Microsoft Word - 6. Felton 171-202.doc © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise: A Study of Dialogic Purpose and Dialectical Relevance in Novice and Experienced Arguers MARK FELTON AMANDA CROWELL Department of Teacher Education Department of Educational Foun- San José State dations and Counselling One Washington Square Hunter College, 695 Park Ave San Jose, CA 95192, U.S.A. New York, NY 10065, U.S.A. mark.felton@sjsu.edu Amanda.crowell@hunter.cuny.edu Abstract: Studies of adolescents and young-adults suggest that deliberative dialogue, a form of consensus-seeking argumentation, leads to stronger learning outcomes than persuasive dialogue. However, this research has not been informed by an analysis of dialogue among more experienced arguers. In the present study, we compare the deliberative and persua- sive dialogues of novice and experi- enced arguers to better understand the difference between these two forms of discourse at differing levels of argu- mentative expertise. Our results confirm theoretical distinctions between deliberation and persuasion. Results also suggest that greater experience in argumentation is asso- ciated with a richer array of argumen- tative purposes, producing more cohesive, intersubjective and dialecti- cally relevant dialogue. The implica- tions of these findings for learning are discussed. Résumé: Des études sur les adoles- cents et les jeunes adultes suggèrent que le dialogue délibératif, une forme d'argumentation avec laquelle on recherche le consensus, conduit à de meilleurs résultats d'apprentissage que le dialogue persuasif. Cependant, cette recherche n'a pas été éclairée par une analyse du dialogue entre des gens plus expérimentés dans l’argumentation. Dans la présente étude, nous comparons les dialogues délibératifs et persuasifs des per- sonnes novices et des personnes expérimentées dans l’argumentation afin de mieux comprendre la diffé- rence entre ces deux formes de discours à différents niveaux d'exper- tise argumentative. Nos résultats confirment les distinctions théoriques entre délibération et persuasion. Les résultats suggèrent également qu'une plus grande expérience de l'argumen- tation est associée à un éventail plus riche d'objectifs argumentatifs, produisant un dialogue plus cohérent, intersubjectif et dialectiquement pertinent. On discute des implications de ces résultats pour l'apprentissage. Keywords: deliberation, persuasion, critical dialogue, arguing to learn 172 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. 1. Introduction In recent years, educational researchers have turned their attention to argumentative dialogue as a vehicle for learning in school. When students argue, they engage in a form of elaborative ques- tioning, prompting partners to clarify claims, cite evidence and justify conclusions; they may also challenge each other’s reason- ing with counter-claims and counter-evidence that support alterna- tive points of view (Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert 2015; Reznitskaya and Wilkinson 2017). These processes encour- age students to make their thinking explicit, to respond to critical questioning, and to augment, revise or even replace knowledge with more accurate, nuanced or complex representations of the content under discussion (Andriessen 2006; Iordanou, Kuhn, Matos, Shi and Hemberger 2019; Osbourne 2010; Weinberger and Fischer 2006). The potential benefits of argumentation for learning are well documented in the extant literature. First, argumentation can pro- mote knowledge-building (Leitão 2000). When students argue with peers in dialogue, they prompt one another to explain not only what they believe to be true, but also why. This exploratory engagement encourages students to make sense of each other’s thinking and articulate the evidence undergirding their understand- ing in a way that simple recitation of knowledge does not (Berland and Resier 2009). Second, argumentation can produce cognitive conflict, opening students’ ideas up for critical questioning. When students argue, they must consider their views against those of their peers, prompting a reckoning that can uncover inaccurate or incomplete representations of knowledge (Asterhan and Schwarz 2009). This critical engagement drives students to identify gaps, inconsistencies or misconceptions in prior knowledge that can open the door to learning (Nussbaum and Sinatra 2003). Third, argumentation can drive students to reconstruct their representa- tions of knowledge as they integrate the valid claims and evidence that emerge during discussion. This reconstructive engagement prompts students to co-construct new knowledge by coalescing their views and reconciling apparent contradictions in valid claims and evidence (Leitão 2000, Nussbaum and Edwards 2011). Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 173 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. However, the conditions required to realize the educative po- tential of argumentation are complex, particularly among inexperi- enced arguers. The kind of active engagement that promotes the explanation, critique and reconstruction of knowledge involves a combination of factors including not only the strength and coher- ence of the learner’s prior knowledge in explaining a phenomenon, but also their commitment to it (Dole and Sinatra 1998). While argumentative dialogue can prompt students to collaboratively test the strength and coherence of their ideas, it can also have the opposite effect, triggering cognitive biases that increase their commitment to their prior knowledge in ways that undermine learning (Felton, Crowell and Liu 2015; Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert 2015; Nussbaum and Edwards 2011). Speakers must actively avoid these biases if they are to fully lever- age the educative potential of argument. For example, in the case of confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998), a student must set aside the tendency to devalue valid evidence that supports an opposing position in order to consider whether this evidence can be ac- counted for in their own understanding of a phenomenon. Careful consideration of the evidence may then lead them to moderate their views, adapt their conclusions, or abandon their knowledge construction altogether. 