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© Fabrizio Macagno.  Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 83–138. 

Argumentation Profiles: A Tool for Analyzing  
Argumentative Strategies 
 
FABRIZIO MACAGNO 

ArgLab, Instituto de Filosofia da Nova 
Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, 
Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
Av. de Berna 26C, 1069-061 Lisboa 
Portugal 
fabrizio.macagno@fcsh.unl.pt 
  
Abstract: An argumentation profile is 
defined as a methodological instru-
ment for analyzing argumentative 
discourse considering distinct and 
interrelated dimensions: the types of 
argument used, their quality, and the 
emotions triggered. Walton’s theoret-
ical contributions are developed as a 
coherent analytical and multifaceted 
toolbox for capturing these aspects. 
Argumentation schemes are used to 
detect and quantify the types of 
argument. Fallacy analysis and the 
assessment of the implicit premises 
retrieved through the schemes allow 
evaluating arguments. Finally, the 
frequency of emotive words signals 
the most common emotions aroused. 
This method is illustrated through a 
corpus of argumentative tweets of 
three politicians.       

Résumé: Un profil d'argumentation 
est défini comme un instrument 
methodologique d'analyse du discours 
argumentatif qui prend en compte des 
dimensions distinctes et interdépen-
dantes : les types d'arguments utilisés, 
leur qualité et les émotions déclen-
chées. Les contributions théoriques de 
Walton sont développées comme une 
boîte à outils analytique cohérente et 
multiforme pour saisir ces aspects. 
Les schèmes d'argumentation sont 
utilisés pour identifier et quantifier les 
types d'arguments. L'analyse des 
erreurs et l'évaluation des prémisses 
implicites récupérées par les schèmes 
permettent d'évaluer les arguments. 
Enfin, la fréquence des mots émotifs 
signale les émotions les plus cou-
rantes suscitées. Cette méthode est 
illustrée à travers un corpus de tweets 
argumentatifs de trois hommes 
politiques.

 
Keywords: Walton’s theory, pragmatics, manipulation, propaganda, discourse 
analysis, fallacies, argumentation, political discourse 
 



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1.  Introduction 
Douglas Walton’s contribution to philosophy and argumentation 
theory is a mosaic of theories, challenges, and proposals whose 
common thread can be hard to find in the thousands and thousands 
of pages he wrote, unless one starts to use and apply his ideas. 
Walton’s program was not focused on a-contextualized constructs, 
namely the “examples” of the textbooks; rather his efforts were 
devoted to real-life contexts of dialogue and argument. His chal-
lenge was to make philosophy, and in particular what was tradi-
tionally called “dialectics” and nowadays “logic,” useful for prac-
tical purposes. Walton underscored very clearly that a real argu-
ment is a complex construct: first and foremost, it is a discourse (a 
logos using Aristotle’s terminology), and thus needs to be studied 
starting from its goals and more importantly its relationship with 
its other neglected and essential components, the interlocutors 
(Walton 1990). An argument, on this perspective, is a unit of 
argumentation, blurring the artificial divide between product and 
process (O’Keefe 1977). An argument is essentially a pragmatic 
notion, defined by its essential purpose, addressing a difference 
between the parties engaging in a dialogue. The logical dimension 
of an argument needs to be studied and assessed considering its 
use in a dialogue, and its effects on what the persons involved 
hold, accept, or can accept, namely their commitments (Walton 
and Krabbe 1995). Arguments cannot be studied apart from their 
uses—and their users. In this framework, logic becomes inter-
twined with dialogue theory, pragmatics, and rhetoric, and each 
type of argument or manipulative tactic mirrors this complexity of 
levels.  
 Walton’s theory provides complementary tools that can be 
systematically used for different purposes. In this paper, Walton’s 
theories of argumentation schemes, fallacies, emotions, and emo-
tive language are shown to constitute a unified method for analyz-
ing argumentative discourse, and in particular political speech, 
called “argumentation profile method.” Building on two distinct 
attempts to profiling a speaker’s argumentation (Hansen and 
Walton 2013; Rapanta and Walton 2016), this paper proposes to 
integrate the analysis of the types of argument, rhetorical strategies 
(including emotions), and fallacies for outlining and assessing 



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political argumentation. In a democratic society jeopardized by 
populist discourses and an information ecosystem polluted by 
sophistical tactics (often reduced to the naïve notions of fake news 
and hate speech), the possibility of pinpointing and proving when 
and to what extent a politician is misleading the audience is cru-
cial. More importantly, in this context the possibility of providing 
audiences with instruments for unveiling problematic arguments—
and understanding when the common ground is manipulated—
becomes extremely relevant 
 The integrated and combined use of different instruments de-
veloped in Walton’s theoretical proposals will be used for describ-
ing quantitatively and qualitatively speakers’ argumentative pref-
erences, bringing to light their tendencies to advance specific types 
of argument, or to rely on certain emotional or eristic strategies. 
The output is an “argumentation profile,” namely a representation 
of the speaker’s standard argumentative behavior. This outline can 
become extremely relevant in the present political context in 
which the so-called “populist” leaders are attracting much atten-
tion and arousing controversies related to their use of deceitful 
reasons and language. Drawing the argumentation profiles of these 
politicians can bring to light their common strategies and the 
specific tactics that they use for manipulating the popular opinion. 
To this purpose, the methodological approach proposed will be 
illustrated through the analysis of the argumentative tweets pub-
lished by three politicians (Matteo Salvini, Donald Trump, and Jair 
Bolsonaro) from their taking office (corresponding to the official 
end of their election campaign). The argumentation profiles of the 
three politicians will be compared through the most representative 
examples to show their similarities and differences.    

2.  Why argumentation profiles matter   
Manipulative speech is attracting growing attention, especially due 
to the fast dissemination that it can have through the social media 
and the internet in general, and its effects on political choices. The 
terms ‘fake news’ and ‘hate speech’ are frequently used for cen-
suring some types of verbal behavior that can be relatively simply 
detected and condemned. However, these catchy and trendy terms 



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refer only to naïve tactics that constitute the very tip of the iceberg 
of manipulation, and certainly do not characterize the problems 
that can affect political communication. Manipulation is a much 
more complex phenomenon and a much deeper problem that 
cannot be prevented through labels and automatic detection. Ma-
nipulation lies mostly in what is not said, and not only in slurs or 
blatantly fabricated stories. The attention paid to the prevention of 
deceptive speech hides the other dimension of manipulation, 
which is its possibility, namely the vulnerability of the audience. 
Without the capacity to distinguish between evidence and claim, 
and between evidence and pseudo-evidence, an audience makes it 
possible to use different types and levels of sophistical tactics 
successfully.  

2.1. Deceitful communication and the audience 
The terms ‘fake news’ and ‘hate speech’ are controversial, con-
stantly redefined and specified (Blitz 2018; Davidson et al. 2017; 
Habgood-Coote 2019; Shu et al. 2017), that are intended to cap-
ture some manifestations of a much more complex and trouble-
some phenomenon, namely the use of media (social media and the 
traditional ones) to manipulate the public opinion. The risk posed 
by information manipulation are visible and include some evident 
and structural phenomena such as influences on election results 
(Allcott and Gentzkow 2017), the loss of credibility in the media, 
or the upsetting of the “authenticity balance of the news ecosys-
tem” (Shu et al. 2017, p. 22). Of these two dimensions of infor-
mation manipulation—centralized detection (and control) and 
users’ judgments of information credibility (Atodiresei et al. 
2018)—the former has attracted the efforts of the academic com-
munity, which is increasingly pursuing the goal of regulating the 
quality of the disseminated information.  
 A growing amount of work developed in information technolo-
gy and computational linguistics has been recently devoted to fake 
news and hate speech detection. In both cases, the problem of 
detection is crucial, and addressable only by considering the epi-
phenomenon—the explicit expression of false information (Allcott 
and Gentzkow 2017, p. 213; Shu et al. 2017, p. 23) or hatred  
through the most visible and prototypical indicators (Aldwairi and 



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Alwahedi 2018; Jin et al. 2016; Rubin et al. 2015), such as false 
titles, the relationship between title and body text (Shu et al. 
2017), or the use of slurs (Davidson et al. 2017). However, one of 
the greatest vulnerabilities acknowledged in the automatic detec-
tion systems is the lack of correspondence between expression and 
meaning (Pisarevskaya 2017; Rubin and Lukoianova 2015). In 
case of “fake news” and hate speech, the detection instruments 
used in computational linguistics are insufficient for capturing the 
complexity of the phenomenon. Mere textual indicators can pro-
vide mere hints, which are useful for certain purposes such as the 
identification of texts created and spread by automatic agents such 
as social bots or cyborgs. However, their effectiveness is limited in 
contexts such as political discourse, where only the most evident 
and explicit types of information manipulation are detected and 
banned, and this type of control is perceived as exceptional and 
extraordinary (Lerman, Shepherd and Telford 2020). 

Manipulative speech is often analyzed without a fundamental 
dimension thereof, the audience. Misleading speech is a hazard to 
our society basically because the audience is affected by it, and it 
jeopardizes democratic life by disregarding the universal condi-
tions for deliberative discourse. On the one hand, this awareness 
led to careful controls on the spreading of certain types of infor-
mation, which is at the same time a highly debated and controver-
sial topic. On the other hand, however, the development of the 
audience’s capacities of comprehension, deep understanding, and 
engaging in accountable dialogues (Michaels et al. 2008)—
necessary for detecting and defusing misleading discourse—have 
attracted much less attention, leading to a lack of educational tools 
for identifying and proving that a message is deceitful.  

