1 the sumgait massacres: concerning their characteristics and definitions gayane s. hovhannisyan armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, armenia abstract this paper concerns one of the first displays of ethnic violence in the recent history of the ussr that took place in the city of sumgait in the azerbaijanian ssr in february 1988 and was the start of violence of an anti-armenian nature. it is a study of contemporary perceptions, definitions and terminology. arising from this object, this paper examines the following questions: ● what were armenian perceptions and characteristics of the sumgait massacres and the factors that governed their conditions ● what definitions and perceptions were merited as a result of the sumgait massacres by the azerbaijanian side ● how were the sumgait massacres evaluated by the international public and the ussr leadership ● what were the scientific definitions of the terms given to the sumgait massacres and their characteristics. research has been carried out on the basis of specialist literature, archival materials, witness statements, contemporary periodical press etc. descriptions, analyses, narrative analyses and comparative methods were also utilised in this study. as a result of the research carried out, the conclusion was reached that the february 1988 massacres of the armenian population of the azerbaijanian city of sumgait by the participants, various political circles and structures, conditioned by several factors, merited different appraisals. on the armenian side, they were immediately linked, in the collective armenian consciousness, to the armenian genocide realised in the 20 th century within the ottoman empire. the central authorities, arising out of soviet national policy principles, interpreted the event as “mass unrest.” in its euphemistic definitions, the azerbaijani side attempted to “neutralise” the ethnically based violence used against a part of the population. the “armenian intrigue and treachery” theory, as a “legal” explanation of the violence, aims to justify the crimes committed and evade any responsibility for them. the international public saw the sumgait massacres in an ethnic context, stressing the laudable, necessary measures taken by the central authorities to prevent and stop them. keywords: artshakh issue, sumgait, ethnic violence, genocide, massacre, slaughter. the article was submitted on 04.12.2021 and accepted for publication on 06.10.2022. how to cite: gayane hovhannisyan, “the sumgait massacres: concerning their characteristics and definitions,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 7, no. 2 (2022): 69-101. 2 introduction one of the demonstrations of the gorbachev policies of perestroika and glasnost in the national policies field was the re-opening of the basic artsakh problem. the extraordinary session of the nagorno (mountainous) karabakh autonomous region’s regional soviet that took place on february 20th, 1988, accepted the resolution that the region should be removed from the jurisdiction of the azerbaijan ssr and placed under that of the armenian ssr. it also requested that the supreme soviets of the azerbaijan ssr and the armenian ssr, achieve a favourable solution through the mediation of the ussr supreme soviet.1 several days later, on february 26th, the general secretary of the central committee of the communist party of the ussr, mikhail gorbachev, addressed the peoples of the armenian ssr and azerbaijan ssr and, reminding them of the basic principles of “leninist national political policies,” called upon them to “show civilian maturity and patience, to return to normal life and work and to preserve public order.”2 the national political policy, utilised by the soviet central authorities for decades for the friendship, brotherhood and the united soviet nationalities ideal, faced a serious challenge. the increasing tensions in armenian-azerbaijani relations and anti-armenian sentiment in azerbaijan reached their summit on february 27th and 28th, 1988 in the city of sumgait, considered to be a symbol of the soviet union’s internationalism. the national television broadcast on the evening of february 27th and the radio broadcast from baku by alexander katusev, the ussr chief military prosecutor, concerning the clash in askeran in which two azerbaijanis were killed, both inflamed matters.3 the thousands of people, mainly young azerbaijanis, many of whom, according to viktor krivopuskov,4 were already completely organised “with the knowledge of the managers of various establishments and enterprises,”5 assembled in lenin square, sumgait. the main theme of this rally was the demand made by the nagorno karabakh armenians to join the armenian ssr. the “dreadful” stories told by “fugitives” from the kapan region of armenia further incited the crowds, resulting in shouts 1 sovetakan gharabagh (stepanakert), 21 february 1988, 1. 2 mikhail gorbachev, «դիմում ադրբեջանի և հայաստանի աշխատավորներին, ժողովուրդներին» [appeal to the workers and peoples of azerbaijan and armenia], sovetakan hayastan (yerevan), 27 february 1988, 1. 3 at least one of the people who were killed by rifle fire in the clash near askeran died at the hands of an azerbaijani policeman. aleksandr vasilevskij, «туча в горах» [cloud in the mountains], avrora 10 (1988), 12. 4 he worked in the ussr ministry of the interior and was, in 1990-1991, the head of the urgent action group on its behalf in the mountainous karabakh autonomous region. the written records he prepared and information he gleaned were collected in a separate work. 5 viktor krivopuskov, мятежный карабах. из дневника офицера мвд ссср [rebellious karabakh. from the diary of a ussr interior ministry officer] (moscow: golos-press, 2007), 239․ 3 of “death to armenians.”6 then groups made up of between 10 and 15 azerbaijanis spread through the city, seeking out and killing armenians.7 by its nature and the way this all happened (killings, physical injuries inflicted, torture, burnings, chopping up of corpses and gang rape) and its aim, constituted one of the greatest crimes against humanity of the latter half of the 20th century.8 according to official data 32 people were killed as a result of the sumgait massacres (26 armenians and 6 azerbaijanis),9 over 400 people received wounds of various kinds, about 200 homes were invaded and looted, 50 buildings of cultural-living significance were damaged as were more than 100 motor transport vehicles.10 the organisation of the legal procedures concerning the sumgait massacres and their “impartiality” left several questions unanswered, one of which was that of the actual numbers of killed and wounded. apart from official figures, there is other information or data available.11 6 ibid, 238. 7 thomas de waal, black garden: armenia and azerbaijan through peace and war, transl. leonid zilfugharyan (yerevan: zangak, 2014), 65. 8 for the sumgait massacres and their nature, organisation and realisation, see, for example, bagrat ulubabyan, suren zolyan et al., сумгаит... геноцид... гласность? [sumgayit... genocide... glasnost?] (yerevan: obshhestvo znanie, 1989); arsen melik-shahnazarov, нагорный карабах: факты против лжи [nagornokarabakh: facts against lies] (moscow: volshebnyj fonar, 2009); igor babanov, konstantin voevodskij, карабахский кризис [karabakh crisis] (st. petersburg: 1992); сумгаитская трагедия в свидетельствах очевидцев, книга первая [sumgayit tragedy in eyewitness accounts. volume 1], ed. samvel shahmuradyan (yerevan: armjanskij fond kultury, 1989); сумгаитская трагедия в свидетельствах очевидцев, книга вторая [sumgayit tragedy in eyewitness accounts. volume 2] (yerevan: public relations and information center of staff of the president of the republic of armenia, 2015); the sumgait syndrome. anatomy of racism in azerbaijan (yerevan: mia, 2012); сумгаит. говорят свидетели-азербайджанцы [the sumgait: azerbaijani witnesses speak out] (yerevan: public relations and information center of staff of the president of the republic of armenia, 2018); krivopuskov, rebellious karabakh; valerij kiporenko, “беспорядки в баку проходили под теми же лозунгами, что и в сумгаите” [riots in baku were held under the same slogans as in sumgayit], https://www.panorama.am/ru/news/2011/01/13/analitika/1005171, accessed 20.10.2021, as well as marina grigoryan, “sumgait, february 1988: a crime with no limitations,” asbarez, 11 march, 2011, https://asbarez.com/sumgait-february-1988-a-crime-with-no-limitation/, accessed 20.10.2021. 9 according to viktor krivobuskov, the driver of a military transport went mad as a result of it being set on fire and crashed it into the crowd, killing 6 azerbaijanis. see krivopuskov, rebellious karabakh, 241. 10 следственные документы: обвинительное заключение. по уголовному делу № 18/60232-08/ [investigative documents: indictment. on criminal case no. 18/60232-08] http://karabakhrecords.info/documents_investigation_obvinitelnoe-zaklyuchenie-ud-1860232-08.html, accessed 20․10․2021. 11 for detailed figures of the number of dead and wounded see ulubabyan, zolyan et al., sumgayit, 55; melikshahnazarov, nagorno-karabakh, 285; krivopuskov, rebellious karabakh, 149; hrayr ulubabjan, «в сумгаите погибло 32 человека. ложь!» [32 people died in sumgayit. false!], jepoha 4 (1990) http://karabakhrecords.info/publication_articles_sumgait_lozh.html, accessed 20․10․2021; hrayr ulubabyan, «սումգայիթում հայերի ցեղասպանության զոհերի թվի մասին» [about the number of armenian genocide victims in sumgait], luys 163 (2011): 1-2; mariam avagyan, hovik avanesov, «սումգայիթի և բաքվի ցեղասպանությունների զոհերի թվի շուրջ» [about the number of victims of the sumgait and baku genocides], https://www.lragir.am/2020/03/07/524751/, accessed 20․10․2021. https://www.panorama.am/ru/news/2011/01/13/analitika/1005171 https://asbarez.com/sumgait-february-1988-a-crime-with-no-limitation/ http://karabakhrecords.info/documents_investigation_obvinitelnoe-zaklyuchenie-ud-1860232-08.html http://karabakhrecords.info/publication_articles_sumgait_lozh.html https://www.lragir.am/2020/03/07/524751/ 4 the sumgait massacres: armenian perceptions and characteristics the sumgait massacres provoked a great reaction in armenian reality. in the first instance they were linked to the 20th century armenian genocide that took place in the ottoman empire. this mentality was especially noticeable in popular perceptions. its first expression occurred on march 8th, 1988, when thousands of women (as well as men) marched in sorrow to the armenian genocide memorial complex at tsitsernakaberd.12 a khachkar (cross stone) commemorating the memory of those who died in sumgait was erected within the armenian genocide memorial complex on april 24th, 1988.13 the identification of the armenian genocide with the massacres in sumgait also found expression on march 8th and november 7th, 1988 and on february 28th, 1989 and in the wording on the banners displayed on the sorrow marches that took place on those days, as well as in pictures, schematic depictions and on maps.14 among them was were? “события в сумгаите – продолжение геноцида 1915 г.” (the events in sumgait are the continuation of the 1915 genocide), “нежелание признать геноцид 1915 г. привело к геноциду 1988 г.” (those who didn’t want to recognise the genocide of 1915 ended with that of 1988), “sumgait is the continuation of the mets yeghern” and other similar statements on posters and banners. the people’s dissatisfaction with the progress of the judicial enquiries regarding the massacres was expressed by banners and posters stating, “the sumgait satire,” “the moscow trial soils the memory of the armenian victims of sumgait.”15 as harutyun marutyan pointed out, the people’s synthesis of the medz yeghern and the sumgait massacres had detrimental expressions, some of which had the nature of belief, iconographic solutions, reflections of collective and historic memories with dates and place names that were, at the very least, enumerated etc.16 witnesses of the crimes committed in sumgait described what happened, in their testimonies, as genocide.17 in one of the trial sessions on october 21st, 1988, relating to the events in sumgait, karina melkumyan, speaking on behalf of all those who had suffered, stated 12 harutyun marutyan, հայ ինքնության պատկերագրությունը։ հատոր 1․ ցեղասպանության հիշողությունը և ղարաբաղյան շարժումը [iconography of armenian identity: the memory of genocide and the karabagh movement. volume 1] (yerevan: gitutyun, 2009), 126. 13 ibid., 127. 14 ibid., 129-133. 15 ibid., 151. 16 ibid., 306. 17 ulubabyan, zolyan et al., sumgayit. 5 that “preparations were made and realised to commit genocide in sumgait” and insisted that the crime had to be given due importance, so that truth could be revealed.18 it is also significant that in the perceptions of armenians, azerbaijan gradually became synonymous with the perpetrator of the 20th century armenian genocide – ottoman turkey and its pan-turanist political plans. the very similar political plans made by turkey and azerbaijan may have been expressed for the first time in 1987, in an address to mikhail gorbachev made by the armenian academy of sciences.19 in various works, armenian scientific circles basically presented the sumgait massacres as proof of genocide. the sumgait massacres were described and analysed in detail, classing those that took place between february 27th and 29th their repercussions as dreadful events.20 the analysis of the evidence produced by armenian researchers allows the separation of the following basic theses. 1. the object of the sumgait massacres was to prevent the growth of the karabakh movement and to block the implementation of the rights to self-determination by the armenians of the region. 2. to separate the preliminary setting up and organising of the subsequent events (the planned fanning of anti-armenian sentiment, previously listing armenians’ addresses, preparing cold weapons in factories in the city, the eliminating traces of crimes by the local authorities, etc.) 3. to present the methods used to realise the massacres and the squads involved (the organising and arming of special groups, as well as the distribution of anaesthetics, antipsychotic drugs and alcohol among them, the plunder and looting of the armenian population, killing of armenians, burning people alive and gang rape). to demonstrate the genocidal nature of the sumgait massacres, the armenian scientific mentality was to refer to the 1948 “convention on preventing and punishing genocide.”21 quotations from the 4th article were used, which sets out the punishment for the crime of genocide, independent of the fact that the perpetrators were constitutionally responsible leaders, officials or specific people.22 the 36th article of the ussr constitution, in which equal 18armen oganesyan, «водораздел» [watershed], kommunist (yerevan), 2 november 1988, http://karabakhrecords.info/publication_articles_sumgait_vodorazdel.html, accessed 20․10․2021. 19 stuart j. kaufman, modern hatreds: the symbolic politics of ethnic war (ithaca and london։ cornell university press, 2001), 55. 20 ulubabyan, zolyan et al., sumgayit. 21 ibid., 44․ 22 ibid., 45. http://karabakhrecords.info/publication_articles_sumgait_vodorazdel.html 6 rights for all citizens of the ussr were enshrined, irrespective of national or racial affiliations, was also invoked.23 armenian authors also alluded to part of the work “права человека: сборник международных документов” [human rights: a collection of international documents] which referred to “quantitative standards” relating to genocide victims. it was especially stressed that “the quantitative standard for the crime of genocide is not definitive; genocide is the killing of several representatives of a national group if it had been perpetrated with the object of destroying it.”24 in their speeches, appearances and appeals, contemporary armenian orators, journalists, writers and cultural activists present the sumgait massacres as having a genocidal nature.25 as far as official statements from the armenian ssr are concerned, their first official explanation about the sumgait massacres was given by karen demirchyan, the first secretary of the central committee of the armenian communist party, on february 29th, 1988, in an interview on armenian television. he stated the fact that there had been clashes in azerbaijan: “there were several incidents of uncontrolled hooligan unrest and violence fomented in the city of sumgait on february 28th.26 in those days, articles were published in the daily newspaper “sovetakan hayastan” concerning the “good examples” of the “brotherhood” of the armenian and azerbaijani peoples and about “socialist internationalism.”27 the legislative body of the armenian ssr, the supreme soviet, in a stance that differed from that of the “centre,” adopted a resolution on june 15th, 1988, titled “concerning the 23 ibid., 44-45. 24 sumgayit tragedy in eyewitness accounts, volume 1, 7. права человека: сборник международных документов [human rights: a collection of international documents], ed. lev shestakov, (moscow: moscow university press, 1986), 12․ 25 aydin morikyan, «քարերը հավաքելու ժամանակը» [time to collect the stones], avangard (yerevan), 11 november 1988, 3-4; oganesyan, watershed; suren zoljan, kim balajan, «сумгаит. испытание гласности» [sumgait. test of glasnost], national archives of armenia (hereinafter: naa), f․ 1159, i․ 1, c․ 8․ p․ 1-11; «սիլվա կապուտիկյանի բաց նամակը ուղղված գիտության, մշակույթի և տպագրության գործիչներին» [silva kaputikyan's open letter addressed to the figures of science, culture and publishing], naa, f. 1159, i. 4, c․ 90, p․ 1-19; «զորի բալայանի բաց նամակը գորբաչովին» [zori balayan's open letter to gorbachev], naa, f. 1159, i․ 6, c․ 74, p․ 1. 26 «հայաստանի կոմկուսի կենտկոմի առաջին քարտուղար կ․ ս․ դեմիրճյանի ելույթը հայկական հեռուստատեսությամբ 1988 թ․ փետրվարի 29-ին» [speech by the first secretary of the central committee of the communist party of armenia k. s. demirchyan on armenian television on 29 february 1988], sovetakan hayastan, 1 march 1988, 1. 27 see, for example, «ուղևորություն արարատի շրջան» [trip to ararat region], «ժողովուրդների բարեկամությունը մեր ուժի հիմքն է» [friendship of peoples is the basis of our strength], «բարեկամության կամուրջներ» [bridges of friendship], sovetakan hayastan, 2 march 1988, 1, 4; baqil aliev, razmik meliqjanyan, «նույն ճանապարհի ընկերներ» [friends on the same road]; manzara sadixova, «եվ ամենակարևորը՝ սրտանց․․․» [and most importantly – from the heart], sovetakan hayastan, 3 march 1988, 1; jabar guliev, «մեկ սիրտ, մեկ նպատակ» [one heart, one goal]; s․ esayan, «հաշտ ու խաղաղ» [peaceful and tranquil], sovetakan hayastan, 4 march 1988, 1; s․ abdullaev, «հաջողության գրավականը» [the key to success], s․ humbatov «բարեկամության քվե» [friendship vote], sovetakan hayastan, 6 march 1988, 2. 7 condemnation of the crimes committed in the city of sumgait in the azerbaijan ssr,” in which it expressed its condolences to the victims, their families and loved ones and sympathy for those who suffered losses.28 the question of the genocidal nature of the sumgait massacres was officially raised in the july 18th 1988 session of the leadership of the ussr supreme soviet by vardges petrosyan, president of the armenian writers’ union, who stated his opinion that genocide had been attempted in sumgait.29 the genocidal nature of the massacres in sumgait was also referred to in the resolution made in the joint meeting of the armenian ssr supreme soviet and the nagorno (mountainous) karabakh autonomous region’s national council on december 1st, 1989. the resolution described the massacres as a “genocidal act.”30 considering the sumgait massacres as having a genocidal nature in armenian circles was further established after the baku massacres that took place in 1990. at that time soviet armenian newspapers were full of comparisons between the sumgait and baku massacres (“because we didn’t see where sumgait was taking us,” “an unpunished crime leads to a new one,” “a second sumgait or a new baku?”) with the basic emphasis that the sumgait crime being left unpunished resulted in the armenian population of azerbaijan’s capital city, baku, suffering a new massacre.31 for the armenian side, the sumgait massacres confirmed the impossibility of nagorno (mountainous) karabakh and its armenian people remaining within azerbaijan’s jurisdiction. it should be underlined that the armenian ssr’s official discourses expressed these same thoughts in their announcements and speeches about azerbaijan’s antiarmenian policies and were based on the latest incidents.32 28 «հայկական սսհ գերագույն սովետի որոշումը ադրբեջանական սսհ սումգայիթ քաղաքում կատարված ոճրագործությունները դատապարտելու մասին» [decree of the supreme soviet of the armenian ssr on the condemnation of crimes committed in the city of sumgait of the azerbaijani ssr], sovetakan hayastan, 16 june 1988, 2. 29 «սսհմ գերագույն խորհրդի նախագահության նիստը» [meeting of the chairman of the supreme soviet of the ussr], grakan tert (yerevan), 22 july 1988, 1. 30 «հայկական խսհ գերագույն խորհրդի և լեռնային ղարաբաղի ազգային խորհրդի որոշումը «լեռնային ղարաբաղի ինքնավար մարզում իրադրությունը նորմալացնելու միջոցառումներ մասին» խսհմ գերագույն խորհրդի 1989 թ․ նոյեմբերի 28-ի որոշման մասին» [decree of the supreme soviet of the armenian ssr and the national soviet of nagorno-karabakh "on measures to normalize the situation in the nagorno-karabakh autonomous region,” resolution of the supreme soviet of the ussr of 28 november 1989] https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=3154, accessed 20․10․2021. 31 see, for example, r․ aleqyan, «չպատժված հանցանքը նոր հանցանք է ծնում» [unpunished crime begets new crime]; a․ markosyan, «որովհետև չտեսաք, թե ուր է տանում սումգայիթը» [because you haven't seen where sumgayit leads], yerekoyan yerevan (yerevan), 15 january 1990, 1; ashot nazaryan, «դարձյալ սումգայիթ» [again sumgayit], yerekoyan yerevan, 16 january 1990, 1; hakob srapyan, margar menechyan, «երկրորդ «սումգայի՞թ» թե՞ նոր «բաքու»» [second "sumgayit" or new "baku"?], khorhrdayin hayastan (yerevan), 18 january 1990, 1. 32 “president serzh sargsyan's speech at the pace january session,” https://www.president.am/en/statementsand-messages/item/2018/01/24/president-serzh-sargsyan-speech-at-the-session-of-the-pace/, accessed 20․10․2021; “statement by the foreign ministry of armenia on the 33rd anniversary of the anti-armenian massacres in sumgait,” https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2021/02/27/sumg/10816, accessed 20․10․ 2021. https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=3154 https://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/01/24/president-serzh-sargsyan-speech-at-the-session-of-the-pace/ https://www.president.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/01/24/president-serzh-sargsyan-speech-at-the-session-of-the-pace/ https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2021/02/27/sumg/10816 8 generalising, the conclusion may be arrived at that the armenian people’s historic experience, memories and collective knowledge equated the armenian genocide that took place at the beginning of 20th century with the sumgait massacres of 1988. the armenian scientific and public mind with its arguments, decided that the massacres were of a genocidal nature and fell within the terms of the 1948 genocide convention. the sumgait massacres having a genocidal nature ալսո found its formulation in official discourses, being articulated in the resolutions made by the supreme soviet of the armenian ssr. appraisals of the sumgait massacres within the armenian reality happened, not because of “orders made to the people from above,” but in accordance with public perceptions the sumgait armenian massacres: azerbaijani characterisations and perceptions the official characteristics made on march 16th, 1988, during a meeting of the central committee of the azerbaijan communist party concerning the sumgait massacres had special significance. the session examined the question of the “great deficiencies in the organisation of the population of the city, the lack of political foresight and lack of activity by sumgait’s political committee’s bureau in the matter of preventing the lamentable events.”33 in the resolution adopted concerning the sumgait massacres, they were described as “lamentable events,” “acts of robbery carried out by criminal elements,” which ended with human victims. similar “lamentable events” were considered to be “the result of the indifference and shortsightedness of the leadership of the sumgait party’s city committee with regard to the instruction given to workers and young people in party political idealism and internationalism.”34 the person responsible was considered to be the first secretary of the communist party sumgait city committee, jahangir muslimzade who, despite prior warnings, wasn’t able to show that he returned from his holiday. several people responsible for preventing or halting the sumgait massacres were dismissed and given “strict reprimands.” stressing internationalism and the ideals of friendship and the brotherhood of peoples, the resolution adopted and handed to the central committee of the azerbaijan communist party included several recommendations and points to be carried out followed up.35 thus the official discourse concerning the sumgait massacres considered them to be the result of neglect and mistakes made in the area of soviet national policy. 33 «ադրբեջանի կոմկուսի կենտկոմում» [in the central committee of the communist party of azerbaijan], sovetakan hayastan, 20 march 1988, 2. 34 ibid. 35 ibid. 9 the azerbaijani people’s perception was a belief in the “treachery” theory. bill keller was the first western journalist permitted to visit sumgait after the soviet authorities banned journalists from entering the city. he arrived there in august 1988, six months after the massacres and wrote that the massacres were “delicately” called the “february events.”36 the writer noted that the majority of azerbaijanis accepted that the sumgait massacres that occurred between february 27th and 29th were “deliberately organised by armenian extremists to obtain world goodwill in the battle to discredit azerbaijan.”37 despite the azerbaijan prosecutor ilias ismailov saying, in an interview, that there was no proof of this, 38 over a period of time this azerbaijani perception was “corrected” and presented as the “absolute truth.” this was pointed out in 1989 by david remnick, the “washington post” reporter in sumgait. it was obvious from his article that the point of view, according to which sumgait massacres were an armenian “plot” to present the azerbaijanis as killers, had gained firm credibility among the azerbaijanis.39 according to them, armenians who were fluent azerbaijani speakers had collected “azerbaijanis who had escaped from yerevan, given them drugs and distributed arms among them. when these ‘escapees’ had gone mad, they went from door to door to punish those armenians who had not made donations the ‘krunk’40 committee.”41 as “proof” of their point of view, the azerbaijanis referred to the distribution of photographs of the sumgait massacres and to the swift construction42 of the memorial43 dedicated to the victims of the sumgait massacres. the first reaction to the sumgait massacres made by azerbaijani scientific circles was by the historian and member of the azerbaijan academy of sciences of azerbaijan ziya buniatov who, in january 1989, in his article titled “почему сумгаит? [why sumgayit?]”44 insisted 36 bill keller, “riot's legacy of distrust quietly stalks a soviet city,” the new york times, 31 august 1988, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/31/world/riot-s-legacy-of-distrust-quietly-stalks-a-soviet-city.html, accessed 20․10․2021. 37 ibid. 38 ibid. 39 david remnick, “hate runs high in soviet union’s most explosive ethnic feud,” the washington post, 6 september 1989, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/09/06/hate-runs-high-in-soviet-unionsmost-explosive-ethnic-feud/38ac827c-17a0-474c-9647-39189d0415ec/, accessed 20․10․2021. 40 the public-political organisation that was formed in nagorno (mountainous) karabakh in march 1988 which, acting with the “karabakh committee” working in the armenian ssr, organised the karabakh armenian struggle for self-determination, with the object of reuniting the region with the armenian ssr. 41 remnick, “hate runs high.” 42 a khachkar [cross-stone] (sculpted by smbat hakobyan) in memory of the victims of the sumgait massacres was erected near the armenian genocide memorial on april 24th, 1988. 43 remnick, “hate runs high.” 44 zija bunijatov, «почему сумгаит? (ситуационный анализ)», история азербайджана по документам и публикациям (под ред. з. буниятова) [“why sumgayit? (situational analysis)” in history of azerbaijan according to documents and publications, ed. zia buniatov] (baku: elm, 1990), 207-211. the article was first https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/31/world/riot-s-legacy-of-distrust-quietly-stalks-a-soviet-city.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/the_new_york_times https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/31/world/riot-s-legacy-of-distrust-quietly-stalks-a-soviet-city.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/09/06/hate-runs-high-in-soviet-unions-most-explosive-ethnic-feud/38ac827c-17a0-474c-9647-39189d0415ec/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/09/06/hate-runs-high-in-soviet-unions-most-explosive-ethnic-feud/38ac827c-17a0-474c-9647-39189d0415ec/ 10 that the sumgait massacres were planned and realised by the armenians themselves. 45 this article by buniatov started the tale that one of the people taking part in the massacre of armenians, eduard grigoryan, who until then had only a minor role in the azerbaijani “proofs,” later became the foundation stone of the “armenian treachery” theory.46 in any event, there also were exceptions in azerbaijani public-intellectual circles. this especially refers to the well-known writer chingiz husseinov47 and the secretary of the azerbaijan writers’ union, the writer akram aylisli. the latter, in a letter addressed to sergey baruzdin, the editor of the monthly journal “дружба народов [druzhba narodov],” wrote about the negative essence of chauvinism and its effects. he further wrote that since his childhood he had faith in the representatives of other nationalities but, in his surroundings, did not find anyone who lived up to his human ideals.48 he added, in his letter, that he felt hurt and ashamed about “the monstrous sumgait events.”49 it should also be noted that, more than twenty years after the sumgait events, akram aylisli attempted to promote the truth in the novel “stone dreams” published in 2012. he was pursued after it was published and his works were burnt in gandja [gandzak] and in his home village of aylis. he was also forbidden to leave the country by its political leadership.50 testimony was provided about the nature, organisation and even about certain circles connected with the sumgait massacres by people in important roles in the popular (national) published in the january 1989 edition of the azerbaijan academy of sciences monthly journal «известия академии наук азербайджанской сср'' [izvestija akademii nauk azerbajdzhanskoj ssr]. 45 ibid., 210. 46 edward grigoryan was an individual with a criminal past who was one of the hundreds of people who took part in the massacres, being remembered in only one criminal action. he was of mixed armenian -azerbaijani (or russian) parentage, while his perception of himself was not as being armenian. 82 of the people arrested were azerbaijanis and one was russian. (de waal, armenia and azerbaijan, 77.) the ussr government security committee chairman, v. kiporenko, personally interviewed him (kiporenko, “riots in baku”), stating that grigoryan was recorded as being an azerbaijani and had a very negative attitude concerning armenians. at present official azerbaijani historiography is based on “grigoryan’s activities” to prove “traces left by armenians” (see, for example, ibrahim mammadov, secrets of the soviet empire. the sumgayit provocation against azerbaijan. “the grigoryan case,” (baku: tahsil, 2014); aslan ismayilov, sumgayit-beginning of the collapse of the ussr (baku: çаşioğlu, 2011). for details of the azerbaijani point of view see de waal, armenia and azerbaijan, 72; marina grigoryan, ““sumgait”: ilham aliyev insults his own nation”, part 1, https://armenpress.am/eng/news/996562/, accessed 20․10․2021; marina grigoryan, “sumgayit – a case of azerbaijan’s kgb,” part 2, http://karabakhrecords.info/english_publication_articles_azerbaijans-kgb.html, accessed 20․10․2021. 47 oganesyan, “watershed”․ 48 akram aylisli, «пока в нашем доме будет существовать любовь... письмо с. а. баруздину» [“as long as there is love in our house... letter to s. a. baruzdin”], druzhba narodov 3 (1989): 170-171. 49 ibid. 50 grigor atanesyan, magerram zejnalov, «как азербайджан и армения распространяют теории заговора о карабахском конфликте» [how azerbaijan and armenia are spreading conspiracy theories about the karabakh conflict], https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-51549094, accessed 20․10․2021. https://armenpress.am/eng/news/996562/ http://karabakhrecords.info/english_publication_articles_azerbaijans-kgb.html https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-51549094 11 front in contemporary azerbaijani political life.51 this was especially true of leyla yunus in her work “из советского лагеря в азербайджанскую тюрьму” where, referring to the antiarmenian violence, she emphasised the deliberate nature of the ministry of the interior’s and government security committee’s lack of activity.52 she wrote: carefully analysing the events in which those dreadful crimes were committed, one may understand that they were incited and organised by the ussr government security committee and certain forces in the cpsu central committee that were led by the country’s law enforcement agencies. the massacres were, in some places, initiated by their appointees, the government security committee functionaries and representatives of heydar aliev’s clan network.53 another member of the popular (national), zardusht alizade recalled khitir aloyev in his memoirs, the person who articulated the slogan “death to armenians” in a public rally in sumgait, after which the first groups of killers began to move against the previously determined addresses of the armenian population of the city.54 khitir aloyev later became the chairman of the sumgait city’s “new azerbaijan” political party organisation that heydar aliev created. he became deputy chairman of the city’s executive authority in 1995. alizade also mentioned his meeting, ten days after the massacres, with workers from the sumgait aluminium factory, who testified to the fact that the mob had been led by unknown young men.55 it should also be noted that musayev who was, at the time of the sumgait massacres, the secretary of the baku city committee, stressed, in an interview with the journalist de waal in 2000, that he had been forced to curtail his holiday and return to baku as the city had a very tense atmosphere as “certain forces were stirring people up by every means in their power by preaching.” 56 51 a group of azerbaijani intellectuals created a “baku city scholars’ club” in the summer of 1988, on which the “people’s front initiative group” was based. this group, in november 1988, united with the “varlez” (existence) nationalist intellectual group and became the “azerbaijan people’s front” political party. for details see tatevik hayrapetyan, ««ադրբեջանի ժողովրդական ճակատ» կուսակցության ձևավորումը և գործունեությունը (1988-1990 թթ․)» [formation and activities of the azerbaijan popular front party (1988-1990)], arevelagitut’yan harts’er 7 (2014): 140-144. 52 leyla and arif yunus, из советского лагеря в азербайджанскую тюрьму [from soviet camp to azerbaijani prison] (wroclaw: jan nowak-jeziorański college of eastern europe, 2018), 269-280. 53 ibid., 269. 54 zardusht alizade, «азербайджанская элита и массы в период распада ссср (статья-мемуары о бурном времени)» [azerbaijani elite and masses during the collapse of the ussr (article-memoirs about the turbulent time], http://old.sakharov-center.ru/publications/azrus/az_0055.htm, accessed 20․10․2021; junus, from soviet camp, 269-280. 55 ализаде, azerbaijani elite and masses. 56 de waal, armenia and azerbaijan, 60. http://old.sakharov-center.ru/publications/azrus/az_0055.htm 12 it would not be superfluous to note that, at one of the trial sessions of y. djafarov, who was accused of participation in the sumgait massacres, his mother, e. djafarova testified that the real organisers of the massacres had not been held responsible and that her son had been a blind tool in their hands.57 she further declared that the people responsible were heydar aliev, kyamran baghirov and jahangir muslimzade.58 it is possible to say, by generalising, that the characteristics and definitions of the sumgait massacres from the azerbaijani point of view, with certain exceptions, were euphemistic and designed to disguise the scope of the actual events and their nature. official, popular and scientific circles in azerbaijan gradually settled on the “armenian intrigue and treachery” theory. a similar stance was conditioned by two factors: on the one hand the use of the “intrigue” view, as an explanation of the violence, provided the opportunity for the azerbaijanis to successfully utilise it in their internal and international communications; on the other, it absolved the criminals from responsibility for anti-armenian violence and punishment. this is how the study of a number of important factors concerning the realisation of criminal intentions and the organisation of violence opened. the atmosphere of freedom from punishment was important in terms of the subsequent increase of anti-armenian violence in azerbaijan. the ussr central authorities’ responses and characteristics the ussr central authorities had their own approaches and characteristics regarding the sumgait massacres. the first response by the official press organisation, tass (telegraph agency of the soviet union), was issued on march 1st. in a short statement it said that “hooligan elements fomented unrest in the city of sumgait on february 28th, 1988. violent incidents and atrocities took place.”59 the february 29th session of the politburo of the central committee of the communist party of the soviet union was of great significance. mikhail gorbachev, referring to the sumgait events, stressed the lack of action by the local police and said: “this means that this was deliberate and a reply to the armenians, giving them a curt answer.”60 the soviet government leadership was looking for ways to overcome the reality that had been created. 57 the sumgait: azerbaijani witnesses speak out, 48. 58 ibid. 59 «сообщение» [message], izvestija (moscow), 1 march 1988, 2․ 60 «заседание политбюро цк кпсс (29 февраля 1988 года)» [the meeting of the politburo of the central committee of the cpsu, 29 february 1988], http://sumgait.info/sumgait/politburo-meeting-29-february1988.htm, accessed 20․10․2021. http://sumgait.info/sumgait/politburo-meeting-29-february-1988.htm http://sumgait.info/sumgait/politburo-meeting-29-february-1988.htm 13 gorbachev stressed the importance of “getting to grips” with the situation, noting “there were 14 deaths in just one night” and, with the news reaching armenia, there might be a reaction from there, therefore “…armenia must be restrained so a reaction doesn’t take place.”61 aleksander yakovlev, a member of the politburo of the central committee of the communist party of the soviet union noted that, for feelings to subside, it was necessary to announce, as quickly as possible, that unlawful acts had taken place and that the criminals had been arrested.62 defence minister of ussr dmitrij yazov suggested that military units be deployed in sumgait to restore order.63 speaking about the stance that the central authorities had adopted, gorbachev noted that these events could not be ignored in the relations between the two republics, as similar problems existed everywhere and, if they didn’t cease, civilian dissent would spread throughout the country.64 it is no coincidence that the sumgait massacres were presented to the ussr central authorities as actions instigated and carried out by certain – hooligan – elements and being “mass unrest.”65 the position adopted by the ussr’s highest leadership was conditioned by the events being presented as being of a similar nature in the minds of the soviet public.66 the highest ussr authorities expressed themselves even more objectively about the sumgait massacres on july 18th, 1988, during the chairmen’s??? meeting of the supreme soviet, when vardges petrosyan, the secretary of union of writers of armenia, stated that “an attempt at genocide” had been made in sumgait. gorbachev immediately recorded: genocide is a plainly political, racist, organised act and is not of a spontaneous nature. the ferocious attacks in sumgait, however, were carried out by the dregs of society. it has become obvious who they were. genocide is the conscious destruction of any people or 61 ibid. 62 ibid. 63 ibid. 64 ibid. 65 «обстановка в сумгаите» [situation in sumgayit], kommunist (moscow), 5 march 1988, 3; v. itkin, «сумгаит: прокуратура продолжает следствие» [sumgayit: prosecutor's office continues investigation], известия, 20 august 1988, 4․ 66 yu. arakelyan, z. kadymbekov, g. ovcharenko, «эмоции и разум. о событиях в нагорном карабахе и вокруг него» [emotions and reason. on the events in nagorno-karabakh and around it], pravda (moscow), 21 march 1988, 3 (y. arakelyan, resigned from being a “pravda” correspondent after the article had been published with his signature under it without his knowledge); s. dardykin, r. lynev, «встречи после митингов» [meetings after the rallies], izvestija, 24 march 1988; a. vasil'kov, g. ovcharenko, «подстрекатели: ещё раз о событиях нагорном карабахе и вокруг него» [instigators: once again about the events of nagorno-karabakh and around it], pravda, 4 april 1988, 3․ 14 minority as a political act. why are you trying to ascribe the crimes committed to the whole of azerbaijan? what genocide are you talking about?67 in essence, the leader of the ussr had emphasised that, according to his perception, the violence was of a spontaneous nature and he rejected the description of the massacres by the armenian side as genocide and basically negatively labelling the crimes committed as premeditated and organised acts. gorbachev, at the same time, refuted the ethnic nature of the attacks on the armenian population of sumgait, ascribing them as being carried out the “dregs of soviet society.” in this way he removed the problem from the area of national relationships and placed it in that of class relationships in soviet society. official positions of a similar nature were adopted during the examination and subsequent trials relating to the sumgait massacres. by the decision made by the ussr prosecutors, the legal work concerned with the sumgait massacres was split into 80 parts with the trials basically taking place in azerbaijan. 94 people were arrested, of whom about 80 were convicted, with one being condemned to death. in all the cases, the accused were prosecuted for “hooliganism.”68 it is important to note that apart from official discourses and, in opposition to them, there were condemnatory speeches made by progressive soviet intellectuals. this was especially true in february 1989, on the first anniversary of the sumgait massacres, when a group of intellectuals (l. gozman, l. patkin, g. staravoytova, y. levada, v. chalikova, m. yezorova and others) sent a letter, addressed to their “armenian comrades” sharing the armenian people’s anger, stating, “the dreadful crimes – genocide – have not been examined and tried properly …”69 there were articles in the press that attempted, under soviet censorship conditions, to publish the more or less correct descriptions of the sumgait massacres or parts of them .70 it is of significance that the former president of the ussr, m. gorbachev, in his article titled “perestroika and new thinking: a retrospective” published in august 2021, looking back on the basic artsakh (mountainous karabakh) problem, confessed that the central 67 «սսհմ գերագույն խորհրդի նախագահության նիստը» [the session of the presidency of the ussr supreme council], grakan tert, 22 july 1988, 1. 68 babanov, voevodskij, karabakh crisis, 12․ 69 «открытое письмо друзьям в армении» [open letter to friends in armenia], naa, f․ 1159, i․ 2, c․ 20․ p․ 1. 70 vasilevskij, cloud in the mountains, viktor loshak, «сумгаит, месяц спустя» [sumgayit, a month later], moskovskie novosti (moscow), 17 april 1988, 13; sergej baruzdin, «эмоции и факты» [emotions and facts], druzhba narodov (moscow), № 3 (1989), 171-174․ 15 authorities were sceptical, at first, of the scale and severity of the problem. 71 in his opinion, the artsakh problem was for the armenian ssr and the azerbaijan ssr to solve, while the role of the centre was “to help them normalise the situation and, in particular, solve the economic problems.”72 this was, according to gorbachev, the correct way to solve the problem, but the two countries were unable to create a dialogue. “the situation unravelled rapidly. in late february 1988, there was bloodshed in the azerbaijani city of sumgait. troops had to be sent in to stop the massacre.”73 gorbachev thus confessed that the massacres of the armenian population of sumgait were only halted thanks to military means.74 the military, however, did not record the fact that operations by the ussr military forces were significantly late in starting, starting only after a portion of the armenian population had been massacred. thus, the soviet central authorities presented the sumgait massacres as mass unrest, carried out by certain elements of the public. they did not differentiate between the group identities of the murderers and those massacred, without azerbaijanis being shown as being the aggressors and armenians the victims. this is explained by the fact that the official discourse was conditioned by soviet national policy. for the central authorities, the most important thing was to swiftly disguise the sumgait massacres, moderate their extent and nature and to prevent the spread of inter-national dissent. according to the assumptions made by the centre, unanimously raising the importance and real nature of the sumgait events would deepen the conflict between the armenians and-azerbaijanis and sharpen inter-ethnic relations, creating serious threats concerning physical security, both in the many thousands-strong armenian community in azerbaijan and for the azerbaijanis living in armenia. no less important were the circumstances concerning the central authorities’ responsibility. in the end, 71 mikhail gorbachev, «понять перестройку, отстоять новое мышление» [perestroika and new thinking: a retrospective] https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/perestroika-and-new-thinking, accessed 20․10․2021. 72 ibid. 73 ibid. 74 the ussr defence ministry, to stop the anti-armenian sumgait massacres, deployed 3,000 ussr interior ministry soldiers and aircraft to the city. (vladimir gurov, «вооруженные силы ссср в армяноазербайджанском (карабахском) вооружённом конфликте (1988-1991 гг.)» [armed forces of the ussr in the armenian-azerbaijani (karabakh) armed conflict (1988-1991)], izvestija samarskogo nauchnogo central rossiiskoi akademii nauk 14, no. 3 (2012): 110). the 137th infantry regiment (commanded by lieutenant-colonel v. khatskevich) was also brought to sumgait which was able to reimpose order in the city. the troops were, initially, ordered to remain neutral and not to use weapons, resulting in them often responding to cries for help by the officers and soldiers saying just that. (ibid., 111). this resulted in the azerbaijanis attacking soldiers of the regiment’s sub-units, causing 140 casualties. (ibid.) according to the information provided by v. krivopuskov, the head of the operational examining group of the ussr ministry of the interior in mountainous karabakh (artsakh), 270 soldiers were injured during the clashes. (krivopuskov, rebellious karabakh, 149). it was only on the evening of the february 28th that, after decisive action taken by the troops, the massacres ceased. the clash between the sumgait murderers and the soldiers, as the number of wounded testified, meant that the massacres of the armenian population that were taking place were only stopped with great difficulty and that, without the intervention of the military units, the massacres would have been much more extensive. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/perestroika-and-new-thinking 16 the crimes committed against the armenian population of sumgait had taken place during the time of soviet rule and the central authorities were also responsible for its citizens’ right to life and security. thus, the means used by the highest soviet leadership showed that it hadn’t appreciated the nature of ethnic conflict, its possible repercussions and was found to be unready to stop resurgent violence. the sumgait massacres: international responses and characteristics the international press also reported on the sumgait massacres. in the beginning, they just gave news of the events, presenting it as tass-provided information from official sources.75 there were unofficial reports and eyewitness accounts could be found in its pages too.76 the writers of the articles concerning the events in sumgait basically described them as “pogroms,” “ethnic violence” or “ethnic riots”. the sumgait massacres also received attention and were noted by the european union parliament. this was especially true as shown in its resolution concerning the armenian ssr of july 7th, 1988, which took note of the worsening political situation (which resulted in armenian massacres in the city of sumgait), as well as very serious acts of violence in baku. it called upon the soviet authorities to protect the security of the 500,000 armenians living in azerbaijan and was convinced that the anti-armenian massacres were fomented, or at least 75 international press report cuttings are held in the armenian national library’s archives concerned with the artsakh movement, see naa, f․ 1159, i․ 3, c․ 105. william j. eaton, “soviets enforce curfew after ethnic rioting,” los angeles times, 2 march 1988; william j. eaton, “several killed in rioting in azerbaijan, soviets say,” los angeles times, 3 march 1988; thom shanker, “violence reported by armenia's neighbour,” chicago tribune, 1 march 1988; thom shanker “armenian riots: deaths confirmed,” chicago tribune, 3 march 1988; gary lee, “tass reports new violence in azerbaijan,” the washington post, 1 march 1988; garry lee, “rioters draw soviet troops: azerbaijani city termed ‘calm but tense,’” washington post, 2 march 1988; philip taubman, “soviets report a major oil centre in azerbaijan is shaken by riots,” the new york times, 1 march 1988; felicity barringer, “soviet armenians mourn their dead,” the new york times, 9 march 1988; christopher bobinski, “soviet troops enforce curfew in riot city,” financial times, 2 march 1988; john-thor dahlburg, “‘hooligans' spread ethnic turmoil in soviet azerbaijan,” the washington times, 1 march 1988; robert evans, “troops enforce rare soviet curfew in riot-torn ethnic city,” the washington times, 1 march 1988; philip taubman “soviet army enforces curfew in riot-torn caspian capital,” the fresno bee, 2 march 1988. 76 david remnick, “soviet tanks, troops said to be at site of ethnic violence: witnesses put armenian toll at 350 dead,” the washington post, 12 march 1988. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/12/soviet-tanks-troops-said-at-site-of-ethnicviolence/966c8cd2-287b-4972-8bdb-5262c7bf1ce3/; david remnick, “soviets report 31 killed in ethnic rioting,” the washington post, 4 march 1988. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/05/soviets-report-31-killed-in-ethnic rioting/e0ba7100-9cf9-492e-9447-02cf9ecf6cd4/; “soviets tell of ‘pogroms’ by rioters in azerbaijan,” the washington post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/16/soviet-tells-of-pogroms-by-rioters-inazerbaijan/56dc16e1-9aeb-40cd-9ffd-0f176a55a223/; philip taubman, “soviet reports deaths of 31 in azerbaijan rioting,” the new york times, 5 march 1988. see https://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/05/world/soviet-reports-deaths-of-31-in-azerbaijan-rioting.html all of the above accessed 20․10․2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/12/soviet-tanks-troops-said-at-site-of-ethnic-violence/966c8cd2-287b-4972-8bdb-5262c7bf1ce3/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/12/soviet-tanks-troops-said-at-site-of-ethnic-violence/966c8cd2-287b-4972-8bdb-5262c7bf1ce3/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/05/soviets-report-31-killed-in-ethnic%20rioting/e0ba7100-9cf9-492e-9447-02cf9ecf6cd4/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/05/soviets-report-31-killed-in-ethnic%20rioting/e0ba7100-9cf9-492e-9447-02cf9ecf6cd4/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/16/soviet-tells-of-pogroms-by-rioters-in-azerbaijan/56dc16e1-9aeb-40cd-9ffd-0f176a55a223/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/03/16/soviet-tells-of-pogroms-by-rioters-in-azerbaijan/56dc16e1-9aeb-40cd-9ffd-0f176a55a223/ https://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/05/world/soviet-reports-deaths-of-31-in-azerbaijan-rioting.html 17 participated in by the people deemed guilty who should be punished in accordance with ussr law.77 the european parliament also referred to the sumgait massacres in its resolution of january 18th, 1990 which, condemning the massacres that were continuing in baku, the attacks carried out shahumyan and getashen areas and other circumstances, called upon the european commission and parliament to present its resolution to the ussr authorities and to “…ensure that they guarantee the defence of the armenian population of azerbaijan, by sending troops there.”78 the resolution also called for a protest to be presented to the soviet authorities that all the circumstances pertaining to the massacres of the armenians, especially the pogroms that took place in sumgait and kirovabad be revealed.79 the third time it was mentioned in the european parliament was on march 14th, 1991, in the resolution titled “the blockading of armenia and the human rights reality there.” the resolution included the statement that the 300,000 armenians who had escaped from the azerbaijani city of baku and the massacres in sumgait were living in extreme poverty and needed immediate assistance.80 as far as international public opinion was concerned, it is significant that the september 1990 edition of the monthly journal “new york review of books” published the letter-address regarding the armenian massacres that had taken place within the ussr. this initiative had been made by intellectuals of the paris college of philosophy and the french supervisory committee of the helsinki accords body.81 the letter had been signed by 133 famous scientists and advocates from europe, canada and the usa. the authors stressed that the repeated pogroms carried out against the armenian people in azerbaijan and their nature forced them to think that they weren’t just incidents or spontaneous explosions, but a “continuous practical, if not official, policy carried out by soviet azerbaijan.”82 the letter ended with an appeal to 77 “resolution on the situation in soviet armenia, adopted on 7 july 1988,” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/all/?uri=celex:51988ip0538&qid=1631174857109, accessed 20․10․2021. 78 “resolution on the situation in armenia, adopted on 18 january 1990,” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:c:1990:038:full&from=en, accessed 20․10․2021. 79 ibid. 80 “resolution on the blockade of armenia and the human rights situation there, adopted on 14 march 1991,” https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:joc_1991_106_r_0102_01&qid=1547723161105 &from=en, accessed 20․10․2021։ 81 jacques derrida, isaiah berlin et al., “an open letter on anti-armenian pogroms in the soviet union,” the new york review, vol. 37, 27 september 1990, https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/09/27/an-open-letter-onanti-armenian-pogroms-in-the-sov/, accessed 20․10․2021։ 82 ibid. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/all/?uri=celex:51988ip0538&qid=1631174857109 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/all/?uri=celex:51988ip0538&qid=1631174857109 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:c:1990:038:full&from=en https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:c:1990:038:full&from=en https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:joc_1991_106_r_0102_01&qid=1547723161105&from=en https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=oj:joc_1991_106_r_0102_01&qid=1547723161105&from=en https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/09/27/an-open-letter-on-anti-armenian-pogroms-in-the-sov/ https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/09/27/an-open-letter-on-anti-armenian-pogroms-in-the-sov/ 18 the international public to condemn the anti-armenian pogroms and racist ideals which were utilised to justify the crimes committed.83 thus, the international press, organisations and public-intellectual activists basically used the terms “pogrom” and “massacre” with regard to the sumgait massacres. their critical responses, in the first instance, stressed and gave importance to the ethnic nature of the violence, its nationalistic basis and its continuation in armenian-inhabited areas in azerbaijan. they also underlined the necessity of halting anti-armenian violence and holding those responsible for it to account, the genocidal terms used for the sumgait massacres and their content several terms used to describe the sumgait massacres, as appear in this study, are based on several immediate perceptions and characteristics of the events themselves. they are “genocide,” “pogrom” (massacre) and “slaughter”. genocide, in international law and specialist literature, is defined as the premeditated destruction of people because they belong to a specific race, religion, ethnic or other group. the primary source for this perception is rafael lemkin’s work published in 1944 titled “axis rule in occupied europe.” this is the signpost to the definition of the term genocide for its examination in the context of international law. lemkin defines genocide as being the destruction of a nation or ethnic group.84 he explained that, although the term “genocide” describes, in itself, the annihilation of a group, it does not mean that such destruction must happen without any delay. in lemkin’s opinion, genocide rather means the aim of eliminating a group through co-ordinated plans directed at the essential bases of its existence.85 thus lemkin’s definition is wider than simple physical destruction. he includes groups’ culture, language, national feelings, political and social institutions and economic existence. genocide is aimed at people – not at their individual abilities – but as members of a national group.86 the meaning and content of the word “genocide” is, in international law, governed by the un assembly’s convention of december 9th, 1948, titled “convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide.”87 83 ibid. 84 lemkin raphael, axis rule in occupied europe. laws of occupation, analysis of government, proposals for redress (washington: carnegie endowment for international peace, 1944), 79. 85 ibid. 86 ibid. 87 convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/doc.1_convention%20on%20the%20pre vention%20and%20punishment%20of%20the%20crime%20of%20genocide.pdf, accessed 20․10․2021. https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/doc.1_convention%20on%20the%20prevention%20and%20punishment%20of%20the%20crime%20of%20genocide.pdf https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocitycrimes/doc.1_convention%20on%20the%20prevention%20and%20punishment%20of%20the%20crime%20of%20genocide.pdf 19 both lemkin’s definition and the convention’s main meaning are that the aim of genocide is the complete or partial annihilation of any group. one of the methods of achieving this is the slaughter of the individuals in the group but includes any plan to exterminate part or whole of the group itself by other means, such as the prevention of procreation in the group or inflicting psychological damage to it.88 although there are other definitions of the term “genocide,”89 all international legal bodies condemn such crimes in accordance with the convention. the form of the genocide convention has, on many occasions, resulted in theoretical discussions and disputes. for a crime to be described as genocide, it is vital to establish the specific aim of eliminating a group (dolus specialis). it is this aim, in the opinion of many researchers and theoreticians, which defines genocide.90 this means that the criminal commits a crime definitely striving to either totally or partially annihilate a given group. there are two most important, specific things connected with a plan to commit genocide: firstly, that it is almost impossible to obtain persuasive proof of the plan and, secondly, that the genocide plan may either be evident or hidden.91 the next important thing concerning the definition and content of the term genocide is linked to the expression “wholly or partially”. those studying the subject are basically in agreement that a group’s “annihilation” usually has to include its physical mass destruction.92 the expression “partially” is often used for complete clarity to denote the slaughter of a “substantial” part of a group. however, some lawyers (among whom are william schabas and chile eboe-osuji) consider the restriction on the definition of the term “genocide” as dangerous with regard to the mass killings of a “substantial” number of a group, taking the convention’s aim of “preventing” it into account.93 according to the opinion of another lawyer, david alonzo-maizlish, the “quantitative standard” of genocide contradicts the object of the definition of the convention and it aims.94 in this case, the characteristics and perceptions of genocide are of even greater importance, not because of some numerical threshold when mass killings become genocide but more often, because of the plans to commit it. in essence, the 88 rudolph j. rummel, death by government (new brunswick and london: transaction publishers, 2009), 33. 89 adam jones, genocide: a comprehensive introduction: second edition (new york: routledge, 2011), 16-20. 90 ibid., 37. 91 kurt jonassohn, frank chalk, “a typology of genocide and some implications for the human rights agenda,” in genocide and the modern age: etiology and case studies of mass death, ed. isidor wallimann, michael dobkowski (westport ct: greenwood press, 1987), 4-5. 92 jones, genocide, 24. 93 ibid., 24-25. 94 david alonzo-maizlish, “in whole or in part: group rights, the intent element of genocide, and the ‘quantitative criterion,’” new york university law review 77 (2002):1375. 20 number of victims is important as proof of the plan, not as an evolved plan in itself or as a prerequisite.95 as far as the term pogrom (massacre) is concerned, it originated from the russian word “гром” (meaning thunder, thunderbolt or lightning) and the “пo” prefix (meaning method or target). the literal translation of the term means “sudden ethnic eruption [of flame] against a specific target”96 this definition of ethnic violence is basically utilised in works concerning genocide to describe the anti-jewish massacres that took place in russia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.97 turning to the term’s content, it is important to note that researchers do not have, in this connection, any final formulations. thus, paul brass considers a pogrom as attacks made, with the involvement of the government or high-ranking government political officials, on the individuals of ethnic, racial or other groups and their assets.98 he considers the involvement of the government as pivotal, to differentiate them from massacres taking place during riots.99 w. bergmann, however, stresses that the term “government control” originates, in the context of the anti-jewish massacres, from an historically incorrect approach, therefore a pogrom must be viewed as a form of spontaneous riot.100 according to bergmann, pogroms organised at a low level differ from murder, massacre and genocide. at the same time, he states that the theoretical forms of ethnic violence are not easy to apply to any given incident, because pogroms often take place in the context of international or political wars or genocide.101 in any event, most researchers, when they use the term “pogrom”, accept that a government or certain of its officials participated in them, or at least refused to act to prevent or stop imminent massacres.102 the significant points for characterising massacres (pogroms) are, basically: 95 ibid., 1383-1384, also william a. schabas, “was genocide committed in bosnia and herzegovina? first judgments of the international criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia,” fordham international law journal 25, no. 1 (2001); 23-53. 96 henry abrasmon, a prayer for the government: ukrainians and jews in revolutionary times, 1917-1920, (cambridge: harvard university press, 1999), 109. 97 ibid., 354. 98 paul r. brass, “introduction: discourses of ethnicity, communalism, and violence,” in riots and pogroms, ed. paul r. brass (london: macmillan press, 1996), 33. 99 ibid., 26. 100 werner bergmann, “pogroms,” in international handbook of violence research, ed. wilhelm heitmeyer, john hagan (dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 2003), 352. 101 ibid., 354. 102 brass, “introduction,” 33, john k. roth, “pogrom,” in a dictionary of jewish-christian relations, ed. edward kessler, neil wenborn, (new york: cambridge university press, 2005), 346; avraham greenbaum, “bibliographical essay,” in pogroms: anti-jewish violence in modern russian history, ed. john d. klier, shlomo lambroza (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1992), 373. 21 ● the fomenting of massacres by governmental, political party, military or senior law-abiding officials or their lack of activity during them ● to stir mobs up and involvement in massacres ● the gradual reduction of the massacres after they reached their peak ● the low organisational level of the massacres. a number of researchers underlined the genocidal nature of the massacres, considering them to be genocidal massacres. thus, the famous student of genocide, leo kuper, considered that the annihilation of a group – men, women and children – and lesser killings, such as the obliteration of complete villages, to be genocidal massacres.103 israel charny, writing like kuper, determined genocidal massacre as being small-scale mass killing.104 definitions of a similar nature, in his opinion, allow many massacres, mass annihilations and mass killings to be described in this way. although they are no less tragic for the victims, the number of dead is relatively small compared to those killed in acts of genocide. 105 schabas also writes that examples of genocidal massacres may be pogroms and mass death sentences. 106 in paul mojzes’ opinion, “a more accurate meaning for the word pogrom is genocidal massacre, in other words a mob’s semi-spontaneous attack created by an explosion by a majority ethnic or religious group against a minority.”107 ben kiernan’s interpretation of genocidal massacre is also very significant; he considers such events as being much shorter, limited episodes, aimed at a specific local or regional community that had been targeted for being part of a larger one.108 it should be noted that the armenians of sumgait were targeted by azerbaijan on the basis of ethnic identity because they belonged to a larger group – the armenian nation. another theoretician, benjamin lieberman, links massacres to ethnic cleansing policies, noting that they usually precede more forcible events of a similar nature or may happen in political circles.109 103 leo kuper, genocide: its political use in the twentieth century (new haven and london: yale university press, 1981), 10. 104 israel w. charny, “toward a generic definition of genocide,” in genocide: conceptual and historical dimensions, ed. george j. andreopoulos (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania, 1997), 77. 105 ibid. 106 william a. schabas, genocide in international law: the crimes of crimes (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2000), 240. 107 paul mojzes, balkan genocides: holocaust and ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century (lanham: rowman and littlefield, 2011), 5. 108 ben kiernan, blood and soil: a world history of genocide and extermination from sparta to darfur (new haven and london: yale university press, 2007), 13. 109 benjamin lieberman, terrible fate: ethnic cleansing in the making of modern europe (chicago: iva r. dee publisher, 2006), xiv. 22 genocide expert vahagn dadrian views massacres as a conception of “retributive genocide.” in his opinion, this kind of genocide is limited to being localised ferocious attacks, “as a form of punishment for a portion of a minority that had issued challenges or threatened the larger group.”110 the author maintains that it has a cautioning and (or) intimidating effect on the minority, which also moves to prevent a repeat of problems previously created.111 the previously mentioned conception best expresses the origin of the sumgait massacres. the armenian population of mountainous karabakh began its struggle for self-determination and reunion with their historic homeland, armenia.in 1988. by this, the armenian population of the whole of azerbaijan, as a minority, became a target group for azerbaijan government repressive policies and the use of violence. in response to the re-opening of the artsakh problem, the azerbaijan side used “punitive” measures, organising the massacre of the sumgait armenian population, thus terrifying the armenians and attempting to preclude the future expansion of the movement. turning to the term “massacre”, it should be noted that it has a french origin.112 the researcher mark levene stresses the one-sided nature of massacres. in his opinion, massacres happen when at least, at the given time, people who cannot defend themselves are killed by another group that has the physical means and strength with which to carry out killings without physical loss to itself.113 speaking about the 1894-1896 abdul-hamid massacres, robert melson defines massacre as the deliberate killing of significantly large numbers of defenceless people by political agents.114 in his opinion, genocide and massacre differ by the nature of their aims and scope. according to this researcher, massacres are utilised by governments as a form of terror, not to eliminate, but to change the ways certain community groups live or their status.115 as can be seen, there are quite a few theoretical approaches to the terms “pogrom” and “massacre”. they have no legal form and, in essence, are part of other international crimes (genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity). finally, turning to the definitions question in genocide studies, it must be underlined that the genocide scholar israel charny has warned about the pointless “definitions struggle”, which 110 vahakn dadrian, “a typology of genocide,” international review of modern sociology 5 (1975): 207. 111 ibid. 112 mark levene “introduction,” in the massacre in history, ed. mark levene and roberts penny (new york: berghahn books, 1999), 9. 113 ibid., 5. 114 robert melson, a theoretical inquiry into the armenian massacres of 1894-1896,” comparative studies in society and history 24, no. 3 (1982): 482. 115 ibid., 483-484. 23 occasionally simply eliminates the extent of this or that event, importance and its great human tragedy.116 it is thought, in this sense, the main problem for researchers should not be the precise classification and definition of this or that kind of terror, but the progress of the development of terror, the reasons for its advance and the revelation of its consequences. conclusion generalising research results, the conclusion may be reached for the parties, political circles and different structures involved, the sumgait massacres have been characterised as follows: ● the armenian side has defined and characterised the sumgait massacres as a genocidal act, linking them to the armenian genocide inflicted by the ottoman empire at the beginning of the 20th century. it also stresses the importance of their being organised and of an ethnic nature. ● it is noticeable that the azerbaijan side euphemistically defines the sumgait massacres as “the february events.” the notion of “armenian intrigue and treachery” was put into circulation, which as a “lawful” explanation, had the aim of justifying the crimes that were committed and passing the blame onto the victim. ● the ussr central authorities avoided emphasising the identity of the group, describing the events as “disorders” and “hooligan acts” taking care, looking to the future, not to stir up inter-ethnic problems, not just in armenian-azerbaijani relations, but throughout the entire country. ● the international press, organisations and the public were not impeded by such interests and accepted formulas and, in condemnatory statements, called the sumgait massacres “massacres,” underlining the biased, ethnic nature of the anti-armenian violence in azerbaijan. it may be seen, comparing perceptions of the sumgait massacres, that the armenian and international evaluations contain certain generalisations. the emphasis, in both instances, is placed on the one-sided, ethnic nature of the violence, the separation of its prevention and the question of the security of the armenian population of azerbaijan, through appropriate methods and political evaluation. against this approach, characteristics made by the ussr central authorities and azerbaijani side separated them using euphemisms, with the aim of minimising the scale of the massacres, their essence and consequences. 116 israel charny, “the psychological satisfaction of denials of the holocaust or other genocides by nonextremists or bigots, and even by known scholars,” idea: a journal of social issues 6, no. 1, https://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=27, accessed 20․10․2021. https://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=27 24 as for using the term “genocide” for the sumgait massacres, this is mainly because of the immediate perceptions and definitions of the events. the terms generally used for the sumgait massacres are genocide and massacre. the sumgait massacres became the immutable point in artsakh-azerbaijan antagonism. it had great importance for both the armenian and 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“on measures to normalize the situation in the nagorno-karabakh autonomous region,” resolution of the supreme soviet of the ussr of november 28, 1989]. аccessed 20 october 2021. https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=3154. «հայկական սսհ գերագույն սովետի որոշումը ադրբեջանական սսհ սումգայիթ քաղաքում կատարված ոճրագործությունները դատապարտելու մասին» [decree of the supreme soviet of the armenian ssr on the condemnation of crimes committed in the city of sumgait of the azerbaijani ssr], sovetakan hayastan, 16 june 1988. «սսհմ գերագույն խորհրդի նախագահության նիստը» [meeting of the chairman of the supreme soviet of the ussr]. grakan tert (yerevan), 22 july 1988. «սսհմ գերագույն խորհրդի նախագահության նիստը» [the session of the presidency of the ussr supreme council], grakan tert, 22 july 1988. երեկոյան երևան [yerekoyan yerevan]. yerevan, 15, 16 january 1990. http://karabakhrecords.info/documents_investigation_obvinitelnoe-zaklyuchenie-ud-1860232-08.html http://karabakhrecords.info/documents_investigation_obvinitelnoe-zaklyuchenie-ud-1860232-08.html https://www.arlis.am/documentview.aspx?docid=3154 31 խորհրդային հայաստան [khorhrdayin hayastan], yerevan, 18 january 1990. հայաստանի կոմկուսի կենտկոմի առաջին քարտուղար կ․ ս․ դեմիրճյանի ելույթը հայկական հեռուստատեսությամբ 1988 թ․ փետրվարի 29-ին» [speech by the first secretary of the central committee of the communist party of armenia k. s. demirchyan on armenian television on february 29, 1988]. sovetakan hayastan, march 1, 1988, 1. սովետական հայաստան [sovetakan hayastan], yerevan, february 27, march 2, march 4, march 6, 1988. սովետական ղարաբաղ [sovetakan gharabagh], stepanakert, 21 february 1988. about the author: gayane hovhannisyan is a researcher at study of oppression in artsakh, nakhijevan and azerbaijan department, the department armenian genocide museum-institute foundation. she is also a phd student in history at yerevan state university. hovhannisyan’s research fields include historical demography of nagorno karabakh, armenian pogroms in the armenian-populated regions of azerbaijan (1988-1990). e-mail: gayane.hovhannisyan@genocide-museum.am mailto:gayane.hovhannisyan@genocide-museum.am the “karabakh – armenia” theme in the iconography of armenian identity (based on posters and banners from the karabakh movement) harutyun t. marutyan1 2 levon h. abrahamian2 3 1armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, armenia 2institute of archaeology and ethnography, national academy of sciences, armenia 3associate professor of anthropology, yerevan state university, armenia abstract the images and written formulas depicted on banners and posters are a vivid manifestation of national identity and tend to appear and reappear in abundant quantities in times of societal crises. in this sense, the iconography of the karabakh movement represents a rich and broad field of study. what is distinctive about the posters created during the karabakh movement is that a great majority did not simply proclaim the programmatic ideas of certain parties or political trends but rather expressed the people’s concerns, moods and wishes and their interpretations of events as they unfolded. the posters and banners of the movement manifested in varying genres and revealed diversity in their content. they were the product of both soviet and nationalist mentality. the theme “karabakh-armenia” had many different manifestations in the iconography of the karabakh movement, such as quotations and the creation of posters using or based on “quote thinking”; unification of karabakh with armenia as a solution for the karabakh issue; the theme of mother armenia and child-karabakh; “karabakh is ours”; manifestations of solidarity with the people of karabakh; karabakh and armenia as one entity. this article aims to present and analyse those banners and posters as manifestations of national identity. keywords: posters and banners, iconography, karabakh movement, national identity, mother armenia. funding: the article is written within the scopes of “memory across borders: dealing with the legacy of disputed territories.” marie skłodowska-curie actions (msca) – research and innovation staff exchange (rise) – horizon 2020 – msca – rise – 2018 – 823803 project. how to cite: harutyun marutyan and levon abrahamyan, “the “karabakh – armenia” theme in the iconography of armenian identity (based on posters and banners from the karabakh movement),” international journal of armenian genocide studies 7, no. 2 (2022): 7-68. introduction the karabakh movement was indeed the first truly nationwide insurrection in terms of the range of mass protests that occurred in succession in various parts of the soviet union. with no precedent, the movement’s characteristics came into being spontaneously in a situation where powerful state machinery needed to be opposed. parallel to this rapid succession of events, armenian identity underwent significant changes; the demonstrators of april 1990 were vastly different from those of february 1988. the images and written formulas depicted on banners and posters are a vivid manifestation of national identity and tend to appear and reappear in abundant quantities in times of societal crises. in this sense, the iconography of the karabakh movement represents a rich and broad field of study. what is distinctive about the posters created during the karabakh movement is that a great majority did not simply proclaim the programmatic ideas of certain parties or political trends but rather expressed the people’s concerns, moods and wishes and their interpretations of events as they unfolded. the posters and banners of the movement manifested in varying genres and revealed diversity in their content. they were the product of both soviet and nationalist mentality. in short, they were unmediated indicators of an unfettered, popular mentality of an iconographic nature. in the years of the karabakh movement, posters were mediators and tools in the relationships between individuals and authorities, and between society and state, which conveyed the perspectives of the people about society, their appeals to the authorities, as well as their evaluation of the latter. the posters were addresses not only to the authorities, but also to armenians, to the people of armenia, to azerbaijan, to the wider citizenry of the vast soviet state and, ultimately, to the world. in this way, the posters can be understood as a kind of soliloquy of the people, which they hoped would develop into dialogue. the posters created in the years of the karabakh movement (1988–1990) are deeply rich material for study in terms of their significant quantity (we have been able to document and collect about 1000 posters from oral and written sources); their diverse content (about twenty thematic groups have been distinguished); and insofar 2 as they express a wide but evidently specific range of mentalities.1 in what follows, we focus only on one of the thematic groups under the conditional title “karabakharmenia”.2 this theme broadly reflects the movement members’ understanding of their history, the idea of justice in that context, and people’s right to self-determination, which fed the movement throughout its life. simultaneously, it is evident that, while tackling complex social phenomena, the creators of these posters often drew on a broader dimension of human relations (such as representations of mother and offspring, solidarity, the part and the whole, etc.) and cartographic thinking (such as representations of the contours of armenia and nagorno karabakh/nkao maps). in addition, the posters’ creators tended to offer a “humanizing” perspective, allowing more intelligible and empathetic messaging. quotations and the creation of posters using or based on “quote thinking” to confer greater legitimacy for their oral and written statements, ordinary people tend to lean on quotations from famous people of the past: referring to pieces of writing or perspectives from persons considered wise or simply to the repository of popular wisdom. therefore, the use of quotations is neither arbitrary nor, moreover, unique to armenians. to present and justify one’s perspective using “quote thinking” is an approach that has been used since ancient times. however, during the years of soviet power, societal life was saturated with often obligatory -“quotation mania”. in the early years, quotations were taken from the works of marx and engels, and later from lenin too. from the 1930s to the 1950s, quotes were taken mostly from stalin’s works and speeches as well as from those of leaders at lower levels. thereafter, it was the turn of other leaders of the communist party and the soviet state, including nikita khrushchеv, leonid brezhnev and mikhail gorbachev. for seventy years, the newspaper pravda served as a boundless source of quotes. in the 1 for the discussion of the issue see: harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity. volume 1: the memory of genocide and the karabakh movement (yerevan: gitutyun, 2009) (anthropology of memory, 2), 4-7. 2 for a partial discussion of the issue, see: harut’yun marut’yan, levon abrahamian, «հայ ինքնության պատկերագրությունը. քննության փորձ ղարաբաղյան շարժման ցուցապաստառների մի խմբի նյութերով» [iconography of the armenian identity: examination attempt on the materials of a group of karabakh movement posters]. hayats’q yerevanits’: hayagitakan. razmavarakan yev azgayin hetazotut’yunneri haykakan kentron 4 (1997): 55-68. 3 introduction to any, more or less serious, piece of writing, it was obligatory to include quotes from at least the classics of marxism; from the materials of the congress of the communist party of the soviet union; and/or from the regular plenary sessions of the communist party. it is possible that the publication of “aid” materials distributed in the tens of thousands had been intended to facilitate doing just that.3 during the years of the karabakh movement, the use of quotations was also recurrent, reflected not only in speeches and appeals but in posters as well. however, over the years of the movement, quotes were used differently. for example, quotes from a text pursuing other objectives were cited to emphasize an entirely different idea, and there were several, likely deliberate, misquotations or artificial “quoting” strategies, too.4 in the very first days of the karabakh movement (20-21 february 1988), a banner appeared on the platform of the opera square, which quoted a sentence pronouncing karabakh, nakhichevan and zangezur as part of armenia. further, the statement was attributed to nariman narimanov, head of the revolutionary committee of soviet azerbaijan. the banner read: “карабах, нахичевань и зангезур были и остаются неотделимой частью армении. н. нариманов. 2 декабря 1920, газ. “бакинский рабочий”” [karabakh, nakhijevan and zangezur have been and remain an integral part of armenia: n. narimanov, 2 december 1920, “bakinskiy rabochiy”] (fig. 1).5 3 see for instance karl marx, friedrich engels, vladimir lenin, կրոնի մասին [on religion] (yerevan: hayastan, 1977); karl marx, friedrich engels, vladimir lenin, պրոլետարիատի դիկտատուրայի մասին [on dictatorship of proletariat] (yerevan: hayastan, 1981); karl marx, friedrich engels, vladimir lenin, կանանց հարցի մասին [on the woman question] (yerevan: hayastan, 1983); karl marx, friedrich engels, vladimir lenin, բարոյականության և բարոյական դաստիարակության մասին [on morality and moral education] (yerevan: hayastan, 1989). 4 marutyan, iconography of armenian identity, 69-70. 5 taking into account the fact that the volume of the journal article is relatively limited, as well as the fact that the content of about six dozen photos is presented to some extent in the text of the article, the authors of the article decided to avoid making detailed explanations of the photographs and limit themselves only to the authors of the photos or, if they are not known, to the available sources noting. the author of the pictures no. 3-11, 13, 15, 16, 21-23, 31, 35-39, 42-44, 50, 51, 54, 55, 57 is harut’yun marut’yan, no. 2, 29, 49 – levon abrahamian, no. 32-34, 40 – mayis vardanyan, no. 14, 19, 20, 46 – lyova hambardzumyan, no. 24, 25, 45 – valeri petrosyan, no. 26, 27 – rouben mangasaryan, no. 52 – vram hakobyan. pictures no. 1, 12, and 41 are stored in the “artsakhian movement” repository of the armenian genocide museum-institute (department 1, folder 103, pictures no. 1003, 1020, 1048), no. 17, 18 – are from the collection of gagik safaryan (department 1, box 401, pictures no. 3107, 3097). picture no. 30 is from the collection of armen shavarshi sargsyan, pictures no. 47, 48, and 53 are taken from the facebook page of the “mayr hayastan” museum, the sources for pictures 4 how, where, and with what precise phrasing was this statement made? this question has repeatedly been examined in armenian and azerbaijani historiography.6 the issue has multiple historiographical nuances. in what follows, we briefly consider the matter of wording alone. the challenge is that this text does not exist in this precise formulation. according to azerbaijani sources, upon learning about the establishment of soviet power in armenia, azerbaijani leadership convened a session of the central committee (politburo and orgburo) of the azerbaijani communist (bolshevik) party on 29 november 1920. the decision passed made mention of the transfer of zangezur to armenia and the provision of the right to self-determination to the mountainous part of karabakh.7 however, the issue of nakhijevan was not discussed. on 30 november, the head of the revolutionary committee of azerbaijan, narimanov, and people’s commissar of foreign affairs, huseynov, sent a telegram to the revolutionary committee of armenia, the content of which differed from that of the decision adopted at the previous day’s session. the telegram read, “from today, disputes over the borders between armenia and azerbaijan are declared liquidated. nagorno karabakh, zangezur and nakhijevan are considered as part of the armenian socialist republic” (published in the newspaper “коммунист” [communist] issued on 7 december 1920 in yerevan).8 in narimanov’s speech at the ceremonial session of the baku council on 1 december, on the occasion of the sovietization of armenia, no. 28 and 56 are mentioned in the appropriate references. 6 for the sourceological basis of the issue see: к истории образования нагорнокарабахской автономной области азербайджанской сср. 1918-1925: документы и материалы [on the history of the formation of the nagornokarabakh autonomous region of the azerbaijani ssr. 1918-1925: documents and materials], ed. d. p. guliev (baku: azerneshr, 1989), 44-47; нагорный карабах в 1918-1923 гг.: сборник документов и материалов, [nagorno karabakh in 19181923: collection of documents and materials], ed. by v. a. mikaelyan (yerevan: national academy of sciences, 1992), 600-608; нагорный карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. документы и комментарии [nagorno karabakh in international law and world politics. documents and commentary], volume i. ed. yuri barsegov (moscow: krug, 2008), 599 (document n 630). for the discussion of the issue see: нагорный карабах. историческая справка [nagorno karabakh. historical reference], eds. g. a. galoyan, k. s. khudaverdyan (yerevan: academy of sciences of armssr, 1988), 23-30; jamil hasanly. “вопрос о нагорном карабахе на кавказском бюро цк ркп(б) в 19201923 годах” [the question of nagorno karabakh on the caucasian buro of the central committee of russian communist (bolshevik) party], kavkaz i globalizats’iya 5 (2011): 1-2: 139-144. 7 on the history of the formation of the nagorno-karabakh, 44. 8 “с сегодняшнего дня объявляются ликвидированными споры о границах между арменией и азербайджаном. нагорный карабах, зангезур и нахичеван считаются частью армянской социалистической республики.” nagorno karabakh in 1918-1923, 602 (document no. 420); nagorno karabakh in international law, 601 (document no. 632). 5 it was specifically stated: “the working peasantry of nagorno karabakh is granted the full right to self-determination. all military operations within zangezur are being suspended and troops of soviet azerbaijan are being withdrawn” (published in the newspaper “коммунист” [communist] of baku on 2 december 1920. there is no mention of nakhijevan in the speech).9 furthermore, in the official declaration of the azerbaijani revolutionary committee, the foregoing statement was formulated as follows: “[…] territories of the zangezur and nakhijevan districts [uyezd] are an integral part of soviet armenia, and the working peasantry of nagorno karabakh is granted the full right to self-determination. all military operations within zangezur are being suspended, and troops of soviet azerbaijan are being withdrawn” (published in baku’s “коммунист” newspaper on 2 december 1920).10 our findings reveal the following inconsistencies between the sources and the quotation on the banner hung at opera square, (a) the words “have been and remain” [были и остаются] do not exist in the official texts, (b) the text of the telegram is signed by two people, not only narimanov, and (c) in the archive collections for the place of publication dated 2 december, only the “communist” newspaper of baku is mentioned. further, a publication on this issue in the “bakinskiy rabochiy” newspaper is dated 3 december 1920. consistent with the theme of “quote thinking”, a banner, displayed at a rally near the presidium of the academy of sciences of armenia on 7 may 1988, boasted the words: “карабахский вопрос есть вопрос чести советских республик. орджоникидзе” [the karabakh issue is a point of honour for soviet republics. ordzhonikidze]. the statement draws on the words of sergo (gregory) ordzhonikidze in june 1921, when the issue of territorial belonging of nagorno-karabakh was decided. at the time, ordzhonikidze was the chairman of the caucasian bureau of the russian communist (bolshevik) party’s (hereinafter, rc(b)p) central committee, created in april of 1920 (with sergey kirov as his deputy). it should be noted that the caucasian bureau was not a regional body governing the party organizations of the 9 “[…] трудовому крестьянству нагорного карабаха предоставляется полное право самоопределения, все военные действия в пределах зангезура приостанавливаются, а войска советского азербайджана выводятся.” nagorno karabakh in 1918-1923, 604 (document no. 423). 10 “[…] территории зангезурского и нахичеванского уездов являются нераздельной частью советской армении, а трудовому крестьянству нагорного карабаха предоставляется полное право самоопределиться, все военные действия в пределах зангезура приостанавливаются, а войска советского азербайджана выводятся.” нагорный карабах в 1918-1923 гг., 601 (document no. 419); nagorno karabakh in 1918-1923, 599 (document no. 630). 6 caucasus region, but a regional responsible body of the rc(b)p) centre. the bureau’s activity was directed organizationally by the rc(b)p central committee and personally by the chairman of soviet russia’s council of people’s commissars, the actual leader of the country—vladimir lenin. the statement attributed to ordjonikidze was made on 27 june 1921 in a telephone (teletype) conversation between the chairman of the azerbaijani council of people’s commissars, narimanov, and the people’s commissar of foreign affairs of azerbaijan, huseynov. the person substituting narimanov (named shirvani) informed huseynov that, on that very day, the senior leadership of azerbaijan (the political bureau of the central committee of the communist party), had discussed the issue of karabakh and, in fact, had decided to contest her transfer to armenia, expressing their readiness to resign if the transfer were to proceed. huseynov was likely responsible for informing ordzhonikidze about this decision and was sure that the news “would be received very coldly.” it was on june 26, that ordzhonikidze had explicitly said to huseynov: “the karabakh issue is a point of honour for soviet republics, and it should be resolved precisely in this sense; so that this is the last time, i.e. in the form that i relayed to you yesterday.”11 it should be noted that on the same day (june 26), in a telegram to narimanov, ordzhonikidze and kirov had shared their opinion: “for the sake of resolving all disagreements/frictions once and for all and establishing truly amicable relations over the solution of the issue of nagorno karabakh, it is necessary to be guided by the following principle: not a single armenian village should be annexed to azerbaijan, just as not a single azerbaijani village should be annexed to armenia.”12 this approach clearly met with the opposition of the political and organizational bureaus of the central committee of the communist party of azerbaijan.13 why did banners of this specific content appear during the rallies at the opera square platform in february and near the presidium of the academy of sciences in 11 “карабахский вопрос есть вопрос чести советских республик и его нужно решить именно в этом смысле, чтобы это было в последний раз, то есть в том виде, как я вам передал вчера.” nagorno karabakh in 1918-1923, 647 (document no. 447). 12 “в интересах окончательного разрешения всех трений и установления истинно дружественных отношений при решении вопроса о нагорном карабахе необходимо руководствоваться таким принципом: ни одно армянское село не должно быть присоединено к азербайджану, равно как ни одно мусульманское село нельзя присоединять к армении.” nagorno karabakh in 1918-1923, 645 (document no. 445). 13 ibid., 645 (document n 446). 7 may, addressing hundreds of thousands of people? evidently, the then leadership of the karabakh movement, igor muradyan in particular, identified the possibility of persuading the top leadership of the ussr to address the issue by a volitional decision, given that, in their time, the communist leaders of soviet azerbaijan seemed to have made a fair, volitional decision about the transfer of karabakh to armenia. therefore, they wanted to resolve the matter by employing the same “volitional” decision approach. however, in reality, the leaders of soviet azerbaijan had never used the wording “были и остаются” [have been and are] referring to the disputed territories in 1920 (that is to say, the azerbaijani communist leaders were somewhat dishonest; they were very far from the ideas of historical justice and, especially, the proclaimed “proletarian internationalism”). moreover, as evidenced by the documents, they were doing everything to hinder the radical resolution of the matter. note that, in the initial phase of the karabakh movement, the concept of “free self-determination of peoples” was not necessarily pronounced, it was only referenced in several banners. in the decision passed by the extraordinary session of the council of people’s deputies 20th convocation of nkao on 20 february 1988,14 for whatever reason (perhaps, assuming that it would be more purposeful to present the matter as a mere territorial issue under article 78 of the ussr constitution; such issues existed throughout the history of the ussr and were resolved by the volitional decisions of central authorities15), no reference was made to the right of peoples to selfdetermination.16 however, the importance of this concept gradually began to come to 14 the session has resolved: “considering the wishes of the workers of nkao, to ask the supreme council of the azerbaijani ssr and the supreme council of the armenian ssr to demonstrate a sense of deep understanding of the aspirations of the armenian population of nagorno karabakh and resolve the question of transferring nkao from the azerbaijani ssr to the armenian ssr, at the same time to intercede with the supreme council of the ussr to reach a positive resolution on the issue of transferring the region from the azerbaijani ssr to the armenian ssr.” sovetakan gharabagh (stepanakert), 21 february 1988, no. 43. 15 for a comprehensive analysis of the perceptions of the karabakh problem as a subject matter of legal-political, historical rights or land claims and the right to self-determination see ashot sargsyan, ղարաբաղյան շարժման պատմություն 1988-1989 [history of the karabakh movement 1988-1989] (yerevan: antares, 2018), 96-101. 16 there has been no mention of it also in the decision of the plenum of the nagorno-karabakh regional committee of the communist party of azerbaijan dated 17 march 1988, or in the appeals of 119 deputies at various levels dated 20 may 1988 to the presidency of azerbaijani, ussr and armenian supreme councils and in those of the bureau of the regional committee of nagorno-karabakh and the executive committee of the region dated 27 may 1988 to the political bureau of the communist party of the ussr. and only in the decision adopted by the 8 the fore in the armenian reality, which also provided an opportunity to rely on article 70 of the ussr constitution.17 thus, the matter was reframed from being within the domain of the “willingness or unwillingness” of the country’s leadership to a constitutional domain. it should also be noted that, before the decision on 20 february 1988, the actions of nagorno karabakh armenians (such as the posting of petitions with tens of thousands of signatures to the central authorities of the country, the departure of three delegations to moscow, and the decisions of executive committees of regional councils of nkao) were manifestations of the exercise of the right to selfdetermination by their very nature, albeit without a direct reference to this fundamental principle.18 extraordinary session of the council of people’s deputies 12th convocation of nkao on june 21 the importance of the “leninist principle of the free selfdetermination of nations” was emphasized twice. see for details v. b. arutyunyan, события в нагорном карабахе: хроника. часть i: февраль 1988-январь 1989 [events in nagorno-karabakh: chronicle, part 1: february 1988 – january 1989] (yerevan, 1990), 60-61, 85-101. 17 it can be assumed that many of the participants in the rallies would have had the awareness that nagorno karabakh armenians have achieved selfdetermination; however, this awareness did not entail the linking of the continuation of the constitutional struggle with the promotion and implementation of the constitutional principle of the “free self-determination of nations.” for the first time, the issue was voiced from such a perspective on 19 march 1988 in a leaflet of the organizational committee of the karabakh movement (renamed armenian committee of karabakh movement since the end of may 1988) under the title of “our political principles” (author: vazgen manukyan). point 2 of this eight-point document read: “the goal of the movement is to achieve the satisfaction of the legitimate demand of the population of nkao based on the principle of the self-determination of nations and guided by the soviet constitution.” see vazgen manukyan, հայկական երազանքը գոյատևման փակուղում։ ելույթների և հոդվածների ժողովածու [armenian dream in the impasse of survival. collection of speeches and articles] (yerevan: v.i.v. aysor yev vaghe, 2002), 5. later the statement of the “free self-determination of peoples” found its place in levon ter-petrossyan’s speech about the proposed decisions to the supreme council of the armenian ssr during the rally on 7 july 1988, in the decision adopted during the rally on 12 june (“respect the right of all armenian people to national self-determination and reunite nkao with the armenian ssr”), then also in the draft decision to be adopted by the supreme council of the armenian ssr published in the republican press on 14 june. see иб (информационный бюллетень) [information bulletin] n 3 (1988): 7 (samizdat); հայության պայքարը լղիմ-ը խորհրդային հայաստանի հետ միավորելու համար: փաստաթղթերի և նյութերի ժողովածու [the struggle of the armenians to unite nkao with soviet armenia. collection of documents and materials], comps. karen khachatryan, hrant abrahamyan (yerevan: n.p., 2011), 164; ashot sargsyan, history of the karabakh movement 1988-1989, 125-129. 18 harut’yun marut’yan, «սահմանադրական պայքարը հայաստանի անկախացման ճանապարհին. սահմանադրության մասին պատկերացումները, ընկալումները, գնահատականները ղարաբաղյան շարժման տարիներին», սահմանադրական մշակույթի արժեբանական ակունքները հայ ժողովրդի հազարամյա տարեգրության ծալքերում [“constitutional struggle on the way to armenia’s independence: perceptions, 9 clearly, the highest authority among those who have spoken on the matter of karabakh’s status should be lenin. however, since lenin's attitude to this issue remains unknown to this day, it has been elicited from lenin’s expressions of a more general nature. to be specific, lenin had written only about the “self-determination of peoples” without any specific explanations, which, by the way, is the precise reason for the diametrically opposed interpretations of lenin’s national policy by the armenians and azerbaijanis. nonetheless, a poster referencing lenin’s attitude on the issue was circulated in the first half of june 1988 when, at the request of the people, it was decided to convene an extraordinary session of the supreme council of the armenian ssr on the issue of nkao “becoming a part of the armenian ssr”. the poster featured the contour maps of the armenian ssr and nkao and claimed that «վերամիավորումը լիովին համապատասխանում է լենինյան ազգային քաղաքականությանը» [reunification fully complies with lenin’s national policy] (fig. 2). what is important in the poster’s statement is that activists of the movement were indeed able to find a specific quote, which they believed related directly to the karabakh issue as a manifestation of the right to self-determination (fig. 3, 4). “право на самоопределение... означает решение вопроса именно не центральным, [sic!] парламентом, а парламентом, сеймом, референдумом отделяющегося меньшинства. когда норвегия отделялась в 1905 г. от швеции, решала это одна норвегия, которая вдвое меньше швеции. в. и. ленин, том 24, стр. 227” [“the right to self-determination... means resolving the matter by not the central parliament, [sic!] but by the parliament, seim, a referendum of the secessionist minority. when norway separated (1905) from sweden, the matter was resolved solely by norway (which is twice as small as sweden). v.i. lenin, vol. 27, page 227”].19 apprehensions, and assessments of the constitution during the years of the karabakh movement” in the axiological roots of constitutional culture in the millennial annals of the armenian people], eds. gagik harut’yunyan, artak movsisyan, ter ararat qahana movsisyan (etchmiadzin: publishing house of holy see of etchmiadzin, 2020), 651. 19 the quote is from lenin’s «о национальной программе рсдрп» [on national program of rsdrp [russian social-democratic labour party] article published in december of 1913. in the following two sentences of this article the abovementioned idea is reinforced as follows: “the right to self-determination”… means such a democratic system where not only would democracy exist in general, but especially there could not be an n o n-d e m o c r a t i c solution to the issue of secession. …the proletariat demands such a democracy that will exclude forceful retention of one of the nations within the borders of the state. for this reason, “in order not to violate the right to self-determination” we have to “vote not for secession,”… but vote to leave the solution of this issue to the 10 a compelling “leninist saying” on the karabakh issue was similarly developed during the last official soviet demonstration on 7 november 1988. a large portrait of lenin on a vehicle featuring the word “academia” was complemented by a banner reading “карабах-армения. один народ – одна республика” [karabakharmenia – one nation, one republic] (fig. 5). in those days, v. i. lenin remained the most significant authority. in fact, in the background of fig. 5, an official banner displays the cliché-formula “long live lenin’s great work”. displaying the statement declaring karabakh and armenia as one nation combined was coming to be the “author” of that expression gaining even more value by being carried by the researchers of the academy of sciences of armenia. at the same demonstration on 7 november 1988, lenin’s authority was invoked similarly when a teenager climbed atop the vehicle bearing lenin’s image and his famous statement “есть такая партия!”20 [there is such a party!], unfurling the tricolour flag and thereby suggesting a new interpretation of the leninist formula.21 other examples of “quote thinking” are evident on a banner reading «մեր գործը արդար է մենք կհաղթեʹնք» [our cause is just. we will win] from february 1988,22 a poster featuring the contour maps of armenia and nagorno separatist region.” see vladimir lenin, “о национальной программе рсдрп” в кн.: в. и. ленин, полное собрание сочинений, т. 24 [on nationalities question of rsdrp [russian social-democratic labour party] in v. i. lenin, full composition of writings, vol. 24] (moscow: izdatel’stvo politicheskoj literaturi, 1973), 227. the part quoted in the text of the article was also used by the chairman of the writers’ union of armenia, deputy of the supreme council of ussr vardges petrosyan in his 18 july 1988 speech at the session of the presidium of the supreme council of the ussr. see արցախ. нагорный карабах. информационные материалы. заседание президиума верховного совета ссср от 18.07.88 [artsakh. nagorno-karabakh. informational materials. the session of the presidium of the supreme soviet of the ussr of 18.07.88] (vararakn-yerevan, 1988), 11 (samizdat). the issue in a wider context is discussed in the following publication: harut’yun marut’yan, “constitutional struggle on the way to armenia’s independence,” 643-680. 20 see for details: https://kommynist.ru/%d0%95%d1%81%d1%82%d1%8c_ %d1%82%d0%b0%d0%ba%d0%b0%d1%8f_%d0%bf %d0%b0%d1%80%d1%82%d0%b8%d1%8f 21 levon abrahamian, harut’yun marut’yan, «քաղաքական ելույթների պատկերագրական լեզվի շուրջ (ղարաբաղյան շարժման ցուցապաստառների օրինակով)» հայ արվեստին նվիրված հանրապետական viii գիտական կոնֆերանս։ զեկուցումների թեզիսներ [“on iconographic language of political speeches (based on the examples of the posters of karabakh movement)” in the 8th republican scientific conference dedicated to armenian art. executive summaries of papers], eds. g. gyodakyan et al. (yerevan: gitutyun, 1997), 5-6. 22 see «մեր մայր հայաստանն ենք ուզում» [we want our mother armenia]: rallies in stepanakert and yerevan, 25-26.02.1988, 11 https://kommynist.ru/%d0%95%d1%81%d1%82%d1%8c_%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%ba%d0%b0%d1%8f_%d0%bf%d0%b0%d1%80%d1%82%d0%b8%d1%8f https://kommynist.ru/%d0%95%d1%81%d1%82%d1%8c_%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%ba%d0%b0%d1%8f_%d0%bf%d0%b0%d1%80%d1%82%d0%b8%d1%8f https://kommynist.ru/%d0%95%d1%81%d1%82%d1%8c_%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%ba%d0%b0%d1%8f_%d0%bf%d0%b0%d1%80%d1%82%d0%b8%d1%8f karabakh and the words «հավերժ միասին: մեր գործն արդար է» [forever together. our cause is just] from 18 november 1988 (fig. 6, 7) and a banner reading «առաջ, հանուն արդար գործի» [onwards, for the just cause]. although the writing on the poster bears no attribution, is not difficult to identify its source. the first part of the “quote” is a variation of the infamous front-office stock phrase signed into law, through which soviet ideologues asserted the inviolability of friendship between different peoples. for instance, between russians and ukrainians (which stretches as far back as the 17th century under the military leadership of bogdan khmelnytsky) or between russians and bulgarians. and, of course, between all the peoples and nations of the ussr; as the lyrics of the ussr anthem suggest, “сплотила навеки великая русь” (“are forever united by great russia”). the second part of the “quote” (alongside the text of the february banner) is also well-known to many people from the history of the ussr. they are the final words of address to the nation by the people’s commissar for foreign affairs, deputy chairman of the council of people’s commissars of the ussr, vyacheslav molotov, on 22 june 1941, at 12 noon, on the occasion of the invasion of nazi germany: “наше дело правое, враг будет разбит, победа будет за нами!” [“our cause is just. the enemy shall be defeated. victory will be ours.”]. a slightly modified version was repeated by joseph stalin on 3 july 1941. this appeal was repeated frequently, both in the press and verbally, throughout the great patriotic war (1941-1945). as the internet suggests, variations of individual sentences of the three-part appeal have been evident as early as the first world war and the russian civil war. the phrase “наше дело правое” [“our cause is just”] was even used by vladimir lenin in one of his works in 1903. this statement has become a catchphrase used at various levels of propaganda since at least the 1940s, including on the medals of victory in the great patriotic war: “наше дело правое. мы победили” [our cause is just. we won]. the use of this wording in the posters and banners of the karabakh movement is thereby aligned with a righteous, patriotic war against fascist invaders. the final part of the “stalinist” phrase, “мы победим” [we will win], can also be interpreted beyond the surface, revealing deeper implications. although the slogan in question—on the poster “forever together. our cause is just” is written in armenian, it is certainly a product of russian/soviet thinking. as a result, this strategy to advocate for a righteous solution to the karabakh issue relies on the https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlt-q3vt4aq, 12.36 minutes. 12 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlt-q3vt4aq “quotation” of cliché statements made by the very individual – joseph stalin – who, according to armenian historiography, has played a fatal role in settling the karabakh issue. the phrase “our cause is just” has maintained no less relevance since the 1990s, but the armenian translation is typically used in another context—the word “just” in armenian also means “unfaked” or “pure”.23 in that sense, it is used in the word combination “just clarified butter.” furthermore, the wording “our cause is just” has been used for more than a quarter of a century by the “arznikat” dairy processing plant to promote its products,24 i.e., on the labels of milk products and on vehicles for the transportation thereof. another banner, displayed in february 1988, includes the slogan “карабах должен быть в составе арм.сср” [karabakh should be in the armenian ssr]. this is not merely an abstract meditation on the karabakh issue, but rather a statement directly reflecting the decision passed on 20 february 1988 by the extraordinary session of the council of people’s deputies 20th convocation of nkao to appeal to the supreme councils of the azerbaijani ssr and armenian ssr to transfer nkao from the azerbaijani ssr to the armenian ssr. this decision prompted people to take to the streets of yerevan in defence of their karabakh compatriots, thereby initiating the launch of the karabakh movement. posters such as «արցախը անհապաղ վերամիավորել հայաստանին» [reunite artsakh with armenia immediately]25 (fig. 8), and «արցախը հայաստանին» [artsakh – to armenia] (fig. 9) (both displayed on 7 november 1988) clearly originate from the wording of the aforementioned decision, as well as the decision made by armenia’s parliament on the inclusion of nkao in the armenian ssr about four months later, on 15 june 1988. drawing on the easily recognisable language of flags, the idea was further expressed via the inscription «ղարաբաղ» [karabakh] on the middle blue strip of the flag of the armenian ssr (fig. 10). “unification” as a solution 23 stepan malkhasiants, հայերէն բացատրական բառարան, հատոր 1 [armenian explanatory dictionary, vol. 1] (yerevan: haypethrat, 1944), 257. 24 see for example https://www.instagram.com/arzni_kat/ , accessed 02.02.2022. 25 this same demand with a slightly different wording, “reunite artsakh with armenia immediately” was among the demands of the hunger strike that started in mid-october 1988. see the photo: harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity, 109, fig. 57. 13 https://www.instagram.com/arzni_kat/ a part of the aforementioned group of posters could be distinguished by a peculiar keyword contained therein – «միացում» [miatsum, unification]. for example, «միացումը մեր գլխավոր խնդիրն է» [unification is our main objective] (18 september 1988), «հայաստան – արցախ – միացում» [armenia – artsakh – unification] (early to mid-1988) (fig. 11, 12), «արցախ-միացում» [artsakh – unification] (7 november 1988) (fig. 13), «հայաստան / միացում / արցախ» [armenia/unification/artsakh] (7–8 november 1988) (fig. 14), to list only a few. “unification” was one of the most popular and polysemantic words in the rallies right from the start. first, it was a slogan itself, often chanted after the speeches dedicated to the reunification of karabakh with armenia. in fact, the word was more frequently used in karabakh than in armenia. thus, while people in yerevan typically protested by chanting «ղա-րա-բաղ» [ka-ra-bakh], people in karabakh tended to use the slogan «մի-ա-ցում» [u-ni-fi-cation], although «հայաս-տան» [ar-me-nia] was common as well. apparently, the “big country-small country” relationship was putting its stamp on the karabakh-armenia bond: unification is naturally a more significant notion for the “small” than for the “big”. the word «միավորում» [unification] appears even in official documents adopted by nkao, while in similar decisions adopted by armenia, the preferred expression is «կազմի մեջ մտնել» [entry to…]. it is noteworthy that the core, leading, an informal organization of the movement was called «ղարաբաղ կոմիտե» [karabakh committee], while a key organization representing the karabakh wing of the movement assumed the name «միացում» [unification]. it is further interesting to observe the alteration of the context against which the concept of “unification” developed during the years of the movement. it started (as already noted) as a means for restoring historical justice, later metamorphosing into a mechanism for exercising the right of peoples to self-determination. after the sumgait massacres, the concept of “unification” evolved as a way to safeguard against future genocides. in this way, the very concept of unification was the only means to protect human rights because the notion of human rights was considered logistically unfeasible were nkao to remain a part of azerbaijan. finally, around the summer of 1990, the concepts of unification and unity began to feed the reclamation programs of both different organizations and parties. the following are examples of such slogans: «արցախյան պահանջատիրությունը ազգի միասնության հիմքն է» [reclaiming 14 artsakh is the basis for the unity of the nation], «արցախի պահանջատիրությունը հայ դատի անբաժանելի մասն է» [reclaiming artsakh is an integral part of the armenian cause], «ով արցախի հետ չէ և պահանջատեր չէ՝ հայ չէ» [those who are not with artsakh and do not reclaim it, are not armenians]. it is noteworthy that the slogan «միացում» [unification] very quickly acquired a relatively broad semantic spectrum. people started to chant it immediately after every speech touching upon this or that perspective of the concept of unification in general. consequently, this was the slogan crowning speeches about the unanimity of the armenian people scattered all over the world. a poster from 7 june 1988 stating, «հայեր բոլոր երկրների, միացե՛ք» [armenians of all countries, unite] (fig. 15) built on the principle of the famous appeal of the communist party manifesto. the speeches that called for the unity of the nation and its leadership worked similarly (compare, for example, the february 1988 poster with the same theme «հայաստանի կառավարություն, միացեք ժողովրդի ձայնին» [government of armenia, join the voice of the people]26). in the summer and autumn of 1988, the speeches of guests from the baltic states were also accompanied by the chanting of «միացում» [unification]. this new aspect of the word “unification” was embodied in a colourful poster where the flags of the three baltic republics and armenia were united. the last recorded call for “unification” was made in the february 1992 rally dedicated to the four-year anniversary of the karabakh movement. this time the call for “unification” was directed to opposing parties and ngos. the word «միացում» [unification] also gave birth to the highly popular «հայեր, միացեք» [armenians, unite!]27 slogan, calling for the unification of armenians as early as 1988. this slogan, without fail, has been voiced during all mass rallies and marches and represented a special rallying cry calling people to join the demonstrations. thus, the word «միացում» [unification] was initially used in a narrow sense (unification of artsakh with armenia) and later in a broader sense (unification of all armenians). its logical conclusion manifests in a november 1988 26 see «ժամանակագրության շարունակությունը» [the continuation of the chronicle], hayastan. hayastani azgayin ankakhut’yun kusaktsut’yan pashtonat’ert’, 25 october 1989 (no. 16), 12. 27 see for instance levon ter-petrosyan, «ղարաբաղը մերն է և մերը կլինի» [karabakh is and will be ours], june 15, 1988, https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v=1pueeejkdk4 , 0.001-0.020. 15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pueeejkdk4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pueeejkdk4 poster: «հայ ժողովրդի միասնությունը արցախի հարցի լուծման գրավականն է» [the unity of the armenian people is the pledge for addressing the issue of artsakh] (fig. 16). mother and child apart from historical, political, legal and other justifications, the idea of “unification”— now with a gesture towards reunification—also operated on the basis of “popular evidence”. here, the idea manifested in a variety of posters where a motif of mother and child were depicted as forcibly separated from each other and evoking a sense of longing to be reunited. the motif was often deployed through schematic solutions, and expressions of “cartographic thinking”.28 the first expressions of this idea appeared already in the february 1988 rallies (february 20–26) on the platform of opera square, where two banners were displayed side-by-side, reading: «դու էլ դառած կռվածաղիկ իմ / բալիկն ես / աʹյ ղարաբաղ» [an apple of discord, / you are my baby, / karabakh] (fig. 17), «մայր հայաստանը տառապած / քեզ է սպասում գրկաբաց» [mother-armenia broken of heart / is waiting for you with open arms] (fig. 18). the words on the first banner constitute the first line of hovhannes shiraz’s poem «ղարաբաղի ողբը» [lament of karabakh]. poetically describing the difficult situation of karabakh-artsakh’s armenians, this verse was probably written in the 1950s but went unpublished until far later for obvious reasons, but it was wellliked and often learnt by heart by the people; it was one of the most frequently used poems during the rally on 24 april 1965.29 the poem repeats the notion of karabakh 28 the vision of “armenia,” “greater armenia,” “lost homeland,” “free, independent and united armenia” has always excited the armenians deprived of statehood for centuries, it has been in their thoughts, in their distant and proximate, real and unreal dreams. the armenians, especially in soviet times, appreciated the old, new and contemporary maps in armenian and foreign languages representing historical armenia, or those having, for instance, “armenia” or “armenian highland” written on the territory of the ottoman empire and later of turkey. that is to say the iconographic solution of seeing armenian lands united, unified as the maps were suggesting had always been appreciated. the issue is thoroughly discussed in the following publications: harut’yun marut’yan, «քարտէզը որպէս ինքնութեան խորհրդանիշ» [maps as symbols of identity], handes amsorya 1-12 (2006): 443-478; arutyun marutyan, «карты как символы национального движения в армении» [maps as symbols of national movement in armenia] in mythical landscapes then and now: the mystification of landscapes in search for national identity, eds. rüth büttner and judith peltz (yerevan: antares, 2006), 229-250, 279-285. 29 samvel muradyan, հովհաննես շիրազ. բանաստեղծը, մարդը [hovhannes shiraz, the poet, person], vol. 2 (yerevan: ysu, 2015), 61; ashot ter-minasyan, 16 as the offspring (“baby”) of armenia several times, emphasizing that karabakh was “an armenian land since the beginning” which was now “captured”. the poem asks: “when will the armenian hands raise up in fists like your mountains?” and assures that “we are one, body and soul, and not even death could do us part”, culminating in a prediction that karabakh will become armenian once again.30 therefore, it is no accident that a banner appeared in february 1988 with the inscription «երազդ կիրականացնենք, շիրազ» [we’ll make your dream come true, shiraz] alongside a large picture of the poet, implicitly alluding to the idea expressed in “the lament of karabakh.” the second poster depicts a young mother with outstretched arms, ready to embrace the little boy running towards her against the backdrop of the double cones of mount ararat, which is the national symbol of armenia. at the very top of the poster is a photo of the leader of the ussr, mikhail gorbachev (this will be expanded upon in the paragraphs to come). the mother and child metaphor is also evident in the following four posters. the first features a fragment of raphael’s “sistine madonna”—the virgin mary and child—above a contour map of armenia and karabakh. a thick, black line separates the mother from the child, continuing down to separate armenia from karabakh. this poster, created by a professional artist, was exhibited at the artist’s house in may 1988. in another poster with a similar approach (likely displayed on 7 november 1988), a person with a sword cuts up the road before a little child rushing from the territory of nkao towards his mother, who reclines along the contour map of armenia (mother armenia) (fig. 19). the third poster (fig. 20) can, perhaps, be considered the most characteristic appearance of the “mother and child” motif. the poster appeared in opera square in the summer of 1988. embedded in primitivist principles, the poster features the mother in traditional armenian costume in the territory of the armenian ssr, where «հովհաննես շիրազի հայրենասիրական քնարի աշխարհայացքային շերտերը» [worldview layers of hovhannes shiraz’s patriotic lyre], banber yerevani hamalsarani 2 (2000): 42-55; silva khachatryan, «հովհաննես շիրազի քնարը՝ արցախի ազատագրական շարժման զանգահար», արցախի պետական համալսարան։ գիտական ընթերցումներ։ ղարաբաղյան շարժման 30-րդ տարեդարձին նվիրված գիտաժողովի նյութեր [“hovhannes shiraz’s lyrics as the call for the artsakh liberation movement” in artsakh state university. scientific readings (collection of articles) proceedings of the conference on 30th anniversary of karabakh movement] (stepanakert: artsakh state university press, 2018), 178-180. 30 hovhannes shiraz, «ղարաբաղի ողբը» [the lament of karabakh], bagin 9-12 (1990): 26-27. 17 yerevan should be. the child is pictured with outstretched arms in nagorno karabakh territory (inscribed with “artsakh”) and is separated from the mother figure and armenia by a barbed wire fence. the “border” evoked by the fence is topped by a muslim crescent and star, thus representing azerbaijan.31 at the top of the poster is the following quatrain, expressing the heartbreak of the situation: «միʹ լար որդիս հասկանում եմ՝ մերկ ես, մենակ ու անտուն… / ախ, ինչ անեմ, անխղճորեն քեզ գիրկս առնել չեն թողնում, / քիչ էլ տոկա, հո մեր երկրում միայն անխիղճ չի ապրում, / ժամն այդ կգա, հավատա ինձ՝ կհայտնվես իմ գրկում» [don’t you cry, sonny boy, unclothed, alone and homeless that you are, / what can i do? deprived, so ruthlessly, of hugging you as i am / a little longer you hang on there, ‘tis not land for only the cruel / believe that soon will come the time, you will be back into my arms]. the fourth poster, created by an amateur artist, was held on 24 april 1990, the day of remembrance of the genocide victims (fig. 21). again, the poster depicts a mother and child drawn to each other but separated. the mother’s arms take the shape of the armenian national tricolour flag, while the child is imaged in padlocked iron chains, again bearing the muslim crescent and star. notably, this is one of the rare cases where an image-based poster is accompanied by a separate banner explaining in words what is being depicted – «շղթաներից ազատվելու համար 31 the star and crescent are sometimes presented as symbols of islam. however, it is known that the star and crescent were used as symbols at least 3,000 years prior to the formation of islam. according to certain sources, in the fourth century b.c. these signs had become the symbol of byzantium (later constantinople, now istanbul). when the turks conquered the capital of the byzantine empire in 1453, they appropriated the banner and the symbol of the city, too. moreover, as the ottoman empire had for centuries ruled the islamic world, and had led numerous wars against christian europe, many have come to perceive the star and crescent as specifically islamic symbols. meanwhile, it is known that islam has no historically created symbols: there is no mention of them in the koran and there is no evidence of their link to the prophet mohammed, not to mention that according to the muslim religion to use anything as a symbol of allah is considered a sin. thus, the star and crescent were symbols of the ottoman empire, and are to the present, at least as perceived by armenian society, considered symbols of turkish identity. since the azerbaijanis have been perceived by armenians as caucasian turks, it is but natural that people, wishing to point out the ethnic identity of turks/azerbaijanis, have made use of none other than the star and crescent, which is also a handy means for the iconographic solution of the problem. see in detail, for example: http://islam.about.com/library/weekly/aa060401a.htm; http://islam.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.fotw.net/flags/ islam.html ; http://altreligion.about.com/library/glossary/ symbols/bldefsstarcrescent.htm; http://altreligion.about.com/library/texts/bl_2ancientpagan11.htm ; http://www.straightdope.com/ mailbag/mcrescent.html . 18 http://www.straightdope.com/ http://altreligion.about.com/library/texts/bl_2ancientpagan11.htm http://altreligion.about.com/library/glossary/ http://islam.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.fotw.net/flags/islam.html http://islam.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.fotw.net/flags/islam.html հարկավոր է պայքարել» [one needs to fight to cast off one’s chains]. if the earlier mother and child poster only depicted separation, the 1990 poster and accompanying banner show a means to overcome that separation. as in almost all traditional images of motherhood, the child on the poster is male. even in posters that do not directly relate to the theme of motherhood, artsakh is characteristically presented as a “wronged” teenage boy. another poster (7 june 1988), following the theme of mother and child separation, reads (“мать-армения ждет свое дитя арцах” [mother-armenia is waiting for her child artsakh]) (fig. 22): now a purely symbolic image. here armenia is represented by its universally recognized symbol, mount ararat, while artsakh is represented by the sculpture of an elderly married couple, which has become its most recognizable image, especially during the movement. also relating to this theme is the cover image of the october 1988 issue of the magazine “garun” [spring]. the cover features a magnet on the contour map of armenia, attracting a smaller magnet in the place where nkao would be located where the map continues. in addition to the magnet motif, the mother and child theme manifests via a map of armenia that resembles a silhouette of a woman’s head in profile with an elongated neck. the latter motif is most vividly expressed in a “photo badge” issued in the summer of 1988 (fig. 23).32 the multiple photo prints of the 4x6.5 cm “badge” represent the anthropomorphized map of armenia in miniature, depicted with eyes and hair. in the figure, lake sevan is featured as a hairpin and yerevan is marked by a round earring made of precious stones. the woman gazes longingly at the map of nako, painted against the background of the flag of the armenian ssr in an oval frame. the woman’s head is also placed against a similar backdrop. in fact, in the upper corner of the badge, on the flag of the armenian ssr, the artist tsedrik aslanyan also placed the symbol of agricultural and industrial workers – the hammer and sickle with a star. the writings at the top and the bottom of the photo badge read, «միայն այդպես ենք հաղորդակցվում... մինչև ե՞րբ...» [this is the only way we communicate ... until when...?] and «բանական մարդի՜կ, մի թույլ տվեք կորչի՛... փրկե՜ք, վերադարձրե՜ք...» [intelligent people, don’t let it perish… save it, bring it back!], respectively. this is the only poster known to us 32 the “photo badge” kindly provided to the authors by our colleague dr. hripsime pikichyan. 19 where there is a deliberate cartographical rearrangement – nkao is not placed to the right (as it is geographically),33 but to the left so that the “woman-armenia” is able to see it. compellingly, the artist has inserted the map of nkao into a gilded frame, perhaps trying to justify this topographical inaccuracy. the aesthetic strategy accompanies the inscription, which reads: “this is the only way we communicate.” in other words, we (armenians) communicate as we would with a relative who is in a foreign country (the backdrop of the flag evidences this) and, therefore, in a commemorative photograph. the soviet symbolism of the badge emphasizes the loyalty of the armenians, that is, the reassurance highlighted many times that the demands of the armenians are not anti-soviet. the heart-wrenching poetics of the inscriptions of the badge are juxtaposed with formulas playing on the theme of the separated mother and child, particularly highlighted during the first days of the february 1988 rallies: almost every speaker taking the floor fervently used the iconography of the mother and child.34 other versions read: “мы ждем свое дитя арцах” [we are waiting for our offspring, artsakh], «մայր հայաստանը քեզ է կանչում, ղարաբաղ» [motherarmenia calls you, karabakh] or «մայր հայաստանն է կանչում» [motherarmenia calls]35 (all from february 1988). the last slogan is interesting in the sense that it is directly copied from the poster “родина-мать зовет” [the motherland calls], well-known from the very beginning of the great patriotic war. all the formulas are expressions of a mother pleading with her offspring, which is not surprising, as all these banners were created from the perspective of activists in yerevan. at approximately the same time, in february, may and september 1988, 33 the placement of the contour of the nkao below the occipital part of mother armenia contour map-profile found on other posters matches with the well-known verbal formula «ղարաբաղը մայր-հայաստանի մեջքն է» [karabakh is the back of mother-armenia] and therefore it – the back, cannot be “broken.” this thesis is brought up more than once in support of the fact that karabakh should remain armenian. 34 cf. the statement of one of the participants in stepanakert rallies poet gurgen gabrielyan during an interview on 25 february 1988: “the claim of the people is very just, honest and moral. … these people want to live with their people, like when a son wants to live with his mother and wants, so to speak, to get rid of his stepmother and come live with his birth mother. there is nothing bad here, there is nothing wicked here. there is no intent to disturb the relations of nations.” see «մեր մայր հայաստանն ենք ուզում». հանրահավաքներ ստեփանակերտում և երևանում [“we want out mother armenia”: rallies in stepanakert and yerevan], 25-26 february 1988, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlt-q3vt4aq, 0.221.32 min. on gurgen gabrielyan see: gayane lalayan, «գուրգեն գաբրիելյանը և արցախյան շարժումը» [gurgen gabrielyan and the artsakh movement], artsakhi petakan hamalsarani gitakan teghekagir, humanitar gitut’yunner 1 (2015): 84-88. 35 see “the continuation of the chronicle.” 20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wlt-q3vt4aq similar posters were displayed in stepanakert, but depicting the reverse: a homeless child calling for his mom «ղարաբաղին՝ մայր հայաստան» [mother armenia to karabakh] (fig. 24), «որբ ղարաբաղը մայր է ուզում» [orphaned karabakh wants a mother], “мечта карабахцев – воссоединение с матерью-арменией” [the dream of the people of karabakh is reunification with mother armenia]. here too are other slogans indirectly relating to the group under scrutiny – “гарантия счастья наших детей – воссоединение нкао с арменией” [the pledge for our children’s happiness is the reunification of the nkao with armenia] (although the text refers to parents’ care for their children instead of mothers alone), “наша цель – воссоединение с матерью арменией” [our goal [is] reunification with mother armenia] (askeran, fig. 25). indeed, in february 1988, in yerevan, too, there appeared a banner showing contour maps of armenia and nkao and a heartbreaking image of mother armenia begging in the name of her child, karabakh – «մայրիկ, օգնիր, դժբախտության մեջ եմ» [mother, help me, i am in trouble] (fig. 26, 27). however, judging from the content, it could be assumed that the banner was created by yerevan residents of karabakh origin.36 the situation seemed to repeat itself over three decades later when, during the 5 november 2022 rally of the “hayastan” alliance, a young boy holds a picture of a little girl with a poster representing child-artsakh’s appeal to mother armenia «ես քոʹ զավակն եմ, հայաստան» [i am your offspring, armenia] taken a few weeks earlier on 30 october 2022, during a rally of many thousands in stepanakert (fig. 28).37 in the summer of 1988, the offered popular solutions to the karabakh issue included another version, that armenia should join karabakh. and, immediately a poster with the corresponding content was created and recorded in july of 1988, «արցախ[,] մայր հայաստանի սիրտն ու ձեռքը քեզ» [artsakh, mother armenia’s heart and hand to you].38 the image of the mother caring for her children’s happiness turned out to feed the imagination not only of the creators of posters in karabakh and armenia but also 36 export of slogans and poster ideas as a rule from karabakh to armenia was seen throughout the entire movement. there was even an area in the opera square standing out with vividly pronounced karabakh slogans; it was near the statue of hovhannes tumanyan, the usual gathering place of karabakh people of yerevan during the rallies. 37 «մեʹնք ալ քո զավակն ենք, հայաստաʹն…» [we also are your child, armenia…], hairenik (boston), 8 november 2022. 38 the banner was captured in autumn of 2004, during the «հեղափոխություն» [revolution] tv program (hosted by vahram martirosyan). 21 of mikhail gorbachev himself. in his address “to the workers, nations of azerbaijan and armenia” (26 february 1988) gorbachev also referred to this image cited almost every day: “ни одна мать не согласится с тем, чтобы ее детям угрожали национальные распри...” [no mother will acquiesce to her children being threatened with national strife...].39 interestingly, this cliché combined with the foregoing posters stirred up illusory hopes among some armenians that gorbachev, like the armenians, also tended to see the image of a separated mother and child in the karabakh problem. apparently, the theme of parentage was so close to gorbachev that later, in july 1988, he referred to it once again; this time in the defence of the punitive forces (“это же наши дети…” [after all they are our children...]), against whom armenians were trying to show resistance. this catchphrase immediately prompted the creation of a new series of posters.40 the touching, sometimes heart-breaking tenor of the posters featuring the mother and orphaned child acquire a tinge of demand in a banner reading «ղարաբաղը մայր-հայաստանին» [karabakh to mother-armenia].41 it should be noted that, chronologically, the latter does not represent the evolution of the aforementioned group; it appeared at the same time as the other posters of the batch, during the february rallies of 1988. factually, however, it constitutes their logical development, marking the transition from emotional ascertainment to demand. generally, the analysis of the content of the posters shows that each point of the movement is characterized by the simultaneous appearance of banners and posters indicative of its most diverse future and past phases. while the main thematic vector is created by the posters consistent with the period and constituting the overwhelming majority, there are exceptions (like, for instance, the aforementioned banner, which is the only one in the mass of february posters). in a similar banner that appeared in june–july 1988, there was also mention of the name of the region, making the claim: «ղարաբաղը՝ մայր հայաստանին – քյավառ» [karabakh to mother armenia – gavar] (fig. 29). without a reference to the theme of motherhood, the demand “karabakh to mother-armenia” evolved into “artsakh to armenia,” which has already been examined in the earlier discussion of the concept of “unification” in posters. a similar 39 գրական թերթ [grakan tert], 4 march 1988, no. 10 (2378). 40 for details, see harut’yun marut’yan, iconography of armenian identity, 175-178 (fig. 142, 144, 145). 41 “the continuation of the chronicle.” 22 poster with a cartographic solution emerged in february 1988 (fig. 30). the poster features the contour maps of the armenian ssr and nkao with «հայաստան» [armenia] written thereon, while the header reads «ղարաբաղ-արցախը՝ հայաստանից անբաժան» [karabakh-artsakh inseparable from armenia]. schematically, this notion is formulated in the demand of the first nationwide strike in early july of 1988 «միացնել արցախը հայաստանին» [unite artsakh to armenia] (fig. 31). in mid-october of 1988, along with the dramatic events taking place in karabakh, the following intervention intended to demonstrate the spiritual unity of armenia and karabakh: conservatory students, who had already been on strike for several days, created the contour maps of the armenian ssr and nkao and the word « » [artsakh] with candles, lighting them late in the evening (fig. 32, 33, 34,արցախ 35). the images have a sacred quality as if addressed as a prayer for unification. it should be noted that, in addition to sober and sombre demands, the theme of unification was also conveyed in joyful and festive ways, which is not surprising, if we take into consideration that mass rallies and demonstrations have a lot in common with carnival-type popular holidays.42 generally, many “high-level” slogans had their “low-level” analogues—even in the form of jokes. thus, in february–march 1988, it was also commonplace to see the display of jokes about how people outside the movement, such as tsekhaviks [ցեխավիկները],43 suggested that the famous black sea resort cities like sochi, sukhumi should be claimed alongside or instead of karabakh. and, an old woman requested that people also claim the capital of medieval armenia, ani. although anecdotal, such suggestions nevertheless indicate the fairly low level of people’s legal knowledge at the beginning of the movement, but which developed rapidly as conflicts ensued. “karabakh is ours” 42 see for instance levon abrahamian, «քաոսը և կոսմոսը ժողովրդական ելույթների կառուցվածքում. ղարաբաղյան շարժումը ազգագրագետի հայացքով» [chaos and cosmos in the structure of people’s movement: the karabakh movement from ethnographer’s point of view], mshakuyt’ 2-3 (1990): 14-21. 43 translated from russian “tsekhavik” literally means head of a workshop. in soviet times, “tsekhaviks” were called people who being involved in industry sector used part of the profit from state production and also extracted raw materials in their own illegal production. 23 an interesting group in the theme of “karabakh-armenia” are posters claiming that: «արցախ աշխարհը մերն է» [the land of artsakh is ours], «ղարաբաղը մերն է» [karabakh is ours] (fig. 18).44 this slogan enjoyed such popularity that it became an everyday formula almost immediately, serving as a base for the most unexpected manifestations of mass folk creativity. thus, during the summer 1988 marches, one could hear the following, amusing play-on-words: one of the demonstrators would ask loudly «ղարաբաղը ու՞մն ա» [whose is karabakh?] and the crowd would answer «մե՛րը» [ours!]. he would ask again, and the same polyphonic answer would follow. for the third time, the moderator of the “dialogue” would ask: «թուրքերի ի՞նչը» [what y’say to turks?] and «մե՛րը» [motherf’ers begone!] would come the cheerful reply. in armenian, the words “ours” and a dialectic version of “mother” are homonyms. the last part of the dialogue thus ends with a play on words involving the mothers of the turks. another example of popular creativity along the same theme is an inscription on a handmade tin disk (thanks to which three people could drink water at the same time) attached to a drinking fountain: «հայեր, դիմացե՛ք, ղարաբաղը մերն է» [armenians, hold on, karabakh is ours] (26 september 1989) (fig. 36, 37). another sample of folklore, in the form of a nursery rhyme, displays the many contradictory aspects of this seemingly simple formula: «ղարաբաղը մերն ա, / բայց թուրքերի ձեռն ա, / պապան գնաց ցույցի, / որ ապացուցի» [karabakh is ours, / turks say “no, ours”, / papa went to rally, / to prove the contrary]. according to the logic of this rhyme, “karabakh is ours”, that is, she belongs to armenians (de facto, historically, and ethnically), but, at the same time, she is not ours (de jure, according to the soviet constitution) and that is why the armenians have rallied to address this contradiction. this nursery rhyme also shows that in their quest for “proof”, the armenians are using peaceful demonstrations seeking a wise and just resolution from the centre (moscow/kremlin). the means of proving that karabakh “is ours” once had varied nuances, from calls for forbearance («հայեր, դիմացե՛ք...» [armenians, hold on…]) to outright (probably written by hovhannes shiraz) «մի հող, որ թեկուզ երկինք 44 it is indicative that the leitmotif of baku rallies held in response to those in stepanakert and yerevan was the same formula about karabakh being “ours” as evidenced by for instance «карабах был и будет нашим!» [karabakh was and will be ours] banner. see трагедия длиною в 2 года. фотохроника событий [the tragedy lasting for two years] (baku: azerneshr, 1990). 24 համբառնա, / հայոց եղել է, հայոց կմնա» [no matter what happens even in heavens, / this land will remain forever armenian] (fig. 38), «ղարաբաղը մերն է եղել, կա և կլինի» [karabakh has been, is and will be ours]45 and «ղարաբաղը միայն հայաստանին» [karabakh only to armenia] (fig. 39). iconographically, reunification was “fulfilled” in yet another february poster (fig. 40). however, whereas in the aforementioned case, they simply painted the maps with the same colour, here, the necessity to literally fight for unification was indirectly highlighted the identity of the bearers of the poster. the poster, with a modest contour map of united armenia and karabakh as well as an inscription reading: «արցախ դու մերն ես» [artsakh, you are ours], was accompanied by a banner boasting combat medals, and those who were awarded those medals; young armenian men who had fought in afghanistan and had combat experience. their active involvement was intended to show that armenians are ready to take up arms and enter into combat for the liberation of artsakh. this was directly articulated in another “explanatory” banner: «աֆղանստանում ինտերնացիոնալ պարտքը կատարած հայ զինվորները քեզ հետ են ղարաբաղ» [armenian soldiers who fulfilled their international duty in afghanistan are with you, karabakh] (fig. 41). this readiness was further emphasised in a poster bearing general andranik’s picture carried by the “afghans.” andranik was a fearless hajduk, a popular hero and a famous warlord under whose command armenian warriors/combatants had successfully fought battles against the turkish oppressors on several occasions. there is an additional peculiarity of language arising from consideration of these posters and banners— the same poster/banner or a slogan used at various phases of the movement can acquire different semantic nuances. thus, the last (as well as the previous one) slogan appeared in february 1988 and, in the context of those days, meant a categorical statement within the general “karabakh – part of armenia” theme. however, the same slogan recorded in november of the same year expresses the widely discussed disagreement with placing nkao under the territorialadministrative control of the russian soviet federative socialist republic (rsfsr). in november, this slogan also expressed the rejection of a policy based on compromise in the resolution of the karabakh problem, which was called for by the country’s leadership more than once without specific, constructive prescriptions. an immediate answer to those calls arose in the posters appearing in the autumn of 1989: 45 “the continuation of the chronicle.” 25 «ոչ մի «կոմպրոմիս» արցախի հարցում» [no “compromises” in the issue of artsakh] (fig. 42), «կոմպրոմիսը» արցախի նոր գերութիւնն է» [“compromise” will be the new captivity of artsakh] (fig. 42). a specific example of disagreement with compromises could be the banner “шуши армянам или никому” [shushi to the armenians or to no one] (fig. 43). it appeared in november 1988 in response to rumours that top-level officials were considering the issue of transferring only the parts of nkao where the armenian population prevailed, and therefore, according to that option, shushi would remain as part of azerbaijan. “solidarity” posters the posters have another unique quality. without resorting to laborious sociological research, one can use the posters to assess with sufficient confidence, not only the desires and demands of the participants of multi-thousand-person rallies but also about their social composition. for example, from february 1988 through the rest of the year, a host of “solidarity” banners emerged, pledging their support to the people of artsakh at various levels: «արցախ, արտաշատը միշտ քեզ հետ է» [artsakh, artashat is always with you] (fig. 44), «մեսրոպ մաշտոցը և օշականը ձեզ հետ են» [mesrop mashtots and oshakan are with you], «բաղրամյանի անվան սովխոզը միանում է ձեզ ղարաբաղի հայեր» [sovkhoz after baghramian is joining you[,] armenians of karabakh], «արարատը քեզ հետ է, ղարաբաղ» [ararat is with you, karabakh], «աբովյանցիները քեզ հետ են, ղարաբաղ» [residents of abovyan are with you, karabakh], (fig. 45), «արցախ՝ էջմիածինը քեզ հետ է» [artsakh, etchmiadzin is with you] (fig. 46), «կաբելագործները արցախի հետ են» [cable makers are with artsakh], «ռելեի աշխատողները ձեզ հետ են, ղարաբաղցիներ» [relay workers are with you, armenians of karabakh], «արցախ, հայաստանը քեզ հետ է. երպի» [artsakh, armenia is with you: ypi], «ղարաբաղ, համալսարանը քեզ հետ է» [karabakh, university is with you] (fig. 47), «արցախ, կոնսերվատորիան քեզ հետ է» [artsakh, conservatoire is with you], and similar assurances from individual faculties, colleges, schools, various facilities, various regions, cities and villages of armenia, as well as individual centres of the armenian soviet diaspora, such as «ախալքալաքի 70 հազար հայերը քեզ հետ են, ղարաբաղ» [70 thousand armenians of 26 akhalkalak are with you, karabakh].46 at the time, there were over a thousand students of the armenian diaspora studying at various universities in yerevan. on 23 february, around four dozen of these students studying at the yerevan medical institute joined in a rally, bearing a banner reading «սփյուռքը ձեզ հետ [է]» [diaspora [is] with you] (fig. 48).47 in short, there was complete geographical, social and age representation: here, there were workers and farmers, employees and students, including the pre-schooler hakobik carrying his «ղարաբա՛ղ, չվախենա՛ս, հակոբիկը քեզ հետ է» [karabakh, do not be afraid, hakobik is with you] banner.48 “карабах – армения. один народ – одна республика” [karabakh – armenia. one nation – one republic] analysis of these posters also provides insight into the legislative principles that were being proposed as a solution to the karabakh problem. for instance, in november 1988, when the addenda and amendments to the constitution of the ussr were being discussed widely, the previously mentioned banner “карабах – армения. один народ – одна республика” [karabakh – armenia. one nation – one republic] appeared (fig. 5). here, in the very language of “law-making,” the main idea of the broader group of “karabakh – armenia” posters is being asserted. since the logic of this group of posters and banners suggests that karabakh and armenia are a natural entity, any attempt to “forcefully separate” nkao is perceived as an act of violence. for instance, a poster (fig. 49) displayed in midnovember 1988 features the maps of armenia and nkao painted in the three colours of the armenian national flag. karabakh is chained and being dragged away from 46 artashat, ararat, abovyan, etchmiadzin – names of regions and cities in armenia; mesrop mashtots and oshakan – mesrop mashtots is the creator of the armenian alphabet (405 ad) and is buried in the village oshakan; sovkhoz after baghramian – a village in the etchmiadzin region of armenia; cable makers, relay workers – the workers of the cable and relay factories in yerevan; ypi – yerevan polytechnic institute (now – the national polytechnic university of armenia); university – yerevan state university; conservatory – yerevan state conservatory after komitas; akhalkalak – a region in the south-west of the republic of georgia, populated exclusively by armenians.   47 this information was kindly provided by gevorg yazichyan, who then was a student of the faculty of history of yerevan state university, currently – a phd in history. as reported by him the diaspora demonstrators were mostly from lebanon and syria, their organizer, in the front of the photo, was matheos cholakyan, a junior student from kesap by origin, a member of armenian popular movement (հայ ժողովրդային շարժում). 48 zaven kharatyan, «արցախ, չվախենաս, հակոբիկը քեզ հետ է» [artsakh, don’t be afraid, hakobik is with you], pioneer kanch, 25 october 1989 (no. 84). 27 armenia into the depths of azerbaijan by a soviet tank. the author of the poster and accompanying patriotic poem was a 7th-grade student originally from artsakh. another poster (june 1988) depicts the contour maps of the armenian ssr and nkao with “armenia” and “artsakh” inscribed thereon (fig. 50). an arrow points from artsakh to armenia, perhaps hinting at the yearning of the armenians of artsakh for their motherland. this yearning is being fought against by the yataghan (an image signifying the bearers of the yataghan culture), which in this case are the azerbaijanians and turks. they are fighting against that yearning through bloody massacres similar to those in sumgait. however, countering yataghan is the armenian sword. along the edges of the poster runs the highly popular refrain from paruyr sevak’s poem, «եռաձայն պատարագ» [three-voiced liturgy], expanded by the poster’s creator to an entire programme statement: «ողբամ մեռելոց, բեկանեմ շանթեր, կոչեմ ապրողաց։ ճշմարտության սուրն ենք բարձրացնում արյունակոլոլ յաթաղանի դեմ, ու թե աշխարհում կա արդարություն, թե կա պատմություն, ինտերնացիոնալ հավասարություն ու եղբայրություն, մենք պիտի հաղթենք…» [i’ll lament the dead, reverse lightning and call to the living. we are raising the sword of truth against the bloodstained yataghan and, if there is justice in the world, if there is history, international equality and brotherhood, then we will win…]. as the text of the poster expresses, the “sword of the truth” is the symbol of a bloodless struggle. the poetics of this text is noteworthy: it uses both emotionally charged and poetic words, like “bloodstained,” as well as revolutionary language. in fact, the text embodies sincere, patriotic pathos, including the line by sevak at the beginning. the “weapons” used in the text of the poster, viz. “sword of truth,” “justice,” and “history,” once again indicate that notwithstanding abundant challenges the universal concepts of truth and justice, seasoned by the factors of history—historical truth, historical justice and historical memory have been and remain the most important components of armenian national identity.49 a poster made in the summer of 1988 also depicts the conventions of this group of posters. the image depicts the removal of the piece karabakh stuck on the point of a big knife from the watermelon-armenia, reflecting the forcible separation of karabakh from armenia. interestingly, there are further instances of culinary metaphors. one example features a bloody yataghan and a trident-a “fork” stuck on 49 see harut’yun marut’yan, iconography of armenian identity, 143-144. 28 the map of armenia. the accompanying inscription explains: «եթե ղարաբաղը պարտվի, այս վերջին պատառը ևս կուլ կգնա» [if karabakh defeated, this last morsel will also be devoured] (fig. 51). again, the gesture towards the integrity of the whole and the part is widely spread, and it is no coincidence that the same theme, this time expressing the viewpoint of the azerbaijani party verbally rather than iconographically, presents azerbaijan in the form of a pie, wherefrom armenians want to cut and remove the “delicious” piece-karabakh. this was the comparison used by azerbaijani scientists in their telegram to the president of the academy of sciences of armenia viktor hambartsumyan on 29 february 1988. in place of an epilogue as we have seen, the theme “karabakh–armenia” has undergone a transformation from a historically, morally, and legally justified request-demand to an affirmative statement that «ղարաբաղը մերն է եղել, կա և կլինի» [karabakh has been, is and will be ours]. and, if the last slogan refers to the famous mythological-poetic formula of eternity (comp. “ленин жил, ленин жив, ленин будет жить” [lenin lived, lenin lives, lenin will live forever]) to confirm the fact of karabakh “being ours,” then in another slogan, «ղարաբաղը մերն ա ու все» [վերջ]» [karabakh is ours and that’s it],50 the same idea is expressed in a more categorical and “final” way. in our research, we saw another two formulas based on the concept of an affirmative statement: «ղարաբաղ / հայաստան / մի էություն է» [karabakh / armenia / is one entity] (february 1988) (fig. 52) and “арцах – неотъемлемая часть армении” [artsakh [is] an integral part of armenia] (june 1988 and 7 november 1988) (fig. 53, 54). and yet, many posters, both in the past and in the present, have linked the solution of the karabakh problem with the centre, that is moscow. suffice it to recall multiple displays of gorbachev’s image or words, such as in a poster from 24 november 1988,51 where he is depicted intensely reading the koran to find a solution to the karabakh issue: “мы в цк внимательно ищем пути решения карабахской 50 comp. with the well-known formulas by the participant in artsakh liberation war, the hero of artsakh leonid azgaldyan’s «սա հայաստան է և վերջ» [this is armenia and that’s all] and armenia’s prime minister nikol pashinyan’s «արցախը հայաստան է, և՝ վերջ» [artsakh is armenia and that’s all]. 51 the same night saw a curfew introduced in yerevan and a ban on all rallies. 29 проблемы…” [we in the central committee are carefully looking for ways to address the karabakh problem]. in fact, the mark on his forehead is substituted with an inscription saying “карабах?” [karabakh?] (fig. 55). as indicated in the poster, these quotes are from his 18 july 1988 speech.52 in a poster created in 1991 in france, the figure personifying lenin and gorbachev is pictured demolishing the border between armenia and karabakh with a hoe (fig. 56), aiming to expand it further and separate the territories of the two fragments of the armenian nation from one another.53 this has also served as a base for oral folklore, accounting for the abundant use of words like “give” or “take, seize.” thus, when in march of 1988 the theatrical square (where the first rallies were held only a month before) was surrounded by soviet troops to disallow the rally planned for those days, a joke emerged reading «ղարաբաղը ուզեցինք, հրապարակն էլ խլեցին» [we craved karabakh, they seized the square on top of that]. another, prophetic joke surfaced about a man travelling to a geography lesson at a school in the xxi century. the man sees the map of the ussr painted in one colour and asks, “what does this mean?” they answer that it is the map of armenia. “and what is this?” the man points to a small dot in another colour. “that’s karabakh,” they answer, “we never got it back.” at an exhibition in november 1989, the theme reached its logical development with one of the posters directly pointing at the forces keeping armenia in the ussr. this was during the days of the congress of the pan-armenian national movement, which led the karabakh movement, and, as if in response to the speeches of the orators, one poster features armenia and karabakh in the colours of the tricolour armenian national flag (not yet state insignia). red and orange wings are juxtaposed with a blue background, wanting to fly away from the ussr, but are forcibly held back by the russian muzhik (fig. 57). biblography արցախ. нагорный карабах. информационные материалы. заседание президиума верховного совета ссср от 18.07.88 [artsakh. nagorno-karabakh. 52 on that day, the session of the presidium of the supreme council of the ussr discussing the karabakh issue was held, part of which, along with m. gorbachev's speech, was broadcast on tv. 53 see azad magazine edité par le club des arméniens de grenoble [azad magazine published by the house of armenian 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պրոլետարիատի դիկտատուրայի մասին [on dictatorship of proletariat]. yerevan: hayastan, 1981, 422 p. marx, karl; engels, friedrich; lenin, vladimir. կանանց հարցի մասին [on the woman question]. yerevan: hayastan, 1983, 288 p. marx, karl; engels, friedrich; lenin, vladimir. բարոյականության և բարոյական դաստիարակության մասին [on morality and moral education]. yerevan: hayastan, 1989, 720 p. sargsyan, ashot. 1988-1989ղարաբաղյան շարժման պատմություն [history of the karabakh movement 1988-1989]. yerevan: antares, 2018, 640+16 p. muradyan, samvel. . , հովհաննես շիրազ բանաստեղծը մարդը [hovhannes shiraz, the poet, person], vol. 2. yerevan: ysu, 2015, 408 p. 32 shiraz, hovhannes. « » [the lament of karabakh]ղարաբաղի ողբը . bagin 9-12 (1990): 26-27. ter-minasyan, ashot. « հովհաննես շիրազի հայրենասիրական քնարի աշխարհա » [worldview layers of hovhannes shiraz’sյացքային շերտերը patriotic lyre]. banber yerevani hamalsarani 2 (2000): 42-55. иб [информационный бюллетень] [information bulletin] 3 (1988) (samizdat). guliev, jamil (ed.). к истории образования нагорно-карабахской автономной области азербайджанской сср. 1918-1925: документы и материалы. под ред. д. п. гулиева [on the history of the formation of the nagorno-karabakh autonomous region of the azerbaijani ssr. 1918-1925: documents and materials]. baku: azerneshr, 1989, 334 p. mikaelyan, vardkes (ed.). нагорный карабах в 1918-1923 гг.: сборник документов и материалов, [nagorno karabakh in 1918-1923: collection of documents and materials]. yerevan: national academy of sciences, 1992, xxxii+756 p. barsegov, yuri (comp., ed., author of forward and commentary). нагорный карабах в международном праве и мировой политике. документы и комментарии [nagornyi karabakh in international law and world politics. documents and commentary], vol. i. moscow: krug, 2008, 944 p. galoyan, galust and khudaverdyan, konstantin. нагорный карабах. историческая справка [nagorno karabakh. historical reference]. yerevan: academy of sciences of armssr, 1988, 95 p. трагедия длиною в 2 года. фотохроника событий [the tragedy lasting for two years]. baku: azerneshr, 1990. 1 33 2 3 34 4 5 35 6 7 8 36 9 37 10 11 38 12 13 39 14 15 40 16 41 17 18 19 42 20 21 43 22 23 44 24 25 45 26 27 46 28 29 47 30 31 48 32 33 49 34 35 50 36 37 51 38 39 52 40 41 53 42 43 54 44 45 55 46 47 56 48 49 57 50 51 58 52 53 59 54 5460 55 56 61 57 62 about the authors: dr. harutyun t. marutyan is social/cultural anthropologist, director of the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation. he is also a cheif researcher in the institute of archaeology and ethnography, national academy of sciences, armenia. dr. marutyan's research fileds include memory studies, genocide memory and national identity, iconography, contemporary social movements, armenian ethnography. e-mail: agmidirector@genocide-museum.am; hmarutyan@yahoo.com corresponding member of national academy of sciences of armenia, dr. levon h. abrahamian is social/cultural anthropologist, head of the department of contemporary anthropological studies of institute of archaeology and ethnography, national academy of sciences, armenia, and associate professor of anthropology at yerevan state university. prof. abrahamian's research fields include contemporary social movements, armenian ethnography, symbolic anthropology, and comparative mythology. e-mail: levon_abrahamian@yahoo.com 63 107 carolyn j. dean, the moral witness: trials and testimony after genocide, ithaca: cornell university press, 2019, 198 pp. reviewed by asya darbinyan, phd, visiting scholar, clark university how did genocide, from a cultural point of view, become differentiated in the public mind from other forms of violence? how did we come to understand the kind of suffering that genocide entails? emerging in the interwar period, the “moral witness,” according to carolyn dean, made the crime of genocide legible (2). in her book, dean analyzes the genealogy of the witness figure over the last one hundred years and claims that “the icon of the witness to genocide is one key to the development of contemporary western moral culture” (25). the moral witness investigates five trials in the interwar and postwar periods that shaped the narrative about witnessing and then examines the shift in this narrative in the postcolonial era, “when witnessing became the obligation of all responsible citizens” (7). dean suggests four iterations of a “moral witness” or the witness to genocide, presenting them chronologically: the “righteous avenger” (1921-1950), the “concentration camp survivor” (1950-1961), “the holocaust survivor” in the 1960s-1970s, and the “global victim and the counterwitness” from the 1990s to the present (6, 176-177). as dean explains in the introduction, when no international courts existed to try the perpetrators of such crimes as crimes against humanity and genocide, the trials discussed in this book led to the recognition of victims of mass atrocities in court. chapter 1, “the righteous avengers,” focuses on the trials of soghomon tehlirian and scholem schwarzbard, “the first major trials in western europe featuring victims of interethnic violence and state-sponsored mass atrocities seeking justice” (28). tehlirian had assassinated talaat pasha in 1921 in berlin for his responsibility in orchestrating the armenian genocide; schwarzbard shot and killed simon petliura in paris in 1926 for commandeering ukrainian pogroms against jews (1918-1921). despite clear evidence of their culpability as assassins, tehlirian and schwarzbard were acquitted of murder since they established themselves as witnesses to unfathomable crimes committed against armenians and jews. according to dean, these trials formulated the archetype of the “moral witness” as a “righteous man of honor, a humanitarian,” and “a locus of human conscience” (39). they “imagined a new kind of crime,” and formed a novel witness figure, one “who demands not pity or empathy, but justice” (60). in chapter 2, dean recounts the two public libel trials of the late 1940s and early 1950s in france by victor kravchencko, a ukrainian émigré, and david rousset, french resistance member and a writer. kravchenko and rousset brought suits against the french communist literary magazine les lettres françaises over the existence of the soviet or gulag camps. both used the public trials to call former gulag detainees to testify about their experiences in the concentration camps and condemn their existence in the soviet union. 108 while kravchencko “won his battle” (70), it was rousset’s trial that not only proved the camp survivors to be “credible,” but also “above all partisanship” (63). in dean’s words, “rousset’s trial stressed the distinctiveness of nazi and stalinist camps from all other experiences of atrocity” (88) and “made the concentration camp survivor an authoritative source of knowledge about an ostensibly new form of inhumanity” (90). analyzing these trials and their outcomes, dean emphasizes that they had no significant impact on the existing legal system and the international criminal law. moreover, the vocabulary of all the trials was highly politicized. for instance, tehlirian’s trial lasted only two days, since german foreign office was profoundly concerned about the evidence that could have been presented to the court, exposing the extent of german complicity in the armenian genocide (40). and yet, during these trials the “witnesses’ suffering took central stage” (8), and the crimes that had no name and had not been distinguished from other forms of violence and atrocity were acknowledged and condemned as such. dean focuses on “the holocaust witness” in chapter 3, examining the trial of adolf eichmann in jerusalem in 1961. her analysis aims to understand how in the 1960s and 1970s jewish holocaust survivors “became western stand-ins for all of human suffering” (21) and “quintessential witnesses to genocide” (98). focusing on the survivor testimonies that did not involve the defendant directly, dean shows how survivors were treated as “oracles from another world” (16), bearer of “dark knowledge,” (99) and “symbols of human conscience” (131). the eichmann trial “refocused public attention on the jewish dimension of the holocaust” (93) and “victim testimony led to increased empathy” for the survivors (106). dean asserts that jewish witnesses of the nazi crimes became “a reminder of western murderousness and at the same time an image of western soul-searching” (130). they were no longer condemned as passive victims or collaborators and, according to dean, they demonstrated the need to dignify the weak. chapter 4 analyses the shift in the meaning of witnessing that, according to dean, transpired in the late 1990s, after the creation of the international criminal court (icc), when the unimaginable and unfathomable crime of genocide had become part of our geopolitical landscape. dean discusses the figures of the “global victim and the counterwitness” explaining that “the global stands in for victims of genocidal crimes but is no longer attached to specific victims and the experience they had undergone” (177). she argues that “the global victim is a rhetorical figure with no distinctive features, characterized by a generic helplessness” (177). and even though the chapter focuses on the period when the institutionalization of humanitarianism and the prosecution of genocide have become a reality, dean considers it necessary to “move out of the courtroom in order to address the cultural role accorded to victim testimony” (135). reflecting on debates around and the critique of the icc, the humanitarian government, and atrocity photography, dean holds that the failures of these new institutions and systems gave rise to “the counterwitness” as “a symbol of frustration with uneven global justice” (137). investigating the transformation of the “moral witness” from the 1920s to the present, dean seems to indicate certain gendered aspects of witnessing without, however, expanding or elaborating on those further. tehlirian and schwarzbard “were recast as righteous avenginternational journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0012 109 ers and humanitarian warriors” (58), the “camp survivor” was a “combatant” since survival was conceived “as a form of heroism shared by an international and exclusive ‘brotherhood’ who continue their work as soldiers by other means” (87). the trial of adolf eichmann “revised such constructions of heroism” (108) and led to emergence of non-conventional, more “feminized forms” (107) of heroism or the “new heroism” (127). the discourse on heroism, masculinity and agency is also present in dean’s analysis of didier fassin’s “portrayal of dignified victims” and “the counterwitness” (152). hence, the moral witness not only offers a thorough examination of the genealogy of the witness to genocide in the 20th century, but it also invites future studies on rhetoric of masculinity and heroism that have accompanied witnessing throughout the time. 5 welcome note dear reader, after the fi rst issue of the international journal of armenian genocide studies (ijags) was printed we understood the whole seriousness of this undertaking. high quality academic articles and strict timetable of release of each new volume was the main tasks we expected to face with. the current issue comes to confi rm the statement that we are on the right way. when the armenians worldwide launched their preparations for 2015 none could even imagine that in the very year of the centennial of the armenian genocide the attention of the whole world would be focused exactly on the same areas, were hundreds of thousands of armenians were perished between 1915 and 1916. deir el-zor, rakka, hama... those were the names creating pain and sorrow for every armenian. exactly hundred years later the very same names come back to symbolize new genocidal crimes of isis and countries supporting this terrorist network. although many prefer to say that turkey unmask herself openly as one of the sponsors of isis, in fact it will be correct to say that from the very beginning there were no masks to cover intentions and far reaching realpolitik calculations. again many thousands of christian and muslim victims and causalities, hundreds of thousands of displaced from their native lands creating disastrous humanitarian crisis in the middle east. remembrance and dealing with the consequences of the armenian genocide is not and must not be a pure armenian-turkish issue. this is a problem of global justice and security. unfortunately past and modern political calculations and interests live no place for humanitarian approaches and honest discussions of the topic. the centennial of the armenian genocide is not the end of the chapter. on the contrary, it is a new beginning and starting point for everyone caring about the history, memory and justice. the task of academicians is twofold: to continue fi ght against state-sponsored denial and further the research and analysis of the armenian genocide in order to understand the subsequent crimes of the xx century as well as crimes in our days. from this standpoint ijags has an important mission to complete having many of our colleagues involved in genocide studies as brothers in arm in these crucial battles. hayk demoyan director of the armenian genocide museum-institute secretary of the committee for coordinating events dedicated to the centennial of the armenian genocide 72 book review from adana to der zor. a review of bedross der matossian, the horrors of adana: revolution and violence in the early twentieth century, stanford, california: stanford university press, 2022, 343 pp. reviewed by matthias bjørnlund, historian. a review essay, in which we move in time from 1909 to 1918. in space from adana over aleppo to der zor in the syrian desert. and, on this journey ever further to the southeast of the ottoman empire, we move in scale of destruction, from the massacre of tens of thousands to the finalization of the genocide of 1,5 million armenians or more. we begin with the 1909 massacres at adana in the wake of the young turk/unionist revolution of 1908, the event that first brought to power such main perpetrators as mehmet talaat and ahmed cemal – the latter particularly tying the events in cilicia and syria together in person. bloodbath in armenia. 30.000 people killed? it is reported to local papers from messina that two turkish regiments were sent ashore on saturday and immediately dispatched to adana. the night between sunday and monday they have perpetrated a horrible bloodbath on the local armenians and set the houses on fire. 1.000 armenians burnt to death, and the fleeing armenians were shot down by the soldiers. in the province of adana, it is estimated that 30.000 armenians are killed. the material losses are enormous.1 this, from the front page of the norwegian daily newspaper sandefjords dagblad, 30 april 1909, is but one of thousands from around the world dealing almost in real time with a new round of massacres of armenians in the ottoman empire, as the papers had done during the 1890s abdülhamid massacres. of course, as the question mark and the estimated number of casualties indicate, getting precise information and an accurate overview of seemingly chaotic events most often takes time. in the case of adana 1909, we basically had to wait until 2022 and bedross der matossian’s book to get a proper account of the events. der matossian himself is rather modest about his aims and achievements, but i do not have to be, so here goes: the horrors of adana is the first broad, deep, and analytical take on the adana massacres. the introduction alone is a tour de force, giving us an overview of the relevant literature and discussions pertaining to the main question: how do we 1 sandefjords dagblad, 30 april 1909. 73 explain the massacres and destruction of armenians in and around adana in 1909? to answer that question, we begin in the city of adana, the epicenter of the violence in 1909, with its public space – its rapidly modernizing agora – increasingly filled with emotions, ranging from excitement to anxiety and resentment, and with rumors, manufactured or readily instrumentalized and acted upon, especially during and after the 1908/9 revolution/counter-revolution. how and why, then, does this “well-organized conspiracy against the hated armenians,” as a german eyewitness puts it, happen?2 der matossian deals in detail with the longer socioeconomic and political lines, but here we jump right to the immediate context: how the revolution and counter-revolution upsets the existing ethnoreligious balance, enfranchising and emancipating some, at least for a while and on the surface, like the local armenians and supporters of the new young turk regime in general. while many muslims, especially the supporters of the ancient regime, experiences relative deprivation. and chooses to interpret an armenian cultural revival, flourishing under a (relatively) democratic constitution, as preparations for an insurrection to bring back the medieval cilician kingdom. the flipside of the janus-faced new freedoms is thus that the indigenous armenians in the economic powerhouse that is adana – where much is at stake – are suddenly appearing assertive in the face of the dominant muslim groups. and inadvertently end up visible and exposed, convenient scapegoats for those groups disengaged from discourses of ethnoreligious equality, and less able to benefit from socioeconomic change and the overall twists and turns of this new, fragile experiment with ottoman modernity heralded by the unionist revolution. the author’s detailed micro level analysis of the actions and reactions of perpetrators, bystander, and victims – who fight back, outnumbered and outgunned – is dispassionate, evenhanded, and yet reads like a thriller: tensions rise, and then begin the killings, the rapes, forced conversions, and the pillaging, burning, and plunder during easter of 1909. the ignition: a brawl between an armenian and a turk. false rumors are spread, including from the center in constantinople, emotions run high, leading to the first large-scale attacks on the armenian quarter in adana, attacks that are spreading to the whole region and beyond, including to the province of aleppo. resentment and anxiety find an outlet. and, i would add, transforms perpetrators by creating joy in the process, since the ugly truth is that very many participants in such transgressions find it uplifting to be part of “righteous” mobs, with a license to get high on abusing and destroying “evil.” the immediate end-result: at least 20.000 murdered armenians and other christians, some 2.000 muslims killed in self-defense, and a botched attempt at holding accountable the main perpetrators, found among supporters of both the old and the new regime. order is restored, not least thank to ahmed cemal’s stint as governor of the region, and 2 hejmdal, 11 may 1909, 1. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0030 74 humanitarian aid from armenian, ottoman christian, jewish, and western organizations pour in, but the armenian community is devasted and severely decimated, subdued economically and culturally, as was a main motive of the massacres all along. drawing a direct causal line from these events to the genocide only a handful of years later is difficult, as der matossian states in yet another nuanced and informed discussion in the book’s conclusion. but arguably, the adana massacres continue an ottoman culture of impunity, radicalize the young turks, create even deeper intercommunal mistrust, and show once more that massacre is a handy tool in the toolbox when it comes to “solving” perceived ethnoreligious, socioeconomic, and demographic problems. so, though a new balance is struck in adana after 1909, this all points towards 1915 and the destruction of the christian populations in the empire. because a balance of terror this fragile is not a balance at all, as we see in the ottoman and other cases. anyway, it is not a balance worth preserving since, all virtues of the ottoman empire and the turkish republic aside, there is a massacre here and a genocide there waiting to happen. chios 1822, lebanon 1860, dersim 1937-1938, yet another invasion of syria coming up, the list goes on. as an armenian or assyrian in 1909, the question is to reform or not to reform, to thrive, economically, politically, religiously, or not to thrive. damned if you do, damned if you do not. because you are acutely aware that continuing life as a second-class citizen in your own country is unviable, yet it is equally clear that the dominant groups always have massacre to resort to if you stick out your neck. to sum up: der matossian’s the horrors of adana is the book we could have hoped for on the adana massacres. i have few issues, one of them being the oft-repeated claim of western indifference to muslim suffering: “in the european view, it was always the muslim who killed the christian.” racism, also in the form of anti-muslim/ turkish sentiments, is indeed widespread at the time, but very many westerners during the 1890s massacres, adana 1909, and the armenian genocide are not only decidedly anti-armenian (and against jews and “oriental” christians in general), but also proturkish/muslim, defending the empire as well as its excesses. in addition, they are often quite influential, particularly in germany, ranging in ideological backgrounds from conservatives supporting the sultan and the imperial status quo, to liberal intellectuals despising the empires non-muslim “soulless modernizers,” and socialists seeing ottoman christians and jews through a marxist lens as the “comprador” oppressor class holding the muslim peasants and workers down. moreover, related to this discussion, there is the criticism, also brought forward by der matossian, that western aid to, and intervention on behalf of, ottoman armenians leaves out or discriminates against muslims. i.e., that we in 2022 should expect all western humanitarianism in the decades around 1900 to be truly universalistic. in my mind, such criticism is somewhat anachronistic and unfair. it is hardly surprising that european and 75 american humanitarianism is heavily influenced by christian solidarity – if it is not too expensive in economic or geopolitical terms. just like notions of “muslim solidarity” and pan-islamism are widespread during those times.3 3 see, e.g., matthias bjørnlund, “virtuous victims? imagining armenians in the west,” armenian weekly, april 2012, 38-42; idem, “adana and beyond: revolution and massacre in the ottoman empire seen through danish eyes, 1908/9,” haigazian armenological review 30 (2010): 125-156; alp yenen, “pan-islamism (ottoman empire),” in international encyclopedia of the first world war, april 2020, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism_ottoman_empire; mehrdad kia, “pan-islamism in late nineteenth-century iran,” middle eastern studies 32, no. 1 (1996): 30-52. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism_ottoman_empire https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism_ottoman_empire 97 book reviews wolfgang gust, ed., the armenian genocide: evidence from the german foreign offi ce archives, 1915-1916 (new york and oxford: berghahn books, 2014), 816 pages, reviewed by suren manukyan, deputy director, armenian genocide museum & institute, yerevan, armenia the armenian genocide scholarship is ongoing struggle against denialism. the turkish state denial policy became more sophisticated and aggressive politically. but academic level is also still in the spotlight of revisionist scholars. one of the main arguments propounded by the professional denialists of the armenian genocide is the lack of sources credibility. for example “blue book” (the treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire, 1915–1916) by james bryce and arnold j. toynbee is attempted to call product of wartime propaganda1 as well as the authenticity and veracity of the ambassador’s witness memoirs of henry morgenthau (1856–1945), the american ambassador to the sublime porte2 is undermined by pointing him as “confi rmed ‘turcophobe’ whose hatred for the turks was matched only by his unabashed support for the christian minorities under ottoman rule.”3 but one sort of sources is out of these allegations. they cannot identifi ed as incredible, propagandistic of non-objective. these sources are german documents. germany was ally of ottoman empire in the wwi and had great and in many cases critical and decisive impact on policy making and implementation of constantinople. more than 7-8 thousands german offi cers, 12 thousands soldiers served in ottoman empire during the wwi. ottoman army was mostly administrated by german military stuff. moreover, important decisions were made directly by german offi cers. thus one of the turkish generals ismet pasha even complained that the german military mission was allowed to follow what was going on in the country and germans were entrusted with all state secrets, both political and military. in particular, german offi cer was heading the second department ottoman army general staff (or investigation department).4 this shows the huge degree and level of information access the german soldiers and, therefore, the diplomats had. 1. on blue book case see, taner akcam, anatomy of genocide denial: academics, politicians, and the “re-making” of history, www.chgs.umn.edu/histories/occasional/akcam_anatomy_of_denial.pdf 2. a question of genocide: armenians and turks at the end of the ottoman empire ed.by ronald grigor suny, fatma müge göçek, and norman m. naimark suny (oxford university press, 2011), 15, see also, vahakn n. dadrian, the key elements in the turkish denial of the armenian genocide: a case study of distortion and falsifi cation (zoryan institute, toronto, 1999), 40-42. 3. heath w. lowry, american observers in anatolia ca. 1920: the bristol papers 4. v.n. dadrian, the history of the armenian genocide. ethnic confl ict from the balkans to anatolia to the caucasus, (providence-oxford: berghahn books, 1995), 252 98 german diplomatic network in the ottoman empire was very spread։ even after outburst of war they continued their stay in turkey and their reports, notes and letters designed the pervasive canvas of planned and state-implemented policy of total annihilation. for example, from the report of ambassador in constantinople (wangenheim) to the imperial chancellor (bethmann hollweg) at 7 july 1915 “the expulsion and relocation of the armenian people was limited until 14 days ago to the provinces nearest to the eastern theatre of war and to certain areas in the province of adana; since then the porte has resolved to extend these measures also to the provinces of trebizond, mamuret-ul-aziz and sivas and has begun with these measures even though these parts of the country are not threatened by any enemy invasion for the time being. this situation, and the way in which the relocation is being carried out shows that the government is indeed pursuing its purpose of eradicating the armenian race from the turkish empire…” (p. 230) the reports of german diplomats embraced the entire territory of the ottoman empire, where consuls and vice-consuls were informing the ambassadors and foreign ministers of their countries about the deportations and massacres of the armenians by “strictly confi dential” or “top-secret” inscriptions. these documents considered the deportation and massacres of the armenian population as equivalent occurrences as a method of armenians’ extermination. from the report of rossler, consul in aleppo to wolff-metternich, the ambassador in constantinople when he shared disruption of imperial vice-consul hoffmann from alexandretta “it can be regarded as an established fact that in the actual armenian vilayets – quite apart from the war zone near van – the deportation has been accompanied by the massacre of the adult male armenians, but also partly of the whole population of armenian towns and villages.” (p. 505) the german documents do not evoke any doubt, because the offi cers’ reports of war ally of ottoman empire of course could not be in favor of the armenians. moreover, there is also another feature, which makes the german sources trustworthy. the authors of these reports did not have any positive opinion about the armenian population in the ottoman empire, and sometimes negatively tempered towards them. thus, in 1915 ambassador wangenheim transmits to berlin that the situation of the armenians is quite hopeless, and it is for germany’s supreme interest not to interfere, and at the same time announces to morgenthau that the armenians were simply traitorous vermin.5 representatives of the german diplomatic staff working many years in the ottoman empire were in close contact with the armenian people, they ere well aware of the situation, and the involvement of the armenians in the economic life of the empire, therefore they easily denied the turkish hypotheses about the armenians’ rebellion (“there only seems to be agreement on one point: that the armenians have given up their ideas of a revolution since the introduction of the constitution and there is no organization for such a revolt” by the ambassador in constantinople (wangenheim) to the imperial chancellor (bethmann hollweg) (p. 169), they also reveal the real purpose of deportation (“…at this stage i will disregard thе fact that these measures by the government were carried out in such a way that they meant the absolute extermination of the armenians. also, i do not believe that it is possible in any other way to destroy a culture that is older and much higher than of the 5. h.morgenthau, ambassador morgenthau’s story (ny: doubleday, page & company, 1918), 370 99 turks” in memorandum concerning the armenian question from administrator in erzerum to the imperial chancellor bethman hollweg) (p. 295) and the economic disaster which will cause the empire in case of the armenians destruction. although the german diplomats and consuls were sending countless messages to berlin with details about the massacres, however they received clear command from the authorities: “not to interfere and keep the confi dentiality”. (from the note of imperial chancellor bethmann hollweg to the telegram of ambassador in constantinople wolffmeternich “the proposed public reprimand of an ally in the course of a war would be an act which is unprecedented in history. our only aim is keep turkey on our site until the end of the war, no matter whether as a result armenians do perish or not…”( p. 492) this corpus of 240 documents uncovers so large visions and horizons, that questions raised by their compiler and editor wolfgang gust sounds very natural: was imperial germany a driving force in the genocide of the armenians, or possibly even the source of the ideаs, as some non-german historians have suspected? did imperial germany view the armenian genocide with indifference or with sympathy? did some germans or part of the leading class resist the deportations and mass killings? and fi nally, did germany have the power to stop the armenian genocide, and if they were able to so, why did they not make use of this power? (pp. ix-x) all of these questions are discussed in this volume, and furthermore discussed directly by the language of documents. german offi cials narrated this reports without any compassion and preconditions about nameless brutalities perpetrated in the ally state and by their allies and whose even that time called extermination of whole nation. wartime conditions were increasing the degree of already high leveled diplomatic secrecy. therefore the german diplomats being sure of their reports’ secrecy did not constrain in any way while composing the contents of their letters. this condition makes the book so attractive, exciting and important. very important as dadrian mentioned “the network of german diplomatic and military offi cials deployed throughout turkey afforded them to rare opportunity to observe fi rst-hand the atrocities in progress.” (p. xv) the book includes an interesting foreword by the one the coryphaeus of armenian genocide scholarship vahakn dadrian. professor dadrian being well informed in the topic as an author of noted german responsibility in the armenian genocide: a review of historical evidence of german complicity, was published in 1996 gives analysis of critical import of offi cial german documentation, historical legacy of german attitude to armenian question and fi nally complicity, of german government in the armenian genocide. (pp. xiv-xxviii) the volume has also 130-pages overview strong written and covered the topic of armenian genocide in general as well as analyze meticulously different aspects refl ected in the documents by group them into chapters (e.g. deportation and annihilation campaigns with subchapters labour battalions, the murder of adult males, acts of extermination in home towns, the annihilation of entire deportation convoys etc.). in one of the chapters gust dives into the details of the role of germans and their joint responsibility for the genocide (pp 82-126) by discribing the reactions of german politicians and the attitude of the german ambassadors and the consuls as well as central headquaters in berlin. 100 to conclude, we should to stress that the book “armenian genocide, evidence from the german foreign offi ce archives, 1915-1916” provides a unique, disturbing and close-up view of how german diplomats faced, reacted and accounted the violent annihilation of entire nation. this fascinating, and highly informative book is one of the cornerstones of genocide studies and its english translation was must for a scholar who researches any aspect of armenian genocide. for that reason, alone, this book is highly recommended to those who are serious about attempting to begin to understand the history of armenian genocide. at the foreword v. dadrian evaluates german documentation by the four attributes: reliability, explicitness, incontestability and verifi ability (p. xv) and work of the author. “the corpus is the product of hard labour, diligence, discipline and, above all, tenacious persistence. historical scholarship owes to wolfgang gust and his spouse sigrid a great dept of gratitude”. i surely should join to an appreciation. 76 khatchig mouradian, the resistance network: the armenian genocide and humani tarianism in ottoman syria, 1915-1918, east lansing: michigan university press, 2021, 233 pp. reviewed by matthias bjørnlund, historian. we now move to another book on 1915 and beyond. the armenian genocide has begun, and a main protagonist from adana, ahmed cemal, is not only at the very top of the unionist party, but also governor and military commander of the neighboring region, aleppo. we begin in the middle of things: the next day we catch up with our battalion again, they have stayed in ”nesebin,” here we can rest for a few days. there are lots of prisoners here, they are englishmen and indians, they come from “kut-el-amara,” about 300 km south of “baghdad”, they are on route to “konia.” 13-14.000 were taken prisoner down there, they sell all they got to get a few turkish coins to buy just a little bit to eat, their catering is meager, i sure would not want to be a prisoner of the turks. witnessing such cruelty, well, it is almost indescribably what goes on down here. we sometimes meet large groups of ”armenians” chained together by their wrists, those starving, tormented human beings, “infidel dogs,” as the turks say. armenians are indeed a christian people. seeing their ragged clothing, their pleading looks when they meet us with their arms stretched out, begging for help, and begging for alms, seeing this cut through the heart, we would have liked to mow down the whole of the gendarmerie with machine guns, but, alas, we were not allowed to do so. we gave all the bread we had to them, but the gendarmerie gave us evil eyes. it is sad that some people are tormented like that. the turks went to their country, stole all they had, burned their houses, the children were killed, the girls were sold, and the men first had to work for as long as they could, and, when they broke down, they were forced into the desert to become food for the jackals. later on, an “armenian camp” was established, karen jeppe has done a great deal of work here to ease the suffering of the distressed armenians. sometimes one [armenian] managed to escape, we, too, had a couple with us, because here the turks did not dare retrieve them, we could take a servant, and, for as long as it lasted, the turks would be off his back. the next couple of days we meet many english and indian prisoners. one morning we also meet the swedish naturalist sven hedin, he is on his way from the east to constantinople. 24 june we arrive at “mosul.” 4 4 heinrich jessen, krigen 1914-1918 og mine erindringer derfra, privattryk u.å, excerpt from https://denstorekrig1914-1918.dk/24-juni-1916-ulykkelige-armeniere-boernene-slog-de-ihjel-pigerne-solgte-de/, accessed 02.03.2022. all translations are mine. https://denstorekrig1914-1918.dk/24-juni-1916-ulykkelige-armeniere-boernene-slog-de-ihjel-pigerne-solgte-de/ https://denstorekrig1914-1918.dk/24-juni-1916-ulykkelige-armeniere-boernene-slog-de-ihjel-pigerne-solgte-de/ 77 heinrich jessen, an ethnic dane conscripted (unwillingly, like most danes in germany) into the german army, writes this about encountering armenians on death marches in the syrian desert in the summer of 1916. and meeting sven hedin, a leading swedish pro-turkish and pro-german intellectual, who spends time and energy defending the genocide that he, too, witnesses. heinrich jessen serves in a machine gun battalion and reacts frankly (and, i would add on a personal note, refreshingly) with anger to the sight of limitless suffering, in the middle of nowhere, far from any frontline. so angry are he and his comrades that their trigger fingers are itching to gun down the torturers of the defenseless armenians. because this is not war, this is genocide. resentment is janus-faced too, like so many other emotions, it can be a vice, facilitating mass murder, and a virtue, leading to righteous anger.5 how to make just some sense, then, of such horror in the syrian desert? we have snippets by jessen and a host of survivors and other eyewitnesses casting rays of light here and there on “what went on down here” during the armenian genocide. and we have raymond kévorkian’s magisterial treatment of the second phase of the genocide, the extermination of the survivors of the death marches.6 but many pieces of the puzzle have still been missing. khatchig mouradian sets out to fill the voids, and he succeeds. we now have an impressively straightforward, well-researched, and convincing account of how the genocide of the armenians, and the mostly local and humanitarian, resistance to that state-initiated and state-led campaign of destruction, played out in syria 1915-1918. truth is precision, and mouradian, like der matossian, goes all the way in his extensive use of archives and a myriad of other sources, with a good and creative use of endnotes, to paint a detailed, nuanced, and vivid picture of the project of destruction, and how that project was met with various forms of local armenian resistance that accompanied the genocide during all stages. because just as genocide denial is hardly the last stage of genocide, but rather a companion to every stage of the annihilation process, so, fortunately, is resistance. a resistance that continues to this very day from many corners against the denial of fact, reason, and memory by the turkish state and various fellow travelers.7 what is resistance to genocide, then? as mouradian shows, it has many forms other than taking up arms, as desperate armenians did at locations such as musa dagh and urfa. in an overview, he points to how resistance has been defined in genocide literature as covering a broad range of actions and refusals to act, from organizing relief and refuge to spreading news about the annihilation, and to simply going on living. mouradian chooses a rather narrow definition of resistance, i.e., “actions carried out illegally, or against the sanction and will of the authorities, to save armenian deportees from 5 thomas brudholm, resentment’s virtue: jean améry and the refusal to forgive (philadelphia, pa: temple university press, 2008). 6 raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (london and new york: i. b. tauris, 2011). 7 see gregory h. stanton’s “ten stages of genocide,” https://www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages, accessed 13.02.2022. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0031 https://www.genocidewatch.com/tenstages 78 annihilation.”8 i disagree with that definition, as it excludes aiding refugees in aleppo before the authorities crack down and start implementing the genocide there. it is still not just relief, but resistance to a genocidal scheme and regime – and still dangerous, as one’s actions at some point can lead to persecution. but that is a minor point. in any event, soon there are ox carts for garbage disposal in the streets of aleppo picking up dead or dying children to be put in mass graves. just like in adana, destruction and resistance begins here in the narrative, within the cityscape, the epicenter of despair, and moves to the periphery. how does it come to this, what to do about it, and how does it end? mouradian explains this through the lens of the armenian victims in ottoman syria, the destination of most death marches, the location of most concentration camps, and where most massacres during the second phase of the genocide took place. in 1915, the city of aleppo becomes a hub for armenians on death marches from the rest of the empire. due to local circumstances, it is possible for armenian city dwellers to extend humanitarian aid to their compatriots largely unhindered for a while. those circumstances include help from other nondominant groups, syriacs, christian arabs, etc., and some muslim notables’ resistance or indifference to the genocide. mouradian convincingly argues that cemal rather plays all sides expertly, and largely lets the genocide run its course, facilitating it here, ignoring it there. but what is most vital for survival has been quite neglected by scholars (including myself), as the author shows: armenian agency, such as extensive lobbying, bribing, fundraising, establishing networks of informants, extending all sorts of aid to the persecuted, food, shelter, vaccines, etc. in short, acting like responsible, caring ottoman citizens, rather than the disloyal terrorists the young turks claims them to be in the official propaganda. such agency – what has been called “victim agency” in somewhat related settings – saves thousands of lives long before western aid begins to arrive from the outside, despite the dangerous circumstances and profoundly uneven power structure, where armenians are pitted against the full power of a state bent on destroying them.9 but with the arrival during 1915 of hardcore unionists to enforce the complete destruction of the deportees, humanitarianism moves underground. and moves increasingly from the relative safety of the urban setting and into the open, the desert, where the armenians end up, in concentration camps, transit camps, and labor camps in their hundreds of thousands. camps complete with the ottoman version of kapos and other collaborators facing, perhaps, “choiceless choices,” at least in some instances, and with the endless degradation and murder we know from, say, nazi and soviet camps.10 8 mouradian, the resistance network, xx. 9 see, e.g., elizabeth m. schneider, “feminism and the false dichotomy of victimization and agency,” new york law school law review 38 (1993): 387. 10 “choiceless choice” was originally coined by lawrence langer to denote impossible situations faced by jews during the holocaust: lawrence langer, “the dilemma of choice in the deathcamps,” centerpoint: a journal of interdisciplinary studies 4, no. 1 (1980): 53-58. 79 armenians are sent to the desert to die, and mouradian’s discussion of these camps, and of the phenomenon of concentration camps in general, should be required reading for all students of mass violence. so should his treatment of how the network of camps are shut down in 1916, usually after no more than a year. too much disease, annihilation is too slow, armenians are still too many, so the massacres of hundreds of thousands begin, thereby finally “answering” “the armenian question” that ends up being pushed all the way down to the desert. supplementing mouradian’s account, here are two testimonies from danish archives and contemporary publications on the short, precarious cycle of life and death for armenians in 1915-1916. first there is a doctor from aintab, khosrov krikorian, who witnesses how seasoned perpetrator zeki bey arrives at der zor in 1916 as the new governor, begins by firing local civil servants “too friendly towards the armenians,” and proceeds to organize massacres with the help of a few hundred gendarmes and groups of local chechen tribesmen, some of them led by one suleiman bey. krikorian also overhears a massacre of 20.000 armenian men, women, and children, the rifles, the cries of the victims, and the “deep, expressive ‘allah, allah, allah’” of the perpetrators. and then there is this testimony, related to a danish priest in greece in 1922: the first ones to arrive in der-sâd [der zor] were not worse off there than they were at other places. they received a little land to till, but after some months an order came that all men had to meet ten hours from there to receive tools. they entered the barracks – ‘take off all your clothes and put money and rings on a blanket, fold your clothes neatly in another corner,’ and then they were herded, naked, out in the field ten minutes from there and lined up. a detachment of chechens came from the front, and a detachment of soldiers came from behind. this was the first massacre in the der-sâd district in march 1916.11 in conclusion, of sorts: why study mass murder, why write these books, why read them? the books themselves provide some rather clear answers, and let us ask new, more informed questions. and then there is the answer by british author d. m. thomas, when asked why he, as it is put, is obsessed with violence – first a novel about the holocaust (the white hotel, 1981), then one about the armenian genocide (ararat, 1983)? his answer: “but that’s the story of the twentieth century.”12 it is, and of the 21th century too, and yet none of this is history, really, as everyone who has been to der zor with their eyes open can testify to. the bones are still there, like ghosts of murders past, and since then islamic state came by, adding new slave markets, new forced conversions, new massacres. 11 danish national archives (rigsarkivet), pk. 15, “arminier-missionen. diverse skildringer vedr. arminierne [sic], 1906-1927, macine-written testimony in danish.; h. p. larsen, blodet og taarernes land i europa. en orientrejse 1922, industrimissionen i armenien 1922, p. 36. 12 donald michael thomas, memories and hallucinations: a memoir (new york: viking penguin 1988), 56. 102 book review heghar zeitlian watenpaugh, the missing pages: the modern life of a medieval manuscript from genocide to justice, stanford, california: stanford university press, 2019, 436 pp. reviewed by sato moughalian, writer and musician, new york, usa on 15 december 2005 the prelate of northern iran’s armenian church received an emergency alert from a border guard and hastened to the bank of the river araxes. across the river, in nakhichevan, azerbaijani troops wielded sledgehammers as they demolished a vast field of ornately carved medieval armenian cross-stones, the irreplaceable legacy of historic armenian djulfa. bishop nshan topouzian videotaped the atrocity in order to bear witness to the world.1 even before raphael lemkin’s neologism genocide was legitimated in the 1948 convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide,2 the polish-jewish jurist understood the mass destruction of humanity as encompassing both “acts of barbarism” and “acts of vandalism.” lemkin’s early formulations of “offenses against the law of nations” recognized works of art as defining elements of a people and identified the “systematic destruction of works of cultural heritage” as an international crime and a grievous loss to all humanity.3 his cultural genocide framework, “vandalism,” was ultimately excluded from the ratified 1948 un convention, but the need for legal and reparative frameworks remains urgent.4 in the missing pages: the modern life of a medieval manuscript from genocide to justice, heghnar zeitlian watenpaugh advances a new approach to reconsidering that omission, mobilizing toros roslin’s lavishly illuminated thirteenth-century zeytun gospels as the subject of a biography and the nexus of a web of social relations and ethical perspectives. in narrating the life story of the gospels book from its creation in 1 simon maghakyan and sarah pickman, “a regime conceals its erasure of indigenous armenian culture,” hyperallergic blog, 18 february 2019, at https://hyperallergic.com/482353/a-regime-conceals-its-erasureof-indigenous-armenian-culture/, accessed 18.06.2020; geospatial technologies and human rights project, high-resolution satellite imagery and the destruction of cultural artifacts in nakhchivan, azerbaijan (washington: american association for the advancement of science, 2010), at https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/s3fs-public/reports/azerbaijan_report.pdf, accessed 12.07.2020. 2 convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (genocide convention) 1948, in united nations treaty collection 78, 277, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume78-i-1021-english.pdf, accessed 12.07.2020.. 3 raphael lemkin, “acts constituting a general (transnational) danger considered as offences against the law of nations,” additional explications to the special report presented to the 5th conference for the unification of penal law in madrid (14-20 october 1933), at www.preventgenocide.org/ lemkin/madrid1933-english. htm, accessed 10.07.2020. 4 for two thoughtful analyses of lemkin on the subject of cultural destruction, see peter balakian, “raphael lemkin, cultural destruction, and the armenian genocide,” holocaust and genocide studies 27, no. 1 (2013): 57-89; leora bilsky and rachel klagsbrun, “the return of cultural genocide?” european journal of international law 29, no. 2 (2018): 373-396. 103 1256 through its current state sundered between two continents watenpaugh revivifies the historic armenian communities that commissioned and venerated it and interrogates broader issues of patrimony, art trafficking, and the place of purposeful cultural destruction in contemporary definitions of genocide. watenpaugh begins her account of the zeytun gospels with a lawsuit from 2010, western prelacy of the armenian apostolic church of america v. j. paul getty museum. that litigation, brought by the armenian church in los angeles, sought restitution of the eight missing pages of the gospels’ canon tables, severed from the manuscript during the mayhem of the armenian genocide and sold privately to the getty in 1994. media reports brought the case to her attention. a professor of art and architectural history at the university of california, davis, specializing in the urban history of the medieval middle east, watenpaugh steeped herself in the arguments. while the case was in progress, she published an op-ed in the los angeles times proposing a solution that recognized the canon tables as both the precious liturgical object of a dispossessed people and an exquisite work of art worthy of study by a wide audience.5 watenpaugh analogized the case to other legal settlements of looted art and argued that the canon tables could be displayed in a way that honored both its religious and aesthetic functions. she suggested that the museum’s provenance statement and didactic materials should reflect the history of violence and mutilation the pages endured. watenpaugh is herself a descendant of armenian genocide survivors, some of whose ancestors hailed from or passed through regions she describes. in the “prologue,” she recounts a research trip to eastern turkey to the site where toros roslin’s manuscript had been created and notes the deliberate effacement of crosses and other symbols of the armenian christians who had once thrived there. it is in the intersection of these roles historian, documentarian, and descendant that watenpaugh introduces into her discourse novel terms such as “mother manuscript” and “orphaned fragment,” which personalize the reader’s connection to the holy book. in her telling, the manuscript continues to be a living entity with agency, as it was during the long centuries of its sacred function. watenpaugh also reflects on the responses of individuals under calamitous assault, noting that many armenian survivors not only struggled to preserve themselves, but instinctively carried family bibles, house keys, and photographs into flight relics that would bind them to place and heritage. offering this context for the book, she layers her narrative around the idea of the zeytun gospels as a “survivor object,” a rescued material trace that endured the attempted extermination of the culture that produced it. balancing art historical and ethnographic detail, watenpaugh recreates for the reader the lost armenian worlds that were the homelands of her biographical subject. the missing pages also enters into a welcome dialogue with the currently flourishing “history of the book” and “biography of things” subfields and their vibrant convergences. alongside beatrice greundler’s history of the arabic book (harvard university press, 2020), seth jacobowitz’s writing technology in meiji japan: a media history of modern 5 heghnar zeitlian watenpaugh, “when art and religion collide,” los angeles times, 19 july 2010, at https:// www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jul-19-la-oe-watenpaugh-bible-20100719-story.html, accessed 02.10.2019. 104 japanese literature and visual culture (harvard university press, 2020), marina rustow’s the lost archive: traces of a caliphate in a cairo synagogue (princeton university press, 2020), and edgar garcia’s the signs of the americas: a poetics of pictography (chicago university press, 2020), the missing pages, like these other multimodal studies, broadens the literature of non-european book and cultural production and object mobility. chapter 2 begins in hromkla (currently rumkale), in the scriptorium of the “god-protected castle,” at the moment of the gospels book’s creation. once perched above the euphrates river, the ruins of the hromkla fortress and monastery are now half-submerged the consequence of a turkish dam project. this once militarily important stronghold, strategically poised at the intersection of international trade routes, sheltered the seat of the armenian catholicos for the kingdom of cilicia from the mid-twelfth century. watenpaugh chronicles the history of cilician armenians in cooperation and conflict with crusaders, seljuks, and mamluks. armenian nobles formed networks of alliances through diplomacy, mastery of languages, and marriages with crusaders, byzantine royalty, mongols, and even sultans of aleppo. stretched across the fertile northern mediterranean coast, the armenian kingdom of cilicia suffered frequent invasions, punctuated by brief periods of stability and prosperity. watenpaugh observes that hromkla’s location also enabled aesthetic interchanges, especially with europe. armenian artists played an honored role in hromkla’s religious sphere. under generous royal and religious patronage, scribes and craftspeople produced luxurious liturgical objects, bibles, and gospel books, which commanded exceptional reverence as materializations of the holy word. elaborate colophons recorded the genealogy of patrons and circumstances of the commissions. subsequent marginalia noted lineage of ownership, invasions and earthquakes, as well as anathemas and exhortations. roslin’s 1256 gospels book, the subject of the missing pages, was commissioned by catholicos constantine of partzrpert. the resplendent pages were filled with toros roslin’s beautifully executed calligraphy, with portraits of saints, angels, palm trees, peacocks, and roosters rendered in lush, color-saturated mineral pigments, silver, and gold. a dazzling crucifix and precious ornaments adorned its binding. as custom dictated, the canon tables’s concordance lists nestled columns of numbers within architectural forms. somewhat unusually for the period, the canon tables also featured some of the manuscript’s most exuberant ornamentation. the zeytun gospels represents roslin’s earliest signed manuscript -one of only seven affirmed extant examples of his work. the mamluk sack of hromkla in 1292 devastated armenian monastic life, but by then, toros roslin’s glittering pages had already begun their long peregrination. during a sojourn in the monastery of furnus, it was rebound and adorned with sacred relics, before that city too, was overrun. the furnus priests, devastated and impoverished, sold the manuscript to one mahdesi hagop. by his hand and perhaps others, the holy book eventually reached zeytun sometime in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. in chapter 3, watenpaugh resurrects with vivid specificity the distinctive urban fabric, religious traditions, and intercommunal tensions of the once-thriving ottoman armenian world of zeytun (currently süleymanı). perched high on a crag and dubbed the “eagle’s nest,” the overwhelmingly christian city international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0011 105 had boasted some eight armenian churches, a monastery, and as many as 20,000 armenian residents on the eve of wwi. during the manuscript’s life in zeytun, the gospels book, along with other surviving relics of medieval armenian cilicia, was closely guarded, removed from its hiding place only on ceremonial occasions. priests and parishioners believed it possessed protective powers of its own. however, not even the sanctified gospels book, it seemed, could protect zeytun from the first waves of violent ottoman mass expulsions in early april of 1915. watenpaugh underlines this pivotal moment for the gospels, as it was removed for the last time from its religious function and began a long transformation from sacred talisman to fragmented masterpiece of medieval art. in the fourth and fifth chapters, she traces the movement of the holy book through the bloody battle of marash. the gospels book, wrapped in a paisley shawl, was dropped in a wrenching moment of flight. by the time the book reappeared in armenian hands, the chain of learned custody the succession of armenian notables, intellectuals, and humanitarians who understood the priceless nature of the medieval volume had been broken. precious ornaments had been stripped from the binding, the eight pages of the canon tables amputated from the mother manuscript. from here forward, watenpaugh’s meticulous reporting follows each appearance of the mutilated holy book in testimonies, articles, archives, and interviews as it winds its way through aleppo, istanbul, and ultimately to yerevan and the united states. as she charts the book’s passage from hand to hand, she portrays the figures who interacted with it and ushered it into the art historical record. she pays particular homage to art historian sirarpie der nercessian, a seminal figure in the establishment of armenian art history as a discipline, and the scholar who discerned the connection between toros roslin’s fractured canon tables and the mother manuscript. in chapter 5, “aleppo,” watenpaugh details the legal processes of armenian deportation as well as the seizure and destruction of moveable and immovable properties. she emphasizes that the arrest and deportation of church leaders in the early waves of the genocidal process ensured religious institutions and their congregations would be shorn of leadership. then, churches were often destroyed or repurposed by the state; the sight of a church engulfed in flames signified conquest as well as brutal cultural destruction. the ottoman young turk “abandoned properties” laws of 1915 required that liturgical objects, paintings, and holy books, icons, and furniture be recorded and safeguarded; in reality, precious treasures of the armenian church were never seen again. watenpaugh estimates that as many as thirty thousand religious manuscripts might have been lost in this period maimed, used as wrapping materials, or sold on the black market. much of the material heritage of the medieval armenian kingdom of cilicia was destroyed in this manner. the rare remaining objects, such as the zeytun gospels, thus became even more powerful repositories of memory simply by virtue of their survival. watenpaugh recounts other “survivor objects,” such as the mush homiliariam, rescued through heroic feats of ordinary armenians who recognized that in saving the heirlooms of their culture and religions, even while under unimaginable duress, they would also be saving themselves. although the missing pages gives primacy to the zeytun gospels as the central “survi106 vor object,” in the narrative, watenpaugh unspools multiple storylines in this ambitious and multifaceted book. in the closing chapters, she pays tribute to many armenian individuals who recognized the urgency of salvaging all possible traces of armenian intellectual, spiritual, and artistic life as they fled. asadur surenian-basilosian, a descendant of one of the zeytun’s princely clans, spirited the manuscript to marash. artin der ghazarian secreted it from turkish troops and then deputized his sister to deliver it from marash, even as his own family faced barbaric violence. later, leaders such as boghos nubar and avedis aharonian pressed for reparations at the paris peace conference. other intellectuals, archbishop artavazd surmeyan among them, rescued dispersed fragments of armenian legacy, publishing a magisterial, three-volume account, the history of the armenians of aleppo.6 notably, a number of american missionaries, scholars, and humanitarians also aided in the effort james lyman, ernest partridge, frances w. kelsey, mabel elliott rescuing valuables and bearing witness. watenpaugh’s closing chapters movingly recount stories of individuals, often survivors of depredations themselves, who exhibited tremendous fortitude in saving gospels, prayer books, icons, and other artifacts. by memorializing the actions of these armenians to rescue their national cultural heritage, under conditions of horrific violence, she forges her own work of memory and witness and introduces a new model for art historical monographs as social histories and material studies. in reconstituting toros roslin’s zeytun gospels as a living entity with spiritual power and agency, she compels us to consider this “survivor object” not only as artistic masterpiece, but also as surrogate for countless other works lost, disfigured, stabbed, vandalized all of them the patrimony of humankind and all worthy of an internationally recognized system of norms. 6 artavazd surmeyan, պատմութիւն հալէպի հայոց [history of the armenian aleppo] (paris: éditions araks, 1950). 