cat~on relate to argumentation, and a chapter 
on 1nformal fallacies. Part IV consists of a 
~er~es of essays presenting the character-
1st1: fe~~ures of reasoning in a variety of 
s~ec1al f1elds: legal reasoning, argumenta-
t10n in science, arguing about the arts rea-
soning about management, and ethical re~son­
ing. 

There are exercises following each chap-
ter, ranging from easy to difficult. The 
ex~rcises tend to be open~ended. A teaching 
gu1de, presenting a brief rationale to the 
teacher of each chapter's approach and main 
points, and suggesting answers to the exer-
cises, comes with instructors' copies. 

Weddle, Perry. Argument, A Guide to Critical 
Thinking. New York: McGraw=H'iIT Book 
Company, 1978. Pp. 192 + xiv. Paperback. 

A straight "informal logic" text, Argument 
is designed, by topics covered, by example 
and by exercises, to teach thoughtful rea-
soning and assessment of others' reasoning. 

* 

14 

* 

The first chapter introduces the realm of 
reason--the mechanics of argument, the ecol-
ogy of argument, and criteria of good rea-
soning. Chapter two discusses fallacies of 
oversimplification and of "smokescreen". 
The third chapter treats language: the de-
mands good argument makes of language, trad-
ing on words, and an interesting treatment 
of definition. Under the rubric "Authority", 
chapter four discusses not only experts and 
other sources of authority, but also ad 
hominem and the use of statistics. Chapter 
five is on generality: the logic of general 
statements, and generalizing, sampling, and 
polls and surveys. Chapter six covers 
Comparison: analogical reasoning in general, 
and historical and moral comparisons. The 
seventh and final chapter is on Cause--the 
idea of cause, causal arguments and causal 
reasoning. 

Once or twice in each chapter there ap-
pears a "Quick Check"--a device which enables 
the reader to check his or her understanding 
of the material just read (answers are pro-
vided). As well there are examples at the 
end of each chapter which may be used as ex-
ercises. "Comments" rather than answers are 
provided for some of these. Thirdly, there 
are "applications", which may be used as 
exercises, projects or take-offs for dis-
cussions. The examples, found throughout the 
text, are many, non-artificial, and often 
taken from actual public discourse. 

* 

ANALYSIS OF PUZZLE 

We received the following response to the 
Woods-Walton "Find the Fallacy" puzzle in the 
December 1978 (Vol. I, No.2) Newsletter: 

First of all, it seems to me that in 
order to commit a fallacy in reasoning, there 
must be some reason1ng, either explicit or 
implicit, that is to say, one must have an 
argument. The "bus service" argument is, in 
effect, as it is originally stated, really 
two arguments--or perhaps more properly an 
argument and its counterargument. It starts 
with the citizens request (or demand) for 
more bus service in an outlying suburb. No 
argument. City Hall responds with Argument 
1, which amounts to a denial of the request. 
The citizens counter with Argument 2. 

In order to have a petitio, there would 
have to be a circle within one of the argu-
ments--or else, one would have to have some 
sort of situation in which Argument 2 ~-

tinued the reasoning of Argument 1. Here, 
however, that is not the case. So petitio 
principii does not seem, on the face of 
th1ngs, a plausible analysis of this example. 

But what does? It seems to me that there 
are two possible approaches to take. First, 
that there is no fallacy--at least none de-
tectible given the scant information supplied. 
possibly some suppressed information could 
be brought forth to show, say, a Half Truth 
in City Hall's argument. But we can't say. 
A second approach seems better: There is a 
Contrary-to-Fact Argument in #2. It is 
always difficult to argue convincingly (and 
soundly) of what "would be" or worse "would 
have been" without a great deal of supportive 
material, which is not furnished here; even 
with such supportive material, the argument 
is usually weak at best. 