In a world characterized by a growing number of fake news re-
ports (such as in Twitter) (Allcott et al. 2019), the audience has 
remained vulnerable to manipulative speech, confined in a per-
spective that could be defined as “multiplist” (Kuhn et al. 2000), 
namely characterized by the acknowledgment of the uncertainty of 
knowledge and the existence different perspectives, but also by the 
irrelevant role of critical thinking and more importantly, evidence. 
A multiplist audience tends to accept viewpoints as matter of 
personal taste, not engaging in the analysis of the arguments un-



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derlying them (Kuhn et al. 2000, p. 325) and instead looking for 
positions or evidence confirming their own view (Guess et al. 
2018; Kuhn et al. 1994; Shu et al. 2017). In this sense, misleading 
information or arguments are not evaluated as weaker than the 
ones supported by proofs or evidence (Kuhn 2001, 2002; Kuhn et 
al. 1994).  
 As various studies have underscored, the majority of the indi-
viduals fail to distinguish genuine evidence from pseudo-evidence 
(Kuhn 1991, pp. 238; 266; Kuhn et al. 1994), and detect the basic 
components of an argument. The lack of these basic argumentative 
skills leads to relativism—namely the incapacity to evaluate one’s 
own and the others’ view—and extreme vulnerability to manipula-
tive speech. When a reasoner cannot distinguish pseudo-evidence 
(co-occurrences of events or temporal sequences thereof, or mere 
descriptions of the view itself) from genuine evidence (data and 
information bearing on the correctness of a view), he or she cannot 
differentiate a perspective from the reasons why it can be correct 
or wrong (Kuhn 1991, p. 94). This condition leads to the impossi-
bility of disconfirming the view that an individual holds, as there 
is no possibility to find evidence that can counter it (Kuhn, 1991, 
p. 238)—just like evidence that can confirm it. Only a minority of 
reasoners manage to evaluate their own views by not only distin-
guishing evidence and claims, but engaging in the evaluation of 
the different and alternative claims through the assessment of the 
supporting and contrasting evidence (and the force thereof) (Kuhn 
1991, p. 267; Kuhn et al. 1994). 

2.2 The role of argumentation and argumentation profiles 
Argumentation has been historically developed for the purpose of 
analyzing and assessing arguments and inventing counterargu-
ments and rebuttals. The analysis of arguments and persuasive 
strategies, and the identification and assessment of the fallacies in 
political discourse have been the subject matters of many works in 
argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992; Fairclough 
and Fairclough 2012; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969; 
Walton 2006). However, these analytical tools have been used 
separately for studying specific and isolated phenomena.   



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The systematic analysis of the different ways a view can be 
corroborated or rebutted by evidence, or in contrast be only appar-
ently and fallaciously argued for or against can portray the com-
plexity of manipulative speech and at the same time bring to light 
different strategies used for presenting an ungrounded claim as an 
argument. Moreover, a systematic argumentative analysis of polit-
ical discourse can show how political leaders treat their audiences, 
distinguishing when they offer the needed evidence and when they 
resort to manipulation to deceive their hearers. This type of analy-
sis is more complex but can depict more accurately how speakers 
behave and reason verbally and be used to present to the public 
what happens under the surface of their discourses.  

Speakers, and more specifically political actors communicating 
publicly, use complex strategies used for leading the interlocutor 
to accept a viewpoint. Arguments, intended as means for address-
ing an actual or potential difference (at the level of opinions, fac-
tual judgments, decisions, etc.) (Walton 1990), are one of the most 
important tools, and characterize a fundamental aspect of the 
orator’s style (Hansen and Walton 2013). However, as pointed out 
above, political discourse is heavily characterized by other tactics 
that include classical features of rhetorical speech, such as the use 
of emotions (Macagno and Walton 2019), but also classical in-
stances of sophistical discourse, such as the use of fallacies 
(Walton 1987) or the redefinition of keywords (Schiappa 2003).  

The notion of “argumentation profile” refers to an analytical 
representation of the strategic argumentative choices of a speaker. 
A profile is conceived as an outline, a quali-quantitative descrip-
tion of the way a speaker tends to support his viewpoint based on 
the frequency of the different argumentative strategies at his dis-
posal. The “profile” is thus a descriptive output of the unified use 
of different tools for analyzing argumentative discourse—which 
will be referred to as the “argumentation profile method.” This 
concept is thus methodologically distinct from the normative 
construct called “profile of dialogue” (Walton 1989, pp. 48–49)—
an ideal sequence of moves drawn from a type of formal dialogue 
that is confronted with a sequence from a real dialogue to assess 
whether a specific move (for example a question) is appropriate to 



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the dialogue and the stage of the dialogue the participants are 
engaging in.1  

The notion of argumentation profile results from the combina-
tion of two distinct attempts to capture systematically trends in the 
production of arguments. On the one hand, Hansen & Walton 
(2013) analyzed the arguments of the political candidates in the 
Ontario provincial elections. The different types of argument were 
coded using argumentation schemes (Walton 1995a) and the rela-
tive frequencies of the argument kinds used by each party were 
compared. On the other hand, Rapanta & Walton (2016) addressed 
the differences in the production of arguments by students of 
different cultures, combining the analysis of the types of argument 
with the fallacies (paralogisms) committed. In the first study, the 
result was an analysis of the profiles of the candidates at the level 
of their general strategic choices (more oriented towards criticiz-
ing or proposing), but the authors did not consider the manipula-
tive dimension. In the second case, both reasonable and weaker 
arguments were captured; however, the types of fallacies consid-
ered were confined to the uncritical use of argumentation schemes 
(arguments not backed by the necessary evidence) (Walton 
2010a), not including the classical fallacies that instead can reveal 
deeper levels of manipulation.  

Based on these studies, an argumentation profile can be de-
fined as the strategy (consisting in distinct argumentative tools) 
that a speaker preferentially uses for defending his or her view-
point or addressing a possible doubt. An argumentation profile can 
be determined considering two levels: the descriptive (consisting 
in the quantification of the different tactics used detectable without 
involving evaluative considerations), and the evaluative (consist-
ing in the quantification of deceptive tactics) (Macagno 2019; 
Rapanta and Walton 2016).  

 
1 This abstract and unrealistic view of dialogue and profile of dialogue was later 
modified for describing how presumptions arising from the context and the 
dialogical setting create expectations on the subsequent moves of a dialogue 
(Walton 1999b). The profiles of dialogue remained an evaluative method, but 
not normative in the sense of based on a-priori formal and thus abstract model. 
Rather, its evaluative dimension rests on the analysis of the sets of the interlocu-
tors’ commitments and the conversational setting.  



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However, to capture these dimensions of the argumentation 
profile of a speaker, it is necessary to go beyond the analysis of 
argument types and paralogisms and consider three distinct dimen-
sions: 1) the types of argument, 2) the use of evidence and the 
fallacies committed (revealing a manipulation of the common 
ground), 3) the emotive or evaluative language used, and their use 
to evoke emotions (pathos) or assessments of the speaker (ethos). 
These three dimensions can capture the complexity of the strate-
gies used for argumentative purpose, and their interrelation is 
represented in Figure 1 below.    

 

 
 

Figure 1: Dimensions of argumentation profiles 
 
The first dimension is referred to as “dialectical” (as opposed to 
“rhetorical”) drawing on the classical meaning of the term, used to 
refer to the logic of arguments in the broader and proper sense 
(Macagno and Walton 2014a). The “dialectical dimension” thus 
concerns the relationship between the speaker, the different types 
of reasons provided, and the doubt that they are used to address, 
emphasizing the classical “logical” aspect of argumentation which 
is distinguished from the “rhetorical” one. This latter term is used 

Dialectical dimension
Types of argument

Rhetorical dimension
Emotive language

Ethos and emotions

Evaluative dimension
Fallacies



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to include the use of pathos and the construction of the speaker’s 
role and credibility (ethos) to affect the audience’s opinion, which 
are both captured in text through the use of emotive language. 
Finally, the evaluative dimension is transversal to the other two, 
and involves the determination of the fallaciousness or acceptabil-
ity of an argument (Blair and Johnson 1987) considering its rele-
vance (dialogical, topical), its compliance with the common 
ground (which includes factual information and principles of 
inference), and its backings (the provision of the necessary evi-
dence).  

3. The dimensions of an argument 
The object of analysis by the argumentation profile method is 
argumentative discourse, namely a discourse or dialogue defined 
by the use of arguments (Walton 2006, p. 4). Therefore, from a 
theoretical perspective, an argumentation profile is primarily the 
outline of the strategies that the speaker uses in supporting his or 
her viewpoint through the use of (explicit or implicit) arguments. 
The concept of argument, however, needs to be specified. An 
argument has been traditionally defined as “a reason producing 
belief regarding something which is in doubt” (Boethius, De 
Topicis Differentiis, 1180C 6-7), which “must always be more 
known than the question; for if things which are not known are 
proved by things which are known and an argument proves some-
thing which is in doubt, then what is adduced to provide belief for 
the question must be more known than the question” (1180C 8-
11). This definition is only apparently simple (Walton 1990). In 
fact, it presupposes four different levels that correspond to four 
dimensions of dialectics, which are mirrored in both activities of 
argument analysis and evaluation. These dimensions correspond to 
the dimensions that an argumentation profile needs to mirror.      

3.1. The four dimensions of arguments 
An argument is primarily a logical construct, as it consists of a 
series of statements (premises) related to a further statement called 
“conclusion,” which transfer the acceptability of the former to the 
latter based on some principles. Such principles are indemonstra-



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ble and commonly accepted rules of inference called topics or 
maximae propositiones in the ancient tradition (Hitchcock 1998; 
Macagno and Walton 2014a; Rigotti 2007; Rigotti and Greco-
Morasso 2019), which corresponding to the modern notion of 
warrant (Hitchcock 2003; Toulmin 1958).  

Second, an argument is part of a dialogue, and pursues a specif-
ic communicative goal, to “do things with words” (Austin 1962, 
pp. 96–99) in a specific (dialogical) context. In the dialectical 
tradition, a clear distinction was drawn between the logical dimen-
sion (argument) and its pragmatic one, consisting in its expression 
and role in discourse (argumentation) (Boethius, De Topicis 
Differentiis, 1173D 22-31). In a modern perspective, an argument 
is not only regarded as a logical and semantic relationship between 
propositions, but as a complex speech act (van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst 1984, pp. 40–46) pursuing different communicative 
goals. Walton clearly explained this dialogical dimension of argu-
ments showing its essential relation with the types of dialogue in 
which they are used: 
 

Argument is a social and verbal means of trying to resolve, or at 
least to contend with, a conflict or difference that has arisen or ex-
ists between two (or more) parties. An argument necessarily in-
volves a claim that is advanced by at least one of the parties. […] 
The claim is very often an opinion, or claim that a view is right, 
but it need not be. In a negotiation argument, the claim could be to 
goods or to financial assets. The conflict or difference (stasis) that 
is the origin of the argument could be of different kinds-it could 
be a conflict of opinions, an unsolved problem, an unproven hy-
pothesis, or even a situation where both parties are blocked from 
further actions they are trying to carry out. The different kinds of 
argument are different ways of trying to resolve these conflicts 
(Walton 1990, p. 411). 
 