1.1. Deliberative dialogue and its potential for learning Educational research into one particular form of argumentation, deliberative dialogue, has linked this collaborative, consensus- based form of reasoning to greater learning outcomes when com- pared to persuasive dialogue (Asterhan and Schwarz 2016; Felton, Garcia-Mila and Gilabert 2009; Berland and Lee 2012; Nussbaum 2008). According to Walton (2010), deliberative dialogue can be distinguished from persuasive dialogue by its goals. While speak- ers may hold divergent views in either context, in persuasive dialogue, they advance arguments in the interest of defending a conclusion, whereas in deliberative dialogue they advance argu- ments in the interest of arriving at a conclusion based on weighing arguments on either side. This distinction is of particular interest for educational researchers who study the potential of argumenta- tion for learning. Research suggests that in persuasive dialogue, 174 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. speakers often look to neutralize, dismiss, or ignore alternative views when defending their position (Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villar- roel and Gilabert 2015) in order to win or perhaps to save face in an argument (Asterhan 2013). It can also lead speakers to disen- gage with opposing-side arguments (Lao and Kuhn 2002), to overlook valid critiques of their own arguments, or select weak opposing claims to critique (Fischer and Greitemeyer 2010). In deliberative dialogue, on the other hand, speakers will critique opposing claims, but they may also choose to adapt their argu- ments, to concede or to integrate legitimate alternative claims in arriving at a conclusion. Because speakers are seeking to arrive at a conclusion when deliberating, they are more apt to entertain opposing positions and the impact of these views on their reason- ing in the interest of finding the best solution (Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert 2015). Referencing work by McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons (2007), Walton, Toniolo and Norman (2020) present a three-stage model of deliberation: (1) an opening stage in which participants establish the question, propose answers to discuss, and establish what types of evidence will be brought to bear; (2) an argumenta- tion stage in which participants advance opposing claims and evidence in support of competing proposals, revising their argu- ments, as needed, through argument-counterargument integration (Leitão 2000; Nussbaum and Edwards 2011); and (3) a closing stage, in which consensus is sought and the dialogue is brought to an end (Walton, Toniolo and Norman 2020). However, Walton and colleagues (2020) suggest augmenting this model with an additional process related to information-seeking, wherein speak- ers exchange new knowledge germane to the problem and adjust their arguments in light of the additional information. They go on to suggest that the educational potential of argumentative dialogue lies in this iterative process of exchanging information and revis- ing one’s understanding of the problem space in ways that inform and expand the array of possible solutions (Walton, et al. 2020). Although all of the processes outlined in the argumentation stage can emerge in either persuasive or deliberative dialogue, in the latter speakers are inclined to coalesce arguments in the closing stage even when they cannot reach consensus. In addition, studies Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 175 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. have shown that persuasion goals can often trigger cognitive bias- es that undermine argumentative reasoning in both laboratory and classroom settings (Felton, Crowell and Liu 2015; Felton, Garcia- Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert 2015; Ferretti, MacArthur, and Dow- dy 2000; Kuhn and Lao 1996; Nussbaum, Kardash and Graham 2005; Wolfe and Britt 2008). While speakers certainly advance and critique arguments, cognitive biases can lead speakers to avoid revising or adapting arguments despite valid critiques. Further- more, some research on adolescent reasoning suggests that delib- eration and persuasion dialogue may differ not only in the closing phase, but also in the argumentation and revise phase. These stud- ies, which elicit deliberation with consensus goals (see Walton 2010), have documented the positive effects of consensus goals on the quality of argumentative reasoning when compared to persua- sion goals. In one such comparison, Felton and colleagues (2009) ran a study with middle school science students and found evi- dence of better learning and critical reasoning in the deliberation group. In a later paper, they performed a close analysis of discourse moves in each group (Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert 2015) and found that participants in the deliberation condition were more likely to revise their own arguments in response to critiques from their partners than participants in the persuasion condition. They also engaged in longer exchanges around each claim, co-constructing arguments with their partners by offering additional claims to elaborate opposing viewpoints. Conversely, participants in the persuasion condition were more prone to dispu- tative talk, competitively advancing claims and counterarguments, without responding to one another’s arguments. However, despite these promising findings, the extant research does not universally favor consensus-seeking dialogue. In another comparison of persuasion and deliberation conducted with under- graduates, Asterhan, Butler and Schwarz (2010) found that persua- sion goals did lead to more competitive moves (e.g., devaluing a partner’s contributions) and fewer collaborative moves (e.g., joint problem solving) in dialogue. However, they also found more instances of critical reasoning in the persuasion group, leading them to call for further research to understand how consensus goal 176 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. instructions affect the quality of reasoning. Similarly, Thiebach, Mayweg-Paus, and Jucks (2016) found that