,-, as: .... • nse f . ',(1 j inforl~lal ISSN 0226-1448 logic newsletter newsletter newsletter newsletter University ot Windsor vol. iii, no. 1 eds., J. Anthony Blair & Ralph H. Johnson October, 1980 contents RESPONSES Addessing Arguments; Khat Range of Standards? Trudy Govier ......•....•...•...... 2 Deductively-Inductively Fred Johnson •••••••••••••••••••••• 4 Deductive-Inductive: Reply to Criticisms Samuel D. Fohr •••••••••••••••••••• 5 Good Grief! More on Induction/Deduction Perry Weddle •••••••••••••••••••••• 10 DISCUSSION NOTE Proofs and Begging the Question Milton H .• Snoeyenbos •.•••••••••••• 13 ANALYSIS OF EXAMPLES Pomerantz on Hardin •••••••••••••••..• 14 CHESTNUTS & PARADIGMS Horace's Slippery Slope Robert W. Binkley ••••••••••••••••• 16 ANNOUNCEMENTS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 17 CONFERENCE REPORTS •••••••••••••••••••••• 18 BOOKS RECEIVED ••••••••••••.••••••••••••• 19 JOURNAL CONTENTS •••••••••••••••••••••••• 21 NOV LT190D from the editors The bulk of this issue is taken up with responses to papers written on the inductive- deductive distinction which appeared in ILN, ii.2 and ii.3. This has Deen a livelyeX=- change, and although it would appear that no one taking part has changed her or his pas! tion appreciably, there is no doubt that many of the underlying issues have Deen brought to the surface. Although we do not wish to Decome known as the "Deductive~ Inductive Newsletter", we will continue to consider responses and articles on this issue, particularly if they break new ground in the dispute. We would like to draw readers' attention to the announcement of "The New Logic Course" program at the APA Western Division meetings Subscriptions: $4 to individuals, $8 to institut~ons, annually, payable to: Informal Logic Newsletter. All subscriptions begin with the early Fall number 1 late subscribers receive the year's back issues. Otherwise, back issues are $1.50 each, $5 per complete volume to individuals1 and $2.50 each, $9 per complete volume to institutions. Published a minimum of three times a year, normally in early Fall, early Winter and Spring, with supplementary issues appearing from time to time. Published by the editors. Address: Subscription and advertising communIcations to: Professor Peter F. Wilkinson, Managing Editor-- Manuscripts and other editorial communications to: The Editors--Informal Logic Newsletter, Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, Canada N9B 3P 4. coming up in Milwaukee on April 23-25, 1981. We heartily congratulate the Western Confer- ence on the Teaching of Philosophy for or- ganizing this program, and hope that many of our readers will attend. We also applaud the initiative that Teaching PhilOSOPh! and its editor Arnold Wilson have taken n offering a $200 prize and publication in that journal as incentives for writing papers on teaching informal logic and practical reasoning for the APA "The New Logic Course" program. Contributors to the Informal Liiic Newsletter who have sent us course out ~nes may well want to write their teaching ideas up and submit them. Remember the December 15 deadline. A new feature, "Chestnuts and Paradigms" is launched with this issue. We hope scholars among our readers will send us more goodies for this larder in the future. As the ILN moves toward a newsletter-cum- journal, we hope that reader~ will remember that our initial objective of serving as a clearing house for ideas, notices, news, announcements of interest to people teaching informal logic courses remains central. This is you: mouthpiece, your notice-board. Please cont~nue to feel free to send us any and all material you would like to share with others. The sense of isolation, of working alone in the dark, which so many of us felt while we were teaching informal logic/criti- cal reasoning courses a few years ago, has to some extent lifted. The devotion of part of an APA program to informal logic indicates that things have begun to change; our subject is becoming respectable. May this augur a more self-confident and vigorous exchange of ideas in these columns. . . Ralph H. Johnson continues to serve as co- editor while on sabbatical this year (1980- 81). West coast (North American) readers may be interested to know that he is located in Los Angeles, and can contact him directly at 2553 Tanoble Drive, Altadena, California 91001 (213-791-3519). ~ s~ecial thanks for assistance in the produc- t~on and distribution of this issue of ILN to: Violet Smith, our stellar typist; --- Jerome V. Brown and June Blair for production assis·tance; Irene Antaya and Peter F. Wilkinson for doing the mailing. 2 responses The "inductive-deductive" debate continues unabated in this issue. David Hitchcock.ts article in ILN, ii.3 sparked a response from Trudy Govier:-in which. she argues further that deductive standards and inductive stan- dards do not exhaust the standards of argu- ment. Fred Johnson reacts also to Hitchcock, but mainly to Sam Fohr's article in ILN, ii.2; Johnson suggests we should tal~out inductive and deductive arguings, not argu- ments. Fohr himself has a response to the criticisms by Hitch.cock and Govier of his original piece in ILN, ii.2, as well as some comments on Fred Jonnson's suggestions; Fohr remains convinced that the inductive argument vs. deductive argument distinction is sound and exhaustive, and that his way of characterizing it is correct. Finally--so far as this issue goes, at any rate--Perry Weddle, who began the exchange with his article in ILN, ii.l, responds to Hitchcock (ILN, ii. 3) ;-Fohr CILN, ii. 2), and Govier (!LN, ii. 3); and Wedare hasn't much changed hra-mind, either. Is that clear? Asses~i~ Argu- rnents:What Range of Standards? Trudy Govier Trent University David Hitchcock, following Brian Skyrrns, defends the inductive-deductive dichotomy by taking it to be a dichotomy' of standards, rather than an exhaustive division of argu- ments into two basic types. l He says that in deductive logic, we have a theory of the circumstances in which premises do or do not make it logically impossible for a conclusion to be false. And in inductive logic, we have a th.eory of the circumstances "in which an argument is inductively strong or inductively weak--that is, in which it is more or less probable that its conclusion is true, given that its premise(s) are true." within each theory there are various types of logic: in deductive logic we have the logic of truth- functional sentence connectives, first-order quantifiers, the logic of identity ... ; and within inductive logic we have "the logiC of f ,. th~ poi thE tel lo~ cal baJ ar~ C bet to goe "ty inc not the it ded twe eas out abl the num tic rea log tha are the 1 wit dil of vie the pre and ass asl< mal< imI= the ask mak ble sta T use the fer are pro the abl rea gro mak its thi thi Pro pot are ica con pre Arg fou men log the pla men typ