IL 33.3 Macagno & Damele PUBVERS


 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises: 
Presumptions in Enthymemes 
 
FABRIZIO MACAGNO & GIOVANNI DAMELE 
 
Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem (IFL) 
Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
Avenida de Berna, 26-C 
P 1069-061 Lisboa – Portugal 
fabriziomacagno@hotmail.com 
giovanni.damele@gmail.com 
 
 
Abstract: The implicit dimension of 
enthymemes is investigated from a 
pragmatic perspective to show why a 
premise can be left unexpressed, and 
how it can be used strategically. The 
relationship between the implicit act 
of taking for granted and the pattern 
of presumptive reasoning is shown 
to be the cornerstone of kairos and 
the fallacy of straw man. By taking a 
proposition for granted, the speaker 
shifts the burden of proving its un-
acceptability onto the hearer. The 
resemblance (likeliness) of the tacit 
premise with what is commonly ac-
ceptable or has been actually stated 
can be used as a rhetorical strategy.  
 
 

Résumé: La dimension implicite des 
enthymèmes est étudiée dans une 
perspective pragmatique afin de 
montrer pourquoi une prémisse peut 
être laissée inexprimée, et comment 
elle peut être utilisée de façon stra-
tégique. La relation entre l'acte im-
plicite de prendre pour acquis et le 
modèle de raisonnement présomptif 
se révèle être la pierre angulaire du 
kairos et du sophisme de l'homme de 
paille. En prenant une proposition 
pour acquis, l'orateur transfère le 
fardeau de prouver son caractère 
inacceptable à l'auditeur. La ressem-
blance de la prémisse tacite avec ce 
qui est généralement acceptable ou 
avec ce qui a été réellement dit peut 
être utilisée comme une stratégie 
rhétorique.    

 
Keywords: burden of proof, commitment, implicit premise, interpretation, 
kairos, pragmatics, presumption, presupposition, rhetorical strategies, straw 
man 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In the logical and rhetorical tradition, enthymemes have often 
been described according to two criteria: their structure and the 
epistemic status of their premises. At the beginning of the Top-
ics, Aristotle provides the definition of syllogism, that is, a logos 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

362  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

(a piece of reasoning or an argument) “in which, certain things 
being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes 
about through them” (Topics 100a 25-26). For Aristotle, rhetori-
cal syllogisms are syllogisms having fewer premises than the 
ordinary ones (Rhetoric 1357a 16-17); they are characterized by 
an implicit dimension, by a premise that is left unexpressed 
(Sorensen 1988; Gough & Tindale 1985). From an epistemic 
perspective, enthymemes are grounded on premises that are not 
absolutely true, but only commonly accepted (Walker 1994: 47; 
Walton 2001: 106). Unlike dialectical topoi, rhetorical topics do 
not represent abstract relations between concepts (such as “what 
is said of the species is said of the genus as well”), but refer spe-
cifically to connections between specific states of affairs (for 
instance, the relationship between the existence of a specific an-
imal and the existence of animals belonging to the genus there-
of). For this reason, they proceed from what usually happens, 
from “the province of opinion” (De Quincey 1893: 146; McBur-
ney 1994: 184). 
 These two characteristics of enthymemes are strictly con-
nected to each other. As Braet (1999: 107) pointed out, the im-
plicit dimension is not described by Aristotle as essential, but 
rather as a property that enthymemes often have because of their 
epistemic nature (Hamilton 1874: 389). On this view, the major 
premise of an enthymeme can be taken for granted because it is 
commonly considered as likely, which makes these instruments 
context-relevant and audience oriented (Tindale 1999: 112). 
However, this characteristic raises some crucial problems. What 
is the relationship between likeliness and the possibility of tak-
ing a proposition for granted? Why does a speaker decide to 
leave a premise unexpressed? In order to address these ques-
tions, we will move from an epistemic perspective to a pragmat-
ic one. Enthymemes will be considered as moves in a dialogue, 
i.e. speech acts aimed at a pursuing a specific communicative 
goal, which in case of rhetorical syllogisms corresponds to per-
suading the interlocutors or the audience.  
 The purpose of this work is to show how the decision to 
leave a proposition unexpressed can be considered as kind of 
speech act resulting in specific dialogical effects. The act of tak-
ing a proposition for granted will be shown to transform the rhe-
torical syllogism into a powerful strategy aimed at modifying 
the burden of proof.    
 
 
 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  363 

 
2.  The implicit dimension of enthymemes: missing premises 

and presuppositions 
 
From a pragmatic perspective, enthymemes can be considered as 
dialogical moves aimed at supporting a given conclusion, in 
which a premise is left unexpressed. Aristotle underscored this 
implicit dimension when he stated that the speaker does not 
need to mention any of the propositions making up a rhetorical 
argument if it is a familiar fact. In this case, he claims, the hear-
er will add it himself (Rhetoric 1357a 17-18; Burke 1985). In 
this account we can distinguish two different aspects of the same 
phenomenon. On the one hand, the speaker decides to leave 
some propositions unexpressed; on the other hand, the hearer 
reconstructs what is taken for granted and retrieves the meaning 
of the argument. The first issue to tackle is the analysis of the 
relation between the speaker and his tacit premises, and between 
the linguistic and the epistemic dimension of the propositions 
left unexpressed. Why and how is it possible to leave a compo-
nent of a speech act implicit? Moreover, the possibility of leav-
ing a proposition unexpressed leads to the problem of establish-
ing the limits of this act, or rather non-act. Why is it not possible 
to take a false or an unacceptable premise for granted? When 
does the implicit premise of an enthymeme become fallacious 
and how is it possible to pinpoint and describe its fallacious na-
ture?  
 Possible answers to these questions can be found by taking 
into account a particular type of enthymeme, the rhetorical syl-
logism in which the major premise is tacit, and analyzing it from 
a linguistic and pragmatic perspective.  
 
2.1  Implicit premises as presuppositions 
 
From a linguistic perspective, the relationship between premises 
and conclusion in an enthymeme can be represented by a so-
called high-level predicate (Rigotti 1993; Rigotti 2005; Rigotti 
& Rocci 2001), which can we express with the connector ‘there-
fore.’ Karttunen (1973: 176) described the structure of such 
higher-level predicates, called connectives, whose linguistic ar-
guments are discourse sequences.  
 Connectives link sequences and presuppose specific rela-
tions between them. We can consider for example the connector 
‘but.’ As Lakoff pointed out (Lakoff 1971: 133), the sentence 
“John is tall, but he is no good at basketball” is composed of an 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

364  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

assertion (“John is tall, and he is no good at basketball”) and a 
presupposition (“If someone is tall, then one would expect him 
to be good at basketball”). The effect of the connector is a con-
tradiction (or rather a denial of expectation, see Ducrot 1978) 
between what is stated and what is presupposed. Similarly, the 
connective ‘and’ presupposes a common relevance or topic 
(Lakoff 1971: 128; Kempson 1975: 58), which can be a tem-
poral sequence (it would be awkward to say “The Ranger rode 
off into the sunset and mounted his horse”) or a causal relation 
(it would make little sense to claim “Pope John is dying and the 
cat is in the bath”). Subordinate connectives, such as ‘therefore’, 
specify explicitly the type of relationship between the sequences 
that needs to be reconstructed in coordination (Hobbs 1985). For 
instance, the predicate ‘therefore’ presupposes that the first se-
quence is a reason supporting the second one (see also Grice 
1975: 44). In both cases of coordination and subordination, the 
high-level predicate imposes a set of specific coherence condi-
tions, or pragmatic presuppositions (Vanderveken 2002: 47; 
Bach 2003: 163), on the text sequences (Grimes 1975: 162).  
 There can be several high-level relations: explanation, nar-
ration, contrast, etc. (see Hobbs 1985; Lascarides & Asher 
1993). Enthymemes are characterized by a specific type of rela-
tion, called “motivation or support.” For instance, consider the 
following reasoning based on a definitional major premise, tak-
en from a recent discussion between President Obama and the 
U.S. Congress concerning the classification of air strikes as 
‘hostilities’ (Obama Administration letter to Congress justifying 
Libya engagement, June 15th, 2011, p. 25):  
 
Case 1  
 

(A) Our operations do not involve the presence of U.S. 
ground troops. (B) (therefore) Our operations are not ‘hos-
tilities.’  

