ILRC-Rooney RTG © Phyllis Rooney. Informal Logic, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2010), pp. 203-234. Philosophy, Adversarial Argumentation, and Embattled Reason PHYLLIS ROONEY Department of Philosophy Oakland University Rochester, Michigan 48309, USA Email: rooney@oakland.edu Abstract: Philosophy’s adversarial argumentation style is often noted as a factor contributing to the low numbers of women in philosophy. I argue that there is a level of adversariality pecu- liar to philosophy that merits specific feminist examination, yet doesn’t as- sume controversial gender differences claims. The dominance of the argu- ment-as-war metaphor is not war- ranted, since this metaphor miscon- strues the epistemic role of good ar- gument as a tool of rational persua- sion. This metaphor is entangled with the persisting narrative of embattled reason, which, in turn, is linked to the sexism-informed narrative of the “man of reason” continually warding off or battling “feminine” unreason. Resumé: On note souvent que le style combatif de l’argumentation en phi- losophie est un facteur qui contribue au nombre faible de femmes en phi- losophie. J’avance qu’il y a un niveau d’antagonisme propre à la philosophie qui mérite un examen spécifiquement féministe, mais qui ne suppose pas des jugements controversés sur les différents rôles attendus des hommes et des femmes. La prédominance de la métaphore de l’argument-comme-la- guerre n’est pas justifiée, car elle in- terprète mal le rôle épistémique qu’un bon argument joue comme outil de persuasion rationnelle. Cette méta- phore est embrouillée avec la tradition persistante de la raison combative, qui se lie à la tradition sexiste de «l’homme de la raison» qui détourne ou combat toujours la déraison «féminine». Keywords: adversarial argumentation, adversary paradigm, argument-as-war, embattled reason, equity in philosophy, feminism, gender differences, man of reason 1. Philosophy’s woman problem Philosophy’s woman problem has recently garnered attention out- side philosophy circles, though it has been a concern for women in philosophy for some time. This past October (2009) an article in the New York Times, “A Dearth of Woman Philosophers,” noted that in the United States and Britain, women make up about 20% of academic philosophers.1 This is noteworthy since, after decades of 1 New York Times, October 2, 2009. Available at: Phyllis Rooney 204 affirmative intention (if not action) designed to counter centuries of academic exclusion and discouragement, women now comprise close to 40% of academic staff in most other disciplines in the hu- manities and social sciences.2 The Times piece made significant reference to an article by Brooke Lewis published some weeks ear- lier in The Philosopher’s Magazine (TPM) which raised the ques- tion of whether philosophy’s reputation as a “white men’s club” is deserved, and what might account for the persistence of the gender imbalance, in particular (Lewis, 2009). Helen Beebee, Director of the British Philosophical Association, is quoted in both articles as suggesting that part of the reason for the lower numbers of women in philosophy is that women are turned off by a culture of aggres- sive argument particular to the discipline. Beebee remarks, “I can remember being a PhD student and giving seminar papers and just being absolutely terrified that I was going to wind up intellectually beaten to a pulp by the audience. I can easily imagine someone thinking, ‘this is just ridiculous, why should I want to pursue a ca- reer where I open myself up to having my work publicly trashed on a regular basis?’” Beebe is not the first to link philosophy’s gender imbalance with a male-inflected aggressive and adversarial style of argumen- tation regularly practiced in the discipline. Drawing from our expe- riences and observations, many women philosophers make similar connections. In addition, in the comparatively few philosophy con- texts dominated by women (feminist philosophy seminars and con- ferences, for instance), one notices a concerted effort among par- ticipants to counter the adversarial and agonistic style of male- dominated philosophy discussions with more measured, construc- tive criticism of philosophy theses and papers. There has been a growing awareness that such reflexive attention to style and method of argumentation not only helps to address the gender im- balance in philosophy, but it sustains better philosophical discus- http://ideas.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/a-dearth-of-women-philosophers/ See the Spring 2009 (vol. 8, no. 2) and Fall 2009 (vol. 9, no.1) issues of the American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy for important discussions about the numbers of women in Philosophy (US, 21%), and about ways to address equity concerns. These newsletters are available at the American Philosophical Association’s website, at: http://www.apaonline.org/publications/newsletters/index.aspx. In what is a likely result of recommendations adopted by the Canadian Philoso- phical Association (CPA) in the early 1990s, the percentage of women in full- time tenured or tenure-tract philosophy positions in Canada is notably better— figures from 2008-09 indicate that it is close to 30%. For discussion and analy- sis of the data, see the CPA website: http://www.acpcpa.ca/documents/Survey%202009%20Final%20Report%20En.p df. 2 According to a U. S. Department of Education report from 2004, women make up 41% of faculty in most other humanities disciplines. For a discussion of this and other relevant data see Crasnow 2009. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 205 sion and, in turn, better philosophy. Philosopher Jennifer Saul re- marks (in the TPM article), “I think that the very combative ‘out to destroy the speaker’ sort of philosophy is something that a lot of women find uncomfortable. But I wouldn’t want to say it’s just a problem for women—I think it’s a problem for men and a problem for philosophy because I don’t think it’s a good way to do philoso- phy” (Lewis, 2009). Saul’s comment echoes the two main concerns raised by Janice Moulton in her classic paper on women, argumentation, and philosophy. The “Adversary Paradigm,” Moulton maintains, values aggression in a way that discourages more women than men from philosophy. In addition, it is not good for philosophy since it con- strains philosophical argumentation: “when [the Adversary Method in its role as a paradigm] dominates the methodology and evalua- tion of philosophy, it restricts and misrepresents what philosophic reasoning is” (Moulton, 1983, p. 153). Among other things, Moul- ton argues, the Adversary Paradigm misrepresents the history of philosophy (“philosophers who cannot be recast into the adversar- ial mold are likely to be ignored”); it puts more emphasis on win- ning points than on convincing (or it conflates these two goals); it grants greater recognition to problems that are articulated in terms of opposing positions; and it “[gives] undue attention and publicity to positions merely because they are those of a hypothetical adver- sary and possibly ignoring positions which make more valuable or interesting claims” ( Moulton, 1983, p. 158). I agree with Moulton that, for these and other reasons, the Adversary Paradigm either “leads to bad reasoning” in philosophy or, at the very least, it sus- tains a more limited range of reasoning and argument forms and practices than good philosophical insight and development surely merit. Moulton’s paper, however, like the comment by Saul, presents the two concerns with adversarial argumentation in philosophy as somewhat separate concerns. Moulton’s arguments addressing the second concern (the limited philosophical method concern) pro- ceed largely independently of the concern that women may be less comfortable with adversarial argumentation, that is, many of her arguments stand even if women and men were equally comfortable with a combative style. More particularly, while the gender con- cern seems clearly a feminist one, Moulton’s arguments about lim- ited philosophical method are not based on specifically-feminist examinations. (This is less a critique of her arguments than it is a description of the theoretical resources she brings to bear on them.) She connects the two concerns by linking the persistence of the Adversary Paradigm in philosophy (despite its limitations) to the general cultural association of aggression with masculinity and, in turn, with competence and success. She notes that, while aggres- sion is often considered a negative trait, “when it is specifically Phyllis Rooney 206 connected to males qua males…[it] often takes on positive associa- tions…[in professions such as politics, sales, law, and philosophy] aggression is thought to be related to positive concepts such as power, activity, ambition, authority, competence, and effective- ness—concepts that are related to success in these professions” (p. 149). Feminist activism and theorizing during these past decades have helped to dislodge some aspects of the general cultural asso- ciation of aggression and masculinity with competence and suc- cess. In educational settings, for example, women have been en- couraged to assert themselves and to challenge traditional stereo- types linking femininity with passivity and submissiveness. Women have made notable advances in many academic disciplines that require proficiency in presenting, challenging, and defending arguments, whether in written theses, dissertations, and journal ar- ticles, or in oral debate in seminars, conferences, and job talks.3 In addition, women now comprise close to 50% of law school admis- sions in many places, doing well in a discipline and profession based on adversarial forms of argumentation. Thus, despite some gains, philosophy stands out as something of an anomaly. The lin- gering gender imbalance there, along with recurring mention of adversarial argumentation as a contributing factor, raises questions about whether philosophy still sustains a type of male-inflected ad- versariality peculiar to the discipline. I will argue that it does, and that this adversariality requires specifically-feminist philosophical examination. While I do not disagree with many of Moulton’s ar- guments about the limitations of the Adversary Paradigm in phi- losophy, I think they merit further development and expansion, drawing specifically on feminist philosophical work developed since the 1983 publication of her important paper. Though feminist work in moral, social, and political philosophy was already under- way by then, Moulton’s paper originally appeared in a ground- breaking volume in the development of feminist perspectives in epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of sci- ence, Discovering Reality (Harding and Hintikka, 1983). A third notable (extra-philosophy) article addressing philoso- phy’s woman problem—one that also appeared last October— draws particular attention to the significance of feminist philoso- phy. In an article in The Chronicle of Higher Education, Regan Pe- 3 For example, Olivia Frey (1990) examined the papers published in PMLA (the journal of the Modern Language Association of America) from 1977 to 1985 and concluded that all but two used “some version of the adversarial method” (p. 512), often beginning with an attack on the views of earlier authors. The two exceptions are by “critics who have thought about how they are going to dis- agree, and have done it, respectfully, without sarcasm or innuendo or statements suggesting ‘wrong-headedness,’ ‘reluctance,’ ‘confusion,’ or ‘stupidity’” (p. 521). Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 207 naluna reflects on the low numbers of women earning bachelor’s degrees in philosophy. She notes that US Department of Education statistics from 2006-07 reveal that women earned 31% of philoso- phy degrees, compared to 41% of history degrees, 45% in mathe- matics, 60% in biology, and 69% in English.4 Penaluna argues that we cannot overlook sexism and misogyny in the Western philoso- phical canon in explaining women’s disaffection with the disci- pline. Drawing attention to this same concern, Janet Kourany suc- cinctly describes the problem that has significantly motivated and defined the project of feminist philosophy: Feminist research into the history of philosophy… dis- closes that many of the greatest philosophers have held deeply misogynist views of women, views that shaped some of the most important parts of their philosophies. Thus, women have been characterized as rationally defi- cient (Aristotle), incapable of emotional self-control (Plato) or principled behavior (Kant), and more suscep- tible to sin (Aquinas), whose only function is to bear ro- bust children (Nietzsche). And the concepts of justice (Plato) and moral worth (Kant) and the good life (Aris- totle) have been modeled not on them but on what is held to be their opposite—men. There is much in the philosophic canon, therefore, that might alienate would- be women philosophers. (Kourany, 2009, p. 9) Philosophy, in effect, has had a woman problem for well over two millennia! Noting similar “canonical” views about women in con- nection with women’s entry into the discipline, Penaluna interjects, “How is that for a welcome mat?” Penaluna remarks that other disciplines such as English and history also have male-dominated canons, and one explanation for why there are more women in these areas is that “researchers and teachers in those fields have taken steps to offset the negative con- sequences of a male-dominated canon…[but] philosophers are re- luctant to take on a feminist critique of the canon” (Penaluna, 2009). Her observation is borne out by that fact that, though it has been significantly invested (for over a quarter century now) in un- covering and counteracting the various effects of sexist and mi- sogynist theorizing, feminist philosophy is still significantly mar- 4 Penaluna 2009. This United States percentage of women earning bachelor de- grees in philosophy contrasts interestingly with Beebee’s “impression” that in the United Kingdom “there are roughly equal numbers of men and women graduating with good bachelor degrees in philosophy.” There the numbers of women drop off at the MA level, and then again at the PhD level (Lewis, 2009). The comparison with mathematics (45%) is noteworthy, given that mathematics has also been traditionally viewed as a “male” discipline of reasoning. Phyllis Rooney 208 ginalized in the discipline. Some have identified elements of “back- lash” in this marginalization.5 Others have also stressed a link be- tween the low numbers of women in philosophy and the disci- pline’s particular resistance to feminist philosophy. Sally Haslanger notes this link in her paper examining how the “ideology and cul- ture of philosophy” still sustains subtle or not-so-subtle forms of discrimination against women. Not only does an examination of the papers published in seven top philosophy journals from 2002 to 2007 suggest that there is gender bias in the evaluation process, but, Haslanger adds, “The virtual absence of feminist philosophy in the journals considered stands in stark contrast to the acceptance of feminist work in other humanities and social sciences. Philosophy is, and is generally perceived to be, reactionary in this respect” (Haslanger, 2008, p. 216). The marginalization of feminist work suggests that philoso- phy’s current woman problem is, in no small part, a lingering effect of its long historical woman problem. Its historical problem signifi- cantly contributed to the epistemic subordination and disenfran- chisement of women, both in the general culture and in the disci- pline itself. More particularly, philosophical theorizing about the natures of women, men, reason, and knowledge reinforced the cul- tural dismissal and denigration of women as reasoners, knowers, or credible authorities; it thus contributed to their exclusion from edu- cational, academic, and other public institutions of social and po- litical influence which were thereby normalized as male places. Quite specifically, women’s supposed deficiencies in reasoning excluded them from philosophy which was understood as a (if not the) discipline of reason. This supposition, I suspect, is still playing a role in the marginalization or denigration of feminist philosophy. As the first significant area in philosophy developed primarily by women, it is not accorded the same careful reading, reasoning, and integration that is normally accorded projects in philosophy devel- oped primarily by men. Yet feminist philosophy aims to uncover and elucidate this and other effects of philosophy’s sexist history— including its effects in philosophical theorizing about justice, mo- rality, reason, and argument, concepts that initially seem to have little to do with gender. So we have a conundrum. Philosophy re- sists the very thing (feminist philosophy) that helps to uncover and mitigate the lingering effects of the historical roots of that same resistance, producing a kind of vicious circle that, to my mind, is especially problematic in philosophy, and contributes to the peculi- arity of its gender imbalance. 5 See Burgess-Jackson (2002). Many of the other papers in Superson and Cudd (2002) also address the backlash against feminist philosophy. I examine the mar- ginalization of feminist epistemology, in particular, in Rooney (forthcoming). Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 209 My goal is to advance an understanding of feminist concerns with adversarial argumentation as concerns that are bound up, en- tangled with philosophy’s sexist history, and with the ways in which that history informed theorizing about reason and argument. Toward that end, I will argue (in section 2 below) that we first need to disentangle adversariality, specifically as a feminist philosophi- cal concern, from the issue about gender differences in styles or types of argumentation. I do not deny that such differences may still pertain in many contexts (including philosophical ones), that they still reflect problematic gender socialization and stereotyping, as well as cultural determinations of competence and authority, and that, if so, they merit significant feminist attention. The feminist philosophical concern with adversarial argumentation, as I develop it here, is directed primarily to the tradition and culture of philoso- phy, and, in particular, to philosophical conceptions and under- standings of reason and of argument understood as a paradigm ex- ample of reasoning. However, I think that a full feminist account- ing of the general cultural problem with gender, adversariality, and authority must include consideration of philosophy’s history and its lingering effects. As we will see, such an inclusion counsels care in the way we articulate and examine gender differences, lest we rein- force historical associations that, instead, need feminist uprooting. The terms “Adversary Paradigm” and “adversarial argumenta- tion” can mean various things, and we need to be mindful of this when we elucidate feminist concerns with adversariality. On the one hand, the terms are associated with hostility and combativeness in argumentation, with an aggressive atmosphere that can include name-calling, put-downs, or quips such as “that’s a ridiculous ar- gument!” On the other hand, the terms can be associated with non- aggressive, respectful disagreement and debate between “adversar- ies” who hold different or opposite positions on some matter. In reality, including in philosophy, argumentation regularly falls somewhere in between, sometimes leaning more toward the ag- gressive end, sometimes more toward the respectful disagreement end. Although philosophical argumentation ideally purports to be about respectful disagreement and debate, Moulton argues that the dominance of the Adversary Method not only constrains the meth- odology of philosophy into an oppositional reasoning model, but it also creates “conditions of hostility [that] are not likely to elicit the best reasoning.”6 Yet even though she argues for connections among different problematic aspects of the Adversary Paradigm, Moulton sometimes runs them together when more distinctions are 6 Moulton, 1983, p. 153. By “oppositional reasoning” I mean reasoning and ar- guing that is largely structured in terms of opponents and opposing positions, attacks and defenses, winners and losers. Phyllis Rooney 210 needed.7 The hostility issue is different from the concern with the dominance of oppositional reasoning in philosophy: “opponents” in argument can proceed in a respectful manner without elements of aggression or hostility—they often do. Specifically-feminist con- cerns with either issue might also be different, even if, as I will ar- gue below, the concerns are linked. Trudy Govier’s distinction between ancillary adversariality and minimal adversariality captures the difference between hostile and respectful forms of argumentation, and it also helps to clarify some of the feminist concerns with adversarial argumentation. Many feminist criticisms, Govier notes, are directed toward “ancil- lary adversariality,” the hostility, name-calling, rudeness, intoler- ance, and quarrelsomeness that can infuse argument situations (Govier, 1999, p. 245). In philosophy, in particular, we might in- clude ancillary adversariality among the factors that contribute to what Haslanger calls the “hypermasculine places” philosophy de- partments often are.8 Govier does not disagree with feminists who critique argumentative practices that reflect socially-encouraged masculine forms of ancillary aggression and combativeness that discourage many women. Yet these forms of ancillary adversarial- ity should be discouraged in any case, she argues, because they are not consistent with good argument practice that involves respectful exchange of evidence and ideas. However, Govier adds, such re- spectful exchange typically involves differences and disagreements in beliefs and positions and, as such, it involves “minimal adversar- iality,” a basic level of adversariality that need not be negative in the way that ancillary adversariality is. I will argue in section 3 that while Govier’s distinction is help- ful in clarifying different feminist concerns with adversariality, it does not quite address the feminist issue as I develop it in this pa- per. Though she is certainly concerned with combative climate fac- tors that may disproportionately discourage women, Govier’s ar- gument against ancillary adversariality does not draw on feminist work on reason, argument, and the history of philosophy. As such, her argument is not unlike Moulton’s (limited philosophical method) argument against the Adversary Paradigm. As is the case with Moulton’s argument, I do not disagree with Govier’s argu- 7 Jean Grimshaw argues that Moulton’s terms and arguments sometimes shift in a problematic way, for example, “from a consideration of the relation between the participants in a debate or discussion, to a consideration of the relation be- tween a person and some view or theory” (Grimshaw, 1987, p. 19). 