On this perspective, arguments are instruments in a specific con-
versational context characterized by specific dialogical goals, or 
rather interactional intentions (Bellack 1968; Bellack et al. 1966; 
Gumperz 1982, pp. 31–32; Merin 1994, p. 238; Sinclair and 
Coulthard 1992; Stubbs 1983; Walton 2007a; Widdowson 1979, p. 
144). In this sense, arguments become essentially intertwined with 



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the dialogical goal that a speaker proposes through his or her 
argument, which Walton captured in the theory of types of dia-
logue.  
 Third, an argument, being part of a dialogue and being ground-
ed on accepted inferential rules, depends essentially on the com-
mon ground between the interlocutors. This dimension can be 
defined “pragmatic” in the sense that refers to how an argument 
(the linguistic expression of a goal-directed reason) is related to 
the individuals involved (Kecskes 2013, p. 21) and the dialogue in 
which it occurs (Hamblin 1970, p. 40). The common ground ac-
counts for two interrelated aspects of an argument, its endoxical 
nature (an argument is grounded on what is commonly accepted, 
as underscored by Aristotle) and its defeasibility, namely the 
acceptability of its conclusion until contrary evidence is provided. 
The first aspect was addressed by Walton through the notions of 
commitment and dark side commitments (Macagno 2018; 
Macagno and Walton 2017; Walton and Krabbe 1995), while the 
second was developed in his theory of evidence and burden of 
proof (Walton 2002, 2016).  
 Commitments are dialogical obligations, what a participant to a 
dialogue holds as true and thus accepts and is disposed to defend 
in case it is challenged. Commitments are thus the dialectical 
image of the logical concept of “truth” and the psychological 
notion of “belief” (Hamblin 1970, 1971; Walton 2010b). An ar-
gument is intended to modify what an interlocutor accepts or is 
committed to (see Hamblin, 1970; Walton & Krabbe, 1995) start-
ing from his or her existing commitments, which can include not 
only encyclopedic information, but generalizations, definitions and 
word uses, and values and hierarchies thereof (Macagno and 
Walton 2017). Such previous commitments of the interlocutor can 
be drawn from the evidence of previous dialogues or by presump-
tion, namely relying on what is commonly accepted in a given 
culture (Macagno 2015a).  

Commitments are not only the result of explicit dialogical acts; 
they also represent what is taken for granted by advancing an 
argument. The implicit or “dark-side” commitments include dis-
tinct phenomena that in pragmatics would be classified as “prag-
matic presuppositions,” namely propositions taken for granted by a 



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person in performing a speech act (whether an assertion or a dif-
ferent speech act), whose felicity, or conversational acceptability 
depends on the interlocutor’s acceptance of such propositions 
(Allan 2013; Stalnaker 1974, 2002). In this type of commitments 
fall the classical “semantic” presuppositions triggered by various 
grammatical phenomena (such as factives, etc.) and the theme-
focus articulation of an utterance (Abrusán 2010, 2011; Atlas 
1991; Gazdar 1979; Kay 1992; Levinson 1983, chap. 4), but also 
the needed tacit assumptions (Ennis 1982) necessary for the rea-
sonableness of the argument and some conventional implicatures 
(such as the ones triggered by “but” or “only”) (Ducrot 1972, 
1980). Such “hidden,” or dark-side commitments are the core of 
the argumentative strategies and the manipulative tactics. To 
persuade or convince the audience, a speaker needs to start from 
what has been already accepted; however, sometimes an unproven, 
unaccepted or even unacceptable proposition can be presented as 
commonly accepted, shared, and known (Macagno 2015a, 2018; 
Macagno and Walton 2014b)—namely it can be used as a dark-
side commitment. This implicit dimension of arguments draws the 
line between acceptable arguments and the sophistical ones.     
 The epistemic dimension concerns the role of evidence. An 
argument provides a presumptive reason to accept a conclusion, in 
the sense that the latter can be accepted and be acceptable unless 
and until contrary and stronger arguments are advanced. Its ac-
ceptability depends on the lack of contrary arguments grounded 
not only on more accepted or acceptable premises, but also on 
(more) evidence (Walton 1995a, 2001a). Moreover, an argument 
modifies a status quo, namely the dialectical relation between a 
participant to a dialogue and a proposition. An argument modifies 
the attitude of the interlocutor towards a proposition that he or she 
considers as doubtful or unacceptable, turning it into a commit-
ment. Thus, the speaker needs to fulfil a burden of proof: the 
reasons provided in favor of its acceptance need to overcome the 
reasons to doubt or not to accept it. The notion of strength of 
argument is thus as crucial as the problem of its fallaciousness, as 
the potentially doubtful premises need to be grounded on sufficient 
backings (evidence) to provide probative weight on the conclusion 
(Walton 2002, p. 16; 2016).  



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 The four dimensions of an argument can be represented as four 
vectors in the following Figure 2.  
 

 
Figure 2: The dimensions of argument 

 
These dimensions can be used for assessing an argument.  

3.2. Argument evaluation: The dialectics and pragmatics of falla-
cies 
The logical tradition has drawn a clear distinction between good 
and bad arguments, where the latter are detected through two 
criteria: soundness, namely the truth of the premises, and validity, 
namely the compliance with logical axioms—generally the deduc-
tive ones (Reed and Walton 2003). However, an argument is not 
only a logical construct—and deductive axioms are not the only 
ones characterizing arguments. Moreover, truth can be established 

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only in very few cases of arguments exchanged in real-life con-
texts. More commonly, arguments are based on premises that 
represent the commitments of the interlocutor—directly based on 
evidence, or indirectly based on what is commonly accepted. In 
this framework, validity and soundness are not sufficient for ana-
lyzing the quality of an argument—nor are they necessary. Argu-
ments can be deceptive for pragmatic or dialogical reason, and the 
backing or the lack of backing of a premise can be hardly captured 
using the dichotomy between “true” and “false.” Finally, dichoto-
my between good or bad arguments fails to acknowledge the fact 
that between these two extremes there are arguments that are weak 
or inadequate to the conclusion defended.  
 The notion of argument shown in Figure 2 above outlines di-
mensions that were not considered in the classical view of falla-
cies. The crucial dimension that Walton brought to light is the 
dialogical one (z), which he captured considering the predefined 
“rules” of a dialogue (Walton 1995b, p. 271). This normative 
approach can work very well in formal dialectical models, but can 
be highly problematic in conversational settings where several 
factors define the mutual expectations of the participants 
(Levinson 1992, 2012). Walton was aware of this limitation when 
he underscored how the pragmatic notion of “collective goal” of a 
dialogue—and relevance thereto—establishes the intent to deceive 
underlying the fallacies (Walton 1995b, pp. 184–85). Building on 
this suggestion, it is possible to translate the predefined specific 
standards into broader and more flexible ones, grounded on the 
notions of dialogical relevance, common ground, and evidential 
burden. Together with the “logical” dimension accounted for by 
the classical approaches, Walton’s theory can be used for outlining 
a four-dimensional evaluation of an argument.     

In argument evaluation, the dialogical dimension (z) concerns 
the relevance of an argument to the dialogue (Walton 2010a). 
When an argument is used in a context to pursue a goal different 
from the one shared by the interlocutors (for example, attacking 
instead of finding a solution), the argument is only an apparent 
reason (Walton 1995b, 2008). Let us consider the case of personal 
attacks (ad hominem arguments). When used in a discussion about 
the acceptability of a statement or a proposal, these arguments 



98 Macagno 
 

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only apparently pursue the goal agreed upon by the interlocutors. 
In fact, they are used for a different purpose—ending the discus-
sion, or excluding the interlocutor from it, or triggering a negative 
value judgment on him or her. Thus, in these cases ad hominem 
arguments are fallacious because they are irrelevant (Macagno 
2013).  

The pragmatic dimension (y) captures the compliance with the 
common ground, namely the use of implicit commitments accept-
ed by the interlocutors. An argument is grounded on implicit, 
dark-side commitments, which, however, need to be actually 
shared by the audience—as resulting from previous dialogues or 
the belonging to a specific culture (Manor 1982; Walton 1981). 
For example, the assertion that “I do not want to visit the ceme-
tery, as it is filled with losers” pragmatically presupposes that 
there are (many) losers buried in the cemetery (pp). The “act of 
presupposing” pp has a threefold effect: 1) it commits the speaker 
to pp, 2) it denies the audience the chance to correct pp (Manor 
1975, p. 144; 1976), and 3) it commits the interlocutor to pp 
(Walton 1981). Thus, when the speaker presupposes a content that 
is not shared nor acceptable by the audience, he or she “entraps” 
the interlocutors in a commitment that is not the result of previous 
actual or cultural dialogues (Sbisà 1999; Walton 1999a), and 
forces them to either accept it, or fulfil the burden of disproving it 
(Macagno and Walton 2017). Thus, when a speaker takes for 
granted an unshared proposition that is not accommodable (as it 
conflicts with the implicit commitments of the interlocutors, see 
Macagno, 2018), he or she is manipulating the common ground 
(Walton and Macagno 2010). For analytical purposes, the content 
that is taken for granted as accepted needs to be first detected and 
reconstructed, based on a) the presupposition triggers analyzed in 
the pragmatic literature (Abrusán 2011; Levinson 1983, chap. 4), 
and b) the specified rules of inference (argumentative relations) 
that are left unexpressed in an argument (Anscombre and Ducrot 
1983) and are necessary for the discourse coherence (Moeschler 
2010; Rocci 2005). Then, these implicit commitments need to be 
compared with the available information concerning the common 
ground of the audience.   



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By considering the epistemic dimension (w), it is possible to 
distinguish arguments presumptively acceptable from the ones that 
cannot fulfil their burden of proof—even though they do not ma-
nipulate the common ground. This criterion captures the accepta-
bility of the factual premises that the critical questions are intend-
ed to assess (Rapanta and Walton 2016; Walton 2010a). The prin-
ciple underlying this criterion is that when a factual premise is 
potentially doubtful, it needs to be backed by adequate evidence 
(Kuhn 1993, 2010, p. 817). The lack of backings or the use of 
inadequate or wrong evidence is commonly considered as a sign of 
poor argumentative skills (Erduran et al. 2004; Kuhn 2010; 
McNeill and Krajcik 2008), as the argument, even though not 
necessarily fallacious, is incomplete (not fulfilling the critical 
questions), and cannot be presumptively accepted in ordinary 
contexts (Walton 2010a). 

