: of !d- I a Lte lat ioes ~he Ls 1e) , lnly :i- l. !an :an ;- !S 1St by !S Lt- Lble )r r )- ;e- it )re- ,ves 'ies 'et- Lan } his ,e ,sm .st ,ts and those which are obviously unacceptable. perhaps! But one wonders if students, who successfully use the two conditions to dis- cuss media reports, will have learned from Giere enough about the nature of science to distinguish good reports from bad when, ,y7ars from now, he has forgotten the two cond~t~ons. As I completed this report, th.is criticism of both Giere and my teaching was given an added point when I told one of my students ~ho completed the class very successfully Just two months ago that I had finished the report. He asked: "Did you criticize Giere for getting into all that complicated stuff about theories when all along he was merely making a very simple point about the use of the two condi tions?" It really is very difficult to make some things easy in a satisfactory way or to con- vince o~~ers that some things ought not to be thought of as simple. REASONING Michael Scriven A. S. Carson University of Alberta Into a growing market of informal logic texts, many of which are either interminable and boring lists of argument fallacies or watered-down formal logic manuals, Michael Scriven introduces Reasoning, an engaging alternative. With a conscious attempt to avoid making argument analysis a witch-hunt for fallacies or an over-technical glossary of logic terms, he endeavours to explain the nature of reasoning and argumentation and to demonstrate, step-by-step, how arguments are st~uctured and a systematic means by which th~s structure can be drawn from prose and examined. The enterprise is as much a posi- tive tuition in the construction of sound ~ractical arguments as it is skill training In the rather more negative art of critical analysis. It is, most commendably, a teaching device to the last. Scriven makes a considerable departure from a number of accepted views in logic and an even greater distancing move from standard approaches to informal logic. On the former, he gives up on talk of "validity" in favour of "sound inferences" and "true premises"1 he eschews the use/mention distinction and its quotation mark symbolization1 he makes a number of attacks against the utility of for- mal logic in "real reasoning", Scriven points out, for instance, that formal systems can have value to natural language arguments only 17 if (a) the natural language can be encoded into the symbolism (b) transformations can be made within the calculus (c) the symbolism can then be decoded into the natural language 1 the value in this process being in the reli- ability of the transformations. However the encoding step, he maintains, is as problem- atic in all but trivial cases as the assess- ment of the original argument would have been. And he goes on to claim that formal systems have never developed a satisfactory way of dealing with assumptions, something which real arguments are rarely without. Equally, formal systems are rife with para- doxes such as that of "material implication"1 and the willingness of logicians to substi- tute formal simplicity for practical utility is evident from the work of C. I. Lewis, and of Anderson and Belnap who simply do not tackle the need to distinguish "guarantees of truth for £" from "good reasons for believing that £" from "allows the derivation of £". Says Scriven: "The truth of ~ guarantees the truth of £, but it sure ~sn't a good reason for believing it" (1'. xvi 1. To contrast ·"i th this, and to introduce the approach to be taken to informal logic Cthe latter point mentioned above), Scriven states: "This book is about good reasons, not repetitions or transformations. It's just a start on what shouldn't be but is, almost an untouched subj ect" (ibid). , What Scriven is after in this book, then, ~s to show the reader what real reasoning is and how to do it well. Specifically, his aims are tO,improve one's skill in "analysing and evaluat~ng arguments and presentations" and in "eresenting argumentS, re~orts and instruct~ons clearly and persuas~vely.-"--TO be improved as well are one's "critical instincts" and "knowledge about the facts and arguments relevant to a large number of im- portant contemporary issues in politics, education, ethics, and several practical fields" (p. ix). These aims are to be brought about by doing what other texts of this sort do not. For one thing, reasoning is to be construed more b:oadly than simply argumentation. Reading w~th understanding, for instance, is to be taken as a form of reasoning. Moreover, reasoning is shown to be a social enterprise --something that has to do with language, rational persuasion, open-mindedness, a com- mitment to truth and even a moral commitment to respecting other people's rights to make up there own minds on the basis of reasons or evidence. For another thing, the analysis of arguments is to be taught, not as is often the case, solely by a combination of principle and demonstration, but through a series of seven procedural steps, each of which is carefully explained and illustrated. These procedures direct the student's attention to careful reading (or listening), to distin- guishing between reasons and conclusions and the particular relations among them, to drawing out assumptions or unstated premises (and