2 32.2 Govier&Ayers. Logic,... F


 
© Trudy Govier and Lowell Ayers. Informal Logic, Vol. 32, No. 
2, (2012), pp. 161–189. 

Logic, Parables, and Argument 
 
TRUDY GOVIER & LOWELL AYERS 
 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Lethbridge 
Lethbridge, AB 
T1K 3M4 
trudy.govier@uleth.ca 
lowell.ayers@uleth.ca 
 
 
Abstract: We
explore
the
relation‐
ship
between
argument
and
narra‐
tive
 with
 reference
 to
 parables.

Parables
 are
 typically
 thought
 to

convey
a
message.
In
examining
a

parable,
 we
 can
 ask
 what
 that

message
is,
whether
the
story
told

provides
reasons
for
the
message,

and
 whether
 those
 reasons
 are

good
reasons.
 
 In
exploring
these

questions,
we
employ
as
an
inves‐
tigative
 technique
 the
 strategy
 of

reconstructing
 parables
 as
 argu‐
ments.
 We
 then
 proceed
 to
 con‐
sider
 the
 cogency
 of
 those
 argu‐
ments.
 One
 can
 offer
 arguments

through
narratives
and,
in
particu‐
lar,
through
parables,
but
that
do‐
ing
 so
 likely
 brings
 more
 risks

than
 benefits,
 from
 an
 epistemic

point
of
view.


Résumé: Nous explorons la relation 
entre l’argument et le récit dans les 
paraboles. Généralement on croit 
que les paraboles transmettent un 
message. En examinant une 
parabole, nous pouvons nous de-
mander ce que ce message est, si 
l'histoire racontée fournit des raisons 
pour ce message, et si ces raisons 
sont bonnes. Pour répondre à ces 
questions, nous employons une 
technique d'enquête qui consiste à 
reconstruire des paraboles en argu-
ments et ensuite à examiner la force 
probante de ceux-ci. On peut offrir 
des arguments à travers des récits et 
des paraboles, mais, d'un point de 
vue épistémique, ce faisant apporte 
probablement plus de risques que 
d’avantages. 
 

 
Keywords: analogy, argument, conclusion, instantiation, message, narrative, 
reasons, representation, story, symbolism 
 
 
 
Some take the view that narratives and arguments fall into 
mutually exclusive categories, on the grounds that narratives are 
stories and arguments are attempts to support claims by offering 
reasons for them. That sort of dichotomous contrast is 
exaggerated, though: there is ample evidence of overlaps. A 
narrative may contain one or more arguments, as in a case where 
legal speeches or intellectual discussions are contained in a 
novel. Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged provides an obvious 
example. On the other hand, a work that is primarily 
argumentative may contain one or more narratives, as in the 





story of the Sun and the Cave or the Ring of Gyges, in Plato’s 
Republic and the short narratives in some of Jean-Paul Sartre’s 
books. Some narratives play important rhetorical roles in 
contexts where arguments are offered, adding interest and 
vividness. From narratives one can extract propositional claims 
that in other contexts serve as the premises or conclusions of 
arguments. And despite the bad reputation of “anecdotal 
arguments,” a story about an individual case can show that 
something exists or is possible, or provide a counter-example.1  
 Further questions about narrative and argument have 
special significance and interest. Here we are concerned to 
explore the following question. Can a narrative serve to provide 
an argument for a claim that can reasonably be taken to be its 
“point” or conclusion? This question concerns the potential 
relationship between the point of a narrative, as emerging from 
the story told in that narrative, and the conclusion of an 
argument, as emerging from reasons or evidence stated in its 
premises.2 In this essay, we explore this question with reference 
to one type of narrative, the parable. 
 Parables are of special interest and, due to their relative 
brevity, provide convenient material for theoretical analysis. 
Because parables are often used in teaching contexts, it makes 
sense to explore just how we could find good reasons within 
such them. To regard a parable as having a message and as 
providing reasons (potentially good reasons) to support that 
message is, in effect, to regard it as offering an argument. 
People often change their minds on the basis of stories such as 
parables, and we can ask whether they do that for good reasons.  
 To be sure, interpretive, logical, and epistemic difficulties 
often arise if one seeks to extract an argument from a 
narrative-even a short one such as a parable or fable.3 The 

























































1
See
Govier
and
Jansen
(2011),
p.
75–88.

2
 It
 is
 one
 thing
 to
 extract
 claims
 from
 narratives,
 or
 even
 to
 extract

arguments
from
narratives.
It
is
another
thing
to
extract
from
a
narrative

an
 argument
 that
 putatively
 expresses
 the
 point
 or
 message
 of
 that

narrative,
as
supported
by
the
events
recounted
in
the
narrative.
Thanks

to
Gilbert
Plumer
for
relevant
correspondence
on
this
matter.
We
take
it

to
be
quite
obvious
that
one
can
extract
claims
in
the
first
sense
here,
but

far
less
obvious
that
one
can
derive
an
argument
from
a
narrative,
in
the

second
sense.
Broader
questions
about
the
relation
between
narrative

and
argument
are
of
great
interest
but
cannot
be
considered
here.
These

include
whether
there
is
such
a
thing
as
a
distinctive
narrative
type
of

argument
(as
distinct
type
in
the
way,
say,
that
abductive
arguments
are

a
 distinct
 type),
 and
 whether
 there
 is
 such
 a
 thing
 as
 narrative

rationality,
 which
 is
 distinctive
 from
 the
 rationality
 characteristic
 of

arguments.

3
Ayers
(2010).
See
also
Faigley
and
Selzer
(2009),
Fisher
(1984)
and

Reissman
(2008),
and
Spigelman
(2001).




interpretive issues that arise when one tries to construct an 
argument so as to capture the point of a story are many and 
complex. It may be alleged that argument and narrative are quite 
distinct genres and a story will be “killed” if cast into 
argumentative form. Compared to logically stated arguments, 
stories tend to be vivid, memorable, and emotionally appealing. 
From the point of view of logical cogency, there is a trap here:  
we risk persuasion on the basis of vividness and appeal, as 
distinct from relevant reasons. When a solution works in some 
narrative (often a fictive one) we may infer that it would be 
realistic outside that narrative, an inference that would be 
logically mistaken.  
 Seeking to derive from a narrative an argument with 
explicit premises and conclusion is an approach employed here 
as a method of inquiry. We do not adopt this approach due to 
any theoretical commitment to the claim that all narratives 
ought to be recast as arguments. Rather, we adopt it as a kind of 
investigative tool. If we can plausibly derive an argument from a 
narrative such as a parable, we can assess the merits of that 
argument, and scrutinize it to consider whether the narrative 
offers good reasons to support its message. If we cannot 
plausibly derive an argument, or can derive only a very weak 
argument from the narrative in question, that outcome 
undermines the view that the parable or story supplies a message 
supported by good reasons. Parables are a convenient and 
appropriate form of narrative in this exploration because they 
are short and are characteristically understood as conveying a 
serious message.  
 
 
1. Definitions:  Narrative, Argument, and Parable 
 
We take these definitions to be broadly in accordance with 
ordinary usage and, if not definitive from a scholarly point of 
view, adequate for our purposes here.  
 
