If a person dislikes someone else it's 
lLkely that he will want to have nothing to 
do. not only with him, but also with the sorts 
of things that the other person likes. For 
example if Jones dislikes Smith and Smith 
sports a moustache and likes to wear tweed 
'ackets, chances are that Jones will avoid 
~weed jackets and moustaches. Not only will 
people distance themselves from the sorts of 
th~ngs their enemies like they will also dis-
tance themselves from their thoughts and ideas. 
If 3mith is in favour of capital punishment 
for murder and a champion of free enterprise, 
chances are that Jones will be opposed to 
cap~tal punishment and to free enterprise. 

The same is also true of groups. Fascists 
were inclined to wear black shirts and cut 
their hair short while Communists were in-
cl~ned to wear red shirts, or at least red 
t~es, and grow their hair long. And again, 
not only will members of one group want to 
disassociate themselves from the accoutrements 
and trapp~ngs of the group they dislike, they 
will also want to disassociate themselves from 
thoughts and ideas of the group they dislike. 

'~'s here, I think, that we find the legiti-
mate source of the ad hominem fallacy. A says 
to B, "Don't buy a Lada because that's the 
sort of car the Communists produce and drive". 
But he also says, "Don't accept that fluori-
dation of the drinking water reduces tooth 
decay because that is a belief the Communists 
hold" . Tha.t is to say, A treats beliefs as 
though they were like clothes and instead of 
saying something like, "Don't wear X because 
that's what the Communists wear" he-says, 
"Don't hold Y because that's what the Commu-
nists hold". But this is of course clearly 
fallacious. Beliefs should be held or dis-
missed not on the basis of whether we like the 
people who hold them or not but on the grounds 
of whether they are true or false. If there 
~s overwhelming statistical evidence to show 
that fluoridation of the drinking water re-
duces tooth decay then we have grounds for 
accepting such a belief. 

fhe same point can be made about the ad 
verecundiam fallacy. As well as there being 
people in this world whom others dislike there 
are also people whom they admire. Not only do 
they want to be close to these people but they 
also want to wear the sorts of clothes that 
they wear, eat the sorts of food that they eat 
and do the sorts of things that they do. As 
well as all this they also want to hold the 
beliefs that they hold. For example if A is a 
great admirer of George Bernard Shaw he might 
decide to accept the belief that meat is in-
Jurious to the health because he believes that 
Shaw held that meat was injurious to the 
health. And again such reasoning (in so far 
~s there is any) is clearly fallacious. A 
could only legitimately, in this context, 
accept that meat is injurious to human health 
if he is prepared to accept that G. B. Shaw 
was an authority on dietary matters. 

To conclude, many people have unwittingly 
felt what makes, or could make, ad hominem and 
ad verecundiam arguments fallaciOUs is that 
they involve a move from statements about 
statements to statements about things. How-
ever, there is no room for fallacy here since 
statements about statements can entail state-
ments about things. The source of the falla-

11 
ciousness that may be involved in such argu-
ments is to be found in the fact that people 
are inclined to consider thoughts and ideas as 
being like personal possessions. And since 
many people want to distance themselves from 
the personal posseSSions of those they dislike 
and surround themselves with possessions simi-
lar to the possessions of those that they 
admire, they also want to distance themselves 
from the beliefs (any belief) of those they 
dislike and accept the beliefs of those they 
admire. And of course if anyone were to ig-
nore or accept a belief for this sort of rea-
son he would be reasoning (to the extent that 
he could be said to be reasoning) fallaciously . 

FOOTNOTE 

II.M. Copi, Introduction to Logic (5th 
ed.), f.1acmillan, p. 90. 

Part/Whole 
Fallacies 

Nelson Pole 
Cleveland State University 

... 'Co 
~" 

CompOSition/Division are the best known of 
the part/whole fallacies but there is a grow-
ing list of others which deserve special at-
tention. A few years ago Howard Kahane noted 
that most examples of compOSition/division 
found in texts were contrived. He went on to 
suspect that people did not in fact commit 
such fallacies. I took him to task in pri-
vate communication and he conceded only to 
the point of including one of my examples, 
the salesman's fallacy, in the third edition 
of his book Lo~ic and Philosophy. The purpose 
of this study ~s to make the case for there 
being a virtual epidemic of part/whole fal-
lacies being perpetrated upon an unsuspecting 
public. In what follows I will catalog a . 
variety of arguments which, like the sales-
man's fallacy, are special applications of 
the more general category: composition/ 
division. In addition, I will argue for a 
third kind of part/whole fallacy which is 
neither a species of composition nor one of 
division. 