In this perspective, classical fallacies are a fundamental instru-
ment for argument evaluation, but not sufficient. More important-
ly, they incoherently mirror distinct dimensions of an argument, 
each identifying the cause of the deceit in the weakness of one of 
the four axes, considered independently of the others. For exam-
ple, an ad hominem fallacy consists in an attack to the person and 
not to the conclusion or the argument of the interlocutor. However, 
a personal attack can be mischievous not only for reasons of dia-
logical relevance (axis z) (Walton 1998a), but also because it is 
ungrounded or based on unaccepted premises. Fallacies need to be 
considered as epiphenomena of breaches on different axes, which 
can be brought to light by analyzing the critical questions associat-
ed to argumentation schemes. Through the critical questions, it is 
possible to assess all the dimensions of an argument (Rapanta and 
Walton 2016; Walton 2015; Walton and Godden 2005).  

This four-dimensional analysis leads to a scalar evaluation, in-
stead of a binary opposition between “good” and “bad” or “sound” 
and “fallacious” reasons. Arguments can be evaluated along a 
continuum ranging from presumptively acceptable to clearly unac-
ceptable and manipulative (as unsound or invalid), which encom-
passes the different degrees to which a reason can appear stronger 
or better than it is (Walton 2010a). The “pragmatic” view of falla-
cies involves in the evaluation not only voluntary violations of the 



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unwritten rules of a dialogue used for deceptive purposes, but also 
different types of flaws, blunders, and errors—and omission of 
evidence (Walton 1995b, pp. 264–66). 

4. Argumentation profiles: Types of argument 
The notion of argument mentioned above brings to light a funda-
mental relationship between its logical and its dialogical dimen-
sion. This articulation is crucial for understanding the notion of 
argumentation scheme, and more importantly for using them as an 
analytical tool.  

4.1. The goals of arguments: Types of dialogue and dialogue 
moves 
In the literature in pragmatics, the focus has been generally placed 
on the individual intentions that are traditionally captured by 
speech acts (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984). However, to 
identify what an argument is for, it is necessary to also consider 
the other dimension of a dialogue, the interlocutor. The dialogue is 
thus the expression of a joint intention of the participants, which 
can be a priori (such as in formal models of dialogue or in specifi-
cally regulated dialogues) or negotiated, generated, and modified 
during the communicative process (Kecskes 2010, 2013, p. 50). 
The theory of types of dialogue (Walton 1989, 1990, 1998b; 
Walton and Krabbe 1995) classifies these joint dialogical inten-
tions in six categories (persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, delibera-
tion, information seeking, and eristic), later developed to seven 
(adding the discovery dialogue) (Walton 2010c). The types of 
dialogue are represented in Table 1Table 1: Types of  below (adapted 
from Walton & Krabbe 1995, p.66):  
 



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Table 1: Types of dialogue 
 
The types of dialogue were conceived for representing formal 
dialogues, in which the joint dialogical intention preceded and 
governed the individual moves. Under a formal approach, the type 
of predetermined intention does not mirror actual dialogues, in 
which participants do not only pursue multiple dialogical goals 
within the same dialogue (Walton et al. 2016), but often challenge, 
impose, and negotiate the type of dialogue they want to engage in. 
For example, personal attacks (characterizing eristic dialogues) 
can be irrelevantly advanced for turning a persuasion dialogue into 
a quarrel, or the other expression of ad hominem arguments, vic-
timization, can be used for interpreting the interlocutor’s persua-
sive attempt as eristic. Therefore, instead of identifying Walton’s 
types of dialogue with the activities that more clearly exemplify 
them (formal systems), it can be useful to look at them in pragmat-
ic terms as a tentative to classify the joint communicative inten-

TYPE INITIAL SITUATION MAIN GOAL 
PARTICIPANTS’ 

AIMS
SIDE BENEFITS

1. Persuasion 
Dialogue

Conflicting points of 
view.

Resolving conflicts 
by verbal means.

Persuading the 
other(s).

• Develop and reveal 
positions.

• Build up confidence.
• Influence onlookers. 
• Add to prestige.

2. Negotiation Conflict of interests & need for 
cooperation.

Making a deal.
Getting the best out 

of it for oneself. 

• Reach an agreement.
• Build up confidence. 
• Reveal positions. 
• Influence onlookers. 
• Add to prestige.

3. Inquiry General ignorance on an issue. 

Increasing 
knowledge and 

reaching an 
agreement.

Finding a “proof” or 
destroying one.

• Add to prestige. 
• Gain experience. 
• Raise funds.

4. Deliberation Need for action. Reaching a decision. 
Influencing the 

outcome. 

• Reach an agreement.
• Develop and reveal 

positions. 
• Add to prestige.
• Express preferences.

5. Discovery Need to find an explanation of facts.

Choose best 
hypothesis for 

testing.

Find and defend a 
suitable hypothesis.

• Develop and reveal 
positions. 

• Gain experience. 
• Reach an agreement.

6. Information-
seeking

Personal ignorance. 
Spreading 

knowledge and 
revealing positions. 

Gaining, passing on, 
showing, or hiding 

personal knowledge.

• Reach an agreement.
• Develop and reveal 

positions. 

7. Eristic Conflict and antagonism.

Reaching a 
(provisional) 

accommodation in a 
relationship.

Striking the other 
party and winning in 
the eyes of 
onlookers. 

• Reach an agreement.
• Develop and reveal 

positions. 
• Gain experience and 

amusement.
• Add to prestige.
• Vent emotions.



102 Macagno 
 

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tions (in the sense of communicative purposes) that the interlocu-
tors can hold to pursue in their interaction. The theory of dialogue 
types can be better regarded as a theory of dialogue moves types 
(corresponding to discourse segments, see Grosz & Sidner, 1986, 
p. 178) that the participants perform to co-construct their dialogue 
(Macagno and Bigi 2017, 2020). The situational and institutional 
context clearly constraints the type of moves that can be expected 
to occur: an educational dialogue (Rapanta and Christodoulou 
2019) shows different types and frequencies of moves than a 
medical interview or a legal discussion. However, dialogue moves 
are the building blocks that can be adapted to distinct activities and 
contexts.  
 Considering the context and the type of argumentative activity 
considered in this paper (political argumentation on social media), 
it is possible to outline the moves that can ideally characterize it. 
Political discourse is defined as a “realm of action,” primarily 
characterized by decision-making, where solutions to present or 
future problems are defended and attacked (Fairclough and 
Fairclough 2011, p. 244). Thus, when a politician acts in his or her 
institutional role, the primary presumed goal is to justify and argue 
for and against decisions of different kind before an audience 
constituted by all the citizens. This primary goal, which defines 
the specific dialogical activity, is pursued primarily through delib-
eration moves, but also by persuasion (when the acceptability of a 
value judgment is disputed) or information sharing moves whose 
acceptability can be the object of explanations or inquiry. Eristic 
moves can be used exceptionally; however, these types of moves 
are characteristic of antagonistic scenarios, such as direct confron-
tations in election campaigns. Overall, this type of activity can 
prototypically lead to the following types of moves (Figure 3).     



Argumentation Profiles 103 
 

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Figure 3: Types of moves in political institutional tweets 

 
Even though this typology does not exhaust the complexity of the 
moves in political institutional online argumentation, it can pro-
vide a guidance for interpreting the arguments occurring in it. In a 
sense, it is a tool for the argument analysis.  

4.2. Types of argument expressed through argumentation schemes 
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of argument, 
representing the most generic types of argument as a combination 
of one or more factual premises, a generalization (a warrant), and a 
conclusion. The premises are forms of premises, namely proposi-
tions that include variables that need to be specified in each argu-
ment. The generalization works as a rule of inference, providing 
for the reason why a type of conclusion (representing, for exam-
ple, a state of affairs) follows from a type of premise (representing, 
for example, a cause of such a state of affairs).  

Argumentation schemes are associated with a set of critical 
questions, which mirror the acceptability conditions of an argu-
ment at different levels, including the acceptability of the factual 
premises and the relationship between the latter and the rule of 
inference. Should these questions be not fulfilled, the argument 
cannot be considered as acceptable—or even reasonable—and 
cannot be used to provide a presumptive reason for accepting the 
conclusion. Thus, an argumentation scheme presents in its struc-
ture the dialectical nature of argumentation, where reasons are 

(7) Other (including 
rapport building 

moves, etc.)

Relevant argumentative 
dialogue moves

Cognitive Practical

Lack of 
information

No presumable 
agreement

(1) Information-
sharing (factual)

(3) Persuasion (5) Decision-
making (proposals)

(2) Information-
sharing (explanations)

Essential information 
(decisions and character)

Goal: Informing the audience of and 
justifying a reasoned decision about different 

political, economical, diplomatic, 
environmental, etc. issues of a country.

(4) Eristic (4) Eristic



104 Macagno 
 

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advanced to modify the interlocutors’ commitments, and result in 
specific burdens of questioning or providing evidence (Godden 
and Walton 2006).  
 An example of an argumentation scheme is the argument from 
practical reasoning represented below, a type of argument that 
characterizes political discussions (Macagno and Walton 2018; 
Walton et al. 2008, p. 96):  
 

 

The scheme can be evaluated through the following critical ques-
tions:  
 

  
CQ1, CQ2, and CQ3 represent the defeasibility condition of the 
factual premises, namely the exhaustiveness of the alternatives, 



Argumentation Profiles 105 
 

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their assessment, and their feasibility. CQ4 and CQ5 address the 
reasonableness of the conditional (warrant). 
 In the literature, more than 60 schemes have been analyzed (for 
an outline, see Walton et al., 2008). However, most of them are 
combination of different more basic schemes, which can be sum-
marized in the following dichotomic tree (Figure 4) (Macagno 
2015b; Macagno and Walton 2015)2.    
 