 
In this case, a higher level predicate connecting the discourse 
moves needs to be reconstructed. It expresses a relation of moti-
vation (Rigotti & Rocci 2006) and can be linguistically repre-
sented as the connective ‘therefore’. In order to reconstruct the 
structure of the dialogical move (supporting a potentially con-
troversial conclusion by means of a reason) it is necessary to 
retrieve the “motivational” link between the two sequences 
(Burke 1985). The relation of motivation needs to support the 
attribution of a predicate (to be hostilities) in (B) to the same 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  365 

subject of the previous sequence (A). The attribution of a predi-
cate on the basis of its qualities can be usually presumed to be a 
classification, which requires that the quality mentioned in the 
first sentence represents a definitional principle for the attribu-
tion of the quality in the second sentence (Kempson 1975: 109-
110). Therefore, the characteristic of U.S. operations, i.e. “not 
involving the presence of ground troops,” shall be taken to be a 
definitional principle, of ‘to be hostilities.’ The presupposition 
of ‘therefore’ in this specific case can be reconstructed by speci-
fying the abstract relation of the high-level predicate. This pro-
cess can be summarized as follows:  
 

1. Meaning of ‘therefore’ A is a reason for B

2. Specifying the meaning 
of B

B expresses a classification of the subject ‘our 
operations’ as not ‘hostilities.’ 

3. Specifying the connector 
(from 1 and 2)

A is reason for supporting a classification of 
‘operations’ as not ‘hostilities.’

4. Specifying the relation
A reason for supporting a classification is presumed to 
be a definitional principle of the property attributed. 

5. Specifying the connector 
(from 3 and 4)

A expresses a definitional principle of ‘to be hostilities.’

6. Specifying the meaning 
of A

The quality of ‘involving the presence of troops’ is 
denied of the subject ‘our operations.’

7. Specifying the connector 
(from 5 and 6)

‘Involving the presence of troops’ expresses a 
definitional principle of ‘to be hostilities.’

 
Figure 1: Reconstructing the missing premise 

 
 This analysis represents the most reasonable reconstruc-
tion of a presupposed proposition, where “reasonableness” shall 
be taken to refer to a linguistic (pragmatic) behavior that com-
plies with the accepted hierarchy of linguistic (or rather prag-
matic) presumptions (Macagno 2011; 2012). In other words, the 
hearer follows the commonly accepted presumption (such as the 
one mentioned at line 4 of figure 1 above) and performs all the 
steps of reasoning correctly. The reasonableness and the cor-
rectness of the reconstruction need to be distinguished from its 
strategic and potentially manipulative uses. As a matter of fact, 
the addressee of the move can decide not to comply with the ac-
cepted presumptions, or to retrieve the tacit proposition based on 
an incorrect (fallacious, contradictory) pattern of reasoning. We 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

366  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

will analyze this choice in section 5, when we will consider the 
cases in which the reconstruction of the tacit premise becomes a 
strategic and potentially fallacious instrument.    
 Considering the relationship between the speaker and the 
presupposed content, the presuppositional nature of the implicit 
premise raises the problem of defining its characteristics and its 
boundaries. In order to address this issue, we need to investigate 
the pragmatic dimension of presupposition.  
 
2.2  The speech act of taking for granted 
 
Stalnaker defined the concept of presupposing a proposition as 
“to take its truth for granted, and to assume that others involved 
in the context do the same” (Stalnaker 1970: 279). He under-
scored how the act of taking a proposition for granted shall be 
considered as a propositional attitude, which can be interpreted 
as an action of a kind (Stalnaker 2002: 701). On his view, pre-
suppositions are made by the speakers (Stalnaker 1970: 279), in 
the sense that presupposing a proposition amounts to a form of 
decision made by the speaker to treat some information as com-
mon ground among the participants, or rather as belonging to the 
Universe of Discourse (Kempson 1975: 17). However, enthy-
memes can be based on major premises that are known to be 
false or not accepted or considered acceptable by the hearer. 
How can a speaker believe or assume that a proposition is 
shared by the addressee, especially when it is known to be unac-
ceptable or unaccepted?  
 Taking for granted that a proposition can be described as 
the performance of an implicit speech act, in which the speaker 
subordinates the felicity of his move to the listener’s acceptance 
of some conditions. This idea was advanced by Ducrot, who de-
scribed presupposition as the set of conditions that need to be 
fulfilled in order to satisfy the pretension of carrying out an ef-
fect on the listener (Ducrot 1966). On this view, if the presuppo-
sitions of a move fail because the interlocutor rejects them, the 
move itself will be infelicitous and void (Ducrot 1972). Such 
conditions limit the field of the possible moves of the interlocu-
tor. For instance, if the addressee accepts the assertion that “I 
have met Pierre this morning”, he also implicitly agrees to a 
conversational situation in which the topic is Pierre, and a 
“Universe of Discourse” where Pierre exists (or is known). On 
the contrary, if the hearer refuses the presupposition, he termi-
nates the dialogue game, just like a chess player can accept or 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  367 

refuse the possibilities opened up by the move of his opponent, 
and thereby continue or terminate the game (Ducrot 1968: 87).  
 This account of presuppositions as a kind of speech act 
can explain how and why the speaker can treat a proposition as 
part of the common ground even if it is not. Such an act does not 
depend on what the interlocutors actually share, or on what the 
speaker believes (Burton-Roberts 1989: 26). A proposition that 
is known or believed not to be shared can be still presupposed, 
in the sense that it can be advanced as a condition or ground for 
the continuation of the dialogue. However, the structure of the 
dialogue move should be distinguished from its possibility, i.e. 
from the limits that separate an acceptable act of presupposition 
from a mischievous or fallacious one.  
 
2.3  The limits of presupposing 
 
According to Ducrot, presuppositions need to be accepted in or-
der for the dialogue to be possible. However, at the same time 
presuppositions need to be part of the common ground of the 
interlocutor. How is it then possible to presuppose information 
not shared, or not known to be shared? On Lewis' perspective 
(Von Fintel 2008), in this case the hearer “accommodates” (or 
reconstructs) the presupposed and not shared propositions in or-
der to avoid communicative failure, within certain limits (Lewis 
1979: 340). The problem is to identify the “certain limits” that 
restrict the possibility of reconstructing a presupposition.  
 According to Stalnaker (1998: 8), the relationship between 
speaker’s and hearer’s knowledge in the process of accommoda-
tion can be considered as a presumption of the speaker that the 
presupposed information is available to his or her audience. For 
instance, we modified the argument in Case 1 above so that we 
can analyze the acceptability and reasonableness of the follow-
ing variants:   
 

A. Our intervention cannot be considered as hostilities. 
We have not used weapons or the military. 

B. Our intervention is not a çatışma1. We have not inter-
vened. 

C. Our intervention cannot be considered as hostilities. It 
is fast and well done. 

D. Our intervention cannot be considered as hostilities. It 
does not involve the cooking of potatoes. 

                                                
1 Çatışma is the Turkish word for war (we presume that not all our readers 
are from Turkey or speak Turkish).  