87 book reviews stefan ihrig, atatürk in the nazi imagination (cambridge, belknap press/ harvard university press, 2014), 320 pages. reviewed by vahram ter-matevosyan, senior research fellow, institute of oriental studies, national academy of sciences of republic of armenia, assistant professor, american university of armenia this book is undoubtedly an important, enlightening and original contribution to our understanding of the post-wwi transformations in germany as well as in turkey. it brings into a picture hitherto unknown facts, perceptions and assertions about admirations that the german right wing political parties, especially nazis, and key politicians had for turkey. it is an eye-opening account, which deserves further contextualization within the history of both countries of turkey and germany of the inter-war period. although the book “is a history of perceptions and discourses about turkey” (p. 7), it does bring interesting insights about the reasons for the nazi engagement with the kemalist turkey. although the book is about germany and its post wwi transformations, it also provides important hints about many developments in turkey especially in the 1930s. it also implies that the book is an important contribution in studying the german dimensions and perspectives in examining the history of turkey also. the author cautions about two important assumptions at the beginning of the book hoping that his clarifi cations will clear out any ambiguity that the book may trigger. the author arguably claims that he does not intend to discuss “whether the nazis were right that the kemalists displayed fascist tendencies” and secondly, he “cannot delve too deeply into the diffi cult topic” of the armenian genocide. although he immediately refers to the period under discussion (1919-1923 and 1933-1938) as a reason for not including it, his next argument comes a little off the context of the book. by citing key studies in the fi eld of the armenian genocide, he implicitly questions them as he claims that the armenian genocide “still needs to be studied extensively before we can make more defi nite statements about it” (p. 7). although later in the book he dedicated an entire subsection to the armenian genocide, the caveat of his raises some questions for the reader. as for his fi rst claim, that he leaves the discussion of the existence of the fascist tendencies of the kemalists to others (p. 7), he admittedly points at one of the major gaps of the book. the nazi’s admiration of the turkish transformation is presented as a one-way process, underestimating the german experience of feeding pro-german sentiments in turkey since the late 19th century, and overestimating the turkish model of transformation. the book mainly examines the german nationalist excitement and obsession with turkey through analysis of a range of conservative to far-right newspapers, oftentimes turning to broader media trends. he mainly concentrated on the following newspapers: neue preussische zeitung (also called kreuzzeitung), deutsche allgemeine zeitung, vossische zeitung, heimatland, völkischer beobachter (vb), der reichwart etc. the author claims “the international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 book reviews 88 89 whole spectrum of newspapers, from the nationalist center to the fringe far-right, developed an almost monolithic discourse on turkey”. (p. 15) the german newspapers recognized turkey as a role model for the germans urging “certain turkish strategies to replicate in germany in some way”. (p. 15) the process of “role modeling” became more accentuated with the rise into prominence of mustafa kemal in 1919. in the following years, the german press covered extensively the major achievements and steps of mustafa kemal. the image around mustafa kemal was consistently built in a way as to construct a nationalist backbone and martial spirit that might appeal many readers (p. 49). the german press not only “became champions of and spokespeople of mustafa kemal ataturk” but also “something akin to a large european kemalist pr agency” (pp. 23, 150-151). the german press even reprinted kemalist demands during the lausanne negotiations as lists on page 1, (p. 43), thereby expressing their apparent support to the kemalist cause. with the advent of mustafa kemal and the attention given to him in the german press, the author argues that “there has never been another period with a huge number of articles in the german press devoted to turkey, not even during the high points of the recent eu-turkey debate”. (p. 23) the main feature of the right wing german press of the weimer republic was to seek commonalities and parallelism (anti-western, anti-entente, anti-greek etc.) between turkey and germany and potential lessons that germany could draw from the turkish tactics. (p. 49) in addition, the nationalist german press was full of overexcitement, fascination, admiration and praise for the turkish success, “turkish methods”, “turkish solutions”, for mustafa kemal and, even for ismet inönü. interestingly, the history textbooks of the late weimer years mentioned the turkish war of independence as a “marvelous example of national devotion” (p. 113). the main conclusion that german nationalist circles drew from the turkish experience and tried to disseminate through the press was the following belief: “national unity, a strong leader, a preemptive and total military action were advanced as crucial policy prerequisites and political means”. (p. 66) the second chapter starts with a rather strong claim, which challenges established views in the historiography. ihrig argues that hitler’s attempted seizure of power in 1923 “was inspired much more by mustafa kemal and the events in anatolia than by the example of mussolini’s “march of rome””. (p. 68) he further argues that the “nazis “grew up” with turkey as it was the case for the “völkisch” press to which continually proposed to learn from turkey. (p. 70) he approached this case through the offi cial nazi papers, völkischer beobachter (vb), and a weekly, heimatland. both papers closely followed the major development in turkey. the vb explicitly called to resort to “turkish methods” (p. 71), the heimatland in turn was quite encouraged by the kemalist experience of countering the entente. that paper also looks at the case of turkey with a sense of inspiration: “the governing in anatolia has managed, after the downfall of their fatherland, to get a lot of trumps into their hands by intelligently waiting, the iron nerves and skillful maneuvering”. (p. 74) by relying the claims of the nazi papers, the author argues that, inspired by the turkish model of counterpoising constantinople with ankara, the nazis tried to follow suit and change the center of gravity from berlin to munich. thus, what was happening in turkey had captivated the imagination of the nazis in a very detailed way. they sought models and inspirations not only from general trends which were unveiling in turkey, but also in certain steps and tactics that mustafa kemal and his “ankara government” took to cope with the entente and the power-holders in constantinople. (p. 91) references to turkey, mustafa kemal and ankara government popped up regularly in testimonies and during the trial of the organizers of the failed munich coup détat in november 1923. ihrig also argues that many names, which played an important role during hitler’s time in power, had a previous experience both in the ottoman empire and turkey. they were also either actively involved in the armenian genocide or served in the ottoman empire as german offi cials carrying out different missions (military, diplomatic), which made them to build and develop signifi cant connections with turkey and its key politicians. holistically referred as “german ottomans”, the author brings the following names lossow, hans von seeckt, hans humann, franz von papen, konstantin von neurath (foreign minister) and general bronsart von schellendorf, otto von feldman (a leading politician in the dnvp and the all-deutscher verband), max erwin von scheubner-richter (hitler’s political advisor, who was the german vicechancellor in eastern regions of turkey and witnessed the armenian genocide, he is believed to be the main person that hitler learnt about the armenian genocide), rudolf hoess (future commander of auschwitz), (p. 104), josef thorak, a nazi sculptor, who had erected many monuments of central importance in turkey (p. 130). ihrig clearly displays that hitler knew very well about turkish domestic politics (minority questions, domestic reforms etc.) and major turning points in the foreign policy of the past 20 decades at least. hitler’s admiration with turkey and particularly with mustafa kemal did not fade away even when he came to power. in 1933, he turkish milliyet interviewed him, which later on was reprinted and summarized in a variety of german papers. in that interview, hitler spared no words to share his excitement and admiration of turkey and its leader. he famously pointed at that turkey and germany were united not only by mere good relations, but also by “something more” sympathy and understanding based on the shared pursuit of similar goals”. he named turkey “a shining star for him” and called mustafa kemal “the greatest man of the century”. (p. 115) the same logic of words were later used by hitler when he was sending congratulatory telegrams to mustafa kemal. hitler famously admitted “… atatürk was a teacher, mussolini was his fi rst and i his second student.” (p. 116) ihrig quotes heinrich hoffman, hitler’s personal photographer and a close friend, who reported in his memoirs that hitler’s admired ataturk so much that one of the many busts of ataturk by the famous nazi sculptor josef thorak, became hitler’s cherished possession. (p. 129) the nazi press also presented atatürk and his deeds to ascertain the righteousness of “men make history” claim. the latter was widely circulated to affi rm that only great men, the führer, can regenerate the nation and to refute the anticipations both from the masses and democracy. (p. 149) hitler also repeatedly mentioned that turkey had been a role model for him (p. 116), which was used along with a famous metaphor when referring to turkey “star in the darkness” (pp. 114-117). later, in the midst of the war against poland, he told turkish ambassador that he “was coping atatürk.” (p. 116) particularly interesting were the statements made on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the turkish republic in 1933. in one of those statements, kemalism, nazism and international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 book reviews 90 91 fascism were seen as emanations of the same thing that emerged from the same source of great ideological breakthrough. the three were also seen “as the fi rst great eruptions, which will cover the antiquated intellectual crust with a new, smoldering and fi ery layer, with a new ideology and [a new] cultural layer.” (p. 119) already in power, hitler and the nazi press continued to share their admiration with turkey and mustafa kemal. between 1933 and 1938, volkischer beobachter, the fl agship of the nazi press, kept publishing hundreds of articles about turkey. (pp. 134-136) atatürk featured prominently in books on contemporary führers and the new world order. in those depictions, atatürk was put on equal footing with hitler himself as well as with mussolini. moreover, ihrig claims that, nowhere in the world, except turkey, were as many books on atatürk and the new turkey published as in interwar germany. (p. 151) in its glorifi ed descriptions of atatürk and his achievements the nazi press created an aura which “elevated him to messianistic levels”, he was presented as “the imminent savior” or as “a transcendental savior”, and oftentimes “savior and führer” in some texts. (p. 155) understandably, atatürk was highlighted along those lines in order to strengthen his image among germans and boost the confi dence towards the german führer. the nazi press also presented “actual, coincidental and manufactured parallels” between atatürk and hitler (both came from periphery, had humble backgrounds and were soldiers). (p. 157) when atatürk passed away on november 10, 1938, the nazi leadership and the entire propaganda machine did their best to convey to turkey “german’s people’s painful sympathy”. hitler also made sure to underline that point in his condolences telegram. (pp. 138143). for the next days and weeks atatürk’s death turn into a major nazi media event as both national and provincial papers carried announcements and essays on atatürk, his life, deeds, his successor ismet inonu and the new turkey that he created. (p. 138) the fi fth chapter of the book stands out for a number of reasons. most prominently, one of its sections discusses the armenian genocide, albeit briefl y, through the eyes of the nazi germany1. at the outset, he argues that in the eyes of nazis “the murder of the ottoman armenians was one of the main foundations” of the new national (völkisch) state. (p. 175) ihrig questions hitler’s alleged exclamation “who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the armenians” and his reference to the “extermination of the armenians”. ihrig does not seem to trust the reliability of the sources which discuss those quotes. (p. 176) without providing his own explanations why the sources are not reliable, ihrig argues that there is no need in “either of them to show that the nazis were infl uenced by the armenian genocide”. he goes on to argue: “because as much as the nazis grew up with turkey and the turkish war of independence, they also grew up with the armenian genocide” (p. 175). ihrig takes the argument even further by claiming that in the process of constructing anti-armenianism germans borrowed heavily from the late 19-th century anti-semitism. he once again shares the widely known fact that in the german anti-armenian discourse the armenians were presented as the “jews of the orient” (p. 177). ihrig claims that in the nazi press armenians were presented as “parasites”, a “plague” and as early as in the beginning of the 1920s, it 1. he apparently promises to cover it in detail in his forthcoming book “justifying genocide: germany, the armenian genocide, the long road to auschwitz”, cambridge, ma: harvard university press. was replete with warnings that “what happened to the armenians might very well happen to the jews in a future germany” (p. 179). ihrig also argues that hitler was very well informed about the intricacies of the armenian genocide. one of the possible sources of him being informed was that the former german vice-consul in eastern turkey during wwi, max erwin von scheubner-richter, was hitler’s close friend. thus, ihrig believes that the former vice-consul would not have failed to discuss turkey and the armenians with hitler. (p. 179) during the 1920s, hitler sought the opportunity to present the armenians as an example of a “lesser race” on par with the jews. (p. 181) the third reich continued its previously built foundation of anti-armenianism. its key ideologues came to believe that “the destruction of the armenians” as a “compelling necessity”. (p. 182) the third reich press kept using different negative stereotypes about armenians as well as greeks. (pp. 183-184) based on the discourse of the time, the concluding parts of that chapter carries three central arguments: a) the armenian genocide was nothing distant to interwar germany, b) furthermore, the armenian genocide served as a tempting precedent as it helped the new turkey with its national rebirth and a blissful völkisch existence, c) the process of constructing the “pure turkish nation” through the extermination of the armenians did not entail any “negative” repercussions for the turks, such as a great power intervention to punish them for the committed crime. (pp. 206-207) this part of the book is certainly interesting and it would tremendously interesting to examine ihrig’s forthcoming book, the title of which is quite telling and promising. overall the book leaves only positive impressions, however, from time to time, it takes some efforts to grasp the chronology jumps and thematic discussions. the other minor issue is that many topics and assertions in the book surface repeatedly in different chapter. quite logically, the book also raises some questions. for instance, while dealing with turkey why the question of “race”, an important part of the nazi discourse, was not discussed deeper enough in the nazi press of the 1920s and 1930s (the book discusses it albeit very briefl y)? why hitler continued to use the image of atatürk and his new turkey even after coming to power? even though the author mentions a few times that certain sentiments of right wing press were shared by other papers, it would have been helpful if the author could discuss a few left wing papers in order to see whether there was any discussion at all about new turkey in the german press, which could have been slightly different than that of the far right press. that would also be helpful to put some of the claims and perceptions in the book into a larger perspective. it would also be helpful to understand how big the audience was and an approximate number of subscriptions of the nazi press in the 1920s and during the later decades. that would undoubtedly help us enormously to understand the size of readers and the potential impact that the nazi press was having on the german society. the sixth chapter on turkish-german relations during wwii ends with questions rather than defi nite arguments, which is done to signify that turkish-german relations during wwii remain understudied. that chapter, the shortest in the book, does not even have a conclusion. however, that chapter reiterates a set of questions that a reader would think about while reading the book – why did hitler care about german-turkish friendship international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 book reviews 92 93 after wwi? in order to answer to that and many other questions ihrig rightly proposes to analyze the other side of the coin – the image of national socialism in 1930s turkey. he conditions that option with the claim that it would not be possible to have a complete answer to that until “the turkish foreign offi ce archives are opened” (p. 221). book reviews fuat dündar, crime of numbers: the role of statistics in the armenian question (1878–1918) (new brunswick (usa) and london (uk): transaction publishers, 2010), xiv, 238 pages. reviewed by robert tatoyan, senior research fellow, the armenian genocide museum-institute, yerevan, armenia questions about the number of armenians living in the ottoman empire on the threshold of the armenian genocide and the death toll during the armenian genocide have special place among falsifi cations by those scholars, who deny the historical fact of the armenian genocide. upon visiting the webpage of turkish ministry of foreign affairs, one can come across the title “the armenian allegation of genocide: the issue and the facts”, where the following information is provided under fact 1: “demographic studies prove that prior to world war i, fewer than 1.5 million armenians lived in the entire ottoman empire. thus, allegations that more than 1.5 million armenians from eastern anatolia died must be false.”1 there are a number of scholars, like esat uras2, stanford shaw3, kamuran gürün4, kemal karpat5, justin mccarthy6 and others engaged in putting this “fact” on scientifi c grounds. unconditional and uncritical acceptance of statistical data, provided by the ottoman government regarding the number of the ottoman armenians living in the empire during 1878-1914 and the denial of statistics originating from mainly armenian sources (according to armenian patriarchate of constantinople, about two million armenians living in the ottoman empire in 1914) 7, which is discrepant to the 1. “the armenian allegation of genocide: the issue and the facts” (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-armenian-allegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts.en.mfa, taken on 07.10.2015). 2. esat uras, tarihte ermeniler ve ermeni meselesi (ankara: yeni matbaa, 1950), english translation: esat uras, the armenians in history and the armenian question (ankara: documentary publications, 1988). 3. stanford j. shaw and ezel kural shaw, history of the ottoman empire and modern turkey, vol.2 (n.y.: cambridge university press, 1977); stanford j. shaw, “the ottoman census system and population, 1831-1914”, international journal of middle east studies (ijmes), № 9 (1978): 325-338. 4. kamuran gürün, the armenian file: the myth of innocence exposed (nicosia and london: k. rustem and brother and weidenfeld and nicolson, 1985). 5. karpat kemal h., ottoman population 1830-1914: demographic and social characteristics (wisconsin: the university of wisconsin press, 1985). 6. mccarthy justin, muslims and minorities. the population of ottoman anatolia and the end of the empire (new york: new york university press, 1983). 7. according to memorandum presented by the armenian delegation at paris peace conference in 1919, 2.026.000 armenians lived in the ottoman empire by 1914, out of which 1.403.000 inhabited in the territory of ottoman armenia (including trebizond province and cilicia), 440.000 in other regions of asian turkey, and 183.000 in constantinople and european turkey: see: the armenian question 88 book reviews1 michael m. gunter, armenian history and the question of genocide (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2011), 195 pages. reviewed by israel w. charny, executive director, institute on the holocaust and genocide in jerusalem; awarded armenian presidential prize 2011, editorin-chief, web magazine gpn genocide prevention now 2010-2012. this is the best book i have ever read -which means it is the best of the whole terrible world of books that are devoted to ridiculous and ugly denials of absolutely factual known genocides. it is, therefore, a terrible work. so the question is what is the meaning of my quite genuine praise for something that i condemn so strongly and uncompromisingly? this is the best denialist work i have ever seen insofar as it is written with a quietness, and solidity of coverage of issues, and even more as if with an apparent fairness of representing ranges of ideas and opinions about issues rather than strong-arm statements of single opinion-truths. moreover, michael gunter, a professor at tennessee tech, opens the book with a clear acknowledgment-disclosure of his signifi cant period of lecturing in turkey, and even as he says “i have long wanted to present an objective analysis of the turkish point of view” he clearly conveys that he is very much on the side of turkish denial of the armenian genocide. already in the foreword gunter cites a smaller number (600,000) of armenian victims than is generally accepted, a reduction of the number of victims that has long been characteristic of traditional turkish denial propaganda. he says right out, so that there is no doubt for the reader where his “objective analysis” is heading, that these deaths whatever the number, even the lower number would clearly constitute a major genocide that “it was neither a premeditated policy perpetrated by the ottoman turkish government nor an event unilaterally implemented without cause.” yes, the author says “cause.” if there were killings they were caused, and you know by whom -the victims of course. so we know from the fi rst page of the foreword quite clearly where our ‘objective’ analyst stands. gunter is not only a denier who revises some of the facts of the genocide thus the lower number of victims than most historians recognize; he also denies the very essence of the genocide as having been in any way a premeditated government policy. and he also has pulled one of the ultimates in the denial kit bag of justifying the murders telling us there was cause for the murders. according to gunter, the armenians forced the turkish government to contain them as rebels. tell that to armenian 1.to cite this article: book reviews, international journal of armenian genocide studies, 1:1(2014): 88100 book reviews 89 soldiers in the turkish army as they are taken out and murdered en masse. tell that to armenian women and children staggering in the ‘desert,’ starving, raped, watching their children die or be killed, and themselves cut down by swords. but i haven’t fi nished all my praise of michael gunter. gunter is nonetheless a kind denier who continuously throws us bones for our respite and thereby of course it would seem proves and reproves his announced objectivity. thus in the same poisonous foreword he quickly adds to his core statement of denial crocodile tears, “of course in no way does this excuse the horrible excesses committed by the turks.” oh, thank you, michael, for your understanding of our pain and outrage that you indeed share or do you? perhaps the highest praise i can give denier gunter is that unlike the great deniers that have gone before him of the armenian genocide but also deniers of other genocides such as the holocaust gunter cites a large number of those of us scholars and writers who have published the now wonderfully strong literature confi rming the armenian genocide and i would add genocides of other peoples alongside the armenians, specifi cally the assyrians, greeks, and yezidis, 2, 3, 4 and also the beginning moves of the ottoman government toward a potential genocide of the jews in palestine.5 deniers generally stay away from us writers who confi rm the armenian genocide like a plague. or they may cite one or two of us to demolish our statements, but rarely if ever do they assemble such a huge number of scholars who clearly stand by recognition of the armenian genocide. gunter also refers to works like forty days of musa dagh and laws and legal institutions and more that clearly account the armenian genocide. look at the following unbelievable list to who gunter writes about or cites (it is a great list of so many people we would want to invite to a party): [in a few cases i add explanatory notes] akcam, taner alvarez, alex balakian, peter 2. genocide prevention now (2011) special issue, armenian genocide and co-victims: assyrians, yezidis, greeks, available at: http://www.genocidepreventionnow.org/home/gpnissues/ specialissue5winter2011.aspx 3. tessa hofmann, matthias bjørnlund, vasileios meichanetsidis (editors), the genocide of the ottoman greeks: studies on the state–sponsored campaign of extermination of the christians of asia minor, 1912-1922 and its a� ermath: history, law, memory (new york & athens: aristide d. caratzas, 2011). 4. israel w. charny, “the integrity and courage to recognize all the victims of a genocide,” in tessa hofmann, matthias bjørnlund, vasileios meichanetsidis (editors), the genocide of the ottoman greeks: studies on the state–sponsored campaign of extermination of the christians of asia minor, 1912-1922 and its a� ermath: history, law, memory (new york & athens: aristide d. caratzas, 2011), 21-38; republished in genocide prevention now, issue 10, spring 2012. available at: http:// genocidepreventionnow.org/gpnsearchresults/tabid/64/ctl/displaycitation/mid/400/cid/115/default. aspx 5. for an introduction to the history of the turks’ expulsion of jews from tel aviv in 1917, see the excellent work by yair auron, including the additional references that he gives: yair auron, the banality of indiff erence: zionism and the armenian genocide ( new brunswick, nj: transaction publishers, 2000), 73-83. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 90 bardakjian, kevork bloxam, donald bryce, lord james the blue book by lord bryce and arnold toynbee charny, israel dadrian, vahakn davis, leslie dink, hrant dole, robert (senator) fein, helen forty days of musa dagh by franz werfel gayssot act this is a french law against denials of crimes including genocide committed by the nazis during wwii, and that is the basis for the recent efforts in france to expand french law to cover other recognized genocides such as the armenian genocide. genocide resolutions by the us congress gurr, ted robert harff, barbara hovanissian, richard g. huttenbach, henry international court of justice international criminal court international crisis group johannsohn, kurt jorgensen, torben kaiser, hilmar kopf, david kuschner, bernard kristof, nicholas kuper, leo in my judgment, following lemkin, the late leo kuper was the preeminent genocide scholar in the world, and he adamantly recognized the armenian genocide. lemkin, raphael lemkin is the creator of the word genocide and the father of the un genocide convention. much of lemkin’s early work was deeply inspired by the armenian genocide. lepsius, johannes libaridian, gerard book reviews 91 markusen, eric melson, robert minasian, edward midlarsky, manus morgenthau, henry morgenthau is the well-known us ambassador to turkey who wrote so fully and passionately about the armenian genocide at the time. as noted earlier, at a conference in turkey at istanbul university we heard pseudo-learned allegations that morgenthau’s wellknown diary is a forged document, like many other evidences of the armenian genocide that turks easily call “forgeries,” including even the record of their court martials of the genocides. naim bey oran baskin a leading turkish intellectual who fi ghts against government denial of the armenian genocide pamuk orhan papazian, dennis phillips, david l. leader of tarc (the turkish armenian reconciliation commission) which contracted with the international center for transitional justice (ictj) for a report on whether the armenian genocide indeed constituted genocide. when the commission ruled that it did, all the turkish participants in tarc pulled out, never to be seen again in that supposed effort at a joint commission with the armenians.6 despite my high praises of gunter for covering lots of differing ideas, i note that he does not even mention the ictj ruling. power, samantha rummel, rudolf safrastian, ruben sanjian, avedis sarafi an, ara sassounian, harut semelin, jacques smith, roger; and eric markusen, and robert jay lifton smith, markusen and lifton authored a famous wonderful paper about how turkey’s ambassador to the us, with the assistance of an ostensible scholar at princeton, went after lifton for daring to refer to the armenian genocide in his milestone study of the nazi 6. international center for transitional justice (ictj) report prepared for tarc, the applicability of the united nations convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide to events which occurred during the early twentieth century, executive summary of legal conclusions (february 10, 2003), available at: http://www.armenian-genocide.org/affi rmation.244/current_category.5/affi rmation_ detail.html international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 92 doctors at auschwitz. staub, ervin suny, ronald tatz, colin ternon, yves theriault, henry vartian, ross walker, christopher wegner, armin weitz, eric zoryan institute zwaan, ton whew! wow! (there are so many sources given by gunter that i now feel badly for some dear and respected colleagues, such as yair auron and rouben adalian, for examples, who have been passed over by gunter undeservedly). have you ever seen a denier of any genocide who quotes so extensively from so many sources that say clearly and decisively that the very genocide he is denying really took place? now the reader will understand more fully my enthusiastic ‘recommendation’ of this book. how can you expect anything but objectivity, fairness and serious scholarship from someone who is so open-minded and thorough? gunter refers to a turkish assertion taken from a book published in ankara that claims the famous british blue book by lord bryce and arnold toynbee is a “so-called document that contains nothing more than one sided british propaganda and hence is not worth dwelling upon.” (p. 13) here, our open-minded scholar who quotes so many of us was quoting from one of his turkish sources, and indeed it is very important to bring in turkish sources too, isn’t it? but let’s also hear what gunter himself says immediately following: “the above analysis also indicated that both bryce and morgenthau held powerful and deep rooted prejudices against the turks that undoubtedly prevented them from seeing the entire situation. although the armenians did suffer grievously so too did their antagonists.” (p. 13) as noted, gunter acknowledges some killing but explains the killing constituted perfectly normal security measures against a rebellious people. gunter refers to some people who see “a justifi ed turkish response to armenian and foreign provocations [and that] the picture they paint is very different from the one depicted by the armenians and largely accepted in the west.” (p. 5) in this connection we note that the failure to mention co-victims of the armenians further protects the spurious argument that turkish killing was an understandable self-defense against the rebellious armenians allying with russia. the fact is that the turks were out to kill many non-turks and non-muslims. see also a recent book by george shirinian, well-respected director of the zoryan institute, on the fate of the greeks.7 7. the asia minor catastrophe and the ottoman greek genocide: essays on asia minor, pontos, and book reviews 93 how does our intrepid objective scholar conclude his book? of course he wants to be helpful and help in curbing the denial that fuels “continuing fear and revenge.” (p. 137) so he offers strategies beginning with splitting the “more affl uent armenian diaspora” that is so concerned with “allegations of genocide” from “the nation in armenia” and the “immediate economic reality of armenia.” yes, he wants to be large-hearted and he calls on turkey to help armenia with its economic problems, and thus in eternal realpolitik “turkey may begin to split the two armenian actors.” (p. 137) but all is not lost in deception. goodhearted gunter also includes a proposal to turkey to open the borders it has lockjammed with armenia for so many years. as for the piece de résistance of “genocide allegations,” gunter proposes that turkey should continue to advocate a “joint commission of historians to undertake an objective analysis.” he notes again, in his fair way of course, that the armenian diaspora opposes such a commission and therefore “once again turkey is presented with an opportunity to portray the armenian diaspora as obstructionist.” (p. 137) as noted earlier there is not a word on the very responsible objective commission that was hired years ago by tarc (turkish armenian reconciliation commission) in which the turks were enthusiastic partners only to turn their backs on the results of the independent commission that said there was no basis for their denial it was genocide!8 conclusion: i have long been a student of the language and logic devices employed by deniers of all genocides. as noted, michael gunter has expanded the roster of denial strategies meaningfully and thereby qualifi es for the high praise i have for his book. this book should be studied by all students of denial for its artful stratagems of sounding fair, acting fairly, citing scholarship that covers divergent and contradictory points of view, speaking consistently softly, and of course calling for justice and peace, all in the course of organizing a disarming, deceitful, anti-history and anti-value-of-life work that should frighten anybody who is concerned with integrity in intellectual and scholarly works, and genuine valuing of human life. once upon a time deniers were so wild and obvious buffoons that they claimed in respect of the armenian genocide that the ottoman turkish government protected and took care of the poor armenian exiles in their forced march out of armenia – no mention of course of the many armenians they killed outright. about the holocaust, old-fashioned deniers said that there were no gas chambers, and that the poor jews died from wartime conditions, even also happier nonsense that the inmates at auschwitz dined to good music and swam in a swimming pool. now increasingly we have a whole series of recognized academicians who write in our contemporary language of scholarship and make their points in the name of open discussion and fairness. michael gunter can be congratulated that he has risen to the top of this group.9 he is a bona fi de academic who is one hell of an artful liar. eastern thrace, 1912-1923, edited by george n. shirinian (bloomingdale, il: the asia minor and pontos hellenic research center, inc., 2012). 8. enver ziya karal, armenian question (1878-1923), (ankara: gunduz, 1975), 18., international center for transitional justice (ictj) report prepared for tarc (february 10, 2003). 9. deborah lipstadt, denying the holocaust: the growing assault on truth and memory (new york: free press, 1993). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 94 additional writings on denial by israel w. charny selected publications on denial of genocide by the author on how denials are created and the concepts and the languages that are used to get these crazy ideas across to rational people: templates for gross denial of a known genocide: a manual: “the holocaust is the hoax of the twentieth century.” “there never was an armenian genocide.” in encyclopedia of genocide. edited by israel w. charny. (santa barabara ca: abc-clio, 1999),168. originally published in the internet on the holocaust and genocide, 1986, issue seven, 3. serious, real, but also inadvertently humorous as one sees the ridiculous shemas designed for denying an established genocide. these templates were originally developed in a dialogue with vartan gregorian, then president of the new york public library, and were also based on joint research with marjorie housepian-dobkin, a pioneer in writing about the armenian genocide as “the forgotten genocide. “how to avoid (legally) conviction for crimes of genocide: a one-act reading,” in a special issue (teaching about genocide, edited by samuel totten) of the social science record, 1987, 24 (2), 89-93. a satire--at the legal offi ces as it were of “satan, whore, and conformist, attorneysat-law” who conduct a consulting fi rm catering to the likes of clients like talaat, hitler, stalin, idi amin, and pol pot. israel w. charny and daphna fromer, “a follow-up of the sixty-nine scholars who signed an advertisement questioning the armenian genocide,” internet on the holocaust and genocide, special issue on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the armenian genocide, special double issue, no. 25/26 (april 1990), 5-6 reprinted in journal of the armenian assembly of america, 1990, 17 (1), 5. a fuller report of this research was published in an academic journal: israel w. charny and daphna fromer, “denying the armenian genocide: patterns of thinking as defence mechanisms,” patterns of prejudice, 32(1), 1998, 39-49. a classic study that has been widely referred to over the years in which, after promising the 69 signators absolute confi dentiality, a surprising number acknowledged the mass murders of the armenians, although most would not call the event “genocide.” “l’intolérable perversion des universitaires négateurs du génocide arménien ou de l’holocauste,” revue du monde arménien moderne et contemporain, 3, 1997, 123-141. (french). see the english version of this paper: the unbearable corruption of academics who deny the armenian genocide or the holocaust. idea, a journal of social issues, 2001, 6 (1). http://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?id=27 book reviews 95 background: censored by the publisher the above paper was accepted for publication in a book, the holocaust in an age of genocide, by palgrave (macmillan uk), but was then canceled by the publisher in fear of suits by deniers of the holocaust and the armenian genocide. the paper had been initially accepted and presented at a conference, remembering for the future iii, oxford, 2000. it was then chosen by the conference organizers to be included in an announcement of a selection of sample articles in a pre-publication brochure announcing the forthcoming book that was distributed internationally by the publishers. the reason the paper was then removed peremptorily from the book was a legal opinion received from the publisher’s attorney that this paper could draw libel suits from the academics discussed—including, and particularly, david irving! this concern was expressed at the height of anticipations of the then forthcoming irving-lipstadt court case. no amount of effort to convince the publishers or the organizers of the conference to stand up to the risks and not succumb to the deniers were of avail. this story was documented no less than by david irving himself on his website (!) in a story posted june 27, 2001 which was reprinted from the armenian reporter international, december 30, 2000. as noted above the same paper already had been published in france, in french in 1997. the paper was now accepted for publication by the electronic journal, idea. “innocent denials of known genocides: a further contribution to a psychology of denial of genocide,” human rights review, 1 (3), 2000, 15-39. the majority of deniers in this world are not “malevolent deniers,” nor are they the exhibitionists or negativistic people who take pleasure in stirring up storms of provocation. they are rather ‘innocents’ who know too little about a genocide but who willingly choose to move towards and adopt the “other side” or point of view about a disputed genocide -ultimately all genocides are disputed and denial is in fact aptly called “the last stage of genocide.” why do they adopt this position? to what extent do they become advocates of denial? the paper presents two axes for classifying and understanding deniers. the fi rst axis pertains to the extent of failure to acquire knowledge and the extent to which one subscribes to distortion of knowledge; and the second axis evaluates the extent to which a denier signals approval, encouragement and outright incitement of genocidal violence -including unconscious wishes, to approve, encourage, and incite renewed violence. “a classifi cation of denials of the holocaust and other genocides,” journal of genocide research, 5(1), 2003, 11-34. this is a major paper providing a comprehensive -but always growing-classifi cation of many different types and strategies of denials of established genocides an updating of the above classifi cation was published in gpn web magazine: a classifi cation of denials of the holocaust and other genocides updated 2012, http:// www.genocidepreventionnow.org/gpnsearchresults/tabid/64/ctl/displayarticle/ mid/400/aid/655/default.aspx 96 “a casebook of denials of doing harm to others and rewards to people and nations who overcome denial,” in şafak ural, feridam emecam, and mustafa aydn, (editors), the new approaches to turkish-armenian relations (turkish and english-language articles combined), (istanbul: istanbul university press, 2008), 728-775. republished in gpn web magazine,issue 3 (2010). a casebook of denials of doing harm to others and rewards to people and nations who overcome denial http:// www.genocidepreventionnow.org/home/gpnissues/issue3summer2010/tabid/70/ctl/ displayarticle/mid/460/aid/285/default.aspx this paper was presented to a conference in istanbul (!!) amidst a sea of atrocious denials by the overwhelming majority of presenterse.g., morgenthau was a forgery, the court record of the turkish court martial of the perpetrators was also a forgery. there were 5 of us who were invited scholars from outside of turkey and who, known to the organizers, clearly validated the facts of the armenian genocide. the resulting book is a very unusual, almost comic collection of many denialist papers and our papers which clearly testify to the historical reality of the armenian genocide. it is amazing that the conference organizers published our pieces; moreover, my paper included a disclaimer that i insisted must introduce the paper, criticizing the overall predominant denial. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 book reviews 92 93 after wwi? in order to answer to that and many other questions ihrig rightly proposes to analyze the other side of the coin – the image of national socialism in 1930s turkey. he conditions that option with the claim that it would not be possible to have a complete answer to that until “the turkish foreign offi ce archives are opened” (p. 221). book reviews fuat dündar, crime of numbers: the role of statistics in the armenian question (1878–1918) (new brunswick (usa) and london (uk): transaction publishers, 2010), xiv, 238 pages. reviewed by robert tatoyan, senior research fellow, the armenian genocide museum-institute, yerevan, armenia questions about the number of armenians living in the ottoman empire on the threshold of the armenian genocide and the death toll during the armenian genocide have special place among falsifi cations by those scholars, who deny the historical fact of the armenian genocide. upon visiting the webpage of turkish ministry of foreign affairs, one can come across the title “the armenian allegation of genocide: the issue and the facts”, where the following information is provided under fact 1: “demographic studies prove that prior to world war i, fewer than 1.5 million armenians lived in the entire ottoman empire. thus, allegations that more than 1.5 million armenians from eastern anatolia died must be false.”1 there are a number of scholars, like esat uras2, stanford shaw3, kamuran gürün4, kemal karpat5, justin mccarthy6 and others engaged in putting this “fact” on scientifi c grounds. unconditional and uncritical acceptance of statistical data, provided by the ottoman government regarding the number of the ottoman armenians living in the empire during 1878-1914 and the denial of statistics originating from mainly armenian sources (according to armenian patriarchate of constantinople, about two million armenians living in the ottoman empire in 1914) 7, which is discrepant to the 1. “the armenian allegation of genocide: the issue and the facts” (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-armenian-allegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts.en.mfa, taken on 07.10.2015). 2. esat uras, tarihte ermeniler ve ermeni meselesi (ankara: yeni matbaa, 1950), english translation: esat uras, the armenians in history and the armenian question (ankara: documentary publications, 1988). 3. stanford j. shaw and ezel kural shaw, history of the ottoman empire and modern turkey, vol.2 (n.y.: cambridge university press, 1977); stanford j. shaw, “the ottoman census system and population, 1831-1914”, international journal of middle east studies (ijmes), № 9 (1978): 325-338. 4. kamuran gürün, the armenian file: the myth of innocence exposed (nicosia and london: k. rustem and brother and weidenfeld and nicolson, 1985). 5. karpat kemal h., ottoman population 1830-1914: demographic and social characteristics (wisconsin: the university of wisconsin press, 1985). 6. mccarthy justin, muslims and minorities. the population of ottoman anatolia and the end of the empire (new york: new york university press, 1983). 7. according to memorandum presented by the armenian delegation at paris peace conference in 1919, 2.026.000 armenians lived in the ottoman empire by 1914, out of which 1.403.000 inhabited in the territory of ottoman armenia (including trebizond province and cilicia), 440.000 in other regions of asian turkey, and 183.000 in constantinople and european turkey: see: the armenian question international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 book reviews 94 95 ottoman data, is peculiar to the scholars showing denialist approach. on the other hand, more recently a number of turkish scholars are showing more distinctive, impartial and balanced approach to the issue. one of such scholars is fuat dündar with his book “crime of numbers: the role of statistics in the armenian question (1878– 1918)”, published in 2010 in english8. in the introduction (pp. 1-10) the author states that the main argument of the study is to substantiate the important role statistics played in the emergence of the armenian question both on the international landscape and in its “defi nitive solution.” in the fi rst chapter titled “diplomacy and statistics, emergence of the armenian question (1878-1913)” (pp. 11-65) the author presents the role of statistics of the western armenian population in the framework of diplomacy around the armenian question for the above-given period. in this regard the author addresses the issue of credibility of the statistical data provided to the powers by two bodies, the ottoman government and the armenian patriarchate of constantinople, in frames of the armenian question. as dündar fairly mentions, “contrary to what scholars such as kemal karpat and justin mccarthy have argued, ottoman statistical data concerning the armenian population was not entirely reliable.” the author argues that the ottoman authorities conducted census to determine not only the number of recruits and/or the tax sum, as stated by k. karpat and j. mccarthy, but also for determining the share of muslim and non-muslim representatives in local self-governing units. for this reason the ottoman authorities sought to have control over statistical data in places, where non-muslim population (armenians) formed a majority, though they were considered a minority in the empire. the author attaches importance to the fact that, unlike persistence of k. karpat and j. mccarthy, the ottoman authorities counted and recorded muslims, i. e. turks, kurds, circassians and others, according to their ethnic origin features as well. the above-mentioned allows the researcher to conclude that the ottoman authorities meddled in both data collection and classifi cation system, imposing their political interests (p. 3). at the same time dündar makes an attempt to question the credibility of statistical data provided by the armenian patriarchate of constantinople stating that “the data provided by the armenians was also at times inconsistent” (p. 2) and “exaggerated.” precisely, the author fi nds the statistics by grigor zohrap (published in 1913) and data provided by the armenian patriarchate of constantinople to be contradictory9. dündar mentions that though zohrap insisted the data was provided by the armenian patriarchate, it is exaggerated. the author substantiates his opinion by failing to fi nd any other document proving the trustworthiness of zohrab’s data (p. 3). as a matter of fact, grigor zohrap only featured the table before the peace conference. a memorandum presented offi cially by the representatives of armenia to the peace conference at versailles, on february 26th, 1919 (new york: press bureau, the armenian national union of america, 1919), 34. 8. see fuat dündar, crime of numbers. the role of statistics in the armenian question (new brunswick (usa) and london (uk): transactions publishers, 2010), xiv + 238 pp. 9. the data can be found in book “the armenian question in the light of documents” which zohrappublished under pseudonym marcel leart in french in 1913. see marcel leart, la question arménienne à la lumière des documents (paris: challamel, 1913). with statistical data collected in 1912 by the security committee authorized by the armenian patriarchate, in his 1913 book. in early 1913 ottoman armenians presented this table attached to the armenian reform proposal to ambassadors of the european powers as at that time the armenian question returned to the active agenda of international diplomacy. generally, dündar has a vague idea about censuses conducted during 1878-1914 by the armenian patriarchate and statistical data collected as a result. he falsely considers that data appearing in zohrap’s book and the statistics provided by the armenian researcher raymond kevorkian in 1992 are both the two variants of the statistical data collected by the armenian patriarchate in 1912, and fi nds this to be contradictory (p. 145). while statistics provided by raymond kevorkian is based on the summarized tables of census conducted during 1913-1914 by the armenian patriarchate10. the armenian deportations and massacres are presented in the second chapter “war, massacre and statistics (1914-1918); final outcome of the armenian question” (pp. 67140). dündar does not deny the events (1911-1917) that took place were systematic, but he views them as “demographic operations”, which was part of the young turks’ ethnic engineering. according to the researcher, the goal of the cup party was to decrease the number of the armenian population in the entire population of the empire and not the extermination of the ottoman armenians as an entity. the author evades using the term “genocide”11 and calls what was happened “the massacres of 1915-1917.” dündar thinks that the goal of the young turks was to completely displace the armenian population from the territory (six vilayets of western armenia and vilayet of trebizond) under the concern of 1914 russo-turkish reform agreement, to decrease the armenian population in anatolian (the asia minor) provinces by 5%, in aleppo vilayet by 2% and down to 10% in other territories (p. 2). according to the author, “the cup policy of the defi nitive solution of the armenian question evolved through three phases: 1) destruction of both “causes” and the “spirit” of rebellion of the armenian revolutionaries; 2) elimination of armenian people’s all possible means of representation both personal and institutional, and fi nally, 3) deportation of the armenian population to semi-desert area and there, reducing it to a level where not be a threat from a statistical point of view” (p. 68). the fact that the organizers of the armenian genocide had to be guided by another, i. e. more serious considerations, rather than by the decrease of the number of the armenian population down to 10%, 5% or even to 2.5%, can be obviously seen from the ottoman statistical data of 1914. according to that offi cial data, which were to form that basis of statistic estimates of the young turks, the number of the armenian population in some asia 10. our research, the results of which can be found in the work “the question of western armenian population number in 1878-1914” (yerevan: agmi, 2015) showed that fi ve censuses were conducted and records made in the entire territory of western armenia by armenian patriarchate of constantinople during 1878-1914: 1-2) during 1878-1880 and 1880-1881, by patriarch nersses varzhapetyan, 3) in 1902, under the patriarchate of maghakia ormanyan, 4) in 1912 on the occasion of re-emergence of the armenian question, and 5) during 1913-1914, parallel to developments on armenian reforms dra� . special importance is paid to statistical table compiled by stepan papasyan, a member of armenian delegation, and attached to western armenian reforms dra� , presented at berlin congress in 1878. this table with his own calculations was based on diff erent ottoman statistical sources. 11. this term is used only once, in a footnote (dündar, crime of numbers, 7). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 book reviews 96 97 minor vilayets was already insignifi cant and did not outnumber 5% before deportations (see table 1). this fact, however, did not hamper the young turks from deporting and massacring the armenian population of the territories under concern. table 1 12 13 administrative unit armenians13 overall population share of armenian population, % edirne (adrianople) 19,773 631,094 3,1 ankara 51,576 953,817 5,4 kastamonu 8,959 767,227 1,1 konya 12,971 789,308 1,6 eskişehir 8,592 152,726 5,6 nigde 4,935 291,117 1,7 biğa (kale-i sultanye) 2,474 165,815 1,5 of course, it cannot be denied that the young turks were attaching much importance to statistical data in organizing extermination of the ottoman armenian population. but statistics was just a medium, namely a tool to handle the process of genocide and not a goal, as presented by fuat dündar. besides, it is not possible to explain and justify neither the extermination of the western armenian socio-political and cultural elite, nor the annihilation of the armenian servicemen, proceeding only from “a statistical point of view” and the logics of “demographic engineering” policy. those two are part of the genocidal process. the third chapter (“crime in numbers, counting armenian death toll”, pp. 141-157) of dündar’s research focuses on the number of the ottoman armenian population on the threshold of wwi and counting victim population of the armenian genocide. the researcher does not make any calculations of his own to determine the number of the armenian population before deportation, but adopts a number, found in a recently published report, prepared for talaat pasha in 1917 and kept in his archives. the so called “talaat pasha’s record book” includes information about the number of the armenian population according to administrative units of the ottoman empire, before (in 1914) and after (1917) the armenian genocide. commenting on the data of the ottoman statistics (according to it the number of the western armenian population in 1914 was 1.251.785 including both apostolic and catholic armenians), the turkish offi cial mentions this number to be lower than the actual fi gures because not all armenians were registered, and the actual number should be around 1.500.000. this data is considered by dündar as a number that “puts an end to arguments about the armenian population” (p. 149). as a ground to this statement the researcher brings two reasons: 1. data was provided by a political organization that wanted to 12. ottoman statistical data of 1914 are taken from kemal karpat’s book “ottoman population during 1830-1914; demographic and social characteristics” (karpat, ottoman population during 1830-1914, 188-189). 13. both gregorian and catholic armenians. fi nd a fi nal solution for the armenian question and for that reason it made every effort to determine the exact number of the armenian population, and 2) data was not prepared with the intention of publication, but rather for internal circulation (ibid). even if we consider the deemed link between the fi nal outcome of the armenian question and the exact number of the armenian population, which is not logical, it is still unclear how the fi gure 1.5 million is supposed to be “exact”. conversely, the logic suggests that if the author of the 1917 report set a goal to fi nd out the precise number of the armenian population, he would not have to limit his study to presenting round numbers in footnotes, but would try to present more reasonable and accurate calculations, particularly, as it was already mentioned, when the number of the ottoman armenians, according to the ottoman statistical data of 1914, was very specifi c: 1.251.785. therefore, there were no grounds for the researcher to suppose that the calculations appearing in talaat pasha’s record book put an end to the allegations by the armenian patriarchate of constantinople that about 2 million armenians lived in the ottoman empire on the threshold of the armenian genocide. actually the data in talaat’s report proves another thing: ottoman offi cials themselves didn’t believe in trustworthiness of the ottoman offi cial statistics on the number of the western armenian population, and thought these data should be corrected. at the same time approximately 20% addition to the report aimed at the correction of the ottoman data should be considered as insuffi cient; counting the gregorian and catholic armenian population to 1.500.000 before deportation and massacres is also incomplete, and this number is lower than the actual fi gure14. after “fi nding out” that the number of the ottoman armenians was 1.5 million on the threshold of wwi, the researcher passes on to his next goal: to determine the number of victims of the armenian genocide. dündar mentions that this can be achieved by applying the following method: subtract the number of survivors by 1918 from that of the ottoman armenian population on the threshold of wwi. in order to fi nd out the number of survivors he classifi es them into three groups: the armenians “allowed to stay in anatolia”, the deported armenians and the armenian refugees, who found shelter in other countries. according to the author, there are 281.000 armenians in the fi rst group, including armenians from constantinople, smyrna (aydin), adrianople (edirne) and konya, as well as families of catholic and protestant armenians, craftsman and servicemen (about 75.000), and about 50.000 islamized armenians, mainly women and children. the second group consists of about 300.000 armenians, who survived the genocide in syria and mesopotamia refugee camps. the third group consists of the armenian refugees counting to 255.000. after subtracting the number of survivors (836.000 by 1918) from the above-stated 1.5 million, the author concludes that 664.000 armenians fell victim of the armenian genocide (p. 151). 14. it should be mentioned that taner akçam also referred to talaat pasha’s data on western armenian population. prominent turkish historian states that he has no end to argue on the question of number of armenian population and victims of the genocide, but instead says he uses these ottoman data to cover the link between young turk demographic policy and the genocide (taner akçam, the young turks’ crime against humanity: the armenian genocide and ethnic cleansing in the ottoman empire (princeton university press, 2012), 255). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 book reviews 98 99 it is clear by itself that this number has nothing to do with actual fi gures, because the number of the armenian population on the threshold of wwi (1.5 million) is signifi cant underestimate. besides, author’s approach reveals serious fallacy of his methodology based on taking out different sets of data out of their context and trying to artifi cially combine and reconcile them. for example he assumes ottoman data as a basis for determining the number of the armenian population on the threshold of wwi, but makes a wide use of the armenian and western sources to calculate the number of survivors of the genocide. the number of the armenian refugees sheltered in the caucasus is close to the actual one, but perhaps dündar is unaware of the wide-acknowledged fact that the armenians, who had migrated from van province, were more than half of that number (about 150.000) 15. this documental number proves once again that the offi cial ottoman statistics had nothing to do with reality, because, according to the ottoman data, the armenian population of van province in 1914 was 67.79216. the summarizing chapter titled “a few observations” (pp. 157-172) actually serves as an afterword. dündar fi nishes his studies with the following lines: “even today statistics inevitably occupy a central position within every discussion of the armenian genocide, and in all aspects of the armenian question” (p. 171). author’s persistence that data from talaat pasha’s record book put an end to disputes about the number of the western armenian population is undoubtedly groundless, and there are other disputable issues as well. however, this is perhaps the value of dündar’s book “crime of numbers”, as a work that gathers readers at the discussion table, can promote the research of the diffi cult and entangled issues of accurately determining the number of the western armenian population on the threshold 15. see j. s. kirakossyan, the first world war and the western armenians (in armenian) (yerevan: hayastan publishing, 1967), 43. according to data provided by alexander sharafyan, the authorized agent of armenian benevolent association of the caucasus, by january 1916 the number of western armenians refugees sheltered in the russian empire was 229.293, including inhabitants of bassen (18.910), bitlis, mush, bayazet provinces and van vilayet (about 170.000), inhabitants of eastern region of van vilayet and western region of persia (18.055), as well as refugees from van vilayet sheltered in persia (about 10.000) and 3500 orphans. the same source mentions that in july 1915 about 20.000 armenians died during the migration of van and vaspurakan population (see article “armenian refugees, january 1916” in hambavaber weekly (hambavaber social and literary weekly, offi cial gazette of armenian benevolent association of the caucasus (issue 2, january 3, 1916) (in armenian)). in the memorandum presented by armenian delegation at paris peace conference in 1919 it is mentioned that the number of armenians, who migrated from van vilayet and found shelter in russia, was over 220.000 (see the armenian question before the peace conference, 21). armenian researcher g. badalyan, assuming the data retrieved from refugee registration during july-september, 1917 as a basis (according to that register the number of armenian families leaving van vilayet was equal to 24.127, while the average rate showing the largeness of van armenian family was 8.8), considers that 210.000-212.000 armenians lived in van vilayet in 1914 (see g. m. badalyan, “some demographic principles to determine western armenian population (on the example of erzeroum and van vilayets)” in modern status of armenology and development perspectives, report provisions of international armenological conference (yerevan, september 15-20, 2003) (yerevan: 2003), 140). see also r. a. tatoyan, “statistical data on number of armenian population in van vilayet during 1878-1914 (attempt to compare and analyze sources),” the issues of the history and historiography of the armenian genocide, 7 (2003): 65-79. 16. even if we consider the rate used by dündar (20%) to clarify the ottoman statistical data, the result for van province armenians (81.600) is considerable underestimate. of wwi and the number of victims of the genocide, as well as the publication of new works directed at covering the anti-armenian policy (with its statistical and administrative-demographic expressions) of the ottoman state, adopted after berlin congress. 80 reprint regina galustyan, robert tatoyan, “introduction,” in memoirs of survivors of the armenian genocide, 7. aram mantashyan, aram could not be seito.1 sokrat mkrtchyan, memoirs, eds. regina galustyan and robert tatoyan, yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, 2022, 163 pp. in 2020, the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation launched the series of books titled memoirs of survivors of the armenian genocide, with the symbolic volume ravished armenia: the story of aurora mardiganian, the christian girl who lived through the great massacres, as one of the first memories on the armenian genocide. the aim of the series is to publish handwritten memories kept in the archive of the armenian genocide museum-institute. the two memoirs that were combined in one book and presented in volume 7 of this series were first published in armenian (volume 4 of the series) and then translated into english by ara stepan melkonian and are the second english language memories in the series. volume 7 represents the two survivors’ eyewitness accounts of the armenian genocide. footnotes were added by the editors to detail and clarify geographical and place names in western armenia quoted in the text, as well to clarify dialect and word usage. use has been made of the appropriate volumes of “dictionary of toponymy of armenia and adjacent territories” (in armenian).2 the population figures for armenian settlements have been collated from raymond kevorkian and paul paboudjian’s book, “the armenians in the ottoman empire on the eve of the genocide” (in french).3 aram mantashyan’s story, which is the first memoirs in the book, is a narrative of a boy who, with his family, was deported from the village of mshaknots in the district of shabin-karahisar. young aram shared the fate of the children who, during the genocide, were converted and made into slaves but who later re-established their former armenian identities. through this narrative he transfers his and thousands of others’ experiences to future generations. the memoir aram could not be seito was written by aram misak mantashyan (19061981) who was born in the village of mshaknots in the sushehir (entires or andreas) subdistrict of shabin-karahisar district, province of sebastia of the ottoman empire. the 1 the manuscript is held in the armenian genocide museum-institute’s scientific archives, section 8, collection 69, file 56. the title of the original manuscript is 1915 հայկական կոտորածներից [from the massacres of 1915]. the editor, regina galustyan, felt it was better titled with a phrase from the author’s text, considering that it suits aram mantashyan’s narrative more closely. 2 t. kh. hakobyan, st. t. melik-bakhshyan, h. kh. barsegyan, հայաստանի և հարակից շրջանների տեղանունների բառարան [dictionary of toponymy of armenia and adjacent territories], vol. 1, ա-դ [a-d] (yerevan: yerevan state university, 1986), vol. 2, դ–կ [d-k] (1988), vol. 3, կ–ն [k-n] (1991), vol. 4, ն-վ [n-v] (1998), vol. 5, տ-ֆ [t-f] (2001). 3 raymond h. kevorkian, paul b. paboudjian, lés arméniens dans l’empire ottoman à la vielle du génocide (paris: arhis, 1992). 81 village was mostly inhabited by armenians and, in about 1910, had approximately 300 armenian houses.4 the population’s occupations consisted of farming, animal husbandry and various trades. it had two churches and one school with 55 pupils. the historian raymond kevorkian states that in 1915 the village of mshaknots had a population of 844, noting that it was one of the most densely-populated villages in the district.5 according to the report prepared on 28th october 1920 by sahak sarkisian, the overseer of the shabin-karahisar region who worked for the armenian national relief agency under the constantinople patriarchate’s aegis, mshaknots village was made up of 350 houses, from which only 15-18 houses were stable in 1919.6 the population of the sushehir sub-district was either killed on the spot or deported during the second half of june 1915, the actions being led by the local governor ahmed hilmi. the caravan of deported armenians followed the akn – malatya route.7 aram was exiled with his mother and sister. providing valuable insights into village life prior to the genocide and the family’s deportation, the main narrative begins with the crossing of the kirkgyoz bridge over the river euphrates near malatya. aram went ahead of his mother: “i tried to get even a small amount of bread and get it to my mother.” he got lost and wasn’t able to find any bread. thus, began the wandering of nine-year old boy, with all its consequences, in the kurdish-populated villages of malatya region. it is important to refer to the ottoman turkish government’s actions regarding children during the armenian genocide and to put aram mantashyan’s experiences into context. the forced islamisation and turkification of armenian children (and women) during the armenian genocide was one of the methods used to destroy the armenian nation as such. the forced transfer of armenian children to the turkish community was the classic case of the forcible child transfer from a victim’s group to a perpetrator’s.8 the act of the “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” with intent to destroy in whole or in part any national, ethnic, racial or religious group is enshrined in the 1948 united nations convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. accordingly, the criminal aim of destroying a group by pre-meditated actions, with individual children being forcibly transferred to another environment is seen as a component of the general action which is to destroy the child’s previous, in this case armenian, identity and to turkify him/her. therefore, the singular reasoning of “aiding,” 4 t. kh. hakobyan, st. t. melik-bakhshyan, h. kh. barsegyan, հայաստանի և հարակից շրջանների տեղանունների բառարան [dictionary of toponymy of armenia and adjacent territories], vol. 3, կ–ն [k–n], edited by. t. kh. hakobyan (yerevan: yerevan state university, 1991), 847. 5 kévorkian, paboudjian, les arméniens dans l’empire ottoman, 249. 6 matteos eplighatian, ազգային խնամատարութիւն, ընդհանուր տեղեկագիր, առաջին վեցամսեայ, 1 մայիս 1919 – 31 հոկտեմբեր 1919 [national relief organisation, general report, first six months, 1 may – 31 october 1919] (antelias: the armenian catholicosate of the great house of cilicia, 1985), 489. 7 raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (london-new york: i.b. tauris, 2011), 459. 8 edita gzoyan, «երեխաների բռնի տեղափոխումը որպես ցեղասպանական գործողություն. ձևա վորումից դեպի քրեականացում» [forcible child transfer as a genocidal act: from conceptualization to criminalization], ts’eghaspanagitakan handes 8, no. 1 (2020): 104. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0032 82 “saving” or “protecting” children are not seen as mitigating circumstances in legal terms, although genocide denialists continue to present them as such.9 the forcible transfer and further assimilation of armenian children into the turkish environment during the armenian genocide was premeditated and organised by the nationalist ideologists and high-ranking politicians, thus becoming one of the methods of genocide. the government enacted orders and laws to ensure that it was organised and ran smoothly. historian ara sarafian determined four methods of child transfer: 1. the “voluntary conversion” at the beginning of the genocide to avoid persecution; 2. the placing of children in special government orphanages having the aim of assimilating them; 3. the distribution of armenian children to turkish families by turkish organisations; 4. the selection of individual children by muslims.10 in the last case, the muslim population of the ottoman empire was permitted to select and take children of deported armenians. the muslim masters sometimes treated the children as adoptees, but in most of the cases armenian children were given to turkish, kurdish and arab households as slaves, forcing them to work for their daily food, subjecting them to rough treatment and sexual violence. they died of hunger and beatings. the forced conversion of armenian children to islam was a precondition of their turkification,11 being followed by changing names and forbidding the use of spoken armenian.12 in the case of boys, this was accompanied by obligatory circumcision. left without friends and relatives, many, amongst whom was the author of this memoir aramseito, adapted to the conditions of this new way of life and cultural environment. it should be noted that the transfer of armenian children was not a general policy. the aim of the government was not to turkify every child of the armenian community. children were eliminated, like all segments of the armenian population during the genocide. the armenian orphans’ incineration in the orphanage in mush, the medical experiments conducted on them in the trabzon province, their drowning in the black sea and their suffocation by smoke by the thousand in caves of der zor are the proved 9 ibid., 101. 10 ara sarafian, “the absorption of armenian women and children into muslim households as a structural component of the armenian genocide” in in god’s name: genocide and religion in the 20th century, eds. omer bartov, phyllis mack (new york: berghahn books, 2001), 210. 11 here “turkification” is used as a commonly known term in academic circles. in a broader sense it is the government’s efforts to turkify the multi-ethnic and multi-religious ottoman empire, in a narrower sense it refers to the forcible change of armenian children’s identity within the course of the genocide. although in the memoir itself aram was taken by different turkish, but mostly kurdish masters, this also falls under the “turkification” category, as the whole process was planned by the turkish government and implemented by state laws, orders from the interior ministry and served to the final aim of the destruction of the armenian nation and homogenization of the country. 12 narine margaryan, «հայ երեխաների թրքացման գործընթացն օսմանյան կայսրության պետական որբանոցներում (1915-1918 թթ.)» [turkification of armenian children in the ottoman empire’s state orphanages (1915-1918)], ts’eghaspanagitakan handes 4, no. 1 (2016), 26. 83 examples of this.13 the policy of transfer was considered by the turkish government and ideologists as the means to inject some age and gender-specified groups of armenians, who were considered as easily transformable, into the turkish nation. among the aims of the forcible transfer, the idea of enrichment of the turkish genetic character, appropriation of children’s inheritance and mitigation of human losses suffered by the population during wwi were singled out by contemporary researchers.14 aram mantashyan was one of the enslaved, converted and renamed armenian children. determined to live, the nine-year-old boy struggled to survive each day, led by the hope of returning to his birthplace and finding his relatives. the memoir describes, in detail, his forced religious conversion, first by flattery and persuasion, then by death threats. it acquaints the reader with how renamed armenian boys tribon-omar, khachik-heyto, hayrapet-mustafa, vahan-khalil, arakel-suleiman and others worked for turkish and kurdish masters in the malatya region for their daily bread. parallel to this, the physical and psychological state of the armenian children and the moral dilemmas which they faced are also described. the memoir clearly demonstrates the attitude of the muslim community towards the converted armenian children, the regular beatings they received accompanied by the derogatory epithet “gavur oğlu” (the son of an infidel) long used in ottoman society towards christians, while their lives were worth nothing. if their masters killed them for any mistake they made, they were not brought to justice. aram also testifies how gendarmes regularly collected converted boys. the aim, perhaps, was to reduce even the numbers of converts in the ottoman empire. there are several specific incidents in this memoir that are worthy of special attention, such as aram’s attitude towards turkish doctors. the doctors had a special role in destroying armenians during the genocide, even using red crescent hospitals for that purpose.15 the gendarmes, advised aram, as he was ill, to go to the hospital in malatya. he spent his time wandering and returned, recording, in his memoir, “what had i, an armenian boy, to do with a hospital? they would probably finish me off.” the moral choices that armenian children were forced to face are worthy of attention as well. using this memoir as an example it could be proved that even kept in servitude, the converted armenian children retained their altruism and were psychologically inclined towards helping and saving each other.16 the typical behaviour for armenian children living in muslim households was to escape at the first opportunity in search of relatives 13 vahakn dadrian, “children as victims of genocide: the armenian case,” hayots’ ts’eghaspanutyan patmutyan ev patmagrutyan harts’er 7 (2003): 8-9. 14 vahakn dadrian, “the role of turkish physicians in the world war i genocide of ottoman armenians,” holocaust and genocide studies 1, no. 2 (1986): 184; lerna ekmekcioğlu, “a climate for abduction, a climate for redemption: the politics of inclusion during and after the armenian genocide,” comparative studies in society and history 55, no. 3 (2013): 526. 15 dadrian, “the role of turkish physicians,” 177. 16 donald e. miller, lorna touryan miller, survivors: an oral history of the armenian genocide (berkeley, los angeles, london: university of california press, 1993), 186-187. 84 and other armenians, even when the house was relatively safe.17 aram mantashyan followed the same behavioural pattern. the other specific thing was that most of the children, from a very early age, had to earn their living. survivor children were clever, made decisions easily and took risks that could, in many cases, end in death.18 this was mostly associated with the struggle with hunger. aram was not an exception to this: “i felt i wanted to eat everything, but who would give me what i wanted? no one. but i’d found the way through my cleverness.” the many incidents of stealing food recorded in this memoir must be seen in this context and not as the result of the lowering of survivor’s moral standards. aram did steal at the behest of his muslim masters for their benefit. it is obvious that masters’ influence concerning such things would, over a long period, have negative effects on the moral perception of converted children. the memoir clearly, without artistic embellishment, also shows the feelings of a child bereft of care. describing the visit of his master’s sister and her children, aram writes: “there were all kinds of dried fruit in the house, such as raisins of mulberries and grapes, walnuts and kernels. she filled her children’s pockets with them every day, but never gave me even one.” salvation and return to the armenian identity for aram mantashyan and thousands of children like him was a national cause. this was only possible after the defeat of the ottoman empire in the first world war and the mudros armistice of 30 october 1918, when national and international humanitarian organisations restarted their rescue work within the ottoman empire.19 hearing that an orphanage had opened in malatya which was accepting armenian children, aram decided to go there. joining a group of boys from shabin-karahisar there, they asked for aid from the orphanage administration so they could return to their home villages. going to mshaknots, aram found his mother’s sister and her daughter both of whom had survived by hiding in the nearby greek village. unfortunately, history repeated itself. the solution to stopping intimidation for aram mantashyan was to escape to soviet armenia. he was arrested several times, but his detention in the port of giresun forever separated him from the members of his family that had survived – his aunt and cousin. he managed, alone and without a passport, to sneak aboard a ship going from constantinople to batumi in 1924, joining a repatriation group. reaching batumi, the survivor recorded: “the world is mine now, i’m very happy despite the fact that i’ve nothing – no food, a place to shelter and no money.” aram mantashyan’s memoir could be generalised by the following points: • it is a written testimony of an armenian boy’s experience, who was turkified on a private level. it provides material to compare with the experiences of those 17 ibid., 112. 18 ibid., 114. 19 edita gzoyan, «փրկություն հայ որբերին. առաքել չաքրյանի հուշերը» [saving armenian orphans: memoirs of arakel chakirian], ts’eghaspanagitakan handes 4, no. 2 (2016): 193. 85 armenian orphans who had passed through the turkification process in the state orphanages.20 • this memoir was written in 1932, when mantashyan was only 26 years old. many survivors wrote their memoire at the down of their life thanks to the persuasion of their children and due to the age are prone to being self-edited. this is the reason that the aram’s childhood memories are bright and described clearly. • the memoir also shows that the policy of the turkish government of eliminating the armenians continued in the republic of turkey as well. one of the problems connected with the publication of this memoir in its original language was bringing it to a standard form of armenian, as it was not written in either eastern or western dialects of the language, because of mantashyan’s lack of schooling due to the deportations and his subsequent early move to soviet armenia. it wasn’t possible to publish it as it was, due to the almost total lack of punctuation and the amount of other people’s direct speech within it. with the aim of being able to present this testimony to a wide readership it has been necessary to add punctuation marks and correct obvious spelling mistakes. the english equivalents of western armenian idioms, dialect and turkish expressions are put in parenthesis. this testimony by an eyewitness survivor of the armenian genocide completes the series of eyewitness accounts, at the same time providing an example of invincible will, the wish to struggle and to live. as aram mantashyan himself sums up his memoir, turkish government efforts to crush his firm will and turn him into seito failed. the next is sokrat mkrtchyan’s memoir,21 which presents the story of the destruction of the armenian people of his home village of prkhus, in the sub-district of khlat, in the province of bitlis (baghesh) and his and his family’s experiences. the author presents the story of the trials and tribulations that his family suffered as a result of the massacre and looting of the armenian community that lived in the village of prkhus. in that battle for survival, to achieve salvation from the permanent threat of death on a daily basis, sokrat mkrtchyan lost his father, mother, baby brother; only he and his little sister margarit survived. the author has divided his memoirs into five chapters. the first, titled “our village, its way of life” provides the descriptions of places in and around his birthplace: the village, its surroundings, “clear and blue” lake nazik; “brooding, always sombre” mount nemrut, located to the south of the village; his family, schooling in the village school, etc. his notes on the daily lives, occupations and customs and ceremonies of the inhabitants of the village of prkhus and the district are significant. 20 the following memoirs are valuable for comparing the experiences of the armenian orphans who went through the turkish state orphanages and which provide testimonies: karnig panian, goodbye, antoura: a memoir of the armenian genocide (california: stanford university press, 2015), 216; harutyun alboyajyan, խաչելության ճամբաներով: հուշագրություն [on crucifixion roads: a memoir] (yerevan: vmv print, 2005), 302. 21 agmi scientific archives, section 8, collection 24, files 29-30. 86 in the second chapter, titled “my childhood,” the author continues to present the history of his family until 1914, the year when the first world war broke out. the ten-year-old boy’s memoirs turns the reader into participants of the quiet life of a western armenian village on the eve of the metz yeghern.22 a picture is put before us of the difficulties and privation of the daily life of a peasant. the author, from his early days, was involved in farm work, helping his father as a herdsman, as a boy who either sat on the oxen’s yoke or walked in front of them pulling them forward. one of the significant episodes described in one section of these memoirs is little sokrat’s descriptions of the journeys made to the centre of the province, bitlis, as well as to bulanukh. the first world war broke out and 1915 arrived. the first stage of the armenian genocide was the annihilation of armenian men serving in the labour battalions. sokrat’s father, with many men of prkhus and the other villages in the province, were conscripted into the turkish army to act as porters and never returned. the third chapter, titled “the war” contains the description of the catastrophe that befell the village of prkhus. the russian army, advancing from bayazet in april 1915, pushed the hasnatsi (hasananli) kurdish tribe back; they, retreating, fell upon the village of prkhus “like a pack of howling, hungry wolves,” put most of the village’s population to the sword, looting the defenceless armenian villagers’ possessions: grain, animals and assets. the few villagers who survived – among whom was the author and his mother, baby brother and sister – escaped from the destroyed village. the odyssey of sokrat and his family’s wanderings is presented in the fourth (“captivity”) and fifth (“salvation”) chapters. every step of their journey threatened them with death. the author’s mother, with the aim of saving her son’s life, gave him to a local kurd, binbo, as an apprentice shepherd. the author was forced to follow the kurds who were retreating westward from the advancing russians, leaving his mother and sister behind (his baby brother had died by that time). they crossed the mush plain and it was only then that he was able to escape. after various incidents, the descriptions of which are fascinating reading, sokrat was able to make his way to a place behind the russian lines. he found only his sister alive on his return journey; his mother, unable withstand the things she had suffered, had died. later he and his sister joined the thousands of refugee armenians from bitlis and mush who retreated with the russian army and went to eastern armenia. after reaching echmiadzin, they initially settled in one of the orphanages there, then moved to the one in ashtarak sponsored by the moscow armenian committee.23 this memoir ends with warm words about the teachers and teaching assistants in the orphanage. 22 an armenian term for armenian genocide that translates as great catastrophe or great calamity with a legal connotation. the term used extensively in the memoirs of survivors, also in sokrat mkrtchyan’s memoir. for more details see vartan matiossian, the politics of naming the armenian genocide: language, history, and ‘medz yeghern,’ (london: i. b. tauris, 2022). 23 it should be noted that the names of 13-year-old sokrat and his 9-year-old sister margarit are listed in the register of orphans who were in the ashtarak orphanage sponsored by the moscow armenian committee dated may 14th 1916, published in the appendix to the caucasian benevolent society’s socio-political weekly journal hambavaber dated december 4th 1916. there were a further 28 orphans from prkhus village in the same orphanage at that time (hambavaber (tiflis), no. 49, 4 december 1916, appendix). 87 the author’s subsequent fate is revealed through the few laconic autobiographical sentences he added at the end of his memoir. he received a basic secondary education in the orphanage and after completing his studies, got married and, with his sister, left the establishment. he served in the red army for seven years, leaving it in 1930. he was accepted, in the same year, as a student in the all-union veterinary-animal husbandry institute, graduating in 1934 having received a technical education in animal husbandry. he accepted a position as the leader of political-mass radio broadcasting attached to the soviet armenian government in 1935. he moved to became the responsible editor for political broadcasting in 1937. he was appointed chief editor of the latest news broadcasts from june 1940. after the beginning of the great patriotic war he was sent to the battlefront in 1941 then demobilized in 1943 due to sickness. he worked in the social security ministry from 1943 until 1946 then, from 1947 until 1954 as the local correspondent for the newspaper “communist” for the martuni, kamo and vardenis regions. in about 1960 he worked as a censor in the kurdish-language newspaper “rya taza.” after that he retired due to illness and died in february 1968. sokrat mkrtchyan’s memoir is valuable for a number of reasons. firstly, it is a singular primary source concerning the destruction of one of western armenia’s settlements – prkhus – and of other armenian populated villages in the khlat sub-district; secondly, the role of the kurds, the mechanics of the implementation of the armenian genocide, in other words the concrete means aimed at killing specific groups of armenians (men and young women), other violent methods used (rape, torture, forced labour) and testimony concerning the despoiling of the armenians. the memoir is also enriched with a certain literary-artistic value, bringing also the customs of local armenians, several examples of songs from mush, etc. it also has a firm structure, its narrative style is clear and absorbing, the language is simple but, at the same time, is bright and figurative. sokrat hake mkrtchyan’s memoir was brought together by his eldest daughter, lena mkrtchyan. it was she who, in 1998, gave the five notebooks containing the original manuscript to the armenian genocide museum-institute and she prepared the final text that is based on them. when preparing the manuscript for publication, the editor considered her final text as its basis, referring back to the notebooks to make any corrections necessary. editing was carried out based on the principle that there should only be minimum intervention. in the main, only grammatical and punctuation corrections have been made, bringing the manuscript up to present-day standards and evening out most obvious grammatical problems. it is also important to note that the armenian researcher, ethnographer and folklorist, verjine svazlian, used certain excerpts taken from sokrat mkrtchyan’s memoir manuscript in her book “the armenian genocide: testimonies of the eyewitness survivors.”24 24 verjine svazlian, հայոց ցեղասպանություն. ականատես վերապրողների վկայություններ [the armenian genocide: testimonies of the eyewitness survivors] (yerevan: gitutyun, 2011), 105-108. 88 the book contains two appendices. the first is the editor, robert tatoyan’s article titled “genocide on the example of one settlement: the destruction of the village prkhus in 1915.” the second is the testimony by sokrat hake mkrtchyan, probably on august 9th, 1916, when he was in the moscow armenian committee’s orphanage, the original of which is kept in the national archive of armenia.25 those two memoirs are very different in style and narrative. simply told and without embellishment, they are penned enriched with words taken from turkish and russian, but the language is clear and they tell their stories almost dispassionately, although with an underlying sense of anger, loathing, horror and loss. both are vivid, concrete testimonies of genocide and the men’s successful efforts to survive and rebuild their individual lives. 25 հայոց ցեղասպանությունը օսմանյան թուրքիայում: վերապրածների վկայություններ: փաստաթղթերի ժողովածու [armenian genocide in ottoman turkey. testimonies of survivors. collection of documents], amatuni virabyan, gohar avagyan (compilers), ed. by amatuni virabyan, vol ii, բիթլիսի նահանգ [bitlis province] (yerevan: national archive of armenia, 2012), 50-51. 54 robert tatoyan, ph.d. in history, works as a senior researcher at the armenian genocide museum-institute in yerevan, armenia. his research interests include the issues of demography of the armenian population in the ottoman empire on the eve of the armenian genocide, particularly the analysis of statistical sources for that period. he has authored numerous publications on the subject including the monograph “the question of western armenian population number in 1878-1914,” (in armenian) published in 2015 (for the complete list of publications visit: https://independent.academia.edu/roberttatoyan). email: r.tatoyan@gmail.com 55 wwi armenian refugees census data as a source for ottoman armenian population numbers on the eve of the armenian genocide1 robert tatoyan this paper aims to present and analyze data provided by censuses of the ottoman armenians from van, erzeroum and bitlis provinces, who, fleeing the threat of massacre during wwi, found refuge in the territory of the russian empire, particularly in the russian transcaucasia. by comparing data on the armenian refugees with information provided by other statistical sources, particularly the armenian patriarchate and the ottoman government, it is possible to enrich our knowledge of the numbers of armenian population in western armenia and the ottoman empire in general on the eve of wwi and the armenian genocide. it is shown that the number of refugees is about 70% higher than the number of the armenian population for the same areas before wwi mentioned in the official ottoman statistics and corresponds approximately to the figures of the armenian patriarchate. if account is taken that some people were already dead by the time the refugee censuses were carried out and also that the populations of some settlements within the administrative units in question were not evacuated at all but massacred, then the actual number of the armenian population in these areas was even higher. key-words: armenian question, wwi, armenian genocide, armenian refugees, census, statistics, demography, van province, bitlis province, erzeroum province. introduction according to article 61 of the berlin treaty (1878), the ottoman government undertook the obligation “to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by armenians.”2 almost immediately after making this commitment, the ottoman sultan abdul hamid ii and the successor young turk government tried to demonstrate to the great powers, the guarantors of the implementation of the armenian reforms, that there were no “armenian-inhabited provinces” in the ottoman empire and the armenians in “the six eastern vilayets”3 or “eastern anatolia,” as the ottoman authorities began to call historical armenian territories under the ottoman rule, were a minority. this was achieved by issuing more and more government statistical data. in its 1 the article was received on 21.12.2019 and accepted for publication on 20.09.2020. 2 the full text of article lxi is as follows: “the sublime porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the armenians, and to guarantee their security against the circassians and kurds. it will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the powers, who will superintend their application.” see: “treaty between great britain, germany, austria, france, italy, russia, and turkey for the settlement of affairs in the east: signed at berlin, july 13, 1878,” the american journal of international law 2, no. 4, supplement: official documents (1908): 422. 3 the ottoman empire was divided using the following administrative-territorial entities (from major to minor): vilayet (province), sanjak (district), kaza (sub-district), and nahiye (village group). in this article both ottoman and their english equivalents are used. 56 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0008 turn, the armenian patriarchate of constantinople, body responsible for internal governance of the ottoman armenian community (millet), opposed these claims by presenting its own estimates of the number of ottoman armenians and the ethnic composition of the vilayets of “turkish armenia.” by comparing the ottoman armenian population figures provided by the ottoman government (1914) and those issued by armenian patriarchate (1912) prior to wwi, it can be seen that the armenian patriarchate statistics, compared to that of ottoman data were about 1.57 times higher. as for the six armenian provinces (van, bitlis, erzeroum, kharberd, diyarbekir and sebastia) the discrepancy between two sets of data was about 1.83 (see table 1). table 1. the ottoman armenian population figures provided by the ottoman government (1914) and the armenian patriarchate (1913-1914). administrative unit 1914 ottoman government4 1913-1914 armenian patriarchate5 six armenian provinces van 67,792 197,000 bitlis 119,132 198,000 erzeroum 136,618 215,000 kharberd 87,864 204,000 diyarbekir 73,226 124,000 sebastia 151,674 225,000 total six armenian provinces 636,306 1,163,000 other parts of the ottoman empire 658,545 863,700 grand total 1,294,851 2,026,700 4 kemal karpat, ottoman population 1830-1914: demographic and social characteristics (wisconsin: the university of wisconsin press, 1985), 188-189 (it included armenian catholic and protestant population figures). 5 t’eodik, ամէնուն տարեցոյցը, ժզ. տարի, 1922 [everybody’s almanac, 16th year, 1922] (constantinople, 1922), 261-263. this census of the patriarchate was elaborated with the help of the provincial dioceses and parishes to which the armenian populations were attached, and it is presented in the form of parish by parish tables. the original documents of this census, which were kept at the armenian patriarchate of constantinople, were deposited at the nubarian library in paris in 1928. 1913-1914 census data were used in french-armenian scholars raymond h. kevorkian’s and paul b. paboudjian’s detailed study of the pre-wwi ottoman armenian population (raymond h. kévorkian, paul b. paboudjian, les arméniens dans l’empire ottoman à la veille du génocide (paris: editions d’art et d’histoire arhis, 1992). 57 wwi armenian refugees census data in general, there are two ways of checking the reliability of historical statistical information. one is to analyze the data itself, reveal its internal shortcomings, define an adjustment factor and adjust the data in accordance on that basis. in case of ottoman statistics, this method was used by historian justin mccarthy, who based his estimates of the population of the anatolian provinces on ottoman data.6 the second method is to compare existing statistical information with data from other sources for the approximately same period and for conclusions to be reached through such a comparison. in the case of the ottoman armenian population prior to the armenian genocide, four kinds of such sources may be identified: 1. data provided by censuses of the armenians who, fleeing the threat of massacre during wwi, found refuge on the territory of the russian empire, particularly in russian transcaucasia (the caucasus); 2. data gathered by questioning armenian refugees about their native settlements; 3. data contained in armenian genocide survivors’ memoirs and testimonies concerning their native settlements; 4. estimates of the ottoman armenian population made by diplomats of various states: the allies of the ottoman empire (germany and austria-hungary) as well as those that were neutral (usa) and that were present at the places in question. of these four sources, the first the data provided by censuses of the western armenian refugees is more reliable and generally more trustworthy, based on the following interconnected arguments. first, western armenians had no reason to hide their numbers as was the case before the deportations there is widespread evidence of such a practice in western armenia with the aim of avoiding taxation.7 on the contrary, they were interested in showing their numbers as accurately as possible in order to receive humanitarian assistance. second, the bodies which carried out censuses also needed the most accurate number of armenian refugees possible to organize aid. third, the organizers adopted accurate methods of collating these censuses: in particular, they counted refugees in different refugee concentration areas simultaneously, on one specific day, to avoid double counting (registration). the data from the first source is presented below and is compared to that of the armenian patriarchate and ottoman government. thus, by comparison of armenian refugees’ data with information provided by other statistical sources it is possible to enrich our knowledge of armenian population numbers in western armenia and the ottoman empire in general on the eve of wwi and the armenian genocide. 6 justin mccarthy, muslims and minorities. the population of ottoman anatolia and the end of the empire (new york: n.y. university press, 1983). 7 the ottoman armenians’ incentive to avoid registration in order not to be taxed is widely attested to in various sources and was common knowledge for researchers that specialized in ottoman armenian demographic studies. for recent studies in english where this issue is touched upon see particularly: levon marashlian, politics and demography. armenians, turks, and kurds in the ottoman empire (cambridge, ma-paris-toronto: zoryan institute, 1991), 48; vahakn n. dadrian, warrant for genocide: key elements of the turko-armenian conflict (new brunswick, n.j.: transaction publishers, 1999), 176; for diyarbekir province see: hilmar kaiser, the extermination of armenians in the diyarbekir region (istanbul: bilgi university press, 2014), 20-21. 58 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 the administrative units of western armenia should be defined at the outset. the armenian population of those areas, being in the majority or being a considerable percentage of the total resident population, could escape massacre by finding refuge in the caucasus in 1914-1915. those regions were: 1. van province; 2. basen sub-district of the erzeroum district of erzeroum province; 3. bayazet, diadin, karakilise, and alashkert sub-districts of the bayazet district of erzeroum province; 4. boulanykh and manazkert sub-districts of the mush district of bitlis province. the armenian refugees from those regions were mainly enumerated during the socalled “one-day” censuses that took place in 1915-1916. the russian government had ordered two censuses taken of refugees in transcaucasia during this period. the first was carried out on 30 january 1915 (12 february, new style), the second one on 14 january 1916 (27 january 1916 new style). they were carried out by the yerevan statistical bureau.8 armenian refugee statistics should be presented and analyzed separately for each of the administrative units mentioned and compared with the data provided by the ottoman government and the armenian patriarchate of constantinople. van province most of the armenian population of van province managed to avoid massacres and deportations by resorting to self-defense. turkish troops withdrew with the russian army advance in april-may 1915. the tactical retreat of the russian army in july 1915, however, forced the entire armenian population of van province to follow it to the caucasus to avoid imminent retaliatory action by the turkish government. not all the armenians of van province, however, were able to overcome the difficulties of the journey, many perishing on the way. the armenian population of van province, which found refuge in transcaucasia, was counted during the “one-day census” carried out on 14 january 1916 (27 january 1916 new style). according to the data provided by this census, 18,586 armenian families or about 8 summary results of “one-day census” of 30 january 1915 were published in 1915 in однодневная перепись бѣженцевъ изъ турціи, персіи и изъ мѣстъ пограничныхъ съ турціей (армянъ, айсоровъ, грековъ и пр.) 1914-1915г. [one-day census of refugees from turkey, persia and from places adjacent to the border of turkey, 1914-1915] (yerevan: luys, 1915); summary data of the “one-day census” of 14 january 1916 can be found in eduard danielyan, «անդրկովկասում ապաստանած արևմտահայ գաղթականության թվաքանակի հարցի շուրջ (1914-1917թթ.)» [on western armenian refugee figure, who found refuge in transcaucasia (1914-1917)], herald of the social sciences 2 (2002): 116. another primary source for western armenian refugee numbers by the place of origin is the report prepared by aleksander sharafyan, the commissioner for refugee aid of the caucasus armenian charitable society, published in hambavaber weekly journal in january, 1916. see: aleksander sharafyan, «համառօտ տեսութիւն գաղթականութեան ծագման, արդի կացութեան, կ.հ. ընկերութեան եւ հայկ. կենտ. կօմիտէի գործունեութեան» [a brief survey on the origins of refugees, their present condition, and the activities of the caucasus armenian society and the armenian central commission], hambavaber (tiflis), 1916, no. 2, 45-47. 59 wwi armenian refugees census data 81,800 persons from van province were registered (the number of persons per family was 4.4).9 additionally, according to information collected during the “one-day census” from the armenian refugees from van province, at the actual time the census was held, one third of the members of the registered families had already died as a result of massacre, shortage of food and diseases after the beginning of wwi. the number of dead was about 36,500.10 of this figure, about 20,000 had perished during the evacuation in july 1915, both on the journey and in refugee camps in etchmiadzin, igdir, yerevan and other areas.11 it should also be noted that about 12,000 armenians from van province returned to their former homes before january 1916. (following defeats suffered at the caucasus front, the ottoman army left the city of van on 29 september 1915, thus allowing recapture of the province by the russian troops and the subsequent return of some of the armenians to van.) these people were not counted during the so-called “one-day census” of january 14, 1916. in addition, the armenians from van vilayet who found refuge in persian territory were not counted. these numbered approximately 10,000 individuals and, additionally, 3,500 orphans.12 by summing up all the above-mentioned figures, we can conclude that at least 144,000 armenians lived in van province on the eve of the armenian genocide. 13 other sources contemporary to the events largely confirm this data. thus, according to the memorandum on the condition of armenian refugees, compiled by the british foreign office from information furnished by mr. stevens, the british consul at batum, as of december 1915 there were 105,000 armenian refugees from the province of van in the caucasus.14 the armenian journalist bakhshi ishkhanian, in his series of articles about the condition of the armenian refugees published in 1915, gives the range of numbers of armenian refugees from van province as being between 120,000-140,000.15 the figure of 144,000 quoted for the armenian population of pre-genocide van province is a conservative estimate. researchers who have attempted to correct van province armenian population numbers by using armenian refugee statistical data give even higher figures. the armenian researcher john kirakosyan, for example, counts the number of armenian refugees evacuated from van was more than 150,000 (unfortunately he does not provide any factors or mentions any sources in reaching this figure).16 gegham 9 danielyan, «անդրկովկասում ապաստանած արևմտահայ գաղթականության», 116. 10 this number is obtained by calculating the percentage from the total number of both the dead and survivors. 11 sharafyan, «համառօտ տեսութիւն», 46. 12 ibid. 13 for my detailed estimate of van province armenian population number see: robert tatoyan, «վիճակագրական տվյալները վանի նահանգի հայ բնակչության թվաքանակի վերաբերյալ 18781914 (աղբյուրների համադրության և վերլուծության փորձ)» [statistics of the armenian population of van vilayet 1878-1914 (attempt of comparison and analysis of sources)], the issues of the history and historiography of the armenian genocide 7 (2003): 65-78. 14 james bryce and arnold toynbee, the treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire, 1915-1916. documents presented to viscount grey of falloden by viscount bryce, uncensored edition, edited and with an introduction by ara sarafian (priceton, new jersey: gomidas institute, 2000), 237. 15 bakhshi ishkhanian, «աղէտի եւ տառապանքի աշխարհից (այց թիւրքահայ փախստականներին) iii» [from the world of disaster and suffering (a visit to the turkish armenian refugees) iii], arev (alexandria), 5 november 1915, 1. 16 john s. kirakosyan, առաջին համաշխարհային պատերազմը և արևմտահայությունը [the first world war and the western armenians] (yerevan: hayastan, 1967), 43. 60 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 badalyan, another armenian scholar, took the armenian refugee statistical data collected in july-september 1917 into account. he thus ascertained that the number of refugee families from van was 24,127 and, fixing the number of adult members in a family as 8 or 8.8, concluded that about 210,000-212,000 armenians lived in van province in 1914.17 it should also be noted that the information contained in a memorandum, submitted by the armenian national delegation to the paris peace conference in 1919, stated that the number of van province armenians who had found refuge in russian transcaucasia was more than 220,000.18 for comparison according to statistical data based on settlement census returns of the armenian patriarchate of constantinople there were 19,222 armenian households or 121,377 armenians in van province on the eve of wwi.19 the data of the ottoman government is 65% less: about 68,000 (67,792) armenians.20 erzeroum province: basen sub-district of the erzeroum district of erzeroum province basen sub-district had 57 armenian-populated villages where, according to the ottoman government data, 10,046 armenians lived on the eve of wwi.21 according to the armenian patriarchate data the figure for the armenian population in basen was 16,740.22 basen subdistrict was divided in two areas upper basen and lower basen. of these two areas only the population of lower basen was able to take refuge in the transcaucasia at the beginning of november 1914. basen sub-district’s armenians were registered during the so-called “one-day census” of 30 january 1915 (12 february new style).23 according to this registration data, armenian population from the 23 villages of lower basen that found refuge in transcaucasia totaled 1,551 families or 12,914 individuals.24 the comparison of refugee population data by village with corresponding statistics provided by the armenian patriarchate of constantinople shows that the statistics 17 gegham badalyan, «արևմ տա հա յութ յան թվա քա նա կի ճշգրտման ժողովրդագրական ո րոշ սկզբունքներ (էրզրու մի և վա նի վի լա յեթ նե րի օ րի նա կով)» [some principles of adjusting the number of western armenians (by the example of erzurum and van vilayets)] in the current state of armenology and development perspectives, international conference proceedings (yerevan, 2003), 140. see also։ gegham badalyan, «կ. պոլսի հայոց պատրիարքության 1912 թ. վիճակագրության տվյալների քննությունը (վանի սանջակի օրինակով)» [analysis of constantinople armenian patriarchate statistical data of 1912 (on the example of van province)] in capitals of armenia, book 1, van, proceedings of the international conference, dedicated to the 2865th anniversary of the first record about city of van, (october 7-9, 2010), ed. harutyun marutyan (yerevan: gitutyun, 2013), 157. 18 the armenian question before the peace conference, 1919: a memorandum presented officially by the representatives of armenia to the peace conference at versailles, on february 26th, 1919 (new york: press bureau, the armenian national union of america, 1919), 21. 19 a-do, մեծ դէպքերը վասպուրականում 1914-1915 թւականներին [the big events in vaspourakan in 1914-1915], (yerevan, 1917), 30. 20 karpat, ottoman population 1830-1914, 188-189. 21 ibid., 170. 22 kevorkian, paboudjian, les arméniens dans l’empire ottoman, 59. 23 однодневная перепись. 24 ibid., 44-45. 61 wwi armenian refugees census data for refugees are about 26% higher. in some cases, the refugee registration data is 1.5-1.7 times higher. table 2. armenian population numbers for several settlements in the basen sub-district according to the armenian patriarchate 1913-1914 census and 1915 refugee “one-day census” returns. settlement 1913-14 armenian patriarchate25 1915 “one-day census”26 difference persons persons 1 aruchagrak [ա րու ճագ րակ] 1,075 1,434 33 % 2 eghan [եղ ան ] 1,298 1,308 1 % 3 egepat [էգե պա տ] 978 1,149 17 % 4 khydyrelyagh [խըդը րէ լյաղ] 29 35 21 % 5 kamurdj [կա մո ւրջ] 81 0 1,076 33 % 6 kirdabaz [կիրդ աբ ազ] 312 480 54 % 7 harsnekar [հարսն եք ար] 390 44 6 14 % 8 yuzveran [յ ուզվե րան ] 608 777 28 % 9 tchrasun [ճռասո ւն] 456 8 15 79 % 10 toti [տոտի] 540 68 0 26 % total 6,4 96 8 ,2 00 26% by the end of 1915 the armenian populations of both upper and lower basen had been able to find refuge in the caucasus. there were, according to the report made by alexander sharafian, 18,910 armenians from the basen sub-district there as at january 1916.27 the armenian researcher gegham badalyan, by using refugee statistical data, adding data from other sources and projecting the undercounting fixing pattern on all the settlements 25 kevorkian, paboudjian, les armeniens dans l’empire ottoman, 451. 26 однодневная перепись, 44-45. 27 sharafyan, «համառօտ տեսութիւն», 45. 62 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 in the basen district, arrived at the conclusion that, on the eve of wwi, the armenian population of the basen sub-district was about 21,000 persons a figure that was double that of the ottoman government data and about 25% higher than that of the constantinople armenian patriarchate.28 erzeroum province: bayazet, diadin, karakilisa and alashkert sub-districts of the bayazet district almost the entire population of the four sub-districts of the bayazet district of erzeroum province (these sub-districts were bayazet, alashkert, diadin and karakilisa) took refuge in the russian transcaucasia at the end of 1914. according to the ottoman government data published on the eve of wwi , the armenian population of these territories numbered 10,920.29 the figure provided by the armenian patriarchate for the same territories was about double or 24,627 persons.30 the armenian refugees from the bayazet district were counted during the “one-day census” of 30 january 1915 (12 february 1915 new style). according to that data, 16,612 armenians who had left those territories were registered. as can be seen, although the refugee statistics didn’t present the complete picture of the armenian population of these areas prior to the beginning of the war not all armenians managed to escape the massacres and overcome the difficulties of the journey but even though this data is incomplete, the number of bayazet district armenian refugees was about 52% higher than the official ottoman figures for the total armenian population of that administrative unit (see also table 3). table 3. armenian population numbers for the bayazet district on the eve of the armenian genocide according to data from different sources. administrative unit armenian patriarchate 1913-1914 census ottoman statistics of 1914 refugee “one-day census” of january 1915 1. bayazet sub-district 4,884 2,619 1,735 2. diadin sub-district 1,649 904 1,111 3. karakilise sub-district 8,180 3,195 6,034 4. alashkert sub-district 9,914 4,202 7,732 it is worth mentioning that in the months after the “one-day census” of 30 january 1915 (12 february 1915 new style), bayazet district armenian refugee data were corrected and, according to information published in spring 1915, the number of armenian refugees from 28 badalyan, «արևմ տա հա յութ յան թվա քա նա կի ճշգրտման», 138. 29 karpat, ottoman population 1830-1914, 170. 30 kevorkian, paboudjian, les arméniens dans l’empire ottoman, 59. 63 wwi armenian refugees census data this area was 23,850 persons (or 3,245 households) including those who perished during the evacuation.31 this figure is close to that of the armenian patriarchate (24,627 individuals), and if account is taken of the fact that some people didn’t take refuge in russia and therefore were not registered during the censuses, then we can estimate the armenian population of bayazet district prior to wwi as about 26,000.32 bitlis province: boulanykh and manazkert sub-districts of mush district the armenian populations of the boulanykh and manazkert sub-districts of the mush district of bitlis province were also evacuated along with van province armenian population in july 1915. boulanykh and manazkert armenian refugee statistical data confirms the reliability of the armenian patriarchate figures. according to these data, about 34,000 armenians from boulanykh and manazkert found refuge in the russian transcaucasia in july 1915 (see table 4).33 8,965 armenian families from these and other areas of bitlis province were registered during the armenian refugee “one-day” census of 16 january 1916 (29 january 1916, new style). one third of the members of the registered families had perished during the evacuation as a result of diseases or food shortages.34 according to karo sasuni, the armenian public figure who was a member of russian administration of portions of bitlis vilayet occupied by russian troops in 1916-1917, about 67,000 armenian refugees from this province were counted in february 1916, of which 45,000 were from the boulanykh, manazkert and their adjacent areas, 8,400 were from the mush valley (of which 400 were from the city of mush itself), 1,000 were from bitlis and khlat sub-districts, 700 were from varto and 12,000 were from sasun.35 according to the ottoman government statistics provided prior to wwi, only 19,100 armenians lived in these two sub-districts; of this figure 14,662 lived in boulanykh and 4,438 in manazkert.36 the statistics published by the armenian patriarchate provided the figure of 36,984 for these areas, of which 25,053 was for boulanykh and 11,931 for manazkert.37 31 badalyan, «արևմ տա հա յութ յան թվա քա նա կի ճշգրտման», 139. 32 for the estimates of gegham badalyan see: gegham badalyan, «էրզրումի վիլայեթի որոշ կազաների հայ բնակչության թվաքանակի ճշտումն ըստ արևելյան հայաստանում ապաստանած արևմտահայ գաղթականների 1914-1915 թթ. կազմված վիճակագրական ցուցակների» [quantities of the armenian population in some of the kazas of the province of erzeroum (1914-1915)], the issues of the history and historiography of the armenian genocide 4 (2001): 122-124. see also our survey for bayazet armenian population number: robert tatoyan, «էրզ րու մի նահանգի հայ բնակ չութ յան թվա քա նա կը մեծ ե ղեռ նի նախօր յա կին (աղբ յուր նե րի հա մե մա տա կան վերլուծության փորձ)» [the number of armenian population of the erzurum province of the ottoman empire on the eve of the armenian genocide (an attempt at comparative analysis of sources)], journal of genocide studies 2 no. 1 (2014): 52-54. 33 karo sasuni, տաճկահայաստանը ռուսական տիրապետության տակ (1914-1918) [turkish armenia under the russian rule] (boston, 1927), 68, 75. 34 danielyan, «անդրկովկասում ապաստանած արևմտահայ գաղթականության», 116. 35 karo sasuni, «մուշէն եւ սասունէն ազատուածները» [rescued from mush and sasoun], tchakatamart, daily newspaper (constantinople), 22 may 1919, no. 161, 2. 36 karpat, ottoman population 1830-1914, 174. 37 kevorkian, paboudjian, les arméniens dans l’empire ottoman, 59. 64 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 table 4. the armenian population of boulanykh and manazkert sub-districts prior to wwi. administrative unit armenian patriarchate 19131914 census ottoman statistics of 1914 refugee statistical data of 1915 1 boulanykh sub-district 25,053 14,662 2 manazkert sub-district 11,931 4,438 total 36,984 19,100 34,000 conclusion to summarize, the number of refugees from 1) van province, 2) basen sub-district and bayazet district (bayazet sub-district, diadin sub-district, karakilise sub-district, alashkert sub-district) of erzeroum province, 3) boulanykh and manazkert sub-districts of bitlis province, who were registered during the so-called “one-day censuses” carried out on 30 january 1915 (12 february 1915 new style) and 14 january, 1916 (27 january, 1916 new style) is about 70% higher than the number of the armenian population before wwi as enumerated for the same areas in official the ottoman statistics and corresponds approximately to the armenian patriarchate figures as shown in table 5. if account is taken that some people were already deceased by the time the refugee censuses were carried out and also that the populations of some settlements within the administrative units in question were not evacuated at all but were massacred, then the actual armenian population figures in these areas was even higher. by the most conservative estimates the actual armenian population of these areas prior to the genocide was about 234,000. this estimate is approximately twice that of the figure provided by the ottoman government. 65 wwi armenian refugees census data table 5. comparative summary statistics. administrative unit ottoman government, 1914 armenian patriarchate, 1913-1914 armenian refugees in the caucasus, 1915-1916 armenian population number, 1914 (approximate estimate, based on refugee counting data) 1 van province 67,792 121,377 120,000 150,00038 2 erzeroum province 2.1 basen sub-district of erzeroum district 10,046 16,740 18,910 21,000 2.2 bayazet subdistrict of bayazet district 2,619 4,884 1,735 5,000 2.3 diadin sub-district of bayazet district 904 1,649 1,111 2,000 2.4 karakilise subdistrict of bayazet district 3,195 8,180 6,034 8,000 2.5 alashkert subdistrict of bayazet district 4,202 9,914 7,732 10,000 3 bitlis province 3.1 boulanykh subdistrict of mush district 19,100 36,984 34,000 38,000 3.2 manazkert subdistrict of mush district total 107,858 199,728 189,522 234,000 the refugee registration data are incomplete and haven’t covered all the areas of the ottoman empire, but even in their present state they show that the ottoman government undercounted the armenian population. therefore, in order to determine the armenian population figures for western armenia and of the ottoman empire in general prior to the armenian genocide which corresponds to reality, account should be taken of the numbers provided by the armenian patriarchate of constantinople as a basis for calculation, settlement by settlement and comparison and adjustments should be made of those figures with data provided by refugee registration data and other available primary sources. 38 conservative estimate. 1 azerbaijan’s policy of forced cultural appropriation after the second artsakh war. case of dadivank hayastan a. martirosyan armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, armenia abstract the article presents the methods of the continuing forced appropriation of armenian cultural monuments in artsakh by the republic of azerbaijan’s functionaries after the second artsakh war. 1 the “albanisation” of armenian cultural monuments in mountainous karabakh in the scientific field began in the 1950s, when it was imperative to reinforce the azerbaijani people’s cultural identity, based on the foundations laid between 1920 and 1930 and to try to make all the peoples living in the southern caucasus equally indigenous to the region. one of the “victims” of the “albanisation” of the cultural heritage of the armenians of mountainous karabakh is the monastic complex of dadivank, located in the karvachar area of the shahumyan region. passing under azerbaijani jurisdiction in november 2020, it was presented to the international community as part of the historic-cultural heritage of the descendants of the caucasian albanians, which should be under the jurisdiction of udis and azerbaijanis. with this aim in view, the azerbaijani leadership instituted the policy of forced appropriation and alienation of armenian heritage from the armenian culture through various means, which will be shown in detail below. this article will also demonstrate how the theory of “albanisation” began and developed in azerbaijan ssr historiography and what “scientific bases” were – and are being brought forward during the soviet and post-soviet eras by historians to present dadivank as albanian. it will also reveal the directions azerbaijan is following for the appropriation of armenian cultural legacy, rebranding it as albanian, and foisting this theory on the international public. keywords: artsakh 2 , dadivank, cultural heritage, albanisation, azerbaijan funding: this work was supported by science committee of the ra in the frames of the research projects 22yr-6a033. the article was submitted on 17.03.2021 and accepted for publication on 05.10.2022. how to cite: hayastan martirosyan, “azerbaijan’s policy of forced cultural appropriation after the second artsakh war. case of dadivank,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 7, no. 2 (2022): 102-146. 1 also called the “44 day war.” 2 the original, armenian name for nagorno-karabakh is “artsakh”. 2 introduction raphael lemkin, who coined the term genocide and participated in the formation of the un “convention on the preventing and punishment of the crime of genocide,” (1948) initially used, in the 1933 madrid conference, the term “an act of vandalism” to describe the crime against humanity that is “cultural genocide,” before that term was utilised. he noted that by that act, the perpetrator showed his destructive spirit, the opposite face of human culture and progress.3 according to lemkin “…the ban on cultural genocide must only be directed against the policies designed to assimilate a group into a larger society, but only drastic methods used to aid in the rapid and complete disappearance of the cultural, moral and religious life of a group of human beings.”4 researchers, working in this direction in the following decades, brought forward different approaches to the term “cultural genocide.” two approaches may be determined: the first, to use cultural genocide as a means or method of eliminating a group and, second, to use cultural genocide as a process of making a group disappear. according to dr. sylvia maus, former scientific coordinator of the unesco chair in international relations at technical university of dresden, although the elimination of cultural sites, churches and cross stones in mountainous karabakh may be regarded as part of the means of realising genocide, there is not, at present, any special intent for the elimination of the group by azerbaijan. in the wider context, if the destruction of armenian heritage does take place, it is possible that there will be a long, durable process, the aim of which would be to eradicate the armenian people’s identity in mountainous karabakh and minimize its historical roots and cultural diversity. from that point of view, the destruction of the armenian cultural heritage that has taken place in nakhichevan5 has an important role in understanding the wider picture. therefore, future wide-scale destruction will, in itself, be cultural genocide. in this sense, the nakhichevan example is a cautionary tool and reminds the international community to focus its attention on mountainous karabakh.6 3 raphael lemkin, “acts constituting a general (transnational) danger considered as offences against the law of nations,” additional explications to the special report presented to the 5th conference for the unification of penal law in madrid (14-20 october 1933), at http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm. 4 barry sautman, cultural genocide and asian state peripheries (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2006): 5-6. 5 simon maghakyan and sarah pickman, “a regime conceals its erasure of indigenous armenian culture,” hyperallergic, 18.02.2019, https://hyperallergic.com/482353/a-regime-conceals-its-erasure-of-indigenousarmenian-culture/, accessed 01.03.2021. 6 sylvia maus, “a violent effort to rewrite history? destruction of religious sites in nagorno-karabakh and the concept of cultural genocide,” völkerrechtsblog, 19 april 2021, https://intr2dok.vifarecht.de/receive/mir_mods_00010644. http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm https://hyperallergic.com/author/simon-maghakyan/ https://hyperallergic.com/author/sarah-pickman/ https://hyperallergic.com/482353/a-regime-conceals-its-erasure-of-indigenous-armenian-culture/ https://hyperallergic.com/482353/a-regime-conceals-its-erasure-of-indigenous-armenian-culture/ https://intr2dok.vifa-recht.de/receive/mir_mods_00010644 https://intr2dok.vifa-recht.de/receive/mir_mods_00010644 3 the republic of azerbaijan, perhaps even from the soviet era, adopted two approaches toward the christian monuments in mountainous karabakh: their destruction or the forced appropriation. there are several interpretations of the latter. forced appropriation may be used for various things that form parts of cultural heritage: starting with the kinds of dishes, dress and music, to holy places and historic-cultural monuments. generally speaking, forced cultural appropriation is used when the subject culture is that of a minority or is, in any way, inferior to that of the appropriating culture in its social, political, economic or military state, or when a more powerful culture “attacks” that of a weak neighbour or when there are other problems, such as ethnic or racial enmity between the two groups.7 forced appropriation is directed at creating or strengthening an identity. one of the ways of establishing identity is to take other peoples’ history as one’s own.8 the motivation for forced cultural appropriation is, in the first instance, to gain predominance or governance. robert nelson, professor of art history, notes that “in every cultural appropriation there are those who act and those who are acted upon, and for those whose memories and cultural identities are manipulated by academic, economic or political appropriations, the consequences can be disquieting or painful.”9 the historian and geographer david lowenthal, referring to the reasons for choosing specific aspects of the past, insists that the public changes or alters the past because it often needs or wants more than it has. lowenthal is certain that most people exaggerate their cultural ancientness or hide its relative recentness. they therefore create new, more apposite histories.10 the british historian john tosh notes that while social groups need records of past experiences, it is also imperative for them that they have a history of the past which either explains or justifies their present, often for historical accuracy. he observes that “memories are modified to suit particular situations or circumstances and do not always correlate with historical truths. these histories can become distorted and permeated (often deliberately) with inaccuracies and myths during the selection process.”11 7 mahmoud hawari, “the citadel of jerusalem: a case study in the cultural appropriation of archaeology in palestine,” present pasts 2, no. 1 (2010): 89, http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/pp.25. 8 kathleen ashley and veronique plesch, “the cultural processes of ‘appropriation,’” journal of medieval and early modern studies 32, no. 1 (2002): 6. 9 robert s. nelson and richard shiff, eds., critical terms for art history (chicago: university of chicago press, 1996), 127, quoted in ashley and plesch, “the cultural processes of ‘appropriation,’” 3. 10 david lowenthal, the past is a foreign country (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1985), quoted in sara mcdowell, “heritage, memory and identity,” in the ashgate research companion to heritage and identity, eds. brian graham and peter howard (farnham: ashgate publishing, 2008), 42. 11 john tosh, in pursuit of history (london: longman press, 1991), quoted in mcdowell, “heritage, memory and identity,” 42-43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/pp.25 4 and cultural geographer donald mitchell notes that “societies justify current attitudes and future aspirations by linking them to past traditions which helps bond and unify factionalism.”12 the medieval albanian christian state13 is known as being an area within the present republic of azerbaijan, before the nomadic turkish-speaking people appeared. in any event, some azerbaijani researchers accept an extreme, materialistic version of azerbaijan culture, according to which they either reject the presence of non-turkish culture in their country or consider the whole of it to be turkish speaking. the others consider present-day azerbaijanis to be an amalgamation of the albanians and their turkish forefathers.14 the launch of the azerbaijan’s policy of forced cultural appropriation began during soviet times, when the first problem put before azerbaijani historians was to formulate national self-awareness for the ethnic azerbaijani group, which would inculcate a “feeling of historicalness into the understanding of the word ‘motherland’.”15 according to the ussr constitution of 5th december 1936, azerbaijan became a fullyfledged soviet socialist republic, its people being named “azerbaijanis.” it was imperative that the latter had its own history, allowing it to be “separate” from the turks, so as not to be considered to be a base for pan-turkism and from shia iran to escape the accusation of being pan-islamist. at the same time, the azerbaijanis needed to receive the status of an indigenous people in accordance with the soviet concept, which required proof to finally free itself from being labelled as people that have arrived from elsewhere. one of the first steps taken was the teaching of azerbaijan history at the azerbaijan state university (now baku state university) in the faculty of history during 1940-1941. until then, the first version of azerbaijani history was published in 1939 in the form of a textbook 12 donald mitchell, cultural geography: a critical introduction (oxford: blackwell, 2003), quoted in mcdowell, "heritage, memory and identity," 43. 13 the albanian tribes (according to strabo, 26) lived north of kur river, reaching as far as the river alazan, on the shores of the caspian sea between the caucasus mountains and the derbend pass. the albanians were, to the west, neighbours of iberia (georgia); to the north the sarmatia; to the south with armenian major and, on various occasions, to the south-east with marastan minor (atrpatakan). for details see, for example, аleksan hakobyan, албания-алуанк в греко-латинских и древнеармянских источниках [albania-aluank in the greek-latin and old-armenian sources] (yerevan, assr academy of sciences, 1987), 20-36. enaetollah reza, ազարբայջան և առան (կովկասեան ալբանիա) [azerbaijan and arran (caucasian albania)], trans. yervand papazyan (yerevan, pyunik, 1994), 86. the geographer strabo praised, in the first century bc, the beauty of the 26 tribes living in caucasian albania; he describes their simple and patriarchal way of living, noting that they couldn’t count to more than one hundred, “but that they comprised both light and armoured infantry and cavalry in time of war, like the armenians” see strabo, օտար աղբյուրներ հայերի մասին, [foreign sources about armenians], n 1, trans. hrachya acharyan, (yerevan: ysu, 1940): 33. 14 nationalism, politics, and the practice of archaeology, eds. philip l. kohl and clare p. fawcett (cambridge, new york: cambridge university press, 1995), 153. 15 victor shnirelman, войны памяти: мифы, идентичность и политика в закавказье [wars of memory: myths, identity and politics in transcaucasia] (moscow: akademkniga, 2003), 38. 5 envisaged for the school pupils of the 8th and 9th grades in the azerbaijan ssr. in the book, there was no “proper” place given to the medes in the development of the statehood of azerbaijanis, while the theory of albanians was almost ignored. speaking about the local people, however, only the name “azerbaijani” was used for them for all historical eras.16 the second attempt at writing a history of azerbijan was made in 1945-1946 when, apart from representing the medes as ancestors of the azerbaijanis, the caucasian albanians were also added.17 there was no mention, however, of their language and literature.18 azerbaijani scholars gradually included mountainous karabakh in the caucasian albanian polity to reinforce their territorial claims to the former. articles and books were published19 which attempted to construct azerbaijani cultural identity using that of the caucasian albanians, in other words through the appropriation of that of the armenians. the notion of being the heirs of the albanians solved several questions. firstly, the azerbaijanis thus gained an acceptable status as an indigenous people; secondly, they secured their pretentions, through forgery, to the mountainous karabakh territory they coveted, as well as becoming the owners of armenian christian culture. one of the armenian historical-cultural treasures is dadivank which was a target for forged azerbaijani historiography and the subject of the policy of forced appropriation, about which is presented below. the history of dadivank the monastic complex of dadivank (pic. 1) is located in the shahumyan region of the republic of artsakh (after the signature of the declaration of 9th november 2020, it was redesignated as being in the kelbajar region of the republic of azerbaijan), about half a 16 ibid., 133-134. 17 the descendants of the albanians are considered to be the udis, lezgis and about ten minor peoples speaking the lezgi language (the tsakhurs, tabasarantsis, rutuls, aguls etc.). 18 shnirelman, wars of memory, 138. 19 the azerbaijani scholar zia buniatov noted, in his 1959 article titled “new material on the location of the fortress sheki” that sheki mentioned in the arab and armenian sources is the shaki, located in the sisian province of armenia, not the one near the town of sheki (now nukhi) in the republic of azerbaijan. buniatov’s conclusion is that in the 9th century, the arran border (including shaki in the province of syunik) extended as far as sevan, thus not only karabakh, but also the region to the west – in other words soviet armenia – was included in it. his second article about shaki had already prepared the soil to present azerbaijan as being the heir of the ancient albania, which included mountainous karabakh. the author periodically published articles concerning caucasian albania, creating a new field of study for azerbaijani scholars. the soviet authorities did not intervene in any way to all this, as buniatov never talked about pan-islamic or pan-turkic ideals and didn’t base his work on islamic or turkic ethnicity. his works were really about caucasian albania, so accorded with soviet standards, providing him with the opportunity to probe deeper and maneuver into this subject. for details, see, for example, sara crombach, “ziia buniiatov and the invention of an azerbaijani past” (phd thesis amsterdam school for regional, transnational and european studies (artes), 2019. 6 kilometre north of the left bank of the tartar river. according to history, it was named after one of thaddeus’ disciples, dad, who was murdered for preaching christianity in the first century, and the monastery was built around his tomb.20 according to various sources, it was also occasionally known as the monastery of the apostles, while mkhitar gosh called it “arakeladir.” it is possible that the first church built on the supposed location of the tomb was constructed after the acceptance of christianity in the 4th century.21 the monastery initially appears in bibliographical sources in the 9th century, such as movses dashkhurantsi’s (kaghankatvatsi) work “the history of albania.”22 the feudal lords of the monastery and the surrounding area at that time were the indigenous aranshahik dynasty, in the person of aternerseh, his father sahl and their forefathers and descendants. the monastery suffered great calamities during literate medieval times due to the seljuk incursions, as did other cultural centres. mkhitar gosh, in his “chronicle,” recalls the chol’s ferocious military leader, who repeatedly ravaged the khachen region and once burned down all the defenceless villages in the province, as well as dadivank monastery, in 1143.23 there was a probable increase in activity in the rebuilding of the monastery in the second half of the 12th century. many cross stones have reached us from that time, the majority of which were set up in the name of representatives of the descendants of the aranshahiks, the haterk branch of the family of the lords of khachen, proving that dadivank was their region’s prelacy. in 1182, prince of princes and curopalate hassan the great, son of vakhtang, erected one cross stone (pic. 2), which recounted the wars he waged against the seljuks, the castles under his control, his sons and the spiritual life he led in the monastery.24 the construction of dadivank’s main church was completed in 1214 by the widowed lady arzu (arzu khatun), daughter of prince of princes kurt and wife of the deceased vakhtang, lord of haterk, son of hassan the great. the researcher mesrop magistros noted that dadivank surpassed the later catholicossal seat of gandzasar, as it had several churches, 20 samvel ayvazian, դադի վանքի վերականգնումը 1997-2011 թթ. [the restoration of the monastery of dad, 1997-2011] (yerevan: raa, 2015), 6. 21 samvel karapetyan, հայ մշակույթի հուշարձանները խորհրդային ադրբեջանին բռնակցված շրջաններում [the armenian cultural monuments in the regions annexed to soviet azerbaijan] (yerevan: gitutyun, 1999), 82. 22 movses kaghankatvatsi, պատմություն աղվանից աշխարհի [history of albania], trans. v. d. arakelyan, ed. a. a. abrahamyan, (yerevan, 1969), 266. 23 bagrat ulubabyan, «դադի կամ խութա վանք» [ dadi or khuta monastery] echmiadzin 28, nos. 6-7, (1971): 63-64. 24 ayvazyan, the restoration of the monastery of dad, 8. https://arar.sci.am/dlibra/metadatasearch?action=advancedsearchaction&type=-3&val1=volume:%22%d4%bb%d4%b8%22 https://arar.sci.am/dlibra/metadatasearch?action=advancedsearchaction&type=-3&val1=number:%22%d4%b6%5c-%d4%b7%22 7 chapels and many secondary monastic buildings (pic 3,4). it is therefore possible to infer that the monastery was a very popular holy site with many pilgrimages taking place there.25 the monastery bell tower, built in 1260, was presented with a new bell in 1314 by sarkis, son of prince vahram dopyants. the abbot of the monastery rev. atanas erected two magnificent cross stones in 1283 (pic. 5) which were, later, moved inside the bell tower.26 construction activities gained impetus during that time and secular buildings were also built. the monastery gained significant landholdings during the following centuries which included areas now in the karvachar, vardenis and martakert regions. there were no monks or functionaries, however, in the monastery from the end of the 18th to the beginning of the 19th centuries. the villages belonging to the monastery were completely denuded of inhabitants at the end of the 18th century as a result of agha mahmed’s incursion and the plague and famine that followed it. this was followed by the settlement in the area of kurds of the qolani tribe that arrived from the khanate of yerevan. other kurdish tribes also settled in the region during the following decades, as well as ayrums.27 metropolitan (bishop) baghdasar hasan-jalalyan made attempts, after the khanate of karabakh became part of russia in 1813, to recover lands owned by the monastery. during his prelacy, at his suggestion and with the intercession of the catholicos of all armenians nerses v,28 viceroy of the caucasus m. vorontsov arranged to have an investigation carried out and land with an area of 196,438 dessiatins (214,118 hectares) was returned to the monastery. however, over time, some of it became disputed, and the monastery's ownership of some areas shrank 29. one of the problems was that it was difficult to get the tribes that had settled on the land to pay the 10% tithe for utilizing the monastery’s land; the monastery’s income therefore declined. according to a report dated 15th august 1909, the prelate of the diocese of karabakh noted that: the armenian diocese of karabakh includes the whole of the shushi, jevanshir, caryagino (fizuli), nukhi and aresh districts, parts of those of gandzak and zangezur, the town of lankaran (lenkoran) and the northern part of zakatala. there are, in the 25 mesrop magistros, հայկական երեք մեծ վանքերի տաթևի, հաղարծնի և դադի եկեղեցիները և վանական շինությունները [the churches and monastic buildings of the three great armenian monasteries of tatev, haghartsni and dad] (jerusalem: srbots hakobeants, 1938), 84. 26 ayvazyan, the restoration of the monastery of dad, 11. 27 karapetyan, the armenian cultural monuments, 83. 28 nerses v of ashdarak, (1770-february 13, 1857). catholicos of all armenians 1843-1857. he served as prelate of the diocese of georgia 1811-1830, then of the diocese of bessarabia and nor nakhichevan from 1830 until his election as catholicos in 1843. he was buried in echmiadzin. 29 karapetyan, the armenian cultural monuments, 84. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/catholicos https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/georgia_(country) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bessarabia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/nakhichevan-on-don 8 whole of the diocese, 26,364 families, including 101,143 males and 88,857 females, a total of 190,000 people …the diocese of karabakh has 221 churches and 9 monasteries, six of which are in use and three abandoned. the churches are generally bereft of any capital, while their yearly income is so little that they cannot even take care of the smallest expenses. as for the land: …the monastery of khota owns 45,997 dessiatins (50,137 hectares) of land… this remained in the hands of the government for three years but, when it was handed back in september 1906, the turkish-armenian clashes had already started and no one was able to enter the lands inhabited by the turks and kurds, which remained without land factors being in charge.30 a letter was sent to the department of the printing house of the mother see of echmiadzin, dated 23rd october 1912 and addressed to catholicos gevorg v,31 requesting that he orders copies of the necessary church books to be sent to the armenian population of the land belonging to the monastery of khota which was under echmiadzin’ s jurisdiction.32 around 1910, levon mikayel ter-avetisyan was appointed as a land factor of the monastery-owned land, which improved the situation. in 1917, despite the animosity of the turks and kurds, he was able to recapture numerous summer pastures and other lands belonging to it. however, with the establishment of soviet rule, the monastery’s lands were confiscated.33 the monastery complex, having been forcibly annexed to soviet azerbaijan from 1920 until 1990, fell into a dilapidated state and gradually became ruined. it had, until just before the first artsakh war, been turned into a house and barn and used as such by a large kurdish family. they had lit fires in the church itself to keep warm and, as a result, the walls were covered in soot. when rebuilding and restoration work began and the soot was cleaned off, marvelous frescos were revealed.34 30 national archives of armenia (naa), box 57, folder 2, file 1851, 2. 31 gevorg v surenyants (1847-1930), catholicos of all armenians december 1911-1930. bishop of artsakh and assistant prelate in aleksandropol (now gyumri) in 1878 and in yerevan in 1881. appointed prelate and bishop of astrakhan, russia in 1886 and of georgia in 1894. he was buried in echmiadzin. 32 naa, box 57, folder 2, file 1911, 5. 33 karapetyan, the armenian cultural monuments, 83-85. 34 one of the frescoes depicts jesus, who delivers the gospel to nicholas the wonderworker. the mother of god and archangel michael are also depicted. and the martyrdom of stepanos by stoning is depicted on the northern facade, ibid, 124. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/nagorno-karabakh https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/alexandropol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/yerevan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/astrakhan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/georgia_(country) 9 rev. hovhannes hovhannisyan, spiritual leader of the karvachar region and abbot of dadivank notes: this was the reason why the azerbaijanis didn’t notice the frescos and, in the 1990s, during the karabakh war for independence, didn’t destroy them. when the karvachar region and dadivank were liberated on 3rd april 1993 and i was still abbot of gandzasar, i was among the first to set foot inside the monastery. entering it, i saw there was excreta everywhere, the walls were covered in soot and only about 8-10% of the frescos could be seen.35 rebuilding work began in 1997, alongside comprehensive research, which included historical, architectural and archaeological studies and cleaning activities.36 directions of forced appropriation (“albanisation”) of dadivank the origin of its name forgeries concerning dadivank monastery begin with the origin of its name. for example, the azerbaijan ssr historian davud akhundov, in his russian-language book titled “azerbaijan’s ancient and medieval architecture,” presents the name dadivank as actually being khashavank-khotavank, explaining the origin of its name in the following way: there were, living in the artsakh-khachen region, caucasian albanians, among whom were udi people, whose language included the word “khash” which had two meanings. one was moon and light, the other brightness. the author noted that, according to strabo, there were devotees of helios, zeus and selene in caucasian albania. it apparently then followed that the most ancient site of worship was linked to that of unlimited light, in other words to the deities of mithras and the moon. so, the place was called khashavank, based on the udi word “khash.” this name, over a long period of time changed, becoming khoshavank, khotavank, khatavank etc.37 another “esteemed” name was suggested by doctor of architecture, professor gyulchokhra mamedova who noted that there is a simpler explanation: “khuda” meaning god and “vanik” meaning place, thus making khudavank to mean “god’s house”.38 35 «դադիվանք. ինչպես ադրբեջանաբնակ քուրդը «փրկեց» արցախի վանքի որմնանկարները» [dadivank: how a kurd living in azerbaijan "saved" the murals of the artsakh monastery], armenian sputnik, 19. 09. 2017, https://armeniasputnik.am/karabah/20170918/8700975/arcax-dadivanq-ter-hovhannesvormnankar.html․ 36 ayvazyan, the restoration of the monastery of dad, 18. 37 davud akhundov, архитектура древнего и ранне-средневекового азербайджана [architecture of ancient and early-medieval azerbaijan] (baku: azerneshr, 1986): 195-196. 38 gyulchokhra mamedova, “албанские памятники тертерского ущелья” [albanian monuments of terter gorge], zodchestvo 4-5, nos. 28-29 (2007): 60. https://armeniasputnik.am/karabah/20170918/8700975/arcax-dadivanq-ter-hovhannes-vormnankar.html https://armeniasputnik.am/karabah/20170918/8700975/arcax-dadivanq-ter-hovhannes-vormnankar.html 10 azerbaijani scholars thus even falsified the monastery’s name attempting, in every way, to “albanise” the armenian monastic complex, hiding the name’s real origin which was the preacher dadi’s name. christianity and armenisation according to azerbaijani historiography, it must be completely accepted that christianity was firmly entrenched within the borders of the “albanian-azerbaijani” state. according to azerbaijani side, the “albanian-azerbaijani” christian church existed for a very long time (until 1836) as one of the most ancient churches, not only in that region, but in the whole of the christian world. in the words of azerbaijani historians, christian evangelists and their students spread from jerusalem and assyria from the 1st to the 2nd centuries to albaniaazerbaijan and created the first christian communities there. it was noted that, within the republic of azerbaijan’s territories, christian churches built during the 18th and 19th centuries were constructed on the foundations of ancient albanian-azerbaijani ones. thus, from the middle of the 7th century, as a result of the arab invasions, the people living on the plains of the region accepted islam, while those living in the mountains preserved their christian faith.39 according to azerbaijani historiography, the population of mountainous karabakh was albanians and their transition to armenian apostolic church՛s creed and armenisation was a long process, which is displayed as follows.  the indigenous people of karabakh, like those of northern azerbaijan (albania) apparently were albanian tribes;  christianity spread, at the beginning of the 4th century, through certain areas of albania, including mountainous karabakh;  during the arab occupation in 7th to 9th centuries, islam spread, but the albanians who lived in the mountainous regions of karabakh remained christian;  armenian apostolic church missionaries, emigrating to the southern caucasus, began to convert the indigenous population to the armenian church then to make them into armenians; 39 yunis hüseynov, qarabağ [karabakh], (baku: afpoliqraf, 2018), 144. 11  the christian population of the karabakh highlands called themselves albanians in a letter sent to peter the great, proving that they didn’t think of themselves as armenians until the beginning of the 18th century.40 this is how azerbaijani scholars now present the people of artsakh as having caucasian albanian origins, something that bears no relation to the truth. the truth is that at the beginning of the 5th century, in 428, the persian state created a satrapy of which the real caucasian albania, armenian utik and artsakh regions were a part, with the catch-all name of albania. this name, in the following centuries, was used in different sources for the above-mentioned armenian regions, while the real caucasian albania, which was a divided area made up of different tribes, was denied from a unified government and had various names: lpnik, baghasakan and land of masktats. as the various satrapies were divided from each other and the catholicossate in central armenia wasn’t able to completely oversee the religious dioceses of artsakh and utik, the armenian church’s catholicossate of caucasian albania became firmly established (the diocese had been established as a bishopric by st. gregory the illuminator at the beginning of the 4th century) and preserved the spiritual life of the armenian people of the region. the centre of the albanian catholicossate moved, in 551 or 552, from the left bank of kur river to the right, the newly constructed seat of the satrapy partav and abas, the bishop of the province of metsarank (metsirank), was ordained as its spiritual leader. the clerics that followed him were consecrated by the armenian church’s mother see.41 thus the christian people of the satrapy of caucasian albania or arran were subject to the albanian church, which was under the jurisdiction of the armenian catholicossate and social and cultural development progressed in a united way. but in the 6th century, when albania’s spiritual and administrative centres moved to partav, ethnically armenian area on the kur river, the region’s christian population’s development mainly continued based on armenian written culture, while the caucasian albanian alphabet created by mesrop mashtots and the albanian archimandrite benyamin only enjoyed limited development. during the period of arab rule, in the century when islam was being spread, the part of the albanian people that remained christian coalesced into a single ethnos, the self-named 40 yagub mahmudov, karim shukurov, qarabağ: real tarix, faktlar, sənədlər [garabagh: real history, facts, documents], (baku: tehsil, 2005): 34. 41 see, for example, bagrat ulubabyan, արցախի պատմությունը սկզբից մինչև մեր օրերը [the history of artsakh from the beginning to the present days], (yerevan: m. varandean, 1994): 36-37. 12 “udi” people. the majority that had converted to islam became a people that called themselves “lezgis.”42 at that time, however, the azerbaijani ethnic group didn’t really exist. the “catholicossate of caucasian albania” was, at various periods of the middle ages, subject to the catholicos of all armenians of echmiadzin and received confirmation of its pastoral letters from him. despite retaining the historic name “albania” as a traditionally acceptable name, the catholicossate and the whole diocese never ascribed an ethnic content to it and retained it solely to delineate the diocese’s area. as for the population of the region, various georgian, perso-turkish, russian, and western european sources note that during the 17th-18th centuries the population of karabakh was a homogeneous ethnically armenian people. changes to the ethnic composition of the population of karabakh began in the middle of the 16th century, when certain turkish and kurdish tribes were resettled in the area by the safavids and for who “the patriotism of iranians or azerbaijanis” were foreign (i. petrushevski),thus, they didn’t form one ethnic group or polity.43 cross stones and inscriptions armenian cross stones are also targets for azerbaijani forgery. this is especially true of the abovementioned d. akhundov, who has created a new term “khachdash” (stone-cross) and then added differences with the albanian khachdash (stone-khach), the islamic tombstone (bash-khach) and the armenian khachkar (cross stone), noting that although they were different from one another externally, they were the same in terms of content with their universal models (the celestial, earth and underground spheres). he wrote, “…but if there is a tree of life shown on the khachdash (stone-khach), the picture of the cross disappears in the decorative forms, often splitting up into several small crosses, which differentiates them from those that are armenian.”44 he then adds that “…there are two interesting albanian cross stones in “khashavank” on which, as godly symbols of ahura-mithras, are entwined with christian symbols, which may only be seen in caucasian albanian architecture.”45 the azerbaijani authors davud and murad akhundovs, at the beginning presented their “new entries” at the 4th international symposium of georgian art held in tbilisi in 1983.their 42 aleksan hakobyan, արքայատոհմերն ու իշխանատոհմերը բուն աղվանքում և հայոց արևելից կողմանքում անտիկից մինչև ժգ դար [the royal and princery houses of proper albania and eastern regions of armenia from antiquity to the 13th century], (yerevan: gitutyun, 2020): 5-6. 43 artashes shahnazaryan, «գիտական նստաշրջան՝ նվիրված կովկասյան աղվանքի պատմության և մշակույթի խնդիրներին» [scientific session dedicated to the problems of the history and culture of the caucasian albania], lraber hasarakakan gitutyunneri, n 7(1988): 100-101. 44 akhundov, architecture of ancient and early-medieval azerbaijan, 203-204. 45 ibid., 207. 13 paper was titled “the cultural symbols and the image of the world reflected on the temples and shrines of caucasian albania”. this was subjected to a critical appraisal by dr of sciences a. l. yakobson, who pointed out the incorrect depictions made by the akhundovs concerning albanian history, their false, manufactured mithras-devotion symbolism which, however, seemed to have no effect on the azerbaijani historians and on those who continued their “work”.46 two years later, in an all-union archaeology congress held in baku in 1985, akhundov, in his paper,47 tried to demonstrate that carved stone crosses apparently found in azerbaijan were albanian and were the cultural heritage of a pre-islamic christian state located in eastern transcaucasia. the paper presented by an apparently innocent young azerbaijani was actually a political insinuation, with all the known cross stones throughout azerbaijan, including those in mountainous karabakh and nakhichevan, being seen as albanian and the latter as the azerbaijanis’ ancestors. the armenian archaeologists, despairing, threatened to leave the congress, protests were even made by russian scholars from leningrad (st. petersburg), who protested at the manifestly political nature of this attempt at cultural appropriation.48 in reply to the akhundovs’ falsehoods, armenian scholars noted that, in the general cultural study, it had long been established that, in many human cultures, beginning with our earliest farming ancestors, a universal model had appeared, comprising three parts, of which the most widespread and expressed was the universal tree. “the three-part edifice, thus, is not a national phenomenon, but a phenomenon of human thinking in general.”49 in the scientific session with the theme of “issues of caucasian albanian history and culture” held on june 30th, 1988, cultural studies scholar h. petrosyan, in his paper titled “artsakh’s medieval monuments,” referring to the question of ethno-cultural belonging of the khachkars of artsakh, noted, “at the time when cross stones were being developed, there was a particular denationalising and pro-islamic movement in artsakh, which could not lead to the appearance of khachkars, nor to the appearance of even their distant counterparts.”50 the architect m. hasratyan also noted that r. geyushev, d. akhundov and those who continued their work, contrary to historical facts, lithographic information and architectural 46 babken arakelyan, artsruni sahakyan, «խաչքարերը հակագիտական խեղաթյուրումների առարկա» [cross stones as object of unscientific distortions], lraber hasarakakan gitutyunneri 7(1986): 41. 47 davud akhundov, “отличительные черты и символические особенности стел кавказской албании,” всесоюзная археологическая конференция «достижения советской археологии в xi пятилетке» [distinctive features and symbolic features of the steles of caucasian albania, all-union archaeological conference “achievements of soviet archeology in the xi five-year plan”], (baku, 1985): 77-78. 48 kohl and tsetskhladze, “nationalism, politics,” 154. 49 arakelyan, sahakyan, “cross stones as object of unscientific distortions,” 41. 50 shahnazaryan, “scientific session,” 99-100. 14 features, declared the monasteries and churches of artsakh and their depictive carvings and frescos, to be albanian trying, intentionally alienate from armenian culture.51 azerbaijani scholars are, presently, adding that no armenian cross stones or inscriptions had been found in karabakh until 1992, that there was no evidence that there have been any armenian churches in the region and that armenian churches had only begun to be constructed in the 1970s.52 these new “discoveries” made by azerbaijani scholars have produced real amazement as, in the karabakh region, hundreds of armenian churches and monasteries exist, noted and documented not just by armenian researchers, but also by foreign scholars, who presented, clearly, their ancient history and that they are armenian. nothing was ever mentioned about them being albanian before the soviet era, when azerbaijani scholars decided to appropriate mountainous karabakh and its culture. azerbaijani researchers have also noted that manuscripts found in caucasian albanian churches had been translated by armenians into armenian, and then burnt the originals and changed the inscriptions of the churches too. such churches are, apparently those of “…the architectural complex of the monastery of khudavank built in the 13th century in kelbajar, the urek temple [actually horeka – hm] in talish, amaras etc.53 thus, azerbaijani researchers reproach the armenians with the very thing they are doing with government patronage. it is important to recall that in the church at nizh, 54 which really was albanian, its armenian inscriptions were erased (pic. 6, 7), using the pretence of rebuilding it, leading to the foreign ambassadors to azerbaijan refusing to attend its reopening in 2004. the norwegian ambassador of the time, steinar gil, basing his words on the previous attempt [the destruction of the cross stones in julfa/jugha – hm] (pic. 8, 9) said “i am worried because azerbaijan has a sad reputation related to armenian religious monuments,” testifying that all the armenian monasteries and churches are being completely albanised, without considering their construction dates.55 the azerbaijanis also insist that several names written on the walls of dadivank monastery, such as arzu khatun, tursun, seyti, hasan, avag, shams, altun, aghbuh, garagoz etc., should be considered to be one of the most accurate evidence of their ethnic 51 ibid., 99. 52 faig ismayilov, historical and cultural monuments in the occupied territories of azerbaijan: damage and loss (baku: elm ve tehsil 2016): 63-64. 53 ibid., 13. 54 gabala region, republic of azerbaijan. 55 thomas de vaal, “perspectives, now comes a karabakh war over cultural heritage,” eurasianet, 16.11.2020, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-now-comes-a-karabakh-war-over-cultural-heritage. https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-now-comes-a-karabakh-war-over-cultural-heritage 15 origins-turkic identity. “direct relations to azerbaijan’s muslim architecture are clearly felt as well in numerous stone-carving decorations of the site,” an azerbaijani author said.56 but the answer to this question is very clear. the non-armenian and non-christian names that were used throughout artsakh and the other regions of armenia were “imported” from outside – from iran and, later, via the arab khalifate – through the influence of foreign cultural environments. practically all the lay individuals who were active in those times have been so named, but it must be stressed that those same rulers’ (for example the ruling family of upper khachen) spiritual brothers never ever forsook their armenian names, and succeeded each other, such as hovhannes and krikor.57 the history of artsakh clearly shows that the princes who were christened with foreign names were actually very patriotic and increasingly defended the armenians of the region against foreign conquerors and were the founders of many churches and monasteries, preserving the christian faith in artsakh. the appropriation of armenian historians and literature the author f. mamedova, in her book titled “caucasian albania and the albanians” published in 2005 states, in the very first paragraph: the azerbaijani people were formed from three powerful ethno-cultural groups: caucasian (albanian), persian (medes, kurds, talish and tats) and turkish. the azerbaijani and daghestani peoples are the descendants of the albanians, being the heirs of three powerful ethno-cultural groups, with a rich albanian culture, which is reflected in material and spiritual culture, from the earliest days to the most recent times. the creation of the sovereign republic of azerbaijan provided the opportunity to return to one of its roots – its albanian origin – and the albanian studies to be passed to its real heirs and owners.58 azerbaijani historians, in this way, leaving aside their own history and taking that of other nations, present themselves as the heirs of one of the most ancient people, the caucasian albanians. it is necessary, once more, to remind azerbaijani historians that the azerbaijani identity was created during the soviet years, within the azerbaijan ssr, 56 qarabaği̇rsimizin əbədi yaddaşı [karabakh the eternal memory of our heritage], ministry of culture and tourism of the republic of azerbaijan (baku, 2008), 162. 57 ulubabyan, the history of artsakh, 70-71. 58 farida mamedova, кавказская албания и албаны [caucasian albania and albanians], (baku: centr issledovanii kavkazskoi albanii, 2005), 3-4. 16 legitimizing it at the expense of media, atropatene, caucasian albania and historic regions of armenia – utik, artsakh and nakhichevan, falsifying or appropriating their history and culture.59 the turkish speaking muslim people that lived in the eastern caucasus until the 1930s, were known as muslims, caucasian tatars, caucasian turks and other similar names and it was only in the 1939 census that the ethnic name “azerbaijani” began to be used.60 concerning the name “the democratic republic of azerbaijan,” created in 1918, the name was taken from the iranian province of atropatene61, in future to demand territory from iran as well. the famous russian eastern scholar vasili bartold, in one of his lectures delivered in november-december 1924 in the faculty of oriental studies of the azerbaijan state university noted, “to the territory that is now known as the republic of azerbaijan, previously known as arran (caucasian albania) – was given the name azerbaijan, thinking that, when the new state is created, persian [territory atropatene] and the new azerbaijan would become one state.”62 therefore, he notes, when talking about azerbaijan, confusion arises and the question emerges as to which azerbaijan we mean. f. mamedova’s second falsehood is that she presents the armenian historian movses kaghankatvatsi (dashkhurantsi) as being caucasian albanian. she states that the armenian church apparently appropriated the manuscript of his “history of albania” and subjected it to major changes, translating it into classical armenian, aiming to take ownership of albania’s history, literature and culture, then to spread this version and copies of it. the same accusation is levelled at the armenian poet davtak qertogh, with regard to his elegy on the death of javanshir, prince of albania, which was, apparently, written in the albanian 59 hamlet petrosyan, “ethnocide in artsakh: the mechanisms of azerbaijan’s usurpation of indigenous armenian cultural heritage,” proceedings of the rochemp center international conference (yerevan, 23-24 january 2020): 79. 60 tamara vardanyan, «ադրբեջանցիներ.ինքնության փնտրտուքը հետխորհրդային շրջանում» [azerbaijanis: the search for identity in the post-soviet period], «21-rd dar», n 3 (49) (2013): 75. 61 russian encyclopaedic dictionary, published between the years of 1890 to 1907, vol. 1, page 212 of the encyclopaedia published by brockhaus & efron in saint petersburg in 1890, with its english translation. azerbaijan – or adherbaijan – land of fire; (in pahlavi aturpatkan, in armenian aderpadekan), the most north western province and the richest trading and manufacturing province of persia, bordering to the south by persian kurdistan (ardalan) and irak-adjemi (media), in the west by turkish kurdistan and turkish armenia, in the north by russian armenia (south caucasus) from which it is separated by the [river] arax and to the east by the russian region of talish and the persian province of gilan by the caspian sea. quoted in rouben galichian, armenia, azerbaijan and turkey: addressing paradoxes of culture geography and history (yerevan: zangak, 2019), 22-23. 62 vasiliy bartold, сочинения. общие работы по истории средней азии, работы по истории кавказа и восточной европы [writings. general works on the history of central asia, works on the history of the caucasus and eastern europe], vol. 2, part 1(moscow: izdatelstvo vastochnoy literature, 1963), 703. 17 alphabet of 19 letters but, through false translation had become armenian, with its 36 letters.63 there is no logic in this as, if it had been written as an acrostic text, why did daftak chose only 19 characters of the albanian alphabet, rather that the full 52? even azerbaijani scholars don’t have a common opinion on this issue, as, before f. mamedova’s statement, z. buniatov had presented datak’s elegy as being written on the basis of using all 52 letters of the albanian alphabet and had accused the armenians of changing it to suit the armenian 36 letter alphabet. armenian scholars have, long since, provided a definitive answer to this.64 the works of the medieval armenian historians mkhitar gosh, hetum and kirakos gandzaketsi have been treated in the same way. on this occasion, concerning so-called “albanian literature” of the 12th-13th centuries, dr. of historical sciences p. muradyan noted that this is an obvious sham, as the albanian people had ceased to be an ethnic entity a very long time before, while artsakh had never been populated by ethnic tribes collectively known as “albanians.” mkhitar gosh, kirakos gandzaketsi and the other armenian historians had only ever created works in the armenian language and for the benefit of armenians and have written about their ethnic origins and the culture they belonged to in their own works.65 under the guaranty of the editing-publishing council of the academy of sciences of azerbaijan, perhaps in 1986, the “elm” publishing house in baku published farida mamedova’s monograph “политическая история и историческая география кавказской албании (iii в. до н. э.—viii в. н. э.)”/ political history and historical geography of caucasian albania (iii century ad-viii century ad), which was defended as a doctoral dissertation. the book’s editor was academician zia buniatov from the academy of sciences of azerbaijan. the book contained completely distorted facts and anti-scientific analysis, which provoked protests from scientific circles. in the six maps of the monograph, f. mamedova extended the caucasian albanian borders from derbend to the araxes valley and as far as half of lake sevan. this was, according to albert musheghyan, a senior researcher of the institute of literature of the armenian ssr academy of sciences, nothing more than a copy of the map of “united azerbaijan” published in the second volume of 63 mamedova, caucasian albania and albanians, 738. 64 if daftak was an albanian poet and his acrostic poem had been written in albanian, then why was it composed on the basis of the 36 letters of the armenian alphabet and not using the 52 letters of albanian, when the letters of the latter were arranged in a different order? again, if it had been written in albanian, then the order of the letters would have been in accordance with that alphabet, not in that of the armenian. is it also possible to accurately translate an acrostic poem from one language to the other, retaining the same letter order? for more details see asatur mnatsakanyan, paruyr sevak, “по поводу книги з. буниятова «азербайджан в vii-ix вв,” [about the book of z. buniatova "azerbaijan in vii-ix centuries], patmabanasirakan handes 1 (1967):183. 65 shahnazaryan, "scientific session," 99. 18 "islam encyclopedia" (between pages 112 and 113) in istanbul in 1944. this was followed by the official reply sent to a. musheghyan by andrey nikolayevich sakharov, deputy director of the history institute of the ussr academy of sciences. its content is so informative that we considered presenting it here: f. mamedova, in the abovementioned book, has taken it upon herself to research all aspects of caucasian albanian medieval history, but her aim and means resulted in distinct contradictions, as the author has dealt with materials, on which she has only superficial knowledge. this refers to both historic geography and those maps which you invite examination of in your letter. apart from that, she has ignored sufficiently wellresearched facts, by which the overwhelming majority of soviet oriental scholars (k. v. trever, s. t. eremyan, a. p. novoseltsev and others) had the opportunity to confirm that a united albanian nation did not exist. the right-bank part of the population was armenianized at least in the 5th century, the other part, as shown by a. p. novoseltsev, v. t. pashuto, l. v. cherepnin in the book “the ways to develop feudalism” (moscow, 1972), spoke different languages. the name "albanians" was collective for that ethnic population. the descendants of certain tribes living on the left bank of the river, the udis, khinalughs, and others, live in azerbaijan and georgia to this day. it should be noted that, in the book by the three famous soviet historians, the influx of ethnically turkish tribes was, until the 11th century, insignificant. from the time of the creation of the albanian satrapy – the 5th century – the term “albanians” was not an ethnic name, but a political one, meaning the inhabitants of that satrapy subject to the albanian church’s jurisdiction. ignoring those proofs that are well known to experts, forces f. mamedova to extend her conclusions concerning the people living on the left bank of kur river to include those living on the right bank, leading her to make unfortunate errors. the alphabet created by mesrop mashtots for the albanians (before 428ad) was, obviously, for one of the albanian tribes. nevertheless, no written albanian monument has reached us.66 as for the cultural environment of the right bank was armenian, and the works produced there were written in armenian. the term “albania” is historicalgeographic one. 66 it was only in 1996 that two georgian palimpsest manuscripts with an albanian text on their lower layers were found in the monastery of st. catherine on mt. sinai, zaza aleksidze, “preliminary account on the identification and deciphering of the caucasian albanian manuscript discovered on mount sinai,” https://armazi.uni-frankfurt.de/sinai/prelacc.htm. ../appdata/roaming/microsoft/word/zaza%20aleksidze, ../appdata/roaming/microsoft/word/zaza%20aleksidze, https://armazi.uni-frankfurt.de/sinai/prelacc.htm 19 instead of these real proofs, f. mamedova’s book describes a fictitious caucasian albania (of the 11th-13th centuries) with its culture. in reality the culture wasn’t albanian but an armenian and those bearing it were armenians living on the right bank of the kur river. it is for that reason that it is so ludicrous that one of the greatest armenian cultural figures, the writer, theologian, and jurist mkhitar gosh, the author of the “datastanagirk” (book of law) as well as, to the same extent, his students, are made out to be “albanian.” f. mamedova declares, without any basis whatsoever, that the well-known historian kirakos gandzaketsi, author of “the history of the armenians,” as well as other 11th-13th century representatives of armenian culture to be “albanians.” f. mamedova's book contains a few errors of other types as well. she detaches nakhchavan67 and goghtn from vaspurakan68 and attaches those provinces to syunik, then removes syunik from armenia and gives it to albania. f. mamedova's efforts to arbitrarily interpret the cultural heritage of the armenian people and the invention of the non-existent albanian culture of the 11th-13th centuries force us to be highly critical of her book, which does not contribute to the mutual understanding of the historians and the societies of the two transcaucasian republics, armenia and azerbaijan.69 it should also be noted that a map of azerbaijani architectural monuments was published in 1980 in moscow, prepared by azerbaijani experts. of the 101 monuments on the map, only two were represented as being christian churches of the early middle ages, which, however, were located in north-west of azerbaijan, close to the border with georgia. but in mountainous karabakh and the areas around it even the monastery of gandzasar was missing. in other words, historic azerbaijan was portrayed to tourists as a purely muslim country, despite the fact that azerbaijani scholars have spent decades attempting to trace the origins of azerbaijanis back to christian albanians.70 the tools used by azerbaijan for the forced appropriation of armenian dadivank after the second artsakh war 67 nakhchavan is the same as nakhichevan/nakhijevan. 68 vaspurakan was the 8th state of the kingdom of armenia, which included nakhijevan and goghtn provinces as well. presently it is devided between turkey, iran and azerbaijan. 69 պաշտոնական պատասխան [official response], գրական թերթ [grakan tert], n 88(2849), 14 august 1987, 4. 70 shnirelman, wars of memory, 209-210. 20 the azerbaijani historiography gained new traction after the second artsakh war, to the theory of "albanisation" of nagorno-karabakh's armenian heritage, when azerbaijan took control of territories containing a large number of armenian historical and cultural monuments, bringing armenians new fears of the cultural genocide already experienced by the republic of azerbaijan. the azerbaijan government, after the end of the war, quickly described several medieval churches – among them dadivank – as being albanian. to reinforce their position, they requested assistance from the orthodox churches in turkey, syria, egypt, israel and the ukraine.71 the president of azerbaijan also announced their intention to remove armenian inscriptions from the churches’ walls which, apparently, were bogus and to “reinstate” their former appearance.72 thus, from november 2020 onwards, the azerbaijani side began the practical implementation round of “albanisation” of the armenian historic-cultural monuments, which today take many forms. four of these forms will be analysed below: propaganda in the social media, making azerbaijan's udi minority a part of azerbaijan's frauds, scientific activities and cultural events. propaganda in the social media during and after the 44-day artsakh war, armenian and azerbaijani social media such as facebook, twitter and telegram were very active, due to which news was swiftly available to many foreign social media users. anar karimov, the minister of culture of the republic of azerbaijan, tweeted on november 11, 2020, shortly after the armenian-azerbaijan-russia statement73, that, “khudaveng is one of the best testimonials to the ancient caucasian albanian civilisation. built during the 9th to 13th centuries by albanian prince vakhtang’s 71 javid agha, “perspectives. who were the caucasian albanians?” eurasianet, 07.06.2021, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-who-were-the-caucasian-albanians, accessed 20.02.2022. 72 president of azerbaijan ilham aliyev’s address to the nation, 25.11.2020, https://mincom.gov.az/en/view/news/1066/president-of-azerbaijan-ilham-aliyev-addressed-the-nation. qədim alban məbədində saxta tarix [a fake history in an ancient albanian temple], 16.03.2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4nsan1yooc, accessed 20.02.2022. 73 statement of the president of the republic of azerbaijan, the prime minister of the republic of armenia and the president of the russian federation, 10 november 2020, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384, accessed 20.02.2022. https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-who-were-the-caucasian-albanians https://mincom.gov.az/en/view/news/1066/president-of-azerbaijan-ilham-aliyev-addressed-the-nation https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4nsan1yooc http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384 21 wife in azerbaijan’s kelbajar region, this complex comprises the arzu khatun’s church, a basilica and two chapels.”74 thousands of users, ranging from government officials to scholars and radio program producers, shared this and other similar tweets with the hashtag #xudavəng alongside accusations of “armenian forgeries”. after the war, from 17th november 2020, pictures were circulated on social media by azerbaijani users, which claimed that azerbaijani soldiers discovered a place where armenian cross stones were being manufactured and then set up in various places of karabakh.75 it soon became obvious that the cross stones shown were those at the sevan monastery,76 which had simply “became” victims of false azerbaijani news. all this proves that azerbaijani officials and ordinary social media users have inserted their historians’ forgeries to the internet, continuing the distortion of history and trying to gain some sort of advantage on different social platforms. apart from that, the state service for the protection, development and restoration of cultural heritage attached to the ministry of culture of azerbaijan, has created a website (heritage.gov.az), which apparently presents, to the international public “armenian vandalism” toward azerbaijani monuments of karabakh. books about the “azerbaijani cultural heritage” in mountainous karabakh are published periodically, while the azerbaijan’s minister of culture states that all this is done for the information warfare in order to present the “truth” to the public.77 input by the udi minority the udi minority living in azerbaijan is one of the real descendants of the caucasian albanian tribes, living mainly in nizh (gabala region) and vardashen (oghuz region) villages. the udis population in azerbaijan has halved in the eighties of the 20th century. before that, they also lived in sultan nukhi and dzhorlu, they were turkish-speaking, but christian and udi ethnic self-consciously. currently, they have left the last two villages. in azerbaijan, the udis have no public institutions to raise their concerns. udis have, in recent 74 azerbaijan’s minister of culture anar karimov’s official twitter account, 11 november 2020, https://twitter.com/anar_karim/status/1326437397270310912, accessed 11.02.2022. 75 twitter account of gulmammad mammadov, 17 november 2020, https://mobile.twitter.com/gulmammad/status/1328735592428023810, accessed 11.02.2022. 76 azerbaijani social media spreads story of khachkar forgeries, the aragats foundation, 28 november 2020, https://www.aragatsfound.org/post/azerbaijani-social-media-spreads-story-of-khachkar-forgeries. 77 hayastan martirosyan, «էթնոցիդ. արցախի մշակութային ժառանգությունը՝ ադրբեջանական վանդալիզմի թիրախ» [ethnocide. cultural heritage of artsakh-target of azerbaijani vandalism], armenian genocide museum-institute, 24 august 2022, http://www.genocidemuseum.am/arm/24.08.22.php?fbclid=iwar0vm8rmni7lnxdp16bk9jbljktqdqnttgyr5a6va7qbayqumy brqhpemee, accessed 11.10.2022. https://twitter.com/anar_karim/status/1326437397270310912 https://mobile.twitter.com/gulmammad/status/1328735592428023810 https://www.aragatsfound.org/post/azerbaijani-social-media-spreads-story-of-khachkar-forgeries http://www.genocide-museum.am/arm/24.08.22.php?fbclid=iwar0vm8rmni7lnxdp16bk9jbljktqdqnttgyr5a6va7qbayqumybrqhpemee http://www.genocide-museum.am/arm/24.08.22.php?fbclid=iwar0vm8rmni7lnxdp16bk9jbljktqdqnttgyr5a6va7qbayqumybrqhpemee http://www.genocide-museum.am/arm/24.08.22.php?fbclid=iwar0vm8rmni7lnxdp16bk9jbljktqdqnttgyr5a6va7qbayqumybrqhpemee 22 years, began to transform their historic past, which linked them to armenian culture. all this has happened because the azerbaijani authorities, from 1988 onwards, have subjected them to harassment to force the udis accept that they are part of the azerbaijani ethnos.78 for example, the udi community website stresses that azerbaijan, since independence, has apparently given the udis an important place and repaired the udi churches as the “udis are one of the roots of azerbaijan ethnic identity.79 the azerbaijani authorities, under the guise of presenting themselves as a multi-cultural and tolerant country,80 have also begun to “take notice” of national minorities living in the country. it began with the creation of the socalled “udi church” in 2003-2004, which had to form the basis of the restoration of the “albanian” church. the first step taken towards the "reconstruction of the albanian church of azerbaijan" took place on 10th april 2003, when the albanian-udi christian community was registered at the state committee for work with religious organizations.81 azerbaijan demonstrated, on the one hand, that it apparently respects its national minorities, their religious rights and, on the other, through the utilisation of the udi minority, attempts to impose spiritual authority in the occupied areas of mountainous karabakh. it is obvious today how the azerbaijanis use the udi people, demanding, in their name, the restoration of udi rights towards armenian churches. the leading figures of the udi community play a major role in the implementation of this policy. it was perhaps during the war, on 16th october 2020 that the leader of the albanian-udi christian community and chairman of the bible association in azerbaijan, robert mobili said, in one of his interviews, that they were assisting the azerbaijan army, that vandalism was policy of armenians, while churches were being repaired in azerbaijan.82 78 hranush kharatyan, «ուդիների ոդիսականը 18-20 դդ. (պատմությու՞ն, էթնիկ գոյատևու՞մ, ինքնահաստատու՞մ)», հայոց մեծ եղեռն 90, հոդվածների ժողովածու [“the odyssey of the udis in the 18th-20th centuries. (history, ethnic survival, self-assertion?), in hayots mets yeghern 90, collection of articles (yerevan: ysu, 2005), 2. 79 албано-удинская христианская община [albanian-udin christian community], 13.11.2013, https://udi.az/articles/0200.html, accessed 11.02.2022. 80 benoit filou, in his article titled “multiculturalism in azerbaijan” concludes: “the implicit superiority of azerbaijani ethnicity appears clear and minorities tend to assimilate themselves to this dominant model, mostly for pragmatic reasons. the multicultural policy followed by azerbaijan paradoxically goes together with a deeper assimilation of minorities. multiculturalism is highlighted, when necessary, to leave room for turkic solidarity or even islamic solidarity when necessary,” article published by the baku research institute, 06.07.2021, https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/en/multiculturalism-in-azerbaijan/. 81 grigory ayvazyan, “удины и албанская церковь азербайджана” [udis and the albanian church of azerbaijan], 21-rd dar 3, no. 40 (2016): 60. 82 “robert mobili, “vandalism is armenian state strategy,” report.az, 16.10.2020, https://report.az/en/karabakh/chairman-of-azerbaijan-s-albanian-udi-christian-community-robert-mobilisaid/. https://udi.az/articles/0200.html https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/en/multiculturalism-in-azerbaijan/ https://report.az/en/karabakh/chairman-of-azerbaijan-s-albanian-udi-christian-community-robert-mobilisaid/ 23 representatives of the “azerbaijan’s albanian-udi christian community” had visited, on 4th december 2020, according to their statement, the dadivank monastery complex that had been “liberated from the armenians in the kelbajar region.” as the newspaper “azerbaijan” noted “the udis, who had become more prosperous in azerbaijan over the years, impatiently awaited the opportunity to bow in albanian temples and churches, among which was khudaveng.”83 after the ceremonies were over, robert mobili noted that the temple not only architecturally, but also historically belonged to the albanian church, while the forgeries perpetrated by the armenians were obvious.84 during the same period, rafik danakari, the deputy leader of the udi community, was appointed as a preacher in the dadivank monastery. community leaders periodically visit dadivank from december onwards, performing ceremonies which are organised or sponsored by various azerbaijani organisations such as the “promotion of moral values” foundation.85 armenian pilgrims and clergymen were also allowed to visit the monastery, but their access to monastery were forbidden on 7th february 2021. at present there are six armenian clergymen in the monastery, but their periodic replacement by others, as well as pilgrimages, have been forbidden by the azerbaijani side, using various excuses starting with pandemic and including the flooding of the river tartar. the goal of all of this is, of course, to rid the monastery of armenian pastors, secure the places of udi clergymen in the church, and "clear" dadivank monastery of armenian traces. the above-mentioned udi representatives are also included in anti-armenian “scientific” propaganda. there was a scientific seminar held in baku state university on 2nd march 2021, titled “the falsification of albanian temples in karabakh by the armenians according to the mineral-geological composition of the construction materials used.” a paper was presented by robert mobili, a senior researcher at baku state university’s geology and geophysical scientific research laboratory.86 83 vətən müharibəsi şəhidlərinin əziz xatirəsi dağlar qoynunda yerləşən monastırda ehtiramla yad olunub,” azərbaycan [to the memory of the martyrs of the patriotic war was honored in the monastery located in the heart of the mountains," azerbaijan, 06 dekabr 2020, 5, http://anl.az/down/meqale/azerbaycan/2020/dekabr/730852.htm. 84 ibid.. 85 “albanian-udi religious community of azerbaijan visits khudavang monastery,” azernews, 5 may 2021, https://www.azernews.az/nation/178639.html. 86 “azərbaycan respublikası alban-udi-xristian i̇cmasının sədri, bdu-nun kompleks geoloji və geofiziki tədqiqatlar elmi-tədqiqat laboratoriyasının böyük elmi işçisi robert mobili “qarabağdakı alban məbədlərinin ermənilər tərəfindən saxtalaşdırılmasının tikinti materialları və bağlayıcıların mineralojigeokimyəvi tərkibinə görə əsaslandırılması” mövzusunda məruzə edib” [chairman of the albanian-udichristian community of the republic of azerbaijan, robert mobili, a senior researcher at the complex http://anl.az/down/meqale/azerbaycan/2020/dekabr/730852.htm https://www.azernews.az/nation/178639.html 24 the “azerbaijan’s albanian-udi christian religious community” declaration of 8th february 2022, in which they called themselves adherents of the “albanian apostolic church,” stated: we, the successors of the azerbaijani albanian-udi religious community of the albanian apostolic church, appreciate and support the consistent measures taken during the last year in the liberated areas... in the direction of the protection and restoration of the temples of the albanian heritage... and we also express our willingness to cooperate with the armenian apostolic church … for peace and humanity.87 it is interesting to see what kind of cooperation with the armenian apostolic church they envisage. if it is about becoming one of its dioceses, the armenian church’s charter88 precludes that possibility. even the foundation of the albanian-udi church in mountainous karabakh cannot be considered to be legal and acceptable, nor can it be possible to perform any spiritual activity in accordance with the rules laid down in the diocesan charter published by the armenian apostolic church in 2009.89 article 1.2 states that a diocese is an inseparable part of the armenian apostolic church, whose centre is the mother see of holy echmiadzin. article 1.3 states that a diocese is governed in accordance with armenian apostolic church laws and holy tradition, the orders placed by the catholicos of all armenians, the given country’s laws and the diocesan constitution. article 1.4 states that a diocese is established by a pastoral letter from the catholicos․90 article 1.5 states that the rules laid down in articles 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 are not subject to change. it is obvious from the articles quoted above that no diocese belonging to the armenian apostolic church may separate itself from it or, moreover, cannot declare itself an individual geological and geophysical research laboratory ff bsu, gave a report on “the falsification of albanian temples in karabakh by the armenians according to the mineral-geological composition of the construction materials used”], udi.az, 5 march 2021, https://udi.az/news/0585.html. 87 azərbaycan alban-udi xristian dini i̇cması azad olunmuş ərazilərdəki alban məbədləri ilə bağlı bəyanat yayıb[the albanian-udi christian religious community of azerbaijan issued a statement regarding the albanian temples in the liberated territories], azərbaycan respublikası dini qurumlarla i̇ş üzrə dövlət komitəsi[state committee on work with religious organizations of the republic of azerbaijan,], 08.02.2022, https://scwra.gov.az/az/view/news/10383/azerbaycan-alban-udi-xristian-dini-icmasi-azad-olunmusherazilerdeki-alban-mebedleri-ile-bagli-beyanat-yayib. 88 guide of the armenian apostolic holy church’s diocesan charter, echmiadzin, volume 65, n 11, 2009. 89 the diocese of artsakh belongs to the armenian apostolic church. 90 guide of the armenian apostolic holy church’s diocesan charter, 38. https://udi.az/news/0585.html https://scwra.gov.az/az/view/news/10383/azerbaycan-alban-udi-xristian-dini-icmasi-azad-olunmush-erazilerdeki-alban-mebedleri-ile-bagli-beyanat-yayib https://scwra.gov.az/az/view/news/10383/azerbaycan-alban-udi-xristian-dini-icmasi-azad-olunmush-erazilerdeki-alban-mebedleri-ile-bagli-beyanat-yayib https://arar.sci.am/dlibra/metadatasearch?action=advancedsearchaction&type=-3&val1=journalorpublication:%22%d4%b7%d5%bb%d5%b4%d5%ab%d5%a1%d5%ae%d5%ab%d5%b6%d6%89+%d5%8a%d5%a1%d5%b7%d5%bf%d6%85%d5%b6%d5%a1%d5%af%d5%a1%d5%b6+%d5%a1%d5%b4%d5%bd%d5%a1%d5%a3%d5%ab%d6%80+%d4%b1%d5%b4%d5%a5%d5%b6%d5%a1%d5%b5%d5%b6+%d5%80%d5%a1%d5%b5%d5%b8%d6%81+%d4%bf%d5%a1%d5%a9%d5%b8%d5%b2%d5%ab%d5%af%d5%b8%d5%bd%d5%b8%d6%82%d5%a9%d5%a5%d5%a1%d5%b6+%d5%84%d5%a1%d5%b5%d6%80+%d4%b1%d5%a9%d5%b8%d5%bc%d5%b8%d5%b5+%d5%8d%d6%80%d5%a2%d5%b8%d5%b5+%d4%b7%d5%bb%d5%b4%d5%ab%d5%a1%d5%ae%d5%b6%d5%ab%22 25 diocese, in this case becoming albanian-udi, without the confirmation of the armenian apostolic church. thus, even the de facto udi community’s spiritual activity in artsakh religious sites is illegal and cannot be accepted by international religious communities. scientific activities the next tool of forced appropriation by azerbaijan is the scientific or scholarly method. a meeting of the azerbaijan national academy of sciences took place on 25th november 2020, where a decision was made to found a “scientific centre for albanian studies.” the director of the academy, ramiz mehdiev stated, during the meeting, that the centre’s aim was to “reveal those historic proofs that demonstrate that the albanian monuments, which the armenians wish to appropriate, belong to us.” 91 he also mentioned the opening of the “artsakh’s spiritual and cultural heritage study office” in echmiadzin, and that the national academy of sciences of azerbaijan, the country’s major scientific centre, should take serious steps concerning it.92 furthermore, many international conferences are held in azerbaijani scientific centres where they try to involve foreign researchers as well. among these was the international conference held in the international multicultural centre in baku on 26th may 2021 titled “caucasian albania: history, religion and architecture,” attended by researchers from nine countries – germany, norway, france, italy, turkey, russia, lithuania, georgia and azerbaijan. in the plenary session of the conference, the importance of the enlargement of cooperation between foreign and azerbaijani scientists and researchers was stressed. foreign and local experts were called upon to assist in the design of events aimed at studying the history of the caucasian albania and to provide various assistance in this field.93 azerbaijani historians, in various conferences “explain” armenians’ activities towards armenian monuments. for example, when rev. hovhannes, the abbot of dadivank monastery and spiritual leader of the karvachar region, declared that the church’s bells and cross stones (khachkars) were being taken to the mother see of holy echmiadzin to save 91 javid agha, “perspectives. who were the caucasian albanians?” eurasianet, 07.06.2021, https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-who-were-the-caucasian-albanians. 92 “akademiya ciddi addımlar atmalı, erməni saxtakarlıqları ilə dolu “faktların” qarşısının alınması istiqamətində tədqiqatları gücləndirməlidir” – akademik ramiz mehdiyev["academy must take serious steps, strengthen research in the direction of prevention of "facts" full of armenian forgeries" academician ramiz mehdiyev], azərbaycan milli elmlər akademiyası [national academy of sciences of azerbaijan], 25 nov 2020, https://science.gov.az/az/news/open/15174. 93 “qafqaz albaniyasi: tarix, din və memarliq” adli beynəlxalq elmi konfrans keçirilib ["caucasus albania: history, religion and architecture" international scientific conference held], azərbaycan milli elmlər akademiyası, tarix i̇nstitutu [national academy of sciences of azerbaijan, institute of history], 27 may 2021, http://tarixinstitutu.az/news/view/327. https://eurasianet.org/perspectives-who-were-the-caucasian-albanians https://science.gov.az/az/news/open/15174 http://tarixinstitutu.az/news/view/327 26 them from azerbaijani vandalism,94 azerbaijani researchers reported, in a paper that following the 44-day war, armenians relocated dadivank’s fake khachkars and slabs with fake inscriptions solely to prevent the untruth of them from being discovered later.95 according to the paper’s author, armenians auctioned off dadivank’s khackars, after the 44day war, in order to clear up the traces of their crime, which has nothing to do with reality.96 it was noted that armenian researchers and the clergy had not, previously, made any mention of any of dadivank’s belltower’s cross stones and that, in general, no cross stones had ever been discovered there during the soviet era,97 without considering the fact that not only armenian researchers,98 but also soviet azerbaijani researchers99 had, for a long time, confirmed their existence in their works. books about armenian culture continued to be published in azerbaijan after the 44-day artsakh war, continuing the chain of forgeries. the heydar aliyev foundation, especially, which had its own unique input in financing of anti-armenian projects, prepared a series of books titled “cultural heritage of karabakh,” which was presented to the public on 15th november 2021. the set comprised five publications concerning mountainous karabakh’s literature, music, architecture, art and carpet making. the volume concerning architecture presented mountainous karabakh’s architectural monuments, with pictures and graphical drawings,100 including those well known to us. reports were also prepared and presented to international organisations. thus, center for analysis of international relations (air) in azerbaijan prepared a report, in july 2021, titled “the appropriation of azerbaijan’s cultural and historical heritage by armenia.” it presented the apparent looting of museums and cultural places in karabakh by armenians, illegal archaeological excavations as well as the ”armenianisation” of azerbaijani monuments and their forced appropriation.101 the international journal “irs heritage” also took an increasingly active part in all this and, after the war, published books and articles concerning the second artsakh war and 94 “տեր հովհաննեսը դադիվանքի խաչքարերը, խաչն ու զանգերը հայաստան է բերում” [rev. hovhannes brings dadivank khachkars, crosses and bells to armenia], artsakh lratvakan, 11 նոյեմբեր 2020, https://artsakh.news/am/news/194425. 95 telman ibrahimov, “khachkars of dadivank monastery or… “finita est comoedia”, 2020, 1. 96 ibid., 3. 97 ibid.. 98 magistros, the churches and monastic buildings, 88-89. ulubabyan, “dadi or khuta monastery,” 69. 99 akhundov, architecture of ancient and early-medieval azerbaijan, 206-207. 100 “a collection of publications “cultural heritage of karabakh,’” heydar aliyev foundation, june 2021, https://heydar-aliyev-foundation.org/en/content/view/96/5069/a-collection-of-publications%e2%80%9ccultural-heritage-of-karabakh%e2%80%9d-, accessed 11.02.2022. 101 “armenia’s appropriation of the azerbaijani cultural and historic heritage,” analyses center of international relations, 13 july 2021. https://artsakh.news/am/news/194425 https://heydar-aliyev-foundation.org/en/content/view/96/5069/a-collection-of-publications-%e2%80%9ccultural-heritage-of-karabakh%e2%80%9dhttps://heydar-aliyev-foundation.org/en/content/view/96/5069/a-collection-of-publications-%e2%80%9ccultural-heritage-of-karabakh%e2%80%9d27 artsakh’s culture.102 the journal was produced in 17 languages, which greatly facilitated the swift circulation of azerbaijan’s false theses in international circles. cultural methods used two days after the outbreak of the 44-day war, the ministry of culture of azerbaijan began to publish articles about armenian monuments in karabakh, seen from its own point of view, with their history and photographs on its official website on 29th september 2020.103 since february 2021, the ministry began monitoring the cultural sites in the occupied areas of mountainous karabakh. this was in line with the written order promulgated by the president of azerbaijan, which stated: …its aim is to initially find and protect historical-cultural monuments in the liberated areas. not only have muslim holy places been vandalised by armenians but also christian historical-religious monuments. many caucasian albanian temples, among which is khudavang and gyanjasar [gandzasar-hm] monasteries in the kelbajar region, have been subjected to barbaric treatment.104 the ministry of culture of azerbaijan has also realised the program called “let’s get to know our christian heritage.” the newspaper “azerbaijan” notets “within the framework of the program, short videos about the temples, churches and sanctuaries belonging to the christian faith and protected by the state in the territory of azerbaijan are presented.”105 the global campaign “peace for culture” took place in the mugham international centre on 23rd march 2021, where anar karimov, the minister of culture of azerbaijan said that the goal of the campaign was the preservation of cultural heritage through peace, the strengthening of international peace, as well as the role of peace in the development of culture. regarding the methods used, miguel angel moratinos, high representative for the united nations alliance of civilizations (unaoc) , noted that to this azerbaijani initiative, which has the goal to find mechanisms and tools to response today’s reality and issues, he 102 irs heritage, https://irs-az.com/journal-archive. 103 ministry of culture of the republic of azerbaijan, http://mct.gov.az/en/common-news/. 104 “azerbaijani culture ministry begins monitoring monuments in liberated lands,” azernews, 19 feb. 2021, https://www.azernews.az/news.php?news_id=176387&cat=culture. 105 “mədəniyyət nazirliyi “xristian i̇rsimizi tanıyaq layihəsini təqdim edir,”” azərbaycan qəzəti[azerbaycan gezeti], 19 noyabr 2020, 7. https://irs-az.com/journal-archive http://mct.gov.az/en/common-news/ https://www.azernews.az/news.php?news_id=176387&cat=culture 28 responded immediately.106 the campaign invited diplomats, media representatives, scholars as well as foreign government and international organisations’ political, cultural and public representatives to the “liberated” areas of azerbaijan raise their voices in the name of peace.107 it should be noted that this organisation was created in 2005 by kofi annan, the former secretary general of the un, co-sponsored by the governments of turkey and spain. according to vasif eyvazzade, the chief of staff of the culture ministry of azerbaijan, there was an aim to also present the above-mentioned campaign at the un headquarters.108 the azerbaijani side, to achieve their political aims also utilises azerbaijani youth, as well as different youth groups and organisations which periodically held meetings with azerbaijan’s government officials. one was “the eurasian regional center of the islamic cooperation youth forum (icyf–erc)”109 some of whose members – both foreign and azerbaijani – visited the territories that were apparently “liberated” by azerbaijan. the above-mentioned forum organised a “karabakh-the cultural heart of azerbaijan” international competition, which had 15 contestants from 13 countries: turkey, pakistan, tajikistan, iran, kyrgyzstan, usa, estonia, brazil, poland, algeria, tunisia and so forth. it was noted that the competition was actively circulated on social media by over 20,000 users from more than 30 countries. the project was realised under the title of “karabakh is azerbaijan,” the aim of which was to inform the international public that “karabakh is an integral part of azerbaijani culture and history.” five of the victors were taken on a visit to karabakh.110 it should be noted that several of the competitors, without regard to the fact that they held other countries’ citizenships, were actually ethnic azerbaijanis, meaning that despite the great propaganda efforts made by azerbaijan, those efforts were not very successful among foreign youth circles. the azerbaijani side on an official level also takes part in the cultural events held abroad. the ambassador of azerbaijan to italy, as well as the head of the cultural heritage protection, development and restoration service attached to the ministry of culture of 106 “presentation of "peace for culture" global campaign held,” apa news, 23 june 2021, https://apa.az/en/xeber/culture-policy/presentation-of-peace-for-culture-global-campaign-held-photo-352409. 107 “azerbaijan sends appeal to unesco,” azernews, 24 june 2021, https://www.azernews.az/culture/180526.html, accessed 25.02.2022. 108 “peace for culture campaign might be presented at un headquarters,” azernews, 6 aug 2021, https://www.azernews.az/culture/181967.html, accessed 25.02.2022. 109 young people from the countries that were members of the islamic cooperation youth forum (icyf–erc). 110 youth from the united states, estonia, tunisia, malaysia and pakistan will travel to karabakh, islamic cooperation youth forum eurasian regional center, https://icyf-erc.org/press-releases/youth-from-the-unitedstates-estonia-tunisia-malaysia-and-pakistan-will-travel-to-karabakh/, accessed 25.02.2022. https://apa.az/en/xeber/culture-policy/presentation-of-peace-for-culture-global-campaign-held-photo-352409 https://www.azernews.az/culture/180526.html https://www.azernews.az/culture/181967.html https://icyf-erc.org/press-releases/youth-from-the-united-states-estonia-tunisia-malaysia-and-pakistan-will-travel-to-karabakh/ https://icyf-erc.org/press-releases/youth-from-the-united-states-estonia-tunisia-malaysia-and-pakistan-will-travel-to-karabakh/ 29 azerbaijan and others have participated in the international event called "reconstruction week 2021" held in different cities of italy from august 30th to september 4th 2021. at the event, the azerbaijani side presented the "armenian vandalism in the liberated territories" with videos, noting that the return of azerbaijani refugees to those territories will begin with the revival of historical monuments.111 the three-day conference entitled “great return: cultural revival” was organized in november 2021, by the "state service for the protection, development and restoration of cultural heritage" of the ministry of culture of azerbaijan, where foreign ambassadors, diplomats, state figures and leaders of the organizations were also present. at that time us ambassador to azerbaijan e.d. litzenberger announced that they were happy to support azerbaijan, which was opening a new page in the history of preserving its culture.112 apart from that, one of the azerbaijani news agencies spread the news that a group of experts studying caucasian albanian history and architecture had been formed “to remove traces left by armenians on albanian religious temples.” this was announced in ganja [gandzak-hm] by anar karimov. the latter noted that representatives of state institutions are also represented in the group. members of the group have already conducted checks in the territories “liberated” by azerbaijan.113 a few days later, the ministry of culture of azerbaijan announced that "azerbaijan has always respected its historical and cultural heritage, regardless of their religious and ethnic origin." it also included a reference to the 1954 hague convention concerning the protection of cultural values. 114 it is interesting that azerbaijan itself presented the fact that it was desecrating and changing armenian churches, yet referred to the hague convention; but it must be reminded that the first thesis of the 3rd point of the 9th article (concerning the protection of cultural values in occupied territories) of the 2nd protocol (march 26th 1999) of that same convention115 forbids “any alteration to, or change of use of, cultural property which is intended to conceal or destroy cultural, historical 111 azerbaijan ministry of culture’s official website, http://mct.gov.az/az/umumi-xeberler/13697, accessed 18.02.2022. 112 “one of the positive impressions of azerbaijan is its respect for different cultures us ambassador,” azernews, 25 november 2021, https://menafn.com/1103248039/one-of-positive-impressions-of-azerbaijan-isits-respect-for-different-cultures-us-ambassador&source=138, accessed 18.03.2022. 113 “ermənlilərin saxtalaşdırdıqları alban dini məbədlərinin bərpası üçün i̇şçi qrup yaradılıb”[a working group was created for the restoration of albanian religious temples, which were falsified by armenians], report i̇nformasiya agentliyi [report information agency], report.az, 03.02.2022, https://report.az/medeniyyet-siyaseti/alban-dini-mebedlerinin-berpasi-ucun-isci-qrup-yaradilib/, accessed 11.02.2022. 114 statement by the ministry for culture of the republic of azerbaijan, http://www.mct.gov.az/en/commonnews/14102, accessed 11.03.2022. 115 second protocol to the hague convention of 1954 for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict the hague, 26 march 1999. http://mct.gov.az/az/umumi-xeberler/13697 https://menafn.com/1103248039/one-of-positive-impressions-of-azerbaijan-is-its-respect-for-different-cultures-us-ambassador&source=138 https://menafn.com/1103248039/one-of-positive-impressions-of-azerbaijan-is-its-respect-for-different-cultures-us-ambassador&source=138 https://report.az/medeniyyet-siyaseti/alban-dini-mebedlerinin-berpasi-ucun-isci-qrup-yaradilib/ http://www.mct.gov.az/en/common-news/14102 http://www.mct.gov.az/en/common-news/14102 30 or scientific evidence.” meanwhile, the azerbaijani side is moving in the path of breaking the same convention's provisions. targeting the symbols of the christian heritage of artsakharmenians and disrupting christian ritual’s actual traditions, azerbaijan, despite being a member, went against the protocols of the conventions on the “preservation of cultural diversity”(2001) 116 and the “protection and the promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions” (2005).117 such a policy is a discriminatory attitude, which also violates the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and the right to value the heritage created as a result of this freedom in the way one wants, as stipulated in the "universal declaration of human rights".118 it should be noted that all this is happening when un international court of justice on december 7th 2021 within the framework of the armenia v. azerbaijan and azerbaijan v. armenia court cases under the international convention "on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination", published decisions on applying emergency measures presented by armenia and azerbaijan, one of which referred to the armenian cultural heritage.119 the decision obliged azerbaijan to “take all necessary measures to prevent and punish acts of vandalism and desecration directed against armenian cultural heritage, including churches and other places of worship, monuments, landmarks, cemeteries and artifacts.” it is therefore obvious that despite the efforts made by international organisations and the un international court of justice, azerbaijan not only is not carrying out its obligations, but also develops new plans for the alienation and appropriat ion of armenian monuments from artsakh-armenians. conclusion the article showed the process of the forced appropriation (albanisation) of the armenian monastic complex of dadivank in mountainous karabakh carried out by azerbaijan through different methods. starting from the previous century and “albanising” armenian names, cross stones and inscriptions, armenian historians and literature, after the second artsakh 116 unesco universal declaration on cultural diversity, adopted by the 31st session of the general conference of unesco, paris, 02.11.2001, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000127160, accessed 01.02.2022. 117 basic texts of the 2005 convention on the protection and the promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, 2013 edition, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000225383, accessed 02.02.2022. 118 «ուդիական քարոզչություն մատաղիսի սուրբ եղիշե եկեղեցում» [religious preaching in st. yeghishe church of mataghis], monument watch, 17.07.2022, https://bit.ly/3cbzwvk, accessed 01.02.2022. 119 international court of justice, application of the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (armenia v. azerbaijan), 07.12.2021, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/180, accessed 26.08.2022. https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000127160 https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000225383 https://bit.ly/3cbzwvk https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/180 31 war, the practical phase of their appropriation began. for the latter, we identified four directions: propaganda in social media, the inclusion of the udi minority in the process, scientific activities and cultural events. propaganda on social media in azerbaijan at present is carried out at the state level: websites are created to spread theses of the azerbaijani side and promote false information about armenian churches and monuments. all this does not leave aside the azerbaijani youth, who are provided with state financial resources in order to carry out activities in this direction, perhaps also for the dissemination of azerbaijani theses to foreign youth. in spite of the fact that azerbaijan makes great efforts in this direction, it should be stressed that despite active propaganda carried out by azerbaijani social media users, results cannot be considered to be very good, considering that those materials are basically being shared by ethnic azerbaijanis. as for the azerbaijani cultural competitions, the participants from different states are mostly ethnic azerbaijanis, who have citizenship of foreign countries, thus the impact of these competitions on foreigners cannot be overestimated. as for the “utilisation” of the leadership of the udi minority by the authorities of azerbaijan, the community, in general, has no other option than to subject itself to the authorities, taking into account the authoritarian regime operating in azerbaijan. the leaders of the udi community are just a tool for the azerbaijani authorities, by which the national minority of azerbaijan is served to their interests under the name of minority integration. the udi leaders are pushed forward in every direction to spread anti-armenian propaganda, and considering the fact that the udis are one of the descendants of the caucasian albanians, most of whom are christians, it is easier to carry out the "albanisation" of armenian cultural monuments through the latter. regardless of historical distortions and efforts to establish the albanian-udi church in nagorno-karabakh, it will never be legal without the approval of the armenian apostolic church, because the ancient albanian church has always been subordinate to the armenian apostolic church and cannot function independently of it. the conferences and events organised by azerbaijani researchers concerning the “albanisation” of armenian monuments gained fresh impetus after the second artsakh war. scientific conferences on this topic are regularly organized, where foreign scientists are invited and urged to join the advancement of the theory of “albanisation”. in azerbaijan, after the war, books, articles, and series are published with even greater frequency and enthusiasm, presenting the entire cultural heritage of artsakh as azerbaijani. within the framework of cultural policy, after the second artsakh war, the azerbaijani side does not miss the opportunity to invite diplomatic representations and provide false 32 information at cultural state events held in azerbaijan and the occupied territories of artsakh. during the events, naturally, “armenian vandalism” is demonstrated, while azerbaijan is presented as the restorer and recreator of cultural monuments. despite the fact that various international structures are examining the situation created around the armenian monuments of artsakh, however, there is no positive movement on the part of azerbaijan to not defile, destroy or usurp the armenian historical and cultural legacy. azerbaijan continues to violate its obligations stipulated by international conventions, in particularly, the provisions of the 1954 hague convention concerning the protection of cultural property in the event of war conflict and its second protocol, the 2001 “convention on the preservation of cultural diversity” and the 2005 “convention on the protection and the promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions,” as well as the verdicts handed down by un international court of justice within the framework of the “on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination” on 7th december 2021 regarding armenia vs. azerbaijan and azerbaijan vs. armenia court cases, by which azerbaijan assumed a number of obligations related to the protection of armenian cultural heritage. thus, if azerbaijan attempted to misrepresent the history of armenian monuments solely through propaganda from 1991 to 2020, then practical measures began after november 2020, discreetly witnessed by the international community. 33 picture 1. dadivank monastery in artsakh (source: the last two pictures-personal archive of the author, 13 nov. 2020) 34 picture 3. the inscription of 1224 on the western facade of the [katoghike] church of dadivank monastery ( source: personal archive of the author) picture 4. armenian inscriptions (13 th century) of the [katoghike] church of dadivank monastery ( source: personal archive of the author) 35 picture 2. the two deliberately cut parts of dadivank’s khachkar (1182), which were established by hasan vakhtangyan (source: personal archive of the author) 36 picture 5. the two khachkars (1283) of the bell tower of dadivank (source: artsakh monuments.com) 37 picture 6. st. elysaeus church in nij [nizh], gabala (azerbaijan), armenian inscriptions were erased after “restoration” by azerbaijan in 2004 (source: armenian national commission for unesco) 38 picture 7. the 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https://mincom.gov.az/en/view/news/1066/president-of-azerbaijan-ilham-aliyev-addressed-the-nation https://mincom.gov.az/en/view/news/1066/president-of-azerbaijan-ilham-aliyev-addressed-the-nation 43 shahnazaryan artashes, «գիտական նստաշրջան՝ նվիրված կովկասյան աղվանքի պատմության և մշակույթի խնդիրներին» [scientific session dedicated to the problems of the history and culture of the caucasian albania], lraber hasarakakan gitutyunneri, n 7(1988): 100-101. shnirelman, victor. войны памяти: мифы, идентичность и политика в закавказье [wars of memory: myths, identity and politics in transcaucasia], (moscow: akademkniga, 2003): 38. statement by the ministry for culture of the republic of azerbaijan, http://www.mct.gov.az/en/common-news/14102 . statement of the president of the republic of azerbaijan, the prime minister of the republic of armenia and the president of the russian federation, 10 november 2020, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384. strabo, օտար աղբյուրներ հայերի մասին, [foreign sources about armenians], n 1, trans. hrachya acharyan, (yerevan: ysu, 1940): 33. the national archive of the republic of armenia, box 57, folder 2, file 1851, 2. the national archive of the republic of armenia, box 57, folder 2, file 1911, 5. tosh, john. in pursuit of history (london: longman press, 1991, 2nd ed.), quoted in mcdowell, "heritage, memory and identity," 42-43. twitter account of mammadov, gulmammad. 17 november 2020, https://mobile.twitter.com/gulmammad/status/1328735592428023810. ulubabyan, bagrat. «դադի կամ խութա վանք» [ dadi or khuta monastery] echmiadzin, 28, n 6-7, (1971): 63-64. ulubabyan bagrat. արցախի պատմությունը սկզբից մինչև մեր օրերը [the history of artsakh from the beginning to the present days], (yerevan: m. varandean, 1994): 36-37. unesco universal declaration on cultural diversity, adopted by the 31st session of the general conference of unesco, paris, 02.11. 2001, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000127160. vardanyan, tamara. «ադրբեջանցիներ.