dialogue aimed at agreement around similarities in perspective can leave speakers prone to blindly accepting ideas without carefully assessing them. They point to the importance of focusing speakers’ attention on differences in their perspectives to trigger critical dialogue and generative argumentation. Herein lies an important distinction: although deliberative argument aims at consensus, quick- consensus, where speakers prioritize agreement or face-saving over the careful analysis of alternative arguments (Asterhan 2013, Weinberger and Fischer 2006) may undermine the critical analysis of arguments, typically found in the argumentation and revise phase of deliberative dialogue. Thus, while the extant research on persuasive and deliberative dialogue has uncovered significant findings on the power of deliberative dialogue for learning, at least among adolescents and young adults, additional research is needed to better understand why and under what conditions it can be optimized for learning. One promising way to revisit these contradictory findings in the literature is to look at dialectical relevance (Macagno 2018, Wal- ton 2003), or the degree to which speakers take up joint activity in argumentative dialogue. Dialectical relevance can be understood as the use of three kinds of relevance in dialogue: (1) topical rele- vance, or adherence to the issue being discussed; (2) probative relevance, or the degree to which moves promote or challenge the acceptability of claims; and (3) pragmatic relevance, or the degree to which moves engage with or respond to moves made by others in the dialogue (Macagno 2018, Walton 2003). When individuals fully engage with each other’s reasoning in these three ways, they naturally surface, critique and coalesce their collective arguments on a particular issue. In contrast, one thing that dispute and quick- consensus may share in common is a failure to maintain one or more of these types of relevance in dialogue. 1.2. The present study Taken together, past studies suggest that under the right condi- tions, deliberative argument may be more likely to promote gener- ative and collaborative reasoning than persuasive dialogue among Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 177 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. novice arguers. However, it is unclear how the goals of reaching consensus interact with specific argumentative moves and purpos- es in each phase of argumentative dialogue, particularly when it comes to dialogic moves that focus on critiquing arguments. Fur- thermore, none of the extant studies explores the role of experi- ence in shaping argumentative discourse. Much of the empirical work to date, particularly in educational contexts, has looked at adolescent and young adult speakers. An analysis of argumenta- tion among more experienced arguers might yield important in- sights into the more sophisticated use of dialogue to engage in argumentative reasoning across dialogue types. In the present investigation, we look to extend the extant literature by comparing deliberative dialogue with persuasive dialogue among novice and experienced arguers. We ask whether more experienced arguers show the same differences between discourse conditions as novices do, and more broadly, we seek to understand how discourse unfolds in the hands of these more practiced argu- ers across dialogue types. Finally, we examine dialectical rele- vance (Macagno 2018) in each condition to better understand how this construct can help to inform our understanding of what it means to engage in productive argumentation. Research questions: 1. What patterns of discourse emerge when we cross dis course goals (persuasion vs. deliberation) with level of experience (novice vs. experience) and what do these patterns tell us about the relationships between dis course goals and experience? 2. How does an analysis of dialectical relevance in these dialogues inform our understanding of argumentation as a joint activity? 178 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. 2. Methods 2.1. Participants Participants in the novice arguer (Nov-Arguer) group were 162 first-year college students (90 male, 72 female); participants in the experienced arguer (Exp-Arguer) group were 78 second- and third- year law students (47 male, 31 female) and 74 science PhD candi- dates (34 male, 40 female). The total sample size comprised 157 dyads engaged in argumentation, and when restricted to the small- est within-sample comparison (experience comparisons across conditions) differences were based on 72 dyads, a sample suffi- cient to draw comparisons across two groups. The novice sample was enrolled in an introductory psychology course at a mid-size university in the American Midwest. Intro- ductory psychology courses, such as Psychology 101, are often taken by freshmen students across university majors. Such courses often require participation in psychological research to fulfill course requirements, making students from these courses a con- venience sample, but also a reasonable point of comparison when making inferences about undergraduate students. Participants in the Exp-Arguer group were recruited from grad- uate programs in law and science at ten comparable universities in the American Midwest. Our rationale for using graduate students in law and science to comprise our Exp-Arguer group is three-fold. First, these students have self-selected to go into professions where argumentation plays a central role. Second, they have been selected into their programs by graduate admissions committees. Finally, all participants in the Exp-Arguer group have completed a bachelor's degree prior to engaging in graduate work making them an appropriate comparison group to those just beginning an under- graduate degree. 