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

368  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

E. Our intervention cannot be considered as hostilities. 
Ground troops have not intervened.  

 
 The first crucial issue that these examples point out is the 
possibility of accommodating a presupposition. In (A) the inter-
locutor can accommodate the missing premise and accept it. In 
(B), the tacit premise cannot be evaluated as the hearer cannot 
accommodate some pieces of information. In (A), the speaker 
grounds the presupposition of his major premise on the fact that 
people (and congressmen) usually know that “use of weapons 
and the military is a definition of hostilities.” Case (B) is radi-
cally different. The hearer (in an ordinary context, where people 
cannot speak Turkish) cannot reconstruct and accept the presup-
position. As an essential requirement, it fails clearly for two rea-
sons. The speaker cannot presume that the interlocutor knows 
the meaning of a Turkish word (‘çatışma’) and, therefore, that 
he can retrieve the tacit premise (“çatışma means intervention”) 
from his background information. The speaker can reconstruct 
the tacit premise, but he cannot understand its meaning and can-
not evaluate it. The purpose of the enthymeme, transferring the 
acceptability of the premises onto the conclusion, fails com-
pletely, as an unknown proposition cannot be evaluated.  
 Another crucial dimension is the acceptability of a presup-
position, namely the case in which the interlocutor can recon-
struct and evaluate the presupposed premise, but he does not or 
cannot accept it. In (C) and (D) the hearer can understand the 
nature of the proposition taken for granted (a definitional state-
ment) and connect it with his or her background knowledge. 
However, in (C) the hearer cannot accept that the property of 
“being nice and well done” is a definition of an action (hostili-
ties). In (D), the presupposition can be reconstructed and its na-
ture as a definitional statement accepted. However, no English 
speaker can accept that ‘cooking of potatoes’ is a definition of 
‘hostilities.’ The possibility of presupposing (corresponding to 
the possibility of our speaker’s evaluating it) needs to be distin-
guished from the acceptability (or rather the evaluation) of a 
proposition taken for granted.  
 The last aspect of presupposition that emerges from these 
cases is its effectiveness. The speaker can take for granted a 
proposition that the hearer does not share. However, this does 
not mean that the interlocutor accepts it (Hopper 1981). For this 
reason, the speaker can be effective when he presupposes a 
premise that only resembles the commonly accepted one. In the 
presupposed implicit premise of (E), a sufficient condition (in-



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  369 

tervention of ground troops) is treated as a necessary one. We 
distinguish between four different cases of presupposition of 
implicit premises: 
 

(i)  The premise can be reconstructed, evaluated and ac-
cepted as a background assumption (case A); 

(ii) The presupposition cannot be evaluated, as it cannot be 
related with the common ground (case B); 

(iii) The presupposition can be evaluated but its function 
(the relation between antecedent and consequent) 
cannot be accepted (case C); 

(iv) The presupposition can be evaluated but its content 
cannot be accepted (case D and E).  

 
These possibilities allow us to outline the possible felicity condi-
tions of the implicit speech act of presupposing, building on 
Austin’s and Searle and Vanderveken’s accounts of speech act 
conditions (Austin 1962: 14-15; Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 
13-19; Holdgraves 2008: 13):  
 

Essential Condition
Speaker (S) sets the presupposed proposition (pp) as a 
condition of the felicity of his speech act (SA); if Hearer 
(H) does not accept pp, SA will be void.

Propositional 
Condition

pp is a proposition that can be reconstructed and 
evaluated by H.

Preparatory Condition S can presume that H can evaluate and accept pp.

Sincerity Condition
S believes that pp; S believes that H can evaluate and 
know or accept pp.

 
Figure 2: Conditions of the act of presupposing 

 
 This speech act has a direction of fit from World (of the 
Hearer) to Words (of the Speaker), and its goal is to set the 
propositions that the hearer needs to accept for the dialogue to 
continue. The possibility of evaluating the presupposition is in-
dicated as a propositional condition: H needs to be able to draw 
pp from the linguistic and pragmatic elements provided. The ac-
ceptability of the presupposition is governed by both the prepar-
atory and the sincerity condition. The sincerity condition ex-
presses the conditions that the tradition on pragmatic presuppo-
sition considered as essential, while the preparatory condition, 
framed as a presumption, is aimed at bridging the gap between 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

370  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

the speaker’s and hearer’s mind from an epistemic and argumen-
tative perspective.      
 
 
3. Tacit premises and presumptive reasoning  
 
The crucial characteristic of the act of presupposing mentioned 
above is the possibility of presuming that the hearer shares the 
proposition to be taken for granted (see for this notion Strawson 
1971: 58-59; Kempson 1975: 166-167). This condition repre-
sents the grounds of the reasonableness of this move. By inves-
tigating the structure of presumptive reasoning it is possible to 
understand the relationship between a presumed proposition and 
its epistemic status, and the dialogical effects of leaving a prem-
ise unexpressed.  
 
3.1  Implicit premises and presumption 
 
Implicit premises can be conceived as the conclusion of pre-
sumptive reasoning. The speaker cannot know the other’s mind, 
what the interlocutor knows. He can only advance a tentative 
and defeasible conclusion based on a form of reasoning in lack 
of evidence. The speaker draws specific conclusions on what the 
interlocutor may know based on general principles concerning 
common knowledge, such as “Speakers belonging to a specific 
speech community usually know the meaning of the most im-
portant words of the language used therein.” According to 
Rescher, presumptions are forms of reasoning in lack of evi-
dence (Rescher 1977: 1). They cannot prove a conclusion, and 
are used when it is not possible to demonstrate a conclusion. 
This type of reasoning is rebuttable and defeasible, as it supports 
a conclusion until contrary evidence is produced. However, its 
inherent defeasibility has a fundamental effect on the dialogical 
setting: it has the effect of shifting the burden of producing evi-
dence, or supporting a standpoint, onto the other party.  
 Presumptions work to move the dialogue further when 
knowledge is lacking by shifting the burden of proof onto the 
other party, who can reject the controversial proposition only by 
providing contrary arguments or positive facts leading to a con-
trary conclusion. If not rebutted, the proposition can be consid-
ered as tentatively proved, and move the dialogue further. 
Rescher represented the structure of this type of inference as fol-
lows (Rescher 2006: 33):  
 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  371 

Premise 1: 

P (the proposition representing the presumption) obtains 
whenever the condition C obtains unless and until the 
standard default proviso D (to the effect that 
countervailing evidence is at hand) obtains.

Premise 2: Condition C obtains (Fact).

Premise 3: Proviso D does not obtain (Exception).

Conclusion: P obtains.
 

 
Figure 3: Presumptive reasoning 

 
 The Rule of presumption links the acceptability of a prop-
osition P (for instance, a man is dead) to a condition C (the man 
has not been heard from in five years) until a specific default 
proviso D obtains (for instance, he is found to be alive). If a man 
has not been heard from in five years and no evidence of his be-
ing alive has been advanced, he is to be considered as dead.  
 This type of reasoning can be applied to the analysis of the 
implicit premise in enthymemes. Presumptive reasoning can be 
used to highlight the conditions in which the speaker can rea-
sonably take a premise for granted and the possible contradic-
tion resulting from presupposing an unshared or unaccepted 
proposition. For instance, we analyze Case 1 above and assess 
the reasonableness of its implicit premise reconstructing the pre-
sumptive reasoning on which it is based (see Figure 4, below).   
  

RULE :

The audience should know (be committed to) the shared 
meaning of “hostilities” (P) whenever such a word is used with 
its commonly accepted meaning (C) (unless the interlocutor 
does not master the language, belongs to a different culture or 
community, etc.) (D)

FACT  
The commonly accepted definition of ‘hostilities’ is “overt 
act of warfare.” (C)

EXCEPTION
It is not the case that the audience does not know the language 
or belongs to a different community of speaker (or culture). 
(non-D)

CONCLUSION 
(presupposition)

The audience should know that the definition of ‘hostilities’ 
is “presence of land troops and sustained fighting.” (P)

Accepted 
meaning

Hostilities: “overt act of warfare.”