Narrative 
 
In a narrative, a sequence of events in described from a point of 
view that is often but not necessarily that of a person who has 
experienced it and serves as its narrator. The narrative has a 
kind of form; sense is made of the events, which are shaped into 
a story with a beginning, middle, and end.4 Typically there is a 


























































4
We
cannot
pause
 to
analyze
 further
 this
commonly
made
statement

which,
despite
its
triteness,
seems
open
to
the
objection
that
anything

has
in
some
sense
or
other
a
beginning,
middle,
and
end.







sort of plot in which a problem arises; as the story goes on there 
is some kind of outcome as the problem is resolved or ends in 
some way. In many narratives, events are sequenced in a 
realistic temporal order; however there may be deviations, as in 
the case of a story about time travel or novel with frequent 
flashback scenes. (Ayers 2010) Often, but not necessarily, 
events are causally linked in a narrative account. A narrative 
may be an autobiographical account; there is a narrator who is 
recounting a story of something that happened to him or her and 
may in some contexts be said to be “telling his or her story.” 
This notion is presumed in Spigelman (2001) and in Faigley and 
Spelzer (2009). Narrative accounts are typically particular, 
about what happened in one case. However, one could have a 
general narrative account of a sequence of events, as in an 
evolutionary explanation or historical account of economic 
problems leading up to a revolution. Liszka (2003) claims that 
general narratives about processes in nature may, in effect, 
justify claims about conservation ethics. Narratives may be 
fictional or non-fictional. Many stories are vivid and absorbing, 
but a narrative account need not have these features. One might, 
for example, offer an account of a board meeting which, though 
boring, would still amount to a narrative in the basic sense that it 
described events leading to some outcome. 
 
Parable 
 
A parable is a short simple story typically told of specific events 
and characters likely to be familiar and readily understood by 
the intended audience. It might, for instance, be about a man 
disturbing his neighbour in the middle of the night, a person 
helping a wounded stranger, a wandering son returning to his 
father, a stranded traveler constructing for himself a raft to cross 
a river, or some other specific and concrete thing (see Munson 
(1976), Cartwright (1999), Parker (2011)). Many parables are 
religious in nature; Jesus of Nazareth is especially renowned as 
one who sought to teach by parable. However, there are parables 
within other religious traditions as well as non-religious moral 
parables-and even philosophical parables, as we shall see. The 
parable is one type of narrative and considerations pertaining to 
it do not necessarily apply to narratives of other types.5 A 
parable has a message, often referred to as its lesson. (Good 
novels and short stories are less didactic.) Often the message of 
a parable goes unstated and is implicit. The story of something 
specific and particular is told so as to convey or suggest a more 


























































5
Munson
(1976).
See
also
Parker
(2011)
and
Cartwright
(1999).




general claim.6 In religious parables the message is broadly 
spiritual in nature, often concerning the relationship between 
God and human beings or moral relationships between people. 
 Some New Testament passages commonly described as 
parables would not count as parables in our sense of that term.  
A well-known example is the so-called parable of the mustard 
seed as expressed in Mark 13: 31–32. Here Jesus is asked to 
what we shall liken the kingdom of heaven, or to what we 
should compare it. His answer is: 
 

It is like a grain of mustard seed, which, when it is sown in the 
earth, is less than all the seeds that be in the earth; but when it 
is sown, it groweth up, and becometh greater than all the herbs, 
and shooteth out great branches; so that the fowls of the air 
may lodge under the shadow of it.7 

 
In this version of The Mustard Seed there is no story, so it is not 
a parable in the sense defined here. What we have instead is a 
figure of speech—a statement that the kingdom of heaven is like 
a growing mustard seed.   
 
 Argument 
 
The point of an argument is not to tell a story that goes in some 
direction to a resolution but rather to provide reasons to support 
a claim that is in question. Arguments are often made in efforts 
to rationally persuade some audience that a claim or claims are 
rationally acceptable. They may also be put forward in contexts 
of deliberation or inquiry, when arguers explore reasons to 
consider the extent to which claims can be given rational 
support.8 In an argument one or more claims are made to offer 
evidence or reasons for a further claim or claims. The claims 
offered as support are premises of the argument and the claim to 
be supported is its conclusion. The term “argument” is not a 
success term. It is quite possible to have a poor argument, in 
which premise claims are put forward as supporting some 
conclusion for which they offer only weak support or no support 


























































6
 Our
 preliminary
 survey
 suggests
 that
 the
 implicit
 message
 is
 more

characteristic
 of
 Christian
 parables
 in
 the
 western
 tradition
 than
 of

secular
parables
and
parables
within
Hinduism
and
Buddhism.

7
 See
 also
 Luke
 13:
 18–19,
 where
 the
 “parable”
 is
 stated
 in
 more

narrative
terms,
and
we
have
an
analogy
between
the
kingdom
of
heaven

on
 the
one
hand
and
 the
very
 small,
but
growing,
 seed
on
 the
other.

 

8
See
Govier
(1999)
and
Govier
(2010)
for
defence
and
elaboration
of

this
 account
 of
 argument.
 Compare
 also
 Johnson
 (1996),
 especially

Chapter
Six.






at all. It is one thing to say that a discourse expresses an 
argument and another to say that it expresses a good argument.  
 Important for our account here will be the fact that many 
arguments may be reasonably deemed to have implicit 
conclusions or premises. If one understands an argument to have 
implicit material, one should be able to give interpretive reasons 
for adding that material, from the context or wording of the 
stated material. For present purposes, we presume that at least 
one premise or conclusion claim must be explicitly expressed in 
order to have an argument. Any claim that we take to be an 
implicit conclusion or premise is marked in our presentation of 
an argument by *. We do not allow here for the possibility that 
all of an argument could be expressed visually or through some 
other non-verbal means. A picture of a gleaming new car is not 
itself an argument, on our view, though such a picture might be 
said to provide the premise of an argument to the effect that 
“you should buy this car,” provided there are appropriate verbal 
indicators. 
  The logical core of an argument is constituted by its 
premises (explicit and implicit), indicators of its line of 
reasoning, and its conclusion or conclusions. To display the 
logical core of an argument, we standardize, stating the 
argument’s premise(s) and conclusion(s), employing indicator 
words to show which statement(s) are used to support which 
others, and marking implicit claims with *.9  
 
 
2. An investigation, and some logical issues  
 
With reference to parables, the question of arguments can be 
posed in this way: if we learn from these stories (as is 
commonly presumed) do we simply learn a lesson as illustrated 
or suggested in the parable? Or do we, rather, learn that lesson 
in some way that incorporates reasons that are offered in its 
narrative and can be plausibly and fairly articulated in an 
argument?10 In such an argument, the lesson would appear as 


























































9
To
speak
of
the
logical
core
of
an
argument
is
not
to
ignore
the
fact
that

there
 may
 be
 other
 important
 elements
 present
 when
 arguments
 are

articulated
 in
 discourse.
 These
 include
 emotive
 indicators;
 counter‐
considerations
introduced
by
such
terms
as
 ‘even
though,’
 ‘while,’
and

‘despite
 the
 fact
 that’;
 introductory
 material;
 asides
 such
 as
 jokes
 or

illustrative
 anecdotes
 or
 elucidatory
 remarks;
 and
 attempts
 to
 rebut

actual
 and
potential
objections
 to
 the
premises,
 conclusion,
or
 line
of

reasoning.

