reply VIII.1, Winter 1986 Informal Logic Deep Disagreement and Informal logic: No Cause for Alarm ANDREW LUGG In a recent paper in this journal,[1] Robert Fogelin argues that "there are disagreements, sometimes on impor- tant issues, which by their nature, are not subject to rational resolution"(p.7). Contrary to the view of many partisans of informal logic, he maintains that in certain cases (specifically, in cases of what he calls deep disagreement) argu- ment is pointless and non rational per- suasion the only alternative. In his view, deep disagreement precludes "argumentative exchange" since "to the extent that the argumentative con- text becomes less normal, argument, to that extent, becomes impossible"(p.4). Indeed, for Fogelin, "the language of argumentation, including the language of argumentative assessment, has its primary application in the context of normal or near normal argumentative exchanges"(p.3). Fogelin explains the contrast bet- ween ordinary and deep disagreement in terms of whether or not the partici- pants share sufficiently broad back- ground of commitments to engage in genuine argument. Whereas in the nor- mal course of events individuals agree concerning what is needed to settle the issues between them, in the case of deep disagreements, the required con- sensus about how to proceed is un- available. Since "arguing, i.e., enga- ging in argumentative exchange, pre- supposes a background of shared com- mitments" (p. 3), individuals who dif- fer fundamentally are bound to talk past one another. As Fogelin puts the point, in the case of deep disagree- ment, "the language of argument may University of Ottawa persist, but it becomes pointless since it makes an appeal to something that does not exist: a shared background of be- liefs and preferences"(p. 5). In arguing this view, Fogelin takes it for granted that individuals who share sufficient commitments to engage in genuine argument also share sufficient commitments to forge a mutually ac- ceptable point of view. But presumably the interesting case is the one in which individuals are able to argue yet unable to settle their differences, i.e., the case in which there exists a framework for disagreement but not one for bringing about its resolution. It is not a strike against informal logic that it does not possess the resources for resolving the irresolvable, still less that the language of argument cannot always be applied. What makes disagreements interest- ingly deep is not that the parties to them talk at cross-purposes but rather that they differ even though they share a rich body of commitments (possibly including even views about what is required to settle the issues between them).[2] Certainly, the examples that Fogelin gives of deep disagreement-the abor- tion and reverse discrimination debates - are cases in which the "language of argument" is entirely appropriate. True, the parties to these debates have had little success in convincing one ano- ther to change their views, but it can hardly be denied that they have been engaged in argument (some of it at an exceptionally high level). What makes these and similar cases interesting for proponents of informal logic is not that 48 Andrew Lugg the parties fail to agree concerning the prerequisites for genuine argument but their agreement with respect to these prerequisites is insufficient to settle the issues that separate them. Indeed, it is plausibly argued that debates about abortion, reverse discrimination and the like are especially important preci- sely because they occur within exten- sive frameworks of shared beliefs and preferences. In response to this view of deep disa- greement (which I take to capture the spirit of Fogelin's position), it is temp- ting to argue that it is a requirement of rational argument that controversial as- sumptions be treated as conclusions to be argued for rather than as premises to be accepted. On this view, indivi- duals involved in deep disagreements, no less than those involved in "normal argumentative exchanges", should al- ways suspend judgement concerning the questions at issue and attempt to determine which if any of their views can be justified given the shared com- mitments underlying their arguments. Such a view, however, fails to take into account the depth of the resources a- vailable to those engaged in deep disa- greement. As Fogelin observes, "when we inquire into the source of a deep di- sagreement, we do not simply find iso- lated propositions ... , but instead a who- le system of mutually supporting propo- sitions (and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking)"(pp. 5-6). Nonetheless, it is one thing to main- tain that individuals may find themsel- ves in the situation of being unable to resolve their differences on the basis of shared commitments, quite another to conclude that in such cases argument is pointless and non rational persuasion unavoidable. Questioning the effective- ness of the strategy of reverting to neutral territory is not at all the same thing as questioning the possibility of rational discussion. Reason may not be sufficient to decide a particular issue here and now but it may still contribute significantly to its resolution later on. While it is undoubtedly true that deep disagreements cannot be immediately resolved by "normal critici sm", it is not at all obvious that they can never be resolved this way, nor even that normal argumentative exchange can never ha- ve an effect.