 
Figure 4: Presumptive reasoning and presuppositions 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

372  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

 
 In this case, the presupposed proposition is in conflict with 
the premise on which it is drawn (the Fact), and therefore cannot 
follow from it. The reconstruction of the presumptive meaning 
shows a clear contradiction, which makes the whole act of pre-
supposing unreasonable (Macagno 2011).  
 However, as mentioned above, the possibility and the rea-
sonableness of presupposing need to be distinguished from its 
effectiveness. In this case, Obama took for granted a definition 
similar to the commonly accepted one. Moreover, he used it be-
fore the Congress, relying on the lack of an official definition of 
this word. As a matter of fact, ‘hostilities’ was not defined in the 
relevant act, in this case the War Powers Resolution Act. As a 
consequence, the effect was extremely powerful. Obama chose 
to take the major premise of his reasoning for granted, as he 
could not prove that “hostilities means presence of land troops 
and sustained fighting.” However, he also knew that, in lack of 
an explicit definition, the contrary could be hardly proved. The 
Congress could not accept the implicit premise, but at the same 
time they could not prove the contrary. The force of Obama’s 
rhetorical syllogism did not lie in its probative weight (the major 
premise was unacceptable), but in its implicit dimension (the 
major premise was presupposed). The force of his argument 
rested in the dialogical effect of burden-shifting of the tacit 
premise. The presumptive reasoning underlying his move shift-
ed the burden of proof.   
 
3.2  The effects of presuming  
     
The analysis of speaker’s presuppositions as the outcome of the 
speaker’s presumptive reasoning can help understand the effects 
of presupposition. From a dialectical point of view, a presuppo-
sition carries the effects of a presumption: the hearer becomes 
committed to it, unless he challenges and rejects it (Walton 
1999: 380; Hickey 1993: 108). The hearer needs to fulfill the 
burden of rebutting the epistemic presumption, which can be 
easily done by providing information about his own knowledge. 
Such positive evidence often is much stronger than the de-
faultive presumptive reasoning; however, the force of presup-
posing lies in a different effect of this act. As Kauffeld noticed, 
ordinary presumptions result in a specific burden placed on the 
interlocutor, the “risk of resentment, criticism, reprobation, loss 
of esteem” in the event that he or she does not accept a presump-
tive conclusion (Kauffeld 1998: 264). For instance, the risk of 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  373 

negative judgment is often associated with presumptions of 
knowledge or interest. By underscoring that a premise is shared 
by everybody, or the “true” or the “good” citizen, it is possible 
to enhance the burden of rejection. Ideally, the interlocutor 
would need to show not only that the premise is wrong, but that 
actually it is not shared, facing an implicit threat of being classi-
fied as an ignorant, or an “untrue” citizen (Macagno 2012).  
 Politicians often use this appeal to the common ground by 
emphasizing the concept of ‘we-ness,’ which underscores the 
fact that they are voicing an opinion commonly shared in the 
country. For instance, consider the following excerpt from Clin-
ton’s speech in favor of the Bosnia intervention in 20082 (em-
phasis added):   
 
Case 2 
 

And all around the world, more people than ever before 
live in freedom, more people than ever before are treated 
with dignity, more people than ever before can hope to 
build a better life. That is what America's leadership is all 
about. We know that these are the blessings of freedom, 
and America has always been freedom's greatest champi-
on. 

 
Clinton stresses how the relationship between the improving 
conditions of people on earth and the American wars is known 
by his fellow countrymen. Potentially controversial premises 
(the actual role of U.S. wars on the freedom and dignity of the 
population of the world; the relationship between wars and free-
dom, etc.) are presented as shared, and to be shared. Another 
clear example of this strategy is the following quotation from 
Mitt Romney’s Wisconsin speech3 (emphasis added):       
 
Case 3 
 

You know, we all know that President Obama cannot run 
on his record. We know that he can’t run on his broken 
promises. [..] We need someone who appeals to our 
dreams and our aspirations, not to our fears and our anxi-
eties. We as Americans deserve to choose what kind of 
country we want and what kind of people we want to be. 

                                                
2 http://edition.cnn.com/US/9511/bosnia_speech/speech.html (Accessed on 7 
February 2013).  
3 http://emptysuit.wordpress.com/2012/04/04/mitt-romney-wisconsin-
primary-speech-transcript/ (Accessed on 7 February 2013).  



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

374  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

And the good news is, it’s not too late to get America 
back on track. It’s not too late to put our country back on-
to a path of prosperity. Guess what? We have a leader 
who can do that. We have a leader who will give Ameri-
cans that choice. We have a leader who will put our 
country back on the right track. Tonight, Wisconsinites 
have spoken. Republicans are unifying. 

  
Romney presents Obama’s unreliability (broken promises), ap-
peals to fear, and poor ability to run the country as a fact that 
everybody knows. He increases the burden of disproving this 
premise, which becomes the reason not to vote Obama and 
therefore choose the alternative, specifically the speaker, Mitt 
Romney.  
 Presuppositions, and in particular tacit enthymematic 
premises, are acceptable and reasonable when they can be pre-
sumed to be shared or accepted.4 However, they are effective 
also when they only resemble the commonly accepted ones. 
This characteristic of presupposition can explain one of the most 
important dimensions of enthymemes, their context-dependency.     
 
 
4.  Enthymemes and Kairos: Tacit premises and their con-

text-dependency  
 
The presumptions on which an enthymeme is based are not all at 
the same level (Giuliani 1961: 66-67). Their credibility (or ra-
ther acceptability) varies according to their nature, and, more 
importantly, according to the values of the interlocutors. Ac-
cording to Quintilian, there are different levels of credibility of a 
premise (Institutio Oratoria V, 10, 16):  
 

With regard to credibility there are three degrees. First, 
the highest, based on what usually happens, as for in-
stance the assumption that children are loved by their 
parents. Secondly, there is the highly probable, as for in-
stance the assumption that a man in the enjoyment of 
good health will probably live till tomorrow. The third 
degree is found where there is nothing absolutely against 

                                                
4 On this view, the distinction between assumption and presumption is drawn 
at a linguistic level. The speaker can presume (and, therefore, presuppose) a 
proposition that has been solely assumed to be true. In this case, he presumes 
that his interlocutor is willing to accept it as an assumption. What is crucial is 
that the speaker cannot presume (and, therefore, presuppose) that an unac-
ceptable proposition is shared or accepted by the hearer.  



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  375 

an assumption, such as that a theft committed in a house 
was the work of one of the household. 

 
On this view, some presumptions shall be, or usually are, pre-
ferred over others, and who challenges them carries the burden 
of proof (Giuliani 1961: 67). The hierarchy of presumptions de-
pends on the hierarchy of values and opinions shared by a given 
community. For instance, ethical norms such as “If she is his 
mother, she loves her son” or “If he is an avaricious man, he ne-
glects his oath” (Ciceronis De Inventione I, 29-30) represent the 
strongest presumptions. They carry not only a burden of proof, 
but also a burden of criticism (Kauffeld 1998: 264), as the party 
who rejects one of them risks being criticized for challenging 
shared values. For this reason, depending on the hierarchies of 
values of the audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1951), 
some premises will be more effective because they are more 
shared, more acceptable, and more difficult to rebut in a given 
community.    
 This relationship between presumptions, enthymemes, 
values, and audience brings to light the “situational” or rather 
contextual dimension of rhetoric (Bitzer 1968), which is essen-
tially related to the notion of kairos, i.e. opportunity.  Even 
though according to Vatz “rhetoric controls the situational re-
sponse” (Vatz 1968), and therefore it “is a cause not an effect of 
meaning,” kairos plays a crucial role in rhetorical discourse. 
Rhetorical discourse can be seen as the result of an activity of 
strategic invention, and not as the outcome of a process of dis-
covery from reality. Therefore, rhetorical discourse can be con-
sidered as grounded on a sort of epistemological relativism, 
whose keystone is the concept of kairos (Untersteiner 1954). 
The contextual and individual dimension of the rhetorical dis-
course is also a crucial element of the Aristotelian approach to 
rhetoric, and in particular to its role in political and legal discus-
sions (Rhetoric 1354b 3-8). The concept of kairos, which is 
complex and hard to define, is basically related to the specific 
opportunity at a given time (Kinneavy 2002: 67). It is strictly 
bound to the ability of finding or reconstructing a premise that is 
strategically necessary to achieve a specific outcome in a given 
context. It is the situational, contextual dimension of rhetoric, in 
the spatial and temporal meaning of the term.   
 Kairos represents an essential dimension of enthymeme, 
and one of the material elements distinguishing between dialec-
tical and rhetorical argument. The relationship between the op-
portunity and the structure of the enthymeme is pointed out by 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