 
 

Figure 4: Pragmatic classification of argumentation schemes 

This “tree” of schemes can be explained by considering the dialog-
ical (pragmatic) nature of an argument. Some schemes have proto-
typical goals, namely they can be used for pursuing a specific 
dialogue move. For example, an argument from consequences 
pursued a specific type of dialogue move, namely making a deci-

 
2 To these categories, two other schemes—the argument from analogy and the 
argument from example—need to be added, which convey implicitly the other 
schemes. The former presupposes a semantic (material) relation captured by the 
aforementioned schemes through a comparison between two heterogeneous 
entities or states of affairs, while the latter through an illustration, or a more 
specific instance of the entity or state of affairs represented in the conclusion 
(Macagno 2017; Macagno and Walton 2017). 

Purpose of the scheme

Establish the acceptability of 
a proposition based on the 

quality of its source

Assess the desirablity of a 
course of action

Predict/retrodict an event/
entity 

Classify entities or facts/
events

Establish the acceptability of 
a judgment

Establish the acceptability of a 
proposition based on the 

properties of the subject matter

Future state 
of affairs

Past fact/
entity

Value 
judgment

Attribution of 
factual properties 

Means to 
achieve a goal

Consequences 
of an action

Knowledge Reliability

Argument from:
Practical reasoning;  

Values;
Distress

Argument from:
Consequences; 

Danger; Fear; Threat; 
Sunk cost

Argument from:
Expert opinion;

Position to know;
Popular opinion;

Ad hominem

Ad hominem 
arguments

Argument from 
cause to effect 

Argument from:
Verbal classification;

Composition;
Division; Sign

Argument from 
sign; abductive 

argument 

Argument from: 
Classification;

Sign  

Internally (quality of the 
course of action)

Externally (authority of the 
source)

Authority Popular practice

Argument from
popular practice



106 Macagno 
 

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sion or negotiating. This goal is not directly and primarily pursued 
by other schemes: for instance, an argument from cause to effect 
can be used for analyzing a phenomenon (inquiry), but not directly 
for suggesting a course of action. Some schemes can be used for 
pursuing all types of dialogue moves: the “external arguments” 
(from authority or testimony) can be used for supporting any kind 
of conclusion, aimed at any kind of dialogical goal. The relation-
ship between the dialogical goal of the conclusion and the catego-
ries of the schemes allows identifying the possible candidates, 
which can be narrowed down further by considering the semantic 
dimension of a scheme.  

The round-edge boxes indicate the type of material relation be-
tween the premises and the conclusion—whether it is causal, 
definitional, authoritative, etc. This dimension represents the 
means to achieve the sought-after goal. Thus, a proposal for a 
decision can be supported by an argument from consequences if 
the speaker intends to emphasize possible benefits or trigger nega-
tive emotions related to a specific course of action (“if we do not 
do this, we will lose everything”). In contrast, a deliberative con-
clusion can be grounded on a practical argument when the speaker 
intends to assess the alternatives and compare them critically.  

Argumentation schemes and dialogue moves are the backbone 
of argumentative analysis, constituting the dialectical dimension of 
argumentation. This element needs to be combined with the other 
two dimensions, namely the rhetorical and the evaluative one.   

5.  Argumentation profiles—Evaluation 
As mentioned in the previous section, fallacies can be considered 
as manifestations of argument weaknesses at different levels. The 
different dimensions of evaluation mirror a continuum of argu-
ment quality ranging from clear cases of voluntary manipulation to 
presumptively acceptable arguments. This continuum is represent-
ed in the following Figure 5:   

 



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Figure 5: Acceptability of arguments 

Manipulative arguments are distinguished not only from presump-
tively acceptable arguments, but also from weak arguments. The 
latter are described as argument lacking the necessary evidence for 
supporting the conclusion. For this reason, they are not necessarily 
conceived as instruments for misleading the audience, even though 
they cannot fulfil the burden of proof and thus, in an ordinary 
context in which information is available, they cannot be used for 
supporting a conclusion (Walton 1995b, 2016). Manipulative 
arguments consist in a deliberate (provable) modification of what 
the audience (the interlocutor) accepts, which can be manifested in 
three different dimensions: 1) the purpose of the dialogue (turning 
a deliberation or an assessment of an opinion into a quarrel, see 
Macagno, 2013) (axe z); 2) the explicit commitments of the inter-
locutor (or another party) (misquoting or misreporting, see 
Macagno & Walton, 2017) (assessed at the logical level of incom-
patibilities and at the pragmatic level of quotations); and 3) the 
common ground (taking for granted that a proposition that is not 
accepted by everyone in the audience or even acceptable is in fact 
part of their commitments) (axe y).  

Arguments 
presumptively 

acceptable
Manipulative 

arguments

Relevance of the argument

Arguments 
presumptively not 
acceptable (lack of 

evidence)

To the purpose of the dialogue

To the conclusion

Back-up evidence (for premises 
potentially controversial)

-

-+

+

Compliance with the common 
ground (presuppositions) -

Conflict with common 
ground

+

-
+

Manifestation 
(classical fallacies)

Post hoc, secundum quid, 
hasty generalization, false 

dichotomy, question-begging, 
persuasive definition, quasi-

definition

Straw man

Ad hominem



108 Macagno 
 

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 The problem at an operational level consists in capturing the 
different types of violations. To this purpose, two instruments can 
be extremely effective, namely the detection of the “classical” 
fallacies, and the use of critical questions. The first instrument has 
been developed accurately by Walton in his immense toolkit of 
argumentation theory, in which each fallacy is accurately identi-
fied, and its possible uses illustrated and evaluated. As shown 
above, fallacies capture different types of voluntary manipulation, 
detecting when an argument is used irrelevantly to the context of 
dialogue, to the conclusion of an argument, or in breach of the 
common knowledge.  

One limitation of this instrument is the number of possible fal-
lacies. However, the likelihood that a fallacy is committed is con-
strained by the type of conversational setting. Following Walton’s 
account, some arguments are considered as fallacious in some 
dialogical contexts, while not in others (Walton 1995b). Similarly, 
some fallacies are more effective in some contexts, while easily 
detected and defused in others. For this reason, the fallacy toolbox 
can be simplified by reducing the fallacies to the ones that are 
more likely to be found. For example, considering written argu-
ments in the specific context of political communication, it is 
possible to identify the most generic and common types of falla-
cies (Rapanta and Walton 2016; Walton 2007b) (Table 2). These 
fallacies are classified according to three categories of manipula-
tive arguments, which are labelled “manipulation strategy” (argu-
ments irrelevant to the dialogue goal or to the conclusion, and 
arguments with unaccepted presuppositions). 
   

Manipulation 

strategy 
Fallacy Example 

1. Dialogical 
irrelevance 
(manipulating 
the goal of the 
dialogue) (axe z) 

Ad hominem arguments fallacious-
ly used to rebut a viewpoint or a 
proposal in a context of dialogue 
that is not eristic, or in which the 
authority of the speaker is not the 
ground of the attacked argument.  

a. “Don’t let the fake 
media tell you that I 
have changed my 
position.” 

2. Topical 
irrelevance 
(attacking or 
using a view-

Straw man (a modification of the 
viewpoint or a claim of the inter-
locutor for attacking it more 
easily).  

b. “Remember when 
the failing @nytimes 
apologized to its 
subscribers, right after 



Argumentation Profiles 109 
 

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point that is not 
the one ad-
vanced) (axes x 
and y) 

the election, because 
their coverage was so 
wrong. Now worse!”3 

3. Presupposi-
tions in conflict 
with the common 
ground (axes x 
and y) 
 

3.1. Facts 

False dichotomy (contrary or 
alternative options or states of 
affairs presupposed as contradicto-
ry) 

c. “Somebody with 
aptitude and conviction 
should buy the FAKE 
NEWS and failing 
@nytimes and either 
run it correctly or let it 
fold with dignity!” 

Secundum quid (presupposing that 
the premise includes the qualifica-
tions necessary for drawing the 
conclusion) 

d. “The threat from 
radical Islamic terror-
ism is very real, just 
look at what is happen-
ing in Europe and the 
Middle-East. Courts 
must act fast!”   

Question begging epithets (the use 
of a word presupposes unproven or 
unaccepted judgments or states of 
affairs) 

e. “Don't let the fake 
media tell you that I 
have changed my 
position.” (Presuppos-
ing that there are fake 
media). 

3.2. Logical 
rules or 
premises  

Post hoc ergo propter hoc (a 
temporal or spatial coincidence or 
succession presupposed as a cause-
effect relation) 

f. “The weak illegal 
immigration policies of 
the Obama Admin. 
allowed bad MS 13 
gangs to form in cities 
across U.S. We are 
removing them fast!” 

Hasty generalization (from specific 
events to a universal generaliza-
tion) 

g. “The Fake News 
media is officially out of 
control. They will do or 
say anything in order to 
get attention - never 
been a time like this!” 

3.3. Word 
meaning or 
connotation Persuasive definition (implicit 

modification of the meaning of 
words) 

h. “If our healthcare 
plan is approved, you 
will see real healthcare 
and premiums will start 
tumbling down. 
ObamaCare is in a 
death spiral!” 

 
3 Borchers, C. (2017). No, the New York Times did not apologize because its 
Trump coverage was ‘so wrong’. The Washington Post, 29 March 2017 (re-
trieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/03/29/no-
the-new-york-times-did-not-apologize-because-its-trump-coverage-was-so-
wrong/ on 4 September 2020).  