ինքնության փնտրտուքը հետխորհրդային շրջանում» [azerbaijanis: the search for identity in the post-soviet period], «21-rd dar», n 3 (49) (2013): 75. aleksidze, zaza. preliminary account on the identification and deciphering of the caucasian albanian manuscript discovered on mount sinai, https://armazi.unifrankfurt.de/sinai/prelacc.htm. албано-удинская христианская община [albanian-udin christian community], 13.11.2013, https://udi.az/articles/0200.html. “akademiya ciddi addımlar atmalı, erməni saxtakarlıqları ilə dolu “faktların” qarşısının alınması istiqamətində tədqiqatları gücləndirməlidir” – akademik ramiz mehdiyev ["academy must take serious steps, strengthen research in the direction of prevention of "facts" full of armenian forgeries" academician ramiz mehdiyev], azərbaycan milli elmlər akademiyası [national academy of sciences of azerbaijan], 25 nov 2020, https://science.gov.az/az/news/open/15174 . “qafqaz albaniyasi: tarix, din və memarliq” adli beynəlxalq elmi konfrans keçirilib ["caucasus albania: history, religion and architecture" international scientific conference held], azərbaycan milli elmlər akademiyası, tarix i̇nstitutu [national academy of sciences of azerbaijan, institute of history], 27 may 2021, http://tarixinstitutu.az/news/view/327 . “azərbaycan alban-udi xristian dini i̇cması azad olunmuş ərazilərdəki alban məbədləri ilə bağlı bəyanat yayıb”[the albanian-udi christian religious community of azerbaijan issued a statement regarding the albanian temples in the liberated territories], azərbaycan respublikası dini qurumlarla i̇ş üzrə dövlət komitəsi[state committee on work with religious organizations of the republic of azerbaijan], 08.02.2022, https://scwra.gov.az/az/view/news/10383/azerbaycan-alban-udi-xristian-dini-icmasi-azadolunmush-erazilerdeki-alban-mebedleri-ile-bagli-beyanat-yayib . “azərbaycan respublikası alban-udi xristian i̇cmasının sədri, bdu-nun kompleks geoloji və geofiziki tədqiqatlar elmi-tədqiqat laboratoriyasının böyük elmi işçisi robert mobili “qarabağdakı alban məbədlərinin ermənilər tərəfindən saxtalaşdırılmasının tikinti materialları və bağlayıcıların mineraloji-geokimyəvi tərkibinə görə əsaslandırılması” mövzusunda məruzə http://www.mct.gov.az/en/common-news/14102 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384 https://mobile.twitter.com/gulmammad/status/1328735592428023810 https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000127160 https://armazi.uni-frankfurt.de/sinai/prelacc.htm https://armazi.uni-frankfurt.de/sinai/prelacc.htm https://udi.az/articles/0200.html https://science.gov.az/az/news/open/15174 http://tarixinstitutu.az/news/view/327 https://scwra.gov.az/az/view/news/10383/azerbaycan-alban-udi-xristian-dini-icmasi-azad-olunmush-erazilerdeki-alban-mebedleri-ile-bagli-beyanat-yayib https://scwra.gov.az/az/view/news/10383/azerbaycan-alban-udi-xristian-dini-icmasi-azad-olunmush-erazilerdeki-alban-mebedleri-ile-bagli-beyanat-yayib 44 edib” [chairman of the albanian-udi-christian community of the republic of azerbaijan, robert mobili, a senior researcher at the complex geological and geophysical research laboratory of bsu, gave a report on “the falsification of albanian temples in karabakh by the armenians according to the mineral-geological composition of the construction materials used”], udi.az, 5 march 2021, https://udi.az/news/0585.html . “ermənlilərin saxtalaşdırdıqları alban dini məbədlərinin bərpası üçün i̇şçi qrup yaradılıb [a working group was created for the restoration of albanian religious temples, which were falsified by armenians], report i̇nformasiya agentliyi [report information agency], report.az, 03.02.2022, https://report.az/medeniyyet-siyaseti/alban-dini-mebedlerinin-berpasi-ucun-isci-qrupyaradilib/. mədəniyyət nazirliyi “xristian irsimizi tanıyaq layihəsini təqdim edir”, azərbaycan qəzəti[azerbaycan gezeti], 19 noyabr 2020, 7. “qədim alban məbədində saxta tarix “[a fake history in an ancient albanian temple], 16.03.2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4nsan1yooc. “vətən müharibəsi şəhidlərinin əziz xatirəsi dağlar qoynunda yerləşən monastırda ehtiramla yad olunub,” [to the memory of the martyrs of the patriotic war was honored in the monastery located in the heart of the mountains," azerbaijan, 06 dekabr 2020, 5, http://anl.az/down/meqale/azerbaycan/2020/dekabr/730852.htm. about the author: hayastan martirosyan is a junior researcher at the armenian genocide museum-institute, as well as is pursuing her phd in the same institution on the topic of “racial discrimination in the soviet azerbaijan toward armenians in 1920-1991.” e-mail: hyn.martirosyan@gmail.com https://udi.az/news/0585.html https://report.az/medeniyyet-siyaseti/alban-dini-mebedlerinin-berpasi-ucun-isci-qrup-yaradilib/ https://report.az/medeniyyet-siyaseti/alban-dini-mebedlerinin-berpasi-ucun-isci-qrup-yaradilib/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4nsan1yooc http://anl.az/down/meqale/azerbaycan/2020/dekabr/730852.htm mailto:hyn.martirosyan@gmail.com 90 mrs. hasmik tigranyan is head of anti-corruption monitoring division (department of anti-corruption elaboration and monitoring) in the ministry of justice of the republic of armenia. previously, she has worked in the ra state commission for protection of economic competition as a legal expert, a lawyer, then as a chief lawyer for nearly ten years. she received an ma at yerevan state university and an l.l.m. at american university of armenia. her scientific research relates to the issues of human rights, constitutional law, competition law, and business law (specifically transactions, mergers, and acquisitions). she is an author of three scientific articles and dozens of comparative legal analyses. email: hasmiktigranyan@gmail.com dr. edita gzoyan is deputy scientific director at the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation since 2018. she received her ph.d. in history at yerevan state university and an l.l.m. at american university of armenia. she authored more than four dozen articles and a book. dr. gzoyan is armenia country editor for central and eastern european review and associate editor of ts’eghaspanagitakan handes and international journal of armenian genocide studies. email: gzoyan.edita@genocide-museum.am 91 ecthr retroactive jurisdiction and the possibility of compensations for the armenian properties confiscated during and after the armenian genocide: a brief analysis1 hasmik tigranyan edita gzoyan this article examines retroactive jurisdiction of the european court of human rights (ecthr) for the possibility to litigate compensations for the armenian properties confiscated during and after the armenian genocide. the study considers ecthr platform for the armenian genocide reparations, as ecthr is the most effective human rights regional court to compel turkey to protect human rights and remedy for violations. the paper considers only european convention on human rights (convention) article 1 protocol 1 to avoid as much as possible politicizing this study. considering the fact that long time has passed since the confiscations, this study considers ratione temporis jurisdiction of the ecthr. key words: reparations, compensations, european court of human rights (ecthr), european convention on human rights (convention), confiscation, abandoned property. introduction in 1915 the ottoman empire implemented the most heinous plan of annihilation of its armenian population. alongside with systematic and organized massacres, deportations and assimilations armenians were being deprived of their properties. dispossession of the armenian community was a part of government policy to change the ethnic composition of the ottoman empire.2 the government enacted a series of laws and decrees to deal with the issue of abandoned property known as the abandoned properties laws. the laws legalized the liquidation of the armenian properties and the settlement of muslim migrants on those properties. meanwhile, it should be mentioned that the abandoned properties law (also the deportation law) was enacted retroactively, intended to justify the illegal actions of the ottoman government in view of possible future demands for retribution.3 initially armenians were assured by the turkish government that they would be provided with equivalent values of their seized properties and measures would be taken to safeguard their property rights. however, situation was completely different on the ground: armenian properties were sold, auctioned and/or transferred to others, while the government continued to assure that it was administering the properties in the name of its original owners.4 1 the article was received on 10.01.2020 and accepted for publication on 01.10.2020. 2 hilmar kaiser’s “armenian property, ottoman law and nationality policies during the armenian genocide, 1915-1916,” in olaf farschid et al, the world war i as remembered in the countries of the eastern mediterranean (beirut: orient-institute beirut, 2006), 64. 3 ibid., 70. 4 on the issue of the confiscation see: gözel durmaz, “the distribution of the armenian abandoned proper92 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0010 the situation continued also during the turkish republic the continuing state of the ottoman empire.5 although after wwi the new turkish government rejected and reversed the abandoned properties laws, however, the new nationalistic government of turkey led by mustafa kemal abolished those laws, reinstating the old ones. the kemalist government seized all the armenian properties and rejected the return of armenians and reclamation of their properties.6 a general principle of international law stipulates that wrongful acts and injuries caused by those acts made by the state put responsibility to provide reparation. the principle was reiterated by permanent court of international justice stating that “it is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.”7 though approximately a century has passed from those notorious events this issue is still urgent. nowadays descendants of the armenian genocide survivors, as their legal successors, are still trying to seek appropriate remedies for restoration of their violated rights. today the republic of turkey is an active member of the international community and party to different international treaties, under which it takes some obligations to implement. the republic ratified the european convention on human rights (hereinafter convention) in 1954,8 although recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the european court of human rights (hereinafter ecthr) in 1990.9 the right of individual petition is accurately considered as the greatest achievement of individuals who consider their human rights have been violated to lodge a complaint before the ecthr. there are, however, important admissibility requirements (admissibility criteria) set out in the ecthr that must be satisfied for the case examination. the ecthr standing and admissibility criteria are set in article 34 and article 35 of the convention. one of these criteria is compatibility ratione temporis for admissibility relating to ecthr’s jurisdiction. because the actual confiscations have occurred nearly 100 years ties in an ottoman locality: kayseri (1915-18),” middle eastern studies 51, no. 5 (2015): 838-885; bedross der matossian, “the taboo within the taboo: the fate of ‘armenian capital’ at the end of the ottoman empire,” european journal of turkish studies, complete list (2011), at http://journals.openedition.org/ejts/4411, accessed 20.11.2019; uğur ümit üngör and mehmet polatel, confiscation and colonization: the young turk seizure of armenian property (london, new york: continuum, 2011); levon marashlian, “finishing the genocide: cleansing turkey of armenian survivors, 1920-1923,” in remembrance and denial: the case of the armenian genocide, ed. richard hovannisian (detroit: wayne state university press, 1999): 113-145; kévork baghdjian, la confiscation, par le gouvernement turc, des biens arméniens...dits «abandonnés», (montreal: s. n., 1987); levon vartan, հայկական տասնըհինգը և հայերու լքեալ գոյքերը [քննական ակնարկ ըստ թրքական վավերագրերու] [the armenian 15 and the abandoned properties of the armenians: critical commentary according to the turkish documents] (beirut: atlas, 1970), etc. 5 on the issue of the state secession see e.g. emre ökmen, “turkey: successor or continuing state of the ottoman empire?” leiden journal of international law 24, no. 1 (2011): 561-583; patrick dumberry, “the consequences of turkey being the ‘continuing’ state of the ottoman empire in terms of international responsibility for internationally wrongful acts,” international criminal law review 14 (2014): 261-273. 6 üngör and polatel, confiscation and colonization, 49-59. 7 factory at chorzow (germ. v. pol.), 1927 p.c.i.j. (ser. a) no. 9 (july 26), para. 55. 8 see e.g. at https://www.convention.coe.int/documents/cp_turkey_eng.pdf, accessed 21.11.2019. 9 frédéric mégret, “the notion of ‘continuous violations’, expropriated armenian properties, and the european court of human rights,” international criminal law review 14 (2014): 317-331. 93 ecthr retroactive jurisdiction ago, and ratione temporis criteria seem to be the most problematic in the armenian case, the article considers only ratione temporis jurisdiction issue. as is the case in most court proceedings, time is a crucial element for anyone who wants to apply to ecthr. time factor poses restrictions on the possibility to bring a claim to ecthr, in respect of the admissibility of the claim as well as the jurisdiction of ecthr. in both cases the concept of continuing violations/continuing situations can have a softening effect on the established strict procedural limitations. the birth of the concept of “continuing violations” was connected with the human disappearance cases considered by the inter-american court of human rights despite the lack of ratione tempori jurisdiction.10 this approach was also taken by the ecthr, which for the first time recognized the existence of continuing situation in the case of de becker v belgium in 1958.11 another instance when the concept was used was connected with the expropriation cases. despite a general approach by the ecthr that expropriation cases are predominantly instantaneous acts,12 in certain cases they can be viewed as continuing violation when deprivation “manifest itself in some specific fashion.”13 the article will firstly examine compatibility ratione temporis for the jurisdiction of the ecthr and analyze cases on court’s retroactive jurisdiction. then the article will examine turkish laws, decrees and orders related to the armenian properties. finally, the article will apply ecthr case law on the armenian properties confiscations case to find whether the continuing situation/continuing violation can be applied. ecthr ratione temporis admissibility criteria in accordance with a general principle of non-retroactivity of treaties, the provisions of the convention “do not bind a contracting party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the convention in respect of that party.” 14 jurisdiction ratione temporis covers only a period after the ratification of the convention or its protocols15 and imposes no specific obligation on member states to provide redress for wrongs or damage caused prior to that date.16 however, after the ratification date, 10 the reasoning was that disappearances were assessed as continuing violation before discovering circumstances of the disappeared person. for more on this see mégret, “the notion of continuous violations.” 11 de becker v. belgium, app. no. 214/56, [1958-59] y.b. 12 case of posti and rahko v. finland, no. 27824/95, judgement, 21.05.2003, paras. 39, 40, 46; kotov v. russia, no. 54522/00, judgement, 03.04.2012, paras. 63, 66, 67. 13 mégret, “the notion of continuous violations,” 321. 14 european court of human rights, practical guide on admissibility criteria (updated on 30 april 2020), p. 46, at http://www.convention.coe.int/documents/admissibility_guide_eng.pdf, 47, accessed 02.11.2019; see also blečić v. croatia, no. 59532/00, judgement, 08.03.2006, para. 70; varnava and others v. turkey, nos. 16 064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, judgement, 18.09.2009, para. 130. 15 since its adoption in 1950 the convention has been amended a number of times and supplemented with many rights in addition to those set forth in the original text. as of now there are 16 protocols. 16 practical guide on admissibility criteria, 59; see also kopecký v. slovakia, no. 44912/98, judgement, 28.06.2004, para. 38. 94 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 all the acts and omissions of the contracting states must be in accordance to the convention and its protocols and, consequently, all following facts fall within the jurisdiction of the ecthr even if they are “merely extensions of an already existing situation.”17 ecthr may, however, consider facts prior to the ratification date “inasmuch as they could be considered to have created a situation extending beyond that date or may be relevant for the understanding of facts occurring after that date.”18 moreover, the ecthr has an obligation on its own motion to examine its ratione temporis jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings.19 the european commission on human rights (hereinafter commission) and the ecthr have accepted the extension of their jurisdiction ratione temporis to situations involving a continuing violation. as already mentioned the concept arose with regard to human disappearances. according to the ecthr disappearance is not an “instantaneous” act or event but a “distinct phenomenon,” marked by uncertainty and unaccountability, where there is a lack of information or a willful concealment of what has happened to a person. the failure to provide about the whereabouts and fate of the missing person gives rise to a continuing situation. consequently, the obligation to investigate into the happening will remain as long as the fate of the disappeared person remains unknown and the failure for such investigation will be regarded as a continuing violation.20 in another instance the concept was used with regard to the right of property. in some cases the ecthr has recognized continuing violations of the right to property when “the deprivation could be said to have manifested itself in some specific fashion.” the jurisprudence of the ecthr on the issue began in the mid-1990s relating to greece and turkey, and later included cases against the states of the former eastern bloc.21 particularly, ecthr has stated having temporal jurisdiction in the following cases: • denial of access to the applicant’s property in northern cyprus;22 • continuing unlawful occupation without compensation by the navy of land that belong to the applicants;23 • continuing impossibility to regain possession of the property and receive an adequate level of rent because of the polish laws in force before and after ratification of protocol 1 by poland;24 • failure to pay final compensation for the property that was nationalized;25 • continued non-enforcement of a domestic decision in the applicant’s favor against the state.26 17 practical guide on admissibility criteria, 59; see also almeida garrett, mascarenhas falcão and others v. portugal, nos. 29813/96 and 30229/96, judgement, 11.01.2000, para. 43. 18 practical guide on admissibility criteria; see e.g. hutten-czapska v. poland, no. 35014/97, judgement, 19.06.2006, paras. 147-153. 19 practical guide on admissibility criteria, 59. 20 varnava and others v. turkey, paras.148-149. 21 mégret, “the notion of continuous violations,” 321. 22 loizidou v. turkey, no. 15318/89, judgement, 18.12.1996, paras. 46-47. 23 papamichalopoulos and others v. greece, no. 14556/89, judgement, 24.06.1993, para. 40. 24 hutten-czapska v. poland, no. 35014/97, judgement, 19.06.2006, paras. 152-153. 25 almeida garrett, mascarenhas falcão and others v. portugal, nos. 29813/96 and 30229/96, judgement, 11.01.2000. 26 krstić v. serbia, no. 45394/06, judgement, 10.03.2014, paras. 63-69. 95 ecthr retroactive jurisdiction meanwhile it should be noted that the mere deprivation of a property is considered to be an “instantaneous act” without producing a continuing situation. thus, the ecthr can apply retroactive jurisdiction if continuing situation/violation is established. in order to deeply understand the nature of continuing violation and apply it to armenian properties case, this article bellow will present a deep analysis of continuing situations regarding property confiscation generally and the ecthr practice in this regard. continuing situation/violation analysis: expropriation in its commentary on the articles on the origin of state responsibility the international law commission of the united nations (i.l.c.) described a “continuing act” as “one which is a single act extending over period of time and of a lasting nature.”27 also the i.l.c. has defined a “continuing act” as one “which proceeds unchanged over period of time: in other words an act which, after it occurs continues to exist as such and not merely in its effects and consequences.” while an instantaneous act is “an act that does not extend in time, i.e. act that ends as soon as committed; where the breach have occurred also automatically ceases to exist.”28 according to the articles on state responsibility of i.l.c’s, “acts that constitute continuing violations of international law, distinguishable from instantaneous acts, are not only “acts which continue in time” but also composite acts which consists of sequence of separate courses of conduct, actions or omissions adopted in separate cases, but all contributing to the commission of the aggregate act in question.”29 in more details the following are three categories of alleged breaches by the state of its international obligations that differ from instantaneous acts: • situations that are act with a continuing character; • composite acts, those “composed of a series of actions or omissions in respect of separate cases”; • complex acts, constituted by actions or omissions by the same or different organs of the state in respect of the same case.30 the ecthr and the commission has accepted this line and have acknowledged continuing situations in the same three categories.31 under the first category are simple continuing situations that usually started at an identifiable date and continued until the situation ceases to exist (e.g. detentions and legislative provisions that remain in force). second are complex acts which are composed of a series of consecutive acts. the third one is composite acts (concerning the “reasonable time” of proceedings before civil courts). here ecthr concluded: 27 document a/33/10, report of the international law commission on the work of its thirtieth session, 8 may 28 july 1978, official records of the general assembly, thirty-third session, supplement no. 10, p. 90-97 at https://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_33_10.pdf, accessed 30.11.2019. 28 ibid., 88, 90-97. 29 ibid., 92. 30 draft articles on state responsibility with commentaries thereto adopted by the international law commission on first reading (1997), 97-98. 31 andy van pachtenbeke and yves haeck, “from de becker to varnava: the state of continuing situations in the strasbourg case law,” european human rights law review 1 (2010): 47-59. 96 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 the frequency with which violations are found shows that there is an accumulation of identical breaches which are sufficiently numerous to amount not merely to isolated incidents. such breaches reflect a continuing situation that has not yet been remedied and in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy. this accumulation of breaches accordingly constitutes a practice that is incompatible with the convention.32 moreover, according to the commission continuing nature of violations of human rights is considered to be an aggravating factor.33 in other international instruments and resolutions continuing nature of human rights violations is qualified as “systematic,” “constant,” “gross” or “fragrant.”34 thus, there may be continuing violations through a series of actions or omissions by a state related to the same case which taken as a whole represent the position of a state in that particular case. in agrotexim and others v. greece case the ecthr accepted that a series of events may constitute a continuing breach of the convention considering the successive actions of athens municipal council amounting to a continuing violation,35 even though the actions had been initiated before greece ratified protocol 1. the argument was based also on the fact that the expropriation was not an instantaneous act but rather consisted of a series of steps that continued until the protocol’s entry into force.36 similarly, in phocas v france case the applicant was unable to formally use his property under a threat of expropriation of his land during a period of about 15 years which was recognized as a factual situation having continuing nature.37 thus, there are instances when continuing violations of human rights is apparent (the continuing illegal prevention to possess and enjoy property or join families, not enforce a person’s right to see his/her child, execute a judgment in the applicant’s favor, etc.). similarly, instantaneous acts can also be easily detectable when violations are executed immediately and are not accompanied with lasting effects (e.g. killing, destruction of moveable property, killing). problem arises in respect of cases with continuing negative consequences. in this case, if negative consequences by themselves, without reference to the causing act, do not qualify as breaches of the convention (e.g. pain resulting from a single act of assault) then there is no “continuing violations.” however, in cases when the lasting consequences or effects of an instantaneous act are themselves contrary to the convention, such cases can be considered as continuing situations/violations (e.g. unlawful detention which is a result of unlawful arrest; unlawful possession of someone’s’ property which is a result of unlawful confiscation).38 consequently, if an act of confiscation is unlawful and incompatible with the rights 32 bottazzi v. italy, no.34884/97, judgement, 28 july1999, para. 22. 33 see the report of the commission in the case of cyprus v turkey, appl. no. 80007/77, dr72, p. 6. 34 loukis loucaides, the european convention on human rights. collected essays, nijhoff law specials, vol. 70 (leiden, boston: brill/nijhoff, 2007), 17. 35 agrotexim and others v. greece, no. 14807/89, judgement, 24.10.1995, para.58. 36 ibid.; loucaides, the european convention on human rights, 20. 37 phocas v. france, no. 17869/91, judgement, 23.04.1996. 38 loucaides, the european convention on human rights, 19-20. 97 ecthr retroactive jurisdiction protected by the convention, the future deprivation can be considered as a continuing breach of the right of peaceful enjoyment of property. similarly, if the original act of “deprivation” of a property was illegal the keeping of the property by the state by virtue of such an act amounts to a continuing interference or unlawful keeping of confiscated property. in such circumstances the government should be accountable during all the period which has elapsed since the original act of deprivation. the ecthr case law demonstrates that the time element is not a deterrent in such cases. the test of whether violations are continuing in cases that originate from an initial instantaneous act are composed of the following factors: • the nature of the complaint (the particular act or conduct that is alleged to be a violation); • the effects of the complained conduct or act on the applicant’s right; • the duration of abovementioned effects; • the prolongation of the operation of the relevant conduct or act or the maintenance of the effects via the conduct or involvement of the state.39 armenian confiscated properties: a brief analysis of turkish laws the overall process of confiscation of the armenian properties and their legitimization began in 1915 and continued to the present being a direct consequence of the armenian genocide. a long sequence of laws, orders and decrees has been passed to initiate, manage and resume the process, starting with the temporary law of deportation of armenians on 27 may 1915, a secret order informing the local government about the management of the armenian properties immediately after the deportation decision on 10 june 1915; 13 september 1915, the ottoman parliament passed the “temporary law of expropriation and confiscation, “temporary law” of 27 september 1915 titled “the law about the abandoned properties, debts and credits of the population who were sent elsewhere”; 8 november 1915 regulation regarding the practice of the items of the 27 september law and modification of the armenian constitution of 1863 by the on 11 august 1916.40 this was the first phase of initiation and implementation of confiscation process. after the defeat of the ottoman turkey in wwi, the new government and parliament have rejected the laws on deportation and abandoned properties as violating the ottoman constitution. moreover, by 8 january 1920 decree, the istanbul government protected the rights of original owners of the confiscated properties.41 this course was soon reverted by the ankara government established by nationalistic forces and on 7 june 1920 the grand national assembly of turkey adopted a law invalidating the political and commercial treaties of the istanbul government thus legalizing and legitimizing the liquidation of the armenian properties. this was followed by series of laws and decrees that reach till 2011 (law of 20 april 1922; decree of 12 march 1922; law of 15 april 1923; decree issued on 28 june 1923; law on the abandoned properties 39 loucaides, the european convention on human rights, 33. 40 üngör and polatel, confiscation and colonization, 41-47. 41 ibid., 48-49. 98 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 of 13 march 1924; the decree of 15 july 1925 on abolishing bank account deposit (bakiye) of the missing persons; the government ordinance of 13 june 1926 on necessity to seize the abandoned properties; the governmental decree of 17 july 1927; the assembly decision on 2 june 1929; governmental law of exclusion of turkish nationality from those who had not taken part in the war of independence, had remained abroad between 19231927; the 1935 law on religious foundations and its amendments made in 2002, 2003, and 2008;42 the constitution of turkey; the general directorate of land registry and cadaster’s circular order on confiscation by the state of the abandoned properties on 29 june 2001 and prime minister’s decree of 27 august 2011. thus, there is a clear pattern of consequent actions aimed at legalizing the unlawful confiscations. the analysis of turkish laws and administrative practice by taner akcam,43 uğur ümit üngör and mehmet polatel,44 as well as sait cenitoglu45 clearly demonstrated that confiscation of the armenian properties, later refusal to provide remedy, to return them to their real owners or pay compensation, accepted administrative practice and obstacle to apply to the turkish courts, hindering and not allowing details about confiscated properties deeds and other information is an example of mix of complex acts and composite acts (like italian cases) with aggravating effects. particularly, since the adoption of first decrees, laws and decisions regarding armenians confiscated properties, ottoman empire, and later the turkish republic has created all the possible difficulties for armenians to return to get their properties back or to get compensation. at first, before deportation armenians were not allowed to sell their properties and take money from the banks. then the properties of those people, who managed to escape from genocide were abandoned.46 after 1924 those people who were absent from turkey for different reasons, were deprived of turkish citizenship and thus could not any more return and get their properties back.47 several people managed with the difficulties with international passport to return to turkey in 1920’s to get their properties back or to get compensation; however they were arrested and expelled.48 those people who stayed in turkey were forced to refuse from their rights to claim their properties, to claim to protect their right under lausanne treaty. later on in september 1923 the return of those armenians who left turkey during the war was banned.49 even those armenians, who were escaped to syria and lebanon, tried to get their prop42 http://ncwarmenians.org/lawsdecrees, accessed 12.05.2018; üngör and polatel, confiscation and destruction, 4159. 43 taner akçam, “the spirit of the law: following the traces of genocide in the law of abandoned property,” international criminal law review 14 (2014) 377-395 44 üngör and polatel, confiscation and destruction, 4159 45 sait çetinoðlu, “foundations of non-muslim communities: the last object of confiscation,” international criminal law review 14 (2014): 396-406. 46 http://ncwarmenians.org/lawsdecrees. 47 ibid. 48 çetinoğlu, “foundations of non-muslim communities,” 398-399. 49 ibid., 399. 99 ecthr retroactive jurisdiction erties back or to get compensation through the french government as a mandatory of syria and lebanon. in 1924 the french government began negotiations with turkey for compensation of lebanese and syrian rum-orthodox people, and armenian tried to include their properties issue, too. despite the agreement from the french side, turkey refused including the armenian reparation issue, threatened france to stop negotiations, and finally french-turkey agreement was concluded without a mention to the armenians properties issue.50 the abandoned property laws were abolished only 73 years later, on 11 june 1986. the abolishment of the law, however, does not mean that the liquidation process has stopped. the general directorate of land registry and cadaster on 29 june 2001 published a circular order about the abandoned properties, according to which all abandoned properties had transferred to the state. also, it was made impossible to give any title deed, information or document to anyone. this indicates that armenian property had ultimately been transferred to the state.51 for the real owners or their heirs it was nearly impossible to claim any rights to their properties according to turkish law. furthermore, the 1935 law on religious foundations was amended several times (in 2002, 2003, and 2008), allowing religious foundations in very limited circumstances and only with the approval of the general directorate of foundations to gain property and apply for the return of confiscated property. the effect of these amendments was limited, and the vast majority of such applications were denied. on 27 august 2011, the then prime minister of turkey recep tayyip erdoğan announced a new decree (the decree) that “communities whose properties had been expropriated by the state could apply for the properties to be returned, or to receive compensation for properties that had been sold to third parties. the decree also permitted the formation of new religious community foundations to account for oversights in the 1935 foundations law and the reopening of foundations that previously had been closed and administered by the gdf.”52 the decree covered “(i) properties surveyed and registered in 1936 and subsequently confiscated from the religious foundations by various administrations of the republic of turkey; (ii) cemeteries belonging to non-muslim foundations which had been improperly placed under the control and management of various towns and municipalities; and (iii) undefined deeded property (such as monasteries, parishes, and schools), which were never recognized as legal entities by the turkish republic.”53 in its review of the decree of 2011 the organization for security and cooperation in europe (osce) concluded that the process has been challenging, flawed, and at times illusory, identifying the following problems: 50 for more on this issue see vahé tachjian, “an attempt to recover armenian properties in turkey through the french authorities in syria and lebanon in the 1920s,” international criminal law review 14 (2014): 396-406, 350-355, üngör and polatel, confiscation and destruction, 4159. 51 http://ncwarmenians.org/lawsdecrees. 52 tolerance and non-discrimination ii combating discrimination against christians,” at http://www.osce. org/odihr/124651?download=true, accessed 15.06.2019. 53 ibid. 100 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 • the decree covered only very limited number of properties, omitting several thousands; • one year time limit for the submission of the applications was not sufficient; • the decree was intended only for foundation; • the application process was also flawed, as was being administered by the gdf, the same office that seized those property; • the majority of cases were rejected without any explanation; • the process of appeal was also flawed as was heard by the same officials who had already denied the applications; • the ministry of finance ministry was the only body to decide the size of compensation, which as a state institution was interested in reducing the amounts; • there were also problems with the management of the foundations caused by the turkish government putting the ability of foundations to sustain the returned properties under a risk.54 in his paper on “foundations of non-muslim communities: the last object of confiscation” sait çetinoðlu concludes that “while on the surface there might appear to be some positive movement regarding properties confiscated from non-muslim foundations in turkey, this is undermined by the reality of the difficulty of pursuing recovery cases and the many exclusions from the laws appearing to allow for recovery. it is further possible to say that confiscation has been legally normalized and continues to be acceptable, as part of a long-term property expropriation process targeting non-muslim minorities in turkey and contributing to their communities dissolution.”55 thus, there is a clear series of composite acts first by the ottoman empire than by the republic of turkey that aimed at confiscating and legalizing the armenian properties. meanwhile, it is also obvious that there was and is a really serious administrative practice and obstacle for getting effective remedy for armenian properties. conclusion thus, ratione temporis jurisdiction of ecthr covers only the period after the ratification of convention or its protocols by states. however, convention institutions have accepted the extension of their jurisdiction ratione temporis to situations involving a continuing violation which originated before the entry into force of the convention but persisted after that date. the analysis provided in this article demonstrates that it must be shown continuing violation/situation, in order to apply retroactive jurisdiction of ecthr. the application of the continuing violation/situation test provided in this article to the armenian properties case confiscated during the armenian genocide shows that ecthr could accept the possible cases from the heirs of armenian genocide survivors and consider those cases admissible ratione temporis. 54 “tolerance and non-discrimination ii combating discrimination against christians.” 55 çetinoðlu, “foundations of non-muslim communities,” 406. 101 ecthr retroactive jurisdiction acknowledgment this work was made possible by a research grant (hu-hist-1289) from the armenian national science and education fund (ansef), based in new york, usa. 1 islamic solidarity on sale: the nagorno-karabakh conflict in the context of azerbaijan’s nation-branding endeavors naira e. sahakyan 1 anush s. brutian 2 3 1armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, armenia 2russian-armenian university, armenia 3center for culture and civilization studies, armenia abstract to reach their political goals, countries try to craft an image acceptable to the international community as reliable allies standing for similar values. since its independence, azerbaijan has been actively working on its branding as a country that bridges the west and the islamic world. to do this, azerbaijan creates its image as a secular, multicultural state and a leading state among islamic countries with a firm support of islamic solidarity. positioning azerbaijan as an advocate of islamic solidarity, ilham aliyev then embarks on the next step of his plan to demand the islamic world’s solidarity about the nagorno-karabakh conflict. thus, nation branding in the case of azerbaijan is not only about creating an image of a possible investment place or touristic destination; official baku “sells” its solidarity pursuing the political goal of getting the support of islamic countries against armenia․ keywords: nation branding, nagorno-karabakh, azerbaijan, islamic solidarity funding: the work was supported by a university of southern california research grant on the future of karabakh and the science committee mescs ra [21ag-6a081]. acknowledgment: the authors extend their gratitude to dr. harutyun marutyan, dr. vahram termatevosyan, and levon petrosyan sharing their ideas with us and commenting on the drafts of this article. we thank our anonymous reviewers who provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted the research. how to cite: naira sahakyan and anush brutian, “islamic solidarity on sale: the nagorno-karabakh conflict in the context of azerbaijan’s nation-branding endeavors,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 7, no. 2 (2022):147165. 2 introduction countries in the modern world strive to project-specific images that will make them desirable partners, investment hubs, tourist destinations, and political allies. this branding is how a country’s image can be created or changed, monitored, evaluated, and actively managed to improve its reputation with its target audience. after the independence, and especially since 2003 when ilham aliyev succeeded his father in the post of azerbaijan’s president,1 his country has put considerable efforts into the nation branding endeavours. through various channels, azerbaijan sought to create an image of a country as a bridge between east and west;2 the first democracy in the islamic world3, the victim of injustice of armenian aggression that successfully found enough strength to overcome the problem.4 the multi-ethnic character of azerbaijani society gives the country yet another tool to connect state branding with “multicultural” image-making. azerbaijan seeks to make multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity, and interreligious harmony trademarks of azerbaijani society. the branding of azerbaijan and the place of the nagorno-karabakh conflict in that we traced mainly in the speeches of ilham aliyev addressed to international audiences. thus, the primary source to analyse in this paper is ilham aliyev’s speeches published on the official webpage of the republic of azerbaijan’s president. these speeches ilham aliyev delivered during his two-decadelong reign, i.e., from his inauguration in 20035 to 2022. this paper considers issues related to the image of azerbaijan created by ilham aliyev and the connection of the nagorno-karabakh conflict in that nation branding process. we argue that natiօn-branding of azerbaijan is highly related to the nagorno-karabakh conflict. whenever aliyev stresses azerbaijan as a desirable partner and loyal, friendly state, he makes the next step forward, describing armenia as an unreliable and even an adversary state. by branding azerbaijan as a multicultural state and by stressing the islamic solidarity of azerbaijan, ilham aliyev seeks to create an image of a desired ally for the islamic-majority countries. 1 ilham aliyev was elected president of azerbaijan as a result of controversial election which was accompanied by “numerous instances of violent and excessive use of force by police, a pattern of intimidation against opposition supporters, journalists and others, which overshadowed the political atmosphere; the conditions for campaigning by governing party candidates and opposition candidates were manifestly unequal.” “international election observation mission presidential election, republic of azerbaijan – 15 october 2003, statement of preliminary findings and conclusion,” https://www.oscepa.org/ru/dokumenty/election-observation/election-observationstatements/azerbaijan/statements-3/1377-2003-presidential/file, accessed 01.03.2022. 2 “opening speech by ilham aliyev at the trilateral meeting of azerbaijani, iranian and russian presidents 8 august 2016,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/20843, accessed 12.03.2022. 3 “speech by ilham aliyev at the official reception on the occasion of the republic day 27 may, 2016,” accessed 22 september 2022, https://en.president.az/articles/19986; “speech by ilham aliyev at the opening of 5th news agencies world congress 16 november, 2016,” https://en.president.az/articles/21720, accessed 11.04.2022. 4 this idea can be traced in nearly every speech by aliyev. 5 “speech in the inauguration ceremony by ilham aliyev, president of the republic of azerbaijan october 31, 2003,” https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/en/2773818.html, accessed 11.04.2022. https://www.oscepa.org/ru/dokumenty/election-observation/election-observation-statements/azerbaijan/statements-3/1377-2003-presidential/file https://www.oscepa.org/ru/dokumenty/election-observation/election-observation-statements/azerbaijan/statements-3/1377-2003-presidential/file https://president.az/en/articles/view/20843 https://en.president.az/articles/19986 https://en.president.az/articles/21720 https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/en/2773818.html 3 the article has three main parts. the first one describes the theoretical bases on which the rest of the article operates. it represents the nation branding through which we analyse ilham aliyev’s speeches. it also connects these phenomena with the case of the azerbaijani nation branding activities in front of the islamic audience and its aspirations to get support in the nagorno-karabakh conflict. the second section investigates the state of islam in azerbaijan. here after a brief historical survey, we demonstrate how the state controls religious activities and use them whenever the need arises. the third part discusses the nagorno-karabakh conflict in the context of understanding islamic solidarity by ilham aliyev. nation branding and the case of azerbaijan in his brand new justice simon anholt writes: countries behave, in many ways, just like brands. they are perceived – rightly or wrongly – in certain ways by large groups of people at home and abroad; they are associated with certain qualities and characteristics. those perceptions can have a significant impact on the way that overseas consumers view their products, and the way they behave towards those countries in sports, politics, trade and cultural matters; it will affect their propensity to visit or relocate or invest there; their willingness to partner with such countries in international affairs; and whether they are more likely to interpret the actions and behaviours of those countries in a positive or a negative light. in short, the image of a country determines the way the world sees it and treats it. this image may be entirely accurate and fully justified, but it is more likely to be at least partly untrue and unfair, based on a whole mess of misunderstandings, prejudices, cultural differences and half-forgotten events from history.6 göran bolin per ståhlberg defines nation branding as “the phenomenon by which governments engage in self-conscious activities aimed at producing a certain image of the nation state.”7 this image is important in various spheres. around two decades ago, peter van ham noted that “crafting a brand is not only economically desirable, it has considerable political and strategic implications, affecting even the dynamic of nato and eu enlargement. the traditional diplomacy of yesteryear is disappearing. to do their jobs well in the future, politicians will have to train themselves in brand asset management. their tasks will be a finding a brand niche for their state, engaging in competitive marketing.”8 in this nation branding process, diplomacy plays a central role. mark 6 simon anholt, brand new justice: the upside of global branding (oxford: butterworth heinemann, 2003), 109. 7 göran bolin, per ståhlberg, “between community and commodity: nationalism and nation branding” in communicating the nation: national topographies of global media landscapes, eds. anna roosvall, inka salovaaramoring (gothenburg nordicom: university of gothenburg, 2010), 79-101. 8 peter van ham, “the rise of the brand state: the postmodern politics of image and reputation,” foreign affairs 80, no. 5 (2001): 2-6. 4 leonard stresses the role of public diplomacy; however, azerbaijan’s case demonstrates that traditional diplomacy can also play that role. in general, there are a group of impacts that diplomacy can achieve in the process of nation branding. among these impacts, one can mention a) creating positive perceptions of the country by the targeted group, b) strengthening ties, c) raising attractiveness as a destination for tourism, and c) obtaining investments.9 however, in the case of azerbaijan, there is an additional impact as well – getting support against armenia in the nagorno-karabakh conflict. in this theoretical research frame we will discuss the nation branding of azerbaijan in front of the islamic audience. as it was discussed above, branding is a cumulative and complex effort that requires countries to implement consistency and stability to achieve the desired image in the minds of their target audiences. azerbaijan embarked upon a number of nation branding initiatives, which aim to improve the national image, enhance its economic profile, and, more importantly, to receive support in the nagorno-karabakh conflict. the main goal was to change the image of azerbaijan from a backward post-soviet country to a bridge between the civilisations. thus, the main tactics, as will be seen below, are branding azerbaijan as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state and stressing, on the one hand, its solidarity with the islamic world, on the other hand, making it pioneer of democracy in the islamic world projecting a developed and strong country to pacify both east and west. however, as they can be traced in the speeches by aliyev, this service has its price – supporting azerbaijan in the context of the nagorno-karabakh conflict. islam, azerbaijan, and islamic azerbaijan before focusing on the speeches addressed to the islamic audiences, we would give a brief historical background of azerbaijani islam, given that a significant part of its 10 million population is muslim. furthermore, despite the positioning of azerbaijan as a secular state, islam is one of the essential markers of azerbaijani identity, for the target audiences of aliyev which is the framework of this research for islamic-majority countries. a significant part of the azerbaijani population constitutes muslim turks (91,6%). most of the minorities are also mainly muslims (lezgins – 2%, talysh – 1,3%, avars – 0.6 %, meskhetian turks – 0.4%, tatars – 0.3%, tats – 0.3%). these are the official data, in reality, the number of minorities is much higher, as both representatives of these minorities and researchers 9 mark leonard, catherine stead and conrad smewing, public diplomacy (london: the foreign policy center, 2002), 9-10. 5 claim. approximately 65% of muslims are shia (mainly twelvers10), and 35 percent are sunni.11 the survey from 2013 by the crrc demonstrates that “when asked about the importance of religion in their daily lives, however, a remarkable 80% of azerbaijanis indicated that religion played a ‘very’ or ‘rather’ important role in their lives, while less than 20% stated that religion was ‘not very’ or ‘not at all’ important.”12 it also should be noted that the same survey demonstrates that the “azerbaijanis’ active (i.e. institutionalised) religiosity as measured by mosque attendance and fasting is quite low.”13 this picture is the result of historical unrests that impacted the overall demography of the region and their perception of religions.14 “although dissemination of islamic belief in the territories of current day azerbaijan started in the middle of the 7th century a.d., formation of religious and ethnic identities here has always been a dynamic and complex process, 10 the term twelver refers to its adherents’ belief in twelve divinely ordained imams. they also believe that the last imam, imam al-mahdi, lives in occultation and will reappear. see, haider najam iftikhar, shi'i islam: an introduction (new york: cambridge university press, 2014). 11 altay goyushov, “azerbaijan,” in yearbook of muslims in europe 13, ed. stephanie mussig, egdunas racius (leiden: brill, 2022), 68. 12 “islam in azerbaijan: a sectarian approach to measuring religiosity,” http://crrccaucasus.blogspot.com/2013/10/islam-in-azerbaijan-sectarian-approach.html, accessed 18.05.2022. 13 ibid. 14 the territories of modern-day azerbaijan faced islam in the mid of 7th century when as a result of the early muslim conquests the caucasus became a part of the umayyad caliphate (661–750). it is not our goal to go deep into the historical cirqumstances of the transformation of the image of islam in azerbaijan. thus, here we will provide a very brief summery and bibliography for furture investigation. during the abbasid caliphate (750–1258), however, this large-scale arab state was fragmented and lost its former power. in the 11th century, the region came under the rule of the seljuks. the immigration of turkic tribes from central asia changes both the ethnic and religious features of the region. the seljuk-turks accepted islam, starting to follow the hanafi religious and legal school. during the reign of safavid iran, the shia twelver islam gradually spread in this region, which currently has a dominant position among the muslims of the territories of today’s azerbaijan. during this period, the territories of azerbaijan appear between the sunni ottoman empire and the shiite safavid iran, which has a corresponding effect on the religious image and later should play a role in azerbaijani political environment. with the expansion of the russian empire to the caucasus, sunni islam expanded its influence. the naqshbandi sufi brotherhood began to play a major role among the muslims here. in 1870s the tsarist government established separate governing institutions for the shi'a and the sunni. this phase was, in general, the institutionalisation of islam in the russian empire. late imperial era was overlaped with the rise of nationalistic feelings among the people of the caucasus. unlike armenians and georgians who had their culturally and religiously grounded identity, the muslim people of the caucasus had a road to cross in search of identity. at the begining the dominant identity marker of the muslims of the modern day azerbaijan was turkic and only during several next decades the invention of azerbaijani identity occured. the establishment of the first republics in the south caucasus, the conflicts between the ethnic groups and in some sense the complicated relations between the ottomans and the muslims of the caucasus contributed to the formation of that identity where the religion continued to play a central role․ in the last decades of the existence of the russian empire, the reform movement gained great popularity among the muslim population, one of the essential elements of its speech was the criticism of the traditional education system. this circumstance also had its impact on the development of the secular intelligentsia. jo van steenbergen, a history of the islamic world 600-1800: empire dynastic formations and heterogeneities in pre-modern islamic west-asia (abingdon oxon: routledge taylor & francis group, 2020); andrew peacock, early seljuq history: a new interpretation (new york: routledge, 2013); peter golden, an introduction to the history of the turkic peoples: ethnogenesis and state-formation in medieval and early modern eurasia and the middle east (wiesbaden: otto harrassowitz, 1992); vladimir bobrovnikov, “islam in the russian empire” in the cambridge history of russia, ed. dominic lieven, (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006), 202-24; svante cornell, azerbaijan since independence (new york: m. e. sharpe armonk, 2011), 15-30. http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2013/10/islam-in-azerbaijan-sectarian-approach.html http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.com/2013/10/islam-in-azerbaijan-sectarian-approach.html 6 which has gone through numerous changes over the course of a long, rich history, ultimately laying the foundations for the current situation.”15 during the soviet years, the position of islam in azerbaijan began to weaken. in the ussr, religion was considered the opium of the people (opium des volkes), as karl marx coined it, and a phenomenon hindering the construction of communism. in the pre-revolutionary period, there were about 3.000 mosques in the territory of azerbaijan, and already in 1933, that number was reduced to 17. however, in the years of perestroika (the 1980s) and especially in the post-soviet period, azerbaijan experienced a great religious awakening. a large number of new mosques were built, old ones were reopened, and dozens of religious organisations were registered. this will help azerbaijan to join the family of muslim-majority countries, to use these relations in diplomacy, and serve these relations its interests despite the stress of being a secular state.16 paralleled to the establishment of the secular state, azerbaijan also started positioning itself as a muslim country. in 1993, kurban bayram began to be celebrated in azerbaijan, and the qur’an was translated into azerbaijani. this growth of religious feelings impacts the foreign policy of azerbaijan as well, for azerbaijan positioned itself as a part of the islamic world.17 however, azerbaijani leadership navigates between the shia and the sunni islamic world. the regime's support brings islam under the state’s supervision.18 the rest of the religious activities are being repressed by the azerbaijani authorities. for example, the islamic party of azerbaijan, founded in 1991 and registered in 1992, was closed in 1995 because this organisation was accused of mixing religion and politics during municipal elections and receiving foreign funding from iran. a year later, four members of this party were arrested on charges of anti-state activities and sentenced to several years in prison. the sunni-shia divide has also become an essential part of the foreign power politics. the islamic republic of iran, the republic of turkey, and the countries of the middle east are actively trying to create spheres of influence in this direction. especially active is iran, which has been trying to neutralise azerbaijani nationalism which targets azerbaijani-speaking iranians as well. previously, this policy was carried out openly in nakhichevan and the apsheron region. for religious propaganda, iran uses its mullahs and pro-iranian mosques in the south of azerbaijan 15 altay goyushov, “islam in azerbaijan (historical background),” caucasus analytical digest 44 (2012): 2-4. 16 the article 7 of the constitution of the republic of azerbaijan (adopted on 12 of november 1995) describes azerbaijan as a secular country. 17 altay goyushov, “azerbaijan,” in yearbook of muslims in europe 11, ed. oliver scharbrodt (leiden: brill, 2019). 18 vahram ter-matevosyan, nelli minasyan, “praying under restrictions: islam, identity and social change in azerbaijan,” europe-asia studies 69, no. 5 (2017): 819-837. 7 and areas like nardaran, one of the most religious places in the country or “a bastion of devout shia muslims” as eldar mamedov put it.19 in the 1990s, when heydar aliyev banned the propaganda of iranian mullahs, iran changed its policy. it began to carry out the propaganda through pro-iranian azerbaijani mullahs, very often at cultural and public events. due to these changes, iran maintains its influence in the south of azerbaijan, significantly exceeding the number of mosques in other regions. in this case, it is also important to emphasise that the mentioned southern regions are the homeland of talysh and tat peoples.20 tehran also finances azerbaijanis who want to study shia theology. much like iran, other islamic countries also try to use islam as a soft power tool in azerbaijan. while turkey and iran influence the spread of politicised sunni and shia islam in azerbaijan, saudi arabia spreads influences of salafi sunni islam. the number of sunnis in azerbaijan, however, is increasing. in addition to azerbaijanis, the sunni population is also made up of national minorities, which mainly live in the northern region near the north caucasus. these peoples were primarily divided into two parts after the collapse of the ussr one part remained in the russian federation, and the other in azerbaijan. lezgis, avars, rutuls, tsakhurs, etc. belong to their rank. in azerbaijan, aliyev’s regime fully controls the country’s religious life, banning everything that is not in line with the state-backed variation of islam. the state control extends to both mosques and islamic educational institutions. significantly, the case of the baku islamic university case vividly demonstrates the state’s control over the religion rather than the freedom and harmony about which aliyev loves to talk. the baku islamic university, under the religious administration of caucasian muslims, has been operating for 20 years. university has islamic studies and sharia faculties. seeking to reduce the role of any authority, including the religious authority such as shaykh al-islam, aliyev set out to close the university and established a similar institute but now under his complete control. several representatives of the azerbaijani government expressed their displeasure regarding the quality of education at this university. this was a signal that profound changes are expected. already in 2018 that change happened. by order of the president of azerbaijan, the institute of theology of azerbaijan, which was already under government control, was opened. 19 eldar mamedov “azerbaijan: examining the source of discontent in nardaran,” eurasianet, 8 december 2015, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-examining-the-source-of-discontent-in-nardaran; mike runey, “azerbaijan's nardaran affair,” open democracy, 24 august 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/nardaran-affair/ , accessed 25.05.2022. 20 garnik asatrian, habib borjian, “talish and the talishis (the state of research),” iran & the caucasus 9, no. 1 (2005): 43–72, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4030905. https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-examining-the-source-of-discontent-in-nardaran https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/nardaran-affair/ http://www.jstor.org/stable/4030905 8 on the other hand, baku islamic university announced that it will not accept new students and will only operate until the current students graduate. moreover, the faculty of theology of baku state university also joined the new institute. through the foundation for the preservation of moral values, azerbaijan spends a lot of money to control religious education. these actions naturally left their mark on the relationship between sheikh al-islam allahshukur pashazadeh and the azerbaijani leadership since the baku islamic university was essentially under the latter's control, while the new institute was not. since the state seeks to control the religious organisation of the country, these organisations become the continuation of state politics in the case of the nagorno-karabakh conflict. since the early 1990s, more or less independent and oppositional religious islamic organisations have been proponents of war with armenia and frequently criticised the government for not launching the war against armenia.21 this perhaps can be considered a political step that is not about the war but against the aliyev regime. however, the situation gradually changed in recent years, and statebacked organisations also started expressing support for the war. for instance, haji shahin hasanli22 – a shi’i preacher and a representative of the sheikh al-islam in a district of the capital baku – articulated the significance of vengeance and the certainty of a future war with armenia.23 this gradual turn demonstrates how the state discourse is disseminated through religious organisations. azerbaijan tries to keep its political field away from islamization and uses islam only to reach its goals, such as support of the islamic countries in the nagorno-karabakh conflict. to do this, azerbaijan joined the branding bandwagon of states trying to sell itself as a bridge between the east and west where it can use its islamic and secular identities in a single package. while branding azerbaijan as a religiously harmonious, multicultural, and secular country, ilham aliyev stresses azerbaijani islamic solidarity in his speeches, linking it with the nagorno-karabakh conflict as a sphere where his audience should help him. this is especially obvious in his speeches in the islamic audiences, where he demands the same solidarity toward azerbaijan to fight armenia. the following paragraphs of the paper will investigate these branding steps deeper. 21 altay goyushov, “azerbaijan,” in yearbook of muslims in europe 13, ed. stephanie mussig, egdunas racius (leiden: brill, 2022), 56. 22 haji shahin hasanli, “on 8 november 2022 haji shahin hasanli was awarded with an honorary decree by the ministry of defense” facebook, 8 november 2022, https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=674700967351527&set=a.256363962518565. 23 hacı şahin həsənli. “şəhidlərimizin intiqamı alınmalıdır,” [“our martyrs must be avenged”] day.az. https://news.day.az/azerinews/1096612.html, accessed 01.09.2022. https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=674700967351527&set=a.256363962518565 https://news.day.az/azerinews/1096612.html 9 aliyev’s discourse on islamic solidarity in january 2017, azerbaijani president ilham aliyev signed an order declaring the year 2017 a year of islamic solidarity.24 “the order says azerbaijan was one of the main centres of islamic civilization for many centuries. the country played an important role in spreading out the religion of islam and reestablishing the islamic renaissance.”25 throughout that year and after that, aliyev will often mention the idea of islamic solidarity in many of his speeches, making it a special tool for the azerbaijani nation branding campaign.26 nevertheless, our research demonstrates that this idea was a key component in getting the support of muslim-majority countries in the conflict over nagorno-karabakh. this link we will discuss in the next paragraphs of this research. one of the key audiences for aliyev’s foreign speeches is the so-called islamic world, which largely consists of the organization for islamic cooperation members. here, aliyev’s speeches are mainly dedicated to azerbaijan’s islamic solidarity.27 this idea of islamic solidarity, however, is a melting pot. in his speeches, aliyev tries to accumulate all the things needed for azerbaijan in this dimension, representing it as a part of islamic solidarity. according to ilham aliyev, islamic solidarity is based on shared values, and unity among the muslim world, which also means addressing similar issues on an international platform. notably, in one of his speeches aliyev said: the people of azerbaijan have preserved their national and spiritual values over the centuries. islamic values are an integral part of our national and spiritual values. the tranquility and mutual understanding observed in the religious sphere in our country, 24 “president ilham aliyev declares 2017 year of islamic solidarity,” azər tac, 10 january 2017, https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_declares_2017_year_of_islamic_solidarity-1025354; “meeting on declaration of 2017 “year of islamic solidarity’ held by cabinet of ministers in baku,” azvision, 14 january 2017, https://en.azvision.az/news/56584/meeting-on-declaration-of-2017-year-of-islamic-solidarity-held-by-cabinet-ofministers-in-baku-.html, accessed 10.09.2022. 25 “president ilham aliyev signed order on declaration of 2017 year of islamic solidarity,” azər tac, 10 january 2017, https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_signed_order_on_declaration_of_2017_year_of_islamic_soli darity-1025501, accessed 10.09.2022. 26 “speech by ilham aliyev at the first summit on science and technology of organization of islamic cooperation in astana 10 september 2017, https://president.az/en/articles/view/25189.; “speech by ilham aliyev at receptions of ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions of muslim countries in azerbaijan 13 june 2017,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/24398; “speech by ilham aliyev at the conference on oic emergency summit on jerusalem 13 december 2017, ”, https://president.az/en/articles/view/26561; “speech by ilham aliyev at the reception of the heads of diplomatic missions and international organizations of muslim countries in azerbaijan on the occasion of the holy month of ramadan 08 june 2016, https://president.az/en/articles/view/20241; “speech by ilham aliyev at the opening of the 12th session of isesco general conference 26 november 2015,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/17313, accessed 31.09.2022. 27 the article “position of the organization of islamic cooperation on nagorno-karabakh conflict” by araks pashayan discusses activities and resolutions of this organization in detail. araks pashayan, «իսլամական համագործակցություն կազմակերպության դիրքորոշումը արցախյան հակամարտության հարցում» [position of the organization of islamic cooperation on nagorno-karabakh conflict] mertdzavor ev mijin arevelki erkrner ev zhoghovurdner v xxxiii, no. 2 (2020): 181-205. https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_declares_2017_year_of_islamic_solidarity-1025354 https://en.azvision.az/news/56584/meeting-on-declaration-of-2017-year-of-islamic-solidarity-held-by-cabinet-of-ministers-in-baku-.html https://en.azvision.az/news/56584/meeting-on-declaration-of-2017-year-of-islamic-solidarity-held-by-cabinet-of-ministers-in-baku-.html https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_signed_order_on_declaration_of_2017_year_of_islamic_solidarity-1025501 https://azertag.az/en/xeber/president_ilham_aliyev_signed_order_on_declaration_of_2017_year_of_islamic_solidarity-1025501 https://president.az/en/articles/view/17313 10 the unity among muslims, and the regulation of interreligious relations at a high level – all these are factors strengthening our country today.28 in parallel with the so-called spiritual enrichment of the term islamic solidarity, in 2010, there was an idea of mixing it with the financial and economic systems29. in the 35th annual meeting of the islamic development bank group, the economic and financial development are highlighted as a basis for azerbaijan’s progress and strengthening of its regional and international cooperation potential, including the energy sphere (oil and gas projects). during the speech, the azerbaijani president mentioned the support of the organisation, and its assistance during the difficult years for the country. earlier in 2009, the year of “baku – the capital of islamic culture2009,”30 there was an idea formulated as “unification of muslim world” that was probably developed into islamic solidarity through the azerbaijani authorities’ lens, giving the open space for further discussions. the role of mutual trade and in addition to other economic and political cooperation was pointed as a factor strengthening islamic solidarity, giving some foundation for the discussion on the unity of muslim countries as a part of islamic solidarity. nevertheless, in many cases, this islamic solidarity is limited by cultural events. for instance, the islamic solidarity games, organised by azerbaijan, became another platform where aliyev was putting some extra emphasis on emotional ties.31 every event is demonstrated as a manifestation of these ideas, and this is nothing but a product-based branding of the country as a platform where azerbaijan represents itself in the light that serves political ambitions of aliyev. while declaring the importance of “unity among muslims,” aliyev’s azerbaijan is at the same time quite pragmatic in his actions. it does not tie itself with activities that can harm the nonislamic affairs of the country. this is especially true about azerbaijan’s relations with israel, which is a sensitive issue for iran and palestine. the links between israel and azerbaijan were established on 7 april 1992 and the next year, 1993, israel opened its embassy in baku. azerbaijan, however, did not open its embassy in israel. the reasons preventing opening of that mission in israel, indeed, were its closeness to iran and its membership in oic. 28 “speech by ilham aliyev at the opening ceremony of the conference on '2017year of islamic solidarity: interfaith and intercultural dialogue 21 december 2017,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/26557, accessed 01.09.2022. 29 “speech by ilham aliyev at the opening ceremony of the 35th annual meeting of islamic development bank group 23 june 2010" accessed september 21, 2022, https://president.az/en/articles/view/269, accessed 10.08.2022. 30 “speech by president ilham aliyev at the official opening of the 'baku – capital of islamic culture-2009' year of culture 18 february 2009,” http://archive.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20100511111125939&sec_id=11, accessed 10.09.2022. 31 “speech by ilham aliyev at the reception of the heads of diplomatic missions and international organizations of muslim countries in azerbaijan on the occasion of the holy month of ramadan 08 june, 2016,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/20241; “speech by ilham aliyev at the first session of 13th summit of organization of islamic cooperation in istanbul 14 april, 2016,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/19728; “speech by ilham aliyev at the first summit on science and technology of organization of islamic cooperation in astana – september 10, 2017,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/25189, accessed 26.09.2022. https://president.az/en/articles/view/26557 https://president.az/en/articles/view/269 http://archive.president.az/articles.php?item_id=20100511111125939&sec_id=11 https://president.az/en/articles/view/19728 https://president.az/en/articles/view/25189 11 nevertheless, since the relations between azerbaijan and israel are pragmatic and based on mutual benefits, israel demonstrated an understanding of these circumstance. at the same time, the two countries pursued multi-level cooperation in the spheres such as security, military procurement, and energy.32 especially, the military and security spheres occupy the lion’s share of these bilateral relations.33 this situation changed after the 2020 war in nagorno-karabakh and skyrocketing tensions between azerbaijan and iran in 2022. on 18 november 2022 when baku made a historic decision to open azerbaijan’s embassy in the israeli capital of tel aviv.34 as vasif huseynov writes, “until now, azerbaijan had refused to reciprocate the opening of an israeli embassy in baku (29 august 1993), most assuredly so as not to alienate the other muslim countries in the region and to ensure their support in the ongoing armenian-azerbaijani conflict.”35 here we would agree with huseynov. azerbaijan’s discourse on islamic solidarity especially developed in the speeches at the oic platforms, was pursuing a goal “to ensure their support” in the nagorno-karabakh conflict rather than unite muslims or preserve islamic values. while demonstrating azerbaijan as a part of the islamic world, aliyev also tries to show its superiority among other islamic countries. aliyev seeks to demonstrate that azerbaijan is a pioneer among the muslim countries. for instance, whenever he speaks about the first republic of azerbaijan, he mentions that this republic was the first democratic republic in the muslim world.36 besides this notion, he also finds other cases to stress the role of azerbaijan in the islamic world. for example, he mentions the visit of the pope or the relations with the vatican as something that makes azerbaijan a leader among muslim countries.37 32 alexander murinson, “israeli-azerbaijani diplomatic ties: respect for mutual sensitivities,” the ties between israel and azerbaijan (begin-sadat center for strategic studies: 2014): 14-19, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04730.7. 33 alexander murinson, “military and security cooperation: navigating dangerous waters together,” the ties between israel and azerbaijan (begin-sadat center for strategic studies, 2014): 21-26, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04730.9. 34 samira abdullayeva, “azerbaijani parliament approves opening of embassies of azerbaijan in israel, albania and kenya,” report news agency, https://report.az/en/milli-majlis/milli-majlis-approves-opening-of-embassies-ofazerbaijan-in-israel-albania-and-kenya/, accessed 08.10.2022. 35 vasif huseynov, “in unprecedented move, baku opens embassy in tel aviv publication,” eurasia daily monitor 19 no. 178, https://jamestown.org/program/in-unprecedented-move-baku-opens-embassy-in-tel-aviv/, accessed 08.10.2022. 36 “speech by ilham aliyev at the official reception on the occasion of the republic day 27 may, 2016,” https://en.president.az/articles/19986; “speech by ilham aliyev at the opening of 5th news agencies world congress 16 november, 2016,” https://en.president.az/articles/21720, accessed 10.10.2022. 37 “speech by ilham aliyev in front of representatives of the general public at the heydar aliyev center 2 october, 2016,” https://en.president.az/articles/21268; “speech by ilham aliyev at the iftar ceremony on the occasion of holy month of ramadan 20 june, 2017,” https://en.president.az/articles/24399, accessed 08.09.2022. https://report.az/en/milli-majlis/milli-majlis-approves-opening-of-embassies-of-azerbaijan-in-israel-albania-and-kenya/ https://report.az/en/milli-majlis/milli-majlis-approves-opening-of-embassies-of-azerbaijan-in-israel-albania-and-kenya/ https://jamestown.org/program/in-unprecedented-move-baku-opens-embassy-in-tel-aviv/ https://en.president.az/articles/19986 https://en.president.az/articles/21720 https://en.president.az/articles/21268 https://en.president.az/articles/24399 12 the price of solidarity: the nagorno karabakh ցonflict in the azerbaijani agenda of the islamic world this nation branding itself as a leading member of the islamic world, stands with the other members of the “islamic family” and pursues political goals, among which the nagorno-karabakh conflict is the key one. aliyev uses a large audience of islamic-majority countries to present his attitude toward the nagorno-karabakh conflict. here he is incredibly successful given that armenia is not represented in this arena. thus, it is one of the audiences where azerbaijan’s picture exists without a balancing armenian one. here, we will discuss ilham aliyev’s speeches mainly addressed to islamic-majority audiences. one of the key audiences, as it was mentioned, is the organization of islamic cooperation.38 azerbaijan has been a member of the organisation since 1992. since then, the nagorno-karabakh conflict has become one of the actively discussed topics of the organisation. azerbaijan, financing and hosting many activities of the organisation, such as the islamic solidarity games, secured the acceptance of several anti-armenian resolutions.39 given that armenia has no representative in the organisation, azerbaijan has no opposition here and azerbaijan fully manipulates its discourse. in his speeches at the oic meetings, ilham aliyev highlights azerbaijan as a part of the islamic world and as a bridge between the islamic east and the west. nevertheless, this organisation’s impact is spreading beyond its borders as well since azerbaijan coordinates its steps against armenia in other places. for example, many islamic countries support azerbaijan in the un. ilham aliyev mentions this in his speeches: 38 organization of islamic cooperation (oic) is the second largest organization after the united nations with a membership of 57 states spread over four continents. the organization is the collective voice of the muslim world. it endeavors to safeguard and protect the interests of the muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world. the organization was established upon a decision of the historical summit which took place in rabat, kingdom of morocco on 12th rajab 1389 hijra (25 september 1969) following the criminal arson of al-aqsa mosque in occupied jerusalem. in 1970, the first ever meeting of islamic conference of foreign minister (icfm) was held in jeddah which decided to establish a permanent secretariat in jeddah headed by the organization’s secretary general. amb. hissein brahim taha is the 12th secretary general who assumed the office in november 2021. the oic charter was adopted by the 3rd icfm session held in 1972. the charter laid down the objectives and principles of the organization and fundamental purposes to strengthen the solidarity and cooperation among the member states. over the last 40 years, the membership has grown from its founding members of 30 to 57 states. “history of organization of islamic cooperation”, organization of islamic cooperation,” https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en, accessed 08.09.2022. 39 “final communique of the 7th session of the islamic summit conference casablanca, morocco (13-15 december 1994),” https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docid=4320&refid=1212; “final communique of the 8th session of the islamic summit conference tehran, iran (9-11 december 1997),” http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/8/8th-issummits.htm#final%20%20communique; “final communique of the 9th session of the islamic summit conference doha, qatar (12-13 november 2000),” http://ww1.oic-oci.org/english/conf/is/9/9th-is-sumfinal_communique.htm; “resolution no.21/9-p(is) on the aggression of the republic of armenia against the republic of azerbaijan,” resolution on political affairs adopted by the twenty-ninth session of the islamic conference of foreign ministers, june 25-27, 2002, https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docid=4283&refid=1182, accessed 01.10.2022. https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docid=4283&refid=1182 13 cooperation with muslim countries is one of the priorities of our foreign policy. i emphasised this while talking about foreign policy priorities at the official reception dedicated to the republic day. at the same time, we successfully cooperate and always support each other in international organisations. whenever issues related to azerbaijan are discussed in the un, we feel the support of muslim countries. for our part, we always support muslim countries in the united nations. during the summit of the organization of islamic cooperation in istanbul in april, we demonstrated this solidarity once again. as you know, the summit adopted a very serious document related to the armenia-azerbaijan nagorno-karabakh conflict.40 in front of this audiences, aliyev uses vocabulary entirely understandable to them and stresses the spheres where the goals of azerbaijan and the oic overlap. in particular, fighting islamophobia, dialogue with the rest of the world, and preserving the islamic heritage are the main narratives aliyev supports. in all these cases, aliyev makes a two-step move. first, he highlights the role of azerbaijan in the islamic world. then he jumps to the nagorno-karabakh conflict demanding or appreciating solidarity from the other members of the oic.41 azerbaijan considers cooperation with islamic countries a priority. in recent years, baku has hosted about 10 summits of ministers of foreign affairs, culture, tourism, education, and labor of oic member countries. i highly appreciate the activity of the oic in terms of mutual support and solidarity. islamophobia today is one of the most serious threats in the world. we strongly condemn this trend. islam is actually a religion of peace, mercy, tolerance and justice. the identification of islam with terrorism is an erroneous and biased approach. it is muslim countries that suffer from terrorism the most. dear participants of the summit! i would like to draw your attention to the armenianazerbaijani nagorno-karabakh conflict. for more than 20 years, armenia has pursued an aggressive policy against azerbaijan. as a result of this policy, 20 percent of azerbaijan’s territory, including nagorno-karabakh and seven adjacent districts, has been occupied. a policy of ethnic cleansing has been carried out on these lands. more 40 “speech by ilham aliyev at the reception of the heads of diplomatic missions and international organizations of muslim countries in azerbaijan on the occasion of the holy month of ramadan 8 june 2016,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/20241, accessed 08.09.2022. 41 “speech by ilham aliyev at the first session of 13th summit of organization of islamic cooperation in istanbul 14 april 2016,” https://en.president.az/articles/19728; “speech by ilham aliyev at the first summit on science and technology of organization of islamic cooperation in astana 10 september 2017,” https://president.az/en/articles/view/25189, accessed 12.09.2022. https://president.az/en/articles/view/20241 https://en.president.az/articles/19728 https://president.az/en/articles/view/25189 14 than a million of our compatriots have become refugees and internally displaced persons. armenia has committed the khojaly genocide. the international community and international organisations recognise the territorial integrity of azerbaijan and are in favor of a fair settlement of the conflict in accordance with international law. the un security council has adopted four resolutions in connection with the conflict. these resolutions demand an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the armenian forces from azerbaijani lands. similar decisions and resolutions have been adopted by the non-aligned movement, the osce, the parliamentary assembly of the council of europe, and other organisations. i would like to once again express my sincere appreciation to the oic for its fair resolution supporting a settlement of the armenian-azerbaijani nagorno-karabakh conflict within the framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of azerbaijan. however, aggressive armenia ignores these resolutions and regularly resorts to armed provocations to disrupt the process of negotiations. one of them was carried out in early april. as a result of an armed attack, azerbaijani soldiers and civilians were killed. the oic has decided to establish a contact group at the level of foreign ministers to deal with armenia’s aggression against azerbaijan. thank you for this decision.42 when talking to the other organisation members, he mainly appreciates their actions to help azerbaijan against armenia. however, when he is talking to the azerbaijani audiences about the role of muslim countries, he starts stating that since azerbaijan is a part of the muslim world, they have to show solidarity. in this case, aliyev presents muslim mosques as not only azerbaijani heritage but islamic in general. for example, in one of his speeches in front of the families of war victims, aliyev accuses leaders of muslim countries who visit armenia, saying, “what kind of contacts can there be with armenia, which is responsible for the destruction of muslim mosques? … we say openly that solidarity should be not in words, but in deeds.”43 aliyev here stresses the price of islamic solidarity that he has in his mind, which is nothing else but the subject of political trade. the same lexicon is followed in other speeches addressed to this inner audience.44 unlike these speeches, phrasing completely differs when he talks to an islamic audience outside azerbaijan. indeed, he does not say anything critical to the muslem leaders visits to 42 “speech by ilham aliyev at the first session of 13th summit of organization of islamic cooperation in istanbul 14 april 2016,” https://en.president.az/articles/19728, accessed 08.09.2022. 43 “speech by ilham aliyev at the ceremony to give out apartments and cars to families of martyrs and war disabled 21 july 2020,” https://en.president.az/articles/39951, accessed 08.09.2022. 44 “speech by ilham aliyev at the ceremony to mark 100th anniversary of baku state university 26 november 2019,” https://en.president.az/articles/34985, accessed 10.09.2022. https://en.president.az/articles/19728 https://en.president.az/articles/39951 https://en.president.az/articles/34985 15 armenia. here, he stresses that armenia cannot be a friend, and rather muslim countries should not befriend armenia.45 for example, he states, "muslims of the world should know that armenia, which has destroyed our sacred mosques, cannot be a friend of muslim countries.”46 another example from the speech by aliyev at the 7th summit of cooperation council of turkic-speaking states: armenia is trying to establish close cooperation with muslim countries. however, having destroyed mosques sacred to muslims around the world, armenia cannot be a friend of muslim countries. the vandalism against our religion shows the islamophobic essence of armenia.47 aliyev positions himself as a strong leader who can talk to other state heads demanding solidarity. with this macho image, he mobilises masculinity as a resource in statecraft. these speeches demonstrate that aliyev sells azerbaijani islamic solidarity. he first positions azerbaijan as a leading member of the “islamic family of countries,” describing azerbaijan as a most reliable ally and a road to development and strength. after that, he raises the question of the nagornokarabakh conflict and vividly demands support in that conflict in return for azerbaijan’s islamic solidarity. conclusion nations work to make an image that will be acknowledged within the world community as a reliable partner maintaining the same beliefs to attain their political targets. since 1991, azerbaijan has made a concerted exertion to position itself as a multicultural country that serves as a crossroad between the west and the islamic world. to do this, azerbaijan develops a picture of itself as a country that is an advocate of islamic solidarity. coming back to the words of simon anhold, it becomes evident during the azerbaijani nation branding aliyev crafts an image that is “at least partly untrue and unfair, based on a whole mess of misunderstandings, prejudices, cultural differences, and half-forgotten events from history.”48 45 in his speeches, ilham aliyev periodically dehumanize armenians in his speeches. more see, naira sahakyan. “the rhetorical face of enmity: the nagorno-karabakh conflict and the dehumanization of armenians in the speeches by ilham aliyev,” southeast european and black sea studies, (november 2022): 9-13. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2022.2153402. 46 “speech by ilham aliyev at the conference on oic emergency summit on jerusalem 13 december 2017,” https://en.president.az/articles/26561, accessed 12.09.2022. 47 “speech by ilham aliyev at the7th summit of cooperation council of turkic-speaking states 15 october 2019,” https://en.president.az/articles/34458, accessed 11.09.2022. 48 anholt, brand new justice, 109. https://en.president.az/articles/26561 https://en.president.az/articles/34458 16 while crafting azerbaijan's image, aliyev tries to emphasise his country as an example of multiculturalism where the inter-religious dialogue succeeded. for this purpose, the azerbaijani president actively uses religion-related platforms to a) present itself as a multi-religious country with strong support of islamic solidarity and b) highlights its leading role among the muslim countries. this dual nature, in understanding aliyev, is a key to making azerbaijan a needed connecting link between islamic countries and the rest of the world. “we want interreligious dialogue to strengthen in the muslim world, in europe, and throughout the world in general.49” while examining the nation branding in azerbaijan, we identified the discourse of islamic solidarity as a vital component of that brand. the link between this nation branding component and the nagorno-karabakh conflict looks significant. when aliyev positions azerbaijan as a leading country in the islamic world and brands it as a state with solid islamic solidarity, the next step is demanding support from those islamic countries in the nagorno-karabakh conflict. this idea is a key in the speeches by ilham aliyev addressed to islamic-majority audiences, where he describes azerbaijan as a member of the islamic community and a defender and preserver of islamic cultural heritage. at the same time, by posing azerbaijan between the islamic east and the west, aliyev nominates azerbaijan as a connecting link and essentially offers its services. however, the following paragraphs of his speech usually demonstrate the price for that service – the support of the islamic world in the conflict against armenia for nagorno-karabakh. that support aliyev seeks to obtain political isolation of armenia and resolutions condemning armenia as an aggressor state. bibliography "opening speech by ilham aliyev at the trilateral meeting of azerbaijani, iranian and russian presidents 8 august 2016." accessed september 15, 2022. 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"azerbaijan's nardaran affair." open democracy, august 24, 2016. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/nardaran-affair/. sahakyan, naira. “the rhetorical face of enmity: the nagorno-karabakh conflict and the dehumanisation of armenians in the speeches by ilham aliyev.” southeast european and black sea studies, (november 2022): 9-13. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2022.2153402. van ham, peter. “the rise of the brand state: the postmodern politics of image and reputation.” foreign affairs 80, no. 5. (sep.-oct., 2001): 2-6. abdullayeva, samira. “azerbaijani parliament approves opening of embassies of azerbaijan in israel, albania and kenya.” report news agency (november 18, 2022). https://report.az/en/milli-majlis/milli-majlis-approves-opening-ofembassies-of-azerbaijan-in-israel-albania-and-kenya/. anholt, simon. brand new justice: the upside of global branding. gothenburg nordicom: butterworth heinemann, 2003. cornell, svante. azerbaijan since independence. m. e. sharpe armonk: new york, 2011. ter-matevosyan, vahram, minasyan, nelli. “praying under restrictions: islam, identity and social change in azerbaijan.” europe-asia studies 69, no. 5 (2017): 819-837. huseynov, vasif․ “in unprecedented move, baku opens embassy in tel aviv publication,” eurasia daily monitor 19, no. 178 (november 20, 2022)․ https://jamestown.org/program/in-unprecedented-move-baku-opens-embassy-in-telaviv/. bobrovnikov, vladimir․ “islam in the russian empire․” in the cambridge history of russia, edited dominic lieven. cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521815291.012 about the author(s) dr naira sahakyan is a senior researcher at the armenian genocide museum-institute and a visiting scholar at the university of cambridge. she is also lecturing at the aua and ysu. anush brutian is a junior researcher at the center for culture and civilization studies and a phd student at the russian-armenian university. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/nardaran-affair/ https://report.az/en/milli-majlis/milli-majlis-approves-opening-of-embassies-of-azerbaijan-in-israel-albania-and-kenya/ https://report.az/en/milli-majlis/milli-majlis-approves-opening-of-embassies-of-azerbaijan-in-israel-albania-and-kenya/ https://jamestown.org/program/in-unprecedented-move-baku-opens-embassy-in-tel-aviv/ https://jamestown.org/program/in-unprecedented-move-baku-opens-embassy-in-tel-aviv/ 5 welcome note dear reader, we are pleased to introduce you to our inaugural issue of the international journal of armenian genocide studies (ijags). this is the fi rst inter-disciplinary, academic peer review journal in english exploring a wide range of topics about the armenian genocide. the journal will however not be limited to exploring issues concerning the armenian genocide, but aims to explore a broader range of topics in genocide studies. we at ijags recognize and embrace the responsibilities that come with the launch of this academic enterprise. we envision this journal as a signifi cant step towards featuring and disseminating innovative and recent academic research on the armenian genocide to a broader audience. we also see this as an important to bring together emerging scholars to a space in which critical and collegial exchanges can take place. at the threshold of the centennial of the armenian genocide the publication of this journal can also be conceived as a long term initiative enabling the next generation of genocide scholars to develop new insights and research approaches in the study of all genocides and their consequences. ijags aims to secure a fi rm place in the global fi ght against the crime of the genocide and the scourge and grave danger of denial. ijags will fi ght against denial of any genocide. we envision this endeavor as part of the challenge of establishing early warnings and working towards prevention for the sake of global security. unfortunately, today we still face the dangers of emerging genocides. there is a sad reality of the possibility of other genocides in the 21st century. this is evident in the violent rhetoric that often accompanies global relations, in the continued injustices suffered by vulnerable populations around the world, in the indifference to these challenges and in the phenomenon of denial. the destructive forces of genocide compel us to collaborate and share resources so that the next generation can more effectively work on prevention of this terrible crime against humanity and civilization. we welcome our colleagues in the global community of genocide scholars to disseminate new fi ndings and academic research on the pages of the international journal of armenian genocide studies. hayk demoyan director of the armenian genocide museum-institute 6 from the editor the conflicts surrounding the safety and security of artsakh date back more than a century. the search for solutions has been accompanied by negotiations and debate in the upper echelons of government, various referendums and popular movements, bloody clashes and military operations. the relative stability of the last three decades was broken in 2020 by the war of aggression initiated by the republic of azerbaijan. as a result of this conflict, a number of territories, including a part of the nagorno-karabagh autonomous region (shushi and hadrut), rich in tangible heritage and monuments of armenian culture fell under the control of the azerbaijani side. the active military phase of the war ended with the announcement signed on 9 november 2020, but the aggression of the azerbaijani side has not stopped. azerbaijani encroachments have continued towards internationally recognized territory of the republic of armenia – a part of which now remains under illegal azerbaijani occupation. both during and after the war, we have witnessed attempts at ethnic cleansing; a practice that highlights a dangerous resurgence of genocidal action. an alarm about a possible genocide was sounded by organizations such as genocide watch and the lemkin institute for genocide prevention. this alarm was raised once again during the september aggression unleashed by azerbaijan against armenia in 2022, which shows the continuation of the use of violence by azerbaijan; violence which has manifested both through active military operations and the blockade of artsakh by false “activists” who infringe on people’s rights to free movement and safe living conditions without disruption or harassment. official azerbaijani propaganda, based on lies and falsehoods and accompanied by expressions of open racism and xenophobia, attempts to distort and appropriate armenian cultural heritage. these efforts have continued to intensify in recent years, as have attempts to rewrite past realities and historical-legal evaluations of the issue. after the outbreak of open warfare in 2020, a research group on the repression of the armenians of artsakh, nakhijevan and azerbaijan was created at the armenian genocide museum-institute. as of 2022, this research group has since grown into a department with a small number of dedicated employees. the target was set to objectively address the various aspects of the artsakh issue and render it accessible in a wide variety of foreign languages. the publications presented within are among the first such steps. we wish to thank the non-profit organization rearmenia and the april initiative together with all donors for supporting the promotion of our journal and contributing to this volume. harutyun marutyan director of the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, chief editor of the international journal of armenian genocide studies 98 harutyun marutyan, narine margaryan (eds.), հայերի փրկության գործը մերձավոր արևելքում 1915-1923 թթ., միջազգային գիտաժողովի նյութերի ժողովածու. [the rescue of armenians in the middle east in 1915-1923, international conference proceedings] yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, 2020, 440+16 pp. reviewed by artyom tonoyan, phd, research associate, university of minnesota, twin cities although the last two decades have seen a steady rise in scholarship on the armenian genocide, there still are aspects of the genocide that are neither fully investigated or fully understood. some of the reasons for this lack has to do with the fact that much energy was spent on producing works that, for the lack of a better term, were dedicated to the search after the elusive “smoking gun” that would prove once and for all that what happened to the ottoman armenians was indeed genocide rather than a series of unfortunate events that for some inexplicable reason rendered armenian life and culture extinct in the ottoman hinterlands. the works of vahakn dadrian, raymond kevorkian, and taner akcam have been especially instrumental and effective in dismantling some of the persistent and ideologically driven narrative constructs that looked to question the veracity of the armenian experience or deny basic and verifi able facts altogether. though defying logic in the spirit of what philosopher paul boghossian has called “the doctrine of equal validity,” (a postmodernist philosophical posture which in its barest form posits that both a and non a are equally valid if not equally true),1 many of these denialist works erected obstacles in the path of investigating the whole range of the genocidal experience and not just aspects that would help scholars discover said smoking gun. more than simple bad faith scholarship they were often political projects designed to create the illusion that when it comes to the armenian experience, there are no facts but only interpretations, to paraphrase nietzsche.2 thankfully the armenian genocide scholarship has now moved beyond that limiting paradigm. with the armenian genocide now enjoying universal consensus among reputable historians, new research areas have become available for scholars allowing them to understand the complexity of the calamity brought upon the armenians and other ethno-religious minorities of the empire. which brings us to the book under consideration here. the volume, the rescue of armenians in the middle east in 1915-1923, international conference proceedings, as the title suggests consists of papers presented at an international conference held in yerevan in 2020. featuring (bilingual) chapters by a stellar group of genocide scholars and historians, and edited by the director of the armenian genocide museum-institute prof. harutyun marutyan and historian narine margaryan, the book is a long overdue attempt to reconstruct 1 paul boghossian, fear of knowledge: against relativism and constructivism (new york: oxford university press, 2006). 2 fredrich nietzsche, the will to power, trans. walter kaufmann and r.j. hollingsdale (new york: vintage books, 1967), 267. 99 the multilayered history of the rescue of armenian orphans and survivors, a topic that has been lamentably understudied, for reasons discussed above. the thrust of the book is simple enough – on the whole, it seeks to identify the individuals and institutions (and what motivated them) central in the efforts to save, rescue, and rehabilitate armenians. the enterprise itself is not new, there have been previous works dealing with the issue and a more recent work, khatchig mouradian’s superb monograph on the armenian resistance network through ottoman syria readily comes to mind.3 what is however new is that for the fi rst time, if my memory serves well, there has been a concerted effort to probe the entire scope the rescue efforts from a variety of historical, historiographic, and disciplinary perspectives. which is not to say everything imaginable has been covered in the book, but being a fi rst, the book opens the fi eld for further investigation into the topic. the overarching theme of the book is that the brave efforts of foreign missionaries and humanitarians notwithstanding, more often than not it was the armenians themselves that were agents of their own rescue and rehabilitation, not unlike the argument in mouradian’s book mentioned earlier. particularly illuminating on these points are chapters by raymond kevorkian, eduard melkonian, and seda ohanean. their chapters on armenian rescue and rehabilitation missions in places like jerusalem, mosul, and elsewhere throughout the middle east, shed new and important light on the issue and in an exemplary fashion reveal the scope of the gap in our knowledge on this very important topic. especially useful is the discussion by marutyan on “rescue” as a term and as a concept. what do scholars mean when they discuss the issue of rescue of armenians as they were undergoing massacres and dispossession? drawing upon similar terminology found in the yad vashem memorial’s righteous among nations conceptual approach to the issue as a point of departure, marutyan distinguishes between rescue qua rescue, i.e. rescue motivated by altruism and for exclusively humanitarian purposes (often risking rescuer’s own life and freedom), and rescue motivated by material gain or attendant “non-humanitarian” motivations. by the latter marutyan means rescue efforts that were conditional or transactional, i.e. (forced) religious conversions, adoption of children (many of whom would be rescued but lost to armenian culture), sex slavery, etc. basing his research on hundreds of interviews with survivors and/or their descendants marutyan argues, with some merit, that not all rescues were equal. moreover, of the 600 interviews that form the basis of marutyan’s argument, nearly all of the rescuees were either children or women, with men having virtually no chance to survive regardless of motivations of would-be rescuers. while marutyan’s chapter is the sole theoretical work in the collection, (perhaps unsurprising given his background as an ethnographer), other chapters that follow take readers on a sort of journey through the important and familiar waystations that marked the rescue and rehabilitation operations in the broader middle east. chapter after chapter the reader is introduced to equal part fascinating, tragic, and heroic individuals and institutions whose cumulative efforts at rescuing survivors were nothing short of miraculous. be they the german missionaries, who at great personal risk and in the conditions of state-imposed censorship 3 khatchig mouradian, the resistance network: the armenian genocide and humanitarianism in ottoman syria, 1915–1918 (east lansing: michigan state university press, 2021). 100 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 https://doi.org/ 10.51442/ijags.0020 managed to rescue and care for armenian children during the genocide and in its aftermath in places such as marash, mezre, and haruniye, or rev. aharon a. shirajian and the british friends of armenia society who ran a hostel in port said, egypt tasked with sheltering, rehabilitating, and re-armenizing rescued armenian women from muslim captivity, these are stories that need to be told and retold. and it is one of the main virtues of the collection that by bringing these stories and histories to the reader they at the same time lay the foundation for further and more extensive research. it will take considerable effort and space to do proper justice to all the chapters found in the book, and nothing short of proper justice is what these c hapters deserve. unfortunately given the space limitations usually imposed on book reviews it is well-nigh impossible. nevertheless, the collection of articles affords an important new step away from the “smoking gun” paradigm in the scholarship on the armenian genocide. the book’s richly textured and well-organized chapters make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the mechanics of genocide survival. it will be of interest to students of the armenian genocide, history of humanitarian movements in the middle east, as well as to anyone interested in lesser known chapters of armenian life in the aftermath of the genocide. 7 dr. arman kirakossian is ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the republic of armenia to austria, permanent representative of the republic of armenia to the osce. he is author of books and more than 120 publications on the history of diplomacy and international relations among them british diplomacy and the armenian question (gomidas institute, princeton and london, 2003), the armenian massacres 1894-1896: u.s. media testimony (wayne state university press, detroit, 2004), armenia-usa: current realities and vision for future (yerevan state university press, 2007), and the armenian massacres 1894-1896: british media testimony (armenian research center, university of michigan, dearborn, 2008) the extermination of the armenians and the concept of genocide in contemporary american encyclopedias arman kirakossian the armenian genocide is an approved fact of history, a public knowledge which is recognized not only by specialists but also by the international community. for more than forty years, the government of the ottoman empire succeeded in the cleaning out of the native-born armenian population from not only the armenian highland but also from the entire territory of the empire by carrying out a genocidal policy of massacres and deportations, the culmination of which was the genocide of the armenians during the first world war. the crime committed by the ottoman authorities towards the armenian nation fully corresponds to the defi nition of the special convention of un general assembly in 1948 “on prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide” according to which “genocide means the acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” as a recognized public knowledge the armenian genocide is adequately and in a worthy manner represented in contemporary specialized encyclopedias, dictionaries, resource guides and handbooks published in the united states during the last fi fteen years. the authors of the entries are leading specialists in the fi eld of genocide studies. the analysis of this issues shows that the armenian genocide strengthened its position as a public knowledge and recognized fact of history. according to alan whitehorn1 “the armenian genocide is a reminder of the risks of not learning the lessons of history, the dangers of genocide denial, and the long-term negative consequences of allowing perpetrators to go unpunished. these were contributing factors to subsequent genocides. the knowledge of past genocides, such as the armenian case, is a key to understanding and preventing future genocide. the mass slaughter of the armenians was, however, instrumental in the birth of two important human rights concepts: ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘genocide’.”2 genocide is a twentieth-century concept for an age-old phenomenon, the killing of a defi ned population group. the word was coined during the second world war by raphael lemkin,3 who “was looking for a word that would convey the full dimension of 1. alan whitehorn is a professor at royal military college of canada. 2. alan whitehorn, “armenian genocide.” genocide awareness and prevention month 2013, abc-clio. cf. http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/contentpages/contentpage.aspx?entryid=1797707&currentsection=1797513&productid=61. 3. raphael lemkin (1900-1959) was a polish lawyer of jewish descent, who lived in the united states from 1941. he is best known for his work against genocide, a word he coined in 1943. he fi rst used the word genocide in print in axis rule in occupied europe: laws of occupation – analysis of government – proposals for redress (1944), and defi ned it as “the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group.” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 the extermination of the armenians and the concept of genocide in contemporary american encyclopedias 8 9 the nazi murder of jews, though he also was deeply conscious of precedents, especially the killing of armenians in 1915 and 1916 by the young turk government of the ottoman empire. lemkin joined the greek word for a group, ‘genus’, with the latin suffi x for murder, ‘-cide’, to create the word genocide. he launched a one-man diplomatic campaign to convince the newly formed united nations that it should develop a treaty that would outlaw genocide.”4 lemkin insisted upon the relationship between genocide and the growing interest in the protection of peoples and minorities that was manifested in several treaties and declarations adopted following world war i. he said there was a need to revisit international legal instruments, pointing out particularly the inadequacies of the hague convention of 1907, which he noted was “silent regarding the preservation of the integrity of a people.”5 the general assembly passed an initial resolution in favor of such a treaty in 1946, and the fi nal convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide was approved on 9 december 1948. it came into effect in january 1951 with the ratifi cation by the requisite number of states. since then, more than 140 states have signed the genocide convention. the massacres and deportations of the armenian population of the ottoman empire are qualifi ed by the authors of the conceptual entries in the encyclopedias of genocide, death and human experience, global justice, human rights issues since 1945, ethics, world’s minorities, social science, war crimes and genocide, community, human rights, and the oxford handbook of genocide studies as a genocide. in the editor’s introduction of the encyclopedia of genocide one of the leading specialists in genocide studies dr. israel w. charny6 listed the “the armenian genocide at the hands of the turks” at the fi rst place of the “past genocides in the twentieth century.”7 in the foreword to the same encyclopedia, the most reverend archbishop emeritus desmond m. tutu8 wrote: “and yet it is possible that if the world had been conscious of the genocide that was committed by the ottoman turks against the armenians, the fi rst genocide of the twentieth century, then perhaps humanity might have been more alert to the warning signs that were being given before hitler’s madness was unleashed on an unbelieving world.”9 according to encyclopedia of war crimes 4. eric d. weitz, “genocide.” in the social science encyclopedia, ed. adam kuper and jessica kuper (new york: routledge, 2004, 2009), 409. 5. william a. schabas, “genocide,” in encyclopedia of human rights, vol. 2, ed. david p. forsythe (new york: oxford university press, 2009), 295-296. 6. dr. israel w. charny (born 1931, brooklyn, new york) is an israeli psychologist and genocide scholar, executive director of the institute on the holocaust and genocide in jerusalem, professor of psychology and family therapy at the hebrew university of jerusalem, co-founder of the international association of genocide scholars, editor-in-chief and executive director of gpn – genocide prevention now. 7. israel w. charny, “editor`s introduction to the encyclopedia: the dawning of a new age of opposition to genocide,” in encyclopedia of genocide, vol. 1, ed. israel w. charny (santa barbara, ca; abcclio, 1999), lxi. 8. tutu, desmond mpilo (born 1931, klerksdorp, transvaal) is a south african social rights activist and retired anglican bishop, world known opponent of apartheid, was the fi rst black archbishop of cape town, received nobel peace prize in 1984. 9. desmond m. tutu, “foreword: why is it important to learn about the holocaust and the genocides of all peoples,” in encyclopedia of genocide, vol. 1, ed. israel w. charny (santa barbara, ca; abcand genocide “the campaign to exterminate the armenian population and expel them from ottoman empire (which was superseded by turkey) was so organized and systematic that it became a model for the prosecution of even more devastating genocidal programs later in the 20th century.”10 professors donald bloxham11 and a. dirk moses12 advocate in the introduction of the oxford handbook of genocide studies that “…there is the tendency in university syllabi, textbooks, and the mantras of public commemoration of genocide to focus upon a few instances of genocide that, for a variety of reasons, have qualifi ed for the canon of general acceptance: alongside the holocaust, armenia, cambodia, rwanda, and the former yugoslavia, and now darfur tend to be included, but virtually no other cases.”13 according to michael r. taylor (encyclopedia of death and human experience), “genocide is the attempt to eradicate a people due to their race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality, usually by means of mass slaughter. the holocaust, in which the nazis murdered about 6 million jews along with millions of others, is probably the most widely known genocide of the 20th century. although the holocaust may be unique in other respects, it is not unique in its being genocide. over the 20th century and into the 21st century, genocide has occurred in cambodia, germany, iraq, turkey, and rwanda, and intervention has been rare. some of these acts of genocide were probably preventable, and great harm might have been averted had the international community taken swift, decisive action.”14 the author continues that “there is no known single motive or reason for genocide. the nazis were motivated primarily by concerns for racial purity. the khmer rouge, responsible for the genocide in cambodia in the latter half of the 1970s, were intent on creating what they took to be an ideal communist society, and they eliminated anyone they believed might obstruct this project. the genocide perpetrated by the government of turkey in 1915 against its armenian population was apparently motivated by concerns for national security, as was saddam hussein’s genocide directed against the kurds of iraq. …the government of turkey, allied with germany during world war i, suspected that some of turkey’s armenians were aiding opposing powers. the armenians were taken to pose a threat to national security, and their elimination was a way of resolving this issue.”15 clio, 1999), lvii. 10. “armenian genocide,” in leslie alan horvitz and christopher catherwood, encyclopedia of war crimes and genocide (new york: facts on file, 2006), 25. 11. donald bloxham is a professor of modern history at edinburgh university, editor of the journal of holocaust education. 12. a. dirk moses is the chair of global and colonial history at the european university institute, floence, and the editor-in-chief of the journal of genocide research. 13. donald bloxham and dirk a moses, “editors` introduction. changing themes in the study of genocide,” in the oxford handbook of genocide studies, ed. donald bloxham and dirk a moses (new york: oxford university press, 2013), 4. 14. michael r. taylor, “genocide,” in encyclopedia of death & the human experience, vol. 1, ed. clifton d. bryant and dennis l. peck (thousand oaks, california: sage publications, 2009), 508. 15. ibid, 509. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 the extermination of the armenians and the concept of genocide in contemporary american encyclopedias 10 11 according to yves ternon16 (encyclopedia of genocide) “coined in the twentieth century, the word genocide denotes a crime of exceptional gravity, the most extreme violation of the rights of man: denial of the right to live to many people. in order to understand this complex phenomenon, a comparative and multidisciplinary approach is mandatory. though such a crime can be ancient, new characteristics in the recent century have given it its specifi city. perpetrated by the state, the crime consists in the destruction of a community of its own citizens or of those of a country it occupies. implementation foes unhindered when the state exerts unlimited control over decisions and means of action while wielding exclusive authority in all branches of government, in other words when the state has reached a higher degree of totalitarianism. the motive for genocide is based on a creed which, however absurd, holds suffi cient sway to convince and waive any moral inhibitions of those called upon to perpetrate the crime. the creed thus propagated rests on the presumption that one’s very existence is menaced. a fi ctitious menace is serves nonetheless as a pretext to genocide, the ultimate means of getting rid of the targeted victims. contrary to war conditions wherein belligerents have, more or less, the means of reciprocal destruction, the implementation of genocide imposes an overpowering state on a powerless community devoid of the means of self-defense and much less still of infl icting harm, literally speaking an ‘innocent’ community. the twentieth century has witnessed the emergence of the most basically criminal regime in contemporary history: national-socialism (nazism), build upon hatred, scorn and brutal force, rooted in an absurd ideology, the ingredients of which are racism, social-darwinism and anti-semitism. such ‘negative dialectics’ through a natural though devious process brought about the annihilation of the jews in europe during the second world war, the unsurpassed crime of the twentieth century. related to it stands the genocide of the gypsies, less thorough and perhaps based on a less pervasively blind hatred-here the nazis claimed they sought the elimination of the ‘drop-outs’ of society. the uniqueness of the genocide of the jews, with its specifi c and exclusive characteristics in this century doesn’t, however, preclude the use of the term genocide in qualifying other crimes. one notes perhaps in particular the annihilation by the union and progress party, at the head of the ottoman government in the years 1915-1916, of the armenian communities then living in ottoman empire. this genocide was also perpetrates as a ‘fi nal solution’ to a problem which had gone unsolved for 40 years.”17 “regarded as the ultimate crime and the gravest possible violation of human rights, -written in the entry genocide of the encyclopedia of human rights issues since 1945, genocide occupies a prominent place in human history, including twentieth-century history. in 1915, for example, the ottoman turks conducted the systematic extermination of over an estimated 1 million armenians. during world war ii, through forced labor, sterilization, starvation, gassings and muss murder in concentration camps, some six million jews, along with an uncertain number of homosexuals, roma people (gypsies), and others were killed 16. yves ternon (born in 1932, france) is a french physician and medical historian, an author of historical books about the jewish holocaust and the armenian genocide, professor of the history of medicine at university paris iv sorbonne. 17. yves ternon, “the twentieth century: a century of genocide,” in encyclopedia of genocide, vol. 2, ed. israel w. charny (santa barbara, ca; abc-clio, 1999), 562-563. by nazi germany. in the case of the jews, the effort was designed to effect the final solution (from the standpoint of nazis) to their undesirable and undeserved presence in europe. it was the reaction of the global community to the killing of the jews that prompted the united nations to adopt the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide in 1948. since 1945, there have been repeated examples of genocide: the killing of cambodians during the pol pot regime; the indonesian slaughter of the people of east timor; and most recently, the occurrences in rwanda and the former yugoslavia.”18 according to javaid rehman19 (encyclopedia of the world’s minorities), “the term genocide means the killing of a race, a tribe, or a religious or ethnic group. genocide as an unfortunate phenomenon of physical extermination of a minority group has remained part and parcel of human history. however, it was only after the genocidal acts committed by the nazis during world war ii that genocide was condemned as an international crime. in 1948 the united nations adopted the convention on prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, which condemns genocide and prohibits its exercise in times of war and peace. the condemnation of genocide has recently been reaffi rmed by the statute of the international criminal court (1998). although genocide is now universally condemned as an international crime, there are substantial concerns about the continuing exercises of genocidal activities within contemporary societies. many minorities and groups live under the shadow of extinction; some continue to suffer from physical destruction, partially if not completely… …genocide has been practiced since the beginning of human history. many tragic instances of genocide could be recounted. these would include the horrifying massacres resulting from assyrian warfare during the seventh and eighth centuries bce and the roman obliteration of the city of carthage and all its inhabitants. religion has been used as a weapon for generating intolerance and for the ultimate destruction and genocide of religious minorities. within the texts of religious scriptures, various forms of genocide of religious minorities are sanctioned. the tragic wars of the medieval period and the middle ages, the crusades, and the jihads (islamic holy wars) translated these religious ordinances to complete and thorough use. many of the contemporary genocidal confl icts are based around religious supremacy. the process of colonization resulted in the extermination and genocide of indigenous and colonized peoples. more recently, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the mechanism of genocide has been practiced on a very wide scale. thus, the armenian genocide conducted by the ottoman turks between 1895 and 1896 in the massacres of nearly 200,000 armenians. the turks repeated this practice of genocide of the armenian people during world war i. the rise of nationalism and totalitarian ideologies such as nazism and stalinism and the upsurge of racial, religious, and linguistic extremism in the twentieth century generated wholesale extermination of minorities. the crimes of physical extermination conducted by the nazis against the jewish population in europe were of unparalleled gravity.”20 18. “genocide,” in encyclopedia of human rights issues since 1945, ed. winston e. langley (london, chicago: fitzroy dearborn publishers, 1999), 133. 19. javaid rehman is a professor of law at the brunei university, london. 20. javaid rehman, “genocide,” in encyclopedia of the world`s minorities, ed. carl skutsch (new york: international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 the extermination of the armenians and the concept of genocide in contemporary american encyclopedias 12 13 each genocidal act is based on ideology, an important part of the process in society that leads to the tragedy of the victim nation. these ideologies vary in form or content but usually have certain structures in common with others that support genocide, and they all serve certain common functions for the dominant race, group and its members. the entry of ervin staub21 in the encyclopedia of genocide is dedicated to the ideology of genocide: “an ideology is a conception of social arrangements in a society or in the world that for the creators of the ideology are the desirable, ideal forms of life. there are nationalist ideologies, which focus on the wealth, power, infl uence and frequently also the purity of a group or nation; and “better world” ideologies, like communism, which offer a version of ideal social arrangements for all humanity. many ideologies are destructive, potentially genocidal, in that they identify enemies who supposedly stand in the way of the ideology’s fulfi llment. these enemies must be ‘dealt with’ if the ideology is to be fulfi lled. sometimes the intention to kill them is present from the start. more often, there is no intention or fully formed intention to kill them, but discrimination and limited violence against the opponents, nonbelievers and outsiders lead to changes in perpetrators and to an evolution of increasing violence that ends in genocide. genocidal ideologies can have both nationalist and bitter-world elements. for example, the nazi ideology included the concept of ‘lebensraum’ or living space, the right of germans to more territory, clearly nationalist in nature. it also included the concept of the purity of race. while its focus was the protection of germans from jews, gypsies, and others, even genetically inferior germans, it implied that by eliminating the contamination of higher races by lower ones all the higher races would be improved. the ‘auto genocide’ in cambodia was based on a vision of total social equality derived in part from communism, but had nationalistic building blocks and elements. the genocide of the armenians in turkey was shaped by a ‘pan-turkish,’ nationalistic ideology. the violence in bosnia was based on a combination of fear, hate and ambition that manifested itself in a primarily nationalistic form. why do people turn to such destructive ideologies? they often do so in response to diffi cult social conditions and the frustration of basic human needs, fear and confusion. having a positive vision of the future provides a comprehension of reality and hope in place of the chaos and confusion of the present. it helps people unite, at a time they feel alone and isolated. it provides them with purpose and meaning, at a time they feel helpless and not in control of their lives. people do need visions of a hopeful future in such diffi cult times. unfortunately, the culture, past history and the conditions of life generate forces for the creation of visions that identify enemies. scapegoating some group, identifying it as responsible for life problems, provides an explanation for the diffi cult conditions of life, and makes people feel better about themselves. pointing to enemies also brings people together, help them unite. the group’s culture often includes a history of devaluation of the group that becomes the scapegoat and ideological enemy (the jews, the armenians), or a historical rift (between the people in the cities and in the countryside in cambodia). at routledge, 2005), 493. 21. ervin staub has taught at harvard university and the university of massachusetts at amherst. times the diffi cult conditions themselves arise from confl ict and enmity with another group, or there is a history of mutual antagonism between the two groups (like hutus and tutsis in rwanda and burundi). long-standing traditions of dehumanization and antagonism can be greatly and seedily intensifi ed and catapulted into frenzied extremes relatively easily and in amazingly short periods of time by propaganda campaigns, for example, hitler’s repeated documentations of the jews in contexts of majestic public events accompanied by stirring pageantry and marital spirit. there was an extensive state-run radio campaign against the tutsi preceding the rwanda genocide in 1994. as the dehumanization effect escalates, another mechanism of attribution of evil intention and demonic powers to the intended victim people also comes into stronger play. in the end, the implicit or explicit message becomes that the other people must be killed fi rst in order to saves one’s own people from destruction. the combination of dehumanization-they are not human beings like us and are outside of our moral universe of obligation to protect human lifeand attribution of dangerous demonic intent and strength provides a powerful basis for an ideology of genocide: they deserve to be and must be eliminated.”22 continuing the ideological aspect of genocide eric d. weitz23 notes (the social science encyclopedia): “…genocides take on truly massive proportions when racism or extreme nationalism becomes the guiding principles of the state (though not all racial states engage in genocide: witness south africa and the jim crow usa). the infamous, though not exclusive, examples are the late ottoman empire under the young turks, nazy germany, the former yugoslavia and rwanda. in all of these instances, the state promised its followers a future of unbounded happiness and prosperity once the supposed enemy group – armenians in the ottoman empire, jews in third reich, croats and muslims in yugoslavia, tutsis under a radical hutu government – was eliminated. at the same time, moderate members of the dominant group who opposed the genocides were also killed. no genocide occurs divorced from other human rights violations.”24 there are many examples of genocides in the world history. we read about them in the social science encyclopedia: “some of the earliest cases occur in the bible. the book of joshua records numerous instances in which the israelites completely destroy the populations they encounter. the roman destruction of carthage is often cited as another case. but in the modern period, genocides became more systematic, more widespread and more deadly. in the twentieth century, genocides were produced mostly by states that sought to create homogeneous populations of one sort or another. they are part of revolutionary drives to remake the social order, to ‘purify’ the population of groups, conceived in racial, national or religious terms, which hold on to different ways of life and are demonized as the enemies that threaten the well-being of the dominant group. genocides are terribly violent acts that entail high levels of face-to-face brutality. they are never antiseptic, factory-like processes of death, not even in the holocaust. while modern genocides are typically initiated by 22. ervin staub and israel w. charny, “ideology of genocide,” in encyclopedia of genocide, vol. 2, ed. israel w. charny (santa barbara, ca; abc-clio, 1999), 347-349. 23. eric d. weitz is the dean of humanities and arts and professor of history at city college, city university of new york. 24. eric d. weitz, “genocide,” 410-411. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 the extermination of the armenians and the concept of genocide in contemporary american encyclopedias 14 15 states, they require the mobilization of substantial segments of the population to carry out the work of killing… …most modern genocides have occurred in the context of war or vast domestic upheaval, when old rules no longer apply and conditions of instability both heighten the sense of insecurity and open up visions of great transformations, of fi nally laying to rest internal social divisions and creating a prosperous, harmonious future. the first world war was the landmark event because it created a culture of killing and revealed what highly organized states could accomplish. it is no surprise that the fi rst modern genocide, that of the armenians, occurred in context of total war when the young turk rulers were threatened by the allied powers and demonized the armenian population as traitors. at the same time, the young turks imagined a vast, homogeneous pan-turkic empire, which could only be accomplished, they believed, through the deportation and massacres of armenians. similarly, jews in nazi germany were subject to the most severe discrimination in the 1930s, but it was only in the context of total war that the nazis unleashed the holocaust. three kinds of genocides emerged in the modern period: (1) colonial genocides, (2) genocides as by-products of more general and massive violations of political and social rights, and (3) genocides in which mass killings based on ethnicity, nationality, religion or race move to the very core of state policies…”25 according to william a. schabas26 “the paradigm of modern genocides is of course the nazi holocaust or shoah, the partially successful attempt to exterminate the jews of europe. in the twentieth century three other manifestations of genocide stand out: the attack on the herero people by german colonialists in german southwest africa (now namibia) in 1904, the massacres of the armenians by the ottoman turkish regime in 1915, and the attempted extermination of rwanda`s tutsi population by racist extremists in 1994.”27 as it was mentioned before, the term “genocide” was created by polish jurist raphael lemkin as a term to defi ne the mass killing of jews by the nazis in the second world war and the mass killing of the armenians by the ottoman authorities during the first world war. in both cases, the mass killing took place within the context of a more general war, and lemkin thought of genocide as a type of warfare. according to jerry fowler (encyclopedia of community, from the village to the virtual world) “already familiar with the ottoman campaign of murder and deportation against the armenians that began in 1915, he [lemkin] understood the murderous implications of nazi ideology much sooner than most of his contemporaries.”28 although the term was introduced by lemkin “…most immediately in reaction to the nazi ‘final solution’ directed against the jews, but it was also meant to identify that crime more generally as the annihilation or attempted annihilation of the members of the group 25. ibid, 409-410. 26. william a. schabas (born 1950) is a canadian academic in the fi eld of international criminal and human rights law, professor of international law at middlesex university, professor of international human law and human rights at leiden university, an internationally recognized expert on human rights law, genocide, and the death penalty, president of the international association of genocide scholars from 2009-2011. 27. william a. schabas, “genocide,” 294. 28. jerry fowler, “genocide,” in encyclopedia of community: from the village to the virtual world, vol. 1, ed. karen christensen and david levinson (thousand oaks, ca: sage publications, 2003), 540-541. (genos) solely because of group association. lemkin, a lawyer and himself a polish-jewish refugee, had previously (at the fifth international conference for the unifi cation of penal law, madrid, 1933) unsuccessfully proposed international recognition of the crime of ‘barbarity’ – ‘oppressive and destructive actions directed against individuals as members of a national, religious, or racial group.’ …lemkin expanded the concept of genocide to include attacks on political, economic, and cultural groups; in addition to the nazi campaign of annihilation, he cites among earlier instances of such attacks the roman destruction of carthage (146 b.c.e.), the conquest of jerusalem by titus (c.e. 72), and the turkish massacre of the armenians (1915-1917). the crime of genocide, he claims, extends beyond the attacks on civilian populations in ‘occupied’ territory that had been addressed and in some measure guarded against in international law by the hague conventions. the designation of groups as targets for destruction, in lemkin`s view, expands the possible rationale (and thus the threat) of systematic killing.”29 according to sally j. scholz30 “in his 1944 work axis rule in occupied europe, raphael lemkin coined the word “genocide” in order to designate the scale of atrocities that he had spent much of his adult life fi ghting. lemkin combined the greek word for people, race, or tribe with a word derived from latin meaning “to kill”. his aim was to identify the mass scale atrocity that targets a people. he recognized that planned and coordinated destruction of a people or a nation aims not solely or even primarily at outright killing but also at the destruction of culture, language, traditions, and social and political infrastructures. …the genocide that inspired lemkin to fi ght for international laws barring acts that intend to destroy a nation or people, is the armenian genocide during world war i. on april 24, 1915, the turks of the ottoman empire began rounding up thousands of armenians and forcibly exiling them in a campaign that has come to be recognized as the fi rst major genocide of the modern era. it is estimated that one and a half million armenians were systematically killed by the military or starved while on the forced marches out of the ottoman empire…”31 the editor-in-chief of the journal of genocide research a. dirk moses writes in the oxford handbook of genocide studies that “the genocide concept is also the culmination of a long tradition of european legal and political critique of imperialism and warfare against civilians. all of the instances about which he [lemkin] wrote for his projected world history of genocide occurred in imperial contexts or involved warfare against civilian populations. most of his [lemkin] case studies from the eurasian land mass were taken from continental empires: the roman empire, the mongols, the ottoman empire, charlemagne and the spread of german peoples eastwards since the middle ages. here is a typical statement from an article in the christian science monitor in 1948: `the destruction of carthage, the destruction 29. berel lang, “genocide,” in encyclopedia of ethics, ed. lawrence c. becker and charlotte b. becker (new york: routledge, 2011) 607. 30. sally j. scholz (born 1968) is a professor of philosophy at villanova university and editor of hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy. her research focuses on social and political philosophy, feminist theory, violence against women in confl ict settings, war rape and war theory. 31. sally j. scholz, “genocide,” in encyclopedia of global justice, vol. 1, ed. deen k. chatterjee (new york: springer, 2011), 387. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 the extermination of the armenians and the concept of genocide in contemporary american encyclopedias 16 17 of the albigenses and waldenses, the crusades, the march of teutonic knights, the destruction of the christians under the ottoman empire, the massacres of the herero in africa, the extermination of the armenians, the slaughter of the christian assyrians in iraq in 1933, the destruction of the maronites, the pogroms of jews in tsarist russia and romania – all these are classical genocide cases (lemkin, raphael. war against genocide. in: christian science monitor, 31 january 1948).”32 the author continues further that “’barbarity’ and ‘vandalism’ are of relevance for genocide because of their focus on group protection. he [lemkin] had been indignant that the turkish perpetrators of the armenian deportations and massacres were able largely to escape prosecution, and appalled by the massacres of the assyrian christians in iraq.”33 prior to 1945 there had been other recognitions of crimes against humanity or crimen contra omnes. in 1915 the governments of great britain, france, and russia condemned massacres of armenians by turks as “crimes against humanity and civilization.”34william a. schabas writes in the oxford handbook of genocide studies: “even prior to lemkin`s time, international law recognized a limited number of so-called international crimes. as a general rule, they were so designated not because of their shocking scale and extent but for more mundane reasons, namely, because they escaped the territorial jurisdiction of states; piracy is the classic example, a crime committed on the high seas. other examples include traffi cking in women, damaging submarine cables, and offenses relating to drugs, counterfeit currency, and pornography. in the early twenty-fi rst century these would be more likely described as transnational crimes. lemkin and others argued from a different perspective, proposing the recognition of international crimes where these represented serious human rights violations. the emphasis was not so much on the international dimension of their perpetration as on the scale or horror of the acts. such crimes tended to escape prosecution not because of international diffi culties in enforcement but because the state where the crime took place was unwilling to prosecute, generally because its government was complicit in the acts. the beginnings of this new vision of criminal justice were already apparent at the time of world war i, when britain, france, and russia warned that they would hold perpetrators to account for ‘these new crimes of turkey against humanity and civilization.’ but the idea that a state and its leaders could be held accountable for atrocities committed against their own nationals remained extremely controversial, and it was this lacuna in the law that lemkin worked to fi ll.”35 according to michael j. bazyler36 (encyclopedia of genocide)“the term ‘crimes against humanity’ was fi rst utilized in international law in the 1915 joint declaration of great britain, france and russia in response to the massacres of the armenian population 32. a. dirk moses, “lemkin, culture, and concept of genocide,” in the oxford handbook of genocide studies, ed. donald bloxham and a. dirk moses (new york: oxford university press, 2013), 25-26. 33. ibid, 30-31. 34. jordan j. paust, “crimes agaist humanity,” in encyclopedia of human rights, ed. david p. forsythe (new york: oxford university press, 2009), 421. 35. william a. schabas, “the law and genocide,” in the oxford handbook of genocide studies, ed. donald bloxham, and a. dirk moses (new york: oxford university press, 2013), 124. 36. michael j. bazyler is a professor of law at whittier law school in costa mesa, california. in ottoman empire. the term was formally defi ned by the nuremberg charter, during the prosecution of the nazi war criminals. article 6(c) of the charter defi nes crimes against humanity as ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated’.”37 the encyclopedia of war crimes and genocide notes: “the earliest use of the term is found in the hague convention of 1907, although it is based in customary law during armed confl ict. that is to say, the codifi ed law pertaining to crimes against humanity evolved from principles and values that have gained almost universal acceptance throughout history. even though most international agreements in the early years of the 20th century covered the conduct of armed parties to a confl ict, there were exceptions, notably the forced deportations and massacres of armenians by ottoman turks in 1915, which involved the use of military force against an unarmed civilian population. a commission established in 1919 found that turkish offi cers had in fact been culpable of ‘crimes against the laws of humanity’ for their treatment of the armenians, yet both the united states and japan opposed the criminalizing of these acts because they were violations of moral law.”38 benjamin lieberman39 believes that “the persecution of armenians during the first world war incorporated many of the chief features of ethnic cleansing. …in this case ethnic cleansing led to genocide.”40 summarizing the abovementioned, we conclude that in their entries the leading specialists in genocide studies not only qualify the massacres and deportations of the armenian population of the ottoman empire during the first world war as genocide but also consider this historical fact as a crime which became a precedent for the creation and development of the genocide concept. 37. michael j. bazyler, “crimes against humanity,” in encyclopedia of genocide, vol. 1, ed. israel w. charny (santa barbara, ca; abc-clio, 1999), 153-154. 38. “crimes against humanity,” in encyclopedia of war crimes and genocide, ed. leslie alan horvitz and christopher catherwood (new york: facts on file, 2006), 110. 39. benjamin lieberman i s a professor of history at fitchburg state college (ma, usa). his research focuses mainly on the concept of ethnic cleansing. 40. benjamin lieberman, “‘ethnic cleansing’ versus genocide?,” in the oxford handbook of genocide studies, ed. donald bloxham and a. dirk moses (new york: oxford university press, 2013), 50. 32 dr. meline mesropyan is a gsics fellow at graduate school of international cultural studies, tohoku university. she is a graduate (march 2019) of tohoku university’s graduate school of international cultural studies in sendai, japan. she has spent the last 6 years as a masters and phd student researching the life and work of diana apcar. her phd dissertation, written in japanese and making extensive use of japanese archival data, dealt with the japanese government’s processing of armenian refugees during the armenian genocide and wwi and diana apcar’s role in this. email: melka5mes@gmail.com 33 diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate: hope and disappointment dr. meline mesropyan tohoku university, japan this article studies diana agabeg apcar’s (1859-1937) perspective regarding the proposed american mandate over genocide-ravaged armenia. it touches on aspects of historical empathy that are important in assessing the true nature of historical events. through examining diana apcar’s correspondence with different individuals such as david starr jordan, thomas j. edmonds, charles albert gobat as well as her articles related to this topic, this article aims to reveal the attitudes, opinions and mindset of this armenian historical fi gure regarding the mandate issue. keywords: armenian genocide, american mandate, protectorate for armenia, paris peace conference, league of nations, historical empathy. the article was submitted on 17.02.2021 and accepted for publication on 28.04.2021. how to cite: meline mesropyan, “diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate: hope and disappointment,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 1(2021): 33-47. 34 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0016 introduction diana apcar (1859-1937) was an indian-raised armenian and a descendant of jugha1 armenians, who lived in japan from 1890 until the end of her life. she played an important role as an activist for her people through her writing endeavors, which began in 1909, and in her later humanitarian work for many armenian refugees, as well as for some assyrian and greek refugees who reached japan between 1915 and 1930. diana was passionate about anything connected to the welfare of the armenian people and did her utmost to contribute towards armenia obtaining peace. as a prolifi c writer she was constantly writing books, articles, letters and stories aimed at promoting her cause. she published more than one hundred articles in various armenian, american, japanese and european newspapers and magazines, especially in those supporting the armenian question. there are probably dozens more of these articles still waiting to be discovered in japanese, american and european archives. most of her writing was done in english. her main tool, her pen, was to give her people a voice, to relieve the oppression of the ottoman armenians and to gain support for her country from the western powers, especially the united states of america. the international peace movement had been reaching the peak of its infl uence leading up to wwi and diana had been actively trying to bring the armenian question to the attention of various peace conferences. her view was that there could not be peace in europe until smaller nations (within larger empires) had their heritage and freedom restored.2 in other words, diana supported self-determination for small countries striving for independence. diana’s greatest hope was to see smaller nations living in a peaceful world. the geo-political situation just after wwi was such that, in order to create peace in armenia, a protecting country was needed. diana was sure that if armenia did not have a major country supporting it, ottoman armenians would not be safe and their survival was unlikely. consequently, her belief was that procuring an american mandate for armenia meant guaranteed peace of her countrymen. this paper adopts a historical empathetic perspective.3 in the area of historical research, there is a tendency not to focus on the beliefs, attitudes and emotions of those individuals who were tied to historical events. this is an opinion shared by several historical researchers. in the words of andrew j. huebner “as historians, we write about the most dramatic and poignant human experiences, yet too often we drain those subjects of emotion. our admirable quest for detachment, our devotion to provable assertions, our reliance on often 1 jugha was an armenian town in nakhichevan, an exclave of the present-day republic of azerbaijan. about the history of jugha see sebouh david aslanian, from the indian ocean to the mediterranean: the global trade networks of armenian merchants from new julfa (berkeley: university of california press, 2011), 23-43. 2 d.a.a., “correspondence: the outlook for turkey,” the japan advertiser (tokyo), october 3, 1911. before 1911, diana signed her articles as “diana apcar” or “diana a. apcar”. most of her 1911 articles are signed as “d. a. a.” starting from 1912, her articles were signed with her full name “diana agabeg apcar.” 3 “historical empathy involves understanding how people from the past thought, felt, made decisions, acted, and faced consequences within a specifi c historical and social context.” see jason endacott, sarah brooks, “an updated theoretical and practical model for promoting historical empathy,” social studies research and practice 8, no. 1 (2013): 41, at http://www.socstrpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ms_06482_no3.pdf, accessed 14.09.2020. 35 meline mesropyan: diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate dry archival sources, perhaps even our desire to be taken seriously in the academy — all inhibit more evocative writing.”4 he then suggests cultivating empathy and sympathy “as a way of truly excavating the character of the past”.5 in a similar vein hallie rubenhold writes that, “too much emotional detachment from the people and events of the past presents a problem for wider society. the mistaken but prevalent concept that history is something distant, that it has no bearing on the present, is a dangerous one.”6 according to katherine jewell, in order to enhance the critical thinking of students of history, it is important for historians to allow the scholarly and the personal to meet.7 jewell feels that historians have a responsibility to apply not only their skepticism and their skills, but also their ability to imagine, to enter into the worldview of someone else, and to do so with understanding and compassion. subsequently this paper will try to show diana apcar’s hope and disappointment regarding the issue of the proposed american mandate. as will be discussed below, diana was knowledgeable of and deeply invested in every aspect of armenia’s welfare and the proposed mandate. consequently, an analysis of her mindset and reactions to the event will be highly instructive in providing a historical empathetic lens to experiencing what was a key turning point in armenian history. the article's research objective is to fl esh out the specifi cs of diana’s story based on newly uncovered archival documents. this article serves the dual purpose of detailing a particular chapter from diana’s life, while also adding a new perspective to an important chapter in armenian history: the question of an american mandate over armenia. this will be accomplished by examining diana’s correspondence with certain individuals such as american peace activist and fi rst president of stanford university david starr jordan, the director of civil affairs of the american red cross in eastern siberia, thomas j. edmonds and fi nally the honorary secretary of the permanent international peace bureau (as well as a 1902 nobel peace prize laureate) charles albert gobat. diana’s articles on the topic of the mandate will also be analyzed diana’s favored candidate for an armenian protectorate referring to the provinces in the ottoman empire inhabited by armenians (mainly erzeroum, van, bitlis, sebastia, diarbekir, kharberd) in 1910, diana stated that “the appointment of christian governors over the provinces inhabited by them [armenians] might ameliorate some of the evils.”8 ever since the 1909 adana massacres had galvanized her into taking up 4 andrew j. huebner, “writing history with emotion,” organization of american historians, at https://www. oah.org/tah/issues/2014/august/writing-history-with-emotion/, accessed 14.09.2020. 5 huebner, “writing history.” 6 “the concept that history is something distant is a dangerous one.” see hallie rubenhold, “is empathy an aid or a hindrance to historians?” history today 69, no. 5 (2019), at https://www.historytoday.com/archive/headhead/empathy-aid-or-hindrance-historians, accessed 14.09.2020. 7 katherine r. jewell, “worlds collide: the boston marathon bombing, historical thinking and empathy,” the american historian 5 (2017): 15. 8 d. a. apcar, “the turkish constitution and armenia,” the new armenia (new york), may 1910. 36 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 writing as a form of protest and a call for justice, diana had been primarily appealing for american support. this was due to diana’s belief that, unlike the european powers, the us did not have any imperialistic goals. the protectorate she preferred for armenia had to be both non-islamic and be implemented by a christian country without any “sphere of infl uence” and imperialistic objectives. in 1910, when she appealed to the us department of state for the american protection over armenia, they replied to her with the us president’s (grover cleveland, term of offi ce: 1885-1889 and 1893-1897) answer9 that, as the us was not a signatory to the treaty of berlin it could not interfere with european politics.10 in her correspondence (1912-1913) with gobat, in response to his question of “…who could undertake this protection without danger for the liberty of the people?”11 diana suggested that joint american and british protection with the appointment of swiss governors would be ideal.12 this suggestion was given despite her negative attitude towards british imperialistic policy. there is the question of why she preferred swiss governors to british or american governors. in the case of an american governor, diana did not think it was likely that after the american fi nancial adviser (morgan shuster)13 to the persian government had been exiled from persia in 1911, that the us government would care to send american offi cials to the near east. regarding a british governor, she simply felt that would not be acceptable as it would lead to giving the british government too much authority. diana thought that there could be no danger from the swiss people, as they had been armenians’ best friends,14 and the swiss governors would be the best. it can be speculated that due to switzerland’s approximately hundredyear-old (at the time) internationally recognized policy of neutrality15 and non-imperialistic goals, diana felt that armenia would be safe, governed by a citizen of such a country. additionally, equal protection by us and swiss governors would have kept the british “sphere of infl uence” at bay.16 regarding european protection, diana thought of it as a “chimera,” that wouldn’t be 9 according to article 61 of 1878 berlin treaty, the ottoman government undertakes to carry out the ameliorations and reforms in the provinces inhabited by the armenians, and to guarantee their security against the circassians and the kurds. it will periodically inform about the taken steps to the great powers, who will supervise their application. in 1886 the american senate and the house of representatives passed a resolution concerning article 61, calling upon the powers to enforce the statement in the article which allow them to forcibly intervene in the case of turkish cruelty, to protect armenia. however, president cleveland was reluctant to communicate the resolution to the powers fearing his act would be seen as interference in european affairs. (“america and the berlin treaty. president cleveland hesitates,” the age (melbourne), january 31, 1896.) 10 d. a. apcar to d. s. jordan, january 17, 1912 (must be 1913), diana agabeg apcar (hereafter daa) 19101924, david starr jordan papers (hereafter dsjp) 1794-1950, collection 240, box 13, folder 1-5, hoover institution archives (hereafter: hia), stanford, ca. d. a. apcar to albert gobat, january 12, 1913, international peace movements, international peace bureau (hereinafter: ipm/ipb) 275/6, un archives, geneva. 11 a. gobat to d. a. apcar, december 20, 1912, ipm/ipb. 12 d. a. apcar to albert gobat, january 12, 1913, ipm/ipb. 13 w. morgan shuster, the strangling of persia (new york: the century co., 1912). 14 “the united states does not want our country nor are we in any danger from the swiss people, who have been in reality our best friends …”. d. a. apcar to a. gobat, january 12, 1913, ipm/ipb. 15 lassa oppenheim, international law: a treatise. vol. i. peace, third edition, ed. by ronald f. roxburgh (london: longmans, green and co, 1920), 176. 16 d. a. apcar to a. gobat, january 12, 1913, ipm/ipb. 37 meline mesropyan: diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate realized.17 consequently, the next candidate-country she suggested was russia. however, diana had a deep distrust of russia which can be seen in the following statement by her: “the armenian question would have found its solution years ago if we did not have, behind our country, the government of the czar, which since 1881 has wanted an armenia without armenians.”18 despite this distrust, she started, in 1912, to consider the “russian occupation” in a more favorable light, stating that “russian occupation of armenia would have been the only door of escape out of the turkish hell.”19 of course, she still had a dread of russia’s “sphere of infl uence,” which was unavoidable due to armenia’s geographical position. as diana describes it, “a geographical position […] is a rock that cannot be hewn.” she described armenia’s location as “…luckless geographical position at the mercy of three evils, ― turkish reforms, to be controlled or superintended by ‘the powers’; german interests in asia minor, …and russian occupation of armenia.”20 because it was a requirement to escape from the “turkish hell,” she considered russian occupation to be a “modifi ed evil” compared with the other two, calling it a “stern necessity” or an “inexorable fate.”21 additionally, diana had been appealing for america’s support for more than ten years. aside from her articles on the subject, diana had also published a poem, where she was calling for america’s help on behalf of armenia. below [figure 1] is a copy of the poem that was published in at least six american newspaper in 1916.22 17 d. a. apcar to d. s. jordan, august 29, 1913, ipm/ipb. 18 d. a. apcar to d. s. jordan, january 17, 1912 (must be 1913), daa 1910-1924, dsjp 1794-1950, collection 240, box 13, folder 1-5, hia, stanford, ca. 19 d. a. apcar to d. s. jordan, december 30, 1913, ibid. d. a. apcar “correspondence: the situation in armenia and the case of the armenians,” the far east, oct 4, 1913. 20 d. a. apcar, “correspondence: russia and armenia,” the far east (yokohama), january 24, 1914, 648, 658. 21 d. a. apcar, “russian occupation of armenia,” armenia (new york), august, 1913, 8-9. d. a. apcar to d. s. jordan, december 30, 1913, daa 1910-1924, dsjp 1794-1950, collection 240, box 13, folder 1-5, hia, stanford, ca. armenia was a semimonthly english magazine (editor arshag d. mahdesian) issued in boston, later in new york between 1904-1929. in 1910s the name of the magazine changed from “armenia” to “the new armenia.” 22 d. a. apcar, “america, armenia calls to thee,” binghamton press (new york), july 11, 1916; “table talk: america, armenia calls to thee,” the buffalo commercial (new york), july 13, 1916; “armenian and syrian belief”, the kenosha evening news (wisconsin), oct 17, 1916; “america! armenia calls to thee,” the hartford daily courant (connecticut), oct 18, 1916, “bryce makes appeal for the armenians,” appleton evening crescent (wisconsin), oct 21, 1916. “america! armenia calls to thee”, the scranton republican (pennsylvania), october 24, 1916. 38 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 figure 1: diana’s poem calling for america’s help the poem is clearly a call for help from “the land of the west, where people rule” to aid armenians who reside in “land of the east where horrors rule” and demonstrates diana’s regard for the democratic west. in this poem it is clear that she desired and hoped that as a free country america would bring peace to armenia. 39 meline mesropyan: diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate remembering the historical background of the unattained american mandate in order to comprehend diana’s views better, it is necessary to look back at the historical development of the armenian mandate. in 1918 eastern armenia, also known as russian armenia, regained its independence after several centuries. the paris peace conference (1919-1920) which was convened at the conclusion of wwi, was the location where the peace terms for the defeated powers of germany, austria, the austro-hungarian empire and the ottoman empire were set. a number of issues were discussed such as the creation of the league of nations, mandated territories and other territorial problems. petitions made by nations that had autonomy or had already become independent were also being heard at the conference. the republic of armenia (that had already declared its independence by that time) sent a delegation to the peace conference to urge armenia’s claim to six provinces in western or ottoman armenia, and that a connection to the black sea be granted to the republic. in addition to the delegation from the armenian republic, the armenian national delegation representing western armenians petitioned for cilicia to have a connection to the mediterranean sea, which was a larger claim in comparison to the demands of the eastern armenians. initially, there were disagreements between the two delegations; however, they eventually united and petitioned for armenia to be expanded from the black sea to the mediterranean, an area that had been viewed as a historical homeland of the armenian people. additionally, a mandate was needed to put a united armenia back on its feet.23 in 1920 diana wrote: “cilicia has been called “the lungs of armenia.” armenians know that the loss of cilicia, with its outlet to the mediterranean, means economic strangulation, and it also means weakening the self-defenses of the armenian state.”24 here we can see that diana’s views on the matter were in line with those of the armenian national delegation, which eventually reached agreement with the armenian republic delegation, that cilicia should be included in the armenian state.25 there were many factors that made these demands impossible to be realized. in the fi rst place, half of the territory of cilicia and western armenia had been under french control since 1916 (the sykes-picot agreement). secondly, ottoman kurdish demands overlapped those of the armenians. finally, there were many other territorial issues such as the ottoman armenian territories being occupied by russian troops. consequently, there were many obstacles interfering with the armenian claim. furthermore, the allies prioritized the treaty with germany over the partitioning of the ottoman empire, which included dealing with 23 samvel poghosyan, «փարիզի վեհաժողովի հայկական հուշագիրը և նրա հետագա ճակատագիրը» [the armenian memorandum of the paris conference and its further fate”], hayots’ ts’eghaspanut’yan patmut’yan ev patmagrutyan harts’er 6 (2002): 123-124. 24 d. a. apcar, “correspondence: the american mandate for armenia,” the japan gazette (yokohama), june 1, 1920. 25 poghosyan, the armenian memorandum, 125. 40 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 the armenian question.26 thus the armenian question was left to be discussed in future conferences. under article 22 of part i of the treaty of versailles signed on june 28, 1919 by germany and the powers during the paris peace conference, the mandate system was established. the mandate system dictated that, the nations that were under the ottoman and german rule were to be put under the control and protection of more experienced and better geographically positioned countries and to develop the territories until they could become stable and selfsuffi cient. the mandate over armenia, however, had not yet been decided.27 a 1920 article from an american newspaper fort wayne news and sentinel stated the following: in the splitting up of turkey various allies took various slices, but no one took armenia. it lacked the natural riches that made syria and mesopotamia, for instance, attractive. the mandate was offered to the league of nations, but the league replied that it could not assume the task, because it had neither an army nor money with which to administer armenia. the allies then engaged in a search for someone [sic] who wished to put up the $50,000,000 and supply the 40,000 men needed to put armenia on its feet.28 in another american newspaper article discussing american president woodrow wilson’s request to congress to accept the mandate over armenia it was stated: provision for mandates is made in the peace treaty and it is set forth that such mandates shall be executed under the league of nations, but since the united states is not a member, administration offi cials said if congress decided that the united states should act for armenia, the treaty provisions would be waived in this case.29 consequently the possibility of america taking on the mandate was being discussed, which gave armenians hope. during the paris peace conference, diana wished that one day in the near future all armenian refugees could return to their freed fatherland. she and those refugees who reached her were “anxiously watching developments at the peace conference.”30 from the time that the discussion over the mandate started in the us, diana was fi lled with great hope, which can be seen in the following passages from her letters: i am at last seeing the realization of my hopes and i think i can say that the whole armenian nation has received this news with great joy and thankfulness; many like me have worked hard for this realization and everyone is thankful that at last 26 george a. bournoutian, a concise history of the armenian people: from ancient times to the present (costa mesa: mazda publishers, 2003), 300-302. 27 oppenheim, international law, 288n. 28 “armenia first! america last!” the fort wayne news and sentinel (indiana), june 7, 1920. 29 “president sends note urging action,” the ogden standard-examiner (utah), may 25, 1920. 30 d. a. apcar to thomas. j. edmonds, 14 march, 1919, folder 6-7, box 165, collection 482, anrc, hia, stanford, ca. 41 meline mesropyan: diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate armenians can live on the soil of armenia and enter into their own heritage.31 … i hope president wilson will hold out for armenia which must have an outlet to the mediterranean and mersine, [sic] which will be our port on the mediterranean, is connected with adana.32 we are now sure of a free and independent armenia which will comprise of what used to be russian armenia and the whole of what used to be turkish armenia including cilicia with mersine as the mediterranean port, and we are hoping, believing, praying and expecting that the united states will become the mandatory power during the period of reorganization: all the armenians wish it, but we do not know as yet what the american people are going to do because there has been no offi cial declaration made as yet, but if the united states (america whom we all love) fails us, then england will become the mandatory power during the period of organization and reconstruction.33 in august 1919, president wilson dispatched a delegation led by a major general of the us army, james g. harbord, to investigate and report on america’s interest and responsibility regarding the middle east and to probe the possibly of the us assuming the mandate over armenia. after 6 weeks of investigation, harbord reported on the situation in the middle east, armenian history and the current political situation in armenia with suggestions to rearrange it. at the end of the report, he concluded with the following statement and suggested 14 reasons for and 13 against accepting the mandate. accepting this diffi cult task without previously securing the assurance of conditions would be fatal to success. … every possible precaution against international complications should be taken in advance. in our opinion there should be specifi c pledges in terms of formal agreements with france and england and defi nite approval from germany and russia of the dispositions made of turkey and transcaucasia, and a pledge to respect them.34 president wilson presented the case of the american mandate over armenia to the american congress on may 24, 1920 saying: i am conscious that i am urging upon the congress a very critical choice, but i make the suggestion in the confi dence that i am speaking in the spirit and in accordance with the wishes of the greatest of the christian peoples. the sympathy for armenia 31 d. a. apcar to mr. hall, march 20, 1919, folder 6-7, box 165, collection 482, anrc, hia, stanford, ca. 32 d. a. apcar to thomas j. edmonds, may 28, 1919, folder 6-7, box 165, collection 482, anrc, hia, stanford, ca. 33 d. a. apcar to edmonds, august 11, 1919, folder 6-7, box 165, collection 482, anrc, hia, stanford, ca. 34 maj. gen. james g. harbord, conditions in the near east. report of the american military mission to armenia, 66th cong., 2d sess., s. doc. 266, washington government printing offi ce, 1920, 24-28, at http:// armenianhouse.org/harbord/conditions-near-east.htm, accessed 21.06.2018. 42 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 among our people has sprung from untainted conscience, pure christian faith, and the earnest desire to see christian people succored in their time of suffering and lifted from their abject subjection and distress and enabled to stand upon their feet and take their place among the free nations in the world. our recognition of the independence of armenia will mean genuine liberty and assured happiness for her people if we fearlessly undertake the duties of guidance and assistance involved in the function of a mandatory.35 however, congress adopted a resolution, on may 29th, to decline an american mandate over armenia. the reason for the decline was not clarifi ed, but it was based on the abovementioned report that “did not have a clear proposal.”36 diana and the american mandate to comprehend diana’s disappointment in having the mandate rejected, one must appreciate that the hope and tension invested in the decision of american congress had been building up for years. eleven years before the question of the american mandate over armenia had even arisen (1909), when diana started her appeal for america’s support, her ideas were not welcomed by the armenian people, who thought diana was “indulging in foolish fancies and in chimera.”37 despite this setback, the hope that diana held onto gave her the strength to “fi ght” for another 10 years. again in 1916 she described how she could envision her country being wiped clear of her countrymen and thought that “the fi nal decision of ‘armenia emptied of armenians’ lay in the hands of the god of abel” and that “president wilson as the chief magistrate of a great neutral state and the representative of a great neutral nation, must go over the side of the god of abel in order to work for a stable peace.”38 thus, one can only imagine the immensity of her disappointment after fi ghting for so long while simultaneously dealing directly with the refugees whose hopes were added to her thoughts. in this time of disappointment, her only comfort was her faith and diana declared that the only “power” that she would never be disappointed in was god.“but god stands above all principalities, and powers and nations, therefore i who began this work of desiring american political interference in armenia, now am hoping that god will take up the mandate, and there is no doubt that nothing would be better.”39 diana continued writing, strongly arguing why armenia needed the american mandate, even after it was rejected by the us congress. on may 31, 1920, two days after the resolution was announced, diana wrote an article which was published in the japan gazette. in it she praised president wilson for his efforts and stated that he “has placed himself at the head of 35 “president sends note urging action,” ogden standard-examiner (utah), may 25, 1920. 36 philip marshall brown, “the mandate over armenia,” the american journal of international law 13, no. 3, (1920): 396. 37 d. a. apcar, “america and the armenian mandate,” the japan advertiser (tokyo), june 23, 1920. 38 d. a. apcar, “correspondence the coming peace,” the far east (yokohama), december 23, 1916. 39 apcar, “the coming peace.” 43 meline mesropyan: diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate the list of armenia’s friends.” she furthermore expressed hope that american advocacy for the mandate might still develop into meaningful action. her primary focus however was on the isolated nature of armenia’s position. she wrote: “the turk wishes to join his brothers (sons of the same father) the tartars [sic], and thus create one big turkish empire from the bosphorus to turkestan. […] armenia stands as the barrier to the success of this panturanian scheme, and armenia will continue so to stand if christendom wishes.” and so she posed a question: “is it right to let one small christian nation be “the barrier of living fl esh” for ever and ever and to stand fi ghting as the lone outpost of christianity, absolutely unaided, for all time?”40 it was completely beyond diana’s imagination that fellow christian countries and even non-religious humanitarians could ignore the injustice perpetrated against her people. diana, who longed for america’s help for years, continued writing with strength of purpose even after the us senate made the resolution to decline the mandate. with regards to the declaration made by the senate stating: “the acceptance of such a mandate would throw the us into the very maelstrom of european quarrels,”41 diana wrote, “european intrigues created the “maelstrom” in armenia, but those who advocate the american mandate know that when the united states enters into the arena, european intrigues will withdraw from the scene, and then the ‘maelstrom’ will no longer be dangerous.”42 she stated three essential needs, critical for the new armenia: fi rst – free and easy access to the sea, essential to the prosperity and security of the new armenian state; second – a political guarantee secured by the protection of the league of nations so that it could be protected from a union between turk and tatar (present day azerbaijanis) and third – fi nancial aid that would be obtainable from the united states, which “[…] will stabilise the new armenian state and thereby stabilise the peace of the near east.”43 what follows are a response to diana’s strongly written articles on this matter. five articles have been found that reveal the argument between betty graeme,44 who criticized diana and a japanese methodist episcopal church missionary arthur d. berry,45 who supported armenia and diana herself. in response to diana’s above-mentioned article in the japan gazette, graeme indirectly called diana an “amateur world fi xer” and continued by writing that “… statements like 40 d. a. apcar, “correspondence: the american mandate for armenia,” the japan gazette (yokohama), june 1, 1920. 41 d. a. apcar, “readers in council: america and the armenian mandate,” the japan advertiser (tokyo), june 19, 1920. 42 apcar, “america and the armenian mandate.” 43 d. a. apcar, “armenia’s needs,” japan times and mail (tokyo), november 5, 1920. 44 elizabeth boschke, the so-called betty graeme was famous in the city of spokane in washington state. she was active as a journalist for the daily newspaper the spokesman-review with “betty graeme” pen name. it seems like she was also corresponding with oriental newspapers. see sunday oregonian (oregon), october 22, 1916. 45 the directory & chronicle for china, japan, corea, indo-china, straits settlements, malay states, sian, netherlands india, borneo, the philippines, &c: with which are incorporated “the china directory” and “the hongkong list for the far east” (hongkong: the hongkong daily press offi ce, 1910), 693. 44 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 that of diana agabeg apcar show commendable humanitarianism but small knowledge of word politics.”46 in response to graeme’s critical comments saying that “world fi xers” like diana “somewhat offi ciously, point out their duty to them [americans] and, all unsolicited, attempt to direct the foreign policy of their country,”47 diana stated that discussing [a] subject is not offi ciously pointing out their duty to americans, neither attempting to direct the foreign policy of their country, and no one can deny that every subject needs to be discussed before a solution can be reached. […] and in asking for an american mandate we did not dictate to the american nation the foreign policy of their country, but we only asked them to stand as our friend. we asked for various reasons, but asking is not dictating.48 in his article arthur berry hoped that the japanese and other non-american readers would not think that betty graeme represents the attitude of all americans toward the mandate for armenia and in support of diana’s call he continued: “there are many americans who feel that the acceptance of the armenian mandate is the plain international duty and privilege of america. we do not feel so because “amateur world fi xers of other nationalities” tell us so. our own national conscience, our own american idealism, our own humanitarianism make us feel that the armenian mandate is a big world task that america ought to undertake.”49 diana’s articles about the american mandate over armenia continued to be a discussion topic until 1922. an american missionary residing in tokyo, rev. charles f. sweet,50 referring to america’s rejection of the mandate wrote: “the people of the united states might have saved armenia, had we been willing to accept a mandate for the armenian portion of the turkish empire. the mandate was offered us, and we refused to accept its obligations and the troubles which acceptance would have involved. we feared foreign entanglements.”51 referring to diana he stated: the letters of mrs. apcar which from time to time have appeared in your columns reveal in their burning intensity how deep is her sense of the misfortunes and the wrongs of her race. not, exactly, however as narrating the dreadful story － she seems to take for granted that the whole world knows it well enough － but as implying both her suffering and her despair. the agony of an outraged ancient people that has outlived its hope echoes in her lines. who can read them without sympathy, who can even think of it all without deep stirrings of the heart?52 46 betty graeme, “americans and the armenian mandate,” the japan advertiser (tokyo), june 22, 1920. 47 graeme, “americans and the armenian mandate.” 48 d. a. apcar, “america and the armenian mandate,” japan advertiser (tokyo), june 23, 1920. 49 arthur d. berry, “readers in council: another american viewpoint,” japan advertiser (tokyo), june 23, 1920. 50 robert cornell armstrong (ed.), the christian movement in japan korea and formosa: a year book of christian work: nineteenth annual issue, (japan: federation of cristian missions, 1921), 94, 101, 131. 51 charles f. sweet, “readers in council: the wrongs of armenia,” japan advertiser (tokyo), august 1, 1922. 52 sweet, “the wrongs of armenia.” 45 meline mesropyan: diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate one can only imagine diana’s despair and disappointment. in a letter to president wilson on the eve of the decision by the us congress, she seemed to want to underline the seriousness of what was at stake with the decision. in this letter diana accuses the french of being behind the 1920 turkish attack on the republic of armenia by turkish nationalists. she furthermore stated that, “every turkish massacre of armenians has invariably had some powerful european government or governments behind it.”53 the entire letter alluded to the fact that without suffi cient protection, armenia would continue to suffer at the hands of european political intrigue. her disappointment can also be read in two of her letters sent to jordan after a long period of no correspondence: “it is a long time since we corresponded, and the reason has been that all the heart has been taken out of me: these three and a half years since the armistice have been bitter indeed.”54 it can be assumed that the rejection of the mandate, coupled with the new massacres in cilicia were indeed devastating for diana. especially considering the fact that she had repatriated about 80-100 armenians from japan in 1919.55 the repatriation of those armenians to port said was a source of bitter regret to diana.56 after 1920 even when the situation in cilicia was deteriorating and despite the fact that america refused to help armenia by accepting the mandate, diana was still a little hopeful that america would do something.57 naturally, the mandate was important for armenia to become a stable state, but it was also essential and urgent for the people’s safety, as there was the constant danger of more massacres. despite everything, diana’s faith was so strong that she trusted that god would be “taking the mandate over armenia,” which would place armenia in the most trustworthy hands of all. diana was not a political thinker, but her strong will to help her own people and country to escape the “hell” in which they were drowning, made her one of the most active female political activists of her time, whose approach to politics was not based on calculation and compromise but on a desperate hope for the welfare of her people. epilogue by examining diana’s correspondence with different people and her articles and books, the author has endeavoured to reveal a portion of diana’s enormous and untiring dedication to her people and her country. this can be seen in the high hopes she had for fi nding a 53 d. a. apcar to woodrow wilson, december 20, 1920. records of the department of state relating to internal affairs of armenia, 1910-1929, of united states. national archives and records administration, atlanta, ga, http://search.alexanderstreet.com/preview/work/bibliographic_entity%7cbibliographic_details%7c2725621, accessed 13.11.2018. 54 d. a. apcar to d. s. jordan, february 13, 1922, folder 1-5, box 13, collection 240, daa 1910-1924, dsjp 1794-1950, hia, stanford, ca. 55 see meline mesropyan, 「デ ィアナ・アプ カーと来日アルメニア人難民」[diana apcar and the armenian refugees in japan], phd thesis, 174-175, http://hdl.handle.net/10097/00125709. 56 d. a. apcar to alfred davies, folder 6-7, box 165, collection 482, anrc, hia, stanford, ca. 57 d. a. apcar to d. s. jordan, february 13, 1922, folder 1-5, box 13, collection 240, daa 1910-1924, dsjp 1794-1950, hia, stanford, ca. 46 guardian-country for armenia and the despair and disappointment during the last stage of her 10-year effort. what diana’s hope and disappointment on the loss of an american mandate revealed was how much of armenia’s welfare was dependent on the support of a powerful state and how close armenia came to actually achieving this through the vocal support of president wilson and the democratic processes of the us congress. diana’s hope and disappointment show us a state in need of powerful allies which did not have suffi cient geopolitical incentives to intervene. indeed, the us’s great unconditional humanitarian and diplomatic assistance to the armenian refugees after wwi and president wilson’s compassionate approach seemed to heighten diana’s hope and faith in its realization. she was seeing america as a potential protecting country for armenia without any designs on increasing their “sphere of infl uence.” in fact, armenia’s not being a focus of america’s geopolitical interests might have been the very reason america did not take the mandate. the armenian genocide and the holocaust are the most compared genocides of the 20th century by various researchers.58 given the topic of this paper it is hard to avoid parallels with the support the state of israel received from the us after wwii. notwithstanding the many geopolitical differences between the two circumstances as well as between armenia and israel themselves, there are striking similarities. both of these ancient nations had been living without their own states for centuries, creating vast diasporas all around the world. both of these nations were granted internationally recognized small states after world wars hemmed in by hostile muslim neighbors and both states belong to a cultural heritage that has endured genocide. the similarities highlight the necessity of a powerful ally that was essential for their survival and development. however, despite the fact that, unlike israel, armenia’s direct neighbor was the genocide perpetrator thus increasing the danger to the armenian state, the re-formed state in the caucasus, surrounded by enemies, was abandoned fi rst by the european powers that had no political interests in armenia and then by the us, which did not consider armenia as being in its “sphere of infl uence.” it is also unnecessary to mention the complete absence of reparations for the armenian genocide, loss of homeland territories, an unpunished turkish government and the constant denial of the armenian genocide until the present day. it is also obvious that unlike with armenia, the western powers, especially the us had geopolitical interests in israel. given these parallels it is hard not to wonder what could have been, had the american mandate over armenia been approved. as harsh as it sounds, no matter how compassionate a state or state leader may wish to be, fundamental aspects of geopolitics are spheres of infl uence and political interests. when armenia’s situation is viewed in this light, diana’s hopes, despite being well-reasoned could also be called naive. ultimately, what we can see in diana’s hope and disappointment is the realization that 58 see, for example, robert melson, revolution and genocide: on the origins of the armenian genocide and the holocaust (chicago : university of chicago press, 1996); yair auron, the banality of indifference: zionism and the armenian genocide, trans. by maggie bar-tura (new york: routledge, 2017); dlpak jabar ali dawood, “the aftermath of the armenian genocide and the holocaust: a comparative study,” journal of university of garmian 6, no. 3 (2019), at http://jgu.garmian.edu.krd/article_99472_9907367600af94e744a71585900c1037. pdf, accessed 02.01.2021. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 47 the “rock” of armenia’s geographical position truly could not be hewn. 100 years have passed but armenia is still hemmed in by hostility. as diana put it, armenia’s “inexorable fate” is that the only ally that it can turn to is russia with its own geopolitical interests. meline mesropyan: diana apcar’s search for an armenian protectorate dr. edita gzoyan is a senior researcher at the armenian genocide museum-institute. she has a phd in international relations from yerevan state university and llm from american university of armenia. she is an author of a monograph and nearly three dozens of articles related to legal, historical and gender aspects of the armenian genocide. 73 genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france edita gzoyan phd in international relations, llm abstract: this article examines genocide denial under the constitutional law, mainly the conflict between constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and dignity/equality. the comparison reflects the attitudes of three european states germany, spain and france. the article discusses the history and background of anti-holocaust laws in the concerned countries and possible criminalization of the armenian genocide denial. if further concentrated on the constitutional court decisions, which are marked with differences connected with factors such as history, morals, values of the particular society and, of course, politics. introduction the phenomenon of genocide denial is an issue of hot debate. opinions on how to deal with the denial are sharply divided. those favoring robust speech protection assess denial as a political issue, while others offer legal regulations. apart from being an issue of public, academic and political debate, genocide denial possesses also a crucial constitutional difficulty, as its regulation operates in the nexus of competing constitutional concepts freedom of speech and dignity, equality. the second important aspect of the issue is the type of regulationcriminalization or civil law solution. the mentioned considerations are grounded on the specific historical and conceptual settings, as well as on the system of values of the particular society. this paper is a comparative analysis of the constitutional law approaches to the criminalization of genocide denial within the framework of values and symbolic function of the anti-negation laws in a specific cultural context. the three states – germany, spain and france-are chosen for having adopted different approaches to the issue, from the robust protection of human dignity by germany to valuing french freedom of expression and a moderate approach elaborated by the spain constitutional court. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 74 freedom of speech v. dignity one of the basic arguments for the freedom of speech is its fundamental role in seeking the truth,1 which was further elaborated in the theory of the “marketplace of ideas”2 to enhance public discourse. the importance of free speech is also assessed as a high democratic value and a basis for the development of an individual autonomy3 in the democratic order4.meanwhile, in nearly all legal systems, the freedom of expression is recognized as a non-absolute right in the context of other fundamental rights and may be limited by the states under certain conditions.5 the limitations aim at balancing the freedom of speech and the rights of others. all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, which encompasses also the right of non-discrimination.6human dignity7 is tightly connected with individual autonomy and is called an inherent right,8the “highest human right”, as well as “the source of rights”9 and that only “the performance of free person can create human dignity”.10 in other words, other rights, including freedom of speech become means and conditions for the formation of human dignity. the prevalence of one constitutional norm over the other in a particular society depends “on the values sought to be promoted, harm perceived, and the importance attributed to this harm”11. when the freedom of speech conflicts with other values of the society (dignity and equality), a “wide array for regulations come to play”.12 the underlying argument is that societies are founded on different historical, cultural, philosophical premises, which brings to different perceptions and values. the overall attitude of european nations to human 1. mill john stuart, “on liberty,” cited in claudia e. haupt, “regulating hate speech—damned if you do and damned if you don’t: lessons learned from comparing the german and u.s. approaches,” boston university international law journal 23:299 (2005): 314. 2. bruce ackerman, “the marketplace of ideas,” www.digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/154 (accessed 10 may, 2012). 3. keith werhan, freedom of speech: a reference guide to the united states constitution (westport, conn.: praeger, 2004), 36. 4. alexander meiklejohn, free speech and its relations to self-government (new york: harper and brothers publishers, 1948), 93-94. 5. limitation clauses in international and national jurisdictions. 6. un preamble. 7. dignity (latin– dignitas – worth, noble appearance, worth, dignatio – respect for someone). 8. human rights. collection of regional international documents (vilnius, 1993), 232. 9. alfonsas vaišvila, “human dignity and the right to human dignity in terms of legal personalism, from conception of static dignity to conception of dynamic one,” jurisprudencija 3:117(2009): 111-127, www. mruni.eu (accessed 10 may, 2012). 10. ibid. 11. michel rosenfeld, “hate speech in the constitutional jurisprudence: a comparative analysis,” cardozo law review 24: 4 (2003): 1528. 12. kathleen mahoney, “the canadian constitutional approach to freedom of expression in hate propaganda and pornography,” law and contemporary problems 55, 1 (1992):77. genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france 75 rights bears the notion of the wwii.13 europe generally has never accepted the freedom of speech in the same manner as the u.s. with its unique preference and protections of free speech.14 while dignity, in the context of constitutional rights and values plays more primary role in europe15 than in the u.s.16 genocide denial regulations partly depend on the mentioned factors. two ways are offered to assess the regulations of genocide-denial laws:17 to look into “historical accounts of ethnic, racial and religious violence, genocide, and discriminatory practices” that have occurred within that particular state and consider “the jurisprudential history of the society concerning equality, group libel, peace and security, and human dignity”. both the european commission on human rights and the european court of human rights has ruled that in light of “historical experience” it is acceptable to prohibit certain acts.18this implies that a law criminalizing holocaust denial may be appropriate for germany as a perpetrator of a crime, while the same law will not be accepted in other state not connected with holocaust. it derives that crimes should have a substantive impact on a society or a significant group within the society to serve as a basis for the content-based regulation of freedom of speech. the second factor to consider is the attitude of that particular state towards freedom of speech, human dignity and equality. thus, under this analysis a law criminalizing holocaust denial may be appropriate in most states of europe because of its wide impact on those particular states and a high value of human dignity in the region, but the armenian genocide, while passing the dignity requirement, will probably fail under the first. german constitutional law approach to criminalization of genocide denial dignity has a dominant role in the german constitution, and is called “a supreme value dominating the whole system of the fundamental rights”19, a central value “obliging states to realize and protect it”20. this attitude is linked to the historical developments, culture and perceptions of the german society. human dignity is enshrined in article 1 of the german 13. ruti teitel, “militating democracy: comparative constitutional perspectives,” michigan journal of international law, 29:49(2008): 65. 14. john knechtle, “holocaust denial and the concept of dignity in the european union,” florida state university law review 36:41(2008): 45, 47. 15. ibid., 58. 16. silvia suteu, “law against negation: anti-holocaust denial legislations in europe,” www.fromceu.hu (accessed 2 may, 2012). 17. john knechtle, “holocaust denial and the concept of dignity in the european union,” 52-53. 18. b.h., m.w., h.p. et g.k. v. austria, no. 1277/87, commission decision of october 12, 1989. refah partisi (the welfare party) and others v. turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 4144/98, 2003, para. 124. 19. claudia e. haupt, “regulating hate speech,” 326. 20. silvia suteu, “law against negation...” 41. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 76 basic law21. it stipulates that human dignity is inviolable and the state has a duty to respect and protect it. it’s also important to mention article 2(1), which provides the right for free development of one’s personality “insofar as does not violate the rights of others or the constitutional order and the moral law”. it is important to mention that an insult to the memory of deceased person is protected in german jurisdiction, which recognizes that the specific circumstances of an individual’s death as part of his/her dignity, which is protected after the death22. under the german jurisprudence the denial of a murder of an individual by a state based on his/her origin/race harms the dignity of that individual. the right of free speech is in article 5, which initially makes broad protection for speech, ensuring both a right to disseminate expression and receive information. paragraph 2 of the same article further indicates the conditions for limitation as found “in the provisions of general laws, for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor”. the rights enshrined in article 5 are limited by different provisions of the criminal code, administrative law, and the civil code of germany, which empowered the state to exercise wide content-based regulations on speech. there is no separate law banning holocaust denial in germany. meanwhile,several provisions in the german penal code form an anti-denial apparatus. section 130 deals with “agitation of people”, which punishes incitement to racial hatred and attacks on human dignity. art. 130 (2) deals directly with denial of nazi crimes. it stipulates that the incitement of hatred against segments of the population and calls for violent or arbitrary measures assaults their human dignity and shall be punished with imprisonment from three months to five years. paragraph 3 of the same article punishes with imprisonment for five years or a fine those who “publicly or in a meeting approves of denies or belittles an act committed under the rule of national socialism or the code of crimes against international law”. the newly added paragraph 4 made it an act punishable by 3 years of imprisonment and fine publicly or in a meeting to assault human dignity of the victims by approving of, denying or rendering harmless the violent and arbitrary national socialist rule. article 189 criminalizes the detraction of the memory of deed. a major consideration in evaluating anti-denial laws should be paid on the german’s self-perception as a perpetrator of holocaust; and in this respect criminalizing denial serves a moral purpose. the successor state of the “third reich” has assumed legal and moral responsibility for the nazi policy of jews extermination.23 these historical and moral elements explain the fact that germany was the first country to enact such laws, and during its eu presidency strongly agitated for the criminalization of holocaust denial throughout 21. german constitution. 22. “introduction,” in ludovic hennebel and tomas hochmann (eds.), genocide denials and the law (oxford: oxford university press, 2011), xliii-xliv. 23. claus leggewie, “seven circles of european memory,” www.eurozine.com/pdf/2010-12-20-leggewie-en.pdf (accessed 25 april 2012). genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france 77 the eu.24the history of fascism and third reich played a significant role also in shaping german’s attitude toward democracy and the state’s anti-denial legislation.25 the state is called a “militant democracy”26, as the constitution of germany is based on the principle of a “democracy capable of defending itself”27 and fighting against anti-democratic forces. the enactment of many german statutes after world war ii also aimed at eliminating nazism and its ideology, namely that of disseminating racial hatred.28 in this realm hate speech29 is assessed as a tool of propaganda which can destroy the foundations of cherished democracy and speech regulations are established to prevent the revival of nazi past.30 only taking the aforementioned background in the mind one can assess the germans federal constitutional court (hereinafter the court) decision on the constitutionality of holocaust denial laws (auschwitzluge). court explained its position by distinguishing between opinions and facts. the court emphasized that opinions are subjective and are protected under basic law whether they are “well founded or emotional or rational, dangerous or harmless, valuable or worthless”31. thus, the mere expression of opinion is considered as constitutionally protected. by contrast, freedom of speech does not protect the dissemination of factual statements that are false or are based on the fact that has been proven to be false.32 in other words, incorrect or untruthful factual statements do not fall within the ambits of article 5. the court further stressed that the denial of holocaust is a clearly false fact, as the accounts of eyewitnesses, historians, and judicial proceedings dismiss any doubt about holocaust and german responsibility. the court’s next argument was that freedom of speech does not take precedence when it violates the right to the protection of personality by “formal insult or vilification”33. the 24. ian traynor, “germany bids to outlaw denial of holocaust across continent,” www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2007/jan/16/germany.thefarright (accessed 20 may, 2012). 25. sionaidh douglas-scott, “the hatefulness of protected speech: a comparison of american and european approaches,” william and mary bill of rights journal 7(1999): 319. 26. silvia suteu, “law against negation,” 45. 27. laurent pech, “the law of holocaust denial in europe: towards a (qualified) eu-wide criminal prohibition,” www.centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/09/091001.html (accessed 25 april 2012). 28. john knechtle, “holocaust denial and the concept of dignity,” 49. 29. hate speech is a communication that carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some group, especially in circumstances in which the communication is likely to provoke violence. it is an incitement to hatred primarily against a group of persons defined in terms of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and the like. hate speech can be any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete minorities or to women. 30. mariana mello, “hagan v. australia: a sign of the emerging notion of hate speech in customary international law,” loyola of los angeles international and comparative law review 28:365 (2006): 374. 31. bundesverfassungsgericht [bverfg] [federal constitutional court] apr. 13, 1994, 90 entscheidungen des bundesverfassungsgerichts [bverfge] 241 (f.r.g.), www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen.html (accessed 11 may 2012). 32. claudia haupt, “regulating hate speech,” 329. 33. bundesverfassungsgericht [bverfg] [federal constitutional court] apr. 13, 1994. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 78 court also stressed the importance of not only an individual dignity but also of a particular group implying the dignity rights of the jews currently living in germany. the jews were regarded as a vulnerable group. holocaust denial significantly harms the reputation and dignity of jews, since the holocaust is an integral part of jews identity and personal dignity34 (a strong dignity-based argument). the court stressed that nazi persecutions have become part of modern generation of jews living in germany. so, denial of holocaust equals to denial of jews identity35. it will create an atmosphere of insecurity for the jews and a possibility of repetition of those notorious events. the rights to equality and non-discrimination were also evaluated by the court. so, the court concluded that sec 130 is compatible with the constitution and other rights, namely dignity, equality, non-discrimination and protection of personality. besides, the court stated that it is simply enforcing the limits established by the german constitution itself.36 while the criminalization of glorification of nazi crimes is not neutral toward opinions as the constitution requires, it is nevertheless justified by germany’s dark past.37 thus, the essence of this decision was the role of holocaust denial in the german society, the guilt of the german state and the responsibility of the state that such crimes will never happen again. the court’s decision was criticized in that the latter did not consider other non-punishable interpretations and other less restrictive means to achieve the goal,38and has chosen to protect dignity at the expense of free speech in nearly absolute terms.39this is, however, quite in consonance with the spirit of german basic law that “all rights must be weighed against human dignity, which takes precedence over all other values”40. as mentioned, germany’s direct participation in holocaust results in a special moral responsibility on the german society. this responsibility mandates to assure and guarantee the collective dignity and security of jews living in germany. above all, the constitutional court of germany as a part of society and state apparatus feels the same moral responsibility, which explains the compatibility of the holocaust denial criminalization with the german constitution. 34. ibid. 35. dieter grimm, “the holocaust denial decision of the federal constitutional court of germany,” in ivan hare, james weinstein (eds.), extreme speech and democracy (oxford: oxford university press, 2010), 560. 36. claudia haupt, “regulating hate speech,” 330. 37. bverfg (2009), wunsiedel, 1 bvr 2150/08, par. 64-68. 38. winfried brugger, “ban on or protection of hate speech? some observations based on german and american law,” tulane european and civil law forum 17 (2002): 53. 39. ronald j. krotoszynski, “a comparative perspective on the first amendment: free speech, militant democracy, and the primacy of dignity as a preferred constitutional value in germany,” tulane european and civil law forum 78 (2004): 1581. 40. claudia haupt, “regulating hate speech,” 314. genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france 79 taking these dignity-based and guilt-based arguments can the armenian genocide denial survive the german constitutional court analysis? within the spectrum of guilt-based argument one can argue that germany was an ally of ottoman turkey during world war i and the armenian genocide in 1915 was perpetrated and executed by the approval of the germany. this was admitted also on the governmental level: the german bundestag adopted a resolution on the armenian genocide which not only condemned the actions of the young turks’ government that resulted in almost a complete extermination of the armenians living in the ottoman empire, but also recognized the historical responsibility of germany and called on the federal government to continue further public discussions about the responsibility of the german reich in the armenian genocide. however, whether this would be enough to shape a public attitude and establish collective guilt so that to raise it to the level of moral issue? it took more than 100 years for the german lawmakers to admit the fact of the armenian genocide and the responsibility of germany. although the criminalization of denial in germany relates only to the holocaust, in this paragraph we will apply the court’s reasoning to the armenian genocide denial case to see whether it will pass the test. definitely, the armenian genocide denial passes the first argument of the german constitutional court on opinions and facts, as the armenian genocide is a clearly established historical fact. moreover, the german bundestag very recently officially admitted that the 1915 events qualify as genocide. the court’s next argument on the protection of personality and the importance of dignity of a particular group can also well suit into an armenian case. armenian genocide denial significantly harms the reputation and dignity of armenians, since mets yeghern is an integral part of armenians’ identity. as in case of holocaust denial, armenian genocide denial also violates the rights to equality and non-discrimination. however, in holocaust denial case the court referred to the rights of jews living in germany, and the responsibility of the german state to assure their security and guarantee against the holocaust repetition. the number of jews living in germany outnumbered the armenians living in germany several times. there are still holocaust survivors and their heirs living in germany a perpetrator state, who admitted and hugely regretted about the past genocide, and the german state feels an obligation to safeguard them from any kind of discrimination and reminder about the past atrocities. this analysis is hardly applicable to the armenians living in germany. plus, the existence of a huge turkish diaspora in germany can play a negative role in this case. finally, the weight of guilt in the jews case is far great than in the armenian genocide case, where the weight of german guilt is still to be discovered, discussed and admitted. spain constitutional law approach to criminalization of genocide denial article 20 of the spain constitution recognizes the freedom of speech, thoughts and truthful information. in its fourth paragraph, article 20 imposes limits on this right based on “the respect for the rights… and, especially, in the right to honor, privacy, personal ideninternational journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 80 tity, and protection of youth and childhood”. article 10 of the constitution declares dignity as the inviolable inherent right, which together with “the free development of the personality, respect for the law and the rights of others, constitutes the foundation of political order and social peace”. the spain constitutional court (hereinafter the court) has declared that the right to freedom of speech is a precondition for exercising other rights. at the same time constitution does not recognize the right to insult, and freedom of speech protection “excludes absolutely humiliating expressions”.41 according to the court freedom of speech is a right to make judgments and opinions, without factual claims or objective data, and when freedom of speech provides untrue information, the court will assess it as information and “the constitutional protection will be extended only to truthful information”.42 however, in assessing the holocaust denial law the court seemed to contradict this approach. in 1971, article 607 on the crime of genocide was introduced to the spanish criminal code, which was amended in 2007.43in its original, section 607.2 of the spanish criminal code prescribed that “dissemination of ideas and doctrines that deny or justify the crimes [acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group] or aim at reinstating regimes or institutions that contribute those crimes is punishable with imprisonment from one to two years”. in its analysis the spain constitutional court states that this rule aims not to “the simple spreading of ideas or opinions, but to the protection of society from behaviors that “would generate a climate of violence and hostility that, in an indirect way, could materialize in specific acts of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination”.44 although the article was aimed at the protection of jews, the wording of the article is wide, including also other genocides. in understanding spain anti-negation legislation it’s also important to consider that the spain constitution came into force after 36 years of franco dictatorship and the fears of spanish people are reflected in the constitution.45that’s why it is also called “militant democracy”, which implies the defensive character of the spain constitution and the re41. alfredo coll and sergio doncel, “freedom of speech in american and spanish law: a comparative perspective,” www.works.bepress.com/alfredo_coll/1 (accessed 28 july 2016). 42. ibid, 7. 43. the section was amended in november 2007 after another decision of the constitutional court that criminalization of denial of past events violates the right to freedom of speech. now section 607.2 reads ‘’...those who are found guilty of spreading ideas justifying the destruction of the protected groups or of attempting to reinstate regimes or institutions which carried out such policies and/or bore relevant ideologies are to be punished with a prison sentence of one to two years’’. 44. spain constitutional court judgment no. 235/2007, of november 7. www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ es/jurisprudencia/restrad/paginas/jcc2352007en.aspx (accessed 30 may 2012), also pablo salvador coderch and antoni rubí puig,, “genocide denial and freedom of speech: comments on the spanish constitutional court’s judgment 235/2007, november 7th”, in dret. revista para el análisis del derecho 4 (2008):16. 45. for more information see enrique guillen lopez, “judicial review in spain: the constitutional court,” loyola of los angeles law review 41: 529 (2008): 529-562. genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france 81 striction of some fundamental rights freedom of speech in order not to be used for anti-constitutional purposes. another important fact related to section 607.2 is that jewish culture and community had been historically and systematically persecuted in spain and anti-semitism was quite widespread in spanish society.46 with this background in 1991 the court in assessing the constitutionality of section 607.2 ruled that initially denial speech fell under the freedom of speech protection, however, it does not protect racist declarations, which are contrary to the right of honor and human dignity47. so, the court was of the opinion that the right to dignity should prevail over the right of freedom of speech. however, in 2007 the constitutional court of spain struck off the denial aspect of the article, thus criminalizing only the justification of genocides. the issue of article 607.2 constitutionality was again raised on september 14, 2000 connected with the case of the bookstore owner who had sold and distributed books and documents denying the holocaust. in evaluating article 607.2 the court first stressed the importance of the freedom of speech not only as a basic individual freedom (even if is disturbing and unpleasant), but also its role in spain’s democratic system, which implies that fundamental rights may not be limited because are counter to the spirit of constitution.48in democracy state authorities cannot interfere in the exchange of ideas (very similar to “marketplace of ideas” theory), unless they infringe upon other constitutionaly protected rights.49the court highlighted the urgent need to set clear boundaries between behaviors that do not merit protection and dissemination of ideas and ideologies. the court differentiated between denial and justification, between simple denial and positive value judgments. the simple denial of genocide as a historical fact without adding any subjective value judgment is ruled to be protected by the constitution. the court found that section 607(2) of the criminal code punishes simply the dissemination of ideas without any damage to the constitutionally protected rights, so constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech (articles 20(1), and freedom of thought (art. 16)) should prevail. although the court accepted that the denial of holocaust is very “reprehensible and distorted”, however statements, doubts and opinions about the historical fact are protected by the freedom of speech. by contrast, positive value judgments may be criminally punished, because “dissemination of offensive utterances is unnecessary for the expression of ideas and opinions and fall outside the right’s scope of protection”50. so, the court held that there is a difference between denying and justifying, because the “latter conduct does create a clear and present danger”. 46. jose rodriguez jiménez, “antisemitism and the extreme right in spain (1962-1997),” www.sicsa.huji. ac.il (accessed 24 april 2012). 47. case of violeta friedman, no 101/90, judgment of november 11, 1991. 48. spain constitutional court judgment no. 235/2007, of november 7, para 5. 49. ibid.para 6. 50. ibid. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 82 as to the punishable acts the court explained that freedom of speech does not guarantee the right to express and disseminate particular statements with the intention of “disdaining or discriminating individuals or groups”. second, freedom of speech does not guarantee the right to “praising tyrants, glorifying their publicity or justifying their actions if they entail humiliation to their victims in the context of denying the nazi genocide”. third, freedom of speech does not cover the so-called «hate speech», which involves direct incitement to violence against citizens or against particular racial or ideological groups. thus, genocide denial will be criminalized only if disdain or discriminate, justify the crime or humiliate the victims and incite violence against particular group. in other cases holocaust denial is protected by the freedom of expression. so, the ruling of the spain court differs from the german court with regard to opinions and factual statements. under the right of freedom of speech the spain court decided to protect factual statements, while the german court preferred to guarantee opinions. from the moral point of view opinions are free but lies have no constitutional value. moreover, facts are scientifically testable, while opinions labeled radical yesterday can be considered acceptable today. so, despite the historical fact of spain’s involvement in the persecutions of jews and anti-semitism, it seems that the society is changing. the moral part of guilt becomes more and more remote and by the influence of globalization and modern challenges new human right values appear to outweigh in the spanish society. the people start to value the freedom of speech and its role in the everyday life of ordinary citizens. meanwhile, legislator declared its intention to continue efforts to bring a new draft with a view to overcome the court’s decision.51 in spain’s perspective, the denial of the armenian genocide is not quite straightforward: most importantly, the state hasn’t yet officially recognized the armenian genocide, which was done by more than dozen city councils. it is clear that the mere denial of the historical fact of the armenian genocide fall outside the scope of article 607.2 spain penal code. however, whether the justification of the armenian genocide could still be protected under the spain constitution? the issue seems quite debatable. although there was no underlying argumentation about holocaust history in the reasoning of the court, however in assessing the mere existence of article 607.2, the history of jews persecutions in spain should be kept in mind. there is no history of armenian persecutions in spain. moreover, spain was a neutral state during wwi, during which the armenian genocide was carried out. armenian community in spain was formed after the dissolution of the ussr, in contrast to other states where the armenian emigration started just after the 1915 genocide. thus the court’s argument that denial “would generate a climate of violence and hostility” and “could be materialized in specific acts of racial, ethnic or religious discrimination” is less applicable to the armenians. however, as already mentioned because spain hasn’t 51. cited in michael whine, “expanding holocaust denial and legislation against it,” jewish political studies review 20:1-2(2008). genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france 83 recognized the armenian genocide, this mere fact can deter the court from even considering the armenian genocide denial case. french constitutional law approach to criminalization of genocide denial the declaration of rights of man and citizen guarantees freedom of speech as the most precious rights of man, stating that people are free to speak, write, and print “on condition that they answer for any abuse of this freedom”.52furthermore, the declaration states the only bound on the exercise of natural rights is the necessity to assure the enjoyment of these same rights to other members of the society.53 meanwhile the parliament of france can enact rules on the right of freedom of speech, as well as institute indictments on abuse of the right that violate public order and the rights of others provided “that damage must be necessary, appropriate and proportionate to the objective pursued”.54 consequently, under french law, people have rights which can be restricted by the legislature if considered necessary for public security. to understand such an approach one should consider the philosophical and historical grounds of free speech in france, which was directed at the preservation of democracy55 as a non-self-perpetuating system.56this notion comes from the 1793 french revolutionary slogan “pas de libert´e pour les ennemis de la libert´e”57. one of such restrictions on the freedom of speech is holocaust denial law (loi gaysot), which was paradoxically included as article 24 in the 1881 freedom of the press law. the article stipulates that “anyone who disputes the existence of the crimes against humanity as defined in the statute of the international military tribunal which have been committed by the members of a criminal organization or by a person found guilty of such crimes by a french or international court shall be liable to one year’s imprisonment and/or a fine”. the aim of the law is to “protect public order, morals and rights of others, referring to the respect due to past and the necessary preservation of social peace in the future”.58 a clear recognition that the holocaust denial is anti-semitism the gayssot law is intended to protect the jewish community “against hostility, antagonism and ill will”.59 it should also be clarified that the rationale of the law in france differs from that of germany. the 52. declaration of the rights of man – 1789, www.avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp (accessed 21 may 2012). 53. article 4 and 11of the declaration of the rights of man. 54. article 34 of the french constitution. 55. sévane garibian, “taking denial seriously: genocide denial and freedom of speech in french law,” cardozo journal of conflict resolution 9:479 (2008): 483. 56. vivian curran, "balancing freedom of expression and human rights in france,” www.jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vivian-curran-genocide-denial.php (accessed 30 may 2012). 57. “no liberty to the enemies of liberty,” sévane garibian, “taking denial seriously,” 482. 58. silvia suteu, “law against negation,” 73. 59. josephs jonathan, “holocaust denial legislation,” working papers du centre perelman de philosophie du droit 3 (2008): 50. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 84 latter focused on the untruthful nature of the auschwitz lie, while the french authorities in outlawing holocaust denial have mostly relied on the argument that it pursues racist and antidemocratic aims.60 it’s worth highlighting the role of history in shaping the attitude of france towards holocaust. the involvement of vichy france with nazi german anti-jewish policy, french anti-semitic attitude,61 jews aggressive persecutions in france62 played their prominent role on the conciseness of the french society.63 in 1995 president chirac recognized the responsibility on behalf of the french state for the nation’s participation in atrocities against its jewish citizens during wwii.64 as a result, there is a solid degree of culpability in the french society. holocaust denial laws are legacies of sensitive and painful events in french history through which “the french nation is supposed to come to terms with its sobering past”.65 even the u.s. district court for the northern district of california accepted the right of france to enact anti-negation laws against “the distribution of nazi propaganda in response to its terrible experiences during wwii”.66 the law was not submitted to review to the constitutional council (hereinafter the council) prior to its ratification. the court of cassation decided not to refer the law to the constitutional review because “it evidently does not conflict with the freedom of expression”.67the gayssot law was assumed compatible with the constitution, because what is punished is not the holding of opinions, but the diffusion of that opinion, which is an “act susceptible to produce undesirable effects…”68 so far 29 cases have been tried under gayssot law69 and ordinary courts have ruled on the compatibility of the law with the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by article 10 of the european convention on human rights (ecthr),70 namely is prescribed by law, is necessary in a democratic society for 60. sévane garibian, “taking denial seriously,” 485. 61. lyombe eko, “new medium, old free speech regimes: the historical and ideological foundations of french & american regulation of bias-motivated speech and symbolic expression on the internet,” loyola. los angeles international and comparative law review 28:69 (2006):106. 62. richard h. weisberg, vichy law and the holocaust in france (amsterdam: harwood academic publisher, 1996), 2. 63. peter carrier, holocaust monuments and the national memory cultures in france and germany since 1989 (new york:berghahn books, 2005), 51. 64. lyombe eko, “new medium, old free speech regimes,” 83-84. 65. roger cohen, “france confronts its jews, and itself,” new york times, 19 october 1997, 1. 66. uejf & licra v. yahoo! inc., tribunal de grande instance [t.g.i.] [superior court] paris, may 22, 2000, the clerk of the chief justice christine bensoam, (fr.), available at www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ yauctions20000522.htm. 67. www.senat.fr/basile/visio.do?id=d45186620120123_8&idtable=d13628272330_3|d45186620120123_8&_c=genocide+bill&rch=ds&de=20110527&au=20120527&dp=1+an&radi o=dp&aff=36282&tri=p&off=0&afd=ppr&afd=ppl&afd=pjl&afd=cvn#eltsign7 (accessed 31 may 2012). 68. michel troper, “la loi gayssot et la constitution,” annale. histoire, sciences sociales 54(6) (1999):1253. 69. silvia suteu, “law against negation,” 96. 70. 1. everyone has the right to freedom of expression. this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france 85 the prevention of disorder and the protection of the rights of others. the law is considered to protect the rights of the nazis’ victims by ensuring and safeguarding the respect to their memory and safeguards the peaceful coexistence in the france.71 to further justify this conclusion, courts sometimes additionally referred to ecthr limitation clause.72 the legitimacy of the law was also upheld by the international case-law.73 on january 2012the french parliament adopted the genocide bill criminalizing “contestation or trivialization of genocide named in the french criminal code and recognized by the french law”.74although the law criminalizes the denial of any genocide legally recognized by france, it unofficially implied the armenian genocide, as the french law recognized only 2 genocides – the holocaust, the denial of which is criminalized separately, and the armenian genocide75.the experts assessed the adoption of the bill within the framework of 2008 eu council framework decision and with the nation’s own complicated past.76 however, these were not enough for the bill to survive. unlike the gaysot law, the genocide bill was submitted to the constitutional council (hereinafter the council) for evaluation. of frontiers. 2. the exercise of these freedoms, carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 71. yahoo! ii, 379 f.3d 1120, 1126-1127 (9th cir. 2004). 72. none of the provisions of the ecthr may be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms set forth in the echr. 73. ecthr 7 july 2003, case no. 65831/01, garaudy v. france; iccpr 8 november 1996, case no 550/1993, robert faurisson v. france. 74. the purpose of this bill is to punish by one year of imprisonment and a fine of 45,000 euros, or both, only those who have publicly denied, challenged or trivialized crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined in articles 6, 7 and 8 of the statute of the international criminal court, article 6 of the charter of the international military tribunal annexed to the agreement of london of august 8th, 1945, or recognized by france. accordingly, the act on freedom of the press is amended to ensure that offenses of a racist nature are now a common law offense under the freedom of the press act. moreover, it allows any association duly declared for at least five years at the date of the facts, which proposes, in its statutes, to defend the moral interests and honor of victims of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes to exercise the rights of the civil party with respect to the apology, denial or trivialization of crimes of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.www.senat.fr/lng/en/index.html 75. in 2001france passed a law recognizing the armenians genocide. in 2006 the french national assembly approved an amendment to the 2001 statute, imposing criminal sanctions for the denial of the armenian genocide. however, it was dropped before being submitted to the senate. the next attempt to criminalize the armenian genocide denial was made on 2012. 76. balancing freedom of expression and human rights in france, www.jurist.org/forum/2012/02/vivian-curran-genocide-denial.php (accessed 12 june 2012). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 86 before dwelling upon the council reasoning and decision, let’s first understand the place of the armenian genocide in the frame of the french memory laws’ arguments77. so, the gayssot law as a memory law deals specifically with the holocaust denial in france and is tightly connected with the history of holocaust in france, its political, cultural and social implications, the killing of french jews and the rise of denialism in france.78 what about the armenian genocide? does it fit into the common understanding of french history and culture? armenian genocide denial laws should have some connection with the french history, culture, etc. although one can argue that france as a great power did not interfere to stop the massacres and deportations, thus aiding and abetting the armenian genocide, this argument will hardly survive the critique. this same rationale could be applied to other great powers as well. plus, other instances of assistance and help from the french part can be pointed out. another argument, listed also in the report to the national assembly on the proposed armenian memory law79, could be the place of france “as a birthplace of human rights”, thus having a role to protect universal human rights values. however, as the author of the idea correctly put it, in this case the france will adopt a broader approach to the issue and will criminalize all genocides80 (by the way, this was one of the arguments of the council). when evaluating the constitutionality of genocide bill, the council first assessed the vital role of the freedom of speech, and further elaborated on the right of the parliament to enact on freedom of speech and at the same time to institute indictments on abuse of its exercise.81 the main argument of the council was based on article 6 of the declaration of human and citizens rights 1789, which stipulates that the law as the expression of general will of all citizens must be the same for all “whether it protects or punishes”. the genocide bill was intended to punish only genocides recognized by the french parliament, which, according to the council, cannot be considered as normative within the meaning of article 6. and thus, the legislature unconstitutionally interfered with the right of freedom of expression.82it derives from the reasoning of the council that if the bill equally criminalizes all genocides it will survive judicial scrutiny. in this case what about holocaust, does its “exceptional status” still work? in that case what about the equality and normative value of the laws declared by the council? 77. together with the gaysott law, there is another memory law connected with the french history taubira law which recognizes slave trade and slavery as a crime against humanity. 78. john wolf, harnessing the holocaust: the politics of memory in france (palo alto, ca: stanford university press, 2003), 264. 79. http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/dossiers/genocide.asp (assecced 30 june 30 2017). 80. david fraser, “law’s holocaust denial: state memory, legality,” in ludovic hennebel and tomas hochmann (eds), “genocide denials and the law,”(oxford: oxford university press, 2011), 41. 81. www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/decision/decision-no-2012647-dc-of-28-february-2012.114637.html 82. ibid. genocide denial under constitutional law: comparative analysis of spain, germany and france 87 as to the reality, the dissemination of the bill on all genocides poses a clear danger for france, because accusations of france’s involvement in rwandan genocide and massacres in algeria.83according to some analysts, there is also a political and economic context in this overall situation: in addition of being an active ally of nato, turkey and france (also eu -turkey relations84) have trade ties valued at $13.5 billion.85 in 2016 the french legislature again tried to criminalize the denial of the armenian genocide. it was passed as an amendment to the french “loi relative à l’égalitéet à la citoyenneté” (law on equality and citizenship).however, the french constitutional council again ruled the amendment unconstitutional as it conflicts with the freedom of expression and is neither necessary nor proportionate86. conclusion genocide denial laws are “symbolic laws”;87 they incorporate different constitutional values such as freedom of speech, dignity, equality. they are also contingent on the historical, cultural, political, social and psychological matters of a particular society, thus being called also memory laws. however, these approaches do not fully explain the choice of the particular state how to deal with an issue of genocide denial. from the historical perspective the three discussed states were somehow similar: the concept of militant democracy was relevant in all cases. the same refers to their collective memory related to holocaust as a social imperative to remember the past atrocities against jews. the special responsibility seems to be felt by the three states, with different degree of culpability. the decision of french constitutional council reflects not only the absence of that culpability towards the armenian genocide, but also the political reasons underlying the decision, which can well be applied to germany and spain. social change and geopolitical evolution brought to the reevaluation of the right-protection system in spain, where past notions are replaced by a more balanced ones to the values related to individual rights. however, one crucial question still remains with such approach: shouldn’t the law be the same for all? 83. www.taipeitimes.com/news/world/archives/2011/12/19/2003521130 (accessed 29 june 2015). 84. www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-14/end-france-s-block-on-turkey-s-eu-bid-president-hollande. html (accessed 28 june 2015). 85. www.edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/europe/france-armenia-genocide/index.html (accessed 24 may 2012). 86.  décision № 2016-745 dc du conseilconstitutionnel du 26 janvier 2017. 87. silvia suteu, “law against negation,”54. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 102 yetvart ficiciyan, ed., der völkermordan den armeniernim spiegel derdeutschsprachigen tagespresse, 1912–1922, bremen: donatverlag, 2015, 447 pages. isbn 978-3-943425-51-2 reviewed by stefan ihrig university of haifa the german dimension of the armenian genocide has seen important contributions over the last decade. one could mention for example rolf hosfeld’s operation nemesis.1 but of course, one must also mention the activities related to the publication of source materials, first and foremost the endeavors of wolfgang gust in editing materials available in the german foreign office. the documents collected in gust’s volume are invaluable to the study and understanding of the armenian genocide, and now are available in english and turkish (and online) as well.2 these materials are still very actively ignored by denialists as they are not easy to discard. the question remains and remains unanswered by denialists: why would germany, an ally of the ottomans and much worried by all the moral and political implications of the genocide in progress, falsify documents attesting to something that the german diplomats themselves (largely) wanted to stop or at the very least saw as damaging and misguided? but the german connection still has much more to offer, also by way of new source materials still waiting to be fully explored. one such source material are newspapers and other forms of public and printed discourse. there have been similar publications in and on other countries already; now with yetvart ficiciyan’s book we have something comparable for germany as well.3 in his 447-page book ficiciyan brings together many dozens of 1. besides my own contribution, see also: hans-lukas kieser and dominik j. schaller, eds., der völkermord an den armeniern und die shoah (zurich: chronos, 2002); jürgen gottschlich, beihilfezumvölkermord: deutschlands rollebei der vernichtung der armenier (berlin: ch. links, 2015); margaret lavinia anderson, “who still talked about the extermination of the armenians? german talk and german silences,” in ronald grigor suny, fatma müge göcek, and norman m. naimark, eds.,  a question of genocide: armenians and turks at the end of the ottoman empire (oxford: oxford university press, 2011), 199–217; rolf hosfeld, operation nemesis: die türkei, deutschland und der völkermord an den armeniern (cologne: kiepenheuer and witsch, 2005); stefan ihrig, justifying genocide – germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2016). 2. wolfgang gust, ed., der völkermord an den armeniern 1915/1916: dokumente aus dem politischen archiv des deutschen auswärtigen amts (springe, germany: zu klampen, 2005); wolfgang gust, ed.,  the armenian genocide – evidence from the german foreign office archives, 1915–1916 (new york: berghahn, 2014); wolfgang gust (ed.), alman belgeleri ermeni soykirimi 1915-16 (istanbul: belge, 2012) as well as online at www.armenocide.de. 3. cf. for example: richard d. kloian, ed., the armenian genocide – news accounts from the american 103 newspaper articles from the period immediately before the genocide, beginning in 1912, up to the post-war years, ending with 1922. having worked myself on the german printed discourse and often the very same newspapers and articles for many years, it is hard not to greatly appreciate the work that has flown into this publication as well as the incredible service it provides for future researchers. the volume combines newspapers from germany, austria, and switzerland. this makes the volume more diverse, but not necessarily more representative of the trends of the time. for example the swiss neue zürcher zeitung had been at the avant-garde of reporting on the armenians and had regularly featured extensive articles for some time already before world war i. during the armenian genocide itself the neue zürcher zeitung was arguably the best source in the german language of what was actually going on. the german and austrian papers, on the other hand, were acting under official censorship as well as self-imposed self-censorship; they viciously attacked the armenians for the course of the war and were, in any way, not able to offer balanced views. interestingly enough, swiss papers were available at newspaper stands in germany’s larger cities throughout the war. thus german newspaper readers could have informed themselves on the ongoing genocide at the time through papers such as the neue zürcher zeitung. the main contribution of this volume is perhaps something this reviewer has also attempted to do recently – to contradict two prevalent academic myths relating to the armenian genocide and the german dimension. the first, also grounded on previous, too narrowly focused analyses of the wartime press, was the idea that during the first world war censorship had prevented germany’s newspapers from discussing the armenians.1the second dealt with the interwar period and the claim that germany did not discuss the armenian genocide, even more that it did not come to terms with it and that this also contributed to the possibility of the holocaust years later.2 ficiciyan’s volume forcefully contradicts such legends by laying bare a series of articles from the war years and the early interwar period. it is true that censorship prohibited a balanced treatment of the armenian genocide and that de facto only anti-armenian voices in the press were able to express themselves. but in the end and however skewed, there was a discussion of the armenians. often ottoman propaganda was merely reproduced, sometimes german newspapers ventured farther and developed their own anti-armenian discourse and logic. but it was an important topic in some phases of the war and any intelligent reader could have understood that the germans and the ottomans protested too much against allegations of wrongdoing for there not to have been something larger going on than atrocities and resettlement. similarly ficiciyan’s collection shows that in the period after the war there was quite some debate on the arpress, 1915-1922 (berkeley: anto printing, 1985). 1.  elizabeth khorikian, “die behandlung des völkermordes an den armeniern in der deutschen presse  und literatur um 1915-1925,” in armenuhi drost-abgarjan, ed., armenologie in deutschland (münster: lit  verlag, 2005), 159-172. 2.  wolfgang gust, “die verdrängung des völkermordes an den armeniern – ein signal für die shoah,”  in hans-lukas kieser and dominik schaller, der völkermordan den armeniern und die shoah, 463-480. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 104 menian genocide – i go as far as to claim that there was a great german genocide debate in the years from 1919 until 1923. ficiciyan republished here a selection of important articles from these years. the idea that germany failed to come to terms with the armenian genocide is true, but only in so far as we would expect coming to terms to involve strong condemnations and some sort of moral learning. this was not the case. by the end of 1921, after a markedly pro-armenian period directly following the trial of talât pasha’s assassin, many german nationalist papers went on to even justify genocide outright. another fascinating contribution of this volume is the spotlight it throws on the period immediately before the genocide. in the first part of the book the years from 1912-1914 are covered for which the editor has found a wealth of articles and longer essays in the german-language press. the almost 150-pages of materials on this period convey a sense of heightened urgency of the armenian question before the first world war that contrasts sharply with how the years before are often portrayed in the main narratives of the armenian genocide. perhaps this first chapter alone should serve as a call to further investigate these crucial years. one could criticize ficiciyan for missing some major articles and debates of the years that are covered in the volume. especially blatant is the absence of theodor wolff’s highly important editorial in the summer of 1919 when the so-called lepsius documents were published – the documents from the german foreign office on the genocide.3 similarly the volume missed some of the larger debates during world war i itself.4 however, given the absolute dearth of studies on the german newspapers and the armenian genocide, this would be an unfair criticism. but it should stand as a warning to the reader who might think that the volume is comprehensive and the last word on the german-language newspapers and the armenian genocide. germany was highly attuned to the armenian topic and highly entangled with ottoman affairs in these years; it is an even broader and richer field than this book might suggest. but this should not deflect from the fact that this a highly important and welcome book. it should be but the beginning of more exploration, of more activities towards understanding how, in the era of the telegraph and modern mass (media) societies, a genocide could unfold, be discussed in the daily press, even to great extents, and yet lead to nothing more than often phony condemnations, or as i have shown and is documented also in this volume, to justifications for genocide. 3. theodor wolff, untitled daily commentary, berliner tageblatt, 28 july 1919. 4. stefan ihrig: “lord bryce and the armenian genocide in german wartime propaganda,” in stefan ihrig, ed., the armenian genocide and the world, special issue of the journal of levantine studies 2 (2015): 51-70. matthias bjørnlund, historian and archival researcher specializing in the armenian genocide and related issues, author of a danish monograph on the armenian genocide. he was lecturer at the danish institute for study abroad in copenhagen until 2014 and is currently working on a couple of books. 2015 he will be teaching a course on the armenian genocide at an open university. he is co-editor of www.armenocide.net. iben hendel philipsen, bi-lingual danish and english, professional translator and owner of ipwords with a master of arts in english/postcolonial studies from the university of copenhagen (2014), prior to which she worked as an actor and director for 17 years. 71 sorrow is turned to joy: a play about the 1909 adana massacres, staged by armenian genocide survivors in greece 1 matthias bjørnlund & iben hendel philipsen abstract: in april 1924, a group of armenian women genocide survivors in the care of a danish missionary organization in thessaloniki staged a play; sorrow is turned to joy, based on the 1909 adana massacres. the article briefl y explores the framework and context of the missionary organization, the actors, and the theatrical performance, followed by a translation of the entire play from danish into english. background the year was 1924. in the greek city of thessaloniki (salonica), the small danish evangelical missionary organization industrimissionen i armenien (the industrial mission in armenia; im) had established workshops, homes, and educational facilities for armenian genocide survivors, mainly widows, young women, and children, from their base in the papafi quarter. the organization was founded in denmark in the autumn of 1921 under the motto of “hjælp til selvhjælp” (“help to self-help”), and their fi rst mission fi eld was in greek-controlled rodosto (tekirdag), a city overfl owing with tens of thousands of destitute christian refugees from asia minor. according to the memoirs of one of the im missionaries, margrethe jepsen, on their arrival in the spring of 1922, the shores at rodosto were fi lled with dead and dying people, mostly women and children, often half-naked and abused, sometimes pregnant from rape and tattooed by the perpetrators.2 however, like most other non-turks and non-muslims, the im staff and the armenians in their care had to relocate head over heels (albeit under the formal protection of british, french, and italian troops in the region) after only a few months as kemalist forces took over eastern thrace and the city.3 1. to cite this article: matthias bjørnlund & iben hendel philipsen, “sorrow is turned to joy: a play about the 1909 adana massacres, staged by armenian genocide survivors in greece,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 1:1 (2014): 71-86. 2. axel gram, blandt armeniske flygtninge i grækenland. med erindringer af den tidligere armeniermissionær margrethe jepsen, (industrimissionen i grækenland (dansk armeniermission i grækenland), 1953), 13, 17-18. see also industrimissionens blad 1 4 (december 1922): 49; ”city a mass of wreckage,” new york times, 15 september 1922; h. l. larsen, et folk i nød: træk af armeniernes trængsler (aarhus: industrimissionen i armenien, 1933), 58; the orient, 9 10 (october 1922): 93-94. on the tattoo issue, see, e.g., the documentary by suzanne khardalian, grandma’s tattoos (sweden 2011); the past under our skin, “a very wild publication: the slave market news”, https://thepastunderourskin.wordpress.com/ 3. on the evacuation of rodosto and the accompanying atrocities, see, e.g., lysimachos oeconomos, the international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 72 now, two years later, the industrial mission was but one of many missionary and relief organizations, from the american board of commissioners for foreign missions (abcfm) and the near east relief (ner) to the high commissioner of refugees of the league of nations, working in thessaloniki. like rodosto, it was a city overflowing with poor, miserable greek and armenian refugees from what had now become the turkish republic; in addition, it was a city plagued by diseases, including malaria, and it was still partly in ruins after the balkan wars and the great fire of 1917. to complicate matters further, the local and national authorities had become significantly less welcoming toward the armenian refugees as greece was now being flooded with more than one million greek refugees from turkey as a result of the league of nations-orchestrated “population exchange” headed by the norwegian league commissioner fridtjof nansen. as a result, organizations like im, desperate to find a long-term solution to the problem, came up with more or less realistic ideas about what to do, such as large-scale migration of armenians to regions and countries like greek macedonia, brazil, syria, canada, the soviet armenian republic, and egypt. some armenians supported these ideas, as they feared the last remnants of the nation would disappear, should they be split into small groups all over greece, while the greek authorities, on the other hand, generally opposed such ideas as they did not welcome the prospect of larger concentrations of non-greek populations within their country.4 quite a few of the western missionaries and relief workers in thessaloniki and elsewhere in greece were veterans with experience from working in the ottoman empire before and during the armenian genocide, including the abcfm missionaries ruth parmelee, bertha morley, and george e. white, alma johansson from the swedish branch of kvindelige missions arbejdere (women missionary workers; kma), wilhelmine grünhagen from the danish branch of kma, and anna jensen and jensine ørtz (jensine oerts peters) from im, former members of the german missionary organization deutsche hülfsbund and danish tragedy of the christian near east, (london: anglo-hellenic league, 1923), 15ff ; ernest hemingway, “refugees from thrace,” toronto daily star, 22 november 1922; in ernest hemingway, by-line ernest hemingway: selected articles and dispatches of four decades, ed. william white (new york: simon & schuster, 2002); “rodosto handed over to kemalists,” the west australian, 15 november 1922; “greek soldiers mutiny, many desertions from troops at rodosto also reported,” philadelphia inquirer, 6 august 1922; “evacuation of thrace to be started soon. greeks will leave in 3 stages, a 5-day period for each being allowed,” cornell daily sun, october 16, 1922; “allied troops patrol thrace” the hutchinson news, 3 november 1922; “greek forces begin evacuating thrace” new york times, 16 october 1922; panayiotis diamadis, “australian responses to hellenic genocide in 1910-1930s with additional references to responses to the assyrian genocide and to the shoah,” genocide prevention now 11 (2012). 4. industrimissionens blad2 11, 12, 13, 14 (1924): 158, 190-91, 206-07, 237-38; isabel kaprielian-churchill, ”armenian refugees and their entry into canada, 1919-1930,” canadian historical review 71 1 (1990): 9091. for early u.s. relief eff orts in thessaloniki, constantinople, etc., see, e.g., suda lorena bane & ralph haswell lutz, organization of american relief in europe, 1918-1919: including negotiations leading up to the establishment of the offi ce of director general of relief at paris by the allied and associated powers (stanford university press, 1943), 214ff . a play about the 1909 adana massacres 73 kma, respectively.5 parmelee and morley still worked for abcfm,6 while ørtz, who worked as missionary and relief worker in malatia (malatya) in the ottoman mamouretul-aziz (harput/kharpert) province until 1914, founded im in 1921, as she was unable to continue her work in the fi eld for kma.7 many of these individuals and organizations worked together in the face of this massive humanitarian crisis; the industrial mission, for instance, cooperated with the greek red cross and the league of nations, and they received fi nancial as well as material aid from kma, the greek government, and private donors like the danish count frederik holstein.8 aside from jensine ørtz, margrethe jepsen, anna jensen, and the missionary couple andreas and karen hansen, during the early years, the im staff also included a number of armenians, among them the teachers nevart, takuhi minasian, and baron hagop as well as the protestant pastor (badveli) sarkis kisilian (kizilian; keselian). furthermore, the organization cooperated with local protestant and apostolic (gregorian) armenian leaders. the im facilities were modest, usually located in cheap, functional barracks or tents in various quarters and refugee camps in and around thessaloniki, including the venizelos camp, tomba, adabassartar, kalamaria, and tiniki mahali (tin town; tin neighborhood), where large empty kerosene tin cans had been fl attened and used as walls and roofs for makeshift houses for homeless christian refugees from turkey.9 the industrial mission’s activities included micro5. see, e.g., matthias bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab fra begyndelsen til enden (copenhagen: kristeligt dagblads forlag, 2013), 257; jensine ørtz, armeniske martyrer, kma pamfl et nr. 102, københavn 1917; jensine oertz peters (jensine ørtz), tests and triumphs of armenians in turkey and macedonia (grand rapids, michigan: zondervan publishing house, 1940); http://www.aga-online.org/ texts/malatia.php?locale=de; http://www.imprescriptible.fr/rhac/tome2/p4ch1; alma johansson, ett folk i landsfl ykt: ett år ur armeniernes historia (stockholm: kma, 1930); 7 gamle koner (lemvig 1927); h. l. larsen, blodets og taarernes land i europa. en orientrejse 1922 (industrimissionen i armenien, 1922); john o. latrides, ”missionary educators and the asia minor disaster: anatolia college’s move to greece,” journal of modern greek studies 4 2 (october 1986): 143-57. 6. see, e.g., isabel b. rose, great little greece (boston, ma: american board of commissioners for foreign missions, 1931), 8-11; ruth a. parmelee, “meeting salonica’s needs,” the life boat 28 7, (july 1925): 199-201; ruth a. parmelee, a pioneer in the euphrates valley (princeton: gomidas institute, 2002 (1967)); abraham d. krikorian & eugene l. taylor, ”finding a photograph for a caption: dr. ruth a. parmelee’s comments on some euphrates (yeprad) college professors and their fate during the armenian genocide”, armenian news networks/groong, 27 june 2011, http://www.groong.com/orig/ak20110627.html#sdendnote1sym); esther pohl lovejoy, certain samaritans (new york: the macmillan co., 1933 (1927)), passim;, “asserts atrocities continue in smyrna. dr. esther lovejoy describes systematic robbery and outrages by troops,” new york times, 3 october 1922; bertha b. morley, marsovan 1915: the diaries of bertha morley (ann arbor, mi.: gomidas institute, 2000). 7. in 1908, danish-german missionary anna jensen from frankfurt am main went with wilhelmine grünhagen to mezreh, where she worked at an orphanage. in 1915-1916 she worked at an ottoman fi eld hospital in skutari near constantinople (today the üsküdar quarter in istanbul), then, in 19161917, she worked as a nurse treating armenian orphans in aleppo. a� er the armistice she went to the ottoman armenian provinces until she was expelled along with most other western missionaries and relief workers in 1919. 8. see, e.g., h. l. larsen, blodets og taarernes land i europa. en orientrejse 1922, passim. 9. tiniki mahali (teneke mahalle) is a turkish (in ottoman as well as modern turkish) term that was probably brought to thessaloniki by turkish-speaking greek refugees. we thank ugur ümit üngör, amsterdam, and stavros terry stavridis, wapato, washington, for this piece of information. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 74 loans offered to armenian entrepreneurs who wanted to start a small business like a bakery or a shop; distributing bibles in armenian; running workshops for armenian women and men to create jobs and produce handicrafts to be sold at bazaars in denmark; providing homes for the old and the sick; and running a school for boys and girls in grades one to three. all in all some 200-500 survivors of the armenian genocide and kemalist persecution were housed, fi nanced, employed, and/or educated by the organization at any given time from the early 1920s. one of the im homes in thessaloniki, the so-called mothers’ home, was reserved specifi cally for armenian refugee women and girls from the smyrna (izmir) region who had just arrived in the city, pregnant from being raped by turkish soldiers in their homeland, and in 1922-23 similar homes were run by the organization in athens and dionysi.10 it was part of a conscious effort by the industrial mission to provide shelter and education for these often marginalized, traumatized, and stigmatized women and their children, although they were to be kept in isolation from those who did not suffer a similar fate – as jensine ørtz and the head of the board of directors, provost hans lauritz larsen, wrote in a direct address to their members and sponsors in industrimissionens blad, the im monthly journal: [ørtz:] what do you think we should do? there are very many young women, even girls as young as 13-14 years of age, who have been in the hands of the turks, and they are now to become mothers in a few months. i don’t believe we can mix these girls with our young girls from rodosto who have avoided such a fate. but what do you think? [larsen:] i don’t believe we can have them living and working together either. but what about those poor girls who have been ravaged and then thrown out to be picked up by their loved ones or by other merciful persons, those who now await such a sad fate? what do you, dear friends, think we should do with those poor youngsters? if there was money for a special home for them, then, by the grace of god, there would also be time to do the deed of the good samaritan to those who literally fell amongst thieves.11 a typical example of the massive trauma, loss, and seemingly endless displacement that such refugees in greece had to suffer is provided by mariam dilsisian, daughter of a rich armenian merchant from eskishehir (eskisehir; eski shehir): in 1915 she was deported through konya, tarsus, adana, and aleppo towards der zor, where she witnessed the mass murder by fi re of armenian boys. she escaped to the mountains and was subsequently sheltered by an arab christian. then, when it was decreed that anyone hiding armenians would be executed, she was expelled from that household and forcibly married to a turkish offi cer. she escaped once more and was sent by british soldiers to safety in port said in egypt. from there she returned to eskishehir after the end of the world war, only to be driven out yet again when the kemalists took over the town.12 10. h. l. larsen, et folk i nød: træk af armeniernes trængsler, 61. 11. industrimissionens blad 1 4 (1922): 49. the other members of the im board were nielsen vrads, kantor bech nielsen, and offi ce manager alfred hansen: industrimissionen i armenien (hjælp til selvhjælp). bestyrelsens udførlige redegørelse af sagen og referat fra mødet i odense den 1. marts 1927 (holbæk, 1927), 5. im still exists and is now called dansk armeniermission: see www.armenien.dk. 12. h. l. larsen, falden blandt røvere: armenierne paa apostelen paulus veje. en orientrejse 1924 (aarhus: industrimissionen i armenien, 1924), 42-49. a play about the 1909 adana massacres 75 the play perhaps some of the armenian women genocide survivors who performed and most likely wrote or co-wrote the play about the 1909 adana massacres, a play transcribed and translated in full below, came from the mothers’ home.13 what is certain, however, is that the actors drew on their own experiences from before, during, and after the genocide to create an artistic rendering of real events – as hans lauritz larsen writes in his short introduction to the play (which he transcribed in full in danish in a 1924 book about his inspection tour to thessaloniki): it should not be forgotten what was the cause [of the present situation for the armenians in thessaloniki]. – the past, which is the reason for all the suffering, was vividly described to us by our young girls who joyfully greeted us at our workshops, and the following lines are thus meant to describe the past, the conditions they endured when they were persecuted by the turks. it should be noted that what is presented here as a drama is not made up or fi ction; it is the bitter reality, retold by those who lived through it, and i can add that there wasn’t a dry eye in the audience as these aspects from the times of trouble were retold in the vivid words of the orientals.14 like the sermon by thessaloniki’s armenian bishop featured below, the play was most likely translated from armenian into danish by jensine ørtz, who spoke and read armenian fl uently. according to larsen, the title of the play is sorrow is turned to joy, a slight paraphrase of a quote from the new testament, john 16:20, “verily, verily, i say unto you, that ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice: and ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy.” it is arguably an early (though not the fi rst)15 recorded instance of an armenian theatrical play with a genocide theme. because although the events described in the play take place shortly after – and revolve around – the massacres of some 20-30.000 armenians in and around adana in 1909,16 the cast of women genocide survivors 13. one should perhaps also consider the less likely possibility that the play could in fact be based on or simply be an earlier, unknown play that could have been written in the immediate a� ermath of the adana massacres. 14. larsen, 1924, 29. 15. as one of the anonymous reviewers of the article has kindly pointed out, suren partevian (bartevian) wrote fi ction, including plays, with a genocide theme as early as during the first world war. the writings on the cilician/adana massacres and related issues by zapel esaian (zabel essaian/yesayian) are also noteworthy. see, e.g., marc nichanian, “testimony: from document to monument,” in the armenian genocide: cultural and ethical legacies, ed. richard g. hovannisian, 51-52 (new brunswick, nj: transaction publishers, 2007); notable women in modern armenian drama: an anthology, ed. nishan parlakian (belmont, ma: the armenian heritage press, 2009); rubina peroomian, “tears and laughter of cilician armenia: literary representations of destruction and revival, 1909-1918,” in. armenian cilicia, ed. richard g. hovannisian & simon payaslian, 392ff (mazda publishers, 2008); rubina peroomian, literary responses to catastrophe: a comparison of the armenian and jewish experiences (atlanta, ga: scholars press, 1993), 89ff ; “armenian women victims of genocide,” in women and war: a historical encyclopedia from antiquity to the present, vol. i, ed. bernard a. cook, 29-31 (santa barbara, ca: abc-clio, 2006). 16. matthias bjørnlund, “adana and beyond: revolution and massacre in the ottoman empire seen through danish eyes, 1908/9,” haigazian armenological review 30 (2010): 125-56; bedros der matossian, “from bloodless revolution to bloody counterrevolution: the adana massacres of 1909,” genocide studies & prevention 6 2 (2011): 152-73; helen davenport gibbons, the red rugs of tarsus: a woman’s record of the armenian massacre of 1909 (new york: the century co., 1917); duckett international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 76 clearly, as pointed out by larsen in the above quote, also draw on their experiences from 1915 onwards when performing (and, perhaps, writing) the play. thus the play can be said to be representative of the sufferings of all armenians and other victim groups during the fi nal decades of the ottoman empire and the creation of the turkish republic, especially the women and children. this highly unusual theatrical performance was staged in the industrial mission’s meeting hall in thessaloniki in april 1924. here, the im fi eld staff and a group of armenians in their care entertained a delegation from the organization’s board of directors in denmark, among them hans lauritz larsen and rev. johan nielsen-vrads.17 besides inspecting all areas of im’s work in the city, visiting the abcfm and league of nations operations for inspiration, and attending the play as guests of honor, the two protestant clergymen had both accepted an invitation to preach at an ecumenical april 24 genocide commemoration service in the apostolic church in thessaloniki, a service led by bishop ejervanth (yervand).18 in his own closing address to the large crowd of apostolic, protestant, and catholic armenians who fi lled the church and its premises, the bishop, like the women in the play, tried to make sense of the overwhelming amount of suffering that had befallen the armenians before, during and after the genocide: […] never before has a nation suffered what we have suffered. […]. we waited for freedom and light through dark times, but world politics were always against us. we sat with shaking hands, but no one came to our rescue. our eyes were directed towards the west, and yet we are here. we made many mistakes, but let it be our goal to stay in the true light and hurry towards the true goal. and when we commemorate our victims today, we commemorate that never before have such abuse and such martyrs been seen. but we will see god’s guiding hand during these hard times. we witnessed our loved ones and our young fall along the road, and then we thought of our nation’s future. the youth were like the rising sun. our women, our young girls, sacred in our families, were trampled underfoot; we had to endure seeing them taken away by strangers. many passed out and fell before they went to other men; many still live a hopeless life in the mountains, and we were not able to set our young women free. if we think about this we lose all hope. yet, we will not forget that god can bring the light. […]19 in his sermon, the bishop, who had experienced persecution and imprisonment himself in adrianople (edirne) during the war years, addressed not only the armenian genocide and the general theological and philosophical problem of evil. he also z. ferriman, the young turks and the truth about the holocaust at adana in asia minor during april,1909 (london, 1913). 17. larsen was in a way also a veteran when it came to backing persecuted armenians, as he among other things had served as an interpreter for the german rev. johannes lohmann when he toured denmark and sweden shortly a� er the 1890s abdülhamid ii massacres to raise awareness and generate support. furthermore, the well-educated and well-travelled clergyman was also editor of the newspaper kristeligt folkeblad, member of the board of directors of an orphanage in jerusalem, etc. 18. according to the julian calendar that was still in use, april 24 would be april 11. we thank abraham d. krikorian and eugene l. taylor for this observation. 19. h. l. larsen, 1924, 76. on the april 24 commemoration in 1923, see industrimissionens blad 2 7 (1923): 93-94. a play about the 1909 adana massacres 77 specifi cally, and with considerable empathy, addressed a subject that is often taboo among victim groups after genocide: the perpetrators’ large-scale and systematic abuse of women and children.20 some of the armenian women themselves also tried to address this diffi cult subject in the refugee camps in thessaloniki, but, as larsen describes it, when they got to the part where the turks raped the young girls, they all broke down crying.21 so, how to speak about the unspeakable? as always, art is one possible answer, a way to address both the specifi c and universal aspects of suffering, and perhaps also to provide some amount of sorely needed therapeutic relief, meaning, and hope for the future.22 from the ancient greeks, for whom tragedy 20. matthias bjørnlund, “a fate worse than dying’: sexual violence during the armenian genocide,” in brutality and desire: war and sexuality in europe’s twentieth century, ed. dagmar herzog, 16-58 (palgrave macmillan, 2009); vahé tachjian, “gender, nationalism, exclusion: the reintegration process of female survivors of the armenian genocide,” nations and nationalism 15 1 (2009): 60-80; ugur ümit üngör, “orphans, converts, and prostitutes: social consequences of war and persecution in the ottoman empire, 1914-1923,” war in history 19 2 (2012): 173-92; lerna ekmekcioglu, “a climate for abduction, a climate for redemption: the politics of inclusion during and a� er the armenian genocide,” comparative studies in society & history 55 3 (2013): 522-53; taner akcam, dicle akar bilgin & matthias bjørnlund, the league of nations in aleppo: armenian women and children survivors 1921-1927 (2014), http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/orphan-children.nsf!opendatabase 21. h. l. larsen, 1924, 28. 22. see, e.g., the theatre of genocide: four plays about mass murder in rwanda, bosnia, cambodia, and armenia, ed. robert skloot (madison: university of wisconsin press, 2008); the theatre of the holocaust, ed. robert skloot, vol. i-ii (madison: university of wisconsin press, 1982 & 1999); nishan parlakian, contemporary armenian american drama: an anthology of ancestral voices (columbia university press, 2004); nishan parlakian & s. peter cowe, modern armenian drama: an anthology (columbia university press, 2001); gene a. plunka, holocaust drama: the theater of atrocity (cambridge university press, 2009); marie-chantal kalisa, “theatre and the rwandan genocide,” peace review: a journal of social justice 18 4 (2006): 515-21; amanda breed, theatre for reconciliation in post-genocide rwanda (university of manchester, 2009); karen malpede, “thoughts on a theater of witness and excerpts from two plays of witness: better people, the beekeeper’s daughter,” in genocide, war, and human survival, ed. charles b. strozier & michael flynn (oxford: rowman & littlefi eld, 1996), 231-42; www.holocausttheaterarchive.org , www.armeniandrama.org . post-wwii plays more or less about the armenian genocide also include, in no particular order, night over erzinga: an armenian family’s story of survival and reconciliation by adriana sevahn nichols (2011), see also http://www.illumemag.com/zine/articledetail.php?the-theatre-of-armenian-genocide-13840; forty by leonora rianda, (2014/2015); das märchen vom letzten gedanken by edgar hilsenrath, (2014 (1989)), upstanders by teresa docherty et al. (2008); joyce van dyke, deported / a dream play by joyce van dyke, 2012; forgotten bread by sevan kaloustian green (2010); bleach by leah ryan (1999); brainpeople by jose rivera (2010); protest by aram kouyoumdjian (2005); dear armen by kamee abrahamian, tiff any golarz & lee williams boudakian, 2013; silence by herand m. markarian, 2012; flesh and tenderness by kristen lazarian, 2008; red dog howls by alexander dinelaris, 2012; on the couch with nora armani by nora armeni, 2003; nine armenians by leslie ayvazian, 2013; nicht ich bin der mörder, sondern er: der prozess talaat pascha/the talaat pasha trial – a theatre project for intercultural studies by heinz böke et al., 2010; soujourn at ararat by nora armani & gerald papasian, 1986; state of denial by rahul varma, 2012; abaga by torange yeghiazarian, 2001; komitas by lilly thomassian, 2012; the 40 days of musa dagh adapted for theatre by melik kocharyan, 1961 (1933); i wish i die singing by neil mcpherson, 2005; great silence by berj zeytuntsian, 2009; beast on the moon by richard kalinoski, 1995; found by anoush baghdassarian, 2014; and bitlis by william saroian, 1975. in the 1930s, armenian school children and teachers in thessaloniki staged a play, the refugees, a tragic story about a family of genocide survivors; furthermore, several playwrights international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 78 equaled catharsis, an emotional cleansing that would bring about renewal and restoration, to modern psychological dramas, theatre has been used as a means of “living out” and conveying complex emotional experiences, transcending the “mere” telling of stories as it engages our entire physical presence simply by our occupying the same space as the actors on the stage.23 and this is the avenue chosen by the group of armenian women performing sorrow is turned to joy, a play that appears to have been written specifi cally for the visit of the delegation from the danish evangelical donor organization. while the play to the authors of this article seems to contain elements of christian drama – with the biblical imagery and the strong themes of suffering, sacrifi ce, death, and resurrection that one fi nds in medieval mystery and morality plays as well as in easter drama and passion plays24 – it also fi ts several of the elements used today to defi ne the modern “theatre of genocide”: like all engaged art, [the theatre of genocide] seeks to comment on and infl uence public discourse through various strategies: by the description of the victims’ suffering and the assertion of their essential worthiness, the discussion of the perpetrators’ motivation, the presentation of images of healing and compassion, the evocation of empathy, the questioning of the proper use of historical knowledge, and even the expansion and dissemination of what the critic susan sontag called a “collective instruction” of the public.25 it is impossible (for us) to detach the story from the fact that those who (if not wrote it then) performed in it are the survivors of the very atrocities that are related in the play. this alone makes it utterly impossible to judge the play purely as a work of art. and yet it must be noted that they display a distinct awareness and knowledge of theatrical text. they in soviet armenia dealt with the genocide, especially from the 1960s: personal communication with suzanne khardalian, stockholm, sweden, november 2013. for a brief introduction to the armenian infl uence on ottoman/turkish theatre, see http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/g_brief_06.php. see also ali budak, “the contributions of the armenians over the constitution of a new social life and literature in the 19th century,” ozean journal of social sciences 1 1 (2008): 65-74; eden naby, “theater, language and inter-ethnic exchange: assyrian performance before world war i,” iranian studies 40 4 (2007): 501-10; chrysothemis stamatopoulou-vasilakou, “greek theater in southeastern europe and the eastern mediterranean from 1810 to 1961,” journal of modern greek studies 25 (2007): 267-84; mara yanni, “shakespeare and the audiences of the greek traveling actors,” in shakespeare worldwide and the idea of an audience, ed.tina krontiris & jyotsna singh (thessaloniki: aristotle university, 2007), 175-92; cora skylstad, acting the nation: women on the stage and in the audience of theatre in the late ottoman empire and early turkish republic, ma thesis (university of oslo, 2010); olga borovaya, modern ladino culture: press, belles-letres, and theatre in the late ottoman empire (indiana university press, 2012). armenian theatre was also performed in places such as the caucasus (e.g., in tbilisi/tifl is, yerevan, and baku, then part of the russian empire) and in persia/iran. see, e.g., the “armen ohanian” entry here: http://armenianwomen.wordpress.com/ 23. see, e.g., charles b. daniels & sam scully, “pity, fear, and catharsis in aristotle’s poetics,” noûs 26 2 (1992): 204-17; muriel mirak-weissbach, “power of art to move mind and heart: dink remembered in frankfurt,” the armenian mirror-spectator, 6 february 2014. see also, more generally, richard kearney, “narrating pain: the power of catharsis,” paragraph 30 1 (2007): 51-66; http://chgs.umn. edu/museum/index.html. 24. see, e.g., medieval and renaissance drama in england 8, ed. leeds barroll (cranbury, nj: associated university presses, 1996), 54; francis edwards, ritual and drama: the medieval theatre (james clarke & co., 1976), 36ff . 25. skloot, red., 2008, 5. a play about the 1909 adana massacres 79 adhere to a classic dramaturgy of beginning, middle, turning point, and end, and include classic ploys such as female characters dressing up as young men in order to survive, a grip perhaps made most famous by william shakespeare, and once the true identity of these young women is revealed some sort of order is restored.26 moreover, while they refrain from fl eshing out the atrocities, there is a remarkable lack of sentimentality in the young “shepherd’s” recounting of what was done to the young girls when they were taken to the mountains. it is almost matter of factly described, and as such becomes very powerful as it also suggests a widespread knowledge of what actually went on, of how horror and endurance of horror become the normal state of affairs during times of massacre. the play may not exactly promise a happy ending – there seems to have been too much death and misery for that – but, as the title suggests, the message is that sorrow can still be turned to joy through shared pain and through reuniting with relatives who were believed to be lost. thus at least small parts of a world destroyed, the world of the ottoman armenians, can be restored. so, whatever one might think of the purely artistic quality of the play, it is a strong testament to the courage and survival instinct of some of those who were subjected to almost unspeakable atrocities. what follows below is a complete translation, as literal as possible (including the perhaps sometimes peculiar spelling of armenian names and phrases), of the play as it appears in larsen’s 1924 book, the only known source. it is a haunting story, realistic as well as stylized; a story both modern and ancient, surreal and grotesque, not unlike the collection of poetry by siamanto, bloody news from my friend, which also revolves around the adana massacres.27 it is a story of love, death, loss, mourning, faith, despair, and redemption, of sacrifi ce, madness, suicide, and hope against hope, of massacre as a force of nature, of a common bond created through suffering, and of attaining the power “to stand up to tell the world what happened,” as it is put. the play takes place somewhere in the killing fi elds, probably in the taurus mountains outside adana, shortly after the massacres in 1909. sorrow is turned to joy [introductory note by larsen or, more likely, by the unknown writer(s) of the play]: these women, who have lost everything, including their children, meet and comfort each other. 26. shakespeare’s so-called “transvestite plays” include twel� h night, as you like it, and the merchant of venice. it should be noted that armenian men and boys frequently dressed up as girls or women in order to survive on the death marches during the armenian genocide, while girls and women would seek ways to make themselves less attractive to avoid sexual abuse (see bjørnlund, 2009, passim), and it seems likely that armenian girls and women would on occasion (i.e., when such a survival strategy would appear to have a chance of succeeding, or when there simply was no other alternative) dress up as boys to avoid rape or forced marriage, as suggested in the play. 27. siamanto (atom yarjanian), bloody news from my friend, translated by peter balakian & nevart yaghlian (detroit: wayne state university press, 1996). artistic interpretations of/reactions to the adana massacres also include a requiem mass composed by k. kalfaian (1913), as well as poetry and writings by ruben sevak (rupen sevag tchilinguirian) and taniel varoujan, both of whom were arrested, tortured, and murdered like siamanto and hundreds of others in connection with the roundup of ottoman armenian intellectuals and other community leaders on april 24, 1915. see, e.g., mikayel shamtanchian, the fatal night: an eyewitness account of the extermination of armenian intellectuals in 1915, translated by ishkhan jinbashian (studio city, california: manjikian publications, 2007). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 80 araksi: today is easter for those with a happy heart, but to me and my fellow sufferers it is a day of sorrow. we mothers do not know where our children are or how they have died. oh god, my god, how is it possible to go through all this without dying. but we armenians are like the burning bush in the desert, it burns and burns, but is not consumed by the fl ames. oh god, my god, when will you let me meet my death as a wonderful release from this life? but, alas! i am alive, and like other mothers i will go to the mountains and search for the bones of my children. oh heaven, will i be happy even if i fi nd the bones of my big girl? oh, my home, when i look upon your white walls it is as if they have big red stripes of blood, and there, on the fl oor, she took her fi rst steps and called for me with her sweet babbling. – and the last day she was here she left home saying, “mother, i’m going to school!”, and never, ever did she come back. – oh, my girl, where are you, you are impossible for me to fi nd. vartuhi: araksi, sister! why do you not come with us to the graveyard? by letting our tears fl ow we fi nd comfort. when the tears truly fl ow it is as if the pain goes numb. manik: yes, we are at the graveyard, but it is not like any other, because our graveyard lies in the vast fi elds, mountains, and valleys. haiganush: let us go. – it is easter. other people celebrate the resurrection, but we…let us seek the bones of our children. dikranuhi: we cannot put fl owers on their graves. no, let the lilies of the fi eld bloom over their bones, and let other fl owers be the incense, the sweet scent that the wind sweeps across their bones, bones that are pale from the sun and the wind. araksi: yes, oh yes, my fellow sufferers, let us go to the mountains. even if we cannot fi nd their bones our tears will wash the earth that drank their blood. they all go out searching. araksi: alas, look at all the women here, all with the same aim as us. araksi looks for a lonely spot, while the others go to the ravines to search for the bones of their children. araksi: loneliness, loneliness is what i love. oh god, this life is no longer worth living. where is my girl, maybe these valleys and mountains have heard her last cry for help, maybe they have heard if she still lives at the mercy of her assailant, or if her corpse was devoured by wild animals or by the birds in the sky. only you, my god, know! if only i could fi nd her bones i would use them to make a crucifi x to remind me each day of golgotha and the cross where my innocent savior died. we christians a play about the 1909 adana massacres 81 are called upon to walk in his footsteps, but alas!, it is so diffi cult to do. god, you alone can give me the strength to endure this. it is as if everything falls apart, as if i am about to lose my mind. there is this desire, this urge to howl like a wild animal, it is as if it was all a dream, without any connection to reality. yet you, almighty god, must be part of it all. oh mountains, do you not hear my crying and moaning, do you not even bother to give me an answer? the three other women come towards her, and she starts speaking to them. araksi: excuse me, you have probably walked through many valleys and ravines to get here, i wonder if you have come upon skeletons that might look like my daughter’s on your journey? today, i am out looking for her bones. arschalusch: yes, sister, we understand, but do not sit here alone, come with us and we will tell you who we are, and let us try to share each other’s pain and forget. araksi: forget. hermine: we are three mothers, and like you we are out looking for the bones of our loved ones, we have been wandering around but we found no grave or human bones. iskuhi: we have been searching since this morning. it is as if we are lost. it is our destiny to still, still be kept on the grindstone. i am surprised that we are still human, that there is still something left of this perishable body. – we want death, we long for it like a dear visitor, but god does not send us this blessing. arschalusch: oh sister, why are you crying? iskuhi: maybe because we cannot die. arschalusch: but do not forget that there is a divine reason for the suffering of us armenian women. we will encourage each other to endure until the hour of god strikes, and to seek his will in everything. like you, we all feel that death would be a welcome guest. hermine: oh merciful god in heaven, how can it be that not one drop of blessed rain falls on our fatally wounded hearts? – as soon as the clouds in the skies of our lives begin to clear and we dream of light for ourselves and our children, once again, you send black, thick clouds with lightning bolts that suddenly strike us. iskuhi: what are you doing? we walked together to forget what happened, to comfort each other. it is enough now. our bodies can take no more. let us commemorate our dead as those who now stand before international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 82 god’s throne night and day, and let us thereby also prepare ourselves to become worthy of joining them. araksi: oh, what a strange feeling! i sat alone on the mountain and heard only echoes of my cries. god sent you to me. you found me in one of the most dangerous moments of my life. our lives are chained together by pain and crying, a third chain is still missing, it is death. arschalusch: come, let us continue walking, just another short stretch before we have searched it all and convinced ourselves that the bones of our loved ones are not here. hermine: yes, come, let us not stand here any longer, just to fi nd one bone would be enough of a reward for our toils today – let us forget ourselves and search – search. iskuhi: listen, is it not the voice of the shepherd, is he not blowing his shepherd’s horn? let us go to him, he, who wanders around up here every day and talks to his sheep. the shepherd: alas, my sheep! you walk around, grazing ever so joyously, not knowing what awaits you. one day you shall die to preserve human lives. oh my sheep! i do not know whose turn it is tomorrow. every time i am in town and see sheep and lambs hanging, slaughtered, and see humans with big knives rip and cut them, it is as if i am being whipped with thorns. oh, how diffi cult my work is, truly to be a shepherd and yet endure all this. but god, what can i say, it is your will. the animals must be sacrifi ced to the humans that you love above all. oh god, you did see my tears yesterday when the beloved little lambs had to adorn the dinner table of a rich person, and there – there the other dear little lambs come to meet me, happy and trusting, and i, i must surrender them to death. – i cannot, – it is not for me, an orphan with a sensitive girl’s heart. even if i fool others with my costume my heart stays the same – it is not a job for me. arschalusch: we heard your voice and walked here to ask you: have you seen human bones up here? hermine: we have wandered the entire day, back and forth, to fi nd the graves or bones of our loved ones. we wonder if you have seen any such thing. we beg of you to tell us, even if it were to be found in the wolf’s lair. iskuhi: noble shepherd! do not be surprised. we are not the half savages our appearance might indicate, we are mothers, desperate mothers whose loved ones were torn from our embrace. help us, enlighten us, are there any traces of human corpses or bones here? it is the comfort we went out to fi nd today – the bones of our loved ones. a play about the 1909 adana massacres 83 araksi: oh, good shepherd, hurry up, answer our questions, we are so tired, it is impossible for us to stand and to walk. open your lips and tell us some good news. the shepherd: may i ask you to sit here on the green grass? it is my living room. – yes, on the other side, at the foot of the mountain, i will show you a little dirt mound. we were four girls who were only lightly wounded, but we, too, were thrown on the carts with all the other dead or half-dead and driven here. it was around sunset, and we were all unloaded there. they began to throw rocks and dirt on us to cover our small, innocent bodies that were to shape this mound, hidden and silenced to the world, but god gave the four of us the power to stand up to tell the world what happened. arschalusch: we do not want to ask much. the wounds in our hearts are so deep and drip with fresh blood. just tell us where the other three are. araksi: how old were they? are they your size? the shepherd: yes, we all went to the same school and we were in the same class. the storm broke out so fast that we did not have time to run back home, so we fl ed up here were we were discovered and nearly killed. for a while we lived of dirt and grass here, we were afraid of humans, and then we draped ourselves in the shepherd’s cloak, trying to live and be useful in this way. hermine: that means they are shepherds like you. where are they now? can we not get to see them? if you tell us where they are we will never forget your goodness, oh, hurry up – –. araksi: if you can help despairing mothers who searched for their children’s bones in the mountains, to fi nd their girls alive, you will be the reason we can once again fi nd happiness in this world, something which seems so impossible to us now. iskuhi: i am sorry, what school did you go to? the shepherd: “to askrinian’s school! oh, if only i, too, could fi nd my mother! dear madam, do not think that i did not have a mother. oh majrik [mayrik, mother]! majrik! my home, my home! i know what it means to have a good home, but i have heard that our whole town has been burnt to ashes and that no one is still alive, and this is why i have given it all up to hide in this shepherd’s cloak. tell me; where are you from, and where do you come from? arschalusch: as you may imagine, we are from a place where life has begun again, where it is not completely extinct. maybe you can fi nd your father and your mother there. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 84 the shepherd: quiet, do you hear the singing? it is one of the other shepherds. wait here a moment, she will be here soon, we often meet here. araksi: oh, what do i hear? the voice of my girl. – my girl, my dear girl! does your voice come from heaven? then i am in heaven. paradise is such a wonderful place, no more pain. – – goodbye, world, i never want to see you again. araksi faints. araksi: now i am in heaven, where no one can take my child from me. hermine: look, look, here is your girl… araksi’s eyes are closed. she has fallen into hermine’s lap, overcome by joy. anik: oh, what am i seeing? is it my mother, my mother whom i believed to be dead? majrik! majrik! is it you! – – – why do you not speak? do you not know your anik? look, look, majrik, it is me that you carried in your arms so that no thorns should pierce me. it is me, a shepherd, a hardened shepherd who has struggled with life, an honest fi ght to keep my purity and earn my bread. women, women! why do you stand so petrifi ed, tell me, is it a vision or is it reality, is it really my mother or is it a spirit from heaven that has taken her form? but what do i see, tears are rolling down her cheeks …mother, will you not say something? … could it be a spirit that comes by day and not by night to seek me …oh, embrace me, it cannot be an evil spirit who wants to attack me. mother, why do you not say something? iskuhi: sisters, let us do something to wake her up. by fi nding out her child is alive her joy made her senseless and powerless. arschalusch: “look, she opens her eyes. talk. look. here is your girl. araksi: yes, you wonderful angels, i know. …so this is heaven. …oh, my girl, we are happy here, we have no fear of death any more, or of separation, eternity is here for us, we cannot be persecuted here. …here is paradise … what peace and what rest …if i had known this i would have come here sooner …oh sisters, why do you cry? rejoice! you, too, will fi nd your children here …my sweet girl, how did you die? who killed you? anik: mother! i am alive, i am not dead. who says i am dead! i have gone through many hardships, yes, i stood up from the grave, but mother, why do you not say something? hermine: sister, we are still in the world. your girl is not dead. these are not her dead bones, god let her come back into your arms alive. iskuhi: this sister believes that she is in heaven, but let us see what she a play about the 1909 adana massacres 85 will do when she is completely awake. wake up! wake up! sister, it is no dream, it is reality. anik: majrik, majrik! i am with you. araksi: oh, we are still here! what joy, i thought i was up there, that i had died and gone to heaven and found my girl who was dead …oh come, let me embrace you, my girl, do not be afraid. i am your mother. your father is also alive, come, we will go to him. anik: majrik! is hajrik [hayrik, father] really alive …he lives … araksi: yes, he lives, and each and every day he earns all the bread we can eat …come, let us go! oh, what will your father say? we have made promises to god so many times, just so that we might fi nd your grave or bones from your body. but how shall i thank you, lord, for having my living child in my arms? oh sisters, i am happy now, it only hurts me that you have not found your girls. may god lead your way so that you might also fi nd them, start a home once again, and regain your will to live. vartuhi: look, i have found a bone. perhaps it is a part of my child’s body. oh, my dear little girl, why do you not answer me? …look at the dry bone. i must press it to my chest. what the turks have completed here in adana during this spring (1909) is of such a nature that even wild, bloodthirsty animals could not have been more cruel. oh, my child, my child …maybe you look from heaven upon your desperate mother. manik: on my way here, i met 3-4 children who told me: “we come from our hiding place to search for our mothers. we have heard that several have risen again; oh, tell us if our mothers are alive …do not hide anything from us” – seeing them made such a deep impression on me that i quickly disappeared to hide my tears from them. oh, my girl, i wonder if you too wander around, searching for your mother, or if you gaze down on me from heaven. siranusch (the shepherd): oh, what do i see, the woman who speaks is my mother. how shall i identify myself in such a way that she will not react like anik’s mother?, but waiting – i cannot wait either …majrik, majrik! it is me, i am not dead! embrace me, mother! mother, is father alive? why are you mute? show your joy. it is me. touch me. haiganusch: truly, truly, it is siranusch. how the shepherd’s dress had changed her. manik: oh, my girl, you stand here in front of me like an angel. what a wonder that these eyes of mine really see you alive, it is a miracle, a great miracle of god …oh sisters! i wish the same happiness for you. let us walk around, praying that the almighty god will guide us and international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 86 that you may also fi nd your children. come, my child, i must embrace you again, and soon we shall go home. father is alive. he is home. our house was not burned down, come, child, home …home. vartuhi: tell me, where did you meet the 3-4 little children, maybe one of them could be my child? manik: down there, close to where we split up. come, it is not night yet. araksi: glory to the lord who has miraculously granted us our two girls. we hope and pray that god will grant you your children, too. oh my child, you who grew up raised by a mother’s soft hand. your feet had not seen the sun, and now …being a mother is hard for an armenian woman …only you, god, can give us the strength …come, child, i will hold you to my heart, the heart that was beating in fear and pain for you, but now it jumps with joy. in my deep sorrow and on my clouded sky, god has let a beautiful rainbow appear. he has not forsaken me after all; he let pretty fresh fl owers bloom from my crown of thorns instead. god, perform this great miracle for many armenian mothers so that sorrow may turn to joy here on earth, and so that our children and we may sparkle like fi nely cut jewels in your crown. untitled david low is a manoogian post-doctoral fellow with the armenian studies program at the university of michigan. he was awarded his phd in 2015 by the courtauld institute of art, london, for a thesis on photography during the late ottoman period and the armenian genocide. 53 the returning hero and the exiled villain:  the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-19161 david low abstract: this essay explores the evolution of photographic constructions of armenian identity and the place of armenians within ottoman society through a comparison of images made in the aftermath of the revolution of 1908 with those produced during the 191516 period. in the earlier period, recurring motifs of return and reconciliation can be discerned, with there being pictured a new, inclusive ottoman society. while armenians were depicted as a vital element within post-revolutionary society, the photographic medium simultaneously identified those that that were thought not to belong and was complicit in their social exclusion. during the armenian genocide, photography was employed in a similar visual strategy, with armenians finding themselves in a changed position, being targeted by the lens and marked as lying outside of a reconceptualised ottoman society. the manner in which the committee of union and progress (cup, also referred to as the unionists, or the young turks) mounted their revolution of july 1908 is noteworthy, for it was by telegram that they warned sultan abdülhamid ii that failure to restore the suspended constitution would be met with an armed response. the event presents a challenge to the conventional conceptualisation of technology as an instrument of the state by demonstrating how it could be turned against centralised authority by actors on the peripheries. power, as roderic h davison observes, ‘could emanate from either end of the telegraph line’, and such a claim might equally be made with regards to the photography of the era.2 accepting this principle of multivalence, this essay examines the contrasting sides of photography and the divergent uses to which the medium was put. it specifically addresses the manner in which ottoman armenians were presented photographically and charts the evolution of images from the time of the revolution to the armenian genocide of 1915-16. 1. this work is partially the product of research undertaken at the armenian genocide museum-institute, yerevan, as a raphael lemkin scholar in 2012. i would like to thank all colleagues and staff at agmi, especially gevorg vardanyan and arevik avetisyan. the essay further develops sections from my phd thesis ‘framing the armenian genocide: photography and the revisualisation of the ottoman empire, 18781923’ (the courtauld institute of art, university of london, 2015), for which i wish to thank shulamith behr, gabriel koureas, james ryan and the uk arts and humanities research council. my thanks also to benedetta guerzoni and those that commented on this essay in draft form. translations are my own, except for those from ottoman turkish which are by yaşar tolga cora. 2. roderic h davison, essays in ottoman and turkish history, 1774-1923: the impact of the west (london: saqi books, 1990), 156. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 54 having been associated with state surveillance and censorship during the repressive hamidian era, photography became synonymous in the post-revolutionary period with new freedoms. the lifting of censorship brought about a marked rise in photographic practice amongst ‘ordinary’ ottoman subjects and a great proliferation of images by way of illustrated magazines and picture postcards. the first part of this essay examines some of these photographic offerings, in particular those that appeared in one of the key publications of the era resimli kitab (illustrated book), as part of a consideration of the new individual and collective narratives propagated by the lens. prominent motifs of return, reconciliation and fraternity can be discerned, with armenians positioned as an integral part of a new, inclusive ottoman society. however, the new vision of empire did not embrace all. the very first days of the new constitutional regime saw the publication of images depicting ‘enemies’ of the state, a clear indication that photography could speak of exclusion as well as inclusion, and be used to denigrate as much as celebrate. the practice reached its apex during the first world war and the armenian genocide, when photography once again served the interests of the state. the second part of this essay considers photographic albums produced by the ottoman authorities during this time, addressing these as some of the central photographic products of an era in which censorship and state control had once again been imposed. the albums, concerned with justifying state actions against the armenians, can be read as enacting a reversal of the previous discourse of fraternity and inclusivity, thereby constructing an image of armenians as a seditious element of which ottoman society needed to be purged. photography during its earliest days, photography’s principal originators outlined their vision of an image-making practice with a unique relationship to the physical world. frenchman louis daguerre stated that the new instrument gave nature ‘the power to reproduce herself’, while william henry fox talbot, daguerre’s british counterpart, suggested something similar, not least by naming his first book of photographs the pencil of nature (1844-46).3 photography, based upon the registering and fixing of the reflected rays of the sun, was perceived in natural terms, its products regarded as ‘imprints’ of the physical world. thought to elide the human element to produce direct and unmediated images of pre-existing physical reality, the medium gained its ‘evidentiary’ quality and its currency as a ‘truthful’ witness. perhaps most memorable of all in this regard is roland barthes’s later invocation of the ‘that-has-been’. ‘i can never deny that the thing has been there’, he asserted of the photographic referent, ‘the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens’. therein was seen to lie photography’s unique authority, with ‘the power of authentication’ exceeding ‘the power of representation’.4 3. mary warner marien, photography: a cultural history (new york: harry n. abrams, 2002), 23, 30-32. 4. roland barthes, camera lucida: reflections on photography, trans. richard howard (new york: hill and wang, 1981), 76-7, 89. the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 55 taking this as his point of embarkation, john tagg argues that photography ‘is not the inflection of a prior … reality, as barthes would have us believe, but the production of a new and specific reality. ’barthes’s position is far more complex than simply the ‘thathas-been’, for photographs in his work are always wrapped up in wider associations, but he provides as useful opponent for tagg’s denunciation of the ‘realist’ position. shifting the discussion from the ‘magical’ to the material, tagg lays out the photograph in stark terms as ‘a material product of a material apparatus set to work in specific contexts, by specific forces, for more or less defined purposes.’5the ‘truth’ of photography, from this perspective, is constructed; photographs are representations deployed with certain agendas and made meaningful within particular discursive frameworks. spurred by the work of michael foucault, tagg identifies institutionalised observation productive of social categorisation and control as the key defining context of photography. this is an area also examined by allan sekula, but his theorisation is notable for positioning photographs as controlling instruments of power within a wider range of photographic activity. sekula outlines a double system of representation in which photographs function ‘both honorifically and repressively. in other words, the photograph might speak either for or against its subject. sekula places bourgeois portraiture and the criminal archive in relation to one another, identifying them as two opposing ends of photographic practice and discourse in which ‘every proper portrait has its lurking, objectifying inverse in the files of the police’.6 these different photographic modes are described in terms of a certain symbiotic relationship, fortogether they outline the shape of society. this reading of photography as a medium productive of not only castes but society at large invites the possibility of charting the journey of armenians from one side of the social and photographic spectrum to the other. visualising revolution the revolution of july 1908 brought about the restoration of the constitution, the transference of power away from the sultan, and the relaxation of limits on freedoms of association, assembly and the press, with one consequence being a press boom and an immediate increase in the presence of photography in ottoman life.7 significantly, photographers were for the first time allowed at the weekly selamlık, the procession of the sultan and his entourage to friday prayers at the yıldız hamidiye mosque, as british witness charles roden buxton recounts: the first week after the constitution (that is the way they describe what is almost a new era in chronology) the photographers were admitted to the court of the mosque, and one of 5. john tagg, the burden of representation: essays on photographies and histories (basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 1988), 3. 6. allan sekula, “the body and the archive,” october 39 (winter 1986): 3-63 (original emphasis). 7. palmira brummett, image and imperialism in the ottoman revolutionary press, 1908-1911 (albany: state university of new york press, 2000), 25-50; erol baykal, the ottoman press, 1908-1923 (unpublished doctoral thesis, university of cambridge, 2013), 29-44. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 56 them secured the finest snapshot of his majesty that has ever been taken. it is all a terrible profanation ... but i do not think the sultan can complain. a snapshot is better than a bomb.8 the ‘new era’ was thus inaugurated photographically, with the camera prising open the previously hidden world of ottoman power. henceforward, photography would have a role to play in the proceedings of the new empire, participating in a public realm characterised by openness and visibility. indeed, it became something of a motif of the time, with the new figure of the public photographer evident in the foreground ofone of the many illustrated postcards marking the restoration of the constitution (figure 1). the scene depicted is typical of the era, featuring celebrants coming together as a cohesive mass in order to usher in a new epoch. the card’s message of ‘long live the constitution; liberty, equality, fraternity’ suggests not only political change but also, in being presented in armenian, greek, ottoman turkish, french and ladino, social progress. image and text thus combine to demonstrate succinctly the ostensible central principles of revolutionary thought that aspired to an inclusive, collaborative ‘nation’ comprised of the different ottoman ethnic communities and based upon the enlightened beliefs that had underpinned the french revolution.9 meanwhile, on the peripheries of the scene the role of the photographer is ambiguous; simultaneously a part of the crowd and apart from the crowd, he occupies a liminal position between observation and participation, between visibility and invisibility. 8. charles roden buxton, turkey in revolution (london: t. fisher unwin, 1909), 152. 9.  erik j zürcher, the young turk legacy and nation building: from the ottoman empire to atatürk’s turkey (london & new york: i.b. tauris & co, 2010), 57-58. figure 1 photographer unknown, “proclamation de la constitution le 24. juillet 1908.,” hayk demoyan, haykakan sporty ev marmnakrtutyuny osmanyan kaysrutyunum [armenian sport and physical gymnastics in the ottoman empire] (yerevan: agmi, 2015), 10. the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 57 after the censorship of the hamidian era, the public presence of the photographer in the constitutional era was seen as a remarkable indication of new freedoms, as suggested by charles roden buxton’s description of the selamlık. that account is also interesting in its linking of photography with the prospect of a new political and social settlement, with his comment about photographs replacing bombs appearing to allude to the occasion in 1905 when the selamlık was the scene of a dashnak attempt on abdülhamid’s life. in a sign of the great sea change, three years after that event revolutionaries were invited to participate in the new constitutional politics, with the dashnak activist and droschak journalist aknuni describing his return to constantinople to his colleagues in geneva: you cannot imagine how happy i am to be able to write you from this city without the slightest censorship or control. after thirty-two years of silence, the city is chanting “freedom”; the crowds are drunk with joy.10 the letter succinctly communicates a distinct historical moment that saw the unleashing of pent-up emotions as people revelled en masse in newly restored freedoms. indeed, the crowd became the motif par excellence of the day, with the flood of new illustrated periodicals offering abundant images of street celebrations and ‘public manifestations’. resimli kitab contains fine examples of this phenomenon, with its first issue alone containing 15 such scenes, including an image of the first post-revolutionary selamlık ceremony, as if to share in buxton’s view of it as a foundational event.11a further scene depicts celebrations outside the holy trinity armenian church in péra (figure 2), a setting that would seem to suggest an emphasis upon the re-emergence of the ottoman armenian community after a period of oppression.12however, the church itself is not visible, and the scene is instead dominated by a crowd gathered beneath ottoman flags on the grande rue de péra. in short, the image is concerned with communal identity and public solidarity, and by locating the armenians within a wider collective it suggests not simply the re-emergence of this marginalised group but its reintegration into the social body. resimli kitab balanced these broad images of mass events with portrait photographs that specifically located the revolution and its values in the bodies of a number of individual actors. notable amongst these was enver bey, the young turk ‘hero of liberty’ who had spearheaded the movement to restore the constitution and who recognised in the camera a means of sculpting a public persona.13 the raising of enver to the status of ‘national’ figure was greatly aided by his willingness to pose for the lens and the dissemination of the resulting images by way of illustrated magazines and picture postcards, affordable, compact and mobile formats that allowed photographic images to be increasingly woven into the daily fabric of ottoman life.14 the new ‘heroes’ were not re10. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (london: i.b. tauris, 2011), 53. 11. resimli kitab, 1 (september 1908): 40. 12. resimli kitab, 1(september 1908): 60. 13. resimli kitab, 1 (september 1908): 17; 2 (october 1908): 158; 10 (july 1909): 974. 14. edhem eldem, “the dissemination and impact of photography in the ottoman empire, 1870–1914” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 58 stricted to the ranks of the cup, however, for there existed a strong strain of rhetoric dedicated to saluting those that had previously opposed the government. armenian revolutionaries emerged from hiding to be ceremoniously welcomed by armenians and turks alike and, as raymond kévorkian describes the turn of events, these ‘militants, villains only yesterday, were suddenly being celebrated as heroes’.15 similar scenes were played out across the empire with fighters from various ethno-religious groups, and readers of resimli kitab were presented with portraits of greek, albanian and macedonian fighters, the latter praised for having ‘made common cause with the turks in order to call for the constitution’.16 enver’s utilisation of the camera for the theatrical staging of political and social identity was nothing new, as shown by the images that revolutionary organisations had produced over decades of anti-ottoman agitation.17 the creation of such scenes continued after july 1908, and yet clearly the new era had brought about a seismic shift in the connotations attached to the image of the fedayi, with that figure morphing from a shadowy, seditious enemy to a public, patriotic ally, while the broad and varying aims of disparate revolutionary in camera ottoman: photography and modernity in the ottoman empire 1840-1914, ed. zeynep çelik &  edhem eldem (istanbul: koç university publications, 2015), 106-153. 15. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide, 53. 16. resimli kitab, 2 (october 1908): 124-125. 17. see, for example, martina baleva, “revolution in the darkroom: nineteenth-century portrait photography as a visual discourse of authenticity in historiography,” hungarian historical review 3:2 (2014): 363-390. figure 2 photographer unknown, ‘demonstrations outside the armenian church in péra’, resimli kitab, 1(september 1908): 60 the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 59 groups were happily subsumed within the narrative of a unified struggle for constitutional politics. perhaps nowhere is this better seen than in resimli kitab’s coverage of the ongoing revolution in neighbouring persia, a country seen as having similarly suffered by the hands of both domestic despotism and foreign imperialism.18 one of the visual focal points of a 1910 report is yeprem khan, the persian-armenian dashnak who had previously operated in ottoman lands and been part of the famous googoonian expedition.19 now dubbing him a ‘warrior of freedom’, resimli kitab hailed yeprem khan’s ‘extraordinary sacrifices in the making of the persian revolution’ in texts accompanying numerous heroic images of him and his revolutionary colleagues.20 it is, above all, his own solo portrait adopting the established mise-en-scène of the fedayi photograph that provides compelling evidence of the extent to which images and philosophies of the sort once restricted to the underground revolutionary presses had found a place within popular, mainstream illustrated magazines. such image rehabilitation occurred not simply among fedayin but within a wider circle of dissidents and outcasts. myriad returning exiles were honoured by resimli kitab, with patriarch madteos ii izmirlian providing armenians with perhaps their most powerful symbol of return and reconciliation.21 the first edition reproduced his portrait to mark his arrival back from jerusalem, a city to which he had been banished by abdülhamid in 1896 for protesting against the massacres of that time.22 izmirlian returned bearing a wreath given to him by the jerusalem branch of the cup, and the second edition of resimli kitab carried an image of a ceremonial procession to the cemetery at şişli for it to be laid in memory of the armenian victims of the massacres (figure 3).23 it is a scene in which the patriarch himself is barely distinguishable amidst a throng of people made up, as the caption describing joint endeavour suggests, of both armenians and turks. through a symbolic renunciation of the hamidian past and its imposed social divisions, emphasis is again laid on collective identity and reintegration into the ottoman fold. the image stands as a prime example of what michelle u campos terms the ‘theatrical production of revolutionary brotherhood’, for it consciously enacts, through a visual rhetoric of kinship and solidarity, a vision of a society in which citizens would stand as equals.24 it can be identified as part of the dominant discourse of the day, with the themes of return, reconciliation, fraternity and the ‘unity of the elements’, based upon a 18. palmira brummett, “image and imperialism,” 91-96. 19. ags, “general yeprem khan,” armenia 5:12 (july 1912): 359-361. 20. resimli kitab, 21 (june 1910): 760-785. 21. bedross der matossian, shattered dreams of revolution: from liberty to violence in the late ottoman empire (stanford: stanford university press, 2014), 32-35. 22. resimli kitab, 1 (september 1908): 32. 23. resimli kitab, 2 (october 1908): 176. 24. michelle u campos, ottoman brothers: muslims, christians, and jews in early twentieth-century palestine (stanford: stanford university press, 2011), 74-81. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 60 shared ottoman citizenship of the different communities, being at the fore.25 in this way, the revolution was staged not only on the streets but also within the pages of the press. however, the source of such rhetoric and the precise nature of these events is unclear. bedross der matossian hints at their inherent contradictions, for while ‘some of the revolutionary festivals were spontaneous, they all entailed a certain level of organization and planning’.26 of the cemetery visits raymond kévorkian poses the blunt question: ‘how are we to interpret the display of mutual respect ... in a capital in which a little more than ten years earlier thousands of armenians had been publicly disembowelled?’27 it is difficult to state with any certainty whether these events were staged productions or organic expressions of newfound freedoms, and as such they occupy a vague, indistinct zone between the actions and rhetoric of the political parties and those of the general public. these ambiguities were similarly carried by the print culture of the day. the illustrated press presented itself, according to palmira brummett, as a ‘forum for the voices of the “people”, as if voices, somehow snatched from the air … had suddenly metamorphosed directly onto the printed page’. however, it was not free from influence, being regularly utilised by political parties in order ‘to mobilize support, influence public opinion, and even spread rumours’.28 25.  erik j zürcher, the young turk legacy and nation building, 57-60. 26. bedross der matossian, shattered dreams of revolution, 37. 27. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide, 54. 28. palmira brummett, “image and imperialism,” 53. figure 3 photographer unknown, ‘the wreath sent by the armenian and turkish committee of jerusalem to the armenian cemetery of şişli’, resimli kitab, 2 (october 1908): 176 the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 61 the source of photographs was sometimes unknown, for many carried no credit lines or indications of authorship. however, the mention of a photographer’s name below an image or the reproduction of their signature within the frame was becoming increasingly common. with this growing suggestion of human agency at work in photography, the photographer emerged into public life. resimli kitab gave prime billing to its main photographic contributors, the new studios of apollon, run by aşil samancı, and kenan bey, crediting them alongside the editor and thus affording their roles similar stature.29 on at least one occasion, kenan bey found his portrait featured in resimli kitab‘s pantheon of honoured faces, while amateur image-makers also found a home within the magazine upon the advent of its photography competition.30 there can be little doubt that image-making was enjoying a period of unprecedented freedom and, as photographic practice flourished, the photographer began to take on a role in ottoman society that was at once more prominent and more visible. not all photographers prospered, however, and within the pages of resimli kitab can also be found a portrait of ali sami, a former military photographer close to the sultan’s court, reproduced beneath the words ‘former ministers and spies of l’ancien régime’.31 the portrait formed part of a collection of personae non gratae, those deemed too closely associated with hamidian power to have a place in the new society of the constitutional era. this rogues’ gallery served to delineate a hamidian space for public edification, projecting the idea that responsibility for the internal conflicts and international failures that had brought about imperial decline was confined to a small circle, and that the empire, apparently unburdened by inherent structural failings, was at liberty to begin anew. enacted was a process of social ostracism that mirrored political and physical exile, with this in ali sami’s case taking the form of his being stripped of his rank and removed from the capital by way of an administrative posting to alexandretta.32 images of the empire’s personae non gratae were but another way in which the new era was signalled, appearing in the first issue of resimli kitab along with portraits of those returned from exile. acting as counterpoints to one another, those admitted into the imperial body are weighed against those expelled in a reciprocal motion, with the process speaking of the social and political reconfiguration of the empire. created is what allan sekula writes of as the ‘shadow archive’, a photographic hierarchy of the social terrain in which portraits contribute to the conceptualisation of the social body by identifying and demarcating its ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’.33 ali sami had proudly posed with his imperial medals, thus projecting a relationship to state power. the portrait was clearly produced for honorific purposes, and indeed would 29. ibid., 36. 30. resimli kitab, 14 (december 1909): 119; 2 (october 1908): 288-292. 31. resimli kitab, 1 (september 1908): 62. 32. bahattin öztuncay, the photographers of constantinople: pioneers, studios and artists from 19th century istanbul, volume 1 (istanbul: aygaz, 2003), 342. 33. allan sekula, “the body and the archive,” 10. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 62 be used by the photographer to advertise his studio.34 however, in its reprinting the subject is inadvertently associated with a cruel form of power and accused of playing an unethical role on behalf of that power, thus standing damned by his own professed connections with l’ancien régime. this act of appropriation provides a lesson in the passage of photographic meaning, showing how the semantic fluidity of the medium allowed for the imposition of divergent connotations. as photographic historian silvana palma has observed, a caption ‘influences perception to such an extent that it can reverse its interpretation’ so that ‘the same image can be taken equally well to portray an ally or a traitor’.35 the example of ali sami also succinctly demonstrates sekula’s double system of representation within photography, with ‘every proper portrait has its lurking, objectifying inverse in the files of the police’. his portrait made the transition from one side of the medium to the other, showing how images could be upturned, and with them reputation and social standing. photography provided its subjects with a means of defining themselves and their places in society, but it also contained the potential for these to be given definition by others. seen here is the hand that photography had in crafting public personas and shaping the social landscape. its role could be one of not only expressing solidarity but also asserting its limits, and this engagement in disciplinary modes was brought into sharper focus after the failed counter-revolution of april 1909.resimli kitab’s first issue after that event features images of chained prisoners and public executions, with such vilification interspersed amongst laudatory photographs of those who had taken action to defeat the counter-revolution. the magazine continues the use of dramatic image contrasts to describe the social and political terrain by presenting a photograph of a shackled and guarded ‘reactionary’ opposite one of new sultan mehmed v, a juxtaposition that worked to characterise the latter as much as the former.36 although at first used by some to celebrate the reimplementation of the constitution (as evidenced by the picture postcard already discussed), the image of abdülhamid had proved too firmly wedded to the negative connotations it had accrued over the years.37 rehabilitation of the sultan’s image was only possible with abdülhamid’s removal and the accession of his brother, with mehmed providing the young turks with a blank space upon which to project ideas of new beginnings and ‘national’ cohesion.38 1909 also saw shifts in the image of the armenian in ottoman society when massacres took place in cilicia. the swirling of rumour played a part in the violence, and it is interesting to consider one particular accusation levelled at the bishop of adana, mushegh seropian, namely that he had been photographed in the guise of an ancient armenian king. 34. for a reproduction of the photograph in this context, see bahattin öztuncay, the photographers of constantinople, 341. 35. silvana palma, “the seen, the unseen, the invented: misrepresentations of african “otherness” in the making of a colony. eritrea, 1885-1896,” cahiers d’études africaines 45:177 (2005): 39-69. 36. resimli kitab, 8 (may 1909): 762-795. 37. palmira brummett, “image and imperialism,” 121-123. 38.  erik j. zürcher, the young turk legacy and nation building, 73-94. the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 63 the photograph, in fact, depicted the bishop wearing ceremonial dress on the occasion of a feast day, but it was read by some as revealing the cilician armenian community’s desire to establish an independent kingdom.39 the incident is further evidence of how readily semantic migrations could occur with photographs, and the likelihood of such rereadings became heightened in charged environments in which changes to the social order threatened established power and privileges. fears concerning the loss of power only increased as the new ottoman leaders failed to stem imperial decline, most notably with the balkan wars of 1912-13 reducing the empire’s european holdings to a small toehold on that continent. the ensuing coup d’état completed the unionist’s seizure of the state and brought about a return to hamidian forms of governance.40 the reimplementation of censorship greatly contributed to the end of the press boom and the retreat of print culture, with resimli kitab producing its final edition in 1914.41 the shallowness of their commitment to the constitution and the principle of the ‘unity of the elements’ exposed, it was clear, as erik zürcher explains, that the cup ‘identified themselves with the interests of the state … and of the muslim majority. their perceived enemy was as much an ‘enemy within’ as an ‘enemy without’’.42 only a few short years after the restoration of the constitution, armenians were being presented as a people whose identities could not be reconciled with the new vision of the state. as edhem eldem states at the close of his essay that takes photography up to 1914, photography followed in the wake of the empire’s darkening politics ‘and soon abandoned its recently achieved freedom to become the instrument of violent ideologies and aggressive nation building.’43 visualising genocide as it had been with the revolution, the genocide was in part founded upon the visual construction of identity. from the time of the disastrous ottoman defeat at sarikamiş in january 1915, the unionists promoted an image of armenians as traitors and fifth columnists.44 this campaign took on a visual element after the entente declaration of may that year that those responsible for the recent massacres of armenians would be held to account, and germany’s own warnings to its ottoman partner that a better ‘presentational’ job was needed in order to legitimise its acts to a world audience.45 production of a number of books, albums and 39. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide, 78. 40.  erik j. zürcher, “the young turks - children of the borderlands?” international journal of turkish studies 9:1-2 (summer 2003): 275-286. 41.  erol  köroğlu,  ottoman propaganda and turkish identity: literature in turkey during world war i (london & new york: ib tauris, 2007), 11-14. 42.  erik j. zürcher, the young turk legacy and nation building,, 69; see also bedross der matossian, shattered dreams of revolution, 170-176. 43. edhem eldem, “the dissemination and impact of photography,” 153. 44. donald bloxham, the great game of genocide: imperialism, nationalism and the destruction of the ottoman armenians (oxford: oxford university press, 2005), 75-76. 45.  fuat dündar, crime of numbers: the role of statistics in the armenian question (1978-1918) (new international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 64 pamphlets was overseen by polis mecmuası (police magazine), part of a slim press industry that was by this time not only censored but utilised for state propaganda.46 the first publication to result was aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires des comités arméniens avant et après la proclamation de la constitution ottoman (1916/1917), a book, printed first in ottoman turkish and then in french, that contained substantial texts supported by a number of photographs.47 this was followed by a photographic album in two volumes with texts in ottoman turkish, english, french and german (1916).48 the range of languages in use in itself provides an indication of the intended audiences for the work. the publications utilise both images made by armenian groups and images created by the ottoman authorities, deploying them in tandem in support of an official government version of events depicting armenians as ‘instruments of foreign governments’.49 this narrative describes the good faith of the young turks during the constitutional era, for at ‘all armenian ceremonies, at the reception for the return from jerusalem of patriarch izmirlian, as well as at the requiem at the cemetery of [şişli] in memory of armenians who died for the constitution, one always saw at the forefront the most well-known figures from the cup’.50 however, ‘while all ottomans were fraternising and indulging in the joy that had very naturally arisen from the new era of freedom, armenians piled up engines of destruction in all corners of the country’.51 in this way, armenians are presented as betraying the revolutionary ideal of ottoman brotherhood and reconciliation. not only is the discourse of 1908 invoked, but those very scenes and images through which it was staged, including the previously discussed visit of patriarch madteos ii izmirlian to şişli. we thus see outlined the project of these albums, being the complete reversal of the former narrative of unity. as has been observed by benedetta guerzoni, the characterisation of the armenians as ‘forever dedicated to conspiracy’ had its roots in the state propaganda of the 1890s.52 therefore, the narrative of the 1916 albums should not be seen simply as an inversion of the discourse of 1908 but a reversion back to the dominant narratives of the hamidian era. the discourse of the genocide years harked back to, and most likely consciously stirred memories of, the late nineteenth-century broad brush characterisation of the armenians as a treacherous community. as in the past, revolutionaries were presented as drawing all brunswick & london: transaction publishers, 2010), 123-127. 46.  erol köroğlu, ottoman propaganda and turkish identity, 79-82. 47. aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires des comités arméniens avant et après la proclamation de la constitution ottoman[constantinople: 1917](ankara: direction général des archives de l'etat du premier ministre, 2001), hereafter aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires. 48. ermeni̇ âmâl ve harekât-i i̇htįlâlįyyesį tesâir ve vesâįk, two volumes [1916] (ankara: ankara matbaacılar  ciltçiler ve sanatkarlar odası eğitim ve kültür yayınları, n.d.), hereafter ermeni̇ âmâl 49. aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires, 8-12. 50. aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires, 50. 51. aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires, 67. 52. benedetta guerzoni, “il "nemico armeno" nell'impero ottomano: le immagini,” storicamente, 1:6 (2005), www.storicamente.org/guerzoni (accessed 7 september 2016). the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 65 armenians into their conspiratorial web. they are described, for example, as promoting revolution, independence and nationalism in schools, instilling ‘hatred against the turks and all things turkish, poisoning the minds of children’.53 the restoration of the armenian revolutionary to the former role asbogey man of the empire is further evidenced by the reprinting of fedayi portraits, including those of andranik, murad of sebastia and keri. while this again shows continuity with the hamidian era, it is difficult not to dwell on the stark contrast with the stories of recent years when one reads references to keri’s activities alongside yeprem khan. this ‘incriminating’ connection to a man once celebrated as a hero of the constitutional era demonstrates how the image of the fedayi had evolved once more.54 with their overarching narrative of sedition and betrayal, texts provide the lens through which armenian images are viewed. this operation, designed to shape readings and subvert messages, is at work most clearly in the direct application of new captions to existing photographs, notably in the case of images from the 1915 siege of van. that these images had their origins in the us press is plain to see, for the albums reproduce not only the images but wider sections of the newspapers that originally housed them. the result of this intriguing editorial decision is that captions both old and new are legible, and the supreme role of text in guiding interpretation is made evident. ‘armenians defending themselves from the turks’ reads one still visible newspaper caption; ‘armenians fighting in the trenches against the turks for the purpose of facilitating the occupation of the city of van by the russians’ is the caption with which the first is overlaid (figure 4).55 the second text inverts the scenario laid out by the first, in the process turning defence into attack and victim into aggressor. through such transplants, armenians are subjected to a variety of the treatment seen meted out in 1908 to ali sami. images designed as positive portrayals of their subjects are recast as pictures of villainy, and the strata of conflicting captions makes the viewer privy to this process of the rewriting of photographic meaning. in addition to these semantic redeployments, the ottoman authorities produced new accusatory photographic tableaus depicting prisoners and weapons. such images also circulated as prints that were passed from hand to hand and shown in private circles, as attested to in his memoirs by rafael de nogales, a venezuelan officer serving in the ottoman army. recalling a meeting with mehmed-asim bey, commander in the gendarmerie of diyarbekir, de nogales describes how ‘this gentleman overwhelmed me with attentions; and offered me two photographs, showing him and his secretaries aligned behind a stack of arms’. presented as loose prints, these photographs were free from the texts that guide interpretation in the printed albums, and yet they had their own determining narrative with 53. aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires, 52. 54. ermeni̇ âmâl, vol.2, 64. 55. the original source for the photograph and text appears to have been the periodical leslie’s illustrated weekly (the precise edition is not known). the photograph was also printed with the caption ‘armenians fighting for their lives’ in the literary digest (9 october 1915). for the ottoman version see ermeni̇ âmâl, vol.1, 53. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 66 the commander painting the armenians as the agents of a russian-sponsored plan of revolution. of this nogales writes that ‘it is impossible to know whether things were thus in hard fact, or merely in the dantesque vision of the sublime porte, which, habituated to its own regime of blood and darkness, believed that the rest of the world acted in the same way.’ he was certain, however, that the photographs were of questionable veracity, for he saw the ‘discovery’ of weapons in armenian homes and churches as a charade, while an examination of the photographs told him that most of the weapons were not designed for combat. his conclusion is that ‘this ostentatious collection of elements of war was nothing more nor less than the work of mehmed-asim bey himself, in his attempt to mislead and impress the public’.56 we 56. rafael de nogales, four years beneath the crescent (new york & london: charles scribner’s sons, figure 4 photographer unknown, ‘armenians fighting in the trenches against the turks for the purpose of facilitating the occupation of the city of van by the russians’, ermeni̇ âmâl ve harekât-i i̇htįlâlįyyesį tesâir ve vesâįk, 1916, vol.1, 53 the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 67 find similar statements in the memoir accounts of aram dildilian, who was tasked with photographing what he terms ‘fake’ displays of weapons in marsovan, and mary louise graffam, an american missionary in sivas.57 the ‘evidence’ provided by these photographs not only took the form of weapons but also the human body (figure 5). armenians were paraded as prisoners of the state in photographs that conform to an overarching compositional format premised upon the disciplinary modes identified by john tagg, ‘a repetitive pattern, the body isolated; narrow space; the subjection to an unreturnable gaze’.58 furthermore, many prisoners display numerical markers on their chests, thus giving the suggestion of the photographs operating within a disciplinary apparatus, as per the model of alphonse bertillon’s classificatory system in which photographs of criminals were accompanied by detailed physical descriptions and measurements.59 however, whatever state bureaucratic function the ottoman photographs may have served, as seen in the albums they largely lack any corresponding information detailing the identities of their subjects. in such minimalist form, photographs play no role, as they did within the bertillon system, in pinning down identity. such imaging is instead interested only in highly reductive forms of characterisation and categorisation, resulting in generalised pronouncements regarding an entire community. as such its subjects stand not as themselves but as anonymous symbols of armenian ‘treachery’ and ‘lawlessness’. armenians were not the only people on show for the camera. the account provided by de nogales of his meeting with mehmed-asim bey suggests that the propaganda mission upon which the commander had embarked was in no small way orientated around himself as the subject. the creation of negative images of armenians was certainly the primary aim of these pictures, but they also served as opportunities for positive depictions of ottoman functionaries. importantly, these figures are not just symbols of ottoman power in the way that prisoners are symbols of armenian guilt, for they also stand before the camera as individuals wanting to promote themselves. the role they play is similar to that of the policeman and doctor in british criminal photography as described by jennifer green-lewis, those who ‘[b]y writing themselves into the photograph ... announce the significance of their authority, just as they indicate their sense that such authority must be recorded in order to be rendered real.’60 such people were thus involved, as enver had been, in personal image construction based upon the projection of power, perhaps similarly imagining 1926), 140. 57. armen t. marsoobian, fragments of a lost homeland: remembering armenia (london & new york: i.b. tauris, 2015), 199; susan billington harper, “mary louise graffam: witness to genocide” in jay winter (ed.) america and the armenian genocide of 1915 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2008), 214-239. 58. john tagg, the burden of representation, 85. 59. jonathan finn, capturing the criminal image: from mug show to surveillance society (minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 2009), 23-28. 60. jennifer green-lewis, framing the victorians: photography and the culture of realism (ithaca & london: cornell university press, 1996), 225. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 68 themselves in the role of ‘national’ heroes. what was theatrically performed in the wartime albums, however, was unmistakeably the wielding of power over others. by providing testimony in favour of agents of the state and against armenians, these photographs succinctly demonstrate allan sekula’s double system of representation, and do so not within the space of the archive or in the pages of a journal, but within the frames of single images. in this way, photographs of officials and their captives combine the criminal mug shot and the society portrait, thus acting both repressively and honorifically. this dual role is particularly evident in a photograph from maraş that depicts two clusters of people in a scene divided along the horizontal axis (figure 6). on the upper level stand ottoman soldiers and officials, while below them we find a group of armenian prisoners. the two groups are separated physically and socially, with the camera performing different operations with regards to each: those above are praised by the lens, while those below are condemned. comparing this to the 1908 photographs of crowds, particularly that of the procession of armenians and turks at şişli, we see the abandonment of solidarity and the involvement of photography not in the breaking down of social divisions but rather in their construction. the maraş photograph’s clear signalling of its message of the violent tilting of the social scales possibly provides the reason why this photograph did not appear in the ottoman albums, appearing instead to have circulated only in the form of prints. the accentuated theatricality with which its scene of rise and fall is performed suggests the photograph more as a souvenir and trophy than a piece of ‘evidence’.61 61. for this aspect of photography, see leigh raiford, “the consumption of lynching images” in only figure 5 photographer unknown, ‘some bombs seized at ada-bazar together with tools to manufacture them. a few influential leaders of the committee and some of its members whose duty it is to make bombs and distribute them’, ermeni̇ âmâl ve harekât-i i̇htįlâlįyyesį tesâir ve vesâįk, 1916, vol.1, 32 the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 69 it is necessary to consider what took place not only in front of the lens but behind it also. grigoris balakian, the priest and historian of the years of destruction, reports the widespread use of armenian photographers for the making of these images.62 the ottoman state thus relied upon the skills of members of the very community it was targeting, and the survival of some photographers because of their roles in the construction of ‘evidence’ against armenians calls to mind primo levi’s ‘grey zone’, the ambiguous, morally complex position in which some victims found themselves during the holocaust.63 these photographers included the dildilians of marsovan, whose survival also rested upon a forced conversion to islam, and the encababians of sivas.64 the work of these photographers was not advertised, and it might be said that if the post-revolutionary period witnessed the emergence of the photographer into the public realm, then the genocide era witnessed the disappearance. the absence of photographers’ names is in keeping with a strategy that positioned these images are neutral, organic documents that carried that aforementioned quality of having been ‘somehow snatched from air’. similar tactics were at work when, according tofuat skin deep: changing visions of the american self, ed. coco fusco & brian wallis (new york: international center of photography / harry n abrams, 2003), 267-273 62. grigoris balakian, armenian golgotha, trans. peter balakian & aris sevag (new york: alfred a. knopf, 2009), 108. 63. primo levi, the complete works of primo levi (uk: penguin classics, 2015), 2430-2456. 64. armen t. marsoobian, fragments of a lost homeland, 187-253; kay encababian surabian, unpublished transcript of interview conducted by ruth thomasian 22 november 1988 (project save armenian photograph archives, watertown, massachusetts). figure 6 photographer unknown, upper level ottoman officials and soldiers, including ali haydar pasha, mutesarif (governor) of maraş, lower levelarmenian prisoners from zeitun in maraş. hayk demoyan (ed.), 100 lusankarchakan patmutyun hayots tseghaspanutyan masin [100 photo stories on armenian genocide] yerevan: agmi, 2015, 48. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 70 dündar, publication details were omitted from the albums to obscure their cup origins, in the belief that ‘western public opinion would be more impressed if they were presented as impartial publications.’65 dündar reports that 1700 copies of the propaganda booklets were sent to foreign diplomatic offices and ottoman embassies abroad for distribution in 1917.66 yet it is also clear that the material had already been in circulation for around a year, with the british historian arnold toynbee describing seeing an album shortly after publication in spring 1916. while compiling documents for the treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire, he wrote of coming into contact with ‘what they call an album containing photographs of arms purporting to have been found in possession of the armenians’. of this material he was dismissive, although without questioning some of the claims, stating ‘i imagine that the armenians were indeed in possession of a considerable number of arms, having been permitted to possess them ever since 1908’.67 the ottoman bid to convince foreign powers of the legitimacy of it actions seems to have met with little success, and yet it must be noted that its propaganda also appears to have carried a domestic agenda. the writer yervant odian records an encounter in konya in 1918 while on his return to constantinople after surviving deportation. he found that the albums, ‘specially published to inflame the turkish mob and the turkish police against the armenians’, were being circulated among the population by local unionists. this, he writes, ‘was nothing but laying the groundwork for a massacre. and indeed, a short time after the arrival and distribution of those books, turkish hatred towards the armenians was even greater’.68 the process described by odian strongly resembles what jay winter terms the ‘cultural preparation of hatred, atrocity, and genocide’, the demonization of the enemy that, in a context of total war, allowed ‘war crimes on a revolutionary scale and character’ to take place.69 seen thus, the ottoman visual propaganda operation was not simply concerned with constructing justifications for foreign powers but performed the vital role of readying the domestic cultural space that was necessary for the enactment of a violent reshaping of society. as instruments of this cultural preparation, the albums played a role akin to that of the illustrated press as previously discussed, being used ‘to mobilize support, influence public opinion, and even spread rumours’. returning once again to allan sekula’s assertion that the photographic definition of the criminal body contributes to the creation of a hierarchical social body, we might see how in the ottoman empire it was the body of the armenian that was used for purposes of social construction. an aspect of social definition and social separation is evident in all prisoner 65.  fuat dündar, crime of numbers, 125. 66. ibid. 67. fo 96/205, arnold toynbee to william walter rockwell, 8 june 1916 (foreign office papers, national archives, london) 68. yervant odian, accursed years: my exile and return from der zor, 1914-1919 (london: garod books, 2009), 286. 69. jay winter, “under cover of war: genocide in the perspective of total war” in america and the armenian genocide of 1915, ed. jay winter (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2008), 37-51. the returning hero fnd the exiled villain: the image of the armenian in ottoman society, 1908-1916 71 photographs, but is most clearly seen in the image of the two groups in maraşwith its harshly delineated composition. as resimli kitab had previously done with its assembled galleries of the ‘former ministers and spies of l’ancien régime’, the albums brought together the images of those that were to carry the blame for the empire’s misfortunes. however, in highly generalised depictions and narratives those being identified and disciplined were not individuals but an entire community. branded as the ‘enemy within’, armenians were presented as a dangerous social element from which the empire needed to be freed in order to survive and prosper. the discursive reformulation of ottoman identity taking place at this time was played out through photographs that identified those that belonged and those that did not. that the officials in these photographs represented the power of the state is clear, but they were also presented as belonging to the ottoman state in a way that the armenians on view did not. in the state narrative, the armenian populace had chosen to reject the promise of the 1908 revolution and the new ottoman contract, siding with outside forces who sought the destruction of the empire. in accordance, they were presented visually as being no longer ottoman, no longer part of society and no longer subject to the protection of the state. armenians in this scenario, this ‘dantesque vision’ to borrow rafael de nogales’s term, were an alien, hostile element that needed to be removed from ottoman soil, the very soil that was in the process of being reconceptualised along turkish ‘national’ lines. the photographs made of armenian prisoners in 1915-16 were a visual signal of the end of the multi-ethnic ottoman society and collective existence that had been celebrated, in just as visual a manner, in 1908. separated by seven years, these two groups of images constitute radically different imperial visions and take part in the different discourses that shaped the empire over those short years. however, the strategies at work in each case are remarkably similar, for they demarcate an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, identify those that belong and those that do not. the young turk revolution of 1908 had brought about a new discourse of ottoman identity, one orientated around fraternity and solidarity. photography took part in the reordering of the hamidian world, theatrically announcing a new world of returning heroes and ottoman brotherhood. however, the treatment of elements of l’ancien régime demonstrated that the ‘new’ empire had its divisions and that the camera would be deployed as an instrument to define different social groups and cast out those that were deemed to have no place. armenians were painted as an essential element of ottoman society in 1908, and yet later found themselves on the receiving end of this visual project, one that sought to depict them as a rotten section of the empire that needed removal. the image of an empire under threat from an ‘enemy within’ was promoted through the production and circulation of photographs in the same way that the image of a resurgent and united society once was. in the process of redefining the armenian community, photographs also contributed to the redefinition of the empire in narrow national and religious terms. the returning hero and the exiled villain: these were the roles assigned to the armenians in the period following the revolution, the picture of inclusion morphing into one of annihilation. 39 serafi m seppälä is a professor of systematic theology in the university of eastern finland. his main scholarly interests are in early syriac and greek patristic literature, especially mariology and spirituality, in addition to the idea of jerusalem in the three monotheistic religions. several of his finnish publications deal with the rabbinic literature and judaism. seppälä has also published a cultural history of armenia and two monographs on the armenian genocide in finnish language, concentrating on the representation of the genocide in survivor memoirs, its refl ections on genocide in armenian art, as well as west armenian life and culture before the genocide. he has travelled extensively in eastern poland and western armenia. genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey serafi m seppälä all the consequences of armenian genocide and jewish shoah are still not fully realised or comprehended. in addition to the systematic annihilation of populations and cultures, the fates of the survivors continue to be a tragic reverberation of the genocidal events. in both cases, most of the survivors escaped to other countries and later became subjects and objects of a number of biographies and studies. however, not every survivor fl ed. in both genocides, there were also a remarkable number of victimised individuals who survived the massacres through negligence of the murderers, or by being taken to families, and continued to live in the country of the atrocities, changing or hiding their religious and cultural identity or becoming victims of forced change of identity. the existence of these peoples in poland and turkey remained a curious unrecognized subject that extremely little was known of until recently. in this article, the present situation of both of these groups is discussed in comparative terms in order to outline the character of their identity problems. the comparison is all the more interesting due to the fact that obvious differences between the two social contexts underline the signifi cance of the common factors in the post-genocidal experience. the setting: similar paradigm, dissimilar situations armenians in post-genocide turkey disappeared from the public scene, and the same can be said of jews in post-war poland. in both cases, there was an active and tolerated community in the capital,1 in addition to an unknown number of survivors scattered in various places. in both groups, the survivors represent typical cases of persons who may be survivors in the biological sense yet thoroughly victimized in cultural, religious and psychological terms. having lost their traditional relations, religions, feasts, dances, songs and the whole cultural context, and in most cases marrying from the other religion, they went through an instant assimilation, at least in terms of social interaction. in other words, they were left alone with their nightmares – on the character of which we know something through the studies on the survivors in the diaspora.2 in turkey, the (ex-)armenians had to prove they were muslims and thus good turkish citizens, but even this did not prevent them being seriously harassed. in a similar way, the (ex-) jews in poland had to prove they were good poles, which in the era of cold war meant 1. in istanbul, the number of armenians has been in tens of thousands; in warsaw, there were 5 000 jews in the late 1940’s yet the number was in considerable decline until 1990’s. 2. e.g., aida alayarian, consequences of denial: the armenian genocide (london: karnac books, 2008); donald e. miller and lorna touryan miller, survivors: an oral history of the armenian genocide (berkeley: university of california press, 1993). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 40 41 being good communists, and this did not prevent them from becoming victims of the purges of 1968, resulting in most cases in the survivors’ emigration to israel. armenian survivors in turkey had to carry the additional burden of being a constructive part of the society that generated the destruction of one’s own culture. yet some managed to marry armenians of similar backgrounds and thereby managed to keep some layers of memory and fragments of identity and traditions inside the family, resulting in curious underground identity. even in their cases the lack of proper communities, religious institutions and schools resulted in thorough assimilation into the main stream of society, and due to the all-embracing fear, silence fell on the topic even inside the family. in turkey, most armenian survivors were young girls abducted into families with no possibility whatsoever to lead an armenian life, not to mention delivering the lost identity to their children. memoirs of those survivors who later managed to emigrate sometimes contain detailed descriptions of life as an abducted child in muslim families.3 in poland the danger was less immediate; nevertheless it was typical that jews wanted to prove their polishness by distancing themselves from any sign of judaism. as a result, the assimilated ones in both instances were considered as lost cases by all sides. this was evident not only for practical reasons but also for the theoretical framework of identities on all sides. that is to say, even though armenian and turkish histories and literatures diverge completely on the portrayal and interpretation of the history, both narratives fi rmly agree on the existence and importance of a decisive line between being an armenian and being a turk. in a parallel way, jewish and catholic/polish world views continued to view each other as radically different categories. jews viewed poles as anti-semites, often with good reason, lately with less reason.4 for all sides the narratives functioned according to the paradigm of either-or identities. roughly speaking, american jews and american armenians treated the lost cases in parallel terms in their memoirs and studies, seeing the polish and turkish identities categorically and self-evidently as non-jewish and non-armenian respectively. in a telling testimony, an armenian from ankara became interested in his armenian identity after hrant dink’s murder, and on his trip to israel he went to the armenian quarter of jerusalem, entering an armenian shop: “the shopkeeper gave me the cold shoulder when i said i was an armenian from turkey. they probably see us as people who take side with turkey.”5 several decades after the genocide, it was known that there were a big number of people with armenian genes in turkey, and an unknown number of jewish genes in poland, but identities, communities and peoples were considered as lost forever.6 in the prevailing 3. rapes seem to have been common, and the children could be given dirtiest jobs – even cleaning the buttocks of the master, like in document 170 in svazlian verjine, the armenian genocide: testimonies of the eyewitness survivors (yerevan: nasra, 2011), 345. 4. for an illustrative discussion on the absurd measures taken and surreal fears sensed by jewish heritage traveller groups in poland, see erica t. lehrer, jewish poland revisited. heritage tourism in unquiet places (bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 2013), 63–74. 5. ferda balancar (ed.), the sounds of silence iii: ankara’s armenians speak (istanbul: international hrant dink foundation publ., 2012), 42. 6. this applies to the last jews themselves, like in the pessimistic encounters recorded by niezabitowska traditional either–or identity paradigm this was unavoidable. in fact, one can say that both of these two genocides were enabled and to some extent caused by the historical contrast of identities, and the new post-genocide identities of the survivor communities in armenian and jewish diasporas were defi ned by the same dividing lines. this in turn created the sense that any attempt to diminish the dividing lines would endanger the memory of destruction. the problem as such is of course inescapable because of the traditions of religious self-defi nition: one cannot be christian and muslim at the same time, and one cannot be christian catholic and jewish in the religious (halakhic) sense. and moreover, according to all traditional interpretations of islam, a muslim cannot even become christian (without facing a death penalty). ironically, long after the destruction and annihilation of communities, traditions and identities, there were turkish conspiracy theorists afraid of the re-emergence of hidden armenians in eastern turkey, and in the same way the polish anti-semites were worried about jewish conspiracies when there were no longer jewish communities in existence. change of spirit: from destruction and negligence to protection and restoration when everything was already considered lost, something happened. one could say that the spirit has changed strikingly in poland, and to considerable extent even in turkey, especially in kurdish areas.7 “a process of de-assimilation has begun”, states a polish-jewish professor of philosophy stanislaw krajewski, adding that it is “a novelty in the history of jews in poland”. the latter remark indicates that something is in fact better today than during most of the history. rather similar voices have emerged from certain parts of turkey. “until 10 years ago, we used to conceal our identity from everybody, but being an armenian is no longer dangerous”,8 says mehmet arkan, a muslim of armenian origin in diyarbakir. in poland, there has been an unprecedented rise of interest towards judaism. this applies to polish intellectuals attracted by the extensive amount of jewish infl uence on the cultural history of poland, as well as to many ordinary poles reminiscing about their lost jewish neighbours and neighbourhoods.9 in places like chmielnik, city planners have faced the fact that the problem of a ruined synagogue in a beautiful old city must be solved somehow, and fortunately destruction is not a serious option. during the last fi ve years, a respectable number of synagogues and cemeteries have been renovated and jewish museums opened. the renewed synagogues function either as jewish museums (zamosc, chmielnik, & tomaszewski . see malgorzata niezabitowska and tomasz tomaszewski, remnants: the last jews of poland (new york: friendly press, 1986). 7. there is a growing number of intellectuals and kurdish politicians (e.g. candidate for presidency, selahattin demirtas) who openly speak for the armenian cause, or at least actively show tolerance. 8. “turkey’s secret armenians,” al-monitor, february 19, 2013. 9. e.g. elzbieta skromak, żyd, mój sąsiad; dialog kultur w przedwojennym rozwadowie [the jew, my neighbor: the dialogue of cultures in pre-war rozwadów] (stalowa wola: muzeum regionalne w stalowej woli, 2013). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 42 43 dabrowa tarnowska), communal cultural centers (szczebrzeszyn, zarki, modliborzyce) or, in the most fortunate cases, as synagogues (krakow, chachmei lublin yeshiva). it is well-known that in turkey there are thousands of armenian churches and monastery buildings in decay, some dating to the earliest christian times. however, aghtamar10 and surb kirakos in diyarbakir have been renovated,11 and other projects of renovation are more or less under consideration. there have been preliminary talks even about restoring the famous yet totally ruined surb karapet in mush region. so far the endeavours have not been much more than political manoeuvres for the protection of the image of turkey, with no serious concern on the cultural legacy the destruction of which still continues.12 nevertheless, even this suffi ces to give an impression that the bottom may have been reached and the second post-genocide century might be better than the fi rst one for the last landmarks of west armenian civilization. as regards to the buildings, poland is certainly far ahead. it is true that many of the renovation projects have been more or less funded by jewish organisations in the diaspora, but remarkably, such projects may be initiated and carried out by polish christians as well, and there does exist true interest for the jewish cause. in turkey, a successful restoration implies diffi cult legal processes, yet some cases (surb kirakos, aghtamar) are similar enough so that certain parallelism may be seen in emergence. it must be admitted, however, that what is a painful exception in poland (e.g. the cross and church in auschwitz-birkenau) is an overwhelming rule in turkey (mosques in the places of churches and monasteries). what is happening to the buildings is a good indicator of the situation of people, to which we now turn. sparks of souls re-emerging? the concept of gilgul, transmigration of souls, became popular in medieval jewish mysticism. according to this peculiar doctrine, each human soul is a sum of sparks from the souls of people of former ages – spiritual genetics, so to say. the idea of gilgul has often occurred to me when dealing with the stories of half-jews of poland or half-armenians of turkey, whose genetic ancestry seems to call them back to where they have come from. perhaps even more mystically, there are also cases of authentic poles in process of converting to 10. aghtamar is offi cially a museum, and liturgy may be held there only once year, but the matter is currently under discussion. at the moment it seems possible to have additional ceremonies with a special permission. see siranoush ghazanchyan, “akhtamar church to be allowed to celebrate mass more often,” public radio of armenia, 18 jan 2016, http://www.armradio.am/en/2016/01/18/akhtamar-churchto-be-allowed-to-celebrate-mass-more-o� en/; “armenian acting patriarch comments on the permission to hold masses in akhtamar church more o� en,” public radio of armenia, 21 jan 2016, https://www. armradio.am/en/2016/01/21/armenian-acting-patriarch-comments-on-the-permission-to-hold-massesin-akhtamar-church-more-o� en/ 11. the currently renovated surb kirakos church was recently awarded with a grand prix of the european union prize for cultural heritage/europa nostra awards. nevertheless, the turkish government had no role in the actual project: most of the funding was raised by the armenian diaspora and the rest by the local kurdish municipality. 12. cf. “1,600-year-old armenian cemetery ruined in mush,” asbarez, june 29, 2015, http://asbarez. com/137317/1600-year-old-armenian-cemetery-ruined-in-mush/ (accessed 30 june 2015). judaism, oftentimes as a result of serious refl ections on the legacy of genocide. this unusual phenomenon could be well interpreted with the help of another key concept from jewish spirituality – tiqqun �olam, healing of the world. attempts to defi ne general principles in these processes easily fail to do justice to the cases, so unique the stories of returning souls are. many instances sound unbelievable, like the famous case of polish skinhead and anti-semitic pawel bramson who at the age of 24 discovered that his parents were jews who had converted to catholicism – and the same case with his wife!13 in turkey, there seems to be more and more half-armenians bubbling up from different layers of the society. to name one, mehmet ali arslan, a brand new member of parliament of turkey, is of armenian origin.14 moreover, there have also been anti-armenians with armenian ancestry, just as there have been anti-jewish activists arising from jewish backgrounds. sometimes this is a conscious attempt to prove the authenticity of one’s non-jewishness or non-armenianness. however, the most interesting cases are those who are unaware of their background, like bramson, but who somehow are deeply disturbed by jewishness or armenianness and channel this sense of insecurity into open hatred. the chief rabbi of poland, michael schudrich defi nes his mission as an enterprise “to revive the jewish identity of individuals”,15 arguing that there are “thousands of stories about men and women of all ages and backgrounds” who are “returning to judaism”.16 but are they really? schudrich himself estimates that in one year there were “more than a hundred people” who came to him to discuss their jewish roots, in addition to perhaps dozens who went to other rabbis. it means less than one per cent, and how many of these shall in reality return? media coverage and public interest focus on those few who really adopt the jewish – or armenian – religion and become converts. it is rather obvious, however, that most of those who are “returning” never fully reach the terminus by converting in the actual sense of the word. remaining somewhere in-between, they may start to identify and even defi ne themselves as jews and adopt a wide selection of jewish customs and activities. this does not automatically make anyone a jew in the traditional (halakhic) sense of the word, especially if one’s mother was a non-jew. there are thousands of such people who fall somewhere between the poles: they are not jews, but also it would be misleading to describe them as non-jews. the situation of the jews of poland, and the development of recent decades, has been summarised illustratively by schudrich: 13. adam easton, “jewish life slowly returns to poland,” bbc news, april 20, 2012, http://www.bbc. com/news/world-radio-and-tv-17741185 (accessed 1 july 2015); katarzyna markusz, “sneak peek at a hard-hitter in the upcoming s.f. jewish film festival,” jweekly, june 14, 2012, http://www.jweekly. com/article/full/65535/from-neo-nazi-skinhead-to-a-black-hatted-jew/ (accessed 1 july 201; “polish man journeys from skinhead to orthodox jew,” ctv, march 28, 2012, http://www.ctvnews.ca/polish-manjourneys-from-skinhead-to-orthodox-jew-1.788440 (accessed 1 july 2015). 14. arslan represents people’s democratic party (hdp). 15. michael schudrich, “giving back to the jewish people,” in poland: a jewish matter, ed. kate craddy, mike levy, and jakub nowakowski, (warszawa: adam mickiewicz institute, 2010), 62. 16. ibid, 57. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 44 45 back then, in 1973, it was believed that there were no jews left in poland except a few thousand elderly. by 1990, there was some thought that maybe there were some younger jews, by the mid-1990s we knew there were many more jews than were previously believed but it was not clear if they wanted to express their jewish identity. today we know that some are expressing their jewish identity and the challenge is to give them ways to express their identity in a meaningful way to themselves.17 the estimation can be verifi ed by the interviews made in the 1980’s. “we are defi nitely the last”, the interviewers heard in many occasions. “jews as a community, or even a mini-community, will no longer exist in poland. we are on the way out.”18 contrary to all expectations, the situation started to change just a few years after these words were documented. consequently, during the post-soviet decades, “thousands of poles have discovered that they have jewish roots and nobody knows how many thousands they are”, as jessica zwaiman lerner states.19 something parallel has happened in turkey, especially after fethiye cetin’s book anneannem (2004) that brought the fate of armenian grandmothers into discussion. furthermore, hrant dink’s murder in 2007 made many to take sides in the matter. the situation gave rise to a sense that the armenian issue should be encountered either openly like in dink’s journalism, or destructively, like in the national ideology behind the murder, and many consciously chose the former option.20 as a result of the increase of interest and courage on armenian heritage, we know today much more than ten years ago. interviews, articles and books about the descendants of turkey’s armenians have started to appear. the stories contain obvious parallels with the instances of jews in poland. in both cases, one’s origin is oftentimes realized just by chance; there are also cases of dramatic deathbed confessions.21 reactions of the descendants vary considerably. an ideal example of this is found in an article discussing the situation of people who have discovered their jewish ancestry in poland. the author is pondering upon the reasons why a grandchild would like to become jewish: rabbi schudrich says they have a number of deathbed confessions. he tells the story of this girl who found out she was jewish after a deathbed confession by her grandmother. at 16 years of age she was curious and attended 17. [rabbinical council of america], “rabbi michael schudrich. chief rabbi of poland,” march 18, 2014, http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=105571 (accessed 8 oct, 2015). 18. malgorzata niezabitowska and tomasz tomaszewski, remnants, 15. 19. jessica zwaiman lerner, “rabbi michael schudrich on the opportunity for renewed jewish life in poland,” jewish times asia, december 2010/january 2011, http://www.jewishtimesasia.org/one-to-onetopmenu-45/rabbi-michael-issue-december (accessed 2 july 2015). 20. “the fact that he spoke out about those things was a turning point for turkey.” ferda balancar (ed.), the sounds of silence. turkey’s armenians speak (istanbul: international hrant dink foundation publ., 2012), 43. 21. e.g. ayse gül altinay and fethiye cetin, the grandchildren. the hidden legacy of ”lost” armenians in turkey (new brunswick & london: transaction publishers, 2014), 99. a session the rabbi offered. “she told me at the end of the session she felt something come alive in her that she had never felt before. this pintele yid – the spark of the jewish soul.” that is “the most logical and simplistic answer.”22 something parallel is described by a leftist non-religious descendant of armenians in diyarbakir, who after having entered the church was surprised by a certain feeling of lightness. he tried to explain this by pondering whether there could have been some kind of spiritual energy of the ancestors present: “this may not be scientifi c, but that’s my explanation.”23 it is also striking that even when there was no explicit talk whatsoever on the matter, evidently something had been delivered to the next generations. an alevi woman from east turkey (aged 30) came to know that her father’s side was of armenian origin. after consideration, she concluded that something had been transmitted between the lines: “both my mother and my father carried with them the oppression of the past and they passed it on to me, and it defi ned my childhood.”24 it is telling that this heritage was defi ned in negative terms: for me, having armenian roots means this: you know that there were people in your family who were continuously oppressed on account of their identity. and you grow up carrying that sense of oppression with you.25 problems of recovering identity even for those who manage to go through an actual conversion, it is not easy to become an armenian. a recent publication describes the setting in a church in boyaciköy during the sunday service. some twenty new converts are vehemently crossing themselves, but “when the notes of the hymns rise to the brick roof, they hesitate, stumbling over the words”. in addition to the usual problematics in adopting a new religion and a new way of thinking, there are linguistic diffi culties and social barriers, not to mention the obvious dangers from islamists and nationalists alike. even the armenian bishop, stressing that they are not actively converting in the manner of the evangelical missionaries, remains cautious of the new phenomenon: more and more people are breaking the silence and knocking on our doors. the atmosphere of democratization is favourable here, but the fear is still present: the subject is still politically sensitive. we’re not quite sure how to handle it. 26 for those who do not convert, the setting is even more obscure. the islamized armenians of turkey are a curious sub-group that offi cially does not exist. their identity is constructed in 22. jessica zwaiman lerner, “rabbi michael schudrich.” 23. ferda balancar (ed.), the sounds of silence ii. diyarbakir’s armenians speak (istanbul: international hrant dink foundation, 2013), 199–200. 24. ayse gül altinay and fethiye cetin, the grandchildren, 156. 25. ibid, 153. 26. laure marchand and guillaume perrier, turkey and the armenian ghost: on the trail of the genocide (montreal and kingston: mcgill-queen’s university press, 2015), 57. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 46 47 negative terms: not a real turk, but also not a true armenian. there is even no appropriate name for the group. armenians oftentimes speak of “islamized armenians”, which in many cases is anachronistic, since the term refers accurately only to the situation during the fi rst generation. it is misleading to call “islamized” someone who has one non-islamic (grand-) grandparent. in most cases, there is only 1/4 or 1/8 of armenian genes involved, due to the big number of abducted young girls in 1915. and as one might expect, things get much more obscure when we turn to the non-genetic factors of armenian identity. how to call them, then? who are they? it is characteristic for this new phenomenon that the classical clear-cut divisions between turks and armenians, or poles and jews, are no longer enough to defi ne identities in a functional way. this creates a paradoxical situation due to the fact that the religious defi nitions remain clear as ever: one either is a jew or catholic, muslim or christian. to adopt one religion means to deny the other. but what should then be done to the growing number of cases who defi ne themselves somewhere between the categories, or who feel at home in both of them? in diyarbakir, mehmet arkan became aware of his family’s armenian identity at the age of seven and affi rms that he does not feel less armenian for being a sunni muslim and performing islamic prayers!27 according to traditional either-or paradigm, this would be impossible – and such a statement would not have made any sense in pre-genocide armenian culture, for which arkan undoubtedly feels genuine affi nity. however, if one becomes acquainted with the pre-genocide armenian culture, its thoroughly christian nature becomes obvious. a 34-year old muslim woman in turkey ponders her self-defi nition after fi nding out (as a teenager) that she, as a matter of fact, is a descendant of an armenian priest and music teacher from mush, father yeghiše: i know that i have armenian origins. a part of me is armenian. i am totally at peace with this. i don’t defi ne myself as armenian or as a turk but i have to admit that the answer to my question, “who am i?” took some time to mature.28 what, then, is this answer of hers? she admits that she was brought up as a turk, her family is turkish, her name is turkish, and that she is “a turk anyway”, and everything about her is “turkish in fact”. yet there is the other half in her, too, and oftentimes these two sides function in contradictory terms: “while my turkish part feels embarrassed, my armenian part feels terrible anger.” the anger and hatred is so strong that one has to actively learn to deal with it in order to be able to carry on ordinary life. neither turkish or armenian history, nor academic scholarship, has valid categories for such “half-cases”, not to mention religions. tragically enough, such cases usually have no possibility to experience or even obtain genuine knowledge about the traditional way of life that their ancestors led. due to the nonexistence of armenian (or jewish) life in quarters and villages that used to be armenian (or jewish), there is a curious and tragic sense of 27. “turkey’s secret armenians,” al-monitor, february 19, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ culture/2013/02/turkey-secret-armenians.html# (accessed 1 july 2015). 28. ferda balancar (ed.), the sounds of silence. turkey’s armenians speak, 86. emptiness and absence all around. for that very reason, however, the annihilated culture in a paradoxical way remains constantly present through its absence. in turkey this applies to both sides: the topic is an untreated wound for turks, too. the situation results in broken identities, in which some fragmentary aspects of the lost armenianness – or judaism – are cherished and respected by the descendants of survivors, but the traditional way of life as a whole remains unknown. this means that the defi nitive constituents of armenianness and jewishness are basically alien and replaced by aspects that are more or less random and even post-genocide.29 in the traditional paradigm, national and religious identity was a harmonious whole, even though consisting of various ingredients; in the half-cases, identity is rather a composition of miscellaneous elements that are incompatible according to the standards of the traditional identities and the paradigm behind them. in the cases of broken identities, the armenian half is undoubtedly real, but extremely fragmentary. after the historical continuity is broken, there is no longer a way to know what it was like to be armenian in the original cultural setting that used to be exceptionally rich and colourful, fl avoured with dozens of peculiar communal feasts and fasts annually, in addition to an endless number of local songs, dances, rituals and customs. this in turn results in what could be labelled as imagined identities: one may think that he is armenian even though there are only tiny and fragmentary random parallels with armenianness as it was before the genocide, or what it would be now without the genocide.30 in a society like turkey, this may lead into situation in which a half-armenian possesses only the negative aspects of armenian identity: the sense of being oppressed and endangered. or, in a more open society like poland – and perhaps istanbul – one may try to pick up some of the best parts of the ancestral identity: a half-jew may have judaism as a kind of hobby, enjoying jewish literature and concerts in jewish festivals (the number of which is increasing in poland). nonetheless, such pursuits are not an insignifi cant phenomenon. the famous festival of jewish culture in cracow has been scorned – oftentimes by the diaspora jewry – as being jewish culture performed by non-jews to non-jews.31 such a blame is in fact an outcome of the traditional paradigm of “either–or” identities and fails to take into consideration the fact that many of the “non-jews” actually come from the half-jewish background, and such open festivals are the easiest and sometimes the only way to achieve at least some taste of the lost ancestral life, as well as of modern judaism. the public interest, especially the articles based on interviews of the most interesting cases, typically concentrate on those few who managed to convert to the religion of their 29. e.g. one may know, say, easter eggs but not the totality of paregentan, great lent, great week and easter night with its hymns, songs and games, to which the eggs belonged. 30. how much better the situation is in the post-soviet armenia, or in the diaspora, is another question. correspondingly, the religious, communal and social life of the jews in london or boston cannot be the same as it was – or would be – in bukowsko or frampol. 31. see the discussion in janusz makuch, “i was neither a jew nor a catholic,” in the fall of the wall and the rebirth of jewish life in poland: 1989–2009, ed. shana penn, konstanty gebert, and anna golstein, ( warsaw: taube foundation for jewish life and culture, 2009), 62. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 48 49 ancestors. this is to create narratives of partisans who went to other side and returned victorious, in accordance with the traditional either-or identity paradigm. the reality is that most of the people who fi nd themselves from somewhere in-between do remain somewhere in-between. they may react to their genetic background either by underlining aggressively their present islamic [or catholic] religious identity, or by becoming friendly towards armenians [or jews], as is the case with many kurds [and poles] today. in poland – and elsewhere – more and more people with some jewish ancestry seem to end up into a curious loose category of something like “hang-around members” of the jewish community. they are unable or unwilling to go through the actual conversion (for males, with circumcision) to become jewish in the halakhic sense, yet they feel deeply sympathetic for the jewish cause, and may be more committed to the jewish activities than those who are offi cially jewish. it can also be that they are unable to leave christianity, the catholic side of their identity, even though they also genuinely “feel like jews”. some say that it is simply too late for conversion. if one recovers his/her jewish ancestry at the age of, say, 45, and then one is to spend at least fi ve years to gradually remodel the identity, at that point it may be no longer possible to raise a jewish family, and conversion as a private exercise would feel like a half-way enterprise in any case.32 this is one variety of post-genocidal tragedies resulting from dealing with the absence. in practice, however, the actual halakhic non-jewishness may be of little importance, since such cases may be considered as “jews enough” by the so-called real jews – especially in a country like poland, where the broken identities are common among the jewish fl ock and the community is secularised in any case. as a matter of fact, the exceptions have become the rule among the jews of poland. common features after these somewhat general considerations i now turn to discuss certain more detailed and more concrete aspects in the material published in the interviews and articles on these two (loose) groups. it is to be noted that the groups in question are in many ways so dissimilar that their very comparability may well be questioned. for that very reason, however, it is all the more striking that the deliberations of central european intelligentsia and those of anatolian peasants may appear amazingly similar. in spite of the divergence in situations, the second or third generation experiences and attitudes, at times even their verbal depictions, appear largely equivalent. representatives of both groups describe a sense, or perhaps rather a state, of deep loneliness. in practical terms this could imply a concrete lack of relatives. konstantiny gebert reminiscences how when reading novels, “cousins” or “uncles” felt like imaginative characters, until he went to school and realized that the others really had such big families.33 similarly, a woman (aged 48) in turkey was pondering why her father had no relatives, and 32. these observations are based not only on literature but also on my own discussions with such cases in poland and other european countries. 33. konstanty gebert, living in the land of ashes (krakow, budapest: austeria, 2008), 14. her story was even entitled “why did my father have no aunts, uncles or cousins?”34 the problem, however, is signifi cantly deeper than mere lack of relatives or ordinary loneliness in the every-day sense. among both groups, there prevails a profound sense of being detached from the mainstream. this is often indicated between the lines, and at times depicted explicitly, depending on one’s psychological talent and ability to refl ect and analyse oneself. the following description by a woman in turkey, 53 years old, is illustrative of the situation: the thing that seems to have bothered us the most is not to have a place we can call ours, not to know where we are from. […] wherever we went, we had to work very hard to make friends; we were very generous but still, when the door closed, we were alone. we were alone on holidays. we had nowhere to go. we had no relatives, no land, no trees.35 in poland, gebert summarizes an equivalent situation even more compactly: “we had no christmas, only a tree”.36 from the psychological point of view, one of the most interesting aspects is the combination of bizarre tensions and deep insecurity concerning the identity described in both groups. this in turn is connected with an evident lack of discussion on the matter even inside the family – an extreme indicator of the presence of absence. the internal silence also partly explains why people in so many cases are shocked when fi nding out their own family history. tragicomically, in many cases in turkey the truth had been known all the time by others, such as neighbours and colleagues, yet silenced inside the family! it is striking how similar moods the following quotes express. the fi rst one is again by gebert, second by a half-armenian woman in turkey (aged 53): some of us knew, some of us suspected, and some denied strenuously that we were…jewish. what that term actually meant, nobody seemed to know for sure.37 i can’t say exactly when i noticed it. there have been fragments of this story at the back of my mind for as long as i can remember. there’s something different about us, but what is it?38 it is remarkable that in both cases the weight of the lost identities and legacies was present even when there was no clear awareness of one’s armenian or jewish roots. in turkey, many armenian grandmothers lived their lives without saying a word about their armenian background or armenian culture in general. they did not only keep their secret but could even remain silent when the secret was no longer a secret: some remained 34. ayse gül altinay and fethiye cetin, the grandchildren, 46. 35. ibid, 184. 36. konstanty gebert, living in the land of ashes, 14. 37. ibid 38. ayse gül altinay and fethiye cetin, the grandchildren, 183. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 50 51 quiet even when their descendants already knew and tried to pose questions.39 this cannot be due to fear alone but rather to the exceptionally deep-rooted frustration and bitterness because of the denied way of life they never could have among their own.40 in a similar fashion in poland, agnieska markowska tells about her grandmother after fi nding about her jewish background: “when i showed her what i discovered, she still denied she knew anything.” likewise, mother of olga danek (28) is said to have “known the family secret but felt it was too dangerous to acknowledge”.41 such descriptions are to be found from both groups. many of these symptoms can be labelled under the concept of problem of dealing with the absence of the annihilated life and culture. brilliant descriptions of the sense of presence of absence are given by peroomian in her analysis of the post-genocide artistic literature by armenians in turkey. this is all the more revealing, considering the fact that in turkey the references to the disappearance of armenian culture had to be as implicit as possible. consequently, the most powerful message is the one between the lines. one could write about pomegranate trees no longer casting their shadow, or about one’s mother begging for “bread, bread, bread” – but the actual cause of this state of affairs remains unsaid.42 yet also in poland, where one could refl ect on auschwitz more openly, the presence of absence is literally behind any corner. the post-genocide experience is characterised by a deep sense of bitterness that operates in many levels. “auschwitz still has the power of poisoning human souls,”43 as gebert has it. the ways how this poisonous bitterness have been experienced in the diaspora are well-known and much studied, but in fact the present groups represent even more painful situations, given that they have lived as detached individuals in the authentic setting of the once-fl ourishing culture, yet unable to gain a proper comprehension of the character of the life annihilated from the immediate surroundings. they have a curious feeling of being unable to be what one should be, due to fact that without a community there is no way to lead traditional jewish or armenian way of life. in short, the identities of half-armenians and half-jews contain rather similar characteristics and are constituted by largely parallel experiences. the problems and the human reactions to them appear essentially similar, in spite of the variation in situations. some diverging trends there are also several aspects that can be considered as dissimilarities, even though the phenomena are based on somewhat similar dispositions. basically, a sense of fear is an 39. see ayse gül altinay and fethiye cetin, the grandchildren, 46, 72–73. 40. for a compact analysis of the reasons for silence in both diaspora and turkey, see rubina peroomian, and those who continued living in turkey after 1915: the metamorphosis of the post-genocide armenian identity as reflected in artistic literature (yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute, 2008), 110–112. 41. graham-harrison, “the third-generation polish jews rediscovering long-buried roots,” the guardian, january 25, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/third-generation-polish-jews-rediscovering-roots (accessed 19 june 2015). 42. for discussion and examples, see peroomian rubina, and those who continued living in turkey after 1915, 22–24, 113–118. 43. konstanty gebert, living in the land of ashes, 154. important common factor. polish jews are still cautious about showing their jewishness, even though the present situation would admit remarkable openness. indeed, there are cases of jews who do show their judaism openly without encountering any kind of problems. yet somewhere in the background the fear still remains, and the jews are used to be quiet about their identity. the chief rabbi admits that he cannot say for sure that “it won’t happen again”.44 the remark is characteristic for the post-genocide existence in which the reality is thoroughly stained by ethical pessimism and certain distrust in the everyday reality, shadowed by the unrelenting possibility of new atrocities. nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between the two cases. in turkey, fear still dominates vehemently. disinformation on armenians is everywhere present, and threat of harassment, even persecution, is still in the air. even in 2010’s, the most of those who were interviewed in a project by hrant dink foundation did not allow their cases to be published at all, and those who did, wanted their names to be changed or omitted. in poland the identity discussions are open and provoke no danger. therefore, it is no surprise that every armenian who was interviewed in another recent project had sensed deeply depressive moods due to the fear, sorrow and silence. to be an armenian is a painful secret and depressive burden, sensed even by third or fourth generation muslims.45 it is telling that one young muslim “cried for days” after having heard that he is armenian.46 there is no excitement whatsoever of absorbing oneself to the medieval literature, art and other forms of cultural richness, as it may be the case for many in poland. the pre-genocide armenian culture is non-accessible for the half-armenians in turkey (outside istanbul), and its qualitative and quantitative richness remain in darkness. even today, one century after the genocide, those who stand out as too armenian may encounter problems and may be oppressed so that they have to change their home-place. (diyarbakir seems to be a happy exception.47) armenianness has meant apparent physical danger till 2000’s. this being the case, it is no wonder that the converted armenians traditionally have had a strong need to show one is a “real muslim”. in poland the situation was parallel but the content almost the opposite: a jew had to prove he is a good pole by being a good communist. a signifi cant outcome of the fear and threatening atmosphere is that the awakenings are taking place one or two generations later than in poland. it is not unusual that, like in the case of cetin, the stories of armenian grandmothers emerge when they themselves are no longer present. consequently, it is clear that the half-armenians in turkey know much less of armenian culture and genocide than their fate-mates in poland. this is an evident outcome of 44. michael schudrich, “giving back to the jewish people,” in poland: a jewish matter, ed. kate craddy, mike levy, and jakub nowakowski, (warszawa: adam mickiewicz institute, 2010), 58. 45. see ayse gül altinay and fethiye cetin, the grandchildren, xi–xiii. 46. ferda balancar (ed.), the sounds of silence ii, 54. 47. see vicken cheterian, “armenian life returns to diyarbakir,” al-monitor, october 16, 2013, http:// www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/10/turkish-armenians-rediscover-roots.html# (accessed 1 july 2015); “islamized armenians are baptized and learning the language – diaspora minister”, december 25, 2014, http://news.am/eng/news/245835.html (accessed 1 july 2015). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 52 53 the continuation of oppressive anti-armenian policy in turkey. in poland, there is a huge amount of intellectual literature on polish jewry, their history and cultural contributions, and the number of new publications is still increasing. moreover, in poland the archives have served to reveal jewish ancestry for some, while in turkey there is hardly any documented information available on armenians’ roots in public archives. the half-armenians of turkey may know about their immediate family background but they are almost totally unaware on the historical truths concerning the genocide, or armenian culture and history in general. up to our times, it has been very diffi cult to gain even basic information about armenian history and culture in turkey. interestingly, the internet is changing the setting somewhat: to have some taste of armenian village life in ottoman times one needs just to fi nd and click houshamadyan.org. whether the descriptions of paregentan festivities relieve the sense of loss or make it worse, however, is another question. the question of numbers one concrete result of the undefi ned and uncertain identity situation is the fact that it is still impossible to give any reasonable or even rough numbers for these groups. in poland, there are tens of thousands of catholic, or atheist, people with jewish ancestry. however, one could say that most of those who are jews do not really know whether they are jews or not. schudrich commented on the question of numbers in june 2015 in a most rabbinic manner: when asked how many jews there are in poland today, he answers, “pick a number; double it. it is too small.” then he adds, “i don’t know, but tomorrow there will be more.” estimations say there are somewhere between 30 and 50 thousand people who have jewish roots, “of which the majority know it and want to do something about it, although there can be many more than could be discovering their jewish identity.”48 what the rabbi does not like to say, however, is that there is an essential difference between “wanting to do something about it” and becoming a jew in the actual sense of the word. one individual can perhaps move somewhat between two religions and identities, but the ultimate choice is inescapable in the case of his/her children: baptism or circumcision? or could it be both? there is an evident parallelism here with the fourth century jewish-christian demarcation problematics on which st. jerome sharply commented that those who try to be both jews and christians are neither jews nor christians.49 it seems that there is a need of new categories, but any new category would be unable to do any justice for any of the religions involved. however, the latest estimation of the actual number of “declared jews” in poland is set at seven thousand.50 this seems to be from three to six times less than the number of what we have called “half-jews”, which alone shows how relevant the latter category is. 48. jessica zwaiman lerner, “rabbi michael schudrich.” 49. jerome: epistle 75 (letter to st. augustine), 4:13. nicene and post-nicene fathers, first series, vol. 1. (buff alo, ny: christian literature publishing co., 1887). 50. elżbieta mostowska, “the question all tourists ask: how many jews are there in poland?” august, 2015, http://www.sztetl.org.pl/en/cms/news/4799,the-question-all-tourists-ask-how-many-jews-are-there-inpoland-/ html (accessed 1 sep 2015). in turkey, due to the large number of kidnapped armenian girls and the exponential population growth, the numbers are at minimum in the hundreds of thousands, to say the least. one recent estimation set the number around three million, another to 4–6 million.51 even though such numbers may have a considerable genetic truth imbedded in them, they are of little practical relevance. most of these people have only 12.5% or 25% of armenian genes, and their identity is completely islamic (turkish or kurdish), so there is in fact not any lost armenianness whatsoever left that they could or should return into, regardless of the amount of information they may have about the background of their grand(-grand) mother. at best, many of them may be able to develop some true sympathy for the armenians and armenian cause. the news concerning hidden crypto-armenians who take baptism and truly return to the armenian faith are fascinating, and in their own way they serve as historical healing process after a century of genocide and silence – but they deal with individuals or extremely tiny groups (mostly crypto-armenians who managed to retain some of their armenianness by marrying with similar cases). for every such “neo-armenian” who is baptized, however, there are tens of thousands of those who will never be baptized. yet some of them consider themselves armenian, and many of them do not consider them as non-armenian. conclusion the last ten years has witnessed an unprecedented rise of interest and growth of information on the descendants of the armenian and jewish genocide survivors in turkey and poland. after decades and generations of silence, both communities show signs of re-emergence and slow revival. a lot of public interest and media coverage, however, has focused on the relatively small number of converts who have adopted the ancestral jewish or armenian religion. nevertheless, most of those who discover their (often partial) armenian or jewish ancestry in fact remain somewhere in-between the identities. they constitute groups that have neither names nor established criteria of identity. in this article, terms “half-jews” and “half-armenians” have been used to refer to those whose identity is broken in a way that does not fi t into traditional “either–or” identities. the tragedy of the broken identities is the inability to know the whole of the lost traditional life-styles in shtetls or armenian villages. according to the books and interviews published during the last years, it is evident that the half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey have experienced existential and identity crises in parallel terms, in spite of the obvious differences in their cultural contexts. in both cases, interviews of the survivors show similar dispositions of problems concerning identity, family heritage and dealing with the absence of culture that once fl ourished. 51. in a conference on islamized armenians, organised in october 2014 by university of bosphorus in istanbul, haykazun alvrtsyan’s estimation was 2.5 million, in addition to half a million in diaspora and 300,000 of these in germany alone. “2.5 million islamized armenians estimated in turkey,” asbarez 29 oct 2014. next week in armenian radio, however, abdul gafuri from diyarbakir set the number at 4–6 million. see aida avetisyan, “more hidden armenians reveal their true identity in turkey,” public radio of armenia november 5, 2014, http://www.armradio.am/en/2014/11/05/more-hidden-armeniansreveal-their-true-identity-in-turkey/ (accessed 1 july 2015). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 54 55 the parallelism of the polish-jewish and turkish-armenian experiences shows something essential of the character of the post-genocide existence. this fact alone has obvious potentiality to contribute ingredients for the philosophical discussions on the ontology of genocide. post-genocidal trauma is of collective nature and for that reason essentially deeper than “ordinary” private traumas of loss and damage. genocide by its deepest essence is an ontological attack in three levels: an aim to annihilate people’s past, present and future. consequently, post-genocide existence is broken, shattered and scattered by nature. this brokenness is refl ected in a silent yet dramatic way in the identities and psyches of the remnants of the survivors. bibliography altinay, ayse gül and fethiye cetin. the grandchildren. the hidden legacy of “lost” armenians in turkey. new brunswick & london: transaction publishers 2014. alayarian, aida. consequences of denial. the armenian genocide. london: karnac books 2008. avetisyan, aida. ”more hidden armenians reveal their true identity in turkey.” public radio of armenia, 5 nov. 2014. http://www.armradio.am/en/2014/11/05/more-hiddenarmenians-reveal-their-true-identity-in-turkey/ (accessed 1 july 2015). balancar, ferda, editor. the sounds of silence. turkey’s armenians speak. istanbul: hrant dink vakfi 2012. balancar, ferda, editor. the sounds of silence ii. diyarbakir’s armenians speak. istanbul: hrant dink vakfi 2013. balancar, ferda, editor. the sounds of silence iii. ankara’s armenians speak. istanbul: hrant dink vakfi 2015. cheterian, vicken. “armenian life returns to diyarbakir.” al-monitor, 16 oct 2013. www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/10/turkish-armenians-rediscover-roots.html# (accessed 1 july 2015). craddy, kate, mike levy & jakub nowakowski. poland: a jewish matter. warszawa: adam mickiewicz institute 2010. easton, adam. “jewish life slowly returns to poland.” bbc news, 20 april 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-radio-and-tv-17741185 (accessed 1 july 2015). gebert, konstanty. living in the land of ashes. krakow & budapest: austeria publishing house 2008.ghazanchyan, siranush. “akhtamar church to be allowed to celebrate mass more often.” public radio of armenia, 18 jan 2016. http://www.armradio.am/ en/2016/01/18/akhtamar-church-to-be-allowed-to-celebrate-mass-more-often/ ghazanchyan, siranush. “armenian acting patriarch comments on the permission to hold masses in akhtamar church more often.” public radio of armenia, 21 jan 2016. http://www.armradio.am/en/2016/01/21/armenian-acting-patriarch-comments-on-the-permission-to-hold-masses-in-akhtamar-church-more-often/ graham-harrison, emma. “the third-generation polish jews rediscovering long-buried roots.” the guardian 25 jan 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/ third-generation-polish-jews-rediscovering-roots (accessed 19 june 2015). “islamized armenians are baptized and learning the language – diaspora minister.” news.am, 25 dec 2014. http://news.am/eng/news/245835.html (accessed 1 july 2015). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 genocide descending: half-jews in poland and half-armenians in turkey 56 57 lehrer, erica t. jewish poland revisited. heritage tourism in unquiet places. bloomington & indianapolis: indiana university press 2013. katarzyna markusz. “sneak peek at a hard-hitter in the upcoming s.f. jewish film festival.” jweekly, 14 june 2012. http://www.jweekly.com/article/full/65535/from-neonazi-skinhead-to-a-black-hatted-jew/ (accessed 1 july 2015). makuch, janusz. “i was neither a jew nor a catholic.” in the fall of the wall and the rebirth of jewish life in poland: 1989–2009. edited by shana penn, pages 59–63. poland: taube foundation for jewish life and culture in cooperation with the honorary consulate for the republic of poland in the san francisco bay area 2009. marchand, laure & guillaume perrier. turkey and the armenian ghost. on the trail of the genocide. montreal & kingston: mcgill-queen’s university press 2015. miller, donald e. & lorna touryan miller, survivors: an oral history of the armenian genocide. berkeley: university of california press 1993. mostowska, elżbieta. “the question all tourists ask: how many jews are there in poland?” sztetl.org, 26 aug 2015. http://www.sztetl.org.pl/en/cms/news/4799,the-question-all-tourists-ask-how-many-jews-are-there-in-poland-/ html (accessed 1 sep 2015). niezabitowska, malgorzata & tomasz tomaszewski. remnants, the last jews of poland. new york: friendly press 1986. peroomian, rubina. and those who continued living in turkey after 1915. the metamorphosis of the post-genocide armenian identity as refl ected in artistic literature. yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute 2008. “polish man journeys from skinhead to orthodox jew.” ctv news, 28 march 2012. http://www.ctvnews.ca/polish-man-journeys-from-skinhead-to-orthodox-jew-1.788440 (accessed 1 july 2015). rabbinical council of america, “rabbi michael schudrich. chief rabbi of poland.” 18 mar 2014. http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=105571 (accessed 8 oct, 2015). schudrich, michael. “giving back to the jewish people.” in poland: a jewish matter. edited by kate craddy, mike levy, and jakub nowakowski, pages 57–63. warszawa: adam mickiewicz institute 2010. skromak, elzbieta. the jew mój sąsiad. żyd, my neighbour. stalowa wola: muzeum regionalne w stalowej woli 2013. svazlian, verjiné. the armenian genocide: testimonies of the eyewitness survivors. yerevan: gitoutyoun publishing house of nas ra 2011. “turkey’s secret armenians.” al-monitor 19 feb 2013. available from: http://www. al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2013/02/turkey-secret-armenians.html# (accessed 1 july 2015). zwaiman lerner, jessica. “rabbi michael schudrich on the opportunity for renewed jewish life in poland.” jewish times asia, december 2010/january 2011. http://www. jewishtimesasia.org/one-to-one-topmenu-45/rabbi-michael-issue-december (accessed 2 july 2015). “1,600-year-old armenian cemetery ruined in mush.” asbarez, 29 jun 2015. available from: http://asbarez.com/137317/1600-year-old-armenian-cemetery-ruined-in-mush/ (accessed 30 june 2015). “2.5 million islamized armenians estimated in turkey.” asbarez, 29 sep 2014. available from: http://asbarez.com/128378/2-5-mil-muslim-armenians-estimated-in-turkey/ (accessed 1 july 2015). untitled 32 dr. lidia prisac is a senior researcher at the institute of cultural heritage of the moldavian ministry of education, culture and research. she holds a phd in historical sciences (2013). in 2019 she was raphael lemkin fellow at the armenian genocide museum-institute in yerevan, armenia. her research interests involve the history of the armenian community in bessarabia/romania in the interwar period, and the history of the armenian refugees from russian and ottoman empires. she is an author of over three dozen articles related to the history of armenians in romania. email: lidiaprisac@yahoo.com 33 armenian genocide survivors: the strunga orphanage in romania1 lidia prisac motto: a child without parents is like a house without a roof varujan vosganian this article examines the history of the 200 children rescued from massacres that took place during the armenian genocide, who found shelter in greater romania (1918-1940), in the strunga orphanage, which was open for three years, from 1923 to 1926. the strunga orphanage history approach reflects the dimensions of humanitarian assistance in the kingdom of romania on the issue of armenian refugees, particularly on the fate of children after the genocide. the reconstruction of this orphanage history is based on historical sources, such the album of orphans (1923), archive documents and articles from the contemporary press published by the armenian minority in interwar romania. in general, the humanitarian dimensions of armenian community support in romania offered the orphans the possibility of rehabilitation after the genocide and adaptation to the new social environment that romania represented. key-words: orphans, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, armenian genocide, armenian community from romania, kingdom of romania. introduction the strunga orphanage was set up in the county of roman in the kingdom of romania, for orphans of armenian origin saved from genocide. this article draws attention to a subject practically unknown to the public but resonating with the sinister events succeeding one another over more than a century within the ottoman empire, where more than one and a half million armenians were massacred. the development of the study of the armenian exodus after genocide and the sovietization of armenia represents an important step in reconstructing the picture of armenian refugees in romania.2 the approach is part of the “more difficult stories” genre as it aims at studying one of the most vulnerable segments, namely, the life experience of children rescued from massacre.3 1 the article was received on 03.05.2020 and accepted for publication on 20.06.2020. strunga is a commune in the north-east of romania, iași county. it is situated 55 km from iași city. 2 lidia prisac, “exodul armenilor după genocid şi sovietizare în românia regală (1915/1918-1924),” in the 1st annual kurultai of the endangered cultural heritage akech 2018 (constanța: anticus press, 2018), 85-99; lidia prisac, ion valer xenofontov, “genocidul, refugiații armeni și românia mare (1918-1940),” in akademos. revistă de știință, inovare, cultură și artă 46, no. 3 (2017): 103-112; lidia prisac, “problema emigrării armenilor peste nistru în românia interbelică în documentele arhivei naționale a republicii moldova,” in istorie, cultură și cercetare, vol. ii (deva: editura cetatea de scaun, 2017), 172-188. 3 florence m. soghoian, portrait of a survivor (brand: christopher publishing house, 1997); l’enfant et le génocide. témoignages sur l’enfance pendant la shoah (paris: editions robert laffont, 2007); suzanne kaplan, 34 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0007 initially, the study was intended to be based exclusively on articles in the contemporary press published by the armenian minority in interwar romania. but, after a research internship at the armenian genocide museum-institute in yerevan, where i had the chance to study the album of orphans from strunga (1923),4 i decided to use this historical source as a guide in reconstructing the history of the orphanage. the research would not have been complete had i not used archived documents kept in the collections of the armenian archdiocese of romania, which helped reveal the fate of orphaned children following the closure of that charity establishment. i also appealed for stories from orphans who had been housed in strunga.5 being part of the historiography concerning the consequences of the armenian genocide, my research started from two impulses the first, the continuing interest and topicality of the subject of the armenian genocide, the second determined by the need to outline, at a historiographical discourse level, the subject of the charity work in romania carried out for the care of armenian orphans. an overview of the research about the strunga orphanage story reveals that there are almost no studies to have approached the subject in a detailed way,6 the main ones being more like types of review.7 yet, among the works published so far, my attention was drawn to a phd thesis defended at “babeş-bolyai” university of cluj-napoca, the author of which, in a chapter on refugee aid organizations, also covers the issue of the establishment and closure of the armenian orphanage in strunga, which was open for three years, from 1923 to 1926.8 what i would like to do in this study is to understand and delve into the narrative of humanitarian assistance in the kingdom of romania concerning armenian refugees, particularly the fate of the children moved there after the genocide. although the armenian community as a whole participated in the establishment of the orphanage and supported the children in strunga, my attention has mainly focused on the contribution made by the armenians in bessarabia that officially formed a community of 1,509 people.9 children in genocide. extreme traumatization and effect regulation (london: international psychoanalytical association, 2008). 4 centenar genocid/albumul orfanilor de la strunga, at https://www.araratonline.com/albumul-orfanilor-de-la-strunga/, accessed 25.09.2019. 5 “hairabed bostangian: în turcia era interzis să-ţi faci semnul crucii,” in mărturii. genocidul armenilor, realizat de mihai stepan cazazian şi eduard antonian (bucureşti: editura ararat, 1998), 106-108; strunga. documentary made by cadri abdula, producer, mihai stepan cazazian, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=12&v=_3v29cctw1y&feature=emb_title&fbclid=iwar0sj6nzzy66cpqntpdz0xusxm8oodu81wu37ojb93yuhmnrmjeeaihfccc%20, accessed 30.05.2020. 6 in 1930 international public opinion knew practically nothing about the situation of armenian refugees in the kingdom of romania, let alone orphans. la situation des enfents des refugiés russes et armeniens en 1930. rapport du sous-comité pour l’étude de la condition des enfants des réfugiés du comité consultative des organisations privées auprès du haut-commissaire pour des réfugiés de la société des nations (genève: union internationale des secours aux enfants, 1930), 42. 7 sergiu selian, schiță istorică a comunității armene din românia (bucurești: editura ararat, 1999), 111; andreea tănase, sfârşit de istorie la strunga (27.04.2010), at http://www.araratonline.com/sfar%c8%99it-de-istorie-la-strunga/, accessed 25.05.2019; andreea tănase, armenians in romania. the stories of the people closet to us (bucharest: master print super offset, 2015), 345-347. 8 claudia dărăban, impactul genocidului asupra evoluției comunității armene din românia interbelică (teză de doctorat în relaţii internaţionale şi studii de securitate, cluj-napoca, 2018), 156-161. 9 recensământul general al populației româniei din 29 decembrie 1930, vol. ii (bucurești, 1938), xxiv. 35 armenian genocide survivors contextualizing the emergence of charities for orphans the armenian genocide generated clear solidarity in international humanitarian assistance. aid for the approximately 500,00010 armenian survivors out of a population of about 2 million11 was carried out worldwide by organizations and individuals who were or weren’t of armenian origin.12 armenian refugee relief organizations were established immediately after the massacres, between 1916-1923, especially in eastern armenia,13 on the territories bordering the ottoman empire, and later around the world.14 when the international society of the middle east assembly took place in geneva on 3 september 1926, 20 armenian organizations from the usa, scandinavia, belgium, switzerland, france, etc. also participated.15 the league of nations set up a commission of inquiry to study the situation of deported women and children. the american missionary and nurse emma darling cushman, one of its three members, prepared estimates of the numbers of armenian orphans. in the context of the organized exterminations that took place in 1921, the number of armenian orphans was found to be 12,480 in the unoccupied areas and 11,339 in the occupied territo10 around 200,000 armenians would have escaped forced deportations from constantinople and smyrna. another 300,000 would have found refuge in the caucasus and other territories of the tsarist empire. hagop asatryan, “impactul primului război mondial asupra formării diasporei armene,” in primul război mondial şi influenţa sa asupra formării diasporei armene, materialele conferinţei internaţionale, 26-28 septembrie 2014 (bucureşti: zamca, 2015), 113. 11 in 1914 the number of armenians in western armenia was estimated at 1,198,000 and in cilicia at 205,050 (not considering the armenians of the other regions of the ottoman empire). later, by 1921, 75,000 had taken refuge from there in syria (from cilicia), in palestine 3,500; in mesopotamia 6,000; in yerevan 200,000; in the north caucasus 60,000; in the black sea region 60,000; in persia or america 20,000, the total number making 464,000 refugees. subsequently, due to the massacres of 1922, another 60,000 armenians took refuge in greece; in bulgaria 10,000; in algeria, tunisia and egypt 1,500; in france 1,350; in italy 850. hagob turabyan (ed.), lʼarménie et la question arménienne avant, pendant et depuis la guerre (paris: imp. turabian, 1922), 9, 70-71. according to the modern research by the armenian scholars, the number of armenians living in the ottoman empire before wwi was 2,488,100, of whom 1, 675, 800 were living in the western armenia and cilicia. see հայոց պատմություն: հ. 3, նոր ժամանակաշրջան (xvii դարի երկրորդ կես 1918 թ.): գիրք ii (1901-1918 թթ., հայ գաղթավայրերը, պարբերական մամուլը և մշակույթը xix դ. և xx դ. սկզբին) [the history of armenia, vol. iii. modern era (second half of the xvii century 1918), book 2 (1901-1918, armenian settlements, periodical press and culture in the xix century and the beginning of the xx century)], eds. ashot melkonyan et al. (yerevan: nas ra, institute of history, 2015), 64. 12 dzovinar kévonian, réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire. les acteurs européens et la scène proche-orientale pendant lʼentre-deux-guerres (paris: sorbonne, 2014), 541. 13 положение беженцев в александропольском районе [the situation of refugees in alexandropol region], (baku: tipografiya pervogo tipograficheskogo tovarishchestva, 1915); prist s. aslanyan, среди беженцев (личные впечатления). перепечатка из “астраханского вестника” [among the refugees (personal impressions). reprint from “astrakhan vestnik”] (astrakhan: tipografiya a.a. shtyl’ko, 1915) grigor chalkhush’yan, красная книга [the red book], (rostov on don: tipografiya ashkhatank, 1919). 14 see the newspaper collection армяне и война [armenians and war] (odessa), 1916, 1917, 1918, or армянский вестник [the armenian bulletin] (moscow), 1916, 1917, 1918; armenian red cross and refugee fund. first annual report (london: np, 1915); second annual report (london: np, 1916); third annual report (london: np, 1917); fourth annual report (london: np, 1918); fifth annual report (london: np, 1919); sixth annual report (london: np., 1920). see also: eduard narcis antonian, “armenii din imperiul otoman la începutul secolului xx,” in mărturii. genocidul armenilor, 80-84. 15 “chestiunea orfanilor armeni la geneva,” in ararat (bucharest), october 1926, no. 28, 5. 36 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 ries. the approximate or unofficial total number of orphans living in the unoccupied areas was estimated at 60,750 and in the occupied territories 12,600. in order to save them from islamisation and provide them with places of safety as a large part of them were in turkish locations, the premise of the commission for the protection of women and children of the middle east became the “house of the league of nations,” thus allowing the transfer of children to other places, institutions or charities, or to their relatives or families who had managed to survive. from constantinople, now istanbul, the children were sent abroad.16 armenian orphans in romania after completing the necessary formalities and a medical examination 200 orphaned children arrived by ship in romania on 12 april 1923.17 transporting them to the romanian coast, on a stormy sea, took one day, the children being accompanied by khachadour n. vosdanigian, secretary of the union of armenians in romania (uar),18 in charge of bringing the orphans to the country.19 according to contemporary testimonies, the children who disembarked in constanța “had been gathered up from the sides of roads” or “taken from under carts transporting dead people…,” “some had been taken from the breasts of their dying mothers..., others had been entrusted to authorities or charity institutions by the parents themselves...” they “had lived in orphanages run by scattered groups from adana to beirut or used as labor in the weaving mills of aleppo and damascus. each child was wearing a cardboard placard around his neck with his armenian name on it.20 hairabed bostanjian stated that when they landed in constanţa, “a mass of people, both men and women, armenians and romanians, were there” to meet them, “waving handkerchiefs, some with tears in their eyes, others making the sign of the cross.”21 if we examine the data from the album with reference to the orphaned children (which, in some places, are incomplete), despite the fact that the information concerning eight out of 150 boys has been removed, that the profile photos are missing of 18 children (10 girls and 8 boys) and only 174 of the 200 children were photographed, we can still conclude that the orphans were born between 1906 and 1918. the majority went through the ordeal of genocide; most were born in 1911 (35 in number), followed by those born in 1913 (32); 1909 (25); 1910 (23); 1912 (20); 1914 (18); 1908 (16) etc. the youngest was 5 years old, and the oldest was 17. among the orphans were those who, at the beginning of the massacres, were only a 16 kévonian, réfugiés et diplomatie humanitaire, 145-146, 151-152. 17 in some sources there were 198 children, in others 400 children. varujan vosganian, cartea șoaptelor (ediția a ii-a, iași: polirom, 2012), 399-400. 18 established in early 1919, the organization had the mission of taking on and assisting armenian refugees. archive of the armenian archdiocese of romania (aaar), d. 471, 12; d. 161, 1-99. 19 edvard jeamgocian, u.a.r. 100 /khaciadur n.vosdanighian [1864(?)feb. 1942], primul secretar al uniunii armenilor din românia: 1919-1922, at http://www.araratonline.com/u-a-r-100-khaciadur-n-vosdanighian-1864feb-1942-primul-secretar-al-uniunii-armenilor-din-romania-1919-1922/, accessed 05.01.2020. 20 vosganian, cartea șoaptelor, 401. 21 aaar, d. 260, 161-168; bostangian, în turcia era, 106. 37 armenian genocide survivors few days old; others were from one to a few months old, others being between one and nine years old.22 most of the children, 34, came from ordu, followed by stanoz (17 children), chankere (13), ankara (11), kapan maden (11 children), erzerum (8), amasia (8), constantinople (7), kesaria (6), adabazar (6), brusa (5), kastemuni (4), sebastia (3), eskishehir (3) and one-two orphans from other localities in the ottoman empire. the data entered shows that there were children who bore the same surname, which leads me to believe that they were brothers, sisters or relatives. for example, the three karaoghlanian boys: norair, 9, haikazun, 10, and haik, 13, were all born in changra; or the kahvegian girls: 10-year-old vergin, 11-year-old araxi and 12-year-old azaduhi, who were born in stanoci. examining the photos of the children, who seem, in some pictures, to be scared and disorientated, it can be seen that they wore modest clothing of a uniform style. many boys displayed the tip of a white handkerchief protruding from the pockets of their shirts. the girls had short haircuts (probably for hygienic reasons) and almost all of them had bows in their hair and wore a beaded pendant with a medallion or cross around their necks. regarding the children’s physical and mental condition when they arrived in strunga, we can conclude from the reports in the magazine ararat that they were facing certain health problems, having been witnesses to the horrors of genocide. if some did seem healthy, others were affected by skin diseases (possibly as a result of neuro-psychiatric disorders or malnutrition).23 during the massacres, some children became infected with tuberculosis, which was a fatal disease in the early 20th century. the orphan azaduhi somangian, who had nobody her parents having died during the deportations, a sister being abducted by the kurds and an older brother killed in front of her brought the disease from asia minor, where she came from. after a life of wandering from village to village, the girl reached brusa, from where she was sent to constantinople and, later, to strunga in romania, together with the other orphans. living with anton ştefănescu’s family in bacău for two years, where, together with four other orphans, she enjoyed that adoptive family’s care. she died at the age of 17 of galloping tuberculosis in the bârnova sanatorium, mourned by orphanage friends and the ştefănescu family.24 foundation of the orphanage in moldova25 as early as the summer of 1921, the national council of the patriarchate of constantinople established, in bucharest, a branch of the fundraising committee for orphans, one of whose representatives was khachadour n. vosdanigian. later, in november 1921, the 22 in 1915, hayrabed bostangian, reached the age of 6… and in 1915-1920 he had lost all connection with the rest of the family… borrowing a turkish name, he was admitted to a turkish orphanage, with about 4,000 turkish, greek and armenian children. bostangian, în turcia era, 106. 23 “locale,” ararat, june 1925, no. 12, 7; december 1926, no. 30, 8; july 1927, no. 37, 8. 24 “locale,” ararat, july 1925, no. 13, 7. 25 moldova was one of the 10 provinces of the great romania (muntenia, oltenia, dobrogea, transilvania, banat, crișana, maramureș, bucovina and bessarabia), located in the east of the country, between the carpathian mountains and the prut river. is not to be confused with actual moldova (republic), successor of rssm/ bessarabia. 38 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 committee was renamed as the orphanage committee, which was at the basis of the armenian orphanage establishment in strunga.26 the armenian community in romania worked very hard to open the orphanage. many people, led by armenag manisalian as well as khachadour n. vosdanigian made numerous tours around the country and to constantinople, activities which took more than a year. with the approval of king ferdinand i, the orphanage received the 200 children, with the authorization of the romanian government and a collective passport endorsed by the romanian ministry of the interior dated 18 november 1922, on 1 april 1923.27 hairabed bostangian remembers that before arriving at the orphanage, the orphans, “… while waiting to leave for strunga were hosted by armenian families from constanţa and bucharest.”28 according to the album, the children entered the orphanage on 1 may 1923, arriving by carts at their destination. although there is nothing in strunga to recall the existence of the former orphanage, it is certain that it was founded, almost a century ago, by the generosity of the manolescu-strunga family, the humanitarian aid being provided by the uar in the person of its president, armenag manisalian29 (who had also become the chairman of the central committee of the orphanage), as well as with the support of the armenian community of romania. located in an area with sulfurous mineral waters, the orphanage was housed in a building meant for spa baths. founded in 1880 at the initiative of the landowner and dr. nicolae manolescu-strunga (1850-1910), the baths had gone into decline during wwi. the orphanage building had over 30 rooms and an infirmary, laundry, bathroom, kitchen (where sofia agop, a widow with two children, cooked),30 a living room, cloakroom, workshops, etc. plus housing for educators, caregivers, seamstresses and service people. the landscape around the orphanage seemed to be soothing, as anyone could spend their time “in the midst of the fir trees.”31 manush mardirosian (born on 15 august 1915 in a locality in persia), who arrived in strunga with her father who was a teacher, remembers that the orphans were housed in some beautiful buildings, behind which was a hill with a small church on it, the walls of which had carved armenian inscriptions. a forest and a field full of flowers that were like a carpet of violets was in front of the buildings.32 the orphanage also had large orchards with fruit trees and gardens which were cultivated by the orphans themselves to provide the vegetables needed for their daily food. according to hairabed bostangian’s testimony, the orphanage also had a sports field and children’s’ playgrounds.33 even though the area offered a feeling of safety, the children were not exempt from bad 26 jeamgocian, u.a.r. 100. 27 aaar, d. 177, 33; d. 260, 62. 28 bostangian, în turcia, 107. 29 “statutele orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 2. 30 aaar, d. 260, 162. 31 “în jurul orfelinatului,” ararat, april 1925 no. 10, 3; “serbarea orfelinatului,” ararat, september 1925, no. 15, 5. 32 see min. 27 in strunga documentary. 33 “informațiuni,” ararat, july 1, 1924, no. 1, 7; “transferarea orfelinatului,” ararat, april 1926, no. 22, 5; bostangian, în turcia, 107. 39 armenian genocide survivors weather. the orphanage was affected by an unusually heavy hail storm, which caused damage estimated at 15,000 lei34, in june 1924. later, in the spring of 1926, strunga was covered with a vast amount of snow.35 orphanage administration and management the council of the armenian diocese of romania appointed a central committee for a period of five years for the administration of the institution, composed of a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and three advisers, their positions being honorary. the central committee was later completed with three new members: k. eksergian, hazarian and a. acikgheozian. the vice-chairman, k. eksergian, had the task of managing things at strunga in armenag manisalian’s absence.36 the orphanage central committee was in bucharest, on calea victoriei street. it was responsible for administering funds, appointing and replacing the principal and the entire staff of the orphanage, setting salaries, vetting and approving members of the orphanage management and organizing regional committees (initially 18, later, starting in 1924, 22). if comparison is made of the number of regional committees by province, it can be seen that the most numerous were in vechiul regat (old kingdom), followed by those in bessarabia, cetatea albă (akkerman), chișinău, bălți and hâncești. the regional committees were responsible for covering orphanage expenses with the minimum amounts set by the general assembly, made up of all the orphanage’s great and small benefactors.37 education and other activities at the orphanage a four-grade primary school based on a three-year curriculum was opened in strunga for the orphans’ education, including an elementary vocational school. in order to train the orphans for a profession, the orphanage also set up two workshops for boys (one for shoemaking and another for wood turning) and a workshop for girls (for making oriental carpets). thanks to the nefian brothers, merchants in bucharest, the carpet workshop was equipped with 12 weaving looms.38 education at the orphanage was compulsory and was conducted in accordance with the curriculum of armenian schools in romania as approved by the ministry of public instruction, the school courses being conducted in romanian and armenian. although children were on vacation in summer, romanian language lessons continued uninterrupted so that by the end of august, the children would be able to pass their examinations. in actual fact, the orphans made significant progress in the second year, especially in learning the language of their host country.39 recalling past events, hairabed bostangian said that some 34 the romanian leu (plural lei) is the currency of romania. 35 “știri de la orfelinat,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 5; “locale,” ararat, april 1926, no. 22, 8. 36 “orfelinatul,” ararat, april 1925 no. 10, 7; “locale,” ararat, july 1925, no. 13, 8. 37 “statutele orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 2; “orfelinatul,” ararat, july 1926, no. 25, 5. 38 “transferarea orfelinatului,” in ararat, april 1926, no. 22, 5; “adunare generală anuală a orfelinatului armean din românia,” in ararat, 1 july 1924, no. 1, 6; “locale,” ararat, january 1925, no. 7, 8. 39 “știri de la orfelinat,” ararat, august 1, 1924, no. 2, 5; “adunare generală anuală a orfelinatului armean 40 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 of the children could neither read nor write. as for the teachers: “we were surrounded by staff filled with unimaginable love and we felt very good, as if forgetting the ‘fire’ we had gone through…”40 among the orphanage mentors and teachers were the principal, deputy principal and teachers of the institution. for three years, until june 1926, “showing diligence, honor, and invaluable features as an organizer and educator,” sarkis srintz was the principal: “an eminent teacher and diplomatist of the nancy normal school”. he helped in reorganizing some incomplete committees and visited bessarabia, moldova and bukovina to raise money for the orphans. following the closure of the orphanage, sarkis srintz was appointed as a teacher at the armenian school in bucharest. on his initiative a circle of former orphanage students from strunga was formed “casa noastră” (our house), where single young people gathered, eating together and “…after leaving the workshops, keeping busy with useful reading.”41 eliza srintz, the principal’s daughter, a graduate of the english college in constantinople, also worked at strunga by the autumn of 1925.42 nshan maganian, armenian language teacher, who settled in romania in 1922, taught history and geography at the orphanage.43 thanks to their teachers, the children learned both school subjects and to recite verses in armenian and romanian and to sing and dance. various celebrations or commemorations in which children were involved tell us of the skills learnt by the orphans. under the leadership of the principal and the teachers, april 24 was commemorated with both a religious service and a memorial one, held in the orphanage’s chapel.44 on may 10 (romanian royal day), the principal would give a patriotic speech, and a religious service would be held in the orphanage’s chapel. on may 13, the orphans would attend the solemn commemoration of the unknown hero, which would take place in the local cemetery. another celebration was related to the creation of the armenian alphabet on st. mesrob’s day.45 the orphanage’s anniversary was another important event that was held every year and a program was prepared with the utmost care. a detailed description of the second anniversary celebration may be read in ararat magazine. it began on sunday, september 7, 1924, and lasted for two days in superb weather. the arrival of the guests was facilitated by a special car service, which brought them from tg. frumos station to strunga. guests arrived from bucharest, constanța, cernăuți, galați, brăila, iași, suceava, botoșani, roman, bacău, tg. ocna, brădulești and tg. frumos.46 din românia,” ararat, 1 july 1924, no. 1, 6. 40 bostangian, în turcia, 107. 41 “de la orfelinat,” ararat, january 1925, no. 7, 8; “locale,” ararat, november 1925, no. 17, 8; october 1926, no. 28, 7; october 1928 no. 52, 8; march 1930, no. 4 (60), 8. 42 the principal had three daughters: annig, eliza and armine. the latter was soon lost, and the former left for greece in 1924 to marry the armenian professor nerses balian, who later, both, returned to romania. aaar, d. 260, 125; “de la orfelinat,” ararat, august 1926, no. 26, 7; “locale,” ararat, october 1926, no. 28, 7; vosganian, cartea șoaptelor, 400. 43 “nâșan maganian (1891-1978),” at http://personalitati.araratonline.com/maganian-nasan-1891-1978/, accessed 01.06.2020; see min. 21 in strunga documentary. 44 “de la orfelinat,” ararat, may 1925, no.11, 7. 45 “locale,” ararat, june 1926, no. 24, 8; “informațiuni,” ararat, 1 july 1924, no. 1, 7; “locale,” ararat, june 1926, no. 24, 8; “știri de la orfelinat,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 5. 46 “știri de la orfelinat,”ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 5. 41 armenian genocide survivors although physically absent, representatives of bessarabia’s regional committees also joined the anniversary through several written messages. for example, the chairman of the committee from hânceşti, tosunianţs, sent a greeting: “…regretting not being able to take part in the celebration, we send you our joyful and warm greetings and congratulations... long live his majesty the king and the dynasty. long live great romania.” from chișinău, the following telegram came from the priest rev. zadigian: “i congratulate you and i hope you continue the work begun with the same wonderful ardor …”47 the celebratory religious service began at 10 o’clock, led by the priest rev. leon papazian,48 in the presence of bishop husig zohrabian, accompanied by the choir of orphans conducted by stepan sagheldian. after the service, the guests, led by orphans, visited the orphanage gardens. at 12 o’clock a table, set on the orphanage terrace and adorned with wildflowers awaited the guests. the series of toasts was begun by armenag manisalian, who praised the principal and the entire staff for their work for the good of the children. at the end, he wished good health for the king and queen, the glory and greatness of romania, the hospitable country where a handful of children had found shelter. later, at 2 pm, the school celebration began in the large orphanage hall, adorned with garlands of flowers, greenery and flags, which was opened with the royal anthem sung by the school choir. dozens of children ascended the improvised tribune, reciting in romanian and armenian. armenian national dances aroused admiration among the spectators. the final part of the program, which included gymnastics and various games, held on the field in front of the main pavilion, took place later in the evening, the boys being led by masters maganian and mardiros, and the girls by miss eliza srintz.49 the new year celebration was marked by children through various songs. in general, children were educated in the spirit of the adoptive country’s identity, being taught to cherish and love romania’s royal family. both during and after the celebrations, the orphans were visited by different people, either to contribute to their material support, a subject i will return to below, or to encourage them through communication with them.50 regarding the visits to the orphanage, hairabed bostangian remembers that between 1923 and 1924 conditions were unforgettable. many armenians …visited them very often, always providing the children with food, clothing and other necessary things.51 another custom established at the orphanage was the organization of excursions. to visit the olympic games on 19 july 1925, a group of 24 orphans met father măgărdici bodurian for tea.52 it became a real artistic celebration lasting for three hours. in addition to the stated activities, the orphanage also focused on the development of physical culture and the sports movement. the boys played football and participated in various matches. hairabed bostangian fondly remembers these activities: “one day... i 47 “serbarea aniversară a orfelinatului,” ararat, 1 october 1924, no. 4, 5-6. 48 priest from the town of roman, awarded with numerous decorations, including the “french medal of honor,” at http://personalitati.araratonline.com/papazian-leon-1872-1928/, accessed 01.06.2019. 49 “serbarea aniversară a orfelinatului,” ararat, 1 october 1924, no. 4, 5. 50 “de la orfelinat,” ararat, january 1925, no. 7, 8; “locale,” ararat, may 1925, no.11, 8. 51 bostangian, în turcia, 107. 52 armenian vicar-priest of the catholic rite (1881-1959), scholar and preacher of armenian culture, at http:// personalitati.araratonline.com/bodurian-magardici-1881-1959/, accessed 07.11.2019. 42 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 was playing football, having sandals on that were tied with string ... armenag manisalian, seeing us, got very upset and ordered football boots and special t-shirts for all the boys… in another case, the orphanage was visited by an armenian from the usa, who endowed it with baseball equipment…”53 two football teams were set up at the orphanage: “ararat 1” and “ararat 2.” in the summer of 1924, the “ararat 2” team had a match against one from tg. frumos. at the beginning, the orphanage team was hesitant against the opposing one, but in the second half, it won the match with a score of 2 to 0.54 practicing sports, excursions, walks and visits was a way for children to shape their personalities. reduction of the number of orphans in strunga during the three years of its existence, the number of children in the orphanage steadily decreased. the album highlights the fact that a few months after its establishment, between july and november 1923, 14 children (9 boys and 5 girls) left it. in 1924, from may to december, 40 children left (34 boys and 6 girls), and from february to october 1925, another seven children left (4 boys and 3 girls). the names of the children in strunga had been published in many countries with armenian populations in europe. that way some children found their relatives, while others were adopted by armenian families from france, bulgaria, greece, etc. some of them, through happy circumstances, were reunited with their mothers, fathers, uncles and aunts settled in different parts of the world, such as the towns in romania (bucharest, constanța, roman, botoșani), bulgaria, greece, france and the usa. in the summer of 1924, two of the children were called to paris by an elder brother. both embarked on the ship robert bella at the port of brăila, to leave for marseilles, from where they were to continue their journey to paris.55 ararat magazine reported in early 1926 that several children from the orphanage went to their close relatives who made a living in different countries 12 left for constantinople being called there by relatives. according to the records, the number of orphans decreased, “especially in the second year” from 200 at the beginning to 125.56 during the first general assembly that took place on 25 may 1924, a year after its opening, it was decided not to accept any more orphans except for those who were to be adopted through legal means. subsequently, only children of adolescent age were entrusted to individuals, provided that they assumed the responsibility of taking care of them like parents and taught them a trade. orphans could only be removed from the institution if a favorable opinion from the regional committee was obtained.57 the armenians in romania were informed that there were, in 1925, several boys between the ages of 15 and 17 at the 53 bostangian, în turcia, 107. 54 “informațiuni,” ararat, 1 july 1924, no.1, 7; “de la orfelinat,” ararat, may 1925, no. 11, 3. 55 “informațiuni,” ararat, 1 july 1924, no. 1, 7. 56 “transferarea orfelinatului,” ararat, april 1926, no. 22, 5; “locale,” ararat, february 1926, no. 20, 8; “orfelinatul,” ararat, august 1925, no. 14, 4. 57 “adunare generală anuală a orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 july 1924, no. 1, 6; “statutele orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 2. 43 armenian genocide survivors orphanage who had finished primary school and had learnt a trade. they were well brought up, obedient and healthy and would be useful to those who wanted them to teach others the craft they were engaged in.58 it appears from the album that several orphans were taken for adoption by the same person. ardashes bardisbanian of bucharest had taken 5 orphans and hagop baclagian 4. a. ștefănescu of bacău adopted 3 orphans. hairabed bostangian reveals that he and many others like him were employed as apprentices to various armenian merchants or craftsmen, jewelers, watchmakers, etc. “...among my orphanage colleagues i remember kalust hazarian (i know he died in 1993 in constanţa), stepan meldonian, antranig marcarian, edvard gearbinian… the latter was adopted by an armenian merchant and became an aviator…”59 if we analyze the number of orphans taken by individuals by gender (even if the proportion was different, from 75 to 25 percent), we can see that boys were more often asked for than girls. orphanage subsidy and supply the existence of the establishment was due to various donations and grants that facilitated the care of the orphans. this aspect deserves special attention when dealing with the problem. the funds the orphanage had at its disposal consisted of various taxes (around 7,000 lei per year from patrons) paid in two half-yearly installments, subscriptions (collected monthly by regional committees), voluntary donations, benefits from balls and celebrations organized by the regional committees, as well as the subsidy granted by the romanian ministry of health and social welfare. the orphanage received an annual subsidy of 60,000 lei from the ministry, including various amounts from banca comercială română (the national bank of romania) and many other banking and commercial institutions in bucharest such as banca românească, contin-export, creditul român, marmorosh blank, moara assan, moara comercială, societatea generală de export, societatea intercontinentală şi societatea leonida (general export society, intercontinental society and leonida society).60 the establishment of the uar office significantly eased the collection of monthly subscriptions. taking 1925 alone, about 400,000 romanian lei was paid into the orphanage’s account solely from bucharest. the orphanage’s material situation could only improve with the intervention of the head of the establishment.61 in order to support and supply the orphanage, a food collection campaign or “collection of offerings in kind” was started at the initiative of the central committee. starting in november 1924, “an ad-hoc commission composed of several people roamed armenian merchants’ shops in calea griviţei street and received various quantities of sugar, tea and 58 “locale,” ararat, june 1925, no. 12, 7. 