376  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

Aristotle when he analyzes the use and the choice of the maxims 
(Rhetoric 1394a 25-26): “In regard to the use of maxims, it will 
most readily be evident on what subjects, and on what occa-
sions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims should be em-
ployed in speeches.” Kairos does not simply describe a tactic; it 
concerns the whole rhetorical strategy, as it refers to the selec-
tion of the persuasive premises. On the one hand, the rhetorical 
syllogism cannot be simply described as a syllogism grounded 
on common knowledge, or rather endoxa (propositions belong-
ing to the common ground, i.e. accepted by the majority or the 
wise), otherwise there would be no difference between the dia-
lectical and the rhetorical syllogism. On the other hand, the 
presence of an audience that characterizes rhetorical discourse 
does not only result in the emotional components of rhetoric. 
The crucial role that the audience plays in rhetoric is related to 
the very structure of the rhetorical syllogism and its persuasive 
power (pithanòn). According to Aristotle, the grounds of en-
thymemes are probabilities [ex eikònta] and signs. In particular, 
eikòs refers to what “is accustomed generally to take place, or 
which depends upon the opinion of men, or which contains 
some resemblance to these properties, whether it be false or 
true.” (Ciceronis De Inventione I, 46). Enthymemes are ground-
ed on what is presumed to usually occur, on what is likely to be 
true for a specific audience, and not on statistical probability 
(Viano 1955: 280-86).  
 In this rhetorical view, truth is regarded not as the end of 
the discourse, but as an instrument of persuasion. The perspec-
tive from which the elements of the discourse are analyzed 
changes radically with respect to dialectics. The discourse is not 
aimed at what is true or what is accepted, like in dialectics, but 
at what is persuasive. For this reason, truth is rhetorically im-
portant because of its persuasive force, as “things that are true 
and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over 
their opposites” (Rhetoric 1355a 21-22). An enthymeme can be 
also apparently true, as long as it is likely, i.e. persuasive. The 
rhetorical syllogism is bound to the audience, as the speaker 
needs to choose the premises that are likely to be true for the 
specific interlocutors in a given situation.   
 The relationship between the choice of the “opportune” 
premises and the force (or persuasive effect) of enthymemes 
emerges when the problem of the relative likeliness of an argu-
ment arises. One of the most famous examples of the importance 
of the kairos in rhetorical discourse can be found in the O.J. 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  377 

Simpson trial, and in particular in the arguments in the defense 
attorney’s closing statement (Bayor 2004: 928):  
 
 Case 4 
 

We owe a debt of gratitude to this lady that ultimately 
and finally came forward. And she tells us that this man 
over the time of these interviews uses the "N" word 42 
times is what she says. And so-called Fuhrman tapes. 
And you of course had an opportunity to listen to this 
man and espouse this evil, this personification of evil. 
[…] Talking about women. Doesn't like them any better 
than he likes African Americans. They don't go out and 
initiate contact with some six foot five inch Nigger who 
has been in prison pumping weights. This is how he sees 
this world. That is this man's cynical view of the world. 
This is this man who is out there protecting and serving. 
That is Mark Fuhrman. 

 
 This argument was used by the defense to show that the 
detective (Mr. Fuhrman) that found the fundamental pieces of 
evidence incriminating the defendant, Mr. Simpson, was actual-
ly lying and could have likely planted the evidence in order to 
harm an Afro-American. The argument could be reconstructed 
as follows: 1) Fuhrman stated that he never used racial epithets; 
2) In the last 10 years, Fuhrman was found to have used private-
ly racial epithets 42 times (in some interviews aimed at writing a 
novel and a screenplay). Therefore, 3a) he is not credible as a 
witness and 3b) he is a racist and hates Afro-American people. 
The argument is actually extremely weak, as using racial epi-
thets is only a possible sign of racism (also considering the con-
text of screenplay interviews), and the “N” words were used 
over 10 years. Similarly, his false testimony concerning the use 
of racial epithets is only a weak sign of his lack of credibility 
concerning matters related to his work. However, the implicit 
premises “Who uses racial epithets is a racist” and “Who lies 
about not being a racist (or using racial epithets) should not be 
credible” (or more simply, “Racist should not be trusted”) had 
an extremely high impact on an jury composed primarily of 
black people (10 out of 12 jurors were Afro-American; see also 
Schiller & Willwerth 1997: 220). The choice of the tacit premis-
es had an extremely powerful effect on the specific jury 
(Thagard 2003), noticeably increasing the weight of the proba-
bility that the defendant was not guilty (Dung & Thang 2010). 
The same evidence had a significantly different effect when pre-



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

378  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

sented in the civil trial before a mostly white jury. In this other 
context, characterized by an audience having different shared 
values, the strength of the presumptions used was different. The 
same tacit major premises were no longer opportune, and the 
argument lost most of its effectiveness.  
 Implicit premises are grounded on a presumptive mecha-
nism that results in a powerful dialogical effect. By presuppos-
ing a premise, the speaker presumes that is shared, shifting the 
burden of proof onto the interlocutor, who needs to prove that 
the proposition left unexpressed is not acceptable or is false. 
This presumptive aspect of enthymemes can be used strategical-
ly, taking for granted not what is actually shared, but what only 
appears to be so. On this perspective, the likeliness of a premise 
plays a crucial role. The speaker can understand what his partic-
ular audience holds to be likely, and presuppose premises that 
are only apparently shared. 
 
 
5.  Manipulating the tacit premises: Strategies of presuming  
 
In section 2, and in particular in subsection 2.1, we have men-
tioned that the phenomenon of presupposition has two dimen-
sions, depending on its relation with the dialogical “actors.” On 
the one hand, the speaker performs the act of presupposing, 
within the limits mentioned in 2.3, which results in the presump-
tive effects mentioned in section 3.2 above. On the other hand, 
however, this implicit proposition needs to be reconstructed by 
the hearer. The way he can retrieve this presupposed content can 
be the ground of a specific strategy, the likely distortion of im-
plicit commitments, which is a particular type of the fallacy of 
straw man.    
 The strategic effect of distorting the interlocutor’s implicit 
premises can be understood starting from the analysis of the ef-
fects and the dialogical risks of the straw man fallacy. This mis-
chievous move consists in the speaker’s attacking a manipulated 
version of the other’s viewpoint or commitments. In this fash-
ion, he can rebut more easily a position that he has simplified 
and weakened. However, by explicitly stating the interlocutor’s 
manipulated commitments, the speaker risks being accused of 
breaching the rules of the discussion by distorting the other’s 
ideas, incurring what Hamblin would call a “point of order” 
(Hamblin 1970: 283-284). This risk can be avoided by exploit-
ing the presumptive and burden-shifting effects of presupposi-
tion.  