2.2. Procedure Recruitment materials stated that individuals were needed to take part in an online chat to argue with a peer who disagrees with them about capital punishment (CP). Participants were asked to send an email with the answer to the following question: “Capital punish- Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 179 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. ment, also called the death penalty, is the practice of putting someone to death for committing a serious crime, like murder. Are you for or against capital punishment?” Interested individu- als emailed their opinion about CP and were then paired with the next available person from their group (ie, novice, lawyer, scien- tist) who held the opposing position. Pairs were randomly assigned to either the consensus-dialogue condition or the persuasion-dialogue condition in order to discuss the issue as a way to prepare a written essay on the topic. Those in the consensus-dialogue condition were instructed to try to reach consensus with their partner while students in the persuasion- dialogue condition were instructed to try to persuade their partner to adopt their position. The goal-manipulation instructions were given twice, once at the beginning of the email and once at the end of the email to strengthen its impact. 2.3. Coding To analyze the dialogues, we used an argumentative dialogue coding scheme originally developed for persuasive dialogue (Fel- ton and Kuhn 2001) and later expanded to capture deliberative dialogue (Felton, Crowell, Garcia-Mila and Villarroel 2019) (see Appendix A). All data were blinded by a research assistant to remove any references to the participants’ level of experience or discourse goals. The authors then double coded twelve percent of the dialogues to calculate inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s Kappa= .87, sig<.001). Disagreements in coding were resolved by dialogue and the remaining data were then divided between the authors and coded for data analysis. It was decided that although the authors were not blind to the research questions, being blind to the condi- tions of the participants provided an acceptable safeguard against bias in coding, while ensuring accurate application of the coding scheme. While this decision introduces a limitation in the study, we have tried to mitigate this effect in the interest of ensuring that the data were coded accurately by the researchers who developed the coding scheme. 180 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Table 1. Dialogic moves associated with the purposes and phases of delibera- tive argument. Codes for dialogic moves (Table 1) were then combined into theory-driven categories of argumentative purposes (Felton, Crowell, Garcia-Mila and Villarroel 2019), aligned to the three stages of deliberative dialogue outlined by Walton, Toniolo and Norman (2020). Approximately 58% (26 of 45) of the moves from the argumentative dialogue coding scheme apply directly to these argumentative purposes, resulting in the 13 categories seen in Table 1. (The 19 categories of dialogic moves not included in Table 1 were not germane to our research questions and were therefore excluded from our statistical analysis. For a full list of codes, see Appendix A.) These moves and purposes were then applied to both the persuasive and deliberative dialogues, since the Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 181 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. two discourse goals differ only in the closing phase (Walton et al. 2020). 3. Results 3.1. Quantitative analysis Quantitative analysis of the dialogue data allows us to see if there are structural differences that rise above the level of chance that can be attributed to the level of experience, discourse goal, or an interaction of the two. To account for variability in the lengths of the dialogues, we calculated proportions of the total dialogue moves that were coded as a particular category. For each dialogue, proportional use of each of the 13 categories of dialogic purpose was calculated by dividing the occurrence of each by the total number of coded utterances in that dialogue. These distributions were then arcsine transformed (as is appropri- ate for values close to zero) and tested for skew. Codes with skew between -2 to +2 were included in the analysis (George and Mal- lery 2010) as this indicates that that the data is fairly normal, and the basic assumption of parametric testing are met. The categories that were excluded from analysis were: initiating dialogue, setting bounds to discussion, co-constructing argument, and withdrawing arguments. This resulted in the nine analyzable categories of argumentative purposes. Table 2 presents the proportional use for each of these nine categories by condition. 182 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Table 2. Proportional use of argumentative purposes by condition. A two-way factorial (Experience x Argumentative Goal) ANOVA was then used to test the effect of each factor in the presence of the other factor for every category of dialogic purpose. Overall, one significant interaction effect was found for the cate- gory of making claims, F (3,149) =6.63, p=.01, R2=.15. Novice arguers utilized this move more frequently in the persuasion condi- tion than they did in the deliberative condition while experts uti- lized the move with about equal frequency in the two argumenta- tive goal conditions, a degree that is roughly on par with the level of novices in the deliberative condition (Figure 1). Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 183 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Figure 1. Interaction effect for proportional use of making claims In addition, several key main effects for argumentative experi- ence were found in our data with experienced arguers being more likely than novices to engage in inviting elaboration of arguments (Justify?, Clarify?, Substantiate?), F(3, 149)= 4.76, p<.05), secur- ing commitments (Stance?, Case?, Initiate, Case), F(3, 149)= 8.77, p<.01) and representing partner’s argument (Interpret), F(3, 149)= 14.81, p<.01). Novice arguers, on the other hand, were more likely to engage in critically evaluating arguments (Counter-critique) than experts F(3, 149)= 7.46, p<.01). Figure 2: Main effects for experience There were also significant differences across argumentative goal conditions, with the categories of reviewing progress in the argument (Recap) F(3, 149)= 8.02, p<.01) and reaching consen- sus (Position-qualification, Accept, reject) F(3, 149)= 36.96, p<.01) occurring more frequently in the deliberative condition than the persuasive condition. These were the two argumentative 184 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. purposes that comprise the closing phase of deliberative dialogue and distinguish it from persuasive dialogue. Figure 3: Main effects for discourse goals 3.2. Qualitative analysis of data In this section we present sample data from each condition to illustrate our quantitative findings and consider the role of dialec- tical relevance in creating a sense of cohesion in participants’ argumentative dialogues. Here, we analyze data for the three types of dialectical relevance (topical, probative and pragmatic). Fol- lowing Macagno (2018), we recognize that judging relevance requires considering moves in the context of the broader sequence in which it appears. For this reason, we consider how particular moves function not only locally, in relationship to other moves, but also globally in terms of its argumentative purpose in the dialogue as a whole. Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 185 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. 186 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Table 3. Sample Dialogue from the Exp-Arguer x Deliberative Condition In the first except, taken from the Exp-Arguer x Deliberation condition (Table 3), we see that the two speakers closely engage with each other’s thinking, inviting elaborations (Clarify-?, lines 7 and 28) and securing commitments (Stance-?, lines 5, 17, 19 and 22) regarding DNA evidence (lines 5-14), societal ethics (lines 15- 20) and rehabilitation (lines 21-30), in order to review arguments (Recap, lines 15 and 31) and reach consensus (P-Q, Accept, lines 15-16, 21, and 28). More broadly, the two speakers maintain topi- cal relevance throughout by limiting their dialogue to capital punishment. They also maintain probative relevance through a series of questions and answers aimed at testing the grounds and limits of each other’s commitments. For example, in lines 5-14, Paul (all names are pseudonyms) elicits Carli’s stance on the certainty of DNA evidence. Carli responds by explaining that mitochondrial DNA is imprecise, and Paul concedes the point on line 13. Significantly, we see a probative examination from Paul that surfaces the grounds for Carli’s stance and leads Paul to cede ground and adopt a commitment for the opposing side. This dia- lectical shift to information-seeking dialogue, demonstrates the way in which speakers can maintain dialectical relevance in an exchange even as the local aims of a dialogue change (per Walton et al. 2020). A similar probative exchange, this time about reha- bilitation, occurs on lines 22-28, with Carli ceding ground this time. As we can see, although there is only limited use of counter- argument moves in the excerpt (lines 26-27), exchanges like this illustrate the way in which critical questioning can be used for probative aims. Finally, throughout the exchange, the two speakers Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 187 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. also maintain pragmatic relevance in an uninterrupted series of questions, answers, meta-dialogue, and statements all produced in the service of collaboratively surfacing, probing and reconciling arguments. Table 4. Sample dialogue from the Exp-Arguer x Persuasion condition 188 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. The next excerpt (Table 4) is taken from the Exp-Arguer x Persuasion condition. Like the speakers in the previous excerpt, Yasmin and Talia use lines of questioning to invite elaboration (Clarify-?, lines 10 and 16) and secure commitments (Stance-?, line 13), in this case to discuss issues of inequity, certainty, and deterrence. Only one argument, regarding the culpability of crimi- nals (line 10) is dropped, but without digression from the topic. Thus, we again see a high degree of topical relevance maintained throughout the exchange. We also see probative relevance as the two speakers secure commitments (line 13) and critique their partner’s reasoning (lines 8 and 15). For example, Yasmin presses Talia with an argument about inequity in the justice system (lines 8-9) and deterrence (line 13-17). In both cases, Yasmin revises arguments (Accommodate, lines 9 and 14) in response to valid points made by Talia, a sort of parallel to the position qualifica- tions observed in the Exp-A x Deliberation condition. In other words, although Yasmin aims to persuade Talia, she also remains open to adjusting her arguments in response to opposing argument. Finally, in terms of pragmatic relevance, the two maintain a high degree of coherence by asking and answering pertinent questions in the service of engaging with each other’s thinking. Indeed, the coordination of argumentative purposes (inviting elaboration, securing commitments, and critiquing reasoning) signal a genuine attempt on the part of each speaker to actively engage their part- ners in a joint activity. Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 189 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Table 5. Sample dialogue from the Nov-Arguer x Deliberation condition 190 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. In Table 5, we see a typical exchange from the Nov-Arguer x Deliberation condition. As with the experienced arguers, we see a high degree of topical relevance. What is different is the way in which the speakers engage with each other’s reasoning. Darius and Chloe spend much of their time making claims (Argument, lines 5, 6 and 9) and critically evaluating arguments (Counter-C, lines 3- 10), cycling through the process of introducing and evaluating new arguments at a much higher rate than experienced arguers. Though probative relevance is high, these novice arguers showed signifi- cantly less range in their argumentative purposes, spending less time inviting elaborations and securing commitments than more experienced arguers. They spend less time developing intersubjec- tivity, the common ground from which to develop consensus. Nonetheless, they do manage to revise arguments (line 5), review progress and reach consensus (lines12-13), enacting the purposes that typically characterize deliberative dialogue. And, like the experienced arguers, they maintain a high degree of pragmatic relevance, clearly engaging with each other’s thinking throughout. Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 191 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Table 6. Sample dialogue from the Nov-Arguer x Persuasion condition The argumentative exchange in Table 6, illustrates a defining feature observed in the Nov-Arguer x Persuasion condition. The speakers spend the majority of their time making claims (Argu- ment, Counter-A). Certainly, they maintain a high degree of topi- cal relevance throughout. As with the other three conditions, the entire exchange focuses on claims pertinent to capital punishment. Lorena and Elise also maintain in a reasonably high degree of probative relevance, as a number of turns involve critically evalu- ating arguments (Counter-C, Rebut, lines 5, 6, 10 and 11). How- ever, when it comes to pragmatic relevance, we see a phenomenon not typically observed in the other three conditions. The presence of Counter-A moves (lines 8, 9 and 10) indicates disjuncture, or breaks in the transactive exchange where speakers introduce a new claim, rather than address their partner’s point. Thus, like the Nov- Arguer x Deliberation, we see little diversity in the argumentative purposes pursued by the two speakers. In addition, in this condi- tion, although we see a similar set of argumentative purposes at play (making claims, critically evaluating arguments), the flip in proportion of these two purposes indicates a lower degree of trans- active dialogue, pragmatic relevance, and more broadly, joint activity. This phenomenon is what Macagno (2018) refers to as 192 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. dialogue clashes, or breakdowns in joint communication where speakers pursue divergent, incompatible aims and argue at cross purposes. 4. Discussion 4.1. Argumentative purpose, dialectical relevance and argumenta- tive competence In the present study, we sought to better understand the nature of persuasive and deliberative dialogue by studying the two discourse goals crossed with two levels of experience. Specifically, we asked: (1) What patterns of discourse emerge when we cross dis- course goals (persuasion vs. deliberation) with level of experience (novice vs. experience) and what do these patterns tell us about the relationships between discourse goals and experience? And (2) how might an analysis of dialectical relevance in these dialogues inform our understanding of argumentation as a joint activity? To the first research question, we found two main effects for dis- course goal. Across our two levels of experience, participants in the deliberation condition were more likely than those in the per- suasion condition to review progress and reach consensus, argu- mentative purposes characteristic of the revise phase of delibera- tion dialogue outlined by Walton, Toniolo and Norman (2020). This finding supports theoretical models of argumentation that propose that the two discourse goals differ primarily in the closure phase of argumentation (Walton at al. 2020) and replicate similar findings among adolescents (Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert 2015) with an older and more experienced group of argu- ers. They also point to the power of deliberative dialogue to elicit the kind of reconstructive engagement associated with learning outcomes. We also found several main effects for experience. Experienced arguers were more likely than novices to represent their partners argument, invite elaboration of that argument and seek and secure commitments from their partner. These argumentative purposes, which align with the potential for exploratory engagement in learning, illustrate that experienced arguers were more adept than novices at drawing on a wide array of argumentative purposes in Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 193 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. an effort to develop intersubjectivity while arguing. Experienced arguers across both conditions treated argumentative dialogue as a cooperative activity regardless of whether they sought to persuade one another or reach consensus, working together to understand and critique each other’s arguments. These findings suggest that experienced arguers may share a set of assumptions about dialecti- cal relevance in argumentation as whole, worthy of further study. Similarly, further research into novice arguers’ assumptions about dialectical relevance particularly as it relates to argumentation as a collaborative enterprise, may uncover valuable insights into trajec- tories in learning to argue. Novices, on the other hand, often argued at cross purposes, switching topics frequently to either out-maneuver or overwhelm opponents rather than engage with them, especially when seeking to persuade. Novices in both conditions were also more likely to critically evaluate their partners’ arguments. However, while it might be tempting to conclude that novices are somehow more inclined to engage in critical discourse, it is important to note that counter-argument (Counter-C) represented the highest-proportion move in all four groups. In other words, even though counter- argument occurs significantly more frequently among novices, experienced arguers made ample use of this discourse move across dialogue conditions. Instead, it might be more accurate to conclude that more experienced arguers were more likely to coordinate the critical evaluation of argument with a host of other argumentative purposes, thereby spending less time pursuing this one purpose overall. Indeed, some argumentative purposes, like inviting elabo- rations, may sometimes involve critical engagement with a part- ner’s argument, as seen in our qualitative data from the Exp- Arguer x Deliberation condition. Together, these findings suggest that more experienced arguers engage in a richer, more collabora- tive process of critical reasoning that cannot be reduced to a mere frequency count of counter-arguments. Experienced arguers bal- ance exploratory-, critical- and reconstructive engagement when speaking, suggesting that their dialogue may be more conducive the leveraging the educational potential of argumentation. These findings may shed new light on