Olbrechts- Tyteca, Arne Naess and Paul Lorenzen). By describing Beth's outlook on logic and the needs of humanity, I hope to influence your ideas about the less threatening formal/informal divide as well. Jonathan Berg (Haifa) . 'Inference and Explana- tion. " Inference and explanation can best be distinguished on the basis of the distinction be- tween acceptance and understanding. The two are confused not only because the language of each so resembles that of the other, but also because they so often (and so naturally) interact (even to the point of coinciding). An examina- tion of the many different ways in which they interact helps to clarify the distinction between them. Georg Brutian (Yerevan) "Logic and Argumentation. " It will be shown in the paper that the role of logic in argumentation is very important. There are different kinds of logic. and the problem-what kind of logic we use in the concrete case of argumentation-depends on the character of the field of argumentaiton. We differentiate three kinds of logic-formalized, formal and contental. The informal logic as well as dialectical logic are kinds of contental logic. They playa specific role in argumentation. Jerrold R. Coombs (British Columbia) . 'Infor- mal Logic in Teaching and Learning . .. This paper analyzes the role that competence in In- formal Logic, broadly conceived. plays in teaching responsibly. particularly when the teaching is directed toward developing moral understanding and competence in moral deliberation. The paper has three parts. Part one sketches the requirements of responsible teaching giving special attention to the re- 48 Informal Logic quirements for teaching morality. Part two con- siders the nature of the reasoning practices in- volved in teaching morality in a responsible manner. Part three discusses the ways in which we need to refine and extend our understanding of the practice of good reasoning in the pedagogical context if we are to develop educa- tional programs better suited to the task of help- ing teachers to acquire the intellectual and dispositional resources necessary for respons- ible teaching. Maurice A. Finocchiaro (Nevada-Las Vegas) "The Positive versus the Negative Evaluation of Arguments. " I should like to explore the question of whether there are significant dif- ferences between the positive and the negative evaluation of arguments, and if so, what is the nature and origin of these differences, and what are their implications (for theory, practice, and teaching). A central part of the paper would be a summary, analysis, and evaluation of Gerald Massey's thesis of asymmetry (in, for example, "Are there Good Arguments that Bad Arguments Are Bad?" and "The Fallacy Behind Fallacies"): here I should like to elaborate my hunch that there is something right about this thesis, and that its implications are favorable to the enterprise of informal logic, rather than un- favorable as he himself and many informallogi- cians think. Another part of the investigation would be to explore how Massey's asymmetry relates to the one I elaborated in my article on "Fallacies and the Evaluation of Reasoning". Alec Fisher (East Anglia) "Argument Analysis and Socratic Questioning. " Argument analysis is at the heart of informal logic. Whatever else the informal logician teaches, he or she characteristically studies already-presented arguments and analyses and critiques them. Socractic questioning is at the heart of critical thinking. What ever else the critical thinking teacher does, he or she characteristically em- phasizes the skills of Socratic questioning. But what counts as Socratic questioning, as distinct from any other kind of questioning? Many critical thinkers appear to regard argu- ment analysis as a mere "micro-skill", but in fact it determines which questions to ask in the course of Socratic questioning. Socratic quest- ioning is not just any questioning. Its questions are, "What is your main point/conclu- sion/recommendation, etc.?". "What is your reasoning/argument/evidence etc.?", "Are you assuming, presupposing, implying P etc.?", "What do you mean by that term, expression, claim etc.?", "Suppose P were true; would this be irrelevant to, strengthen, or weaken your argument etc.?". And these are the questions of argument analysis, so informal logic is at the heart of critical thinking. James B. Freeman (Hunter) 'The Place of In- formal Logic in Logic. " Logic has been defin- ed as the appraisal of reasoning or argument. We standardly carry out this appraisal by analyz- ing argument structure, asking critical question, and applying evaluative tools. One approach within informal logic proceeds also in this fashion. We analyze the structure of arguments by constructing diagrams displaying how their elements hang together. We then ask such critical questions as: Are the premises accept- able? Are they relevant to the conclusion? Do they support it with adequate weight? This ap- proach is associated with texts by Beardsley, Thomas, Johnson and Blair, Toulmin et a1., Nolt, Govier, and myself. Insofar as this ap- proach constitutes a viable way to appraise arguments, it is genuine logic. However, we may place it within the wider perspective of the logic enterprise by contrasting it in four ways with how logic has been done traditionally. First, this approach is generic rather than specific. The tools which it uses or seeks to develop are intended to be applicable to all arguments, not just those of a specific type. For example, we can construct a diagram of any argument, be it inductive or deductive. Tradi- tional logic, on the other hand, presents tools specific to one type of argument. We do not ap- ply Venn diagrams to evaluate arguments by analogy, nor do we compare categorical syllogisms for argument strength. Second, the structural analysis of this infor- mal logic approach is concerned with the macrostructure as opposed to the microstructure of arguments. Argument diagrams represent how argumentative elements hang together as wholes, not whether the component statements of arguments are conditionals, disjunctions, categorical propositions, or statements concern- ing instances of some generalization. Third, since the focus of informal logic is on arguments in natural language and natural argumentative contexts, this approach within in- formal logic will be concerned far more with arguments which seek evidence to rationally justify some claim than with those which seek to derive some conclusion from given premises. That is, it will be concerned far more with in- ductive, evidential, or probative issues than with deductive questions. Fourth, as a result of this, since we can argue with Rescher in Dialectics that probative ques- tions should properly be studied within the framework of dialectic or disputation, this ap- proach will be at bottom dialectical or dialogical rather than monological, the standard logical stance. By developing these four dichotomies, we intend to place this informal logic approach within the perspective of the