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  379 

 From a pragmatic perspective, the straw man encompasses 
three different tactics that are based on the different pragmatic 
nature of the speaker’s move and the hearer’s commitments: (1) 
the explicit distortion of the interlocutor’s explicit position; (2) 
the implicit manipulation of the addressee’s explicit commit-
ments; and (3) the implicit or explicit distortion of the interlocu-
tor’s implicit commitments. In the first case, as mentioned above 
the speaker exposes himself to the risk of being counter-
attacked. In the second case, the effect of the argument amounts 
to shifting the burden of interrupting the dialogue and rejecting 
the implicit premise onto the interlocutor. The most powerful 
and dangerous tactic is the third one, which is closely related 
with the concepts of premise reconstruction and likeliness of the 
tacit propositions.  
 The speaker can attack or take for granted the misrepre-
sentation (and therefore misinterpretation) of interlocutor’s 
commitments that can be reconstructed from his arguments or 
claims. This move can be extremely effective, as it consists in an 
implicit distorted, but at the same time likely, interpretation (or 
rather an uncharitable reconstruction) of a tacit position, and for 
this reason it is more difficult to detect and reconstruct. The 
hearer cannot rebut the tacit straw man by simply appealing to a 
statement that can be “on record,” as the distorted position has 
never been explicitly put forward. In order to reject the move, 
the hearer needs to reconstruct his implicit position, and provide 
arguments to support his interpretation of his own view. He 
needs to show that the speaker’s interpretation is not correct, or 
not acceptable, or in any case less likely than the one that the 
addressee is advocating. For this reason, the distortion of implic-
it commitments is characterized not only by the burden-shifting 
effect, but more importantly by the increase of the burden of re-
jecting the altered commitment. This strategy is extremely pow-
erful and is greatly effective both in law and politics. 
 To illustrate this strategy we will analyze two cases taken 
from the legal context, in which the speaker reconstructs strate-
gically the implicit premises on which the interlocutor’s argu-
ment is based and takes them for granted in his enthymeme. In 
both cases the speaker distorts the tacit principles supporting the 
explicit conclusions, showing their weakness and rejecting them 
with an appropriate counter-argument. The first example is from 
the case of Cesare Battisti, an Italian terrorist sentenced to life in 
prison in Italy, who flew first to France and then to Brazil in or-
der to receive protection and avoid imprisonment. The following 
discussion between two judges of the Supreme Federal Court of 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

380  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

Brazil, Mr. Eros Grau and Mr. Cezar Peluso, concerns the ap-
peal issued by the Italian Government against the Minister of 
Justice, who offered protection to Battisti as a refugee. The sub-
ject matter of the controversy is the reason put forward by the 
Minister of Justice (in this case representing the Public Admin-
istration) on the right of asylum to Battisti. Mr. Grau holds that 
the Minister has the right to appear before the Court to explain 
his reasons and clarify his position. On the contrary, Mr. Peluso 
aims at avoiding any appearance of the Minister and grounding 
the decision on the brief of the Minister’s lawyer5:   
 
Case 5 
 

Grau: When there is a discussion before the court con-
cerning the validity of a decision of the Public Admin-
istration […], the Administration shall be considered 
as a party. 

Peluso: [...] Why do you insist on claiming that the Min-
ister of Justice has not expressed his reasons, or that 
his claims are not valid? 

Grau: Because what I have read is not enough for me.  
Peluso: Then, you should have told to the lawyer of the 

Minister of Justice to be clearer in writing his state-
ment of defence.  

Grau: This claim of yours is a serious one.  
Peluso: Your excellence, you have said that you are not 

happy with the reasons put forward by the Minister of 
Justice!  

Grau: I have already said what I think. I will just vote.  
  
 Here Mr. Peluso reconstructs the implicit reasons underly-
ing Mr. Grau’s claim that the Minister has the right to be heard. 
According to Mr. Peluso, Mr. Grau wants the Minister heard 
because the reasons advanced in his brief are not clear enough. 
However, as shown in the opinion supporting his vote (Supremo 
Tribunal Federal, Ext 1085, Voto Eros Grau, at 5-8), Mr. Grau 
requested the hearing of the Minister because the Minister had 
the right of appearance, which in this case amounts to the right 
to reject possible objections to his reasons. Peluso, by recon-
structing and distorting the reasoning supporting Grau’s conclu-
sion, can attack the reasonableness of his request. His move is 
grounded on the strategy of taking for granted potentially con-
                                                
5 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ybTLVYQl2h0&feature=relmfu (Su-
premo Tribunal Federal - Canal Oficial) min. 4.30-5.35. (Accessed on 9 July 
2012).  



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  381 

troversial enthymematic premises, which we represent as fol-
lows:  
 

GRAU’s argument PELUSO’s interpretation of GRAU

IMPLICIT 
PREMISE

The Administration has the right to reject 
possible objections to his reasons.

The statement of defence of the 
Administration is unclear.

IMPLICIT MAJOR 
PREMISE

Who has the right to reject possible 
objections shall be heard (shall be 

considered as a party).

Who advanced unclear reasons in his 
written briefs shall be heard (so that he 

can clarify his statements).

EXPLICIT 
CONCLUSION

    The Administration shall be considered 
as a party (it shall be heard).

The Administration shall be considered as 
a party (it shall be heard).

 
 

Figure 5: Distorting the implicit grounds of a claim 
 
 In this figure, it is clear how Peluso distorts Grau’s implic-
it premise supporting his conclusion. Moreover, he increases the 
burden of attacking his straw man by taking for granted that his 
reconstruction is the accepted one (“why do you insist on claim-
ing…”).   
 The second example is taken from a statement delivered 
by Judge Scalia during the discussion on the constitutionality of 
the American health law (Affordable Care Act), requiring every 
citizen to purchase a mandate, or rather health insurance. In or-
der to attack the health insurance mandate, Scalia used the fol-
lowing analogy6:   
 
Case 6 
 

“Could you define the market—everybody has to buy 
food sooner or later, so you define the market as food, 
therefore, everybody is in the market; therefore, you can 
make people buy broccoli,” Scalia said. 

 
The argument can be paraphrased as follows7:  
 
 

                                                
6 http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/03/27/you-can-make-people-buy-
broccoli-scalia-goes-after-health-care-law/ (Accessed on 9 July 2012).  
7 For the interepretation, see  
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-27/broccoli-bungling-defense-
puts-health-care-at-risk-noah-feldman.html (Accessed on 9 July 2012). 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

382  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

ADMINISTRATION SCALIA’s interpretation

IMPLICIT 
PREMISE

Imposing the purchase of health insurance 
will result in everybody having it.

Health insurance is like broccoli (they 
are both a product on the market).

IMPLICIT 
PREMISE

The purpose of the law is to force people 
to buy a product. 

CONCLUSION   Health insurance shall be mandatory. 
Requiring people to buy health insurance 

is unconstitutional.

IMPLICIT MAJOR 
PREMISE

If a regulation has positive effects on the 
population, it shall be approved.

 Forcing the people to buy a specific 
product (broccoli) is unconstitutional. 

The purpose of the law is to diminish the 
costs of health insurance.  

 
Figure 6: Distorting the purpose of a proposal 

 
Scalia used an analogy whose implicit premises misrepresent the 
interlocutor’s position. Scalia presented the supporters of the 
Affordable Care Act as imposing the purchase of a product, not 
taking into consideration the essential differences between a 
commercial item and an essential need whose lack can affect the 
rights of others. Scalia implicitly distorts the purpose of the law, 
which was actually to extend health insurance to everybody, es-
pecially to the poor, reducing its costs.   
 The two aforementioned examples show the strategic im-
portance of implicit premises and kairos in enthymemes. The 
implicit dimension of enthymemes can be used strategically to 
take for granted a misrepresentation of another’s position. The 
two examples point out the crucial strategic role of implicitness 
in distorting the interlocutor’s position. The speaker can recon-
struct the tacit premise of the interlocutor’s enthymeme to serve 
a specific goal, and take his (mis)reconstruction for granted to 
avoid the burden of proof. In both cases the speaker is extremely 
successful. In the first example the interlocutor does not even 
reply; in the second one, the rebuttal is extremely weak and inef-
fective.8 These two examples underscore the crucial role of 
kairos. The speakers were successful because they could select 
premises that were likely to be the ones that grounded the inter-
locutor’s argument. They provided implicit reconstructions that 
were plausible, or rather likely.  
 The effectiveness of the implicit straw man crucially de-
pends on the likeliness of the distorted position. The speaker 
needs to choose the implicit premise in an opportune fashion: 
his misrepresentation needs to be credible, likely and, most im-

                                                
8 http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/03/27/you-can-make-people-buy-
broccoli-scalia-goes-after-health-care-law/ (Accessed on 9 July 2012).  



