From the Editors 

This issue on analogical reasoning is the 
first such special issue of Informal Logic 
devoted to a particular topic. The papers are 
evenly divided between the first three papers 
which are problem centred and the last three 
which are more historical in inspiration. 

In "By Parity of Reasoning," John 
Woods and Brent Hudak argue that 
arguments from analogy are arguments by 
parity of reasoning. They are arguments 
about arguments and hence meta-arguments 
which occur in what Woods and Hudak 
refer to as a stand-off. It follows from their 
analysis that the analogy relationship defin-
ed over arguments is symmetrical, which 
differentiates analogical arguments from 
other forms of analogical reasoning, e.g. 
analogical predication. 

Govier's paper, "Analogies and Miss-
ing Premises," was originally delivered at 
the Third International Symposium on In-
formal Logic (June 1989). In it she argues, 
following John Wisdom, that analogy is a 
distinct type of argument. Govier accepts 
Wisdom's and Stephen Barker's category 
of the inductive analogy and goes on to 
focus on the a priori or logical analogy. She 
tests her position on a series of examples 
and situates her account vis-a-vis others who 
have written on this matter. 

Fred Johnson's paper, "Analogical 
Arguings and Explainings," defends the 
thesis that many analogical arguments have 
a valid deductive structure which is not well-
accounted for by inductive (Mill), abductive 
[Peirce] or eductive (W.E. Johnson) formula-
tions. For him the essential structure of ana-
logical arguments contains a hidden condi-
tional, and this mode of analysis is superior 
to that of the inductive analysis of analogies. 

In "Two Traditions of Analogy," 
William Brown examines the traditions of 
the predictive analogy and the proportional 
analogy. Brown discusses how these two 
types of analogy have been used in various 
ways, and eventually links the predictive 
analogy to empiricism and the proportional 
analogy to idealism. 

Stephen Barker's paper, "Reasoning by 
Analogy in Hume's Dialogues," argues that 
Hume's work relies heavily on two different 
types of analogical reasoning, one of which 
is the non-inductive type of analogy first so 
called by Wisdom and discussed by Govier 
in her article. Barker agrees with Woods 
and Hudak that analogical arguments are 
meta-arguments. 

In "Beardsley's Theory of Analogy," 
Evelyn Barker investigates Monroe Beard-
sley's position on reasoning by analogy, 
claiming that his theory exemplifies over-
formalization in reducing diverse kinds of 
analogy arguments to a single form and then 
assessing them all as fallacious because of 
the logical characteristics of that form. This 
results in a "denaturalized epistemology" 
of analogical arguments, one with inap-
propriate concepts of knowledge, unrelated 
to reasoning techniques successfully 
employed in a range of actual situations. 

Looking ahead 

We remind readers that we have also an-
nounced a call for papers for an upcoming 
special issue on the Nicholas Rescher's con-
tribution to informal logic and argumenta-
tion. The deadline for submissions is 
January 5, 1991. 

The first number of Volume XII (1990) 
will follow at the end of August. All the 
papers for Volume XII have been accepted, 
so if subscription renewals arrive in time 
to permit us to pay our bills, we will publish 
XII.2 and XII.3 in the fall, and (we can 
scarcely believe it ourselves) at long last be 
up to date. During this catch-up period, we 
have been asking you, dear readers, to pay 
for more than one volume per calendar year. 
That is because you have been getting more 
than one volume per calendar year. Since 
current expenses must be paid out of cur-
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