Book Reviews 
Frans H. van Eemeren, Rob Grooten-
dorst and Tjark Kruiger: HANDBOOK 
OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A 
Critical Survey of Classical Backgrounds 
and Modern Studies. 

Dordrecht-Holiand/Providence, Rhode 
Island, Foris Publications, 1987. viii, 
333pp. US$22.90 ISBN 90 6765 330 6 

Review by JAMES B. FREEMAN, Hunter 
College of The City University of New 
York. 

This book should have significant in-
terest for many readers of Informal 
Logic. Recent developments, in par-
ticular the 1986 first International Con-
ference on Argumentation in Amster-
dam, indicate that scholars from many 
disciplines are actively investigating 
argumentation. A significant literature 
has developed over some years, much of 
it unfamiliar to North American 
philosophical audiences. What are the 
most significant contributions to this 
literature, who are its central figures, and 
with which problems in particular do 
these scholars deal? What work is rele-
vant to what problems? Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, and Kruiger's book is well 
titled, for it provides a guide to certain 
major contributions of philosophical in-
terest in this recent literature. It 
describes their work, while indicating 
the main issues of argumentation theory 
and its classical background. 

The authors begin by presenting their 
own understanding of argumentation 
and its theory. According to them, 
"Argumentation is a social, intellectual, 
verbal activity serving to justify or refute 
an opinion, consisting of a constellation 
of statements and directed towards ob-
taining the approbation [based on ra-
tional assessment] of the audience." (p.?) 
This not only defines "argumentation" 

Informal Logic 
IX.1 Winter 1987 

but delimits argumentation theory, 
which is concerned with developing 
criteria for the rational assessment of 
argumentation. The authors state that at 
present, no theory or approach 
dominates the field. Theories differ in 
their conception of rationality and in 
their particular aims. Most conceptions 
of rationality are normative/analytic 
although some are empirical. Besides 
developing these pOints, the authors 
present an overall model of argumenta-
tion and an elaboration of the basic 
premises of argumentation theory in 
their first chapter. 

The second chapter reviews three 
backgrounds to argumentation theory: 
classical logic, dialectic, and rhetoric; 
fallacy study; and modern formal logic. 
Coverage of the classical period reviews 
Aristotle's contribution together with 
later Roman rhetoric. Discussion of 
fallacy study again considers Aristotle's 
contribution along with many other 
common fallacies familiar from standard 
textbooks. The review of modern logic 
also summarizes familiar textbook 
material on truth functional proposi-
tional logic, with a brief look at some ad-
vanced topics. The authors in addition 
develop how the standard logician's 
treatment of argument form is the result 
of a number of levels of abstraction from 
the concrete situation of dialectical 
argumentative exchange. 

In Chapter Three, the authors turn to 
less familiar material: Arne Naess' 
analysis of discussions, Crawshay-
Williams' analysis of controversy, and 
Barth and Krabbe's formal dialectic. The 
Naess material concerns principally the 
issues of meaning and preciseness, and 
weighing the strength of argumentation 
for a thesis. Crawshay-Williams' con-
tribution centers on dimensions of 
meaning involved in disputes and their 
resolution. Barth's formal dialectics 



50 james B. Freeman 

presents rules which define the roles, 
proper moves, and overall conduct of 
proponent and opponent in a dialectical 
exchange. The authors also review her 
interesting and, I think, provative views 
in logical theory. 

The two most important recent con-
tributions to argumentation theory, in 
the authors' view, come from Toulmin 
and Perelman. They devote a chapter to 
each. In Chapter Four, they examine 
Toulmin's views on argument analysis 
and evaluation, including his well-
studied model and his conception of 
what is field dependent and field in-
variant, presented in The uses of Argu-
ment. The authors use the model both 
to analyse an argu ment and to review 
how the model has been extended in the 
literature. In Chapter Five, they examine 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's new 
rhetoric. For these authors, soundness 
of argu mentation is i ntu itively con-
nected with its persuasive effect. 
Argumentation theory systematically 
studies how to bring about "purposive, 
persuasive effects." This does not mean, 
however, that argumentation lacks any 
normative dimension. What gains the 
approval of the universal audience-the 
totality of reasonable or rational 
persons-is convincing as opposed to 
merely persuading. However, this 
universal audience is apparently 
speaker-relative, reflecti ng his or her 
idea of rationality. The authors then 
review Perelman and Olbrecht-Tyteca's 
account of the basic premises and 
argumentation moves (analogous to in-
ference rules) in argumentation, and use 
these concepts in argument analysis. 