[3] To put the point another way, indivi- duals who disagree deeply may still be able to narrow the distance between themselves by dint of argument, deba- te; inquiry and research. The strategy of reverting to neutral ground is only one strategy among many. Individuals can also bring about a shift in one ano- ther's allegiances by demonstrating hidden strengths of their own views and by eliciting hidden weaknesses of alter- native views. Furthermore, they may find themselves having to shift ground as a result of their discovering things wrong with the views that they accept and things right with the ones that they reject. What we would expect to find is what we in fact find-the development and defense of the various views under discussion along with the gradual for- mation of consensus.[4] Of course, there is no guarantee that agreement will always be achieved by argumenta- tive exchange, but this is hardly a rea- son for not making an effort. Consider the case of reverse discri- mination. Like Fogelin, I see no way in which the clash of viewpoints concer- ning this issue can be satisfactorily re- solved at present, yet I would also insist that it is possible and perhaps even li- kely that it will be resolvable in the fu- ture. Even granting that the debate re- duces to a fundamental clash of views concerning the cogency of appeals to the rights of groups (as Fogelin plausi- bly argues), there remains the possibili- ty of settling the issue one way or the other by mounting arguments that are neutral with regard to the question of group rights. The fact that quotas are inimical to fairness and justice unachie- vable without them may well be what has stymied the debate up to now, but this hardly precludes the two sides ne- gotiating a position that they can live with at least temporarily. Indeed, it is not implausible to argue that recent de- bates concerning this issue have resul- ted in a noticeable shift towards such an "equilibrium position". What I am suggesting is that we take common viewpoints to be what indivi- duals move towards rather than what they fall back to. Instead of thinking of shared belief as a "common court of ap- peal", we should think of it as a product of discussion, argument and debate. When we engage in argumentative ex- change, our aim is not to determine what we and our opponents can agree on given the information that we share but to derive a common position, to fi- gure out what we should believe, to as- certain the correct view of the matter. What we happen to agree on is impor- tant because it provides a starting point for discussion between us, not because it dictates what the outcome of our dis- cussion should be. Except for the relati- vely trivial case of "normal exchange", differences of opinion are not resolved on the basis of shared assumptions; ra- ther shared assumptions are obtained as a result of differences being resol- ved. When thinking about debates among individuals, it is helpful to recall John Dewey's conception of deliberation as involving a "dramatic rehearsal" in im- agination of competing possibilities.[5] In debate no less than in deliberation, ideas are disentangled, coordinated and systematized, reasons are marshal- led, suspect assumptions are isolated, alternative proposals are reviewed, and conflicting demands are negotiated. Furthermore, the parties to disagree- ments find themselves having to modi- fy, revise, supplement and renounce views when debating just as they find themselves being driven from point to point by the internal dynamics of their deliberations. The only difference bet- ween the two sorts of inquiry is that in debates the various approaches that individuals explore on their own are ta- ken up and defended by others. Inter- nal reflection gives way to external de- bate, and private discussion is transfer- red to the public arena. It might be argued that were these observations spelled out in detail, they would be seen to presuppose a concep- tion of public deliberation that is to all intents and purposes identical to Foge- Deep Disagreement 49 lin's conception of normal argumenta- tive exchange based on shared assump- tions. But why think this? It is not being assumed that individuals genuinely en- gaged in debate can always force a de- cision one way or the other. Nor, more importantly, is it being claimed that they confine themselves to considera- tions that are as acceptable to their op- ponents as to themselves.[6] In fact, the more details we introduce concer- ning the criticisms that individuals urge in the course of discussions and the ways in which they rework their posi- tions, the more reasonable the picture of their reasoning their way to a com- mon position becomes. An account of the resolution of disagreements in terms of informal debates may well leave a lot unsaid, but it should not be dismissed as being vague, deceptive or merely metaphorical. Furthermore, it would be inappropri- ate to complain that debates are ratio- nal only insofar as they conform to ge- neral logical principles. Logical consi- derations do certainly play an important role in debate (along with many other kinds of factual and conceptual conside- rations). But it is surely implausible to suppose that debates are governed by logical principles. For one thing, logic does not determine whether conclu- sions should be accepted or premises rejected; and for another, it provides no guidance concerning the appropriate- ness of continuing to defend a point of view, repudiating it or setting it aside pending further investigation. If a mo- del of debate is needed, we would be well advised to stop thinking of it as being subject to rule and instead think of it as a capacity that we exercise to a greater or lesser degree and more or less well, i.e., as a practice on a par with speaking a language, riding a bi- cycle and painting a picture.