10
We
have
selected
cases
with
reference
to
our
primary
interest
in
the

relation
of
narrative
and
argument.





the conclusion and the reasons given by the story of the parable 
would appear as the premises.  
 As plausibly as we can, we will proceed here to derive 
arguments from a number of parables. We will then examine 
logical and interpretive problems, reflecting on the implications 
of our results for the broader issue of learning from stories, and 
the relationship between narrative and argument.  
 From a logical point of view, basic questions arise 
concerning the notion that rationally compelling arguments can 
be derived from narratives.11  
 First, the scope of the conclusion. As mentioned already, 
typically a narrative is particular, being an account of events in a 
singular actual or fictional case. If one seeks to derive from such 
a narrative a general or universal conclusion, is the result simply 
an anecdotal argument? Is there a fallacy of hasty 
generalization? If a narrative is used simply to show that one 
instance exists, these issues do not arise.12 But if the case within 
the narrative is to represent further cases, we need to ask what 
those further cases are, and how (if at all) the narrative can 
acquire the needed representative quality. Questions of this type 
arise whether we interpret the representation as analogical (how 
good is the analogy?), by instance (do we have a hasty 
generalization?), or symbolical. 
 Second, there is the matter of fictive assertion. In an 
argument, premises are asserted and when the argument is 
evaluated, one checks whether those premises are true or 
rationally acceptable. If the narrative is about a fictional case, 
that epistemic approach seems inappropriate. One might try to 
dodge the issue of truth by thinking in terms of the rational 
acceptability of the premises.13 However it is not clear that the 
problem of fictive assertion is thereby fully resolved, given that 
the larger question of what it is to rationally accept claims made 
in fiction remains unanswered. An alternative approach, and the 
one used here, is to state the premises in conditional form so as 
to minimize ontological commitments.  


























































11
These
will
be
illustrated
by
our
efforts
regarding
examples
here,
and

we
will
return
to
these
general
logical
points
at
the
end
of
our
paper.

12
These
issues
have
been
explored
in
Govier
and
Jansen
(2011).
Michael

Stingl
 interestingly
 suggests
 that
 the
 message
 of
 a
 parable
 should
 be

interpreted
according
to
the
context
in
which
the
parable
is
offered
and,

in
 particular,
 the
 specific
 question
 to
 which
 it
 is
 an
 answer.
 That

approach
 would
 be
 fitting
 when
 a
 parable
 emerges
 from
 an
 oral

tradition.
We
do
not
adopt
it
here
because
the
parables
we
discuss
are

teaching
parables
that
appear
to
be
offered
to
a
general
audience.

13
 This
 is
 the
 view
 taken
 in
 Govier
 (2010)
 though
 not
 for
 reasons

connected
with
fictive
assertion.






Third, there are questions of representation. Just how does the 
story of a parable represent something else? Our consideration 
of parables so far suggests three distinct relationships for 
representation. These are: 
 
(1) Analogy. The parable is about some concrete phenomenon 
X; the intended message or lesson is about some more abstract 
phenomenon Y, where Y is said or presumed to be relevantly 
similar to X, which is to say similar in aspects relevant to the 
credibility of the conclusion or message. X is the analogue and 
Y is the primary subject. The presumption underlying the 
argument is that the claim made about X can also correctly be 
made about Y. If there is an argument in such a parable, it is an 
argument by analogy.  
 
(2) Symbolism.  The items and events in the parable are 
symbolic of something else.  For example “a master” in a story 
may symbolize God and “a feast” may symbolically represent 
the riches of heaven.  It’s important here to note that symbolic 
representation is not that of analogy, although there can be 
overlaps. Symbolism need not be based on relevant similarity. 
An item S may symbolize a characteristic W without in any way 
resembling W, as when a pen symbolizes an author and a sword 
symbolizes a war.  How to assess symbolism from a logical 
perspective is, to say the least, unclear. 
 
(3) Instantiation.  The items and events in the parable are 
instances, or cases of something.  A figure in a teaching role is 
an instance of “the teacher” and a figure in a learning role is an 
instance of “the student”, for example.14 
 
 
3. Discussions of parables 
 
We begin our exploration of these questions by examining three 
accounts of parables and the claims emerging from them.  In 
considering these accounts, we present examples relevant to the 
understanding and assessment of the claims made.    
 
 3.1  A.H. Parker 
 


























































14
We
note
that
an
instance
may
come
to
serve
as
a
symbol,
if
it
is
widely

accepted
 as
 a
 stand‐in
 for
 a
 class.
 The
 royal
 couple,
 the
 Duke
 and

Duchess
of
Cambridge
are
an
instance
of
young
European
royalty;
their

publicized
tour
across
Canada
in
July,
2011
may
also
serve
to
make
them

a
symbol
of
young
European
royalty.




In Light Denied, a recent work on the parables of Jesus, A.H. 
Parker interprets parables in a broadly argumentative way.  On 
his account, a parable “puts forward an illustrative package that 
consists of an argumentation along the lines that if such and 
such a situation pertains then commonsense dictates that so and 
so will follow.” We note here that these conditional claims do 
not in themselves amount to arguments; they may be said to be 
“argumentative” in the sense that they seem like the sorts of 
claims one might incorporate into an argument. The problem of 
fictive assertion is avoided when one adopts this approach, since 
the premise is understood as conditional.15 Parker states that 
parables function as two-dimensional speech-forms in that they 
describe “a particular scenario but only so as to make reference 
in some way to something quite other.”16 That comment alludes 
to the representativeness problem, which (disappointingly) is 
avoided by Parker. He only handles the particular scenario, 
omitting the “something quite other”, which he is unwilling to 
address.17 A parable’s illustrative package (for Parker it is “if… 
then” “logic”) is very literal and specific. For example Parker 
identifies the “logic” of The Insistent Neighbour (which we 
discuss later under the title The Bothersome Neighbour) to be 
that “[i]f the neighbour was successful in getting what he 
needed, then commonsense suggests that it was not due to 
friendship but to his shameless persistence.”18  
 On Parker’s account, a further step, interpretation, is 
required to understand what Jesus meant, spiritually and 
morally, by that story and by other stories such as those of the 
Good Samaritan or the Prodigal Son.19 (We have called this the 
problem of representation: just what does the parable represent, 
and how does it do that?) For our purposes, it is this further step 
of interpretation that is of special interest, as it is directly related 
to the question of whether there is a central message or “point” 
which can be regarded as a conclusion supported by reasons. 
 Contrary to Parker, in some parables, what happens is 
contrary to what one would expect from a commonsense 
perspective. An example is the parable of the Labourers in the 
Vineyard (Matthew 20: 1–16), in which people who work very 
different numbers of hours are all paid the same amount by their 
employer. This parable seems to work as an analogy; the 
analogue is that of a land-owner who chooses to pay late-
arriving workers the same amount as those who have been 

























































15
We
have
benefitted
from
this
suggestion.

16
Parker
(2011).


17
Parker
(2011),
p.
10.

18
Parker
(2011),
p.
60.

19
Parker
(2011)
makes
it
clear
that
this
step
has
many
problems.
See
Ch.

9
for
further
discussion.






working all day. The analogy is not stated in fully explicit form 
in the text; however there is a clear textual justification for it 
earlier in verse 1, which says “For the kingdom of heaven is like 
unto a man that is an householder, which went out early in the 
morning to hire labourers into his vineyard.” The parable is 
developed over sixteen verses, the last of which says, “So the 
last shall be first, and the first last…” The message of this 
parable is that people who repent and begin to serve the Lord 
late in life deserve the same reward as those who began to serve 
him early in life. Contrary to Parker, the way in which the 
landowner is paying his workers seems strikingly unlike 
common sense, and the memorability and interest of the parable 
are mostly due to that fact.  
 While we find Parker’s account helpful with regard to the 
issue of fictive assertion, his failure to address the 
representativeness problem is disappointing. In addition, his 
view that the literal message of a parable is accord with 
common sense fails to fit some significant cases. 
 