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Quasi-definition (takes for granted 
unshared or not commonly accept-
ed inferences from the use of a 
word) 

i. “We must stop 
being politically 
correct and get down 
to the business of 
security for our 
people. If we don't get 
smart it will only get 
worse” (politically 
correct is not normal-
ly considered as 
cause of negligence 
or disinterest in 
protection) 

Table 2: Categories of manipulation and fallacies 

In this type of classification, it is possible to notice a probative 
difference between the first and the second and third “manipula-
tion strategy.” While in case of straw man and the different strate-
gies of common ground manipulation, it is possible to prove that a 
quote or paraphrase does not correspond to the original speech, or 
that a proposition is not commonly accepted (for example, consid-
ering whether the analyst considers the contrary as acceptable), the 
evaluation of ad hominem arguments can be more complex. Ad 
hominem arguments can be reasonable in specific contexts (quar-
rels, attacks to a questionable authority, etc.). However, consider-
ing that political communication is not principally a quarrel, and 
that attacks on improper authorities need to be grounded on evi-
dence (to satisfy the burden of disproof, see Walton, 1997), the 
lack of evidence and the high frequency of this type of argument is 
an indicator of manipulative intentions. For example, in case a) the 
attack is grounded on a generalization (some media publish fake 
news ordinarily) which is neither based on evidence nor accepted.  
 The second instrument for the assessment of arguments is the 
use of critical questions, which is complementary to the fallacy 
toolbox. Argumentation schemes are associated with critical ques-
tions, which mirror the defeasibility conditions of an argument 
according to the different dimensions of an argument. First, critical 
questions capture the logical relationship between the premises 
and the conclusion, detecting the cases in which the conclusion is 
not supported by the premises, or is too strong considering the 
type of logical relation used. Second, critical questions highlight 
the dialogical conditions of use, thus guiding the recognition of the 



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arguments that are irrelevant to the dialogue goal (fallacious uses 
of ad hominem, expert opinion, consequences…). Finally, some 
schemes include the evidence question, which is specifically 
aimed at capturing arguments poorly backed by evidence.  
 Critical questions can be a partial guide to the detection of 
some fallacies. However, these two instruments do not fully over-
lap. Critical questions detect arguments unbacked or poorly 
backed by evidence, which would pass through the fallacy sieve. 
However, they do not pinpoint all the uses of unaccepted infor-
mation that is taken for granted in an argument, which are instead 
finely distinguished by the different fallacies.  

6. Argumentation profiles: Emotive words and the use of emo-
tions 

Table 2 includes some common strategies of manipulation of 
words meaning and use. These deceptive strategies are character-
ized by two aspects: they result in a use or meaning that is in 
conflict with the common ground, and they are aimed at a specific 
argumentative goal. The most evident and effective argumentative 
function of a word use can be represented through Stevenson’s 
notion of “dynamic use” of an ethical term  (Stevenson 1937, 
1938, 1944; Walton 2001b). Ethical terms (which include also 
pejoratives or laudatory words) are used argumentatively to trigger 
a specific value judgment on a state of affairs (e.g., a “pro-life” 
law is commonly regarded positively, as life is something that 
needs to be protected) and thus affect the audience’s decision-
making (e.g. “pro-life” laws should be approved of) (Walton, 
1992; see also Macagno, 2014). This tendency to affect the inter-
locutor’s attitude towards a state of affairs was labeled by Steven-
son as “emotive meaning,” as the value judgment is the necessary 
condition of the emotions that the use of an ethical term can arouse 
(Macagno and Walton 2014b).. For example, by labeling a politi-
cian as “weak” or “corrupt,” the speaker is not merely describing 
an individual, but inviting a value judgment that can result in an 
emotion (contempt or anger) and suggest an implicit practical 
conclusion (you should not vote for him/her). While this strategy 
is not necessarily fallacious—on the contrary, it is a common 



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tactic in argumentation—the improper use of emotive words can 
be highly deceptive. 
 By combining the detection of ethical terms with the analysis of 
the fallacies associated to their use it is possible to bring to light 
the cases in which language is not merely used persuasively, but 
deceptively. The literature in argumentation theory identified 
specific fallacies related to language use: persuasive definitions 
and quasi-definitions, which are aimed at distorting the common 
ground related to the word meaning and its associated common-
places, and the fallacy of question begging, in which a state of 
affairs that has not been proved nor accepted is taken for granted 
(Bentham 1824; Macagno and Walton 2014b; Walton 1994). 
Thus, the use of emotive words is not an indicator of fallacious-
ness. However, when emotive words are persuasively defined, or 
quasi-defined, or used “begging the question” of their possible use, 
they become manipulative tactics.  

The strict relationship between ethical terms and emotions can 
reveal another dimension of argumentative discourse, namely the 
pathos-related features of its “rhetorical” dimension. The frequen-
cy of the emotive words used by a speaker (revealed through the 
tools of the corpus linguistics, see Kilgarriff et al., 2014), can 
reveal the emotive strategy used—for example the types of emo-
tions that he or she seeks to trigger more often. In particular, the 
frequency of the use of pejoratives or derogatory words, eliciting 
emotions such as contempt, fear, or anger, can be analyzed in 
conjunction with the types of argument used in the same moves in 
which the emotive word occurs (for example, ad hominem), and 
the fallacies therein committed, unveiling specific strategies of 
attack or for diverting attention (Macagno 2019).  
 From a procedural perspective, to detect an emotive word it is 
necessary to ascertain first its argumentative function. Two distinct 
tests can be used to this purpose: 1) determining the role of a word 
for justifying an explicit or implicit value judgment or decision (its 
use as a premise for supporting an explicit or implicit value judg-
ment); and 2) the absence of other reasons in support of such an 
evaluative conclusion. Thus, when a practical or evaluative con-
clusion is only justified by the use of an “ethical” term, the latter 
can be classified as emotive.  



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The assessment of the use of emotive words involves the detec-
tion of the possible fallacies associated with it. First, the word use 
by the speaker is compared with the dictionary definitions thereof. 
In case there is a discrepancy, the conditions for the classification 
of the word use as a persuasive definition are evaluated (Macagno 
and Walton 2010, 2014b): 1) word meaning different from com-
mon use, 2) absence of an explicit redefinition, and 3) denotation 
part of the common ground. For example, if the speaker refers to a 
policy as the “true healthcare,” he is referring to a state of affairs 
that is commonly accepted (a policy concerning healthcare). How-
ever, the meaning of “healthcare” is implicitly redefined, associat-
ing the “true” meaning thereof only to practices corresponding 
specifically to the policy referred to, without providing evidence 
(Halldén 1960; Van Rees 2009).  

In case the word meaning is commonly accepted, but it is used 
to refer to a state of affairs not accepted and presupposed as such 
(Abrusán 2010, 2011; Atlas 1991; Gazdar 1979; Kay 1992; 
Levinson 1983), the case can be classified as a question begging 
epithet. Using a recent example, when Trump claimed “Why 
should I go to that cemetery [an American Cemetery in France 
with more than 1800 US marines buried]? It’s filled with losers” 
(Goldberg 2020),4 he is presupposing that at least some of the 
individuals buried are losers (or that the victims of WW2 are 
losers). Considering the scandal that followed, he was using an 
epithet to take for granted a qualification that was not neither 
accepted nor proven.  

Finally, in case the aforementioned tests are negative, the pos-
sibility of a quasi-definition can be evaluated by taking into ac-
count the probative function of the word and the evaluative infer-
ence that it is used to trigger. In case the type of evaluative conclu-
sion is not commonly supported by the word use (and the evalua-
tive inference or stereotype is not part of the common ground, see 
Jeshion, 2013), the word can be considered as quasi-defined. To 
support a case of quasi-definition, it is possible to use the tools of 
the corpus linguistics, which provide the best dictionary examples 

 
4 A similar question-begging example in the same article: “We’re not going to 
support that loser’s funeral.” 



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of a word use in a reference corpus together with their colloca-
tions. If the word is normally used to trigger conclusions incom-
patible with the one supported or implied in the text, the word use 
should be classified as a quasi-definition.  

7. Illustration of the method  
The different instruments that Walton developed in his theory have 
been organized in the previous sections in a toolkit for the analysis 
of argumentative texts. The theory of dialogue types has been 
shown to be instrumental to the detection of the types of argument, 
which are classified and assessed through argumentation schemes 
(the “dialectical” component presented in Figure 1). The pragmatic 
approach to fallacies that Walton defended provides useful heuris-
tic tools for capturing a fundamental extreme of the continuum 
between acceptable and manipulative arguments, and at the same 
time shows the different dimensions that can be manipulated (the 
“evaluative” component). Finally, Walton’s theory of ethical 
argumentation, emotions, and emotive language (Walton 1992, 
2009) underlies the third element of a profile, namely the use of 
emotive words (the “rhetorical” component).  
 The sections above showed the passage from a theoretical view 
of argument to its translation into an analytical method. Its actual 
use—involving the detection of the different argumentative di-
mensions—and the benefits that can result therefrom can be un-
derstood through its illustration. To this purpose, this section will 
present the analysis of the argumentative communication on Twit-
ter of three political leaders commonly defined as “populists” 
(Rachman 2018), namely the Italian former minister for Internal 
Affairs, Matteo Salvini, the US president, Donald Trump, and the 
Brazilian president, Jair Messias Bolsonaro.  

The argumentative differences and similarities between the 
three leaders can be brought to light by “dissecting” their typical 
tweets according to the three aforementioned variables. The ana-
lyzed tweets of the three leaders are representative of their mes-
sages published through their Twitter institutional profiles (identi-
fying the user through his official political office) along a temporal 
timeframe of 180 days from the date on which each politician took 
office.     



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7.1. Outlining the argumentation profiles of the politicians 
The analysis of the tweets of the three politicians resulted in the 
argumentation profiles that can be represented quantitatively and 
compared with each other. The tables below outline the different 
dimensions of the argumentation profiles of the three politicians, 
significantly different from each other. The first dimension is the 
one capturing the types of argument used (Table 3).   
 

 
Table 3: Types of argument 

The proportion of the typical arguments shows different strategies: 
while the most frequent argument used by Salvini is the ad homi-
nem, Bolsonaro grounds his conclusions frequently on arguments 
from consequences and practical arguments, and Trump combines 
ad hominem arguments with arguments from consequences.  
 The assessment dimension brings to light the manipulative 
intentions of the three leaders. In the table below, the arguments 
are considered in combination with the fallacies detected (Table 
4):  
 



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Table 4: Quality of argument 

Overall, the level of argumentation is extremely problematic. The 
non-fallacious uses of arguments by the three leaders is much 
lower than the arguments flawed by manipulative strategies. In 
Salvini’s tweet, a non fallacious argument is almost an exception 
(on average, fallacious arguments amount to more than 88% of his 
arguments, compared to 78% of Trump and 63% of Bolsonaro). 
The distribution of the fallacies is represented in detail in the 
following Table 5 (Macagno, 2022).  
 

 
Table 5: Types of fallacies committed 

 
The last dimension is the use of emotive words, and more im-
portantly the emotions they are used to trigger through the value 
judgments that the ethical words lead to (Ben-Ze’ev 2000) (Table 
6).  



