34.4Musi4107USEthisforpublication
© Elena Musi, Informal Logic, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2014), pp.417-
442.
Evidential Modals at the Semantic-
Argumentative Interface: Appearance Verbs
as Indicators of Defeasible Argumentation
ELENA MUSI
Università
della
Svizzera
italiana
(Istituto
di
Studi
italiani),
Via
Lambertenghi
10A
CH-‐6904
Lugano
(Switzerland)
elena.musi@usi.ch
Abstract: This contribution aims at
providing an argumentative method
to account for epistemic modality
and evidentiality. I claim that these
two linguistic categories can work as
semantic components of defeasible
argumentative schemes based on
classification processes. This kind of
approximate reasoning is, in fact,
frequently indicated by appearance
verbs which signal that the inferred
standpoint is conceived by the
speaker as uncertain (epistemic
value) due to the deceiving nature of
perceptual data (evidential value).
Drawing from an analysis at the
semantic-argumentative interface,
the way in which prototype theory
sheds light on the processes of
meaning construction underlying
defeasible arguments from definition
is also shown.
Résumé: This contribution aims at
providing an argumentative method
to account for epistemic modality
and evidentiality. I claim that these
two linguistic categories can work as
semantic components of defeasible
argumentative schemes based on
classification processes. This kind of
approximate reasoning is, in fact,
frequently indicated by appearance
verbs which signal that the inferred
standpoint is conceived by the
speaker as uncertain (epistemic
value) due to the deceiving nature of
perceptual data (evidential value).
Drawing from an analysis at the
semantic-argumentative interface,
the way in which prototype theory
sheds light on the processes of
meaning construction underlying
defeasible arguments from definition
is also shown.
Keywords: appearance verbs, argument from definition, Argumentum Model
of Topics, epistemic modality, evidentiality defeasible reasoning, prototype
theory, semantics-argumentation interface.
1. Introduction
This contribution proposes an argumentative method for
analyzing epistemic modality and evidentiality1 commencing
1 Evidentiality is the linguistic category which “refers to the reasoning
processes that lead to a proposition” while epistemic modality “evaluates the
likelihood that a proposition is true” (Cornillie 2009, p. 47).
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from the interface between semantics and argumentation2.
Starting from the analysis of appearance verbs, the aim is to
show how their evidential and epistemic values can be mapped
into the argumentative reconstruction of the reasoning they
indicate. Appearance verbs frequently indicate defeasible
argument schemes based on classification processes: they signal
that the inferred standpoint is conceived by the speaker as
uncertain (epistemic value) due to the deceiving nature of
perceptual data which function as premises (evidential value).
My working hypothesis is that a deep semantic analysis of
appearance verbs is needed to shed light on the complexity of
the processes of categorization exploited in plausible reasoning.
The importance of semantics for a theory of argumentation has
been recently recognized in the study of analytical
reconstructions (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, van
Eemeren 2010) and in the study of implicit premises (Rocci
2005, Bigi and Greco Morasso 2012, Miecznikowski, Rocci and
Zlatkova 2013 and Miecznikowski and Zlatkova, to appear). In
particular, the role of the lexical Italian modals dovere (‘must’)
and potere (‘can’) as argumentative indicators has been widely
investigated by Rocci (2012, 2013) in the context of economical
financial news.
The theoretical and methodological frameworks I refer to
are the Congruity Theory approach (Rigotti and Rocci 2001,
Rigotti 2005, Rigotti, Rocci and Greco 2006) for the semantic
analysis and the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and
Greco 2010) for argumentative reconstructions. The usefulness
of these two models to tackle the semantic–argumentative
interface is respectively explained in sections 2 and 3.
As a case study, I focus on the Italian verb apparire (‘to
appear’) drawing on 31 occurrences of the verb contained in art
exhibition reviews downloaded from the Italian site
Mostreinmostra. The choice of exhibition reviews as a source of
data is motivated by the argumentative nature of this text genre.
As underlined by Miecznikowski (to appear), the aim of an
exhibition review is to help readers decide whether that
exhibition is well worth a visit or not. To this purpose, reviewers
report their firsthand experience as an argument in support of
the overall evaluation. In the case of exhibition reviews, the
2 This study is part of the broader research project “From perception to
inference. Evidential, argumentative and textual aspects of perception
predicates in Italian”, supported by the Swiss National Foundation (grant
n.141350, see http://www.perc-inferenza.ch) and directed by Johanna
Miecznikowski and Andrea Rocci at USI (Università della Svizzera Italiana).
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visual character of the reviewed object favours the occurrences
of appearance verbs both in the description of the reviewer’s
impression in front of the works of art and in evaluative
utterances about the exhibition itself.
The first section of the study is devoted to the semantic
analysis, while the second part deals with argumentative
reconstructions. In section 2, I explain why the verb apparire
functions in its inferential uses, which have proved to be
primarily abductive, as an indicator of defeasible argumentation.
On the one hand, the verb presupposes a set of information
sources in its semantic structure which signals the presence of
premises from which a proposition is inferred (evidential value).
On the other hand, it points to the fact that the inferred
proposition is presented by the speaker as plausible, but not
certain (epistemic-modal value). This lack of certainty can be
traced back to the illusory nature of perception, which is at the
basis of the critical questions that participants to the event raise
from the so called argument from appearance (Walton 2006).