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  383 

portantly, acceptable by the audience. The relationship between 
effectiveness and opportunity becomes clear when things go 
wrong, namely when the strategy of implicit reconstruction and 
misrepresentation is unsuccessful. An extremely famous exam-
ple is the notorious Berlusconi’s reply to Martin Schulz before 
the European Parliament. In the discussion of 2 July 2003, the 
German delegate attacked the former Italian Prime Minister on 
several grounds: he criticized the racist statements of his politi-
cal partner and member of the Italian delegation, Mr. Bossi, and 
the intelligence and the political abilities of Berlusconi’s minis-
ters. He pointed out the problem of conflict of interests in Italian 
politics and reminded the audience of Berlusconi’s trials. Final-
ly, he asked the Italian politician to apply the European direc-
tives in matter of criminal law. Schulz attacked Berlusconi from 
a purely political perspective, as his target was the clear incapac-
ity and inadequacy of a public and political figure. Berlusconi 
replied as follows9:  
 
Case 7 
 

Mister Schulz, I know that a producer in Italy is currently 
preparing a film on the Nazi concentration camps: I 
would propose you for the role of a kapo; you would be 
perfect!  

 
 The interpretation of the reasoning underlying this coun-
ter-attack was provided by Berlusconi himself, who later 
claimed to the press that Schulz attacked him personally and 
wickedly, and, therefore, the reply was on the same personal 
level.10 Berlusconi interpreted an attack to his political and pub-
lic dimension as a personal attack. He reinterpreted the implicit 
premises and the implicit conclusion of Schulz’ criticism and 
used them as a justification for his offensive reply. We can rep-
resent the reasoning as follows:    
 

                                                
9 http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/shotlist.cfm?ref=81521 (Accessed on 9 
July 2012). 
10 
http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Politica/2003/07_Luglio/02/repliche.sht
ml (Accessed on 9 July 2012). 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

384  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

SCHULZ BERLUSCONI’s Straw man

EXPLICIT  PREMISE

The political and public behaviour of 
Berlusconi (and his delegation) is 

unacceptable [legal proceeding, racial 
statements…]. 

IMPLICIT MAJOR 
PREMISE

Whoever behaves in an unacceptable fashion 
from a political point of view is a bad 

representative of Italy and a bad politician. 

Whoever behaves in an unacceptable 
fashion from a political point of view 

is a bad and wicked person.

IMPLICIT/EXPLICIT 
CONCLUSION

Berlusconi is a bad representative of Italy 
and a bad politician. 

Berlusconi is a bad and wicked man. 
 

 
Figure 7: Manipulating the subject matter  

      and the purpose of a move 
 
 Berlusconi reconstructed the purpose of Schulz’s state-
ments and misrepresented them as aimed at attacking him per-
sonally instead criticizing him from a public and political per-
spective. He distorted the very purpose of Schulz’s attack, and 
consequently he manipulated the implicit conclusion and the ex-
plicit premise of his enthymeme. Berlusconi took for granted 
this misrepresentation in replying to him: he insulted him per-
sonally, putting the criticism of the German representative on 
the same level of his vulgar joke. However, his reconstruction of 
the implicit dimension of Schulz’s move was completely unrea-
sonable and unlikely, and could not be anyhow accepted by the 
audience.  
 This example is useful to show the crucial importance of 
kairos and its relationship with ethics pointed out in the ancient 
tradition. Berlusconi chose the implicit premises that “Schulz 
resembles a Nazi,” and that “Nazis (and those who are similar to 
them) are bad.” Both premises are totally inopportune in an in-
ternational and diplomatic context, especially from an ethical 
perspective. For this reason, this move resulted in an interna-
tional scandal.11  

                                                
11 Straw man can be combined with other strategies, such as auto-
victimization, which are based on more ethically opportune premises, and 
lead to extremely successful outcomes. One of the clearest examples is Rom-
ney’s straw man of Gingrich’s attack: Romney distorts Gingrich’s claim that 
“Romney is the most anti-immigrant representative among us [the candi-
dates]” playing the part of the victim, stating that he cannot be racist and anti-
immigrant, considering that his father was born in Mexico. 
(http://www.cfr.org/us-election-2012/republican-debate-transcript-
jacksonville-florida-january-2012/p27204. Accessed on 11 July 2012)  



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  385 

6.  Conclusion 
 
Enthymemes have been described by Aristotle as rhetorical in-
struments, aimed at the persuasion of the audience. Why and 
how can the structure of the rhetorical syllogism be aimed at 
persuasion? A possible answer can be found in their pragmatic 
dimension, in reason why a premise can be “missing”, or rather 
left unexpressed. By investigating the linguistic structure of an 
enthymeme, we have shown how tacit premises can be consid-
ered as presuppositions of a higher level predicate, or rather 
“coherence relation” between the explicit premise and the con-
clusion. Presuppositions are forms of implicit speech acts, char-
acterized by specific conditions governing their possibility and 
reasonableness. In particular, the reasonableness of this act de-
pends on the possibility of presuming the interlocutor’s ac-
ceptance (or knowledge) of the proposition that is left unex-
pressed. On this view, presuppositions are linguistic phenomena 
that are crucially grounded on a pattern of presumptive reason-
ing. The speaker presumes that a proposition is accepted by the 
interlocutor, and for this reason treats it as uncontroversial. This 
analysis of implicit premises accounts for two fundamental rhe-
torical dimensions of enthymemes: their dialogical effects and 
their strategic uses.  
 From a dialogical perspective, the implicit move shifts the 
burden of proof onto the hearer, who needs to reject the move 
and provide evidence that the presupposed proposition is in fact 
not acceptable or shared. The presumptive dimension of enthy-
memes is the cornerstone of kairos, which is the strategic aspect 
of rhetoric. The speaker can take a proposition for granted be-
cause he presumes that it will be accepted by his interlocutors. 
Presumptions are different in strength, and depending on the 
community some propositions are considered more or less like-
ly, more or less acceptable. For this reason, the effectiveness of 
an enthymeme is determined by the opportunity of its implicit 
premise, i.e., its appropriateness in a given context.  
 The dialogical effect of the presumptive and pragmatic 
dimension of the tacit premise and the effect of kairos emerge 
clearly in the fallacy of straw man. By performing this strategic 
move, the speaker distorts the interlocutor’s viewpoint or his 
unstated commitments, and takes the modified position for 
granted. This implicit misrepresentation shifts the burden of 
proving the contrary onto the hearer, who needs to provide ar-
guments in support of his own commitment. The effect of this 
strategy depends on the resemblance of the distorted premise 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

386  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

with the actual proposition, or with what is usually the case. In 
this sense, the representation of the interlocutor’s (or third par-
ty’s) words does not need to be true, but simply likely, similar to 
what usually happens or should be the case. In this sense enthy-
memes can be considered as strategies of presuming.       
 
 
References  
 
Aristotle. (1969). Topica. In W. Ross (ed.), The works of 

Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Aristotle. (1991). On Rhetoric (translated by G. A. Kennedy). 