the relationship between critical evaluation of claims and deliberative dialogue, helping to untangle 194 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. mixed findings in the extant literature (Asterhan Butler, and Schwarz 2010; Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert 2015; Theibach, Mayweg-Paus and Jucks 2016). It suggests that at least among novice arguers, deliberative dialogue may elicit argumenta- tive moves that balance efforts at exploratory, critical and recon- structive engagement. We suggest that further research—utilizing more complex constructs for capturing types of engagement in argumentative dialogue—is warranted. Finally, our quantitative analysis revealed one interaction ef- fect. Novice arguers in the persuasive dialogue condition were more likely than all other groups to advance claims while arguing, favoring breadth over depth when advancing their position. This finding suggests that novice arguers in the persuasion condition were more likely to break transactive dialogue in order to present a new, unrelated claim. In building a bulwark of claims, counter- claims and rebuttals, novice arguers in the persuasion condition seem to favor the strategy of dominating the conversation. Ironi- cally, this impulse undermines each speaker’s ability to build a persuasive argument by carefully addressing and incorporating their partner’s beliefs and commitments. In the end, their discourse more closely resembles a quarrel, or what Walton (2010) calls eristic dialogue, than the persuasive dialogue of the expert group, and less likely to promoting the kinds of active engagement asso- ciated with learning. To address our second research question, we applied the con- cepts of topical, probative, and pragmatic relevance to a small sample of data. A qualitative analysis of dialectical relevance in our data revealed a phenomenon not readily apparent in the quanti- tative analysis of argumentative purposes: when speakers engage with each other’s thinking, they maintain a high degree of proba- tive and pragmatic relevance, producing longer lines of connected discourse. When experienced arguers elicit thinking, secure com- mitments, represent arguments or critically evaluate claims, they also demonstrate a high degree of joint activity (Macagno 2018), attending to one another’s thinking in extended sequences of collaborative dialogue. And while novices seeking consensus draw on a more limited array of argumentative purposes, they nonethe- less resemble experienced arguers by maintaining pragmatic rele- Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 195 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. vance in dialogue. This additional layer of analysis uncovers an important convergence in our findings. In drawing on a wider array of argumentative purposes, these arguers are producing more dialectically relevant dialogue. They are engaging more directly with each other’s thinking, in more extended lines of reasoning, to produce the kind of joint, co-constructive activity that is associated with the potential benefits of argumentation for learning. In contrast, when arguing to persuade, novices produce fewer transactive moves (Felton and Kuhn 2001) and instead draw on the sub-optimal strategy of arguing at cross-purposes, building their argument at the expense of addressing their partner’s reasoning. They argue with divergent discourse aims and produce less dialec- tically relevant discourse, producing divergent monologues, rather than taking up the convergent aim of trying to build a convincing argument from their partner’s commitments (Walton 2001). Taken together, our findings suggest that the benefits of deliberative argument may lie in increasing dialectic relevance, widening the scope of argumentative purposes to include exploratory, critical and reconstructive engagement between speakers. Of course, our findings do not include data on learning, so these connections are tentative for the moment. However, we believe that they may provide insight into past findings regarding the benefits of deliberative dialogue among adolescents (Felton, Gar- cia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert, 2015) and young adults (Aster- han, Butler and Schwarz 2010; Felton, Crowell and Liu 2015), while also explaining why deliberative dialogue can sometimes undermine critical engagement (Thiebach, Mayweg-Paus and Jucks 2016). Further research is necessary to test these connec- tions explicitly in the context of a learning task. 4.2. Educational implications: Leveraging the potential of argu- mentative discourse for learning To summarize, our findings suggest that when they argue to per- suade, novices are less likely to produce transactive and pragmati- cally relevant utterances than they do when they argue to deliber- ate, consistent with the extant literature (Felton, Garcia-Mila, Villarroel and Gilabert, 2015). Furthermore, novices as a whole, 196 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. draw on a narrower array of argumentative purposes while argu- ing. Experienced arguers, for their part, engage in a fuller range of argumentative purposes regardless of condition, suggesting that experience may bring a higher degree of consistency across con- texts of argument. However, despite the apparent shortcomings in the novice group, our findings offer a ray of hope. Novices in our study naturally engaged in convergent discourse when seeking consensus, pointing to an underlying competence in exploring opposing viewpoints (maintaining probative relevance) while engaged in critical dialogue (maintaining pragmatic relevance). They used dialogue as a vehicle to understand and explore oppos- ing viewpoints and they naturally refined and strengthened their arguments in light of valid critiques. Data from our experienced arguer group suggests that under the right conditions, individuals can learn to engage in productive discourse across a variety of contexts. With experience, guidance, or reflection, novices may learn to replace the goal of “winning” an argument by deflecting opposing views, with the goal of constructing an argument by weighing the relative strength of claims and evidence on either side of an issue. In this