The lexicalization of this type of categorization is compatible
with a conceptualization of our processes of meaning
construction as based on a principle of analogy and similarity
more than on a principle of identity. On this basis, in section 4,
after having described some basic principles of prototype theory,
I propose two argumentative reconstructions based on the so-
called “argument from prototype definition” in order to show
the explanatory power of this semantic theory for the analysis of
defeasible arguments.3
2. Apparire’s semantic analysis
This section is dedicated to the identification of the participants
in the event expressed by apparire (linguistic argument
structure), on the basis of the “Congruity Theory”4 approach
(Rigotti and Rocci 2001, Rigotti 2005, Rigotti, Rocci and Greco
2006). Following this semantic-pragmatic theory, discourse
units can be conceived in terms of predicative-argument
3 Framenet is a free access lexical database elaborated by the International
Computer Science Institute in Berkeley
(https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/).
4 The term congruity traces back to the notion of symploké (<Greek
“sympléko”, ‘interwining’) as used in Plato’ Sophist (261.d.4 – 262.e.2)
where the philosopher metaphorically represents discourse as a living body
which cannot be dismembered.
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structures whose combination gives rise to meaningful verbal
communication through language compositionality. This
approach is pragmatic both in a broad and an etymological
sense: it focuses on the relevance of contextual factors required
to interpret the information encoded by linguistic lexicon and it
considers verbal communication as action since the meaning of
an utterance "coincides with its intended effects, that is to say
with the change it brings about in the context-yet more precisely
in the intersubjectivity of the interlocutors" (Rigotti 2005, p. 77).
Predicates (< Latin praedicatum < Greek kategoria =
kata, ‘about’ and agoreuo, ‘to speak’) are those actions, events,
properties which speak about the mode of being of an argument.
The class of arguments includes individuals, states of affairs,
and events that are affected by those modes of being. The
semantic structure of a predicate is characterized by two
components: presuppositions, requirements that the predicate
imposes on its argument places according to number, quality,
and order (argument structure), and entailments, which refer to
what occurs when the predicate is true of its arguments. The
presuppositions are conditions of meaningfulness which
characterize both the cases in which the predicate is affirmed
and those in which the predicate is negated. Differently, the
semantic implications of the predicate do not hold when the
predicate is negated.
The advantages offered by this framework for the study
of the semantic- argumentative interface are twofold: on the one
hand a semantic approach to argument structure, as opposed to a
syntactic one (Hale and Keyser 2002), recognizes as arguments
also elements which are not syntactically expressed but
logically-semantically implied; these arguments are conditions
necessary to interpret the meaning of the predicate and
guarantee the text’s coherence. On the other hand, compared to
other semantic approaches (Pustejovsky 1995), it highlights the
interrelations between presuppositions and lexical meaning
(entailments) enabling the reconstruction of inferential processes.
The presuppositions triggered by the predicate function at a
pragmatic level as Searlian felicity conditions of the utterance
containing the predicate. In this way, the lexical predicate
functions as a high level pragmatic predicate called a
“connective predicate”, guaranteeing the coherence of the text it
is part of. The applicability of such an approach in
argumentative terms is straightforward: “the pragmatic
conditions of argumentation and the logical requirements of the
particular inference schemes employed are analyzed as part of
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the presuppositions of the connective predicate at issue” (Rigotti
2005, p. 75). The choice of adopting the Congruity Theory
approach is justified by the fact that, compared to other
approaches to discourse relations, it encompasses both the
semantic and the pragmatic-argumentative level in a unified
account.
From the analysis of the 31 occurrences of the verb in
the chosen corpus, two basic meanings of the verb have
emerged. The first one is traceable to the etymon of the verb
(apparire < Lat. apparēre ‘to come out, to become visible, to
come to light’) indicating the appearance of an object entering
the perceiver’s visual field:
1. Poi un po’ di calma ed eccoti apparire davanti un paio
di “pezzi da novanta” come la Madonna con il bambino,
serafini e cherubini ed il Cristo morto, entrambi
provenienti da Brera. (Review, Mostreinmostra,
Exhibition: “Mantegna”, Verona)
“Then, after having waited a bit, there appears in front of
us a couple of ‘big pieces’ like the Madonna and child,
seraphim and cherubim and the Dead Christ, both from
Brera”.
In these cases, apparire functions as a two place predicate
where x1 is the object which appears, and x2 is the perceiver:
Apparire (x1, x2)
Presuppositions:
x1: X
(x1) ∧ ¬see (x2, x1) t-1
x2: animate (x2) ∧ ∀y € (X(y) →◊a(x2, see (x1,y)) )
Entailments
see (x2, x1)t X: class of concrete, visible objects
The predicate imposes constraints not only on the number, but
also on the quality of the arguments: x1 has to belong to the class
of concrete, visible objects which have not be seen by x2 at the
moment of speaking; x2, in turn, must exist, be animate, and be
capable of seeing the eventuality x1. Moreover, the semantics of
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apparire as a percept oriented verb 5 presuppose that x1,
positioned before or after the verb, works as the grammatical
subject of the predicate. The presuppositions imposed by the
predicate as represented in the scheme are hyperonyms of the
characteristics of “us” and “a couple of big pieces”. When used
as in example 1 the verb is attested in descriptive rather than
argumentative contexts. The reviewer, in order to describe the
exhibition, leads the reader along a fictive visit: the verb
apparire is at the same time used to express the perceptual
impact of a work of art and to introduce a new topic in the
discourse universe.