3.2  Ronald Munson 
 
In an older textbook on informal logic, Ronald Munson included 
a chapter discussing analogy, parables, fables, and illustrative 
examples. He begins with analogy, noting that an analogy may 
be purely illustrative or may serve as the basis for an argument.  
In any analogy, there are two things said to be similar; these are 
the primary subject and the analogue to which that primary 
subject is compared.  It is the primary subject that is the main 
topic of interest and the analogue is brought in for expository 
purposes. In an illustrative analogy, Munson says, the analogue 
is described as a way of making the primary subject more 
intelligible and interesting. In a good illustrative analogy, the 
analogue is “fitting” to the primary subject (in other words, is 
relevantly similar to it), vivid and more familiar than the 
primary subject, and not misleading. Insofar as it is purely 
illustrative and not argumentative, an analogy has no role in 
providing logical support for a conclusion. The illustrative 
analogy, says Munson, is an expository device as distinct from a 
logical device.  
 Having discussed illustrative analogies, Munson moves on 
to consider parables and fables. He defines parables as simple 
stories told to illustrate or explain certain principles or attitudes, 
saying parables are analogies presented in dramatic or fictional 
form. Munson claims that the analogy underlying a parable is 
often not made explicit; the parable has to be interpreted by the 
reader “in a way that straightforward and explicit analogies 



don’t have to be.”20 On Munson’s account, parables have a 
message, which is their “point”. That message, about a primary 
subject, is presented in an analogy. However the analogy does 
not provide the basis for an argument:  for Munson parables do 
not express arguments. They do not seek to provide reasons for 
the message conveyed. Rather, they are expository devices that 
serve well when they are vivid, memorable, offer short dramatic 
narratives, and are not misleading. Since a parable will be a 
story, it is likely to be more entertaining and remarkable than 
purely descriptive or logical exposition. It may have a use in 
writing that aims at demonstrating norms of behaviour or 
attitude. On this account, parables could be supplements to 
argumentative discourse but would not by themselves provide 
arguments. 
 Here is Munson’s own example of a parable. 
 

The Parable of the Stonemasons 
 
A knight was traveling to London, and as he passed through the 
town of Ely he came upon three stonemasons busy at their 
work. “What is it that you are doing?” the knight asked. “Why, 
Sir,” the first answered, “I am smoothing a stone.” “I am 
fashioning the keystone for an arch,” the second said. “And 
you?” asked the knight, turning to the third mason. “I am 
building a cathedral,” he replied.21 

  
Note: this is a secular parable. The message here would seem to 
be that the third mason is right, and (by analogy, on Munson’s 
account), one should describe one’s work in the broadest and 
most inspirational terms.22 Though some parables amount to 
analogies, on reflection “analogy” does not quite fit the 
stonemason story. The message of this parable is about work 
and the masons are working: what they are performing are 
instances of work, not analogues of it.  
 Contrary to Munson, however, some parables can be cast, 
with relative ease, as arguments. Consider, for instance, the 
well-known Hindu parable of the blind men and the elephant. 
 

The Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant 
 
Four blind men went out to see an elephant.  One touched the 
leg of the elephant and said, “The elephant is like a pillar.”  


























































20
Munson
(1976),
p.
326.

21
Ibid.,
327.

22
 What
 we
 have
 here
 is
 probably
 better
 understood
 as
 a
 symbolic

instance
than
as
an
analogy.
The
masons
are
doing
work;
what
they
are

doing
is,
then,
an
instance
rather
than
an
analogue
if
we
think
the
point
is

about
the
understanding
of
work,
generally.






The second touched the trunk and said, “The elephant is like a 
thick club.” The third touched the belly and said, “The elephant 
is like a big jar.” The fourth touched the ears and said, “The 
elephant is like a big winnowing basket.”  Thus they began to 
dispute hotly amongst themselves as to the shape of the 
elephant. A passer-by, seeing them thus quarrelling, said, 
“What is it you are disputing about?” They told him everything 
and asked him to arbitrate. The man said: “None of you has 
seen the elephant. The elephant is not like a pillar, its legs are 
like pillars. It is not like a winnowing basket, its ears are like 
winnowing baskets. It is not like a stout club, its trunk is like a 
club.  The elephant is the combination of all these—legs, ears, 
belly, trunk and so on.”  
   In the same manner, those who quarrel (about the nature of 
God) have each seen only some one aspect of the Deity.”23 

 
There seems here to be an analogy between the elephant and 
God, and between the blind men seeking to know the elephant 
and limited human beings seeking to know God. The point, or 
message, is that when disputes arise in each of these contexts, 
their sources lies in the limitations of those seeking to know.  
 If we set out to standardize an argument here, we could 
generate the following result: 
 
(1) If four blind men investigated an elephant and touched 

different parts, they would begin to dispute about the shape 
of that elephant. 

(2) If these four blind men began to dispute about the shape of 
the elephant, their dispute would be due to their having 
experienced only one aspect of it. 

(3) People who dispute about the nature of God are like these 
four blind men.24  

Therefore, 
(4) People who dispute about the nature of God have 

experienced only limited aspects of God. 
 
Munson would say that there is no argument in this parable:  on 
his account the message is asserted and the analogy is 
illustrative only. He would say that one should not look for 
reasons for a message.25 To be sure, we could assess the aptness 

























































23
Page
355
of
a
PDF
book
called
Tales
and
Parables
of
Sri
Ramakrishna

accessed
on
July
20,
2011
at

http://www.archive.org/details/TalesAndParablesOfSriRamakrishna

24
This
premise
is
not
marked
as
implicit
because
it
is
explicit,
in
the
final

statement.

25
One
may
believe
that
there
is
an
argument
by
analogy,
on
the
grounds

that
 these
 blind
 men
 are
 LIKE
 limited
 human
 beings
 (with
 respect

precisely
to
their
limitation)
and
the
analogy
provides
the
basis
for
an




of the analogy as an expository device and that alone. One point 
supportive of Munson’s view is that the conclusion, (4), may 
seem more plausible in its own right than it is with “support” 
from the analogy of the blind men and the elephant. But a point 
against Munson’s non-argumentative line of interpretation is 
that this story about the elephant and the blind men does seem to 
provide some account of the nature of disagreement about 
matters of religion.  The blind men are instances of persons 
lacking the capacity needed to make a discovery they seek.  
 In some parables the narrative serves to illustrate a point, 
or remind us of something we already know, rather than to 
provide reasons for a claim, as one would do when offering an 
argument in its support. But it would be premature to stop our 
investigation of parables with the idea that they are all 
illustrative analogies. Contrary to Munson, some parables 
represent by symbolism or instantiation, and some appear to 
provide support for a message. While appreciating the fact that 
Munson included the topic of parables in his informal logic 
textbook, we find his account unduly restricted due to its failure 
to consider the argumentative significance of some parables and 
its concentration solely on analogy, as distinct from instantiation 
and symbolism. 
 
 3.3 Nancy Cartwright, in the tradition of Gotthold Ephraim 

Lessing  
 
Nancy Cartwright has recently explored the notions of fable and 
parable, using them to understand how models work in 
science.26 Her account is developed from eighteenth century 
discussions by Lessing. Both Lessing and Cartwright say that a 
parable differs from a fable insofar as its lesson is not written in, 
but must be inferred. A fable comes with “the moral of the 
story” stated right there, whereas with a parable, the audience 
must supply the message. Interestingly, while this notion that a 
parable must have an implicit message fits parables in the 
western tradition, it does not seem to fit many Hindu and 
Buddhist parables, in which the message is often explicitly 
stated and may even by given in the title of the parable. The 
parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant provides one 
example. Another is the Parable of the Raft. 
 