New York: Oxford University Press. 
Austin, J. (1962). How to do things with words. Oxford: Claren-

don. 
Bach, K. (2003). Speech acts and pragmatics. In M. Devitt and 

R. Hanley (eds.), Blackwell. Guide to the philosophy of lan-
guage (pp. 147-167). Oxford: Blackwell. 

Bayor, R. (2004). The Columbia documentary history of race 
and ethnicity in America. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 

Bitzer, L. (1968). The rhetorical situation, Philosophy and Rhet-
oric 1: 1-14. 

Braet, A.C. (1999). The enthymeme in Aristotle's Rhetoric: 
From argumentation theory to logic. Informal Logic 19: 110-
117. 

Burke, M. (1985). Unstated Premises. Informal logic 7: 107-
118. 

Burton-Roberts, N. (1989). The limits to debate: A revised theo-
ry of semantic presupposition. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press. 

Cicero, M.T. (1988). De Inventione. In The orations of Marcus 
Tullius Cicero (translated by C. D. Yonge). London: George 
Bell & Sons. 

De Quincey, T. (1893). Essays on style, rhetoric, and language. 
Boston: Scott.  

Ducrot, O. (1966). "Le roi de France est sage". Implication 
logique et présupposition linguistique. Etudes de linguistique 
appliquée 4: 39-47.  

Ducrot, O. (1968). Le structuralisme en linguistique. In O. Du-
crot et al. (eds.), Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme? (pp. 13-96). 
Paris: Seuil. 

Ducrot, O. (1972). Dire et ne pas dire. Paris: Hermann. 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  387 

Ducrot, O. (1978). Deux mais. Cahier de linguistique 8: 109-
120. 

Dung, P.M., & Thang, P.M. (2010). Towards (Probabilistic) Ar-
gumentation for Jury-based Dispute Resolution. In P. Baroni 
et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the 2010 conference on Compu-
tational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2010 
(pp. 171-182). Amsterdam: IOS Press.  

Giuliani, A. (1961). Il concetto di prova. Milano: Giuffré.  
Gough. J., & Tindale, C. (1985). Hidden or missing premises. 

Informal Logic 7: 99-106. 
Grice, P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole and J. Mor-

gan (eds.), Syntax and semantics 3: Speech acts (pp. 41-58). 
New York: Academic Press. 

Grimes, J. (1975). The thread of discourse. The Hague: Mouton. 
Hamblin, C. (1970). Fallacies. Newport News: Vale Press.  
Hamilton, W. (1874). Lectures on logic. Edinburgh: William 

Blackwood & Sons. 
Hickey, L. (1993). Presupposition under cross-examination. In-

ternational journal for the semiotics of law 6 (16): 89-109. 
Hobbs, J. (1985). On the coherence and structure of discourse. 

Report No. CSLI-85-37, Center for the Study of Language 
and Information, Stanford University. 

Holdgraves, T. (2008). Language as social action. Mahwah: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 

Hopper, R. (1981) How to do things without words: The taken 
for granted as speech action. Communication Quarterly 29 
(3): 228-236.  

Karttunen, L. (1973). Presuppositions of compound sentences. 
Linguistic inquiry 4 (2): 169-193. 

Kauffeld, F. (1998). Presumptions and the distribution of argu-
mentative burdens in acts of proposing and accusing. Argu-
mentation 12: 245–266.  

Kempson, R. (1975). Presupposition and the delimitations of 
semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  

Kinneavy, J.L. (2002). Kairos in classical and modern rhetori-
cal theory. In P. Sipiora and J.S. Baumlin (eds.), Rhetoric 
and kairos (pp. 58-76). Albany: State University of New 
York Press.  

Lakoff, R. (1971). If’s, and’s, and but’s about conjunction. In C. 
Fillmore and D. Langendoen (eds.), Studies in linguistic se-
mantics (pp. 115-150). New York: Holt. 

Lascarides, A., & Asher, N. (1993). Temporal interpretation, 
discourse relations and commonsense entailment. Linguistics 
and philosophy 16 (5): 437-493. 



 

 
 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

388  Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele 

Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of 
philosophical logic 8: 339–359. 

Macagno, F. (2011). The presumptions of meaning. Hamblin 
and equivocation. Informal logic 31 (4): 367-393.  

Macagno, F. (2012). Presumptive reasoning in interpretation. 
Implicatures and conflicts of presumptions. Argumentation 
26 (2): 233-265.  

McBurney, J. (1994). The place of enthymeme in rhetorical the-
ory. In E. Schiappa (ed.), Landmark essays on classical 
Greek rhetoric (pp. 169-190). Davis: Hermagoras Press.  

Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1951). Act and person in 
argument. Ethics 61 (4): 251-269. 

Quintilian, M.F. (1996). Institutio Oratoria (translated by H.E. 
Butler). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 

Rescher, N. (1977). Dialectics: a controversy-oriented approach 
to the theory of knowledge. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 

Rescher, N. (2006). Presumption and the practices of tentative 
cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Rigotti E., & Rocci A. (2001). Sens - non-sens – contresens. 
Studies in Communication Sciences 2: 45-80. 

Rigotti, E., & Rocci, A. (2006). Denotation vs. Connotation. In 
Encyclopedia of language and linguistics. Second edition (pp. 
1-9). Oxford: Elsevier. 

Rigotti, E. (1993). La sequenza testuale: definizione e procedi-
menti di analisi con esemplificazioni in lingue diverse. L'ana-
lisi linguistica e letteraria 1 (1): 43-148. 

Rigotti, E. (2005). Towards a typology of manipulative proces-
ses. In L. de Saussure and P. Schulz (eds.), Manipulation and 
ideologies in the twentieth century: discourse, language, 
mind (pp. 61- 83). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 

Schiller, L., & Willwerth, J. (1997). American tragedy: The un-
censored story of the Simpson defense. New York: Avon 
Books.  

Searle, J.R., & Vanderveken, D. (1985). Foundations of Illocu-
tionary Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

Sorensen, R. (1988). Are Enthymemes Arguments? Notre Dame 
Journal of Formal Logic 29 (1): 155-159. 

Stalnaker, R.C. (1970). Pragmatics. Synthese 22 (1-2): 272-289. 
Stalnaker, R.C. (1998). On the representation of context. Jour-

nal of logic, language, and information 7 (1): 3-19. 
Stalnaker, R.C. (2002). Common ground. Linguistics and phi-

losophy 25: 701–721. 



                            The Dialogical Force of Implicit Premises 
 

 
© Fabrizio Macagno & Giovanni Damele. Informal Logic, Vol. 33, No. 3 
(2013). Pp. 361-389. 
 

  389 

Strawson, P. (1971). Identifying reference and truth-values. In 
logico-linguistic papers (pp. 75-95). London: Methuen. 

Thagard, P. (2003). Why wasn't O. J. convicted? Emotional co-
herence in legal inference. Cognition and emotion 17 (3): 
361-383. 

Tindale, C. (1999). Acts of arguing: a rhetorical model of argu-
ment. Albany: State University of New York Press.  

Untersteiner, M. (1954). The sophists. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Vanderveken, D. (2002). Universal grammar and speech act 

theory. In D. Vanderveken and S. Kubo (eds.), Essays in 
speech act theory (pp. 25-62). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 

Vatz, R.E. (1968). The myth of the rhetorical situation. Philoso-
phy & rhetoric 6 (3): 154-161. 

Viano, C.A. (1955). La logica di Aristotele. Taylor, Torino. 
Von Fintel, K. (2008). What is presupposition accommodation, 

again? Philosophical perspectives 22: 137–170. 
Walker, J. (1994). The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the En-

thymeme. College English, 56, 1: 46-65. 
Walton, D. (1999). Profiles of dialogue for evaluating arguments 

from ignorance. Argumentation 13: 53-71. 
Walton, D. (2001). Enthymemes, common knowledge and plau-

sible inference. Philosophy and rhetoric 34: 93-112.