59 bostangian, în turcia, 107-108. 60 “statutele orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 2; “adunare generală anuală a orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 july 1924, no. 1, 6; “orfelinatul,” ararat, august 1925, no. 14, 4; “știri de la orfelinat,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 5. 61 “pentru orfani,” ararat, december 1925, no. 18, 5; “locale,” ararat, september 1925, no. 15, 8; october, november 1925, no. 16, no.17, 8; november 1926, no. 29, 8; april 1925, no. 10, 8; january 1925, no. 7, 8. 44 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 pasta…”62 the bucharest regional committee sent a first consignment of snacks weighing about 1,000 kg for the holidays at the end of 1924, followed by two more in the first month of 1925. various products arrived at the orphanage from the “sugar king” of romania, harutiun frengian, who would donate 30 kg of halva at holiday time.63 children were also offered a range of basic necessities during orphanage celebrations. for example, on the second anniversary, several benefactors the brothers galustian and ohanes from bacău, mrs. a. baragian, a. bardizbanian, b. ohanes, messrs. bercovici, zakarian, melikset, k. măgărdician, frimovici and others donated flour (200 kg), sugar (30 kg), fat (112 kg), cheese (10 kg), confectionery (10 kg), chocolate (9.5 kg), biscuits (5 kg), candies (3 kg), melons (100), eggs (100), vinegar (8 bottles), noodles (two boxes), cream (12 boxes), chicory ( 5 boxes), socks (36 pairs), handkerchiefs (36), soap (5 kg) and toilet soap (36 tablets).64 several people committed themselves, in 1925, to provide fabric and sewed clothes for orphans. a. acikgeozian sent linen cloth worth 12,000 lei. later, a group of ladies from bucharest made 150 suits using the donated fabric.65 armenian children themselves took part in charitable activities aimed at helping the orphans. at new year, the students of the school in bucharest, collecting money among them, sent their schoolmates in strunga school supplies valued at 2,258 lei.66 another form of orphan support was cash donations. the orphanage received various amounts, large and small, depending on the donors’ means. adina take ionescu, wife of the brilliant lawyer and prime minister of romania and lady-in-waiting to queen maria, donated 5,000 lei; evanghel mataranga from turnu măgurele, 1,500 lei etc.67 d.a. yughaperian, president of the prevederea insurance company, donated 1,000 lei for the support of orphans when he visited the orphanage in summer 1924. other donations of 1,000; 500; 200; 100; 80; 75; 60 and 50 lei came from armenians from gherla. the lawyer anton melic offered 4,000 lei during the winter holidays in 1925.68 among the donors there were philanthropists who did not want to divulge their identities. for example, on several occasions 50,000 and 30,000 lei were sent to the orphanage by an anonymous local benefactor from galaţi, through aram ghiumlushian. there were also cases of bequests made to the orphanage through wills.69 significant sums were also raised by the armenian regional committees for the benefit 62 “locale,” ararat, december 1, 1924, no. 6, 8. 63 “harutiun frenghian,” at http://personalitati.araratonline.com/frenghian-harutiun-franghian-sau-frenkian-1873-1959/, accessed 14.11.2019; “donaţiuni,” ararat, january 1925, no. 7, 3; “de la orfelinat,” ararat, january 1925, no. 7, 8; “orfelinatul,” ararat, april 1925, no. 10, 7; “locale,” ararat, april 1926, no. 22, 8. 64 “serbarea aniversară a orfelinatului,” ararat, 1 1924, no. 4, 6; “locale,” ararat, august 1926, no. 26, 8. 65 “orfelinatul,” ararat, april 1925, no.10, 7; “locale,” ararat, may 1925, no. 11, 8; july 1925, no. 13, 8. 66 “locale,” ararat, february 1925, no. 8, 8; “de la orfelinat,” ararat, january 1925, no. 7, 8; “locale,” ararat, october 1925, no. 16, 8. 67 “ea …femeia din elita politică românească: adina take ionescu,” at http://www.rador.ro/2015/03/01/ea-femeia-din-elita-politica-romaneasca-adina-take-ionescu/, accessed 08.11.2019; “pentru orfelinat,” ararat, may 1926, no. 23, 6. 68 “știri de la orfelinat,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 5; “donaţiuni pentru orfelinat,” ararat, may 1925, no. 11, 3; “locale,” june 1925, no. 12, 8; “donaţiuni,” in ararat, january 1925, no.7, 3. 69 “locale,” ararat, october 1925, no.16, 8; december 1925, no. 18, 6; “donaţii,” ararat, june 1925, no. 12, 4; “locale,” ararat, january 1926, no. 19, 7. 45 armenian genocide survivors of the orphanage. according to the budget for 1924-1925, the revenues from the 18 committees amounted to 870,000 lei and from the committees in bessarabia 70,000 lei.70 although the orphans in strunga had many well-wishers in bessarabia, such as the chairmen of the committees in chisinau and balti v. acicov, and iacob marcarov, respectively, the material contribution made by armenians from these regions was sporadic and uneven, armenian charity work suffering largely from expropriation and the lawsuit filed in the case of ograda armenească (the armenian courtyard).71 according to ararat magazine, an important donation came from hâncești to strunga from d. tosunian, who offered 1,300 lei on its second anniversary.72 compared to the armenians from hânceşti, whose numbers were significant, the community from cetatea albă, which was quite numerous and rich, “did not contribute any money… and did not appear in the list of donors during 1924.”73 a few years later, o.i. marcarov expressed his regret that the town of balti could not provide an annual contribution of 7,000 lei to support the orphanage until 1926 giving, as a comparison, the small community of suceava that had offered 27,000 lei. in order to raise a certain amount of money in support of the orphans, a committee led by marcarov organised a charity event where the amount of 9,800 lei was collected, with another 1,000 lei being added by h. marcarov himself. another 12,140 lei arrived at the orphanage from the committee about a month after that event.74 significant donations reached the orphanage from abroad. thus, the armenian community in belgrade sent 10,000 lei in march 1925. in september 1926 5,000 lei arrived on behalf of dr. stepanian, a former doctor in strunga, from tehran.75 a charity tradition was the oriental ball held for the benefit of the orphanage. the first of these, with the enchanting appearance of a thousand and one nights took place on february 28, 1925 (a saturday), in liedertafel.76 hundreds of valuable carpets and curtains, which adorned the halls, had been made available to the organizing committee free of charge by several merchants in the capital, representing a value of tens of millions of lei. there were a great number of assistants and the presence of several personalities from the elite of bucharest was remarkable. numerous splendid masks and costumes were to be seen and musical compositions and dances were performed by first class artists. the buffet was very grand. the ball lasted until the following morning… with the net benefit/income 70 “locale,” ararat, may 1925, no. 11, 8; august, no. 14, 8; february, no. 8, 8; january 1926, no.19, 7; “bugetul orfelinatului armean din românia pe anul 1924-1925,” ararat, july 1924, no. 1, 7. 71 “prietenii orfanilor,” ararat, january 1925, no.7, 5; lidia prisac, “ograda armenească din chișinău (18131922),” in identitățile chișinăului. materialele conferinţei științifice (19-20 octombrie 2017, ediția a iv-a) (chișinău: arc, 2018), 161-171; lidia prisac, “exproprierea ogrăzii armenești din chișinău (1922-1932),” in identitățile chișinăului. materialele conferinţei științifice (1-2 noiembrie 2018, ediția a v-a) (chișinău: arc, 2019), 230-240. 72 “serbarea aniversară a orfelinatului,” ararat, 1 october 1924, no. 4, 6. 73 in 1928 there were 22 armenian families, with 76 souls, of which some were very poor. aaar, d. 221, 5; d. 351; “orfelinatul,” ararat, august 1925, no. 14, 4. 74 “corespondențe,” ararat, april 1926, no. 22, 7; “pentru orfelinat,” ararat, may 1926, no. 23, 6. 75 “orfelinatul,” ararat, april 1925, no.10, 7; “locale,” ararat, october 1926, no. 28, 7. 76 song society, founded in bucharest in 1852, at https://dexonline.ro/definitie/liedertafel/540913, accessed 03.06. 2019; “ştiri diverse,” ararat, 1 december 1924, no. 6, 8; “locale,” ararat, february 1925, no. 8, 8; november 1925, no.17, 8. 46 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 totaling over 200,000 lei.77 money was collected during charity balls even after the closure of the orphanage.78 general meetings and the closure of the orphanage the first annual general assembly of patrons and donors was held at strunga on 25 may 1924, under the chairmanship of armenag manisalian. the auditor’s report for 1923-1924 was heard and the general budget detailing revenue and expenditure was set. the minimum amount which each regional committee was to contribute to the orphanage’s expenditure was also fixed. although a new general assembly was planned for the second year, it was never convened.79 the third was to have been held during the third year, but as a significant number of branch delegates in the country did not responded to their invitations, the meeting was postponed indefinitely. things seemed to be generally unchanged at the orphanage, especially in terms of health… however, the idea that the orphanage would no longer be profitable because of the declining number of children began to be circulated as early as the spring of 1925.80 according to reports in ararat magazine, there were several voices in the community that spoke about the orphanage’s unprofitability.81 in this sense, there were several solutions proposed regarding the institution. the first was to send the orphans to armenia, which was not feasible because of the difficulties that the children would be subjected to on such a journey. meanwhile armenia had been sovietized. another solution was to transfer the orphanage to bucharest a situation that would have been more difficult due to the rents payable which would have been greater than that paid in strunga.82 the uncertain situation around the orphanage and the misunderstanding between the members of the establishment’s central committee, made armenag manisalian resign from the position of central committee chairman in the summer of 1926. in the new circumstances and lack of funds, although there were still 70 orphans in the orphanage, it became necessary to create a commission elected from the executive committee to close it. armenag manisalian’s resignation led to a series of other resignations those of the teacher srintz, accountant şantarzian, deputy director gulbenkian, as well as the principal of the orphanage, sarkis srintz, remaining at strunga with only one assistant and a single teacher.83 in the autumn of 1926, another communiqué stated that at strunga “…there were only five children 77 “balul orfelinatului,” ararat, march 1925, no. 9, 8. 78 “locale,” ararat, march 1926, no. 21, 8; january 1927, no. 31, 8; march 1927, no. 33, 8; “balul oriental,” ararat, december 1927, no. 42, 8. 79 “adunare generală anuală a orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 june 1924, no. 1, 6; “locale,” ararat, december 1925, no.18, 7. 80 “locale,” ararat, september 1925, no.15, 8; february 1926, no. 20, 8; “orfelinatul,” ararat, july 1926, no. 25, 5. 81 “în jurul orfelinatului,”ararat, april 1925, no.10, 3-4. 82 “transferarea orfelinatului,” ararat, april 1926, no. 22, 5; “locale,” ararat, may 1926, no. 23, 8. 83 “orfelinatul,” ararat, july 1926, no. 25, 5; “locale,” ararat, august 1926, no. 26, 8; september 1926, no. 27, 8. 47 armenian genocide survivors left who, like the others, were to be handed over to a master.” through these actions, it was finally decided that the orphanage should be closed.84 when informed of the resignations, the diocesan committee took into account that there were the orphans left both boys and girls, without supervision about 45 in all. it appointed a governing body to deal with the children’s fate. the committee held several meetings and compiled a list of orphans from bucharest. stating that “…most of them had been directed to masters, without any commitment by the latter,” the committee took steps to conclude the apprenticeship contracts provided for in labor law as soon as possible. as a result of these changes, although placed with craftsmen, many orphans actually remained on the streets. the few short reports gleaned from ararat show the need for children to be helped, especially in cases of illness or the lack of housing.85 from archive pages referring to the former orphans from strunga who had settled in bucharest with some of the craftsmen there, it can be seen that uar had intervened countless times with the romanian ministry of interior in order to facilitate the issuing of identity certificates, free pass tickets, nansen passports or extending of residence permits/tickets in romania.86 conclusion the orphanage’s creation and its existence in strunga showed the place and role of the armenian community in romania in the process of helping refugees after the genocide. these two landmarks are important in revealing the situation the armenian community in interwar romania was in. the dynamic measures taken in relation to the armenian orphans accepted by the romanian authorities mark the efforts of the armenians in romania through charity actions aimed at solving the pressing problems faced by thousands of orphaned children scattered by the effects of genocide. however, the situation the orphanage was in highlights the failures that existed within the armenian community in romania. caught in a broad process of adjustment to the new political-administrative framework developed after wwi, armenians in greater romania found it difficult to develop a coherent line (even concerning orphans) and to stick to it in a context in which points of view in the vechiul regat (romanian old kingdom, from 1881 till 1918) and in the rest of the provinces were clearly different. speaking of the armenians from bessarabia,87 it can be stated, that they joined the centralization that was emerging from bucharest quite late; in this sense, we distinguish, at 84 “locale,” ararat, november 1926, no. 29, 8; april 1927, no. 34, 8; “statutele orfelinatului armean din românia,” ararat, 1 august 1924, no. 2, 2. 85 “locale,” ararat, december 1926, no. 30, 8; january 1927, no. 31, 8; may 1927, no. 35, 7; june 1927, no. 36, 8; september 1928, no. 51, 8. 86 aaar, d. 177, 33; d. 260, 15, 39, 57, 62, 68, 70, 72, 90, 109, 120, 126, 133, 136-138. 87 lidia prisac, ion gumenâi, “armenii din basarabia în contextul marii uniri,” in historia est magistra vitae: valori, paradigme, personalităţi: in honorem profesor ion eremia (chişinău, tipografia centrală, 2019), 547561; ion gumenâi, lidia prisac, “between separation an unity in the context of the great union. armenians from bessarabia,” in world war and the birth of a new world order: the end of an era, ed. by ioan bolovan and oana mihaela tămaș (newcastle upon tyne: cambridge scholars publishing, 2020), 184-203; lidia prisac, “prezențe armenești în sfatul țării: petre bajbeuc-melicov,” in centenar sfatul țării: 1917-2017. materialele conferinței științifice internaționale (chișinău, 21 noiembrie 2017) (chișinău: lexon prim, 2017), 443-458. 48 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 the country level, a heterogeneous rather than a homogeneous armenian community. some of the orphans who reached romania were lucky, managing to find their relatives and to be reunited with their lost families. the massacres, exodus and their rescue had deeply marked the lives of the armenian orphans who arrived in strunga. in their eyes, the armenian community in romania looked as being well entrenched in a country where christian values were the norm. despite existing dissensions within the armenian community in romania and the declining support for orphans in strunga, it can be stated that the humanitarian aspect meant nothing more than offering the possibility of rehabilitation after the genocide and adaptation to the new social environment that romania represented. acknowledgment this work is partially the product of my research undertaken at the armenian genocide museum-institute, yerevan, as a raphael lemkin scholar in 2019. i would like to thank all my colleagues and the staff at the agmi for their support, especially harutyun marutyan who offered me the content of the orphans’ album and shushan khachatryan, who helped me translate the information about each orphan from armenian. photos of children of the strunga orphanage 49 armenian genocide survivors 50 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 51 armenian genocide survivors 52 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 53 armenian genocide survivors dr. harutyun marutyan is a leading research fellow at the department of contemporary anthropological studies in the institute of archaeology and ethnography, national academy of sciences of armenia, and visiting professor of anthropology at yerevan state university. he is author of iconography of armenian identity. volume 1: the memory of genocide and the karabagh movement (yerevan, 2009, in armenian and in english, two diff erent volumes) monograph, for which (and some other articles) in 2012 he became a recipient of the president of the republic of armenia prize (2011) in the nomination of persons having made a valuable contribution to the recognition of the armenian genocide. 53 trauma and identity: on structural particularities of armenian genocide and jewish holocaust 1,2 harutyun marutyan comparison of the armenian genocide and jewish holocaust memories allows us not only to discuss questions important for armenian sociopolitical and scienti fi c thought regarding the start of the 21st century, but also for deriving useful lessons. the problems are examined from the point of view of memory stu dies and identity politics. the internationally recognized term “holocaust” was used to characterize the armenian mas sacres as far back as the end of the 19th century – beginning of the 20th century. the perception of a “unique” holocaust and “primacy” of the armenian genocide in the 20th century are actually different characteristics of the same phenomenon: in the case of examination of the question from this point of view, the factor of “historiographical competitiveness” is gaining a secondary role, although it still exists in different manifestations of the collective memory. giving priority to the ideological factor in the assessment of the organization and implementation of genocides allows jews and armenians alike to avoid the manifestations of ethnic opposition and to appear to the world in a more (from the point of view of western values) preferable fashion. the jewish institute of the righteous among the nations cannot serve as a model for armenians because of the absence of the factor of unselfi shness (in a great variety of cases) in the rescue of armenian lives. in the jewish, as well as in the armenian memory, there is a fi ght against the stereotype of “being slaughtered like sheep”: in the jewish case, the activities are mostly transferred to the fi eld of “moral resistance”, while in the armenian case, the resistance of the armenian people has not been emphasized as has the jewish struggles, underground fi ghts and rebellions. the process of the armenian genocide memory becoming a part of the american national memory in its certain manifestations repeats the approaches of the jewish community of the united states. there are also some similarities in the case of choosing the sites for memorials, etc. comparative historiography of peoples with similar historical fates contributes not only to scientifi c thought but to our common humanity. in this regard, the comparison of the memories and identity politics of the armenian genocide and the jewish holocaust allows 1. to cite this article: harutyun marutyan, “trauma and identity: on structural particularities of armenian genocide and jewish holocaust,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 1:1(2014): 53-69 2.in memory of my teacher mikhail g. rabinovich and his wife elena poghosian. main ideas of this article were developed thanks to the scholarship of center for advanced holocaust studies, united states holocaust memorial museum (washington, d.c.), where i was diane and howard wohl fellow from september, 2009 to march, 2010. the opinions, arguments, and assertions here are mine alone and in no way should refl ect adversely upon the generosity of that institution. some parts of the article were used during my presentations at cahs fellows’ seminar (january 20, 2010) and at the caucasus connections conference (indiana university, bloomington, april 5, 2014). the armenian version of the article is published in patmabanasirakan handes [historical-philological journal] 2 (2011): 24-46. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 54 us not only to discuss questions that hold value for armenian sociopolitical and scienti fi c thought of the start of the 21st century regarding the study of armenian ge no cide, but also to derive valuable lessons with far reaching consequences. most importantly, these lessons contribute to the prevention of future genocide. a number of scholarly articles have been written on the subject of comparison of the armenian genocide and jewish holocaust, by armenian, as well as jewish and american researchers.3 my task is not to add new research to this list. it is rather to consider how the memories of the genocide and of holocaust are perceived, and how they work to stimulate people to act. identity and naming dramatic events of the past as it is known, the word holocaust was originally derived from the greek word holokauston, meaning “a completely (holos) burnt (kaustos) sacrifi cial offering” to a god. “shoah” (calamity) is the hebrew term for the holocaust. it is used by many jews, as well as a growing number of other people, due to theological dis comfort with the literal meaning of the word “holocaust”; these groups believe it is theo logically offensive to imply that the jews of europe were a sacrifi ce to god. nevertheless, today whenever the word “holocaust” is used, despite the opinions of different scholars about its semantic boundaries, people understand that it refers to the killing by nazis and their allies of six million jews during the second world war. though this term denotes a phenomenon known to practically everybody, it has become thoroughly associated to a specifi c ethnic group: the jewish people. armenians too have their own term for their genocide (which has purely armenian usage) – “metz yeghern” (the great calamity). the armenian word “yeghern”, connoting such meanings as “evil, peril, crime, disaster, accident, [and] loss,” has long been used in armenian medieval literature4, while the term “mets” refers to the great scale of this calamity. after the events of 1915 and before the term “genocide” gained wide circulation in the mid-1960s, the term “metz yeghern” was used to describe the large-scale massacres carried out by the turks and the kurds in the ottoman empire. today the terms “metz yeghern” and “genocide” are still synonymous to the armenian 3. see, for example: franklin h. littell, “holocaust and genocide: the essential dialectic,” holocaust and genocide studies 2: 1 (1987): 95-104; vahakn n. dadrian, “the convergent aspects of the armenian and jewish cases of genocide. a reinterpretation of the concept of holocaust,” holocaust and genocide studies, 3: 2 (1988): 151-69; robert f. melson, “the armenian genocide as precursor and prototype of twentieth-century genocide,” in is the holocaust unique?: perspectives on comparative genocide, edited with an introduction by alan s. rosenbaum, with a foreword by israel w. charny (colorado and oxford: westview press, 1996), 88-93, 97; vahakn n. dadrian, “the comparative aspects of the armenian and jewish cases of genocide: a sociohistorical perspective,” in is the holocaust unique?, 101-35; idem, “the historical and legal interconnections between the armenian genocide and the jewish holocaust: from impunity to retributive justice,” the yale journal of international law 23: 2 (summer 1998): 503-59; tigran matosyan, hayots tseghaspanutyun yev hreakan holoqost: hamematman pordz [armenian genocide and jewish holocaust: attempt of comparison] (yerevan: hayots tseghaspanutyan tangaran-institut, 2005) (in armenian); donald bloxham, “organized mass murder: structure, participation, and motivation in comparative perspective,” holocaust and genocide studies 22: 2 (2008): 203-45. see for details: tigran matosyan, op. cit., 4-12. 4. gabriel avetikian, khachatur syurmelian, and mkrtich avgerian. new wordbook of old armenian, volume 1 (yerevan: yerevan university press, 1836/1979), 654 (in armenian). trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 55 people, and have almost identical usage.5 however, when president obama used “medz yeghern” in his statements of april 24, 2009-2014 addressed to armenians, the term was legally far from being an equivalent of “genocide,”6 and did nothing to assist the cause of international recognition of the armenian genocide. by the way, the same formulation was once used by pope john paul ii.7 the translation of “holocaust” in armenian, “voghjakizum,” manifests certain ambiguity: the fi rst part of the term, “voghj,” has the meanings – “all” and “alive,” while “kizum” means “burning.” thus the term can also be understood as “burning alive.” maybe this is what vahakn dadrian, an outstanding specialist of the history of the armenian genocide, had in mind when comparing the jewish holocaust with the armenian genocide: in one particular respect …the armenian experience of world war i comes closer to the concept of holocaust than the jewish one, in the strictest sense of the word. tens of thousands of armenians were burnt alive in several regions of the interior of turkey. whereas in the jewish case the gas chambers almost always preceded the ovens, in the armenian case the stables, haylofts, barns and pits were inexorably substituted for both contraptions.8 while historians are well aware of the facts about armenians having been burnt alive by the turks, ordinary citizens have this memory mainly as a result of literary works. of these, the most vivid is a poem by siamanto (atom yarjanian), a western armenian writer and a victim of the genocide, called, “the dance,” which, long ago, was included in armenian school curricula. the poem describes an episode from the 1909 massacres in cilicia, when turks stripped armenian women and made them dance, and then poured “a barrel of oil” over the naked bodies to burn them alive. it is in this poem that the expression “o, human justice, let me spit at your forehead” was fi rst used. later, due to its expressiveness and pathos, it became a much used adage in the posters of the karabagh movement (1988-1990).9 another work, zareh vorberian’s “the blazing dance,” published in 1965, in beirut, describes a similar episode after the defence of urfa (formerly edesia). it is characteristic that, conditioned by the above-mentioned works yet dormant, this memory came to the foreground only after the sumgait events (february 27-29, 1988), where the azerbaijanis identifi ed with turks applied the same methods to half dead armenians.10 5. in the google search system the term “holocaust” appears 5.07 million times, “shoah” – 0.73 million times, “armenian genocide” – 0.36 million times and “medz yeghern” – 0.03 million times (retrieved september 12, 2014). 6. see, for example: rouben adalian, “president obama’s statement on the armenian genocide,” the isg newsletter 42 (2009): 13. 7. http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/prayer_of_john_paul_ii_memorial_of_tzitzernagaberd.php 8. vahakn n. dadrian, “the convergent aspects of the armenian and jewish cases of genocide. a rein ter pre tation of the concept of holocaust,” holocaust and genocide studies,vol.3, no.2 (1998): 165. 9. see for details, harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity. vol. 1: the memory of genocide and the karabagh movement (anthropology of memory 2) (yerevan: gitutyun press, 2009), 145-149. 10. the same type of crime was pictured also in atom egoyan’s fi lm “ararat” (2002). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 56 i think it is relevant to note that a s far back as in september 10, 1895, i.e. nearly 40 years before the jewish holocaust began, the new york times headlined a story with the title, “another armenian holocaust,”11 which described the armenian massacres. during the last days of december of 1895, armenians who had sought refuge in the armenian church of urfa were brutally killed by turks. a missionary, ms. corinne shattuck, used the expression “a great holocaust” in her letter (published in the new york times), underlining the religious aspect of the tra gedy—christian armenians massacred by muslim turks and kurds.12 in 1898, a socialist french-jewish journalist, bernard lazare, called the slaughter of armenians between 1894 and 1896 holocaust, and even winston churchill described the “massacre of countless thousands of defenseless armenians” during the world war i as an “administrative ho lo caust.”13 duckett z. ferriman’s the young turks and the truth about the holocaust at adana in asia minor, during april, 1909 was published in london in 1913, describing the massacre of the armenians in adana in 1909,14 and was reprinted by the armenian genocide museum-institute in 2009. the unique or comparable holocaust historians often separate the holocaust of jews from other genocides of the 20th century, defi ning it as an “unique” phenomenon not comparable with any other genocide. this is how it is both presented in professional literature and widely advocated. it is typical that such a formulation as “holocaust and genocide studies” came to being and has become a separate academic trend. the main argument in its favor includes not only the wellorganized nature of the mass extermination of the jews and its scale, but also the fact that the jews were not offered or forced to change their religion in order to save themselves, whereas with armenians it has been repeatedly stated that tens, or rather hundreds, of thousands of armenians had been forced to accept islam and thus to be saved. armenian historians more often put the emphasis on the facts that the armenian genocide was the fi rst of the 20th century as many of its methods were used in the holocaust; while the mass killings were committed on the territory of origin of the victims and had led to its expropriation (which is also a unique fact with respect to genocides), etc. these two 11. http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9d05e5dd113de433a25753c1a96f9c94649ed7cf 12. “three days of butchery; a woman describes the massacre of armenians in ourfa. not less than 3.500 were killed. terrible slaughter in a church.” new york times, february 17, 1896; rouben adalian, “ hamidian (armenian) massacres,” http://www.armenian-genocide.org/hamidian.html; richard hovannisian, “ the armenian question in the ottoman empire 1876 to 1914,” in the armenian people from ancient to modern times, ed. richard hovannisian, volume ii (new york: st. martin’s press, 1997), 223. 13. winston churchill, the world crisis, vol. 5, a� ermath 1918–1928 (new york: c. scribner’s sons, 1929), 157; tessa hofmann, “the affi rmation of the genocide of the armenians. a human rights defender’s point of view,” http://www.proarmenia.am/eng-2003/en-tessa_hofmann.htm; david b. macdonald, identity politics in the age of genocide: the holocaust and historical representation (london, new york: routledge, 2008), 128. 14. duckett z. ferriman, the young turks and the truth about the holocaust at adana in asia minor, during april, 1909 (london, 1913); http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/11.12.2009.php trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 57 genocides do have in fact a number of comparable features. still, each of them has also its own particular characteristics. figuratively speaking, they can be described as the two faces of the same coin. from such a perspective it would seem that the separation intention fades considerably. in other words, adopting a comparable genocide studies’ lens reveals that both armenian and jewish genocides have their own unique characteristics, for in both cases we come across certain phenomena that have occurred for the fi rst time either in the armenian, or the jewish genocide. this is an issue, e.g., the differentiation of the jewish holocaust from other types of genocides that can be addressed and can help to resolve or overcome certain diffi culties encountered by historians with regards to the similarity and/or difference of the phenomena, even though the “uniqueness” perception and stereotypes will persist for quite a long time.15 who is to blame? for several decades now in discussions of the holocaust, jewish and american scholars (at least in the usa and the european countries) have emphasized that the guilt is neither with the “germans” (as a nation), nor with the peoples of germany’s allied countries in world war ii, but with the ss, nazism, fascism, racism and other equivalent ideologies. in other words, they do not give an ethnic qualifi cation to the confl ict that took place in the past, but view it as the result of a criminal ideology. even if some researchers try to put a share of guilt on ethnic germans or any other of the common people (a most vivid example is daniel goldhagen’s publication of 1996 in new york: hitler’s willing executioners. ordinary germans and the holo caust,) notable negative responses ensue in both historiographical (including that of the great majority of jewish authors) and related circles. in the above-said case, the negative response had been so strong that it gave rise to the notion known as “the goldhagen’s effect.” for nearly a century, armenian historians have emphasized the ethnicity of the perpetrators of the genocide. of course, the ideology of the young turks has been voiced and written about, and yet the emphasis, in my opinion, has mostly been on the ethnicity of the genocide perpetrators. such an emphasis may also be conditioned by the level of relations with the side of perpetrators and their legal successors. in the case of the armenians, the responsibility for the present state of affairs lies fi rst and foremost with the turkish policy of denial.16 in turn, this policy has led to the centuries-old persistence of the stereotype of “eternal friends and enemies” (h.j.t. palmerston). this policy has also been responsible for the stereotype’s duration and its active role in contemporary political and civil life. as a consequence, for as long as the armenian genocide remains unrecognized by the legal successors of the state that committed it, and for as long as the phenomenon of the “genocide” is not transferred from its current ethnic dimension to that of an ideology, armenians will have “eternal enemies,” which will automatically make room for the presence of an “eternal friends.” 15. by recognizing the common features of genocides as well as their unique characteristics, the comparative approach contributes to preventing future genocide and to ending those that are still ongoing. 16. according to gregory stanton, “denial is the fi nal stage that lasts throughout and always follows a genocide.” http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/tenstagesofgenocide.html international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 58 righteous or mercenary? during the years the holocaust was perpetrated, a vast number of people saved several individual to several thousand jews, often at the risk of their own lives and that of their relatives. later, the jewish people created a rather extensive list of foreigners who had rescued jews, “the righteous among the nations,”17 thus, also indirectly fi ghting any possible manifestations of xenophobia among jews. the fact is that during the holocaust, not only the germans but also their allies had been engaged in the annihilation of jews, be they government offi cials or common citizens. this was due to the fact that antisemitism had not been a singularly german attitude. jewish researchers who created “the righteous among the nations” list, would, as they say, think twice before they did something. one of the most signifi cant criteria for being included in the list had been the selfl essness of the often self-sacrifi cing assistance. this gave an opportunity to jews and their future generations to avoid becoming racist. in revealing that, some of the peoples of europe would do anything to help jews – often complete strangers – in the time of need, the realization that true humanism was extant among many non-jews and that manifestations of anti-semitism had been mostly caused by nazi propaganda. such an attempt was not made in the case of armenians. there have been considerably fewer instances of manifestation of selfl essness in rescuing the lives of armenians. those “saved” were, as a rule, either suggested to have adopted islam, or, in case of women and girls, to marry their “saviors”, or were exploited as additional labor hands and used otherwise, mostly with motives of self-interest. still, as they say, “a negative answer is nevertheless an answer.” in any case, such a study would be of great help for a more accurate evaluation of the ethnic factor in the occurrences of the beginning of the 20th century, as well as for the interpretation of genocide memory and the elucidation of a number of issues related to the construction of armenian-turkish relations. victim or fighter? the presence of the genocide memory has signifi cance in the armenian system of perceptions and culture, as well as in its interaction with the rest of the world. just as other peoples of the world do not reject the “burden” of their past, which is part of their identity, armenians cannot abandon the legacy of the memory of their diffi cult past. moreover, it is typical to have numerous international parallels, which is far from being detrimental. this emphasis is conditioned by the recent development of a growing belief among some layers of the armenian society, mostly the youth, that enough has already been said concerning the genocide: it distorts the psychology of our children and youth, and contributes to increasing xenophobia, etc. an important aspect of this issue is the fact that when speaking of the genocide, emphasis on the mass extermination of armenians in armenian-inhabited areas of the ottoman empire, the inhumane sufferings of deported armenians in the deserts of deirzor, and the fact of the helplessness of people doomed to be gradually annihilated can hardly be avoided. due to this emphasis, certain members of society believe that the armenians 17. see for details, for example: http://www1.yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/about.asp, http://www1. yadvashem.org/yv/en/righteous/statistics.asp trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 59 were slaughtered like sheep, while showing almost no resistance. such a representation and the equivalent perception of the fact of genocide and the build-up of the national identity on that basis was largely contributed to by the works of talented armenian writers in the soviet period (especially the period from the end of the 1950s and the 1960s) on the theme of the genocide. such writers include paruyr sevak, hovhannes shiraz, silva kaputikian, gevorg emin and hrachya kochar who have produced some of the best-loved classics of several generations. however, an important circumstance has been overlooked. in fact, the soviet leadership, particularly from the second half of the 1950s, did not so much forbid discussion of the genocide, as it did foster the retention of memories in which armenians were exclusively presented as innocent victims who had lost the greater part of their historical homeland and therefore needed sympathy. likewise, in armenian historiography, emphasis was placed on descriptions of the genocide and on collecting related documents, on verifying the number of victims, criticizing the turkish policy of denial, and, later, on highlighting heroically fought battles. it is true that armenian historians have highlighted and are continuing to write about the well-known self-defense battles at van, shatakh, shapin-garahisar, musa ler, hajen, urfa and other places. still a very important circumstance is being left out in this matter: nothing is said from the perspective of historiographic evaluation about the fact that in both large and small villages, armenians put up resistance, whether for a day or two, or a week or two, and that in one armenian settlements or another, families fought deadly battles against the enemy, even if these battles only lasted for a couple of hours. once again, note that such episodes have been described as separate facts/microhistories, yet, there have been no attempts of generalization or of presenting them as a qualitative phenomenon. in many instances (which is measurable) armenians did not docilely wait to be slaughtered. it is diffi cult to explain the reasons why the issue is not analyzed from this standpoint. among other things, not least important is the fact that for decades only historians, for whom “facts” are often identifi ed with “documents,” have engaged in the study of the genocide issues, whereas most of the materials referred to in this study do not belong to that category. the situation has not much changed in recent years. thus, when april arrives, the armenian mass media abounds with the theme of sadness: the innumerable innocent victims are remembered as well as the lost historical homeland, etc. the situation changes radically with the arrival of may, a month that is rightfully considered “a month of victories,” probably because of the battle of avarayr (451), the battle of sardarapat (1918), the victory in the great patriotic war (1945) and the liberation of shushi in the more recent past (1992). the list of the offi cial holidays does not include the heroic struggle of van and its victory (1915). the struggle had begun in april (april 7) and was over in may (may 3), having lasted only 27 days, yet resulted in the saving of at least 200 thousand lives of the people of van-vaspurakan. if the armenian parliament adopted april 7 (or april 19 according to the new style) as self-defense day (even if leaving it a working day), the grave symbol of april as a month of mourning could be gradually changed, or at least be an aid in renaming “a month of struggle and remembrance.” in the case of jews, instances of armed resistance in the years of holocaust had been relatively fewer, or, to be more accurate, different by nature (participation in the underground and thus in the resistance; in the guerrilla movement; resistance in concentration camps, international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 60 etc), yet the holocaust historians consistently pay much attention to this theme and, in particular, to the warsaw ghetto uprising (april-may, 1943). note that the fact that the holocaust commemoration day in israel is offi cially called “holocaust and heroism remembrance day” or “holocaust martyrs’ and heroes’ remembrance day,” the museum – “yad vashem: the holocaust martyrs’ and heroes’ remembrance authority” has been conditioned, among other factors, by this as well. the researchers engaged in the study of the history of holocaust see the solution of the problem in extending the boundaries of the issue and naming it the “jewish response” or giving other similar defi nitions. in this case numerous instances of moral resistance come to the foreground, which at least shakes the decades-old stereotype that the jews had been “slaughtered like sheep” – a defi nition that, as noted above, emerging in some circles of present-day armenian society, leads to manifestations of an inferiority complex, to instances of the perception of the memory of genocide as a burden, and to a recognition of the need for action towards discarding it. the stereotype “slaughtered like sheep” long persisted among the jews as well. the fact that the attitude towards the survivors of the holocaust used to be quite different in the fi rst two decades after the calamity is largely conditioned by this fact. it is a fact that the formation of the state of israel was accompanied by large and small scale wars, which means that the jews, unlike in holocaust years, fought with weapons against the enemy. they were warriors and fi ghters, and it was considered that the image of a survivor of nazi horrors would do nothing to inspire them. only with the пассаге of time this attitude started to change gradually and the recognition of the stories of the survivors and their experiences became a social requirement. the forty days of musa-dagh and jewish resistance it is characteristic that in the jewish ghettos (including those in warsaw) and in the underground that showed resistance to nazism or seeked to do so, franz werfel’s novel, “the forty days of musa dagh,” was widely read. this novel, according to the eyewitnesses, inspired those who struggled against unequal forces, making them confi dent of their own strength. as yair auron, one who has studied the issue meticulously, notes,18 musa dagh has often been compared to the resis tance in the jewish ghettos during the world war ii.19 the jewish underground or ga nizations which operated in the ghettos during the nazi occupation of europe, intensely debated the purpose of their struggle and the meaning of their lives and death in their harsh reality.20 several records from their shocking and fascinating discussions, highlighting moral and existential jewish dilemmas, were found. one of these is the minutes of a general meet ing of kibbutz “tel hai,” a group of jewish activist youth 18. see for details: yair auron, the banality of in diff erence: zionism and the armenian genocide (new brun s wick (usa) and london (uk): transaction pub li shers, 2000), 293–311. see also: hans wagener, understanding franz werfel (columbia, south carolina: south carolina university press, 1993), 115–124; yair auron, “the impact of jewish youth in palestine and europe,” in remembrance and denial: the case of the armenian genocide, ed. richard g. hovannisian (detroit: wayne state university press, 1999), 147–164. 19. yair auron, the banality of indiff erence, p. 293. 20. ibid, p. 301. trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 61 in bialystock (northeast poland), on february 27, 1943. during the discussion, one of the central fi gures of the organi zation, herschel rosenthal, suggested viewing the ghetto as “our musa-dagh,” and so adding “a chapter of honor to the history of jewish bialystock and of our movement.”21 in may 25, 1943 commander of the bialystock underground mordechai tenebaum wrote: “musa-dagh is all the rage with us. if you read it [“the forty days of musa dagh”], you will remember it for the rest of your life.”22 according to chayka grossman, one of the leading fi gures in the leadership of socialist-zionist youth movement in bialystock, copies of the book had been “passed from hand to hand” among the ghetto’s de fen ders, who compared their situation to that of the armenians.23 the same appreciation of this book appeared in the sosnovitz (southern poland), kovno (kaunas, lithuania), and warsaw ghettos youth. another jewish researcher recalled the impact of musa dagh on yitzhak zuckerman (antek), who was one of the leaders of the warsaw ghetto uprising. in his journal, the chronicler of the warsaw ghetto, emmanuel ringelblum, compared the situation in the ghetto with that of musa dagh.24 the book was also infl uential in the western european underground. members of the dutch underground read the book in german. “it was a ‘textbook’ for us,” one of them wrote, “it opened our eyes and spelled out for us what might happen, although we did not know what in fact would occur.”25 the examples cited above indicate the importance and signifi cance that jewish youth movements attributed to “the forty days of musa dagh,” probably before the world war ii and certainly during it. the book was an example, a reference, and, to some extent, a model to be admired and imitated. in a publication on the life of the jewish ghettos in the nazi years, it is stated that26 during the second world war the most widely read books among adults were “the forty days of musa dagh” and “war and peace” by leo tolstoy. as yair auron indicates, it seems that the magnetism of musa dagh which became a symbol for the jewish underground’s resistance fi ghters resulted from the powerful text. during the period of the ghetto, the reality of the ultimate victim became clearer and clearer, at least to the members of the underground. there was, nonetheless, a notion of dignity and self-respect; an admiration for the victim who struggles, rebels, strives for freedom, and maintains his dignity even after his fate is doomed. even the dilemma so widely posed in the context of the holocaust – “going like sheep to slaughter” – appears numerous times in “the forty days of musa dagh,” where the characters state that they have no wish to die in this manner. in this sense the reading of the book fortifi ed the spirit of its readers, future underground fi ghters, as mordechai tenebaum and other underground leaders have suggested. 21. ibid, p. 302. 22. ibid. 23. ibid. 24. ibid, p. 306: 25. ibid. 26. ibid. the author states that (p. 311) he found the information in: david shavit, hunger for the printed world: books and libraries in the jewish ghettoes of nazi-occupied europe (jeff erson, north carolina (usa), and london: mcfarland & co., publishers, 1997). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 62 let me emphasize once again: for the members of the jewish underground the story of the defense of musa dagh was a parable, a model and a source of inspiration. they equated their own fate to that of armenians. in both cases, the persecutor’s purpose was the uprooting, the exile, and the physical annihilation of entire communities, and in both cases, resis tance embodied the idea of an honorable death as a nation, or a chance to be saved as individuals. global response and state formation the evaluation of the forms of the world’s response to the jewish and armenian genocides is closely linked with the armenian identity and with certain elements of the system of armenian perceptions. now then, has the world’s attitude always been indifferent to armenians? armenians have commonly maintained the perception that the great powers have usually sacrifi ced the interests of the armenian people at their convenience, have denied help in the time of need, etc, in order to achieve their own goals and serve their own interests. i believe that this is a rather typical example, not in relation to armenians only, but to many other nations of the world, of an approach taken when a society due to objective or subjective, or both objective and subjective reasons is unable to solve a certain problem unassisted, seeks to put the blame for its failures on someone from outside. thus, even before the end of world war i, eastern armenians managed to proclaim the creation of the republic of armenia. only a week later, the batumi treaty was signed with the state responsible for the armenian genocide, which signifi cantly narrowed down the yet not clearly outlined boundaries of the armenian state. thanks to the victory of the allied states, by the end of the war, the boundaries of the new founded armenian state signifi cantly expanded by the inclusion of the kars region and other territories without any military action. on august 10, 1920 the entente powers and the ottoman empire signed the treaty of sevres, which claimed that the territory of armenia was to be trebled. yet armenia was unable to repulse the recurrent attack of the turks not long after the signing of the treaty; the internal unrest played its role too. the fact remains that thanks to the assistance of the great powers, armenia received the opportunity to become a de jure, powerful middle eastern state, whereas it failed to become de facto. the course of events was different in the case of the jewish people. along with the spread of zionist ideology, “aliyah,” the repatriation of jews towards palestinian territories began under the mandate of the ottoman empire and later of great britain yet populated predominantly by arabs. in the years preceding the formation of the state, the population of the jewish community of the area had reached 650 thousand people. the world at large did not particularly assist this repatriation: there were quotas fi xed by the authorities of the british mandate which were regularly breached not as much with the connivance of the british, as by the mass nature of illegal immigration. the immigration was organized mainly by the effort of the jews. afterwards, the world, in response to the loss of the jews and their persistence, allowed, by the un decree, the creation of a jewish state. right after the proclamation of the state of israel, in may, 1948, wars began with the neighboring arab states. the newly created state withstood and even more – expanded its territory. in short, in the 20th century, the jews succeeded in singlehandedly establishing a more or less de facto (a mass presence in the palestine) status, which was followed with some assistance by trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 63 the great powers to establish a de jure status, creating a small, yet nonetheless powerful, middle eastern state. so, in both the cases of the armenians and jews, the “world” has been both indifferent and compassionate. still, the outcomes remain to be different. crimes against humanity after the defeat of nazi germany, the allies organized an international court-martial for the chief nazi war criminals that lasted for about nine months. the highest-ranking military offi cers and statesmen of nazi germany were called to answer. the nuremberg trial unmasked the essence of german fascism, its plans for the annihilation of whole countries and peoples, and the hazard of fascism to mankind. it is known from history that pan-turkism, too, pursued the extermination of whole countries and peoples. similar to fascism, millions of people, mostly armenians, fell victim to this ideology. as previously promised by the allied states, the pan-turkist young turk leaders were tried after world war i, although the trial never saw a conclusion because of the inconsistency of the allies themselves. as it later became apparent, the allies did not wish to risk their future relations with the turks, and had no intention of punishing the “turk criminal.”27 moreover, they took them under protection. and what happened next? in the words of simon vratsian, the last prime minister of the first republic of armenia: a quarter of a century later, after world war ii, in conditions very much the same, an international court-martial was held in nuremberg for nazi criminals. the nazi leaders were executed and the german people were made to pay an indemnity to jews, to calm the indignant conscience of the ‘civilized humanity.’ different was the attitude of that same ‘civilized humanity’ with regard to armenians. one half of the armenian population of turkey had been massacred in a most vicious way, the other half had been scattered all over the world. the property of armenians was stolen. towns and villages were deserted. and when the time arrived for indemnity, the ‘civilized humanity’ remained unconcerned. the armenians organized, with the “sacred blood of their sons”…their own armenian nuremberg for the turk butchers. [the emphasis is mine—h.m.]28 with the efforts of the armenian political party, “armenian revolutionary federation,” the “nemesis” action was planned, and many of the organizers of the armenian genocide were assassinated by armenian avengers. in the case of jews too, despite the nuremberg trial, right after the war in 1945, a number of groupings of jewish avengers came to assassinate about 1500 or more ss offi cers and offi cials of various levels directly engaged in the actions for the annihilation of jews.29 so, it can be stated that the response of the armenians and the jews with respect to vengeance has been identical. 27. s[imon] v[ratsian], “the armenian nuremberg,” in arshavir shirakian, ktakn er nahataknerun [it was the will of the martyrs] (yerevan: adana, 1991), 75. 28. ibid, pp. 76–77: 29. see for details: morris beckman, the jewish brigade: an army with two masters 1944–1945 (staplehurst, kent: spellmount, 1998). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 64 the americanization of genocide in the monograph devoted to the creation of the united states holocaust memorial museum (ushmm), its author edward t. linenthal, used the following idea in his fi rst sentence: “the holocaust became an event offi cially incorporated into american me mo ry.”30 the idea appears elsewhere in the book, when both positive and negative aspects of the “ame ri canization of holocaust” are considered.31 as linenthal notes when assessing the appointment of a commission on the holocaust in 1978 by president carter, “he signaled that the holocaust had moved not only from the periphery to the center of american jewish consciousness, but to the center of national consciousness as well. too im por tant a story to be bounded by ethnic memory, it was, by virtue of its awesome impact, its poisonous legacy, and its supposed valuable “lessons,” worthy of inclusion in the of fi cial canon that shaped americans’ sense of themselves.”32 on another page he notes that “the report [created by the president’s commission on holocaust] insisted on the jewish core of the holocaust. the event, it insisted, “is essentially jewish, yet its interpretation is universal.”33 on yet another page, he presents the deputy director of the above mentioned commission michael berenbaum’s opinion that “the story [of holocaust] would, how ever, have to be told in a way that would be meaningful to an american audience; it would have to move beyond the boundaries of ethnic memory.”34 as a progress indicator of the phenomenon of “americanization of holocaust,” linenthal presents well known holocaust scholar raul hilberg’s opinion on the reason for the growing interest of university students in the us in courses on the holocaust: “after the disorientation of vietnam, they [americans] wanted to know the difference between good and evil. the holocaust is the benchmark, the defi ning moment in the drama of good and evil.”35 the course taken by the commission for the foundation of the holocaust memorial, even though criticized “in some segments of the american jewish com munity,”36 was nevertheless the only right one. during my interview with the coordinator of the armenian genocide museum of america, dr. rouben adalian, i understood that the same approach was adopted by that museum.37 this approach was infl uenced by close observation of the foundation of the ushmm, and talks with linenthal, as well as the understanding of linenthal’s book. yet, if, in case of holocaust, evil was punished in the highest international courts, and if many the perpetrators admitted their crime and have repented, the situation is very much different in the case of the armenians. to this day, the international community has not 30. edward t. linenthal, preserving memory: the struggle to create america’s ho lo caust museum (new york: columbia university press, 2001), 1. 31. ibid, pp. 44, 216 etc. this phenomenon has been widely considered in many other works on holocaust memory. 32. ibid, pp. 12-13. 33. ibid, p. 36. 34. ibid, pp. 44-45. 35. ibid, p. 11. 36. ibid, p. 13. 37. h. marutyan’s personal archive, recordings. trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 65 legally condemned the armenian genocide; turkey refuses to acknowledge its factuality, insisting that it is a mere fabrication. and, there is no word of compensation on the part of the legal successors of the ottoman empire. in other words, evil has not been punished, and from this aspect, armenians have yet a long way to go. for this reason, the armenian genocide museum in the united states will have to widely display the facts of genocides that occurred in the world during the 20th century, show how a rich historical-cultural heritage created over centuries was largely obliterated, and make future generations aware of the assistance of the american people to armenians during and after the genocide, and thus to make an attempt to link the history of the armenian genocide to 20th century united states history.38 in both cases one can see an effort to take purely ethnic tragedies that were ethnic by nature, beyond the boundaries of ethnicity, and to present them to the world as “evil of international level.” at least in case with ushmm, which has been functioning for 20 years already and has been visited by more than 37 million people, we are faced with facts that show what happens when basic american values are trampled. in particular, this direct link is evident in two inscriptions at the entrance to the museum, one of which is a quotation from george washington, which reads: “the government of the united states... gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance.”39 another indication of such an attempt can be considered the recognition by the general assembly of the united nations in october, 2006, of january 27 (the day of liberation, in 1945, of auschwitz-birkenau, the biggest nazi concentration camp) as the ann ual internatio nal day of commemoration in me mory of the victims of the holocaust. so, in addition to the holocaust remem bran ce day, yom hashoah, observed in israel and in countries with jewish communities on the 27th day of the jewish month of nisan, now another day is offi cially added to be observed by the international community. thus the memory of the holocaust is now offi cially accepted as an important part of the international memory of struggle against evil. so, when armenian scholars and publicists, or ordinary people, compare the armenian genocide with the jewish holocaust, it is not only and not so much a wish to state a historical fact as a wish to make the armenian genocide part of international memory. one manifestation of this intention is the use of holocaust-related terminology in publications on the armenian genocide in english (con centration camp, armenian nu remberg etc). this is also how i am inclined to interpret the following excerpt from linenthal’s book: “each group [polish, armenians, romani] argued that they be longed within the boundaries of the holocaust, and then their representatives made a case for their “space,” their position – always defi ned, however, in relation to the jewish center.”40 38. see for details, for example: rouben adalian, compiler and editor, guide to the armenian genocide in the u.s. archives 1915–1918 (alexandria, va and cambridge, uk, 1994); peter balakian, the burning tigris: the armenian genocide and america’s response (new york: harpercollins, 2003); jay winter, ed., america and the armenian genocide of 1915 (cambridge, uk; new york: cambridge university press, 2003). 39. http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/faq/details.php?lang=en&topic=06#quote_washington 40. edward t. linenthal, op. cit., p. 249. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 66 in the process of becoming part of american memory, armenians are trying to follow the example of the jews. in particular, in a number of u.s. states, april 24 has been declared as commemoration day of the victims of the armenian genocide, and forty-three states have officially recognized the armenian genocide.41 still, it is not yet officially included in the american calendar. the issue of creating an armenian genocide museum in washington pursues the same objective. note that when choosing the site for the museum, the american armenians were comparing its location to that of the ushmm, which is openly implied in, for example, the “ar me nian ge no cide museum of america” video clip.42 the holocaust scholars have in their declarations repeatedly defi ned the occurrences of the beginning of the 20th century as genocide.43 by contrast, in some cases jewish lobbyists have opposed the efforts of armenians to present the fact of genocide to the american public.44 among such recent instances were the activities of anti-de fa ma tion league (adl), which aimed its efforts at denying the mass murder of the armenians to be constituted as genocide.45 linenthal considers the issue of inclusion of the armenian genocide in ushmm in detail. he points out the purely political reasons underlying the results, among them theses of the notion of the “uniqueness of the holocaust” and the pressure of the turks.46 in consequence, the armenians at present are mentioned in ushmm only in the quotation attributed to adolf hitler, and the armenian genocide is mentioned but a couple of times in expert texts broadcast through monitors at wexner center. from september 27 till november 12, 2000, in the least visited part of the museum, in an inconspicuous corner in front of the meyerhoff theatre, a rather large screen titled “the armenian genocide” displayed pictures, maps, and texts on the issue. note that rather primitive texts accompanied this temporary display:47 apart from the title, the word “genocide” occurs not once, and there are no parallels made with the holocaust. on august 25, 2009, the series “voice of america press releases and do cuments,” presented extracts from an interview with bridget conleyzilkic, project director of the ushmm’s committee on conscience, in which a paragraph marked “armenians in world war i” bore a line that reads: “armenia is a controversial case 41. see, for example: “genocide awareness act” clears california state senate. http://www.asbarez. com/2009/06/04/genocide-awareness-act-clears-california-state-senate/; rouben ada l ian, “president obama’s statement on the armenian genocide,” p. 13. 42. see the introductory video about the armenian genocide museum of america, http://www. armeniangenocidemuseum.org/ 43. see, for example: “statement by 126 holocaust scholars, holders of academic chairs, and directors of ho locaust research and studies centers. march 7, 2000,” new york times, june 9, 2000, http:// www.genocide-museum.am/eng/126.php 44. see, for example: peter novick, the holocaust in american life (boston and new york: houghton miffl in, 1999), 192–193. 45. see for details: david boyagian, “confronting the denialist jewish lobby: mission accom plished?” the armenian weekly, april 1, 2009. 46. see for details: edward t. linenthal, op. cit., pp. 228-239, peter novick, op. cit., pp. 192-193. 47. the document titled “script final. pdf” and the photograph were kindly given us by edward phillips, editor of “genocide prevention e-newsletter” at ushmm, at the request of steven feldman. trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 67 today…,” “there is a lot at stake in being able to say that genocide happened.”48 such an attitude has its grounds: a museum is an offi cial establishment and is obliged to demonstrate the operating doctrines of u.s. policy in its offi cial information. despite this offi cial us policy, there is not one researcher in all the research departments of the museum who would question the fact of the armenian genocide. articles on the topic are regularly published in the academic periodical of the museum, “holocaust and genocide studies.” the architecture of genocide memory naturally, the “physical container” of the holocaust memory, considered as an important part of american memory, couldn’t have been situated in an ordinary location. on page two of linenthal’s book is written, that: “the dedication of a museum lo cated adjacent to the ceremonial center of the nation, the washington mall, empha sized the holocaust’s place in the official memory of the nation.”49 further on in the book, the author dwells in detail on the issues of place and site selection for the construction of the museum. some characteristic quotes are: thus, the members of the president’s commission were of the opinion that “since this was to be a ‘national’ memorial, washington, d.c., was the proper location.” or “a museum built in new york, even if national in intent, would clear ly be perceived as a jewish museum built in the heart of the jewish community in america. memory of the holocaust would remain the province of american jews. a national museum in washington, on the other hand, made a more expansive – and cont roversial – claim on memory.” or “what was more attractive, of course, was the site’s location. not only would there be a national museum to the holocaust in the nation’s capital, but, by virtue of its location just off the mall, the museum would gain the prestige of a central national memorial.” or “for survivors, a museum within the mo numental core was especially important. it was the logical extension of their desire and need to make holocaust memory permanent” and “a museum at the heart of ame ri can commemorative space was viewed as an eternal insurance policy.”50 as has been stated above, the agma will be located, if not on the washington mall perceived as the “ceremonial center of the nation,” still on a site no less significant – only a couple of blocks, a few minutes’ walk from the white house. how, then, was the problem solved not abroad, in the diaspora, but in the countries that stand for the sovereignty of the two peoples, the jews and the armenians, who have suffered genocide – in israel and in the republic of armenia? note that the territory of ra has not been part of the territory shown in maps in circulation for several decades, of the places where genocide was perpetrated. similarly, nor was the holocaust perpetrated in israel.51 48. when can it be considered genocide and why it matters. 1049 words. 25 august 2009. voice of ame rica press releases and documents. cy copyright (c) 2009 federal information & news dis patch, inc. voa english service. document voa0000020090825e58p00037. 49. edward t. linenthal, op. cit., p. 2. 50. ibid, pp. 57, 58, 59, 61, 63-72, 256. 51. issues relating to the domain of studies of the armenian genocide memory that face the sociopolitical and academic thought of the beginning of the 21st century are not limited to the above. other domains international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 68 drawing parallels between the genocide memorial in armenia and yad vashem in israel is a matter of elaborate study. here are some parallels: in armenia, the wooded hill of tsitsernakaberd was selected as a location for the construction of the memorial complex for the victims of the genocide. it was rather far, about an hour walk from the center of the capital. it is perceived as a cemetery, and the annual marches to the memorial combine collective memory and burial rituals to become a particular manifestation of national identity.52 mount herzl, on the western slope of which yad vashem is located, is considered a national cemetery, where jewish and israeli national and public fi gures, as well as the fallen soldiers of the israel defense forces are buried. though tzitzernakaberd is currently not a cemetery, it was during the bronze age (burial sites were found here in 1920s), and the part of the complex showcasing the eternal fi re has been designed as a crypt. it was due to this perception of the place as cemetery, too, that in 1991 some of the victims of the armed confl icts on the armenian-azer bai jani border were buried in the immediate vicinity of the genocide monument. the authorities, however, brought this prac tice to a halt. there is usually a chapel in or beside any armenian cemetery. there is no chapel in the area of the genocide me mo rial complex. this “omission” seems to have been noted by the church. on april 24, 2005 the holy see of echmiadzin placed a stone slab near the monument, with an ins cription stating that a chapel would be built there in the memory of the martyrs.53 there is a synagogue on the territory of yad vashem too. though there is no structure intended for religious rites in ushmm, architecturally spiritual feelings impression is created by the hall of remembrance. in the tzitzernakaberd museum, the religious element is manifested by its cross-like windows. in the armenian language, one of the synonyms for “cemetery” is the term “restingplace.”54 it is considered important not to disturb the dead by locating places of worldly entertain ment nearby. when in the mid-1980s the construction of a sports and concert complex on the slope of tsitsernakaberd hill was proposed, there was huge public opposition to the plan and its actual con st ruction, which was considered sacrilegious. critical remarks about a res taurant being located on the approaches of the armenian genocide memorial can still be heard. there are several eateries functioning on the territory of the memorial complex for comparison between the armenian and jewish genocides are: the boundaries of “genocide victim” concept in armenian and jewish cases; ways of “individualization” of the holocaust; questions as to the survivors’ telling what they have experienced; forms of pilgrimage to the “places of remembrance”; the specifi cies of memory preservation in homeland and diaspora; the forms of memory preserving (archives, museums, educational institutions); and the emphasises, the similarities and diff erences in the culture of memorialization; the ways of memory awakening and transforming it to a factor; the potential of genocide/holocaust memory; interrelation between memory and indemnifi cation, etc. 52. see for details: harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity, 40-46. 53. it is of interest that the architect of the armenian genocide memorial mr. sashur kalashyan wrote an “open letter” (may 10, 2005) where he was categorically against the idea. probably his architect’s professional instinct told him that in that case the memorial would com pletely acquire cemetery functions. his criticism was taken into consideration, but only partially: a cha pel will be built on the territory of the complex, but farther from the memorial itself than was origi nal ly planned. 54. see: st. malkhasyants, dictionary of armenian language, vol. iii (yerevan: state press of armenian ssr, 1944), 45. trauma аnd identity: on structural particularities оf armenian genocide аnd jewish holocaust 69 that have opened in the years after the declaration of independence.55 there is an opinion, that tzitzernakaberd was deliberately chosen for the sports and concert complex, in order to de-sanctify the territory.56 each year on april 24 about one million people visit the genocide memorial complex to pay tribute to the martyrs. in the years of the karabagh movement in 1988-1990, this pilgrimage often grew into political demonstrations with countless posters, banners and wreaths bearing political messages. an analysis of the posters seen at the memorial clearly shows how the image of a victim pleading for justice was gradually replaced by that of a warrior who had realized that national objec tives could be achieved through struggle only.57 today, the genocide me mo rial complex is armenia’s single venue in which all various political, economic, and non-governmental organizations have the opportunity to “mark their presence” once a year. 55. see for details: r. arshakyan, “the “bear-pit” spreads its wings,” aravot, september 2, 2004n. babayan, “mourning and carousing side by side,” aravot, october 26, 2007; j. hakobyan, “cultural confl ict: construction on the territory of the genocide memorial gives rise to people’s discontent,” http://www.armenianow.com/hy/features/7805/cultural_clash_development_of_geno, october 2, 2007; 56. the opinions were voiced in the discussions at the international conference, “from memory to remembrance,” on the 40th anniversary of the tzitzernakaberd genocide memorial complex (yerevan, november 27-28, 2007) where i was present too. 57. see for details: harutyun marutyan, op. cit., p. 277. 50 dr. phil. tessa hofmann, magistra artium, prof. h.c., studied philology (slavic literatures and languages, armenian studies) and sociology at the freie universität berlin (fub); 1983-2015 research associate at the institute for eastern european studies of the fu berlin; research associate in international research projects (e.g. “out-migration from armenia and georgia”, 2008-2012); since 2015 independent scholar; author of numerous publications on the history, culture and present situation of armenia and its diaspora, on genocide research with a focus on ottoman genocide, on minorities in turkey and the south caucasus (https://independent.academia.edu/tessahofmann). since 1979 volunteer human rights work, e.g. as chair of the non-profit working group recognition against genocide, for international understanding; spokeswoman of the board of the association for the promotion of an ecumenical memorial for genocide victims in the ottoman empire. email: tessa.hofmann@katwastan.de 51 traces leading to pontus and the bosporus the ottoman genocide in german language (post) migrant prose tessa hofmann free university berlin, germany this literary analysis examines the representation of the ottoman genocide against armenians and greeks in contemporary german prose using four examples of family narratives and travel texts, respectively. two of the authors analyzed – katerina poladyan and laura cwiertnia – represent fictional prose, while mirko heinemann and michael asderis represent factual prose. written three to four generations after the ottoman genocide, all four authors ask themselves what the events of that time mean for the descendants of survivors: a burden or a legacy obligatory to preserve or remember? at the same time, genre hybridity as a characteristic of post-genocidal or post-migrant german prose is analyzed. keywords: ottoman genocide, post-migrant prose, post-genocidal prose, intergenerational experience, family novel, travel prose. this article was submitted on 10.03.2021 and accepted for publication on 27.04.2021. how to cite: tessa hofmann, “traces leading to pontus and the bosporus: the ottoman genocide in german language (post) migrant prose),” international journal of armenian genocide studies 7, no. 1(2022): 51-71. introduction the abundance and literary quality of contributions by the third and fourth post-genocidal generations of armenians and greeks to the u.s., french, and transnational prose in contemporary literature is remarkable. as i noted in a 2014 essay,1 these are (semi-) biographical narratives from authors’ family histories, centered on the ottoman genocide and the loss of ancestral homeland (patricide). a simultaneously developed variant of contemporary turkish prose can be described as “coming-out”, for this prose touches on social taboos and identity issues that have existed for decades and continue to exist up to the present, because of the ottoman genocide of approximately three million christians. the best-known author of such taboo-breaking literature is the istanbul lawyer fethiye çetin, whose work anneannem (“my grandmother,” 2004) has had an impact far beyond 1 tessa hofmann, “zwischen coming-out, identitätsstiftung und (an)klage: der völkermord an den armeniern in der erinnerungsprosa der us-armenischen diaspora und in der türkei,” armenological issues 1 (2014): 76-91. 52 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0029 turkey thanks to numerous translations. the fact that the discovery of a grandmother’s armenian ancestry may trigger a social shock even decades after the 1915 genocide has become comprehensible to numerous non-turkish readers through this book.2 with a time-lag, the genre has now found its way into contemporary german-language prose. the “gateway” is so-called (post)migrant prose, which is very pronounced in germany, not only thanks to the extensive community of people born in turkey, or people with a so-called turkish migrant background. in addition, authors from the post-soviet areas, such as the georgia-born nino haratishvili or the actress katerina poladyan, who was born in moscow in 1971, have likewise introduced the historical experience of their countries or their ethnic groups of origin into german-language literature. the term “postmigrant” reflects the unwillingness of numerous authors to be reduced to their ancestry or “migration history.” the germanist jara schmidt formulated the term in 2020 as follows: in recent anthologies and essayistic prose, attention is increasingly being drawn to intersectional discrimination in germany, for example in: fatma aydemir / hengameh yaghoobifarah (eds.): your homeland is our nightmare (2019); kübra gümüşay: language and being (2020); reyhan şahin: yalla, feminism! (2019). what repeatedly comes to the fore in these social critiques is a frustration at having to constantly explain or even justify one’s own condition, for example, one’s origin or ancestry or one’s religion. this state of having to explain oneself and the discrimination that goes along with it result in an almost collective feeling: rage.3 the four authors on whom my analysis is based represent a subgenre of migrant or post-migrant prose in the german language; it could also be called post-genocidal literature, because it is based on migration experiences triggered by the ottoman genocide. however, the experiences of persecution and the trauma of extermination of the armenian or greek ancestors of these authors, who come from transnational families, date back to mostly four generations ago. narrative communities, on the other hand, usually span only three generations: from grandparents to grandchildren. after that, experiential knowledge is no longer transmitted individually and personally, but as a component of collective, usually written knowledge. how do the authors, examined here deal with this fact? how do they and their protagonists approach events that took place more than 100 years ago? fictional and factual prose a distinction between fictional and factual prose can already be found in aristotle’s “poetics” (4th century bc). according to him, historians and poets differ in that “the one communicates what really happened, the other what may have happened.” 2 ibid., 80-86. 3 jara schmidt, “postmigrantische literatur und germanistik,” multicultural germany project, 3 november 2020, https://mgp.berkeley.edu/2020/11/03/schmidt-postmigrantische-literatur-german/, accessed 27.04.2022. https://mgp.berkeley.edu/2020/11/03/schmidt-postmigrantische-literatur-german/ 53 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus in the prose on the ottoman genocide, however, this distinction becomes blurred, as it fluctuates strikingly between fact-based narrative forms and varying degrees of fictionality. moreover, especially for fictional prose, the mixture of two novel genres is characteristic: the family or generational novel and the travel novel. for the generational novel, the conflicts between generations are significant, as is the motif of legacy. both genres are apparently necessary to enable the authors not only to approach the now very distant time of the ottoman genocide but, at the same time, serve to introduce the geographically as well as culturally distant armenia as the presumed country of origin. fictional prose: two travel novels k. poladyan (berlin) and l. cwiertnia (hamburg; born 1987) are daughters of armenian fathers and survivors of the genocide of 1915/6. cwiertnia’s armenian family, as she confided to me, originally derives from sinope. the black sea port city is also the place of origin of the family of her literary protagonist karla, but the city remains anonymous and vague in cwiertnia’s novel. karla’s grandmother emigrated from istanbul as a “turkish guest worker” after the anti-greek istanbul pogrom (“septembriana” 6/7 september 1955).4 the family of poladyan’s protagonist helen mazavian originates from kars, but the search for the origins of an armenian family bible leads helen to the black sea coast and the port town of kotyora/ordu. this choice of the place of origin of an armenian family story lends poladyan’s narrative the character of arbitrariness: although more than half of the population of kotyora at the beginning of the 20th century were christians, most were, however, greeks. the actress and author poladyan grew up speaking russian, while the journalist and author cwiertnia spoke german in a working-class neighborhood (bremen-nord); she now works as an editor for the renowned weekly newspaper die zeit. the protagonists of both authors obviously display autobiographical traits. like her first-person narrator karla, author l. cwiertnia went on a trip to armenia with her father in 2016.5 in her novel, she uses the legacy motif: with the journey to armenia, karla wants to fulfill the last wish of her recently deceased grandmother maryam, because karla’s journey is dedicated to the search for a certain lilit kuyumciyan, who is to receive a golden bracelet. like cwiertnia’s real armenian father, karla’s father avi has never been to armenia before. k. poladyan’s protagonist helen, in turn, travels via istanbul to yerevan, where she is to complete a three-month internship in manuscript restoration at the matenadaran manuscript museum-institute. she practices her skills on 4 the author’s armenian grandmother is still alive. she also came from istanbul and arrived in germany in 1968 as a guest worker. l. cwiertnia tells the fate of her grandmother in her article “the forgotten,” zeit-magazin, no. 18/2022, 27 april 2022. 5 laura cwiertnia, “zeigst du mir die heimat, in der du noch nie warst, von der du aber ständig träumst, papa?” die zeit, 19 january 2019, https://www.zeit.de/2017/04/armenien-tuerkei-reise-familie-vater-geschichte, accessed 02.03.2022. https://www.zeit.de/2017/04/armenien-tuerkei-reise-familie-vater-geschichte 54 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 an armenian family bible (“healing bible”), whose signs of use and colophons soon raise the question concerning its previous owners. in both novels, then, it is objects that trigger the protagonists’ quest for the past. in the tradition of russian-language travel texts beginning with alexander pushkin’s wartime travelogue (a journey to arzrum [erzerum] during the campaign of 1829, “путешествие в арзрум во время похода 1829 года”), armenia assumed an important role in the russian prose of the 19th and especially the soviet-dominated 20th centuries. while pushkin perceived armenia in the early 19th century, from a russian perspective, still largely as a curiosity and was ultimately disappointed, soviet armenia rose, for russian writers and their readers, to become the symbol of world culture, because it replaced, for educated citizens of the soviet union, the ancient mediterranean cultural heritage of greece and italy, inaccessible to them. the poets andrey belyi (1880-1934), ossip mandelstam (1891-1938)6 and the prose writer andrey bitov (1937-2018) were equally fascinated by armenia. moreover, mandelstam, a jew born in warsaw, recognized the kinship of fate between jews and armenians, which is why he called armenia the “younger sister of the hebrew soil.” belyi and bitov traveled through armenia at the invitation and under the expert guidance of prominent armenian intellectuals; in belyi’s case it was the classic armenian modern painter, martiros saryan (1880-1972), whom bely already knew from moscow7 and, in bitov’s case his friend and fellow writer hrant matevosyan (1935-2002), the most renowned prose writer in soviet armenia after the second world war. bitov, a native of st. petersburg, recorded his travel impressions in his book armyanskie uroki (“armenian lessons,” 1969); it did not pass through the censors entirely unscathed. matevosyan’s remarks on armenia’s history, culture, and fate are cited anonymously as utterances of “the friend,” perhaps in deference to the censors of the time. the german edition (2002) of the second version of bitov’s uroki notes, in the blurb, the special significance of armenia for russian readers and authors: russians have always longed for armenia, their south, their italy. for bitov, as for mandelstam, it is a country that wants to be read. here history has ‘no beginning’ – it has always been there. there is no village that was not once the capital of an ancient state in prehistoric times, no hill that was not the site of a decisive battle, no stone that was not covered in blood, and no man who is indifferent to it.8 6 carmen sippl, reisetexte der russischen moderne: andrej belyj und osip mandel’stam im kaukasus (münchen: verlag otto sagner, 1997) https://www.academia.edu/36257239/reisetexte_der_russischen_moderne?email_work_card=reading-history. 7 ibid., 117. 8 andrej bitow, armenische lektionen: eine reise aus russland (frankfurt/main: suhrkamp, 2002), quoting the text on the left inside the cover. https://www.academia.edu/36257239/reisetexte_der_russischen_moderne?email_work_card=reading-history https://www.academia.edu/36257239/reisetexte_der_russischen_moderne?email_work_card=reading-history 55 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus poladyan’s travel novel is obviously in the tradition of such russian-language travelogues about armenia. these works are about discoveries of the unknown and deliberate confrontation with the hitherto unknown. this is also indicated by the title of poladyan’s novel: “here are lions – hic sunt leones” (or hic sunt dracones) is the usual paraphrase of medieval maps for undiscovered, unknown and therefore uncanny regions, the “terra incognita.” poladyan’s narrative style and her narration are similar to bitov’s: a foreigner embarks on a journey to armenia and presents armenia, its culture and history from the perspective of a stranger to the country. bitov and poladyan do this in a light, miniature, unobtrusive and, for long stretches, pleasingly non-didactic style, with humor, a wink and also unmistakable sympathy for a people afflicted by fate. similar to bitov’s and belyi’s, poladyan’s protagonist and first-person narrator helen mazavian arrives as a stranger in armenia, which was unknown to her previously and, just like bitov and bely, she meets a local cicerone there. in helen’s case, it is evelina, her superior at the matenadaran, who doesn’t just introduce her to the secrets of armenian book art. in poladyan’s novel, and especially through evelina, one learns a lot about armenian book art, healing and family bibles with their history-revealing handwritten marginal and end notes. this emphasis is not accidental, but stems from the conviction that armenians form an ancient cultural, if not a “book-nation”. evelina explains to helen the armenian fixation on the past and book worship or highly developed book art as a result of centuries of persecution experiences: why do you think our bibles are so small and handy compared to the occidental manuscripts? many of these heavyweight western manuscripts are too selfconscious, saying, “i want to influence you, i want to intimidate you.” armenian family bibles had to be small enough for you could tuck them under your arm at any time. that’s what people did. some left their own children behind rather than leave their bibles. people were always prepared for uncertain times, always ready to flee. people found comfort in family bibles; they were used, not just looked at and put back in their place. you are german. you know heinrich heine; you will know what heine wrote about books as being a portable home. it was always about protection and defense, hence the sturdy binding, the pages being tightly pressed to provide protection against insects. pests could not easily penetrate a tightly bound book. this people have always been afraid of disappearing. (...) i am talking about centuries of persecution. we are still living in history, not in the here and not in the now. in books, perhaps in the face of death, eternity revealed itself. (...)9 9 katerina poladyan, hier sind löwen; roman (frankfurt am main: fischer, 2019), 61-62. 56 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 unconnected plot threads: the travel novel and historical retrospective beginning with the section “devotion and waste”10 poladyan’s novel tells the story of an armenian family from the black sea port city of ordu (greek kotyora) in parallel with the present-day travel novel plot: the father owns an inn on the black sea beach. he and his eldest son sarkis are seized one day by gendarmes, then the two girls sona and keghuhi were too. their mother is killed. only 14-year-old anahid and her younger brother hrant manage to escape. starving, the siblings roam the mountains. in the main plot of the travel novel, helen becomes involved with levon, her superior evelina’s son. she falls in love with the amateur bass player and professional officer, but abruptly breaks off the relationship when she realizes how strong her feelings for him are. shortly thereafter, levon conveniently dies in a military accident, so helen is no longer forced to choose between him and her boyfriend danil, who remained in germany. helen does not attend levon’s funeral, but instead goes on a brief visit to ordu, kars and lake van, accompanied by her istanbul acquaintance tarık, before returning to yerevan, where she is met by danil for her return to germany. these passages seem somewhat contrived. only once in the novel’s plot, in the ordu chapter, do the storylines of the present and the past collide, for it is here helen and tarık meet sisters seda and melek, who live in the former armenian quarter and whose father was apparently hrant, the uprooted boy from the retrospective subplot. his life and story of suffering is told in fragmentary form by seda: hrant first comes into the “care” of an ottoman orphanage, then of a pontus greek shoemaker, then of a cretan muslim who had to leave crete after the greek-turkish population exchange. hrant is given a new name each time. in the meantime, he has long since lost the family bible, the symbol of his armenian identity. the reader also learns that greeks and armenians did not get along well in ordu; according to poladyan, the number of armenians there was 20,000; in fact, it was far lower, only being three thousand. more than half of the population of ordu in the early 20th century were christians, mostly greeks.11 the number of armenians, who had emigrated mostly from the area of giresun and tamzara to the town of ordu as late as in the second half of the 19th century, was about 3,000; the armenian population of the entire kaza of ordu numbered 13,565 in 1914.12 poladyan’s narrative about the fate of the armenian family that once owned the bible helen was to restore is thus atypical and appears peculiarly pale in comparison to the narrative of helen’s impressions in post-soviet armenia set in the present. 10 laura cwiertnia, auf der straßen heißen wir anders (stuttgart: klett-cotta, 2022), 37. 11 at the turn of the 20th century, the city was more than half christian (greek and armenian) and was known for its greek schools. according to a 1911 statistical survey on “greek villages in pontus,” 39,800 greek orthodox christians lived in the kaza of ordu in 109 communities, with 100 schools, a monastery and 80 “private chapels.” 103 other churches were catholic. see konstantinos emm. fotiadis, the genocide of the pontian greeks (monee, il., 2020) 58. 12 raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (london, new york: i.b. tauris, 2011), 483-484. 57 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus her novel has little action. where there is action, it appears unmediated, as in helen’s abrupt separation from levon or anahid’s from her brother hrant. in armenia, helen gets to know her boss evelina՚s family: husband araik, evelina՚s son levon and his little daughter julia, as well as ano from syria, who remains the only diaspora armenian in the novel, and some younger colleagues. thus, her stay in armenia seems strangely devoid of any consequences and superficial: helen neither uses it to clarify her own identity, nor gets involved in lasting relationships with people in and from armenia. her relationship with her armenian mother sara also remains in limbo. helen goes in search of her mother’s relatives in armenia and does find them, but this too remains an emotionally inconsequential relationship. and even helen’s mother suddenly seems indifferent to the results of the search for relatives; it is also uncertain what armenia or armenian ancestry mean to sara mazavian. all the protagonists seem to avoid any real contact. apart from the encounter between helen mazavian and hrant’s daughters seda and melek in ordu, poladyan’s retrospective on the fate of hrant and anahid remains almost unconnected with the main plot – helen mazavian’s travel novel. at the end of the novel, anahid abruptly separates from her brother, thus leaving him to assimilate because she sees her separation as saving him. anahid, too, avoids further emotional attachment at the end. her own fate remains open, like so much in this novel. cwiertnia’s post-migrant family novel likewise resembles a travel novel from the 7th chapter on. daughter karla and her father avi travel through armenia like all tourists. the chapter opens with mount ararat as an unavoidable cliché of every armenian trip, then it goes to khor virab and lake sevan. strange and familiar homelands cwiertnia’s novel underlines the fact that armenia has not become a home for the armenians who have fled from istanbul and turkey. the father, avi, is initially reluctant to travel to armenia: “... it is not good to deal with these old things!”13 he also refuses to visit the yerevan genocide museum out of the same conviction. his relationship to armenia and its history remains contradictory until the end of the novel: on the one hand, he calls the foreign country his home, and on the other, he plays the cicerone for his daughter, pompously trying to explain the country and its inhabitants to her. this is not without stereotypical attributions: “armenians are enterprising”;14 even his daughter karla does not always successfully avoid ethnic stereotypes: the large armenian noses appear twice in the novel.15 the tensions between father and daughter sharpen in armenia. there, karla perceives her father as a foreign person, even a comic figure, because he simply does not fit into the 13 cwiertnia, straße, 60. 14 ibid., 133. 15 ibid., 112. 58 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 surroundings, speaks too loudly, is dressed differently, i.e. conspicuously.16 this triggers karla’s reflections on the concept of home: “how are you supposed to find a home in a place you’ve never been in?”17 in armenia, even the sunflower seeds are unfamiliar to her father, because they are prepared differently than in turkey; the schnapps (“oghi”), which in armenia is usually vodka and not aniseed schnapps as in turkey, also remains strange to him. but it is only in armenia that father and daughter discover the contrast between a familiar homeland and an unfamiliar foreign country. armenia is a necessary experience for them both. only there does avi realize that “yaya” (‘grandmother’) is not an armenian word. that it is a greek word and indicative of the family’s origin from the predominantly greek town of sinope is a reality that l. cwiertnia unfortunately does not elaborate on; perhaps she herself being unaware of the connection. karla recognizes that turkey and especially istanbul as the real homeland of her family: “in istanbul i looked, for the first time, for the fragments of history that my father wants to blur.”18 although avi leaves istanbul and his parental home at the early age of 17, the city and the treatment of its ethno-religious minorities have left a deep impression on him: he is bothered by nationalism and prejudice, including his own mother’s prejudice against a german as the mother of her grandson. because of his minority affiliation, he has learned to deceive: “avi knew better than most how to pretend without blowing his cover. but there was nothing that made him more uncomfortable.”19 he quickly makes friends among germans. l. cwiertnia describes him as unprejudiced, open-minded and cosmopolitan. at the age of eight, avi occasionally sells newspapers on the street, unbeknown to his father, a cobbler who had to work as a shoeshine boy after the 1955 “septembriana.” avi has wanderlust, longs for germany. he skips school and spends the night outside his father’s house, in trucks in a parking lot nearby. later it becomes clear that his skipping out is not only out of boredom, but also because of ‘the pledge’ that the students have to recite every day: “happy the one who calls himself a turk…”;20 however, his history teacher has told avi that he is exempt from ‘the pledge’ and consequently is not allowed to recite it.21 when avi is caught stealing from a store, the owner recognizes him as the son of the armenian shoeshine boy. the delinquent is handed over, in a humiliating way, to his father. the father now beats avi, mainly because he has broken the following rule: “don’t cause problems. don’t talk back to anyone. don’t mess with a turk under any circumstances. and, never, never with the police!”22 16 ibid., 163. 17 ibid., 164. 18 ibid., 160. 19 ibid., 74. 20 ne mutlu türküm diyene (turkish for “happy the one who calls himself a turk”) is one of atatürk’s mottoes that is still widely used in turkey today. the entire wording was used in turkish schools from 1933 to 2013. this text was recited by a boy or girl every morning before classes began, as a pledge and was repeated by all the other students after the national anthem was sung. 21 cwiertnia, straße, 174. 22 ibid., 131. 59 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus armenian life in turkey after 1915 meant invisibility. camouflage and at least outward conformity formed the consequences of racist discrimination against armenian genocide survivors, the “left-overs of the sword.” the camouflage of istanbul armenians begins with their christian first names: maryam is called meryem outside her home, her husband hagop hüseyin.23 the short form of her son avedis’ name is armenian avo, but in istanbul his family calls him avi, because it sounds so much like ali. the fact that armenians are still threatened four decades after the genocide is portrayed in the 16th chapter, titled “maryam.” it deals with the night of the pogrom on 6 september 1955. the small cobbler’s shop, which maryam’s husband hagop inherited from his father, is marked with a cross in advance of the pogrom. avi’s family is holed up in their apartment on the night of 6 september 1955, awaiting the gangs of killers. at the same time, there are flashbacks to maryam’s past: she was married off to hagop by her mother armine when she was only 14, which is why the date of birth in her identity document was raised to 18 by bribing the registrar. armine also prevented maryam from attending school because she is allegedly mentally disturbed. here, a mother imposes her own fate on her daughter, as armine was also forcibly married at a very young age. atrocities repeat themselves, victims become perpetrators. in her ordu chapter, katerina poladyan manages a very accomplished portrayal of a hybrid situation characteristic of the last armenians living outside istanbul; in it, the two daughters of her protagonist hrant, seda and melek, embody, respectively, the armenian and turkish legacy of this genocide survivor forced to adopt. asked about the family and healing bible, the following dialogue unfolds: “did our father have a bible? asked melek. yes, our father was armenian, said seda. our father was turkish, said melek. our father was armenian. maybe seda got something mixed up, master ibrahim said that could happen when one had lived here for eighty-six years. then he said goodbye, the business calling him back. he was a turk, melek said. what was his name? what did you call him? asked seda. i called him baba, like you did. seda said the neighbours sometimes came over for tea and brought nut cakes drenched in heavy honey. back home, the neighbours said ‘we were with the infidels’, they didn’t say ‘we were with seda and melek’. that’s how it used to be, they said, just like now. gâvur mahallesi, neighbourhood of the infidels, they said, not ermeni mahallesi. but in the end, we are children of the republic, in the end we are children of atatürk, melek shouted.”24 23 ibid., 211. 24 poladyan, löwen, 232. 60 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 what poladyan presents here, in her own concise manner, tempered by humor and light irony, is in line with raphael lemkin’s definition of genocide in his seminal work axis rule in occupied europe (1943). according to this definition, the decisive factor in genocide is not so much physical extermination as the complete disappearance of a nationally, ethnically, or religiously defined group.25 their members may survive massacres and deportations, but can no longer appear publicly as armenians. the next step in this forced assimilation is, as in melek’s case, the complete acceptance of the identity of the perpetrator group. (post)migrant family novel: on the street we’re called by a different name family or generational novels – the term “family novel” goes back to sigmund freud – were considered a “worn-out genre” after wwii, but since the 1990s have experienced a renewed boom and currently constitute perhaps the most popular novel genre in european and north american literature. the memoir literature within post-migrant prose has been particularly strong in following this trend. laura cwiertnia’s hybrid travel novel, for example, simultaneously forms a backward-looking armenian family history. the penultimate chapter, titled ‘armine’, provides the starting point of the plot, with the genocide of 1915 and the key to understanding the subsequent biographies and fates from more recent times. the narrative style is almost multi-perspective, but only the chapters titled ‘karla’ are told in first person. the period covered spans four generations: from great-grandmother armine to her daughter maryam and her grandson avedis (avi) kunduracı, to great-granddaughter karla; the flashbacks to karla’s childhood and youth are titled “karlotta.” l. cwiertnia’s exposition is reminiscent of that of fethiye çetin, whose “anneannem” also begins with the funeral of an armenian grandmother, except that here it is not a muslim but an armenian apostolic funeral in a run-down working-class neighborhood of bremen, where the protagonist karla/karlotta hangs out with an international gang of “asi kids” (asocial children) in a playground or in their apartments, yearning for a higher and socially enhanced status. the third chapter, again titled karla, continues the main plot: after the grandmother’s funeral, a wake is held in her small apartment. grandmother maryam left a kind of written testament behind as well as various objects, including a gold bangle with the handwritten note inscribed “lilit kuyumciyan.” the clarification of its origin becomes the external trigger for the rest of the novel’s plot, especially the journey to armenia. but it is not until the last chapter (“armine”) that the mystery of lilit is cleared up: she is karla’s great-grandmother armine’s youngest sister; the two sisters armine 25 raphael lemkin, axis rule in occupied europe: laws of occupation; analysis of government proposals for redress concord (carnegie endowment for peace, 1944; new ed.: clark, new jersey: the lawbook exchange, 2005), 79-80. 61 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus and lilit lose sight of each other during the genocide. armine’s entire family is deported, while armine delivers goods – the gold bangle – to a muslim customer for her father, a goldsmith, thus escaping deportation. only in the penultimate chapter does the reader learn that armine is later taken by armenian rescuers to an orphanage in istanbul, where she is married off at an early age. it remains unclear how the gold bangle came into armine’s possession, as it seems unlikely that she would have taken it back after her errand. almost at the end of the novel, avi advises his daughter to get rid of the bangle and, with it, the burden of her armenian family legacy: “(...) it’s just ballast, much too heavy to carry.”26 l. cwiertnia leaves open what karla decides. poladyan’s family novel also is open-ended, but with the author’s confession of fundamental human goodness. after her protagonist anahid makes sure that her little brother can stay with the friendly turkish goatherd they met on the way in the mountains, she falls asleep, exhausted, on the black sea beach and it remains unclear whether she will ever wake up. but hrant would do well with this woman. of course, he would do well. man is good, only sometimes he forgets to be good. but hrant will live. the mother is dead. ‘turn around anahid, turn around at last’, she shouts and anahid does so and sees everything. (...) the familiar sea is familiarly calm in front of her. anahid lies down in the sand and lets the last rays of the sun warm her. (...) she closes her eyes and slips into sleep. whoever wants to wake her, should do so gently.27 factual prose ambivalent constantinople/istanbul as previously mentioned, german-language prose on the ottoman genocide mixes fictional and factual literature. this can be seen particularly clearly in michael asderis’ book the gateway to bliss28 (2018), which the publisher appropriately classifies as “narrative nonfiction” on its cover. the legacy motif characteristic of the fictional family or generational novel is likewise echoed in factual family prose. similar to the healing bible in poladyan’s novel and the gold bangle in cwiertnia’s novel, it is an object that leads michael asderis’ autobiographical first-person narrator into the past: the small mother-of-pearl cross that michael asderis (b. 1950 in istanbul) takes with him from his mother’s apartment in frankfurt/main when he has to clear out the apartment after her death at the end of march 2004; it had hung over the door of his family’s istanbul apartment in the pangaltı district 26 cwiertnia, straße, 238. 27 poladyan, löwen, 284-285. 28 michael asderis, das tor zur glückseligkeit: migration, heimat, vertreibung – die geschichte einer istanbuler familie (berlin: binooki, 2018). 62 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 for many years. the death of a mother or grandmother as an exposition of a narrative about the fate of a family resembles both fethiye çetin’s memoir and cwiertnia’s later novel. michael asderis is descended, on his father’s side, from greeks of ottoman and greek nationality and, on his mother’s side, from catholic italians from trieste, who in turn married armenians and greeks of italian, greek and especially ottoman nationality. “what these people experienced decisively shaped their collective memory across generations. the small mother-of-pearl cross from my parents’ apartment represents, for me, a symbol of this society which had been a part of istanbul since byzantine times. those who were greek-speaking among them referred to themselves as romyos29 and not as ellines, even if they were greek citizens.”30 from a denominational point of view, his maternal family is particularly diverse: in addition to italian, there are also greek and armenian catholics in it. m. asderis explains their highly interesting social and migrational peculiarities using the example of his grandparents andrea poldrugo and anastasia casa: many of the young male immigrants from europe married local catholic women. they were either greek-speakers from the aegean islands31 or armenians. the young wives helped the immigrants to integrate quickly into the long-established catholic society of constantinople. but they also caused the loss of the attachment to their country of origin that had prevailed in the first generation. national origin slowly faded into the background.32 asderis’s hometown had always been “a place of immigrants”33 and accordingly bore many names. we, the romyi, call it simply polis, the city. the question does not arise for us. for us there is no other name, only this one. it is called, in greek, konstantinoupolis, which means city of constantine; in russian, tsarigrad, the imperial city; in turkish, istanbul, in ottoman it was often called ‘der-i saadet’, gateway to bliss.”34 “most of them did not know what (...) the meaning of this ancient name [der-i saadet] was; it originated from persian (...); according to legend, this gate opens to 29 the greeks of asia minor and the pontos saw themselves as direct heirs of the eastern roman and byzantine empires, respectively and therefore proudly called themselves romans (greek “ρωμαίος” – “romayos”; abbreviated “romyos”; plural: “ρωμαίοι“ – “romayi”, abbreviated romyi; “ρωμηοσύνη”, or “ρωμιοσύνη” – romiosini; romiosyni). in turkish, this self-nomination was adopted as “rum” (“romans”; plural “rumlar”). 30 asderis, gate, 12. 31 these are the cycladic islands of tinos and santorini, which lost their previous venetian catholic protectorate status after their conquest by the ottomans in 1580. 32 asderis, gate, 76. 33 ibid., 17. 34 ibid., 16. 63 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus some for a state of bliss, while at the same time it closes access to the others. (...) no one was ever happy for a long time.35 asderis’s family narrative is divided into four sections of varying length: the first two cover the ottoman period between 1848 to 1922, the following two the turkish republican era until asderis’s father’s removal in 1964, as well as his entry into germany. asderis tells the story of his family as the story of the city of istanbul and ultimately of the late ottoman empire and the early republic of turkey. different narrative forms – summarizing resumés, dialogues, quotations – enliven the narration, whereby asderis relies not only on the individual fates as well his relatives’ memories, but also on secondary sources, including turkish and greek-language literature. according to asderis, society living in constantinople, the ottoman capital, was not a “melting pot” but a “salad bowl”: the components did not mix to form something new; they remained side by side. the state itself neither encouraged nor enforced a mingling between muslims and non-muslims. it did not interfere; there were regulations only in matters of marriage. marriage was forbidden between non-muslim men and muslim women, but not vice versa. however, the latter, i.e. the permitted marriages between muslim men and non-muslim women were extremely rare. mixed marriages occurred almost exclusively between the romyis and armenians and, in some cases, with jews.36 the family narrative begins with the politically motivated flight made by antonio poldrugo (died 1855/1866?) from trieste, after the austro-hungarian empire subdued and suppressed the italian independence movement there. a generation later, after 1870, the paternal great-grandfather, periklis asderis (b. 1849), who came from the greek region of epiros, immigrated to constantinople to escape compulsory payments to the irregular greek gangs, the klephtes (greek: thieves). drawing on ambassadorial reports and other eyewitness testimony, m. asderis initially portrays the predominantly christian ottoman capital as a refuge for christians both inside and outside the ottoman sphere of power. the tanzimat (1839-1876) reform period as well as the overthrow of the authoritarian “bloody sultan” abdül-hamid ii by the young turks (1908) and the reintroduction of the ottoman constitution of 1876 nurtured hopes among the christian population of the empire for a lasting and fundamental improvement of their position, especially for their equality with the muslim population. but this hope was deceptive. nationalism prevailed faster and more effectively than the reforms. ottoman federalism had no chance. with reactive turkish nationalism – reactive with regard to the emancipatory, secessionist and irredentist movements among ottoman armenians and greeks – the idea of having to get rid of the greeks and armenians took hold permanently. 35 ibid., 149. 36 ibid., 23. 64 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 the 1896 slaughter and the “bloody sunday” of 24 april 1915 asderis’s narrative of the oppression and extermination of ottoman christians includes sections on the 1986 massacre and “bloody sunday” (11/24 april 1915): where the murdering and looting mob came from and how it was on the scene so quickly has never been clarified. however, foreigners staying in the city at the time were certain that the sublime porte had known beforehand of the planned attack [of 26 august 1896, on the ottoman bank] and had been informed of its details through its informers operating throughout the city. curiously, the police neither arrested the bombers in advance nor prevented the storming of the bank. on the contrary, they let it happen and turned it into a welcome occasion for the massacre. (...) the exact number of massacre victims has never been determined. there are some estimates of ten thousand or more dead. the damage to armenian society was immense. many took the experience as an opportunity to emigrate. they saw no future in their homeland. the armenian population of constantinople decreased rapidly in the next ten years. it decreased by more than half to about 70,000. many of those who remained moved to the sixth district. there, among co-religionists, they felt safer than in the other areas of constantinople. no sooner had the situation eased than uncertain times began for the romyis. the city did not become calm (...). at that time, the romyis of constantinople lived in permanent fear for their future. everyone thought of what had happened to the armenians the previous summer and feared the worst if war broke out. (...) the asderis family hoped that greece would now refrain from its expansionist plans. eurydike and periklis dreamed of finally living in a country where peace reigned and where they could grow old in peace and without fear.37 the deportations during wwi mainly affected the greek and armenian intellectual and spiritual elite, as well as officially unreported armenians who had moved in from the ‘provinces’. surprisingly, in the section titled “red sunday,” asderis reports only 235 armenian notables arrested on 24 april 1915 and claims: “nothing happened to the remaining constantinople armenians.” 38 it is true that due to the presence of numerous foreigners, including many diplomats in the ottoman capital, the c.u.p. regime was reluctant to annihilate all the greek and armenian inhabitants. nevertheless, the capital’s police chief announced that 30,000 armenians had been deported from constantinople by ship in the summer of 1915 alone; another 4,000 followed in the winter of 1915/16. 30,000 armenians had already fled the city in the summer of 1915.39 the german theologian, 37 asderis, gate, 87-88. 38 ibid., 123. 39 johannes lepsius (ed.), deutschland und armenien 1914-1918: sammlung diplomatischer aktenstücke 65 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus missionary and documentarist of the destruction of the ottoman armenians, johannes lepsius, reporting to the german chancellor (head of government) on 29 november 1915, gave the figure of 10,000 armenians who had been deported from constantinople, most of whom were probably murdered in the izmit mountains.40 contemporary greek sources – the ecumenical patriarchate of constantinople and the hellenic embassy of the city – give detailed accounts of deportations of greek orthodox ottomans from within the city and the province of constantinople.41 wwii, 6/7 september 1955 the next turkish attempt at the final disposal of the istanbul romyis occurred during the greek-turkish peace negotiations of 1923, when the turkish delegation wanted to “include the romyis of constantinople in the exchange and, in connection with this, to see to it that the patriarchate left constantinople.” the british foreign secretary lord curzon, who became involved in the negotiations as their coordinator, expressed opposition to such an intention: [the romyis] “were crucial to the existence of constantinople as a great city of commerce and industry, and without them it would be in danger of losing its authority, prosperity, and trade.”42 asderis adds: what he [curzon] actually meant was the fact that an expulsion of the romyis would hit the considerable interests of the english and french economies hard. not only were the executives of the large companies with foreign concessions still romyis, but their proportion among the other employees of these companies varied between fifty and ninety percent. not insignificant were also the numerous lawyers and commercial agents on whose assistance the european companies depended. their help was necessary in order to continue to handle lucrative orders in the new state.43 however, the new state, the republic of turkey, continued to seize every opportunity to get rid of the last christian minorities. the experiences of 1941-1944 reminded the romyis and armenians of c.u.p. practices: on the basis of an extended conscription law, only members of minorities were drafted from mid-april 1941. (potsdam: tempelverlag, 1919), 202. 40 ibid., 200-201. 41 ecumenical patriarchate, persecution of the greeks in turkey 1914-1918 (constantinople: the hesperia press, 1919); ecumenical patriarchate, black book: the expulsion and martyrdom of the greeks of turkey, 1914-1918 (constantinople 1919); carroll n. brown and theodore p. ion, persecution of the greeks in turkey since the beginning of the european war (oxford university press, 1918); alexander papadopoulos, persecutions of the greeks in turkey before the european war: on the basis of official documents (new york: oxford university press, 1919). 42 asderis, gate, 142. 43 ibid. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/johannes_lepsius https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/johannes_lepsius https://virtual-genocide-memorial.de/region/the-black-sea-marmara-and-aegean-littorals-eastern-thrace-and-central-anatolia/bursa-prousa-vilayet-province/mutesarifat-izmit/kaza-izmit-nicomedia/ http://greek-genocide.net/index.php/bibliography/books/258-persecution-of-the-greeks-in-turkey-1914-1918 http://greek-genocide.net/index.php/bibliography/books/359-black-book-1919 http://greek-genocide.net/index.php/bibliography/books/359-black-book-1919 http://greek-genocide.net/index.php/bibliography/books/257-persecution-of-the-greeks-in-turkey-since-the-beginning-of-the-european-war http://greek-genocide.net/index.php/bibliography/books/257-persecution-of-the-greeks-in-turkey-since-the-beginning-of-the-european-war http://greek-genocide.net/index.php/bibliography/books/259-persecutions-of-the-greeks-in-turkey-before-the-european-war http://greek-genocide.net/index.php/bibliography/books/259-persecutions-of-the-greeks-in-turkey-before-the-european-war 66 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 those called up had to report within two weeks. they were taken to assembly points, crammed into cattle wagons and sent toward anatolia to an unknown destination. identity checks were carried out on the streets of istanbul to arrest those who were in hiding. some were led away from their workplaces like criminals, even if they had just finished their regular military service a few days previously. they were not allowed to notify their relatives.44 as an italian citizen, m. asderis’s grandfather escaped conscription; as a greek citizen, his father escaped, too. the law on capital tax, introduced in 194245 was applied exclusively to non-muslims. if the amount due from arbitrary tax ‘calculations’ could not be raised through the proceeds of auctions, the non-muslim tax debtors – 2,500 people – were deported to aşkale near erzurum for forced labor. “greek-language newspapers reported on the work assignments, which took six hours of walking to get to, at an altitude of 1,200 metres, in temperatures of minus 15 degrees and in 1.50 meters of snow.”46 turkey’s transition to a multiparty system and the influx of american capital temporarily improved the situation not only for minorities. “many bought back the properties that they had lost due to the wealth tax. soon, half of the stores and many of the properties in istiklal caddesi belonged to the romyis again. this upsurge, however, aroused dismissive feelings among nationalist-minded turks.”47 ten years later, on 6 september 1955, pent-up and state-incited social envy led to the ‘septembriana’ pogrom. asderis, who witnessed the anti-greek riots himself as a five-yearold, dedicated one of his most detailed chapters to them under the telling heading “in fear of death” quoting, among other things, the recollections of his relatives. a young romyos, who was at the cinema at the time and initially did not notice the riots, found himself in the midst of the angry crowd as he was leaving the cinema and saw himself surrounded by “wildly beating and shouting figures. in order not to attract attention, i took off my glasses and put them in my pocket. people who wore glasses were called dörtgözlü [four-eyes] by such people. for this type of individual, glasses were the sign of a better social position, of the wealthy. under the gaze of this rabble in ecstasy, i was in real danger.”48 imposed invisibility as a means of survival also formed a basic experience of the istanbul family described by laura cwiertnia. asderis expands the traumatizing experience of septembriana to include the aspect of damnatio memoriae, as a special type of punishment against famous personalities was called in the roman empire; in a figurative, general sense, this is the suppression of public memory, which continues to shape how the former presence and culture of greeks and armenians are dealt with in turkey today. 44 ibid., 185. 45 “the capital tax was marked by chauvinist and racist concepts.” see faik ökte, the tragedy of the turkish capital tax (london, sydney, wolfeboro, new hampshire: croom helm, 1987), 94. 46 asderis, gate, 189. 47 ibid., 202. 48 ibid., 223. 67 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus to what took place, today people say σεπτεμβριανά [septembriana]. the word is difficult to translate, it means roughly september matters. however, i remember somewhat differently. people often spoke of september matters afterwards, when they were among themselves and felt safe, for example at home, when they knew that no stranger could listen. in public, on the street or in cafés, one was afraid that a casual passerby would pick up the word and, even if he did not understand it, phonetically associate it with the month of september. they feared that the mention of this month from the mouth of a romyos might cause trouble. they preferred to avoid this and instead used another word that was not so easy to understand phonetically. one said simply γεγονότα [yeyonóta]. this meant events. (...) later, among the romyis, when someone spoke of the events, he did not mean an event such as a brawl after a soccer game or riots during a demonstration, but exclusively what had happened that night. (...) moreover, it became the key word for a collectively suffered pain that was better left silent in public. it became a synonym for our silent, common life.49 from a german perspective mirko heinemann’s monograph the last byzantines: the expulsion of the greeks from the black sea bears the subtitle “a search for traces.” similar to the protagonists of the authors poladyan and cwiertnia, m. heinemann approaches a region that is foreign to him in terms of tourism: pontus and, in particular, the city of ordu (today altınordu; greek kotyora). there he, too, entrusts himself to a local cicerone, tansel, who knows the place well; his muslim grandmother came to ordu from the macedonian drama during the compulsory turkish-greek population exchange of 1923. but tansel has no reservations about greeks. with him or alone, heinemann roams the largely uninhabited, former greek quarter of taşbaşı, which reminds him atmospherically of his youthful experiences in kavala, greece. significantly, m. heinemann has titled this chapter ‘the old homeland,’ for he emphasizes ordu’s commonality with the city of kavala with which he is familiar: where are all the people who once lived here?” the cat seems to ask. why are the rooms behind the bay windows, half-timbering and facades, lifeless? i think that nobody wants to live in the old town and i know why. if there are no ghosts here, where are they? but how did this place come to be depopulated? and what is my role here? i want to revive these houses, i spontaneously think. not in the literal sense, but each of these houses holds a story. it is also my story. everything looks, feels and smells as familiar here as it did in greece, as if i had spent my vacations here as a child and not in kavala, as if i had bought the koulouria, the sesame curls that are 49 asderis, gate, 231. 68 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 called simit here, in the düz mahalle near the fidangöris. my parents would have been waiting for me for breakfast on the terrace overlooking the black sea.50 already in the second chapter heinemann narrates what little he knows about the fate of his pontic greek grandmother alexandra markopoulou (née tatsou) thanks to family lore: on 9 august 1917 alexandra embarked on of one of the twelve or so russian warships which, coming from trabzon, blew up an ammunition depot and destroyed an airfield in ordu. when the greeks realized that the russians would leave again, panic broke out. shouts rang out: “the turks will take revenge on us. leave your homes!” among the hundreds who flocked toward the russian ships was a girl who was 15 years old. (...) from somewhere shouts rang out: “women and children first!” the people pushed the girl along until she was suddenly standing in front on the landing stage. a russian sailor lifted her down into the boat. stiff with shock, she let it happen. she only came to her senses when the boat left and the men steered towards the ships with strong strokes of the oars. (...) the girl could not have known that this would be her last view of her home town. she would never again see the house where she had been born and raised.51 alexandra escaped turkish deportation. with a deadline of eight days after the announcement of the deportation order, the approximately 3,500 greeks remaining in ordu were deported in seven convoys via mesudiye, bazar çiflik and niksar – a total of 200 kilometres on foot – to a camp near erbaa on the orders of the local authorities as well as the commander of the ottoman army, vehib paşa. 40 percent of the deportees from ordu died of epidemics and malnutrition there.52 drawing on contemporary accounts, heinemann recounts the fate of the pontic greeks during the last decade of ottoman rule in four of his 17 chapters. another chapter, titled ‘the empty houses: what happened to the armenians?’ describes the extermination of armenians in the ottoman empire and especially in ordu, where two armenian families are said to still live today: some armenians in ordu had been separated from the others. they were made to board two boats. it was said that they were to be taken to the nearby port city of samsun. the boats’ passengers were drowned in the sea on the way there. the boats returned empty two hours later, eyewitnesses reported. a short time later the bodies washed up on shore.53 50 mirko heinemann, die letzten byzantiner: die vertreibung der griechen vom schwarzen meer; eine spurensuche (berlin: ch. links verlag, 2019), 110. 51 heinemann, byzantiner, 19-20. 52 ibid., 162. 53 ibid., 115. 69 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus heinemann strives for a differentiating, factual, and non-partisan narration. in his historical accounts, he repeatedly points out that there were protests against deportations among the turkish or muslim population, or people that stood up for their neighbors or took persecuted christians in. this particular emphasis seems to stem from the german perspective concerning memory politics, which heinemann emphasized in his introduction as also having shaped his perception. there he writes about his research interests in the history of turkish-greek relations: greeks and turks lived in our west german town. they were classmates, neighbors, guest workers and thus my father’s colleagues in the steel factory or operators of small restaurants. i had nothing against them. their way of life was even familiar to me. (...) “i could not understand the hostility between greeks and turks. language and culture were different, but the culture seemed quite alike to me. where did this antipathy of my greek relatives come from, which seemed to be of biblical vigor and reminded me of the story of cain and abel? the darkness in which my family’s past lay made me uncomfortable. did my existence possibly have more to do with this enmity than i wanted to admit? and why could i do so little with the attributions that were served up to me in greece? was i too much of a german, who reflexively rejected criticism of the foreigner because he was plagued by a guilty conscience instilled in him in countless school lessons about the holocaust? (...) my search for answers led inevitably into the past.54 the vocabulary with which heinemann treats the historical facts in detail and in a way that is easily comprehensible for uninformed readers probably also originates from this specific “german perspective.” this vocabulary is ambivalent: in the subtitle of his chapter titled ‘blutige erde’ (bloody earth),55 the author speaks of the extermination of the pontic greeks and thus uses a term that is synonymous with genocide. but in general, heinemann uses the term “ethnic cleansing,” which unfortunately still predominates in secondary literature. this term is not only unqualified or undefined in legal terms or under international law, but also stems from the slang of genocide perpetrators, because it originates from a dehumanizing view of the victims. instead of making his own statement, heinemann addresses the question of whether the crimes committed by the young turks and kemalists against the ottoman greeks constituted genocide in his concluding chapter under the heading “genocide – or not?” by citing expert opinions: according to heinemann, the genocide researcher tessa hofmann, the greek historian theodosios kyriakidis, and the international association of genocide scholars (iags) stand for the inclusive use of the term genocide in the greek context. on 1 december 54 ibid., 14-15. 55 heinemann uses here the title of the novel “ματωμένα χώματα” (‘matomena khomata’, blood-soaked or bloody earth, 1962) by dido sotiriou (1909-2004). 70 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 2007, the iags issued a resolution classifying the crimes committed against all christian ethnic groups in the ottoman empire as genocide.56 heinemann, on the other hand, cites the german genocide researcher boris barth as well as the turkish-born u.s. historian taner akçam as examples of an exclusive, hierarchizing assessment; he quotes b. barth as saying, “during the war, the young turks took a series of anti-greek measures that can be described as ethnic cleansing, but not as genocide.”57 barth still held this view in 2006 in his monograph völkermord: genozid im 20. jahrhundert (genocide in the 20th century). in the meantime, he has altered his view and accepts the crimes committed against ottoman greeks in the period 1912 to 1922 as genocide as well. b. barth told me this in 2016 at a conference in frankfurt/main. however, m. heinemann does not leave the last word in this discussion of the genocide question in connection with the ottoman greeks, especially the pontic greeks, to a scientist, but to the then german head of state joachim gauck. a few days before the official commemoration hour in the german bundestag on the occasion of the centenary of the commemoration of the armenian genocide, the german president said in an address on april 2015: without distinction, men, women, children and old people were deported, sent on death marches, abandoned without any protection and without any food in the steppe and desert, burned alive, hounded to death, beaten to death and shot. this planned and calculated criminal act hit the armenians for one reason only: because they were armenians. similar action hit their fellow sufferers, the assyrians or arameans and the pontic greeks.58 the european parliament and pope francis had previously expressed themselves in the same inclusive sense. conclusion the four intergenerational novels of german-speaking authors of armenian and greek descent discussed here deal not least with the question of what the ottoman genocide, the loss of homeland and the post-genocidal experiences of suffering mean for the identity of the authors and their protagonists. looking for answers, the protagonists or the author heinemann go in search of traces to armenia and pontus, without ultimately committing themselves: poladyan’s protagonist helen leaves armenia and the pontic city 56 heinemann, byzantiner, 248. the resolution passed on 1 december 2007 with the support of fully 83 percent of iags members who voted; it was first published in a press release on 15 december 2007. cf. also http:// www.genocide-museum.am/eng/2007-december.php. 57 ibid., 243. 58 ibid., 249. http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/2007-december.php http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/2007-december.php 71 tessa hofmann: traces leading to pontus and the bosporus of ordu without being recognizably touched by her respective discoveries. l. cwiertnia’s protagonist karla, or rather the omniscient narrator, succeeds in reconstructing the kuyumciyan family history, but it remains open at the end whether karla will carry the burden of her armenian legacy, symbolized in her ancestor’s gold bangle, or, as her father advises, throw it away. mirko heinemann takes refuge in an only seemingly neutral german perspective, which allows him to view and judge the suffering of his ancestors from a quasi-uninvolved point of view, without having to commit himself emotionally and judgmentally. michael asderis, on the other hand, succeeds in making this emotional statement as a matter of course, presumably because of his generational affiliation; with his birth year of 1950, he is the oldest of the four authors analyzed here, and the story he tells is also, at least in part, his own. unlike his three colleagues, asderis has personally undergone what he writes about. asderis is a romyos, a ‘last byzantine’ and not just an author writing about the romyis. constantinople/istanbul – polis – is his immediate home, the place of his childhood and youth. the fate of the armenians and greeks of this city is his own. this fate includes the social invisibility of the christians, the discrimination they suffer and their constant fear of renewed persecution, which is also impressively reconstructed by cwiertnia. at the end of its 150-year history, the christian asderis family was expelled from istanbul. since 1988, m. asderis has visited polis, albeit at long intervals, and describes these travel experiences in his final chapter (“the visitor”). but again, he distinguishes himself from his three other colleagues even in this formal tourist situation. for he does not travel abroad and discover a terra incognita but returns to his painfully familiar homeland. asderis was often asked during these trips to istanbul why he spoke turkish so well. in the last lines of his book, for example, a cab driver asked him that question: i tell him that i come from an old istanbul family and that we were expelled fifty years ago. surprisingly, he is one of the very few who have heard about it. after we have conversed for a while, he says, ‘then you’ve been lucky. you are now in germany. i’m sure you’re better off there than many people here and you can come and visit anytime.’ ‘i’m not a stranger who comes to visit,’ i say. ‘i belong to this city. it is my home.’ the cab driver is silent.59 the pain of patricide, which for the survivors of the ottoman genocide was and is inseparable from their deportation from society and life in turkey, has been portrayed best, and unpretentiously, as well as convincingly comprehensible by michael asderis, followed by laura cwiertnia. 59 asderis, gate, 323. 19 tessa hofmann, dr. phil., magistra artium, professor h.c., has studied slavonic literatures and languages, armenology, and sociology. from 1983-march 2015 she worked at the insti tute for eastern european studies at freie universität berlin and is now an independent scholar and author with numerous books and articles in armenian studieson history, culture, and current aff airsand genocide/minority studieson the ottoman genocide against christianssince 1979. “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose tessa hofmann in my contribution, i introduce four authors of different generations and languages, but all of greek origin: elias venezis, dido sotiriou, jeffrey eugenides and aris fioretos. both the works of expelled authors from asia minor and of their transnational, postmodern descendants are remarkably free of revanchist clichés or the stereotypical ‘othering’ of turks or muslims. while venezis points to the irritating ‘genocidal corruption’ and dehumanization within the victim group, sotiriou puts the political responsibility for the ‘catastrophe’ on germany and the entente, depicting asia minor as the homeland of greeks and turks. eu genides chooses intersexuality as a metaphor of modernity and hybridity of (greek and other) immigrant communities, whereas fioretos is interested in fl owing, fl exible identities and the intersection of past and present that expresses itself in a non-linear narrative, where everybody and everything is related to others. in my native german language, fi ction is called ‘dichtung’, a noun that means ‘closely com pacted in substance’. in historically based prose, fi ction can be defi ned as condensed reality. the literary ways of condensing reality depend on many factors, but mainly on the talent and intent of the author, on the time of publication and, of course, on the object depicted as well as on the intended functions of a literary work. if genocide as the ulti mate crime becomes a literary object, the intentions are multiple, oscillating between docu mentation, accusation, interpretation and refl ection. literature on genocide may even substitute public discourse. when genocide survivors write about their experiences, literature serves as a ‘means of survival’ (‘überlebensmittel’), as the german jewish author and holocaust survivor edgar hilsenrath accurately named this particular type of prose. for survivors, it seems easier to write about genocide as the unspeakable than to discuss it. event close1 non-fi ctional memoirs the history of the genocide against the ottoman greek population that identifi es itself traditionally as romiosyni, or romans (turkish: rumlar), coincides with the last decade of ottoman rule (1912-1922) and can tentatively be divided into three phases2: the fi rst 1. the terms ‘event close’ or ‘event-closeness’ are neologisms. they refer to the short time interval between an event and its transcript or oral report. in criminology and brain research event-closeness is an important criterion for reliability because personal memories are less infl uenced by collective memories/narratives or the recollections of any third party. 2. for the periodization of the ottoman genocide against indigenous greeks cf. tessa hofmann, “γενοκτονία έν ροή – cumulative genocide: the massacres and deportations of the greek population of the ottoman empire (1912-1923),” in the genocide of the ottoman greeks: studies on the statesponsored campaign of extermination of the christians of asia minor (1912-1922) and its a� ermath: international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 20 21 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose phase starts during the balkan wars 1912/3, when two types of deportation were tested in eastern thrace: a) trans-boundary expulsion of greek-orthodox ottomans into greece, b) deportation of greek orthodox christians from eastern thrace to anatolia. whereas the expulsed greek eastern thracians would return after the war, the fatality rate among those deported into the interior was nearly 50 percent and the number of returnees remained low respectively. this kind of fatal deportation, or death march that prevented return was then repeated in western anatolia (ionia) before the first world war, and in pontos and other regions of asia minor during the great war; however, these deportations never reached a nation-wide scale, as it was the case with the ottoman armenians. after ww1, deportations, forced labor and in particular massacres continued in all areas under the infl uence or control of irregular kemalist or nationalist fi ghters. the destruction of the ottoman greeks has caught the attention of many authors not only of greek descent or language. most focus on the fi nal of the three phases of this genocide, the period of 1919-1922, which ended with the ‘great fire of smyrna’ and the enslavement of surviving christian men in the age range of 18 to 45 years. prose about genocide shows remarkable amplitude of narrative techniques, varying from non-fi ctional (‘factional’) novels or stories to fi ctional narratives. the preference for a certain genre seems to be infl uenced by the fact whether the author is a survivor or immediate witness of genocide or belongs to second and third post-genocidal generations. survivors and witnesses of genocide, i.e. fi rst generation authors often choose (auto) biographical testimonies to depict real world events, but blend them to various degrees with fi ctitious conversations and may also use the storytelling techniques of fi ction. these creative techniques of narration set the individual tone and mood; they also convey the narrator’s judgments about the events. the authors of such non-fi ctional testimonies write with the claim and authority of telling the truth, and they infl uence their readers ‘only’ by their creative choice of narrative techniques. on average, this kind of factional prose tends to be event-related rather than focused on characters. authors of the second or third generations usually interpret the events in fi ctional genres.3 in this contribution i tentatively suggest a typology that includes two prominent authors of the fi rst generation as examples of a realist, (auto)biographic response to genocidal events in asia minor in the early 20th century, in particular during the year 1922; a major difference lies in the ‘event-closeness’ of these two representatives. the two other authors, belonging to the third post-genocidal generation, represent transnational fi ction which is, among other specifi cs, characterized by its refl ection on the permanent fl ow, transfer or circulation of people, cultures and ideas; in addition, the two authors under scrutiny here have transnational family backgrounds and personal experience with transnational migration4; they are bior multilingual, and their literary work occurs outside of national contexts and borders. history, law, memory, ed. tessa hofmann, matthias björnlund, vasileios meichanetsidis, (new york, athens: aristide d. caratzas, 2011), 100f. 3. for the debate on ‘factional’, ‘non-fi ctive’ or ‘documentary fi ction’ in the context of holocaust fi ction cf. sue vice, holocaust fiction (london; new york: routledge, 2000), 93-94. 4. transnational migration is characterized as repeated transboundary migration between two or more countries. the fi rst author to be introduced in this comparative context is elias venezis (born mellos; 1904-1973). born in 1904 in the predominantly greek town of ayvalık, or kidonia in greek, venezis was just 18 years old when he was conscripted into a forced labor unit in the fall 1922. out of the originally 3,000 conscripts from his native ayvalık, only 23 men survived the premeditated cruel treatment, the deliberate shootings at the beginning of their death march into the interior and the subsequent concentration camps and forced labor. shortly after his release from 14 months of turkish imprison ment, venezis published his haunting mem oirs in the local weekly ‘kambana’, or ‘bell’, on the island of lesvos, from where his family originated. in 1923 and 1924, ‘kambana’ was run by the author stratis myrivilis (born efstratios stamatopoulos, 1890-1969), who became a mentor and literary model for venezis. in 1931, a fi rst book version with 20 brief chapters appeared under the title “the number 31,328: the book of slavery” (“to noumero 31,328: to vivlio tes sklavias”). venezis called his book “written with blood” and largely waived on literary methods and fi ctionalization, trying to let facts speak for themselves. his photographically precise representation refl ects a world in which the supreme goal of life is to be registered as a number, because only after 1923 ottoman greeks were registered as prisoners and subsequently got a chance to be protected by the international red cross and eventually to depart to greece. until their registration, they possessed no rights whatsoever. due to the author’s documentary approach, ‘the book of slavery’ reads as an illustrative history of the destruction of the greeks of asia minor, including scenes of humilia tion, gang rape, and massive killings, in which even turkish children took part. venezis re called a group of thirty greek orthodox priests who were detached to his labour convoy; among them was an old man, who soon broke down and could no longer walk: the soldiers dragged him to the side of the road and they released him face down and then began to beat him with their rifl e butts. he did not even give a groan, only his tongue began to lick the earth to see if it were dry or bitter. from the heights of attalus, a few meters from where we were, the turkish children were playing, and they ran downhill to the scene. the soldiers withdrew in order to continue our march and the children began at once to stone the body which was in its death throes. for some time we could hear the dull thud of the stones as they began to accumulate atop the priest.5 in the 18th chapter venezis tells how he and his comrades were given the task to hide the corpses of approximately 40,000 christian men, women and children from smyrna and mag nesia (greek: μαγνησία ἡ ὑπὸ σιπύλῳ; today: manisa) before the arrival of a commission from the league of nations. this commission is expected to monitor, for the fi rst time ever, the conditions of the ‘labor battalions’. 5. quoted from: speros vryonis, “greek labour battalions in asia minor,” in the armenian genocide: cultural and ethical legacies, ed. richard hovannisian (new brunswick, nj: transaction publishers, 2007), 282. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 22 23 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose corrupted by genocide: loss of emphaty one of the outstanding features of venezis’ narration is the precise exploration of gradual corruption by the infl iction of genocide: long before physical death itself, the victims’ dignity, humanity and integrity is destroyed; exhausted and tired, as the deportees are, they become indifferent to co-sufferers. this loss of empathy and compassion is illustrated, among many other examples, with the refusal of the fi rst person narrator and his comrades to intervene when a greek woman is brutally gang-raped in the presence of her husband and their three-year-old infant in a church where the deportees have to spend the night. on the next day, the husband, a watchmaker, collapses during the death march, while his wife is struggling to carry their infant alone. the other male deportees realize her diffi culties, but are too weak to help (chapters 4 and 5): the herd halted. the soldiers tried to bring him back into a trot. they pushed at him. it did not help. they beat him with whips, afterwards with rifl e butts. the baby began to cry. you will kill him! do you not see that? called his wife, who lunged at the soldier. i will carry the child! her lips trembled. her eyes were cold and hard. she held out her weak arms and sat the crying child on her shoulders. she did not caress it. none of us moved to help her. she will not stand it. she is a woman, told one of us. no, she will not endure. (...) the watchmaker rose, and we moved on. before long, sank the hard gaze of the woman. it softened. finally, it was fi lled, silently, with tears. a little further on she fell. beside herself, she took the child in her arms and burst into tears. let us! ... let us die here! she cried, sobbing. now, the leader of the escort said angrily, then another will carry that child. we all made an unconscious movement, as to escape a threat. the soldiers seized one of the last in the column and put the child on his shoulders. a bit farther he cried they should give it to somebody else. then it was my turn. it was real martyrdom because we had to walk, were naked and starving, were so exhausted that we ourselves were to fall on the ground at any moment. i went tumbling there, then i called, another should take the child. everyone rushed to the front to escape in the fi rst rows. (...) a little child had become a nightmare. the anger hardened more and more in our tormented heart. why it does not want to die? suddenly someone uttered wildly. (...) no one said that this would be a pity. was that hatred of a little child? yes, it was hatred.6 6. elias venesis [i.e. venezis], nr. 31328; leidensweg in anatolien (mainz: philipp von zabern, 1969), 60-62; translated from ger man by tessa hofmann. – on online edition of the greek original is available in this world of merciless self-interest of the victims and perpetrators, rape and even killings of co-sufferers represent welcome interludes, for they provide the other deportees with an opportun ity to rest longer or to stretch out more comfortably in their cramped accommodation, once some of their comrades are shackled and led away to be killed (chapter 9): the two girls that we had wit h us since pergamon gave us a lot of relaxation. they were still unploughed soil and over again there were stays. the soldiers shared them, retreated with them, came back; then we marched further. these border decorations of the march did us good.7 being the only two young male deportees in this convoy, the narrator and his friend argyris, who is also among the deportees, have an additional reason to be thankful that women and girls are raped instead of them (chapter 7). with his focus on the overall loss of humanity and civilization, including critical selfex ploration, and in particular with his sarcasm, venezis resembles the master of literature on dehumaniza tion, the polish author and survivor of auschwitz and dachau, tadeusz borowski (1922-1951)8, who after the second word war literally explored the ‘auschwitz system’ as the complete corruption of human empathy and compassion. in borowski’s stories, the differences between the victims and perpetrators blur, because the ‘auschwitz system’ destroys in numerous ways the humanity of all those who come into closer contact with this system, voluntarily or not. among other examples, venezis and borowski exemplify genocidal corruption by the system of overseers, or kapos9, who belong to the same groups as the other inmates of the turkish and german concentration camps, but are given certain privileges and powers over their fellows: the battalion was divided into companies, the companies into trains. the management by the turkish offi cers could not easily be done in direct ways. therefore from the beginning a non-commissioned offi cer or ςavuş, who had a command of turkish, was determined for each train. mikhál ςavuş, vasil ςavuş, yován ςavuş. these sergeants did not work. they led only supervision. in these positions came, as it always happens, the most devious. greeks and armenians. (...) to gain the favor with the battalion, they sucked us out at work. they feared neither god nor devil. (...)10 on this site: https://1oholargou.fi les.wordpress.com/2012/08/13078091-31328.pdf 7. venezis, nr. 31328, 75. 8. cf. the collection of stories in tadeusz borowski, u nas w auschwitzu (here in auschwitz), 1946; pożegnanie z marią (farewell to maria), 1947; kamienny świat (a world of stone), 1948; proszę państwa do gazu (this way for the gas, ladies and gentlemen), 1949. 9. in the greek original, the ottoman turkish term ‘çavuş’ (‘sergeant’) is used which was a military rank in the army and the police (gendarmes). the german translation of 1969, however, uses ‘kapo’ instead. the origin of ‘kapo’ is uncertain: german (abbreviation from ‘kameradscha� spolizei’), french (caporal) or italian (il capo). the ‘kapo system’ was established in german concentration camps during nazi reign. 10. venezis, nr. 31328, 157 f. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 24 25 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose mikhál ςavuş embodies the worst characteristics of greek overseers. without any scruples, he sells an entire train of greek labor soldiers to be butchered by revenge-seeking turks, sharing the profi t with a turkish offi cer.11 he also torments venezis’ narrator elias for the refusal to serve mikhál as a cook and presumably also as a sex slave. the narrator points out the profound polarization between those ‘slaves, who gave orders and pocketed the bribes, and on the other side, us, the people that shed the sweat and blemished the air with its moans”.12 such a polarization does not exist in borowski’s depiction of auschwitz. in his startling short story “proszę państwa do gazu” (1946; “this way for the gas, ladies and gentlemen”, 1967), borowski recounts a typical workday of the ‘canada’ squad in the auschwitz camp, where the ‘canada’ members collaborate in the daily extermination of 10,000 and more jewish deportees from all of europe. the squad members have the task to meet the incoming deportees, to drive them hurriedly out of the railway waggons to the selection by ss men and to rush the designated victims to the gas chambers. the ‘canadians’ enjoy this ‘work’ as an opportunity to amply steal and rob from the victims, and they are largely immune to the massive human suffering that they witness daily. the monstrosity of the events, depicted by venezis and borowski, contrasts with the simplicity of their narrative styles. in particular borowski limits his narration to the description of the behavior and outward reactions of his characters; unlike venezis, whose narrator articulates clear moral judgements, borowski entirely excludes the description of inner emotions, motivations or moral positions. the fi rst person narrators both of venezis and borowski bear autobiographical characteristics of their authors, but the differences between tadeusz borowski and his ‘survivalist’ narrator tadek seem to be larger than those between venezis and his young narrator elias. in his conclusive refl ections, borowski’s narrator cynically lists the material benefi ts of mass murder for the overseers and other privileged inmates of auschwitz, suggesting a system in which nearly everyone benefi ts from the holocaust, albeit to various degrees: the kapo is busily engaged with a large kettle. he stuffs in silk, gold and coffee. that’s for the guards at the gate. in return they will let the squad pass uncontrolled. for a few days, the camp will live by this transport, will eat its ham and sausages, it will drink its booze and liqueur, wearing its clothes and trade with its money and jewelry. the civilians carry a whole lot of things out of the camp. to silesia, to kraków, maybe even further. in return, they bring cigarettes, eggs, booze and letters from home ... for a few days the camp will talk about the transport “bendzin-sosnowiec”. a good, rich transport it has been.13 like venezis before him, borowski published his memoirs promptly after the crimes that he 11. ibid, 160-162. 12. ibid, 187. 13. the english translation of borowski’s “proszę państwa do gazu” (new york: penguin group, 1967; 1976) contains too many deletions and other arbitrary changes to the text; i therefore translated from the german edition; cf. tadeusz borowski, die steinerne welt. erzählungen (münchen: r. piper, 1963), 132. survived and depicted. in difference to venezis, however, borowski did not live to (relatively) old age, but committed suicide after a few restless years in post-war poland and germany. later non-fi ctional memoirs this promptness of the literary response is one of the main differences between venezis and the journalist and writer dido sotiriou, who captured inter-communal life during the last decade of ottoman rule from the distance of 30 years after the destruction of smyrna. her biographical non-fi ctional nov el “ματωμένα χώματα” (“bloodied soil”, 1962; english title: “farewell, anatolia!”) is based on the testimony of 360 handwritten pages, which the witness and survivor manolis axiotis had handed over to her.14 born into a poor ionian peasant family of the village of kirkica (today: şir ince)15 above the ancient city of ephesos, where the in digenous greek population had to assimilate linguistically to their turkish neighbors, axiotis experienced conscription into labor battalions twice, in 1915 and in 1922; at both occasions, he survived daily workloads of up to 18 hours and numerous fatal hardships to which the greek conscripts were deliberately exposed. he deserted the units each time, until he was eventual ly saved by fi shermen from the greek island of samos and became a dockworker in piraeus. three years after the publication of sotiriou`s transcript of his account, axiotis came out with his own book ‘the tangled ball’ (“το μπερδέμενο κουβάρι”), which was “heavily infl uenced by the author’s experience of decolonization, international socialism and the peace movement of the 1960s”16. axiotis subsequently criticized sotiriou for having ‘nationalized’ his account.17 in contrast to axiotis, dido sotiriou was the daughter of a wealthy ionian entrepreneur, who went bankrupt due to the young turks’ boycott measures against the greek fi nancial and industrial elite of the ottoman empire. however, being communist, sotiriou largely shared axiotis’ political views. repeatedly, her narrator in the fi rst person, and in particular her cre tan protagonist nikitas drosakis, emphasize that it is not the people, but the profi teers of war and confl ict who bear the responsibility for the destruction of the greeks and armenians of asia minor. therefore, and despite her numerous examples of antigreek atrocities, sotiriou’s narrative contains several examples of good, just and likable turks, be it ismail agha, the benevolent military doctor, şükrü efendi, who saved 700 labor conscripts, the farmer ali dayi, who tries to treat manolis like his own son, or ali dayi’s daughter adviye, who fell for manolis. “the same earth nurtured our two people”, refl ects the literary axiotis on the rela tionship of turks with greeks. “deep down we neither hated them, nor they us.”18 accord ing to sotiriou, the real competitors of the greeks of asia minor are not the turks, but the christian levantines who enjoyed an extraterritorial status; one 14. vangelis calotychos, the balkan prospect. identity, culture, and politics in greece a� er 1989 (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2013), 154. 15. a� er the lausanne treaty (1923), the village has been populated with muslim settlers from kavala (greece). 16. calotychos, the balkan prospect, 154. 17. ibid. 18. dido sotiriou, farewell, anatolia, trans. by fred. a. reed (athens: kedros, 1991), 61. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 26 27 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose of sotiriou’s greek peasant protagonists calls them “european leeches, sucking turkey’s blood straight from the vein.”19 in the novels of sotiriou and other greek authors from asia minor, such as venezis, myrivilis20 or kosmas politis (born paraskevas taveloudis, 1888-1974)21, we fi nd, “maybe for the fi rst time in greek literature, ‘the or dinary turk’, (…) who is not a conqueror, a person in the service of the ‘state’”; if a literary turk (or a greek) behaves cruelly, it is because of war and confl ict.22 venezis articulates criticism and disdain for those greeks who work as overseers of their compatriots (chapter 15), but simultaneously un derstanding for the poor soldiers from anatolia who have to watch the greek prisoners and are mistreated by their superiors: “how did they differ? we were infi dels, were prisoners. and those, who were free?” (p. 202) both venezis and sotiriou describe the same fatal turkish-greek dialectic of atrocities, retri bution and revenge killings, but sotiriou projects the political and ethical responsibilities for the ‘catastrophe of asia minor’ largely on external, ‘imperialistic’ factors, and less on the military occupation and civic administration in ionia during 1919-1922, as established by greece with allied and in particular british consent.23 according to her, a million armenians and about 500,000 greeks fall victim to the imperialist plans fi rst of the germans, then of the vic torious entente: “the deeply rooted christian population who held in their hands the wealth and the keys to anatolia had to be eliminated.”24 here we must remember that sotiriou’s accusation occurred against the more recent background of starvation, massacres and dis possession, suffered in greece during the german occupation in the second world war, thus perhaps representing a constructed continuity of german war crimes against the greek nation throughout two world wars. in this vein, yakovos, the godfather of the narrator manolis, quotes the martyred and 19. sotiriou, farewell, anatolia, 57. 20. st. myrivilis was born on the aegean island of lesbos that until 1912 belonged to the ottoman empire. in the literary context of asia minor, he is mostly known for his autobiographical novel η ζωή εν τάφω (the life in the tomb, 1924), in which he depicts his experience as a volunteer soldier against the ottoman empire, 1912-1922. 21. born in athens, k. politis lived in smyrna from his early childhood until 1922. in his popular novel eroica (1937-1938) which combines elements of autobiography and a novel of education (bildungsroman), politis tells about a group of boys, growing up in smyrna. 22. iraklis millas, “tourkokratia: history and image of the turk in greek literature,” in when greeks think about turks: a view from anthropology, ed. dimitrios theodossopoulos (london, new york: routledge, 2013), 54. 23. for lloyd george’s foreign policy towards turkey and greece and greece’s policy towards asia minor see: michael llewellyn smith, ionian vision. greece in asia minor, 1919-1922 (london: st. martin’s press, 1973; with extensive bibliography: ann arbor: the university of michigan press, 1998); about the greek occupation and administration of ionia see the unpublished doctoral dissertation of victoria solomonides, the greek administration of the vilayet of aidin 1919-1922 (london: king’s college, university of london, 1984); giles milton, paradise lost. smyrna 1922 (new york: basic books, 2008); edward hale bierstadt, the great betrayal. economic imperialism & and the destruction of christian communities in asia minor (new york: robert m. mcbride & co., 1924; reprint: bloomingdale: the pontian greek society of chicago, 2008) 24. sotiriou, farewell, anatolia, 138. canonized metropolitan chrysosto mos kalafatis of smyrna (1867-1922), warning his fl ock of the germans and the ‘conqueror’ general liman von sanders25 in particular: “he had been sent to our land with the cruel intention of eradicating us, to tear the golden fleece from our hands. in fact, turkey had become little more than a german colony. (…) in a word, the greeks and the armenians were a serious obstacle to german in terests; they had to be pushed aside.”26 when a controversy around history school textbooks in greece emerged during the years 2007-2009, the government suggested replacing a debated textbook with sotiriou’s popular novel. as the debate of those years revealed, ‘farewell, anatolia!’ is usually perceived according to ideo logical and political proclivities; for leftists, her narrative about ‘national betrayal’ is some times perceived as too nationalistic, whereas rightists cannot agree with the communist author’s antiimperialist interpretation of ‘national betrayal’.27 the literary works of most ‘μικρασιάτες’ [mikrasiates] – as the refugees from asia minor are called in greece – do not contain revanchist appeals and perhaps therefore were 25. the case of liman von sanders illustrates the discrepancies between political or literary myth and historic reality: in reality, the intervention of the german general of cavalry, otto liman von sanders, supported by the german foreign offi ce, saved the greeks of ionia from wholesale deportation in 1916 and the greeks of smyrna in late 1917, although in april 1917 liman had ordered the ‘evacuation’ of the greek population of ayvalık (aivali, kydonies) and its surroundings, which at that time was estimated to be 12,000 to 20,000. the reason given for liman’s order was ‘persistent treason and espionage communication’ of the ayvalık residents with the entente military. in 1915, liman von sanders successfully stopped the deportation of armenians from smyrna, against the will of the ottoman governor rahmi. in his memoirs liman von sanders did not mention the ayvalık deportation of 1917, but wrote in the context of his inspection tour to ayvalik in summer 1915 that germans in turkey were exposed to “truly unfounded attacks”: “during summer of the same year, at the time of the dardanelles fi ghts, i received a letter of the german ambassador, by which king constantine of greece inquired whether i really had said to the mayor of edremid that ‘all greeks deserved to be thrown into the sea.’ but during my brief stay in that town i had neither met, nor talked to the mayor of edremid, nor to a similar personality, and of course i did not make any remarks about greeks, with whom i had nothing to do there. i was able to reject with few words this shameless invention. (…) being a turkish general, i was a stumbling block to several fanatic greeks.” otto liman von sanders, fünf jahre in der türkei [five years in turkey] (berlin 1920), 70. false accusations led to the detention of liman von sanders on 3 february 1919 and his arrest on malta until his release on 21 august 1919. he was one of the only three high ranking offi cers of jewish descent in the german forces during the first world war and suff ered from the anti-jewish atmosphere; in turkey, he was in confl ict with the pro-german war minister enver, whom liman despised. – see also: jürgen gottschlich, beihilfe zum völkermord. deutschlands rolle bei der vernichtung der armenier (berlin: ch. links verlag, 2015), 104f., 107-110, 120-123 26. sotiriou, farewell, anatolia, 73f. 27. lydia papadimitriou, “book review: the balkan prospect: identity, culture and politics in greece a� er 1989, van gelis calotychos (2013), new york: palgrave macmillan”, journal of greek media & culture, 2014, 1:1, 167. more recently, the socialist-nationalist coalition under alexis tsipras has changed offi cial memory and history politics: the destruction of pontian greeks is no longer qualifi ed as a genocide, but minimized to ‘persecutions’ (diogmoi), whereas more generally the genocide of the greeks of asia minor seems to have completely disappeared from offi cial wordings and announcements. in summer 2015, the ministry of education enacted a policy as a result of which the ‘pontian persecutions’ would not be included in the examination content. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 28 29 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose acceptable for turkish readers, too. both venezis’ and sotiriou’s novels saw turkish translations, in the case of ‘matomena homata’ 16 editions in all.28 the loss of the anatolian homeland is nevertheless deeply mourned by greek authors. in the fi rst sentence of his ‘book of slavery’, venezis expresses the nostalgia for a gentle and abundant land in contrast to the horrors to come: “1922. anatolia was so sweet as a sonnet or something of the kind. everything in nature was gentle and mild this fall.” the comparison of the desired country with a sophisticated classical poem underlines the cultural dimension of the loss. in the end of his tale sotiriou’s narrator manolis axiotis directly addresses a personalized anatolia, asking for her forgiveness; for him, anatolia is a country where the greeks were deeply rooted, but had to abandon everything, after, under hellenic administration and for less than three years, they had enjoyed the liberty that they were denied for centuries under ottoman rule: there, across the water, we abandoned our homes, our bolted storerooms, our wedding wreath laid atop the iconostase, our ancestors in their graveyards. we abandoned our children and parents and brothers, left our dead unburied, the living without a roof over their heads. haunted dreams. there. over there, until just yester day, it had been our home. (…) so much suffering, so much tragedy. now my mind wanted only to return to the past. if it could only all be lie, if we could only go back to our land, to our gardens, to our forests with their songbirds, sparrows and tiny owls, to our orchards with their tangerine trees and fl owering cherries, to our beautiful festivals… (…) farewell anatolia! hold it not against us that we drenched you with blood. (…) a curse on the guilty ones!29 desiring the other: eros and sex in times of confl ict and genocide passionate, but socially unaccepted and therefore not lasting erotic encounters between greek and turkish protagonists are part of the plots not only in sotiriou’s novel, but also in aris fioretos’ transnational novel30 ‘den siste greken’ (2009; ‘der letzte grieche’, 2011). in venezis’ early published memoirs, the nar rator meets the deportee and slave laborer jacques, who is a 23 years old armenian musician posing as a greek. when jacques’ real profession is revealed, he is detached to be come the piano teacher of the turkish colonel’s young daughter; this tremendously improves his living standards, but at the same time causes a profound dilemma: 28. however, in 2015 a publication of “to noumero 31,328: to vivlio tes sklavias” by the istanbul belge publishing house was banned; the case is now under trial. according to publisher ragıp zarakolu, in turkey there are since 1996 fi ve cases of banned and trialed books on greek issues. a new edition of the 1970 turkish edition of “farewell, anatolia” was banned and put on trial in 1982, with the accusation of “insulting turkishness”. 29. sotiriou, farewell, anatolia, 297f. 30. transnational novels (and perhaps transnationalism in general) are characterized by the three topics of immigration, cultural clash and cultural diff usion, which cause the fi gures and the readers to search for identity. since one or two days, she began to look at him with other eyes. in the beginning her behavior towards him was neutral – she touched him, teased him, did not look at him as a male being. she treated him as on object, let’s say, like the piano. they told her: he is yours. but due to the better food jacques transformed into the jacques he had once been. and this old jacques was a sweet boy with huge eyes.31 instructed by his greek friend, the narrator elias, not to give in to the girl’s persistent attempts to seduce him, jacques eventually becomes the victim of her revenge. “angry, as a wild animal”, the repulsed girl whips the young man’s face bloody, dismisses him as a teacher and returns him mercilessly to his miserable life as a slave laborer. in sotiriou’s novel the main protagonist and narrator manolis axiotis fi nds himself in a simi lar confl ict, but with some remarkable distinctions: given to the farmer ali dayi as a slave la borer, manolis submits for once to the seduction by his beautiful daughter adviye. but when she understands that they have no chance as a couple, the generous adviye is far from taking re venge and from egoist claims: “i do not regret a thing, and i’m not worried for myself. you are all i care about, manolis. i don’t want you to be hurt. love blinded me; i did not know what i was doing. you are christian, i am turkish. the laws are strict. it would be hard for us to marry. how could you ever live in a place like this, what with your land down smyrna way?” (…) i could not sleep that night; what was i to do about adviye? i had become entangled; badly. i was afraid that we might be found out, that i might be forced to turn turk, to marry her. i had to make a decision, fast, no matter how hard. it was time to leave!32 when adviye learns about manolis’ secret plan to desert, she even offers self-denial, i.e. her conversion to christianity: don’t do it, manolis. stay with us until the war is over, and then, if you wish, i will come with you to your land. you can tell your family i am christian, does it really matter? whatever you love i will love, and whatever you believe, i will believe. here in ankara all the christian women speak turkish, and i cannot tell the difference between us. don’t tell them my name is adviye, tell them it’s maria. my poor little adviye! you spoke the language of true love, but how could i have ever hoped to understand in the whirlwind of hatred whipped up by the war?33 sotiriou’s treatment of this confl ict follows traditional gender clichés: although manolis is a prisoner and adviye a free woman of the ruling turkish majority, it is the nevertheless the constrained man who takes the decision. lacking imagination and trust in their common future and perhaps also lacking true love for his turkish lover, manolis decides to leave adviye. 31. venezis, nr. 31328,114. 32. sotiriou, farewell, anatolia, 126. 33. ibid, 139f. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 30 31 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose in fioretos’ ‘the last greek’ it is again the greek partner, who takes the decision about a seem ingly unacceptable bi-religious and bi-ethnic love story: the deaf, but educated and beautiful ly green-eyed turk erol bulut, a mechanic of bicycles and a scribe, has set eyes on despina bakirikas, the 17 years old daughter of a greek baker in smyrna. in her environment, despina is reputed to have an “adventurous heart” and to be a girl “that did what turkish boys were do ing”. although despina’s illiterate mother sofi a intercepts the perfumed love letters of the young turk, despina, who likes cycling, agrees to join erol for a bike tour and to be seduced behind a mosque at the periphery of the city. when she realizes her pregnancy, despina arranges a meeting with erol in a cafe, trying to metaphorically explain her situation to her deaf lover: well, it is like this: even the moon that shines above your quarter of the city is growing. today it may be a crescent, but tomorrow we shall have a half-moon and after-tomorrow the full moon. and then, my friend, it will not be bread that is coming out of the oven. if you know what i mean. (…) i mean, if you do not understand what can happen behind a mosque, it is good night. please try to understand that, for god’s sake. or the sake of al lah, if you prefer. soon new stars will be born.34 in contrast to the humble adviye of manolis axiotis/sotiriou, despina dares to confi de in her moth er who then convinces her husband lefteris to hurriedly arrange a marriage with his compatriot yannis georgiadis, who soon develops a preference for young boys in the capital city con stantinople. although many in despina’s environment sense a possible ‘illegitimacy’ in de spina’s son yannis, who is born only seven months after marriage, the climate of overall tolerance and tacit acceptance of ‘adventurous passions’ across communal borders prevent dra matic twists, for fioretos’ protagonists are convinced that collective identities are constructed rather than inherited: the priest, who had seen more strange baptisms than this one, also preferred to keep silence. but when he anointed the fore-head, chest, back, hands and feet of the infant with olive-oil, he whispered, for safety’s sake: “wherever you may have come from, little friend, from now on you will be a genuine greek. don’t ever forget that! and make your mother proud!”35 although not offi cially accepted, the friendship and love between erol and despina proves to be lasting and even lifesaving. when erol reads the wedding announcement of despina and georgiadis, he decides not to belong to anyone except “allah, the almighty” and be comes a muezzin. but from afar he follows the destiny of his erstwhile lover and their son yannis. 27 years later, in mid-september 1922, when kemalist troops set fi re on the christian quar ters of smyrna, erol suddenly and just in time appears at despina’s house: “y-you were right”, he explained tonelessly, but comprehensively, as if their last conversation of two decades ago had never end34. aris fioretos, der letzte grieche; roman (münchen: carl hanser verlag, 2011), 70. the novel fi rst appeared in swedish (2009), than in dutch and german translation (2011), followed by a translation into french (2012). the quotations in this contribution were translated from german into english by tes sa hofmann. 35. fioretos, der letzte grieche, 80. ed. (…) “it is f-full moon, i mean. at present your god hides in a r-rabbit hole.”36 erol gives his garment of a muezzin to his son, helping him to disguise and to escape, together with despina and her bike. despite the hardships that mother and son endure during the subsequent death march, despina recalls erol with gratefulness, once they reach their new homeland: together they marched in one of those kilometers long columns, consisting mainly of greek families and their animals that left smyrna in september 1922. many perished, others fell to the ground and refused to walk any further. (…) two weeks later the refugees arrived in a homeland that none of them had ever set foot on. “beloved erol, allah ismarladik”, murmured despina, when they crossed the border.37 comparing the literary treatment of sexual encounters between members of con fl icting ethno-religious communities under genocidal circumstances, the two authors from asia minor, venezis and sotiriou, depict them as socially impossible, painful and torment ing, regardless of whether greeks and turks affl icted by desire gave in to their passion or resisted. with a time difference of more than 85 years, aris fioretos treats the same constella tion in a more relaxed and even humorous, tongue-in-cheek way: although he does not lead his turkish and greek lovers into marriage, he describes their profound love as unshaken by times of complete disaster and catastrophe. transnational fi ction in some postmodern38 novels of the 21th century, authors of the greek diasporas39 expanded the narrative of the asia minor ‘catastrophe’ into intergenerational tales of fl ight, migration and integration into the societies of receiving countries. the most prominent examples, published by such ‘global greeks’, are jeffry eugenides’ pulitzer awarded ‘middlesex’ (2002), written in english, and aris fioretos’ novel ‘the last greek’ (2009), written in swedish. eugenides’ narrator and main protagonist is the hermaphrodite cal stephanides (born as calliope helen, or callie), who em bodies physical and social hybridity. the cultural concept of intersexuality, or hermaphrodism, de rives from asia minor, where according to greek mythology the intimate embrace of the god dess aphrodite and the god hermes generates the hybrid hermaphrodi tos.40 being positioned ‘in-between’ their country of origin and the receiving country, immi grant communities can similarly be 36. ibid., 86. 37. ibid., 89. 38. in this contribution, the term ‘postmodern fi ction/novel’ is used in its rather formal connotation, relating to fi ction a� er the second world war. while there is little consensus on the precise characteristics of postmodern literature, the term seems stylistically applicable to aris fioretos’ ‘the last greek’ and the use of historiographic metafi ction, fragmentation and temporal distortion in that novel. 39. cf. dimitris tsiovas (ed.), greek diaspora and migration since 1700: society, politics and culture (farnham, sur rey; burlington: ashgate, 2009). 40. anika götje, “ethnicity and ethnic identity in jeff rey eugenides’ ‘middlesex’.” (ma thesis, universität hannover, 2005), 4ff . international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 32 33 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose defi ned as hybrid. according to one of the protagonists in eugenides’ immigrant novel, the hermaphrodite represents “what is to come next”, i.e. the new man with changing and highly individual identities. for the author, androgyny serves as a metaphor to question identities, based on difference41; eugenides suggests a concept of bridging or crossing the differences, be it gender, ethnic/communal or social difference. the scholar s. caovoux concluded: “(…) middlesex show(s) the erosion of the traditional understanding of both ethnic identity and gender identity. describing the limits of multiculturalism, the (…) author (…) seem(s) to reject any given identity category, unable to fi t to individual subjectivities.”42 callie or cal stephanides’ particular sex is the genetic result of an incestuous romance between his grandparents desdemona and eleftherios (‘lefty’). typical for the social-economic situa tion of rural christians in the ottoman empire, the orphaned siblings are producers (des demona) and traders (eleftherios) of silk cocoons. grown up in the remote village of bithynios43 at the slope of mount olympus44 (asia minor), they are confronted with a declining population of less than one hundred and few chances to meet agreeable greek marriage partners. instead, the two young people, who grew up together, discover their attraction to each other. in a milieu where the orthodox prohibition of intermarriage be tween cousins of fi rst and second grade has been violated for generations, such a step does not appear all too unexpected. however, the night when brother and sister fi rst realize their mutual attraction to each other coincides with the retreat of the hellenic administration from nearby bursa (prusa in greek) on 31 august 1922 and the defeat of the hellenic army in asia minor. the siblings decide to leave for greece via smyrna: by the morning (…) desdemona’s forebodings had been borne out. the megale idea had come to an end. the turks had captured afyon. the greek army, beaten, was fl eeing toward the sea. in retreat, it was setting fi re to everything on its path. desdemona and lefty, in dawn’s light, stood at the mountainside and surveyed the devas tation. black smoke rose for miles across the valley. every village, every tree, every fi eld was afl ame. “we can’t stay here,” lefty said. “the turks will take revenge.” “since when did they need a reason?” 45 desdemona and lefty disagree on the interpretation of the sequence of events and revenge41. arne de boever, states of exception in the contemporary novel: martel, eugenides, coetzee, sebald (new york: bloomsbury publishing, 2012), 54. 42. sophie coavoux, greek diaspora and hybrid identities: transnational and transgender perspectives in two novels: loaded, by christos tsiolkas (australia) and middlesex, by jeff rey eugenides (usa) “transtext(e)s transcultures: journal of global transcultural studies”, 7, 2012, http://transtexts.revues.org/451 43. a fi ctitious toponym, a� er the ancient region of bithynia 44. mount olympus (olympos in greek) is one of 20 mountains of same name on the territory of recent turkey. it can be identifi ed as the highest mountain in the marmara region, uludağ, or keşiş dağı, “mountain of monks in turkish (2,543 m), which is located at the southern edge of the ancient region of bithynia. 45. jeff rey eugenides, middlesex (london: bloomsbury publishing, 2002), 42. tak ing on both sides, and so does the narrator/author, leaving it to the reader to decide whether the massacres and crimes, committed in mid-september 1922 in asia minor, were intentional de struction or rather retaliation. with changed passport identities the siblings succeed to embark from smyrna and marry on board a ship to the united states. the story of their family develops according to the experience of immigrant communities from asia minor in the united states during the fi rst half of the 20th century, where greeks and armenians fi nd themselves sandwiched ‘in-between’ the white anglo-saxon protestant upper class and the african americans. although eu genides always refused to have his novel categorized as autobiographic, he nevertheless drew on his own family story, in particular on his father’s greek ancestry and also on his childhood and adolescence in eugenides’ native city detroit and his time in berlin.46 flowing, fl exible identity is also a major theme for aris fioretos, who is of greekaustrian descent, grew up in sweden and has found an adopted home in berlin.47 his third novel ‘the last greek’ tells the story of yannis georgiadis, who was born in a macedonian village as a child of refugees from smyrna. this postmodern ‘picaresque novel’48 un folds over four generations starting in the mid-19th century, and develops a story of repeated catastrophe and losses, which is followed by emigration, migration and alienation each time: fi rst from asia minor to greece and from there to north and central europe. fioretos’ narrator kostas kez doglu is a friend of the main hero yannis and author of his biography, which comes as a sup plement to the ‘encyclopedia of diasporic greeks’. the twelve volumes of the ‘encyclopedia’ form a collective memory, established and written by smyrniote survivor eleni vembas and her friends, who took it upon themselves to write the history of all those greeks who had to leave their homeland during the 20th century. yannis georgiadis, the protagonist of the supplement, is the last of three generations of the same name, and he is also the last member in his family born in greece. his biographer and friend kostas documents the life of the last yannis georgiadis not in a linear, chronological way, but fragmented and thematically modularized according to the network structure of this novel. interlinking past and present, fioretos emphasizes the interconnection of all places and times: “people consist of other people. the only way to do them justice is to not be limited to the bare facts and a sheath of skin, bones and some internal organs.”49 at the same time the novels of eugenides and in particular fioretos illustrate that the literary topic of asia minor, which originally had been embedded into greek national literature, moved not only into european literatures, but has been globalized, due to eng lish or other european 46. encyclopedia of contemporary writers and their work, ed. jeff hamilton and brian jones, (new york: facts on file, 2010), 125. 47. ursula märz, “provinzler und weltreisender,” deutschlandfunk, november 20, 2011, http://www. deutschlandfunk.de/provinzler-und-weltreisender.700.de.html?dram:article_id=84957 48. a reviewer classifi ed ‘the last greek’ as ‘picaresque novel’. the genre emerged in spain in the 16th century as a variety of baroque romance, and became popular also in other european literatures since the 17th century. the term derives from the protagonist (‘picaro’), who retrospectively narrates or justifi es his life in the fi rst person. although the classifi cation as picaresque novel could be challenged, a. fioretos’ ‘the last greek’ contains at least some traditional features of the genre, in particular the preference for comical or satirical elements, or the linking of individual biographies with general history. 49. fioretos, der letzte grieche, 10. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 34 35 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose interlanguages. meanwhile, the great fire of smyrna and impossible romance between turks and indigenous christians caught also the attention of the izmir born resident of toronto, loren edizel, who published her english written historical novel “the ghosts of smyrna” (2013) fi rst in her homeland and in turkish translation (“i̇zmir hayaletleri”50; 2008; translated by roza hakmen). in this sense the destruction of a pluralist city that has been praised as the ‘paris of the orient’, acquires universal signifi cance, as eugenides’ narrator comments: “i want to mention these things, because they all happened in that city that was no place exactly, that was part of no country because it was all countries (...)”.51 the irreversible loss of smyrna therefore denotes a loss for humankind. the smyrna holocaust as an episode of transnational prose in the novels ‘middlesex’ and ‘the last greek’ the destruction of smyrna and the subsequent expulsion of surviving greeks by mustafa kemal and his troops in september 1922 is a linchpin of the story. this fi nal episode of the genocide against ottoman greeks has been documented and analyzed in non-fi ctional literature, starting with the event close rec ollections ‘the blight of asia’ (1926) by the us consul to smyrna, george horton (1859-1942) and marjorie housepian dobkin’s (1922-2013)52 book ‘the smyrna affair’ (1966). born as a daughter of a smyrniote armenian who did not survive the ‘great fire’, or ‘holocaust’ of the ionian capital, housepian based her work on extensive eyewitness testimonies from survivors53, allied troops sent to smyrna during the evacuation, foreign diplomats, relief workers, and turkish eyewitnesses. later studies, in particular by giles milton (‘paradise lost: smyr na 1922: the destruction of islam’s city of tolerance’, 2008), confi rmed the accusation of contemporary witnesses that kemalist forces set fi re to the christian quarters intentionally. fioretos refers to the ‘great fire’ and the subsequent expulsion and fl ight of christian communities twice: in the fi ctitious editor’s prologue, which sets the novel’s frame story, and in the paragraph of the love-story of erol bulut and despina bakirikas, which results in her suc cessful fl ight with the initial help of erol. in his prologue, a fi ctitious editor introduces kostas kezdoglou as author of the supplement to the ‘encyclopedia of diasporic 50. literally „the ghosts of izmir“; the turkish edition avoided the original greek toponym. 51. eugenides, middlesex, 54. 52. for a biography of housepian see huberta von voss, portrait of hope: armenians in the contemporary world (new york: berghahn books, 2007), 88-92, (chapter 10: the ashes of smyrna: marjorie housepian dobkin, writer (new york)). 53. a late publication of a handwritten testimony is the diary of the armenian physician garabed hatcherian, published by his granddaughter dora sakayan in armenian original (1995) and in english translation under the title “an armenian doctor in turkey: garabed hatcherian: my smyrna ordeal of 1922” (montreal: arod books, 1997). more recently, lou ureneck published the story of the american methodist minister asa jennings and the naval offi cer lt. commander halsey powell, who organized the rescue of christians from smyrna; the author drew largely on previously known primary sources and research by michael llewellyn-smith, richard hovannisian, daniel yergin and andrew mango. cf. lou ureneck, the great fire: one american’s mission to rescue victims of the 20th century’s first genocide (ecco, 2015; new edition under the title: smyrna, september 1922: the american mission to rescue victims of the 20th century’s first genocide (2016). greeks’, which has been established by kostas’ grandmother eleni vembas. already on the second page of the book the events of smyrna in fall 1922 are mentioned, thus becoming a major reference point in the novel: we write the year 1922. in smyrna they hear screams and shattering glass, bolting horses and something that could have been theater thunder, but wasn’t. (…) in that fall eleni became 38 years of age and marched with the greeks and the animals that left the mad city in con voys. many perished, many disappeared. in the same summarizing style, fioretos catches the events in the chapter ‘homeland and homeland’, which starts with the death of despina’s mother sofi a bakirikas, who at that time suffers already from dementia (“incapable to rise from her couch, sofi a died in the fl ames”), in order to return to the general picture: on a warm day in september with unfavorable winds – we write the year 1922 – turkish forces cordoned the armenian quarters. they invaded in stiff uniforms with fl ashing sabers – gaunt, dark, determined. for nearly a week they did with the residents as they wished. when the wind eventually turned into the direction of the chris tian quarters, they set the houses on fi re. because the soldiers had spilled petrol on the streets, the fi re spread rapidly and greedily.54 the following events are described mainly from the perspective of yannis georgiadis, who, in his disguise as a muezzin, arrives at the destroyed house of despina’s friend eleni, where he discovers the youngest son, pavlos vembas. swimming, he evacuates the child to an italian vessel in the gulf of smyrna: “around them all kind of things swayed on the water: bundles of cloth, mashed water melons, charred branches, a horse... and of course human beings. in whole or parts of them, living or less living.” at her old age of 94 and sick from mercury pollution and perhaps also dementia, despina is still tormented by fl ashbacks from her ottoman past: she takes her daughter-in-law for an intruding turkish soldier (“out of my land!”) and warns of a “hill, back there, for there the tongues of the armenians are cut off”. the devastation of smyrna is described even more extensively in the third chapter (‘an immodest proposal’) of eugenides’ ‘middlesex’, where the illegitimate love-story of callie/cal’s grand parents un folds against the background of the fi nal chapter in the ottoman greek’s destruc tion. the events are refl ected upon from the divergent perspectives of the narrator cal stephanides, adding his comments in brackets, of despina and lefty, dr nishan philobosian, a smyrniote physician of armenian descent, general hajienestis55 and the british major arthur maxwell: while the siblings fi nd themselves among hundreds of thousands of desperate, starving greek refugees, hajienestis is described as insane and incapable: “on sep tember 6, 1922, general hajienestis, commander in chief of the greek forces in asia mi nor, awoke with the impression that his legs were made of glass. afraid to 54. fioretos, der letzte grieche, 85f. 55. the historical model for this character was the hellenic general georgios hatsianestis (1863-1922), who largely led the war against the turkish nationalist forces from his bed, for fear that his alleged ‘glass bones’ might break. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 36 37 “only those who look back, move forward”: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose get out of bed, he sent the barber away, forgoing his morning shave” (p. 43). on september 8, he gives his fi rst and only command for weeks (“up anchors! reverse engines. full steam ahead!” p. 54), leav ing the city of smyrna entirely undefended: on shore, lefty and desdemona watched the greek fl eet leaving. the crowd surged toward the water, raised its four hundred thousand hands, and shouted. and then it fell silent. not one mouth uttered a sound as the real ization came home that their own country had deserted them, that smyrna had now no government, and that there was nothing between them and the advancing turks.56 to this betrayal the next one is added: the refugees and christian residents of smyrna hope for greek ships to evacuate them, but no vessel appears. the conversations between maxwell and his subordinate phillips reveal that the commanders of allied ships in the gulf of smyrna have neither any intention nor any order to evacuate christians from asia minor for whom maxwell has nothing but racist contempt: but surely, sir, if the turks arrive and there’s a massacre... there is nothing we can do about it, phillips. i’ve spent years in the near east. the one lesson i’ve learned is that there is nothing one can do with these people. nothing at all! the turks are the best of the lot. the armenian i liken to the jew. defi cient moral and intellectual character. as for the greeks, well, look at them. they have burned down the whole country and now they swarm in here crying for help. nice cigar, what? 57 dr. philobosian hopes in vain that he and his family will be protected by a letter of recommen dation written by mustafa kemal, whose diverticulitis the armenian physician has successfully treated. but the turkish soldiers, who raid his house in philobosian’s absence, are illiterate; returning home, philobosian fi nds his entire family wiped out: it didn’t occur to dr. philobosian that the twisted body he stepped over in the street belonged to his younger son. he noticed only that his front door was open. in the foyer, he stopped to listen. there was only silence. slowly, still holding his doctor’s bag, he climbed the stairs. all the lamps were on now. the living room was bright. toukhie was sitting on the sofa, waiting for him. her head had fallen backward as though in hilarity, the angle opening the wound, so that a section of windpipe gleamed. stepan sat slumped at the dining table, his right hand, which held the letter of protection, nailed down with a steak knife. dr. philobosian took a step and slipped, then noticed a trail of blood leading down the hallway. he followed the trail into the master bedroom, where he found his two daughters. they were both naked, lying on their backs. three of their four breasts had been cut off.58 56. eugenides, middlesex, 54. 57. ibid, 52. 58. ibid, 60f. in smyrna, the destiny of the armenian physician and the greek siblings intertwine: first, philobosian saves the wounded and starving lefty by providing free medical care and supporting the young refugee with some money, then in return lefty saves the completely shaken doctor from suicide. after lefty has succeeded to gain a french visa for himself and his alleged wife desdemona, he helps philobosian to leave smyrna, declaring the armenian to be his cousin. in the united states, philobosian remains the family doctor of the stephanides and is respon sible for not realizing the sexual anomaly of the newborn cal, whom he mistakes for a “beau tiful, healthy girl”. metaphorically spoken, cal stephanides, the hybrid new man, emerges from the destruction of the global city of smyrna, for the anonymity and chaos in the devas tated city help lefty and desdemona to achieve new identities for their mar riage and escape. but as in fioretos’ novel, the female survivor desdemona suffers from lifelong trauma. the 1967 detroit riots remind her of smyrna and the looting, arsonist turks. no less trauma tized, dr. philobosian, on the other hand, never mentions smyrna again and leaves the room, if somebody else does. he never mentions his fi rst wife or murdered sons and daughters. “perhaps for that reason he was still alive”, comments the narrator. complex symbols of creative continuity between the lost world in asia minor and the new homeland in north america are the silkworms and desdemona’s knowledge about them that she brought with her from bithynia. in ‘middlesex’, the silk worms are described as highly sensitive, almost mythical creatures, reacting immediate ly to their keepers’ well-being and psychic state; in the crisis of fall 1922, they stopped spinning their cocoons. in 1932, when desdemona is looking for ways of earning money to sustain her fami ly, she therefore eventually accepts an offer to train young black muslim women to produce silk, despite her initial hesitation. ancient greek belief from asia minor meets with new african american religious convictions: “listen, des, before i became supreme captain, i did hair and nails. not no farmer’s daughter, understand? this thumb look green to you? help me out. what do these silkworm fellas like? how we get them to, you know, silkify?” “it hard work.” “we don’t mind.” “it take money.” “we got plenty.” desdemona picked up a shriveled worm, barely alive. she cooed to it in greek. (…) twenty-three pairs of eyes fell on desdemona. she gathered courage. she translated what she wanted to say in english and went over it twice before she spoke. “to make good silk,” she then pronounced, beginning her lessons to the muslim girls training and general civilization class, “you have to be pure.” “we trying, des. praise allah. we trying.”59 59. ibid, 147f. 98 book review sarkis y. karayan, armenians in ottoman turkey, 1914: a geographic and demographic gazetteer, london, gomidas institute, 2018, 674 pp., maps, photos reviewed by robert tatoyan, senior research fellow, armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, yerevan, armenia the question of the number of the armenians in the ottoman empire prior to and after the armenian genocide continues to attract widespread attention of many scholars. besides being purely of an academic nature, this interest is also due to the turkish government’s continuous efforts to use these population figures as a keystone of its policy of genocide denial. thus, the ministry of foreign affairs of turkey, in one of its official publications, connects these two questions in the following way: “demographic studies prove that prior to world war i, fewer than 1.5 million armenians lived in the entire ottoman empire. thus, allegations that more than 1.5 million armenians from eastern anatolia died must be false.”1 the vast majority of turkish and some international scholars try to justify the turkish state’s official position by taking the ottoman census data on armenians for granted. they also dismiss data provided by armenian sources, particularly the statistics provided by the constantinople armenian patriarchate, which usually provide higher figures for the armenian population than that of the ottoman ones.2 under the pressure of this wave of denialist scholarship concerning these figures, armenian scholars in the west who deal with this topic mainly take a defensive stance. thus, the late vahakn dadrian, a distinguished scholar of the armenian genocide, points out the systematic character of the mishandling of the armenian population statistics by 1. “the armenian allegation of genocide: the issue and the facts,” accessed 20.04.2018, http://www. mfa.gov.tr/the-armenian-allegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts.en.mfa. 2. almost every denialist historian surveying work on the armenian question and the armenian genocide has a chapter or two dealing with armenian population figures and the controversy over the number of armenian casualties. see particularly: esat uras, tarihte ermeniler ve ermeni meselesi (ankara: yeni matbaa, 1950), and english translation esat uras, the armenians in history and the armenian question (ankara: documentary publications, 1988); see also kamuran gürün, the armenian file: the myth of innocence exposed (nicosia and london: k. rustem and brother and weidenfeld and nicolson, 1985); for more recent example of this denial approach see guenter lewy, the armenian massacres in ottoman turkey. a disputed genocide (salt lake city: university of utah press, 2007). some turkish and american denialist scholars have a special interest in late ottoman demography issues (see particularly, kemal karpat, ottoman population, 1830-1914: demographic and social characteristics (madison: university of wisconsin press, 1985); see also justin mccarthy, muslims and minorities. the population of ottoman anatolia and the end of the empire (new york: new york university press, 1983). at the same time, justin mccarthy, while praising ottoman official statistics and basing his counts on the data they contain, is forced to make some adjustments and corrections, usually estimating the ottoman armenian population number higher than it is recorded by the ottoman state. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-armenian-allegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts.en.mfa http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-armenian-allegation-of-genocide-the-issue-and-the-facts.en.mfa 99 the ottoman authorities during the armenian reforms era (1878-1914), as well as other discrepancies and fallacies connected to ottoman statistics related to the ethnic distribution of population in the six provinces of western armenia (vilayet-i sitte).3 levon marashlian, another armenian scholar with a special interest in ottoman armenian demographic issues, while criticizing denialist scholars’ (justin mccarthy, kemal karpat et al.) methodological and factual fallacies in their approach to the armenian population figures of the empire, uses statistical data provided by armenian compatriotic studies on ottoman armenian communities and other unofficial armenian sources and argues that prior to the armenian genocide there were at least 2,000,000 armenians living in the ottoman empire.4 it is important also to mention here the french-armenian scholars raymond h. kevorkian’s and paul b. paboudjian’s detailed study of the pre-wwi ottoman armenian population. based on census provided by the constantinople armenian patriarchate in 1913 they put the number of the armenian populations at 1,914,620 armenians living in 2,925 localities on the territory of the ottoman empire.5 sarkis y. karayan’s study is a new major attempt to break down this academic stalemate in the field of ottoman armenian demographic studies, by providing a detailed and scrupulous calculation of the number of armenians in the ottoman empire prior to the armenian genocide. he does so on the basis of precise scientific methodology and comparison of statistical data provided by different sources. karayan’s book consists of two sections which are unequal in their size, as well as appendices 1-3, a bibliography, and index. part 1 of the book (pp. 3-67) deals with the methododolgy used by the author. by providing a survey of the main statistical source, karayan examines the figures before and after the genocide. these sources are: 1. constantinople armenian patriarchate figures for 1882-1912; 2. turkish official figures on armenians; and 3. european sources on the population of the ottoman empire. following this information, the author furnishes data on the number of armenians in the diaspora from 1914 and after 1918, as well as the number of armenian lives lost in turkey and the caucasus from the end of world war i to the final establishment of kemalist rule in turkey (december 31, 1922.).6 in his conclusion to part 1, karayan presents a summary of his findings for the armenian population in 1914 as well as his final figure of the total number of armenian lives lost during 1915-1918. these are presented and summarized by vilayets [ottoman provinces] in comparison to the constantinople armenian patriarchate and ottoman government’s official figures. section two (pp. 70-566) of the book which is considered as the main portion of the 3. vahakn n. dadrian, warrant for genocide: key elements of turko-armenian conflict (new brunswick: n.j., transaction publishers, 1999), 171-190 (appendix entitled “the questionable features of the ottoman calculus of the demography of armenians.”) 4. levon marashlian, politics and demography: armenians, turks, and kurds in the ottoman empire (cambridge mass.: zoryan institute, 1991). 5. raymond h. kévorkian, paul b. paboudjian, les arméniens dans l’empire ottoman à la veille du génocide (paris: editions d’art et d’histoire arhis, 1992). see also raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (london-new york: i.b. tauris, 2011), 265-278. 6. in accordance to his methodology, karayan uses these figures in calculation of the armenian death toll during the armenian genocide. 100 study, deals with the population figures of the armenians living in the ottoman empire in 1914. in this section karayan provides a long and detailed analysis of over 4,000 armenian populated settlements. he groups them according to the administrative divisions of the ottoman empire at the beginning of the 20th century: vilayets, sanjaks, kazas, and, in some cases, nahiyes. the names of the administrative units presented within the book are given in alphabetical order. the tables of these data consists of five columns: 1. place, name, and position, 2. modern turkish name, 3. number of families, 4. number of persons and a code, from a to e, referring to the given settlement mentioned in the u.s. maps and gazetteer7 of turkey. karayan’s research determines the total number of armenians worldwide in 1914 as 4,800,787 (including 2,534,784 in the ottoman empire, 2,026,000 in the russian empire, and 240,003 in the diaspora) and total number of armenians worldwide in 1923-27 as 2,203,206 (including 150,000 in turkey, 1,568,900 in the soviet union (including armenia), and 484,316 in the diaspora). by subtracting the second figure from the first, the author provides the following final figures of the total armenian lives lost during 1914-1923 as 2,597,581 of which armenian lives lost between november 11, 1918 and december 1923 as 412,791, and total losses in 1914-1918 as 2,184,790 (by rounding up: 2,185,000.) (p. 67). thus, based on this extensive research, karayan provides the numbers of ottoman armenians in 1914, diaspora armenians in 1914, and diaspora armenians in 1927, as well as the number of armenian lives lost between november 11, 1918 and december 1923. as the main bulk of the study is dedicated to the calculation of the number of armenians in the ottoman empire in 1914, it would be reasonable in the limited scope of this review to focus on the analysis of these figures through examining both the methods used by the author and their reliability. first, it should be pointed out that both the ottoman government and constantinople armenian patriarchate sources provide different figures even for smaller administrative units such as the sanjak and kaza. hence, there is no other reliable way to determine the number of ottoman armenians prior to the genocide than by counting the armenian population, settlement by settlement, using the most important sources. karayan uses this particular method which situates his work on a methodologically firm basis. the bulk of sources used by the author to give the armenian population figures on the settlement level are the following: 1. data from the books about particular ottoman armenian communities published by diaspora armenian compatriotic unions and armenian genocide survivors; 2. census figures provided by the armenian patriarchate of constantinople in 1912, taken from the book koghkota hay hokevoraganutian yev ir hodin 1915 aghedali dariin [the golgotha of the armenian clergy and its faithful in the catastrophic year of 1915], compiled by teotig [lapjinian] in 1921 and printed in new york in 1985;8 3. 7. geographical dictionary or directory used in conjunction with a map or atlas. 8. elsewhere the author dates teodig’s data at 1914 (see, for example, bitlis kaza figures, 173). this census was taken in 1913, as it is justly mentioned in the note by ara sarafian (gomidas institute), the publisher of karayan’s study (p.vii). this confusion probably originates from the fact that the armenian patriarchate had actually prepared ottoman armenian population statistics in 1912, which were partially published by the ottoman armenian writer and public figure grigor zohrab under the pen name, marcel leart in 1913 (see marcel leart, la question armenienne a la lumiere des documents (paris: 101 population figures collected by certain individuals concerning specific provinces and published around 1910; 4. armenian periodicals and journals published in the diaspora; 5. official ottoman population figures for 1914 (these are used whenever figures are not available from other sources); 6. the armenian soviet encyclopedia (12 volumes, around 8,500 pages) and geographical dictionary of historical and modern armenia (5 volumes, around 4,000 pages) (pp. 5-9)9. it should be noted that karayan’s statement that he “presented and examined practically all available figures provided by different authors” (p.7), for the 1914 ottoman armenian population does not do justice to the scholarship. for example, the author does not use the groundbreaking study kevorkian and paboudjian mentioned above which provides complete data of the armenian population figure based on the the 1913 census survey lists which are kept in the nubarian library in paris. while karayan’s available source for this census (teodig) provides only the number of households or families for each particular settlement by multiplying them by 7 in order to obtain the number of persons, kevorkian and paboudjian’s work provides the precise number of individuals as they were recorded in these lists. the main methodological weakness of the karayan’s approach to the populaton is that, as a rule, only one source is used for each settlement. this makes the author’s calculation dependent on the reliability of that partuclular source and creates serious discrepancies. in some cases the author provides two or more village lists for the given administrative unit, but there is no indication on which criteria he chooses one of them to be the main source. hence in some cases, he selects less trustworthy source as a basis for his calculations. by doing so his figures again become less reliable. let us provide some examples in order to illustrate the latter point. for the armenian population of the kaza of kharzan in the sanjak of si’irt, karayan uses the inflated figures provided by v. bedoyan according to which the kaza had 2,131 famlies (17,048 persons for the administrative unit). if we compare these figures to the ones provided by teodig (1913), we see that the latter provides a very low figure (1,000 families). it is highly probable that bedoyan’s numbers are inflated, thus affecting karayan’s calculation.10 another example is the case of the city of diarbekir for which karayan estimates the number of the armenian population to be around 45,000, whereas others provide much lower figures of 15,00026,000. despite the fact that the author attempts to justify his choice of the higher figure, almost all of his arguments are problematic and are essentially guesstimations (pp. 272273).11 librairie maritime et colonial, 1913) and in a complete form in 1922 by the same teodig in amenoun taretsoyts [annual calendar], 261-265, where data on the ottoman armenian population as of april 1, 1921 is provided. karayan is aware of this key source, but, surprisingly, uses it only for his counting of armenian genocide survivors. 9. a more accurate translation of the name of the mentioned book is “dictionary of localities in armenia and the neighboring regions” («հայաստանի և հարակից երկրների տեղանունների բառարան»). 10. karayan, actually mentions teodig’s figures, but provides no clue as to why he decided not to use them as a basis for calculating the population figure of the kharzan district (p. 213). 11. if indeed there were about 45,000 armenians in the city of diarbekir, as the author claims, this town would be the largest armenian-populated in six vilayets of western armenia (behind the cities of van, 102 unfortunately, this fallacy is also inherent in some of the author’s other figures for the vilayet of diarbekir, particularly those for the sanjaks of mardin and severag, where he provides the figures of armenians at 44,833 and 37,355 respectively. as a result, the author’s estimate of 194,398 for the armenian population of the vilayet of diarbekir is most likely an exaggeration. the most reliable sources at our disposal (constantinople armenian patriarchate’s estimate of 1912, and thomas mgrdichian) provide figures between 125150,000 for the armenian population of the vilayet of diarbekir. at the same time, the author’s estimate of 123,832 armenians for the vilayet of van at most an underestimation. reliable independent sources (armenian patriarchate statistics for 1912-1914, armenian genocide refugee counting data, among others) provide figures ranging between 150-200,000 and even higher for pre-genocide armenian populations of this province. to conclude, despite some discrpiancies in the figures provided by karayan, most of his calculations and estimates are sound. however, the calculation errors mentioned above, as well as others not mentioned, could have an impact on the reliability of karayan’s estimates for particular provinces that affects his total figure for ottoman armenian population. thus, despite all his efforts, the author’s calculation does not provide definitive and conclusive answers to the question on the number of armenians in all the armenianpopulated provinces of the ottoman empire before the genocide and the consequent question of the figures of the armenian genocide death toll. perhaps, it is a mission impossible for any specific researcher who would dare to undertake a task of similar magnitude and depth. nevertheless, most certainly, karayan’s book contains a massive treasure trove of information, which could and should be used as an indispensable reference book by any future researcher in the field of the ottoman armenian demography. erzeroum and sivas), something that does not hold ground based on all the available sources. taking into account the similarity between figures 15,000 and 45,000 we cannot rule out the possibility that the figure of 45,000 in the original source used is a result of simple typographic error. dr. suren manukyan is deputy director of the armenian genocide museum & institute (yerevan, armenia) as well as lecturer at the departments of history and oriental studies of yerevan state university. his current research focuses on the social-psychological dimension of the armenian genocide. it is based on his fulbright research project “the sociology of armenian genocide: perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers vs. victims, survivors, and betrayers” conducted at the center for the study of genocide and human rights at rutgers university, new jersey. he is a member of the international association of genocide scholars and he was director of the iags’s twelfth conference “comparative analysis of 20th century genocides” (yerevan, 8-12 july 2015). 5 on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide suren manukyan outlining organizers and perpetrators of genocides, as well as analyzing their roles in the process of mass killings are crucial for the study of particular cases of the crime. genocide is first and foremost a political crime, which is masterminded by humans and is carried out by humans. to understand the machinery of the crime we have to learn the system of hierarchy inside its operating mechanism: from decision-makers to ordinary executioners and their proponents. this problem has remained somewhat out of the academic scope of the armenian genocide studies and has found itself in a specific perceptual trap of the belief that there is no need to study a subject as obvious as this. surely, there have been researchers, which have reflected on the matter of identifying the felons; however, the system per se, its horizontal and vertical connections, from decision-making through execution has not been subject to academic scrutiny. the encyclopedia of genocide defines perpetrator as individuals, who “initiate, facilitate, or carry out acts of genocide or crimes against humanity”1. these functions – the initiation, facilitation, and implementation – to some extent describe the operational sequence of any genocide. article 4 of the un convention on prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (adopted on december 9, 1948) defines the scope of complicity to the crime: “persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article iii [of this convention – s.m.] shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.”2 at the court hearings against the young turks in 1919-1920, the offenders were classified into a similar hierarchal order. separated hearings were held for party leaders, state officials, members of the special organization, as well as regional officials, and party secretaries.3 the may 24th, 1915 declaration made by the three entente countries reflected on the problem of personal responsibility, and the complicity of ottoman officials in the mas1. dinah l. shelton (ed.), encyclopedia of genocide and crimes against humanity, vol. 2 (new york: macmillan reference usa, thomson gale, 2004), 790. 