The Parable of the Raft 
























































































































argument.
One
could
also
maintain
that
 the
blind
men
are
actually
an

INSTANCE
of
 limited
persons
seeking
knowledge,
and
that
 there
 is
an

inference
from
this
putatively
representative
instance
to
the
quests
by

beings
who
are
limited
in
other
ways,


26
Cartwright
(1999).






 
A man is trapped on one side of a fast-flowing river.  Where he 
stands, there is great danger and uncertainty—but on the far 
side of the river, there is safety.  But there is no bridge or ferry 
for crossing. So the man gathers logs, leaves, twigs, and vines 
and is able to fashion a raft, sturdy enough to carry him to the 
other shore.  By lying on the raft and using his arms to paddle, 
he crosses the river to safety. The Buddha then asks the 
listeners a question: “What would you think if the man, having 
crossed over the river, then said to himself, “Oh, this raft has 
served me so well, I should strap it on to my back and carry it 
over land now?” The monks replied that it would not be very 
sensible to cling to the raft in such a way.  The Buddha 
continues, “What if he lay the raft down gratefully, thinking 
that this raft has served him well, but is no longer of use and 
can thus be laid down upon the shore?” The monks replied that 
this would be the proper attitude.  The Buddha concluded by 
saying, “So it is with my teachings, which are like a raft, and 
are for crossing over with—not for seizing hold of.”27 

 
In this parable, the message is explicit in the statement of the 
Buddha. The parable may be understood as offering an 
analogical argument; that analogical argument would be that in 
just the same way that it would be silly to carry a raft once it had 
served its purpose, it would be unnecessary to hang onto the 
teachings of the Buddha, once they have served their purpose. 
On the other hand, one might say that, for anything at all, once it 
is not needed, one should no longer hang on to it. The story of 
the raft could be taken as a reminder or illustration that if 
something is no longer needed, one might as well discard it.  
The Buddha is saying that, and claiming that such a reminder 
would apply to his own teachings. 
 When the message of a parable is implicit, extracting it 
can be tricky. Cartwright notes that a parable is more open to 
interpretation than a fable. Both fables and parables use the 
particular and concrete, in narrative form, to approach the 
general and abstract.28 Like parables, fables are short concrete 
narratives put forward to convey a general message. That 
message is typically prudential or moral.  Often the characters in 
fables are animals functioning to represent certain human 


























































27Taken
from

http://heavencantwaitcardsandgifts.blogspot.com/2010/03/Buddhist‐
parable‐of‐raft
06.html
Accessed
July,
2011.

28
 If
 we
 reject
 (on
 the
 grounds
 explained
 above)
 the
 idea
 that
 the

message
of
a
parable
is
always
implicit,
whereas
the
message
of
a
fable
is

always
explicit,
it
is
not
obvious
just
how
we
would
distinguish
parables

from
fables.
Perhaps
there
is
no
hard
and
fast
distinction.




traits—as when a fox represents cleverness, a small bird 
weakness, or a lion, strength.   
 Discussing fables, Lessing said interestingly that fables  
succeed by “reducing” the abstract to some particular. It is 
through something particular and concrete, he said, that we are 
able to know intuitively something general and abstract. The 
concrete particular is able to represent the abstract and more 
general. (This comment seems to apply to many parables as 
well, and specifically to Lessing’s own parable of the rings, to 
be considered later. In that parable three rings represent the 
three distinct religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam.) The concrete expression of a general lesson provides a 
needed particular that is a case of the abstract truth in question 
and enables us to understand it. 
 Cartwright discusses one of Lessing’s fables in which a 
marten eats a grouse. The moral of the story is “the weaker are 
prey to the stronger.” The marten represents the stronger and the 
grouse, the weaker. The abstract claim that the weaker are prey 
to the stronger is “fitted out” by the fable, which represents it in 
a concrete and readily comprehensible form. Cartwright 
comments that there is not an analogy here; nor is there exactly 
a case of symbolism. It is not that the grouse symbolizes a 
weaker creature or is similar to a weaker creature; rather 
(relative to the marten) the grouse is an instance of a weaker 
creature. The abstract relation of weaker/stronger could be 
instantiated in other ways in other contexts. If, for instance, we 
were dealing with labour/management relations, labour would 
be exploited or oppressed, due to its relative weakness in 
economic and political power. Obviously the victory of the 
stronger would not be displayed by management literally eating 
labour as the marten ate the grouse!  
 In fables and parables, the story told is one in which 
characters and dilemmas are representative of something else. 
Unlike Parker, Cartwright does not seek to avoid this question. 
She notes its central importance. One must ask: what is that 
something else? What does the parable or fable represent, and 
how is that representativeness achieved? In a fable, the “moral 
of the story” is stated, providing readers with reliable clues 
about what is to be represented.  In a parable, there are not 
always obvious clues. We must infer the represented content 
from the discourse in context. In the scientific context, 
Cartwright says, abstract theoretical terms apply only given the 
applicability of their more concrete models. Many of these 
models in science, Cartwright maintains, are more like parables 
than models in their lesser degree of explicitness. We do not 
always know how to abstract from a given particular. Often 
representativeness is achieved by instantiation. 





 Representativeness achieved by instantiation is illustrated 
in the famous Christian parable of the Good Samaritan. For that 
reason, it’s illuminating to consider this parable in the context of 
Cartwright’s discussion. 
 

The Parable of the Good Samaritan 
 
And by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and 
when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise 
a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked [on him], 
and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan, as he 
journeyed, came where he was: and when he saw him, he had 
compassion [on him], And went to [him], and bound up his 
wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, 
and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the 
morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave 
[them] to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and 
whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will 
repay thee. Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was 
neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves? And he said, 
He that shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto him, Go, 
and do thou likewise.29 

 
 In this parable the man set upon by thieves serves to 
represent (by instantiation) people in need of help, and the 
generous Samaritan represents (again by instantiation) all those 
who help strangers in need, acting kindly and generously toward 
those in need. The parable offers an answer to a question put to 
Jesus by a lawyer who asked how to inherit eternal life. To 
inherit eternal life, you should love the Lord with all your heart 
and soul and strength and mind and your neighbour as yourself, 
the lawyer says. He then asks Jesus who counts as your 
neighbour. The parable of the Good Samaritan is given in reply 
to that question. In the parable a man showed mercy and 
kindness to a needy man who was a stranger. The response: the 
neighbour was the one who showed mercy on that stranger; 
Jesus said “go, and do thou likewise.” 
 It is indeed a moving story. We can ask about this story:  
are there reasons given, for treating needy strangers with 
kindness and generosity?  If we seek to construct an argument 
on the basis of the parable, we can derive the following:  
 


























































29
Luke
10:31–37.
New
Testament
quotations
are
taken
from
the
King

James
Bible.
Online
version:

http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/book.php?book=Matthew&chapt
er=20&verse=1‐16





(1)* If supposedly holy people (the priest and the Levite) were        
to ignore an unknown and needy person on a road, they 
would  not treat that person as a neighbour. 

(2) If a person who was of no special status and did not know an 
unknown and needy person on a road were to treat him with 
mercy and kindness, that person would treat the needy 
person as a neighbour. 

So, 
(3) What matters about being a neighbour is not one’s status or 

one’s prior knowledge of a person. 
(4) What matters about being a neighbour is treating another 

with mercy and kindness when that person is needy and one 
encounters him. 

(5)* It is good to treat a needy stranger as a neighbour if one 
encounters him. 

Therefore, 
(6)* One should treat other people, when they are in need and 

one encounters them, as one’s neighbours with mercy and 
kindness.   