logic enterprise in general. Trudy Govier (Calgary) "Are Arguments from Analogy a Distinct Species of Arguments?" In this paper I consider several types of arguments from analogy. I distinguish between inductive and a priori analogies, and discuss the issue as to whether arguments of these types should be recast as inductive or deductive arguments. I consider reasons against such recasting and then various objections to these reasons. After con- ceding that some of the reasons I've given elsewhere for regarding analogies as a distinct type of argument weren't exactly compelling, I move on to treat a number of examples. My conclusion is that despite some errors in my previous accounts, it still makes sense to think of arguments from analogy as a distinct type. Rob Grootendorst (Amsterdam) "What a Pragma-Dialectical Approach to Fallacies Can and Cannot Do. " In this paper the author com- pares the starting-points of the Amsterdam pragma-dialetical approach to fallacies with the so-called Standard Treatment and the approach to fallacies advocated by John Woods and Douglas Walton. He presents a survey of the main problems which can be solved by the Amsterdam approach and a list of the problems which remain to be solved. For solving them, cooperation is required between several disciplines. The author indicates along which lines such cooperation can lead to satisfactory solutions. David Hitchcock (McMaster) "A General Theory of Good Inference?" Formal systems developed in accordance with what Alonzo Church has christened the logistic method make TISIL Abstracts 49 explicit the conditions under which conclusions follow from premises in accordance with the (supposed) meaning of logical words such as "if" or "some". Soundness and completeness results for such systems indicate that we have adequate theories of good inference for such cases. Of the inferences we actually draw in our thinking and discourse, however, few are for- mally valid according to such systems. Rather than supposing that we usually do a poor job of drawing inferences, we should consider ex- panding our conception of good inference beyond that of formal deductive validity. John Hoaglund (Christopher Newport) "Why Analyze Arguments?" Why do we identify, analyze, and evaluate arguments as an activity central to informal logic? One rationale is perhaps more implicit than explicit in the work of argument theorists like David Hitchcock and fallacy theorists like Douglas Walton and John Woods. Essentially it is that we do so in order to turn informal arguments into formal ones because we have agreed-on tests of formal validity to test them. Or perhaps this should be less strongly stated so that we derive guidance on assessing these arguments from well developed formal logics such as the first -order pr"!dicate calculus. On this model we reconstruct arguments from 'the messy materials of every- day talk' (the phrase is Joseph Wenzel's) into formal ones to be assessed by the appropriate rules of inference and equivalence. Doubts about this rationale have been raised by Michael Scriven, who calls for a probative rather than a demonstrative logic, and van Eemeren and Grootendorst, who advocate a broader concep- tual framework of rules governing dialectical debate. I offer here not so much a rationale as a working out of a probative logic and dialectical exchange. We analyze and evaluate arguments so that the propositions we assent to and base our actions on are solidly based on evidence, or in other words to become critical thinkers. The aspect of critical thinking that comes to the fore in this connection is itself more implicit than worked out in the well known work of Benjamin Bloom and Robert H. Ennis. Critical thinking is autonomous in that it tests its own norms, and self-correcting in that it monitors its own com- pliance. The model pedagogy of critical think- ing is Socratic dialogue, where one speaker ad- 50 Informal Logic vances a thesis then gains a deeper appreciation of its foundation by responding to probing ques- tions about it by another. We learn to be critical of our own thinking by first learning what ques- tions to ask of the thinking of others. The final stage of this learning is when we internalize the Socratic critic and ask the same questions of our own thinking. So we analyze arguments to make our thinking autonomous, self-correcting, and hence critical. Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair (Windsor) "Informal Logic: Past and Pre- sent . .. "Informal Logic" refers to a reform movement in logic instruction and a reform movement in the normative theory of argu- ment, particularly as found in the academic discipline of philosophy. We have shown how for its first decade that reform was mainly in- itiated in textbooks. These novel texts stop- ped serving up invented examples to fit what was regarded as an a priori theory and began to offer advice to students about how to in- terpret and assess the actual practive of argumentation. Subsequently, it has been recognized that the quarrel was not with the theory itself, but with its misapplication by logic teachers. Meanwhile, attention has gradually turned, over the second decade of reform, to generating various components of normative theory of argument more ap- plicable to the actual practice of argumenta- tion. However, there has been no organized program of research, and indeed no unified conception of the task. In our paper, which will launch the Third Symposium, we return to the task we took up for the first and second symposia-a thorough review of the literature. We investigate (a) the textbooks, (b) the monographs, and (c) the journal articles, published between 1983 and 1988. We discuss any trends that exist, or the absence thereof, in the theory and teaching of developments. We comment on the presence, or absence, of patterns. And from our findings we draw lessons-suggest issues that deserve research, identify problems in theory, and discuss teaching. Erik C.W. Krabbe (Groningen) "Inconsis- tent Commitment and Commitment to Incon- sistencies. " Starting with Aristotle, the paper surveys several instances of horror contradic- tionis, including such seemingly inconsistency tolerant authors as Rescher and Brandom. The perspective is then shifted from inconsistent beliefs to inconsistencies in argumentation and dialogue. How should a system of dialectics rule about inconsistencies? Are they to be con- demned as fallacies? Or should they be con- sidered weaknesses in argument? Do they lead to quandaries in Hamblin's sense? It shall be argued that inconsistency is not a fallacy, i.e., it shouldn't be ruled out by stipulations about dialogue rules. Neither is inconsistency a foolproof indication of some weakness or blunder. However, the rules of dialogue should be framed so as to neutralize any quandarian leanings inherent in inconsis- tent positions. Often inconsistent statements can be isolated one from the other. But there are some problems. Tjark Kruiger (Amsterdam) ''The Evalua- tion of Subordin