In its other occurrences, especially in copulative
constructions, the verb conveys an inferential value signalling
that the proposition expressed by the speaker is based on a set of
information sources. Indeed, this inferential meaning has been
crosslinguistically recognized in studies (Col 2006, Cornillie
2009, Gisborne 2007, Diewald and Smirnova 2010) about
appearance verbs as markers of evidentiality.
As remarked upon by Rocci regarding necessity modals,
evidentiality plays an important role in discourse relations since
it “can constrain the interpretation of their immediate co-text
allowing the addressee to establish an argumentative relation
between the utterance in which they appear and co-textually
recoverable evidence” (Rocci 2012, p. 2129). The nature of this
relation has not been deeply investigated by linguists and lacks a
systematic theoretical account. In this regard, I claim that the
inferential relations in question can be classified as abductive,
drawing from the following definition of abductive reasoning
provided by Walton: “abductive reasoning is a kind of guessing
by a process of forming a plausible hypothesis that explains a
given set of facts or data” (2001, p. 143). The conclusion drawn
from abductive inference is, hence, more fallible than those
resulting from other kinds of inferences (inductive and
deductive). In the literature, abductive inferences are considered
to be the same as inferences to the best explanation (Harman
1965, Josephson and Josephson 1994, Douven and Verbrugge
2010) which are conceived as more or less likely depending on
several factors. In the following sections I will show how
appearance verbs, behaving as markers of evidentiality, impose
constraints on the information sources at the basis of the uttered
proposition. In pragmatic terms, the verb apparire, presupposing
5 Percept oriented verbs differ from perceiver-oriented verbs (for example the
verb to see), in which the perceiver occupies the subject position.
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in its argument structure a set of information sources, gives the
reader the instruction to look in the co-text for a set of premises
at the basis of the uttered proposition p:
2. è il caso di Fanny Churberg che realizza il dipinto
Rocce di granito friabile (1871, Helsinki, Ateneumin
Taidemuseo Suomen Kansalissgalleria) in cui la natura
non affatto idilliaca appare invece brutale e diretta, nella
scoscesità dei massi dipinti, nei giochi di luce ed ombra,
e con l’effetto della profondità dato da un uso sapiente
del bianco e del grigio. (Review, Mostreinmostra,
Exhibition: “Munch e lo spirito del nord”, Udine)
“It is the case of Fanny Churberg who painted friable
Granite rocks (1871 Helsinki, Suomen Ateneumin
Taidemuseo Kansalissgalleria) in which [nature, not
idyllic at all, appears rather brutal and direct] proposition [in
the steep boulders depicted in the play of light and
shadow, and the effect of depth given by a wise use of
white and gray] information source
”
Even if in 2, the information source is of a perceptual
nature, the speaker does not directly witness a brutal nature but
he infers that this impression matches the figurative intention of
the painter from a series of depicted details. Since these details
are overtly expressed, they function as intersubjective sources of
information which the writer is invited to look at in order to
understand and/or agree with the writer’s qualification. The
reviewer’s communicative intention is probably to make the
reader focus on the painting’s most salient peculiarities, which
will be exploited as a ground to express an overall evaluation of
the exhibition at the end of the review.
The role of the reader’s knowledge in making an
interpretative hypothesis (abductive inference) is more apparent
in the following example, in which the recognition of
iconographical roots of the Dinner in the sixteenth’s century
Lombard paintings is due to the reviewer’s personal artistic
notions:
3. Questa prima Cena appare debitrice della tradizione
pittorica lombarda del Cinquecento […]: attorno ad una
tavola imbandita, alla presenza di un oste, Cristo –
giovane e imberbe – spezza il pane e col gesto
benedicente si rivela ai due attoniti pellegrini che
reagiscono al miracolo con accenti plateali. (Review,
Mostreinmostra, Exhibition: “Caravaggio ospita
Caravaggio”, Milano)
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“This first Dinner appears to be retraceable to the
Lombard tradition of painting of the sixteenth century
[...] around a dinner table, in the presence of an innkeeper,
Christ - young and beardless –breaks the bread and with
the gesture of blessing is revealed to the two astonished
pilgrims who react to the miracle with blatant accents.”
The semantic difference between the strictly perceptual
use (see example 1) and the inferential uses of apparire is
reflected in a difference both in the number and the ontological
types of the presupposed argument places. Apparire’s argument
structure in examples 2 and 3 can be formalized as follows:
Apparire (x1, x2, x3, BDox)
Presuppositions
x1: eventuality (x1) ∧ Xn (x1) ∧ see (x2, x1)
x2: animate (x2) ∧ ∀y € (X(y) →◊a(x2, see (x1,y)) )
x3 : eventuality (x3) ∧ Xn’ (x3)
BDox
: background set of presumptions associating eventualities
of class Xn with eventualities of class Xn’
Entailments
□ (({px1} ∪
BDox) → px3) Xn: class of eventualities which
can be visually experienced
The argument x2 is not overtly expressed in the text but it is
presupposed by the semantics of the verb: working as an
epistemic modal, apparire is performative and hence necessarily
defined in relation to a human being who commits himself to the
truth of the uttered proposition. The first argument has to be an
eventuality of the class Xn which can be experienced by x1
through the sense of sight. Ontologically speaking, it can be a
concrete object, like in 2 and 3, or an event such as a football
match or a theatre show. The violation of the condition imposed
by the predicate on x1 would produce incongruity and hence
nonsense (* “Music appears to be”). In example 3, x1 are the
sources of information through which the speaker describes the
painting with its iconographical features. The eventuality x3
corresponds to what appears to x2 as a possible state of affairs.