8 In sustaining a competitive, combative, hostile to femininity, and highly judg- mental climate, Haslanger notes, philosophy departments are often “socially dys- functional places” where women, who are often socialized to feel responsible for maintaining good social dynamics, may feel either burdened or “alienated by an atmosphere where ordinary social norms are not recognized” (Haslanger, 2008, p. 217). Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 211 ment as much as I want to push it further along feminist lines. For a start, we might ask why many male philosophers so readily con- form to modes of aggressive or ancillary adversariality that, as both Moulton and Govier make evident, conflict with standard philoso- phical norms of good reasoning and argumentation. My examina- tion will also address Govier’s argument for the acceptability of minimal adversariality. I agree with her that argumentation is typi- cally based in differences and disagreements about claims or posi- tions, and I would stress that such disagreement is often a signifi- cant driving force in constructive philosophical development, in- cluding feminist philosophical development. Yet, even granting the positive role of disagreement, I question her claim that minimal adversariality is just about inevitable in the working out of dis- agreement. More specifically, I will contend that the distinction between minimal and ancillary adversariality is not as clear as Go- vier thinks: the slide from either one to the other is more slippery than we might suppose or, indeed, hope. I will argue that we need to carefully examine the move from difference and disagreement to opposition and adversariality, not simply because the latter may be uncomfortable for some discussants, but because the move to the latter misconstrues the epistemic role of good argument as a sig- nificant tool of rational persuasion in the acquisition and communi- cation of truths or likely truths. As Govier and others admit, the move from disagreement to adversariality is rendered easy, perhaps inevitable, by the em- beddedness of the argument-as-war metaphor in both the concep- tualization and practice of argument.9 When we talk about oppo- nents, about adopting and defending positions, scoring points, or, simply, winning and losing arguments, it is difficult to know how we might articulate the things we mean by these phrases without using these warring and related sports metaphors. Yet embedded as it is, we can and should attempt to pry loose this metaphor in our thinking about argument and in our practice of argument. Toward that end, as I will argue in section 4, a necessary first step involves acknowledging the entanglement of this metaphor with the long historical narrative of reason as embattled, as continually warding off and defending against the ever-lurking threats of unreason or irrationality. I will also contend that this metaphor of embattled reason is significantly compelled by the recurring historical meta- phorical gendering of reason, by the persistent depiction of the “man of reason” as continually battling aspects of unreason regu- larly constructed as womanly or “feminine”—passion, instinct, na- 9 Discussion of the “ARGUMENT IS WAR” metaphor features significantly in Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980). It serves as their first ex- ample of a “conceptual metaphor…we live by in this culture: it structures the actions we perform in arguing” (1980, p. 4). Phyllis Rooney 212 ture, body, unruly bodily intrusions, or distracting charms. To my mind, this is a key insight in feminist philosophy that warrants much greater attention in philosophy and in argumentation theory more generally. Without this insight and its further elaboration, philosophical understandings and theories of argument and argu- mentation are likely to remain more limited than they need to be. This limitation continues to significantly constrain practices of rea- soning and argumentation, both inside and outside the discipline of philosophy. 2. Disentangling differences There are two kinds of claims about gender differences that have featured in feminist debates about argumentation. One, already noted, is the claim about gender differences in comfort levels with adversariality in argumentation. It is a claim about styles of argu- ing, sometimes spelled out as the claim that, in large part due to their socialization, women are more cooperative and supportive while men are more confrontational and combative in discussion and debate. Although my paper addresses the feminist issue with adversariality as somewhat separable from the different comfort levels concern, I am not suggesting that the latter is insignificant in philosophy. Anecdotal evidence certainly indicates that it is a fac- tor in the discipline’s continuing gender imbalance. However, given that some women are quite comfortable with adversarial ar- gumentation (whether minimal or ancillary) and some men less so, the more general question we need to address in philosophy is whether facility with adversarial argumentation (particularly in oral discussion, though it can play out too in written work) plays a greater role in professional encouragement and advancement than is warranted. I’ve heard many philosophy teachers comment on classes in which the best papers were written by students who never or rarely spoke up in class discussion. (Indeed, I’ve had a few classes where I wondered if there might be an inverse rela- tionship between assertion in discussion and quality of written work!) Thus, while public presentation and defense of one’s views is to be encouraged, it may not be the significant measure of phi- losophical interest and talent that its role in disciplinary advance- ment presumes. In addition, more taciturn students who are com- mended on their written work might still feel discouraged when they perceive the role that being “good on one’s feet” plays in phi- losophy. Types or levels of adversarial argumentation might also be examined in connection with other culturally-inflected practices of speech, attention, and interaction that are encouraged or discour- aged in philosophy, practices that may also account for significant race and class imbalances in the discipline. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 213 The second gender difference claim, though it is sometimes entangled with the first, is a claim about types of argument. Men, it has been claimed, lean more towards abstract and linear reasoning and arguments, and women more towards contextual and narrative arguments. This second difference claim has often been linked with assertions about women’s “different” ways of thinking, reasoning, or knowing. For example, Deborah Orr (1989) connects her discus- sion of female and male “modes” of rationality and argument with Carol Gilligan’s much-discussed work on gender and moral delib- eration.10 While the male-inflected “ethic of justice” emphasizes deductive reasoning from abstract principles, Orr notes, the female- inflected “ethic of care” favors a style or mode that is contextual and narrative. However, these difference claims have been quite contentious in feminist theorizing, not least because empirical in- vestigations have not consistently yielded significant gender differ- ence across different situations and contexts, and separable from other social variables such as race and class. In particular, Sandra Menssen argues that “the work of Carol Gilligan and her associates does not give us good reason for believing that men and women use different logics, and…it is difficult even to illustrate ‘the femi- nine mode of rationality’ Orr asks us to acknowledge” (Menssen, 1993, p. 136). While I cannot address all of the concerns with claims about gender differences here, I want to examine some that are especially pertinent to my discussion about feminism and the theory and practice of argument in philosophy.11 Suppositions about some different-but-equal “women’s ways of arguing” succumb to many of the same critiques that supposi- tions about a women’s “care voice” or “women’s ways of know- ing” did in feminist ethics and feminist epistemology. Although debates about the empirical and philosophical status of a proposed ethic of care have contributed to the development of feminist eth- ics, that area cannot be identified with an ethic of care—though many still make that mistaken identification. Further empirical studies (subsequent to Gilligan’s) rendered the existence, extent, or generalizability of gender differences questionable. In addition, many feminist theorists argued that even if women in some con- texts are more likely to speak in a different care voice, this was not 10 See Gilligan (1982). Gilligan’s work proved to be a significant catalyst for feminist debates about gender and moral reasoning., and it influenced debates about gender and cognitive differences more generally. 11 It should be noted that some feminist work on argumentation and critical thinking does not rely on disputed claims about gender differences. In her femi- nist examination of the Critical Thinking tradition, Karen Warren (1988) argues that it is “patriarchal conceptual frameworks” that need to be the focus of femi- nist attention. These conceptual frameworks, she argues, are oppressive in that they often incorporate “value-hierarchical thinking,” and they support structures of argumentation that maintain the subordination of “inferior” groups. Phyllis Rooney 214 something that could be readily affirmed by feminists (as a differ- ent yet equally valuable voice), since it could well bespeak the voice of the oppressed, and feminist endorsement would then amount to a kind of normalization of that oppression.12 A similar argument can be made about women’s “different” styles or types of argument. To the extent that women’s cooperative style or contex- tual elaboration indicates a tendency to defer, or a hesitancy about adopting and defending a position, it may bespeak women’s dimin- ished sense of cognitive authority and, as such, merits feminist re- dress rather than endorsement. Studies finding gender differences in cognitive capacities and practices are also rendered less than transparent by the complex role that gender stereotypes and expec- tations play, on the part of subjects, data collectors, and theoretical interpreters and commentators. For example, M. Lane Bruner has examined studies on gender and argumentation (conducted by scholars in Rhetoric and Communication) and concludes that many of them “tend to reify gender stereotypes more than problematize them.”13 I want to advance the project of problematizing gender stereo- types by disentangling types of argument or argumentation (linear, abstract, contextual, and narrative) from the gender associations that have regularly featured in gender differences assertions. For a start, it is often not clear what modes or qualities such as “linear,” “abstract,” “contextual,” or “narrative” mean when applied to peo- ple’s preferences in types of argument. To my mind, these terms initially direct attention to different kinds of cognitive situations or tasks which call for different types of reasoning and argumentation. By “linear” argument we might mean something like deductive reasoning, which is quite appropriate in mathematical and logical contexts when, for example, we seek to show that a conclusion fol- lows necessarily from specific premises. (As regards one aspect of gender, I should note that, having taught hundreds of students de- 12 See Rooney (2001) for my further elaboration of these points. Also see Lorraine Code (1991), esp. pp. 251-262, for an examination of the problematic use of the idea of “women’s ways of knowing” in feminist theorizing. In particu- lar, Code is critical of sociological studies and claims about “women’s ways of knowing” where the authors do not ask whether such ways of knowing “are the products of women’s oppressed social positions, nor do they consider whether a celebration if these ‘ways’ would be empowering and politically liberating” (1991, p. 260). 