2. the full text of the un convention on prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide is available at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/ah386.pdf 3. see vahakn n. dadrian and taner akçam, judgment at istanbul: the armenian genocide trials (new york and oxford: berghahn books, 2011); meline anumyan, tchanachum yev datapartum: yeritturkeri datavarutyunnery (1919-1921 tt. և 1926 t.) [recongnition and condemnation, the young turks trials (1919-1921 and 1926)] (yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute, 2013). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 6 sacres of the armenian population, and stated the need of the members of the ottoman empire and the participants of massacres to bear personal responsibility for the events.4 the circle of persons involved in perpetration and the hierarchical organization of the armenian genocide can be provisionally divided into the following groups: upper-level decision-makers, middle-level regional organizers, agencies, and structures, as well as lower level common population. a. decision makers in the upper circle of perpetrators of the armenian genocide were those, who made the crucial decisions. they were responsible for the formulation of the ideology of the genocide, making the decisions on carrying out the genocide and supervising the course of the massacres. decision-makers sent hundreds of thousands of people to death oftentimes without participating in their killings personally. the perpetrators of this level were high ranked state officials, party elites, and a few influential individuals, who had a decisive role in masterminding the armenian genocide. it is impossible to segregate those roles since a person could appear in more than one position of a party leader, a state official, and an influential individual at the same time. the state has a crucial role in programming and carrying out genocide. the genocides of the 20th century have been perpetrated by state authorities or its representatives, for only the excessive centralization of state power, as well as control over communications and transportation means make the organization of a crime of such extent possible on a practical level.5 state resources, the legitimacy of the use of force, access to infrastructures, such as telegraphs, railroads, concentration camps, make a ‘project’ as wide-scale as genocide feasible. the state is also the only agent in possession of all those means, which let instigate a feeling of hatred in the minds of the population by dehumanizing the victims, depicting them as an evil or a deadly menace, and, thus involving huge popular masses in the act of killing. as a rule, such states are governed by political forces, which adopt a genocidal ideology and demonstrate willingness for the mass crime. those forces included the national socialist party in the case of the holocaust, the khmer rouge, one of the currents of the communist party, in cambodia. the armenian genocide is a crime committed by the ottoman empire; however, the decisions for it were made by the central committee of the union and progress party, which had de facto incorporated the state’s authority in its hands, performing functions of state bodies.6 the decisions by the committee of the union 4. “in view of those new crimes of turkey against humanity and civilization, the allied governments announce publicly to the sublime-porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres”, (cf. http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/france.php). 5. frank chalk and kurt jonassohn (eds.), the history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies (new haven and london: yale university press, 1990), 26. 6. see taner akçam, a shameful act: the armenian genocide and the question of turkish responsibility on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 7 and progress, which had been implemented by the government, were later validated by a back date and were given legislative power by the ottoman parliament. the decision on genocide was formulated between 1910 and 1911 in the course of the congresses of the young turks.7 in the situation where the ideology of ottomanism had demonstrated its inefficiency the urge to replace it with that of turkism was growing. a number of proponents of the pan-turkist ideology were elected to the central committee of ittihad in the course of the party congresses held between 1910 and 1911.8 in the autumn of 1911, the 4th congress of the party verified the move to forced turkification. kazım nami duru, who was participating in the congress, recalls in his memoirs: “ittihat swore to dissolve other peoples in the turkish environment and so developed a program to achieve the goal.”9 doctor nazım, one of the pioneers of the plan, consolidated the vision of the ‘final turkification’ at the 1910-1911 congresses; the program was to be implemented through mass resettlements of muslims and through extermination of the armenian population.10 starting from 1913 the central committee of the party of young turks discontinued reporting to the congress; having centralized the control of the country in its hands, the party relied on the influence and the authority of its members, who held positions in the government. it was the ittihat central committee that elaborated and implemented the plan of exterminating the armenian population of the empire. throughout the period, when the armenian genocide was planned and implemented, i.e. in 1912-1917, the central committee of ittihat remained unchanged and included general secretary of the party midhat şükrü, saïd halim pasha, talaat pasha, eyüp sabri, doctor nazım, doctor behaeddin şakir, doctor rusuhi, ziya gökalp, emrullah, küçük talaat, atif riza, and kara kemal.11 a number of authors (arsen avagyan, dogan avçioğlu12, şükrü hanioğlu, robert melson13) give a pivotal role to doctor nazım and behaeddin şakir in programming and carrying out the armenian genocide. (london, macmillan. 2007); vahakn dadrian, the history of the armenian genocide: ethnic conflict from the balkans to anatolia to the caucasus (providence, ri: berghahn books, 2003). 7. vahakn dadrian, the history of the armenian genocide, 179-180. 8. robert melson, revolution and genocide: on the origins of the armenian genocide and the holocaust (chicago: the university of chicago press, 1992), 165; jacob m. landau, pan-turkism: from irredentism to cooperation (bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 1995), 49. 9.  kazım nami duru, ziya gökalp (i̇stanbul, 1965), s. 41, cited from arsen avagyan, genocid armyan: mekhanizmi prinyatiya i ispolneniya resheniy [armenian genocide: mechanisms of decision-making and implementation] (yerevan, armenian genocide museum-institute, 2013), 43. 10. rené pinon, “la liquidation de l`empire ottoman,” revue des deux mondes 53 (september, 1919): 131, 139-140 in vahakn n. dadrian, warrant for genocide: key elements of turko-armenian conflict (new brunswick: transaction books, 1999), 98. 11. arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 46-48. 12. dogan avcioglu, milli kurtulu tarihi, vol. 3 (istanbul: istanbul publications, 1974). 13. robert melson, revolution and genocide, 145, 313, (ft 44). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 8 staying away from the public attention nazım, nevertheless, had centralized the control of the party in his hands.14 he had repeatedly expressed himself in favor of the idea of exterminating non-turkic minorities of the empire and had his loyal proponents in this cause. probably, it was behaeddin şakir, who, together with nazım, authored the law of deportations. the crucial role şakir played was confirmed by colonel of the german army stange, who, together with şakir, was organizing guerilla operations against the russian troops in the first trimester of the world war i. stange informs that the same detachments were further transformed into those of killers.15 vahakn dadrian, too, underlines the crucial role the two had in the final decision regarding the plan of the genocide (along with talaat, head of the national security campolad, and colonel seifi, who was the head of the second department [responsible for investigations] of the chief of defense of the country).16 other two main ideologists of the ittihat in the years of the genocide were ziya gökalp and yusuf akçura, who believed that the extermination of the christians would eliminate the obstacle, which hindered the unification of the turkic-speaking peoples living from anatolia to central asia into a new super-empire.17 however, a detailed plan to annihilate an ethnic group could be implemented only where the party had a total control over the state apparatus, and its agencies, such as the law enforcers. in this light, the formation of the ittihat dictatorship after the 1913 coup d’etat was crucial, since the state and the party apparatus got totally amalgamated shortly after. the government de facto was turned into an instrument in performing the party decisions. the power centralized in the hands of the three pashas, which also bore the main responsibility for the perpetration of the genocide. minister of defense ismail enver, who had accumulated all the military matters in his hands, actively propagated for an alliance with germany, and, being married to the niece of the sultan, was believed to have aspirations for the thronе. ahmet cemal was the first governor of istanbul, who later became minister of navy, commander of the 4th army, and the de facto proprietor of syria. his relationships with enver had always been complicated.18 in general, each of the strongmen in the triumvirate would try to exclude others intervention in spheres under his control, which can explain the sometimes obvious discrepancies in their actions during the armenian genocide. 14. arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 55-56. 15. report no. 3481, dated 23 august 1915, botschaft konstantinopel 170/23, cited from vahakn n. dadrian, “the role of turkish physicians in the world war i genocide of ottoman armenians,” holocaust and genocide studies 1(2) (1986): 173. 16. vahakn n. dadrian, “the secret young-turk ittihadist conference and the decision for the world war i genocide of the armenians,” holocaust and genocide studies 7(2) (1993): 176. 17. norman m. naimark, fires of hatred: ethnic cleansing in twentieth-century europe (cambridge: harvard university press, 2002), 25–26. 18. abram elkus, the memoirs of abram elkus: lawyer, ambassador, statesman (princeton, nj: gomidas institute 2004), 61-62. on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 9 the third in the triumvirate was mehmet talaat, the minister of interior, and later also the head of the government, who de facto entertained the greatest power inside the country, having undertaken the role to reconcile and to restrain the conflicting currents and individual influences within a closed circle of the young turks party.19 as a minister of interior the police and the administration in the vilayets were also under his control, which gave him definitive influence and made him a central figure in the scheme that perpetrated the armenian genocide.20 ambassador of germany to the ottoman empire count von wolff-metternich called him “the soul of the armenian persecutions”.21 the telegrams, which were coordinating the extermination of armenians in the vilayets, bore his name. of course, those orders did not contain overt calls to manslaughter but indirectly indicated on the preparation of the monstrous plan. for instance, a confidential telegram from talaat dated july 21, 1915, that was sent to the governors and mutasarrif of diyarbekır, kharberd, urfa, and der-zor ordered to bury the corpses on the roadsides, to burn the deserted properties, rather than throw the bodies into gorges, rivers, or lakes.22 in another telegram to the governor of diarbekir dated july 22, 1915, talaat called on to immediately terminate the killings of other christian population, since applying the disciplinary measures against armenians on other peoples might backfire.23 the government of the ottoman empire had turned into a tool in the hands of the young turks party fulfilling its programs. prince of egypt saïd halim pasha,24 who was in the closed circle of the leaders of the young turks party, nevertheless never had a major influence on the decision-making inside it. he was only a docile agent for the triumvirate. provisional laws on deportations, which were chosen as a means to implement the armenian genocide, were passed on may 27, 1915. it should be mentioned that the deportations were fully underway from early spring and that the adoption of the provisional laws was a backdated attempt to somewhat legitimize the process.25 19.  erik jan zürcher, turkey: a modern history, 3rd ed. (london: i. b. tauris, 2004), 110. 20. henry morgenthau, ambassador morgenthau’s story (garden city, n.y.: doubleday, page & co., 1918), 24. 21. christopher j. walker, armenia: the survival of a nation (london: croom helm, 1980), 234. 22. avetis papazyan (ed.), hayeri tseghaspanutyuny yst erittutkeri datavarutyan pastatghteri [armenian genocide through the documents of young turk trials] (yerevan: as of assr press, 1989), 42-43. 23.  boa/dh.şfr, no.54-a/73, coded telegram from interior minister talaat to the province of diyarbekir,  dated 22 july, cited from taner akçam, the young turks’ crime against humanity: the armenian genocide and ethnic cleansing in the ottoman empire (princeton, nj: princeton university press, 2012), 210. 24. saïd halim pasha was the grandson of the famous ruler of egypt mohammed ali (nikolay hovhannisyan, hayeri 1915 t. tseghaspanutyan lusabanutyuny arabakan patmagrutyan mej [the 1915 armenian genocide coverage in the arab historiography], patmabanasirakan handes (historical-phililogical journal) 1(1989): 30-31; said amin, vosstaniyе arabov v xx vеке [the arab rebellions of xx c.] (мoscow: progress, 1964), 80. 25. according to the ottoman legislation, the temporary laws allowed to be put them in force before the discussion and approval by the parliament. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 10 the permission for the extermination of the deported population is evidenced by talaat’s directive on june 14, 1915, to kill those in the caravans of the deported population, who would show resistance and would attempt to escape.26 few days later in a conversation with a representative of the german embassy, he would share about the sublime porte’s intention to finalize the task under the guise of the “war against the enemy from within”.27 on june 9 the ministry of interior sent a directive to the governor of erzurum to sell off the property of the deported population28, which clearly indicates the armenians were not expected to return to the areas of their settlement. the process of deportation and extermination of the deported armenians was ensured by the circulars and the directives issued by the ministry of interior for the local governments. for instance, the provisional law on deportations adopted by the government on may 27, 1915, cited the decision n270 dated may 13, 1915, issued by the ministry of interior on deporting armenians to mosul, der-zor, and other regions of syria.29 the pivotal role the ministry of interior and talaat had in the genocide was evidenced by the participants of the 1918 parliamentary hearings, as well as by the high-ranked defendants during the tribunal initiated against the young turks in 1919-1920, most of which pointed to the ministry as fully responsible for the deportation and the massacres of the armenian population.30 to legitimize the atrocities, on may 23, 1915, the ministry of interior sent directives on measures, which were to be undertaken against “the christians, which were supporting the adversary, and the muslims, which were collaborating with them” were subject to military tribunal.31 even before the world war i the ministry of interior had formed structures, which would mostly involve in the coordination of the armenian deportations. one of them was the directorate of tribal and immigrant settlement founded in 191332. later it was expanded and reorganized into four departments, which were named in accor26.  osmanlı belgeler, 43, interior ministry to erzurum, 14 june 1915 cited from donald bloxham, the great game of genocide: imperialism, nationalism, and the destruction of the ottoman armenians (oxford: oxford university press, 2007), 90. 27. aapa, abt. 1a, turkei 183/37, pera, 17 june 1915, cited from donald bloxham, the great game of genocide, 90. 28. şinasi orel and süreyya yuca (ed.), “affaires arméniennes, les “télégrammes” de talât pachafait historiuqe ou fiction? ”, société turque de histoire (france: triangle, 1983): 117, no. 29, cited from donald bloxham, the great game of genocide, 90. 29. arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 67. 30. ibid 31. ibid., 73. 32. the general migration administrative commission was formed to coordinate the einflux of approximately one million over the next half century chechen, crimean tatar, muslim georgian, and turcoman immigrants (kemal karpat, “population movements in the ottoman state in the nineteenth century: an outline,” in contributions à l’histoire économique et sociale de l’empire ottomane; eds. jean-louis bacque-grammont and paul dumont (paris: editions peeters, 1983), 385–428 and 405–408, cited from donald bloxham, the great game of genocide, 42. on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 11 dance with the functions they performed: departments of resettlement, security, transport, and tribes33. interestingly, the agency incorporated also the scientific council that was headed by ziya gökalp and was proposed for the collection of data on ethnic groups living on the territory of the empire. its creation was closely tied with a statement talaat made once: “anatolia is a closed box for us’, arguing that it was first necessary to ‘get to know the contents of it’ in order to operate on it”34. the agency for settlement of tribes and immigrants was involved in the coordination of the deportations in the years of the armenian genocide and was also responsible for the settlement of the armenian areas with muslims. the agency was operating under şukru kaya. another pivotal structure under the ministry was the directorate of general security.35 yet another structure was abandoned properties commission, which was in charge of coordinating the confiscation and redistribution of armenian property. despite the main job for an organization of the forced deportations were performed by the ministry of interior and its bodies, involving local administrations, as well as security, police, and gendarmerie forces, other ministries, such as the ministry of war and the ministry of education were actively engaged in the process. in his theory of the law as a cumulative of resources american sociologist alex alvarez discusses how in times of genocides law “becomes a servant to those who have gained power and can be mobilized to serve their needs and protect their interests”.36 by controlling laws the state gets power over agents with authority of legitimate violence.37 in times of genocides, a “legal crime” or a set of actions that are protected by – in the perpetrator state but certainly not international society – by law are constituted”.38 one such example is the nurenberg laws, 39 which were illegal decisions formally corresponding to the definitions of law. 33. cengiz orhonlu, osmanli imparatorlugu’nda aşiretlerin iskâni (istanbul: eren, 1987), s. 120, cited from ugur ümit üngör, the making of modern turkey: nation and state in eastern anatolia, 1913-50 (oxford: oxford university press, 2011), 36. 34. ibid., 36-37. 35. donald bloxham, “the first world war and the development of the armenian genocide,” in ronald grigor suny, fatma müge göcek, norman m. naimark (eds.), a question of genocide: armenians and turks at the end of the ottoman empire (oxford: oxford university press, 2011), 262. 36. alex alvarez, governments, citizens, and genocide: a comparative and interdisciplinary approach (bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 2001), 72. 37. ibid., 74. 38. ibid., 78. 39. nuremberg laws were adopted on the initiative of hitler on september 15th of 1935, at the national socialist party and reichstag sittings in nuremberg. there were two of them: the law on the reich citizen (reichsbürgergesetz) and the law on the protection of german blood and german honor (gesetzzum schutzedes deutschen blutsundder deutschen ehre) and (gesetzzum schutzedes deutschen blutes und der deutschen ehre): see amy newman, the nuremberg laws: institutionalized anti-semitism (san diego: lucent books, 1998); hecht ingeborgand, invisible walls and to remember is to heal: a german family under the nuremberg laws, translated from german by j. brownjohn and j. broadwin (evanston: northwestern university press, 1999). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 12 the parliament of the ottoman empire would pass such “laws” backdated, too often aimed to “legitimize” the crimes that were committed. early in the beginning of the war, the activities of the ottoman legislative were de facto suspended. the actual structure of the ottoman authorities in the emergency situation of the wartime had significantly relieved the executive from the potential restrictions the legislative might impose on it. talaat hints in his memoirs that the freezing of the parliament’s work on march 1, 1915, was directly connected with the anti-armenian campaigns.40 this may indicate that a certain opposition to those operations was anticipated in the parliament. furthermore, the suspension of the parliamentary works would let the deputies return to their provinces and inform their constituencies about “the armenian danger”.41 the decision was later discussed and approved by the parliamentary committees for military and legal affairs. the law on deportations was passed as late as december 1916, following a voting organized in the parliament.42 b. local officials, party secretaries the second level of genocide perpetrators encompasses structures, which are directly involved in regulating the genocide following the directives of top authorities, and ensuring the implementation of those instructions. the role of the structures or the state bureaucracy on this level was remarkable. a number of scholars of genocide have given a special role to those structures in describing genocides. jack porter, a professor at harvard university, for instance, states perpetration of genocide requires that there are three major components in place – the ideology, the technology, and the bureaucracy.43 sociologist irving horowitz describes genocide as “structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus”.44 the local bureaucracy would greatly precondition the nature and the intensity of genocide. local elites could intensify or slow down the dynamics of killings. the coordination of armenian massacres in the provinces of the country was entrusted to valis, the governors of the provinces, most of whom were actively agitating for and arranging the deportations and killings.45 and that was reasonable since most of the governors were loyal to the union and progress, oftentimes talaat’s brothers in arms. 40. kutay c., talat pasanin gurbet hatiralan (the memoirs of talat pasa in exile), vol. 2 (istanbul, 1983), 907 cited from dadrian vahakn n., the history of the armenian genocide, 223: 41. vahakn n. dadrian, the history of the armenian genocide, 236. 42. arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 86. 43. jack nusan porter, “introduction: what is genocide: notes toward a definition,” in genocide and human rights: a global anthology, ed. jack nusan porter ( washington, dc: university press of america, 1982), 12-15. 44. irving louis horowitz, taking lives: genocide and state power (new brunswick, nj: transaction books, 1980), 17. 45.  see for example takvim-i vekayi, no. 3549, 4th hearing, 8 mayıs 1335 (8 may 1919) from taner  akcam, “the ottoman documents and the genocidal policies of the committee for union and progress on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 13 e.g. cevdet (the vali of van), ahmed muammer (the vali of sebastia/sivas), cemal azmi (the vali of trabzon), personally led the process of executions and spared no effort to implement the plan to the best of their capacity. becoming the vali of diarbekir, mehmet reşid, one of the founders of the young turks party, deported and exterminated hundreds of thousands of armenians, demonstrating an outstanding zest. arab eye-witness faiz el-ghusein mentioned that as of august 1915 some 570 thousand armenians were exterminated in diarbekir.46 the crimes committed on the territory of the province ruled by reşid are hard to describe: victims were crucified, horseshoed, hearts stamped by hot horseshoes, their skulls smashed to pieces.47 the scale of his cruelty made the germany consul to mosul holstein demand that ambassador von wangenheim interfered and required the ottoman government to restrain reşid.48 and he was indeed ousted: however, the reason was rather the expropriation of the armenian property, not the massacres.49 in an exchange with the general secretary of the ittihat midhat şükrü (bleda) that happened in the period following the war doctor reşid tried to justify the annihilation of armenians by the sense of duty he felt both as a turk and as a doctor, just like “dangerous microbes”. 50 besides the valis, the process engaged heads of smaller regions, the mutasafirs (prefects), as well as local police, heads of the gendarmerie, and religious leaders. members of the ottoman parliament, e.g. khoja ilyas sami in bitlis, or mehmet nuri bey in kharberd, and others were actively involved in the killings of armenians across the country. party representatives were eagerly included in the armenian genocide along the local officials. ittihad had a well-tuned network of party structures in the vilayets. in 1908, shortly after the revolution, ittihatists formed clubs in the regions, which were the real centers of power in the provinces directly following party decisions.51 the clubs were also expected to disseminate anti-armenian hate speech. russian consul in erzurum, adamov, reported on january 4, 1914: “…armenians expect assault any time: despite the muslim resent, which was caused by the ittihatists under emissary hilmi bey arriving from the cap(ittihat ve terakki) toward the armenians in 1915,” genocide studies and prevention 1(2), 2006: 141. 46. faiz ei-ghusein, martyred armenia (london: c. a. pearson, 1917), 49. 47. on diyarbakir massacres see hilmar kaiser, the extermination of armenians in the diarbekir region (istanbul: bilgi university press, 2014); üngör ugur ümit, mehmet polatel, confiscation and destruction: the young turk seizure of armenian property (london: continuum international publishing group, 2011); hans-lukas kieser, “from ‘patriotism’ to mass murder: dr. mehmed reşid (1873-1919),” in ronald grigor  suny, fatma müge göcek, norman m. naimark (eds.), a question of genocide: armenians and turks at the end of the ottoman empire (oxford: oxford university press, 2011), 126-150. 48. paa-aa; bokon/169; a53a, 4184; p.11.07.1915. telegraphic report. see wolfgang gust (ed.), the armenian genocide: evidence from the german foreign office archives, 1915-1916 (new york: berghahn books, 2014), 245-246. 49. taner akçam, the young turks’ crime against humanity, 211-212. 50. interview with lttihad party secretary-general midhat sukru (bieda) in resimli tarih, 5 july 1953. see vahakn n. dadrian, “the role of turkish physicians…,“ 175. 51.  fatma müge göçek, the transformation of turkey: redefining state and society from the ottoman empire to the modern era (london: i.b.tauris, 2011), 79. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 14 ital, the ittihatist club, which was chaired by the germany envoy, had organized a shooting contest in the distant districts of the town. the majority of the local mob and dadashes, equipped with arms, were there… armenians are sure [of the prepared assault], while the dadashes openly say the massacre is simply postponed”.52 the local elites, including the valis, were all members of ittihatist clubs and therefore entertained tremendous influence. vice-consul of germany to erzurum von scheubner-richter reported on july 28, 1915, that a parallel authority operated in the state (nebenregierung). he underlined the severity of conditions in which the deportations were carried out by a group ittihatists. in an instance, when the governor had agreed to stop the deportation of families of health-crippled people, absent men, and lonely women, the local young turks club had interfered and had downplayed the decision. an undescribable cruelty that followed led to the death of the people.53 the clubs were integrated into the party branches in vilayets, which were operating under the party’s central committee. in 1913 the central committee delegated party officials to regions. the delegates comprised executive secretaries of the party of union and progress (kâtibi mesut), emissaries (murahhas), superintendents (umumi müfettiş), which played an essential role in carrying out the armenian genocide. they were carefully selected and appointed by the central committee of ittihat and were mostly former army officers.54 these loyal party members could provide efficiency in the organization and guidance on the local level to ensure the smooth and accurate implementation of the plan. as a matter of fact, they were the party agents licensed for total control and a purpose to ensure the proper process of the genocide.55 those party activists were a link between the central committee of ittihat and the grassroots conveying the orders down from the center. the encrypted directives of the ministry of interior were reaching the local authorities and structures, the governors, the regional security offices of the ministry, as well as the gendarmerie, through executive secretaries.56 the secretaries would create groups of four to six to support them, head the local party structures, organize meetings, and set the local population against armenians, issue orders on deportations, massacres, and lootings. in some instances, they would personally lead 52. avpr (archive of foreign policy of russia), embassy in constantinople, 3726, p. 94 in m. nersisyan (ed.), hayeri tseghaspanutyuny osmanyan kaysrutyunum [armenian genocide in the ottoman empire] (yerevan: “hayastan”, 1991), 325. 53. a.a., k170, no 4674, folio 63/,vahakn n. dadrian, “the determinants of the armenian genocide,” journal of genocide research 1:1(1999): 72. 54. g. vardar, ittihad ve terakki [n 23], p. 77, cited from vahakn n. dadrian, “the determinants of the armenian genocide,” 72. 55. ibid., 71. 56. taner akçam, “the ottoman documents and the genocidal policies of the committee for union and progress (ittihat ve terakki) toward the armenians in 1915,” genocide studies and prevention 1:2(2006): 141. on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 15 the process of killing.57 the executive secretaries were also involved in forming teşkilat-i mahsuse detachments and directing mob groups.58 executive secretaries were given tremendous power and could issue directives to valis and mutasarifs. naïl, the executive secretary of trabzon, overturned the local vali’s decision according to which children and handicapped people could temporarily avoid deportation.59 in provinces (angora, yozğat, aleppo, and kastamonou), where the deportations were carried out with a certain degree of reluctance, the valis were ousted by the ittihatist officials, punished in some cases, and replaced with more enthusiastic officials.60 in the course of the 1919-1920 tribunal organized in the post-war period, the cases of the executive secretaries were heard in separate sessions, which proved the importance of the roles they played.61 these party structures and executive secretaries had worked with the governor, mutasarif and gendarmerie offices directly. these local elite groups, which were comprised of about 30 to 40 people, and were usually involved in genocidal operations, included heads of renowned families, kurdish and circassian tribe chiefs, as well as local administrations, law enforcement bodies, religious leaders, and party activists. the competition frequently evolving inside those groups was caused by a desire to prove group members’ loyalty to the leaders of ittihat in anticipation of privileges in the future. in diarbekir, for instance, the race ended up with the victory of piriçizade, muftizade, and derekzade families. 62 c. military and paramilitary structures genocides are mostly carried out by means of military and paramilitary structures: in some case, those are already existing ones, while others new structures are specially formed for the perpetration of genocidal acts. the police and gendarmerie under the ottoman ministry of interior were directly involved in the perpetration of the armenian genocide by participation in the massacres and the seizing of the confiscated armenian property. the police would circle the armenian settlements, break into the houses of the armenian population pretending to toss for arms, detained armenian men, forcefully deported the armenian population. the “death marches” were usually guarded by the gendarmerie. they would urge on the deported, de57. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (london: i.b.tauris, 2011), 144. 58.  many telegrams witnesses about this, for  instance, from responsible secretary mesul rüştü from  samsun. on may 27, 1919, he confirmed that he had organized armed groups needed for this region, takvim-i vekayi, no. 3554, 5th hearing, 14 may 1919, cited from taner akçam, “the ottoman documents…” p.148 (ft 90). 59. vahakn n. dadrian, history of the armenian genocide..., 406-407. 60. vahakn n. dadrian, “the documentation of the world war i armenian massacres in the proceedings of the turkish military tribunal,” journal of political and military sociology 22(1994): 141. 61. the materials on the trials of the cup responsible secretaries see avetis papazyan (ed.), hayeri tseghaspanutyuny…, 129-162 62.  ugur ümit üngör, the making of modern turkey..., 106. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 16 priving them of rest, expropriate their jewelry and clothes, prohibit the people from drinking, when passing by water sources and wells, depriving them of food, torturing them, raping, crippling, and killing them.63 the ministries of interior and war also supervised the telegraph and the railroad networks, the main means of communication of the empire. the telegraph machines played a crucial role in organizing armenian deportations and mass killings. those were used to send directives and reports to the local administrations and party representatives. talaat had once been a postal officer and had a telegraphing machine of his own, which he used to send orders from home. numerous armenians, who used to work at postal services, were laid off en masse from early 1915. 64 the turkish army, too, had a part in the perpetration of the armenian genocide. a particularly big role has been played by the commander-in-chief of the army, minister of war enver, commander of the 4th army cemal, and commander of the 3rd army mahmud kâmil. generals halil kut, enver’s uncle, and ali ihsan sabis, actively participated in the armenian genocide, as well.65 to remind, under article 4 on deportations the observance of the provisional law was licensed to the ministry of defense.66 army’s involvement was greatly conditioned by enver’s factor. the disarming and extermination of the armenian militaries was motivated by enver’s crushing defeat in the battle of sarıkamış. armenians have been openly declared as enemies of the state soon after. hundreds of thousands of armenian soldiers and officers, serving in the ottoman army, were exterminated in february-may 1915. henry morgenthau wrote: “in the early part of 1915, the armenian soldiers in the turkish army were reduced to a new status. up to that time most of them had been combatants, but now they were all stripped of their arms and transformed into workmen. instead of serving their country as artillerymen and cavalrymen, these former soldiers now discovered that they had been transformed into road laborers and pack animals... in many instances, armenian soldiers were disposed of in even more summary fashion, for it now became almost the general practice to shoot them in cold blood.”67 army units were actively involved where armenians would organize self-defense, and there was a need to bear down the resistance. 63. see for example in avpr, politarkhiv (political archive), 3508, p. 16. cited from g. a. abrahamyan and t. g. sevan-khachatryan (eds.), russkiye istochniki o genocide armyan v osmanskoy imperii-1915-1916 gody [russian sources on the armenian genocide in the ottoman empire – 1915-1916] (yerevan: areresum-ani, 1995), 22; цгиа арм. сср, ф. 57, оп. 2, д. 692, п. 17-20, from m. nersisyan and r. sahakyan  (eds.), genocid armyan v osmanskoy imperii [armenian genocide in ottoman empire] (yerevan: “hayastan”, 1983), 284; james bryce and arnold toynbee, the treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire 1915-16: documents presented to viscount grey of falloden by viscount bryce ( london: 1916), 262-264; herbert gibbons, posledniye izbiyeniya v armenii [the last brutalities in armenia] (petrograd, 1916), 15. 64. johannes lepsius, bericht über die lage des armenischen volkes in der türkei (potsdam: tempelverlag, 1916), cited from m. nersisyan and r. sahakyan (eds.), genotsid armyan…, 389. 65. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide… 66. vahakn n. dadrian, the history of the armenian genocide..., 235. 67. henry morgenthau, ambassador morgenthau’s story, 302. on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 17 e.g. the attempts to crack down resistance in van and musa dağ involved army units. furthermore, the influence the military had on the turkish elites largely facilitated to presenting the activities as a military need. in january 1919 the turkish authorities detained a number of high ranked military officers calling the latter organizers of armenian massacres in the areas under their control. it corresponded to the truth to the certain extent. e.g. when von scheubner-richter the vice consul of germany in erzurum, complained to tahsin, the local vali, of the violence against the deported population, tahsin promised to stop them, while, at the same time, made an attempt to justify himself by explaining it with that the real power in the region was centralized in the hands of the commander of the 3rd army mahmud kâmil.68 since the genocide of the armenians was carried out on war-torn territories of the empire and since there was a situation of martial law, the military had concentrated the political power of these regions in its hands. vahakn dadrian brings the case of the kaiseri region where the army would take care of the military conscription, logistics, and transportation, as would perform additional functions – that of unproportionate confiscations on different levels, as well as ‘justices’ made by military tribunals – both of which had tragic consequences for the armenian population. furthermore, the army commanders often relied on the units of the gendarmerie, which accompanied numerous groups of deported armenians.69 the use of non-regular forces to carry out the ‘dirty job’ was a well set ottoman tradition.70 although the regular forces participated in many instances of carrying out the genocide of armenians, they were rarely used to exterminate whole communities. it was the irregular forces, which became a real tool in implementing the state policy.71 a decisive role in the perpetration of the armenian genocide was played by teşkilat-i mahsuse (the special organization). this structure was assigned to exterminate the deported armenian population, as well as to coordinate the activities of all the involved organizations. there are many interpretations of the emergence of the organization; however, it is clear though that up until the wwi it operated under control of minister enver, and was influenced by pan-islamic and pan-turkic ideologies.72 68. hilmar kaiser, “’a scene from the inferno,’ the armenians of erzerum and the genocide, 1915-1916,” in h. l. kieser and d. j. schaller (eds.), der völkermord an den armeniern und die shoah (zürich: chronos, 2002), 139. 69. vahakn n. dadrian., “the agency of ‘‘triggering mechanisms’’ as a factor in the organization of the genocide against the armenians of kayseri district,” genocide studies and prevention 1:2(2006): 110. 70. see james j. reid, crisis of the ottoman empire: prelude to collapse 1839–1878 (stuttgart: franz steiner verlag, 2000). 71. james j. reid , “militarism, partisan war, and destructive inclinations in ottoman military history: 1854-1918,” armenian review 39, no. 3/155(1986): 6–11; arnold j. toynbee, the western question in greece and turkey: a study in the contact of civilizations (london: constable and co., 1923), 278–280. 72. see for example arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 93-96. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 18 in the course of its existence, the organization had three leaders: süleyman askeri, ali başkampa, and husamettin erturk. interestingly, all of them were of northern caucasus (circassian) ancestries. circassians have been widely represented also in other top positions of the special organization.73 the real head of the organization, however, was behaeddin şakir. as early as in 1914 behaeddin şakir traveled to erzurum with circassian hüsein husni with a purpose of forming armed groups in armenian provinces. later he would coordinate the activities of the special organization by touring on his automobile to regions as well as by means of encrypted telegrams.74 nazım also played a big role in the organization. turcologist arsen avagyan underlines that the teşkilat-i mahsuse had four major tasks. those were the organization of the disarmament of the armenian population, organization of accompanying detachments, which were supposed to carry out the deportation and extermination of the population, organization of detachments for the extermination of the armenian population in the deserts of syrian and concentration camps, supervision and coordination of civilian authorities in vilayets in the organization of the armenian genocide.75 teşkilat-i mahsuse had one central and four regional units. the unit responsible for the eastern vilayets was intended for the coordinating the pan-islamist and pan-turkish propaganda in the rear of russia; however, the perpetration of the armenian massacres became its main function. in the eastern vilayets, the supervision of this function of the special organization was assigned to the vali of trabzon cemal azmi, vali of erzurum tahsin, a member of the ittihat central committee behaeddin şakir, as well as doctor fuad sabit bey.76 the directives in teşkilat-i mahsuse were mostly communicated verbally; the correspondence was destroyed immediately after reading. the organization had strict disciplinary rules and used the cypher codes of the ministry of interior for correspondence. nevertheless, teşkilat-i mahsuse was only a body in an implementation of decisions. however it had some jurisdiction, which allowed for sending instructions to local bodies in organizing deportations and killings; to control their activities, and reporting. the valis, the kaimakams, and the agents of ittihat were to abide by the requirements of the special organization. many of them were its members, which significantly simplified the implementation of the tasks. of course, some tensions regularly arose between teşkilat-i mahsuse and other structures: e.g. army units every now and then would refuse to provide supporting forces, because, they said, they served the commander in chief alone, or would refuse to comply with orders received through the channels of the special organization. in such cases, the 73. ryan gingeras, sorrowful shores: violence, ethnicity, and the end of the ottoman empire, 1912–1923 (oxford: oxford university press, 2009), 58. 74. supra, p. 187, n. 155 from raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide…, 199. 75. arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 109. 76. ibid., 107-108. on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 19 orders were sent via the ministry of war. the relationships would regularly become extremely tough. one such instance was the case of commander of the 3rd army mehmed vehib who had planned to detain behaeddin şakir, and it was only with enver’s interference that the decision was derailed.77 executive secretaries closely communicated with teşkilat-i mahsuse. a document dated september 13, 1913, and sent by the special organization to the central committee of ittihat proves that the secretaries were responsible for the forming of mobster groups in the regions. the telegram points that the actions were undertaken by the executive secretary of samsun, ruştu, who had formed groups in the area he controlled, are exemplary and should as models for other groups.78 after they were formed, the groups were then sent to the capital79 to be trained as militaries and then be commissioned with assignments to armenian vilayets. interestingly, the correspondence took place through the general secretary of ittihat midhat şükrü. the numbers of people included in the detachments of the organization regularly changed per each assignment. the groups were mostly formed from kurdish tribes, immigrants from the caucasus and the balkans, as well as criminals, who were released from prisons upon the decree of the minister of interior.80 these mob groups were known as “‘savages and criminals” even among the young turk officials.81 aram antonyan points that the units comprised of balkan muhajirs stood out for their remarkable hatred towards christians and cruelty, which were guided by the feeling of revenge against armenians, although the latter had little if any relation to the sufferings balkan muslims had undergone before.82 groups were also formed from multi-ethnic communities of muslims, which had earlier moved to the ottoman empire and which were commonly known as circassians. one such detachment was led by circassian ahmed, who killed two armenian members of parliament – grigor zohrap and vardges seringulyan, in the neighborhood of diarbekir.83 the massacres of the armenians, who had found refuge 77. ibid., 119. 78. takvimi vekâyi 3554, 5th session, 14 may 1335. taner akçam, from empire to republic: turkish nationalism and the armenian genocide (new york: zed books, 2013), 171. 79. in the telegram dated november 13, 1914 it is demanded “that the people clandestinely recruited by the party secretaries in izmit, bursa, bandirma, balikesir and other relevant regions should be summoned and moved [to istanbul] within a week (takvimi vekâyi 3554, 5th session, 14 may 1335, cited from taner akçam, from empire to republic..., 163). 80. taner akçam, from empire to republic..., 161. 81. a. mil, ‘umumi harpte tejkiläti mahsusa’, in: vakit, 2 october 1933 up to 18 april 1934, republished as: arif cemil (denker), i. dünya savaşı’nda teşkilat-ı mahsusa (istanbul: arba, 1997), 196. cited from ugur ümit üngör, the making of modern turkey, 58. 82. aram antonian, mets votchiry [the great crime] (yerevan: arevik, 1990), 53-54. 83. ahmed refik, yerku komite, yerku votchir [two committees, two crimes] (yerevan, 1997), 46-50. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 20 in the desert of der-zor in 1916 were also perpetrated by the çetes comprised of chechens and arabs, which were organized by the governor of der-zor salih zeki. turkish historian suat parlar mentions that teşkilat-i mahsuse had already started organizing groups of volunteers from the balkans and the caucasus, as well as prisoners serving sentences for grave offenses, even before the decision on deportations was made public. constantinople received several complaints after the assaults the groups organized against villages. 84 falih rifki atay, a personal assistant to cemal pasha, has an interesting recollection of a conversation he had with nazım as he approached him expressing the willingness to join the “homeland defense units” he had heard were being formed. hearing the request, atay recalls, nazım responded with a faint smile on his face, saying those detachments “are made of criminals and murderers, and there is no place among them for a young man like you”. “i didn’t get anything about the army of murderers,” falih rifki atay writes. 85 the çetes in erzurum were formed under behaeddin şakir as an “islamic police” in august 1914. the telegram addressed to the musaserif of erzincan, kaimakams of bayburd, dercan, and kiğ included the names of those, who were responsible for the establishment of the çetehs, ordering: “…to start secretly and silently and to always report on the results”. the mobsters in the mountains of rizeh were openly offered to join the special organization, which they readily did.86 kurdish aşirets were, too, involved in the process. hilmi, the superintendant of the party in erzurum, wrote about one of the kurdish chief aşirets: “the time is about to come to deal with the problem we talked about in erzincan...i want 50 brave [men] from you…i shall prepare everything for their convenience here…never mind if they are young or middle-aged men, as long as they are strong and determined and willing to sacrifice their lives for their country and nation…upon first notice from us put them on their way… only be prepared and keep behaeddin şakir beyefendi informed...”87 kurdish detachments played a colossal role in exterminating armenians in the eastern vilayets. one precondition for that was the nearly total equipment of the kurds. especially as with the annihilation of the armenians, the kurds would free a territory they had long been aspiring.88 that is the reason the kurds would mostly attack villages, and kill the pop84. suat parlar, osmanli`dan günümüze gizli devlet (islanbul, 1997), s. 75, cited from arsen avagyan, cherkesskiy factor v osmanskoy imperii i turtsii [the circassian factor in the ottoman empire and turkey] (yerevan: gitutyun, 2001), 231. 85. see taner akçam, turetskoye natsipnalnoye “ya” i armyanskiy vopros, [turkish national “i” and armenian question] is available at http://armenianhouse.org/akcam/genocide/application.html). 86. arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 106-107. 87. taner akçam, from empire to republic..., 162. 88.  ugur ümit üngör, the making of modern turkey, 108. on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 21 ulation, rather than deporting them. good looking women and young girls were forcefully sent to harems. the villages were oftentimes set on fire.89 d. “ordinary” murderers on the lowest level of the extermination, machinery were the “ordinary” murderers, who participated in the killings or the process implementation, advantaging of the atmosphere of impunity entertaining the general popular support. carrying out genocide is impossible without the large participation of masses. the number of participants to the killings depends on the technology of murder, the size of the victims’ groups, their dislocation, as well as the level of resistance. the decision on involving big numbers of people in the process of carrying out genocide, too, depends on political purposes. in their actions, the initiators of genocide must have support and get it by letting various groups of society satisfy their needs and wants. by involving big groups of population in the system of killings the forces launching the crime create stronger ties between the criminal society and the regime.90 according to paul brass, two components shall be in place to ensure the participation of the population in genocidal acts: “planning” and “enthusiasm”. authorities plan the process of the killings and ensure their coordinated implementation, encouraging at the same time the formation of an atmosphere required for the mass participation of the population. to achieve that the authorities rely on spreading rumors, instigating talks of an imminent danger, reactivate deep, subconscious superstitions, and exploit other means, which help justify the crime and put the responsibility from the true perpetrators to the “objectified, frenzied mass of nameless people”.91 the situation, when an individual turns into a minor part of a major crowd, is scrupulously described in french sociologist gustave le bon’s “the crowd: a study of the popular mind”. genocide is a group action. criminals are members of groups, whether big or small or parts of crowds. according to le bon, the crowd can be described as ”impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments, and others besides – which are almost always observed in beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution…”92 in a crowd personalities are diffused into the collective mind, “…which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation”.93 le bon also points that “by the mere fact that he forms part of an organized crowd, a man descends several rungs in the 89. arsen avagyan, genocid armyan, 121. 90. encyclopedia of genocide and crimes against humanity, , vol. 2, 792 91. paul r. brass, “the partition of india and retributive genocide in the punjab, 1946-47: means, methods, and purposes,” journal of genocide research 5:1(2003): 92. 92. gustave le bon, the crowd: a study of the popular mind (new york: dover publications, inc.; reprint edition, 2002), 10. 93. ibid., 4. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 22 ladder of civilization. isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is a barbarian – that is, creature acting by instinct.”94 in other words, the actions of the members of a group become more simplistic, more emotional, and, eventually, more anti-social. oftentimes, the perpetrators of the armenian genocide are pictured as zealous barbarians, a particular evil in human disguise. this gives some metaphysical nature to the committed crime. the same concern was present in interpreting and presenting the holocaust;95 however, it changed to a certain degree after the publication of “eichmann in jerusalem”, a book by philosopher and political thinker hannah arendt. arendt called nazi criminal eichmann the embodiment of the “banality of evil” and described him as an ordinary and common personality. eichmann was not a madman. moreover, eichmann was certified by psychiatrists as “normal.” arendt argued that a terrifying thing about eichmann was not how unusual or how sinister he was, but the understanding of his extreme ordinariness”.96 therefore, it can be stated that in terms of the holocaust, the armenian genocide, or other genocides, the criminals to a great degree were hundreds of thousands of common people, who took millions of lives. of course, there were those with mental disorders among them; however, the big number of the participants does not allow connecting the carrying out of genocide with individual conditions, educational level, or social origins of the murderers. privates, volunteers conscribed to the paramilitary detachments of teşkilat-i mahsuse, gendarmerie officers, criminals released from prisons, doctors, peasants, students, kurds, refugees from the balkans, i.e. almost every group of the society took part in the process of annihilating armenians. the scale of the participation was obvious even to the contemporaries of the events. e.g. british admiral richard webb, who was the assistant high commissioner of constantinople during its occupation, on april 13, 1919, reported to the british foreign office: “to punish all persons guilty of armenian atrocities would necessitate wholesale execution of the turks, and i therefore suggest retribution both on a national scale by dismembering the late turkish empire, as well as individually by the trial of high officials, such as those on my lists, whose fate will serve as an example.”97 turkish officials shared the opinion. e.g. ali kemal, later the minister of education of the ottoman empire, noted in “sabah” newspaper on january 28, 1919: “…a crime unprecedented in scale was committed four to five years ago, a crime, which caused the awe of the world. if we want to make an impression on the scale and the terms of the crime, then 94. ibid., 8. 95. james e. waller, becoming evil: how ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing (oxford: oxford university press, 2007), 61. 96. hannah arendt, eichmann in jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil (new york: penguin group, 1994), 76. 97. british foreign office archives 371/4173/53351 (folio 192-93), cited from vahakn n. dadrian, the history of the armenian genocide..., 306. on the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 23 we have to speak not of five to ten criminals, but of hundreds of thousands of them.”98 halil menteşe, who had been the chairman of the ottoman parliament, as well as its minister of foreign affairs, and the minister of justice in the years of wwi, confessed in his memoirs: “there were very few turks, who did not have relation to the deportations.”99 therefore, one of the specifics of the armenian genocide was the nearly total participation of the turkish, kurdish, and circassian population in the massacres. the armenian genocide was perpetrated by the hands of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people, who personally took millions of lives. further still, the popular participation cannot be differentiated by gender or age. e.g., mkrtich kechyan, a survivor of the genocide, recalls how turkish and circassian villagers of all gender and age, circled armenian women and children and continued the killings.100 participation of women and children in crimes is a separate topic within genocide studies. there were many women, members of the ss, working at the nazi concentration and death camps. the number of women involved in the genocide committed in cambodia exceeded men in the country, that in its entirety was turned into an actual concentration camp, and tens of thousands of women served as order givers and guards or even participated in the killings. at least three of the main perpetrators of the genocide in rwanda were women – the wife of the assassinated president, and two members of the government, while thousands of other hutu women joined the process of instigating the actual killings, lootings, and raping of tutsi women.101 children were easily getting engaged in the genocidal acts in cambodia and rwanda. the ways people joined the process varied. part of them was encouraged to do so, while others were forced in to committing crimes. children were learning by watching scenes of murders, and killings were turning into routine ways of proving loyalty to own community.102 jean hatzfield, a french reporter in rwanda, recalls a young member of the kibungo mob group, which had killed around 50,000 tutsis, explaining: “killing is easier than farming”.”103 it is equally traceable in the case of the armenian genocide. e.g. admiral mark bristol, who was the high commissioner of the united states to turkey between 1919-1927 described the extermination of the christian population in smyrna in a telegram sent to the us state secretary on september 14, 1922: “…several of the relief workers as well as vice consul barnes reported to me that there was a noticeable change in the temper of the turkish troops and civilians towards the armenians. the impression they received that 98.  günel g., “i̇ttihat terakki’den günümüze yektarz-ı siyaset: türkleştirme, belgeyayınları”, (i̇stanbul,  2006), s. 127, cited from meline anumyan, tchanachum yev datapartum, 52-53. 99. halil menteşe osmanlı mebusan meclisi reisi halil menteşe’nin anıları, (i̇stanbul: hürriyet vakfı yayınları, 1986), s. 239, cited from meline anumyan, tchanachum yev datapartum, 28-29. 100. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide…, 510. 101. encyclopedia of genocide and crimes against humanity, vol. 2, 793. 102. ibid. 103. steven k. baum, the psychology of genocide: perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2008), 123. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 24 every able-bodied armenian man was being hunted down and killed wherever found; even small boys of between 12 to 15 years armed with clubs (were) taking part in the hunt.”104 children participation was not spontaneous in every instance. e.g. following the military failures of turkey during the balkan war, in 1912 turkish authorities launched a full-scale program for national and paramilitary training of young turkish population. the by-law of the association for the development of turkish forces (türk gücu cemiyeti), created in 1913, had program for “preparation of young people”, which was “needed to make the nation that of soldiers again” and to prevent “the deterioration of the turkish people” (turk irki inhitata). there were other youth groups, too, which operated under the ministry of defense, and were getting prepared to “defend the homeland”.105 to achieve it the ministry provided rifles, bullets, and outfit. the process was coordinated by ziya gökalp, the ideologist behind the minister of defense enver, and ittihat. the league for national defense (mudafaa-i milliye cemiyeti), which was created in the course of the balkan war, was also aimed at providing military education. the founders of the league included party and government leaders, including talaat, enver, saïd halim, cemal, and minister of justice ibrahim.106 the atmosphere of violence was an important precondition to warrant popular participation. a proper atmosphere guarantees popular support for radical leadership and awakens the binary contradiction between “us” and “them”. the war helps outline the “adversary” and make people perceive it as a danger and menace. involvement of masses in the killings in the course of the armenian genocide took place through a number of concurrent and intersecting processes. the state propaganda would picture armenians as the fifth column collaborating with the adversary, traitors, responsible for all the defeats and misfortunes of turkey. this overt propaganda was spread through young turks’ clubs and mosques. high level of illiteracy and the traditional anti-armenian public sentiments and stereotypes proved the efficiency of propaganda. the persistent stereotype of armenian racial inferiority or raya107, the popular treatment of armenians as infidels or gyavurs, were further nurtured by the rage of the population, incited by the constitutional provision which gave armenians equal rights with muslims following the young turks revolution of 1908. all these factors created the basis for the rationalization108 of mass engagement in killings. ordinary citizens were given an opportunity to feel 104. christos papoutsy, ships of mercy, the true story of the rescue of the greeks, smyrna, september 1922 (portsmouth, new hampshire: peter e. randall, 2008), 38. 105. among them were also sports and scouting groups (see. hayk demoyan, haykakan sportn u manmnamarzuty osmanyan kaysrutyunum [armenian sport and gymnastics in the ottoman empire] (yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute, 2009), 135-136 106. vahakn n. dadrian, the history of the armenian genocide..., 196-197. 107. c. e. bosworth, “the concept of dhimma in early islam”, in christians and jews in the ottoman empire: the functioning of a plural society, ed. b. braude and b. lewis, 2 vols, (new york and london, 1982). 108. rationalization is a psychological protection mechanism that looking for a rational and good exon the hierarchy of perpetrators during the armenian genocide 25 them as part of a big cause, and a historical event (building the greater turan, saving the homeland), as well as a chance to get possession of the property of the victims. the population had achieved a total consensus in its system of values, which allowed for conscribing squads of future murderers from various groups of society.109 daniel jonah goldhagen reflected on a similar phenomenon in his controversial book, where he claimed the nazis’ success in organizing the holocaust without much effort was made possible owing to the preparedness with which the germans carried it out. according to goldhagen, the regime did not have to overcome moral doubts or reluctance of those who were supposed to commit the crime of the holocaust, since an average german was overwhelmed with extreme antisemitism.110 of course, the picture is exaggerated; however, in a certain degree, it characterizes those, who conscribed to genocide. the attitudes of turks towards armenians in the ottoman empire had much resemblance to the attitudes in the german society: given an opportunity the majority of the muslim population would realize its long-time desire, would organize atrocities and would massacre armenians, especially when there was the “blessing” of the religious leaders, who declared jihad, a holy war against the infidels. although the leaders of the young turks were not fervent religious muslims, they took the advantage of the announced jihad to raise the forces inside the empire filled with religious zeal against the christians.111 the ease with which the turkish population took up the role is well described in a number of instances:admiral bristol, known for his pro-turkish stand, found in proper to send a recommendation to washington: “it is known that the turks will rob, pillage, deport and murder christians whenever the opportunity is favorable from their point of view... it is my opinion that, knowing the character of the moslem turks... if you arouse the brutal instincts of the turks, together with his fanatical tendencies, he will attack the christian races if he is not restrained by absolute force.”112 planation for behavioral decisions that have other, condemnable reasons. the term was suggested by z. freud, and the concept was later developed by anna freud, see for example jason d’cruz, “rationalization as performative pretense,” philosophical psychology 28, no. 7: 980-1000. siegfried zepf, “about  rationalization and intellectualization,” international forum օf psychoanalysis 20:3 (2011), 148-158. 109. mihran p. dabag, “the decisive generation: self-authorization and delegations in deciding a genocide,” in genocide: approaches, case studies, and responses, ed. graham c. kinloch (new york: algora publishing, 2005), 134. 110. daniel jonah goldhagen, hitler’s willing executioners: ordinary germans and the holocaust (new york: vintage, 1997), 14, 416-419. 111. leo kuper, “theological warrants for genocide: judaism, islam, and christianity,” in confronting genocide: judaism, christianity, islam, ed. steven leonard jacobs (plymouth:: lexington books, 2009), 25. 112. us national archives, record group (rg) 59.867.00/1361, bristol`s october 23, 1920 report to washington, pp. 1-2. untitled 105 documentary and artistic perspectives on the armenian genocide in the golden apricot film festival reviewed by serafim seppälä university of eastern finland stony paths. dir. arnaud khayadjanian. france 2016, 60 min. the other side of home. dir. naré mkrtchyan. usa/armenia/turkey 2016, 40 min journey in anatolia. dir. bernard mangiante. france 2016, 60 min. gavur neighbourhood. dir. yusuf kenan beysülen. turkey 2016, 95 min. geographies. dir.chaghig arzoumanian. lebanon 2015, 72 min. children of vank. dir. nezahat gündoğan. turkey 2016, 70 min. who killed the armenians? dir. mohamed hanafy nasr. egypt 2015, 73 min. the famous golden apricot film festival in yerevan has become, among its other aims, a remarkable forum for documentary and artistic films on the armenian genocide and its cultural legacies. in recent years, the emphasis of the genocide-related documentary films has shifted from historical presentations of the actual events to the cases of lost armenians and rediscoveries of armenian identities inside turkey, in addition to the stories of western armenians tracing the whereabouts of their forefathers. the centennial output in the centennial year of 2015, the genocide was a special theme in golden apricot, anda big number of old genocide-related films were shown in retrospective replays. as was to be expected, the centennial witnessed also a burst of new documentaries and a few more artistic enterprises. the new films included documentaries on armenians looking for their roots in western armenia, such as adrineh gregorian’s back to gürün (armenia 2015, 64 min) and eric nazarian’s bolis (2011, 19 min), or istanbul armenians returning to their ancestral lands for the summer, as was the case in armen khachatryan’s touching return or we exist 2 (52 min). there were also cases of turkish muslims discovering their armenian roots, like in turkey, the legacy of silence (2015, 52 min) by guillaume clere and anna benjamin from france. moreover, the lives of certain scandinavian female missionaries and their roles in the aftermath of genocide werereflected in two dissimilar films. aram shahbazyan’s map of salvation (armenia 2015, 94 min), a big and expensive international project, was distinguished by its cheerful narrator svante lundgren. aesthetically, however, the result was surpassed by vrezh petrosyan’s simpler yet more poetical approach to a rather similar theme in other homeland: diaries of maria jacobsen (armenia 2014, 50 min). petinternational journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 106 rosyan’s tranquil narrative manages to express something of the inner development of jacobsen rather solemnly. unfortunately, the list of big films with potentiality for international success was much shorter. in addition to the well-known american enterprise called simply 1915 (usa, 82 min), the most interesting case was robert guédiguian’s thought-provoking don’t tell me the boy was mad (france, 134 min). guédiguian’s movie was well-directed, but in cultural and political sense his choice to approach the armenian genocide through the phenomenon of armenian terrorism of 1970’s was unfortunately the most difficult imaginable for promoting the armenian cause, and probably an easy one to misunderstand. but at least for those who are familiar with the entire historical problematics, the film offers valuable insights for the legacy of genocide among the french armenians. moreover, it must be admitted that truly artistic endeavours were also scarce. the most profound moments of 2015 were offered by the film portraying diaspora armenians’ efforts to carry out west armenian mystical chants first in europe and then in west armenian places: nathalie rossetti’s and turi finocchiaro’s singing in exile (belgium/poland/france 2015, 77 min) included some magical moments carried by the traditional akn chants. fortunately, the bloom of genocide films did not end with the centennial year, but a considerable amount of interesting new films were presented also during the golden apricot festival of 2016.in fact, the number of new genocide-related documentary films remained approximately the same as the year before. perchance some projects had slightly missed the centennial deadline, but nevertheless the output of 2016 was significant. regrettably, such films often fall into oblivion after the festival even though the production may have demanded considerable efforts, and at times the films display artistic qualities that might have some potentiality to popularise the genocide and its heritage. in the following, the films related to genocide presented during the latest golden apricot festival in yerevan, july 10‒17, 2016, are reviewed and discussed in order to pay attention to this remarkable phenomenon and to briefly estimate its qualities. in addition to the particular films and their characteristics, the purpose here is to provide some general outlines of the phenomenon in a wider perspective. stony paths, with an idea in hand documentaries on armenians searching for their ancestral whereabouts in present-day turkey typically suffer of two defects, or perhaps rather, obstacles. firstly, the experience of being an outsider in turkey is oftentimes delivered in so thorough manner that the result may not differ much from average tourists’ attempts to film random people and places. secondly, the films often make no serious efforts to reach artistic or philosophical depths but concentrate on documenting the phenomenological experience in turkey. sure, this may be effective, especially when showing the unwillingness and insecurity of the turks to deal with the subject, but tourist perspectives are not enough to make outstanding documentaries, even though the films may be flavoured by a few deeper moments of personal documentary and artistic perspectives on the armenian genocide in the golden apricot film festival 107 reflections. in other words, the problem is: how to get hold of insiders’ views when coming from outside? and how to make the film surpass what is evident? with some creativity, however, this outsider’s complex may be overcome, and even rather easily, as proven by young french-armenian director arnaud khayadjanian in his stony paths. firstly, his decision to concentrate to the righteous muslims who tried to save some armenians, like the governor of konya, is probably the best method to engage in confidential and warm discussions without provoking immediate defence mechanisms in encounters with the locals. khayadjanian’s bravest and most original idea, however, was to take with him a copy of aimé morot’s (1850– 1913) painting the good samaritan that happens to match with the survival story of his great-grandfather who was saved by a kurd from the river somewhere around erzincan. discussions on the painting easily open up views to the fate of his armenian great-grandfather, and the artwork serves as a functional substitute to deal with the painful subject – not to mention its christian contents –in a somewhat indirect way. moreover, the silent sequences of the young frenchman tramping in anatolian mountains carrying a vast painting also manages to represent something of the surrealism of the genocidal experience and its abnormal legacy. having said that, khayadjanian’s imagery also shows how deeply the turks are conscious of the subject, even though they seem to know nothing about it. when the discussion touches the fate of armenians, the body-language and shivering hands of the interviewees silently show how the experience of destroying a people in one’s own neighbourhood is transmitted, at least for a couple of generations. khayadjanian himself keeps on showing a friendly face with a sad international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 108 smile, and at the same time maintains certain distance to his interviewees, some of whom openly accuse of armenians killing the turks as the cause of their misfortune. nevertheless, khayadjanian’s soft and constructive approach manages to bring some muslims to acknowledge that a systematic destruction organised by the government may have been ‘possible’. however, the use of the ‘g-word’ means an end to discussion, even with a young intellectual in turkey. moreover, the film is concluded with a proper elevation. in the story of the grandfather, the turning point between life and death was the river. for khayadjanian, river functions as a symbol that carries time into oblivion yet remains to show the original setting of the genocide. the film ends up with a spectacular scene with morot’s painting standing silently in the landscape in a place where it as if finally found its original setting. as a result of his creative, personal and warm approach on the painful subject, khayadjanian won the golden apricot price for the best armenian documentary in 2016. one may hope that stony paths is not his last word on his armenian heritage, and armenian culture in general. the other side of home naré mkrtchyan’s the other side of home tells the story of a turkish woman who has discovered her armenian roots from the mother’s side. the woman openly and honestly presents herself as a battle-field and conflict zone for whom the annihilated armenianness has become a part of identity: “i am the conflict. […] it is just what i am.” the armenian grandmother of the woman represents a typical case of 13‒14 year old girl who was forced to convert and to marry a turkish officer. consequently, the captured grandmother never laughed, was never happy, always dressed in black, and never spoke a word about armenians or armenian life, but took the secret with her to the grave instead. documentary and artistic perspectives on the armenian genocide in the golden apricot film festival 109 similar descriptions have been heard on many cases in the interviews of last years. in this case, however, the grandmother is remembered as having shown minor signs of happiness when singing armenian songs that no-one understood. in the family tradition, grandmother’s story was told as a happy fairy tale of a girl who fell in love with a soldier who saved her life. the main character of mkrtchyan’s film refuses to believe the fairy-tale and examines the case critically. the film, typically for documentaries on the armenian genocide, also presents some basic information and historical photographs that are familiar from various books and films. this once again indirectly shows the power of denialism: the basic facts are as if forced to be presented again and again, which in turn effectively hinders possibilities for artistic or discursive evolution. the woman visited armenia for the first time in april 2015. in manner of all armenians, she had the authentic feeling of homecoming when viewing mount ararat. remarkably, she was also deeply impressed by the presence of uprooted armenians from all over the world – people who do not belong in the places in which they are located today, but who should rather be somewhere in anatolian mountains. in spite of her armenian part and genuine sympathy, the woman does not want to use the word ‘genocide’ and speaks of massacres and deportations instead. a victory to the turkish side in her inner conflict. journey in anatolia: post-genocide tourism documented western armenian cultural heritage tours from yerevan to turkey via georgia have been active for several years, and thousands of armenians from armenia and diaspora have seen ani, kars and van, to say the least. bernard mangiante’s journey in anatolia tells the story of one such group consisting of armenians from france, german and yerevan, joined by an armenian from istanbul. the places visited are the customary ones, and the film is a fine basic documentary, yet without any outstanding special dimensions or artistic ambitions. the somewhat middle-of-the-road film is, in a way, saved from mediocrity by the character of charismatic french armenian scholar sharing his own interpretations and backgrounds for the phenomena encountered in a charming manner. (however, i would like to challenge his remark that viewing ararat as a national symbol is a 19th century nationalistic international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 110 invention, for the nationalists did not need to start from zero: they just continued and developed the roles ararat had in medieval armenian culture.) journey in anatolia also manages to document a telling case of the ever-ongoing turkish mania for the hidden armenian gold. namely, a turk completely seriously explains that the cusps of cross in an old khachkar are signs of hidden treasure’s whereabouts! the phenomenon of treasure hunt reveals that the attitudes of legalised robbery of armenian wealth are still alive and well in the eastern turkey. gavur neighbourhood – charming recollections from the past the post-genocide armenian history of diyarbakir has become better known in recent years, owing to the bookpublished by hrant dink vakfi,1 in addition to the emergence of interviews in various media. the interest was intensified first by the restoration of surb kirakos church by the armenian community, and then because of its seizure by turkish authorities for obscure reasons. yusuf kenan beysülen’s gavur neighbourhood tells the story of margosyan family, the survivors of whom were forced to migrate from their village, the beloved heredan in 1915. with the other remains of armenians, they move to diyarbakir’s gavur (‘infidel’) neighbourhood, yet keeping the heredani traditions alive. ‘heredantsi’ was one of the first three words taught to a newborn baby! the central figure in the film is mıgırdiç margosyan, survivors’ child, who in his youth lived and worked in diyarbakir as an apprentice blacksmith until 1953. later he became known in turkey as a writer, “master margos from diyarbakır”. 1. ferda balancar (ed.), sounds of silence ii: diyarbakir’s armenians speak (istanbul: international hrant dink foundation publications, 2013). the turkish original diyarbakırlı ermeniler konuşuyor was published in istanbul 2012. documentary and artistic perspectives on the armenian genocide in the golden apricot film festival 111 in his writings margosyan expressed the inherited yearning for heredan, which had become like a lost eden symbolising all precious that has been lost in both outer and inner reality: heredan, heredan, heredan, the father’s hearth, the mother’s lap… a whole generation, children and all, were separated from you, torn away, piece by piece, ‘berdan, berdan (as the kurds would say)’. but the never could or would forget you. you become a yearning in their hearts, grief on the smiles, and a kiss on the lips. you become a decoration, an adornment on the tombstones over the graves.2 the film gavur neighbourhood is built around margosyan’s charismatic personality. with his original and warm charm, margosyan takes the viewer for a walk in the old streets of diyarbakir and re-awakens armenian characters that once lived and walked there. exceptionally, he manages to do the reminiscing without any bitterness or gloominess. for margosyan, life is like one big fairy-tale the course of which is not in individuals’ hands. in a similar manner, margosyan has in his writings depicted diyarbakır and its forgotten social and cultural fabric with his colourful poetic language. interestingly, the film also documents insights to the jewish quarter of diyarbakir, emptied of its original inhabitants in late 1940’s. thus the film shows the fate of multiculturalism in a society on its way of becoming an utterly islamic nation. unfortunately, similar stories could be told of so many traditionally multicultural centres of eastern mediterranean, such as antioch or alexandria. finally, one cannot help wondering whether the film could have been improved by editing its ending a bit shorter; now it seems to have several potential endings in row. having said that, the present solution serves to distance the viewer in phases, step by step: first from diyarbakir to the school in istanbul, and finally to the graveyard where margosyan reminiscences courses of life in his poetic style. be that as it may, gavur neighbourhood, due to its warmth and insights, stands out among the documentaries in a charming manner. 2.  translation from fatma müge göçek: the transformation of turkey: redefining state and society from the ottoman empire to the modern era (london: i.b. tauris, 2011), 210. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 112 one could suppose that of all these documentaries, gavur neighbourhood might be the easiest one to sell to the european tv channels, because of its multicultural ethos. geographies – a sophisticated narrative from an artistic point of view, the most aesthetic film of the seven is without doubt chaghig arzoumanian’s family story entitled geographies. the lebanese-armenian director narrates a story that starts from erzurum half a millennium ago and proceeds to buruncisla, the village of arzoumanian’s ancestors for hundreds of years. the memory fragments of the village include a blue river, a church and forty donkeys of grandfather’s grandfather. step by step, the story proceeds to beirut, cairo, and as far as canada. in one of the key scenes, a descendant in america, after pink floyd’s concert, realizes that he has as if ended up too far from his ancestors; he burns his books of western philosophy and decides to return to lebanon. the circle is not closed, but at least it started to turn towards the beginning. the film is distinguished by the quality of its verbal narrative ‒ indeed, one of the most solemn armenian genocide heritage narratives on the silver screen. the slow flow of imagery and the mental space created by moments of silence results in a film to be breathed rather than watched. the director does not wail or speculate the lack of information after the annihilation, but proceeds solemnly and resolutely with those facts and contents that do exist, creating a hypnotic poetry of small gestures. in other words, she does not aim to portray the past as it was but rather shows the emptiness, what is no longer there. the long sequences and silent moments are effects that usually demand exceptional visual imagery. in this respect the film is of rather uneven quality, however. part of the documentary and artistic perspectives on the armenian genocide in the golden apricot film festival 113 imagery stands out for its beauty, yet some other sequences are rather ordinary and even somewhat clichéd (camels of cairo). arzoumanian’s narrative connected with visual imagery of theo angelopoulos would have made a perfect match! however, geographies stands out among the genocide stories, due to its sublime narrative, even though the visual imagery is not always completely mature. perhaps the certain softness and sensitivity in the telling could be defined as a kind of feminine mode of narrative, in the sense that the outer actions are less important than their inner contents. in the final climax of the film, the narrator is left with the concepts of blue river, church and forty donkeys; the outer world has no trace of these to offer, but in her inner world they all are real and constantly present. regrettably, technique and style of geographies will unavoidably be considered as too boring for big audiences, yet the long sequences and moments of silence serve those who are familiar with the genocide and are in need of some inner space for its reflection. children of vank most of the documentaries filmed in turkey show a good deal of random people who are more or less unwilling to hear or talk about the annihilated presence of armenians. nezahat gündoğan’s children of vank shows a more rare case of the descendants of armenians who are desperately keen on knowing about their past. the film documents the exceptional case of dersim, an area known of its alevi majority, where some armenians lived in a small monastery of surb karapet of halvor (not the famous karapet of mush) until it was destroyed by the army in 1938. consequently, the last armenians were scattered to different directions. some become alevis, some sunnis. little by little some of them find out about their respected great-grandfather who was an armenian priest. gündoğan shows the heirs of these armenians in search of information about their relatives, grandparents and the way of life they had. each piece of information, even the smallest one, is valuable for them. however, the distorted traditions may include oddities; such has herodes killing john the baptist in kayseri, before a mule brings his relics to the place where the monastery was built! children of vank helps to understand the meaning of genocide as annihilation of national and family customs and beliefs, and even of their memory. the descendants struggle with detached armenian names, some armenian words such as achig, ‘girl’, and give an international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 114 overall impression of helplessness in dealing with the traumatic legacy of genocide and the cultural emptiness left by the disappearance of an ancient way of life. a special mention must be made on mikail aslan’s song surp garabed’e gitmişim. the hypnotic song is used in the very end of the film to express something of was left unsaid: the immeasurable depth of armenian spiritual, aesthetic and cultural life that was lost forever. the song is from aslan’s album petag. dersim ermeni halk şarkıları (2010), which is one of the best monuments of western armenian culture from turkey of our times. who killed the armenians? the only traditional documentary about the genocide itself among these films is who killed the armenians? by maryam zaki and mohamed hanafy nasr from egypt. nasr is the first muslim arab to make a full film on the armenian genocide. it came out just for an important moment in history, when the parliament of egypt was to discuss about the recognition of the genocide. documentary and artistic perspectives on the armenian genocide in the golden apricot film festival 115 given the fact that director nasr is a muslim, and so is most of his audience, it is no surprise that that the role of islam in the events is not highlighted as much as the cruelty of ottoman history. however, the film is made with a good deal of effort, including shootings in armenia, egypt, and lebanon, as well as interviews of remarkable characters such as richard hovannisian, haik demoyan, taner akçam, and the two catholicos aram i and karekin ii. in brief, who killed the armenians? deserves a full appraisal even by its mere existence. the same conclusion was made also by the leadership of armenia, for nasr and zaki received the republic of armenia’s presidential award for their significant contribution to the recognition of the armenian genocide. * * * after viewing more than a dozen new genocide-related non-fiction films in two years, i would like finally to draw attention to two important factors – not in the actual films produced but to what is lacking. firstly, the beauty and colorfulness of the pre-genocide armenian village life and its immeasurably rich traditions are not shown in any film. such a film would need extremely much background work, not only in gathering the ethnographic information, but all the more in learning to grasp the ethos that was so dissimilar to modern way of life in the west, or even to the one in post-soviet armenia, in which most of pre1915 religious traditions of western armenia are already unknown. secondly, where are the art films and creative experiments? most of the films discussed above are very basic by their technical and narrative solutions and, generally speaking, rather predictable. could it be that the turkish denialism has frozen the film makers to the level of the most basic documentary output, leaving everyone cautious of using imagination and creativity in order to avoid accusations of “inventing” things? here again, the best way to show the true meaning of genocide would be to show the inner and outer character of the way of life, spirituality, culture and arts that disappeared. just think of the beauty of armenian medieval folk songs, to name one example, and the possibilities for their visualization. sergei parajanov did not say it all. untitled 6 phd jiří cukr is an archivist, a chronicler and a local historian in české budějovice, czech republic. he wrote a number of books and articles on historical and regional themes. email: jiri.cukr@ceskearchivy.cz mgr. marek jandák is a historian and a phd student at the charles university in prague. he is a member of the centre for the transdisciplinary research of violence, trauma and justice at the same institution. he published a monograph in 2018 on the armenian genocide and its reflection in the bohemian lands. email: marek.jandak@ff.cuni.cz 7 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller in syria and lebanon in 1922 and his work for the benefit of armenian genocide survivors1 jiří cukr, marek jandák in 1922, the czechoslovak traveller karel hansa visited the french mandate for syria and lebanon, where he became acquainted with the lamentable living conditions and pitiful experiences of the survivors of the armenian genocide. he was deeply impressed by the work of western humanitarian organizations, especially the american near east relief. this experience led hansa to decide to write, lecture and try to organise humanitarian aid for armenian orphans in czechoslovakia, although his humanitarian efforts had only limited success. key words: karel hansa, armenian genocide, survivors, humanitarianism, czechoslovakia, syria, lebanon. introduction in interwar czechoslovakia, karel hansa was the only person who systematically dealt with the subject of the armenian genocide. of significant historical value are his testimonies on the humanitarian situation of the survivors in syria and lebanon in 1922, where hansa documents predominantly the transports of armenian children from the territories occupied by turkish nationalists. after his return to czechoslovakia, hansa attempted to organise humanitarian aid for armenian orphans in czechoslovakia. this transfer of the social practice of modern humanitarian work, as hansa observed it in the middle east, to czechoslovakia did not go without the necessary adaptation to the different local environment. we follow the method with which hansa tried to inform and mobilise the czechoslovak public and the ways in which he tried to establish cooperation with czechoslovak and foreign humanitarian organizations. karel hansa achieved some success in the interwar period as a writer and lecturer, but he was never amongst the prominent figures of the public life in czechoslovakia. by the second half of the 20th century he was already a forgotten persona.2 this began to change 1 the article was received on 20.08.2020 and was accepted for publication on 03.10.2020. this article was created with support of the centre for the transdisciplinary research of violence, trauma and justice at charles university (unce/hum/009). translated by terézia klasová. for the purpose of this article, we have studied documents at the following institutions: national archives of the czech republic, prague (národní archiv české republiky, na); prague city archives (archiv hlavního města prahy, amhp); the research library of south bohemia (jihočeská vědecká knihovna, jvk); state district archives české budějovice (státní okresní archiv české budějovice, soka čb); state district archives písek (státní okresní archiv písek, soka písek); state regional archives třeboň (státní oblastní archiv v třeboni, soa třeboň) and state regional archives prague (státní oblastní archiv v praze, soa prague). 2 for example, his name is absent in most of the historical and contemporary biographical dictionaries. an ex8 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0006 over the last 15 years in connection with the increased interest of the czech public in the topic of the armenian genocide, and also thanks to the activities of the armenian community in the czech republic, which has grown significantly in numbers since the 1990s. current research on the life and work of karel hansa has its roots around 2006, when hansa’s book horrors of the east was published in a reprint. members of the prague armenian community, editor-in-chief of orer (days) hakob asatryan and artist tigran abramjan, who received support from the armenian community in cyprus,3 were behind the publication. as part of the then-unsuccessful initiative to recognize the armenian genocide,4 czech senator jaromír štětina organised an international conference “the armenian genocide,” attended by vahakn n. dadrian and tessa hofmann among the others. the conference took place in the hall of the czech senate on april 4, 2006, and hansa’s work was presented there by anna sochová.5 in recent years, several short texts6 and in 2018 also a professional seminar at the faculty of arts, charles university in prague,7 was devoted to hansa. in 2020 the city of české budějovice published hansa’s manuscript dealing with his visit to france in late 1920s.8 the theresienstadt centre for genocide studies plans to start awarding the karel hansa prize in 2021 on the occasion of the commemoration of the international day of remembrance and dignity of the victims of the crime of genocide.9 the aim of this article is to connect with and improve the result of current research, and to contribute to international research on the history of the armenian genocide and humanitarian work. in this text, we would also like to move beyond the simplistic hagiographical narratives, towards a more complex and at the same time ambivalent interpretation of hansa’s life. early life at the end of the 19th century, vienna was a multicultural metropolis of global importance, where people of all nationalities from the austro-hungarian empire lived. the czechs were the largest national minority in vienna around 1900, as many individuals with their entire families came here for a better living or to fulfil their work duties.10 it was employment ception here is the recent biografický slovník českých zemí, vol. 22 (prague: historický ústav av čr, 2019),193194. 3 karel hansa, hrůzy východu (beroun: josef šefl, 1923). the book was reprinted in 2006 in prague with an additional foreword by hakob asatryan. 4 senator jaromír štětina did not succeed in his attempt in 2006, but the czech republic recognized the armenian genocide in 2017, when the initiative was taken by deputy robin böhmisch. marek jandák, arménská genocida: příčiny, průběh a osobní svědectví 1915-1922 (prague: epocha, 2018), 359-365. 5 jaromír štětina et al., mezinárodní konference: arménská genocida (prague, 2006), 41-46; anna sochová, “karel hansa: očitý svědek následků arménské genocidy,” parrésia 12 (2018): 333-340. 6 haig utidjian, the art of the armenian book through the ages (červený kostelec: pavel mervart, 2016), 210213; jiří cukr, “k dobrodružnému životu karla hansy (1890-1967),” výběr: časopis pro historii a vlastivědu jižních čech 53, no.1 (2016): 55-57; jandák, arménská genocida, 483-511. 7 andran abramjan, hakob asatryan, jiří cukr, marek jandák and anna sochová spoke at the event. 8 karel hansa, poznatky a zážitky z francie = connaissances et expériences de france (české budějovice: české budějovice 2020). the book is in czech with a parallel french translation. 9 we received this information from director of the centre, šimon krbec, on 30 october 2020. 10 jana koudelková, češi ve vídni = tschechen in wien (brno: jihomoravský kraj, 2013). 9 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller in the postal services that brought karel hansa sr. (1858-1918) and his newlywed bride jarmila (1869-1943) to vienna shortly after the wedding. both came from working families. karel’s ancestors were millers, jarmila’s ancestors made their living as bakers. their eldest son, named after his father, was born to the newlyweds on november 25, 1890. he was baptized as karel františek václav hansa a week later, in the catholic parish church of st. jan nepomucký on praterstrasse, in the second city district (leopoldstadt).11 members of the czech community gathered in this district of vienna, and the aforementioned church dedicated to the czech patron was available to them. the hansas’ stay in vienna lasted at most three years; their daughter maria (18911973) was also born there. their father was soon transferred to a new job, and in 1892 he relocated to české budějovice (budweis), which at the time was a growing and prosperous centre with a population of 39,000 (1900), mostly ethnic czech and germans.12 he returned to the immediate vicinity of his place of origin, having been born in a neighbouring village where his relatives still owned a farm and operated a mill. at first, hansa sr. worked as a postal clerk; later he advanced his career and social status, becoming a postal inspector and then chief postal inspector.13 his wife did not have any formal employment; she took care of the children and the household. the hansa family settled in a small house in an intensively developing suburb, where other siblings of the traveller-to-be karel josefína (1893-1971), václav (1895-1952) and jaromír (1902-1956) were born.14 in české budějovice, the young karel started attending primary school in 1896. there were several schools of all levels in the city; some were single-sex schools, only a minimum of schools was mixed. the schools were also divided into german and czech schools.15 karel hansa was not among the best students throughout his studies and he also had received lower grades for behaviour. for example, in the spring of 1902, that means at the age of eleven, hansa received 3 (two bands reduced grade) in behaviour, since he repeatedly smoked on the street and he did not restrain from this behaviour even after being repeatedly reprimanded.16 he did not even finish the middle school in české budějovice and in the following years he often changed schools and residences.17 changes of schools and residences, at the time uncommonly frequent, lead towards an unstable environment, in which karel grew up. this experience could have influenced his character traits and his choice of a volatile traveller’s life. after forestry training in the libnič district on the hluboká estate (1906-1907),18 hansa finally graduated from the renowned czech forestry school in písek.19 11 pfarre st. johann nepomuk, wien, taufbuch 1890-1892. 12 population of the town: 17 000 (1869), 24 000 (1880), 28 500 (1890) 39 000 (1900), and 44 500 (1910). encyklopedie českých budějovic (české budějovice: nebe, 1998), 327. 13 budweiser kreisblatt, 15 may 1904, 4-5. 14 soka čb, collection archiv města české budějovice, book 3011, fol. 64. 15 encyklopedie českých budějovic, 490-491. 16 soka čb, collection i. národní škola české budějovice, book 25; collection i. střední škola jírovcova ulice české budějovice, book 15. 17 soka písek, collection měšťanská škola chlapecká písek, book 5 and 6. soka čb, collection základní škola lišov, book 10. 18 soa třeboň, collection schwarzenbergská ústřední kancelář hluboká nad vltavou, sign. 12 f 4a. 19 soka písek, collection vyšší lesnická a revírnická škola písek, book 49. 10 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 figure 1. the hansa family, around 1910. sitting from left to right karel sr., jaromír and josefína sr., standing josefína, karel, marie and václav. source: family collection in the spring of 1910, karel was participating in military service in the hulan cavalry regiment. later, hansa moved to the former ottoman province of bosnia and herzegovina, which austria-hungary had occupied since 1878 and annexed in 1908. as one of the more than 7,000 czechs who had come here for work until then, hansa viewed bosnia and herzegovina as part of the orient, with which austria-hungary had a colonial relationship.20 hansa first worked as a forester in the town of han pijesak, then as a wood warehouse manager in nearby sarajevo, and finally in teslić with a bosnian joint-stock company for wood processing.21 during wwi, he fought as sergeant in the 12th hulan regiment for the habsburg empire. in the autumn of 1915, he was severely wounded in his right forearm on the russian battlefield around the dniester river. later, during his visit to budapest, hansa remembered 20 zdeněk uherek, češi v bosně a hercegovině (prague: etnologický ústav av čr, 2011), 39-40; clemens ruthner, “habsburg’s only colony? bosnia-herzegovina and austria-hungary, 1878-1918,” seeu review 13, no.1 (2018): 2-14. 21 soa prague, collection velkostatek liteň, box 91, inv. no. 93; hansa, z potulek orientem (české budějovice: self-published), 281. 11 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller the doctors (“the butchers” as he called them) telling him there in 1915 that amputation of the hand is necessary; otherwise he will die from blood poisoning. he added: “i didn’t give in, i disagreed.” hansa managed to preserve his arm and his life, but in 1922 the trauma from his injury still lingered: “i unwittingly raised my hand and saw the scars caused by the insidious dum-dum missile.”22 he received a silver medal of the first class for his bravery, but he had to face the consequences of the injury for the rest of his life, since as a consequence he classified as “three-quarters handicapped.”23 after the end of the war, hansa found a new job in the independent czechoslovak republic as a woodsman on the liteň estate southwest of prague.24 however, after half a year, he moved directly to prague, where he became the secretary of the forest workers’ union. in the years 1920-1922 he was also mentioned as editor of forestry magazines. experience with armenian genocide survivors and near east relief czechoslovakia was founded at the end of wwi on the territory of the former austro-hungarian monarchy. the basic concept in its state-building was the wilsonian right to self-determination, which in this case concerned the czechs and slovaks, as they formed at least in theory a czechoslovak political nation. however, czechoslovakia was a de facto multinational state of czechs, germans, slovaks, hungarians, rusyns, poles and jews, which was associated with the former austria-hungary not only by its liberal democratic establishment, but also by complex and often conflicting relations between its individual ethnic groups and large economic differences between the west and east of the state. at the beginning of the 20th century there was a czech expatriate community in the ottoman empire. contact between the bohemian lands and the ottoman empire was provided primarily by travellers, scientists and various people carrying out economic activity, and thus not missionaries or colonial officials.25 during wwi, some czech citizens of the habsburg monarchy fought in the ottoman empire as its allies. the famous czech orientalist alois musil26 had a prominent place among them; however, no testimony by any czech soldier about the armenian genocide is known. on the other hand, unique eyewitness testimony of the violence between armenians and azerbaijanis in baku in march and september 1918 does come from the czech engineer jan kolář.27 22 hansa, z potulek orientem, 16. 23 verlustliste, no. 286, (wien 1915), 17; jvk, sign. p 5.392, karel hansa, poznatky a zážitky z francie (prague: manuscript, 1949-1950), appendix “poznávejte svět!,” 10. henceforth this source will be cited as “manuscript (1949-1950).” na, collection policejní ředitelství ii, všeobecná spisovna 1941-1950, box 2853, sign. h-671/8, hansa’s letter to directorate, january 1925 (henceforth this source will be cited as “police directorate”). 24 soa prague, collection velkostatek liteň, box 91, inv. no. 93. 25 miloš mendel, bronislav ostřanský, tomáš rataj, islám v srdci evropy (prague: academia 2007); adéla jůnová macková et al. (eds.), českoslovenští vědci v orientu, vol. i (prague: scriptorium, 2012), 37-49; petr pabian, “islam in czech travel literature of the nineteenth century,” in: “we” and “the others,” ed. luďa klusáková, (prague: karolinum, 2004); josef kořenský, asie: kulturní obrázky z asijského jihu a západu (prague: storch 192?), 204-206. 26 oldřich klobas, alois musil zvaný músa ar rueili (brno: cerm, 2003); karel jaroš, z turecké armády do britského zajetí (prague: paseka, 1995). 27 jan kolář, na vlnách revoluce v zemi věčných ohňů (prague: československá grafická unie, 1936), 24-35. 12 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 czech and slovak post-communist historiography has so far hardly reflected post-colonial theory in the interpretation of the history of czechoslovakia.28 for the purposes of this article, we will conceptualize the situation here as “colonialism without colonies.”29 this means that, although czechoslovakia did not have control over any overseas colony and belonged to the european semi-periphery, it was linked to the global economy and to the discourses associated with colonialism and imperialism. for example, during the peace negotiations after wwi the idea (never to be realised) of acquiring togo, former german colony in west africa, became popular in czechoslovakia for a short time.30 in the interwar period, hansa cited “orientalist traveller and writer” as his profession. while working in bosnia and herzegovina, and during a visit to syria and lebanon in 1922, he encountered the colonial relationships of the habsburg monarchy and france, with respective the former territories of the ottoman empire. his relatively strong experience with colonialism was unusual in czechoslovakia. hansa based his texts on the ideas of the paternalistic duties of the “cultural west,” perceived black skin as an object of exoticization and stereotyped occidental and oriental women;31 however during his stay in syria and lebanon he was not directly associated with the french colonial apparatus. 28 filip herza, “colonial exceptionalism: post-colonial scholarship and race in czech and slovak historiography,” in slovenský národopis 68, no. 2 (2020): 175-187; pavel barša, “the zero degree of decolonisation,” artalk revue 4 (2020), at https://artalk.cz/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ar-4-en-162045.pdf, accessed 20.09.2020. see also michael borovička, velké dějiny zemí koruny české: cestovatelství (prague: paseka, 2010), 545-551; macková et al. (eds.), českoslovenští vědci v orientu, vol. i, 22-25. 29 patricia purtschert, francesca falk, barbara lüthi, “switzerland and ‘colonialism without colonies,’” interventions 18, no. 2 (2015): 286-302. see also: matthias bjørnlund, “karen jeppe, aage meyer benedictsen, and the ottoman armenians: national survival in imperial and colonial settings,” haigazian armenological review 28 (2008): 11-17. 30 pavel kosatík, české snění [czech dreams] (prague: torst, 2010), 192-206. 31 hansa, z potulek orientem, 59, 89-92, 175-176, 183-187, 269-284. 13 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller figure 2. map of karel hansa’s journey, by martin ďásek and marek jandák. source: jandák, arménská genocida, 488 hansa’s decision to leave czechoslovakia in the early summer of 1922 was an escape from the problems of his love life and an attempt to forget in a new, unknown environment.32 at first he was briefly employed in yugoslavia, where, thanks to his knowledge of serbian and german, he found a position in the administration of an aristocratic residence in the town of futog in bačka. subsequently, equipped with diaries and a camera and dressed as a woodsman, he set out on a train journey through adrianople (edirne) to constantinople. in mid-july 1922, hansa decided to continue his journey on the steamboat hiperochy via smyrna (i̇zmir) to syria and lebanon. during his journey, he relied on the help of expatriate communities in constantinople and aleppo, and czechoslovak diplomatic missions in belgrade, constantinople, smyrna and athens.33 hansa’s now lost diary entries became the basis for some chapters in his book the horrors of the east (1923) and for the travelogue from wanderings through the orient (1925). his writings are full of short stories from his travels and descriptions of everyday life. southeast europe and the parts of the middle east where hansa travelled were severely marked by wwi and a number of subsequent conflicts. not only soldiers and state borders were on the move, but also refugees and genocide survivors. at the time of hansa’s visit, adrianople and smyrna were still controlled by the greek army, and the troops of the entente were still occupying constantinople. the czech traveller witnessed the culmination 32 ibid., 5, 181. hansa, hrůzy východu, 132. police directorate, documents relating to hansa’s passport. 33 hansa, z potulek orientem, 70, 73, 75 (czechoslovak communities in constantinople), 123-129 (aleppo), 14 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 of the exodus of the greeks from anatolia in the middle east and from greece after the crushing defeat of the greek armies in the war with the turkish nationalists (1919-1922).34 in addition, the presence of russian emigrants in hansa’s texts illustrates the global extent of the post-war refugee crisis.35 lebanon was struck with famine during wwi.36 north-eastern syria became a major destination for the deportation of the armenian population in 1915, and the second phase of the armenian genocide took place here a year later.37 the territory of the french mandate for syria and the lebanon has therefore become a key place in the process of the shaping of modern humanitarianism. attempts to rebuild armenian communities led mainly by the american near east relief (ner) and the league of nations, failed due to a series of defeats of the french colonial forces in cilicia by turkish nationalists in 1920 and 1921. turkish nationalists subsequently expelled genocide survivors from cilicia and eastern provinces of the ottoman empire.38 approximately 200,000 genocide survivors were concentrated in syria and lebanon in provisional conditions in 1922, in the hope that in the future they would be permanently resettled in anatolia or in soviet armenia. it was only after 1926 that the french authorities began their permanent establishment directly on the territory of the mandate.39 hansa arrived in aleppo, syria, at the turn of july and august 1922. the humanitarian consequences of the genocide and the ongoing exodus of the armenians were clearly visible in the city itself. this is how the czech traveller captured the contrast between the french headquarters, where the military band was just giving a concert, and the plight of armenian children in the streets: in the magnificent headquarters building, where the power and strength of a glittering golden sword gleaming in the glare of innumerable lights intertwined, the partying society completely forgot about the slender child creatures wrapped in tatters of their dirty clothes, huddled together in the alcoves of the palace, one warming up another and lying down to sleep at night like those street dogs!40 24, 279 (czechoslovak diplomatic missions in belgrade), 83 (constantinople), 98-101 (smyrna) and 98 (athens). 34 ibid., 99, 251-254. 35 ibid., 53-54, 264-265. see also philipp ther, the outsiders: refugees in europe since 1492 (princeton: princeton university press, 2019), 54-69. 36 keith d. watenpaugh, bread from stones: the middle east and the making of modern humanitarianism (oakland: university of california press, 2015), 45-56. 37 raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (new york: i. b. tauris, 2011), 625-696, 743-762; hilmar kaiser, “the armenians in lebanon during the armenian genocide,” in armenians of lebanon, ed. aida boudjikanian (beirut: haigazian university, 2009), 31-58. 38 levon marashlian, “finishing the genocide: cleansing turkey of armenian survivors, 1920-1923,” in remembrance and denial, ed. richard g. hovannisian (detroit: wayne state university press, 1999), 113-145. 39 vahé tachjian, “l’établissement définitif des réfugiés arméniens au liban dans les années 1920 et 1930,” in armenianas of lebanon, 59-66. 40 hansa, z potulek orientem, 197. 15 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller figure 3. a sign in the english, armenian and arabic languages, marking the building of american near east relief in aleppo. source: hansa, hrůzy východu at a time when hansa had difficulty finding affordable housing due to a lack of funds, he met vahan melikian, a ner official. hansa allegedly impressed him with his willingness to “help one old woman in her misfortune,” so he arranged accommodation directly in the organization’s house after coming to an agreement with the director of the ner in aleppo hermann kreider (1898-1967).41 subsequently, hansa participated in the humanitarian activities of the ner, although he was not an employee but a guest. ner was founded in new york in 1915, in response to reports of the ongoing extermination of the armenian population. from the beginning, the organization distributed aid in cooperation with missionaries and american consuls in the region. after wwi, the ner expanded significantly by sending hundreds of humanitarian workers to the middle east and through extensive fundraising in the united states, which generated an average of 12 million u.s. dollars a year between 1919 and 1923.42 the ner, in cooperation with other smaller and mostly european partners, was part of an international network of non-governmental humanitarian organizations whose goal was to provide systematic and long-term 41 ibid., 150-152, 180-189. hansa, hrůzy východu, 114. amerikan bord heyeti (american board), istanbul, “personnel records for herman h. kreider,” american research institute in turkey, istanbul centre library, online in digital library for international research archive, item #13203, at http://www.dlir.org/archive/items/ show/13203, accessed 22.09.2020. 42 james l. barton, story of near east relief (1915-1930) (new york: macmillan company, 1930), 410. 16 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 assistance to armenians, greeks and other people in need in the middle east and greece.43 in 1922, approximately 70,000 armenian and greek children, whom ner decided to evacuate from their orphanages in the ottoman empire, passed through aleppo.44 as an example of hansa’s activity with ner, we can mention the fact of his accompanying one of these children’s transports. figure 4. railroad bridge across the euphrates river near the jarabulus station of bagdad railway; it was partially destroyed by the explosives during the world war. the man in the photograph is hansa himself. source: hansa, hrůzy východu jarabulus, a town at the border with turkey, lies on the euphrates river, which separated the french mandate in the south and the area controlled by the turkish nationalists in the north. hansa arrived here after a wild ford car ride with three turks employed by the ner, as they could easily cross the border into eastern anatolia. one of them, the eccentric enwer [sic], became hansa’s guide and interpreter into german during his stay in aleppo.45 a ner station was set up in jarabulus in a war-torn building without doors and windows. a group of ner workers, led by the armenians karabed [sic] and said, was waiting for the orphans in order to provide food and lodging for the children. the much-anticipated transport of children travelled from the city of harpoot through urfa to jarabulus. there, 43 watenpaugh, bread from stones, 91-156; hans m. jaatun, “from religious relief to development aid: the near east relief and the emergence of international humanitarianism, 1915-1930,” global histories 5, no. 1 (2019): 50-63; vahram l. shemmassian, “the league of nations and the reclamation of armenian genocide survivors,” in looking backward, moving forward, ed. richard g. hovannisian (new brunswick and london: transaction publishers, 2003), 81-112; nefissa naguib, inger m. okkenhaug (eds.), interpreting welfare and relief in the middle east (leiden and boston: brill, 2008). 44 hansa, hrůzy východu, 112; hansa, z potulek orientem, 211-212. 45 hansa, z potulek orientem, 153-165, 192-195, 201-206. 17 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller they were supposed to cross the river and wait for the train to aleppo. the children had to undertake a dangerous journey with the help of hired animals tormented by dust, insects and the heat of the sun. in addition, the railway bridge in jarabulus had been destroyed during wwi, and train traffic to the north was interrupted; the children thus had to use a temporary pontoon bridge. figure 5. a caravan transporting the orphans across dry desert in northern syria. source: hansa, hrůzy východu figure 6. orphans from malatia (the children are equipped with hoods against heatstroke). source: hansa, hrůzy východu hansa photographed the orphan transports and the refugee camps in aleppo and beirut, and later published them in his book horrors of the east. his sketches from the life of humanitarian workers and orphans capture a number of fleeting moments. for example, we 18 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 can cite a short story about a group of children waiting for cattle wagons to arrive at the jarabulus station, which shows orphans not only as suffering victims, but also as people actively living their childhood: i vividly remember one of the boys, approximately 9 years old, who, with the serious face of the diplomat of the flock by which he was surrounded, tried to prove that those who travel in the first carriages, will reach the destination of the journey […] much earlier than their companions in the carriages in the back. with his opinion, he caused a revolution among the children. everyone wanted to get to the front, just behind the machine. […] for a long time, said had to make it clear to everyone that their cars would be placed last […] and that they would all arrive in aleppo in a heap and at the same time.46 figure 7. a special train arranged by the american near east relief committee at jarabulus station prepared to take several thousands of children to aleppo. source: hansa, hrůzy východu at the stations in aleppo and then in beirut, the transports were awaited by armenian women, who hoped to find their children there. the arrival of children thus became a place of receiving bad news as well as for family reunification. this is how hansa captured the meeting of mother and daughter in beirut: only one of the women was fortunate. she found her daughter, an approximately eight-year-old girl, who came from malatia. there she had left little sophia in the protection of a prominent greek family, when she herself had to leave the city with the other armenian inhabitants and was deported. when the americans began rescue work for the remnants of the armenian people of asia minor, sophia was accepted into the care of the committee. the mother recognized her daughter by the sign on the child’s neck. with cries of unspeakable joy, she hugged her child, sprinkling her cheeks with a stream of tears.47 46 ibid., 177. see also donald e. miller, lorna t. miller, survivors: an oral history of the armenian genocide (los angeles: university of california press, 1993), 118-136; nazan maksudyan, ottoman children and youth during world war i (syracuse: syracuse university press, 2019), 105-136. 47 hansa, z potulek orientem, 210-211; hansa, hrůzy východu, 111, 113. 19 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller modern humanitarianism embodied in the work of hermann kreider and his colleagues in aleppo allowed hansa to reformulate his relationship with refugees and survivors of the genocide he had previously perceived only as a passive observer. hansa decided to involve czechoslovakia in international structures to help armenian orphans. he therefore began collecting material for his book in the refugee camps of aleppo and beirut and started to prepare for his return to his homeland. hansa obtained information about the fates of the survivors with the help of interpreters or directly from german-speaking people.48 he usually did not name his sources unless the individual was in a position of authority, and characterised them according to gender, occupation, age and place of origin. i personally know one [student] from zeitun, whose 32-member family was also deported and who were partly murdered during the deportation, partly died of suffering and various diseases. he alone remained alive and was severely wounded; he saved himself by hiding in a pile of corpses after the massacre and fleeing at night.49 in addition to including individual stories of survivors, hansa tried to characterise the problems that the inhabitants of refugee camps had to face: during my stay in beirut in november and december last year, during the winter rains and freezing winds, and with very cold and wet nights, visiting local camps almost daily i saw terrible misery, illness and suffering beyond description. streams of water, rolling incessantly from the clouds, spewed water into every corner of the flimsy tents and huts, where on the soaked and sludge-stained property, often on the bare ground, shivering mothers huddled in the cold, protecting the crying children with their flimsy clothes. the daily influx of water made the camp a real mudflat. there were no spades or shovels, to allow the ditches of water drains to be deepened or built anew. a wild, freezing north wind that had been blowing incessantly for weeks ruthlessly tore the soaked and rotten remnants of blankets and sacks from the tents, which threatened to break free of their pegs in the soaked soil at any moment. for weeks, the weather was terrible and staying in the camps was real suffering. […] everyone is coming out of the soaked tents they are shaking from the cold and poorly dressed. most are barefoot; emaciated baby legs are shivering with cold and are red as a crayfish. children are crying they are hungry. and mothers, with a tear in their eyes, helpless, running through the camp, searching for food for their children or for fuel on which the neediest could cook. there are no hotplates or pebbles, so these poor women have to help themselves with empty kerosene cans, in which they cook breakfast and lunch on a piece of charcoal but also often dinner also. there is no milk, eggs or fat, so a simple rice soup is the only usual dish.50 48 hansa, hrůzy východu, 95. 49 ibid., 99, see also 100, 105. 50 ibid., 104. 20 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 elsewhere, hansa writes about the lack of healthcare and the conditions in which sick children lived in the camps: it is terrible to see sick little children, often wrapped in dirty rags or in wet strips of sacks, as i have seen during my various visits to camps and tents during the weeks of the autumn rains. the children lay there in the highest degree and deadly fever, unassisted, on bare ground, in sludge, mud, water. i will never forget those little creatures, those suffering for sins not committed.51 figure 8. the life of remnants of the christian population from asia minor; tents of refugees in aleppo. source: hansa, hrůzy východu hansa was inspired by the work of various humanitarian workers he met. in aleppo, it was the swiss physician max müller of the german christian relief society in the orient (christlicher hilfsbund im orient), who mainly treated the eye diseases of the refugees.52 during his stay in lebanon, hansa was cared for by krikor khahigian, the administrator of the local ner house, who arranged visits to refugee camps as well as meetings with humanitarian workers and prominent members of the armenian community. the visit to an orphanage in the settlement zouk michail led by the distinguished figure of the scandinavian women’s missionary workers (kvindelige missions arbejdere), namely maria jacobsen (1882-1960), had a great impact on hansa. during a tour of the orphanage, hansa played and talked with the children, then spoke at length with jacobsen about her current work and also about her experiences from wwi. hansa was absolutely enchanted by her story and the operation of the orphanage.53 51 ibid., 100, see also 95-118. hansa, z potulek orientem, 208-220. 52 hansa, hrůzy východu, 102. 53 ibid., 116-118. karekin dickran, “maria jacobsen and the genocide in armenia,” the danish peace acad21 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller figure 9. madam m. jacobsen with her sweethearts at the courtyard of the danish orphanage at the zuk michael settlement in the lebanon. source: hansa, hrůzy východu shortly before leaving lebanon, hansa met the catholicos of cilicia sahak ii (18491939), who appreciated his plan to organise aid for armenian orphans in czechoslovakia, but at the same urged caution and warned him against the opposition of various interest groups leaning towards support of turkey in europe.54 the most dramatic component of hansa’s activities was an eleven-day voyage on the italian steamer marate from beirut to the athenian port of piraeus. the ner ship carried 896 greek orphans, accompanied by hansa and two american nurses. one of them, silvia t. eddy (1893-1954), is known by name.55 during the voyage, the steamer got into a strong, fourteen-hour-long storm. the ship was crammed, poor hygiene prevailed, and some of the children were ill. two boys even died during the trip, a four-year-old and the other an elevemy 2004, 1-3, at http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/library/karekin/ukmaria.pdf, accessed 01.09.2020; inger m. okkenhaug, “scandinavian missionaries, gender and armenian refugees during world war i. crisis and reshaping of vocation,” social sciences and missions 23, no. 1 (2010): 64-71; revised and expanded translation of chapter 8: “maria jacobsen, kma og fuglereden i libanon” “maria jacobsen, kma, and the birds nest in lebanon” from matthias bjørnlund, på herrens mark: nødhjælp, mission og kvindekamp under det armenske folkedrab (copenhagen: kristeligt dagblads forlag, 2015), at https://www.academia.edu/42881210/ birds_nest_on_the_danish_orphanage_for_armenian_genocide_survivors_in_lebanon, accessed 20.05.2020. for more on hansa’s meeting with jacobsen see jandák, arménská genocida, 509-511; see also 368-508. 54 hansa, z potulek orientem, 212-213. 55 amerikan bord heyeti (american board), istanbul, “personnel records for sylvia t. eddy,” american research institute in turkey, istanbul centre library, online in digital library for international research archive, item #12102, at http://www.dlir.org/archive/items/show/12102, accessed 24.09. 2020. 22 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 en-year-old. despite all the difficulties, hansa and the american nurses managed to keep the situation under control and avoided the threat of a fortnight’s quarantine in the port of athens.56 after a short visit to athens and thessaloniki, hansa travelled by train to prague in december 1922, where he wanted to begin his humanitarian work.57 writing, lecturing and organising in czechoslovakia the first obstacle faced by karel hansa at the beginning of his humanitarian endeavours was the insufficient awareness on the part of the czechoslovak public of the deportations and massacres of armenian citizens during wwi. unlike the states of the entente, where the story of the genocide of the armenian nation was an indisputable part of the war experience, mediated by the daily press and amplified by the long-term missionary relationship in the region and the interests of war propaganda,58 the habsburg empire manifested the opposite dynamics. germany and her ally, the austria-hungary, strictly censored their press during the war and prevented publication of reports about the genocide perpetrated by their ally.59 for instance, in the time of hamidian massacres (1894-1896) the main czech newspapers narodni listy and narodni politika published numerous and often detailed reports about this event almost on a daily basis, whereas during wwi only concise reports, denying or downplaying the violence against armenians in the ottoman empire were published. after the end of the war, a small number of factually largely accurate reports about the genocide were published in the czechoslovak press, but they remained without much attention in the turbulent post-war period, and the czechoslovak public as a whole remained poorly informed about the genocide.60 karel hansa thus had to inform the czechoslovak public before he could have started to organise humanitarian help and the collection of donations. karel hansa started to lecture and to collect money for armenian orphans in prague and in other cities in czechoslovakia, predominantly in southern bohemia. he partially followed the tradition of traveller’s lectures well established in the czech speaking lands from the late 19th century.61 his lectures were organised by a wide range of organisations including various civic societies, schools, churches or even the army. hansa’s first known lecture after his return to czechoslovakia was called “on the current fate of the remnants of the armenian nation,” and it was organised by the czech women’s club in prague and held on 24 january 1923.62 56 hansa, hrůzy východu, 119-144. 57 hansa, z potulek orientem, 256-267. 58 jo laycock, imagining armenia: orientalism, ambiguity and intervention (manchester: manchester university press, 2009), 99-143; peter balakian, the burning tigris: the armenian genocide and america’s response (new york: perennial, 2004), 219-296. 59 artem ohanjanian, armenia 1915: austro-hungarian diplomatic reports prove the genocide (vienna: society for promotion of armenian history and culture, 2011), 227-241; hilmar kaiser, imperialism, racism, and development theories: the construction of a dominant paradigm on ottoman armenians (ann arbor: gomidas institute, 1998), 21-32. 60 jandák, arménská genocida, 120-129, 215-218, 252-257, 354-356. řoutil et al., katastrofa křesťanů, 463475. 61 borovička, velké dějiny zemí koruny české: cestovatelství, 536-539. 62 národní politika, 24 january 1923, 4. 23 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller in several extant reviews on hansa’s lectures from independent sources we can read that they “made a lasting impression” or that “[he] touchingly described the fate of the armenian nation and its poor children; that his words moved hearts is evidenced also by the collected amount of money (90.5 crowns)”. every lecture was followed by a fundraising campaign for the armenian orphans; recorded proceeds were around one hundred to a few hundred czechoslovak crowns. the occasional problems recorded in the historical sources were related to low attendance.63 an entry in a local chronicle about a lecture for a child audience shows hansa’s good relationship with children and his ability to communicate with them: “the speaker with his almost childlike rendition made the lecture so pleasant that he held the attention of the children for almost two hours.”64 hansa himself collected a series of positive reviews of his lectures for the purpose of advertisement and communication with the authorities.65 the lectures were accompanied by approximately 180 images projected with a laterna magica. in july 1924, hansa bought a small praga piccolo car to transport the projector and slides. he probably bought this car on credit, as was common at the time, and he sold it as soon as he temporarily stopped lecturing.66 the last known lecture at which he collected money for armenian orphans took place in the town netolice, on 14 april 1926 in south bohemia. 67 in the following two years, his lecturing activity stops and resumes in 1929, in connection with the forthcoming book of travels to yugoslavia.68 another component of hansa’s effort to overcome the lack of knowledge about the armenian question in czechoslovakia and to put his humanitarian activities on a firmer ground was the above-mentioned book horrors of the east. this book can be seen as the first work in the czech language systematically to map the nature of modern genocide and its consequences phenomena which came to central europe 20 years later with the nazi occupation. according to the holistic theory of genocide by the british historian mark levine, genocides local to the area were not an anomaly, for eastern europe and the adjacent areas including anatolia (leven calls them “the european rimlands”), but a systemic trait of world historical development towards “a single, global, political economy composed of nation states.”69 hansa repeatedly amplified the historical importance and unprecedented nature of the violence in the ottoman empire at the beginning of the 20th century: “the credible eyewitness accounts of these acts prove that the atrocities committed against the armenians 63 hlas lidu, 24 december 1923, 3. jihočeské listy, 28 april 1926, 3. 64 the lecture took place on 17 february 1926. soka čb, collection základní škola ledenice, book 1, p. 29. 65 police directorate, advertisement for hansa’s lectures, c. 1930; reviews and recommendations of his lectures, 8 november 1946. manuscript (1949-1950), 360-382. 66 police directorate, hansa received his driver’s licence on 1 february 1924. he bought a car on 21 july 1924, and sold it on 13 august 1926. 67 jihočeské listy, 28 april 1926, 3. 68 police directorate, hansa reported in a letter to the directorate his intention to give new lectures on the topic of yugoslavia, 2 november 1929. 69 mark levene, the crisis of genocide, vol. i (oxford: oxford university press, 2016), xiii. beside levene’s two volume work, which directly examines the european rimlands between 1912 and 1953, see also his overview on continuities and discontinuities: genocide in the age of the nation state: volume i: the meaning of genocide (new york: i. b. tauris, 2008), 144-206. 24 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 are unparalleled in human history.”70 however, he did not interpret this violence as part of modern historical processes, but, in agreement with historical orientalist views, saw it as a decline into “barbarism.”71 hansa implicitly ascribed to the “civilised west” a paternalistic role in the enforcement of humanitarian principles on a global scale. in relation to the armenian tragedy, the west in hansa’s interpretation ceased to be the personification of the positive values of progress and civilisation; on the contrary, the west betrayed these abstract values with its indifference towards the suffering armenians.72 he saw the survivors of the genocides as “victims of the reign of young turks, and the intrigues and weakness of european diplomacy.”73 the book horrors of the east, which hansa managed to write and publish in less than a year after his return to czechoslovakia74 differs from hansa’s later works, which are mostly travelogues. as we have already mentioned above, horrors of the east contains hansa’s testimony from syria and lebanon from 1922, which predominantly has the character of a travelogue; nonetheless, the first two parts of the book try systematically to depict armenian history before the genocide and the genocide itself. hansa did not have a university education, only short experience as editor of a forestry magazine. despite the shortcomings, especially in grammar and in his dealing with the early armenian history, hansa managed, thanks to his determination, to compose a compilation of documents, commentaries and authentic experiences that persuasively outlined the main characteristics of the armenian genocide for the czechoslovak public. in the descriptions of the violence itself, hansa relied on primarily western observers.75 the sources included in the book, though not systematically catalogued, contained much detail which must have had a lasting emotional impact on the readers. to fulfil its goal of informing readers and encouraging their active contribution to the construction of a czechoslovak orphanage in lebanon, the publication of horrors of the east needed to speak to the reader within a familiar ideological framework, which would have helped to legitimise such humanitarian action. whereas the humanitarian reports of the league of nations trove for political neutrality and humanitarian workers from united states of america presented their work in the framework of american exceptionalism,76 in the czechoslovak milieu hansa spoke to readers in the language of solidarity towards nations striving for self-determination. horrors of the east was composed as tragic story of armenian national history, which, due to violent crimes failed to achieve victory in “heroic 70 hansa, hrůzy východu, 89, see also 44, 91. 71 for more on the dichotomy of “civilization” and “barbarism” in genocide studies, see: alexander l. hinton, thomas la pointe, douglas irvin-erickson (eds.) hidden genocides: power, knowledge, memory (newark: rutgers university press, 2014), 2-11. 72 hansa, hrůzy východu, foreword lacking pagination by hakob asatryan (2006, reprint). hansa, z potulek orientem, 212. 73 hansa, hrůzy východu, 91. 74 the first known advertisement for the new book in národní listy, on 23 november 1923, 10. the book is also briefly mentioned earlier in světozor, 11 october 1923, 33. 75 hansa quotes, for example, the german vice-consul kuckhoff from samsun, the american consuls oscar h. heizer from trabzon, and leslie a. davis from kharberd, and a number of unnamed sources. for examples of nurses of german red cross, american missionaries or german employees of the bagdad railroad, see hrůzy východu, 49-80. 76 watenpaugh, bread from stones, 57-123. 25 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller fight of small nations for national and political liberation from the yoke of subjection.” hansa contrasted the armenian tragedy with the situation of the “happily liberated czechoslovak nation,” which attained self-determination under favourable circumstances after the fall of the austro-hungarian empire. at the same time, hansa pondered on possible political solutions, and emphasised that armenians as a nation wanted, and needed, a “motherland, their home.”77 hansa’s appeal also aimed to direct the assistance towards the most vulnerable and evidently “innocent” group among the survivors orphans.78 solidarity with armenians as a christian nation played a secondary but indisputable role in the mobilisation of help.79 humanitarian help in general played an important role in the austro-hungarian empire at the end of wwi, when the food supply system collapsed, and food riots erupted on the streets of the monarchy.80 the “czech heart” organisation in particular contributed not only to an improvement in the supply situation of ethnically czech citizens in the cities, but also to the takeover of control over supplies by the czech national movement at the time of disintegration of the habsburg empire and creation of the new czechoslovak state in the autumn of 1918.81 in february 1919 the czechoslovak red cross (csrc) was founded with president tomáš garrigue masaryk’s daughter, dr alice masaryková (1879-1966) as its chairwoman. csrc replaced the former czech and slovak units of the austrian and hungarian red cross (these were two separate organisations, austrian and hungarian respectively) and soon became a mass organisation with hundreds of thousands of members. csrc engaged in the spheres of public health, youth education, social and humanitarian work and the preparation of health workers in case of war. in 1919 csrc received considerable support exceeding 100 million czechoslovak crowns for post-war renewal from foreign donors, the vast majority of whom were from the united states. likewise, foreign humanitarian workers were sent to czechoslovakia. czechoslovakia not only had experience with the international humanitarian movement from the position of recipient, but in 1921 csrc in collaboration with the czechoslovak ministry for foreign affairs organised aid for those afflicted by the famine in russia. local csrc organizations initiated a nationwide collection, and provided financial and material aid worth 3 million czechoslovak crowns in total. in the 1920s the csrc and the czech government supported numerous russian emigrants in czechoslovakia, including scholarships for several thousands of ukrainian and russian students. a further example is the active resettlement of 5,000 russian immigrants from constantinople to czechoslovakia at the turn of 1921-1922.82 77 hansa, hrůzy východu, 96. 78 ibid., introduction lacking pagination and also closing appeal to reader for help, likewise without pagination. see also hansa, z potulek orientem, 189, 289-290. 79 hansa, hrůzy východu, 97. 80 rudolf kučera, rationed life: science, everyday life, and working class politics in the bohemian lands, 1914-1918 (oxford and new york: berghahn, 2016); ota konrád, rudolf kučera, cesty z apokalypsy (prague: academia, 2018). 81 renata tyršová (ed.), pět let českého srdce 1917-1922 (prague: české srdce, 1922). 82 radovan lovčí, alice masaryková (prague: karlova univerzita, 2007), 245-304; otakar dorazil, čs. červený kříž 1919-1929 (prague: československý červený kříž, 1929); na, collection ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ruská pomocná akce, inv. no. 19, 20, 53, 70, 71, 107. 26 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 hansa felt it crucial to build on the existing czechoslovak infrastructure of humanitarian help. he had already received a promise of support from unnamed czechoslovak officials during his stay in syria.83 after his return to the homeland he met with the chairwoman of the csrc, dr. alice masarykova, on 9 march 1923 and asked her to donate medicine and other necessities for refugees in syria and lebanon. he was allegedly promised “a large consignment,”84 but the archive of csrc was lost during wwii and no further information on the matter can be found in hansa’s writings. however, the establishment of the so-called “hansa’s fund for armenian orphans” at the csrc is well documented. the greater part of the money was collected through public lectures. in addition, hansa also asked for contributions in his books and promised to donate a small part of the sales income to the fund. for greater transparency, the money was sent directly by the organisers of the lectures and not by hansa himself.85 hansa’s fund at csrc raised approximately 5,000 czechoslovak crowns (the equivalent to150 u.s. dollars at that time), which roughly corresponded to the budget of one local organisation of the csrc, a modest annual scholarship for one armenian student or the amount required to provide for several orphans in lebanon for a year.86 the next important figure to whom hansa reached out was dr václav girsa (18751954). their meeting took place on 27 march 1923 at the czechoslovak ministry for foreign affairs. girsa was one of the highest-ranking officials of the ministry, and former head of the commission to support those afflicted by famine in russia in the years 1921-1922. thanks to hansa’s mediation the ministry, much as in case of russian and ukrainian students, allowed 50 armenian students to study at czechoslovak universities and supported them with scholarships. already in 1923 the first students applied, and in the next year the armenian student association in czechoslovakia was founded.87 this was clearly one of hansa’s biggest achievements. the former armenian prime minister alexander khatisian (1874-1945) attended hansa’s lecture during his stay in prague on december 1923 and accompanied him to express his thanks to the czechoslovak government for their support of armenian students.88 at the international level, hansa cooperated with the armenian catholic congregation 83 hansa, z potulek orientem, 208-209. 84 letter to mekhitarists, april 15, 1-2. in his correspondence with the mekhitarist congragation in vienna hansa details his activities. we have in our possession digital copies of three german letters by hansa dated april 15, may 27 and august 23, 1923 that were kindly provided to us by haig utidjian. henceforth this correspondence will be cited as “letters to mekhitarists.” for more details on the letters see utidjian, the art of the armenian book, 210-213. 85 ibid. jihočeské listy, 28 april 1926, 3. hansa, hrůzy východu, 97, 155. hansa, z potulek orientem, 289-290. hansa pledged do give 1 czechoslovak crown to the fund for every sold copy of his books (1923, 1925). the prices of his books were 20 and 35 crowns, respectively. 86 výroční zpráva čs. červeného kříže (prague: československý červený kříž 1921-1925); na, collection ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ruská pomocná akce, inv. no. 70, 71. hansa estimated that to support one orphan in lebanon would cost 2-3 u.s. dollars monthly. hansa, hrůzy východu, 98. 87 letters to mekhitarists, april 15, may 27 and august 23, 1923. jaroslav vaculík, “masarykův spolupracovník mudr. václav girsa,” in t. g. masaryk, jeho spolupracovníci a vznik československého státu (hodonín: masarykovo muzeum, 2009), 102-106; ahmp, collection spolkový katastr, sign. x/0317, arménský studentský svaz v čsr (1924-1936). 88 lidové listy, 11 december 1923. manuscript (1949-1950), appendix “poznávejte svět!,” 3-4. 27 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller of mekhitarists in vienna. the book horrors of the east dedicates considerable space to the history of the congregation, and hansa’s correspondence with the mekhitarists shows that some of the photographs and illustrations in the books are from the congregation.89 hansa also participated in the conference of the international near east association in geneva at which he presented his photographs from lebanon and syria.90 figure 10. participants of the congress of the international near east association held 5-15 september 1923 in geneva, chaired by president auguste de morsier [1864-1923] (1), general secretary gordon l. berry [1884-1932] (2), and attended by delegates from around the world. the czechoslovak delegate karel hansa, orientalist traveller and author of horrors of the east (3). the president of the armenian republic dr alexandr khatissian [sic. former prime minister, april 1919 may 1920] (4). source: světozor, october 11, 1923, 33 the question of cooperation with various organizations and individuals, which key to the success of his activities, because the money he had collected could not be enough to build an orphanage, revealed the limits of hansa’s abilities as a humanitarian worker. in the autumn of 1924, hansa established contact with armenag s. baronigian (1890?), director of the armenian committee for medical aid and evangelization (armenische hilfskomitee zur unterstützung ärztlicher mission und evangelisation). baronigian offered hansa a position in his organisation, and suggested that hansa send him money from his own fund to baronigian’s organisation in germany. to this end, he visited hansa in prague and invited him to nuremberg. during the visit to prague, however, there was a dispute between the two men. in his correspondence, baronigian portrays hansa as a man who constantly complains about his misery and the lack of support for his fund from prominent armenians, but who acts non-transparently, spends time in pubs and is unreliable in financial matters. baronigian even went so far as to ask hansa openly if his activities were fraudulent. according to the german historian uwe feigel, baronigian was involved in court proceed89 hansa, hrůzy východu, 14-20. letters to mekhitarists, april 15, may 27 and august 23, 1923. 90 manuscript (1949-1950), appendix “poznávejte svět!,” 3. hansa, hrůzy východu, 147-149. letter to mekhitarists, 23 august 1923. jihočeské listy, 28 april 1926, 3. 28 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 ings in germany for embezzling money in a charity, but was eventually acquitted by the imperial court.91 this experience could have also helped shape baronigian’s critical view of hansa. as we know from the statement of the csrc accountant josef kapr, hansa’s fund was not a fraud,92 but hansa’s unbalanced nature and the resulting difficulties in cooperating with other people were real. from 1923, hansa tried to establish a czech association in support of deprived armenian orphans, but due to a lack of interest its inaugural meeting did not occur until october 8, 1924. after a few weeks, however, a trivial dispute escalated between hansa who was both the association’s chairman and its secretary and karel tunkl, who served as its vice-chairman. according to tunkl, hansa acted in too “lordly” a manner93 when writing letters to germany and geneva. for example, in a draft letter to geneva hansa spoke of “his association,” “his committee,” instead of writing “our association,” “our committee,” as tunkl would have preferred.94 hansa allegedly replied that he would not be lectured to, because the association only existed for 10 days and he had been working for armenian orphans for two years. hansa, who himself admits in his later lawsuit that he was “rather nervous” as a result of his military service and his stay in the near east,95 after another exchange of views tore up the letter and left the meeting. at further meetings of the association the dispute grew into a bitter struggle for control of the association.96 tunkl and his wife and friends, whom he brought to the association when it was founded, effectively controlled it, deprived hansa of the offices he held and of his membership, and took further steps, including an unsuccessful attempt to take over hansa’s fund at the csrc.97 hansa decided in december 1924 to sue tunkl et al. for defamation, at the smíchov district court. the dispute dragged on for almost a year and ended with an out-of-court settlement on 25 november 1925, in which the defendants stated that they had not made their statements about hansa with malicious intent and “could not blame him for anything dishonest.” the czech traveller withdrew his lawsuit and both parties paid for their court costs themselves.98 records of the association’s day-to-day activities with the new leadership without hansa stopped in 1925.99 hansa’s inability to lead the association by consensus with other members, along with tunkl’s reckless ambitions and determination to remove hansa from the association’s collective, led to the embarrassing failure of the association. 91 uwe feigel, das evangelische deutschland und armenien (göttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht, 1989), 288. 92 ahmp, collection okresní civilní soud po prahu-sever [regional court for prague north], zn. 96, sign. t vi 1906/24, p. 45. witness testimony of the accountant of csrc josefa kapr, 24 november 1925. 93 ibid., hansa’s complaint, 16 december 1924. the word “pánovitě” (“in a lordly manner”) hansa himself repeated in describing the incident in his complaint. 94 ibid., 28, statement by the defendants, 28 january 1925. 95 ibid., 2, hansa’s complaint, 16 december 1924. 96 ibid., 27-29, statement by the defendants, 28 january 1925. 97 ibid., 45, testimony by kapr. 98 ibid., 47. 99 ahmp, collection spolkový katastr, box 78, sign. ii/0635, český spolek pro podporu strádajících arménských sirotků. the association was formally dissolved after a prolonged period of inaction, on 1 january 1928. 29 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller later years hansa’s activity in connection with the armenian question, as we know, ended in the year 1926. in later years, hansa used his experience as a traveller and writer, lecturing and writing about his travels to the allied countries of interwar czechoslovakia and the easternmost part of czechoslovakia itself. in may 1927 he went to france, where he travelled around brittany, studied the language and worked.100 in the summer of 1929, hansa and his girlfriend travelled to yugoslavia, a country that was a close ally of czechoslovakia in the little entente and a popular tourist destination.101 another of hansa’s travel destinations was carpathian ruthenia. this undeveloped “wild east” of czechoslovakia, with which prague in many respects had a repressive relationship shaped by the idea of a civilizational mission of the republic, was an object of interest not only for czech officials, police officers, soldiers, teachers, tourists, writers and adventurers, but also for social and humanitarian workers.102 hansa appears here not only as a traveller and writer, but also again as a philanthropist. in his first book on carpathian ruthenia he focused on the local history of the area,103 and in his second he depicted distributing gifts to poor children there, which he organised for orthodox christmas day in january 1937. young schoolchildren were gifted 500 packages. the most valuable gifts consisted of 71 pairs of shoes, purchased with the permission of the csrc for 2,000 crowns, originally raised for armenian orphans through hansa’s fund, which in the meantime had grown.104 figure 11. extraordinary photograph of hansa portraying his dual aspects as writer and motorist that characterise his more rounded identity as a travel writer. a caption reads: “the ‘aero’ vehicle an ever reliable friend, which in the evening may 20, 1941 came to an ‘unusual’ garage, namely my living room!” source: family collection 100 manuscript (1949-1950), 314-318. 101 hansa, léto pod jihoslovanským nebem (prague: self-published, 1930), 324. 102 konrád et al., cesty z apokalypsy, 278-296. dorazil, čs. červený kříž 1919-1929, 128-142. 103 hansa, stero črt a obrázků z podkarpatské rusi (prague: self-published, 1935), 530. the slovak historian michal falat is currently conducting research on hansa’s texts about carpathian ruthenia. 104 hansa, podkarpatoruská vánoční idyla (prague: self-published, 1937), 9-13, 43-44, 79-81, 97-108. 30 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 in 1925 hansa outlined the possibility of handing over the fund to the international near east association,105 but at least a substantial portion of the money was never used to help armenian orphans, which may be attributed to hansa’s mismanagement of the fund. the rest of the money in the fund for the victims of the armenian genocide ended up in the hands of the nazis, as a result of the occupation of czechoslovakia by the german army in 1939. the nazis abolished the csrc, confiscated its property and persecuted many of its employees.106 the nazi occupation prevented hansa from travelling and lecturing. after the end of the war, hansa set out in a two-seater open aero car made in 1931107 with his travel lectures to various halls in czechoslovakia. the ageing car and its driver were reminiscent of the period of the first czechoslovak republic and increasingly were out of place in the new post-war period. after the establishment of the communist dictatorship in february 1948, his lecturing activities gradually died down, and although he never stopped writing, none of his books were published. in the last years of his life he lived alone, in relative poverty, in the smíchov, one of prague’s working class districts. karel hansa died on 4 june 1967 at the age of 76.108 his apartment was subsequently robbed, before the arrival of his relatives. hansa’s papers, including the manuscript of his book for peace with word and image, were lost.109 conclusion hansa’s life was filled with contradictions, in numerous ways. his childhood was unstable, but he retained ties to his family, especially to his mother. hansa was a mediocre pupil who became a writer as an adult. he understood children well and knew how to approach them in their world; at the same time, he never married and remained childless. he had ambitions to become a prominent humanitarian, but as he himself noted in 1937, his activities were limited by his humble background: “the poor mortal didn’t have enough money to act with dignity in the role of the heavenly benefactor.”110 hansa’s qualities included purposefulness, diligence and ambition. at the same time, however, he was an unstable personality. on the one hand he was perceptive and sensitive, and on the other he was attention-seeking and petulant. his personality was also shaped by the trauma stemming from his war experiences, which had resulted in his serious disability. despite all the contradictions, wandering from place to place and writing remained the constant in his life. his book horrors of the east became the first work in the czech language systematically to address the armenian genocide and thus the hitherto unnamed phenomenon of modern genocide in general. in particular, hansa’s accounts of the lives of armenian genocide survivors and the activities of the humanitarian workers he met in syria and lebanon in 1922 105 police directorate, hansa’s letter to the directorate, 19 january 1925, 2. 106 manuscript (1949-1950), 334. 107 police directorate, application to the motor vehicle registry, 11 july 1946. 108 cukr, “k dobrodružnému životu karla hansy,” 60-61. 109 interview with jarmila jedlinská, niece of karel hansa, conducted by the authors on 26 may 2019 in české budějovice. manuscript (1949-1950), appendix “poznávejte svět!,” 10. 110 hansa, podkarpatoruská vánoční idyla, 12. 31 karel hansa: the czechoslovak traveller are of significant historical value. hansa brought about the extension of the scholarship program of the czechoslovak ministry of foreign affairs originally intended for russian and ukrainian emigrants to include 50 armenian students. however, his attempt to establish a czechoslovak association in support of deprived armenian orphans ended in failure, mainly due to personal disputes. hansa’s three-year public lecturing activities together with his fundraising efforts were, sadly, far from successful in raising sufficient funds to establish a czechoslovak orphanage in lebanon, as hansa’s was in essence an isolated individual endeavour. hansa’s activities were further complicated by the fact that the czechoslovak public was very poorly informed about the armenian genocide during wwi, due to censorship in austria-hungary. in addition, czechoslovakia lacked any previous connection to the event through missionaries and diplomats, which was crucially important to humanitarian initiatives in the united states and various european countries. modern humanitarianism originated in the west in the shadow of the politics of the great powers, of nationalism and of colonialism as a “weak force”111 in the international arena. hansa’s relationship with modern humanitarianism was formed through his contact with humanitarian workers and their institutions, as well as with armenian genocide survivors. hansa attempted to mediate his experience with these two groups in czechoslovakia. he presented humanitarian workers as a role model from foreign countries that were more developed than semi-peripheral czechoslovakia. in line with the ideology of nationalism, then prevailing in czechoslovakia, he depicted survivors as objects of solidarity between small nations striving for self-determination. hansa’s biography broadens our understanding of how the “weak force” of humanitarianism as a reaction to the catastrophe of the armenian genocide spread on a global scale, and at the same time acquired new meanings and reached its limits. acknowledgement our thanks belong to our colleagues and friends andran abramjan, tigran abramjan, hakob asatryan, ema kovalčíková, jan štemberk and anna sochová who kindly helped us with our research in numerous ways. we would like to thank hansa’s relatives jaroslava vlachová and jarmila jedlinská. we are especially grateful for the friendly guidance and selfless help of haig utidjian. 111 chris gratien (host), keith d. watenpaugh, “the middle east in the making of modern humanitarianism,” ottoman history podcast, no. 238, 8 april 2016, 8:00-9:00. see also watenpaugh, bread from stones, 4-29. watenpaugh defined the term “weak force” in the podcast. he did not use it explicitly in his book on the subject, nevertheless, we find it useful here. 103 ruth amir, twentieth century forcible child transfers. probing the boundaries of the genocide convention, lanham, boulder, new york, london: lexington books 2019, 273 pp. reviewed by edita gzoyan, deputy scientific director, armenian genocide museum-institute foundation children played a somewhat more important role in the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (hereinafter the genocide convention) than appears at first sight: while two genocidal acts mentioned in article ii of the genocide convention explicitly deals with children – article 2 (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and 2 (e) forcibly transferring children to another group, the other articles have a somewhat indirect link with the concept of a child. the protected groups under the genocide convention were distinguished mainly by their biological characteristics,1 so that an individual belonging to the group is not part of it through choice but through procreation.2 in this sense children play a central role in the continuity and viability of the protected groups. the forcible child transfer clause prohibits “transferring children of the group to another group with intent to destroy national, religious, racial and ethnic groups in whole or in part.” 3 the forcible children transfer clause is, however, the only genocidal act that is often justified by perpetrators as stemming from benevolent motives, such as “to benefit the affected children” or “to save” them. but motives behind forcible child transfer are irrelevant in “assessing genocidal culpability,” when forcible child transfer is implemented with the intent to destroy a group.4 meanwhile, the term “forcibly” is not restricted to physical force and may include any act consisting of threats, threats of force, inflicted trauma, or coercion such as those caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression, abuse of power or by taking advantage of a coercive environment which would lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.5 1. only in the case of religious groups, can belonging, in some limited cases, be through choice. 2. kurt mundorff, “other peoples’ children: a textual and contextual interpretation of the genocide convention, article 2(e),” harvard international law journal 50, no. 1 (2009): 89-90. 3. convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, at https://www.ohchr.org/ en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx 4. ibid, also keith david watenpaugh, “are there any children for sale?”: genocide and the transfer of armenian children (1915–1922), journal of human rights 12, no. 3 (2013): 289. 5. the prosecutor vs. georges anderson nderubumwe rutaganda case no. ictr-96-3-t, para. 55; prosecutor v. akayesu, case ictr-96-4-t, international criminal tribunal for rwanda, september 2, 1998, para. 509. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crimeofgenocide.aspx 104 two massive programs of forced removal of children were implemented during the armenian genocide of world war i and the holocaust during ii world war with the former being considered as classical case of a genocidal forcible child transfer. forcible transfer of armenian children and their assimilation into the turkish society was a structural component of the ottoman genocidal policy and was one of the methods used for the destruction of the armenians during the armenian genocide. during the death marches, vast numbers of armenian children (also young women) were forcibly transferred and incorporated into the enemy group.6 a similar policy was implemented during wwii when “racially valuable” children, mainly polish, were forcibly removed from the occupied eastern lands to germany for germanization.7 according to a well-designed plan nearly 200,000 racially valuable children were transferred to special institutions, orphanages or german families. other wide scale child removal programs were connected with colonization and further westernization or “education” of indigenous children. starting from the mid nineteenth century in australia, canada and the united states, indigenous children were transferred from their groups for acculturation.8 during 1920-1970s the swiss government removed roma children for the same purpose.9 starting from 1920s a policy of russification of indigenous siberian children was carried out by removing and placing them in distant schools of the soviet union.10 despite being an old phenomenon with many examples in history, forcible child transfer has only recently gained considerable scholarly attention.11 6. see for example watenpaugh, “are there any children for sale?”: 283-295; lerna ekmekçioğlu, recovering armenia. the limits of belonging in post-genocide turkey (stanford, california: stanford university press, 2016); uğur ümit üngör, “orphans, converts and prostitutes: social consequences of war and persecution in the ottoman empire, 1914-1923,” war in history 19, no. 2 (2012): 173-192. 7. for more on this see the international military tribunal, trials of war criminals, selected and prepared by the united nations war crimes commission, volume xiii, (london: his majesty’s stationery office, 1949); trial of ulrich greifelt and others, united states military tribunal, nuremberg, 10th october, 1947 – 10th march, 1948; international military tribunal, trials of war criminals before the nuremberg military tribunals under control; council law no. 10, nuremberg, october 1946 – april 1949, vol. 4 (washington dc: united states government printing office, 1949), 674-687. 8. ruth amir, “killing them softly: forcible transfers of indigenous children,” genocide studies and prevention: an international journal 9, no. 2 (2015): 41-60. also see margaret jacobs, a generation removed: the fostering and adoption of indigenous children in the postwar world (lincoln: university of nebraska press, 2014); margaret jacobs, white mother to a dark race: settler colonialism, maternalism, and the removal of indigenous children in the american west and australia, 1880-1940 (lincoln: university of nebraska press, 2009). 9. mundorff, “other peoples’ children,” 64. 10. nikolai vakhtin, native peoples of the russian far north (minority rights group, 1992), 36. 11. the first major contribution in this direction is the work of kurt mundorff, “other peoples’ children: a textual and contextual interpretation of the genocide convention, article 2(e),” harvard international law journal 50, no. 1 (2009): 61-127; some separate aspects of the issue were addressed by tara zahra, the lost children: reconstructing europe’s families after world war ii (cambridge, massachusetts, and london: harvard university press, 2011); sonja c. grover, child soldier victims of genocidal forcible transfer: exonerating child soldiers charged with grave conflict-related international crimes (berlin: springer publishing, 2012); sonja c. grover, humanity’s children: icc jurisprudence and the failure to address the genocidal forcible transfer of children (berlin: springer publishing, 2012); sonja c. http://history.mit.edu/people/lerna-ekmekcioglu https://www.google.am/search?hl=ru&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22sonja+c.+grover%22 https://www.google.am/search?hl=ru&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22sonja+c.+grover%22 https://www.google.am/search?hl=ru&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22sonja+c.+grover%22 105 ruth amir’s book is a major attempt at bringing the issue of forcible child transfer to the reader by presenting a detailed analysis of the legal history of the forcible child transfer clause within the context of genocide. by referring to different historical examples, the author argues that recognition should be granted to children of any identifiable group that have been forcibly transferred, as a fifth protected group under the genocide convention, by adding a special protocol to it. the book consists of a detailed introduction, three parts (six chapters, including a conclusion), as well as a bibliography and an index. in the introduction amir presents the forcible transfers of children from one group to another as an old phenomenon that developed with modernity. she views a blood tax, devshirme, in the ottoman empire as an early example of forcible child transfer (14th – 17th centuries).12 she also points out that children were also removed for religious purposes in the 15th century, for filling the shortage of slaves, the westernization programs starting at the end of the 19th century, etc. amir examines certain 20th century forcible child transfer programs aimed at children with a particular collective identity, such as “nationality, political affiliation, economic class or ethnicity.” among these she mentions the removal of armenian children to turkish homes and institutions during the armenian genocide, stalin’s mass-deportations of women and children from the baltic states, and hitler’s germanization of polish children. some other examples of forcible child transfer brought by the author relates to political conflicts in cuba,13 spain,14 argentina,15 israel,16 and belgium.17 part 1 of the book provides a detailed legal analysis of the crime of genocide by paying a considerable attention to the notion of groupism as “a major constitutive element of genocide.” the whole legal analysis is paralleled with raphael lemkin’s broader notion of genocide and the intentions of the people drafting the genocide convention. in chapter 2 of part 1 amir concentrates on the legal analysis of the forcible transfer clause assessing it as protecting “children as a subgroup of a protected group.” in this part of the book the author argues for granting protection to children of any identifiable group as the fifth protected group under the genocide convention. her argument is based on four pillars. first, children are recognized as a special protected group by national and international grover, “child soldiers as victims of ‘genocidal forcible transfer’: darfur and syria as case examples,” the international journal of human rights 17, no.3 (2013): 411–427; robert van krieken, “rethinking cultural genocide: aboriginal child removal and settler-colonial state formation,” oceania 75, no. 2 (2004): 125-151; jonas nilsson, “the vŭckovi´c trial in kosovo – deportation and forcible transfer under the definition of genocide,” nordic journal of international law 71 (2002): 545–555. 12. young christian boys were kidnapped, converted to islam and raised as muslims, being trained for military or civil service and later involved in the janissary military corps. 13. operation peter pan, when during 1960-62 over 14,000 unaccompanied cuban children were moved to the us with a support of the us government against fidel castro’s regime. 14. forcible transfer of children of republican families during and after the spanish civil war by franco regime. 15. forcible transfer of children of political dissidents. 16. forcible transfer of immigrant yemeni jewish children and their re-education. 17. children born to congolese and belgian parents who were reclaimed by belgium after decolonization. https://www.google.am/search?hl=ru&tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=inauthor:%22sonja+c.+grover%22 106 law. second, a child’s right is a peremptory norm in international humanitarian and human rights law, as the 1989 convention on the rights of the child is the most rapidly and widely ratified human rights treaty.18 third, the genocide convention recognizes the invaluable contribution of the protected groups to humanity. finally, the forcible child transfer clause recognizes the child not only in her/his individual capacity, but as a member of a family and a group. each of the following three chapters in part two deals with case studies of forcible child transfer, enquiring whether these historical cases could be framed as genocide within the framework of the genocide convention. all case study chapters in the book provide a detailed historical background of these cases, the dominant ideology of the perpetrator group followed by their intent to destroy the group. the final sections of these chapters deal with forcible child transfer. here the author omits a mention of transfer cases that took place during the armenian and jewish genocides and starts with the phase of european colonialism and the forced removal of aboriginal children in australia, canada, and usa. in this section amir highlights the difficulty in defining indigenous people fitting into the category of protected groups under the genocide convention. the forcible transfer of aboriginal children was viewed in the context of “the nineteenth century mega-narrative of progress,” which became a political doctrine in the three discussed countries. the forcible removal of indigenous children from their tribal communities to boarding schools and their adoption by foster families was the essence of socialization or westernization that resulted in the eradication of tribal identity and culture. the author concludes that the concepts of civilization and assimilation are sometimes blurred as if they are synonyms. while seriously presenting the philosophy, political doctrine, and the intent of the forcible transfer of indigenous children, the author has a difficulty in putting the indigenous communities under the protected groups of the genocide convention, which is somewhat debatable. the next case studied in the book is that of jewish immigrant children moved to israel from yemen after the 1948 declaration of israeli independence. at least 1,500 babies and young children were forcibly removed from their families by the jewish agency for israel as part of its activities to absorb immigrants.19 drawing similarities with indigenous boarding schools and methods, amir highlights the east-west divide between european and non-european jews and the zionist movement. from the first day of immigration yemeni jews were singled out as primitive and uncivilized and the need for their civilization and re-education was put forward by the ben gurion government. here amir stresses the 18. dr. amir also details some rights listed in the convention on the rights of the child related to the issue, mainly the child’s right to be free of discrimination of any kind based on his or her parents’ or legal guardian’s race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status (§ 2), to identity (§ 7), to grow up in a family environment, to be cared for by his/her parents and not to be separated from his/her parents against their will (except under specified conditions, § 9). 19. according to the book this number may be up to 10,000 children. 107 doctrine of the centrality and superiority of the state over an individual. however, by trying to draw a line between assimilation and genocide, the author asserts that the methods used for assimilation in this case were much harsher and more violent. here again she points to the difficulty in viewing yemeni jews as a separate group and casts doubt on the genocidal intent of the israeli government. the last case study in the book deals with the spanish civil war and the forced removal of children of republicans’ parents until the 1950s.20 here, together with persecutions and murders, thousands of children of imprisoned republicans were forcibly transferred. the author argues that when targeting republicans, ethnic, national, racial/biological terminology was used to enhance political and ideological rivalry, thus making it difficult to ascertain that the republicans were only a political group. in this section amir stresses the existence of genocidal intent and the devastating effect of excluding political groups from the genocide convention. chapter six concentrates on the discussion of the exclusion of political groups from the genocide convention and the debates among the scholars and international criminal tribunals on the issue by also referring to lemkin’s notion of protected groups. the chapter then analyzes from a comparatively perspective operation peter pan in cuba and the spanish case of transfer of republican children to illustrate the differences between genocidal and non-genocidal forcible child transfer within the framework of political conflicts. the conclusion summarizes the historical cases and discusses the recognition of children as a fifth protected group under the genocide convention. by singling out some modern ways of forcible child transfer such as recruiting child soldiers, forced marriages and forced impregnation, children born out of genocidal rape, sex slaves and domestic workers, amir highlights the new ways genocide can affect children. mentioning the ambiguity in the definition of groups protected under the genocide convention, the author rightly points out that it cannot be reasonably resolved by only legal interpretation, thus offering to add a protocol to the genocide convention. amir’s work is very valuable in bringing forcible child transfer cases to our attention; a once enigmatic concept is shown here under a new light. the book has crucial in that is also presents the complex nature of defining a group whereby some genocidal forcible child transfer cases fall outside the scope of the crime of genocide. 20. the republicans and the nationalists were the two sides of the spanish civil war (1936-1939). 6 dr. robert tatoyan is a senior researcher at the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, yerevan, armenia. his research interests include the issues of demography of the armenian population in the ottoman empire on the eve of the armenian genocide, particularly the analysis of statistical sources for that period. he has authored numerous publications on the subject including the monograph “the question of western armenian population number in 1878-1914,” (in armenian) published in 2015 (for the complete list of publications visit: https://independent.academia.edu/roberttatoyan). email: r.tatoyan@genocide-museum.am 7 the issues of the number of western armenians and ethnic composition of the population of western armenia at paris peace conference (1919-1920) dr. robert tatoyan armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, armenia references to the issues of the number of western armenians and the ratio of armenians to other ethnic groups in western armenia on the eve of the armenian genocide occupy a special place in the context of processes related to drafting a peace agreement with the ottoman empire and armenia’s delineation after wwi. these issues were tackled by diverse armenian offi cial and non-offi cial organizations struggling for the formation of an integral armenian state, as well as turkish authorities manipulating, inter alia, also demographic arguments against the armenian claim for western armenia1 and the entente powers (particularly the united states of america and great britain) needing statistical data for deciding the fate of the ottoman empire. in the post-war processes the long-distance controversy of the armenian and turkish sides over the issues in question can be fi guratively characterized as one of the stages -“battles” of the “statistical war” that emerged after 1878, i.e. following the entry of the armenian question into the international diplomatic agenda. this article aims to present and analyse the statistics on the number of western armenians and the ratio of armenians in western armenia to other ethnic groups on the eve of the armenian genocide presented by armenian and turkish delegations at paris peace conference, as well as data circulated by the us and british diplomacy. it will try to explain the connection between the delineation of armenia and the number of western armenians, the demographic composition of western armenia on the eve of the armenian genocide. the calculations of the number of western armenians have had a certain effect on deliberations around demarcation of the border between the republic of armenia and the ottoman empire in the context of post-war world regulation. keywords: statistics, western armenians’ population fi gure, demography of the ottoman empire, paris peace conference, armenian question, armenian genocide. the article was submitted on 23.10.2020 and accepted for publication on 08.02.2021. this is an extended version of the author’s article published in armenian. how to cite: robert tatoyan, “the issues of the number of western armenians and ethnic composition of the population of western armenia at paris peace conference (1919-1920),” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 1 (2021): 7-31. 1 hereinafter, in the frameworks of this article, we generally refer the concept of “western armenia” to the territory of the ottoman empire, theoretically claimed by the armenian diplomacy after wwi, namely the vilayets of sivas (sebastia), erzeroum, van, bitlis (baghesh), diarbekir and kharput (kharberd, mamuret-ul-aziz), cilicia (adana, djebel-bereket and kozan (sis) sanjaks of adana vilayet, marash sanjak of aleppo vilayet) and the eastern section of trebizond vilayet. 8 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0015 principles of post-war world regulations after wwi on 30 october 1918, the armistice concluded between the ottoman empire and, on behalf of entente, the great britain representatives in mudros harbour on the greek island of lemnos put an end to the participation of the ottoman empire in wwi. the afterlife of the country was to be decided at the peace conference convened in paris on 18 january 1919. in this regard, the armenian question reappeared on the active agenda of international diplomacy, in the given period specifi cally expressed in the form of inclusion of western armenian territories in the integral armenian state and demarcation of armenia’s western borders correspondingly. as far back as on 8 january 1918 the us president woodrow wilson addressing the joint session of the us congress and the senate presented the principles whereon the post-war regulation of the world should be based. they went down in history as “fourteen points.” of those points the twelfth particularly referred to the ottoman empire: “the turkish portions of the present ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely an unmolested opportunity of autonomous development…”2 as the guiding principle relating to the sovereignty over territories of the ottoman empire including those of western armenia was declared the right to “autonomous development” of the peoples living there, i.e. the right of nations to self-determination. this principle was highlighted and elaborated in wilson’s new speech delivered before the us congress and senate on 11 february 1918 the main provisions of which were: “…peoples… are not to be bartered about from one sovereignty to another...,” “...every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest of and for the benefi t of the populations concerned…,” “...all well-defi ned national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction...without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism…”3 the us delegation to the peace conference managed to make the entente allies see the above principles or “wilson’s doctrine” as a base for negotiations, including, also, with regard to the partition of the ottoman empire and demarcation of armenia’s western boundaries.4 this was specifi cally expressed in the joint statement adopted by the governments of france and great britain on 9 november 1918, which particularly read: “the object aimed at by france and great britain in prosecuting in the east the war …is the complete and defi nite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.”5 based on this, the issues of the number of armenians in western armenian districts and their ratio to muslim – turkish and kurdish – population on the eve of the armenian geno2 paul c. helmreich, from paris to sèvres: the partition of the ottoman empire at the peace conference of 1919-1920 (columbus: ohio state university press, 1974), 8. 3 ibid. 4 levon shirinyan, «վիլսոնյան նախագիծը և թուրքիան» [the project of wilson and turkey], 21-st century 4 (2008): 100. 5 united states department of state, papers relating to the foreign relations of the united states, the paris peace conference, 1919, volume v (u.s. government printing offi ce, 1946), 3. 9 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians cide gained importance and were referred to in the context of negotiation of the conditions of peace with the ottoman empire. at the same time, it should be noted that though important, the demographic factor was not key in deciding the fate of the ottoman empire. in tackling the issue of sovereignty over the territories of the ottoman empire, including those of armenians, the entente powers adopted as a guiding principle not only the existing demographic situation in those territories and the right of “nations to self-determination,” but also malfeasances committed by turkey against its subject peoples, and in case of armenia, the “terrible massacres.” in particular, a memorandum prepared by the british foreign offi ce (circulated on 21 november 1918) read: it would be expedient to extend the area of armenia as widely as possible, so as to include all territories north of the boundary in which there is mixed population of turks, armenians and kurds…the principle of equality for all elements in the population is not disputed. on the other hand, in settling the proportional claims of these various elements to a voice in the government of the country, it should be laid down in armenia that the dead and exiles should be taken into account, and armenian immigrants from other parts of the world into armenia should be given the same facilities as jewish immigrants into palestine for settling down in their ancestral home.6 the principle of substantiation of the right of the armenians to the territory of western armenia with the fact of the crimes committed by the turkish authorities was recapitulated in clause 2 of the resolution adopted during the 30 january 1919 session of the council of ten7 within the framework of the paris peace conference: “…because of the historical misgovernment by the turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of armenians and others in recent years, the allied and associated powers are agreed that armenia, syria, mesopotamia, palestine and arabia must be completely severed from the turkish empire...”8 the issue of the number of western armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide in the post-war memoranda of the armenian delegation the armenian delegation to the paris peace conference, putting forward territorial claims to western armenia, fi rst of all substantiated them with the sacrifi ces made by the arme6 richard g. hovannisian, the republic of armenia, vol. 1: the first year, 1918-1919 (berkley and los angeles: university of california press, 1971), 267. 7 the council of ten (known also as the supreme council) was composed of two representatives from the fi ve victorious allied powers each (great britain, france, usa, italy, japan). 8 united states department of state, papers relating to the foreign relations of the united states, the paris peace conference, 1919, vol. iii (u.s. government printing offi ce, 1943), 795. here, it should be noted that other states, who fought within the entente, also perceived the subordination of the wilsonian principles relative to the armenian question. thus, during the presentation of the greek case before the paris peace conference on 3 and 4 february 1919, the prime minister of greece eleutherios venizelos, reaffi rming his support for armenians, stated that the turkish settlement must allow for a “broad and generous interpretation” of the wilsonian principles, for it would otherwise be impossible to resolve the armenian question and “…so put a stop to the sufferings of those people who had lost through massacres over one million people during the course of the war.” hovannissian, republic of armenia, 273. 10 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 nian people for the victory of the entente powers, the facts of armenian moral and military support to the allies.9 but concurrently, as the wilsonian principle of “self-determination of nations” was at the heart of the conference work, the armenian side could not but bring up the matter of the number of the armenian population of western armenia and its ratio to other ethnic groups on the eve of the armenian genocide. this was particularly referred to in a large number of memoranda and reports brought to the attention of the paris peace conference in defence of the idea of creation of an integral armenian state by the armenian representatives.10 the fi rst and perhaps the most important of the mentioned documents is the memorandum entitled “the armenian question before the peace conference”11 and presented by the leaders of the armenian delegation poghos nubar and avetis aharonian to the session of the supreme council of the paris peace conference on 26 february 1919.12 the beginning of the memorandum reads as follows: “on the fi elds of battle, through massacre and deportation, armenia has proportionately paid in this war a heavier tribute to death than any other belligerent nation. …her sufferings would have suffi ced to justify her claim to independence, but…she has other meritorious claims of historical, ethnical, political and moral order…which are no less important.”13 the “ethnical” rights of the armenians are rendered in the section of the memorandum entitled “integral armenia” and particularly in the annexes entirely dedicated to the number of the armenian population of western and eastern14 armenia, their ratio to other ethnicities/nationalities before and after the great war. the authors of the memorandum stated that in examining the issue of the population of armenia they would take into account the statistics before wwi or still earlier, before the hamidian massacres in 1894-1896, as those killings not only took the life of 300,000 arme9 both during and after wwi the leaders of the entente powers were making many promises to the armenians, assuring them that the armenian question will get a fair resolution. samples of pro-armenian statements, in particular, are collected in vahan cardashian, the american committee opposed to the lausanne treaty, the lausanne treaty, turkey and armenia (new york, 1926), 193-199; also a memorandum on the armenian question presented to the council of foreign ministers march 7, 1947 (new york: armenian national council of america, 1947), 11-14. 10 for the list of memoranda and records presented by the armenian delegation to the peace conference see a catalogue of paris peace conference delegation propaganda in the hoover war library (stanford: stanford university press, 1926), 7, 19-22. 11 for the original in french see la question armenienne devant la conférence de la paix (paris: dupont, 1919). the memorandum was translated and published into armenian (both western and eastern) and english: the armenian question before the peace conference. a memorandum presented offi cially by the representatives of armenia to the peace conference at versailles on february 26th, 1919 (new york: press bureau, 1919). armenian historiography focused on territorial claims contained in memorandum without detailed analysis of the statistical data (samvel poghosyan, «փարիզի վեհաժողովի հայկական հուշագիրը և նրա հետագա ճակատագիրը» [armenian memorandum of the paris conference and its afterlife], the issues of the history and historiography of the armenian genocide 6 (2002):119-129; hovannissian, republic of armenia, 277-283; galust galoyan, հայաստանը և մեծ տերությունները, 1917-1923 [armenia and the great powers, 1917-1923] (yerevan: gitutyun, 1999), 102-103). 12 for the minutes of the session see: united states department of state, papers relating to the foreign relations of the united states, the paris peace conference, 1919, vol. iv (u.s. government printing offi ce, 1943), 138-157. 13 the armenian question before the peace conference, 4. 14 historical armenian territory under the rule of the former russian empire. 11 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians nians but also caused the migration of a considerable portion of the population. “the turks’ hideous deeds, which purposed to secure numerical superiority for the moslem elements, must not be allowed to attain their end. the voice of all the armenians, dead or alive, must be heard (bold face in the original r.t.).”15 the authors of the memorandum acknowledged that on the eve of the armenian genocide the armenians did not constitute the absolute majority over the “plurality of population” in western armenia, but they had a number superior to each of the muslim nationalities taken separately: “notwithstanding emigrations and massacres, before the outbreak of the great war, the armenians in the six vilayets, in the vilayet of trebizond and cilicia had a number superior to those of the turks and the kurds taken separately, and their number was equal to those of the turks and kurds combined. in 1914, there were in armenia 1,403,000 armenians, against 943,000 turks and 482,000 kurds,” said the memorandum.16 it should be noted, that this statement of the authors of the memorandum should be accepted with some reservation: armenian organizations pursuing the solution of the armenian question themselves have repeatedly been stating that the armenians constituted the minority in the vilayet of trebizond, as well as some peripheral regions/districts of the six vilayets (southern regions of hakkiari, sgherd, diarbekir and malatya districts and western and north-western regions of sivas (sebastia) vilayet, adding that those regions were annexed to the core armenian-populated territories by the ottoman authorities artifi cially to reduce the share of the armenians.17 in the section of memorandum, entitled “the population of armenia,” the authors put forward the following question: “what was the number of the population of armenia prior to the massacres [i.e. the armenian genocide r.t.] and what were the proportions among the various elements?” immediately afterwards it was stated that one should never give “the slightest attention” to the turkish data on these subjects, for the ottoman government had always falsifi ed the statistics to prove that the armenians constituted a mere insignifi cant minority.18 in justifi cation of the above statement, the authors were bringing some interesting instances of “falsifi cations” as follows: 1. according to the ottoman statistics, the number of the armenian population in the vilayet of van was around 80,000, while over 220,000 armenians from van had found refuge in russia during the great war. 2. in the entire sanjak of marash, according to the turkish government’s data, lived 4,200 armenians,19 whereas according to the french geographer and traveller elisee 15 ibid, 7. 16 ibid. 17 see particularly the armenian reform plan with its justifi cations presented to the attention of the great powers by the patriarchate of constantinople on reopening of the armenian question in 1912. national archives of armenia, fund 57, inventory 5, dossier 15, 110-118. 18 the armenian question before the peace conference, 21. 19 this fi gure is taken from the french statistician vital cuinet’s “asiatic turkey” book published in 1891, according to which the number of the armenians in marash province was 4,313 (vital cuinet, la turquie d’ asie, v. 2 (paris: ernest leroux, 1891), 227). it should be noted, that presenting cuinet’s data as those of the ottoman government by the authors of the memorandum cannot be viewed as a mistake, as cuinet has taken the offi cial ottoman data as the basis for his statistics. besides, there were no other offi cial data on the number of the western armenians circulated by the ottoman government at the time of writing the memorandum (february 1919). 12 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 reclus, there were over 20,000 armenians in the city of marash alone. and zeitun included in the composition of the same sanjak of marash had 27,640 armenians as per the statistics of the year of 1880. 3. the ottoman government counted a total of 848,000 armenians in the vilayets of van, bitlis, diarbekir, kharput, erzeroum, trebizond, sivas, adana and aleppo,20 whereas according to the data published by the american committee for armenian and syrian relief operating in the usa in 1916 around 600,000-850,000 armenians were killed in armenia, the number of armenians deported was 486,000, the number of armenians deported to the interior of asia minor was 300,000, the number of those who have found refuge in the caucasus was 200,000.21 then the authors of the memorandum presented the two main elements of the system introduced by the turkish government to distort the statistics on the number of western armenians: 1. reducing as much as possible the number of the christians (including as well the armenians) without materially modifying the number of total population and adding the difference to the number of the muslims; 2. avoiding to give the exact number of the nationalities, instead grouping them by religions offering separate fi gures for the orthodox, protestant and catholic armenians while uniting the muslims under one fi gure (turks, tartars, turkomans, various kurdish tribes, circassians, zazas, arabs, persians, etc.), though “they are totally different from them [turks] by race, their history, mode of living, degree of culture and particularly political bent.”22 in support of the arguments of the armenian side presented in the memorandum, there were fi ve statistical tables inserted in the annex. purely related to the number of western armenians were the two of them: “table №1: index of the population of the six [western armenian] vilayets in 1912” and “table №2: population of the seven vilayets and of cilicia in 1914.” analysis of the data contained in those tables shows that they are based on the data23 of the security committee established affi liated to the armenian patriarchate already at the end of 1912 in connection with the reopening of the armenian question: particularly the fi rst table (see table 1) was taken from the reform plan prepared by the security committee without alteration. the ottoman government released the offi cial ottoman statistical data for 1914 much later, on 14 april 1919 (meir zamir, “population statistics of the ottoman empire in 1914 and 1919,” middle eastern studies 17, no. 1 (1981): 88). according to those data in 1914 the number of the armenian population in the sanjak of marash was 38,433 (again lower than the real fi gure) (kemal karpat, ottoman population, 1830-1914: demographic and social characteristics (madison, wisconsin: university of wisconsin press, 1985), 188; see also zamir, “population statistics of the ottoman empire,” 100). 20 the source of these data is also cuinet’s “asiatic turkey” book. 21 the armenian question before the peace conference, 21. 22 ibid. 23 for security committee activity see in detail: robert tatoyan, արևմտահայության թվաքանակի հարցը 1878-1914 թվականներին [the question of the number of the western armenians in 1878-1914] (yerevan: agmi, 2015), 92-94. 13 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians table 1. index of the population of the six vilayets in 191224 erzeroum van bitlis kharput diarbekir sivas total per religion moslems 1,178,000 turks 240,000 47,000 40,000 102,000 45,000 192,000 666,000 circassians 7,000 10,000 45,000 62,000 persians 13,000 13,000 lazes 10,000 10,000 gypsies 3,000 3,000 kurds sedentary 35,000 32,000 35,000 75,000 30,000 35,000 242,000 --nomadic 40,000 40,000 42,000 20,000 25,000 15,000 182,000 christians 1,183,000 armenians 215,000 185,000 180,000 168,000 105,000 165,000 1,018,000 nestorians jacobites chaldeans 18,000 15,000 5,000 60,000 25,000 123,000 greeks 12,000 30,000 42,000 other religions 254,000kizilbashis 25,000 8,000 80,000 27,000 140,000 zaza tchareklis 30,000 47,000 77,000 yezidis 3,000 25,000 5,000 4,000 37,000 630,000 350,000 382,000 450,000 296,000 507,000 grand total 2,615,000 much interesting is the second table of the memorandum entitled “population of the seven vilayets25 and of cilicia in 1914,” most probably prepared by the authors of the annexes to the memorandum themselves (see table 2). for the fi rst time the 2,026,000 fi gure standing for the total number of the armenian population of the ottoman empire as of 1914 was put into circulation (see table 2).26 previously the 1912 statistical data of the armenian patriarchate of constantinople were used by the renowned western armenian fi gure grigor zohrap under the pseudonym marcel leart in his work “the armenian question in the light of documents” published in 1913 in french.27 as calculated by zohrap, there were 2,100,000 armenians living in the entire ottoman empire in 1912.28 24 exclusive of the regions of hakkiari, those situate to the south of seghert, of diarbekir, of malatia, to the west and north-west of sivas. 25 the six vilayets of western armenia completely, plus the sanjak of trebizond of the trebizond vilayet. 26 the statistics in its complete form, including data for all administrative (vilayet) units of the ottoman empire, was published in teodik’s yearbook. teodik, ամէնուն տարեցոյցը, ժզ տարի, 1922 [everyone’s almanac] (constantinople, 1921), 261-263. 27 see leart marcel, la question armenienne a la lumiere des documents (paris: challamel, 1913). 28 ibid, 62. in zohrap’s book the fi gure for the armenian population of the six vilayets of western armenia 14 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 table 2. population of the seven vilayets and of cilicia in 1914 the 7 vilayets exclusive of the regions situated to the south of the tigris and to the west of yeshil-irmak cilicia sanjaks of adana, of marash, of kozan and of djebel-bereket29 total armenians 1,198,000 205,000 1,403,000 1,850,000 christians greeks 242,000 40,000 282,000 nestorians jacobites, chaldeans and europeans 124,000 41,000 165,000 turks and turkmens 865,000 78,000 943,000 1,635,000 mussulmans kurds 424,000 58,000 482,000 lazez, circassians, arabs, persians 190,000 20,000 210,000 kizilbashis, yezidis, fellahs, etc 255,000 48,000 303,000 303,000 diverse religions 3,298,000 490,000 3,788,000 total armenian population in turkey in 1914 in turkish armenia30 ..................................... 1,403,000 in other parts of asiatic turkey ..................................... 440,000 in constantinople and european turkey ..................................... 183,000 total 2,026,000 armenians is the same 1,163,000 people, then for the rest of the ottoman empire it says 937,000 armenians, of which 407,000 in cilicia, 530,000 in other regions of the ottoman empire and european turkey. for comparison: the version of 1912 statistics of the armenian patriarchate of constantinople published in teodik’s almanac for the same regions gives the fi gure of 863,700 armenians, including 304,000 armenians in cilicia (adana and aleppo vilayets). apparently, the decrease in the number of the armenian population from 2,100,000 to 2,026,000 in 1914 compared to the year of 1912 is explained by the territorial losses of the ottoman empire due to the balkan wars in 1912-1913, while in case of cilicia, by the divergence of the ottoman administrative and armenian diocesan division (under the jurisdiction of the armenian catholicosate of cilicia were territories outside the core historical and geographic areas of cilicia in the territories of the vilayets of angora, sebastia and kharput the number of the armenian population of which zohrap had calculated in the total number of the population of cilicia). 29 the authors of the memorandum included in cilicia the following ottoman administrative units: entire adana vilayet, the sanjak of marash (marash, zeitun, furnuz) and the district of alexandrette of the sanjak of aleppo of the aleppo vilayet. 30 six armenian vilayets, the province of trebizond and the sanjaks of cilicia, adana, marash, kozan and djebel-bereket. 15 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians in other memoranda and reports published by the armenian delegation on various occasions later the statistical data and tables on the number of the western armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide were essentially the reprints of the data of the memorandum of 12 february 1919.31 the armenian patriarchate of constantinople was also engaged in the collection and recapitulation of various evidence including statistical data on the status of the western armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide concurrently and collaboratively with armenian national delegation. in november-december of 1918, the national league and then national consultative council organizations were created with participation of the armenian intellectuals and former members of the national assembly of armenians in constantinople, counting among their members yeghishe archbishop durian, professor abraham ter-hakobian, dr. vahram torgomian and others.32 the documents committee of the national consultative council was also performing efforts to collect data on the number of the western armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide. a portion of the materials collected was published in 1919 by constantinople armenian intellectual fi gures chituni (tigran chitchian)33 and gevorg mesrop (gevorg ter-mesropian).34 in august 1919 the armenian patriarchate of constantinople established an information 31 see particularly tableau approximatif des réparations et indemnités pour les dommages subis par la nation arménienne en arménie de turquie et dans la république arménienne du caucase (paris, 1919) (presented to the paris peace conference on 6 april 1919), population armenienne de la turquie avant la guerre. statisitques etablies par le patriarcat armenienne de costantinople (paris: turabian, 1920), poghos nubar, the pre-war population of cilicia (paris, 1920), records prepared by the armenian delegation for the london conference on 12-24 february 1920 (national archives of armenia, fund 430, inventory 1, dossier 1325, 1-56), l’armenie et la question armenienne avant, pedant et depuis la guerre (paris, 1922), the memorandum presented by the armenian delegation to the lausanne conference in 1923 (national archives of armenia, fund 430, inventory 1, dossier 1358, 3-32). along with the abovementioned memoranda and reports/statements, the armenian delegation in 1918-19 published and presented to the delegations of the entente powers 23 fascicles of armenian and foreign authors relating to various aspects of the armenian question, in some of which there was a reference to the number of the western armenians (for the list of the fascicles see national archives of armenia, fund 430, inventory 1, dossier 167, 9-10). it is noteworthy that a statesman of the fi rst republic of armenia alexander khatisian in his book reported that in one of the writings presented by the all armenian delegation to the delegates of the lausanne conference in 1923 the number of the armenian population of the ottoman empire on the eve of the armenian genocide was given 2,250,000. alexander khatisian, «հայաստանի հանրապետութեան ծագումն ու զարգացումը», [emergence and development of the republic of armenia] (beirut: hamazgayin, 1968), 365. we believe that this fi gure is closer to reality, however, unfortunately khatisian did not mention any other detail in connection with it (the source of the fi gure, distribution by provinces, etc.). also, this fi gure has not been quoted in the memoranda presented to the lausanne conference by the armenian delegation. during our searches in the fund of the all armenian delegation of the national archives of armenia (national archives of armenia, fund 430) we could not fi nd any document relating to the fi gure mentioned by khatisian. 32 hacob siruni, ինքնակենսագրական նօթեր [autobiographical notes] (yerevan: sargis khachents, 2006), 206-207։ 33 chituni, հուշիկք հայաստանի [memories of armenia] (constantinople, 1919); chituni, աս ու լիս հայաստանի [conversation about armenia] (constantinople, 1920). chituni, comparing several statistical sources, was probably the fi rst among armenian researchers to come to the conclusion that prior to 1915 the number of the armenian population of the ottoman empire comprised around 2,500,000, of which 200,000 – in european turkey, 800,000 – in asia minor and palestinian and mesopotamian vilayets, and 1,500,000 – in the six armenian-populated vilayets and cilicia. 34 gevork mesrop, հայաստան: աշխարհագրական, պատմական, ցեղագրական, վիճակագրական եւ մշակութային տեսակէտներով: իւրացուած ազգ. խորհրդակց. ժողովի «փաստաթուղթերու յանձնախումբ» էն [armenia. from the point of view of geography, history, ethnology, statistics, and culture] (constantinople, 1919). 16 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 bureau, the coordination of the work of which was entrusted to well-known armenian intellectual fi gure arshak alpoyachian.35 according to the charter of the information bureau, it was to host “old and new, all types of statistics on armenia and the armenian cause… all episodes and stories about armenian persecutions, massacres, deportation, statistical images of stolen national and individual movable and immovable property…”36 the report prepared by the information bureau on 29 june 1920 stated that the agency “has initiated preparation of a collection, which will illustrate the real state of the dioceses of the patriarchate at the dawn of the [first world] war, that is the number of churches, monasteries, schools, national properties and population of each primacy.”37 the documentation collection and repository section of the report said that the bureau “…collects and arranges… all benefi cial documents about armenian social and political life. hence, over 600 reports, statistics, etc. published by armenian societies or offi cial bodies.” in the same year of 1919, teodik, a western armenian intellectual, while collecting materials about the clergy killed during the armenian genocide was searching the archives of the patriarchate and came across sacks of papers in the basements. those were the statistical questionnaires the armenian dioceses of the ottoman empire completed and sent to the patriarchate, as instructed, on the eve of the great war, hidden in the basement immediately after the 24 april 1915 arrests along with other documents related to the armenian question.38 the data extracted from those questionnaires were partially put into circulation by teodik in his book “the calvary of armenian clergy and its flock in catastrophic year of 1915” published in 1921. these statistics were passed on to the information bureau and forwarded to the armenian national delegation in paris later.39 meanwhile the present and former ottoman offi cials were trying to contradict the memorandum presented by the armenian national delegation and particularly the statistical data contained therein. thus, to “prove” the invalidity of the statistical data presented by the armenian delegation and allege that the armenians were a minority in western armenia, reşit safvet atabinen, a former young turk state offi cial who took refuge in switzerland, in his booklet entitled “turks and armenians in the face of history. new russian and turkish testimonies about armenian atrocities. refutation of armenian delegation’s memorandum” published in may 1919 (under the pen name kara schemsi) 40 resorted to a device that later was used by the offi cial turkish historiography multiple times, i.e. to show that 35 zaven patriarch, պատրիարքական յուշերս. վավերագրեր եւ վկայություններ [patriarchal memoirs. documents and testimonies] (cairo, 2014), 367. 36 ibid., 368. 37 ibid., 369. 38 teodik, գողգոթա հայ հոգեւորականութեան եւ իր հօտին 1915 աղետալի տարին [the calvary of armenian clergy and its flock in catastrophic year of 1915] (new york, 1985), iii. 39 currently the armenian patriarchate’s 1913-14 census questionnaires are kept in nubarian library in paris. they were widely used also by the diaspora researcher raymond h. kevorkian, who in the expansive work co-authored with paul paboudjian gives the picture of the number of armenian population in the ottoman empire based on the census data locality by locality. see raymond h. kévorkian and paul b. paboudjian, les arméniens dans l’empire ottoman à la veille du génocide (paris: arhis, 1992). for the armenian patriarchate 1913-14 census see also tatoyan, the question of the number of the western armenians in 1878-1914, 92-115. 40 kara schemsi, turcs et arméniens devant l’histoire. nouveaux témoignages russes et turcs sur les atrocités arméniennes de 1914 à 1918 (geneve: impr. nat., 1919). 17 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians the statistics of the armenian sources are refuted not only by turkish but also by different western sources supposedly independent of the turkish ones. the author refers to two french sources containing information about the number of the western armenians – the yellow book41 statistics42 published by the ministry of foreign affairs of france in 1897 and the data in the asiatic turkey book of the french statistician vital cuinet.43 the comparison of the data available in the two sources shows that cuinet’s book has served as a source for the yellow book data44 of the french ministry of foreign affairs: to conceal this fact schemsi employs the following trick – he cites only the fi gure for the percentage of the armenians in the six western armenia vilayets from the yellow book and then takes the numbers of the armenians and the muslims of the six vilayets from vital cuinet. the author in any way does not mention the well-known fact that vital cuinet’s data do not possess a value of their own – they are based on the ottoman data mostly taken from the salnames (ottoman yearbooks, published by central and provincial authorities) and other offi cial sources.45 noteworthy is schemsi’s selective attitude towards the data extracted from the yellow book and generally from western sources. thus, he circumvents the fi gure in the yellow book 1,475,011 standing for the number of armenians living in anatolia (asia minor and western armenia without constantinople and european turkey) at the end of the xix century.46 it would be understandable, if we take into account that as per the ottoman data relating to the year of 1914 the number of the armenian population of the entire empire did not exceed 1,300,000. the next source referred to by schemsi were the fi gures standing for the number of the population of van and bitlis vilayets reported by vladimir mayevski, who was the russian vice-consul in van in 1890. these were also presented by the author selectively – only the percentage of armenians vs. muslims: 26% for armenians in van, 46% for kurds and turks, likewise 39% for armenians in bitlis, 55%47 for kurds and turks. the purpose of the turk offi cial becomes clear when we read through v. mayevski’s numbers, according to which there were 13,735 and 23,326 armenian households48 in van vilayet and bitlis vilayet respectively. mayevski assumed an average number of 8 members of families, which in 41 yellow books (livres jaunes) were called the fascicles of the collections of diplomatic documents, which the minister of foreign affairs of france presented to the country’s parliament for discussion. 42 documents diplomatiques: affaires arméniennes; projets de reforme dans l’empire ottoman 1893-1897 (paris: imprimerie nationale, 1897). 43 here the author uses data contained in ottoman government’s offi cial documents published earlier in 1919, which we will examine in the following section of the article. 44 more details about this to follow. 45 for substantial examination of vital cuinet’s data see haykazun galstyan, «արևմտյան հայաստանի բնակչության ազգային կազմը՝ ըստ վիթալ քինեի վիճակագրության» [national composition of the population in western armenia according to vital cuinet’s statistics], countries and peoples of the near and middle east, xii, turkey (1985): 59-79; sarkis y. karayan, “vital cuinet’s la turquie d’asie: a critical evaluation of cuinet’s information about armenians,” journal of the society for armenian studies, 11 (2000): 53-63. 46 see documents diplomatiques: affaires arméniennes; projets de reforme dans l’empire ottoman 1893-1897, 8. 47 schemsi, turcs et arméniens, 119. 48 сборникъ дипломатическихъ документовъ. реформы въ арменіи (26 ноября 1912 г. – 10 мая 1914 г.) [collection of diplomatic documents. reforms in armenia (1912, november 26 – 1914, may 10)] (petrograd, 1915), 284, 288. 18 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 case of van vilayet would amount to 109,880 armenians and for bitlis – 186,608. for the armenian population of the same vilayets the offi cial ottoman data for the year of 1914 were 67,792 and 119,132 persons respectively.49 that is to say, for the number of the armenian population mayevski’s data, which he, like cuinet, had taken from local ottoman yearbooks, were about 40% higher compared to the statistics of the ottoman government.50 the issue of the number of western armenians in the post-war memoranda of the ottoman government after the defeat in wwi the new ottoman government continued to advance and develop the traditional line of the regimes of abdul hamid and young turks in the armenian question, i.e. to declare that the armenians were an insignifi cant minority in “eastern anatolia” even before wwi and that the muslims had been the predominant ethnic and religious element there for centuries.51 in 1919–1920 both offi cial and non-offi cial turkish circles published a host of memoranda and reports/pamphlets addressed to the participants in the paris peace conference promoting the idea of preserving the integrity of the turkish empire.52 the fi rst and perhaps the most important of such documents on the stand of the ottoman government on the armenian question was the memorandum dated 12 february 1919 and addressed to the high commissioners representing the entente powers in the constantinople.53 about the quarter of the text of the memorandum (12 pages) was dedicated to the substantiation of the notion of the greeks and armenians being an insignifi cant minority in asia minor and western armenia. dividing the territory of the ottoman empire into two parts as per the “wilsonian principles” – “turkish” and “arabic” provinces and declaring as turkish the vilayets of eastern thrace, asia minor (anatolia) and western armenia, the authors of the memorandum were detaching “eastern” or “armenian” vilayets from them in order to examine them separately.54 introducing the names of the territorial administrative units of eastern thrace and asia minor, the authors of the memorandum claimed that the turkish element was enjoying an overwhelming predominance in all those vilayets as stated by offi cial statistics, as well as 49 karpat, ottoman population, 188. 50 in fact, mayevski, while examining cuinet’s data about van vilayet, noted that they contained signifi cant inaccuracies. particularly, fi nding that the number of the armenian population of van district reported by cuinet is lower than in reality the author supposed, that it concerned only the village population of the district, while together with the city of van (13,500, according to cuinet) the number of the armenians should be 26,000. see vladimir mayevski, ванскій вилайетъ. военно-статистичское описаніе [van vilayet. military-statistical description] (tifl is, 1901), 89-90. going on with the examination of cuinet’s data, the researcher also questioned the statistics of van (13,500 armenians). based on his own observations, which according to him were confi rmed even by turkish offi cial data, mayevski believed that the number of the armenian population of the city comprised 20-25 thousand (mayevski, van vilayet, 100-101). 51 hovanissian, the republic of armenia, 421. 52 besides kara schemsi’s book already referred to, see also les turcs et les revendications arméniennes (paris: l’hoir, 1919), the national congress of turkey, the turco-armenian question. the turkish point of view (societe anonyme de papeterie et d’limprimerie, 1919). 53 memorandum of the sublime porte communicated to the american, british, french and italian high commissioners on the 12th february 1919 (constantinople: zelligh bros., 1919). 54 ibid., 4. 19 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians data of foreign researchers of turkey before the war.55 this was blatant misinformation as the kurds had a bigger number among the muslim population compared to the turks particularly in van, bitlis, diarbekir and kharput vilayets of western armenia. in confi rmation of the above statement, three sources were presented: offi cial ottoman data refl ecting the 1914 situation, those of french statistician vital cuinet (early 1890-s) and data extracted from the yellow book (1897). the data of the last two sources almost did not vary from each other, because when compiling the yellow book the french government had taken and placed cuinet’s data there without any material changes, however, the authors of the turkish memorandum did not mention it by any means. as we already said, cuinet’s information in its turn was based on the same offi cial ottoman statistics, so the authors of the memorandum essentially were confi rming the authenticity of the ottoman information through the same ottoman data offered under a different name. the same trick was used also in case of the six western armenian vilayets (van, bitlis, kharput, diarbekir, erzeroum, sivas): at fi rst the offi cial ottoman data was presented and then the statistical data taken from the yellow book (see below)56: offi cial ottoman statistics of the six vilayets number of population proportion muslims 3,040,891 79% armenians 636,306 16.5% other 162,352 4.5% yellow book statistics number of population proportion muslims 2,669,386 73.5% armenians 666,435 18.5% other 272,581 7.5% to fi ght back the armenian claims, the authors of the memorandum felt the need of involving another western source – britannica encyclopaedia (1910 edition), inserting data extracted from it. according to the encyclopaedia, “the armenians, even if we take the most favourable assessments, comprise the majority only in 9 (7 near van, 2 near mush) out of the [western armenian 6 vilayets’ – r.t.] 159 districts (kaza).” it said that in 1896 the population of the nine turkish vilayets – erzeroum, van, bitlis, kharput, diarbekir, sivas, aleppo, adana and trebizond amounted to approximately 6,000,000 of which: 55 ibid., 5. 56 ibid., 7. 20 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 armenians 919,875 or 15% other christians 632,875 or 11% muslims 4,453,250 or 74% according to the britannica encyclopaedia, the number of the population in the fi rst fi ve vilayets (erzeroum, van, bitlis, kharput (mamuret-ul-aziz), diarbekir) counting the biggest part of the armenians was 2,642,000, of which: armenians 633,250 or 24% other christians 179,875 or 7% muslims 1,828,870 or 69% “the above fi gures do not leave room for doubt, – concluded the authors of the turkish memorandum, – that the overwhelming majority of the population of the abovementioned vilayets is made up of the muslims, and the armenians are an insignifi cant minority everywhere.”57 the comparison of the data in the turkish memorandum with the original text of the britannica encyclopaedia revealed interesting circumstances. thus, the authors of the memorandum used the source selectively leaving out formulations non-favourable for the turkish offi cial stand. for instance, omitted were the statement at the very beginning of the subsection of the article that “accurate statistics cannot be obtained” about the ottoman turkey, as well as the original source which britannica encyclopaedia was referring to – the russian general zelyoni’s data.58 the examination of zelyoni’s data proved that the russian researcher, in his turn, had used the data of the very same vital cuinet, when preparing the map of distribution of the armenian population in turkish armenia and kurdistan in 1895 on the basis of the data of the latter’s book “asiatic turkey” (1890-1894).59 in other words, the authors of the turkish memorandum were trying to prove the validity of offi cial ottoman statistical data on the number of western armenians by means of vital cuinet’s data which was based on the same offi cial ottoman data, then by the yellow book of the french ministry of foreign affairs, which was based on cuinet’s data and fi nally by the statistics contained in the britannica encyclopaedia, which again was based on vital cuinet’s data. by such statistical trickery an illusion was created that the offi cial ottoman statistical data was corroborated by western sources. thus, the statistical data of the turkish government was intended to prove that “fi ve million” muslim population should not be ruled by “several hundred thousand” armenians, 57 ibid., 8. 