In its evidential-inferential uses, apparire functions as a
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connective predicate signalling that the proposition
corresponding to the occurrence of the eventuality x3 is inferred
as a conclusion from a set of information sources which can be
conceived of in argumentative terms as signs.
However, the proposition denoting the eventuality x1
alone does not suffice to allow the inferential process as the
basis of the proposition asserting the appearance. To obtain px3,
a second unstated premise which clarifies the relation between
the sources of information and the conclusion must be supplied.
In example 3, a reconstructed implicit premise would state that
the iconographical features described by the author are typical of
the Lombard Sixteenth century tradition of painting. What is
presupposed in the argument structure of the verb is, hence, the
existence of a class of presumptions associating the eventualities
x1 and x3. The BDox argument, which reveals the modal nature of
apparire, can be traced back to Kratzer’s (1981) Relative
Modality 6 following which, modals are relational predicates
whose components are prejacent (the proposition in scope) and
a set of propositions called conversational background. The
modal relation expressed by apparire is that of possibility which
is defined by the compatibility of the prejacent with an
epistemic conversational background. The plausibility of a
possible worlds semantic account for apparire, is consistent
with the fact that the verb seems to work as an operator at the
propositional level. As noticed by Faller (2002, pp. 10-115), the
so called challengeability test (Palmer 2001, Sweetser 1990),
which consists in questioning, doubting, or rejecting the
meaning of an element is the most reliable test to check if an
evidential contributes to the meaning of the main proposition or
not:
4. Guardando all’affrettata stesura del colore, il dipinto
appare incompleto
“Looking at the inaccurate application of the colour, the
painting appears to be incomplete”
a. Is that so?
b. I agree
c. I don’t believe it
6 The interlinguistic usefulness of Relative Modality for a context dependent
semantic account of different modal flavours has been highlighted in various
studies (e.g. Rocci 2012, Faller 2011).
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The antagonist’s reactions in 4(a-c) can be interpreted both as
commenting on the truth of the proposition (the painting is
incomplete) or that of the modal proposition (the painting
appears to be incomplete). The antagonist could disagree with
the fact that the way in which the colour is applied on the canvas
entails that the painting is probably incomplete, claiming for
example that an unrefined application of colour is a typical
feature of that painter’s style. This property is inherent to
evidential verbs: the use of a verbum putandi like ‘to think’
would not allow such an ambiguity, leaving only the truth of the
embedded proposition as questionable.
The verb apparire is not perfectly equivalent to a verbum
putandi due to its evidential nature. The use of the verb next to
an explicit declaration of the lack of sources of information on
the part of the speaker, though acceptable, would in fact sound
weird:
5 a. ?Non so perché, ma il dipinto appare incompleto
“?I do not know why, but the painting appears to be
incomplete
b. Non so perché, ma penso che il dipinto sia incompleto
“I do not know why, but I think the painting is incomplete”
Another argument in support of the evidential character of the
verb is its compatibility only with the expression of indirect
evidentiality: as noticed with regard to example 2, differently
from a verb like vedere, ‘to see’, the verb apparire never refers
to a state of affairs where the experiencer has direct access to an
event which he perceives visually at the moment of speaking.
As argued in possible worlds semantics, the modalized
sentence is false only when the ontological relation between the
proposition and what the speaker knows is negated. This test
shows that apparire is indeed an operator at the propositional
level, whose truth value is connected to its inferential relation
with the sources of information, but does not explain which
elements the speaker’s degree of commitment depends on.
The definition of the argument BDox as a set of presumptions
reveals, in fact, the modal epistemic value intrinsic to the verb:
apparire, compared to essere (‘to be’) assigns a lesser degree of
certainty to the truth of what is asserted; in other words, even if
the reviewer commits himself to the truth of the proposition, he
signals at the same time that the uttered proposition expresses a
state of affairs whose likelihood is judged on the basis of the
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data available to him (x1), his knowledge and reasoning
capacities (BDox).
Formally speaking, this epistemic stance implies a
semantic representation of apparire as a quantifier over possible
worlds which is restricted by a conditional clause concerning the
type of x the speaker is relying on and their relevance for the
operation of classification. This conditional restriction selects
the set of possible worlds in which the inferential relation
between the sources of information and the asserted proposition
is consistent: sentence 4 could, for example, be paraphrased as
“provided that we have only visual evidence available and that
the way in which colour is applied on the canvas is relevant in
deciding if a painting has been finished, the not accurate
application of the color is a signal that the painting was probably
not finished”. The degree of possibility depends on the type of
data at disposal and on our cognitive ways of experiencing the
world.
As shown in the next section the uncertainty conveyed
by modal expressions correlates with the awareness, pointed out
by fuzzy logic, that human reasoning is approximate rather than
exact, especially when based on perceptual data.