being "charitable, Le. fair," to the arguer in so dOing), and to evaluating the argument, not just in light of the truth of premises and soundness of inference, but in v~ew of, and this is important, other pos- s~ble arguments that might be brought to bear. It is, perhaps, this last point that does most to set Scriven's book apart from formal logic and other informal logic approaches because it shifts the focus of critical assessment from the internal consistency of the given argument to a more circumspective assessment, one which, among other things, anticipates counterarguments. To these ends, he writes eight chapters. The first two deal with the nature, teaching, and learning of reasoning; ~he next four , with the various aspects and ref~nements of h~s technique for argument analysis; and the re- maining two with special types of ar~uments (e.g. scientific) and various extens~ons ~nd ramifications of arguments and the analys~s of them (e.g. decision making strategies, being reasonable and flowcharting). It would be impossible in a book review to deal adequately with Scriven's charges , against the practical utility of formal l~g~c. One should, of course, note that many log~c­ ians would strongly disagree with Scriven. (See, for example, Peter G7 ach's view on this in "On Teaching Logic", Ph~losophy, Vol. 54, no. 207, 1979, p. 6.) I shall leave the mat- ter then with this comment: it does not see~ to m~ that the paradoxes with which for- mal logic has to contend and the difficulties of encoding go any way at all toward demon- strating that an intuitive natural langu~ge approach will necessarily be more effect~ve; it shows only that formal logic has not lived up to its promise of reliability. ,But to show the inadequacies of formal log~c for practical purposes one need to no more th~n point to the fact that formal transformat~ons, even if they were reliable, are far too cumbersome for practical use, other than per- haps to professional philosophers in s~m7 aspects of their work. Surely few log~c~ans e'1er expected formal logic to provide tools for every day discourse; since it is the lat- ter with which Scriven is avowedly concerned, it was never really necessary for him to at- tack formal logic. Going on, then, to consider Scriven's ap- proach, one can not help but admire his clear-sightedness in recognizing, and pro-, vi ding remediation for, common weakn7 sses ~n students' abilities to reason. For ~nstance, I have used Reasoning with ten classes of student teachers (about 300 students) and find four principal difficulties: the stu- dents' inability to understand what they read, their lack of awareness of the differ- ences between expositions, explanations, and arguments, their inability to so:t ou~ ~he conclusion of an argument, once ~dent~f~ed, from the premises and the lack of sensitivity of students to the importance of being con- sistent. Evidently Scriven's own research must have shown the same because, for the most part, these are 'deficiencies' ,that Reasonina endeavours to correct. H~s con- stant exhortations about careful reading are very effective as are the sections (espe- cially Chapter Four, Sections 2-6) ,that dif- ferentiate arguments from explanat~ons, etc., and provide ways of recognizing them. Chapter Three is devoted to setting out the seven steps of argument analysis, an impor- tant feature of which is the use of diagrams to portray the relationship between premises, assumptions and conclusion(s) (though, of 18 course, Scriven is not the first to use dia- grams). On the whole, students seem to find the step-by-step approach helpful and the diagramming especially so. Unfortunately, a weakness in his presentation of the latter is that when the diagramming of premises and conclusions is explained, two options are given for portraying the relationship of each premise to the conclusion. In one case, cir- cled numbers, each representing a premise identified in the argument, are joined di- rectly to the circled number representing the conclusion, thus fonning a many-to-one mapping (or one-to-one if there is only one premise); and in the other case, numerically depicted premises are presented horizontally with plus signs between them, and the conjoined numbers (premises) are then linked as a group to the numerically depicted conclusion. Now, what Scriven is trying to show is that in the for- mer portrayal each premise offers independent support for the conclusion, and in the lat- ter, the premises must be taken together. However, this is not made clear to the reader (on pp. 42-43) until nearly forty pages later (on PP. 80-82). A second pedagogical weakness with diagram- ming is that Scriven does not make much use of it later in the text, which leads students to wonder about Scriven's own commitment to it's utility. Indeed, the same problem arises with the discussion of 'inconsistency'. In Chapter Three, Section Two, it is said to be of great moment in argument analysis but direct use of the concept is not made again, other than as a question in one of the quiz- zes (at the end of Chapter Three). The same again could be said of the somewhat technical discussions in Chapter Four of inference, conditional statements and necessary and suf- ficient conditions (Sections One, Two and Three, respectively). Indeed, given the very practical