 
This parable has great appeal. As noted, the representation is by 
instantiation: the man set upon by robbers is an instance of a 
needy stranger and the Samaritan is an instance of a helping 
person who has encountered the needy stranger. When set out as 
an argument, as above, this parable does not obviously provide a 
poor argument. The hypothetical wording in premises (1) and 
(2) avoids the problem of fictive assertion. Claims (3) and (4) 
are distinct conclusions derived from the conjunction of (1) and 
(2). They then link, along with (5*) to support the main 
conclusion, (6*). Due to the fame of this parable, the instances 
have become symbols; charities often employ the word 
“Samaritan” in their name.  
 The first stage of this argument appeals to strong moral 
intuitions about a hypothetical case, to support a normative 
conclusion. The added premise (5*) articulates the norm 
embedded in the term ‘neighbour,’ used here so as to combine 
descriptive and evaluative judgments. The implicit conclusion 
(6*) is inferred from (5*). The logical problems that might be 
alleged here would involve the scope of the conclusion and the 
interpretations of kindness and generosity and what it means to 
encounter a needy stranger. These are timeless questions. 
 
 
4. Some further examples 
 
The dilemma of charm (in a story) versus logical cogency (in a 
good argument) is illustrated by the following example of a 





parable of Sri Ramakrishna. The parable is called “What you are 
after is within yourself.” 
 

What You are After is Within Yourself 
 
A man wanted a smoke.  He went to a neighbour’s house to 
light his charcoal.  It was the dead of night and the household 
was asleep.  After he had knocked a great deal, someone came 
down to open the door. At sight of the man, he asked, “Hello! 
What’s the matter?” The man replied, “Can’t you guess? You 
know how fond I am of smoking. I have come here to light my 
charcoal.”  The neighbour said, “Ha! Ha! You are a fine man 
indeed! You took the trouble to come and do all this knocking at 
the door! Why, you have a lighted lantern in your hand!” 
 
What a man seeks is very near him.  Still, he wanders about 
from place to place.30  

 
The message of this parable is stated in the title and final 
sentence, and would seem to be universal; the reference to “a 
man” would appear to be to any man. Yet the story is about a 
particular man carrying a lantern at night and seeking a light, to 
smoke. Representation would be by instantiation. If we were to 
regard this parable as offering an argument with a general 
conclusion, that argument would involve hastily generalizing 
from the highly specific situation of a man wandering about in 
the dark, with a lighted lantern, to a universal human quest 
(implied in the expression “what a man seeks”). The charm and 
wit of the story seem to disappear if we cast it in argumentative 
form, and the logical argument we would derive from it is weak 
at best. Thus it may seem interpretively preferable, and more 
charitable, to leave the parable as a story. If the parable states a 
lesson, so be it, but no good reason is given for that lesson if we 
take the lesson to be general one. 
 Here is a narrative in the parable of the Bothersome 
Neighbour (Luke 11: 5–8), which we attempt to represent as a 
standardized argument. Premises and conclusions taken to be 
implicit are marked with *. 
 

The Parable of the Bothersome Neighbour 
  
And he said unto them, Which of you shall have a friend, and 
shall go unto him at midnight, and say unto him, Friend, lend 
me three loaves; For a friend of mine in his journey is come to 


























































30
Page
350
of
a
PDF
book
called
Tales
and
Parables
of
Sri
Ramakrishna

accessed
on
July
20,
2011
at

http://www.archive.org/details/TalesAndParablesOfSriRamakrishna





me, and I have nothing to set before him? And he from within 
shall answer and say, Trouble me not: the door is now shut, 
and my children are with me in bed; I cannot rise and give thee. 
I say unto you, Though he will not rise and give him, because 
he is his friend, yet because of his importunity he will rise and 
give him as many as he needeth. 

 
The parable seems to be analogical in nature. Here we represent 
it as having two explicit premises, as well as one implicit 
premise connecting the relationship between two friends to the 
relationship of God and humans. The conclusion that God will 
help a person who persistently asks for his help has also been 
added. We would justify doing this by the context in which the 
narrative appears. (Jesus is talking about the relationship 
between God and human beings who seek things from God.) 
 
(1) A friend might refuse help to a person if it were inconvenient 

to offer it. 
(2) Such a friend would give help to this person, even in 

inconvenient circumstances, if the person persistently 
requested it. 

(3)* God is like this friend. 
So, 
(4)* God will give help to a person if that person persistently 

requests it. 
 
The narrative of the man bothering his neighbour provides the 
first two premises. Here (3*) and (4*) are written in. With the 
addition of (3*) and (4*), we have a pretty clear argument from 
analogy.31 Given problematic nature of (3*), it is not plausible 
to deem this a good argument; we will not comment further on 
its cogency at this point. 
 In the following example of a secular parable, taken from 
Lessing’s play Nathan the Wise, representation proceeds by 
symbolism. In Lessing's play the main character, Nathan, offers 
the Parable of the Three Rings in response to a question from 
the Muslim, Saladin, as to which religion is best—Judaism, 
Islam, or Christianity. 
 


























































31
If
we
read
further
in
the
text,
through
verses
9
and
10,
we
find
“ask,

and
it
shall
be
given
you;
seek,
and
ye
shall
find;
knock
and
it
shall
be

opened
unto
you.
For
everyone
that
asketh
receiveth
and
he
that
seeketh

findeth;
and
to
him
that
knocketh
it
shall
be
opened.”
This
text
seems

more
to
represent
through
symbolism
than
analogy.
 It
does
not
really

constitute
a
narrative
but
an
argument
based
on
the
general
claim
that

(1)
a
person
who
seeks
will
find,
so
(therefore)
(2)
a
person
who
seeks

God
will
find
God.







The Parable of the Three Rings 
  
In the Orient in ancient times there lived a man who possessed 
a ring of inestimable worth. Its stone was an opal that emitted a 
hundred colors, but its real value lay in its ability to make its 
wearer beloved of God and man. The ring passed from father to 
most favored son for many generations, until finally its owner 
was a father with three sons, all equally deserving. Unable to 
decide which of the three sons was most worthy, the father 
commissioned a master artisan to make two exact copies of the 
ring, then gave each son a ring, and each son believed that he 
alone had inherited the original and true ring. But instead of 
harmony, the father's plan brought only discord to his heirs. 
Shortly after the father died, each of the sons claimed to be the 
sole ruler of the father's house, each basing his claim to 
authority on the ring given to him by the father. The discord 
grew even stronger and more hateful when a close examination 
of the rings failed to disclose any differences. 
  
"But wait," interrupted Saladin, "surely you do not mean to tell 
me that there are no differences between Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity!" "You are right, Sultan," replied Nathan. "Their 
teachings and practices differ in ways that can be seen by all. 
However, in each case, the teachings and practices are based 
on beliefs and faith, beliefs and faith that at their roots are the 
same. Which of us can prove that our beliefs and our faith are 
more reliable than those of others?" "I understand," said 
Saladin. "Now continue with your tale." "The story is nearly at 
its end," replied Nathan. 
  