3. Defeasible arguments and reasoning from categorization
To exemplify the mechanisms underlying fuzzy logic, Zadeh
(1975, p. 408) presents the following syllogism:
A1: Most men are vain
A2: Socrates is a man
A3: It is likely that Socrates is vain
A’3: it is very likely that Socrates is vain
The consequents A3 and A’3 are both possible consequents of
premises A1 and A2 depending on the degree of approximations
of the term most. Since the majority of men (but not all) are vain
and Socrates is a man, it is possible/almost certain (but not
certain) that Socrates is vain too.7 Similarly, the evidential-
7 It has to be noted that already in his Posterior Analytics Aristotle speaks
about syllogisms “epì tò polú”, ‘for the most part’ (Lat. “plerumque”):
“Every syllogism proceeds through premises which are either necessary or
usual [epì tò polú]; if the premises are necessary, the conclusion is necessary
too; and if the premises are usual, so is the conclusion” (I, 87b25). As
underlined by Rescher (1964, p. 170) Aristotle’s theory of modal reasoning
has its conceptual roots in the theory of scientific inference.
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epistemic meaning of apparire signals that the proposition p
refers to a possible state of affairs whose plausibility depends on
the reliability of the SoAs (state of affairs) expressed in the
premises, which are subjective in the sense that they are valid as
far as the speaker knows.
Even if direct sight is considered one of the most certain
means of knowledge (Sweetser 1990, p. 33), inference based on
perceptual data (e.g. 2, 3) can be misleading due to the fact that
“a perceived object only approximates material objects, and that
it may change its appearance as our perceptual information
changes.” (van der Does and van Lambalgen 2000, p. 11). The
fact that perceptions depend on the perceiver’s perspective and
thus can be deceiving, is clearly shown by some occurrences of
apparire:
6. Le cavità che attraversano la composizione hanno la
potenzialità di apparire come tetri spazi neri o come
superfici pienamente scintillanti, secondo la disposizione
della fonte luminosa. (Review, Mostreinmostra,
Exhibition: “Ben Ormense per un instabile equilibrio”,
Sacile)
“The cavities throughout the composition have the
potential to appear as gloomy black spaces or as fully
sparkling surfaces, according to the arrangement of the
light source”
7. L’ambiente appare immutato nella sua consuetudine
espositiva, un classicismo narrativo che traghetta lo
sguardo attraverso i secoli. Arrivati a metà del corridoio
d’entrata però, una struttura color rosso vivo regala
nuovi interrogativi: è il Concetto spaziale di Lucio
Fontana (1960), l’idropittura creata con tagli e buchi
che apre la mostra. (Review, Mostreinmostra,
Exhibition: “Burri e Fontana a Brera”, Milano)
“The environment appears unchanged in its customary
exhibition, a classical narrative that draws the gaze
through the centuries. Once in the middle of the entrance
corridor, however, a bright red structure gives new
questions: it is the Lucio Fontana’s spatial concept (1960),
the water-based painting with cuts and holes that opens
the show”
In example 6, the “omniscient reviewer” explains that cavities
could appear differently to visitors depending on the light’s
conditions. In 7, instead, the “filter” influencing the perception
is not external, but part of the perceptual experience itself: if at
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the beginning of the visit the environment seems unchanged, the
appearance of Fontana’s work of art changes the situation.
Generally speaking, our perception is affected by imprecise
visual information and lack of knowledge which make us draw
plausible, but not absolutely valid inferences. In argumentation
theory, this gap between the real object and the perceived object
underlying appearances, is accounted for in terms of defeasible
argumentation schemes. In particular, Walton, Reed and
Macagno (2008) describe the standpoints asserted by inference
from visual data as conclusions driven from the so called
appearance argument scheme:
Premise: This object looks like it could be classified
under verbal category C. Conclusion. Therefore,
this object can be classified under verbal category
C. (Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008, p. 345)
As observed by the above scholars, the argument from
appearance dates back to Greek philosophers as an instance of
plausible reasoning, that is to say the reasoning “based on
appearances, meaning propositions that appear to be true and
have standing as acceptable premises in a rational inference used
to draw a conclusion, even though the inference can later turn
out to be erroneous” (Walton 2006, p. 320). Plausible reasoning
does not include only reasoning based on observational data, but
every argument based on generalizations subject to exceptions.
In the light of this, it seems that apparire, due to its evidential-
epistemic semantics, functions in its inferential uses as a marker
indicating that the type of reasoning at work is a defeasible one:
a proposition appears to the speaker to be true, even if he does
not know it is veridical.
Data analysis has shown that apparire usually indicates
what in Pragma-Dialectics is called symptomatic argumentation
since “the property attributed to the referent in the argument is
put forward as being a symptom of the property attributed to it
in the standpoint” (Hitchcock and Wagemans 2011, p. 186). In
particular, the process involved is that of classification where “x
appears to be y” on the basis of the identification by the
perceiver of some properties of y in x. At this point, the research
question I would like to answer is: which component does the
defeasibility of the argumentative reasoning have its roots in?
In this regard, dealing with arguments from classification,
Walton and Macagno (2010) state that the “Argument from
Criteria to Verbal Classification” (which fits the kind of
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reasoning exploited in our case of study) is defeasible due to the
generalization made in the major premise:
MAJOR PREMISE: If X has the characteristics A, B, C…then X
is Q
MINOR PREMISE: Event or object X has the characteristics A,
B, C
CONCLUSION: Therefore, event or object X is Q.