way, they may discover that the joint activ- ity (or "we-intentions") found among experts and manifest in attempts to elicit, elaborate and critique claims, is more productive when arguing to learn than the competitive ("I-intentions") mani- fest in advancing hasty counter-arguments and disconnected claims. While the former is not a universal aim across all argu- mentative contexts, it is far more likely to optimize the value of argumentation in educational contexts. In short, the key educational implications of our experimental findings emerge at the intersection of argumentative purpose and dialectical relevance. In order to help students fully leverage the value of argumentation for knowledge construction, teachers must help students see that argumentative dialogue (be it information- seeking, persuasion, deliberation or inquiry) is fundamentally a joint activity that aims not only at critical engagement with ideas, but also exploratory and reconstructive engagement. 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A framework to analyze argumen- tative knowledge construction in computer-supported collaborative learning. Computers and education 46(1): 71-95. Wolfe, C. R. and M. A. Britt. 2008. The locus of the myside bias in written argumentation. Thinking and reasoning 14(1): 1-27. Appendix A. Argumentative Discourse Coding Scheme Questions Agree-? A question that asks whether the partner will accept or agree with the speaker's claim. Acknowledge-? A question that checks whether the partner is comprehending what is being said. Case-? A request for the partner to take a position on a particular case or scenario. 200 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Clarify-? A request for the partner to clarify his or her pre- ceding utterance without an interpretation. Justify-? A request for the partner to provide reasons in support of a claim Position-? A request for the partner to provide his or her global position. Question-? A simple informational question which does not refer back to the partner's preceding utterance. Respond-? A request for the partner to react to the speaker's utterance Stance-? A request for the partner to state his or her position on an alternate argument. Substantiate-? A request for the partner to support his or her preceding claim with evidence Statements Accept An explicit agreement to a Position-Qualification, Interpret or Recap Accommodate A statement integrates a point advanced by the partner by qualifying or changing the speaker’s own argument or commitment set without a change in position. Acknowledge A statement that serves to validate the partners immediately preceding utterance. They can com- municate interest, understanding, appreciation, clarity, or attentiveness. Add An elaboration of the partner's preceding utterance that does not strengthen their claim Advance An extension of the partner’s preceding utterance that strengthens the partner’s claim. Agree A statement of agreement with the partner's preced- ing utterance Add- An utterance offered in support of the partner’s preceding utterance—provides data in Substantiate support of claim made by the partner. Answer Response to Question-? Anticipate When the speaker advances a claim for the oppos- ing side linked to another code Argument A new claim that does not connect to the preceding dialogue Argumentation as a Collaborative Enterprise 201 © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Aside An off-topic or tangential comment that does not add to the argument about the issue Case Answer A response that takes a stance a Case-? advanced by the partner. Case An anecdote with details that could be used to pose a question or present an argument Clarify A clarification of speaker's own argument in re- sponse to the partner's preceding utterance. Concede An agreement about a reason put forth by the partner Continue A continuation or elaboration of the speaker’s own last utterance which ignores the partner’s immedi- ately preceding utterance. Coopt An explicit assertion that uses the partner's imme- diately preceding utterance to serve the speaker's own opposing argument. Counter-A A disagreement with the partner's preceding utter- ance, accompanied by an alternate argument that introduces a claim unrelated to the claim advanced in the partners preceding utterance. Counter-C A disagreement with the partner's preceding utter- ance, accompanied by a critique which undermines the strength of a claim presented in the partner’s preceding utterance. Counter-UC An unjustified claim that the speaker’s position is better than the partner’s position. Or, an unprompt- ed restatement of the speaker’s position without further justification or elaboration. Disagree A simple disagreement without further argument or elaboration. Dismiss A simple and isolated statement that the partners preceding reason is unimportant or irrelevant. Framing Narrowing the focus or breadth of the argument, or setting one or more directions to proceed with an argument Interpret A paraphrase of the partner's preceding utterance with or without further elaboration. Either a state- ment or a rhetorical question Initiate A statement that begins a line of reasoning that does not contain an argument and may conclude with a case question. 202 Felton & Crowell © Mark Felton & Amanda Crowell. Informal Logic, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2022), pp. 171–202. Justify A reasons provided in response to a request for reasons. Position A statement of global position on the topic of discussion Position-Q A qualification of a claim or position statement in response to a partner’s argument Recap An attempt to summarize claims to review estab- lished agreement or disagreement Reject An explicit disagreement with a Position- Qualification, Interpret or Recap Refuse An explicit refusal to respond to the partner's preceding question. Stance The answer to a stance question—speaker’s re- sponse to a request for their position on a reason. Substantiate Evidence in support of a speaker’s own claim that can be offered in response to a request for evidence or to set up the speakers argument. Withdraw An explicit retraction of a point, critique, or reason in light of the partner’s preceding utterance.