The dispute among the brothers grew until their case was 
finally brought before a judge. After hearing the history of the 
original ring and its miraculous powers, the judge pronounced 
his conclusion: "The authentic ring," he said, "had the power to 
make its owner beloved of God and man, but each of your rings 
has brought only hatred and strife. None of you is loved by 
others; each loves only himself. Therefore I must conclude that 
none of you has the original ring. Your father must have lost it, 
then attempted to hide his loss by having three counterfeit rings 
made, and these are the rings that cause you so much grief." 
The judge continued: "Or it may be that your father, weary of 
the tyranny of a single ring, made duplicates, which he gave to 
you. Let each of you demonstrate his belief in the power of his 
ring by conducting his life in such a manner that he fully merits 
—as anciently promised—the love of God and man.32 

 


























































32
From
Gotthold
Ephraim
Lessing's
play
Nathan
the
Wise.
Excerpt

accessed
on
July
22,
2011
at

http://www.pitt.edu/~dash/type0972.html#lessing




 This parable seems to present an argument in favour of 
tolerance and charitable living. The messages are stated in 
symbolic form by the judge. Lessing maintains that quarrelling 
over who has the true faith is wrong-headed and that, given our 
inability to discern who is right, we ought to instead live our 
lives so as to merit the love of God and man. The judge reasons 
that their quarrelsome behaviour shows that none of the sons has 
the true ring. The ring represents the true faith, and the sons 
represent adherents to the three religions of the book: Judaism, 
Islam, and Christianity. 
 We've extracted two arguments from this parable. These 
arguments represent what the judge said to the three sons. The 
first captures the reasoning that none of the sons has the true 
ring. The second captures the argument that, even if one of the 
sons has the true ring, we cannot know which one does, so each 
son should live a life that merits the love of God and man. The 
second argument uses a premise from the first, an aspect that is 
reflected in our numbering. 
 
Argument 1 
 
(1) If the owners of the three rings are full of hatred and strife,  

they do not own the original and true ring.  
(2)* The original and true ring represents the true faith and the 

sons possessing the rings represent the adherents to the three 
religions of the book (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). 

(3) The adherents of the three religions of the book are full of 
hatred and strife.  

Therefore,  
(4)* None of the adherents of the three religions of the book has 

the true faith. 
 
Argument 2  
(5) Even if one of the sons has the original ring, then we cannot 

discern which son that is. 
(6) If we cannot discern which son has the original ring, then 

each son should demonstrate the power of his ring by 
conducting his life so as to fully merit the love of God and 
man. 

(2)* The original and true ring symbolically represents the true 
faith and the sons possessing the rings symbolically 
represent the adherents of the three religions of the book. 

(7) We cannot discern which religion has the true faith. 
Therefore, 
(8)* The adherents of the three religions of the book should 

demonstrate their faith by conducting life in a manner so as 
to fully merit the love of God and man. 





 

  Both arguments hinge crucially on (2*), the premise 
stating the symbolic relationship in which the original ring 
represents the true faith and the sons represent the adherents of 
the three religions of the book. The first argument basically 
takes the valid form of modus ponens. The first premise is taken 
from the story, which is given a summary in a conditional 
statement, and the third premise is factually true, with the 
conclusion validly inferred, given (2*). In the second argument, 
there is a longer story to be told. Premise (6) comes from the 
story, but even within it can be said to need support. Premise (7) 
will clearly be plausible to humanists, but may be deemed to 
need support based on some epistemological account implying 
that religious knowledge is not possible.    
 Hesketh Pearson's book The Life of Oscar Wilde includes 
a story by Wilde, who compared metal filings to human beings 
in regards to whether or not we have free will. In an interview 
with Denis Dutton for the first issue of the journal Philosophy 
and Literature, the Argentinean novelist Jorge Luis Borges 
mentioned Wilde’s parable as a case of a philosophically 
rigorous short narrative.33 (Borges qualified his comments by 
reminding Dutton that despite his interest in philosophy, he, 
Borges, was not a philosopher.) Here, analogy is used as the 
basis for a rather clever parable.34 We contend, however, that 
the parable is less philosophically successful than Borges 
supposed. 
 

The Parable of Magnets and Filings 
 
Once upon a time there was a magnet, and in its close 
neighbourhood lived some steel filings. One day two or three 
little filings felt a sudden desire to go and visit the magnet, and 
they began to talk of what a pleasant thing it would be to do. 
Other filings nearby overheard their conversation, and they, 
too, became infected with the same desire. Still others joined 
them, till at last all the filings began to discuss the matter, and 
more and more their vague desire grew into an impulse. “Why 
not go today?” said some of them; but others were of the 
opinion that it would be better to wait till tomorrow. 
Meanwhile, without their having noticed it, they had been 
involuntarily moving nearer to the magnet, which lay there 
quite still, apparently taking no heed of them. And so they went 
on discussing all the time insensibly drawing nearer to their 
neighbour; and the more they talked, the more they felt the 


























































33
Dutton
and
Palencia‐Roth
(1977).


34
 We
 do
 not
 judge
 the
 parable
 to
 be
 a
 philosophical
 success,
 as
 our

analysis
will
indicate.




impulse growing stronger, till the more impatient ones declared 
that they would go that day, whatever the rest did. Some were 
heard to say that it was their duty to visit the magnet, and that 
they ought to have gone long ago. And, while they talked, they 
moved always nearer and nearer, without realizing that they 
had moved. Then, at last, the impatient ones prevailed, and, 
with one irresistible impulse, the whole body cried out, ”There 
is no use waiting. We will go today. We will go now. We will go 
at once.” And then in one unanimous mass they swept along, 
and in another moment were clinging fast to the magnet on 
every side. Then the magnet smiled—for the steel filings had no 
doubt at all but that they were paying that visit of their own free 
will.35 

 
 This philosophical parable is intended to show that belief 
in free will is an illusion. Its argument may be represented as 
follows: 
 
(1) If metal filings were personified they would all have the 

desire to travel towards a magnet. 
(2) If personified metal filings had a desire to travel towards a 

magnet, they could think that their doing so was due to their 
choice and free will. 

Yet 
(3)* If personified metal filings travelled toward a magnet, they 

would do so as a result of the physical laws of magnetism. 
Therefore, 
(4) If personified metal filings thought that their movement 

toward a magnet was due to choice and free will, they 
would be wrong. 

(5)* Humans are like the personified metal filings in that they 
are physical objects fully subject to physical laws. 

(6)* Objects fully subject to physical laws cannot have choice 
and free will. 

Therefore, 
(7)* If human beings believe they have choice and free will, 

they are wrong. 
 
 Here, the argument hinges on an analogy, which we have 
made explicit in (5*), and on the claim in (6*).  In the context of 
an argumentative discussion about whether human beings have 
free will, premise (6*) is contestable. It is true that filings move 
toward a magnet due solely to the operation of the laws of 
magnetism, which are physical laws operating regardless of any 
“choice” on the part of the filings. But whether human 


























































35
Pearson
(1978).






reflections are similar with regard to their choices should not be 
simply assumed in the sixth premise. 
 In an article on moral education and moral reasoning in 
traditional African cultures, Polycarp Ikuenabe provides a 
paraphrased parable about the wrongfulness of deliberately 
harming other people.36 Ikuenabe argues that in traditional 
African cultures morality is taught informally through folklore, 
myths, and parables.  On his account, in these cultures, moral 
thinking is understood as something that should be practical and 
fruitful. Though conveyed by elders with a concern for 
community cohesion, moral thinking is not authoritarian. 
Situations will vary and individuals will have to reason for 
themselves as to what to do.  It is because every situation is 
different that one must reason about guilt, shame, and affronts to 
the community. Ikuenabe describes the story of the son and the 
slave one used to teach a moral lesson against harming someone 
out of jealousy and greed. 
  

An African Parable: The Son and the Slave 
 
A woman had a son and a slave, both of whom were of the same 
age. She treated her son better than the slave. The woman 
would usually prepare meals and dish them differently into the 
plates of her son and the slave. She usually gave her son a 
better portion than the slave. As the son and the slave grew up, 
the slave excelled in everything in the community. The slave 
had more strength and energy and worked harder on the farm. 
Whatever the slave touched with his hands turned out well. The 
same could not be said for her son. The woman became jealous 
and wanted to kill the slave. On a fateful day, she prepared a 
meal and dished it into the plate of the slave and her son. She 
decided to kill the slave by putting some poison in his food. As a 
coverup, she decided to make the slave’s portion more 
handsome and attractive. When the son came in to get his meal, 
he secretly opened the slave’s plate and found how attractive 
the slave’s food was compared to his. He thought that his 
mother must have made a mistake; it could not happen that the 
slave’s meal would be better than his. So, he decided to eat the 
slave’s meal that had been poisoned by his mother. Immediately 
after eating the food, he became sick. His mother became 
apprehensive and asked him which portion of food he had 
eaten, and he replied that he had eaten the portion on the 
slave’s plate that was more attractive and handsome. His 
mother was distraught, and the boy later died from the 
poisoning. 