The fallacy of composition occurs when prop-
erties which do belong to the parts of a whole 
are illicitly attributed to the whole. A 
classroom example occurs in the inference that 
since each person on an elevator weighs less 
than 500 pounds that the total weight of the 
elevator load is less than 500 pounds. (Here 
Kahane is correct--no one in their right mind 
would make this inference.) A more convinCing 
example, at least to the unwary, is this: 
since I like each ingredient in a dish then I 



will like the dish itself. I may like both 
sardines and ice cream but readily refuse a 
sardine sundae! The fallacy of division com-
mits the inverse error. Here a property 
which does belong to the whole is mistakenly 
attributed to each part of the whole. The 
classical example is that since buffalo are 
growing extinct so are the ones in the zoo. 
What is true of the whole, the species of 
buffalo, is thereby true of the parts, each 
individual buffalo. A more convincing example 
occurs in this inference: since I want to 
study with the best philosophers in North 
America, I am going to attend the best univer-
sity in North America. Of course the most 
sound academic university may not have the 
most sound philosophy department. The contra-
positive inference occurs widely. Since I do 
not wish to study with second rate scholars I 
am not going to attend a second rate univer-
sity--only one of the finest schools will do. 
Of course, scholars of the first rank may be 
found at schools not in the first rank; for 
example, the Nobel prize winning economist 
Herbert Simon teaches at Carnegie Mellon 
University. 

In both of these aforementioned cases the 
illicit move is made to or from the whole and 
all of its parts. A third type of part/whole 
fallacy occurs when the move is to or from 
the whole and one of its parts. I have dubbed 
this general class the CAMEL'S BACK FALLACY 
(CBF) after the well known fable of the straw 
that broke the camel's back. In the story it 
was the last straw added to the load that was 
blamed rather than the whole load itself. 
Another appropriate name for the fallacy 
would be the last straw fallac~but I have 
rejected this option for fear at students 
would confuse it with the straw man fallacy. 
It is important to see that the mistake in 
the CBF is not one of composition. To commit 
a composition it is necessary to infer from 
the fact that each part has a property to the 
conclusion tha~e whole has that property. 
In the CBF it is one part which is the center 
of attention. Nor is the mistake one of divi-
sion, for similar reasons. Yet it is a mis-
take about parts and wholes since a property 
of a whole, the load of straw, is mistakenly 
attributed to a part, the last piece that is 
added. 

Why not just call this an example of P?st 
hoc, propter hoc and not worry about hav~ng 
to invent a new category of fallacy? The 
problem here is not that we have put the 
blame on the wrong event at the level of event 
where placing a pi 7ce of straw-rsaneven~ 
Atthat level we w~ll never findthe proper 
cause, for the cause occurs at an entirely 
different level. The cause occurs at the 
level where placing a load of straw is an 
event rather than at the level where placing 
a piece of straw is an event. The cause occurs 
at the level of wholes rather than at the 
level of parts, thus we do have a part/whole 
fallacy. Since the fallacy is part/whole but 
neither composition nor division we have need 
of a third category. This is the camel's 
back fallacy. 

Let us start with a species of the CBF. It 
is the FLUNKING STUDENT'S FALLACY. This oc-
curs on the part of the student who argues 
for a better grade on the ground that if he 
(or she) does not get it then he will flunk 

12 
out of school (bringing even further dire 
consequences upon himself). The cause of 
flunking out of school is not the last grade 
received but rather the whole collection of 
grades which the student has received. The 
last grade, like the last straw, is merely 
taking the blame for what is rather the re-
sponsibility of the whole of which it is but 
a single part. The instructor, by changing 
the part, the last grade, can change the 
whole and thereby keep the student from 
flunking out, just as the camel driver can 
protect the camel by not placing the last 
straw. But still it is the total academic 
record and not the last grade which is the 
cause. 

Shifting perspective between parts and 
wholes is a common way of seeming to avoid 
responsibility, as we shall see below. For 
now let us examine another version of the CBF. 
It is in the well known slippery slope ploy. 
Consider another classroom example. Normally 
you arrive at 8 a.m. It is no particular 
hardship to come 5 minutes early. So you can 
come at 7:55. Since it is never a hardship 
to come 5 minutes early, you can come at 7:50. 
(We are off on the slippery slope 5 minutes 
at a time.) Coming at 6 a.m. is a hardship 
yet you got there through a series of events 
no one of which was a hardship. As the whole 
builds by degrees none of which have the col-
lective property, we have here a part/whole 
fallacy. Which one though? It is the CBF 
because the slippery slope ploy attempts to 
focus our attention just on the last member 
of a whole and its contribution rather than 
on allowing us to take the proper logical per-
spective of examining the responsibility of 
the whole of which it is but a part. Such too 
is the insight behind the remark that liberty 
is lost by degrees rather than at once and the 
reason that otherwise insignificant acts may 
come to symbolize a whole process and hence 
receive an extraordinary response. 