thrust of the book, it is not at all clear that these discussions are essen- tial--particularly the extended treatment of the truth table in dealing with sound infer- ence and true premises. (Regrettably as well, in these sections there are some print- ing errors in very awkward places. On page 59, paragraph 3, clause 12 should read "If the premises are ! ... " in order to correspond to the table that follows on the same page; and on page 63, paragraph 2, lines 4-5, should read "Wherever it's true that q fol- lows from p, it's true that f ... , is a suf- ficient condition for g ••• ", and paragraph 3, lines 1-3 should read "If p implies q, which means that p is a sufficient condition for q, then p guarantees the truth of q, that is, it makes the truth of 9. necessary,") There are two other pedagogical points about which I want to make a brief note. First, many of the sections do not have headings; Scriven suggests that students should supply their own. In my experience, students either do not do this or do it poorly, the consequence of which is that they do not find Reasoning as useful a reference book as they otherwise might. Second, mis- leading hints and very few instructions about how to answer questions are both intentional on Scriven's part. The idea is to make stu- dents more independent but frequently it simply leaves them adrift--at their wit's end to know what to do. Alth appoiIl think merit. ScrivE to arg to be induct no dif sis an vides exampl avoidE in no someth studen infon conteili at temp indepe these Ct nt The I Teachi: versit: will bl afternl cover i afternl of inti Of pi be the Logic, AUI AUI FOl dia- find .e y, a .er is .d e each cir- e i- 9 the apping ise) ; ted plus mbers the hat for- ndent at- eader later gram- use dents to ency' • d to but ain, uiz- same nical I suf- Id ! very at len- tt of tfer- I )rint- ,age 'If ispond Ige; :01- luf- Iph 3, rhich 'or q, .s, it ce, they nce lis- about onal stu- s Although flawed and in some respects dis- appointing, it would be a great mistake to think that Reasonin~ is without considerable merit. Apart from he difficulties mentioned, Scriven does present a very useful approach to argument analysis. His seven steps prove to be helpful to students; he ignores the inductive/decuctive distinction which causes no difficulty for purposes of argument analy- sis and saves confusion about them; he pro- vides an excellent discussion of counter- exampling; technical jargon is scrupulously avoided; and creative thought is shown to be in no way incompatible with reasoning-- something that is very important for some students. Scriven's style is charmingly informal and his examples interesting and contemporary. And, he makes a very laudable attempt to force students to think independently and with confidence. None of these are mean achievements. conference • natlces The Third National Workshop-Conference on Teaching Philosophy will be held at the Uni- versity of Toledo from August 12-15. There will be three morning workshops and four afternoon workshops. The morning workshops cover areas of broad interest, while the afternoon sessions will be on specific topics of interest to philosophy teachers. Of particular interest to.our readers will be the morning workshops on Introductory Logic, for which the tentative line-up is: August 13: Review of Recent Developments in Informal Logic --Ralph H. Johnson Informal Logic as Logic --J. Anthony Blair August 14: Introductory Logic as Rational persuasion --Rosalind Ekman Ladd Conceptual Skills Prerequisite for Logic --Eric Lindermayer August 15: The Place of LogiC in the Curriculum --Robert Baum Review of Recent Textbooks and Other Material --Philip Pecorino For further information, write to Professor Richard A. Wright Chair, Program Committee, 3rd NW-CTP De~artm7nt of Philosophy Un~versl.ty of Toledo Toledo, Ohio 43606 19 WORKSHOP The Institute for the Advancement of Philos- ophy for Children is also sponsoring a series of two-week summer workshops in philosophy for children to be held at the Pocono Envi~ rorunental Education Center at Dinqrnan's Ferry, Pennsylvania. July l-July 15 Reasoning Skills in Lang- uage Arts· and Social Studies July 1-Ju1y 15 Basic Reasoning Skills Reasoning Skills in Ethics July 16-Ju1y 31 Comprehensive program for teachers with philosophy background July2S-August 8 Basic Reasoning Skills Reasoning Skills in Language Arts Aug, 16~Aug. 30 Basic Reasoning Skills Reasoning Skills in Social Studies .Pre-requisite: Training in the Basic Reasoning Skills Program. For further information, write to; IAPC Summer Workshops, Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, NJ, 17043. baaks received TEXTBOOKS James D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer, Fundamentals of Lotic, 3rd edition. New York: Macmillan, 9S0. Cloth. x, 461 pages, Karel Lambert and William Ulrich, The Nature of Argument. New York: MacmIllan, 19S0. Cloth. xl.I, 261 pages. Thomas Schwartz, The Art of LOiical Reasonin,' New York: Random House, 9S0. Paperbac • x, 31Q pages. BOOKS Robert J. Gula, Nonsense: How to OVercome it. New York: SteIn and Day, 1979. cloth. 204 pages. David T. Tuma and Frederick Reif editors Problem SOlvina and Educati~n: ISSU~S in Teaching an Research. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1980. Cloth. xi, 212 pages.