13 Bruner, 1996, p. 185. Also see Bonnie Dow and Celeste Condit (2005) for a recent analysis of studies (in Communication) on gender, feminism, and com- munication. These authors argue that the studies indicate that gender functions in a much more complicated way than that conveyed by earlier male-female differ- ences claims. Catherine Helen Palczewski (1996) provides a helpful overview and critical analysis of feminist work that tends to uncritically reify “feminine” and “masculine” styles of arguing. Michael Gilbert (1994) also critically exam- ines claims of gender differences in argumentation. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 215 ductive proofs in logic classes, I have yet to see any noticeable gender differences in my students’ ability to grasp and do these proofs. Having a female teacher may, however, go some way to- ward countering the general cultural association of logic with mas- culinity.14) Just as linear reasoning may be quite appropriate in de- ductive reasoning contexts, narrative and contextual expansion may be required in eliciting and then reasoning about the situational and relational complexities of moral situations. For example, most medical ethical arguments and decisions are made using such elaboration. I suspect that, insofar as gender figures into types of reasoning and argument, it figures in secondarily in the way in which cognitive and reasoning tasks were traditionally distributed by gender roles. But such gender distribution does not make the corresponding forms of reasoning or arguing naturally “feminine” or “masculine” in any meaningful sense. However, we cannot over- look the fact that “male” cognitive roles and tasks were typically selected as the models or prime examples of reasoning when phi- losophers theorized about reason and rationality.15 Problems with gender stereotyping also arise in the way that “abstract” reasoning has been contrasted with “contextual” reason- ing and argument. Gender differences in moral voice were regu- larly explained in terms of the greater (male) or lesser (female) use of abstract principles in moral deliberations. However, as I argue in more detail elsewhere (Rooney, 2001), where gender differences seemed to appear, they could have been articulated, just as plausi- bly, in terms of the application of different types of abstract princi- ples—as applied to different aspects of the moral situations in question. More specifically, abstraction is something of a relative and situated notion, as when we abstract from some of the contex- tual specifics or saliencies of a given situation and not others. Ab- stracting from a (multi-faceted) moral situation with respect to par- ticular kinds of relationships and responsibilities among individuals in the situation (as reported of female respondents), and not with respect to specific juridical rights of those individuals as autono- mous agents (as reported of male respondents), is one way of ab- stracting from the situation; another way involves abstracting with respect to the latter and not the former. And these, clearly, need not be the only ways of abstracting. In a sense, then, abstraction and attention to contextual details go hand-in-hand, since abstracting well or appropriately from a given situation typically involves a careful assessment of the contextual particulars and nuances of the situation It is, unfortunately, the traditional association of male- 14 See Pam Oliver (2002) for a critical examination of the cultural associations of rationality and logic with masculinity. Additional critical analyses of feminist issues in formal logic and logical issue in feminist theory appear in Rachel Fal- magne and Marjorie Hass (2002). 15 See Rooney, 1995, esp. pp. 29-30 for my fuller elucidation of this claim. Phyllis Rooney 216 ness with rationality—the latter typically fleshed in terms of prin- ciples, autonomy, universality, and abstraction—that seems to automatically lend voice to particular ways of reading gender dif- ferences in these contexts and not alternative ways that, I maintain, are just as plausible. In sum, even if gender differences appear (and these have been a matter of some contention), it is important that we resist reading or interpreting them in accord with traditional stereotypes that, instead, require feminist rethinking. Let us now turn our attention to narrative argument which, perhaps because of its traditional gender association and its asso- ciation with imagination, has been given woefully little attention in philosophy and informal logic. It is difficult to get a precise defini- tion of “narrative argument,” yet it is clear that narrative plays an important role in argumentation, including in philosophy. A good narrative can clearly convey a narrator’s position about some issue, and it can also persuade the narrator’s audience of that same posi- tion. As such, it can constitute an argument, certainly according to a rhetorical view of argument which pays particular attention to audience persuasion. Important evidence relating to personal or cultural experience may be conveyed best in narrative form. In phi- losophy, counterexamples to philosophical definitions (or argu- ments) are often presented as narratives about possible situations where the definiens (or premises) are true and the definiendum (or conclusion) is false. Plato’s allegory of the cave has featured sig- nificantly in philosophical understandings of knowledge. It has functioned as a compelling narrative about the epistemic struggle from vague and shadowy ideas to truth and knowledge. Indeed, the profusion of light and vision metaphors used to convey ideas about knowledge and understanding underscores the significance of the movement from darkness to light narrative in everyday as well as philosophical conceptions of truth and knowledge. (I see what you mean; her explanation threw light on the subject; I’m clearer now about his position; I found her account enlightening.) Since a significant part of my argument examines the argu- ment-as-war metaphor as a narrative entangled with other philoso- phical narratives, it is important to reflect on the use of metaphor and narrative as a significant, though often overlooked, component in philosophical argumentation.16 In The Philosophy Imaginary, Michèle Le Dœuff not only establishes the crucial role of metaphor and narrative in philosophy, but she also raises important questions about why philosophers have typically overlooked that role. She writes: 16 I this context I am connecting metaphor and narrative insofar as metaphor of- ten works as part of a familiar narrative. For example, winning an argument is a metaphor that makes sense within the argument-as-war narrative of opponents adopting conflicting positions and then attacking or defending these positions until one or the other opponent/position wins out. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 217 Philosophical discourse is inscribed and declares its status as philosophy through a break with myth, fable, the po- etic, the domain of the image…The images that appear in theoretical texts are normally viewed as extrinsic to the theoretical work…[but] it is no longer feasible to go on ignoring the importance of imagery in philosophy…[we must reflect on] strands of the imaginary operating in places where, in principle, they are supposed not to belong and yet where, without them, nothing would have been accomplished…. Images are the means by which every philosophy can engage in straightforward dogmatization, and decree a 'that's the way it is' without fear of counter-argument, since it is understood that a good reader will by-pass such 'illustrations'—a convention which en- ables the image to do its work all the more effectively. (Le Dœuff, 1989, pp. 1, 2, 12) Le Dœuff proceeds to examine what she takes to be significant metaphors and narratives in some of the canonical works of phi- losophy.17 There is a curious paradox in philosophy, she notes, when philosophers establish the significance of knowledge, truth, understanding, and philosophy itself, using metaphors, images, or fables that in other contexts these same philosophers are likely to characterize as “just” stylistic embellishment, as something which other than, or a distraction from, pure philosophical thinking and content. To my mind, the best example of this conflict comes from Locke, when he characterizes the proper place of philosophy (with respect to language) as a literal place of order and clarity removed from the tempting “figurative applications” of words: If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judg- ment…where truth and knowledge are concerned [these artificial and figurative application of words] cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them. 17 For example, Le Dœuff notes how, in his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant de- picts the “territory of pure understanding…the land of truth” as an island “sur- rounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg gives the deceptive appearance of farther shores” (Kant, quoted in Le Dœuff, 1989, p. 8). Phyllis Rooney 218 Yet Locke remarks that men are much tempted by such entertain- ments and deceptions of language, and he then ends this paragraph two sentences later with the following statement: “Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against; and it is vain to find fault with those arts of de- ceiving, wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.”18 There are four things to note about this gender metaphor in relation to phi- losophy, narrative, argument, and gender. First, the metaphor de- flects attention from the need for an argument for an assumed premise, that is, that there is a clear distinction (for the philosopher at least) between literal and metaphorical use of language. Second, Locke metaphorically marks the metaphorical and figurative as- pects of languages as “feminine” over and against the place of phi- losophy proper which is thereby symbolized as “masculine.” This move reflects the common philosophical depiction of metaphor as stylistic embellishment or decoration of language, as extraneous to the real content of philosophy. Third, the metaphor’s appearance in the very same paragraph in which Locke is warning us of the de- ceptions of metaphor makes one wonder if his gender metaphor is visible as such to Locke. Perhaps it functions as a kind of “invisi- ble” ground metaphor or narrative in philosophy. (I argue that it does in Rooney, 2002.) Fourth, the metaphor seeks to convince the philosophical reader of the tempting but deceiving aspects of figu- rative language. Yet it establishes the reader as, like Locke, a man among men in a specific cultural milieu with specific attitudes and views about the “fair sex.” As metaphor theorists note, metaphors “work” only if they draw on associations or views that are taken for granted by writer and readers. My examination here of the role of metaphor and narrative in philosophy is clearly designed to counter the recurring portrayal of narrative argument as a more “feminine” type of argument, espe- cially when it is contrasted with the “masculine” linear, logical, abstract forms of reasoning and argumentation that dominate phi- losophy’s self-image. The history of philosophy itself troubles that contrast. But troubling that contrast requires making quite visible the role of sex and gender metaphors, in particular, as something other than “mere” stylistic embellishment in philosophy. As we see with the Locke example, gender associations or assumptions can inform key premises or moves in philosophical argumentation; they often do things that—as Le Dœuff notes about philosophical meta- phors more generally—would not get done without them. In sec- tion 4, we will take up this point again when we explore the meta- 18 Locke’s metaphor appears in bk. 3, chap. 10, par. 34 of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. See Rooney (2002) for further discussion of this meta- phor. There I also examine other examples of the metaphorical construction of the linguistic place of pure or proper philosophy as a “masculine” place. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 219 phorical construction of reason as battling philosophy’s imaginary construction of “woman.” Le Dœuff sums up philosophy’s “por- trait of ‘woman’” as, “a power of disorder, a being of night, a twi- light beauty, a dark continent, a sphinx of dissolution, an abyss as of the unintelligible, a voice of underworld gods…a place where all forms dissolve” (Le Dœuff, 1989, p. 113). But first, let us reflect further on the role of the argument-as- war metaphor in philosophical understandings and conceptions of a key practice of reason, argument and argumentation. 3. Minimal adversariality? Disagreement plays an important role in inquiry, in the furtherance of truth, understanding, and knowledge. Given the fact that argu- mentation is a practice that is typically bound up with the working out of disagreement, how much adversariality is required for the epistemically productive use of argumentation? While our main focus in this section is argumentation as an epistemic practice in- volving rational persuasion and truth-seeking, there are other forms of argumentation that don’t readily fall within this epistemic pur- view. Arguments are often about which action to take or which pol- icy to adopt, and these arguments may involve some level of adver- sariality, especially when arguers’ personal interests, preferences, and values are at stake. (Indeed, some form of adversariality may be required when there is a threat to someone’s sense of integrity, value, or self-respect. Perhaps a form of “just war” may apply in such situations.) Yet these arguments often have an epistemic com- ponent, involving claims to the effect that action or policy A is likely to be more effective than action or policy B (where there is some prior agreement about what constitutes effectiveness in the given situation). Evidence of past success with A or B (or with as- pects of A or B) can be brought to bear in determining the likely truth of such claims. Thus, we can take the determination of truth or likely truth to be a significant component of most arguments in a dialectical context—which can also include arguments with one- self. Govier captures important epistemic factors in her understand- ing of good arguments as tools of inquiry which involve claims that are “in some way at issue,” where evidence is submitted to justify claims, where there is an honesty and openness about the existence of disagreement or doubt, and where possibilities of rational per- suasion exist (Govier, 1999, pp. 45-51). She adds, “I would submit that argument is not necessarily confrontational [in the ancillary sense] and that adversariality can be kept to a logical, and polite, minimum…[A]rgument may embrace the positive goals of persua- sion and justification without necessitating adversariality in any negative sense” (p. 55). Phyllis Rooney 220 There are many reasons to impugn what Govier calls “ancil- lary adversariality” in argumentation, in addition to the fact that it can discourage people less comfortable with combative styles of interaction. Standard philosophical norms of good reasoning and arguing also impugn aspects of ancillary adversariality that hinder the careful expression and assessment of arguments. Fallacies such as ad hominem and straw man expressly prohibit the kinds of per- sonal attack and distortion of opponents’ positions that a hostile and combative environment is likely to foster. On the more con- structive side, many norms or principles of argumentation endorsed by informal logicians and argumentation theorists specifically en- courage practices of respectful listening and careful assessment of evidence from different perspectives. Among such recommended dialectical rules of procedure are the Principle of Charity, Paul Grice’s “cooperative principle,” and the specific rules of the pragma-dialectical school of argumentation.19 I agree with Govier that feminist concerns with ancillary ad- versariality do not impugn argument per se, and that, in any case, there are “good independent reasons” for discouraging the antago- nistic, coercive, or militaristic aspects of argumentation that have concerned many feminists.20 But not all feminist critiques are di- rected toward this level of adversariality and the ways it can (given gender socialization) disproportionately discourage and silence women. As I will argue, a specifically-feminist critique can be di- rected, not just to the practice of argumentation, but to the ways in which such practice is supported by philosophical and logical con- ceptions of argument and argumentation that uncritically incorpo- rate competition and battle imagery. I will next argue that Govier’s minimal adversariality, which she maintains is appropriate, perhaps even necessary in argumentation, also involves elements of battle that are not warranted. 19 For a helpful account of these developments in argumentation theory, see van Eemeren et al. (1996). Michael Scriven takes the Principle of Charity to require “ that we try to make the best, rather than the worst, possible interpretation of the argument we’re studying.” He argues that it also proscribes “taking cheap shots,” “nit picking,” and “setting up a straw man” (van Eemeren et al., p. 170). 20 In these contexts Govier is primarily addressing feminist critiques that impugn argument (generally) as aggressive or coercive practice. For example, in her pa- per supporting “the womanization of rhetoric,” Sally Gearhart maintains that “any intent to persuade is an act of violence” (Gearhart, 1979, p. 195). Also see Maryann Ayim (1988) for a discussion of “violence and domination as meta- phors of academic discourse”—metaphors that, she notes, are often linked with imagery of sexual domination. Some have interpreted Andrea Nye’s (1990) feminist examination of the history of logic (with logic’s use of “words of power”) along similar lines. Richard Fulkerson, among others, has argued that some of these critiques rely too heavily on “essentializing stereotypes” of com- petitive men and cooperative and nurturing women---the kinds of stereotypes we examined in section 2 above. See Fulkerson, 1996, esp. pp. 206-210. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 221 It would certainly seem that minimal adversariality is inevita- ble, Govier argues, given the fact that people have definite (and different) beliefs or opinions. When a situation arises where differ- ences need to be addressed, disagreements, criticisms, challenges of others’ premises naturally result. Govier describes such a situa- tion in a series of steps, using what we can recognize as a paradigm case of such difference—where I hold X and you hold not-X. She notes where minimal adversariality can readily make an appearance in our description of our working through the disagreement, but it need not be considered especially negative or destructive (Govier, 1999, p. 244). From our basic difference, and my holding X (step 1), we are likely to say that I think that X is correct (step 2), and that I think that not-X is not correct (step 3), Govier notes. From there one could quite naturally say that I think that anyone who holds not-X (including you) is wrong, or is making a mistake (step 4). Govier does not question this move in our admittedly common or natural description of our disagreement, but I suggest that there is already more confrontation elicited here than is necessary. To go from saying that I think that your belief not-X is mistaken or incor- rect to “you are wrong” is surely an extra and unnecessary step. It illustrates a problematic slippage that is not uncommon in argu- mentation, the slippage from a person’s belief or claim (as wrong) to the person herself (as wrong). It introduces a level of adversari- ality that is unnecessary and epistemically confusing, and, to my mind, borders on the very thing Govier wants to avoid, “the ancil- lary aspects of adversariality commonly attendant upon [minimal adversariality] and thus naturally and readily confused with it” (p. 245). Govier does render “questionable” the next 2 assertions which, again, we might very easily and naturally make in describing this argument situation. “Should I need to argue for X, I will thereby be arguing against not-X” (step 5); “Those who hold not-X are, with regard to the correctness of X and my argument for X, my oppo- nents” (step 6) (p. 244, my emphases). While I agree with Govier that we often quite commonly say such things, I want to render them even more questionable. With regard to step 5, I could just as easily, and perhaps more accurately, say that I am arguing with not- X and with your argument for not-X, in that I am taking into con- sideration and reasoning with your evidence and your reasoning for not-X, even if at the end of the exchange I still hold X? Isn’t this argument a particular kind of conversation (one where we are working through differences in beliefs), and don’t we normally say we converse with rather than against people or their conversation? Relating to step 6, why are you my “opponent” if you are providing me with further or alternative considerations in regard to X, and, again, whether I end up agreeing with X or not-X? Given the use of “opponent” in step 6, we are now very close to an additional step Phyllis Rooney 222 (though not given by Govier) which involves a claim we also read- ily make in the event that, after our exchange of evidence and rea- soning, I end up agreeing with your not-X. I lose the argument and you win (step 7). But surely I am the one who has made the epis- temic gain, however small. I have replaced a probably false belief with a probably true one, and you have made no such gain (though, of course, you might claim some achievement and satisfaction in helping me to my epistemic gain). What I am suggesting with my questioning of this combative wording is not that we should resist it in order to be more polite, but that this wording is misdescribing the argument situation, quite significantly from an epistemic point of view. It is easy to think in terms of “opponents” when there is “conflict of beliefs,” Govier notes. Yet even talking about conflicting or opposing beliefs is al- ready something of a misnomer when we have perfectly fine epis- temic or logical terms such