The SALESMAN'S FALLACY is a species of com-
position. It is fundamental to economic mis-
understanding. When we make a complicated 
purchase such as that of an automobile, the 
salesman attempts to focus our attention on 
the basic cost and that of each accessory. 
Each item on the list is affordable, well 
within our budget. Yet, the total may be way 
over our budget. The same thing happens in 
the supermarket. Suppose we have $100 to 
spend for groceries for a two-week period. 
No one item in the shopping basket costs any-
where near that amount. probably no one item 
in the market costs that much. In this sense 
we can afford any item in the store. But, if 
we are not careful, or if our budget is 
limited, we will not be able to afford the 
collection of items that we have selected. 
The same economic consideration is reflected 
in US Congressional budgeting practices. 
Formerly, Congress would appropriate funds for 
each program as it came up for consideration. 
No one kept an eye on the total. Since each 
program was well within the amount available 
for spending, so would be the total. A few 
years ago Congress realized its error. Now, 
no funds become available until the end of 
the year when programs which have been passed 
are adjusted or even eliminated so that the 



total is within the federal budget. The other 
way in which salespersons take advantage of 
this fallacy is in stressing the monthly pay-
ments associated with a purchase rather than 
the total amount. Anybody can afford pennies 
a week: unless, of course, the total number 
of pennies from all payments is more than the 
weekly income. 

The central thread of discussion in ethics 
during the past two decades has also been 
through part/whole relationships. What I have 
in mind are the examples, arguments, and prin-
=~ples which have led to the dominance of rule 
Jtilitarian theories. Whether we examine 
generalization arguments in ethics, the dis-
tinction between acts and practices, or Garret 
Hardin's notion of the tragedy of the commons 
we find the same territory being surveyed. 
Consider the problem of air pollution from 
automob~les. The amount of pollutant coming 
from my car is well within the ability of the 
atmosphere to absorb. Yet the amount coming 
from all of our automobiles is not. Why should 
: have to drive a (relatively) nonpolluting 
vehLcle when the one that I now drive has no 
significant impact on the environment? As an 
Lndividual act, driving my kind of car is not 
harmful But, considered as a social practice, 
=onsiderable harm must arise. It is right for 
~e ~o drive my car if and only if it is right 
tor everyone to drive automobiles in similar 
'~ndition But it is wrong for everyone to do 
serhus lot is wrong for me to do so. At-
~empt~ng co Justify my activity by reference 
~.o lots consequences in isolation is irrele-
vant. at least according to the now dominant 
way of thinking among moralists. Individual 
act~ons derive their moral value from the 
who~es of which they are parts. If the 
~hole 1S wrong so are the parts. 

fhis last move is not the fallacy of divi-
s~on This is because to say that an act is 
wrong ~s just to say that the whole of which 
Lt is a part loS wrong. There is no way, in 
~eneral, to evaluate the morality of acts 
apart from the wholes which they constitute. 
This is what leads to the tragedy of the com-
mons. We each perform acts (parts) rather 
than practices (wholes). No individual per-
son performs the practice (the whole) and so 
no one person is responsible. What is done 
in =ommon or held in common leads to tragedy 
for no one person is available to take re-
sponsibility. When responsibility is held in 
common it is easy for each of us to ignore it. 
Only by seeing ourselves as entities who are 
people only by being part of a whole can we 
begin to comprehend that we do have respon-
sibility even though no act that we perform 
has serious consequences. 

Let me conclude on this high note. There 
are other areas of modern argumentation or 
philosophy which also demand an analysis in 
terms of part/whole relationships. To name 
only a few: frequency theory of probability; 
the relationship between the high degree of 
accuracy of mortuary tables and the indeter-
minacy of our individual deaths: the recon-
ciliation of the use of determinism in the 
social sciences and the concept of free will; 
the way in which each item in a collection of 
data may be explained away, has a low prob-
ability of confirmation, and yet the collec-
tion may provide strong evidence as a whole; 
and finally, Berkeley's astounding claim that 
obiects are mind-dependent since each part of 

13 
them, their various attributes, are mind-
dependent. The last example brings forth a 
very important point on which to end. Some of 
our most significant disagreements are really 
ones over whether a series should be analyzed 
in terms of its parts or whether it can only 
be understood as a whole. Berkeley assumed 
that objects are mere concatenations of their 
parts; contemporary moralists argue that mor-
ality is a phenomenon of the whole; and we 
still debate these issues. w '7.'" 

critical 
• reviews 

Taulminis Bald 
Experiment 

Ralph H. Johnson 
University of Windsor 

EDITORS~ NOTE 

This is the second part of Professor Johnson's 
critical review of An Introduction to Reasoning 
by Stephen Toulmin,~chard Rieke and Allan 
Janik. The first part appeared in ILN, iii.2 
U1arch 1981), pp. 16-27. Section I01' John-
son's review was his Introduction; Section II 
reviewed Toulmin's (et al.) theory of argument 
in Parts One and Two of~e booR. In Section 
III, below, Johnson focuses on Toulmin's the-
ory of criticism as set forth. in Part Three 
of the text; in Section IV he presents his 
answers to the questions he proposed in Sec-
tion I as the appropriate matrix for this re-
view. 

Footnotes for both parts of Johnson's review 
are found at the end of this second part. We 
apologize for the inconvenience; the omission 
of the footnotes for the first part from the 
last issue was an oversigh.t. 

III. TOULMIN'S THEORY OF CRITICISM (PART III) 

The purpose of Part III, says Toulmin, is 
to shift the focus from the abstract, general 
level of Parts I and II to consider how rea-