(Walton and Macagno 2010, p. 37)
One of the critical questions at issue is: what evidence is there
that the characteristics A, B, C are sufficient conditions to
classify X as Q? In fact, it would be possible that X, even if
showing the characteristics A, B, and C is not, in a real state of
affairs, a member of the class Q. Following this scheme, the
likelihood that the inferred proposition is true depends on the
degree of defeasibility of the major premise. As explained in the
next section, I consider the relevance of the characteristics for
the operation of classification as a subjective, context-bound
matter of the experiencer whose degree of commitment to the
undergone categorization is mirrored by the semantic structure
of the inferential connections on which the locus is based. To
understand the condition of the validity of these connections, I
think it is useful to draw attention to the mechanisms enabling
the inferential relation itself. The fact that some characteristics
are interpreted by the speaker as signs from which to infer a
possible categorization seems to indicate that our processes of
meaning construction work through principles of analogy and
similarity, more than on a principle of identity. Recognizing
graduality and subjectivity as properties inherent to
categorization has been essential to explaining linguistic
phenomena grounded on perception - such as metaphor. As
underlined by Albertazzi (2010) in her studies about perception
and inference, it is impossible to account for metaphorical
categorization in substantial terms (e.g., by genus and species)
even though "when subjective experiences are given names
which also apply to perceptual facts, this does not happen in a
random fashion" (p. 360).
The inferences from objective reality at the basis of the
expression of appearances pertain to the epistemological
relationships between categories of mind and categories of the
real world. As underlined by Lakoff (1982), categories of the
mind do not directly mirror categories which are supposed to
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exist objectively in the world, but they depend on "experiential
aspects of human psychology" (Lakoff 1982, p. 99).
The evidential-epistemic uses of the verb apparire reveal that
the speaker qua experiencer is aware that perception is not the
result of an inference from objective reality but it is the product
of an awareness process based on external visual data.
This non-objectivist view of categories has been deeply
supported by prototype theory which was elaborated in the mid-
1970s as a reaction to the fact that "much work in philosophy,
psychology, linguistics and anthropology assumes that
categories are logical bounded entities, membership in which is
defined by an item's possession of a simple set of criterial
features, in which all instances possessing the criterial attributes
have a full and equal degree of membership" (Rosch and Mervis
1975, pp. 573-574).
The basic proposal of the theory is to focus on the degree
of representativeness of members of a category rather than on
the membership status itself, due to the fuzzy boundaries
characterizing categories. This perspective is especially fruitful
for the analysis of the inferential epistemic meanings of
apparire where the speaker is asserting the belonging of what he
perceives to a category, but he is at the same time questioning
the relevance of the reasons underlying his operation of
classification.
The notion of prototype from psychology has developed
in different directions depending on the field. As far as
linguistics is concerned, prototype theory has developed in
contrast to an idea in transformational grammar, namely that
semantic structure in natural languages can be studied as a
language-specific module independently from the encyclopaedic
knowledge that people possess and that the semantic extension
of a concept may be defined through a list of features
indispensable for its definition (Geeraerts 1989). The
interrelation of encyclopaedic and semantic knowledge
envisaged by prototype theory turns out to play an important
role at the argumentative level: readers are able to understand
the author's use of specific terms to describe what appears to
him in virtue of the sharing of some encyclopaedic world
knowledge which is present in the author's lexicon.
Following Geeraerts (1989, pp. 146-147), prototypical
categories are characterized by four essential properties: absence
of a set of criteria of necessary and sufficient attributes,
presence of a radial set of clustered and overlapping meanings,
degrees of representativeness, and blurred edges.
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One of the most debated aspects of prototype theory
pertains to the parameters used to define the degrees of
representativeness of a member. The most representative
exemplar of the category (prototype) is conceived as the one that
has the majority of common features with the other members of
the category and shares the minor number of features with
members belonging to other categories. The prototype is hence
considered as the most salient member since it presents most of
the features normally attributed to a category.
However, the motivations at the basis of the
identification of the central traits of a category can be cognitive,
cultural, as well as perceptual and are, hence, hard to identify
without making reference to people's judgements. For this
reason, prototypes have been operationally defined, collecting
the people's opinions about the goodness of membership in a
category (Rosch 1978). The occurrences of the verb apparire
are instances of judgments of the experiencer about the
membership of the perceived object in a category: the sources
of information semantically presupposed by apparire can be
conceived as the traits that the experiencer considers relevant for
its reasoning from classification. On the other hand, the
uncertainty expressed by the epistemic value of the verb gives
the reader information about the saliency that the experiencer
attributes to those traits.
The explanatory power of the prototype model for an
argumentative account of evidentiality and epistemic modality
lies in the recognition of a link between the strength of
arguments from definition and the quality of the characteristics
involved: if the features attributed to the object are perceived by
the experiencer as central traits of the category, their belonging
to the category will be presented as more certain than if they are
peripheral.
As noted by Walton and Macagno (2010), in our
everyday experience we have to rely on defeasible evidence and
limited knowledge in order to categorize what we perceive.
When we visit an exhibition our reasoning in approaching works
of art functions as a heuristic, a temporary way to solve
problems of categorization. In this perspective, the basic
principles of prototype theory provide a useful tool to analyse
heuristics of this kind.
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4. The argument from prototype definition
The Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and Greco, 2010) is
an approach to the study of argument schemes based on the
combination of a procedural and a material component: “The
procedural component is based on the semantic-ontological
structure [locus], which generates the inferential connection
[maxim] from which the logical form of the argument is
derived; the material component integrates into the argument
scheme the implicit and explicit premises bound to the
contextual common ground” (Rigotti and Greco 2010, p. 489).