as “contradictory” or “inconsistent” which more precisely describe what the “conflict” is. The fact that such minimal antagonism is comfortably embedded in what we take to be quite natural, common descriptions (misdescriptions) of this and similar argument situations suggests that the boundary be- tween Govier’s minimal and ancillary adversariality is more porous than we might initially think. (In rendering steps 5 and 6 question- able Govier perhaps thinks so too.) Battle images and wording cut across both. War-like metaphors (shooting down points, attacking positions and persons, going after fatal flaws, and so on), often en- acted more explicitly and problematically with ancillary adversari- ality, have their less bellicose cousins—but cousins still—in the minimal adversariality informing basic understandings and descrip- tions of argument and argumentation. They do so to the extent that, as I maintain above, we barely recognize them as such, even when they are characterizing argument situations in epistemically erro- neous and confusing ways. Others have also drawn critical attention to the argument-as- war metaphor and its problematic role in the understanding and practice of argument as a tool of rational persuasion. In connection with what he calls “the ideology of argumentation” Daniel Cohen notes, “What the pervasive argument-is-war metaphor reveals is that the operative ideology [of argumentation] commits us, if not to truth and falsity, or to right and wrong sides, at the very least to winners and losers.”21 Stressing the positive epistemic role of ra- tional persuasion in argumentation, Ralph Johnson implicitly criti- cizes the way in which a win-lose calculus can obscure the goals of truth and good reasoning: “one reason argumentation is such a powerful practice is that if each party does its very best, then both sides will gain as a result of the process” (Johnson, 2000, p. 243). 21 Cohen, 1995, p. 181. Cohen also discusses this metaphor in Cohen, 2004. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 223 Under the shadow of its dominant metaphor, argumentative reason- ing can become “pedantic and petty,” Cohen adds. It can presup- pose that “the subject at hand can be carved into distinct and op- posing positions, and this tends to squeeze the discussion of even the most complex questions into a black-and-white view of the world.” Insight and understanding are likely to be trumped by “cleverness and rhetorical dexterity” (Cohen, 1995, pp. 180-181). Cohen does not exclude arguments in philosophy in this assess- ment. Though he does not mention Moulton’s work, some of his concerns clearly echo problems she had with the way in which the paradigmatic Adversary Method can significantly constrict phi- losophical reasoning and argumentation. In this section it looks like I have done what I earlier noted that Moulton and Govier had done. I have examined problems with ad- versarial argumentation, and minimal adversariality in particular, as not-specifically-feminist problems. My position largely rests on generally accepted epistemic and epistemological concepts and claims about differences and disagreements in beliefs, about adduc- ing evidence in support of beliefs or their negations, and about ar- riving at beliefs that are more likely to be true. But this is not the end of the story, of course. It is the beginning of a new one. Some central questions now loom: Given some of the obvious problems with adversariality, now acknowledged in many circles (not just feminist ones), how did adversariality (with its attendant argument- as-war metaphor) become so implanted in understandings and con- ceptions of argument in the first place, and especially in philoso- phy? Why has it taken so long to see its problems? A better under- standing of how we got ourselves into this problematic and para- doxical situation might also give us an understanding of how we might get ourselves back out of it. I will now proceed to examine adversariality in a way that renews feminist attention on it, yet does not assume controversial claims about (natural or socialized) gen- der differences in styles or modes of reasoning and arguing. Femi- nist epistemological analyses are sometimes described as, simply, “making gender visible,” and I now proceed to make gender visible in metaphorical constructions of embattled reason and its natural offspring argument-as-war.22 4. Embattled reason A year after the publication of Moulton’s paper, Genevieve Lloyd’s Man of Reason appeared, and this work proved to be a significant 22 Helen Longino has proposed as “a bottom line requirement of feminist know- ers [of knowledge and of epistemology]…that they reveal or prevent the disap- pearing of gender’ (1994, p. 481). Phyllis Rooney 224 impetus for feminist work on the history of Western philosophy and feminist work on reason (Lloyd, 1993 [1984]). Lloyd pays par- ticular attention to the historical perseverance of the “maleness” of reason in the Western philosophical tradition. She documents the ways in which philosophical understandings of the value and power of reason regularly involved some form of denigration, con- trol over, distance from, or transcendence of “woman” or “the feminine.” She traces “the implicit maleness of our ideals of Rea- son” through different philosophical eras, through different ap- proaches to conceptualizing reason, and, indeed, through different historical understandings of male-female differences. The stage was well set in Greek theories of knowledge, she notes. “From the beginnings of philosophical thought, femaleness was symbolically associated with what Reason supposedly left behind--the dark powers of the earth goddesses, immersion in unknown forces asso- ciated with mysterious female powers.”23 Aristotle not only thought that women were (in a literal sense) less capable of reason than men, but woman also symbolically rep- resented the irrational element of the soul: “in the soul too there is something contrary to the rational principle, resisting and opposing it…[the relationship between these parts of the soul] metaphori- cally resembles that between master and servant or that between husband and wife.”24 Philo, the first-century Alexandrian, echoed Aristotle’s theme: “[there are] two ingredients which constitute our life-principle, the rational and the irrational; the rational which be- longs to mind and reason is of the masculine gender, the irrational, the province of sense, is of the feminine. Mind belongs to a genus wholly superior to sense as man is to woman” (Philo, quoted in Lloyd, 1993, p. 27). Augustine associated a lesser practical form of reason with “woman’s corporeal veil,” which was distinguished from the part of the mind and Reason directed to “the contempla- tion and consideration of the eternal reasons” (Augustine, quoted in Lloyd, 1993, p. 31). Aquinas’s association of women with sin re- flects the Medieval entanglement of philosophy with theology: the construction of woman as temptress, as identified with body and sexuality, determined her diminished status in both philosophy and theology. In later centuries, when philosophers sought to develop con- ceptions of reason, knowledge, and consciousness in terms of a more harmonious relationship with Nature (Rousseau), or in terms of a reconciliation of human reason with the rationality of Nature 23 Lloyd, 1993 [1984], p. 2. The association of femaleness with darkness and of maleness with light can be examined in connection with the significance of the movement from darkness to light metaphor/narrative in philosophical under- standings of knowledge. 24 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, quoted in Rooney, 1991, p. 81. (My empha- ses). Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 225 (Kant), or in terms of endorsing a conception of Reason as the un- folding of Nature (Hegel), the symbolic or actual woman still does not fare well by ideals of reason. Woman now regularly represents an instinctual or immature stage of nature and consciousness, a stage that must be transcended in the full self-conscious realization of Nature and Reason. In what may seem like a reversal, Nietzsche asks us to “suppose truth is a woman.” His association, however, serves not so much to elevate women, but to disparage truth, espe- cially the traditional slavish following of truth as a dogmatic illu- sion that impedes true exuberance and creativity. The American pragmatist, C. S. Peirce, underscores the importance of clear ideas and thought by warning “us” about what happens to a young man who clings too long to “some vague shadow of an idea.” Such a man wakes up “some bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like the beautiful Melusina of the fable, and the essence of his life gone with it.”25 Gender metaphors thus establish a recurring philosophical nar- rative: following the path of reason, clarity, and knowledge re- quires a constant vigilance against the ever-lurking threats of dis- tractions of “feminine” unreason: emotion, body, sexuality, in- stinct, nature, or wily charms.26 What is especially significant for our feminist purposes here is not that gender imagery is used, but how it is used. Gender doesn’t function as a “different but equal” type of categorization. Reason is significantly valued through a si- multaneous devaluing of a “feminine” aspect or principle that the man of reason must continually monitor, control, reject, or tran- scend.27 A misogyny-inflected cultural imaginary is the taken-for- granted or assumed background that fills the gap between the gen- dering of a particular aspect of mind or experience (passion, body, nature, chaos, or indeterminacy) as “feminine,” and the automatic determination of that same aspect as something to be denigrated, rejected, or transcended. Without such an assumed background functioning essentially as a missing premise, that move couldn’t be made, the metaphor wouldn’t “work.” Metaphor theorists argue that in order for metaphors to work, they must draw upon a "system of associated commonplaces" shared by the writer and intended readers. As one prominent theorist noted, "the important thing for 25 Peirce, quoted in Rooney, 1991, p. 85. See this paper for more examples and further analysis of the metaphorical gendering of reason. 26 It is important to note that the “slave” (as in the Aristotle quote) or the “primi- tive” also regularly took the place of that which is “other” to reason and true knowledge. That is, gender was not the only social category used to mark that which is excluded from the realm of reason. See Mills (1997) for a discussion of the role of racism in epistemological and political theorizing. 