 


























































36
Ikuenabe
(1998),
p.
37‐38.




According to Ikuenabe, the main message here is that one 
should not seek to harm another person. The story does give a 
reason by providing an illustration of that possibility.   
 
(1) If a woman sought to poison a slave in her household, she 

might inadvertently poison her own beloved son. 
(2) A woman would not wish to poison her own beloved son. 
So, 
(3) A woman should not poison a slave in her household. 
Therefore, 
(4)* A person should not seek to harm another.37 
 
In this standardization, we can see the representation proceeds 
by instantiation. The woman is a case of a person who would 
harm another; the slave is a case of the person that some other 
person wishes to harm; the son is a case of a person that that 
person would not wish to harm. The conclusion seems to be 
derived by inference from one instance to a generalization. If we 
generalize only to prospective victims in proximity of the 
harmful act, the generalization may appear plausible. If (as in 
the conclusion represented here and as implied by Ikuenabe’s 
account) a general message of non-harm is inferred from that 
instance, the emerging generalization is rather implausible. If 
the story were told to show the possibility of unintentionally 
harming one person when intending to harm another, a derived 
argument to that effect would be cogent. But that modest 
conclusion is sufficiently banal that we could say it does not 
need support by argument at all. 
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
From the examples discussed here, readers may reach their own 
conclusions about the feasibility and plausibility of deriving 
arguments from parables. A parable is a short narrative 
presented to offer a message and we can ask what that message 
is and whether the narrative provides reasons for it.  If we find 
reasons, they can be expressed as propositions and as the 
premises of an argument in which the message of the parable is 
the conclusion. Our work here shows that for many parables it 
does make sense to extract a message and reasons for it. With 


























































37
Gilbert
Plumer
in
correspondence
has
suggested
that
the
scope
of
this

conclusion
 be
 restricted;
 the
 argument
 would
 then
 be
 considerably

improved.
We
welcome
 this
 suggestion
but
 find
no
hint
as
 to
how
to

restrict
 the
 conclusion’s
 scope.
 The
 issue
 points
 to
 basic
 interpretive

problems.






some twisting and bending, we can construct an argument in 
standardized form. When we have an argument in that form, we 
can evaluate it. From the fact that one can derive some sort of 
argument from a narrative, it does not follow that that argument 
is a good one. We can proceed to assess the cogency of the 
argument we extract.  
 The questions raised here in the context of parables also 
apply to myth, legend, and the stories in which traditional 
knowledge may be cast. As we acknowledged earlier, 
argumentative representation of a narrative may “kill” the 
original story. However, if we are reflecting on a narrative in 
contexts where one is supposed to learn from it, analysis in 
terms of reasoned support is appropriate. Epistemology trumps 
narrative style and interest when we wish to evaluate the 
credibility of a message, and it is from that perspective that we 
have considered logic and parables. In a parable, there is a story 
about one thing and a message about another. As explained 
earlier, key questions arise in three areas: the scope of the 
conclusion, fictive assertion, and representation.  
 The problem of scope of the conclusion clearly arises in 
many cases. What we say about the argument offered in a 
parable will vary depending on the generality of the conclusion 
we attribute to it. Interpretation is crucial and involves 
contextual considerations, these being especially apparent for 
implicit material. If one restricts the scope of the conclusion so 
that only the possibility of some scenario is claimed, many 
parables can be said to represent cogent arguments. Given the 
teaching context in which many parables are stated, restrictions 
of scope to only a few cases, or to a single case, are not 
interpretively plausible. A parable carries a message or lesson 
insofar as it applies to a range of cases and not solely to the 
events described in its story. What is the intended range? That is 
a matter of interpretation. The frequent use of parables in moral 
and religious education makes it reasonable to understand the 
scope of the conclusion as fairly broad. The issue of intended 
scope arises for all parables and is especially clear here for the 
Good Samaritan and the Son and the Slave. 
 The problem of fictive assertion seems manageable: we 
have handled it here through conditionalization, taking a hint 
from the work of A.H. Parker.  
 Not surprisingly, what is central is the aspect of 
representation. As we understand in theory, and as is apparent 
from our examination of examples, representation can be 
attempted in three different ways:  analogy, symbolization, and 
instantiation.  The parables considered here illustrate problems 
arising for each representative strategy. With analogy, the 



general issue is that the things compared are likely to differ in 
respects highly relevant to the conclusion. (The very fact of 
trying to draw an analogy between something concrete and 
something abstract makes that likely.) If a wedding feast is an 
analogue for heaven, or an impatient neighbour an analogue for 
God, problems about relevant similarity clearly arise. With 
Wilde’s magnetic filings, the analogue and primary subject 
(personified magnetic filings and deliberating human beings) are 
presumed to be similar in ways (being fully subject to laws of 
physical causation) that are question-begging in the context. 
With instantiation, we have the potential for generalization from 
a highly specific and unique instance that is vivid and 
memorable but unrepresentative of a broader class. This is the 
same sort of problem that arises with regard to anecdotal 
arguments.38  
 Being hesitant to claim expertise on the matter of symbolic 
representation, we have said relatively little about that matter.  
If a message and its reasons are given through a symbolic 
representation so that an argument contains in its premises some 
such claim as “the landowner symbolically represents God”, 
then in attempting to assess that argument, we will be involved 
in trying to reach some verdict on that claim, which is not one of 
analogy or instantiation, but something else entirely:  symbolic 
representation. We begin to ask: How does X symbolically 
represent Y?  How can a claim to the effect that X symbolically 
represents Y be assessed from a logical point of view?  We do 
not pretend to know the answer to such questions. The nature 
and “merits” of symbolic representation as it appears here are 
not a matter of logic, but if such symbolism is crucial to 
arguments providing reasons for some moral or religious 
position, then we cannot entirely avoid the topic. Awkwardly, 
this somewhat imponderable matter is crucial for our 
considerations. In a number of standardizations, we have 
included a premise stating the intended symbolic representation 
of the parable. We have stated that premise while admitting our 
inability to clarify it further. 
 Now, our debts are being called in. Being unable to spell 
out a symbolic premise, we are unwilling to deem such a 
premise acceptable or unacceptable. Rather, we will deem it 
“not amenable to logical assessment.” Such a verdict on a 
crucial premise reflects on the epistemic status of the argument 
as a whole, making us unwilling to deem that argument cogent. 
 To sum up the results of our investigation, we maintain 
that some narratives, in particular parables, can be interpreted as 
providing arguments for a claim that is their “point” or 

























































38
See
Govier
and
Jansen
(2011).






conclusion. We find, however, that such arguments are rarely 
cogent. Such arguments do not seem to have a distinctively 
narrative form:  some are analogies, while others appear to be 
deductive arguments or generalizing inductive ones. Conveying 
a message in the form of a story is attractive but logically risky 
and questionable, insofar as the form and interest of the story 
will often distract us from attempting any task of logical 
assessment. We are easily misled into accepting a message 
claim when there are no good reasons given in the narrative. 
One can offer arguments through narrative, but doing that has 
more risks than benefits, from an epistemic point of view. 
 
 
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