[7] These observations accord well with Fogelin's views about the inadequacy of traditional accounts of argument in terms of logical principles. I certainly do not mean to be understood as ques- tioning his criticism of treatments of in- formal logic as second-rate formal logic (p. 1) or as countering his insistence on 50 Andrew Lugg the fact that" an argument is produced by arguing", i.e., that it is "something that people do" as opposed to a "struc- ture on propositions" (p. 2). Quite the opposite: my main contention is that these points need to be taken more se- riously than informal logicians, Fogelin included, usually take them. As I see it, deep disagreement poses a serious pro- blem only when the activity of deriving conclusions is "depsychologized" and reasoning is seen to be a matter of ap- plying general logical principles. When we regard reasoning, thought, delibe- ration and the like as practices, we avoid the awkward assumption that ar- gumentative exchanges must be always either normal (and hence rational) or nonrational (because abnorma~).[8]. Thus, I find myself rejecting the di- lemma with which Fogelin closes his paper. Were deep disagreements al- ways rationally unresolvable, we would indeed be obliged either to own up and acknowledge the fact or to dissemble and attempt to keep it hidden from the general public. However, if what I have been arguing is correct, this difficulty need not concern us. For once we reject the assimilation of argument to "struc- tures of propositions", the resolvability of disagreement no longer stands and falls with the existence of shared proce- dures for its resolution and the proprie- ty of persuasion no more poses a prob- lem for disputes about fundamentals than it does for routine differences of opinion. It may well be true that deep disagreements pose formidable practi- cal difficulties, but why think that they must also be impervious to reason and antithetical to resolution by rational ar- gumentative exchange? Notes [1] R. Fogelin, "The Logic of Deep Disagreements", Informal Logic, VII. 1, pp. 1-8. All page references in the text are to this paper. [2] Fogelin develops the thesis that argument fails in cases of deep dis- agreement with reference to Witt- genstein's remarks in On Certainty. This is helpful since it brings out the point that deep disagreements reflect fundamental differences of opinion. But it is also misleading since the kinds of disagreement of interest to Fogelin are far more prosaic than those of interest to Wittgenstein. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein is concerned with the status of claims (such as Moore's insistence that he has two hands) that it makes no sense to deny; he does not purport to be clarifying the status of claims that are open to reasonable doubt. In this regard, it should also be noted that Fogelin himself allows that "even with deep disagreement, people can argue well or badly" (p. 7). [3] Compare this with Fogelin's view that "it is characteri stic of deep disagreements that they persist even when normal criticisms have been answered" (p. 5). [4] For examples of converging points of view, see W. Whewell, "On the Transformation of Hypotheses in the History of Science" in R.E. Butts (ed.), William Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method, Uni- versity of Pittsburgh Press, Pitts- burgh, 1968. One might dispute Whewell's history but he is surely right to suppose that debates may conclude with the views under dis- cussion having "passed into one another" (p. 261). [5] J. Dewey, Human Nature and Con- duct, Modern Library, New York, 1930, p. 190. See also the discus- sion of deliberation in my "The Process of Discovery", Philosophy of Science, 52 (1985), pp. 207-220, especially section IV. [6] Here it is important to note that the strategy of reverti ng to common ground clashes with the method- ological pri nci pie of total i nforma- tion, i.e., the obi igation that we have to take into account all the in- formation that we deem to be rele- vant to the issues at hand. It is a mistake to suppose, as is often done, that standing one's ground is tantamount to begging the ques- tion. One commits this fallacy when one responds to criticism by re- hearsing considerations that have already been challenged; one does not commit it when one introduces new reasons (even though these may be subsequently challenged). [7] I take this suggestion to be in closer accord with Wittgenstein's later philosophy than the view that Fogelin elicits from On Certainty. In my view, Wittgenstein's point is not that rational procedures are re- lative to "framework principles" (which is what Fogelin's quota- Deep Disagreement 51 tions from On Certainty seem to suggest) but rather-to put it very roughly-that intellection is better thought of in terms of skills than in terms or rules. [8] Might not the name "informal logic" be part of the problem? If "logic" were reserved for the theory of validity and "reasoning" used to cover the kinds of issues normally discussed under the rubric of informal logic, the idea of "prin- ciples of argument" would prob- ably seem far less attractive. Prof. Andrew lugg, Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa, 65 Hastey, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6N5 0