27 As Lloyd notes in a later paper on metaphors of maleness and reason, the male/female distinction in philosophical texts is “a vehicle of evaluation. It serves to privilege, through oppositional contrasts, some aspects of mind over others” (Lloyd, 2002, p. 86). Phyllis Rooney 226 the metaphor's effectiveness is not that the commonplaces shall be true, but that they should be readily and freely evoked” (Black, 1962, p. 40). The shared background of many of these freely evoked images is a cultural imaginary drawn in part from mytho- logical associations carried by the Furies and Sirens in classical times, and by Witches in more modern times—a mythological heri- tage making its appearance in a discourse that, as Le Dœuff notes, regularly declares its status as philosophy through a break with myth and fable. As many of the examples above also show, the valuing and devaluing inscribed by gender metaphors is played out as a contin- ual battle, with reason battling over or against ever-threatening “feminine” aspects. Gender is battle here, and “male” reason is em- battled reason. Metaphors of battle are quite explicit in other con- texts. In the Republic, for example, Plato discusses the type of phi- losophical reasoning needed to abstract and analyze the Form of the Good, a reasoning that is able to distinguish appearance from reality and knowledge from opinion. The man who is to “really know the good itself…[must] as it were in battle [run] the gauntlet of all tests…and hold on his way through all this without tripping in his reasoning.”28 In his important epistemological work, The Posterior Analytics, Aristotle symbolically compares the step-by- step rational integration of undifferentiated empirical perceptions and experiences with standing against a rout in battle: “It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then an- other, until the original formation has been restored.”29 The “origi- nal formation” indicative of the growth of knowledge and under- standing thus emerges as something like a well-disciplined army. Militaristic metaphors pepper Descartes’s Passions of the Soul. The properly disciplined will, as an ally of mind and reason, must struggle against primitive instincts and passions as “animal spirits,” using the soul’s “proper arms” of determinate judgments of good and evil (Lloyd, 2002, p. 86). Some centuries (and many similar metaphors) later, Wittgenstein describes the philosopher’s proper vigilance with language in a way that entangles gender with battle quite explicitly, “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”30 A lapse in such vigilance 28 Plato, Republic, Bk VII, 534bc. This translation is by Paul Shorey (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1935). 29 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 19. This translation is by Richard McKeon (The Basic Works of Aristotle, New York: Random House, 1941). 30 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 109 (trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe, New York: MacMillan, 1953). The German word Wittgenstein uses, “die Verhexung,” is appropriately translated as “bewitchment.” The gender asso- ciation is marked by the root word “Hexe,” meaning witch. For a further analysis of the function of this and similar metaphors in Wittgenstein’s demarcation of the proper role of philosophy vis à vis language, see Rooney, 2002. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 227 echoes Peirce’s lapse in clarity of language and thought, which he (Peirce) represents in terms of the captivation and abandonment by the beautiful (and presumably bewitching) Melusina of the fable. We need to be clear about how gender is working in these re- curring gender/battle images. There are two gender battles at issue. The more immediate textual one is not a battle between men (or masculinity) and women (or femininity), but the battle within men between their ”masculine” rational aspects or parts and their “feminine” irrational aspects or parts. It is the defensive struggle within men against what they perceive or construct as inferior “feminine” tendencies within themselves.31 To the extent that women might also aspire to the “man of reason” ideal, they too, presumably, would battle their “feminine” aspects, though, even in sexism-infused cultural contexts, these metaphors might not work in quite the same way for them. However, this battle between parts of mind, soul, or experience derives from an original battle be- tween men (or masculinity) and women (or femininity), as that bat- tle is constructed by men in specific historical-cultural contexts. It is a battle that primarily makes sense to men among men in cultural contexts where sexism or misogyny is a cultural given that infuses imagination and language, among other things. Philosophical understandings of argument and argumentation (as a, if not the paradigmatic practice of reason or reasoning) have not escaped the dictates of the metaphorical construction of embat- tled reason. Success in arguing (reasoning) is fundamentally bound up, metaphorically, with success in maleness overcoming or con- trolling a threatening non-rational femaleness. In a dialectical con- text, argumentation symbolically pits two or more opponents (two “men of reason”) who are both battling for the rational, masculine position. The battle over one’s opponent is now amplified as a bat- tle to avoid the “feminine” position, as the losing position is now symbolically constructed. Perceived failures in argumentation are often feminized, sometimes articulated as “wimping out” or “chickening out.” Success in arguing is, therefore, success in bat- tling; in effect, argument is war. In her paper addressing gender metaphors more explicitly, Lloyd notes how symbolic operations interact with the social for- mation of gender identity: “Masculine socialization influences which symbols male authors choose and how they operate with them. And those uses of symbols influence in turn the social forma- tion of gender identity” (2002, p. 75). Because of this long histori- cal interaction, and because masculine gender socialization and identity is still significantly informed by sexism, uncovering and uprooting the effects of sexism-informed gender symbolism in philosophical texts and imaginations is no easy matter. Recent 31 My thanks to Robert Pinto for stressing this point of clarification. Phyllis Rooney 228 work in masculinity theory helps to shed light on the lingering connections between the (however distant) philosophical construc- tions of embattled/masculine reason and contemporary socio- cultural constructions of masculinity. In this work (which provides a necessary complement to feminist examinations of socio-cultural constructions of femininity) there is recurring mention of early male development, and, in particular, of the significant role that sexism plays in the construction of masculine identity. In reflecting on his teenage years, Patrick Hopkins notes that the most popular insult/name used by boys with other boys was, simply, “girl.” The “blatantly sexist use of the word ‘girl’…like other terms [‘faggot’, ‘homo’] signifies a failure of masculinity, a failure of living up to a gendered standard of behavior, and a gendered standard of iden- tity” (Hopkins, 1996, pp. 95-96). Michael Kimmel, among others, has amplified this point. He argues that “manhood is socially con- structed…historically and developmentally, masculinity has been defined as the flight from women, the repudiation of feminin- ity…Being a man means ‘not being like women’...Masculinity is the relentless repudiation of the feminine” (Kimmel, 1994, pp. 125- 126). The recurring taunts of “gay,” “sissy,” “wimp,” Kimmel ar- gues, construct masculinity as something that must be continually, relentless proved, producing constant fear of emasculation. Kimmel maintains that “homosocial enactment” and “homoso- cial competition” of men among men play a significant role in male identity and experience, at least in the cultural contexts he examines.32 Some studies indicate that such competition also in- forms men’s styles of communication and argumentation, whether in male-male or male-female interactions. Among studies of gender differences in communication are some that point to a man’s need to continually navigate his way through “a hierarchical social order in which he [is] either one-up or one-down…oral disputation is in- herently adversative…oral performance is self-display…is part of a larger framework in which many men approach life as a contest.”33 32 Kimmel is careful to note that his main focus is “American manhood,” and that the definition of manhood he is examining is that of white, middle-class, heterosexual men. Yet that definition, he adds, “continues to remain the standard against which other forms of manhood are measured and evaluated” (Kimmel, 1996, p. 124). 33 Deborah Tannen (1990, 24, p. 150). Not unlike Gilligan in her discussions of gender differences in moral reasoning, Tannen sometimes discusses these differ- ences in the mode of, “women are more like this, men are more like that, and vive la différence.” This gets us back to the recurring and tricky balancing act of, on the one hand, recognizing and understanding gender differences (which are always context-relative and often contested, in any case), and, on the other hand, not reinforcing and normalizing the status and power disparities and injustices that give rise to such differences. We should also keep in mind that, as with women and norms of femininity, there are varying degrees of resistance and con- Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 229 With reference to such studies, Michael Gilbert expands, “For many men, arguing without being committed or as devil’s advocate is the intellectual equivalent of schoolyard roughhousing…arguing can be very aggressive and apparently antagonistic, but also exhila- rating and downright enjoyable to those to whom it is considered play” (Gilbert, 1995, p. 102). Gilbert’s expansion helps to explain why philosophical discussions sometimes play out as competitive sports contests, and why those of us who don’t quite get it are likely to be told that we shouldn’t take it too personally, since, after all, it’s just fun or play in exercising one’s philosophical chops. When I read these accounts of male development and experi- ence, I must say that I better understand why I have sometimes felt like a stranger in a strange land as I’ve observed male philosophers arguing among themselves. These interactions often converge on an interminable battle about what I had understood to be a fairly minor (perhaps irrelevant) point in the overall argument or discus- sion. Insight or understanding about the larger significant philoso- phical issue at hand is often left behind in the rush to score the point or win the argument. Normative masculinity based on relent- less homosocial competition seems to inform the fear of failure (linked, according to Kimmel, to a fear of emasculation) that losing an argument would seem to entail—even a nitpicking, pedantic, or trivial one! Yet this is perhaps no longer strange or surprising. For we have here homosocial competition operating in a discipline that is still, (outside relatively marginalized feminist philosophy circles) largely resistant to critically uncovering and uprooting the full ef- fects of its gender history, a history that inspired and still informs this particular cultural construction of masculinity. Yet—and here I’m surmising as something of outsider again—there seems to be some code of silence among male philosophers about openly chal- lenging these particular (and to many women, peculiar) construc- tions of masculinity. For them to do so would, it seems, automati- cally place them in a one-down position in the specific culture of homosocial enactment that the discipline often still exhibits. 