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Table 6: Types of emotions triggered 
 
Again, the three leaders show an extremely aggressive character, 
dominated by the emotion of contempt (often manifested by ridi-
culing the opponent). Anger and indignation characterize Salvini’s 
rhetoric, while Trump and Bolsonaro use frequently emotive 
words arousing fear.   
 The argumentation profiles shape specific preferences in the 
choice of argumentative strategies that can be illustrated through a 
qualitative analysis of the examples that illustrate the typical ar-
gumentation of each politician.  

7.2. Illustrating the profiles: Salvini 
Salvini’s argumentation on Twitter is characterized by the follow-
ing distinguishing features: 1) high use of ad hominem and victim-
ization arguments; 2) high number of fallacies, and in particular 
straw man and quasi-definitions; 3) use of emotive words aimed at 
ridiculing the interlocutor or a third party or triggering indignation 
and anger. The following examples illustrate these distinctive 
argumentative features.   
 
Example 1  
 

(Salvini replies to Iantorno, a left-wing politician, who commented 
on a claim made by Salvini) 



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“Stop having migrants walking around.” Iantorno (Pd): “Words 
similar to Hitler’s.” That’s crazy! Shame on you. I do not give up; 
the insults of the left wing are medals for me.5  

  
In this tweet, Salvini uses an ad hominem argument to attack the 
viewpoint of a left-wing politician, accusing the opponent of a 
shameful act (thus, taking for granted that his comment is against 
the accepted values, see Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, p. 525) and labeling his 
interpretation as “crazy.” The attack is thus associated with a 
deceitful pretense to defend the public values and decency, which 
leads to the mimicked emotion of “rightful indignation” (Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 46, a1) and leading to assess the speak-
er not as aggressive and abusive, but “righteously indignant,” 
namely pursuing and defending a “shared” ideal of justice.  

The ad hominem is clearly fallacious at the level of dialogical 
relevance (Walton 1998a), as the goal of the attacked politician 
was drawing a grounded comparison between two quotes (“[s]top 
having migrants walking around in the Italian cities” and Hitler’s 
“[t]he Jews must go way from Europe”) (Caso 2018). Salvini is 
ignoring the interlocutor’s argument, and takes it as a direct attack, 
unduly qualifying it as an “insult” (question begging epithet, at-
tributed taking for granted a condition—to be a remark (unground-
ed) and abusive—that is contradicted by the original quote. Thus, 
Salvini is using a straw man: Iantorno’s words are misquoted by 
omitting the reasons on which the claim is based, so that it appears 
as an abusive remark.  

The last manipulative move is the hasty generalization. The 
specific comment of the politician (unrelated to his belonging to a 
specific party) is distorted, qualified, and then presented as an 
unwarranted illustration of a presupposed generalized behavior of 
the left-wing parties (“the insults of the left wing”). This generali-
zation is neither accepted nor proven. The word “insult” has an-
other crucial argumentative effect: victimization. By using this 
“loaded word,” Salvini has become the victim suffering from an 

 
5 “Basta migranti a spasso”. Iantorno (Pd): “Parole simili a quelle di HITLER”. 
Roba da matti! Si vergogni. Io non mollo, gli insulti della sinistra sono meda-
glie. (Tweet of 7 June 2018 
 https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1004667002022187008) 



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injustice, which presupposes that the agent (the left wing) is the 
villain. This scenario can trigger the emotion of pity (suffering 
from an injustice) or anger (desire to restore justice) (Ben-Ze’ev 
2000, chap. 13).   
 Salvini often relies on arguments from consequences; however, 
the negative judgment on the effects of a policy or course of action 
are frequently manipulated through unaccepted (or unacceptable) 
presuppositions. A typical example is the following.  
  
Example 2  

 
For too long too many people have profited hugely from the busi-
ness of the illegal immigrants. With the #DecretoSalvini [a legis-
lative decree proposed by Salvini], for the pro-immigration “fake 
good people” the party is over. Left-wing politicians are upset and 
protest? Well. We have just started to fix the disaster that their 
administrations have caused to the Country.6  
 

Salvini uses an argument from consequences, a type of reason 
commonly used in political discourse and based on a warrant of 
the kind “If action X is/is not carried out, good/bad consequences 
will occur.”  However, the perception of the consequences of the 
policy (the legislative decree proposed by Salvini) is manipulated 
through several tactics. First, the syntactic structure of the first 
statement (having “for too long” as a focus) (Atlas 1991; Hajic̆ová 
1984; Strawson 1971) presupposes that 1) there is a business of 
illegal immigration, and 2) there are people who have profited 
hugely from it; and 3) the number of these people is higher than 
acceptable. These presuppositions are not supported by evidence, 
nor can they be considered as commonly shared (there is no shared 
information about 2 and 3).  

A complex linguistic strategy is then used for justifying the ac-
ceptability of the decree: Salvini takes for granted that there is a 
category of people commonly known as “pro-immigration ‘fake 

 
6 Troppi si sono arricchiti per troppo tempo con business dei clandestini. Con il 
#DecretoSalvini per i “finti buoni” dell’accoglienza la pacchia è finita. A 
sinistra si agitano e protestano? Bene. Abbiamo solo cominciato a rimediare al 
disastro causato al Paese dai loro governi. (Tweet of 28 November 2018, 
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1067686420628811776) 



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good people’,” which is highly evaluative (a disparaging epithet 
leading to contempt), but its use is not  supported by evidence or 
common ground. Salvini is implicitly defining a new concept (a 
persuasive definition) and using it in an ambiguous way to mean 
either 1) there are hypocrites who support immigration; or 2) 
everyone who supports immigration is a hypocrite. In both cases, 
the referent is neither commonly accepted nor justified. The other 
presupposition is that such a category of people was enjoying a 
favorable condition (referred to metaphorically as “party,” which 
is again unshared (question-begging).  

The last extremely problematic move can be found in the last 
statement, in which Salvini takes for granted that the left-wing 
previous administrations have caused “disasters” (an emotive word 
triggering fear), which is clearly unshared and unwarranted (espe-
cially considering that the minister is addressing the whole Italian 
population and not only his own supporters).  
 The following third example shows another distinguishing 
linguistic strategy committed by Salvini, namely the use of the 
“quasi-definition.” 
 
Example 3  
 

According to the British newspaper “The Independent,” Italy is 
becoming fascist… How strange, in the last few months these for-
eign “big journals” have all become experts in Italian politics.7  

 
The reported view of the British newspaper is reported without the 
reasons in support thereof, and as usually in Salvini’s argumenta-
tion, the speaker is attacked instead of the argument. Here, the 
attack strategy consists in ridiculing and disparaging the source of 
the news through the strategy of quasi-definition. The evaluation 
triggered by the stereotypes commonly associated to a word use 
(in this case “international journals,” commonly suggesting posi-

 
7 Secondo il quotidiano britannico “The Independent” l’Italia starebbe diventan-
do fascista... Che strano, da qualche mese questi "giornaloni" stranieri sono 
diventati tutti esperti di politica italiana. (Tweet of 22 October 2018, 
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1054289934893441024) 
 



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tive evaluations based on their credibility) is modified through the 
use of a suffix (the Italian “-one,” translated in English as “big”). 
The journals have become “big journals,” where in Italian the 
augmentative suffix adds to the word a negative trait that triggers 
contempt (Lo Duca 2004, p. 211). Thus, the “big journals” are 
evaluated as journals that are considered as big without reasons. 
The quasi-definition allows Salvini to attack the journals without 
any reason, taking for granted that they are contemptible. The 
hyperbolic description of their alleged quality “experts” is associ-
ated with hasty generalization, through which the speaker takes for 
granted that most of the international journals have advanced 
questionable claims on Italian politics.   
 The last example illustrates the use of one of the most im-
portant keywords used by Salvini, “commonsense:”   
 
Example 4  
 

The time of the Brussels bureaucrats is over. Values, pride, peo-
ples’, and countries’ freedom: in May, the commonsense revolu-
tions will arrive in all Europe. We are ready.8   

 
In this case, Salvini is at the same time attacking the EU and argu-
ing in favor of the parties supporting “sovranist” views. Thus, the 
second argument from values is associated with an ad hominem 
that is expressed through the question-begging epithet “bureau-
crats” (commonly associated with a negative evaluation of the 
referent). Salvini is presupposing that all or most of the politicians 
governing the EU are concerned with procedural correctness at the 
expense of people’s needs (definition of “bureaucrat”) (unwarrant-
ed generalization, which is thus fallacious).  

Moreover, the sovranist view is described as “commonsense,” a 
term that is commonly defined as “sound judgment in practical 
matters,” or “the capacity to assess and distinguish what is reason-

 
8 È finito il tempo dei burocrati di Bruxelles. Valori, orgoglio, libertà dei popoli 
e delle nazioni: a maggio la rivoluzione del buonsenso arriverà in tutta Europa. 
Noi siamo pronti. (Tweet of 9 October 2018, 
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1049711686704406528?ref_src=twsr
c%5Etfw) 



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able from what is unreasonable, what is appropriate from what is 
not, and behave in a just, wise, and balanced way” (La Repubblica 
Italian Dictionary, 2018). The term “commonsense” is persuasive-
ly defined to refer to those who embrace the sovranist views, 
characterized by “values, pride, peoples’ and countries’ freedom.” 
All these latter terms are persuasively defined, as the “freedom of 
peoples” or countries has never been disputed by the opposing 
parties, unless a very specific and unshared definition of “free-
dom” (and “pride”) is used.  

7.3.  Illustrating the profiles: Trump 
Trump’s argumentation on Twitter is characterized by three cru-
cial features: ad hominem attacks, arguments from consequences 
commonly associated with the emotion of fear, and question-
begging epithets. Two leading topics characterize his tweets: the 
attacks against the critics and opponents, and the national pride 
and identity—often expressed as anti-immigration policies. The 
following tweet is a clear example of the first topic:  
 
Example 5  

 
FAKE NEWS media, which makes up stories and “sources,” is far 
more effective than the discredited Democrats - but they are fad-
ing fast!9 

 
Trump is conducting a twofold attack, one against the media pub-
lishing information or opinions grounded on external reports (the 
sources) against the president, and one aimed at the opposing 
party. These ad hominem are unwarranted and based only on the 
use of question-begging epithets (“fake news;” “discredited;” 
“make up”) and a persuasive definition (“source”), which is im-
plicitly triggered by the use of quotes, dissociating the common 
use of the word (the real sources) from the ones used by the “fake 
news” media (the false sources). The emotion of contempt is 
triggered by terms related to the semantic area of “failure.”  