58 encyclopedia britannica, 11th edition, vol. 2, (new york, 1910), 564. 59 пояснительная записка генер. штаба генералъ-лейтенанта зеленого (съ приложенiями) к картѣ распредѣленiя армянскаго населенiя въ турецкой армении и курдистанѣ по казамъ и данныя сочиненiя v. cuinet “la turquie d’asie” 1890-94 г., составленной ген. штаба ген.-лейт. зеленымъ и подполк. сысоевымъ, 1895 [explanatory report lieutenant general zeliony (with attachments) on map of distribution of the armenian population in turkish armenia and kurdistan according to data from v. cuinet’s “la turquie d’asie”], «записки кавказского отдѣла императорскаго русскаго географическаго общества» [notes of the caucasus department of the imperial russian geographical society, vol. xviii] (tifl is, 1896), 1-40. 21 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians which, according to the authors of the memorandum, would inevitably lead to internal atrocities and bloody clashes.60 as a better solution, the ottoman government proposed to leave the territories of “eastern anatolia” under turkish rule somewhat expanding the territory of the republic of armenia to resettle the survivors of “deported to der zor sanjak” armenians there.61 regarding the latest proposal, turkey theoretically did not face big territorial losses as only about 250,000-300,000 of the deported armenians managed to survive the end of the world war i in syrian deserts.62 in addition to the memorandum of 12 february 1919, the ottoman authorities brought to the attention of the paris peace conference also a fascicle in french entitled tables representing the number of different elements of population in the ottoman empire as of 1 march 133063 (14 march 1914) recapitulating the data of 1914 offi cial ottoman statistics, according to which 1,294,851 armenians were living in the ottoman empire prior to wwi.64 the reaction of the armenian circles to the turkish memorandum did not delay. in the same 1919 in constantinople the answer to the 12 february 1919 memorandum of the sublime porte fascicle was published in french. around a quarter of the 40-page writing was dedicated to the refuting of statistical data and demographic arguments contained in the turkish memorandum, while the annexes – fi ve in number, offered various statistics.65 the armenian response elaborated on the main elements of the 1878-1914 administrative and demographic policy of the ottoman government intended to make the muslims a majority, namely: 1. re-delineation of the administrative borders of vilayets in western armenia and cilicia, when mostly muslim-populated regions were appended to armenian-populated vilayets (for instance hakkiari to van vilayet, mesopotamian regions to diarbekir vilayet, the annexation of the armenian-populated province of marash, which was a natural part of cilicia, to aleppo province, the annexation of the muslim-populated ichil region to armenian-populated adana vilayet, etc.), 2. placing muslim settlers (known as “muhajirs”) migrated from the caucasus and the balkans in armenian-populated regions, intimidation and ruthless exploitation of the armenians by the newcomers (presented was data also from the offi cial turkish sources that 854,000 muhajirs were moved to and resettled in the turkish empire during 1878-1908, 60 ibid. 61 ibid. 62 according to turkish researcher fuat dundar’s calculations – 300,000. fuat dundar, crime of numbers, the role of statistics in the armenian question (the state university of new jersey-rutgers: transactions publishers, 2010), 150-151. 63 according to rumi calendar offi cially used in the ottoman empire in 1839-1926 along with the islamic calendar. 64 the tables of 1919 french fascicle included the numbers of muslims, greeks, armenians (aggregate number of apostolic, catholic and protestant armenians) and other elements. the data is distributed by the districts (kaza) of the ottoman empire (see tableaux indiquant le nombre des divers éléments de la population dans l’empire ottoman au 1er mars 1330 (14 mars 1914) (constantinople, i9i9). see also zamir, “population statistics of the ottoman empire,” 89-101, shaw stanford j., “the ottoman census system and population, 18311914,” international journal of middle east studies 9 (1978): 336. for more details on 1914 ottoman statistics see tatoyan,the question of the number of the western armenians in 1878-1914, 38-39. 65 reponse au memoire de la sublime-porte en date du 12 fevrier 1919 (constantinople, 1919). 22 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 noting that the fl ow of muhajirs gained even a greater momentum during the balkan wars in 1912-14), 3. even more preposterous publication of already falsifi ed statistics, when the data of not only turkic-speaking, but also of all islamic tribes, even those neither professing islam, not christianity were being united under one – muslims section, while the armenians were divided into three groups – apostolic christians, catholics and protestants.66 upon the presentment of the above theoretical statements a reference was made to certain statistical data in the turkish memorandum. as one of the sources of the memorandum was vital cuinet, the armenian response showed through references to his asiatic turkey book that the french statistician himself was openly critical of the ottoman statistics. in particular, vital cuinet wrote: “there is absolutely no proper offi cial statistics in turkey, ... the [turkish] authorities not only have not embraced such an interesting and useful statistical science in the country’s practices, but on the contrary, as an interested party they refuse to authorize even simple studies.”67 the authors of the fascicle also of fered some illustrations of inaccuracies and inconsistencies in cuinet’s data, concluding that they refl ect the general “deplorable state of affairs” in ottoman offi cial data.68 us experts and post-war missions on the issue of the number of western armenians to decide the fate of the territories of the ottoman empire the allied powers – victorious in the great war, needed varied information and fi rst of all demographic data relating to the territories in question. the issue was complicated by the fact that the data received from the armenian and ottoman circles were contradictory forcing the representatives of western countries dealing with them to take a specifi c stance on the issue – reject or accept the arguments and data of one of the sides, or do own reckoning. the issue of armenia boundaries coupled with the number of the western armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide has particularly been in the sphere of interests of the united states of america, as it was in direct correlation with the question whether it was expedient or possible for the state to assume armenia’s mandate. still in september of 1917, the us president woodrow wilson commissioned to establish a study group – the inquiry, with an aim to collect data for the peace negotiations to follow wwi. the task of collecting information about armenia and the armenians was assigned to the western asia section of the group consisting of 10 experts.69 upon the end of the great war the members of the study group, including western asia section, integrated into the composition of the american delegation to the paris peace conference.70 66 ibid., 14-17. 67 ibid., 40. 68 ibid., 18. 69 lawrence gelfand, the inquiry; american preparations for peace, 1917-1919 (new haven: yale university press, 1963), 60. 70 richard g. hovhannisian, “the armenian genocide and us post-war commissions,” in jay winter, ed., america and the armenian genocide of 1915 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2003), 259. 23 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians the archive of the inquiry study group contains 98 documents relating to the armenian question, mostly reports of the members of the study group, as well as records of american missionaries. some 13 of those documents deal with the partition of ottoman turkey and 11 relate to national and religious minorities. many of the above documents deal with the issue of the number of western armenians in one way or another.71 the inquiry study group has also prepared extensive reports about various, including western armenian, vilayets of the ottoman empire, containing statistical data as well.72 of the documents prepared by the inquiry study group dealing with the number of western armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide noteworthy is the population of asiatic turkey at the outbreak of the war report dated 15 november 1918, authored by the member of the western asia section professors david magie and william linn westermann, circulated during the paris peace conference and, in its turn, used for preparation of various reports and bulletins relating to the armenian question.73 to study the situation in the territories of the ottoman empire for the purpose of determining the us policy towards the country, in 1919 the us government sent two commissions or missions to the region known by the names of their leaders king-crane74 and harbord.75 the king-crane mission was composed of civilians with an aim of studying the territories of the entire ottoman empire; harbord mission was composed mainly of the military and its primary goal was to examine the situation in the region particularly in terms of the possibility of assuming a mandate for armenia. these commissions compiled reports resulting from their work in which a certain place was given to the issues of the number of the armenian population of western armenia and the proportion of the armenians to the muslims on the eve of the armenian genocide. the authors of the king-crane mission report76 were interested in the number of west71 according to the data of diaspora armenian researcher armen hovannissian: “the united states inquiry and the armenian question, 1917-1919: the archival papers,” armenian review 37, no. 1 (1984):148. 72 for the complete list of the documents on turkey of the inquiry study group see national archives inventory 9: records of the american commission to negotiate peace, inventory of record group 256, compiled by sandra k. rangel, national archives and records service administration (washington, 1974), 81-92, available online at http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/inventory9.pdf), accessed 02.06.2020. 73 for magie’s records see national archives inventory 9: records of the american commission to negotiate peace, inventory of record group 256, 83. 74 the commission is named after its two members – theologian henri king and us democrat fi gure charles crane. it started its work in june 1919 and prepared its report on 28 august 1919. for more details about the king-crane commission, see james b. gidney, a mandate for armenia (kent, ohio: kent state university press, 1967), 136-167. 75 the harbord military mission consisting of over 50 people was led by general james harbord of the us army. he was tasked to “explore and report about the political, military, geographical, administrative, economic and other conditions of the regions that could be of interest to the usa...” the mission visited turkey (the provinces of cilicia, diarbekir, sebastia, kharput, erzeroum), the fi rst republic of armenia, as well as tifl is, baku, batum. the outcomes of the mission were summed up in the middle east situation report presented to the us president on 23 october 1919 and submitted to the us congress for discussion in april of 1920 (see hovhannisian, “the armenian genocide,” 265. for the references of armenian historiography to the activity of the mission see a. j. soghomonyan, «հարբորդի զինվորական առաքելությունը և հայաստանի մանդատը» [harbord’s military mission and the armenian mandate], the herald of social sciences 9 (1985): 13-23). 76 for the complete king-crane report see united states department of state, papers relating to the foreign relations of the united states, the paris peace conference, 1919, vol. xii (u.s. government printing offi ce, 1947), 751863. 24 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 ern armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide with a view to create a “separate armenia.” upon outlining the grounds for creation of an armenian state on some of the territories cut off from the ottoman empire the authors moved on to the issue of the boundaries of future armenia. the idea of establishing a “larger armenia” (six western armenian vilayets, except for the southern and western provinces, cilicia, trebizond) was rejected the fi rst with justifi cation that in 1914 and even before 1894 armenians were a minority in the specifi ed area, never exceeding the 25%.77 “even if we take into account the one million armenians who were killed78 and assuming that it would be possible to gather all of them in this area, still the armenians would make up only about the third of the population,” added the authors of the report.79 the report maintained the creation of a so called “smaller armenia” to which only a portion of the territories geographically belonging to the armenian plateau would be appended from the ottoman empire with an outlet to the black sea, roughly equal to the area occupied by russian troops during the great war. in justifi cation of their viewpoint, again demography was referred to as the fi rst argument: “the turks and kurds would not be able to justifi ably complain about such an area, as this is historical armenia, and also because, if it were possible to recover the one million dead armenians and bring them to that area, the armenians would make up half of the population.”80 in the estimates of the population of an armenian state subsection of the report there were several tables on the number of the population of the supposed territory of the future armenian state. the fi rst of them refl ected the 1914 situation. the statistics were given for three contingent regions “larger turkish armenia,” approximately covering the six vilayets, except for the southern and western provinces, the eastern portion of trebizond vilayet and cilicia (adana vilayet and marash sanjak), “smaller turkish armenia,” approximately corresponding to the area occupied by the russian troops in 1917, which is the eastern portion of trebizond vilayet, van vilayet without hakkiari, the whole of erzeroum vilayet and bitlis vilayet without sgherd, and “differential area”, the area left after separation/ subtraction of the “smaller armenia” from the “larger armenia” – kharput vilayet, eastern regions of sivas vilayet and cilicia (adana vilayet and marash sanjak) (see table 3). table 3. population of western armenia according to king-crane mission report % muslims % armenians % greeks % other total larger turkish armenia 71 3,073,000 211/2 933,000 61/2 289,000 1 34,000 4,329,000 77 ibid., 821. 78 the authors of the report mean the number of armenians who feel victim to 1894-1896 hamidian massacres and the armenian genocide. 79 ibid. 80 ibid., 822. 25 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians differential area 73 1,697,000 20 461,000 6 136,000 1 18,000 2,312,000 smaller turkish armenia 68 1,376,000 231/2 472,000 71/2 153,000 1 16,000 2,017,000 the authors mentioned in the annotations on the report that the above table was estimated from the statistics prepared by drs magie and westermann. of importance is also the observation of the authors of the report that magie’s fi gures may underestimate the armenians in some regions.81 they also found that it would not be possible to be defi nite about the number of various ethnic elements in turkey until a scientifi c ethnological survey had been carried out under disinterested control.82 it should be noted that similar statements regarding western armenia demographics were being made by western diplomats and researchers since 1878 in the earlier stages of the armenian question as well.83 the harbord military mission report stated that “conservative” estimates place the number of armenians over 1,500,000 in asiatic turkey in 1914 (without constantinople and adrianople vilayet), “though some make it higher.”84 it was noted that offi cial reports of the turkish government showed that in 1915 around 1,100,000 armenians were deported. upon describing briefl y the progression of the anti-armenian actions of the turkish authorities, the report stated that the dead from this “wholesale attempt” on the race are variously estimated from 500,000 to over one million, “the usual fi gure being about 800,000.”85 in the opinion of the authors of the report, “…even before the war the armenians were far from being a majority in the region claimed as turkish armenia, excepting in a few places.” “to-day we doubt if they would be in majority in a single community even when the last survivors of the massacres and deportations have returned to the soil, though, – the report went on, – the great losses of turkish population to some extent offset the difference brought about by slaughter.”86 of certain interest is the authors’ estimate, as of 1919, of armenians living in turkish armenia (western regions of sivas vilayet, including the province of shabin-karahisar, cilicia (adana vilayet, marash sanjak and aintab district), kharput vilayet, the northern portion of diarbekir vilayet, the vilayet of bitlis without sgherd province, van vilayet (without hakkiari province), erzeroum and trebizond vilayets) and the number of western armenian refugees in transcaucasus: “we estimate that there are probably 270,000 armenians today in turkish armenia. some 75,000 have been repatriated from the syrian and mesopotamian side, others are slowly returning from other regions, and some from one cause or 81 ibid., 825. 82 ibid. 83 see about that in detail tatoyan, the question of the number of the western armenians in 1878-1914, 121165. 84 conditions in the near east. report of the american military mission to armenia, by maj. gen. james g. harbord, u.s. army. (appendix only) (washington: govt. printing offi ce, 1920), 7. 85 ibid. 86 ibid. 26 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 another remained in the country (the last group includes the islamized armenians r.t.). there are in the transcaucasus probably 300,000 refugees from turkish armenia, and some thousands more in other lands, for they have drifted to all parts of near east.”87 at the end of the report statistical data was presented on the population and resources of “european turkey, asia minor and transcaucasus” in the form of tables; of interest are, from the viewpoint of the above issue, the data on the total number of the preand post-war population of “turkish armenia,”88 which we insert in table 4. table 4. population of western armenia according to harbord military mission report turkish armenia vilayet province sanjak/district area, square km present pre-war population in thousands density per square kilometre density per square kilometre eastern sivas (including shabin-karahisar province) 38.6 319 8 507 14 adana vilayet 25.1 193 8 320 13 marash province and aintab sanjak 16.0 102 6 170 11 kharput vilayet 32.9 282 9 450 14 diarbekir vilayet (northern portion) 16.1 186 12 296 18 bitlis vilayet (without sgherd province) 19.7 229 12 382 19 van vilayet (without hakkiari province) 21.0 204 10 350 17 erzeroum vilayet 49.7 398 8 630 13 trebizond vilayet 32.5 685 21 1,000 31 total 249.8 2,598 10 4,105 16.4 87 ibid., 8. 88 ibid., 41-42. 27 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians a summary document in the sense of taking in the us offi cial standpoint on the number of western armenians, could be considered the report attached to the us president woodrow wilson’s arbitral award on armenia-turkey border (22 november 1920) prepared by a special commission set up for that purpose (see full report of the committee upon the arbitration of the boundary between turkey and armenia).89 according to the authors of the report, for them, underlying the determination of the boundary between armenia and turkey, were three guiding considerations, one of which was ethnography (the other two being geography and economy).90 the report said that the study of ethnic elements that constituted the population of western armenia was rather a shady business (“greatly beclouded”) conditioned by lack of reliable pre-war statistics on western armenian vilayets, the deportations and massacres of armenians, the losses of the turkish and kurdish population.91 in their estimations of the number of the population of western armenia on the eve of the armenian genocide the authors of the report also relied on the data of the above the population of asiatic turkey study of professor magie circulated during the paris peace conference by the american delegation. based on the very data extracted from the abovementioned report justifi ed was the exclusion of hakkiari province of van vilayet and sgherd sanjak of bitlis vilayet from the boundaries of the future armenia (it should be noted that the armenian side never claimed the mentioned regions). noteworthy is the statistics for the mentioned provinces in the report, which in terms of the number of the armenians came close to or even exceeded the fi gures of the armenian patriarchate 92 (see table 5). table 5. population of hakkiari and sgherd according to magie turks kurds armenians nestorians (assyrians) hakkiari 10,000 (4.15%) 130,000 (54.4%) 10,000 (4.15%)93 85,000 (35.9%) sgherd 66,000 (65.3%) 26,000 (25.7%)94 if leaving sgherd and hakkiari provinces outside the boundaries of armenia the authors explained with ethnographic considerations, appending a portion of the vilayet of trebizond to armenia was conditioned by “absolute and decisive” economic considerations, i.e. the imperative of armenia having an outlet to the sea.95 89 arbitral award of the president of the united states of america woodrow wilson: full report of the committee upon the arbitration of the boundary between turkey and armenia. washington, november 22nd, 1920, prepared with an introduction by ara papian (yerevan: asoghik, 2011). 90 ibid., 15. 91 ibid., 16. 92 ibid., 18. 93 according to the armenian patriarchate 1912 data – 12,000 (see teodik, almanac, 262). 94 according to the armenian patriarchate 1912 data 18,000 (see teodik, almanac, 262). 95 ibid. 28 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 great britain experts on the issue of the number of western armenians in the spring of 1917 the british foreign offi ce, in preparations for the peace conference, set up a special section which was supposed to provide information to the british delegates to the conference about geography, economy, history, social, religious and political aspects of various countries in question. one of the numerous reports prepared by the section under the title of armenia and kurdistan related to western armenia.96 the population subsection of the report contained statistical data on the number of the population of western armenia on the eve of the armenian genocide. the authors of the report fi rst noted that the data of interest had been extracted from various pre-war statistics and should be perceived as approximate, regardless of the source. then the report gave the total number of the population of armenia and “kurdistan” vilayets, according to the turkish statistics, followed by the 1912 statistics of the armenian patriarchate on the six armenian vilayets of turkey (see table 1). separately it presented the statistics on the armenian population of cilicia by dioceses compiled and published by the armenian catholicosate of sis in 1913, according to which there were 318,416 armenians living on the territory of cilicia at that time.97 quite noteworthy is the following observation of the authors of the report: “it is probable that the fi gures for the armenians are too low rather than too high, since the existence of a capitation tax tended to make the armenians conceal rather than exaggerate their own numbers.”98 this argument was repeatedly stated in the past by all unbiased researchers familiar with the issue. the british foreign offi ce did not confi ne itself only to collecting statistical data on the population of western armenia and other territories of the ottoman empire on the eve of the great war from various sources, but also made an attempt to compile its own statistics based on them. a sample of such statistics is the statistical table prepared by the geographical department of the british foreign offi ce. as data sources for the table served the 1914 offi cial ottoman statistics, data provided by greek and armenian church sources and particularly the population of asiatic turkey at the outbreak of the war report prepared by professor d. magie, the expert of the western asia section of the american expert group already mentioned.99 according to the data in the document, there were 1,604,000 armenians (for the distribution of armenians and muslims by western armenian vilayets see tables 6 and 7) living in the territory of the ottoman empire in 1914, except for the capital constantinople.100 96 armenia and kurdistan (london: h.m. stationery offi ce, 1920). 97 ibid., 7. 98 ibid., 6. 99 zamir, “population statistics of the ottoman empire,” 87. 100 ibid., 106. 29 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians comparison and analysis of the ottoman, armenian and western (anglo-american) statistical data the collation and comparison of the ottoman, armenian and western (anglo-american) statistical data for the western armenian territory presented to the paris peace conference (see table 6) showed that in case of the armenian population in the area in question, the armenian data was by about 83% higher than the ottoman and 18% higher than the anglo-american experts’ data. in their turn, the anglo-american expert data on the western armenians were by about 50% higher than the ottoman and about 18% lower than the armenian data; in case of the muslim population of western armenia (see table 7) the ottoman data was higher by about 188% than the armenian and about 18% than the anglo-american experts’ data. this came to prove that the diplomats and experts of the us and great britain, within the framework of post-war regulation, in their statements about and appraisals of the demographic composition of western armenia were either relying on the armenian data, or making their own calculations. in case of the number of the western armenians, the authenticity of the ottoman offi cial statistics was rejected and preference was given to the armenian sources. in case of the muslim population, the anglo-american experts were making their calculations based on the data of the ottoman government, as well as those of vital cuinet and from western sources. the anglo-american experts’ statistics for western armenia also contained separate data for major muslim ethnic groups, particularly, turks and kurds, living there, which ottoman offi cial statistics never provided. at the same time, the united states and great britain, while acknowledging the falsehood of the ottoman statistics on the western armenians and the reliability of fi gures of armenian origin, frequently were accentuating the argument of the western armenians yielding to the muslims in percentage even on the eve of the armenian genocide in order to curb armenian claims in the context of making peace with a defeated turkish state.101 in conclusion, we believe that the fi gures standing for the number of the ottoman armenians from the ottoman government, western authors, and even the armenian patriarchate of constantinople are undercountings to a lesser or greater extent. this is evidenced by available armenian sources referring to the eve of the armenian genocide (data on the registration and survey of the armenian refugees, information provided by survivors of the armenian genocide about their native localities, etc.) in many cases independently providing much higher numbers for the armenian population of a given locality and administrative unit than those of the three abovementioned sources.102 at the same time, when critically ap101 interestingly, later, after the victories of the kemalists, during the lausanne conference of 1922 november convened to review the treaty of sevres and make peace with a new, kemalist turkey, the british diplomacy was employing the opposite tactic, this time to extort concessions from the turks. thus, during one of the sessions, the head of the british delegation foreign secretary lord curzon addressed a series of rhetorical questions to the head of the turkish delegation ismet inonu, “how did it happen that the number of armenians previously inhabiting in asia minor decreased from 3,000,000 to 130,000? did they commit suicide or did they leave on their own? why have hundreds of thousand armenians become refugees taking refuge in all countries of the world? why is the armenian question one of the biggest shames in the world?” akaby nassibian, britain and the armenian question, 1915-1923 (new york: st. martin’s press, 1984), 145. 102 for more details about it see tatoyan, the question of the number of the western armenians in 1878-1914, 100-114. 30 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 proached and collated with the materials of other sources, the quite rich, though contradictory, statistical material made known due to the raising of the armenian question in 19191920 could be used to study the complicated issue of the number of western armenians on the eve of the armenian genocide and particularly, verify the number of the armenians by the separate administrative units of the ottoman empire. table 6. armenian population of western armenia, trebizond and cilicia (adana and marash) vilayets and the other parts of the ottoman empire on the eve of the armenian genocide according to different statistical data presented to the paris peace conference administrative unit ottoman data armenian delegation inquiry expert group (usa) geographical department of the foreign offi ce of great britain western armenia van vilayet 67,792 197,000 190,000 bitlis vilayet 119,132 198,000 185,000 erzeroum vilayet 136,618 215,000 205,000 diarbekir vilayet 73,226 124,000 82,000 kharput vilayet 87,864 204,000 130,000 sivas vilayet 151,674 225,000 200,000 total six vilayets 636,306 1,163,000 992,000 trebizond vilayet 40,237 65,000 33,000 total (including trebizond vilayet) 676,543 1,228,000 1,025,000 cilicia adana vilayet 57,686 118,000 75,000 marash province 38,433 69,000103 55,000 total 96,119 187,000 130,000 total (including cilicia) 772,662 1,415,000 1,155,000 other parts of the ottoman empire 522,189 611,000 449,000 grand total 1,294,851 2,026,000 1,604,000 103 marash, zeitun, furnuz. 31 robert tatoyan: the issue of the number of western armenians table 7. “muslim” population of western armenia and cilicia (adana and marash) vilayets on the eve of the armenian genocide according to different statistical data presented to the paris peace conference administrative unit ottoman government armenian delegation104 inquiry expert group (usa) -geographical department of the foreign offi ce of great britain western armenia van vilayet 179,380 122,000105 259,000106 bitlis vilayet 309,999 127,000107 261,000108 erzeroum vilayet 673,297 345,000 540,000109 diarbekir vilayet 492,101 100,000110 400,000111 kharput vilayet 446,379 197,000112 280,000113 sivas vilayet 939,735 287,000114 977,000 total six vilayets 3,040,891 1,178,000 2,717,000 trebizond vilayet 1,187,078 301,000115 848,000 total six vilayets and trebizond vilayet 4,227,969 1,479,000 3,565,000 cilicia adana vilayet 341,903 – 290,000 marash province 152,645 – 146,000116 total cilicia 494,548 156,000117 436,000 grand total 4,722,517 1,635,000118 4,001,000 104 except for kizilbashis, zazas, chariklies and yezidies. 105 without hakkiari sanjak. 106 including 57,000 turks and 202,000 kurds. 107 without sgherd sanjak. 108 including 60,000 turks and 201,000 kurds. 109 including 335,000 turks and 205,000 kurds. 110 without mardin sanjak, bsherik kaza and severek. 111 including 100,000 turks, 230,000 kurds and 70,000 muslim arabs. 112 without malatya province. 113 including 250,000 turks and 230,000 kurds. 114 only sebastia and shabin-karahisar provinces. 115 except for samsun sanjak. 116 including 82,000 turks, 56,000 kurds and 8,000 muslim arabs. 117 marash, kozan and djebel bereket sanjaks. 118 the grand total number according to the data in the memorandum submitted to the paris peace conference by armenian delegation (see the armenian question before the peace conference, 32). timothy williams is a research fellow at the centre for conflict studies  at marburg university and receives a doctoral research grant from the heinrich böll foundation.  in 2015, he was the raphael lemkin fellow of the armenian genocide memorial-institute in yerevan, armenia. he studied at mannheim university (ba political science) and at the london school of economics (msc comparative politics) and he is the executive director of the non-profit organisation beyond violence  (www.beyondviolence.org). 27 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials1 timothy williams centre for conflict studies, university of marburg, germany abstract: the study of the motivations of the people participating in genocide is necessary to fully understand the dynamics of genocide and its genesis, as these are the people who actually implement genocidal policies and provide its material manifestation. this paper looks into the motivations of mid-level perpetrators of the armenian genocide through the verdicts of the ottoman special military tribunal which was established in 1919. it is found that opportunistic motivations dominated for perpetrators’ participation, particularly the opportunity for material gain, rape, forced marriage, free labour and career progression. however, the ambiguous nature of authority, coercive structures and ideological tenets also provided a framework within which perpetrators could become motivated to participate. introduction to look at the face of the clock, we can discern the time, and when one asks anyone how this clock works, they will answer that the hands of the clock turn and thus gradually signal the change of time. but to fully understand how the clock works we need to delve into the depths of the mechanics and understand how the various cogs are interlinked, what makes them turn and how they work together to make the time appear on the clock face. this is no different when trying to gain a full understanding of any social phenomenon, including the crime of crimes, genocide. it cannot suffice to describe and contrast the grand sweeps of history and look into the biographies of the leaders of genocide, but instead we also need to look into the dynamics and motivations of the individuals who actually put the genocidal policies into practice, the cogs which make the clock actually turn. these implementing participants of genocide are not automatons, but instead living, breathing human beings with their own agency, ideas, emotions and interests. only through a thorough understanding of why these people enlist in a genocidal project and put their 1. acknowledgements:this research was made possible by the raphael lemkin scholarship of the armenian genocide museum-institute. i would like to thank agmi for their support, particularly hayk demoyan, suren manukyan, robert tatoyan, regina galustyan, gohar khanumyan and the other helpful members of staff. also my thanks go to hasmik grigoryan, melanie o’brien and erin jessee for their advice on the project, as well as to judith von heusinger, mariam salehi and mareike stolley for comments on earlier drafts of the paper. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 28 beings in the violent service of the genocidal leaders can we ever expect to increase our recognition of what constitutes genocide and why it happens. and only with this knowledge will it ever be possible to contemplate preventing such atrocities from happening in the future. this paper provides one small mosaic stone in the bigger picture of why genocide occurs and will give some insight into why individuals participated in the genocide of the armenian people in 1915. there is an emerging field of work which studies perpetrators in general and in particular what motivates these people to participate in genocidal violence. in particular much work has been done on the holocaust and the rwandan genocide, as well as conceptual work in social psychology, criminology, anthropology and sociology. however, previous work in the field of the armenian genocide has been mostly broad historical studies (akçam 2006; dadrian 1993, 1995, 1996, 1999; kévorkian 2011; zürcher 2010) which have failed to look in depth at the individual level. a wealth of survivor (national archives of armenia 2013; see also anush 2007; aved 1979; barooshian 1976; der-garabedian 2004; derderian 2008; garougian 2005; hamamdjian 2004; hartunian 1999 [1968]; jafferian 1993; ketchian 1988; kharpetian 2003; odian 2009; papazian 2000; shamtanchian 2007; soghoian 1997; tabibian 1988; tilkian 1992) and bystander (alamuddin 1970; davis 1989; jacobsen 2001; morgenthau 2000 [1918]; niepage 1975 [1917]) testimonial literature fills this desideratum but does not give adequate credence to the dynamics of the perpetrators, the actual implementing individuals. this paper contributes to approaching this research gap and starts looking at the genocide from the perspective of the people who are implementing it. from a perspective of genocide prevention, it is particularly important to study this topic of perpetration comparatively, in order to understand why people participate not just specifically in one case but across various cases, and thus what could lead people to participate in future genocides also. thus, this paper will first provide an overview of what motivates people to participate in genocide more generally, before then developing a micro-level foundation for the armenian genocide and building a more nuanced understanding of why people participated in it. this analysis will draw on the state of the art on perpetration in the armenian genocide, as well as analysing data generated from the verdicts of turkish war crimes tribunals from 1919. finally, this paper will contrast the findings from armenia with those of other cases in an attempt understand key similarities and differences and some more generalisable implications.2 the contribution of this paper lies not in its in-depth study of specific motivations of the armenian genocide, but to draw on new data and combine this with the previous studies on this case as well as other cases to paint a broader picture than has been painted thus far on perpetrator motivations in the armenian genocide. this will not provide the last word 2. it would go beyond the scope of this paper to retell the broad sweeps of the armenian genocide here, and it is assumed that the reader has a rudimentary knowledge of the case. for an excellent introduction please see kévorkian (2011). 29 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 29 on perpetrator motivations in the armenian genocide, but it is an attempt to synthesise the literature as it stands and bring a systematic perspective to this topic. the complexity of evil – why people participate in genocidal violence? there has been a growing amount of research on perpetrators in recent years, including work on attempting to understand the motivations individuals have for participating in genocide. this section will give a short overview of the literature on why people participate in genocide as a foundation for discussing the motivations of turkish soldiers and officials on trial subsequently. most of the research on perpetrator motivations has been conducted on the cases of the holocaust (e.g. browning 2001 [1994]; gross 2003; lifton 2000 [1986]; mann 2000; welzer 2006) and the rwandan genocide of 1994 (e.g. fletcher 2007; fujii 2009; hogg 2010; mcdoom 2008, 2013a, 2013b; straus 2006; verwimp 2005), as well as some individual works on the genocide in bosnia in the early 1990s (e.g. clark 2009; lieberman 2006; mueller 2000; petersen 2002) and the khmer rouge genocide in cambodia from 1975-79 (hinton 2004; hinton 2005; williams 2015). furthermore, there is a large social-psychological literature which is informative for this topic (e.g. bandura 1999; burger 2009; milgram 1963; newman 2002, 2006; sidanius and pratto 1999; staub 1989; sternberg 2005; vetlesen 2005; waller 2002; zimbardo 2008), as well as some criminological literature on genocide perpetrators (brannigan 2013; jäger 1982 [1967]).this research has shown first and foremost, that perpetrators’ personalities are not individually aberrant, nor do most of them differ strongly ideologically from their peers; much more, perpetrators appear to be overwhelmingly normal (browder 2003; browning 2001 [1994]; fujii 2009; jensen and szejnmann 2008; straus 2006; welzer 2006). however, beyond this, the many different approaches diverge on what they focus on, both in terms of causal explanations mostly informed by certain disciplinary borders and the cases they study. previously i have developed a model which synthesises these research findings from various historical cases and multiple disciplines to a more abstract and inter-contextually comparable model which seeks to explain participation in genocide across many cases of genocide (williams 2014a; for an updated version see williams 2014b). a model is to be understood as a systematic representation of social phenomena in which the model aims not to provide “a literally true account of the process or entity in question” (hughes 1990, 71), but instead an abstraction or idealisation which reduces the complexity of reality to only its causally relevant elements (mcmullin 1985, 261-262; see also jones 2005; psillos 2011).3 3. the model i have developed is an abstract or idealised representation of genocide participation, which does not take on the form of a typology. a typology would systematically and exhaustively categorise the phenomenon in question along multiple dimensions, while models focus more strongly on capturing the complexity of causal mechanisms. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 30 motivations are seen here as the impetus for action within a genocidal situation in which a perpetrator finds himself or herself4 and these motivations facilitate the process of making a decision between socially structured and individually constructed alternatives (in reference to hedström and udehn 2009). motivations are the driver which guides a person to make a choice between these alternatives. i differentiate between three broad types of motivations: those which focus on the in-group of the perpetrators, on the out-group of the victims or which are intrinsic to the perpetrators themselves and independent of inand outgroup. these three types encompass eleven specific individual motivations.5 furthermore, i identify facilitative factors which are not in and of themselves sufficient for causing an individual to participate in genocide, as a motivation is, but instead make this participation easier. lastly, there are contextual conditions which influence the entire situation and can make certain motivations or facilitative factors more salient. my model differs from previous approaches to understanding perpetrator motivations as it is the first to systematically integrate findings from multiple cases and several disciplines, thus coming at the topic from a new, interdisciplinary angle. while this comes at the cost of a contextually embedded understanding of perpetration, it also allows for a more nuanced perspective which better incorporates the complexity of reality with the many different motivations underlying human action. the fundamental tenet of the model is that it is possible for similar human and interpersonal dynamics to occur in very different cultural and contextual settings. whether this is then actually the case, can then be tested by applying the model to new cases (as will be done with the case of the armenian genocide in this paper). the first group of motivations i identify are in֊group-focused motivations, which concentrate on the social dynamics within the perpetrator group and the social influence exerted between members of it. social influence can be implicit, explicit or even backed up by (threats of) force and can be exercised vertically by an authority or horizontally between peers. most prominent in perpetrator testimonies but also in the literature on motivations is explicit or implicit orders by a person in authority and the obedience to orders that this then effects (see among many others alvarez 2001; brannigan 2013; du preez 1994; gourevitch 1998; hinton 2004; mamdani 2001; mcdoom 2008; meyer 2009; milgram 1963, 1975; semelin 2005; straus 2006; welzer 2002). similar horizontal social influence is termed peer pressure when it is explicit and is a common feature of descriptions of the bosnian and rwandan genocides (bašić 2006, 159; fletcher 2007, 33; hatzfeld 2004b, 25; mcdoom 2008, 265; straus 2006). when this horizontal influence is implicit instead, the active motivation is the desire for conformity, in which individuals participate in order 4. while in the armenian genocide most perpetrators were men, in other contexts women played a larger role. although there is some research on the topic of women’s diverging roles in genocide (adler, loyle, and globerman 2007; rights 1995; hogg 2010, 84; lower 2013; sarti 2011; sperling 2005), there is little evidence for systematic differences in their motivations. 5. each of these motivations is described at a relatively abstract level and their manifestations in actual genocides will vary. the mechanism causing the person to participate will be the same though, even if it is culturally specific how this occurs. 31 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 31 for them not to lose favour with the group and remain part of it (asch 1963). finally, horizontal and vertical influence can be laced with the threat or actual utilization of violence. this coercion can be a powerful motivation for individuals to participate in order not to experience physical violence against them. empirically various instances of genocide have provided significantly different degrees of how credible threats of coercion were, with no known instances of germans being killed for refusing to participate in the holocaust (bhavnani 2006, 657; fletcher 2007, 32; hatzfeld 2004a, 130; mann 2005, 164; straus 2006; see also jäger 1982 [1967], 84-93). the second set of motivations focus on the out-group from the perspective of the perpetrators: the victims. most prominently for this group and possibly the most pervasive in popular perceptions of genocide, genocidal ideologies can motivate individuals to participate in genocide. a genocidal ideology can lead to someone believing that it is the best and morally legitimate course of action or that the victims are deserving of the treatment. ideologies can take on many different forms and while they may look quite different across various genocides (goldhagen 1996; harff 2003; neilsen 2015; orth 2002), jonathon leader maynard (2014) provides a nuanced differentiation of six genocidal ideologies which can be found across various cases. the other out-group-focused motivation is emotions which at a psychological level raise the saliency of one desire over other competing desires and in this way shift motivations for genocide participation (petersen 2002, 17-20). emotions of particular interest in the context of genocide include fear (fujii 2009, 121; hinton 2005; petersen 2002; semelin 2005, 247; straus 2006, 122; sundhaussen 2001, 47), resentment, hatred and rage (petersen 2002), as well as disgust (rozin, haidt, and mccauley 2000). lastly, there is a broad group of intrinsic motivations which are all particular to the individuals themselves and do not relate to the perpetrator or victim group. to begin with, people can be motivated to participate in genocide for a broad range of opportunistic reasons, such as being able to loot and pillage, career promotion (or avoiding demotion), the ability to settle personal scores or get ahead politically, the possibility of raping and many more (browning 2001 [1994], 75; fletcher 2007, 33; fujii 2009, 97; mamdani 2001, 218; mann 2005, 32; mueller 2000, 49, 61; semelin 2005, 242; straus 2006, 79; valentino 2004). innately motivating for people to participate is sadism as it gives people pleasure in inflicting pain on others (alford 1997, 28; baumeister 2002, 254; segev 1992 [1988], 46-47; valentino 2004, 40). further, as with many types of crime people can experience a certain amount of excitement or thrills when being perpetrators which contrasts with their more mundane everyday life, thus giving them good reason to want to participate (katz 1988, 53; hinton 2004; hinton 2005; semelin 2005). next, individual perpetrators can assume genocidal roles in which they come to conform to an alternative set of norms and practices associated with this role (bloxham 2008, 232; browder 2003; lifton 2000 [1986]; roth 2004, 214; waller 2002, 221; zimbardo 2008, 214). a pertinent example of this comes from the cambodian genocide where one cadre speaks of what it was like to join the khmer rouge: “when we joined, it was like we were entering into a tiger zone, so we had to be a tiger like them. so, we needed to be a tiger like them, to be cruel like them. no international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 32 morality like them. that's why they were like that.” finally, status and power can provide enough motivational allure for individuals to participate in genocide (hinton 2004; hinton 2005), particularly through the intensely satisfying experience of gaining power over someone else (semelin 2005). besides these motivations there are also many facilitative factors identified in the model which make participation easier. it would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss these in depth, but a few key facilitative factors will be mentioned in all brevity here. it is easier for people to participate when they can absolve themselves of the responsibility for their actions through the groups they are in. they can do this particularly by displacing it to others or diffusing it within a group, or alternatively by immersing themselves in anonymity (bandura 1999, 196; fujii 2009, 158; vetlesen 2005, 147; waller 2002, 212; warr 2002, 62; zimbardo 2008, 315). further, if people are not ideologically committed to the crimes they are committing it is likely that cognitive dissonance will occur as their actions do not match their morals. to overcome this, people can try and morally disengage from the situation by dehumanising the victim group (thus taking away the moral problem of killing fellow humans) (bandura 1999, 200; fein 1990, 37-39); furthermore, distance can help to morally disengage, be it physical (bandura 1999, 199; chirot and mccauley 2006, 52; grossmann 2004), moral (grossmann 2004, 75; waller 2002, 196; welzer 2002, 243), social (browning 2001 [1994], 153; hatzfeld 2004, 28, 51), psychological (waller 2002, 196) or cultural distance (grossmann 2004, 70). third, another way to overcome cognitive dissonance is to seek moral justification for the deed and thus change one’s attitude towards one’s actions. there are many strategies for moral justification and portraying why the killing is necessary and good (eisner 2009, 53; leader maynard 2014; waller 2002). finally, the factor time can have a facilitative impact on people’s willingness to participate. over time, people can become habituated into violence and thus grow desensitised (browning 2001 [1994], 69, 128; hatzfeld 2004, 54; mccauley 2002, 79; sereny 1977 [1974], 200). also individuals can progress along a ‘continuum of destruction’ (staub 1989) by which an individual changes little by little over successive steps with each task preparing him mentally for the next slightly harder one. similarly, the idea of ‘escalating commitments’ when a person will continue along a pathway towards participation in a series of small steps, because at each point in time, stopping would mean admitting that the previous step (which was not much less worse) was actually also wrong (waller 2002, 205). besides these time-dependent facilitative factors, a final note on temporality as understood in this model is in order: over time people’s motivations for participation can change. while a perpetrator may begin his or her participation in response to social dynamics within the perpetrator group, ideological justification can later become more important or the opportunities the participation has allowed for. the model does not claim that one factor will explain each individual’s participation, but that various factors can coalesce and 33 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 33 that over time these may vary. future empirical research should endeavour to trace these intra-personal developments in some cases. in evaluating this model, a downside could be construed in its abstract nature by which it neglects cultural specificities and the individual dynamics inherent in various cases. however, this is also the strength of such a model as it is its abstraction which allows it to be inter-contextually and inter-culturally applicable, reducing the complexity of reality to the causal mechanisms which effect participation without their context. this in turn means that it can then be ‘re-inserted’ into context and help to understand other cases of genocide participation by reducing the level of abstraction and showing how the causal mechanisms actually work here. hence, this is the point where researchers who are expert on various cases of genocidal violence can bring to the model the cultural specificities of their cases and engage it with these more abstract causal dynamics. for example, some participants are motivated to participate due to obedience to authority; while social psychologically the causal mechanism for how they react to authority will be similar the nature of authority can vary strongly from case to case and authority during the khmer rouge meant something very different to authority in nazi germany or authority in the late ottoman empire. thus, this means that the model should also be able to assist in understanding participants to the armenian genocide. the model will now act as the template by which these perpetrators can be analysed. it will be of particular interest, which cultural specificities the motivations take on when they manifest in this case, but also whether some motivations occur with a higher frequency than in other cases. this model is not important in and of itself, but it allows the empirical data on perpetrators of the armenian genocide to be embedded systematically in the broader discussions of genocidal perpetrators. this is important in order to establish the comparability of the armenian genocide’s dynamics, but also with an ultimate view to genocide prevention. the challenging data situation on perpetrators in the armenian genocide having introduced in short what motivations can drive people to participate in genocide, the focus will turn now to the case of the armenian genocide to see whether the model can explain perpetrators’ participation in this case also. this is not a formal test of the model but instead seeks to understand the case of the armenian genocide using the model as a framework. should motivations emerge in the empirical analysis, this would disprove the model, while the model would be lent a higher credibility if the motivations found in the armenian genocide resonate with the individual elements of the model. in researching perpetrator motivations various approaches which have been pursued in the past will be discussed, demonstrating that there is a dearth of original sources for investigating perpetrators in the armenian genocide. while others have successfully studied perpetrators and their motivations in the armenian genocide, this has most often remained a niche of their analysis (although their valuable insights will help inform this more general analysis below). the most significant international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 34 research dedicated specifically to perpetrators of the armenian genocide has been conducted by hasmik grigoryan who looks at perpetrators through the eyes of survivor and bystander testimonies (grigoryan 2015a, 2015b). in particular she looks at the behaviour of children participants in the violence, women perpetrators and the role of sexual violence as a behavioural expression of perpetration. while the findings in this research are certainly interesting in and of themselves, they are more focused on the individual actions of the perpetrators than their motivations; this is quite reasonable as it is not only difficult for third parties to gauge the thoughts and motivations of others, but moreover the perspective of survivors is likely to diverge quite strongly from that of the perpetrators. baumeister terms this a ‘magnitude gap’ between victims’ and perpetrators’ perceptions. most of these differences in perspective “boil down to the fact that nasty events, both great and small, typically seem worse to the victim than to the perpetrator […]. a researcher therefore cannot understand the perpetrator’s perspective without at least briefly adopting a view of the episode that makes it far less bad than it seems to the victim” (baumeister 2002, 243).6more specifically, survivors like to entertain narratives which “construe the perpetrators’ intentions in a suitably grand and evil manner to match the suffering of the victims” (baumeister 2002, 246). referring to zygmunt bauman’s (1989) metaphor of a gardener who dispassionately weeds, roy baumeister (2002, 246) states that survivors would prefer to be hated passionately as this shows more respect than complete indifference. in this vein, “victim accounts tend to see stark moral issues with clear lines, whereas perpetrator accounts see many more grey areas in the relevant moral judgments. [… further,] perpetrators usually have reasons and explanations for their actions, whereas many victims describe the perpetrator’s actions as utterly gratuitous” (baumeister and campbell 1999, 211). certainly, much can be learned about forms of perpetration from the survivor perspective in the armenian genocide, as is demonstrated in grigoryan’s (2015a, 2015b) work, but to understand motivations from a perpetrator perspective, a different approach becomes necessary. to understand the perpetrator perspective, it would be most promising to directly interview the perpetrators themselves as was done in many of the studies on rwanda and cambodia, as well as some of the holocaust research (e.g. fujii 2009; hinton 2004; hinton 2005; mcdoom 2008; straus 2006; williams 2015). given the passage of time since the armenian genocide, interviews are obviously not a viable approach. other methods for studying perpetrators certainly exist, such as using the transcripts of clandestine audio recordings of german prisoners of war (neitzel and welzer 2011; welzer 2006; welzer, neitzel, and gudehus 2011) or studying their diaries or letters to read how they portrayed themselves and their actions at the actual time. these approaches are advantageous as there is less danger of the people wanting to socially conform as they are not writing or speaking 6. although the terminology used in the literature on the armenian genocide is that of ‘survivors’, these are equivalent to what is termed in most of the genocide studies literature as ‘victims’. the victims meant are obviously also those who were killed, but any types of post-genocide research referring to victims’ perspectives will also entail those who survived. 35 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 35 for a posterior audience. unfortunately, such documents do not exist or are inaccessible for the case of the armenian genocide, as a vast majority of ottoman soldiers were illiterate, as were the villagers and militiamen who participated in massacres (zürcher 2010, 167). furthermore, even if a small amount of such documents did exist, these would be under lock and key of turkish military archives and thus inaccessible to the general public.7 instead this paper will draw on data from judicial proceedings of the 1919 trials, an avenue of research also followed in many holocaust-related projects (most prominently in browning 2001 [1994]; goldhagen 1996). more specifically, this paper will look into the verdicts of the ottoman special military tribunal, which was a post-world war i courts-martial set up in 1919 by the ottoman state under extreme pressure by the allied forces who had just defeated the ottoman empire, germany and others. it was an act of the accommodation by the newly installed government particularly towards the british victors. this paper focuses on several cases which go beyond the highest echelons of power, particularly on the cases regarding local officials in yozgad, trabzon, erzincan, bayburt, as well as some responsible secretaries and delegates of the committee for union and progress (cup). i focus in particular on the verdicts passed by the tribunal, and draw on two different translations from turkish into english by dadrian and akçam (2011) and yeghiayan (1990);8 7. private correspondences. 8. the verdicts studied here are from the following cases which include mid-level perpetrators: 1. in the trial regarding yozgad (dadrian and akçam 2011, 290-293; yeghiayan 1990, 155-158) the accused were kemal bey, boğazlıyan sub-district commissioner  (kaymakam) and acting district governor of  yozgad; and major tevfîk bey, gendarmerie commander for the provincial district of yozgad. 2. in the trial regarding trabzon (dadrian and akçam 2011, 294-299; yeghiayan 1990, 159-165) the accused were mehmed ali bey, director of taxation of trabzon; nuri bey, chief of police of trabzon; mustafa effendi, director of the (secret) service of trabzon; talat bey, sub-district commissioner (kaymakam) and assistant to the chief inspector of the trabzon gendarmerie; niyazi effendi, manager of a hotel in trabzon; ali sayib bey, chief sanitary inspector, trabzon; all of the aforementioned were present at their trial. tried in absentia were cemal azmi bey, provincial governor (vali) of trabzon; and nayil bey, party responsible secretary of trabzon. 3. in the trial regarding erzincan (dadrian and akçam 2011, 312-313) the accused were memduh bey, former district governor of erzincan; hafız abdullah avni efendi, son of haci hüseyin; halit, former  deputy of erzincan; haci vahid-zade efendi from erzincan; karmo yusuf, tribal leader from dersim; arslan, gendarme sergeant from erzincan; tribal leader kagü, director of the daniz bey village connected  to the township of pülümür. 4. in the trial regarding bayburt (dadrian and akçam 2011, 304-310) the accused were yanyali nusret bey, former district governor of urfa; and mehmet necati efendi, discharged from the rank of lieutenant. 5. in the trial regarding responsible secretaries and delegates of the cup (dadrian and akçam 2011, 314-323; yeghiayan 1990, 147-154), avni bey, party responsible secretary of manisa; selaheddin bey, beyoğlu responsible secretary; dr besim zuhti bey, eskişehir responsible secretary; mithad bey, brusa  responsible secretary; cevted bey, lieutenant to the responsible secretary of mirkun; cemal bey, aleppo responsible secretary; abdül geni bey, inspector of edirne; abdül kadir effendi, aid to the konia  responsible secretary; hasan fehmi effendi, aid to the kastamonu responsible secretary; agyah bey, former president of the sanitary commission of karahisar; hayreddin bey, former karahisar official; all the accused were also present at the trial. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 36 the use of two translations allows me to triangulate the translations and minimise the risk of mistakes or biases in the translations misleading the analysis.9 before launching into the analysis of these trial documents, a short discussion of the limitations of this type of source is necessary. the people on trial are certainly not the lowlevel perpetrators in the focus of much perpetrator research, but the list of accused also goes beyond the leaders to include some of the mid-level functionaries to whom the scope of the model could also apply. also, any form of post-genocide data collection is confronted with the problem that “perpetrator testimony after the fact is vulnerable to attempts to minimize personal responsibility, or else to construct socially acceptable narratives. memory loss should also not be under-estimated” (mcdoom 2008, 239). this is exacerbated when the testimonies being examined are taken in the course of judicial proceedings as the individuals have strong incentives to minimize their own role and misconstrue their motivations. furthermore, the source used here are verdicts of the tribunal meaning that they are not the perpetrators’ own words but instead the condensed synopsis as seen by the judges. while this does allow for a certain adjudication of the credibility of the perpetrator testimony, it means that the motivations portrayed will have been filtered; and in this case even by a relatively partisan tribunal as was elaborated on above. nonetheless, these documents are among the only primary sources available through which this level of interaction with perpetrators and their motivations is visible. thus, these sources are anything but ideal, but -with these limitations in mindnonetheless they constitute an interesting launching point from which to explore the motivations of perpetrators of the armenian genocide, to try and understand, at least to a certain degree, what drove people to participate in this heinous violence. lastly, the judicial documents only let one infer the actual motivations of the perpetrators to a certain degree; although much can be said about the actions of perpetrators and some motivations are made explicit, in parts the motivations are only implicit. to bridge this gap, they will –as far as possible– be matched to other studies in the literature in which these actions are founded within the motivations of the perpetrators. as explained in the introduction, the aim of this paper is not to study any one motivation in-depth, but to bring together the insights from these judicial documents with the further research on individual motivations conducted by others and place this within the research framework of perpetrator motivations in other genocidal contexts. perpetrator motivations in the armenian genocide in this section, the tribunal verdicts are analysed in more depth to uncover what motivated some of the perpetrators of the armenian genocide who were on trial and their affiliates who did not need to face justice but were referred to in the trials. this analysis will be complemented by the insights from several other scholars who have in the course of their re9. both translations obviously offer the same content, albeit with different linguistic interpretations. if an idea is cited which can be found in both translations only the verdict will be referred to, whereas if a verbatim quote is given, the direct source will be mentioned. 37 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 37 search discussed perpetrator motivations to some degree. key motivations referred to here are various forms of opportunistic motivations, obedience to authority, sadism, ideology, although all to varying degrees, as well as several interesting facilitative factors. material gain of the motivations discussed in my model above, by far the most prominent in the data under analysis for the armenian genocide is that of opportunism with various forms of opportunistic participation being described in the verdicts. üngör and polatel argue that the seizure of armenian property by the young turk regime was not motivated by economic, but by ethno-nationalist reasons at the systemic level, with the economic destruction of the armenians aiming at supporting the broader annihilationist campaign and securing a turkish economy (üngör and polatel 2011, 166). in particular, “the expropriation of ottoman armenians was a functionally necessary phase linking persecution to destruction” (üngör and polatel 2011, 103). however, they argue that for the individual perpetrators themselves, economic motivations did play a more central role, particularly for the ordinary people participating in the murders who were motivated by plunder as a ‘pull factor’ (üngör and polatel 2011, 104). they also refer to latham’s (2000) work who demonstrates that these economic motivations existed at all levels of the state apparatus and also for non -state participants (üngör and polatel 2011, 10). first and foremost, looting is described in the verdicts as widespread with the seizure of abandoned property and possessions prevalent, as well as the stealing of the deported armenians’ money and carried possessions (cup responsible secretaries; erzincan; trabzon; yozgad; for a broader discussion of the mechanisms of looting during the armenian genocide see kurt 2015). this occurred both in their homes prior to departure as well as when the deported armenians were already being transported away. as the looting continued of the possessions they had taken along, increasingly anything they had with them was stolen, including even their clothes (trabzon). furthermore, even those who were spared immediate killing or were allowed to remain behind (mostly women who were then raped and killed or later married off, see below) were stripped of all their belongings. in their description of aziz feyzi, üngör and polatel (2011, 163) conclude that “it is likely that in his eyes he was only pursuing the financial interest of his family.” furthermore, even not killing, but participating in the broader actions of genocide (e.g guarding a caravan during deportation) could also provide options for enrichment as guards accepted bribes to postpone deportation or to see one’s family one final time (balakian 2010, 124), bribes to be allowed to use the toilet or to be allowed to rent carriages for transportation (at an already grossly inflated rate) (balakian 2010, 132) there were, however, also more subtle ways of gaining materially from participation in the deportations and genocide by either purchasing properties or possessions at desperation prices or by purportedly rescuing armenians but doing this in order to charge a large sum of money. in one example a cup inspector for the province of edirene, abdülgani bey, “had the cassimere and textile shop of the kazazyan brothers, which was worth one huninternational journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 38 dred thousand lira, given to his own son hayrullah in exchange for one thousand lira, and he had the abandoned property [of the armenian deportees] given to other followers at very low prices”(dadrian and akçam 2011, 319). this same abdülgani bey also took over the shares of two armenian brothers in exchange for seeking an exemption for them through a special request to the governor-general (dadrian and akçam 2011, 319). in another example, mrs sophie tahmarzian, widow and daughter of onik mahokian, trader and shipping agent, reports of mehmed ali bey, director of taxation in trabzon, that “in order to further facilitate stealing of my trousseau and my husband’s property he adopted me as his daughter. all my property and my deported husband’s thus became his” (yeghiayan 1991, 434). here the perpetrator was even able to present himself in a positive light as a rescuer, while at the same time taking the entire property of tahmarzian and her family. it was also common among turkish soldiers, paramilitaries and police, accompanying the deportations to collect money daily from the deportees in order to protect them from groups of bandits or potential looters from whom the deportees expected their imminent murder, as has been testified to broadly in the survivor literature (see for example dadrian 1945). access to ‘saved’ armenians as free labour by participating in the genocide, perpetrators were also able to gain access to various types of free labour. primarily such labour was garnered from women and girls who were not sent along with the rest of the deportees, but separated out. in the trabzon verdict, for instance, the plight of several armenian women and girls is told. they were first collected in a hospital supposedly for their protection, however, in due course, the women were then passed on to perpetrators’ households where they were used as slave labour or were married by the men (trabzon). not all ‘saved’ armenian women who were given to members of the perpetrator group were forcibly married. instead some were given into muslim households as maids or slave labour. here, again, perpetrators could benefit from participating by receiving unprecedented access to free labour for their households (trabzon). further, during the genocide some perpetrators took male deportees also as free labour to build clubhouses for members of the cup or to work in the properties which had been stolen from the armenian deportees (dadrian and akçam 2011, 315). lastly, orphaned children were also sometimes converted to islam and then accepted into muslim families (balakian 2010, 87). forced marriages and rape of those who were forcibly married to their new husbands, it is also reported that many of them were first obliged to convert to islam (yeghiayan 1991, 434), and were often also raped in order to prepare “them for absorption into muslim households” (bjørnlund 2009, 30). rape of armenian women was also common throughout the genocidal process and this was integral to the systemic attacks against the armenian population (bayburt; trabzon; bjørnlund 2009). these practices of rape gave male perpetrators an incentive to participate as they had unmitigated access to sexual activity and can “be seen as a result of 39 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 39 a thoroughly brutalized environment that left room for local initiatives when it came to the methods of killing and humiliation, initiatives that satisfied individual needs, not only for self-gratification but also for variation” (bjørnlund 2009, 29). at the individual level and beyond mere sexual desire, the raping allowed some men to gratify their sadistic or dominating needs and provide mutual recognition of masculinity (bjørnlund 2009, 29). theriault brings these perspectives together slightly differently: “the pleasure of rape is not sexual, but rather is experienced as sexual because the perpetrator gets sexual pleasure from violent domination. sexual enslavement of armenian women and girls, including through coerced or forced marriages, allowed perpetrators a related avenue of dominion that could be extended out in time” (theriault 2007, 30).10 freedom from prison a strong opportunistic motivation which can present itself to potential perpetrators is when they are currently in prison and are offered their freedom in exchange for their participation. there is significant evidence that this was a common recruitment strategy in the context of the armenian genocide. these former criminals were then trained for one week at the ministry of war and then sent from the capital to the caucuses as cadres of the ‘special organization’ (teskilat-i mahsusa) in order to implement the annihilation of the armenian people (altınay 1919, 23; quoted in dadrian 1991, 121; see also balakian 2010, 78). demonstration of loyalty for career progression “during the period of the rule of the committee for union and progress, […] all civil servants from the very lowest of rank to the directors of offices were appointed based upon no other qualification other than loyalty” (dadrian and akçam 2011, 307). in the build up to and during the armenian genocide, local officials were systematically replaced by individuals more loyal to the cup and its exterminatory plans (dadrian and akçam 2011, 307; see also balakian 2010, 78, 109). thus individuals who towed the line and positioned themselves strategically in favour of the deportations and the genocide could advance their career by receiving promotions. however, it is also plausible that those who had careerist ambition during this time were already dedicated to the cause for other reasons, thus not making this a motivation. nonetheless, either way, participation was a possibility to signal loyalty to the new system and to establish one’s authority over an area. coercion besides these opportunistic motivations though, there were also a host of further motivations. the power of coercion is indicated to varying degrees in different genocides, as 10. these perspectives which ascribe little erotic sexual pleasure to the act of rape have more problem explaining why, in most accounts of genocidal rape against armenian women and girls, it is the prettiest ones who are sought out. if it were soley about domination, the looks of the girls would matter less than, for instance, their social status. notwithstanding this addendum, the possibility to participate in rape certainly provided a motivation for some perpetrators. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 40 described above. in the case of the armenian genocide, the threat of coercion varied substantially depending on an individual’s position. as mann’s (2005, 164) thorough review of secondary sources demonstrates, normal soldiers were shot if they refused to participate or even dared to help the armenians, while officers in the army were unlikely to be killed for rejecting participation. this security predicament is also demonstrated by the low-level perpetrating individuals themselves, as testified by atkinson (2000, 88; quoted in bjørnlund 2009, 21) when discussing a turkish policeman who participated in killing because he ostensibly believed he would otherwise be killed himself, a common excuse or stated motivation. obedience to authority regarding the role of authority, many of the perpetrators were embedded in official state structures so that any orders they received came along traditional lines of authority used for all manner of legislation and its implementation, giving the genocidal policies fundamental legitimacy. however, the cup party structure became ever more dominant throughout the ottoman empire, with party structures partially existing in parallel to its state counterparts. in this context, there are descriptions of individuals “without any official authority as supervisors over the officials and guards” (dadrian and akçam 2011, 291) taking charge. these people nevertheless managed to successfully assert their authority in these situations, gaining obedience from individual perpetrators to act in accordance with the genocidal policies. it is through the authority of the increasingly dominant cup that these people even without official rank were able to enforce obedience to their orders (trabzon; yozgad).these processes were amplified as decrees were not precisely formulated to begin with, giving ample room for interpretation (üngör and polatel 2011, 104), thus strengthening the importance of authoritative interpretation and the resulting pressure to implement this. consequently, state officials became less willing or placed to intercede, for example, in the trabzon trial the court noted that even members of state institutions such as the local police chief, nuri effendi, took a back seat and “made absolutely no attempt, either officially or unofficially, to prevent [such acts], even though he witnessed them with his very own eyes” (dadrian and akçam 2011, 296). at the same time, these parallel authority structures made it possible for individuals to abdicate responsibility for their acts to the state structures. for instance, besim zuhti bey, cup responsible secretary of brusa, says that “it was not within my authority to do anything, and so i cannot say anything whatsoever about it” (yeghiayan 1990, 141). by referring to the ‘temporary law of deportation’, individuals were also further able to displace the authority which would hold them accountable for their actions, rather than seeing them as just automatons implementing orders. abdül geni bey, cup responsible secretary of edirne states in a cross-examination during his trial that “the deportations taking place were legally sanctioned. how could we have opposed laws established by the government? […] how could we have interfered? there was the law; there was the gendarmerie. 41 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 41 […] could we have said to him, ‘you are authorized’ or ‘you are not authorized’ to do this work on the basis of the law?” (yeghiayan 1990, 127-128). ideology michael mann (2005, 167) finds that “few kurds and few rankers in any unit can have been ideological killers.” while he posits that most perpetrators will have had little positive sentiment towards the comparatively privileged armenians, he argues that for most people ideology did not play a key motivating part. there are certainly some actors who did have ideological motivation, for instance kemal bey in the yozgad trial who displayed “feelings of revenge and of a personal vendetta [against the armenians]” (dadrian and akçam 2011, 292). this form of revenge is not opportunistic in the sense that it is personal but instead ideological as it is against the whole armenian people. while motivating only some individuals, ideology more importantly created a framework of legitimacy within which it became acceptable for people to participate in the deportations, lootings and killings. mann also concedes to the role of ideology that “these motives of retaliation and revenge helped still normal taboos against murdering helpless human beings” (mann 2005, 167). this began with the dispossession of the armenians which was clad in legality, and thus suggested a degree of legitimacy (üngör and polatel 2011, 58) and then continued with the legitimacy was given to the expulsion of the armenians as it was framed as a deportation or relocation. furthermore, nationalist narratives in which the danger posed by rebellious armenian groups fed into people’s perceptions of the necessity of their actions (see göçek 2015, 225). also, the subjugated role of the non-muslim armenians within the ottoman millet system and their unequal status which was legitimised within the doctrines of islamic ideology (dadrian 1995, 4-5) underlined this facilitative framework. within this framework the discrimination and subsequent destruction was able to be framed as legitimate the armenians could be portrayed as “antagonists” of the muslims (dadrian 1995, 125). furthermore, at the local level, it was local religious authorities whose authority “played a pivotal role in motivating and legitimizing the massacres” (dadrian 1995, 150; see also balakian 2010, 146), giving religious absolution for these crimes and also underlining the state lines of authority discussed in the previous section. through declaring the slaughter of the armenians a religious war (‘jihad’), it became legitimate to kill people as a normal act of war, as testified by a police captain (balakian 2010, 146), even stylising it to a “sacred religious obligation” (balakian 2010, 145).hence, ideology functioned here in facilitating people’s participation by removing moral inhibitions which individuals would have had and even creating a positive, religiously-legitimated reason to participate. sadism while there are no direct reports of sadism in the trial verdicts, there are multiple references to how the newly instated people who came to perpetrate the genocide were “cruel inhumane individuals” (dadrian and akçam 2011, 307) and to the “atrocious and cruel” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 42 (dadrian and akçam 2011, 294) manner of the killings. furthermore, although survivor testimony is more susceptible to interpreting perpetrator motivations as vindictive and based on hatred – as explained in more detail above – the actual actions of the perpetrators can be gauged with a higher degree of veracity. the degree of gratuitous violence involved in the deportations and killings speaks to the presence of at least some sadistically motivated perpetrators within the group. if the perpetrators had only been motivated by opportunistic, coercive or obedient motivations, there would have been no necessity for gratuitous violence, no need to torture both physically and psychologically many of the victims before killing them. facilitative factors – group dynamics as detailed above in the discussion of authority, some state and cup officials were able to remain in their positions without effectively and actively propelling the genocide forwards. however, this inaction in and of itself also had an effect on other perpetrators in their perception of the legitimacy of the crimes, because the inaction signals to others that the person is not registering moral inhibitions or their dissent towards the policy, thus inadvertently and implicitly legitimating it. this is epitomised in the trials of the responsible secretaries, when the president of the tribunal is quoted as having said to dr. mithad bey: “it is maintained that in your region and in others, many vile acts took place. and since you did not undertake any measures, your indifference encouraged the initiators and gave them license to expand the scope of their cruel activities” (yeghiayan 1990, 145). facilitative factors – moral disengagement through distance in the armenian genocide, the key facilitative factor which enabled moral disengagement was distance. while the deportations for the most part started through actions of local officials who were geographically as well as socially and possibly even emotionally closer to the victims, the actual killings nearly always occurred either outside the towns in arid areas and “out-of-the-way and concealed places” (dadrian and akçam 2011, 294), or at sea where people were thrown overboard (trabzon). furthermore, the killing groups were most often not made up of individuals who were from the same place as the victims as they had already been deported onwards (altınay 1919, 23; quoted in dadrian 1991, 121). thus any possible emotional or social ties which could have inhibited people from killing were removed. this distancing process began earlier even in the dispossession of the armenians which was clad in legal veneer, which also allowed the involved bureaucrats to take on a specific role of loyal civil servant. this legalisation of the dispossession created a framework for the implementing individuals which “structured their daily work and provided an impersonal, administrative-bureaucratic mask to hide behind. [… furthermore, it] relieved the conscience of the perpetrators by placing the ultimate responsibility with the central authorities” (üngör and polatel 2011, 58). 43 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 43 facilitative factors – dehumanisation a further facilitative factor attested to broadly is the systematic dehumanisation of the armenian population in the years before the genocide through state actors and media, which was augmented as a consequence of the early massacres of the armenians and the deportations which reduced the humanity of their appearance and thus legitimised the bad treatment in the eyes of the perpetrators (bjørnlund 2009, 22; see also balakian 2010, 295). however, theriault (2007, 30) convincingly argues against this omnipresent assumption of dehumanisation by demonstrating that many perpetrators actually attempted to maximise the suffering for the armenian victims, which provided satisfaction precisely because of their status as humans. it is necessary for the human capacity for emotion and trauma of the armenians to be “assumed by perpetrators in order for many forms of cruelty, such as raping of women and girls in front of husbands, siblings, or their children, to be considered meaningful” (theriault 2007, 31). while theriault does agree with the successive reduction of human features as cruelty mounted, he sees this gradual dehumanisation as a process in which enactment of cruelty which had the capacity to dehumanise was the foundation for the pleasure experienced by the perpetrators; he graphically phrases this as a process “through which genocide perpetrators consume the humanity of their targets by converting it into their own pleasure” (theriault 2007, 31). other facilitative factors are also present in the armenian genocide, such as the brutalisation of soldiers through standard training (see riggs 1997, 127-128; quoted in bjørnlund 2009, 21) which made it easier for them to participate in such horrific acts. also, the use of sanitising language such as referring to massacres as ‘cleansing’ (balakian 2010, 139) made it easier to frame the killing in a positive light. other facilitative factors have already been alluded to above in the discussion of the motivations. first and foremost there are the moral legitimisation of the deportations and the genocide through tapping into narratives of revenge and resentment already palatable to many of the rural population. this was not the motivation for their participation but instead it provided the framework for legitimacy within which their actions could become perceived as good and just. discussion how does the data analysed from the armenian genocide compare to the motivations and facilitative factors which have been unearthed for perpetrators of other genocides, as described in my previously developed model? most importantly, it should be noted that there were an exceptional number of opportunistic motivations found for why people participated in the armenian genocide. these were all based on the idea that participating in the deportations and killing enabled people to reap the benefits of being a member of the perpetrator group. these benefits range from the receiving the opportunity to loot armenian money, possessions and property for personal material gain, the possibility to rape or receive a forced bride, access to armenians as free labour, or career progression (or the avoidance of demotion) for loyalty. lastly, a key incentive was the opportunity for criminals to gain freedom from prison in exchange for their participation. this long list of international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 44 opportunistic reasons certainly dominated the trial verdicts, as well as secondary source interpretations of why people participated. nonetheless, further motivations can be identified also. referring to the in-group-focused motivations obedience to authority and coercion played a role, and the ambivalent nature of authority is particularly interesting in this context. however, there was little evidence of horizontal social influence in the form of peer pressure or conformity, as was important especially in the rwandan genocide (fujii 2009). next, out-group-focused motivations were primarily located in the realm of ideology, which played a role as a motivation for some, and provided a legitimacy framework for most, particularly drawing on the subjugating categorisations of the millet system, the ideas of an islamic jihad and turkish nationalism. regarding intrinsic motivations, the primary motivation of opportunism has already been mentioned, but this was also complemented by evidence of sadism. no specific data indicated the motivational power of genocidal roles, status or the thrill and excitement of participation. further, regarding facilitative factors, particularly ideology as a legitimating factor, distance as morally disengaging and group dynamics were shown to have made individuals’ participation easier. altogether, participation in the armenian genocide appears to have significant similarities to other cases, albeit with its own idiosyncrasies. while the motivations certainly have slightly different manifestations in this case to in other cases, they also appear to be quite comparable with other cases. the prevalence of opportunistic motivations which interact with a framework of legitimacy created by religious and state authorities shows how easy it can be to motivate ordinary people to become perpetrators of genocide, and this is an important lesson to heed in thinking about avoiding genocidal violence in the future. as and when new and better primary sources emerge it would be important to continue this systematic investigation of perpetrator motivations in the armenian genocide in an attempt to find out whether certain motivations occur more frequently than others, whether more often in combination with certain others, as well as how these perpetrators themselves perceived their motivations at the time and since. this paper here has not been able to provide a final answer on these issues but has attempted to bring together the work done so far on perpetrator motivations and look at it through the perspective of a model to judge the comparability of perpetrators in the armenian genocide to other cases. while this comparability is certainly given, much work still remains to be done, both in understanding the perpetrators and their motivations, as well as deriving lessons to be learned for the future from these. 45 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 45 references adler, reva n., cyanne e. loyle, and judith globerman. 2007. 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"disgust." in handbook of emotions, edited by michael lewis and jeannette haviland-jones, 637-653. new york: guildford press. sarti, wendy adele-marie. 2011. women and nazis: perpetrators of genocide and other crimes during hitler's regime, 1933-1945. bethseda: academica press. semelin, jacques. 2005. purify and destroy. the political uses of massacre and genocide. translated by cynthia schoch. new york: columbia university press. original edition, french. sereny, gitta. 1977 [1974]. into that darkness. ‘the mind of a mass murderer’. london: picador. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 50 shamtanchian, mikayel. 2007. the fatal night. an eyewitness account of the extermination of armenian intellectuals in 1915. translated from the armenian by ishkhan jinbashian, genocide library volume 2. studio city, ca: h. and k. manjikian publications. sidanius, jim, and felicia pratto. 1999. social dominance. an intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. cambridge: cambridge university press. soghoian, florence m. 1997. portrait of a survivor. hanover, ma: the christopher publishing house. sperling, carrie. 2005. "mother of atrocities: pauline nyiramasuhuko's role in rwandan genocide." fordham urban law journal no. 33 (2):100-127. staub, ervin. 1989. the roots of evil. the origins of genocide and other group violence. cambridge: cambridge university press. sternberg, robert j. 2005. the psychology of hate. washington, d.c.: american psychological association. straus, scott. 2006. the order of genocide: race, power, and war in rwanda. ithaca: cornell university press. sundhaussen, holm. 2001. "ethnonationale gewalt auf dem balkan im spiegel der goldhagendebatte." in politische und ethnische gewalt in südosteuropa und lateinamerika, edited by wolfgang höpken and michael riekenberg, 37-51. köln: böhlau. tabibian, negdar k. 1988. destined to survive. an autobiography. laverne, ca: american-armenian international college. theriault, henry c. 2007. “rethinking dehumanization in genocide.” in: richard hovannisian (ed.). the armenian genocide: cultural and ethical legacies. new brunswick: transaction publishers: 27-40. tilkian, garabed s. 1992. musa dagh boy. story of survival and service. los angeles, ca: abril. üngör, ugurümit, and mehmet polatel. 2011.confiscation and destruction: the young turk seizure of armenian property. london: continuum. verwimp, philip. 2005. "an economic profile of peasant perpetrators of genocide: micro-level evidence from rwanda." journal of development economics no. 77:297-323. vetlesen, arne johan. 2005. evil and human agency: understanding collective evildoing. cambridge: cambridge university press. waller, james. 2002. becoming evil: how ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing. oxford: oxford university press. warr, mark. 2002. companions in crime. the social aspects of criminal conduct. cambridge: cambridge university press. welzer, harald. 2002. "wer waren die täter? anmerkungen zur täterforschung aus sozialpsychologischer sicht." in die täter der shoah. fanatische nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale deutsche?, edited by gerhard paul, 237-253. göttingen: wallstein. ———. 2006. täter. wie aus ganz normalen menschen massenmörder werden. 2 ed. frankfurt: s. fischer verlag. welzer, harald, sönke neitzel, and christian gudehus. 2011. 'der führer war wieder viel zu human, viel zu gefühlvoll'. der zweite weltkrieg aus der sicht deutscher und italienischer soldaten. frankfurt: s. fischer. 51 opportunism, authority and ideology: on the motivations of turkish perpetrators as portrayed in the 1919 war crimes trials 51 williams, timothy. 2014a. "the complexity of evil: a multi-faceted approach to genocide perpetration." zeitschrift für friedensund konfliktforschung no. 3 (1):71-98. ———. 2014b. the simple complexity of perpetrator motivations – an innovative and multifaceted model of why people participate in genocide. in international association of genocide scholars conference. winnipeg, canada. ———. 2015. ‘make the enemy the number one fertiliser’ – why people participated in the khmer rouge genocide. in international association of genocide scholars conference. yerevan, armenia. yeghiayan, vartkes. 1990. the armenian genocide and the trials of the young turks. la verne: american armenian international college press. ———. 1991. british foreign office dossiers on turkish war criminals. la verne: american armenian international college (aaic). zimbardo, philip. 2008. the lucifer effect. understanding how good people turn evil. new york: random house. zürcher, erik j. 2010. the young turk legacy and nation building. from the ottoman empire to atatürk’s turkey. london: i. b. tauris. 66 dr. phil. tessa hofmann, magistra artium, prof. h.c., studied philology (slavic literatures and languages, armenian studies) and sociology at the freie universität berlin (fub); 1983-2015 research associate at the institute for eastern european studies of the fu berlin; research associate in international research projects (e.g. “out-migration from armenia and georgia”, 2008-2012); since 2015 independent scholar; author of numerous publications on the history, culture and present situation of armenia and its diaspora, on genocide research with a focus on ottoman genocide, on minorities in turkey and the south caucasus (https://independent.academia.edu/tessahofmann). since 1979 volunteer human rights work, e.g. as chair of the non-profit working group recognition against genocide, for international understanding; spokeswoman of the board of the association for the promotion of an ecumenical memorial for genocide victims in the ottoman empire. email: tessa.hofmann@katwastan.de 67 a hundred years ago: the assassination of mehmet talaat (15 march 1921) and the berlin criminal proceedings against soghomon tehlirian (2/3 june 1921): background, context, effect1 tessa hofmann a hundred years ago, on the late morning of march 15, 1921, the armenian soghomon tehlirian (soġomon t’ehlirean սողոմոն թեհլիրեան; also: soghomon tehliryan; soġomon t’ehlerean սողոմոն թեհլերեան (1897-1960)) shot the former ottoman minister of the interior (21 january 1913 to 4 february 1917), minister of finance (november 1914 to 4 february 1917) and head of government (grand vizier; 4 february 1917 to 8 october 1918), mehmet talaat (1874-1921) on berlin’s hardenbergstrasse. in an unusually short time by today’s standards, after two and a half months, the assassin was put on trial on 2 and 3 june of the same year at the jury court of berlin district court iii (landgericht berlin iii) in berlin-moabit. the trial lasted one and a half days, which was also unusually short. obviously, the german or prussian judiciary wanted to get rid of the accused and with him the subject of german-turkish relations as quickly as possible. tehlirian was acquitted on 3 june 1920, on the grounds of incapacity of guilt and was immediately deported from germany. this article explains the background, context and lasting effects of his crime. key-words: soghomon tehlirian, mehmet tala(a)t, armenian genocide, armenian question, operation nemesis. political background: the armenian question the killing of talaat has its origin in the genocidally answered armenian question. this in turn originated in article 61 of the berlin treaty (1878), which contained the obligation for immediate reforms in the “provinces inhabited by armenians” and ottoman accountability to the six major european powers france, great britain, austria, russia, germany and italy of the time. the ottoman government, however, dragged out the reforms for a quarter of a century, until the then sole governing nationalist committee for union and progress (ittihat ve terakki cemiyeti) had no choice but to reluctantly agree in 1913 to a reform project mediated by germany and russia. however, it was never realized. on 5 september 1916, count wolff-metternich, the german ambassador to constantinople, announced that the ottoman foreign minister was on his way to berlin to declare the international treaties “by which political shackles were imposed on turkey as no longer binding.”1 in particular, said ambassador metternich, articles 61 and 62 of the berlin trea1 the article was received on 06.06.2020 and eas accepted fopr publication on 03.09.2020. the ambassador on an extraordinary mission in constantinople (wolff-metternich) to the german foreign office; political archives of the federal foreign office (politisches archiv des auswärtigen amtes-pa/aa), de/pa-aa/r14093, at http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1916-09-05-de-002, 68 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0009 ty should be repealed. at that time there were almost no armenians left in the six armenian provinces (vilâyat-ı sitte) in question. in his comprehensive testimony as an expert witness in the criminal proceedings against tehlirian, the german theologian dr. johannes lepsius (1858-1926) emphasized the direct connection between the reform plan of 1913 and the extermination of the armenians by the young turkish regime in wwi: i was in constantinople in 1913. during the negotiations, the young turks were extremely upset that the armenian reform issue was again occupying the powers and doubly bitter when, as a result of the understanding between germany and russia, it was settled in a manner desirable for the armenians. at that time, the young turks said: “if you armenians do not keep your hands off the reforms, something will happen, whereas the massacres of abdul hamid were child’s play.”2 punishment of crimes against humanity reports of massacres of armenians, which had been increasing since mid-april 1915 and the ottoman government’s actions against the “inoffensive armenian population” in the ottoman capital constantinople, prompted the governments of the usa, russia and france to issue a joint protest note on 24 may 1915. it ended with the words: in view of those new crimes of turkey against humanity and civilization, the allied governments announce publicly to the sublime-porte that they will hold personally responsible [for] these crimes all members of the ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres.3 for the first time in legal history, state and mass crimes were qualified here as a crime against humanity4 and an international tribunal was announced. but this did not materialize. after the end of the war, the allies lacked unanimity and experience in the legal handling of such crimes. mustafa arif deymer, then minister of the interior and talaat’s successor in office said in his speech before the ottoman parliament on 21 december 1918: unfortunately, our wartime leaders, imbued with a spirit of brigandage, carried out the law of deportation in a manner that could surpass the proclivities of the most bloodthirsty bandits. they decided to exterminate the armenians and they did exterminate them. this decision was taken by the central committee of the accessed 24.12.2019. 2 der völkermord an den armeniern vor gericht: der prozess talaat pascha. neuaufl. hg. und eingeleitet von tessa hofmann im auftrag der gesellschaft für bedrohte völker. 2. ergänzte aufl (göttingen, wien, 1980), 60. 3 quoted from https://www.armenian-genocide.org/affirmation.160/current_category.7/offset.50/affirmation_ detail.html, accessed 18.06.2019. 4 genocidal acts are considered crimes against humanity. the term goes back to the first geneva convention (1864), which in turn was a reaction to the atrocities committed during the crimean war of 1853-1855. in the geneva conventions and the hague convention on the law of war on land (1899), crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity are seen in close connection with each other. the preamble of the hague land warfare convention with the so-called martens clause contains a ban on expulsion. expulsion and deportation are classified as crimes against humanity under the rome statute (1998). 69 a hundred years ago young turks and was implemented by the government… the atrocities committed against the armenians reduced our country to a gigantic slaughterhouse5 . arif established a governmental commission that examined the massacres for two months. on 18 march 1919 the oppositional daily alemdar, basing on figures compiled by the bureau of minister ahmet cemal, published as the result a figure of 800,000 armenians who had perished between 1915 and 1917-18; these figures were repeated in the official ottoman gazette on 21 july 1920.6 half-heartedly and hesitantly, the ottoman authorities did not begin arrests until april 1919, after most of the accused or suspects had already fled abroad. in 1919 and 1920, the constantinople court martials sentenced a total of 17 party officials to death as war criminals, although only three verdicts were executed because the remaining 14 convicts had managed to escape.7 cemal azmi (1868-1922) and yenibahçeli nail (d. 1926), both condemned to death in the trabzon trial, managed to escape; the latter was the secretary of the young turkish party responsible for the vilayet trabzon (trebizond, trapezounta) and head of the armed forces of teşkilat-i mahsusa, or special organization in this province. in the trial in mamuret-ül-aziz (harput), dr. bahattin (behaeddin, bahaddin) şakir (18741922) was sentenced to death in january 1920. in the erzincan trial, five persons (hafiz abdullah avin, halet efendi, krimo yusuf, the kurdish tribal leader keko, the gendarmerie sergeant arslan) were convicted and in the bayburt trial, lieutenant mehmet necati was condemned to death. among the mass murderers who were sentenced to death in 1919 but escaped, were the members of the young turkish triumvirate (1913-1918): mehmet talaat, ismail enver8 and ahmet cemal9. their execution and that of some of the leading executors of the genocide against the armenians was carried out by armenian avengers in 1920-22. but it was not only the failure of international justice or the ottoman judiciary that drove armenians to “hit and run” actions. the sovietization of armenia, and thus the loss of sovereignty, prevented armenians from kidnapping genocide perpetrators from abroad and bringing them to justice in a sovereign state, just as israeli intelligence officers did with adolf eichmann in may 1960 . 5 vartkes s. dolabjian, “even turkish sources point to 1915 genocide,” the gazette (montreal), 11 january 1999, b2, at https://dev.anccanada.org/turkish-acknowledgments-of-the-armenian-genocide, accessed 24.12.2019. 6 ottoman gazette takvimi vekâyi no. 3909, 21 july 1920, 3-4 cited in alemdar (istanbul), 15 march 1919. 7 taner akçam, armenien und der völkermord: die istanbuler prozesse und die türkische nationalbewegung (hamburg: hamburger edition, 1996), 157. 8 enver was captured in tajikistan, where he had joined pan-islamic insurgents against the soviets, by hakob melkumian’s brigade. melkumian was an armenian from karabakh. 9 minister of the war fleet 1914-1918. as commander-in-chief of the 4th ottoman army stationed in syria, djemal was directly responsible not only for the fate of the armenians deported there, for the suppression of the uprising in the armenian quarter of urfa and the siege of the armenians on musa dag, but also for the brutal suppression of arab liberation movements in syria, lebanon and palestine. “his order to also exterminate the 85,000 jews of palestine was only carried out on one third of the total because of the invasion of the british army in november 1917. the number of jews fell below 60,000 and about 2,500 jewish children became orphans.” quoted from gunnar heinsohn, lexikon der völkermorde (reinbek bei hamburg: rowohlt-taschenbuch-verl., 1998), 219. 70 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 the ottoman government’s attempt to establish justice by means of national jurisdiction failed primarily because of political calculations. the ottoman courts martial, which were held in 1919 and 1920 against members of the war cabinet and middle-ranking government officials, were intended not only to prevent the threatened tribunal of the allied victors, but above all to ensure the preservation of ottoman territorial holdings a deal that was doomed to failure. when the allies stuck to their partition plans, armed resistance against the allied occupation began to form from may 1919 under the leadership of the turkish war hero mustafa kemal. one day after the signing of the peace treaty of sèvres, the nationalist counter-government of ankara abolished the courts martial to investigate the genocide crimes on 11 august 1920. after the capture of constantinople by the nationalist, i.e. kemalist government on 6 november 1922, the government decree of 11 august 1920 officially came into force there as well. on 31 march 1923 a general amnesty was declared, which also ensured the release of those imprisoned by the courts of war. the three people already executed and those shot by armenian avengers in 1921 and 1922 have since been venerated as turkey’s national martyrs. the government of the republic of turkey provided the relatives of the executed with generous pensions. a draft law of 29 may 1926 stipulated that the relatives of leading turkish politicians who had been made “martyr” by armenians “for political reasons” should receive “property from the mobile and immobile property holdings left behind by armenians.”10 in 1921, the british minister of war, winston churchill, decided to close the allied proceedings against the suspects interned in malta. he thus obtained the release of british hostages, whom mustafa kemal had threatened to shoot in the event of criminal proceedings.11 three months after the ottoman court martial in constantinople on 5 july 1919 sentenced the members of the young turkish war cabinet to death in absentia, the 9th party congress of dashnaktsutiun (armenian revolutionary federation arf), the party then ruling alone in the republic of armenia (1918-1920), dealt with the question of retaliation in the fall of 1919. there are various accounts of the outcome. according to one variant, the 9th arf world congress at yerevan passed a secret resolution called the special mission (hatuk gorts; հատուկ գործ) to punish those mainly responsible for the armenian genocide: “between 1920-1922 the perpetrators were located and felled by the armenian avengers.”12 the shahan natalie family foundation, on the other hand, presents the establishment of operation nemesis [armenian: vrej, վրեժ] as an initiative of a minority faction within the arf, caused by the hesitant attitude of the majority: in view of the impotence of the ottoman justice system, the issue of retribution against the principal organizers of the armenian genocide was included in the agenda of the month-long ninth general congress of the armenian revolutionary 10 at http://www.aga-online.org/worship/miscellaneous.php?locale=de, accessed 04.10.2019. 11 akçam, armenien und der völkermord, 118-119. according to rolf hosfeld, talaat obtained his release from his berlin exile through the italian foreign minister sforza. rolf hosfeld, operation nemesis: die türkei, deutschland und der völkermord an den armeniern (köln: kiepenheuer & witsch, 2005), 18. 12 arshavir shiragian, “gomideh: operation nemesis,” at http://www.arfarshavirshiragian.org/armenianhistory/nemesis/nemesis.htm, accessed 12.12.2019. 71 a hundred years ago federation (arf), launched on september 27, 1919, in yerevan. having helped the same young turks come to power, the leadership of the arf, the ruling party of the fledgling armenian republic, refused to take any action. concerned by the advance of the red army, the arf was, in fact, then considering aligning itself with the new turkish authorities to stave off the bolsheviks. as a result, the issue was tabled, to be revisited during the arf eleventh general congress in 1923, after armenia’s loss of independence. shahan natalie, who had vowed to punish the genocide perpetrators upon receiving the first news of the massacres, was now concerned that failure to do so might result in more losses for the armenian people and its newly independent republic. angered by the party’s resistance to act, natalie led a task force with other deeply disenchanted arf founding members, such as grigor merjanov [1880-?] and armen garo, to mete out justice to the people responsible for the armenian genocide. two hundred individuals were blacklisted. mehmed talaat pasha topped the blacklist. shahan natalie referred to him as “number one.”13 the arf dissidents’ intent on retaliation created a secret network named after the ancient greek goddess of revenge, which was to implement the retaliation logistically and operationally. “our organization had no extermination plan,” wrote the avenger arshavir shirakian in retrospect. “it inflicted punishment on individuals who had been tried in absentia and found guilty of mass murder. armenian traitors topped our list.”14 the leadership committee of operation nemesis was initially headed by the former ottoman member of parliament (1908-13) for erzurum, armen garo (garegin pastermadjian գարեգին փաստրմաճեան (1872-1923)), who became ambassador of the republic of armenia to the usa in 1919. the planning and coordination of the special mission was the responsibility of the revolutionary and publicist shahan natali (also natalie; i.e. hakob ter-hakobian; 1884-1983).15 funding was provided by aaron sachaklian (1879-1964), the “financial wizard” of nemesis: “… it can be said that garo was the soul, natalie the heart, and sachaklian the head of operation nemesis.”16 at the end of 1922, when the arf had to move its headquarters to bucharest after the kemalists took the ottoman capital, operation nemesis apparently ended.17 shahan natali was removed from his leadership position at the 11th world congress of the arf in 1929.18 tehlirian’s assassination of talaat, the “number one,” was followed on 18 july 1921 in constantinople by the assassination of behbud (also: bihbud, pipit) jivanshir khan, the leader of the musavat party and minister of the interior of azerbaijan, when up to 30,000 armenians were slaughtered in september 1918 after baku was captured by turkish troops. misak torlakian (1889/90-1968), jivanshir’s executioner, was arrested and beaten up by 13 memoirs of a stranger, at https://snff.org/bookstore/memoirs-stranger/, accessed 14.05.2019. 14 jacques derogy, resistance and revenge: armenian assassination of turkish leaders responsible for the 1915 massacres and deportations (london, new york: routledge, 2016), xxvii. 15 shahan natalie, a biography, at https://snff.org/about/shahan-natalie/, accessed 24.12.2019. 16 marian mesrobian maccurdy, sacred justice: the voices and legacy of the armenian operation nemesis (new brunswick, london: transaction publishers, 2015), 45, 122. 17 ibid., 128. 18 ibid. 72 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 french security forces, but was later handed over to the british occupying forces, whose court acquitted him in november 1921,19 as in the case of tehlirian before, because of torlakian’s disability of guilt. shortly afterwards, on 5 december 1921, the former ottoman grand vizier (head of government) sait (said) halim was shot dead in rome by the young arshavir shirakian (1902-1973). together with aram yerkanian (yerganian; 1890-1934), shirakian subsequently shot cemal azmi, the “butcher of trebizond,” and bahattin şakir, who as a member of the c.u.p.’s central committee and a leading member of the special organization was responsible for the extermination of armenians in the eastern provinces in berlin-charlottenburg on 17 april 1922. the group’s plan was actually to eliminate the entire ittihad leadership, which at the time had found shelter in berlin. to this end, hra(t)ch papazian, disguised as a wealthy turkish student, had already infiltrated turkish circles in berlin and informed his companions natali and shirakian daily.20 on 25 july 1922, ahmet djemal was gunned down in the georgian capital tbilisi directly in front of the headquarters of the soviet intelligence service cheka by the armenian avengers petros ter-poghosian, artashes gevorkian, and stepan tsaghikian. mehmet talaat: a genocide perpetrator talaat, like many leaders of the young turkish union and progress party, originated from the balkans,21 more precisely from the small town of karcali (today bulgaria) in the former thracian province of alexandroupolis (turkish: edirne). here the coexistence of the ethno-religious communities had already become precarious in the late 19th century. edirne itself was temporarily lost to ottoman rule in the russian-turkish wars of 1828-1829 and 1877-1878 and during the balkan wars of 1912-1913. in 1877, the family temporarily fled edirne with talaat, who was barely three years old, from the russian army.22 at 18, talaat lost his father, who had been a low-ranking civil servant. without a high school diploma, talaat was taken into the civil service and began a career as a telegraph official. he earned an additional income as a turkish teacher at the modern school of the alliance israélite universelle in edirne. the principal’s daughter gave him french lessons. “this seems to be the only background for the speculation that talaat was a dönme, i.e. a jew converted to islam.”23 19 vartkes yeghiayan, ara arabyan, the case of misak torlakian (glendale, ca: center for armenian remembrance, 2006). 20 “the punishment of those responsible for the armenian genocide,” at https://www.hayastan.com/armenia/ genocide/punishment/index.html, accessed 05.05.2019. 21 erik jan zürcher, “the young turks children of the borderlands?” at https://www.academia.edu/847449/ the_young_turks_children_of_the_borderlands, accessed 11.05.2019. 22 hans-lukas kieser, mehmet talaat eine identifikationsfigur? eine biografische skizze; leicht gekürztes manuskript eines vortrags im rahmen der veranstaltung “schwierigkeiten des erinnerns der völkermord an den armeniern,” slightly abridged manuscript of a lecture given at the event “difficulties of memory the armenian genocide” in berlin, university of the arts, 18 march 2006, 2. kieser is also the author of the first biography of talaat; cf. hans-lukas kieser, talaat pasha: father of modern turkey, architect of genocide, trans. by tessa hofmann (princeton, nj; oxford: princeton university press, 2018). 23 kieser, mehmet talaat, 2. 73 a hundred years ago although of pomak24 origin, talaat, in his memoirs25 written in berlin in 1919/20, i.e., shortly before his death, “made an almost embarrassingly touching effort to prove his descent only from ‘old and genuine’ turks testimony to a zeitgeist that made mischief with ethnic descent, namely human appreciation and devaluation.”26 in 1895 talaat was arrested for opposition against the sultan, pardoned in 1897 and assigned to the postal service in selanik (thessaloniki), in what is now northern greece. the cosmopolitan garrison city became the center of the young turks’ movement, because it was possible to bring together civil and military opponents who believed in western progress and to create an organizational unification with the young turks in european exile. talaat’s position in the union and progress party was excellent when the party partially seized power in july 1908 through an army insurrection, had the ottoman constitution restored and deposed the autocratic sultan abdül-hamid in 1909. talaat was elected to the ottoman parliament as a representative for edirne and became minister of the interior in 1909, at the age of 35. in the turbulent period from 1911 to early 1913, when italy invaded libya and the united balkan states attacked the ottoman empire, talaat temporarily lost his post. however, after his party’s coup in january 1913 against the government of liberal forces that had just been installed, he became more influential than ever. in early 1913, the dictatorial one-party rule of the young turks, which lasted until october 1918, began. talaat was again minister of the interior and from february 1917 he was head of government with the title pasha. during the war years talaat was the main responsible for the deportation of the armenian population almost throughout the ottoman empire and for the deportations and expulsions of the greek orthodox population in the pontus area27 and western anatolia during the first world war. according to a survey-based projection by the german embassy in constantinople on 4 october 1916, one and a half of 2.5 million armenian citizens of the ottoman empire died of hunger, exhaustion and epidemics, in massacres or on death marches.28 these crimes, planned and directed by the state, were already judged as annihilation by contemporary german observers, including the imperial german ambassador himself.29 24 the ethnic affiliation of the pomaks is disputed between bulgaria and greece; for bulgaria the pomaks are slavs, for the greeks, thracians. their membership in the indo-european language family is undisputed. pomaks are bulgarian-speaking muslims. 25 hülya adak, “identifying the ‘internal tumors’ of world war i: talat paşa’nın hatıraları; or, the travels of a unionist apologia into history,” in räume des selbst: selbstzeugnisforschung, ed. by andreas bähr, peter burschel, gabriele jancke (köln, weimar, wien: böhlau, 2007), 151-172. 26 kieser, mehmet talaat, 2. 27 84,000 was the average number used by rudolph rummel, and 91,000 greek victims was the highest figure. greek authors assume a total of 353,000 greek victims in the pontus area alone in 1916-1922. cf. rudolph rummel, statistics of democide: genocide and mass murder since 1900 (münster: lit, 1998), 96. 28 letter from ambassador radowitz to the chancellor bethmann hollweg; political archives of the german foreign office, pa/aa, r14093, at http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1916-10-04-de-002, accessed 02.09.2019. 29 report by ambassador wangenheim to chancellor bethmann hollweg, 7 july 1915: “the expulsion and relocation of the armenian people was limited until 14 days ago to the provinces nearest to the eastern theatre of war and to certain areas in the province of adana; since then the porte has resolved to extend these measures also to the provinces of trebizond, mamuret-ul-aziz and sivas and has begun with these measures even though these parts of the country are not threatened by any enemy invasion for the time being. this situation and the way in 74 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 moreover, as his own records show, talaat was an accurate accountant of the extermination: throughout 1915-16, talaat, the ottoman minister of interior, supervised the destruction of armenians in the ottoman empire. masking this process as a security measure, he ordered the general deportation of armenians and oversaw the breakup of communities, the systematic confiscation of property, forced conversions, the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of people, and the dispersion of survivors across the empire. talaat received progress reports from different provinces and, at the end of 1916, ordered a general assessment of his work. on 24 august 1916, he sent a cipher telegram to 34 provinces (vilayets and mutasarrifliks) asking for detailed information about the presence of armenians in different parts of the empire. (…) according to talaat’s adjusted figures, around 1,150,000 ottoman armenians (or 77 percent) had disappeared between 1914 and 1917.30 with his appointment as head of government on 4 february 1917, talaat was at the height of his career: two months earlier, he had made an inspection tour of the anatolian provinces and, in a telegram to the sherif, the religious dignitary, from mecca, he had proudly stated that armenian houses and businesses had passed into muslim hands. in this telegram, one hears the voice of a social technologist, but also the voice of a balkan turkic champion who sees himself collectively as a victim and who believes that he has finally gained a territorial foothold in anatolia and this time has triumphed successfully over christians. as late as spring 1918 (...) (talaat) received congratulatory telegrams for his ‘services to turkishness.’ (...) talaat’s decline was all the more rapid in the second half of the year, when bulgaria withdrew from the war alliance and germany’s defeat became clear. on october 8, 1918, he resigned as grand vizier. on november 1, just a few hours before he fled to germany, he admitted his political defeat in a farewell speech at the last party congress sought to mitigate his complicity in the war and justified his failure to fight against abusers and war profiteers by saying that unity was a priority in the world war.31 with german help, talaat, together with other high-ranking leaders of the young turkish committee, had left the country shortly before the ottoman war capitulation (mudros, 30 october 1918) and escaped ottoman or allied jurisdiction. on 2 november 1918, he was transferred from the ukrainian seaport of sevastopol, together with other high-ranking young turks the former ministers enver and cemal and the young turkish party secretary dr. nazım (1872-1926). talaat was evacuated by a german torpedo boat and arrived in berlin in december 1918, where he moved into a nine-room apartment in berlin-charwhich the relocation is being carried out shows that the government is indeed pursuing its purpose of eradicating the armenian race from the turkish empire.” pa/aa, r14086, at http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/ armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-07-07-de-001, accessed 26.11.2019. 30 ara sarafian, talaat pasha’s report on the armenian genocide, 1917 (london: gomidas institute, 2011), 5. 31 kieser, mehmet talaat, 6. 75 a hundred years ago lottenburg under the alias aly saly bey (mehmet sait bey) at hardenbergstrasse 4 with his wife hayriye and initially, dr. nazım as well. as early as 1918 and 1919, respectively, the ottoman government requested the german government to extradite talaat, but the german foreign minister wilhelm solf rejected both requests with, among other reasons: “talaat has been loyal to us, and our country remains open to him.”32 in absentia, talaat was sentenced to death on 5 july 1919 by an ottoman court martial in constantinople for war crimes and the “massacre and annihilation of the armenian population of the empire.” however, the victorious turkish nationalists under the leadership of mustafa kemal immediately overturned the verdicts of the ottoman court martials after they had come to power in full.33 until his death, talaat understood the annihilation of the armenians in the ottoman empire, for which he was mainly responsible, as a necessary evil to save turkey. the us ambassador henry morgenthau quoted talaat in 1918 with the admission: it is no use for you to argue, talaat answered, we have already disposed of three quarters of the armenians; there are none at all left in bitlis, van, and erzerum. the hatred between the turks and the armenians is now so intense that we have got to finish with them. if we don’t, they will plan their revenge.34 the german foreign office therefore assumed that talaat was particularly endangered by armenian avengers in berlin and proposed a remote mecklenburg estate as his residence. talaat declined because it was easier for him to maintain his intense international political contacts from berlin.35 the young turkish leaders who had fled abroad sought to promote the turkish national struggle in the european metropolises (...) with propaganda, relationship work and as organizers of the turkish elite diaspora. they were planning an early return home and renewed participation in power. for this reason, they corresponded with mustafa kemal, who was the head of the anatolian resistance from the spring of 1919. entirely in keeping with the ideological conglomerate of the party during the world war, talaat proposed, in a letter to kemal, that the struggle be led primarily to victory in the homeland of anatolia, but also that the card of pan-turkish and pan-islamic solidarity be played. he also asked him for money, by the way. in his reply, in which he addressed him in good party tradition as “my brother,” kemal himself complained about lack of money. all the more important then was soviet support for turkish nationalism. it is remarkable how talaat made soviet russian, german nationalist and pro-fascist italian contacts. what united him with some socialists, despite his turkishness, was his hatred of tsarist russia and a revolutionary self-image.36 32 vahakn n. dadrian, german responsibility in the armenian genocide: a review of the historical evidence of german complicity (cambridge: ma., 1996), 217. 33 akçam, armenien und der völkermord, 114-119. 34 henry morgenthau, ambassador morgenthau’s story. eighth article [the world’s work, december 1918], at http://jfredmacdonald.com/worldwarone1914-1918/armenian-18ambassador-morgenthau-8th.html, accessed 05.06.2020. 35 hosfeld, operation nemesis, 13. 36 kieser, mehmet talaat, 7. 76 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 in the judgment of european and north american contemporaries talaat is described as a power-hungry, dictatorial, energetic, unscrupulous and irreligious person. in a dispatch to chancellor theobald von bethmann hollweg, the german extraordinary ambassador wolff-metternich described talaat as the cold-blooded “soul of the armenian persecutions.”37 talaat was convinced that his deportation orders were justified from the standpoint of national turkish-muslim interests. the turkish nationalist and feminist halide edip adıvar (1884-1964) quoted talaat on the “armenian question” in her event-close published memoirs: look here, halidé hanum. i have a heart as good as yours, and it keeps me awake at night to think of the human suffering. but that is a personal thing, and i am here on this earth to think of my people and of my sensibilities. if a macedonian or armenian leader gets the chance and excuse he never neglects it. there was an equal number of turks and moslems massacred during the balkan war, yet the world kept a criminal silence. i have the conviction that as long as a nation does the best for its own interests and succeeds, the world admires it and thinks it moral. i am ready to die for what i have done, and i know that i shall die for it.38 on the orders of adolf hitler, talaat’s remains were exhumed in march 1943 from the turkish cemetery in berlin-neukölln and buried in a grave of honor on liberty hill in istanbul in the presence of the then german ambassador franz von papen. hitler hoped in vain that this would make the neutral turkish republic a german ally.39 to this day talaat is revered as a patriotic martyr in his homeland and in the turkish diaspora. three mosques in ankara and istanbul bear his name.40 seven city districts, three boulevards and 21 streets of various large cities also bear talaat’s name.41 soghomon tehlirian, the avenger born on 2 april 1896 in the village of nerkin (inner) bagarij (բագառիճ) in erzurum province, tehlirian was raised in nearby yerznka (erzincan) since 1905, after his father was arrested and sentenced to six months imprisonment. during this time, the tehlirian family moved to erzincan, where tehlirian received his initial education at the protestant elementary school. after graduation at the armenian central lyceum (getronagan) of constantinople, he went to study engineering in serbia. “he was in serbia, having moved there quite 37 hosfeld, operation nemesis, 16 38 halidé edib adivar, the memoirs of halidé edib (piscataway, nj: gorgias press, 2005), 387. 39 tessa hofmann, “der prozeß talaat pascha: vorwort zur neuauflage,” in: der völkermord an den armeniern vor gericht: der prozeß talaat pascha. neuauflage; hrsg. u. eingeleitet von tessa hofmann im auftrag der gesellschaft für bedrohte völker (göttingen, wien: reihe pogrom, 1980); robert fisk, “my conversation with the son of soghomon tehlirian, the man who assassinated the organizer of the armenian genocide,” independent, 20 june 2016, at https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/robert-fisk-armenian-genocide-conversation-son-soghomon-tehlirian-mehmet-talaat-pasha-assasination-a7091951.html, accessed 21.06.2016. 40 “talaatpaşa camii”: 1) ankara-dikmen, gökkuşağı mahallesi, 8. sokak, no. 9; 2) i̇stanbul-kağıthane, talaatpaşa mahallesi, aslangazi caddesi, no. 22; 3) i̇stanbul-maltepe, cevizli mahallesi, talaatpaşa caddesi, no. 22, at http://www.aga-online.org/worship/talaat-pasha.php?locale=de, accessed 21.06.2019. 41 see at http://www.aga-online.org/worship/talaat-pasha.php?locale=de, accessed 21.06.2019. 77 a hundred years ago by chance on the very day in june 1914 that gavrillo principe shot the archduke ferdinand in sarajevo, setting off the first world war.”42 during the bolshevik revolution of 1917, tehlirian went to russia and joined general antranig ozanian’s armenian volunteer force, fighting alongside the regular imperial russian army against the ottomans, while those family members who had stayed in erzincan were deported in june 1915. after the world war, tehlirian learned in constantinople at a lecture by dr. melkon gülistanian that the original list of the armenian elite arrested in the ottoman capital on 24 april 1919, had been compiled by a harutyun mkrtchyan for bedri bey, the president of the capital’s police force. gülistanian was one of the few survivors of those arrested at the time.43 in march 1919, tehlirian shot mkrtchyan in constantinople. this first assassination drew the attention of the nemesis network to tehlirian, who was invited to boston and put on talaat as the “number one” on shahan natali’s hit list. nevertheless, as tehlirian’s biographer edward alexander points out, tehlirian was neither a murderer nor a mere tool of the secret organization nemesis. he was also not a terrorist, because he was not driven by any nationalist or other ideology. he was driven by an obsession to take revenge on the man he considered to be mainly responsible for the destruction of his family: once that was done, the torment in his soul subsided and tehlirian never killed again. the arf’s motive in having talaat killed was political. tehlirian’s motive was vengeance. he was not a soldier in an ideological cause, nor fighting for territorial integrity, nor was he the agent of a political faction. although a loyal member of the arf, under whose auspices he carried out the assassination, he was a member in name only, executing the deed for his own sake rather than for any political program.44 marian mesrobian maccurdy rightly points out that revenge was the motive for all those involved in the planning of the attack on talaat, as they all lamented the loss of relatives “and therefore felt compelled, once it was clear that the allies would not hold the turks accountable, to mete out justice themselves.”45 after his deportation from germany in 1921, tehlirian returned to serbia, where he lived with his wife in belgrade until 1950. from there the couple moved to casablanca. “having been told by the arf that turkish agents were closing on him in 1956 he moved to the united states.”46 in san francisco tehlirian worked as a postal employee under the alias saro melikian. his younger son characterized him as follows: he was the most gentle, mild man you could ever meet, almost naïve. me and my 42 fisk, “my conversation with the son of soghomon tehlirian.” 43 edward alexander, a crime of vengeance: an armenian struggle for justice (ny etc: the free press / collier macmillan, 1991), 43. 44 ibid., 200. 45 mesrobian maccurdy, sacred justice, 123. 46 shiragian, gomideh. 78 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 older brother had to force him to tell us what happened. he never liked to talk about it. he was a man of very few words. he used to write poetry and draw very well.47 the court case against tehlirian in 1985, when i was able to view the preliminary investigation file of the criminal case and other documents in the archives of the german democratic republic at that time, the “depoliticization” of the proceedings by the german foreign office and the prussian ministry of justice became clear to me.48 among other things, the german authorities feared that the criminal trial against tehlirian might be used to discuss german-turkish relations during wwi and especially german complicity in the extermination of the armenians. therefore, the trial should be conducted as swiftly as possible. instead of the three trial days requested by the defense, the trial was conducted in only one and a half days and only nine of the 15 witnesses requested by the defense were heard. the preliminary investigation had already ended on 21 march 1921, just seven days after talaat’s assassination. the court case itself began on 18 april 1921; on 29 march, the district attorney’s office brought the charges before a jury. even though the district attorney’s office expected tehlirian to be charged, it had him sent for a medical examination. dr. stoermer, the medical officer, in his diagnosis of 11 april 1921, stated that tehlirian was “malnourished” and “inconspicuous,” with scars on his skull, upper left arm, and knee, dating presumably back to the massacres. the doctor noted tehlirian’s precise description of his own medical state as follows: tehlirian undoubtedly suffers from epilepsy, but only in its nerve-related form, and not as a psychological disturbance… the diagnosis results from tehlirian’s own vivid descriptions. i was amazed at tehlirian’s ability to describe his illness in precise medical terms.49 the prosecution’s prime question referred to whether the nervous condition he suffered would call for the application of section 51 of the imperial criminal code, which would qualify tehlirian for a plea of insanity.50 talaat’s assination caused german judicial circles considerable embarrassment. on 25 may 1921, gollnick, the chief public prosecutor, addressed the prussian ministry of justice in order to explain his reservations about the legal strategy: it is to be feared that the (forthcoming) trial by jury (…) will escalate into a mammoth political case. (…) first of all, we are sure to expect that the defense will argue on behalf of the accused that his was an act of heroism freeing christian armenians suffering under the turkish yoke. (…) perhaps the defense will even 47 fisk, “my conversation with the son of soghomon tehlirian.” 48 tessa hofmann, “new aspects of the talaat pasha court case: unknown archival documents on the background and procedure of an unintended political trial,” armenian review 42, no. 4/168, (1989): 41-53. 49 record rep. 30 bln c, tit. 198 b, nr. 1182, p. 182 in the state archives in potsdam; hofmann, “new aspects of the talaat pasha court case,” 43. 50 ibid. 79 a hundred years ago try to investigate the stance of the german government on the armenian atrocities. (…) comparing the polish insurrection with the turkish (action), especially (at this time), and in england, where (politics) lends a friendly ear to the armenians, would be (most) undesirable, as long as the upper silesian problem (remains unsolved). of even greater concern from the political point of view is a line of inquiry during the trial, which would consider (talaat) pasha’s general political role and his german connections. talaat was known to be the most reckless of all (representatives) with pro-german inclinations in turkey, (and) actually not only in (turkish) regions, but also beyond (turkish) borders in all parts of the islamic world. the (eyes) of the entire islamic world will be focused on (this) trial. public discussions about the trial would have multiple and significant political repercussions in asia, (especially) on political relations between (germany) and ankara’s newly-formed government. (…)51 however, gollnick did not prevail against the foreign office with his proposal to conduct the proceedings in camera. from the files, we deduce that personal contacts existed between the chief public prosecutor’s office and the german foreign office, both before and after the trial. on 1 june 1921, a day prior to the trial, in a meeting with baron von thermann and count friedrich wilhelm von schulenburg as representatives of the german foreign office, the foreign office representatives, clearly deviating from earlier requests, announced that a request for public exclusion by the prosecutors would be less than desirable as it could not only fail but could make a bad impression on the public. the advocates of a flexible attitude which was intended to impress the allied powers seemed to have convinced the conservative hardliners.52 tehlirian was represented by three lawyers: the privy judicial authority, dr. adolf von gordon (berlin; 1850-1925), whom natali described as “conservative, but very influential.”53 gordon’s partner, justice counsel dr. johannes werthauer (1866-1938), was one of the most prominent lawyers of the weimar republic, whose citizenship was revoked by the national socialists in august 1933 on their first list.54 tehlirian’s third criminal defense attorney was the privy counselor dr. theodor hugo edwin niemeyer (1857-1939), “a man of european reputation, co-founder of the international law association and member of the institut de droit internationale, which was awarded the nobel peace prize in 1904. in 1915 he founded the journal of international law. in 1917, on niemeyer’s initiative, the german society for international law was founded, which was forced to dissolve in 1933.”55 51 ibid., 44. 52 ibid., 45. 53 rolf hosfeld, gurgen petrossian, “der prozess gegen soghomon tehlirjan, deutschland 1919-1921,” in: groenewold/ ignor / koch (hrsg.), lexikon der politischen strafprozesse, at httpss://www.lexikon-der-politischen-strafprozesse.de/glossar/tehlirjan-soghomon/, accessed 15.09.2020. 54 ibid. 55 ibid. 80 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 the defense requested “at least three days adjournment.”56 the second and third days were planned for gathering evidence on the “massacres in armenia.” the defense wanted to subpoena fifteen experts and witnesses, five of whom were missionaries or had served in the german medical services in the ottoman empire and were eyewitnesses; two were former german consuls (dr. erwin von scheubner-richter from erzurum, and walter rössler from aleppo), and one was a member of the german imperial military mission (lt. col. ernst paraquin). only nine of the fifteen expert witnesses were subpoenaed; five of these were medical experts on the question of tehlirian’s mental responsibility. instead of e. paraquin, the former field marshall otto liman von sanders was summoned prior to the trial at the prosecutor’s request. this was clearly to counteract the comprehensive testimony by dr. johannes lepsius, who was generally considered an armenophile. there was no evidence heard on talaat’s blame as author of the genocide. when von gordon wanted to file a petition, gollnick supplied the following counterclaim: i request that this petition be denied. a detailed discussion on whether talaat was responsible for the armenian atrocities has already been permitted. the question is entirely irrelevant. in my opinion, there is no doubt that the accused was convinced that talaat was indeed that person who could be held responsible for the atrocities. thereby, the motive becomes very obvious. i am of the opinion that it is not the duty of this court to question talaat’s guilt. for the judgment would be a historical one, requiring evidence of a very different nature from what is present here.57 nevertheless, thanks to the intervention of the presiding judge and district court director dr. lehmberg, the prehistory of tehlirian’s deed was discussed in detail during the trial, when the defendant reported on the massacre of his family and his own survival: this was unusual, but lehmberg who was very familiar with lepsius’ collection of documents on germany and armenia apparently wanted to strike a major chord that gave tehliria’s “i was not a murderer” a certain credibility right from the start. the core of tehlirian’s statements about the annihilation of his family was known to lehmberg, who repeatedly asked for details, through lepsius’ collection of documents,58 which contained comparable descriptions of the course of the massacres.59 the statements of the two armenian witnesses and genocide survivors christine terzibashian (born eftian, ca. 1894-1969) and rev. grigoris palagian (balakian; 1873-1934) supported tehlirian’s statements. terzibashian and her family were deported from erzurum in july 1915 and were among the remaining survivors. the cleric palagian was one of the few armenians who survived, having been arrested in constantinople on 24 april 1915, and then deported to çankırı or ayaş. after his training in erzurum, rev. palagian had pre56 hofmann, “new aspects of the talaat pasha court case,” 46. 57 ibid., 47. 58 deutschland und armenien 1914-1918: sammlung diplomatischer aktenstücke; hrsg. u. eingeleitet von dr. johannes lepsius. potsdam 1919 (neuauflage bremen: donat verlag, 1986, mit einem vorw. zur neuausgabe von tessa hofmann und einem nachw. von m. rainer lepsius), lxxx, 549. 59 hosfeld and petrossian, “der prozess gegen soghomon tehlirjan.” 81 a hundred years ago viously studied architecture in germany and had written a paper on the monuments of ani, the former capital of the armenian kingdom of shirak. he then became a member of the clerical council in constantinople and its secretary and proved to be an important “leader and organizer” in times of persecution of the armenians. in march 1915, he was put on the denunciation list of harutyun mkrtchyan, sentenced to death but escaped execution. rev. palagian was 42 years old and prelate in manchester at the time of the criminal trial against soghomon tehlirian. he has described his experiences not only as a witness during the trial, but also in his two-volume memoir the armenian golgotha.60 on 3 june 1921, after one and a half hours of deliberation, the twelve members of the jury acquitted tehlirian. the spokesman did not give any contextual reason for the decision. in a letter to the ministry of justice, dated 5 june 1921, gollnick surmised the following: since two medical expert witnesses confirmed the prerequisites of section 51 of the imperial criminal code, we assume that the verdict of not guilty is determined based on this stipulation. the warrant was withdrawn, and tehlirian was set free. i have sent a request to the police headquarters to have tehlirian deported as soon as possible on the grounds of being a troublesome foreigner.61 by removing tehlirian, the german authorities rid themselves of the cause of any further investigations. the acquittal of tehlirian came as a surprise. in the eyes of many, especially armenians, justice and truth triumphed. in particular, the expectations of the media-experienced vrej organizer shahan natali, who, according to his own account in the newspaper nairi (beirut), had instructed tehlirian as follows, were fulfilled: you blow up the skull of the number one nation-murderer and you don’t try to flee. you stand there, your foot on the corpse and surrender to the police, who will come and handcuff you.” shahan natalie’s purpose was to turn soghomon tehlirian’s trial into the political trial of those responsible for the great tragedy, which was realized in part. however, there were those in the arf leadership, simon vratsian in particular, who had two chapters, which dealt with shahan natalie’s leadership role in the assassination of talaat, deleted from tehlirian’s memoirs before their printing.62 not only the german ministries of justice and foreign affairs, but also the vrej organizers influenced the berlin criminal proceedings against tehlirian, presumably through vahan zakariants (zakariantz; also zakarian) and libarit nazariants (liparit nasariantz), both members of the arf and close collaborators of johannes lepsius. nazariants was also a founding member of the german-armenian society (deutsch-armenische gesellschaft) founded by lepsius in june 1914. in the spring of 1915, zakariants “with the support of the 60 grigoris palagian, հայ գողգոթան [the armenian golgotha], vol. 1 (vienna: mechitaristen-kongregation, 1922); vol. 2 (paris: imprimerie araxes, 1959). french edition: le golgotha arménien (la ferté-sous-jouarre: le cercle d’écrits caucasiens, vol. 1, 2002; vol. 2, 2004 (band 2); american edition: armenian golgotha: a memoir of the armenian genocide, 1915-1918, trans. by peter balakian and aris sevag (new york: alfred a. knopf, 2009). 61 hosfeld and petrossian, “der prozess gegen soghomon tehlirjan.” 62 natalie, a biography. 82 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 [german] foreign office and under a false name, had investigated the incipient massacres in turkey and served [1921] as vice consul of the republic of armenia in berlin.”63 the arf is said to have risen between 100,000 and 300,000 marks for the defense of tehlirian. rolf hosfeld and gurgen petrossian in their recently published encyclopedia article describe johannes lepsius as the “actual backstage promoter of tehlirian’s defence.”64 but it remains an open and unresearched question to what extent lepsius himself became aware of this role. just as open remains in view of his humanitarian oeuvre as a whole the question of the general influence of the arf on lepsius. in tehlirian’s criminal case, neither the existence of the secret organization vrej, nor tehlirian’s affiliation to it, nor his membership of general a. ozanian’s voluntary units were mentioned. in his memoirs, published in 1956, tehlirian mentioned the loss of 85 members of his extended family during the genocide,65 but in contradiction to his testimony in the berlin criminal proceedings, he was not an eyewitness to the deportation and murder of his relatives. tehlirian’s younger son remembered in 2016: “my father never had a sister (…). he and two of his brothers were in serbia [at the time of the genocide; t.h.]. it was his mother my grandmother who was killed in the genocide, along with his oldest brother vazken, who would have been my uncle and who had been a medical student in beirut.”66 the autobiographical narrative that tehlirian offered when questioned by judge lehmberg in berlin was thus a construct, but one that contains extremely typical and essential elements of the collective fate of his compatriots. legal and historical significance not only armenian trial observers, but also the liberal and social democratic press of germany celebrated the acquittal by the berlin jury as a triumph of higher justice. the jewish legal expert robert max wassili kempner (1899-1993), who had attended the trial as a young assessor, wrote in retrospect on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the criminal trial: the general deportation of the armenians was decided by the young turk committee during the first world war, ordered by the minister of interior talaat pasha and carried out with the help of the young turk committee until the armenians were massacred. more than two thirds of the armenian people became victims of this holocaust. as a student at the law faculty of the friedrich-wilhelm-university in berlin, i became aware of the terrible human, political and legal tragedy of this genocide, when three years after the end of the war, the armenian student solomon teilirian shot the former turkish minister of the interior talaat pasha, who also lived there, in berlin. the ensuing murder trial before the jury court of the berlin district court iii, which took place on june 2 and 3, 1921, under the chairmanship of district court director dr. lehmberg, shook up the whole world. there were still 63 hosfeld and petrossian, “der prozess gegen soghomon tehlirjan.” 64 ibid. 65 soghomon tehlirian,վերյիշումներ [recollections] (cairo: husaper, 1953), 8. 66 fisk, “my conversation with the son of soghomon tehlirian.” 83 a hundred years ago jurors in berlin: teilirian was acquitted, the twelve jurors coming to the conclusion in a one-hour secret deliberation that the deed was an act of passion by a mentally unstable young man who was under the terrible trauma of the armenian extermination.67 in summary, kempner concluded: “it was a fair and just trial. its objective conduct was particularly commendable because turkey was allied with the central powers during the first world war.”68 in the nuremberg war crimes trials in 1945/6, kempner appeared as the main us prosecutor robert jackson’s deputy. in 1947 kempner detected the so-called wannsee protocol. the criminal trial of 1921 also left a deep impression on the polish jewish jurist raphael lemkin (1990-1959), who was born in what is now belarus, even though lemkin, as a student in lemberg (lvóv, lviv, lvov) only learned of its course from the press. lemkin wrote about this key experience in his autobiography: the court in berlin acquitted tehlirian. it decided that he had acted under “psychological compulsion.” tehlirian, who upheld the moral order of mankind, was classified as insane, incapable of discerning the moral nature of his act. he had acted as the self-appointed legal officer for the conscience of mankind. but can a man appoint himself to mete out justice? will not passion sway away such a form of justice and make a travesty of it? at that moment my worries about the murder of the innocent became more meaningful for me. i did not know all the answers, but i felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be adopted by the world.69 in the dilemma between impunity and lynch law, lemkin’s lasting and outstanding achievement was to have recognized the legislative gap that prevented state and major crimes such as that committed against armenians and other christians in the ottoman empire from being punished or even prevented. he heard from his heidelberg law professor that there was no law to prevent crimes committed by a state against its citizens. lemkin pointed out the legal inconsistencies: “it is a crime for tehlirian to kill a man, but it is not a crime for his oppressor to kill more than a million men? this is most inconsistent.”70 on 25 may 1926, the jewish tailor, poet and anarchist shalom schwarzbart (also schwarzbard; 1886-1938), shot the ukrainian military commander (chief ataman) symon petlyura dead in paris. as the chairman of the board of directors of the ukrainian national republic petliura was responsible for the massacre of jews in 1918, in which schwarzbart’s parents had perished. petliura’s executioner schwarzbart was declared insane after a criminal trial in 1927, just like tehlirian six years before him. lemkin felt confirmed by 67 robert m. w. kempner, “vor sechzig jahren vor einem deutschen schwurgericht: der völkermord an den armeniern,” recht und politik 3 (1980): 167. 68 ibid. 69 donna-lee frieze (ed.), totally unofficial: the autobiography of raphael lemkin (london: yale university press, 2013), 20. 70 samantha power, “a problem from hell”: america and the age of genocide (new york, ny: perennial, 2002), 17; totally unofficial, 20. 84 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 the berlin and paris jury’s decisions: “the perpetrator is insane and therefore must go free. […] gradually, the decision was maturing in me that i had to act.”71 lemkin’s life’s work became the drafting and implementation of an international treaty on the prevention and punishment of genocide. the first attempts to introduce such a convention into the league of nations failed in 193372, and it was only after another world war and genocide on an even larger scale that the united nations adopted the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide in 1948, the essential parts of which were prepared by lemkin. the definition of genocide contained therein is empirically based on the historical examples of the extermination of the armenians in 1915/16, the so-called simele massacre of arameans and assyrians in iraq in 1933, and the extermination of european jewry (shoah) in wwii. as early as 1943, lemkin had introduced the term genocide, which has been in international use ever since, into historical and legal literature. until then, french publicists and british politicians such as winston churchill73 or lloyd george called the mass extermination of the armenians in the late ottoman empire a holocaust74 (greek: “whole-burn sacrifice”). media, scientific and cultural processing the fact that the german judiciary had to face the crimes of germany’s previous ally ottoman turkey on account of the case against tehlirian, brought the proceeding from the very beginning into the center of public attention,75 even though the prosecution had been trying to take the political element out of the trial. despite such efforts, the trial received international media attention from the following newspapers and news agencies: the new york times, the chicago daily news, philadelphia public ledger, the daily telegraph (london) and the agency for international coverage, nz: nachrichten-und artikel-zentrale für zeitungen.76 71 ibid. 72 heinsohn, lexikon der völkermorde, 236. 73 winston churchill, the world crisis, vol. 5, a aftermath 1918-1928 (new york: c. scribner’s sons, 1929), 157. 74 the frequent use of fire in the destruction of the ottoman christians is noteworthy. the term “holocaust” as a synonym for genocidal destruction was applied by the american missionary corinna shattuck, who witnessed the “great holocaust” in urfa, when three-thousand armenians were burnt alive in their cathedral in late 1895. the term was then continuously used by europeans to describe the annihilation of ottoman christians. in 1898 the french-jewish journalist bernard lazare called the nationwide slaughter of armenians and other christians during 1895 and 1896 a holocaust, while the englishman frederick zacheus duckett ferriman (1856-1934) titled his book on the adana slaughter the young turks and the truth about the holocaust at adana in asia minor during april 1909 (london, 1913). with the disappearance of the christian population in asia minor, the historic context of “holocaust” as a synonym for anti-christian destructive events sank into oblivion. during and after wwii, it was increasingly applied to the destruction of the european jews, although elie wiesel believed, that he had invented it in 1958. cf. heinsohn, lexikon der völkermorde, 17. 75 stefan ihrig, “genocide denied, accepted, and justified: the assassination of talât pasha and the subsequent trial as a media event in the early weimar republic,” journal of the society for armenian studies 22 (2013):153-177. 76 an online press review created by heinz böke contains german and foreign press reports on the assassination, burial and transfer of talaat’s mortal remains to istanbul in december 1942, the state funeral on february 25, 1943 and the criminal proceedings against soghomon tehlirian in 1921: at https://3759d405a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/nichtichbindermoerder/literatur-tip-1/pressespiegel1921/pressespiegel_1921_der_mord_an_talaat_pascha.pdf?attachauth=anoy7co-bxrlketoztkh6am2obx6tbo8076b85 a hundred years ago the court case caused a feud between german social-democratic and bourgeois (nationalistic) newspapers, especially between vorwärts and deutsche allgemeine zeitung (daz). adopting turkish criticism of the verdict, the daz called it a “judicial scandal.” daz, which was a kind of semi-official government gazette during the first world war and was under the leadership of the former naval attaché in constantinople, hans humann, “ignited a real anti-armenian campaign after the assassination. a blinded cowardly assassin is tehlirian, a ‘murder jack’ who shot an old man in the back.”77 however, in spite of all the controversial viewpoints, all german papers focused their critics on the conspicuously apolitical nature of the trial: the judge and the prosecutor ardently tried to treat the case as a non-political case. their efforts were unilaterally focused upon the inner aspects of the crime. the fear of the murder gaining political attention rendered them relatively powerless in the face of the accordingly one-sided defense which capitalized successfully both on itself and the assassin.78 comparing this trial with the german war criminal trials in leipzig (1921-1927), the social-democratic press called it the “first real war criminal case,” even though questions on talaat’s personal responsibility for the extermination of the armenians, or that of german involvement79 had not been sufficiently answered.80 five years later, after the assassination of symon petliura, the national socialist ideologist alfred rosenberg drew a parallel with the assassination of talaat in the magazine der weltkampf, which he directed. rosenberg praised talaat for his pro-german attitude and, like other commentators before him, lamented the alleged role model effect of the acquittal of the avenger: ngidc0lwmg3xqwv2dsvladjxkhvozbcvypbdgk7xkepia26kvcs0vehkixdnyj9t4wmczurebbc5q2nlsil6vvnf90bhbwok-pu641uybpab6b52mrhwjbdtmcrgtvylnwuh_ulpg57n_7jyrwrnmjgs0rqnb2hhx_qzpjritpek6u7fkwjhhwnbvgsuh-lcfg8odbfqz1wwkahzwxb1xu3qagxhm7r4vfs4xrdibcoqsts9fe_pfu7rwqlu1h6bpxwwdyrinwiuuyfan3cggw2v--eucfja0yngwzlm&attredirects=0. 77 hosfeld, operation nemesis, 13. 78 deutsche allgemeine zeitung (berlin) 9 juli 1921. 79 to date, the question of collective or individual german culpability has not been dealt with comprehensively in scientific terms. ottoman contemporaries, christians as well as muslims, were largely convinced that the german state was to blame for the genocide against the armenians. but vahakn n. dadrian’s theses in this regard have been rejected by critics as extreme. two investigative german journalists, wolfgang gust and jürgen gottschlich, failed to provide sufficient evidence of a general german state responsibility. i myself assume that the responsibility of the german empire consisted in the knowledge and largely tacit, tolerating acceptance of the state crimes committed during wwi by the allied young turk regime against the christian and especially the armenian population in the ottoman empire and in the ottoman-occupied territories of northwestern iran. cf. vahagn dadrian, german responsibility in the armenian genocide: a review of the historical evidence of german complicity (watertown, ma: blue crane books, 1996); jürgen gottschlich, beihilfe zum völkermord. deutschlands rolle bei der vernichtung der armenier (berlin: links, 2015); tessa hofmann, “le génocide arménien vu d’allemagne: la mise en place d’une tradition d’indifférencela mise en place d’une tradition d’indifférence,” politique internationale la revue, supplément au no 147 (2015), at https://archives.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/read2.php?id_revue=147&id=1397&content=texte (english version at https://www.academia.edu/13681412/le_g%c3%a9nocide_arm%c3%a9nien_vu_dallemagne_la_mise_ en_place_dun_tradition_dindiff%c3%a9rence); stefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2016). 80 vorwärts (berlin) 4 july 1921. 86 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 even during the first world war the armenians led the espionage against the turks, similar to the jews against germany. this forced the loyal ally of the german reich, talaat pasha, to sharply intervene, although some hardships could not be avoided. (...) after the collapse of 1918, talaat now lived in the capital of the country to which he had remained loyal and was murdered here. the major press of this country, however, insulted him even after his death,81 stood protectively before his murderer and demanded his acquittal. and indeed, the berlin court acquitted the armenian teilerian [sic!]. the jewish press of all shades rejoiced and called the acquittal the “only possible” verdict.”82 as early as 1921, the german writer armin t. wegner published the stenographic protocol of the proceedings of the berlin trial with appendices, which included some of talaat’s telegraphic orders provided by the journalist aram antonian (andonian; 1875-1951).83 but the medial and public attention was short-lived.84 even before the nazis came to power in 1933, the coverage of the armenian genocide and related issues had disappeared from german media and subsequently fell into a long-lasting oblivion. only in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the ottoman genocide against the armenians reintroduced through a series of publications. among the “early” post-wwii book publications were the new editions85 of the stenographic protocol by the german human and minority rights ngo geellschaft für bedrohte völker (society for threatened peoples), whose publications brought the issue of the international recognition of this case of genocide to the forefront in post-war german society. in 2003, the courageous istanbul based belge publishing house had this edition published into turkish, after the turkey born writer doğan akhanlı translated the proceedings into turkish86; in the same year, a second volume followed with comments and articles, again translated by d. akhanlı.87 the numerous attacks on turkish and non-turkish institutions and diplomats by the armenian secret army for the liberation of armenia (asala), which was active primarily in 81 this assertion is exaggerated. in the upper middle-class daily deutsche allgemeine zeitung, for example, lieutenant general (ret.) bronsart von schellendorf took the floor for talaat, justifying the deadly forced resettlement of the armenians or trivializing its consequences: “talaat has become a victim of his love for his country!” bronsart v. schellenberg was chief of the general staff of the ottoman field army. cf. the above “ein zeugnis für talaat pascha,” deutsche allgemeine zeitung (berlin) no. 342, beiblatt morgenausgabe, 24. juli 1921. 82 alfred rosenberg, “mörder und mörderschutz,” der weltkampf, juli 1926, reprinted in alfred rosenberg, kampf um die macht: aufsätze von 1921-1932 (münchen: zentralverlag der nsdap, 1938), 435-436. 83 der völkermord an den armeniern vor gericht: der prozess talaat pascha. 2. aufl. d. ausg. berlin 1921, hrsg. u. eingel. von tessa hofmann (göttingen, wien: gesellschaft für bedrohte völker, 1980), xi, 136. a selection of talaat’s orders in german translation was published on pages 133-136; the memoirs of naim bey: turkish official documents relating to the deportation and the massacres of armenians, compiled by aram andonian (london: hodder & stoughton, 1920). 84 tessa hofmann, “from silence to re-remembrance: the response of german media to massacres and genocide against the ottoman armenians,” in mass media and the genocide of the armenians: one hundred years of uncertain representation, ed. by s. kappler, s. kasparian, r. godin, j. chabot (basingstoke, hampshire: palgrave macmillan, 2016), 94-96. 85 under the title “der völkermord an den armeniern vor gericht” (1980, 1985). 86 talaat paşa davası i (2 3 haziran 1921), çev. ve yay. haz. doğan akhanlı (istanbul: belge yayınları, 2003). 87 talaat paşa davası-ii (2 ve 3 haziran 1921): bilinmeyen belgeler yorumla, çev. ve yay. haz. tessa hofmann ve doğan akhanlı (istanbul: belge yayınları. aralık 2003). 87 a hundred years ago the 1970s-1980s, and by three other lesser-known armenian “justice” commands drew the attention of the public media and journalists to operation nemesis as the supposed origin of armenian terrorism. the 95th and 100th anniversary of the ottoman genocide against the armenians offered further occasions for such publications. beginning with les vengeurs arméniens by the french investigative journalist jacques derogy (d.i. jacques weitzman, 1925-1997), seven monographs have been published in france, the usa, and germany to date, dealing with the assassination by tehlirian, the berlin criminal trial, and the clandestine nemesis organization; four of the seven authors are of armenian origin.88 derogy was the first to reveal the connection between the assassination of talaat and vrej. however, it was not until 2019 that armenian historians took notice of his groundbreaking monograph.89 no less stimulating were the events of 1921 in the artistic field. even before the book publications, two documentary films and a feature film were produced since 1982. the 1982 american film assignment berlin, directed by the beirut born producer hrayr toukhanian, chronicles talaat’s assassination. the semi-autobiographical french film mayrig (1991) with claudia cardinale and omar sharif by henri verneuil depicts talaat’s assassination and tehlirian’s trial. the 2015 documentary film execution on the open street by bernard george was broadcast on the franco-german television channel arte on 28 april 2015 on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the genocide commemoration.90 the story of talaat’s assassination and tehlirian’s acquittal, as revealed by the trial’s proceedings, is one of a double paradox: the assassination victim proves to be responsible for mass murder, whereas the perpetrator belongs to the group of victims. this is what the title murderer’s murder (mördermord) in the historical novel (2002, 2012) by the german authors günther fuchs and hans-ulrich lüdemann allude to. it was followed in 2005 by the play history tilt by the german author and theatre director hans-werner kroesinger,91 which was performed on several berlin stages. a civil society initiative was the scenic performance nicht ich bin der mörder! (i am not the murderer!), in which german, armenian and turkish actors and actresses, together with a french pianist, read from the minutes of the trial under the direction of heinz böke between february 2010 and 2016, not just in berlin.92 a resumption of the reading is planned for the 100th anniversary of the criminal trial 88 in chronological order these are the following monographs jacques derogy, les vengeurs arméniens; edward alexander, a crime of vengeance; jonathan bass, stay the hand of vengeance: the politics of war crimes tribunals (princeton: princeton university press, 2001); hosfeld, operation nemesis; vartkes yeghiayan, the case of soghomon tehlirian (glendale, ca: center for armenian remembrance; 2nd edition, 2006); eric bogosian, operation nemesis: the assassination plot that avenged the armenian genocide (new york: little, brown & company, 2015); mesrobian, sacred justice. 89 gohar khanumyan, «սողոմոն թեհլիրյանը և «նեմեսիս» գործողությունը. հատուկ գործի մասին հյդ 9-րդ ընդհանուր ժողովի որոշման 100-ամյակի առթիվ» [soghomon tehlirian and and the “nemesis” operation: to the 100th anniversary of the 9th general assembly resolution of arf dashnaktsutyun on the special project], vem pan-armenian journal 68, no. 4(2019): 67-84. 90 “ausstrahlung am 28. april um 21.45 uhr,” at https://info.arte.tv/de/hinrichtung-auf-offener-strasse, accessed 24.11.2019. 91 “das bürokratisierte grauen, hans-werner kroesinger: history tilt, hebbel am ufer (hau3), berlin / maxim gorki theater (studio я), berlin (regie: hans-werner kroesinger),” at https://stagescreen. wordpress.com/2015/03/14/das-burokratisierte-grauen/, accessed 24.11.2019. 92 “der prozess talaat pascha,” at https://sites.google.com/site/nichtichbindermoerder/, accessed 12.02.2019. 88 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 5, no. 1, 2020 in june 2021. the district court (landgericht) berlin gave permission to stage the reading from the court proceedings protocol in the premises of the district court itself, presumably in the same courtroom no. 700 where the court case against tehlirian took place a hundred years ago. berlin-charlottenburg as a crime scene and a place of memory and learning berlin is currently a city with an ambivalent culture of remembrance with regard to wwi and the reappraisal of the german ottoman young turk alliance during that period. in its district of charlottenburg, germany’s capital city has an ecumenical memorial in a semi-public space for the victims of the ottoman genocide(s) by the young turks and kemalists against about three million indigenous christians in ottoman territories and ottoman-occupied northwestern iran. at the same time, the turkish cemetery at the şehitlik mosque in the district of neukölln honours the genocide perpetrators cemal azmi and bahaddin şakir shot by vrej members in 1922 as patriotic ‘martyrs’. there were also initiatives after 2005, within berlin’s turkish community, to erect a memorial plaque on hardenbergstrasse in memory of talaat as a victim of “armenian terrorism.” the socialist kurdish-born delegate to berlin’s state parliament, giyasettin sayan, asked the government in the berlin senate, in his minor interpellation93 of 29 march 2005, about its knowledge of the “graves of honour” for cemal azmi and bahattin şakir at the şehitlik (martyrs’) mosque ending with the question: what initiatives and measures does the senate want to take in order to counteract the historical revisionism, both regarding the german role in the genocide against the armenians, and the role of the young turks at that time, but also the participation of the population in the genocide against the armenians?94 the answer of the berlin state government of 4 april 2005, which was given even before the adoption of the first bundestag resolution on the ottoman genocide (june 2005), was pleasingly clear: the senate is aware of the events surrounding the armenian genocide, especially since the german reich was also involved in the matter and berlin was the scene of various actions in connection with that genocide. the graves at the turkish cemetery that have been mentioned are not graves of honour of the state of berlin.95 (…) 93 in german parliamentarianism, a minor interpellation by a member of parliament to the government must obligatorily be answered by the government. 94 “armeniergenozid,” at http://www.aga-online.org/news/attachments/kleine_anfrage_sayan.pdf, accessed 22.03.2019. 95 this means that the islamic (turkish) cemetery and the şehitlik mosque are located on extraterritorial grounds. the foundation of the cemetery at columbiadamm in the berlin district of neukölln dates back to 1866, when emperor wilhelm i permanently ceded the area as a burial place to the turkish community in berlin; the inauguration took place on 29 december 1866. see at https://www.berlin.de/sehenswuerdigkeiten/3560303-3558930-islamischer-friedhof-am-columbiadamm.html, accessed 22.03.2019. however, and in contrast to the previously quoted information by the land berlin, the mosque association states that the area was bought from the prussian king friedrich wilhelm iii for 40 taler. among the “many important and 89 a hundred years ago the senate supports initiatives and measures to comprehensively process even uncomfortable chapters of history and to disseminate knowledge about them. against this background, the representative of the senate for integration and migration has commissioned a publication by the expert on armenian affairs, dr. tessa hofmann, in which the history and present state of the armenian diaspora in berlin is presented. this brochure96 includes the genocide of the armenians. the work also picks up on the increasing number of voices from turkey, that are calling for an open approach to this topic, which has been taboo in turkish historiography until now. the senate hopes that this publication will contribute to objective and unprejudiced information and processing of these chapters of armenian-german-turkish history.97 however, the worship of perpetrators within the diaspora of turkish origin, which still persists 15 years later, must continue to be countered with educational information offers. further civil society activities are therefore planned for 2021, including lectures and city tours in berlin-charlottenburg. well-known personalities” who are buried here, the mosque association explicitlycounts cemal azmi and dr. bahattin şakir bey as well as talaat. the şehitlik mosque is under the control of the turkish state authority for religion ditib, at http://sehitlik-moschee.de/?p=355, accessed 22.03.2019. 96 tessa hofmann, armenier in berlin berlin und armenien (mit beiträgen von doğan akhanlı und yelda. berlin: der beauftragte des senats für integration und migration, 2005), 104. 97 “armeniergenozid.” rebecca jinks recently completed her phd at the university of london, entitled «representing genocide: the holocaust as paradigm?». her thesis used the four bestknown genocides of the twentieth century as comparators – armenia, cambodia, bosnia and rwanda – and looked at these issues through the lens of fi lm, literature, testimony, memorials and museums, and photography. dr. jinks is currently lecturer in modern european history at the university of east anglia, and is researching her next book on the social history of interwar humanitarianism. 39 situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context 1 rebecca jinks this article sets the armenian genocide museum-institute, and the tsitsernakaberd memorial complex, into the global context of genocide memorial museums. it discusses architectural and design features as well as the museum’s fi rst permanent exhibition (1995-2013, with updates and additions), and argues that while the museum and memorial complex conform to global trends in many ways, the museum exhibition itself showed some differences. specifi cally, it seems that the experience of longstanding genocide denial and the continued international non-recognition of the genocide in the early 1990s means that the exhibition had to take on the ‘burden of proof’ and, unlike in other museums, was almost wholly devoted to constructing a ‘case for genocide’ a decade into the twenty-fi rst century, the global ‘memory boom’ shows no sign of slowing down – especially regarding ‘diffi cult pasts’: every year, more books are written, fi lms made, and commemorative ceremonies held. alongside these, there has also been a global ‘boom’ in the building of memorial museums; almost every major genocide or authoritarian regime in the twentieth century now has a museum or a memorial dedicated to remembering and to educating subsequent generations. in this article i will set the armenian genocide museuminstitute (agmi) into the global context of genocide museums, those guardians of memory and meaning.1 just as comparative historical analysis has enhanced our understanding of both the specifi cities of the armenian genocide and the phenomenon of genocide more generally,2 so too can a comparative approach to the memorialisation of genocide illuminate how contexts infl uence remembrance and representation, and the processes by which the 1. this article arises from the research i was able to complete at the armenian genocide museuminstitute, whilst holder of the museum-institute’s fi rst raphael lemkin scholarship. i am immensely grateful to the director, hayk demoyan, suren manukyan, asya darbinyan, and the rest of the staff at agmi for the opportunity and the support i received during my stay. my doctoral thesis (2014), for which i held the reid scholarship at royal holloway, university of london, is entitled ‘representing genocide: the holocaust as paradigm?’, and is a comparative analysis of cultural representations of the armenian, jewish, cambodian, bosnian and rwandan genocides, using fi lm, literature, photography and memorialisation as sources. some of the research for this article was generously funded by the friendly hand. to cite this article: rebecca jinks, “situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 1:1 (2014): 39-51. 2. some good examples include donald bloxham, the great game of genocide: imperialism, nationalism and the destruction of the ottoman armenians (oxford: oxford university press, 2005); robert melson, revolution and genocide: on the origins of the armenian genocide and the holocaust (chicago: university of chicago press, 1992); hans-lucas kieser and dominick j. schaller, eds., der völkermord an der armeniern und die shoah (zürich: chronos, 2002); hilmar kaiser, “genocide at the twilight of the ottoman empire,” in the oxford handbook of genocide studies, eds. donald bloxham and a. dirk moses (oxford: oxford university press, 2010). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 40 events are made meaningful to the descendants of the victims and the rest of the world in the aftermath.3 the vast majority of research into memory and representation has been done within the remit of holocaust studies, but this memory boom especially allows us to expand and refi ne our understanding and analyses of how circumstances shape the remembrance of traumatic events. in this vein, i argue here that although the museum, and the tsitsernakaberd memorial complex in which it is located, is in many ways comparable to other memorial museums – in particular the purpose-built holocaust museums in europe, america, and israel – the turkish denial of the genocide had a deep impact, whether subconsciously or not, upon the design of the permanent exhibition. this exhibition ran from 1995 to 2013, with various updates and additions as further donations were made to the institution, and (at the time of writing) is being substantially revised and extended for the centenary anniversary in 2015. the original memorial complex was completed in 1967. in soviet armenia before 1965, the genocide had never been offi cially or publicly memorialised as a national loss; on the fi ftieth anniversary, crowds congregated on lenin square in central yerevan and eventually public protest broke out against the continual non-remembrance of the genocide. the genocide memorial was erected quite shortly thereafter on the hill of tsitsernakaberd, just outside the city centre. designed by architects sashur kalashyan and artur tarkhanyan, it deployed the style of soviet war memorials, and consisted of a huge split obelisk and a massive grey stone mausoleum, made of twelve stone slabs, with an eternal fl ame set into its centre.4 every year, it is the site of the offi cial commemoration on april 24th. the museum itself was not opened until 1995, the eightieth anniversary of the genocide. the exhibition was designed by the museum director and other armenian historians, and its narration of genocide and national loss was shaped by the very immediate contexts of, fi rstly, armenia’s nationand state-building process following its independence from the soviet union in 1991, and secondly, the confl ict with azerbaijan over the territory of nagorno-karabagh5 (as well as a severe economic crisis). in the national context, then, the exhibition was both responding to and shaping the new layers of meaning added to the genocide’s fundamental place in armenian identity. on an international level, as with the survivors of other genocides and their descendants, the memory of the genocide is very present amongst armenians both within armenia and in the diaspora – although there are, obviously, differences in remembrance and its relationship with ethnic identity between different communities across the globe – and this memory is galvanised by, and often articulated in opposition to, turkish denial. during 3. see paul williams, memorial museums: the global rush to commemorate atrocities (oxford and new york: berg, 2007). 4. see tsypylma darieva’s excellent article “‘the road to golgotha’: representing loss in post-socialist armenia,” focaal – european journal of anthropology 52 (2008): 92-108 for an extended analytical description. see also darieva, “from silenced to voiced: changing politics of memory of loss in armenia,” in representations on the margins of europe: politics and identities in the baltic and south caucasian states, edited by tsypylma darieva and wolfgang kaschuba (frankfurt/new york: campus verlag, 2007), 65-88. 5. see harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity: the memory of genocide and the karabagh movement (yerevan: gitutyun publishing house of nas ra, 2009). situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context 41 the fi rst half of the 1990s, when this exhibition was being designed, the offi cial turkish history and much of the turkish historiography still peddled a narrative of 1915 which argued that the subversive acts of armenians, encouraged by western meddling in the ottoman empire, justifi ed the armenian ‘relocations’ and massacres.6 equally, armenia’s relations with turkey were increasingly strained following the nagorno-karabagh war in 1993. internationally, it was bernard lewis, the american historian of modern turkey, who was holding court in the press – he and 68 other international scholars had signed an advertisement which appeared in the new york times in 1985 which questioned the basis of evidence for genocide, and lewis continued to make revisionist claims in various statements to the french press in the early 1990s; in fact only three national governments – cyprus, uruguay and russia – had offi cially recognised the armenian genocide by 1995.7 these struggles over the recognition of the armenian genocide were also somewhat overshadowed by the boom in holocaust memorialisation in the build-up to the 50th anniversary of the liberation of the nazi concentration camps was occurring, reports of atrocities and camps in the former yugoslavia were hitting the press, and, a little later, wrangles over the use of the word ‘genocide’ to describe the massacres in rwanda. this was the context in which the permanent exhibition was designed: the exhibition, i will argue, was working against this denial and the hesitancy surrounding the use of the word ‘genocide’ to describe what happened to armenians, by seeking to provide its international visitors with irrefutable proof of genocide. this article is based on an extensive visit to the museum in april 2011, during which i had the chance to observe visitors’ interactions with the exhibition and memorial complex both during the april 24th commemorations and outside them, and on my research at other multiple sites and museums of genocide. in the fi rst section of this article, i compare the design of the tsitsernakaberd memorial complex and the architecture of the museum itself with other genocide museums, and show that in this respect it entirely conforms to global trends. i then discuss the previous permanent exhibition itself, paying particular attention to the artefacts and documents chosen to narrate the genocide, and what that suggested about the underlying message of the museum. finally, i consider how armenian and nonarmenian visitors, two very different memory communities, might respond to the museum. tsitsernakaberd and the museum in comparative perspective in physical and formal terms, the tsisternakaberd complex is more comparable to the united states holocaust memorial museum (ushmm) in washington, dc, yad vashem 6. see donald bloxham and fatma müge göçek, “the armenian genocide,” in the historiography of genocide, edited by dan stone (basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 2008), 344-72: 349-50. 7. more recently, alternative voices have sprung up within turkey, and 21 governments along with various regional governments and human rights-oriented organisations have now recognised the genocide (the majority since 2000). but the armenian genocide still occupies a somewhat awkward and peripheral position within the global memoryscape – there is a kind of ‘semi-consciousness’ amongst non-armenians in the west, as historian donald bloxham puts it – there is only a consciousness at all because of the special relations of christian powers with christian suff ering in the ottoman empire, but it is a hesitant consciousness because of denial, geopolitics, and changing perceptions of the perpetrator state. bloxham, the great game of genocide, 230. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 42 in jerusalem, the jewish museum of berlin, or london’s imperial war museum (iwm) holocaust exhibition than to many of the other genocide museums or memorials in, for example, bosnia, rwanda, or cambodia, or indeed the museums and memorials on former nazi concentration camp sites, such as at auschwitz or dachau. all of these holocaust museums (or exhibitions within museums, in the case of the iwm) are purpose-built, and have similar institutional objectives of public education, facilitating research, and collecting and maintaining archives. they are also mostly located far from the sites of suffering: although each is heavily imbued with symbolic meaning,8 they do not have quite the same emotional charge as, for example, the memorials and museums at auschwitz, the former interrogation centre s-21 in cambodia, the battery factory in srebrenica where muslim refugees were held before the men were separated and killed, or the many churches and other municipal buildings where the victims sought safety in rwanda, many of which are now preserved as memorials.9 yad vashem is built on the mount of remembrance, near to the national cemetery where the father of zionism, theodore herzl, is buried; the museum visit ends with a magnifi cent view over the hills of jerusalem from the viewing platform at the end of the building, a fi nale to and continuation of the museum narrative’s underlying (zionist) message.10 tsitsernakaberd is located at the top of a hill above yerevan, visible from many areas of the city; on a clear day mount ararat is visible from the memorial complex. once visitors emerge from the museum, then, this view of ararat – that potent symbol of loss in the armenian community – adds to and consolidates the human loss witnessed in the exhibition: where yad vashem offers cathartic redemption, the visit to agmi ends with a potent reminder of loss. both tsitsernakaberd and yad vashem are also quite extensive memorial complexes:11 there are innumerable memorials on the yad vashem campus besides the historical museum, from the children’s memorial and the avenue of the righteous among the nations, to the numerous memorials dotted around the gardens to the jewish victims, communities, soldiers and partisans.12 the focus of the tsitsernakaberd complex is undoubtedly the original memorials built in 1967, the split obelisk and the massive grey stone mausoleum and eternal fl ame, which is gradually surrounded every april 24th by a ring of fl owers left by those on the commemorative march. but the site also holds a memorial alley with trees planted in memory of the victims by international delegates, and a memorial wall 8. see darieva, “the road to golgotha,” for an overview. 9. for brief descriptions and analyses of all of these, see williams, memorial museums, 10, 17-18, 18-19 and passim. the only armenian equivalent would probably be the museum at der-el-zor. 10. an excellent and recent discussion of yad vashem can be found in amos goldberg, “the ‘jewish narrative’ in the yad vashem global holocaust museum,” journal of genocide research 14:2 (2012): 187-213. he discusses the end-point of the museum as a cathartic narrative at 206-7. 11. the ushmm, jmb, and iwm are all built within rather than on the edge of urban spaces, and thus have less space for such an extensive complex. this is not to say that their locations are not symbolic in themselves: the ushmm is a short walk from the mall and the white house; libeskind’s jewish museum is an extension to the original jewish museum in berlin; london’s holocaust exhibition is located within its war museum, also unoffi cially considered the ‘national museum’ of britain. 12. the yad vashem website has an incomplete list of memorials on its campus: http://www1.yadvashem. org/yv/en/visiting/map.asp. situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context 43 which on one side is carved with the memorial geography of armenian deportation and suffering, from constantinople to der-el-zor, and on the other holds earth from the graves of prominent non-armenians who helped the armenians during the genocide, including franz werfel and armin wegner, and most recently on april 21 2011, maria jacobsen and alma johansson. near to the wall are memorials, in the form of traditional khachkars, to the memory of armenian victims of massacres in sumgait and baku, as well as to the defenders of gandzak (gence).13 both complexes are heavy with symbolism, then, drawing together victims and altruistic saviours in the service of an ethnic and transnational remembrance. in a broader sense, one can also relate israel’s national memorial landscape to armenia’s: across each, one fi nds smaller memorials dotted around the landscape, generally funded and commissioned by individuals and local communities (some or all of whom may have been survivors) or municipal authorities.14 in accordance with the victim group’s central tenets of remembrance, the majority are monuments which commemorate suffering and loss, but some are dedicated to the well-known acts of resistance, such as the two largest resistance memorials, beit lohamei hageta’ot (ghetto fighters’ house museum) and the monument in musaler (musa dagh) village in armavir province; both are smaller museums telling the tale of the best-known act of resistance, although the israeli museum is much larger and also holds an extensive archive.15 the crucial difference between the israeli and armenian memorial landscape is that while israeli memory of the holocaust has, obviously, changed since 1945, soviet rule had a much deeper impact upon the nature of armenian remembrance until 1991. many of the armenian memorials were built in the decade or so following the fi ftieth anniversary demonstrations in 1965, and had to conform to the dictats of socialist remembrance – all were designed in what was effectively still a socialist realist style, although the usual tropes of war and loss now signifi ed a very different kind of loss – whereas those built after 1991 tend to follow the more traditional style of a khachkar and inscription with the date of 1915. inside the museum at tsitsernakaberd itself, the architecture and aesthetic design too is comparable to these western-designed, purpose-built museums. in the 1990s and 2000s a spate of holocaust museums were opened – the ushmm in 1993, the jewish museum berlin in 1999, the iwm holocaust exhibition in 2000, and the shoah museum in paris, the memorial to the murdered jews of europe in berlin, and the new yad vashem holocaust history museum in 2005 – all of which eschewed the traditional museum architecture of big open spaces, white walls, and artefacts in display cases.16 instead, these museums 13. see in general darieva, “the road to golgotha,” 96-104. 14. on the memorial landscape in armenia see http://www.armenian-genocide.org/memorials.html and memorials of sorrow, remembrance and struggle (yerevan: ministry of diaspora of the republic of armenia, 2010). on israel, see james e. young, the texture of memory: holocaust memorials and meaning (new haven/london: yale university press, 1993), 209-81. 15. the monument/museum at musaler is visible here: http://www.armenian-genocide.org/memorial.17/ current_category.52/off set.10/memorials_detail.html. for beit lohamei hageta’ot, see http://www.gfh. org.il/eng/. 16. for an excellent overview on these broad changes in museology, see sharon macdonald, “expanding museum studies: an introduction,” in a companion to museum studies, ed. sharon macdonald (oxford: blackwell, 2006): 1-12, and the rest of the essays in that volume. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 44 together marked the inauguration of a new commemorative aesthetic, what i call an ‘affective architecture’, where the interior space and decoration of the building is designed in order to elicit certain sensory and emotional reactions, which chime with the exhibition or memorial’s content and intended meaning. one of the most famous examples of this affective architecture is found in daniel libeskind’s jewish museum berlin, where the tight, twisted, and disorienting spaces create some of the feeling of claustrophobia and disorientation which the victims themselves felt;17 the same techniques of low-ceilinged, constrictive, and dark spaces are used in all of the above-mentioned holocaust museums, and indeed also in other museums dedicated to confl ict and loss – from the kigali national genocide museum in rwanda (designed under the auspices of the uk charity aegis trust) to the imperial war museum north in manchester.18 built and opened in 1995, at a roughly similar time to the earlier museums of this trend, the agmi used many of the same techniques. there are none of the architectural twists and turns – the exhibition was housed in a large, smooth circle built around an inner courtyard, although one could say that the zig-zag progress visitors made from one side of the curve to the other echoes, in a symbolic sense, the wandering paths taken by the deportees in 1915 – but the rooms devoted to the genocide period had a constricted feel, and the museum also used dim lighting, colour, and physical descent to accentuate the visitor’s feeling of unease and unsettlement. at yad vashem, the ushmm, and the iwm, the exhibitions begin with prewar jewish life on the top fl oor of the exhibition (or a physically higher level), and the décor changes to blacks and greys, and the lighting is dimmed, as visitors literally and symbolically descend to lower fl oors to reach the part of the exhibition which deals with the ghettos, deportations, and the concentration camps. at yad vashem, the fl oor of the long, thin building then rises again into the triumphal viewing platform mentioned above. the agmi museum exhibition made use of colour, lighting, and physical space in much the same way: one descended into the museum from the memorial complex outside, and then a few more steps into the exhibition itself. the fi rst square stone hall, which contained a huge map of ‘historic armenia’ and display cases with artefacts showing the vibrancy of pre-wwi armenian society, was relatively spacious and has some natural light from a skylight above; but in the main curved exhibition hall, which documented the deportations and atrocities, the walls were much darker, the ceilings lower, the lighting dim – the only windows to the outside shaped as thin christian crosses – and large reproductions of atrocity photographs taken mostly by armin wegner loomed over the display cases and the visitors. at the end of the exhibition, one ascended again to the light of the reception hall and then the memorial complex outside, with its view of ararat. like its contemporaries, then, the agmi also attempts to enhance the message of its exhibition with an affective architecture. 17. there is a huge literature on the architecture of libeskind, but begin with james e. young, at memory’s edge: a� er-images of the holocaust in contemporary art and architecture (new haven/london: yale university press, 2000), chapter 6 (“daniel libeskind’s jewish museum in berlin”), 152-183, and other relevant essays in the book. libeskind has used a similar style for the danish jewish museum, copenhagen, and the felix-nussbaum-haus in osnabrück, germany. 18. although it is worth noting that there are not many purpose-built museums to other genocides – kigali is an exception – since most are housed in the sites where torture and murder took place. situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context 45 the exhibition however, there were subtle differences between the content and the underlying thrust of the agmi’s 1995-2013 exhibition and those of other holocaust and genocide museums – and these differences, i would argue, were a measure of the (in some ways quite distortive) impact of denial on the representation and the historiography of the armenian genocide.19 although the exhibition itself did not discuss denial, the unremitting stream of atrocity photographs, reproduction of orders from the ottoman turk authorities, and harrowing eyewitness reports – uninterrupted by the temporary and partial relief which survivor testimonies or more detailed analysis of individual case studies can bring – amounted, cumulatively, to a ‘case’ for genocide and a refutation of denial. over the past few decades, a growing trend in holocaust research and representation has sought to integrate the experiences and voices of the victims alongside the words and deeds of the perpetrators, for the historical perspective they add, for the insight they give into the victims’ suffering, and for the empathy they create amongst visitors for the victims.20 the holocaust museums i have mentioned above all construct a careful historical narrative of the events, supported by documentation and artefacts, and then intersperse these with excerpts of survivor testimony, with individual or family photographs of victims, and with poignant personal belongings (for example, shoes, clothing, pairs of glasses, a diary, a pipe – in a smaller version of the famous rooms full of shoes, suitcases, and hair on display at auschwitz).21 many also list the names of the victims, and perhaps their birth and death dates, on walls and in books, to try to communicate the sheer scale of loss and destruction.22 all of these techniques individualise the victims, and invite 19. academic scholarship is beginning to move past the burden placed on it by the need to refute denial and prove genocide. for a recent historiographical analysis, see bloxham and göçek, “the armenian genocide”. for a brave attempt to move beyond these divisions, see the essays in a question of genocide: armenians and turks at the end of the ottoman empire, edited by norman m. naimark, ronald grigor suny, and fatma müge göçek (oxford: oxford university press, 2011). 20. debate within holocaust historiography has been kicked off by saul friedländer’s eff orts to write an ‘integrated’ history of the holocaust, in his two-volume work, nazi germany and the jews: the years of persecution, 1933-1939 (london: weidenfeld and nicholson, 1997) and the years of extermination, 1939-1945 (london: weidenfeld and nicholson, 2007). dissatisfi ed with the tendency in holocaust histories to write using only german sources, he argued that including the voices of the victims (taken from contemporary diaries) would ‘tear through seamless interpretation and pierce the (mostly involuntary) smugness of scholarly detachment and “objectivity” (years of extermination, xxvi). 21. there are many studies of these displays in diff erent museums. on the use of individual and family portraits to elicit identifi cation, see marianne hirsch, family frames: photography, narrative and postmemory (cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 1997); on the use of oral testimony (specifi cally in the iwm), see tony kushner, “oral history at the extremes of human experience: holocaust testimony in a museum setting,” oral history 29:2 (2001): 83-94: on the display of objects, see oren baruch stier, committed to memory: cultural mediations of the holocaust (amherst/boston: university of massachusetts press, 2003): 110-49. more generally, see andrea liss, trespassing through shadows: memory, photography and the holocaust (minneapolis/london: university of minnesota press, 1998). 22. yad vashem has a hall of names, where they hope to collect the names of all 6 million dead (roughly 3 million have been collected thus far); the shoah museum in paris has stone walls engraved with the names of jewish deportees from france; displayed in the jewish museum berlin are the gedenkbücher, fi lled with the names of all those deported from berlin; in a room in the ort der information underneath international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 46 visitors of all nationalities, ethnicities, and ages to identify with their plight; in this, they act as a balance to the more shocking and disturbing images of suffering and death, and humanise the presentation. as louis bickford and amy sodaro have recently noted, this individualising approach is not limited to holocaust museums, and many other memorial museums around the globe now also try to create empathy in this way.23 although the fi rst hall of the agmi exhibition displayed some such artefacts in its coverage of pre-war armenian social and cultural life – photographs of sports teams, of schoolchildren, of community leaders (all of whom, we assume, were swept up into the genocide) – the main part of the exhibition used only photographs of suffering and destruction, the cold orders of the young turks, and copies of reports and books written by western diplomats, missionaries, and academics.24 there was, in fact, very little narrative in the exhibition (the guided tours, available in armenian, english, russian, french, and german, provided this); most of the display cases contained a few paragraphs (in four languages) outlining the basic history of the events under discussion – the hamidian massacres of 18946, the 1909 massacres, the murder of the intellectual and religious leaders, the deportations, foreign witnesses and their reactions, and the destruction of armenian churches and other cultural heritage – but there was no comprehensive causal or explanatory narrative threaded through the exhibition. visitors to the exhibition were therefore encouraged to spend time studying the images and documents, as the tangible remains of what happened. of course, in one sense, these artefacts merely illustrated the progression of violence against the armenians in the crumbling ottoman empire, but it is worth noting that they all provide what is classically recognised as ‘hard evidence’ for genocide, and, in the absence of any ‘softer’ evidence (in the form of emotive displays of the victims’ belongings, family photographs, or oral testimony from survivors), amount to something akin to an evidence docket. as visitors entered the exhibition, a panel on the wall to the left in the entrance hall quoted the un defi nition of genocide as ratifi ed in the genocide convention of 1948, which the memorial to the murdered jews of europe, two voices list the names and brief biographies of victims; the ushmm displays glass panels with jewish fi rst names engraved on them. this trend towards naming the victims individually is not limited to the holocaust; the vietnam veterans memorial in washington, dc is a well-known and provocative example. on this, and more generally, see marita sturken’s masterful tangled memories: the vietnam war, the aids epidemic, and the politics of remembering (berkeley, ca: university of california press, 1997), chapters 2, 6, and passim. 23. louis bickford and amy sodaro, “remembering yesterday to protect tomorrow: the internationalisation of a new commemorative paradigm,” in memory and the future: transnational politics, ethics and society, eds. yifat gutman, adam d. brown and amy sodaro (basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 2010). there are also walls of names at the srebrenica-potočari memorial museum in bosnia, and at a few rwandan memorials (although these are only very partially completed). the tuol sleng genocide museum in phnom penh, cambodia, has famously fi lled room a� er room with prints of the photographs of victims taken by the khmer rouge when they entered the torture centre. both the kigali genocide memorial centre and the srebrenica-potočari memorial museum display the personal possessions of victims in much the same style as holocaust museums. 24. of course, the nature of the armenian genocide (deportations from homes, accompanied by robbery and looting) means that survivors were le� with far fewer possessions which, in turn, could be donated and displayed in the museum (there is a roughly similar situation with the cambodian genocide; the tuol sleng genocide museum displays only the clothes of the victims and the photographs that were taken as they entered the prison). situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context 47 briefed visitors for the exhibition itself. in the main exhibition hall, above each display case a large reproduction of one or more photographs were hung, most of which were taken from the collection of armin wegner. almost without exception, they documented deportation, starvation, execution, and mass death; these are precisely the types of images pragmatically accepted as historical evidence in both public and legal fora.25 likewise, the ‘smoking guns’ were reproduced by the exhibition – large facsimiles of an order from enver pasha and two telegrams from talaat pasha, ordering the extermination of the armenians and its concealment from the outside world. aside from the photographs, the main descriptions of the deportations and killings were then in fact provided by the written reports of foreign diplomats and missionaries. a substantial proportion of the display cases exhibited examples of news reports in the foreign press, telegrams from diplomats and missionaries (often drawing on testimony from contemporary eyewitnesses), speeches in foreign parliaments, and the published diaries or memoirs of these foreign witnesses (as well as the biographies of a select few). many of the passages selected for display repeated the phrase ‘extermination of the armenian race’ or ‘destroy the armenian race as a race’ – an echo not just of the young turk leaders’ orders, but also of the legal defi nition of genocide which was to pass into international law thirty-three years later.26 in one sense, this functioned as a reminder of the sense of outrage and responsibility the west felt for armenians at the time,27 but, rereading this from an evidentiary point of view, one could note that many more display cases were given over to foreign reports and scholarly books on the genocide than those displaying survivor testimonies – and, indeed, since the majority of testimonies were published memoirs, only their front covers or title pages were visible behind the glass, 25. on the photographs of the armenian genocide, see tessa hofmann and gerayer koutcharian, “‘images that horrify and indict’: pictorial documents on the persecution and extermination of armenians from 1877 to 1922,” armenian review 45: 1-2 (1992): 53-184, and sybil milton, “armin t. wegner: polemicist for armenian rights and jewish human rights,” armenian review 42:4 (1989): 17-40. there are, of course, many intermediate diffi culties with using historical photographs as evidence, including the importance of knowing the identity of the photographer, the date, and the location (perhaps the photographer most especially, since his/her perspective on and reaction to the events directly infl uences the content and framing of the image); see, in the armenian context, the essays by abraham d. krikorian and eugene taylor, available at http:// groong.usc.edu/orig/probing-the-photographic-record.html. but there are also knottier problems related to what such photographs cannot depict. in the strict legal sense, photographs cannot prove genocide itself, since one cannot photograph intent (for an analogous argument in the context of the holocaust, see judith keilbach, “photographs, symbolic images, and the holocaust: on the (im)possibility of depicting historical truth,” history and theory 48:2 (2009): 54-76, especially pages 60-1). individually, these images show deportations, starvation, execution, and mass death; cumulatively, they show the outcome of a systematic policy. as genocide scholar dirk moses puts it, historians can ‘construe intent through action’. see a. dirk moses, “an antipodean genocide? the origins of the genocidal moment in the colonization of australia”, journal of genocide research 2:1 (2000): 89-106. 26. this is a striking aspect of many more documents than those on display. see, e.g., ara sarafi an, comp. and intro., united states offi cial documents on the armenian genocide, 1915-17 (princeton/ london: taderon press in association with the gomidas institute, 2004). 27. similarly, in her analysis of the meaning of transferring earth from the graves of those who helped the armenians to tsitsernakaberd, tsypylma darieva argues that the memory of the genocide is thereby converted ‘from an ethnic notion of loss and death into a global memory of forgotten human loss.’ darieva, “from silenced to voiced,” 84. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 48 rather than their words. possibly foreign diplomats’ telegrams and newspaper reports would be thought more ‘impartial’ by visitors to the museum – although there is no real reason to believe that survivors’ testimony would be viewed particularly differently unless a visitor was already inclined to distrust it.28 the exhibition ended with a section on the internationally-administered refugee camps and orphanages, and the efforts to rescue women and children who had been forcibly adopted into muslim households – thus, symbolically, the rebirth of the armenian nation – before visitors returned to the main entrance hall. as i noted before, in some ways these artefacts were merely well-chosen illustrations of the basic and familiar narrative of the armenian genocide. but subconsciously or not, the museum also seemed to have taken on the burden of proof. instead of the detail of video testimonies or personal belongings and other artefacts, what visitors were given to study is hard evidence – documentation, photographs, and witness reports. indeed, at the end of the guided tour, the guides often asked visitors to consider for themselves if this was a genocide. returning to the main entrance hall, they were directed to look at the museum’s glass-fronted inner courtyard. laid out at their feet was a traditional grey stone khachkar, representing the armenian victims, and the semicircular wall was divided into twelve sections, each carved with statements condemning the genocide by those foreign politicians, diplomats, and writers, representing witnesses in a courtroom. the copy of the un genocide convention, which visitors passed as they entered the exhibition, hovered within eyesight on the wall; the guide asks the visitor to judge for themselves. of course, memorial museums dedicated to the holocaust and other genocides also display the relevant artefacts and documentation which is evidence for genocide, but my point here is that in none of these museums does the need to prove genocide seem so insistent or urgent. holocaust museums only display artefacts which can be reliably authenticated, so as not to provide openings for holocaust deniers;29 in cambodia and rwanda, the skulls and bones of victims, which are often displayed in memorials, serve as evidence against denial.30 the memorial museum to the srebrenica 28. it is interesting to compare the use of survivor testimony in legal trials here. the nuremberg trials, in the immediate a� ermath of the war, relied mostly on nazi documents; the lawyers prosecuting david irving for holocaust denial in the uk in 2000 called only historians, and no survivors, as witnesses, for fear that the defence would expose ‘faults’ in their memories and jeopardise the case. in contrast, the trial of adolf eichmann in jerusalem in 1961 famously permitted survivors to testify at length, even if their experiences were somewhat tangential to the case itself. however, this trial (and this testimony) is widely credited with bringing the holocaust back into the world’s attention, as well as bringing about a change in how the holocaust was perceived in israel itself. for a general overview, see donald bloxham, “from streicher to sawoniuk: the holocaust in the courtroom,” in the historiography of the holocaust, ed. dan stone (basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 2004): 397-419. 29. for example, the project director of the iwm’s holocaust exhibition, suzanne bardgett, stated this as a concern whilst they were gathering artefacts for the exhibition. the only inauthentic object in the exhibition is a large-scale model of auschwitz. 30. rwanda has a diff erent set of issues surrounding denial. undoubtedly, there are hutu who deny that genocide happened, but the government also instituted a law under which anyone who includes the politically moderate hutu (who were also targeted during the genocide) as ‘genocide victims’ can be situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context 49 victims is an interesting comparator in this respect: bosnian serbs routinely deny that genocide happened, and indeed there are alternative home-made museums about ‘serbian genocide’ just a short drive away.31 but the museum does not engage with this denial, and indeed is very much aimed at the bosnian muslim and international community: the bodies of the victims who are now interred in the cemetery across the road from the museum have been forensically identified by dna, and the museum itself is very simple, displaying only the brief biographies of fifteen representative victims, together with a personal possessions – pipe, book, a koran – found with them in the grave, and a film which combines an outline of the events with very emotive testimony from surviving mothers and wives of the victims. each of these four cases of genocide, though, has international recognition, whereas, as i noted in the introduction, in the early 1990s when this exhibition was being formulated, armenians were struggling, and indeed are still struggling, against outright denial, geopolitics and misplaced caution in order to achieve global recognition. interestingly, these other museums fit far more squarely in louis bickford and amy sodaro’s ‘new commemorative paradigm’ in memorial museums – which, crucially, they define as a strategy of memorialisation in societies transitioning from conflict, dictatorship and authoritarianism which aims to help communities in confronting and coming to terms with the past.32 since the ottoman past is not just unconfronted but still hotly contested, one can begin to understand these differences in the agmi’s exhibition.33 prosecuted, accusing them of propagating relativism, genocide denial, and the ‘double genocide theory’. see lars waldorf, “instrumentalising genocide: the rpf’s campaign against ‘genocide ideology,’” in remaking rwanda: state building and human rights a� er mass violence, eds. scott straus and lars waldorf (wisconsin: university of wisconsin press, 2011). 31. paul b. miller, “contested memories: the bosnian genocide in serb and muslim minds,” journal of genocide research 8:3 (2006): 311-24. 32. bickford and sodaro, “remembering yesterday to protect tomorrow,” 68-9. these museums, they argue, operate under the rubric of ‘never again’, and try to prevent atrocities and genocide in the future via education, experience, and empathy: by educating younger generations about past injustices, by encouraging them to ‘experience’ the past for themselves at immersive museums, and by creating empathy with the victims through displays of personal belongings, family photographs, and lists of names, these museums hope to enact a moral transformation in their visitors which will encourage them to take action against genocide and promote democratic values (77-82). quite correctly, the question the ability of these techniques alone to inspire the kind of moral transformation in their visitors which will encourage them to take action against genocide, and promote democratic values (82-3). 33. the agmi is thus an excellent example which shows us very clearly the limits of this paradigm’s applicability in cases of contested pasts. other examples of ‘contested pasts’ which reinforce my point: in ways not dissimilar to the armenian case, for example, in present-day spain there is so little agreement about the civil war of 1936-39 and its a� ermath that a museum along the lines of the ‘new commemorative paradigm’ would only be met with deeper contestation. see helen graham, the war and its shadow: spain’s civil war in europe’s long twentieth century (eastbourne: sussex academic press, 2012), especially chapter 7. somewhat diff erently, lithuania’s museum of genocide victims in vilnius is hardly an example of the more open ‘confronting of the past’ which the paradigm suggests, since it minimises the (mainly jewish and communist) victims of the nazis’ cleansing policies, in favour of emphasising the repression of lithuanian national identity and the lithuanians killed under the soviet regime. see a. craig wight and j. john lennon, “selective interpretation and eclectic human heritage in lithuania,” tourism management 28 (2007): 519-29. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 50 conclusion: the visitors the concept of ‘familiarity’ is always quite useful to think about when considering how visitors might respond to a museum, but, as we will see, is particularly apt in the case of the agmi because of the nature of its visitor base (which is primarily armenian, but also includes a fairly large number of non-armenians – mostly european or north american – and the many foreign delegates who are taken on a tour of the museum as part of the offi cial state protocol). at the time of its opening and increasingly so since, most western visitors would in all likelihood have visited at least one holocaust museum before, and would have noticed some of the differences in exhibition style discussed above – but more importantly they will also have arrived with a passing knowledge of the holocaust, gleaned from popular fi lms such as schindler’s list, various literature including survivor testimonies, and these museums. this passing knowledge of the holocaust underpins most westerners’ conception of genocide – as the mass killing of a minority group by a fanatical state34 – and although few will know much of the history of the armenian genocide, the text and images which they encountered in the agmi exhibition will certainly have seemed familiar, and fi tted easily into this general conception of genocide. since we can assume that armenians do not need convincing that these events constitute genocide, it is worth considering what they might nevertheless have taken from the exhibition and memorial complex.35 in part, visiting the exhibition and the memorial complex can act as a confi rmation of identity, and joining the commemorative march on april 24th is in a sense a performance of duty. the exhibition narrative itself will of course have been extremely familiar to most armenian visitors; the events it covered were, in fact, a very basic and standard narrative of the genocide, since (for example) there was little detail on the individual histories of deportation and massacre from the areas now in turkey, in which the relatives of many visiting diaspora armenians will have been born.36 what the exhibition provided visitors with was the opportunity to engage with the authentic objects which narrated their history: although some of the visitors i observed in april 2011 wandered through the exhibition without really pausing (i suspect because they had seen it many times before),37 many also seemed to be engrossed in discussing individual items in the display cases. in this sense, the exhibition did very much function as a guardian of meaning and memory, as i suggested in the introduction. memorial museums increasingly need to be 34. the un genocide convention’s defi nition (and that of genocide scholars) is of course much broader than this – and indeed the agmi exhibition also provides evidence for genocide as the destruction of cultural buildings and as the forcible removal of children from one group to another. 35. of course, these encounters and experiences will also change over time and depending on context. see darieva’s discussion of how interpretations of the symbolism behind the obelisk and eternal fl ame have evolved since 1967 – through soviet rule and during the karabagh movement – in “the road to golgotha,” 98. 36. raymond h. kévorkian’s comprehensive the armenian genocide: a complete history (london: i.b. tauris, 2011), provides such detail. 