5. Conclusion I have made a case for various entanglements and disentanglements in this paper, but one of each predominates. I have argued for dis- entangling, from discussions of gender-inflected adversariality in philosophy especially, particular kinds of gender assumptions and claims. In particular, I have challenged the default assumption that women are less comfortable with adversarial argumentation be- formity that individual men adopt in relation to local norms or expectations of masculinity. Phyllis Rooney 230 cause they are generally more cooperative and supportive. Such an assumption typically derives from claims about gender differences that are at best contested, that do not take full account of the ways in which gender operates with other social variables, and differ- ently in different social and cultural contexts. Just as gender lends itself to different interpretations and understandings, so too does adversariality. I have argued for a specific link between gender and adversari- ality in philosophy, one that pays particular attention to philoso- phy’s history and culture. That examination involves entangling (or, perhaps, re-entangling) the adversariality question with the discipline’s history of sexism and misogyny, and especially with feminist philosophical reflections on that history. I’ve argued that in this context the key gender differences we need to attend to are those that are metaphorically and symbolically constructed in the philosophical canon. The question of gender differences in comfort levels with adversarial argumentation now emerges somewhat dif- ferently. It has to do with the fact that women philosophers are less attached to historical associations and metaphors that have incorpo- rated aspects of a sexist history and culture that the discipline as a whole still tolerates—at least to the extent that it continues to mar- ginalize feminist work uncovering that history and culture. As Lloyd stresses, The linking of the symbolism of the male-female distinc- tion with the understanding of rationality is a contingent feature of Western thought, the elusive but real effects of which are still with us…There can be real discomfort for women in attempting to speak form those supposedly neu- tral positions that have been constituted by and for male thinking subjects for whom the [male-female] oppositions came naturally” (2002, p. 81). Although most philosophers (both female and male) now dis- tance themselves from the more explicit sexist and misogynistic passages in the history of Western philosophy, we all absorb, to some extent, that history’s gender associations when we uncriti- cally absorb aspects of the history and culture of philosophy that I have explored in this paper. Too many philosophers still suppose that gender metaphors in philosophy functioned as “mere” stylistic embellishment. Or they maintain that sexist comments about actual women were “mere” historical curiosities of more sexist times, that they can be set aside from the real philosophical content of histori- cal texts that still inform the core concepts and questions of the dis- cipline. Yet significant feminist scholarship during these past dec- ades has gone quite some distance toward undermining such ready suppositions and assertions. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 231 There are significant advantages in furthering critical examina- tions of philosophy’s gender-inflected and limited understandings and practices of adversariality. To the extent that we are all still influenced by forms of adversarial argumentation that significantly constrain philosophical discussion, insight, and understanding we are poorer reasoners and arguers than we might otherwise be. From the point of view of good philosophical development and the many reasonings, arguments, insights, understandings, truths, or wisdom it may yet reveal, philosophy’s peculiar adversariality is not just a problem for women. It is a problem for anyone who wants to pro- mote the value of philosophy as a discipline that is genuinely wel- coming of the variety of arguments, views, and perspectives that it—in theory at least—claims to welcome. Acknowledgements: I presented an early version of parts of this paper at the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation confer- ence in 2003. I am grateful to audience members there for helpful discussion, and especially to Robert Pinto for his thoughtful written comments on that paper (Rooney, 2003). I also thank Catherine Hundleby for her suggestions and support in the development of this paper. Patricia Trentacoste, Sharon Crasnow, and two anony- mous reviewers for this journal also provided very helpful com- ments on an earlier draft of the paper. References Ayim, Maryann. (1988). Violence and Domination as Metaphors in Academic Discourse. In: Trudy Govier (ed.), Selected Issues in Logic and Communication (pp. 184-195). Belmont, CA: Wad- sworth. Black, Max. (1962). Models and Metaphors. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press Bruner, M. Lane. (1996). Producing Identities: Gender Problemati- zation and Feminist Argumentation. Argumentation and Advo- cacy 32(4): 185-198. Burgess-Jackson, Keith. (2002). The Backlash Against Feminist Philosophy. In: Superson and Cudd (2002), pp. 19-47. Code, Lorraine. (1991). What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer- sity Press. Cohen, Daniel H. (1995). Argument is War...and War is Hell: Phi- losophy, Education, and Metaphors for Argumentation. Infor- mal Logic 17(2): 177-188. ------. (2004). Arguments and Metaphors in Philosophy. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Phyllis Rooney 232 Crasnow, Sharon. (2009). What Do the Numbers Mean? American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philoso- phy, vol. 8, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 13-16. Available at: http://www.apaonline.org/publications/newsletters/v08n2_Femini sm_09.aspx Dow, Bonnie J. and Celeste M. Condit. (2005). The State of the Art in Feminist Scholarship in Communication. Journal of Com- munication 55 (3): 448-478. Falmagne, Rachel Joffe, and Marjorie Hass (Eds.). (2002). Femi- nist Theory and Formal Logic. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Lit- tlefield Frey, Olivia. (1990). Beyond Literary Darwinism: Women’s Voices and Critical Discourse. College English 52(5): 507-26. Fulkerson, Richard. (1996). Transcending Our Conception of Ar- gument in Light of Feminist Critiques. Argumentation and Ad- vocacy 32(4): 199-217. Gearhart, Sally Miller. (1979). The Womanization of Rhetoric. Women’s Studies International Quarterly 2: 195-201. Gilbert, Michael A. (1994). Feminism, Argumentation and Coales- cence. Informal Logic 16(2): 95-113. ------. (1997). Coalescent Argumentation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Gilligan, Carol. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- sity Press. Govier, Trudy. (1999). The Philosophy of Argument. Newport News, Virginia: Vale Press. Grimshaw, Jean. (1987). Philosophy and Aggression. Radical Phi- losophy 47 (Autumn 1987). Harding, Sandra, and Merrill B. Hintikka. (1983). Discovering Re- ality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel. Haslanger, Sally. (2008). Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not By Reason (Alone). Hypatia 23 (2): 210-223. Hopkins, Patrick D. (1996). Gender Treachery: Homophobia, Mas- culinity, and Threatened Identities. In: Larry May, Robert Strikwerda, and Patrick D. Hopkins (eds.), Rethinking Mascu- linity: Philosophical Explorations in Light of Feminism. Sec- ond Edition (pp. 95-115). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Johnson, Ralph H. (2000). Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic The- ory of Argument. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Kimmel, Michael. (1994). Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity. In: Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (eds.), Theorizing Mascu- linities (pp. 119-141). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Adversarial Argumentation and Embattled Reason 233 Kourany, Janet. (2009). Why Are Women Only 21% of Philosophy?: Introduction to the Panel Presentations. American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 8(2, Spring 2009): 9-10. Available at: http://www.apaonline.org/publications/newsletters/v08n2_Femini sm_07.aspx. Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Lewis, Brooke. (2009). Where Are All the Women? The Philoso- phers Magazine 47 (September 2009). Also available at: http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=615. Le Dœuff, Michèle. (1989). The Philosophical Imaginary. Trans. C. Gordon. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lloyd, Genevieve. (1993 [1984]). The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy. Second edition. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. ------. (2002). Maleness, Metaphor, and the ‘Crisis’ of Reason. In L. M. Antony and C. E. Witt (Eds.), A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. Second Edition (pp. 73-89). Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Longino, Helen. (1994). In Search of Feminist Epistemology. The Monist 77(4): 472-485 Menssen, Sandra. (1993). Do Women and Men Use Different Logics?: A Reply to Carol Gilligan and Deborah Orr. Informal Logic 15(2): 123-138. Mills, Charles. (1997). The Racial Contract. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press Moulton, Janice. (1989). A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adver- sary Method. In: Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (Eds.), Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Episte- mology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (pp. 149-164). Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel. Nye, Andrea. (1990). Words of Power. New York: Routledge. Oliver, Pam. (2002). “What Do Girls Know Anyway?”: Rational- ity, Gender, and Social Control. In: Falmagne and Hass (2002), pp. 209-232. Orr, Deborah. (1989). Just the Facts Ma’am: Informal Logic, Gen- der and Pedagogy. Informal Logic 11(1): 1-10. Palczewski, Catherine Helen. (1996) Special Issue: Argumentation and Feminisms. Argumentation and Advocacy 32(4): 161-169. Penaluna, Regan. (2009). Wanted: Female Philosophers, in the Classroom and in the Canon. The Chronicle of Higher Educa- tion, October 11. Rooney, Phyllis. (1991). Gendered Reason: Sex Metaphor and Conceptions of Reason. Hypatia, 6(2): 77-103. ------. (1995) Rationality and the Politics of Gender Difference. Metaphilosophy 26(1-2): 22-45. Phyllis Rooney 234 ------. (2001). Gender and Moral Reasoning Revisited: Reengaging Feminist Psychology. In: Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh (Eds.), Feminists Doing Ethics (pp. 153-166). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. ------. (2002). Philosophy, Language, and Wizardry. In Naomi Scheman and Peg O’Connor (eds.), Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein (pp. 25-47). University Park, PA: Penn State Press. ------. (2003) Feminism and Argumentation: A Response to Govier. Presented at the 2003 Ontario Society for the Study of Argu- mentation (OSSA) Conference, Informal Logic at 25. Avail- able at: http://web2.uwindsor.ca/faculty/arts/philosophy/ILat25/edited _rooney.doc ------. Forthcoming. The Marginalization of Feminist Epistemology and What That Reveals about Epistemology ‘Proper’. In: Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge, ed. Heidi Grasswick. Dordrecht, Holland: Springer. Superson, Anita M. and Ann E. Cudd (Eds.). (2002). Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Resistance to Feminism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Tannen, Deborah. (1990). You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation. New York, NY: HarperCollins. Van Eemeren, Frans H., Rob Grootendorst, and Francisca Snoeck Henkemans. (1996). Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Warren, Karen. (1988). Critical Thinking and Feminism. Informal Logic 10(1): 31-44.