 
9 Tweet of 16 February 2017, available in The Tweets of President Donald J. 
Trump: The Most Liked and Retweeted Tweets from the Inauguration through 
the Impeachment Trial 2020 (Forefront Books) 



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 A similar strategy is pursued in the following excerpt, in which 
the attack on the media is combined with a practical argument. 
 
Example 6  
 

The failing @nytimes has disgraced the media world. Gotten me 
wrong for two solid years. Change libel laws?10 

 
Again, the emotive language used (“failing;” “disgraced”) associ-
ated with a specific news company is intended to trigger contempt 
by showing its lack of praiseworthiness (Ben-Ze’ev 2000, p. 390). 
The first epithet conveys an unshared presupposition (the media 
company is failing), while the second a claim that is unsupported 
by evidence—or justified by a (disputable) reason (they have 
gotten Trump wrong) that is only partially related to the conclu-
sion (a newspaper can commit mistakes without disgracing the 
media world—ignoring qualifications). The practical reasoning 
(i.e., the best way to solve the problem of the newspaper is to 
change libel laws) is taking for granted a premise (NY Times is 
publishing false information that harms others’ reputation) that is 
not shared.  
 In the following tweet, the typical use of argument from conse-
quences associated with fear appeal is illustrated. 
 
Example 7  

 
If the ban were announced with a one-week notice, the “bad” 
would rush into our country during that week. A lot of bad 
“dudes” out there!11 

 
Trump is using here an argument from consequences—associated 
with a fear appeal. The consequence of the policy debated is de-
scribed using emotive words (“bad;” “rush;” “bad dudes”), which 
trigger the fear of an imminent and noticeable danger. The gener-

 
10 Tweet of 30 March 2017, available in (Conway 2017) 
11 Tweet of 31 January 2017, available in The Tweets of President Donald J. 
Trump: The Most Liked and Retweeted Tweets from the Inauguration through 
the Impeachment Trial 2020 (Forefront Books) 



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alization that in Mexico there are a lot of bad people—and more 
importantly that they would rush in the country—is not supported 
by any evidence.  
 Trump uses frequently the argument from consequences to-
gether with a false dilemma, such as in the following message. 
 
Example 8  
 

....the wall is not built, which it will be, the drug situation will 
NEVER be fixed the way it should be! #BuildTheWall12 

 
The need to build the wall is supported by the consequences of the 
failure to do it (namely the impossibility to fix the drug situation). 
This outcome, associated with fear, is not supported by any evi-
dence, just like the consequence of the wall on drug dealing. How-
ever, the false dichotomy “either the wall fixing the drug problem, 
or the drug problem” and the emotions connected therewith lead 
the audience to a fast decision.  

7.4.  Illustrating the profiles: Bolsonaro 
The argumentation profile of Bolsonaro is characterized by three 
distinctive types of argument: practical arguments, ad hominem 
attacks, and arguments from value. The most frequent fallacies are 
the question-begging, secundum quid, and hasty generalization. 
Contempt and fear are the emotions that the emotive words used 
are normally intended to trigger. The following is a typical tweet 
illustrating these features: 
  
Example 9  

 
In the previous governments, these expenses [related to the inter-
national press office] exceeded hundreds of millions of reais. This 
was one of the many sources of the questionable actions of the 
groups that were in power, a good part of whose members have 

 
12 Tweet of 24 April 2017, available in (Estepa 2017). 



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been convicted. An irresponsibility that damages the real needs of 
the Brazilians and the state!13  

 
The implicit argument related to the justification of the decision to 
terminate the contracts with the international press office is justi-
fied by an argument from values, which is grounded on the “real 
needs” of the Brazilians (if something favors or is not against the 
“real needs” of the people, it is good). The argument relies on the 
meaning (and reference) of “needs,” a quasi-defined word used to 
distinguish the “false” needs (pursued by the previous govern-
ments) from the “real” ones, which are not identified. A hasty 
generalization is used to extend the performance of “questionable 
actions” to all the groups of the previous governments (the proven 
crimes were attributed only to the individuals convicted), which is 
used to attack the political opponents belonging to such parties.  
 Another typical strategy consists in the attacks on the sources of 
information detrimental to the speaker.14 
 
Example 10  

 
It is incredible what they do to try to destroy us from the inside 
out creating continuously false narratives. We move on and are 
sorry for the lack of credibility of who should inform, and for 
some reason do exactly the opposite every day.  

 
The ad hominem attack against the press is not grounded on evi-
dence; rather, the term “false narratives” (a question-begging 
epithet) is allegedly extended to refer to a constant and frequent 
behavior of the media. This hasty generalization is continued in 

 
13 Nos governos anteriores, esses gastos ultrapassavam centenas de milhões. Era 
mais uma das muitas fontes de ações escusas dos grupos que estavam no poder, 
cuja boa parte dos membros está presa. Uma irresponsabilidade em detrimento 
das reais demandas dos brasileiros e do Estado! (Tweet from 23 January 2019, 
https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/status/1088048698578423808) 
14 É inacreditável o que fazem para tentar nos destruir de dentro para fora 
insistentemente criando falsas narrativas. Seguimos adiante e lamentando a 
perda de credibilidade de quem deveria informar, e por algum motivo, faz 
exatamente o oposto diariamente (Tweet of 1 February 2019, 
https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/status/1091376839224889345) 



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the next statement, in which the speaker claims that the media 
companies engage in disseminating false information every day. 
These fallacies are combined with a post hoc—the “false narra-
tives” are explained as attempts to destroy the party in charge—
and the unwarranted presupposition concerning the “lack of credi-
bility” of the press. Bolsonaro is thus developing a conspiracy 
theory in which he and his party are the victims of a hidden power 
that involves the media.  
 Bolsonaro frequently combines practical reasoning arguments 
with arguments from values for justifying the purpose of the pro-
posed action. A typical example is the following.  
 
Example 11  

 
The ideological indoctrination in the teaching institutions trains 
political militants, and not citizens with good sense and who are 
ready for the job market. We need to break this backbone for the 
safe future of Brazil.15   

 
The practical reasoning (we need to change the education system) 
is based on the negative value judgment on the teaching institu-
tions. In turn, this judgment is grounded on hasty generalizations 
(trains…), question-begging epithets advancing unshared presup-
positions (political militants; ideological indoctrination), and a 
false dichotomy between the outcomes of the educational system 
and the “citizens with good sense,” a term persuasively defined to 
include those who do not support the left-wing parties. The educa-
tional system is also opposed fallaciously to the “safety” of Brazil, 
another persuasively defined term (referring to the contrary of 
ideological indoctrination, or good-sense citizens). A similar 
strategy is pursued in the following tweet: 
  
 
 

 
15 A doutrinação ideológica nas instituições de ensino forma militantes políticos 
e não cidadãos com bom senso e preparados para o mercado de trabalho. É 
preciso quebrar essa espinha para o futuro saudável do Brasil. (Tweet of 6 
February 2019, https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/status/1093079897151586304)  



Argumentation Profiles 127 
 

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Example 12  
 
Investing in Brazil and not in other countries for developing ques-
tionable alliances for keeping the power! One of the great differ-
ences of our government. To rule the country for the Brazilians, 
and not for the São Paulo Forum [a conference of socialist politi-
cal parties and other organizations from Latin America].16  

 
The practical reasoning is grounded on two false dilemmas: the 
investments in Brazil are shown as excluding investments in other 
countries, while his government, described as governing for the 
Brazilian, is opposed to the other left-wing governments, who 
instead are claimed to govern for their own interests. In both cases, 
this opposition is not supported by evidence nor necessarily shared 
(especially by the supporters of the left-wing party that are part of 
the citizens governed by the president). The dichotomies are used 
for attacking the left-wing party, relying on value judgments trig-
gered by unshared and ungrounded presuppositions. For example, 
the investments in other countries are presupposed to be made “for 
developing questionable alliances” and such alliances were aimed 
only at “keeping the power.” The generalized and unproven behav-
ior is described through question-begging epithets, which lead to 
contempt.  

8. Discussion and conclusions 
Walton’s theory of argumentation hinges on the pragmatic notion 
of argument. Arguments are seen as instruments for pursuing 
different dialogical goals and their logic cannot be severed from it. 
This paper intended to show the unity of Walton’s project, present-
ing the pragmatic view of argument as a combination of analytical 
dimensions and categories. The identification of argument types 
through argumentations schemes helps reconstruct the implicit 
premises defended in the text and bring to light different ways a 
viewpoint is argued for or against. The analysis of fallacies was 

 
16 Investimento no Brasil e não em outros países para formarem alianças espú-
rias a fim de se manterem no poder! Um dos grandes diferenciais de nosso 
governo. Governar para o Brasileiro e não para o Foro de SP! (Tweet of 25 
February 2019, https://twitter.com/jairbolsonaro/status/1100150931147157504) 



128 Macagno 
 

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shown to capture in a systematic way the unshared presupposi-
tions, used by the speaker for including ungrounded and unproven 
propositions in the interlocutors’ commitments. The analysis of 
emotive words unveils the emotive strategies used by the speaker, 
which can be correlated to the corresponding linguistic fallacies.  

From a practical perspective, this method consists of a set of in-
struments for analyzing texts and discourses. In particular, it al-
lows describing the argumentation used according to three distinct 
variables: 1) the types of argument, 2) the quality of arguments, 
and 3) the emotive language used (and the emotions thus trig-
gered). Argumentation schemes allow the measurement of the first 
variable, while fallacies and critical questions can be used for 
sifting manipulative or weak arguments. Finally, by detecting the 
emotive words used (manually or through computational linguistic 
tools), it is possible to outline the types of emotions that a speaker 
tends to evoke through his or her arguments (Ben-Ze’ev 2000).  
 These three variables together provide a global overview on the 
argumentation profile of a speaker. This profile can be used for 
descriptive purposes—such as showing the different dimensions of 
a speech or the hidden strategies of a typical message—or for 
quali-quantitative ones—such as outlining the proportion of each 
strategy compared to the others (Macagno 2019), comparing dif-
ferent speakers, or assessing the frequency of the distinct strategies 
against a benchmark.   

Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia 
for the research grants PTDC/FER‐FIL/28278/2017, EXPL/FER-
FIL/0276/2021 and UIDB/00183/2020. 

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