In particular, the material component includes two components:
endoxa (major premise), which makes reference to common
knowledge, and datum (minor premise), a factual premise which
specifies the realization in discourse of the minor premise of the
logical form.
Compared to other approaches to argument schemes (e.g.
Pragma-Dialectical approach), the AMT Model, taking into
account the level of material premises, makes it possible to
explain the applicability of the inferential connection at work
(maxim) to the actual context of the argumentation. The AMT
Model, guaranteeing the context-boundedness of arguments, is a
useful tool to analyse the argument schemes under question: the
degree of defeasibility of the standpoint depends on the
implementation of the maxim in the material component.
Moreover, the partition of the material component into two
levels mirrors the semantic components at the basis of
apparire’s semantic structure which play a major role in the
building up of inferences: the endoxa corresponds to the
expression of the perceiver’s knowledge about the relevance of
the data in drawing the inference (see BDox section 3) and the
datum to the eventuality experienced by the perceiver.
In this section I propose two argumentative
reconstructions of apparire’s inferential uses modeled on the
AMT Y-like structures.
Reconstruction a:
8. Mirko Basaldella è invece più stilizzato, più sintetico
nell’esprimersi della sua sensibilità d’artista. Suoi sono
il Mino danzante (1967) e il Sacerdote (1969): il primo
presenta forme accostate lineari e rotonde, il secondo più
ieratico e solenne, appare quasi un totem nel suo
costruirsi piano su piano in scaffalature bronzee che
lasciano però al loro interno delle aperture a mezzaluna
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quasi a suggerire che la salita verso un qualsiasi credo è
comunque composta da una globalità di linee che si
intersecano fra loro e dove possono dipanarsi le vicende
umane. (Review, Mostreinmostra, Exhibition: “I
Basaldella. Dino, Mirko e Afro”, Udine)
“Mirko Basaldella is more stylized, more concise in
expressing his sensibility as an artist. The Dancing Mino
(1967) and Priest (1969) are two of his works: the first
presents linear and round juxtaposed forms, the second
more solemn and hieratic, [it appears almost as a
totem]proposition [in his building up floor upon floor of
bronze shelving which, however, leaves within themselves
openings with a crescent shape as if to suggest that the
ascent to any creed is still made up of a whole series of
lines that intersect each other and where they can unravel
human stories]source of information”.
Figure 1. Locus from prototype definition
In 8, the speaker, being exposed to the work of art entitled
“Priest” in the exhibition, abductively infers that the sculpture
by Mirko Basaldella is a totem. Looking at the description of the
shape of the "Priest", it is plausible to claim that the speaker is
exploiting an argument from definition by parts and whole
relying only on visual sources of information. However, the
relative proposition through which the speaker further specifies
the juxtaposition of the bronze shelves as suggesting the ascent
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to a creed, makes clear that his process of categorization is
based on the identification both of concrete and abstract
properties. The speaker makes reference to a supposed function
of the forms because a totem is a superordinate highly culturally
bounded category which can be represented by different types of
objects with different shapes, depending on the cultural context.
Hence, visual data, although being immediately accessible
through the sense of sight, are very poor elements for classifying
an object as a "totem". On the other hand, functional properties
are more central traits of the category since they are intercultural
and they normally belong to intersubjective world knowledge.
Even if relying both on sensorial and functional clues justifying
the inclusion of the "Priest" in the category "totem", the
standpoint inferred from this argument scheme from definition
is presented by the speaker as quite defeasible through the
addition of the adverb quasi (‘almost’) after apparire.
The low level of commitment expressed by the speaker
regarding the uttered proposition mirrors his awareness of an
addition filter imposed on perception by the very nature of
artistic experiences: when seeing a work of art, the perceptual
process of the visitor is mediated by the artist's representative
intentions which cannot in any way be directly accessed by the
visitor. Since the “Priest” is indeed an artifact, there could be a
non-measurable gap between the function of the object as
perceived and its function as conceived by the artist. In the light
of this, the functional properties of the totem recalled by the
author function in the proposed argumentative reconstruction as
peripheral properties revealing that the saliency of the trait is
highly context-bounded.
Reconstruction b:
9. Visitare una monografica su Piet Mondrian, oggi, non
è cosa facile. Richiede uno sforzo. Quella pittura pura,
così maledettamente oggettiva, scientifica, sembra
lontana dalla sensibilità attuale, maggiormente incline a
forme artistiche più espressioniste o a un astrattismo
irrazionale, legato a oscuri automatismi psicologici. Ci
sembra più agevole fruire di un’arte che induca
turbamento più che riflessione, coinvolgimento più che
ragionamento. Forse ciò è dovuto a una presunta
frattura, operata da un certo punto in poi, tra arte e
scienza. E l’arte di Piet Mondrian sembra voler
recuperare questa lacerazione. Appare quindi una bella
scommessa quella fatta dal Centre Pompidou a Parigi,
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promotore di una grande retrospettiva sul maestro
olandese, curata da Brigitte Leal. (Review,
Mostreinmostra, Exhibition: “Mondrian/De Stijl”, Paris)
“[To visit a monograph about Piet Mondrian, today, is
not easy. It requires an effort. That pure painting, so
damned objective and scientific, seems far away from the
current sensitivity, which is more inclined to
expressionist artistic forms or to an irrational abstraction
tied to dark psychological automatisms. It seems easier to
benefit from an art that induces perturbation rather than
reflection, involvement more than reasoning. Perhaps this
is due to an alleged breach, made from a certain point
onwards, between art and science. And the art of Piet
Mondrian seems to want to recover this laceration]sources of
information . [This, therefore, appears a real bet, the one
made by the Centre Pompidou in Paris]proposition , the
promoter of a retrospective on the Dutch master, curated
by Brigitte Leal”.