To suggest that this Handbook is 
totally exposition and devoid of critical 
comment would be misleading. Both the 
chapters on Toulmin's model and on the 
new rhetoric end with sections of 
criticism. I n addition, the book closes 
with a chapter indicating how the 
various contributions surveyed fit 
together. This book might be adopted as 
a text in graduate courses focusing on 
the theory of informal logic or argumen-

tation. It is a useful reference work for 
anyone doing research in this area . D 

Irving Copi: INFORMAL LOGIC 

New York: Macmillan, 1987. xi, 354pp. 
Paper: US$22.50, CDN$32.50 ISBN 
0-02-324949-4 

Review by WA YNE GRENNAN, St. 
Mary's University 

Those who noted in the Macmillan 
catalogue a new text Informal Logic by 
the best-selling author of Introduction to 
Logic will be astonished and disap-
pointed by this recent publication. The 
publisher's blurb for the new text is 
quite different from that for Introduction 
to Logic (to be referred to here as ITL), 
suggesting that we will see a different ap-
proach. But roughly speaking, this is ITL 
(sixth edition) with Part Two ("Deduc-
tion") left out. Therefore, in this review 
I shall discuss only the more significant 
new material since the rest has been 
reviewed by reviewers of ITL in one or 
more if its many editions. * Most of the 
new material occurs in Chapters One 
and Three. 

Besides the new section on problem 
solving, the new material in Chapter 
One includes some new material on 
diagramming argument structure. The 
chapter is reasonably satisfactory for 
developing argument analysis skills but, 
as in ITL (6th ed.), it is merely grafted on-
to the material in earlier editions of ITL. 
Diagrams are not used outside the first 
chapter, not even in the chapter on 
fallacies. An instructor who wished to 
make diagramming a central technique 
in a course would be on his/her own in 
using this text. 

Section 1.6, entitled "Problem Solv-
ing", seems to this reviewer to have 
been included for marketing reasons. 
There is a discussion of some strategies 
for dealing with the type of puzzle found 
in Chapter One of ITL. The main strategy 



is the systematic elimination of 
possibilities using a grid for recording 
decisions. The techniques presented 
deal well enough with the highly ar-
tificial cases presented. As such they are 
probably helpful in solving problems on 
the LSAT or other professional school 
admission test. In defending inclusion of 
this section Copi says that "A useful kind 
of exercise to help strengthen one's 
problem-solving abilities is the logical 
puzzle, or 'brain-teaser' " (p. 58). At the 
end of the section, though, he includes 
a paragraph describing a number of im-
portant respects in which "real problems 
in the real world" differ from the ex-
amples presented. To my mind, the 
paragraph nicely refutes the above 
claim. The issue is the extent to which 
skill in solving such artificial problems 
transfers over to real-life problems. I 
suspect the skills required are too dif-
ferent because the problems are too 
different. 

Chapter Three is the same chapter 
from ITL on informal fallacies, expand-
ed somewhat and with a new section on 
formal fallacies that, in my opinion is too 
slight to be useful. Indeed, it would have 
been better to leave it out because, aher 
discussing Affirming the Consequent 
and Denying the Antecedent, he 
presents examples that are supposed to 
show that arguments of these forms can 
sometimes be formally valid. The ex-
amples are not adequate to show this 
because in each case the conditional 
premiss is logically redundant, but the 
main point is that students will be 
seriously confused. 

Professor Copi's publisher, Mac-
millan (New York), has brought 
marketing cyniCism (perhaps we ought 
to say chutzpah) to new heights in 
representing this as a new text. Granted, 
they do alert the reader (or at least one 
who reads the copyright page) that "a 
portion of this book is reprinted from In-
troduction to Logic, Sixth edition ... /I (my 
stress). This caveat is a gross u nderstate-
ment. A close comparison reveals that 
about 85% comes from ITL! 

This text will appeal to those who 

Copi's Informal Logic 51 

presently use ITL but do not cover Part 
Two of it. Their students will appreciate 
the lower price and lesser bulk. There 
are many exercises to work on. For those 
looking for new techniques the text has 
nothing to recommend it. 

*[Editors' Note: Ronald Roblin reviewed 
Copi's Introduction to Logic (6th edition) 
in Informal Logic IV.3 (July) 1983, pp . 
12-13.] 0