Presumably (just a guess, since there 
could be many motives for such a decision) 
the transportation authority cut back on 
service because it was underutilized, if 
such transportation had originally been-



qreater than at present. Or possibly, a 
decision was made on presumed suburban reli-
ance on automobile transport because of 
qreater affluence; that could have the effect 
of a selffulfilling prophecy. In any event, 
decisions are made, if not done out of negli-
qence, for reasons. To decide between the 
two analyses, one would want to ask the rea-
sons for the original decision for the pres-
ent level of service. If City Hall made a 

* 

15 

* 

potential usage study, the citizens are 
guilty of a Contrary-to-Fact fallacy. If no 
such study was made, there would not appear 
to be anl fallacy--not as the argument is 
stated, ~n any event. 

* 

Richard W. Brooks 
Oakland University 
Rochester, Michigan 

BOOK REVIEW 

Dialectics: ~ Controversy-Oriented Approach 
to the TheorS of Knowledge, Nicholas Rescher. Al any: State University of 
New York Press, 1977. Pp. 218 + xiv. 
Cloth. 

Statement of Purpose. For Rescher, dialectic 
lS the d~sc~pl~ne of "disputation, debate and 
rational controversy." He says in the Pre-
face that the book "explores a disputationa1 
approach to inquiry" and in the introdu.l=tion· 
that "the goal of this exploration is the 
development of a dialectical model for the 
rationalization of cognitive methodology--
scientific methodologY specifically includ-
ed. n (xii) It is "the communal and contro-
versy-oriented aspects of rational argumedta p 
tion and inquiry" which he wants to illumi-, 
nate and to contrast with "the cognitive 
solipsism of the Cartesian approach." 
Accordingly, the first three chapters of the 
book present Rescher's account of dialectic 
--the basic outlines, as it were, of rational 
controversy: the last four chapters apply 
that account in a consideration of issues in 
epistemology and the philosophy of science. 

Table of Contents 

One. The disputationa1 background of dialec-
tic: the structure of formal disputation. 

TWo. Some dialectical tools: burden of 
proof, presumption, and plausibility. 

Three. Unilateral dialectics: a disputa-
tiona1 model of inquiry. 

Four. Facets of "dialectical logic". 
Five. What justifies the dialectical rational 

of probative rationality. 
Six. A dialectically based critique of 

skepticism. 
Seven. Evolutionary epistemology and the, 

burden of proof. 
Eight. The disputationa1 model of scientific 

inquiry. 

Special Features 

****Ch. 1 presents a method for representing 
the structure of a "formal disputation" in 

which there are two participants: someone 
defending a thesis (the proponent) and some-
one challenging that thesis (the opponent~ . 
In this method, there are three fundamental 
moves: 1) categorical assertion (available 
only ,to the proponent): 2) cautious assertion 
(which is ·avai1ab1e only to the opponent and 
amounts to saying "P is the case for all that 

. you have shown") and 3) provisoed assertion 
,(which amounts to saying "P generally or 
usually or ordinarily obtains, provided that 
Q" and is available to either participant in 
combination with the categorical or cautious 
assertion of Q). Various "dialectical 
countermoves" are built up out of these 
fundamental moves and fairly complex courses 
of formal disputation can be represented 
thereby. 

****Ch. 2 explains the concepts of burden of 
proof and presumption, orienting itself from 
the legal tradition. Roughly, to establish 
a presumption is to shift the burden of 
proof. These concepts, together with the 
concept of plausibility, are taken to be 
central in the adjudication of a disputation. 
As a result, "A shared procedure for the 
assessment of plausibility and the allocation 
of presumption thus emerges as a critical 
factor in dia1ectic--indeed as one of the 
crucial presuppositions of rationality 
throughout the context of rational discus-
sion. " 

****Ch. 3 "explores the doctrine that dis-
putation and debate may be taken as a para-
digmatic model for the general process of 
reasoning in the pursuit of truth". The 
root idea is that dialectic provides a method 
of "evidential cost-benefit ana1ysis"--i.e., 
of testing the evidential support of ideas 
and theses. 

il 
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I