The argumentation exploited by the speaker in order to infer that
the monograph about Piet Mondrian is a real bet is based on a
Datum which rather than being a piece of evidence is a
prediction supported by a sub-argumentation. For this reason,
two Y-reconstructions are proposed. The first reconstruction
mirrors the reasoning through which the speaker forecasts that
the monograph will attract few visitors on the basis of his
knowledge about people’s tastes. The use of the impersonal
form in describing the ‘current sensitivity’ with regard to art
makes us understand that the writer is reporting the goals
driving peoples’ decision-making process for going to an
exhibition.
In other words, the author is reconstructing the pragmatic
reasoning underlying the event “going to an exhibition” which is
intentionally caused by human subjects on the basis of the
realization of their purposes. The intentionality trait called into
question makes us understand that the locus exploited by the
author is that from final cause which, different from the locus
from the efficient cause, necessarily belongs to the ontological
frame of human action. This locus, as shown in what follows,
“focuses on the relation connecting the end (goal, purpose) of an
action with the action itself” (Rigotti 2008, p. 566):
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Figure 2. Locus from the final cause
The word "bet" is defined as designating "an act of risking a
sum of money against someone else's on the basis of the
outcome of a future event, such as the result of a race or a game"
(The New Oxford Dictionary of English). In contemporary
English and Italian the term is metaphorically used to generally
encode "risky events", even if the feature "risky" is not per se
distinctive in the semasiological structure of "bet".
The standpoint is an argumentatively justified
presumption which becomes the minor premise of the following
argumentative reasoning from prototype definition:
Figure 3.. Locus from prototype definition
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"risky" is not per se distinctive in the semasiological structure of
"bet". The exhibition of Piet Mondrian shares some features
with the frame of wagering to which the concept of "bet"
belongs (in FrameNet the wagering frame is defined as follows:
"A gambler commits an asset to a prediction that an uncertain
situation will have a particular outcome (or class of
outcomes)"): the organizers have invested some money on its
preparation and the flow of visitors in not measurable at the
moment of speaking and, thus, uncertain.
However, the consecutive connective "therefore", which
links the sources of information to the proposition containing
apparire, signals that the speaker classifies the exhibition as a
bet primarily because of its risky outcome, using the term
metaphorically. Moreover, the speaker's definition of the
monograph about Piet Mondrian not only as a bet, but as a real
bet (bella scommessa) entails that risk is conceived by the
speaker as a non-discrete concept whose graduality affects the
belonging of an event to the category of bet. Since the more
risky the outcome of an event is, the more intense is a bet
stipulated on its realization, the low probability of the happening
of an event is a central property of the category “bet”. Therefore,
the forecast expressed in the Datum determines that the
exhibition’s belonging to the category of a bet is well grounded.
The final conclusion in 9. is less defeasible than the one
in 8. because of the different quality of the properties called into
question in the maxim (peripheral vs. central properties).
Nevertheless, the use of apparire instead of the verb to
be recalls for us the uncertain veridicality of the conclusion,
inherited from the defeasibility of the Datum which is a
presumption.
5. Conclusion
The analysis of the semantic-argumentative interface sketched
out in this paper has shown the relevance that a semantic theory
may have for a deep understanding of defeasible reasoning. On
the backdrop of Congruity Theory, I have formalized the
semantic structure of the Italian verb of appearance apparire in
its inferential uses: the proposition inferred is the result of a set
of information sources and of a set of background presumptions
which are both arguments linguistically presupposed by the verb.
At the argumentative level, these two lexical arguments function
as premises from which the conclusion is drawn. The verb
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apparire, due to its epistemic nature, marks not only the
presence of an inferential reasoning, but signals also that the
kind of reasoning at work is a defeasible one. As shown by
fuzzy logic, the degree of defeasibility of the conclusion is
directly proportional to the degree of defeasibility of the
premises.
As far as our data are concerned, the arguments exploited
in defeasible reasoning have been shown to be symptomatic
arguments and, in particular, arguments from definition. As
indicated by the gap between perceived entities vs. real entities
in our experience of the world, perceivers do not classify objects
on the basis of a set of predefined specific features, but their
process of categorization is gradual, subjective, and affected by
multiple factors. In the two y-like structures proposed as
exemplary argumentative reconstructions, the defeasible
premise is the Datum. The advantage offered by the application
of prototype semantic theory is the identification of a connection
between the degree of defeasibility of the conclusion and the
quality of the properties taken into account in the maxim
(central vs. peripheral properties).
In other words, the defeasibility of the standpoint reflects
the perceiver’s judgement on the goodness of membership about
what he sees in a category. Starting from the methodological
issue addressed in this paper, further research is needed to test if
the locus from prototype definition is an ontological relation
used in inferential configurations activated by other evidential-
epistemic verbs cross-linguistically.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the two anonymous
reviewers, Johanna Miecznikowski, Andrea Rocci Giovanni
Damele, Fabrizio Macagno and Michael Baumtrog for their very
helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this
paper.
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