37. in this sense, the visit to the museum on april 24th really does seem as a ‘performance of duty’. situating tsitsernakaberd: the armenian genocide museum in a global context 51 analysed and understood from a global or transnational perspective – both because they themselves are part of global trends, and because their visitors are also often from different corners of the globe – but this case study also shows how deep an impact specifi c national contexts and histories, and the contestation of those histories, can have on the remembrance and representation of genocide. 88 stefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler, cambridge, ma: harvard university press, 2016, isbn: 978-0674504790; 472 pages. reviewed by robert tatoyan armenian genocide museum-institute the question of involvement and complicity of germany in the armenian genocide is one of the directions of research of the history of the armenian genocide. this question was put into agenda from the beginning of the armenian deportation and massacres in 1915, at first by entente powers with the aim to emphasize germany’s role in this process. afterwards many foreign and armenian scholars explored this question in dozens of books and articles.1 of recent years’ research we would like to highlight the groundbreaking study of vahakn dadrian “german responsibility in the armenian genocide: a review of the historical evidence of german complicity”2 and a fundamental source book of wolfgang gust’s “the armenian genocide. evidence from the german foreign office archives, 1915-1916”.3 to these studies comes to contribute dr. stephen ihrig’s book “justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler,” published in january 2016. here the author, the polonsky fellow at the van leer jerusalem institute, presents a broad picture and a continuous narrative of reception of the armenian question and the armenian genocide topics by german policymakers, press and public from appearance of the armenian question in the agenda of international diplomacy in 1878 up to beginning of wwii. ihrig adopts quite lively and unconventional style and structure for his book. this is obvious from the beginning of his study which actually has two preambles. the first is a short prologue entitled “franz werfel meets adolf hitler,” there in full accordance with the latin principle “in medias res” the author presents one of the “protagonists” of his 1.  the select bibliography on german involvement in the armenian genocide, composed by zorian institute in 22 november 2011 lists the names of 45 studies in english, french and german, which deal with this topic (see online at: http://www.zoryaninstitute.org/bibliographies/select%20bibliography%20 on%20german%20involvement.pdf ): 2. vahakn n. dadrian, german responsibility in the armenian genocide: a review of the historical evidence of german complicity (watertown, ma: blue crane books, 1996). 3. wolfgang gust, der völkermord an den armeniern 1915/16: dockumente aus dem politischen achiv des deutschen auswärigen amts (spinge, germany: яu klampen, 2005). book reviews 89 book – the famous austrian writer of jewish origin – and ponders about the possibility of the meeting between him and adolf hitler in late 1932 in breslau. the second is broader and more formal (in structure but not in content) introduction, entitled “questions of genocide,” here the author presents the main topic, aims and objectives of the study. after introducing werfel’s famous book “the forty days of musa dagh,” as a warning of hitler , ihrig puts before reader the following questions: “why would a german (-language) author use the armenian genocide to warn germany of hitler and nazis? how could he think this was an effective narrative and use of his time?” the answer according to author is imminent: the armenian genocide was well remembered in germany when werfel published his “forty days” in late 1933. (p. 4) thus ihrig states the core argument of his book: the armenian genocide was and is of towering importance for german history, even though its role there has been largely ignored. (p. 6 ) ihrig again and again emphasize what his book is about: “it is the history of germany’s understanding of the armenian genocide (in a broad context, beginning with the role of the armenians in german history since bismark) (p. 11), “this book is about trying to understand how a society – german society – could possibly engage in a multilayer debate about genocide... full of details, horrors, and personal testimonies – only for that very society (or at least part of it) to commit another, even more unimaginable genocide merely a few years later.” (p. 8) author claims that his book is the first extensive study of the role the armenian genocide played for germany and german history. (p. 11) the book covers the time from the 1870s to the holocaust, and thus touches on many very different political and societal backgrounds, actors, relationships, and facts. to accompany the reader throughout the story the author at the end of introduction presents four “protagonists,” four men who, in different ways, and for different reasons, became “passionate warriors” against genocide: johannes lepsius, max erwin scheubner-richter, armin t. wegner, and franz werfel. “who they are will become clear in what follows, – notices ihrig. one thing, though, unites them: their quest to raise the alarm in germany about genocide.” (p. 15) the book consists of four major parts with fifteen chapters. part one, which have four chapters, is entitled “armenian blood money” and serves as a background and introduction to german policies toward and discussions about the ottoman armenians prior to 1915. the first chapter “beguinnings under bismarck” – analyses the policy of german chancellor bismarck in connection of the emergence and during first years of the armenian question. here ihrig discusses the first famous german quote on the oriental (=armenian) question, bismarck’s words that the oriental question is not worth the “healthy bones” of even “one pomeranian musketeer.” the author shows that on the contrary, bismarck and his germany were very much interested in the ottoman empire but not from the point of view of caring about the peoples inside of this state. from the beginning the armenian question was used by the german chancellor as a means to promote the german-ottoman rapprochement at the price of the armenians. (p. 28) as author summarize “the aspiration of the armenians were on the one hand a cumbersome nuisance to bismarck and later to wilhelm ii as well, but, on the other hand, they also offered opportunities. ...the armeinternational journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 90 nian question was constantly used by germany as a pawn in its game to endear itself to the ottomans: it was a pawn in germany’s quest for a place in the colonial sun as well as for its new place in the game of the great powers in europe. germany’s silence on the armenians was something like blood money that bismarck, wilhelm, the foreign office, and other political leaders were willing and even thought in necessary to pay. this constant and decades-long cynical use of the life and liberty of a people – and a christian people – accustomed the german political elite and public to anti-armenian views and discourses, to a “pragmatic” approach to the armenian question, and, most crucially in the long run, to a “pragmatic” approach to human rights, life, and liberty more generally.” (pp. 29-30) the chapter 2 “germany and the armenian horrors of the 1890s” is central both by its length (28 pages) as well as meaning for the part i of the book. here the author discusses the reactions to the massacres of armenians in 1894-1896 by official germany and then by the german press. already in the introduction to this chapter ihrig states that the armenian massacres did little to change political germany’s position on the armenians, quite the opposite: they gave germany another chance to cement its role as abdul hamid’s ally by “selling out the armenians.” (p. 33) ihrig abundantly cites kaiser wilhelm’s reaction to the massacres – comments made on the margins of german diplomatic reports from constantinople: “their [armenians – r.t.] blood upon england’s head,” (about sasoun massacre, p. 37) “artillery fire into yildiz [sultan’s palace] is the only thing that will have any effect now,” (about zeytun conflict, p. 38) “this surpasses everything before, this is indeed a true st. bartholomew’s massacre! it is necessary to speak in a different tone with the porte! because these are christians! and after all it is also against the other white christians,” (on the massacres of armenians in trebizond, ibid) “and new as a christian and a european, one has to watch quietly and even hand out good words to the sultan! shame! on all of us!” (p. 39) as ihrig notes, yet despite all the kaiser’s private outrage, for germany it was not an option to intervene on behalf of the armenians. in this chapter ihrig also introduces johannes lepsius, one of the “protagonists” of his book, the person, who popularized knowledge of 1890s massacres in germany with his articles in press and especially by his volume “armenia and europe” (1896). (p. 47) the author distinguishes the following features of the german reception of the 1890s massacres: 1) the 1896 debates saw the first mention of the direct german equivalent of the term “genocide” (völkermord); 2) the conservative and pro-government press generally advocated and justified turkish actions against armenians by describing armenians as “usurers” and “revolutionaries”; 3) armenian massacres were considered as directed not against christians but against particular race and thus used as argument against extending help and charity to the armenians. (pp. 55-57) ihrig summarizes the chapter in the following sentences: “what is illustrative of the first large armenian debate in germany is the way the anti-armenian faction – the majority of the press, the political leadership, and the foreign office – tried to stifle all criticism of turkey. not only did it attempt to justify what had happened – through racial qualifications, stefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler. 91 appeals to german state interest, and warnings of a european war – but it launched an allout war against any pro-armenian sentiments. ...the kaiser and the leaders of german politics knew what they were doing, whom they were backing, and what moral price they were in fact paying – despite all the whitewashing by the domestic press.” (p. 58) chapter 3, entitled “the triumph of german anti-armenianism” focuses on discussions of the armenian question in germany from the end of hamidian massacres up to young turkish revolution of 1908. author rightly notes that due to germany’s acquiescence to abdul hamid’s bloody policies, germany became privileged economic partner of turkey. accordingly, the anti-armenian stance of german ruling elite and imperialist press became clearer: this new racial discourse massively fostered the dehumanization of armenians, thereby justifying and excusing all kinds of violence against them. thus, the german anti-armenianism became both a duplicate and an extension of modern german anti-semitism. (p. 60) here ihrig gives detailed analysis of anti-armenian passages in protestant pastor friedrich naumann’s book “asia.” published in 1898 it became one of the most-read books of his time, having seven editions by 1913. ihrig shows that naumann was justifying the killings of armenians form the point of view of preservation of the ottoman empire and was defending inaction of germany in the armenian question as in accordance with german interests in connection with struggle with england for world domination. (pp. 63-69) to substantiate and justify its anti-armenian position naumann in his book quotes and agrees with racist remarks on armenian nation made by some german potter in sultan’s court, living in constantinople: “the armenian is the worst type in the world. he sells his wife, his still underaged daughter, he steals from his brother. the whole of constantinople is being morally poisoned by the armenians. ...it is armenian who is practicing all the usury. ...an orderly means of protecting oneself against armenians does not exist. the turk is acting in self-defense.” ihrig notes, that this “potter’s quote” became a key quote of german anti-armenianism. (p. 64) thus in 1890s debates the perception of the armenians as the “true jews of the orient” emerged. in german public discourse the armenians were understood to possess the same racial qualities as the jews in the anti-semitic worldview, but in more pronounced fashion, and even were often portrayed as something of “überjews.” (p. 74) ihrig notes, that the image of armenians as “über-jews” was a result of decades of anti-armenian discourse in germany sustained by a whole plethora of characterizations, images, and proverbs copied from modern anti-semithism. the german anti-armenian literature texts made no mention of the fact that the armenians – unlike the jews – were christian. total disregard for the armenians’ religion became a central aspect of german anti-armenianism over the coming decades. ihrig shows and illustrates with examples how the jewish-armenian parallel, if not equivalence, was continuously reaffirmed in the german press up to world war i, and also how anti-armenianism found its way into fiction – in work of karl may, the one of the most successful german novelists of the time. (pp. 75-79) international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 92 ihrig concludes the chapter by stating, that the german reactions to the 1890s armenian massacres do not only constitute the historical background to the debates that would follow in the wake of the armenian genocide, they also were replicated in almost every respect in the genocide debate of 1920s. (p. 81) the chapter 4 is entitled “from revolution to abyss” and deals with germany’s response to the armenian question developments from young turkish revolution of 1908 till the beginning of world war one. here author shows as repeatedly the kaiser, the german foreign office and political leadership maintained their anti-armenian stance. thus, ihrig sites the angry reaction of the kaiser on the proposal of the german chancellor to send a ship to cilicia during the adana massacres in april 1909: “why warships? the armenian do not concern us at all.” (p. 83) ihrig also touches upon the german reaction to the armenian reform plan of 1914. he notices that even the otherwise rather anti-armenian german ambassador wangenheim –who was to deny the reality of genocide for month in 1915 – acknowledged the need for armenian reforms in 1913. (p. 88) ihrig describes this attitude and germany’s support of the need of reforms for the armenians as “germany’s temporary willingness to change its decades-old anti-armenian policy,” with the main motivation to secure the stability of the ottoman empire. (p. 89) we think that here the author exaggerates the factor of interventions in favor of armenian reforms by wangenheim. actually, the german diplomacy did its best to limit the scope of the initial reform package offered by russian embassy as much as possible. anyway ihrig rightly concludes that germany was a rather unwilling participant in the armenian reform plan developments and did not really do its best to speed up its implementation. (ibid) part two, entitled “under german noses,” deals with the german reactions and knowledge of the armenian genocide in progress. it consists of four chapters. the first chapter of the second part (chapter 5, entitled “notions of total war”) explores some of the backgrounds of the armenian genocide. after touching upon the processes of radicalization that had taken place prior to the armenian genocide and which determined the armenian genocide – “the end of empire,” “ethnic claustrophobia,” “military culture,” “atrocity propaganda,” “propaganda culture,” etc, ihrig notes that these can be served as explanations but not excuses for genocide. (p. 103) the author puts the central question of the next three chapters of the second part as following: what could germany have known about the armenian genocide during genocide in progress? in chapter 6 entitled “dispatches from erzurum” ihrig states and shows that official germany knew in fact “everything”, yet it did not intervene. as there were many german diplomatic witnesses to genocide in eastern and southeastern anatolia and their reports could not all be discussed in the book, ihrig focuses on german vice-consul at erzurum max erwin von scheubner-richter’s reports as an exemplary case. ihrig highlights the reasons for choosing him as the follows: 1) he not only reported extensively and was present at the center of the earlier deportations, but he continually petitioned to the embassy in stefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler. 93 constantinople to intervene on behalf of the armenians, and he even personally attempted to save individual armenians; 2) from the beginning, his reports are thoroughly detailed, and among his colleagues he was the most vocal opponent of the measures against the armenian population; 3) in combination with the answers he received from his superiors, this diplomatic correspondence sheds light on what the german embassy and the foreign office knew, and what they did (and did not do) with this information. (p. 109) ihrig shows the early developments of the armenian genocide in march-july 1915 by abundantly quoting from the scheubner-richter’s reports. (pp. 108-128) particular attention is drawn on his letters to chancellor on 10 august 1915 and on december 1916 (at that time he already returned to germany), where at that time former german consul presents the big picture of the armenian question and “grand resume” on the armenian genocide. we consider it worth to cite from the last letter as well: the fear i spoke of in my report from erzurum, namely that the evacuation of the armenians would be tantamount to their annihilation resp. that this was the purpose behind it, has unfortunately turned out to be true. those evacuees of this tribe who are still living in mesopotamia are in a desolate condition. it would not be saying too much if i tell you that the turkish armenians, with the exception of several hundred thousand living in constantinople and other larger cities, have been practically wiped out.... i feel obliged to direct your excellency’s attention to the following: a number of discussions with leading turkish personalities left me with the following impressions: a large part of the young turkish committee is of the opinion that the ottoman empire should only be built upon a purely mohammedan, pan-turkish foundation. those inhabitants who are neither mohammedan nor turkish should be made to become so by force or, if that is not possible, annihilated. for these gentlemen, the present time seems to be the most suitable to put this plan into effect. the first item on their program was the execution of the armenians. a supposed revolution prepared of the dashnak party was put forward as a pretext for those powers, who are allied with turkey. furthermore, local unrest and self-protection measures on the part of the armenians were exaggerated and taken as an excuse to justify the evacuation of the armenians from endangered border districts. at the instigation of the committee, the armenians were murdered along the way by kurd and turkish gangs, in places also by gendarmes. [secondly, at] about the same time, the nestorians in eastern kurdistan, after brave resistance, were turned out of their domiciles by the vali from mosul, haidar bey, and annihilated in part. their fields and homes were ravaged. ... [thirdly,] halil bey’s campaign in northern persia resulted in the massacre of his armenian and syrian battalions and the expulsion of the armenian, syrian and persian population from northern persia. it left behind a great bitterness towards the turks. ... “if we, the turks, bleed to death in this battle for the existence of the ottoman empire, then there shall be no other nations in this empire either.” this remark by a young turkish international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 94 politician characterises best the point of view held by the circles of the young turkish committee. and the logical consequence of the weakening of pure turkishness (the anatolians), appearing more and more mainly because of a lack of organisation and foresight, is the violent annihilation of the other nations living in turkey. (pp. 122-127) thus showing that by the end of 1915 the german embassy and its consulates time and again had internally acknowledged the extent and intent of the genocide as genocide, ihrig switches his attention to how the german authorities reacted to what was happening with armenians. first, ihrig states that germans knew that what had happened had been “wrong”, and that its own role, not just of the ottomans, would be under scrutiny and attack in the future. thus, from 1915 onward, germany prepared this double strategy: on one hand, blaming the armenians to justify whatever had happened to them; and on the other hand, defending itself by claiming it had helped the armenians. this very much was germany’s official line for the rest of the war and the postwar years. (pp. 128, 132) here ihrig also touches upon the question of german’s guilt in the armenian genocide. opposing what he describes as “allegations by armenian researchers, most prominently vahagn dadrian” who picture germany as co-perpetrator, the author states that the claim that the armenian genocide was a result of joint german-ottoman decision making cannot yet be proven. however, he continues, this does not mean that germany was not guilty in another way: guilty in failing to stop the young turks. germany knew what was going on and chose to accept the death of armenians as part of the cost of doing business at war. (p. 134) chapter 7 bears the name “interlude of the gods” – the same name as one of the key chapters of franz werfel’s novel “the forty days of musa dagh,” where the author depicted the meeting of johannes lepsius with enver pasha, during which german protestant figure tried to convince his powerful interlocutor to stop the extermination of the armenians. here ihrig deals with activity of lepsius and other german figures aimed at increasing of awareness of german public about the ongoing process of extermination of the armenian population in the ottoman empire. following his trip to constantinople in summer 1915 where he failed to persuade the young turkish leaders to stop anti-armenian measures lepsius returned to germany and published the book “report on the state of the armenian people in turkey” in 1916. about 20,000 copies of the report were printed and distributed among german officials, parliamentarians, public figures, journalists, missionary circles, clergy, etc. ihrig gives the short description of lepsius report as well as touches upon armin t. wegner pro-armenian lobbying activity after his return from military service in the ottoman mesopotamia where he witnessed the armenian genocide. (pp. 143-145) in years of 1916 and 1917 two other german testimonies about the armenian genocide were published abroad: these are “the horrors of aleppo” by martin niepage, the teacher at a german school in aleppo, and “two war years in constantinople” by harry stürmer, the former correspondent of the kölnische zeitung in constantinople. ihrig provides summary of these reports here. (pp. 145-149) stefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler. 95 the rest of the chapter 7 deals with the armenian genocide debates in reichstag, the german parliament during world war one. particularly, ihrig puts a spotlight on the question in writing to the german chancellor by karl liebknecht on 18 december 1915, where the famous socialist leader inquired about whether the german government is aware of the fact that the armenian population “were expelled from their places of residence and were butchered in the hundred thousand.” (p. 150) on january 11 this question was read aloud in the plenum of parliament and got an evasive answer of the government official. when liebknecht tried to raise this question again, he was suppressed and halted by his fellow parliamentarians. (pp. 150-151) the chapter 8 (“what germany could have known”) is mainly devoted to the coverage of the armenian topic in the wartime german press. extensive citing of major articles and debates in such newspapers as kölnische zeitung, vorwärts, neue preussische (kreuz-) zeitung, berliner tageblatt, norddeutsche allgemeine zeitung, magdeburger zeitung, deutsche tageszeitung, etc allows ihrig to come to the conclusion, that the armenian issue was discussed and all the allegations of massacres and of the “annihilation of the armenian nation” were treated in the very same fashion in which 1890s massacres were discussed, denying the full extent of violence and justifying violent measures against armenians, including the killing of civilians. (p.185) according to the author “virulent anti-armenian bias,” present in the german press was not a result of total ignorance of the actual events in anatolia. to argument this point ihrig among others cites karl otten, a german wartime censor, who affirmed 1919 that not only diplomats but also the press had been well aware of the suffering in armenia: “i remind you of armenia whose suffering was known to our press and our diplomats as much as they were to me, who held news about them in my hands and was supposed to confiscate it.” (p. 189) part iii of the book is entitled “debating genocide” and is dealing with the discussion of the armenian question and the armenian genocide in weimar germany between 1919 and 1933. as the previous two parts it consists of four chapters of which in the chapter 9 (“war crimes, war guilt, and whitewashing”) the author shows how the armenian topic was discussed in the first two years after the world war one. ihrig notices that “what characterizes these years is the interplay between information and whitewashing, accepting the charges of genocide and denying of justifying what had happened.” (p. 193) the defeat of germany resulted also in lifting of censorship in german press, which allowed german pro-armenian activists, most prominently johannes lepsius and armin t. wegner, to reveal in depth and condemn the armenian atrocities. ihrig emphasize that these texts and reports were first in postwar weeks to use fully fledged “genocide language:” terms such as “systematic annihilation,” “extermination,” “annihilation of the armenian people,” “awful extinction,” “monstrous annihilation of armenians” were frequently used to describe to what happened to armenians. (pp. 194-195) in this connection ihrig extensively cites from the wegner’s open letter to the american president wilson on behalf to the armenians, published 23 february 1919 in the berliner international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 96 tageblatt. yet he also notices that this letter, though “thoroughly passionate,” fell on deaf ears – both abroad and in germany. this convinced wegner to come up with a series of slideshow public lectures on the “armenian horrors” during which he also showed pictures taken by him at armenian concentration camps in syrian deserts. many of wegner’s pictures have since become iconic images of the armenian genocide. (pp. 196-204) with the aim to whitewash and bury german involvement in and responsibility for the armenian genocide the german government asked lepsius to prepare a collection of german diplomatic documents where the reports of german diplomats, who complained against actions of the ottoman government and tried to relieve the condition of armenians, would be gathered. the result was germany and armenia which was published in the same year of 1919. the author surveys the reaction of the german and international press to the lepsius volume. (pp. 209-219) as a whole, ihrig evaluates this book positively, emphasizing that it sparked public interest in and a debate on the armenian genocide itself, although also succeeded in convincing german press and public that germany was not guilty of conconspiracy and coexecution of genocide. (pp. 209, 217) but the acceptance of the charge of genocide leveled against the young turks by many german papers in 1919 did not last long. ihrig names the year of 1920 a “backlash year,” when an overwhelmingly large part of the german press began again to deny intent and minimize the extent of the atrocities. here again ihrig illustrates this point by abundantly citing from the press of the corresponding year. (pp. 219-225) the intensity of armenian debates in germany has significantly increased after the shooting of talât pasha, the key organizer of the armenian genocide, by soghomon tehlirian in berlin on 15 march 1921. in chapter 10, entitled “assassination in berlin, 1921,” author observed the reaction of german public and press to this incident. (pp. 226-233) ihrig shows that the moods of sympathy toward talât were prevailing; he was depicted as a “friend of germany,” a “genuine and honorable statesman.” correspondingly his role in the extermination of armenians was downplayed and once again the full scope of the armenian genocide denial arguments was presented. the chapter 11, entitled “trial in berlin,” is the lengthiest in the third section of ihrig’s book. (pp. 234-269) ihrig calls the topic of this chapter – tehlirian (talât pasha) trial, which lasted only one and a half days (2 and 3 june 1921) – the “one of the most spectacular trials of the twentieth century” for two reasons: 1) from the very first hour the trial turned against talât pasha and, by extension, against the ottoman empire, 2) though tehlirian repeatedly admitted that he had indeed killed talât, he was acquitted and set free. (p. 235) ihrig continues by giving minute details from the proceedings of trial, which are read all in one breath: dialogs between judge and defendant, attempts of prosecutor to stop turning of trial into political one, interrogation of witnesses, among them johannes lepsius, the key defense witness, who presented the broad picture of the armenian genocide, and concluding speeches of state prosecutor and defense attorneys. the verdict of the jury to the question of whether tehlirian was guilty of intentionally killing talât pasha was “no.” ihrig stresses important point here: that contrary to speculastefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler. 97 tions in subsequent press and academic discourse, the jury did not necessarily find tehlirian innocent because of “temporary insanity” – the jury did not deliver its reasoning, just a simple “no.” (p. 262) the rest of the chapter ihrig devotes to the observation of media coverage of talât pasha trial as it was a media event in and of early weimar germany. (pp. 263-269) the dossier of the trial shows that international papers such as the london daily telegraph, the chicago daily news, and the philadelphia public ledger etc, had asked for tickets long in advance, as had german papers such as the deutsche allgemeine zeitung, the bz am mittag, the berliner morgenpost, the freiheit, and the vorwarts. (p. 264) as ihrig notices many papers now realized the full extent of the events of 1915 and expressed this in such terms as “unparalleled horrors,” or “a distressing image of armenian horrors.” most german newspapers had also printed lepsius testimony’s conclusion that what happened to the armenians “was not resettlement but the open intent to exterminate a whole people. only with the most brutal methods could one million people have been exterminated in such a short amount of time.” (p. 266) ihrig states that it was the outcome of the trial, the non-guilty verdict, which left most of the papers in shock. among others, the vorwärts, one of german newspapers present at trial, commented the verdict in the following way: “[the jury] followed the same moral law based on which friedrich schiller acquits the murderer william tell. tehlirian, too, can justify himself with the tell saying ‘avenged i the holy nature.’ ” (p. 267) the berliner volkszeitung also applauded the verdict and characterized the trial as not being about the death of talât pasha, but about “the murder of an entire people,” “condemned to annihilation” by talât. (p. 268) the chapter 12, which bears the title “the victory of justificationalism,” focuses on the armenian genocide debate in germany aftermath of talat pasha trial till the coming of hitler to power in 1933. the trend in these debates is characterized by the author as no longer one of a denial, but of a “justification”, thus the dynamics of this process is described as rise and victory of “justificationalism.” the author argues that after talât pasha trial germany saw the relative predominance in the press of a new and radicalized kind of anti-armenian argumentation that had repercussions for far more than just germany’s understanding of what happened in anatolia. this was the justificationalist argumentation, which accepted all the horrors and, indeed, even the full intent of genocide, but at the same time strove to justify what had happened – thus justifying genocide.” (p. 272) to illustrate this thesis ihrig again extensively quotes from the german press. (pp. 273-283) the next step in the armenian genocide discourse in germany was in finding similarities between the armenian question in the ottoman turkey with the jewish question internally. the year 1922 marks the emergence of articles in the german press there jews were identified as the internal “illness” as the armenians in the ottoman turkey. ihrig notes that the implications of this discourse were dangerously obvious: “the armenian question was international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 98 solved by the young turk “ethnic surgeon” – now something similar had to be done to resolve the jewish question.” (p. 288) the fourth part of the ihrig’s book is entitled “the nazis and the armenian genocide” and is devoted to reconstruction of how the armenian genocide impacted the nazis, the armenian-jewish conflation that is how the armenians were understood as quasi-and even uber-jews in german discourse. author states, that in the decade and a half before the nazi takeover, the armenian genocide had not only been widely discussed in germany, it also involved a group that was typically understood the prism of contemporary anti-semitism. “the armenian genocide was understood through another group that lived in germany and throughout europe and that was also perceived as “problematic” by nationalists, indeed one that was understood by anti-semites to pose another “question,” that is, the “jewish question.” to illustrate this point the author extensively sites from anti-semitic and racial texts, published from the late nineteenth century up to and during the third reich (felix von luschan, hans f.r. gunther, houston chamberlain and others). special attention is made for hitler’s use of armenians as an example of a “lesser race” similar to the jews in his speeches before 1933 (pp. 316-318). as ihrig summarizes “if the armenians were often rather peripheral to the overall arguments of these texts, the way they featured in them placed them right at the heart of anti-semitic discourse: first, the “armenoid race,” used synonymously with the armenians,” was seen as the major parent race of, and thus responsible for, the negative characteristics found in the jews; second, the armenians were perceived as the same as or worse than the jews, as depicted in modern anti-semitic discourse...; third, they played a central role in the debate about the “aryan theory,” that is, the existence of an alleged “aryan race” in opposition to the “semitic race.” thus not only had racial anthropology and (popular) racial handbooks put the armenians on the mental map of anti-semites and nazis, these texts also reaffirmed the core ingredient of the justificationalist argument: the armenians’ (alleged) racial characteristics. the nazis further affirmed and reiterated the jewish-armenian conflation. ” (p 319) the chapter 14, entitled “the nazis’ new turkey” explores the role the new turkey and its leader atatürk played in nazi discourse. as author points out, in the nazi vision the new turkey was a state that had, on a grand scale, “solved” its minority question in a “final” manner and emerged as a kind of “postgenocidal wonderland.” (p. 320) the author states that for the nazis the armenian genocide was in many respects the precondition for the successful kemalist national revolution and resistance and as usual confirms this thesis by abundantly citing relevant articles from the nazi press of 1920s. (pp. 321-326) chapter 15 is entitled “no smoking gun” and surveys some examples of how and where the nazis have come across the armenians and the armenian genocide. here the author presents the gallery of prominent nazi affiliated persons who had been also linked to the annihilation of the armenians in the ottoman empire; these are count friedrich-werner von der schulenburg, the consul in eastern anatolia in 1916, bronsart von schellenstefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler. 99 dorff, the war-era ottoman chief of stuff and, last but not, least max erwin von scheubner-richter, former consul at erzurum. to introduce these persons ihrig returns to the days of tehlirian (talât pasha) trial in the summer of 1921 in berlin, trial on which they all were involved as witnesses of either prosecutors’ or defense side. erwin von scheubner-richter traveled to berlin with his friend, no other than adolf hitler. this fact gives ihrig the opportunity to speculate that hitler would have made his way to the courtroom as a spectator, if any tickets had been available. (p. 336) ihrig again states that the first four and a half years of the weimar republic were saturated with the armenian genocide. according to author while hitler was not directly part of the “great german genocide debate” of those years, he has to be thought as always there, because in fact, he was there: he was in germany; he was in audience and was an especially attentive member of the audience. (ibid) in this part of the book the figure of scheubner-richter is again one of the central – at this time as a hitler’s closest advisor and friend, a “nazi martyr”, killed in the hitler putsch of 1923 and by the fact of his death one of the most important blood heroes of nazism. (p. 339) ihrig portrays scheubner as a paradoxical figure in nazi history. extensively citing from paul leverkuehn’ book on scheubner entitled “guard on eternal watch” and published during nazi era (1938), ihrig shows that despite his antigenocidal past in 1923 scheubner openly called for the “most ruthless struggle against everything foreign in the german national body” and also advocated the “ruthless cleansing of germany” of all foreign and inimical elements. at the same time, ihrig calls the german diplomat’s story, as presented by his former adjutant, “a monument against genocide in the third reich,” because of presence there of extensive depiction of the anit-armenian policy of the ottoman government in 1915. (ibid) the most debated issue in armenian genocidenazi connection is the authenticity of hitler quote “who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of armenians.” ihrig dismisses the attempts of denialist historians to use the controversy surrounding the question whether hitler pronounced these sentence or not, as an argument that the armenian genocide never occurred at all. (p. 348) ihrig states that the burden of proof is actually not on showing that hitler and the other nazis did know of the armenian genocide; it is quite reverse: there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the germans had actually forgotten about the armenian genocide by 1939. there is every reason to believe that what hitler meant in that part of the speech was that the turks (as a whole) had never had to “pay” for the armenian genocide; they got away with it unscathed, without negative consequences. (p. 349) ihrig thus puts the hitler’s quote in context arguing that there is no doubt that the nazis had incorporated the armenian genocide, its “lessons,” tactics, and “benefits,” into their own worldview and their view of the new racial order they were building. (ibid) again according to ihrig there cannot be the slightest doubt that the leading nazis were well informed about the armenian genocide and they knew of it as what we would now call a international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 3, issue 1 100 “genocide” – that is a deliberate attempt to exterminate an entire people. (p. 352) to substantiate this thesis ihrig gives names of top political figures around hitler before and during third reich which had served in the ottoman empire and had direct contact there with the armenian topic: scheubner, humann, schulenburg (hitler’s ambassador to moscow), konstantin neurath (foreign minister of the third reich in 1933-1938), franz von papen (hitler’s first vice-chancellor and future ambassador to vienna and ankara), rudolf hoess (the commander of auschwitz) and others. (p. 352) ihrig highlights aspects of inspiration and motivation for nazis radiating from the armenian genocide. first, it must have taught them that such incredible crimes could go unpunished under the cover of war, even if one lost that war. (p. 353) a second major inspiration according to ihrig was conveyed through the nazis’ understanding and portrayal of the ataturk’s new turkey as a “postgenocidal paradise” of sorts. the role of the nazis had assigned to the new turkey in their beliefs, ideology, and propaganda – that of an “ethnic cleansing” success story, of a state that was now enjoying the benefits of past “cleansing” – must have constituted a perpetual reminder that germany was not “cleansed,” and a strong motivation to think about “cleaning house.” (p. 354) another lesson from the armenian genocide according to author might have been the ability to find “willing executioners” among the population – from people organized in various civil and military formations to different kinds of civilians, from both the dominant and non-dominant ethnicities, including former neighbors and also, prominently, civilian women. (p. 355) the author also shows the lessons from the genocide debate in germany itself, these are: 1) no need to be afraid of such genocide debate, as it had no consequences, 2) it showed that it was incredibly hard to convince the public that genocide was indeed taking place or had happened. (ibid) author concludes the chapter by drawing parallels between the armenian genocide and the jewish holocaust, these are: killing under the cover of a major war; killing mainly away from major population centers and mainly after the target population had been physically removed from their former places of mixed residence; deportation itself as a part of extermination process; death by attrition; extermination as part of larger ethnic restructuring schemes, with “vacated properties” earmarked for and rapidly occupied by members of the dominant ethnic group; organized robbery of the group by structuring deportations so that most immovable and moveable goods stayed behind or were easily discoverable, all this in rather “orderly” fashion; the preparation for physical violence in form of an antiminority discourse, and so on. in epilogue ihrig returns and takes to conclusion the destiny of four figures, the “passionate warriors against genocide” – these were johannes lepsius, max erwin scheubner-richter, armin t. wegner, and franz werfel. as in 1930s and afterwards only two of these “protagonists” were alive and continued their activity – armin wegner and franz werfel. ihrig concentrates on the question of the contribution of the armenian genocide theme to jewish life and identity by the examples of first’s “open letter” to hitler on destefan ihrig, justifying genocide: germany and the armenians from bismarck to hitler. 101 fense of the jews and of reception of second’s famous novel “the forty days of musa dagh” among jews in nazi ghettos, its impact as a source of inspiration for struggle and ideological fortification. yet ihrig chooses to end his book by citation of the “another warrior against genocide” raphael lemkin, who also was influenced not only by the armenian genocide but also by talât pasha trial. in his memoirs, lemkin wrote: “tehlirian acted as the self-appointed legal officer for the conscience of mankind. but can a man appoint himself to mete out justice? will not passion sway such a form of justice and make a travesty of it? at that moment, my worries about the murder of the innocent became more meaningful to me. i didn’t know all the answers but i felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be accepted by the world. ...sovereignty, i argued, cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people.” (p.371) thus raphael lemkin’s “success” according to the author was much more visible and even more important as he fathered both the term “genocide” and the un’s 1948 genocide convention – the mechanisms aimed at deterring the states from butchering civilian populations and thus benefiting from genocides. to conclude ihrig’s book is well researched; all his main theses and arguments, above all the continuity of presence of the armenian question and the armenian genocide topics in german public discourse up to the beginning of wwii, are well grounded in sources and thus fully acceptable. upon reading this book one fully understands that hitler’s famous words –“who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of armenians” – given on the eve of invasion to poland in august 1939, were not made by chance abut were the logical outcome of the long lasted armenian genocide debate in germany. special advantage of the book is the author’s free and lively writing style which makes reader absorbed in narrative. some minor observations on different occasions present in the book, which are not directly related to the main research topic, are also valuable. for example, while discussing the coverage of talât pasha trial in german press, the author ponders upon the power of media to set agenda of public discourse, summarizing that media and propaganda are never really successful in directing what the people think about a topic, but rather which topic the people should think about. (p. 264) in summary, ihrig’s book is a very important contribution to the armenian genocide studies, which provides researchers with huge amount of new data and insight and also paves the way for further similar studies on the impact of the armenian topic in public discourse of other main actors in the armenian question. 97 book review muriel mirak-weiβbach, retter oder täter. ein general zwischen staatsräson und moral: otto liman von sanders und der völkermord an den armeniern. bremen, donat verlag, 2021, 208 s. reviewed by aram mirzoyan, phd, armenian genocide museum-institute foundation the issue of the armenian genocide has attracted the scholarly attention of both armenian and non-armenian researchers for many decades. among the most important subjects in the field was and still is the issue of complicity in the armenian genocide. the most intriguing topic of research within the framework of the latter is the issue of german co-responsibility and in particular the german military’s role in it. numerous monographs and articles have dealt with this issue and allow one to argue that the german military did indeed have the main role in the german co-responsibility. it is worth mentioning, briefly, that the position and behavior of german military personnel who served in the ottoman empire during wwi and about whom materials are accessible were neither spontaneous nor surprising. german military culture had been taking shape from the unity wars of the 19th century and was reflected in various historical events that followed. this began with the colonial campaigns in china during the boxer rebellion between 1900 and 1901, then in german south-west africa during herero and namaqua uprisings between 1904 and 19071 and in german east africa during the maji maji rebellion between 1905 and 1907. it ended with the crimes against humanity in belgium and northern france during wwi2. it is necessary to bear one thing in mind when dealing with the issue of the german military’s role in the armenian genocide – understand the general context of the question being researched. these could be the ideological or historical sectors, “personal portraits” of the key actors and other things. in other words, it is important to have a broad picture rather than a mere mention of the relevant facts. from wwi onward, the issue of german co-responsibility in the armenian genocide has been periodically addressed by academicians as well as by the representatives of the public and political sectors. many accusations have been made against the german empire and its various representatives. of course, not all the accusations made can be justified or have real facts to substantiate them. one of the tasks of the researchers who are active in this field is, therefore, to clarify existing information and present true facts, removing false ones. among the individuals who have been accused was general otto liman von sanders 1 in 2021 germany recognized the crimes of the german empire as genocide. see, https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/deutschland-namibia-herero-voelkermord-100.html, accessed 14.09.2021. 2 for further information see, for example, isabel v. hull, “‘military necessity’ and the laws of war in imperial germany,” in order, conflict, and violence, eds. stathis n. kalyvas, ian shapiro and tarek masoud (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2008): 352-377; isabel v. hull, absolute destruction. military culture and the practices of war in imperial germany (ithaca and london: cornell university press, 2005). 98 (hereafter generally referred to as the general). most probably the severest of such accusations concerning him was made by admiral somerset gough-calthorpe of the royal navy. the admiral argued that the general “held practically autocratic power as military dictator” when 300,000 ottoman greeks were subjected to deportation and massacre and that he oversaw the expulsion of 1.5 million armenians and 450,000 greeks from their homes in 1915.3 it is obvious that more research is necessary to obtain a more objective picture of the role that general liman von sanders played in the fate of the armenian people during the armenian genocide. concerning this, the newly published book retter oder täter. ein general zwischen staatsräson und moral: otto liman von sanders und der völkermord an den armeniern4 by muriel mirak-weiβbach, an american-armenian journalist, writer and specialist in english studies, has broadened the context regarding one of the key individuals of the german military serving in the ottoman empire during wwi. general otto liman von sanders was a prussian cavalry general, a field marshal of the ottoman empire and head of the german military mission there from the end of 1913 until the end of wwi. the book is the sort of an adventurous journey through his later life, starting with his arrival in constantinople on 14 december 1913 and ending with his return to germany in 1919. those times included the prewar period with its diplomatic battle concerning his initial appointment as the head of the first army corps, which triggered the “liman von sanders crisis.” this was followed by the whole of wwi (the gallipoli campaign, the armenian genocide with special attention to the episodes which “brought” the armenians as well as greeks, jews and him together, as well as his service in palestine). in the immediate postwar period, he was held prisoner and interned in malta; then returned home. in the last three chapters of the book (“honour,” “the german tragedy,” “yerevan 2019”) the author has come to the fore. if the previous chapters were devoted to the general’s life and deeds before, during and after wwi (from 1914 to 1919), then these last three chapters provide opportunity for the analysis, reasoning and finalization of the book’s main goal – depicting the general as the savior of the armenian as well as greek peoples and not as the war criminal who was responsible for the deportation and massacres of those same armenians and greeks during wwi. the book ends with professor tessa hofmann’s (dr. phil., magistra artium, prof. h.c.) and helmut donat’s (head of the donat publishing house and a co-founder of the working group on historical peace research) articles, which bring an additional viewpoint to the subject in question. the first article otto liman von sanders – an approach attempt deals with the deportations which otto liman was involved in (in a positive or negative way) and with the accommodation of greek and armenian orphans in panderma which he organized. the latter is considered in comparison with turkish orphanages and turkish state policy towards the non-muslims orphans. 3 michelle tusan, the british empire and the armenian genocide. humanitarianism and imperial politics from gladstone to churchill (london, ny: i.b. tauris, 2017), 216. 4 rescuer or perpetrator. a general between reason of state and morality: otto liman von sanders and the armenian genocide. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 https://doi.org/ 10.51442/ijags.0026 99 the second article the armenian rescuer otto liman von sanders and the “honor of the german army” is devoted to: 1. the crimes committed by the german army in belgium and northern france during wwi; 2. the reluctance to take responsibility for the fate of armenians of the lands which were reconquered or newly conquered by the turkish army after the treaty of brest-litovsk; 3. the propaganda of innocence (die unschuldspropaganda) broadcast in germany and different germans who agreed to take part in it and who denied to do so (otto liman von sanders, johannes lepsius, walter rößler vs. armin t. wegner, martin niepage, heinrich vierbücher). the book’s prologue starts with the case of withdrawal of the honorable status of the general’s grave. the authorities of the german city of darmstadt made this decision in 2015 (7)5 taking into account that “he was partly responsible for the atrocities committed against the armenians.” (9) as mrs. mirak-weiβbach states, her interest concerning the fate of the armenians has a very personal, rather than a purely academic nature: both her parents were survivors of the armenian genocide and had been rescued as orphans by turks. according to the author there were several questions that she wanted like to find answers to. among them were: who was otto liman von sanders? what did he do during the wwi? if he really acted against the deportations, where and when did that happen? why don’t people recognize what he did? etc. (10) concerning the prologue, it is worth mentioning another small detail: it claims that “in 2016, the german bundestag passed a resolution condemning the state crimes of the ottoman regime but without clearly labeling them as genocide.” (7) indeed, this remark is mostly true concerning the body of the resolution. but the title of the resolution reads (literal translation) remembrance and commemoration of the genocide of the armenians and other christian minorities in 1915 and 19166 (erinnerung und gedenken an den völkermord an den armeniern und anderen christlichen minderheiten in den jahren 1915 und 1916). it appears to be a quite precise mention of the armenian genocide. the aforementioned statement is true for the first resolution, passed by bundestag in june 2005. a small nuance should also be mentioned (not as a criticism, but rather as a statement of fact): sometimes it feels like the narrative drifts from the title question – rescuer or perpetrator? (retter oder täter?) and becomes more like biographical research concerning the general’s activities in the ottoman empire before and during wwi and the period of his internment in malta. at first glance this could be considered a disadvantage. in reality, however, it provides us with the aforementioned broader picture which helps to better understand the main issue. taking into account this feature, the current review will mostly be focused on the coverage of those parts which concern the book’s main topic. the content of the chapter “the genocide 1915-1917” can be roughly divided in two parts: a brief overview of the armenian genocide and the general’s activities to prevent or stop the deportations of armenian and greeks. in the transition from one topic to another 5 the respective pages of the book are mentioned in the round parenthesis. 6 https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/086/1808613.pdf, accessed 14.12.2021. 100 mrs. mirak-weiβbach writes: “it was not the first time that wangenheim7 informed berlin about the plight of the armenians, and it would not be the last. but all of his diplomatic initiatives failed, as did morgenthau’s,8 with which he kept clashing. if the ambassadors in constantinople did nothing or could not do anything, what could the military do?” (44) the second part of the chapter describes the cases when the general opposed the deportation of armenians and greeks and either prevented or stopped them, e.g. in urfa (march 1916), in the coastal regions of asia minor (august 1916) and smyrna (november 1916) etc. but there was one case, when von sanders ordered the deportation of greeks from ayvalık, but took all necessary steps in order to protect the deportees from severe measures. (50-51) he also organized the accommodation of greek and armenian orphans in panderma at his own expense. (47) the chapter “yerevan 2019” is the most important in terms of the author’s arguments and approaches concerning the role of the general. at the beginning, mrs. mirak-weiβbach describes the tsitsernakaberd memorial complex and in particular the 100 meter-long memorial wall as well as the symbolic tombs of people who did their best to help the armenian people during the genocide and to inform the world of this crime, e.g. johannes lepsius, armin wegner, franz werfel, jakob künzler, henry morgenthau sr. etc. the author notes that the general is not among them. (90).9 the subsequent part of the chapter deals with author’s meeting and discussion with the director of armenian genocide museum-institute foundation and some of staff members and invited experts. (91-93).10 she also discusses, justifying, in particular, liman von sanders’ role as the rescuer of armenians, using the four criteria for awarding the title of righteous among the nations, an official title awarded to non-jews who risked their lives to save jews during the holocaust. (91-92) the approaches of the author in some points are, however, not substantiated. the rest of this chapter (which also includes a series of photographs) presents a brief presentation of germany’s role in the armenian genocide, as well as british and usa policy. (94-118) when writing about the germans’ role, the author mentions that there wasn’t a united attitude towards the armenian genocide among them: it was either approved of or fought against. the general was among the second group. it is also noted that von sanders was not able to stop the armenian genocide alone. (114) the chapter “the honor” begins with the question “why did liman von sanders stand 7 hans von wangenheim, german ambassador to the ottoman empire in 1912-1915. 8 henry morgenthau sr., us ambassador to the ottoman empire in 1913-1916. 9 this cannot be considered to be a surprise. the tombs are of those people who raised their voices or otherwise helped the armenians during or after the armenian genocide. while liman von sanders is considered to be an accomplice in the crime of the armenian genocide. see for example edita gzoyan, «թուրքիայի միջազգային իրաւական պատասխանատուութեան հարցը ա. համաշխարհային պատերազմից յետոյ», «թուրքիայի միջազգային իրաւական պատասխանատուութեան հարցը ա. համաշխարհային պատերազմից յետոյ» [the issue of turkey’s international legal responsibility after world war i] haigazian armenological review 41 (2021): 95-118 10 it should be specially mentioned that author’s interpretation of the closed discussion with some of the staff members of agmi and invited experts is mostly unacceptable (93) but will not be referred to within this review. generally, she does not clarify who is making the particular assertion, wrongly attributing some of them to the armenian genocide museum-institute. 101 up for the persecuted?” so the main purpose of this chapter is to present the image of the general, introducing him as a person with principles, moral attitudes and a particular nature. one of the key parts of this chapter is the following: according to his (the general’s –a.m.) understanding of military customs, he adhered to certain norms and codes of conduct and expected the same from others. it is the duty of soldiers to fight the enemy and protect civilians. (122) another is: liman’s strict adherence to the code of honor explains why he appealed to his high rank when it came to protecting innocent citizens or discriminated minority groups. it may also declare his unconditional defense of the germans.11 it was the basis of his actions but did not save him from making mistakes. (123) the second part of the chapter deals with soghomon tehlirian’s trial and general’s behavior during it. the last part (culture and character) deals with and brings together three people – otto liman von sanders, johannes lepsius and walter rößler.12 in the last chapter of the book “german tragedy?” (135-137) the tendency to put otto liman von sanders, johannes lepsius and walter rößler on the same level becomes more obvious. it might have been done intentionally in order to promote the situation where there is at least one leading person from the military establishment, civil society and the diplomatic corps who was pro-armenian. the book being reviewed is an attempt to bring together the facts about otto liman von sanders’ life and deeds from 1913 till 1919, with special attention being given to the episodes concerning the saving of armenians, greeks and jews from deportation during wwi. the main goal of this volume is to refute unfair accusations against the general and to present him as a person who carried out his office honestly. moreover, there is a tendency in the last chapters of the book to make otto liman von sanders equal to johannes lepsius and walter rößler in the field of pro-armenian activities. the reason for this may be an attempt to find and/or create (depending on research) a prominent positive personality from the german military in the history of the armenian genocide. not all the statements and arguments the author puts forward may be accepted but this research is a step forward in the study of the role of the german empire and its representatives in the armenian genocide. in any case, this book may contribute to further discussion and research. 11 this was also reflected in the denial of any accusations against the german military regarding their role in the armenian genocide. see, for example, deutschland und die armenier. ein wort zu den beschuldigungen der entente. von general d. kav. liman von sanders. in: 20. jahrhundert. dokumente zur zeitgeschichte 9 (1919). 12 german consul in aleppo from 1910 till 1918. 92 book review shushan khachatryan, the role of religion in the realization of the armenian genocide, st. echmiadzin, 2020, 230 pp. reviewed by tehmine martoyan, phd, armenian genocide museum-institute foundation the role of religion in the realization of the armenian genocide worthwhile monograph authored by shushan r. khachatryan,1 scholar of religious studies, phd in history was published in 2020, by the recommendation of the publishing council of mother see of holy echmiadzin and the scientifi c board of the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation. in her research dr. khachatryan scrutinized, from the historico-religious viewpoint, the religious aspect of the realization of the armenian genocide, as a factor and a tool (starting from the day of the ottoman empire’s entry to the great war (1914) throughout the entire process of the armenian genocide (1915-1923)). identifying the role of religion in perpetration of genocides, as strongly believed by the author, was the most sensitive issue requiring the utmost attention of a scholar, whereas the nexus of religion and genocide could be considered as touchstone in the sense that the issue had not been given due attention to date.2 khachatryan deemed that the signifi cance of the religious aspect of the armenian genocide had been “long noticed,” while its application in the study of genocides, as maintained by the author, might change approaches or offer methods and research leading to completely different complex solutions.3 the goal of the research was the elucidation of the issue of religious targeting within the context of the armenian genocide. khachatryan put forward the following questions/problems: what would the common questions be when considering the nexus of religion and genocide as a subject of scientifi c research? could theological analysis contribute to the development of the topic? to what extent have the genocide scholars tackled the phenomenon of religious targeting manifested during the armenian genocide? what assessments have 1 shushan khachatryan, phd, received her bachelor’s degree (2005-2009) and then her master’s degree (20092011) from the department of theology, yerevan state university (ysu). from 2011 to 2015, she was a phd student at the same department. within the scope of her thesis, she carried out research for her dissertation at ca’ foscari university in venice (september 2013 – july 2014). on 28 june 2018 she defended her phd dissertation titles “issues of religious studies of the armenian genocide” and received her phd in history. since march 2013, she has been working at the armenian genocide museum-institute as a researcher, and since april 2019 as the head of the agmi armenian genocide victims’ documentation and data collection department. 2 shushan khachatryan, կրոնի դերը հայոց ցեղասպանության իրագործման մեջ [the role of religion in the realization of the armenian genocide] (echmiadzin: mother see of holy echmiadzin publishing house, 2020), 14. 3 ibid. 93 been made and what approaches offered around this issue? was the religious difference a factor or an instrument in planning and executing the armenian genocide, etc.?4 the book consists of three chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources and bibliography and appendices.5 the author’s analytical mind, on the one hand, and rich sources of the work on the other hand (documents of the armenian genocide museum-institute and the us national archive, addresses/calls and declarations written using religious terminology, memoirs of survivors and eye-witnesses, chronicles (arm. patmagirk) and memorial-collections (arm. hushamatyan), armenian and foreign-language press of the time, collections of documents of the armenian genocide, scholarly studies, etc.) came to account for the success of the monograph.6 **** in the fi rst chapter of the monograph (“outlines of religious studies and theology for the research of genocides”) shushan khachatryan touched upon historico-religious research and their methodological peculiarities. the author broached topics like extermination and killings in religions (from mythological systems to monotheistic religions), the massacre of canaan nations, the confl ict of religions during genocides, turkish islam and the armenian genocide, the young turk policy towards religious minorities, etc.7 taking up the concept of “mythological thinking,” khachatryan advised to look back at the initial, mythological religious system of a nation/race in order to fi nd out the basis for genocidal ideas. in the case of the turks, the peculiarities of pre-monotheistic religion what heroes did they have at that time, were the heroes taken as ideals for the nation fi ghters for justice, or the incarnation of aggressive force?8 of particular interest is the following observation of the author: “… in each religion the worldview-based attitude towards the representatives of other religions could be both negative, down to calls to exterminate them, and positive, like, for instance, being merciful to people. the study of the role of morality in a given religion might shed light on genocide studies.”9 shushan khachatryan beheld that the confl ict of religions is a manifest, facilitating factor in the genocide: “… the armenian genocide was not a genocide committed on religious grounds, however, religious confrontation and religious otherness were among those material factors that made the realization of the genocide possible.”10 the author comprehensively described how the political elite used the religion as a means of provoking confl ict, and highlighted that the ideology of islam by its nature could not stay separated from the state and politics and therefore from wars and armed confl icts as 4 ibid., 15-16. 5 the appendix to the monograph includes the originals of various calls for holy war issued by the ottoman empire, their tranlsations, copies of photos and postcards, see i-lxiii. 6 ibid., 18-19. 7 khachatryan, the role of religion, 16-17. 8 ibid., 27-28. 9 ibid., 28. 10 ibid. 94 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0019 well.11 considering atheism, juxtaposed also with positivism, biological materialism, social darwinism, etc. as the young turk “ideological core,” khachatryan drew the attention of the readers to the anti-christian worldview of each of them, simultaneously emphasizing the importance of making it a subject of research.12 within the context of the study reference was made to the issue of conversion of the armenians during the genocide: “conversion must be scrutinized through complex and sequential processes – the rite of consecration, the social signifi cance of the converted, and its effects during the armenian genocide and later.”13 khachatryan also presented the theological efforts in the study of genocides. she discriminated the following issues as base points of the common topic for further research in theology and religious studies; viz. the theodicy14 of genocides, the meaning of sacrifi ce in genocides, the issue of extermination of pagan races of canaan, the theological refl ections of catholic and protestant missionaries about the genocide of armenians, the semantic connection of mass killings with religious semiotics, the topic of canonization of the martyrs of the armenian genocide, as well as theological analyses of the armenian genocide.15 according to khachatryan, the issue of religion was not properly addressed in the studies of the armenian genocide leaving the fi eld open for religious scholars and genocide scholars. religious studies scholars have paid special attention to the general problem of religion and violence scrutinizing religions and their features and characteristics that were viewed as a base for various forms of violence throughout different periods.16 the author presented and commented on the ideas of other genocide scholars, who either had dedicated brief analyses to the topic, or expressed their general stand on the religion-genocide problem (raphael lemkin, leo kuper, vahagn dadrian, leonard glick, richard l. rubenstein, steven l. jacobs, ronald g. suny, taner akçam and others).17 historico-religious studies on the armenian genocide, as khachatryan asserted, should cover specifi c issues, such as viewing the inter-religious fabric of the ottoman empire, interactions, animosities and confl icts between turkish islam and christianity, the role of all those factors in the religious and psychological behavior of the planner-perpetrators and the horde of implementers of atrocities.18 while studying the precursor to the canonization of the armenian genocide martyrs, the author clearly stated: “the percept of the sufferers of the armenian genocide as martyrs was not conditioned by some all of a sudden ideas or triggered by an event: it has always been in the perceptions of the armenian people. however, offi cial steps in the [last] 100 years had been undertaken by the church indeed, the 11 ibid. 12 ibid., 29. 13 khachatryan, the role of religion, 30. 14 theodicy (from the greek words “theos” (god) and “dikē” (law, justice)) is a set of questions and theories that discuss, on the one hand, the role of the good and evil in human suffering, putting forward many why-questions connected with the omnipotency, benevolence and mercifulness of god, and on the other hand, refer to the “power” of evil and its presence throughout the history of mankind, see khachatryan, the role of religion, 31. 15 ibid., 31-41. 16 ibid., 42. 17 ibid., 42-52. 18 khachatryan, the role of religion, 55. 95 armenian apostolic church, the adherents of which were martyred as an absolute majority; even there were those, who called the armenian apostolic church a “martyr church” in various memoirs, testimonies, historical documents and papers.”19 presenting and analyzing major occurrences paving the path to and maturing the idea of canonization, mentioning the progression steps, elucidating events that have received public response, the ceremony of canonization of the martyrs of the armenian genocide on 23 april 2015, khachatryan arrived at the following conclusion: “after a long break, through the canonization of the martyrs of the armenian genocide the canonization procedure of armenian apostolic church was restored through canonization of the martyrs of the armenian genocide. however, it is important to understand that canonization is not making someone a saint: by canonization, the church proclaims loudly that she recognizes her martyrs as saints. besides, it is important to understand that it is true that the armenian church has performed collective canonization, but it does not mean that the church has made around 1.5 million people massacred during the genocide saints, as no number has been mentioned… one can only hope that one last ecclesiastical canonical solution will be worked out and they will be mentioned also in the armenian book of divine liturgy.”20 the second chapter of the monograph under the title of “religious and ideological grounds for the realization of the armenian genocide” was dedicated to the young turk attempts of the adaptation of european philosophy and olden and novel turkic teachings, due to which a syncretic ideology with a pan-turkism-positivism-modernism mixture was created. in this chapter, a special place was given to the young turk religious policy, as well as the role of the holy war declared in november of 1914 in the genocide of the christians of the ottoman empire. the author, describing and analyzing the dangerousness of the young turk ideology, arrived at the conclusion that the fundamental cause for the young turk anti-christianity lay with ideology, political views and the general frame.21 khachatryan strongly believed that the ideology of the young turks, ittihadism, at the last stage of its existence, i.e. in 1908-1918, was adamant about massacring christians.22 when examining the cases, khachatryan noted that regarding christians, the young turks had adopted a policy of collaborating with them at fi rst, on the surface, and then exterminating them later. they had intertwined the ideologies of pan-turkism and pan-islamism rendering no future role to pan-islamism.23 the use of the religious difference as an instrument was considered by the author as a material element in the genocidal plan of the young turks, and in this sense, it served to secure the consent of two weighty islam-worshipping layers in the empire the spiritual crust in the fi rst place and then the muslim [population].24 khachatryan, introducing the motivations for participating in the jihad and the implementers thereof, stated: “the young turks were using the religious peculiarities of islam for their own political purposes. the jihad was a pretext and a weapon in the hands of the 19 ibid., 57. 20 ibid., 74. 21 khachatryan, the role of religion, 85. 22 ibid. 23 ibid., 89. 24 ibid. 96 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 young turks; it did not fi nd supporters in the entire islamic world, but put down deep roots in the ottoman empire.”25 the author presented one by one the sultan’s calls for war, the fi ve fatwas of the ottoman sheikh ul-islam, enver pasha’s address to the ottoman army, the jihad pamphlet and the leafl et in ottoman turkish and russian.26 in effect, the texts of various calls for jihad were developed targeting christian “infi dels,” the fi ght and the war against them were considered as a sacred religious duty. the texts of those calls were meant to secure a mass campaign against the already targeted groups.27 in the third and fi nal chapter, religious means of realization of the armenian genocide, the author presented eyewitness accounts of jihadist statements and calls against the armenians and the response of the press of the time, examined the phenomenon of ritualization of violence and killings during the armenian genocide. referring to specifi c religious targets (clergy, cross, holy places, etc.) the author viewed ritualization as an example of the religious factor of realization of the armenian genocide.28 khachatryan described the acts of barbarism against the clergy, the ritualization of violence, ritual killings, the desecration of the cross during the genocide, the crucifi xions of people, the manipulation of jesus christ’s name, religious blasphemy, profanation, labeling, calls, religious vandalism of christian sanctuaries. the architects of declaration of jihad, as interpreted by the author, were the young turk leaders, who were using religious terminology in their calls, citing the quran, so that the call for jihad would be allowed to the masses and committed under the guise of legitimacy, as per the islamic law.29 suggesting to the readers to follow the impacts of the jihadist calls, khachatryan stated that one of their fi rst effects on the drafted christian men of the ottoman empire appeared in 1914, right after the declaration of jihad, and the later massacres also had their roots in jihad and were connected with the declaration of jihad.30 that, as strongly believed by the author, had theological grounds, and the turkish islam had had theological contribution to the atrocities, granting the turkish and kurdish religious mob the privilege of massacring the christians and particularly armenians.31 as an undeniable presence of the religious factor in the realization of the armenian genocide, the author described the manifestations of religious contexts during the assaults. she also mentioned that the massacres were committed with special cruelty, accompanied by torture, ritualization, use of “christian” context crucifying, murdering on church altars, etc.32 speaking of barbarianism against the clergy, the author cited multiple testimonies about the christian clergy who were killed with special cruelty. the tortures administered to the clergy were mainly based on false accusations.33 25 ibid., 97. in her monograph the author introduced written documentations of the jihad calls translating some of them into armenian for the fi rst time, highlighted their substantive signifi cance, made relevant observations and conclusions. 26 khachatryan, the role of religion, 103-114. 27 ibid., 116. 28 ibid., 18. 29 ibid., 124. 30 ibid., 125. 31 khachatryan, the role of religion, 127. 32 ibid., 131. 33 ibid., 142-143. 97 with regard to profanation of christians and their relics and sanctuaries, khachatryan noted that the churches were deliberately turned to brothels subjecting girls to sex slavery.34 the author mentioned that under both the conversion and death threat the armenians demonstrated a unique religious and psychological behavior: performing religious and ritualistic imitations in borderline situations of life (even in the conditions of islamization, armenian orphans in mardin turkish orphanage were fi nding symbolic substitution of christian rituals and sacred ceremonies).35 by unwinding, systematizing and analyzing disciplinary topics the role of religion in the realization of the armenian genocide monograph ended in momentous conclusions. recognizing the importance of shushan khachatryan’s research, we deem it expedient to have her book published in english. 34 ibid., 149. 35 ibid., 150. 90 juan pablo artinian holds a ph.d. and a master’s degree in history from the state university of new york at stony brook. he was awarded a b.a in history, from the university of buenos aires. his doctoral dissertation examined the relationship between politics and visual culture during mid-20th century argentina. he published academic articles on argentine history and a book on the armenian genocide. artinian attended a seminar on genocides at the university of toronto and lectures on this topic. he is currently a visiting professor of history at di tella university on genocides and human rights. 91 between the local and the global south: diaspora’s politics for the recognition of the armenain genocide in argentina 1965-2015 juan pablo artinian torcuato di tella university and university of buenos aires, argentina historiography has analyzed the recognition of the armenian genocide using cultural and geopolitical coordinates belonging to both western and non-western societies. however, the north-south dimension of this event and its effect on the diaspora has been neglected by most of the approaches taken by armenian studies. in this article, i will analyze how the armenian diaspora in argentina advocated for recognition of the armenian genocide from 1965 to 2015. this community is not only significant in terms of population it is the largest in the global south but also because its contribution to the struggle for remembrance and recognition of the armenian genocide is unique. argentina is one of the few countries in which the genocide has been recognized by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. in this article, i will analyze the specific dynamics of the armenian-argentine community’s local activism and its contribution to the global recognition of the genocide.1 the commemoration on april 24 in the official argentine calendar, the recognition of the extermination of armenians as genocide by francis i, roman catholicism’s first argentinean pope, demonstrate the importance of the interaction between the local and global. keywords: armenian genocide, diaspora, recognition of the armenian genocide, the review article was submitted on 17.07.2021 and accepted for publication on 30.10.2021. how to cite: juan pablo artinian, “everything is connected to the genocide,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 2 (2021): 91-96. 1 for the recognition of the genocide in latin america see hayk paronyan, marvelio alfaro matos and rogelio meléndez carbadillo, “el genocidio armenio y su reconocimiento en américa latina,” revista dilemas contemporáneos: educación, política y valores, mexico 8, no. 3 (2021). for the armenian-argentine community’s local activism and its contribution to the global recognition of the genocide see el derrumbe del negacionismo. leandro despouy, el informe whitaker y el aporte argentino al reconocimiento internacional del genocidio de los armenios, ed. khatchik derghougassian (buenos aires: planeta, 2009). 92 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0025 the armenian diaspora between the local and global the academic production on the armenian diaspora in argentina has been less extensive than the large number of books and articles on other groups that emigrated to the country.2 narciso binayan carmona’s 1974 book, the armenian community in argentina, was one of the first published works that provided a narrative and met some academic standards. it also attempted to go beyond what were then the prevailing narratives, most of which were non-professional.3 during the 1980s, the works of the sociologist beatriz balian and psychologist eva tabakian dealt with the assimilation of this community to argentine society.4 during that decade, and also during the nineteen nineties, some academic works which employed a traditional perspective on migration studies focused on the chronological tracking of events having to do with the arrival and adjustment of armenians in argentina.5 in the early nineteen nineties, american researcher kim hekimian also made a valuable contribution by examining the south american armenian diaspora as a case study.6 during that same decade, eduardo karsaclian published a study that emphasized the importance of community educational establishments in argentina.7 in addition to this research paper on armenian schools, several authors such as libertad telecemian have researched the genocide’s traumatic effects.8 in the new millennium, the contributions of the historian brisa varela who does not belong to the armenian community have enriched historiographical discourse by problematizing the uses of memory and the construction of community spaces.9 in 2011, vartan matiossian published a book, which included detailed archival work and new conceptual tools with which to discuss and generate interpretations of the characteristics of the armenian diaspora in argentina.10 the majority of the armenians who arrived in argentina became part of the global diaspora because of the armenian genocide.11 i will use the definition put forth by researcher 2 for an analysis on the historiographical production on the topic see nélida boulgourdjian, “evolución de los estudios armenios en la argentina,” revista espacios de crítica y producción 51 (2015): 57-66. 3 narciso binayan carmona, la colectividad armenia en la argentina (buenos aires: alzamor editores, 1974). from the same author, entre el pasado y el futuro: los armenios en la argentina (buenos aires: n.p., 1996). 4 beatriz balian de tagtachian “inserción de la colectividad armenia en la argentina: un estudio de dirigentes,” in centro de investigaciones sociológicas de la facultad de ciencias sociales y económicas de la universidad católica (1981). eva tabakian, los armenios en argentin (buenos aires, 1989). 5 nélida boulgourdjian-toufeksian, “los armenios en buenos aires”: la reconstrucción de la identidad (19001950) (buenos aires: centro armenio, 1997). 6 kim hekimian, “armenian inmigration to argentina, 1909-1938,” armenian review 43, no. 1 (1990): 85-113. 7 eduardo karsaclian, “escuelas armenias de buenos aires: análisis de sus programas de estudio,” los armenios en america del sur, ed. vartan matiossian (buenos aires: primeras jornadas de estudio, 1991). 8 azaduhí libertad telecemian, “alcances del genocidio en la colectividad armenia de la argentina,” in los armenios en america del sur. on memory also see, rita kuyumciyan, el primer genocidio del siglo xx. regreso de la memoria armenia (buenos aires: planeta, 2009). 9 brisa varela, geografías de la memoria lugares, desarraigos y reconstitución identitaria en situación de genocidio (la plata: unlp, 2008). 10 vartan matiossian, pasado sin retorno, futuro que espera, los armenios en la argentina, ayer y hoy (montevideo: ediciones ascua, 2011). 11 on the armenian genocide see donald bloxham, the great game of genocide. imperialism, nationalism and the destruction of ottoman armenians (new york: oxford university press, 2005); raymond. kévorkian, the armenian genocide a complete history (london and new york: tauris, 2011); ronald suny, they can 93 gabriel sheffer, who states that: “modern diasporas are ethnic minorities groups of migrant origins that residing and acting in host countries, but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin their homelands.”12 the traumatic effects of the genocide and the search for justice on behalf of the armenian cause must also be added to this definition. those individuals who belonged to argentina’s armenian minority arrived after completing a lengthy journey that often included a few months spent in places like greece, lebanon, or france.13 thus, many families were scattered throughout the world, in places such as the united states, canada, brazil, or uruguay. the oldest armenian settlements were located in the middle east in places like lebanon, which, due to its proximity to the ancient armenian territories, became a center for the global diaspora. these settlements used churches, schools and representatives belonging to different political parties to build their community institutions. a large proportion of armenians settled also in the united states, especially in california and in various locations on the east coast, such as new york and boston.14 as for the world beyond the americas, france has the largest armenian community in europe: it is located largely in cities like paris, lyon and marseille. in latin america, the principal destination for armenian migrants were countries of the southern cone: argentina, brazil and uruguay. however, in other parts of latin america, the diaspora also has a presence: thus, in smaller numbers, we can find members of the armenian diaspora in chile, mexico, and venezuela. armenians in argentina armenians first began to arrive in buenos aires in the late nineteenth century. according to matiossian, in 1907, a small group of them founded the first armenian institution in argentina: the chamjlu village society for education, which, though charitable contributions, enabled the functioning of a girls’ school in that village, located in what was then the ottoman empire.15 on the other hand, in 1912, the community celebrated their first mass in buenos aires the first in south america and founded the first parish organization of the armenian apostolic church.16 matiossian’s study, which used the 1923 internal census of buenos aires that was carried out by the armenian colonial center, indicates 46.69 percent came from the region of cilicia, 30 percent from aleppo in modern syria and 19.4 percent from cappadocia.17 the author also includes a statement made in 1931 by the pastor of live in the desert and nowhere else. a history of the armenian genocide (new jersey: princeton university press, 2015); taner akçam, killing orders, talat pasha’s telegrams and the armenian genocide (london: palgrave macmillan, 2018). 12 gabriel sheffer, “a new field of study: modern diasporas in international politics,” in modern diasporas in international politics, ed. gabriel scheffer (london: croom helm, 1986), 3. 13 juan pablo artinian, “la resistencia de los sobrevivientes armenios en la argentina. a 100 años del genocidio armenio,” todo es historia (2015): 28-31. 14 anny bakalian, armenian-americans. from being to feeling armenian (new brunswick and london: transactions publishers, 1993). 15 matiossian, pasado sin retorno, 58-59. 16 ibid., 59. 17 ibid., 69-70. juan pablo artinian: diaspora’s politics for the recognition of the armenian genocide 94 the armenian apostolic church, hovhannes amiriántz, who indicated that more than half of the community was made up of people from hadjin, aintab, and marash.18 for the most part, the armenians who settled in argentina took up residence in the city of buenos aires. they also settled in suburbs of the city. at the same time, other armenians gravitated toward other areas of the country, such as the province of córdoba and the city of rosario. vartan matiossian explains that prior to 1915, between 2,000 and 3,000 armenians arrived to the country. the devastating effects of the genocide, the frustrated armenian republic of 1918 (and its subsequent sovietization) and kemal ataturk’s attempt to annihilate the survivors in asia minor in the early nineteen twenties determined the shape that the flow of armenians arriving to argentina would take.19 furthermore, the restrictions on immigration imposed by the united states government drove many of them to the coastal regions of south america. 20 memory and generations: from 1965 to the 1980s as the armenian genocide receded into history, the memories of the genocide, which had once circulated only in the private sphere, began to crystallize into various rituals and ways of remembering.21 in 1965, a global call for recognition of the genocide emerged, and this proved to be a pivotal moment in the process of recognition. argentina was no exception: in a place where political instability and economic crises recurred, the armenian community created a cultural framework and increased their visibility. some of its members participated in national political life, while others had important roles in its economic and cultural activities. during the last military dictatorship (1976-1983), 22 armenians disappeared because of state terrorism. since 1983, and with the return of democratic governments, the armenian community in argentina has initiated several changes. thus, rather than emphasize key markers of difference language and participation in community’s institutions, such as the armenian orthodox church the 1980s saw a turn towards the notion of a subjective identity. thus, a sort of hybrid identity came into being during this period, in which certain subjective factors prevailed in ideas about identity. along these lines, the researcher khachig tololyan affirms that: “the affiliation happens to replace the filiation.”22 therefore, the redefinition of “armenianism” also featured elements of hybridization with the argentinian local cultural and political environment.23 in this new political atmosphere, the armenian community in 18 ibid., 70. 19 ibid, 60. 20 in 1924 the johnson-reed act was passed in 1924 that established “quotas” of income by national origin in the united states, closing doors for immigration from eastern and southern europe. 21 on rituals and memory of the armenian genocide in argentina see lucila tossounian, “usos del pasado: el ‘24 de abril’ como ritual conmemorativo,” in genocidios del siglo xx y formas de la negación. actas del iii encuentro sobre genocidio, eds. nélida boulgourdjian, juan carlos toufeksian y carlos alemian (buenos aires: centro armenio, 2003). 22 khachig tololyan, “rethinking diaspora(s): stateless power in the transnational moment,” diaspora: a journal of transnational studies 5, no. 1 (1996):3-36. 23 on the concept of hybridization see the classic work by hommi. k bhabha, the location of culture (london and new york: routledge, 1994). for the idea of hybridization and the armenian diaspora in western societies see razmik panossian, the armenians. from king to merchants and commissars (new york: columbia uniinternational journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 95 argentina learned specific lessons from the success of human rights movements in argentina. also, argentinian intellectuals and public figures sympathized with the cause of the campaign for the recognition of the armenian genocide. a number of events in the historical record demonstrate this engagement. in 1984, in paris, the permanent peoples court, created in 1979 by the italian senator lelio basso, debated the genocidal nature of the massacres of the armenians. the jury heard arguments from a group of academics, including tessa hoffman, richard hovannisian, christopher j. walker, jirair libaridian, and yves ternon, as well as others who represented the turkish state. the court, which included three nobel laureates among them the argentine adolfo pérez esquivel recognized the systematic killings of 1915 as a genocide. another example of the engagement of argentinian political figures occurred in august 1985, when the un subcommittee on prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities approved after intense debate its report on prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. one of its members, benjamin whitaker, presented a report that in its twenty-fourth paragraph indicated that the ottomans had committed a genocide against the empire’s armenian minority. the pressures of the turkish government were felt throughout the deliberation process in geneva, but the experts among them the argentine leandro despouy did not yield to them.24 the precedent of the text, popularly known as the “whitaker report” once again made the question of the systematic extermination of armenians a public issue. after these two instances of recognition, in 1987 the armenian community of argentina scored a landmark victory not just in a domestic political context but also at a global level when president raúl alfonsín officially proclaimed that the events that had begun in 1915 were indeed genocidal in nature. from 20th to 21st century: recognition of the armenian genocide in argentina the echoes of international events would also have repercussions in south america’s armenian community. the end of the cold war redefined both political divisions and the ways that one could belong to a diaspora. in 1991 in an unprecedented series of events the soviet union collapsed and armenia declared independence. a new historical moment marked by war, economic difficulties and future uncertainties shaped a new dynamic between the diaspora and a young armenian nation-state. even in this new era, the diaspora’s struggle for recognition and justice continued throughout the world. during this century, the efforts made by the local diaspora have achieved a three-part success in argentina making it a unique case. following the aforementioned presidential recognition of the genocide, the parliamentary and judicial branches of the argentine government officially recognized the armenian genocide.25 in 2007, a law passed argentina’s congress declared april 24 to be “day of action for tolerance and respect between peoples in commemoration of the genocide suffered by the armenian people.”26 also during the versity press, 2006), 307. 24 on despouy see fabián bosoer and florencia terruzzi, “leandro despouy. trayectoria del jurista argentino que llegó a ginebra,” in el derrumbe del negacionismo, 65-155. 25 juan pablo artinian, “el genocidio armenio 100 años después: verdad, memoria y justicia desde américa latina” en cuadernos de coyuntura, uba facultad de ciencias sociales, primer cuatrimestre, 2015. 26 law 26.199 of the argentinian parliament, january 11, 2011. juan pablo artinian: diaspora’s politics for the recognition of the armenian genocide 96 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 new century -thanks to the effort of different institutions and individuals of the armenian community-both the argentine government and the city of buenos aires published textbooks destinated to teachers of national and district schools on the armenian genocide. furthermore, several universities held academic conferences on the topic: one example of those conferences was the one at national university of tres de febrero in 2014. also, the center for genocide studies of the aforementioned university launched a collection with several books on the armenian genocide. in the first years of the twenty-first century, inspired by a legal precedent set by the argentine human right moment, a descendant of an armenian family settled in argentina initiated a legal process to assert his right to learn the truth about what happened to his relatives in 1915.27 finally, in 2011, after ten years had passed, a federal court ruled that the murder, torture and deportation that occurred in 1915 constituted a genocide by the turkish state.28 thus, historiography has analyzed the recognition of the armenian genocide using cultural and geopolitical coordinates belonging to both western and non-western societies. however, the north-south dimension of this event and its effect on the diaspora has been neglected by most of the approaches taken by armenian studies. in this article, i have argued that the specific dynamics of the armenian community’s local activism made a unique contribution to the campaign for the global recognition of the genocide possible. argentina is one of the few countries in the world that has recognized the armenian genocide by way of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of its government. last but not least, in 2015 an argentine pope, francis i, formerly known as cardinal bergoglio, declared that the extermination of the armenians was the first genocide of the twentieth century. therefore, the purpose of this article is to reconsider the importance of the contributions made in the global south and the need for strengthened ties between the diaspora’s northern and southern outposts, as well as for stronger links between the diaspora, armenia, arstakh and latin america in the new millennium. 27 on the legal process see federico gaitan hairabedian and valeria thus, “el juicio por el derecho a la verdad del genocidio armenio. herramientas contra la negación, por la verdad y la justicia,” bordes, revista de política, derecho y sociedad 2 no. 8 (2018): 193-220. 28 for more details see, roberto malkassian, “una sentencia que hace historia,” archivos del presente, revista latinoamericana de temas internacionales 15, no. 55 (2011): 83-117. 59 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, and jewish social democrats: alliances and solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch adam j. sacks of all the many elements that resound and confound as similar between the overwhelming record of historical oppression endured by the armenians and the jews, perhaps the most telling is the echo of silence in the wider world during their hour of greatest need. as is well known, the record of ambassador morgenthau is a telling counterpoint to the dismaying lack of voices raised at critical junctures. it is my intention here to profi le in brief other cases of jews, from bernard lazare of france to israel zangwill of england who voiced solidarity and even sought to forge alliance with armenians. particular attention will be paid to the german social democrats eduard bernstein and hugo haase, who seceded from their party during the war years, in part, so that they could speak out with their colleagues against the armenian genocide. i argue that what united these fi gures was their progressive inclination and embrace of a discourse of human rights which often entailed a critique of nationalism, specifi cally mainstream zionism. the case of the independent social democrats in germany in particular forms an overlooked corrective to a historiography of german opposition to the armenian genocide that has largely focused on the voices of church activists. before turning to these case studies that broke a silence all too pervasive on the events of the caucasian frontline of world war i, i would like to explore the variations and forms this silence takes. variations on a theme of silence jews and armenians, as has been noted by numerous astute observers, share a myriad of cultural traits acquired through an anomalous and often tragic historical experience.1 claimed poetically as both people of dreams, long with imagination but without territory.2 diaspora peoples dispossessed of sovereignty, clinging to a religious tradition distinct from their environment, in the recent era world both emerged as mediators of modernity especially in the economy and the arts and appeared poised to enter even an unprecedented golden age of prosperity before being felled by genocide. arguably, the one outstanding 1. the inverse is also true as prejudiced outsiders o� en viewed negatively these shared traits. though this is largely a study on jewish solidarity with persecuted armenians the co-implication of antiarmenianism with antisemitism in germany is an equally vital yet distinct fi eld of research. 2. peter balakian, black dog of fate: a memoir: an american son uncover his armenian past (new york: basic books, 2009), 133. adam j sacks defended his dissertation in the summer of 2015 at brown university. he is currently serving as a visiting assistant professor in the department of history at brown university. in 2010-2015 he was auschwitz jewish center fellow under the auspices of the museum of jewish heritage in new york, cahnmann foundation fellow at the center for jewish history in new york, leo baeck programme fellow of the studiensti� ung des deutschen volkes and as a guest researcher at the new reseach center for exile culture at the universitaet der kuenste in berlin. publications on the themes of healing, trauma and cultural response and representation of catastrophe have appeared in new german critique, the association for jewish studies journal, as well as other scholarly venues. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 60 61 weakness that proved to be their undoing was the lack of a tradition of political thought in recent history, as it could hardly otherwise be for peoples for whom sovereignty is at best a distant historical memory. due to their aspirational cultural affi liations and their predicament as minorities, what ernst bloch called the “hope principle” defi ned their fragile state to an outsized extent. such faith in the outside world, one is tempted to retrospectively refer to it as a “hope against hope,” was lodged largely and similarly in the anglo-american democracies for the defense of rights and in the russian states for sheer physical protection. as these powers at critical moments did not intervene, the unmitigated oppression and deadly attention they received from turkish and german powers only magnifi ed the silence of the great powers in their hour of greatest need. the historical record is fi lled with not only easily accessible media reports but also offi cial pronouncements of western governments condemning the actions that amounted to genocide. indeed, the propensity and repetition in the pursuit and consumption of media reports throughout the war in the allied press may even be termed a sort of voyeuristic silence. such offi cial declarations of sympathy or horror echoed from an early point in time from which concerted intervention may have decisively altered the course of events saving the lives of scores of potential victims. in the case of the caucasian frontline, the turkish authorities would impound embassy cables and negatives while imposing an interdiction on photography by anyone related to the bagdad rail company and in the entire deportation area, i.e. the province of ottoman syria. yet leaders would also boast of crimes ongoing to foreign offi cials in a manner unknown among the german perpetrators decades later. such careful management of the image has left a scant photographic record that one may refer to as a kind of visual silence. as offi cial declarations as a rule did not have action as a consequence one may identify within such speech a kind of cynical silence that echoes through. additionally, such expressions were rarely conveyed by offi cials with decision making power, or if they were, were never in the context of a decisive policy change. what one might call the great silence, the failure to act and intervene, continues to be vigorously contested among historians in the case of the holocaust as a spate of new works about of franklin d. roosevelt have made clear. setting aside rationalizations of logistical complication one may wonder if this kind of silence is a “pretend” silence as in “they know enough but prefer not to know more” which emanates out of a lack of investment in caring or in evaluating the importance of the matter. there is a more sinister variation, namely, that this may be a manipulative silence, a holding pattern designed to let the destruction take its course. speculatively, one may claim that the allies recognized the scope, aim and outcome of genocide, and saw it either as collateral damage for a new world order and their ultimate victory or in fact sought to manage the outcome in view of their own role in eventual reconstruction. an eyewitness in the ottoman empire, heinrich vierbücher, the german pacifi st with a social democratic background, astutely summarized the careful and cunning reaction of german offi cials fully aware of the crimes as they unfolded. he referred to the upsetting mixture of “empörung und verständnis” what one might translated as indignant understanding, the latter modifying the former element as feigned to no small degree.3 3. heinrich vierbücher, armenien 1915: die abschlachtung eines kulturvolkes durch die turken (hamin his manuscript for a monograph on the armenian genocide, the east european jewish jurist, raphael lemkin echoes consistently the theme of the western world as silent bystander. beginning with earlier massacres, he writes: the concert of europe did nothing. it accepted the situation. the emperor of germany went farther. he sent a special embassy to present to the sultan a portrait of his family as a token of his esteem.4 lemkin here sounds not only his deep conviction in the crucial silence of the west, but also his belief in a german origin for the crime, a position he supports via citation of several german memoirs, a further factor of complication and debate with the historiography on the genocide. about the period of the wartime genocide, he records: the war conditions afforded the turks the opportunity they had long awaited to destroy the christian armenians and they believed that once this destruction was an accomplished fact their crime would be condoned, or at least overlooked, as was done in the case of the massacres of 1895-6, when the great powers did not even reprimand the sultan. allied with germany, who apparently fully approved of the turkish plan the leaders felt they had nothing to fear from europe at the end of the war, which they were convinced would be won by germany.5 the suggestive silence at work here is fi lled in by the imagination of genocide. it is marked by the absence to create a credible alternative. as not just among perpetrators, but also the western powers and even the victims themselves could all too easily imagine the onset of genocide, this kind of weighty silence only serviced this process of accommodation. indeed, events preceding formal orders of deportation and mass killing clearly suggested and created the mental space wherein the next murderous phase could be anticipated. here i am referring, as lemkin described the spoliation and expropriations in service of the caucasian frontline of the turkish military. he used statement of a german eyewitness in moush, who writes, every turk was free to go to an armenian shop and take out what he needed or thought he would like to have. only a tenth perhaps was really for the war, the rest was pure robbery, which was carried to the front on the caucasian frontier…6 burg-bergedorf: fackelreiter-verlag, 1930), 35. 4. raphael lemkin, “turkish massacres of armenians,” american jewish historical archives, center for jewish history, new york, raphael lemkin collection, box 8, folder 14. 5. ibid, 19. 6. lemkin, 57. on this also see, moushstatement by a german eye-witness of occurrences at moush; communicated by the american committee for armenian and syrian relief in viscount bryce and arnold toynbee, the treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire: documents presented to viscount grey of fallodon, secretary of state for foreign affairs by viscount bryce, ed. ara sarafi an (london: gomidas institute, 2005, originally 1916), 124-127. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 62 63 and the image of the victims transporting their own wares to their assassins brings us to the last form of silence i would like to present before examining some critical instances of speech action. the following is taken from among lemkin’s own notes: one day early we heard the procession of those doomed victims. their misfortune was indescribable. they were in absolute silence‒the young and old, even grandfathers advancing under such burdens as even their assess could hardly carry.7 this silence of the victims is the silence that echoes in response to the external silences of the bystander here elucidated. one might refer to it as the black hole center around which all other silences orbit. stunned into this silence by an awareness of the greater silences that enabled their own, one may refer to this silence as both numbing and numbed, as if the victims can no longer bear the deafening silence that has brought them to their fate, as if they are already one stage removed from the sensory perceptions that make up the accepted norm of human experience. at least some victims of this and later genocides were forced to submit to a regime of silence that rendered their death more total than that arguably reserved by natural law without human interference. for arguably, a person is not truly dead as long as their memory lives on in the psyche of their descendants or at least in the form of personal effects left on among a larger community. the eradication of whole inter-generational life worlds unique to genocide means that at least some of the victims, those without descendants or surviving relatives, or those whose meager possessions were destroyed or dispersed without a pursuable trail, experience a silence in death so total as to almost reverse a natural order instituted by human evolution. due to the form of death suffered it is as if they never lived, creating a kind of black hole of life that hovers over and shadows the after world. this is what we may refer to as an epic silence, where there is no one left to remember and there are no signs that remark and remind humanity if they had ever existed. this brings us to the fi nal or meta-silence; the one that cannot respond because no human or other sensory faculties were evolved to adequately account for something so horrifi c that it overwhelms our capacity to process and relate. genocide as the black hole of evolution reveals an unforeseen negation of life; the expression of that destruction similarly renders all expressive developed human capacity mute. this silence after the fact is the one that has emerged in the post-holocaust discourse that seeks to probe the limits of representation. saul friedländer, for instance, has been concerned with the gap between knowledge and comprehension offered as a plausible explanatory framework for the silence of the bystander during the holocaust, this gap is arguably merely presumed, a heuristic device. by that i mean it refl ects a desire to presume such a horror on all sides when confronting events so beyond normal limits, that silence is the only possible reaction, as there are no words that can grasp the transpired. for it is a matter of the historical record that there was greater media attention, public outcry and overall representation of 7. lemkin, 61. events in armenia of the caucasus front of the first world war, then in nazi-occupied europe of the second.8 this is all the more startling as it occurred at a greater distance in time and geography, during an earlier age of the technology of media development, and impacted overall a smaller number, though not proportion, of people. this incongruity and the overall widely accepted belated recognition of events has forced scholars to consider the silence that emerges at the limits of representation. though often considered as a phenomenon and concept that emerged as a belated recognition after decades of scholarly neglect, i know of no better formulation of this problem than that from the german pacifi st heinrich vierbücher, who spent three years of the first world war in the ottoman empire as an interpreter for the german general otto liman von sanders. this astute summary of the crisis of representation posed to the eyewitness deserves reproduction in full: es bleibt bei allen deutungsversuchen, bei einsetzung der faktoren mordlust, raubgier, religionshaß, herrschsucht und dummheit, noch so viel des unbegreifl ichen übrig, daß uns die tragödie von 1915 als das blutigste und unheimlichste aller rätsel der geschichte erscheinen muß. in aller ewigkeit bleibt hier der schulweisheit ein rest, der unerträglich ist.9 [so much remains inconceivable after all the attempts of interpretation, so that the tragedy of 1915 must appear as the most bloody and uncanny of all the riddles of history. an unbearable reside will remain for all times, which conventional wisdom will forever confront.]10 if genocide is indeed the ultimate riddle of history, then silence is its necessary herald and distinguishing feature while also serving as an indictment. jews and social democracy converge: those that pierced the silence present throughout these earlier remarks is the rather widely accepted contention of the historical parallel between the armenians in the first world war and the jews in the second. indeed by the time the confi guration of circumstances necessary for the holocaust existed, say around 1939, for at least informed observers, the link was obvious and active 8. this fact is well elucidated in peter balakian, the burning tigris: the armenian genocide and america’s response (new york: harper collins, 2009), 17 and 282; yet the fact of widespread knowledge does not perforce give rise to sympathy and support as noted at the time by israel zangwill. a playright and voracious consumer of all media reports was still at pains to maintain that contrasted with belgium and even the jews during the first world war, armenians were le� uniquely alone. “but belgium had almost all the world for her friends, and the faith in restoration went before her exiles like a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fi re by night. even the jews of the pale – torn and tossed between the alternate victors – found a helping hand, and begin to behold some faint gleam of zion upon the political horizon. on ararat alone no ark can rest.”.” see israel zangwill, the voice of jerusalem (new york: macmillan, 1921), 367. 9. heinrich vierbücher, armenien 1915: die abschlachtung eines kulturvolkes durch die turken (hamburg-bergedorf: fackelreiter-verlag, 1930), 60. 10. translation into english by the author. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 64 65 on a variety of levels. the legacy of ambassador morgenthau for instance, which i shall briefl y revisit was forefront in his son, treasury secretary henry morgenthau’s mind as he sought with diffi culty to convince his boss, franklin delano roosevelt, in the diffi cult negotiations that led to the creation of the war refugee board in the latter stages of the holocaust.11 such historical echoing as this would soon prove abundantly clear for the victims themselves, as the noted popularity of werfel’s forty days of musa dagh in the ghettos attests. the case of parallelism, in the context of the onset and promulgation of the holocaust, one may refer to as structural and historical. this needn’t have been and cannot assumed to have been, further informed by specifi c political values or by a conviction of the shared historical experience of armenians and jews. here was an instance of historical haunting, a return of the repressed, of the especially feared heart of darkness of the modern nation state, genocide. at the historical moment that is our focus beginning in the winter of 1914, the terrible awareness of affi nity informed the actions of more than just ambassador morgenthau, who after all represented a neutral power, and whose jewish sensibilities were further divided by concern for the fl edgling communities in ottoman palestine. much has been made of the role and involvement of ambassador morgenthau, whose personal concern for the plight of the armenians is beyond question. one should be reminded at the outset, that he was representing a power elite that was self-consciously protestant and had barely begun to allow jews into the ranks of the elite. morgenthau also only reluctantly fulfi lled because it had developed the distinct character of a “token” appointment for jews, and that the focus of his efforts was relief and recovery rather than obstruction or intervention.12 furthermore he was by many accounts woefully underprepared for the challenge he faced, without prior knowledge or training in the region. while he had at one point proposed an evacuation plan for genocide survivors to california during the war, after his term ended, there is no evidence of further endeavor for us intervention against turkey to halt the second phase of the genocide.13 nevertheless from the start of his ambassadorship, he displayed a unique affi nity for armenians. while he apparently was concerned about the problems surrounding american missionary activities, and ottoman policies of anti-semitism in palestine, the problem that preoccupied him the most was the armenian question.14 it would be the ambassador’s grandson who would bring to the surface the implicit association that animated morgenthau’s sense of mission: the armenian presence in both of these opposing empires (ottoman and russian) appeared to have many parallels with the jewish presence, among the opposing nations of eastern europe. as alien minorities, essentially 11. yair auron, the banality of indiff erence: zionism and the armenian genocide (new brunswick, n.j.: transaction publishers, 2000), 8. 12. regarding his hesitance in taking up the appointment see henry morgenthau sr. all in a lifetime, (garden city: doubleday, paige & co., 1922), out of print, 160, copy archived with the yivo institute, center for jewish history, new york. 13. simon payaslian, us policy toward the armenian question and the armenian genocide (new york, palgrave macmillan), 2005, 85. 14. balakian, burning tigris, 17. powerless in themselves, both the jews and the armenians were always being accused of traitorous collaboration by the governments that ruled them.15, morgenthau after all was preceded and succeeded in his position, by fellow german reform jews who only uneasily and gradually had found themselves wearily welcomed into the halls of power in washington. additionally, their cultural and religious sensibilities set them at a distance; one often marked by suspicion from the wider jewish communities, especially by the newly politicized nationalists, known as zionists. in the jewish world as elsewhere, nationalism bred an uncompromising and often myopic outlook, focused on the singularity of their group and threatened by any force of possible confl icting comparison or distraction. in the cases lesser-known than morgenthau of jewish outreach for the armenian cause this emerges as a consistent theme, the tension between those inclined to nationalism and those to social democracy, which ultimately overrides simple jewish solidarity as well as standard interpretations of how to respond to the political predicament of jews in the modern world. it is historically signifi cant that the primary nemesis of the founder of modern political zionism, theodor herzl, was an activist on the board of the french journal pro armenia, bernard lazare. lazare was committed to liberation and self-emancipation, goals though that he could not see appropriately fulfi lled or pursued within the context of the zionist movement. hannah arendt saw in lazare one who consciously accepted pariah status in order to rebel against it, to become a champion of oppressed people as part and parcel of that which all the downtrodden must struggle.16 lazare did not seek an exodus from the anti-semites, but rather comrades-in-arms, among the oppressed groups, and implicit here is that he viewed the armenians as chief amongst them.17 unlike herzl, he did not view anti-semitism as peculiar or eternal; but rather symptomatic of the collapse of moral values under imperialism. this was chiefl y in evidence by the shameful complicity of the great powers in pogroms against jews and massacres among armenians.18 a selfconfessed anarchist, nominally involved with the socialist movement, lazare found the miserable error, if not a founding stain, of the fi rst zionist congress at basel 1896, the letter of solidarity sent by herzl to abdul hamid, known as the “red sultan.”19 so solidarity with the armenians rather became the breaking point between herzl and lazare, the issue upon which the divergent conceptions of struggle were most manifest. herzl’s shameless, and ultimately fruitless, pandering to the sultan was symptomatic of a political method that sought to placate or even ally with the leaders of imperialism, and that put little stake in the mobilization of the downtrodden themselves. 15. ibid, 18; on this see also, some scholars have claimed morgenthau to have been more animated by the struggles of jews in the us, see simon payaslian, us policy, 38. 16. hannah arendt, the jew as pariah, ed. ron h. feldman (new york: grove press, 1978), 108. 17. hannah arendt, the jewish writings, ed. jerome kahn and ron h. feldman (new york: random house, 2009), 340. 18. ibid 19. yair auron, the banality of indiff erence, 105. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 66 67 a further major dissension from herzl, this time from within the zionist fold, took the shape of israel zangwill and his “jewish territorialist organization.” a playwright who had coined the term “melting pot,” seceded from the movement over the focus on palestine a destination he believed would inevitably instigate conditions of civil war. he thus set out in pursuit of fanciful destinations empty of current inhabitants including cyrenaica, uganda, and parts of canada and australia. striking though is that this shift away occurred along with zangwill’s anointing upon the armenians a status he previously reserved for jews in the wake of the world war i genocide. he dedicated the last pages of voice of jerusalem to the armenians who, he wrote, had in the 1915 genocide earned “the crown of thorns” that had previously belonged to the jews.20 such a proclamation emanated from a conviction in the “sisterhood” of jews and armenians central to the outlook of this progressive thinker. he viewed the two as the oldest surviving nationalities from the ancient world, who uniquely persisted either without a sovereign territory or outside one.21 written during the war, zangwill’s refl ections on the crisis of armenia stirred him to ever-greater urgency in his pursuit of a refuge for the jews however far-fl ung. what he had witnessed even at a great distance had shocked him that in this most modern era the primitive instincts inside the human could return with a vengeance. he wrote of the “diabolism of human nature….that returns to that prehistoric animal nature through which the soul has slowly struggled.”22 he compiled these wartime writings into a book that took an explicitly jewish theme, entitled the voice of jerusalem. this renders zangwill’s dedicatory epilogue to armenia all the more startling. designed as if to make maximum impact on the reader, after numerous wide-ranging ruminations on the jews he signs off with an almost monumental, quasi-religious laudation to the armenians. departing from the premise of the conjoined fate of armenians and jews, zangwill’s rhetoric is that of a mental revision, upon which he brings the reader to experience the process for themselves. he also makes an important reference to the post-war failed attempt to establish an american mandate for armenia in which many jews were closely involved, including morgenthau and stephen s. wise.23 yet for zangwill, a progressive dissenter to the zionist movement, one may interpret this epilogue further as an inoculation against provincialism, and perhaps as a reminder not only to uniquely focus on the plight of the armenians as a kind of specifi cally jewish mandate, but also not to simply focus exclusively on oneself. unique in their isolation in their suffering, zangwill’s words bear repeating in part: …on ararat alone no ark can rest. for armenia alone there is the cry without answer: “watchman, what of the night?” 20. meri-jane rochelson, the jews in the public arena: the career of israel zangwill (detroit, michigan: wayne state university press, 2008), 210. 21. israel zangwill, principle of nationalities. conway memorial lecture, delivered at south place institute, 8 march 1917 (new york: macmillan, 1917), 42. 22. israel zangwill, voice of jerusalem (new york: macmillan, 1921), 367. 23. other leading american jews were also active and prominently placed on the american committee for the independence of armenia represented at the versailles peace talks including oscar strauss and samuel gompers. for armenia alone there is no “mandatory “ – she cannot fi nd protection even in the lion’s den or the eagle’s nest. there is neither oil nor gold no aught worth the cost of defending her. the nations, eager to mother more oleaginous or aurate territories, so eager that they will be at one another’s throats rather than forgo their loving labour, here vie with one another only in their solicitousness to offer the task to america. sister-nations – i have been accustomed to think – the armenians and the jews. both hail from sister-lands of the cradle of civilization, both come trailing clouds of glory from the purpureal days of persia and babylon, both have borne the shock of the ancient and medieval empires and of the militant migrations of their races, and both hold to their original faith; for if the one was the fi rst preacher of jehovah, the other was the fi rst nation to profess jesus. and sisters, too, in sorrow, i thought: exiled, scattered, persecuted, massacred. sisters in sooth, ye not equal in suffering. hitherto, through the long centuries, the crown of martyrdom has been pre-eminently israel’s. and as, day by day during this war of ours, there came to me by dark letter or whisper the tale of her woes in the central war-zone, i said to myself: “surely the cup is full: surely no people on earth has such a measure of gall and vinegar to drain.” but i was mistaken. one people is suffering more. that people, whose ancient realm held the legendary eden, has now for abiding place the pit of hell. i bow before this higher majesty of sorrow. i take the crown of thorns from israel’s head and i place it upon armenia’s.24 german (jewish) social democrats, russia, armenia and the changing tide of war support the retraction of initial support of the first world war by a select inner circle of leading german social democrats was perhaps the most dramatic such shift among any belligerent nation in the course of the confl ict. not only was germany the strongest power opposing the entente, but her social democratic party was also the largest in europe both the most successful and the most persecuted, having only exited offi cial prohibition a scant two decades earlier. also signifi cant is that this occurred at a fairly early stage in the war and was motivated by long-standing humanitarian and anti-imperialist concerns prominent amongst which was that of the plight of the armenians. the fi gures upon whom i focus never fully embraced the war but kept party solidarity at least until june of 1915 when they began to speak outside the party against the war. by the spring of 1916 a separate anti-war parliamentary faction had been formed which culminated in the formation of a political party of secession in 1917. it is a matter of continued contention among historians whether the key breaking point in the outbreak of the confl ict was the ascension by european social democracy, 24. israel zangwill, voice of jerusalem, (new york: macmillan, 1921), 368. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 68 69 arguably the largest organized political force in the continent that could have obstructed war, to nationalist aggression over international solidarity. the betrayal taken as most acute in historiography is indeed that of the german social democratic party, the largest and most organized of the many of its kind, as if it alone had the power to stop the fall into catastrophe. i would suggest that one could claim that the early support for the war by the social democratic parliamentary faction signaled not assent to imperialism and reconciliation with the german machtstaat, but rather something more akin to a war of humanitarian intervention as it has become known more common in our own time. the empire of the tsars cut a diabolical profi le as it was widely seen as the chief enemy of democracy and as a superannuated behemoth whose dogged autocracy and suppression of nationalities and minorities. in its persecution of jews, it had also distinguished itself, which of course brought it to the particular attention of leading jewish social democrats. the jewish issue was not simply one facet of the complex political situation of tsarist russia but was rather seen by these german jewish social democrats as its essence and the key to its larger comprehension. in no other matter did the regime so distance itself from the rest of europe, as a one raphael seligmann formulated it, ʽthe singularity of the tsarist regime is refl ected in no other social phenomenon in such a clear and incisive manner, than in this unhappy matter.ʾ seligmann comes to the conclusion that the persecution of the jews belongs to the essence of tsarism, the logical lesson to be derived from such an equation in a time of war would have been quite self-evident for his readers.25 as eduard bernstein would later often refl ect that from the jewish perspective when war appeared ineluctable, its main force should be against tsarist russia.26 yet with bernstein, one may observe instead a striking transformation, initial support for party solidarity during the summer crisis of 1914, but as the spring of 1915 followed with the western, imperialist expansion of the confl ict and the violation of belgian neutrality, the war diverted from its russian focus, and bernstein and others joined the anti-war camp. though preceded by exceptional anti-war colleagues such as karl liebknecht, within two years as the war still raged, a separatist peace party had coalesced. though the focus here will not be primarily a narrative of political engagement but rather on political imagination, it may be helpful to keep this historical development in mind. it is further notable 25. himself an emigrant from the russian empire, seligmann (1875-1943) wrote for social democratic publishing in both german and yiddish. 26. see ludiger heid (ed.), eduard bernstein: “ich bin der letzte, der dazu schweigt” texte in jüdische angelegenheiten (potsdam: verlag für berlin-brandenburg, 2004). eduard bernstein (1850-1932), the son of a locomotive driver, a profession, he would later write which secured his family acceptance in a neighborhood in berlin where no other jews lived. bernstein and his family were active members in the reform congregation on johannistrasse where services were held on sunday. a personal protégé of marx and engels, bernstein spent 12 years in exile during the period of prohibition of the social democratic party from 1878-1890, fi rst in switzerland, then in england. unique perhaps in the entire history of the movement is the extent to which he never forsook his jewish identity, jewish concerns or the outreach to alliance with both the bund in eastern europe, the workmen’s circle in north america and the poale zion/hashomer hatzair in palestine. bernstein would even o� en publish with the new york yiddish communist paper tsukun� or the poale zion affi liated jewish socialist union, materials in yiddish that never saw the light of day in german. that half of jewish fraction members seceded to found this anti-war party, one third of which was made up of jews. what i seek to demonstrate here is that the plight of the armenians had been a long-standing concern for german social democrats to which they were especially sensitive given imperial germany’s increasingly close relationship with the ottoman empire.27 furthermore, the opposition to the war took the form of a principled stance against imperialism, into which opposition to the armenian genocide fi t in context as a symptom of turkish expansionist aims on the caucasian front. finally, special attention will be paid to the fi gures of eduard bernstein and hugo haase who deserve a special place in the genealogy of progressive jewish thinkers, after lazare and zangwill, who dissenting from mainstream zionism, crafted a special engagement with the armenian cause. as with the generation of herzl and lazare before him, bernstein was similarly reproached by the leading zionist of his day, chaim weizmann (later 1st president of israel) for what one might term as his position as an “armenianist” rather than as a zionist. to bernstein goes the distinction, among all the individuals mentioned here, that a relatively early date he published a book dedicated entirely to political intervention on behalf of armenia. as it represented the work of the fi rst german author who related to human rights, instead of a religious language of christian solidarity on behalf of armenians, one may also call this intervention “humanitarian.” entitled die leiden des armenischen volkes und die pfl ichten europas, it derived from an admonitory address given at a social democratic assembly in berlin on the 26th of june, 1902.28 it should also be noted that at the same time bernstein was contributing to “droshak”, the organ of the political party armenian revolutionary federation in france. encapsulated here are the principles that will later emerge as central to advocacy on behalf of armenians during the genocide and as the related basis for opposition to an imperialist war aims. for bernstein the persecution of the armenians was part of a larger system of domination inherent in the european imperial political system and part of the search for a minimum in democratic rights for all that said system had not yet truly fulfi lled. he was further inspired to his words by confronting the silence he observed during the already unprecedented massacres of armenians under the sultan. notably characterized as a stoische gleichgültigkeit (stoic indifference) pronounced even in “democratic” circles, he referred to it as beschämend (shameful). dismayed not only by the events themselves, but also the lack up to that point of protest from his own social democratic circles.29 as a decisive counterpoint to this, bernstein fi gured this breaking of the silence with such a volume as to echo in the 27. for examples of the large literature on this subject see donald bloxham, the great game of genocide: imperialism, nationalism, and the destruction of the ottoman armenians (oxford: oxford university press, 2005). for an earlier publication one may consult ulrich trumpener’s germany and the armenian persecutions (beirut: hamaskaine press, 1968). an important thesis of the same period is whilhelm van kampen’s “studien zur deutschen türkeipolitik in der zeit whilhelms ii” (phd diss., christian-albrechts-universität, kiel, 1968). 28. eduard bernstein, die leiden des armenischen volkes und die pfl ichten europas, (berlin: dr. john edelheim verlag), 1902. 29. „als ich mich in jenen tagen darüber entrüstete, daß unsererseits kein wort des protestes geäussert wurde,“. [as i was incensed that no word of protest was spoken in those days from our side], 29. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 70 71 highest halls of the powers responsible.30 and even at this early stage, bernstein was well aware at what confront concerned observes, nothing less than the life and death of a people (“es handelt sich in der that hier um leben und sterben eines volkes”). historical conscious, he declares that such a process does signify a rupture with previous examples regardless of how far back one might probe.31 he further recognized their vexed state of dependency and hope oriented to the western powers. against such persecution prophetically seen as genocidal (“…gegen verfolgungen, die auf weiter nichts abzielen als das armenische volk als nation ganz und gar vom erdboden verschwinden zu machen”) (“…against persecution, that aims at nothing less than causing the disappearance of the armenian people as a nation as a whole from the face of the earth)”, bernstein claims they have no other hope than that which could come from europe (“…die verfolgten, bedrückten und unterdrückten armenier haben keine andere hoffnung als die auf die hilfe, die ihnen von europa wird…” (“…the persecuted, repressed and suppressed armenians have no hope other than help that comes to them from europe…”)32 interesting to note that in this context bernstein refers to the europeans as vorkämpfern (pioneering champions), indicating that he views the struggle of armenians to be part of a chain of emancipation struggles across europe and across historical epochs in succession, of the third estate in france, the serfs in russia and of course the jews. 33 as a result bernstein lays down a principle for intervention given such a humanitarian crisis that overrides any purported sacrosanct nature of state sovereignty. this in turn is due to the assertion that when a government is unable to assure the life and property of any of its citizens, it essentially forfeits its legal claim to both the law and custom attached to such title: was aber ist der erste sittliche rechtstitel, den eine regierung überhaupt hat und haben muss? es ist der, dass sie den willen und die fähigkeit hat, die staatsangehörigen in bezug auf leben und eigentum gegen gewaltthätigkeiten sicher zu stellen34 what then is the fi rst moral legal title possessed at all by and required for any 30. „…erheben wir heute doch unsere stimme zum fl ammenden protest und rufen es so laut, dass diese stimme gehört wird in yildiz kiosk und den möglich stärksten nachhall fi ndet im deutschen reichskanzleramt,“ [today we nevertheless raise our voice of fl aming protest and shout it so laud, that this voice will be hear in the yildiz kiosk and will fi nd the greatest possible reverberation in the german imperial chancellery], 40. 31. “ein solches beispiel von wildheit gegen ein ganzes volk kennt die geschichte nicht, soweit wir auch in ihren annalen zurückblättern mögen,” [history knows no such example of savagery against an entire people, no matter how far we may gaze back in its annals] 28. 32. eduard bernstein, die leiden des armenischen volkes, 6. 33. “da jedoch die herrschenden nicht der verpfl ichtung gemäß handeln, so blickt das armenische volk auf seine vorkämpfer, die völker europas, in der hoff nung dass diese ihre stimme erheben und die regierungen veranlassen werden, endlich doch einzuschreiten und dem sultan einen energischen willen zu zeigen…(emphasis mine)” [that their rulers however do not act according to their obligations, so the armenian people must turn to its champions, the people of europe, in the hope that they may raise their voices and that governments will fi nally yet be induced to intervene and to demonstrate an energetic will to the sultan…], 32. 34. eduard bernstein, die leiden des armenischen volkes, 24. government? it is that she has the will and capacity to arrange for the security of all nationals with reference to life and property against violent actions. put into practice this would mean not only sanctions against turkey, but also crucially a boycott of those who might boycott such initiatives (“…es braucht nur seine bisherige opposition gegen alle von anderen ländern ausgehenden vorschläge einwirkung auf die turkei zu gunsten armeniens aufzugeben, und der widerstand des sultans ist gebrochen.”) (“…this requires forfeiting all previous opposition to recommendations that come from other countries that seek to infl uence turkey on behalf of armenia, which will break the resistance of the sultan…”) motivating bernstein here are the principles of social democracy, which he clearly lays out via a fundamental humanistic principle that while it has taken different guises, from the bible to the french revolution, remains the same. this idea, that oppression of even one element of society is an act of repressive aggression against society as a whole, and society here conceived of in the international, human sense, was one guarded and proclaimed with unique vigor by that certain set of social democrats, those who ultimately felt compelled to secede and establish their own party during wartime.35,36 such conviction would seem to naturally predispose social democrats to solidarity and engagement with the plight of armenia. yet as bernstein is clear to point out, this would be a case of wishful thinking, as we shall see, only a self-selecting set of social democratic dissenters made their mark on the issue. bernstein was perhaps further aided along, and so far along than most, by the special affi nity out of the uncanny structural resemblance between armenian and jewish social formation. he was careful to point out the high degree of cultural development that distinguished them from their environment: und zwar eines volkes, das ehedem seine relativ hohe culturstufe erlangt hatte und noch heute in seinen dem druck der türkischen misswirtschaft weniger ausgesetzten elementen eine bemerkenswerte geistige regsamkeit an der tag legt.37 namely a people, which had formerly acquired its relatively high stage of culture and still today displays remarkable mental agility despite in elements less exposed to the pressure of turkish mismanagement. though excluded from military and higher positions that represent the state due to their non-identity with the religion of state, such exclusion could not quiet their mental energy and activity. that such an outlet would be created and found in the innovation and expand35. “…es ist unterdrückung gegen den ganzen gesellscha� skörper wenn auch nur ein einziges seiner glieder unterdrückt wird…” […it is repressive against the entire body of society when even only a single of its members is repressed…], see eduard bernstein, die leiden des armenischen volkes, 40. 36. the subject of pre-war reformist social democratic ideology is vast and lies largely outside the purview of this investigation. one may consult manfred steger’s the quest for evolutionary socialism: eduard bernstein and social democracy (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2006), or for an earlier classic, peter gay’s the dilemma of democratic socialism: eduard bernstein’s challenge to max (new york: octagon, 1983). 37. eduard bernstein, die leiden des armenischen volkes, 6. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 72 73 ing horizon of the free marketplace was for bernstein, a rule for all such peoples he draws a direct reference to the quakers in england, looming large is the obvious case of the jews.38 it may seem odd that a social democrat grounded in marxist theory would extol the creative and liberating aspects of the marketplace, but even or especially in his engagement for armenia, one may discern the “revisionism” with which bernstein’s name will remain forever attached. bernstein essentially held that an orderly and equitable expansion of capitalism would provide for a developed democracy, which would in turn prove to provide the means for a socialism fully embraced by the bourgeois parliamentary system. the move to socialism in bernstein is based on the ethical prerogative that emerges out of kantian subjectivism, rather than the historical necessity of the movement of the world spirit as marx applied hegel inverted via materialism.39 the desire here for universal emancipation was not confl ict oriented or even catastrophic (bernstein himself notably rejected the term “revisionism,” and instead preferred “reformism”) among the grounds for which bernstein disavowed the theory of the impoverishment of the proletariat and the pending self-catastrophe of capitalism.40 predicated behind this shift is that bernstein could see benevolent, innovative aspects of the bourgeoisie, and the risk and potential for the downtrodden to result and resort in the most bestial of behaviors. fundamental to bernstein’s “reform” of marx was the conviction in the capacity for self-enlightenment among the bourgeoisie who could be moved to progress to a social democracy out of their own volition. the shadow side to that highly speculative potential development is that certain forms of class confl ict, such as that seen by bernstein among armenians and kurds for instance could turn genocidal. stated otherwise genocide here is an unintended corollary of modern class society, a kind of perversion of class confl ict. it was after all bernstein’s predecessor as a leader party theoretician, august bebel, who famously referred to anti-semitism, and here he undoubtedly meant the organized, political movement led by educated elites as the “socialism of fools.” while it would be an ambitious speculation to link bernstein’s revisionism to his witnessing on behalf of the armenians, it would be historically challenging to fi nd any other case that would appear to justify his shift in postulates. additionally, the account and importance laid on “culture” by bernstein and later vierbücher during the genocide refl ects the shift in emphasis distinctive of reformist social democracy. the distinctive emphasis on culture has not been lost on 38. “…aehnliches hat sich ja bei fast allen nationen gezeigt, die geistig rege sind und in ihrer heimat politisch staatsangehörige zweiter classe waren” […such may also be found among almost all nations that are mentally acute and fi nd themselves second class citizens in their homelands], “…..die gegner der staatskirche konnten also keinen höheren akademischen beruf ergreifen, kein staatsamt annehmen, keine militairs werden” […opponents of the state church could not take up any higher academic career, join the military or assume any position in the military].“was blieb ihnen übrig …volkselemente, die sonst unterdrückt wurden, aber an sich geistig regsam waren, mussten sich irgendwie bethätigen, und da fi el naturgemäß der handel in ihre hände…” [what remained le� for them, who were otherwise repressed but remained mentally acute and who needed to somehow remain active and there naturally trade fell into their hands..] , see eduard bernstein, die leiden des armenischen volkes, 20. 39. ibid, 19. 40. eduard bernstein, der denker und kämpfer: zu seinem 75. geburtstag, in vorwärts, 06 january, 1925. vol. 42, nr. 8 (morning-issue nr. a 5), s.1 historians, some of whom, such as donna harsch, andrew bonnell and vernon lidtke have seen german social democracy as either an alternate cultural world or even an essentially culturalist enterprise. endeavoring to create an alternative social sphere for what functioned like a persecuted caste minority, party initiatives focused as much on expanding the cultural franchise for members as for improving work conditions. banned for twelve years while their myriad of institutions were mercilessly repressed, there is indeed some justifi cation at viewing the social democrats as a kind of dispossessed and affl icted minority. indeed, upon his famous state visit to the ottoman empire, the kaiser wilhelm ii was perceived by critical onlookers to have analogized the sultans treatment of the armenians with how he would like to have dealt with the social democrats.41 efforts like the volksbühnebewegung (movement for a theater of the people) sought to modernize and broaden the appeal of classical canon of works so as to provide care for the intellectual and even spiritual dimensions of life. especially the revisionist tendency identifi ed with bernstein was specifi cally invested in upholding the human treasure of accumulated cultural works and never endeavored, unlike later political developments to limit culture to either only the modernist or socialist realist. this valorization of culture even including embrace of the classical and the religious is highly evident in heinrich vierbücher’s account of the genocide itself. his application of the specifi cally german idealist category of “kultur” refracted through a social democratic lens structures both his narrative and concerns and serves to underlie his explanatory framework as well. the juxtaposition could not be more stark, the turks are not a “kulturvolk,” as is explained in the middle of the narrative, while the armenians are presented as such from the outset, as is made clear from the subtitle, “abschlachtung eines kulturvolkes” (“…slaughter of a cultured people.”)42, 43absent a precise english equivalent for the german concept of kultur, one may summarize it as the achievement of cultural and intellectual uplift of a community based on the internal growth, ardour and effort of its individual members. declared essentially “warriors and imitators,” who gave rise to the most “warlike state on earth,” for vierbücher, turks never produced a literature, a high language or science, while their grandest architecture was all taken from the christians.44 the contrast was immediately available for the ready and unmistakable; armenians were unwarlike, distinguished by love of family and children, who produced the best doctors and teachers, and whose development of craft and trade made an ideal bridge to european progress in the region.45 41. see florentine fritzen quote on heinrich vierbücher’s armenien 1915. donat verlag, 2005. wilhelm ii., heißt es etwa, dieser „handelsreisende der deutschen imperialisten“, hätte es „seinem freund“ sultan abdul hamid gern nachgetan und seine unliebsamen höfl inge einfach geköp� : „wie wäre es den sozialdemokraten ergangen, wenn wilhelm gekonnt hätte, wie er wollte!“ (cf. http:// www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/politik/die-schande-der-gestrigen-1307530.html) 42. heinrich vierbücher, armenien 1915, 30. 43. there is indeed evidence to discuss such infl ated “culturalism,” as itself fi lled with prejudicial misconceptions, though such a pursuit lies outside of the limitations of the current investigation. 44. ibid, 31. 45. ibid, 34. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 74 75 though perhaps not as pointed, bernstein clearly shares the general direction of the conviction of vierbücher as to the cultural and structural differences between armenians and turks. the two had actually worked together at the 1902 congress of friends of armenia, where bernstein had been elected to represent germany. along the lines of the bernstein’s already discussed publication from the same period, the congress worked under the assumption that without practical steps for european intervention, extermination loomed clear on the horizon.46 it is moreover signifi cant that as a non-jew, vierbücher consented to the notion of armenians not only as a clearly exceptional and distinct people, but also as a force for progress with positive international implications. just some year earlier, before the brussels congress they would both attend, bernstein engaged in a very public debate with the english socialist ernest bax over precisely the merits of any particular ethno-nationalist group in taking too great a lead in terms of material and cultural progress. notably concerned with increasing domination worldwide by anglo-saxons, bax analogized this to the vaguely similar case of jews in europe. without distinguishing between dispossessed and persecuted minorities, bax in principle objected to the structure of political support accorded bernstein and other social democrats to the armenians. arguably informed by a certain degree of anti-semitism, bax essentially reduced bernstein’s advocacy on behalf of armenia to his jewishness.47 such an intra-party dispute nevertheless reveals an important difference about a question of both political theory and strategy. it also helps to further qualify and complicate the jewish and/or social democratic affi nity for armenia. naturally including but beyond humanitiarian concerns, or the need to reinforce and maintain status quo rule of law and a state’s obligation to its citizens, thinkers such as bernstein and vierbücher believed that as armenians were more advanced than the other ethnic groups among which they lived, it would serve progress if they gained the ascendancy in the area they populated.48 bernstein clearly understood that the intrusions of the forces of modernity and progress could severely undermine if not threaten armenians if their position was not defended. while recognizing, pre-existing violent enmity, surrounding tribes, slowly brought under the spell of the world fi nancial system, have now added a deadly layer of extortionism to their violence.49 it was this new combination of forces, as analyzed with the philosophical tools of reform marxism bernstein had pioneered, that enabled him to see the contours of genocide from such an early date. the years of war and genocide in writings produced just before the start of the war, bernstein keenly observed a set of conditions that could be seen as setting the stage for genocide. in an article from august 1913, he describes the supposed turkish “reform commission” that while allegedly dedicated to 46. ibid, 90. 47. lars fischer, the socialist response to antisemitism in imperial germany (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2010), 182. 48. ibid 49. lars fischer, the socialist response, 183. improving conditions for armenians clearly had its own agenda.50 instead of promises to defend or arm armenians, then left defenseless from marauding kurds, arms would distributed entirely to the kurds and confi scate weapons obtained via other means. he did take notice of a slight and cynical change from the days of the sultan where instead of being threatened directly with massacre, defensive protection would be withdrawn. bernstein also marked a threatening new development with the worst of criminals let out of jail to serve under newly promoted kurdish tribal chieftains. befi tting, the long-standing and aforementioned social democratic mistrust of russia, (which had slightly different bases than the wider traditional, mainstream german distrust of russia) bernstein’s suspicions of russian designs raises the level of tension in his account.51 he does not hide his intimation that russia, despite its pleas to the contrary, may simply be interested in the annexation of armenian land. in a speech on the fl oor of the german parliament in april of that year, bernstein shared similar concerns in a direct political address on the national stage. he took the task the rhetorical position in defense of the integrity of armenian territory, yet noted as those words rang hollow without any supporting action.52 with words of outright pleading, bernstein calls fi nally for a settlement in the question of armenia. turkey, he notes as never fulfi lled its obligations in this regard, for after all aspirations of a population that could not be more modest. neither separation from turkey, nor even provincial autonomy; rather simply safety and security, with self-representation in administration would be required.53 bernstein singles out russia and germany for responsibility, but in particular it was germany that supported abdul hamid’s resistance to the west during the previous of massacre. for bernstein therefore imperial germany, “loaded onto herself guilt for further massacre.”54 persecutions produced countless victims over the centuries all in the name of benefi t of turkey. all of this bernstein argues did no service in anyway to turkey other than providing for indulgence of the most basic instincts. fully conscious of the special nature of the friendship of germany and turkey, bernstein remained convinced that turkey would follow the lead of its central european ally should it provide such direction. the sense of urgency in his remarks, reveal an acute awareness of the extreme vulnerability confronting armenians. this is especially insightful considering the progressive 50. armenische wirren, vorwärts, august 1, 1913, as found in eduard bernstein collection, international institute of social history, amsterdam, the netherlands, see 42.g354. 51. a generation earlier, submissions by rosa luxemburg on the massacres under sultan abdülhamit ii for the vorwärts, had been defl ected by karl liebknecht’s father wilhelm, on the grounds that they ran the “danger of unintentionally serving the interests of the bulwark of european absolutism,” see margaret anderson, “‘down in turkey far away’: human rights, the armenian massacres, and orientalism in wilhelmine germany,” the journal of modern history, 79, no. 1, (march 2007): 86. 52. 139 sitzung, 14 april, 1913, 4735, (cf. http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/en_blatt_k13_ bsb00003385_00283.html ). 53. “ihre forderungen sind so bescheiden wie nur möglich, und trotzdem sind sie nicht verwirklicht worden”, [their demands are as modest as can possibly be and yet they still were notfullfi lled/realized], ibid 54. “…die schuld an den weiteren metzeleien auf sich geladen,” […having taken upon themselves the guilt for future massacres], ibid international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 76 77 direction many projected onto the young turk regime change, with its initial promises of greater equality and integration. in a revealing article appearing the vorwärts just as the war got underway, a jewish social democratic leader, paul singer, broadly sketch the theaters of military activity for the turkish partner of the central powers. early military losses deprived austria and turkey of both a border and a sphere of joint engagement with the russian empire. thus it was entirely obvious which territory would bear the brunt of the fi ghting: armenia.55 after a detailed climatic and topographic profi le, with a population characterized naturally as predominantly christian armenian, referred to as “lange unterdrückt und mißhandelt.” (“long suppressed and mistreated”)56 mention is made of the great diversity of the surrounding area, but armenians are again held out to distinct in that they are both a “körperlich, physisch und sprachlich ein in sich geschlossenes volk,” (“bodily, physically and linguistically a people closed in themselves”) but also, very possibly, the remnants of the aboriginal population of asia minor.57 mostly town-dwellers and traders they are contrasted with the kurds, who bring to bear an enmity against the armenians so severe, it is characterized as a grimmigen hass (ferocious hatred). they are further described as beholden to antiquated customs, a war-like nature, and apparently a social context where the most developed handicraft was thievery. while it was perfectly clear that armenia would be chief theater of war between turkey and russia, this should not suggest that there was a clear strategy in the sense of obvious war aims. in fact, the author, after noting the complications of the topography and demography, notes that the area is distinguished by the lack of clear military necessities or objectives. in the context of prior awareness of the persecution of armenians, the genocide of 1915 simply could not be linked to any military context or strategic exigency, its character rather took the new form of political murder based on ultra-nationalist, quasi-racial designs for population engineering. just months later, these predictions for the placement of the russian-turkish front line were fulfi lled. by just the third month of the war, historic armenia was in a more severely deadly, though not necessarily historically new position of being torn in two by much larger powers. in a “vorwärts” article entitled armenien im weltkrieg, the anonymous author describes the outbreak of hostilities on the border of the caucausus inside turkisharmenia. the early gains of turkish troops allowed them to push the front line to the southwest territory of the trans-caucasus, described as russian-armenia. this article serves to provide the reader with a synopsis of over a century of events that have impacted armenia as a corollary to the russian-turkish rivalry. reform prescriptions designed to safe guard armenia are described as being “left on the paper,” while england and russia are called “indifferent bystanders” (gleichgültige zuschauer) to what is referred to as a vernichtungsfeldzug gegen ein ganzes volk (“campaign of extermination against an entire people”).58 this is accompanied by a campaign of expropriation designed to enrich their kurdish neighbors and plunge the 2.5 million armenians of turkey into a state of economic 55. singer h., “der türkisch-russische kriegsschauplatz,” in vorwärts, nr. 221, 4 november 1914, 7. 56. ibid 57. ibid 58. “armenien im weltkrieg,” vorwärts, november 20, 1914, vol. 31. nr. 317, 1. immiseration and pauperization. the periodic massacres with victims in the hundreds of thousands are described at having no echo in “christian,” europe worth the name (ohne im “christlichen” europa einen nennenswerten widerhall zu wecken). yet consistent with german social democratic sensibilities is a pronounced suspicion of russia’s attempt to self-stylize as a “liberator” for the armenians, the author noting that russia had in the past persecuted its own armenian population. the article ends on with an ominous tone noting that the prior sense of balance between english and russian interests that had kept stability for decades had eroded. partially due to new advances in british imperialism, notably in cyprus and egypt, the intervention of what is referred to as german hochfi nanz mit ihrer bahnpolitik (high fi nance with its railway politics), threatened to entirely change the outlook of the world powers on this region. recognizing the imperial aspirations of their own government, even if limited at fi rst to economic weapons with political motives, implies that turkey was now on the receiving end of a level of endorsement and sponsorship as never before from a european power via the new german alliance. in an article appearing less than a month later attempted to draw out the consequences of a turkish intervention in all its aspects. written by an unaccredited london correspondent of the vorwärts, the author begins that though such intervention hasn’t had a demonstrable infl uence it is beyond doubt that it signifi es a massive expansion of the foundation for the liquidation ushered in by a world war.59 prescient that such an unprecedented confl ict would inevitably lead to rupture and upheaval in the world order, it is especially notable that such insight is coupled with the expansion of the war brought about by turkey. while not directly linked to perceiving the contours of genocide, it does provide glimpse into a political imagination attuned to such a potential. the author goes on to trace six different military theaters directly implicated in a turkish intervention. given prior documented concern regarding armenians, it is no surprise that armenia and asia minor are naturally the subject of a distinct section. providing a corrective to the instinct to see russia as an aggressive power, the author states distinctly that russia is not interested in any war of conquest, but merely wants to keep turkish troops engaged there. this is signifi cant in that it clarifi es that turkey is in no sense facing an existential threat in this crucial territory and concludes with a claim that the allies perceive the confl ict with turkey to be a “defensive war,” against an opponent trying to rapidly achieve the decisive in asia minor. to summarize coverage of the region in the vorwärts, the attentive reader would have formed a picture of the armenian highland as one without decisive strategic value, would have inevitably formed the main theater of confl ict between turkey and the allies and where no evidence would have suggested the cessation of the exterminatory process already long known of the turkish state against the armenian minority. the issue of the alleged “defensive” nature of the war would prove to be the basis for a split in the german social democratic party, and ultimately the formation of an entirely new, “independent” social democratic party, decisively anti-war and deeply concerned 59. “die türkei und die entente-mächte,” in vorwärts, december 3, 1914, vol. 31, nr. 330, 3. see, “…abgesehen davon, daß er die nach dem kriege stattzufi ndende liquidation auf eine ganz gewaltig erweitertete grundlage stellen muss.” [….leaving aside that the liquidation which will follow the war must be placed on a wholly formidably extended foundation]. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 78 79 about the plight of the armenians. fittingly appearing on the 1st of january 1915, eduard bernstein sought to reassess the logic that had led to social democratic consent to the war. though predating the actual split by several months, it is clear for bernstein that whatever logic had led to war was heavily fl awed. the distinction between aggressive and defensive war had been adopted as a sort of “road map,” by european social democratic parties in their deliberations on consent for war. with the clarity of hindsight, bernstein implies that we should have listened to the warnings that in praxis deciphering this difference is enormously challenging. after all, powers on all sides claimed to be fi ghting in defense. that this distinction proved spurious precipitated what was perhaps the chief calamity and perhaps fi rst social casualty of the war, the collapse of moral values. bernstein claimed that left in the lurch, was the capacity for the most simple of humans to judge their neighbor.60 the faulty logic at work in the rush to war was then followed by a general phenomenon of the abdication of responsibility and the continual shifting of the blame. in response, bernstein offered a clarion call to conscience, “das gefühl für eine hohe verantwortung darf uns gerade bei so folgenschweren ereignissen nie verlassen”(“that the feeling for a highresponsibility should never leave us, especially in the face of such momentous events”). it was indeed such a sense of increased responsibility, which would lead bernstein and his colleagues, liebknecht, lebedour, haase and others to turn against their own government and the war it launched and to speak out on behalf of armenians. the principled stance of a few, self-selecting german social democrats out of leadership circles should not suggest that anti-armenian propaganda did not fi nd its way into the organs of the party. in fact one may claim that it is precisely because of such distortions and silences that aggravated their secession from the party line.61 indeed, the fi rst major coverage devoted to the deportation of the armenians in late july is framed not as a direct reportage of events but rather as a counter to reports surfacing in the media of opposing and neutral countries. the silence enforced by both the german and turkish governments on the genocidal events beginning already in february of that year may rightly be called the silence of the graveyard. it is crucial to note though that even such distorted coverage did attest to proof of the presence of a long prepared and agreed upon plan to take unprecedented action against the armenian population.62 also clear from the citations within this report is that the principles sources of information were only offi cial reports from either the german or the turkish military command. the reality and severity of censorship applied to social democratic party outlets is attested to in the fact that within the fi rst full year of the war that coincided with the prin60. vorwärts, “grundsätze der social demokratie und der weltkrieg” jan. 1, 1915. vol.32, nr. 1, p. 5. 61. widespread, mainstream party positions on the armenians is extremely diffi cult, aggravated by the fact that the question of whether or not armenians counted as a “geschichtsnation,” (historical nation) (though they were clearly counted in the ranks of a kulturnation) was le� rather open. this would further require investigation of the long-standing ideological problematic of nationalism within marxist theory, cf. k. marx: manuskripte über die polnische frage (1863-1864), hrsg. u. iengel. von w. conze und d. hertz-eichenrode. s’gravenhage 1961. 62. “…das vorhandensein eines seit langem vorbereiteten und beschlossenen planes..,” […the presence of a plan that had been long before prepared and agreed upon…] vorwärts, july 17, 1915, vol. 32, nr. 195., s. 3 “die armenier gegen die türkei.” cipal starting events of the armenian genocide, the main party newspaper, vorwärts was forced to cease publication on three separate occasions. whenever news coverage did surface about events behind and around the caucasian front they arrived in berlin via a most circuitous route. for instance, a report on the 5th of october with a by-line out of paris cites information arriving from the “agence havas” press bureau out of new york. this notice further betrays some uncertainty as to whether or not the american president wilson had tried via german authorities to put a stop to the killings, as well as to raise the attention of other nations to this issue. quoted as certainty is the attempt of the american ambassador in constantinople, not mentioned by name, to generate a fund that would enable the transport of fl eeing armenians to america.63 a follow-up notice of the 8th of october, once again from a neutral city, den haag, and a foreign press bureau, reuters, refers to uncertainty in the english house of lords about the precise number of armenian victims. though confi rming that in certain districts the population was completely annihilated the number of victims, by that point, 800,000 is supported by some lords apparently, more than others.64 even such a brief notice is not without a rather forced attempt to defl ect guilt away from germany. it should be noted that this was the fi rst full parliamentary revelation of the ongoing genocide in any nation party to the war.65 the accumulation of such notices did lead the vorwärts to issue a kind of editorial message to clarify an offi cial position for social democracy. appearing on the 10th of october, the piece begins with a kind of surrender to the power of the censor, “der uns gesetzten schranken bewußt nehmen wir selbst zu der sache nicht stellung.” (“conscious of the restrictions set upon us, we do not take an position on the matter.”)66 it is possible to imagine that based on the publication record, any direct opposition to the armenian genocide would have meant further shutdown of the newspaper. it may be helpful to note that the most complete and effective campaign against the genocide by a german, that undertaken by johannes lepsius, president of the german-armenian society, resulted in his politically charged displacement from the country to holland accompanied by an interdiction of travel.67 at least what the record of the vorwärts for the remainder of the war does reveal is that those party members who did openly speak out were no longer welcome to do so in the vorwärts. bernstein, in particular, who during some weeks had an article almost every week in the publication, disappears entirely from its pages. the editorial board did attempt though to take some issue with the principle of non-intervention espoused by the german government. this piece is devoted largely to a critique of the positions put forward in both mainstream liberal and conservative nationalist newspapers. a signifi cant portion of german society and politics that, did also speak out on the armenian genocide, namely christian activists, especially those represented the evangelical missionary movement.68 63. “amerika und die armenier,” vorwärts , october 6, 1915. vol. 32, nr. 276, p. 3. 64. armenierdebatte im englischen oberhause, october 8, 1915. vol. 32, nr. 278, p. 3. 65. christopher walker, armenia: the survival of a nation (london: croon helm, 1980), 183. 66. “grundsatz der nichteinmischung”, vorwärts, october 10, 1915. vol. 32, nr. 280, p. 3. 67. ibid, 236. 68. less known to the historical record, there was some vital catholic opposition as well, especially from the archbishop of cologne and the catholic zentrum reichstag parlimentaria matthias erzberger who international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 80 81 with disapproval the article cites the caustic and insulting remarks reserved for such activists referred to as “sittliche verzweifl ung professoraler armenierseelenfreunde” (“the moral desperation of professorial soul mates of armenians”).69 the article concludes on relying on the old fall-back of german social democracy that allowed their accession to war to begin with, the russophobic position that many maintained throughout the war. the writers applied the simplistic formula that western powers, specifi cally france should intervene and condemn the atrocities of russian forces on the european eastern front. clearly burdened by a newly aggravated nationalism, offi cial social democracy could publicize and follow unfolding news of the genocide based on an incontestably, premeditated plan, but reprehensibly also sought ways to defl ect german guilt. it is with justifi able consternation that from their own offi cial pronouncements the one act they could not tolerate were german political voices that sought to justify turkish actions. for those that would soon leave the party, naturally, this did not go nearly far enough. and for any vocal protest against the genocide to again appear in the pages of the social democracy party paper, it would have to come as a result of objective reporting from without and from a purportedly neutral political context. therefore as we shall see, these efforts of dissenting socialists mostly occurred from the fl oor of the german parliament. karl liebknecht, though seen later as the spiritual father of the german communist party, was for most of his life a social democrat. famously, he was the fi rst member of parliament to vote against war credits. what is less known is that he was also the fi rst to speak out against the armenian genocide, at a time when the division of the party appeared all but inevitable. on the 11th of january 1916, liebknecht posed a question to the chancellor (using the parliamentary conceit of a kleine anfrage, which compelled the executive to respond to critical questions) inquiring into his awareness of the massacres perpetrated by germany’s ally. even at this early date, he presciently saw this as what he described as a sin now placed upon germany.70 his accompanying question concerned whatever direct actions to take to prevent repetition and restore human rights to the armenian population in turkey. in what appeared to be an interruption the response was clearly a pre-packaged government response that parroted turkish propaganda about armenian demonstrations that minimized the extent of the deportations while also refusing to objectively characterize this by now well-known turkish campaign. referencing, dr. lepsius, liebknecht than referred to the “extermination of turkish armenians,” and that germany was already seen as responsible by much of the christian population in turkey.71 as liebknecht clearly attempted to complete his intervention with an accurate representation of events, he was even travelled repeatedly to constantinople on behalf of the armenian cause. 69 “der grundsatz der nichteinmischung,” vorwärts, october 10, 1915. vol. 32, nr. 280, p. 3. 70 as discussed in viscount bryce and arnold toynbee, the treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire: documents presented to viscount grey of fallodon, secretary of state for foreign aff airs by viscount bryce, ed. ara sarafi an (london: gomidas institute, 2005, originally 1916), p. xxvii. 71. comprehensive explanation of this reference would demand a more extensive explanation of german press and censorship policies: lepsius’ speech at the german press association (“deutsche pressevereinigung”) of 5 october 1915 which resulted in stricter censorship against the coverage of armenian issues, despite the fact that the speech was merely a semi-public event. this time not only interrupted, but literally shouted down through loud calls of “stop.” continuing over the disruptive noises, liebknecht affi rms he had not originally completed his entire statement and that the president of the parliament was simply succumbing to the shouts of the house in what was clearly an attempt to silence liebknecht’s valiant efforts. the reichstag president than refuses to tolerate any attempts to critique his leadership, while liebknecht than characterizes this president’s handling of parliamentary procedure as the equivalent of a “rape.” liebknecht made mention in his questioning of politically motivated mail seizures, though at the time, he could not have known that much worse, such as imprisonment, was in store. for his prescience, principle and bravery, liebknecht would soon be arrested and sentenced to four years in prison. fourteen social democratic parliamentary fraction members had already voted against the war credits by the time of the fi rst months of 1915 that also coincided with the start of the armenian genocide. the rest of their colleagues had continued to opt for the so-called burgfrieden, or political truce announced by the kaiser at the start of the confl ict. as positions hardened they further endorsed the so-called durchhalten strategy of staying the course precisely as it appeared clear the war would have no speedy outcome. as a result cooperation steadily diminished within the parliamentary working group as the anti-war faction had risen to 44 by december of 1915. a formal split had in fact already been a foregone conclusion by the 21st of december as the group declared itself no longer content to be represented by the vote of the fraction and wanted the multiple reasons for their anti-war position to receive a hearing in parliament denied them by the majority of their party. in fact, especially the 20 directly elected members of parliament from the anti-war fraction were subject to increasingly frontal and denunciatory attacks by the colleagues in party fora. as they were required to adhere to party discipline they had no access to the press and certainly not to the larger public due to reigning censorship enforced by the government. perhaps paradoxically as they had no other outlet upon which to develop their position or make an accounting with the reproaches received from fellow party members, the parliament tribune itself remained the only place where at least temporarily free speech could be provided for.72 clearly no other choice remained but to secede from the party. and when the split did come, it was not the subject of prior discussion, but rather was presented as a fait accompli on the day of its announcement by anti-war leader, hugo haase, a german jew who had been the only practicing lawyer to adhere to social democracy in all of the territory of east prussia. when the group, who anointed themselves the “independent” social democrats released a statement for the reasoning, they rebuffed the reproach of disloyalty and declared it was they and not the rest of the party that was acting in the true spirit of the social democratic party. yet by the time the split was effectuated the primary phase of the armenian genocide had already taken its course. it was though with the treaty of brest-litovsk that they would make a heroic stand on behalf of armenia, one strikingly overlooked in the historical literature on the subject, as the relevant primary sources and archival documents have remained 72. “eine eigene fraktion der sozialdemokratischen minderheit,” vorwärts, march 26, 1916, nr. 84, vol. 33 p. 1. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 82 83 overlooked. capitulation of the russian side not only allowed for a renewed caucasus campaign in the east, but provided for the secession of russian protected territories of turkish armenia to the turkish state and thereby exposing populations hitherto sheltered from the genocidal program of the cup. not only were these territories of ardahan, kars and batum now explicitly barred from any russian interference including protection, but they were forced to enter into negotiations with turkish authorities. haase’s primary colleague in the leadership of the “independent” social democrats, georg ledebour, a post-christian staunch german secularist was even more pointed in his criticism of his former colleagues when he fi nally had the chance to bring criticism to bear on what he referred to as the “armenian question.”73 referring to their continued war support, he stated: wie sozialisten in irgend einer form einer solchen regierung noch unterstützung angedeihen lassen können, ist mir allerdings vollkommen unerklärlich74 it is entirely inexplicable to me how socialists could bestow support in any form to such a government.75 ledebour declares himself most stupefi ed by the provisions regarding armenia, where according to the “meaning” of the brest litovsk treaty it is essentially allowing turkey to devour remaining armenia. clarifying the ethnographic make-up of the area, ledebour asserts turkey has no right to such areas and that furthermore any historically based claims are also to be considered invalid. worst of all declares ledebour: aber, meine herren, das allerschlimmste ist folgendes. die armenische und georgische bevölkerung dieser gebiete sieht der gefahr der ausrottung entgegen, wenn die türken einmarschieren.76 but gentlemen, the very worst is the following. the armenian and georgian population of these areas face the danger of extermination if the turks march in. cries of “very true” erupted in the plenary hall from the ranks of the “independent” social democrats. ledebour then reminds his listeners that in anatolia the armenian population has already been exterminated by turkish troops, and, he emphasizes, german allies. recognizing that armenians have called upon certain christian political parties already, and though he somewhat mocks their pride in their christianity and doubts their commitment, he delivers a clarion call for intervention and seeks out conjoined action with such christian parties. given the jewish identity of many of his party colleagues and their roles as social democratic leaders, including their leader haase, one can hardly imagine them taking the same verbal liberties afforded to ledebour. 73. ledebour was perhaps using the term in the context of its origin in the berlin treaty (1878) and the project of administrative autonomy in the “armenian provinces” of the ottoman empire. 74. reichstag, 143 sitzung, march 19, 1918, 4483. 75. author’s note: the support in question is that of the german government for the ottoman government. 76. ibid ich erwartete, meine herren, daß sie von der deutschen regierung verlangen würden, sie solle einschreiten, damit unter keinen umständen die möglichkeit für solche metzeleien, wie sie im eigentlichen türkischen armenien stattgefunden haben, jetzt auch in diesen russisch-armenisch-georgischen gebieten geschaffen wird. aber keiner von ihnen hat einen ton darüber gesagt.77 i expect gentleman that you would demand that the german government intervene and that therefore under no conditions would the possibilities be created for massacres in the russian-armenian-georgian territories as have occurred in actual armenia within turkish territory. but none of you has ever uttered a word about this. speaking for his colleagues, ledebour literally states they are raising their voice against any continued massacres of armenians made possible through the shared guilt of the germans. to buttress his claim of the mendacity of turkish authorities ledebour cites the early support of the young turks in the turkish revolution by armenian parties, and the young turks themselves that vocally recognized this before turning on them with unimaginable brutality. ledebour’s specifi c policy recommendation, beyond that of the absolute exigency to deny turkish invasion is the use of soldiers from neutral nations to protect these civilian populations. furthermore he believes that these territories should be aided in their apparent desire to join the then recently developing caucasian democratic federal republic announced in tifl is under the leadership of the social democrat nikolos chkheidze. some days later in summation of the views of his party on the treaty, ledebour introduces what is perhaps the strongest term available in german, schande, which can suggest something more than shame or disgrace. aware of its strength, and therefore introduced rhetorically it is precisely the article that effects armenia that makes the treaty a schande for germany.78 immediately unleashing disturbance in the plenary hall, the vice-president dr. paasche, responds that such a claim cannot be tolerated, and calls for censure. in a response that can be seen as an encapsulation of the vocal efforts of these social democratic war dissenters and activists for armenia, ledebour replies, that it is precisely because this article could very well lead to the extermination of the christian population, and therefore, “it is our conviction that there is no word strong enough, to condemn such an action.”79 haase in his address some days later calls turkish claims on batum, kars and ardahan as one of the direst elements of this treaty. they are further in clear violation of the principle of self-determination by the inhabitants who are threatened by outright conquest. haase states that it was obvious that none of the peoples in question, including those other than armenians would consent to renewed turkish rule. this treaty element is even more tragic, adds haase, when one considers how much of historic armenia has already been lost to turkey. haase then reminds the audience of the “cry of help,” that came via specifi cally 77. ibid 78. 145 sitzung, friday, march22, 1918, 4561. 79. ibid, translation my own. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 2, issue 1 “on ararat alone, no ark can rest.” beyond morgenthau: jews, social democrats, аnd jewish social democrats: alliances аnd solidarity during the armenian genocide epoch 84 85 german voices, not from neutral countries and he references dr. lepsius and dr. niepage.80 haase actually reads a lengthy passage into the parliamentary record of lepsius where he is continually cheered on by supporting cries from his party. he even cites liberal voices in turkey to the effect that there is support to fi nally topple this regime and he ends his remarks with a powerful summarizing question: und da sollen wir es verantworten, daß man den türken gebiete mit armenischer bevölkerung in die hände spielt? nie und nimmer werden wir die verantwortung für einen solchen schritt übernehmen.81 and we should be responsible that one delivers over turkish territories with armenian population? never but never would we take responsibility for such a step. some months later during a parliamentary dispute with conservative colleagues who claimed turkey was awarded the territories in question, haase formulated what he called the “caucasian question,” as whether or not the armenians would be relinquished entirely over to extermination.82 haase reminds his listeners of the documentation they were presented about the genocide, and the “cry for help” that anyone who had heard could not forget for the rest of their lives.83 he refers to the 300,000 survivors who have escaped to the caucasus to fi nd shelter among the remainders of their people. he lists 200,000 under direct turkish threat and recounts how kurds lead by aga abdulla in the direction of ardahan have already reached some and continued the killings. listing the thousands already killed there, haase states that no armenian can count on any sort of protection if found under the power of the turks.84 if christian solidarity did not suffi ce to prevent the award of these territories to the turks then haase calls upon the principle of humanity and for a complete turkish withdrawal, accompanied by cries of support from his party fraction colleagues. it is important to note that these “independent” german social democratic voices for humanitarian assistance for refugees and opposition to genocide emerged out of extremely well-known individuals in the highest leadership echelons. bernstein, a protégé of engels, helped start the party newspaper and as its leading innovative theoretician was perhaps the only german social democrat of international renown. hugo haase, similarly, was elected party co-chairman in 1913 after the death of august bebel, along with later weimar chancellor friedrich ebert. after the anti-war secession he also became the leader of the new party, and continued his leadership role until his assassination in 1919. their principled insurrection was a stance on behalf of humanity without great precedence or repetition in similar contexts. entirely against expedience and arguably their own political career 80. martin niepage worked as a teacher in a german school at aleppo etc. he was interrogated by german authorities on the english war edition of niepage’s report, the author explained that he had acted under the infl uence of j. lepsius – putting the blame on the known armenophile. 81. 145 sitzung, march 22, 1918, 4543. 82. 180 sitzung, june 25, 1918, 5664. 83. this note of documentation may refer tothe publication of “germany and armenia” (1919) released by the publishing house – tempelverlag – of j. lepsius. 84. ibid. interests against the apex of terror in the first world war, i would frame these overlooked efforts within a genealogy of leading jewish fi gures with progressive tendencies, including lazare and zangwill, who beyond the well-known example of morgenthau, placed principle over ethnic and religious solidarity and made the plight of the armenian people their own. jews and germans became primary witnesses to the armenian genocide in ways unlike few others. though this is well known in regard to certain fi gures, such as morgenthau or lepsius, the extent of this fact remains underappreciated. yet even these signifi cant voices are overwhelmed by a larger silence, a meditation on which this article begins. i then established a genealogy of jewish witness that goes “beyond morgenthau”, with fi gures such as zangwill and lazare who were also united by a critique of mainstream zionism. to fi nally achieve emancipation and jewish liberation, these voices sought a horizontal alliance with those similarly downtrodden, those lightning rods for the failures and fi ssures of the modern world-system, like the armenians, rather than a vertical alliance with the powers of imperialism. this jewish genealogy of witness converges with a german history of witness and at times is one and the same, which is to say, german-jewish. german voices against the genocide have been disproportionately construed as emanating out of the liberal, missionizing wing of protestant activists, i demonstrate the signifi cant role played by leading german social democrats, many of whom jews, in piercing the silence and complicity around the genocide. these independent social democrats, such as haase and bernstein, also maintained jewish concern but fused it with a critique of nationalism, remaining conscious of unique german responsibility and jewish responsibility for the unprecedented crimes befalling an exceptional minority like the armenians. what ultimately emerges out of the record of these overlooked voices of human rights centered advocacy from jewish and german sources are the fl edging stages of a new discourse of human rights and a new ethic of political culpability along with a horizontal perspective on world affairs that places priority on a counter-hegemonic alliance of the marginal and oppressed. 80 joceline chabot is a full professor of history in the department of history and geography (moncton university, canada). her current research focuses on humanitarian and socio-health aid to armenian and greek refugees in asia minor after wwi. email: joceline.chabot@umoncton.ca sylvia kasparian is a full professor of linguistics in the department of french studies and director of the textual data analysis laboratory at the university of moncton (canada). her main research focuses on representations in the media, in particular representations of the armenian genocide from press corpus and testimonial literature (survivors and humanitarian and health workers). email: sylvia.kasparian@umoncton.ca 81 “on the high seas with no place to land”: the smyrnaean inferno and humanitarian aid to armenian and greek refugees from turkey (1922-1923) prof. joceline chabot prof. sylvia kasparian université de moncton, canada in september 1922, the great fi re of smyrna drove more than 200,000 armenian and greek refugees to the wharves of that port city. they had fl ed to smyrna to escape the massacres perpetrated by turkish nationalist troops and now urgently needed humanitarian aid to relocate them to safety in greece. in this article we examine the actions and the roles of humanitarian workers of the near east relief (ner) and the american women’s hospitals (amh) working in greece among these refugees deported from smyrna. we highlight the central role of women doctors and nurses in their humanitarian efforts to save this population. their actions, and the gratitude of their peers and government authorities, solidifi ed their professional status in the context of profound changes to transnational humanitarianism after 1919. keywords: humanitarian aid, near east relief, american women’s hospitals, smyrna’s catastrophe, armenian refugees, greek refugees the article was submitted on 10.03.2021 and accepted for publication on 29.04.2021. how to cite: joceline chabot and sylvia kasparian, “on the high seas with no place to land”: the smyrnaean inferno and humanitarian aid to armenian and greek refugees from turkey (19221923),” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 1(2021): 81-91. 82 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0018 introduction as the great powers of france, great britain, italy and the united states occupied the vanquished ottoman empire following wwi, some 13,000 greek soldiers disembarked in smyrna, fully sanctioned by great britain and france. these two allies believed that a greek military presence in the cosmopolitan city would prevent the further massacres of christians.1 what is more, british prime minister david lloyd george appeared to support the creation of an eastern greek empire to defend british interests in the region.2 the greek army occupied smyrna from mid-may 1919 and sought to subdue the anatolian territory. the greek government, led by prime minister eleftherios venizelos, dreamed of reoccupying former greek lands in asia minor and thus unify all greeks in one nation-state (megali idea).3 faced with the occupation of the ottoman empire and the decision of sultan mehmed vi to cooperate with the allied forces, the offi cer mustapha kemal (later, atatürk) rallied the nationalist forces and declared war on both the sultan and the occupying armies.4 even as early as the autumn of 1921, greek soldiers were threatened by kemal’s men.5 the following year, in august 1922, the greek army suffered a catastrophic loss at the hands of turkish nationalist troops. disoriented, the greeks beat a hasty retreat; according to eyewitnesses, the fl eeing soldiers followed a scorched earth policy as they withdrew, burning villages and killing turkish civilians.6 the retreating greek troops were joined by nearly 150,000 panicked refugees fl eeing retaliation by turkish forces.7 on september 8, 1922, greek authorities in smyrna left the port city; the following day, turkish troops arrived, reinforced by irregular armed groups. christian districts of the city were soon pillaged and their citizens massacred. on september 13, fi re broke out in the armenian district and quickly spread to 1 michelle tusan, smyrna’s ashes: humanitarianism, genocide, and the birth of the middle east (berkeley: university of california press, 2012), 154. 2 great britain needed a solid ally in the middle east. greece seemed well positioned to fi ll this role. eleftheria dalizou, britain and the greek-turkish war and settlement of 1919-1923: the pursuit of security by “proxy” in western asia minor, phd thesis in history (glasgow: university of glasgow, 2002), 72. 3 erik goldstein, “greater britain and greater greece,” history journal 32 (1989): 345-346. ioannis-dionysios salavrakos, “the economic forces of victory versus those of defeat: an analysis of the greek economic and military mobilization of the 1903-1923 period,” journal of military and strategic studies 18, no. 1 (2017): 2-14. 4 leyla neyzi, “remembering smyrna/izmir: shared history, shared trauma,” history & memory 20, no. 2 (2008): 107. 5 hervé georgelin, “un cosmopolitisme à détruire,” in la fi n de smyrne: du cosmopolitisme aux nationalismes [online] (paris: cnrs éditions, 2005), at http://books.openedition.org/editionscnrs/2528, accessed 02.02.2021. 6 at the time, a delegate from the international committee of the red cross prepared a report detailing his investigation of the events: maurice gehri, “mission d’enquête en anatolie (12-22 mai 1921),” revue internationale de la croix-rouge 31 (1921): 721-735. the historian arnold j. toynbee was present in anatolia during the greco-turkish war and denounced the crimes committed by both sides as the greek army withdrew, in his book entitled: the western question in greece and turkey (london: constable and company ltd., 1922), 259-319. it remains a controversial topic to this day. peter k. jensen, “the greco-turkish war, 1920-1922,” international journal of middle east studies 10, no. 4 (1979): 563; norman naimark, fires of hatred: ethnic cleansing in twentieth century europe (cambridge, london: harvard university press, 2001); 45-46. jeremy salt, the unmaking of the middle east (berkeley, los angeles, london: university of california press, 2008), 77-78. 7 harry j. psomiades, “the american near east relief (ner) and the megali catastrophe in 1922,” journal of modern hellenism 19 (2001): 135. 83 joceline chabot, sylvia kasparian: on the high seas with no place to land other christian quarters. the armenian doctor garabed hatcherian described the blaze that destroyed his home and a large part of the port city: gradually, the fl ames approach our house. the crackle of burning materials and the transformation of explosives into fl aming clouds produces an infernal sight the likes of which i have never seen before. […] during the battles in the dardanelles and in romania, i have witnessed the burning of so many cities and villages, but none of those fi res has made such a strong impression on me. this fi re in smyrna is indescribable and unimaginable.8 like dr. hatcherian, other witnesses of the fi res – victims, but also consuls and american and british schoolteachers and missionaries – believed the blaze to be the work of turkish troops.9 the smyrnaean devastation forced its residents to escape to the piers on the waterfront, where they met greek and armenian refugees fl eeing from the interior of the country, waiting for rescue at the harbour.10 at that time, the city of smyrna (today known as izmir) was a port city where greeks, armenians, jews, levantines and turks lived peacefully alongside each other. an armenian population was recorded in smyrna as far back as the 13th century.11 in the mid-1800s, the greek population in smyrna, predominately orthodox christian, surpassed that of the muslims, who thereafter renamed the city smyrna, the unfaithful. the city prospered from the 19th century onwards, thanks in large part to the economic power of the local christian population. the fi res that devastated the city would destroy the second largest city after constantinople and one of the ottoman empire’s most cosmopolitan centres.12 witnesses and western bystanders watched the fi nal chapter of the greco-turkish war and the last act of the turkish solution to the problem of the ottoman empire’s christian minorities on the smyrnaean piers in september 1922. the immense humanitarian crisis took place before the eyes of powerful foreigners there on the piers, where 21 french, british, italian and american warships were anchored in the bay. every ship declared its neutrality and their crews received orders from their respective governments to save only their own nationals.13 the turkish authorities announced, on 24 september 1922, that refugees who were not evacuated within one week would be “deported to the interior.” as witness dr. esther pohl lovejoy,14 director of the american women’s hospitals (awh), recalled, all were aware 8 garabed hatcherian, an armenian doctor in turkey: garabed hatcherian, my smyrna ordeal of 1922 (montreal: arod books, 1997), 15. 9 turkish history attributes the destruction to greeks and armenians. on this debate, see georgelin, “un cosmopolitisme à détruire”. 10 psomiades, “the american near east relief,” 136. 11 marie-carmen smyrnelis, “les arméniens catholiques de smyrne aux xviiie et xixe siècles,” revue du monde arménien moderne et contemporain 2 (1995-1996): 27. 12 tusan, smyrna’s ashes, 144. 13 for example, the evacuation of british citizens was undertaken on 4 september 1922. as many as 1,200 british subjects embarked that day, aided by british soldiers on the piers. tusan, smyrna’s ashes,147. 14 for more on the life and work of dr. lovejoy, see kimberley jensen, oregon’s doctor to the world: esther pohl lovejoy and a life in activism (seattle: university of washington press, 2012), and kimberley jensen, 84 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 that this expression clearly meant a death sentence for the majority of those there.15 shortly afterwards, the kemalist authorities allowed greek (hellenic) boats and british and american sailors to assist the refugees and organize their evacuation with the support of humanitarian organizations in the area. among these were the near east relief (ner), one of the largest american humanitarian organisations at the time, the american red cross (arc), the armenian red cross, the american women’s hospitals (awh) and the young men’s christian association (ymca). the disaster relief committee in smyrna got all the american humanitarian organisations to coordinate the urgent aid effort.16 our goal in this article is to examine the role of individual humanitarian aid stakeholders in the smyrnaean refugee crisis in the context of the massive population migrations from asia minor to greece. we are interested in the following questions: by what means and concrete actions did humanitarian organisations – particularly the ner and the awh – help deliver this defenceless population? what challenges did these organisations face and overcome in the wake of the smyrnaean catastrophe? using reports and memoirs of witnesses in smyrna and the archives of the american women’s hospitals, we try to answer these questions here. “every night there came those blood-curdling shrieks that swept along that terrible quay.”17 on the piers of smyrna, a major humanitarian crisis more than 200,000 refugees huddled on those piers in smyrna in september 1922 without food or water, in inconceivably squalid conditions: “the scenes on the quay and the wharf are beyond the possibility of human imagination; they cannot really be described; they can only be expressed as they were expressed, in shrieks and groans and wild prayers and pleadings.”18 the writer was dr. esther pohl lovejoy, one of the rare american women in smyrna authorised by the kemalist armed forces to tend to the refugees. dr. lovejoy assisted women in labour that would give birth on the piers. in a text penned later for a radio speech delivered in new york in early 1923, she wrote: there were a large number of pregnant women in this quarter of a million people and their labors were precipitated by the horrible experiences through which they were passing. a british surgeon at the end of the wharf was taking care of a great many sick and injured people. he told me he knew nothing about maternity work and asked me if i wouldn’t watch the crowd for the women in labor and help them. day after day i “esther clayson pohl lovejoy (1869-1967),” in the oregon encyclopedia, at https://oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/lovejoy_esther_clayson_pohl_1967/, accessed 13.09.2020. 15 dr. lovejoy talk 1922. awh acc 144 box 3, folder 25. lovejoy esther pohl talk 1921-1928. american women’s hospitals records. drexel university, college of medicine legacy center. philadelphia, 1. 16 antonis klapsis, “american initiatives for the relief of greek refugees, 1922-1923,” genocide studies and prevention 6, no. 1 (2011): 101. 17 dr. lovejoy talk 1923. awh acc 144 box 3, folder 25. lovejoy esther pohl talk 1921-1928. american women’s hospitals records, 2. 18 ibid 4. 85 joceline chabot, sylvia kasparian: on the high seas with no place to land went to the dock early in the morning and remained until the ship-loading ceased at night. children were born on the quay, some on the wharf, but most of the women we got abroad ship before their babies came.19 despite the presence of westerners, the refugees were the victims of violence by kemalist armed forces: they were taken hostage and beaten; girls and young women were kidnapped. their immediate evacuation was the only way to save them. most of the evacuees – 177,000 in all, mainly women and children – embarked on boats between september 26 and 29.20 the refugees’ evacuation took place in conditions so utterly chaotic that dr. lovejoy, years later, as she wrote her memoirs, could not fi nd the words to describe the crisis: “the description of that frantic rush to reach the ships is beyond the possibility of language. pain, anguish, fear, fright, despair and that dumb endurance beyond despair, cannot be expressed in words.”21 the exiles were mostly women, children, and the elderly.22 men aged 15 to 45 years were separated from their families and sent to the interior to forced labour battalions. the historian harry j. psomiades states that the life expectancy in these battalions was about two months.23 the majority of the women and children thus found themselves without their men, the traditional breadwinners and family providers. to fully understand the violence suffered by the refugees, it is important to understand the role gender played in the perpetration of ethnic cleansing by turkish authorities. according to dr. lovejoy, the separation of families and the deportation of the men had even more terrible consequences for the women and children left defenceless: this enforced exodus of the christian from anatolia is one of the greatest movements in the history of mankind. it involves problems which challenge the possibilities of human imagination. the fact that the young men of this nation were separated from their women and detained in asia minor has more than a military and economic effect. men were not born [to] live without women, nor women to live without men, and the absence of young men normally belonging to this group of migrating human beings naturally entails far-reaching social and biological problems.24 this excerpt should be put into context: lovejoy’s depiction here of the relationship between men and women was commonplace for the times and not simply one individual’s perspective. in other words, lovejoy – who keenly felt the plight of the refugees and, in particular, that of the women and children in distress – was expressing a worldview shared by the vast majority of her contemporaries: that women were dependent on men to ensure their survival. that being said, violence against the refugee women and girls took place 19 ibid 5. 20 tusan, smyrna’s ashes,151. 21 esther pohl lovejoy, certain samaritans (new york: the macmillan company, 1927), 153. 22 klapsis, “american initiatives,” 99. 23 psomiades, “the american near east relief,” 142. 24 dr. lovejoy talk 1923. awh acc 144 box 3, folder 25. lovejoy esther pohl talk 1921-1928, 1. 86 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 throughout the deportation, to which lovejoy was a witness during her time in smyrna. according to her, two facts were clear to everyone: “the turks are determined to get rid of the christian population in turkish territory, and greece is the only country within reach which will receive them.”25 to compound their miseries, even if the transport of hundreds of thousands of refugees by sea to continental greece and her offshore islands happened quickly, it still took place under perilous conditions. the refugees, some of whom were already suffering serious health problems brought about by their long journey across anatolia, were crammed onto ships, often without food or fresh water. sanitary conditions were deplorable and the weakest among them fell prey to typhus and smallpox. correspondence between dr. mabel evelyn elliott of the awh, medical director in charge of the ner’s refugee health unit, and dr. lovejoy, highlighted the enormous challenges of the mass exodus and the transport of close to one million refugees in the space of a few weeks. in her letter dated january 16, 1923, elliott described the situation in which the survivors found themselves, on board ships leaving turkey: to try and picture to you conditions on these boats is beyond human description. you have seen boats loads of refugees, doctor, no need to describe, if i could, the horror of human beings jammed onto these boats. but remember, these people, before embarking have travelled for days and weeks over the snow-covered mountains of anatolia, they have traveled on these boats down the black sea, through the bosphorous [sic], marmora and aegean sea and now stand in the harbor. not one of these boats but what have on board smallpox and typhus besides all the other diseases which develop [sic] from such hardships. in the harbor it is not permisible [sic] to throw the dead overboard, so there is nothing to do but burn the bodies in the ship’s furnaces. […] added to the rest of the stench which, you know, always accompanies the ships of horror, is now added the distressing odor of burning fl esh.26 note that in 1923, the greek population was approximately 5 million, added to by the nearly one million refugees arriving on their shores.27 the greek government and humanitarian organisations were overwhelmed. in a telegram dated 11 october 1922, dr. fridtjof nansen, high commissioner for refugees of the league of nations and envoy to asia minor, wrote about the critical situation of the refugees in greece: there are probably no fewer than 750,000 refugees, the greater part of whom are women and children, scattered over every part of greece, thrace and the islands. the evacuation of the refugees from asia minor was carried out with admirable thoroughness and effi ciency and undoubtedly saved innumerable lives, but their present 25 ibid 7. 26 letter from dr. mabel e. elliott to dr. lovejoy. january 16, 1923. awh acc 144, box 10, folder 82 mabel elliott, 1922-1923, 1. 27 félix sartiaux, “le problème des réfugiés d’asie mineure et de thrace en grèce,” journal de la société statistique de paris 64 (1923): 30. 87 joceline chabot, sylvia kasparian: on the high seas with no place to land condition is deplorable. they are without money, clothes or shelter and frequently without food […].28 their needs were overwhelming. there was a dire and urgent need for reception camps and socio-health care clinics, which were undertaken by the ner and the awh with the support of the greek authorities. on camps and on islands: humanitarian aid to greek and armenian refugees and orphans faced with the infl ux of refugees, the greek government set up makeshift camps around athens and on numerous islands, wherever the refugees landed. some were housed in buildings made available to them by the government, while others were temporarily placed in crude shelters. still others, mainly armenian women and children, built mud houses on lands allocated to them by the greek government. dr. lovejoy expressed her admiration for the women’s resilience and courage: these heroic women are not conscious of their own heroism. they have accepted their burdens and instinctively dedicated themselves to the task of securing food and shelter for their children. the mother who has lived in the open with her little ones through fair and foul weather knows the meaning of shelter. and when she has dug a home out of the earth and built it brick on brick with her own hands, she has built her soul, hopes and fears, into that home.29 the local greek population was by and large welcoming, but the presence of so many refugees in some poor urban and rural areas created tensions within communities with already limited resources. refugees who were ethnic greeks and who considered greece to be their motherland had adopted turkish customs over the centuries.30 furthermore, some of the refugees were armenians and did not share the greek language or religion with their new hosts. they were seen as complete outsiders. finally, whether greek or armenian, many refugees were simply women and children, all alone, without husbands or fathers: “native women are afraid of this infl ux of females. they are dangerous. in this connection a prominent greek woman said to me: “we want help these smyrna women, but don’t want them in our homes. we must consider our families – our sons and brothers and even our 28 “relief for refugees from asia minor,” league of nations offi cial journal 3, no. 11, part 1 (1922): 1141. 29 dr. lovejoy talk 1923. awh acc 144 box 3, folder 26. lovejoy esther pohl talk 1921-1928, 8. 30 katherine nazloglou, “problèmes d’intégration et quête identitaire des réfugiés grecs de turquie en milieu urbain (athènes-le pirée) de 1922 au début des années 1930 : quelques exemples,” cahiers balkaniques 42 (2014), at http://journals.openedition.org/ceb/5014, accessed 23.11.2020. bayindir goularas gökçe, “un exemple de la perception de la frontière en méditerranée: l’étude de la frontière entre la grèce et la turquie,” diacronie. studie di storia contemporanea 23 (2015), at http://journals.openedition.org/diacroni.2383, accessed 05.12.2020. renée hirschon, heirs of the greek catastrophe: the social life of asia minor refugees in piraeus (oxford: clarendon press, 1989). 88 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 husbands.” and what about the laboring men and women of greece? we are sorry for these people, they say, but charity begins at home.”31 this wariness toward the refugees also came from the fact that some carried infectious diseases, and the risk of an epidemic was signifi cant. the awh archives detail the list of affl ictions suffered by the refugees: malnourishment, typhus, smallpox, tuberculosis, dysentery and trachoma, an eye disease affecting mainly children.32 urgent humanitarian aid was desperately needed. faced with the threat of contagion, the greek authorities imposed a mass quarantine on the refugees. the island of macronissi, tiny and without signifi cant infrastructure, was used as a quarantine station. the doctor in charge of setting up the station, dr. olga stasny of the american women’s hospitals, wrote a very detailed report of the process, in which she lamented the lack of personnel and start-up resources on the island, uninhabited and without drinkable water as it was: i learned i was to organise and direct a large quarantine station on the island of macronissi […] greece, which had been the only nation to accept the unfortunate greek and armenian victims of turkish wrath had closed the gates. thousands in her midst were without shelter or food – would it not be better to save them already there than loose [sic] all? an american group of workers in touch with the situation pleaded with the greek government. […] the government was urged and fi nally in answer to “under what conditions will you take them” said “only if they could be rid of disease and come in clean.” the task seemed impossible to one who knew the condition of these people, but the american women’s hospitals were prevailed upon [to] attempt it. we accept and january 27th i left athens to organize the station for we were to receive our fi rst boat load of refugees in ten or twelve days. no telephone-cable or wireless. our isolation was complete. the government furnished the location – boats for necessary traffi c – water and fuel and the a.w.h. was to furnish all else.33 the macronissi quarantine order lasted from january to june 1923. more than 20,000 refugees from turkey went through the tiny island’s station.34 stasny’s reports testify to the challenges faced by the awh on macronissi, but also to the work accomplished there. the refugees were often moved from one island or camp to another, depending on the local resources available there. the humanitarian workers would follow these movements, trying to attend to the immediate needs of the masses over the short term and anticipate their longer-term needs as well. 31 dr. lovejoy talk 1923. awh acc 144 box 3, folder 26. lovejoy esther pohl talk 1921-1928, 5. 32 rapport to the managing director of ner from mabel elliot. august 1923. awh acc 144 box 10, folder 81 – mabel elliott 1922-1923, 2. 33 olga stastny’s report. november 1923. awh acc box 10 folder 83 – stastny dr. olga macronissi island 1923, 11-12. 34 general report to the board, dr. esther p. lovejoy, 1927. awh acc 144 box 3 folder 24 – lovejoy esther pohl reports 1926-1930, 2. 89 joceline chabot, sylvia kasparian: on the high seas with no place to land on account of the moving refugee population which we serve, our work is transferred from place to place in accordance with the greatest needs. over one and a half million alien, homeless people driven from asia minor were received in greece. the task of replanting an uprooted nation within an impoverished neighbour nation is colossal, and it [will] probably be several years before it is complete.35 the doctors and nurses of the red cross, the awh and the ner set up various facilities in order to care for this destitute population and restore them to health. on the island of mytilene, for example, director general dr. mabel e. elliott coordinated the ner’s entire medical aid service to the refugees. according to an awh report, within two days of dr. elliott’s arrival in greece in october 1922, she opened a hospital, and cared for 80 patients in a single day. two weeks later at the end of october, she inaugurated the piraeus hospital and three urgent care clinics. in addition to caring the sick, elliott raised funds from donors, managed the donations sent to greece, recruited staff and oversaw the proper functioning of services. in early 1923, as many as 39 doctors and 113 nurses worked under her supervision, among them greeks and armenians.36 like her colleagues and the nurses deployed in turkey and greece, dr. elliott proved to be entirely capable of managing a transnational health and relief effort. more than 80,000 of the refugees were armenian and greek orphans, residents of ner orphanages built in turkey following the 1915 genocide and the post-genocide massacres. the ner orphanages had been established under crisis conditions. katherine mcfarland, a nurse working for the awh and the ner, witnessed, fi rst-hand, the arrival of the fi rst orphans from oropos: “can you imagine 1,000 children arriving at such a place and fi nding only an empty building? our hospital had nothing for about three days, until the freight could be unloaded and landed. unfortunately two little bodies have been taken to the graveyard, but i hope they are the last.”37 the awh set up, directed, and fi nanced all the hospitals connected with ner orphanages which had been displaced from anatolia to greece.38 in her written report, the medical director elfi e r. graff confi rmed the central role played by the awh on behalf of the ner orphanages:“from november 1922 to august 31, 1923, the american women’s hospitals did the medical work for the near east relief orphanages, taking care of 12,287 patients and giving 1,499,529 treatments.”39 the ner orphanages had two primary objectives. the fi rst was to care for and ensure the survival of the children, 84% of whom were under the age of 14. in its annual report to 35 report from dr. esther p. lovejoy to the medical woman’s national association, may 19 1925. acc 144 box 3 folder 23lovejoy esther pohl reports 1923-1925, 2. 36 report from mabel elliott to the awh, march 5, 1923. awh acc 144 box 10, folder 81 – mabel elliott 1922-1923, 1-2. 37 letter from oropos, december 28 1922. news from abroad, letters of katharine adele mcfarland 19211925, grim-mcfarland-woodbridge family history collection, collection 3706, the historical society of pennsylvania. 38 report from esther p. lovejoy to the medical woman’s national association, june 1923. awh acc 144 box 3 folder 22lovejoy esther pohl reports 1922-1923, 2. 39 report from elfi e r. graff, september 1922 to september 1926. awh acc 144 box 14 folder 113 – near east 1921-1930, 1. 90 the american congress, the ner reminded its readership that: “the largest medical work of the year has been done in connection with the refugee camps and in fi ghting typhus and other epidemics among refugees in their fl ight from the interior of anatolia, in refugee camps and aboard ships where they have frequently been detained in harbours, unable to land.”40 the ner workers paid a high price indeed: during the forced relocation of the orphans to greece, a dozen of the workers died after contracting typhus or smallpox.41 the second objective of the ner was to enable the orphans to quickly become independent so that they could care for themselves. to expedite this independence, the workers had to train the orphans in a trade. in fact, the training was centred on traditional trades found in communities of the middle east: rug-making, embroidery, ironwork and agriculture. these trades were also common in greece, where the economy was not yet industrialised. according to historian michelle tusan, the training in trades also recalls early means of self-sustaining by missionaries to the ottoman empire, who would support their work in the fi eld by selling hand-crafted items made by the workers they trained.42 for the ner, this longer-term goal was ambitious, because it involved creating a policy of education with the hopes of ending, for good, the confl icts which had raged for decades in the middle east: “the real test of our work is yet before us. the children must not be merely so many lives saved; they must become so many forces for righteousness, progress, world brotherhood and peace, permeating and transforming the industrial and social life of the near east.”43 as a fi nal observation, it is important to point out that the doctors of the awh and the nurses of the american red cross quickly established schools to train greek and armenian nurses in modern medical practices originally developed in western hospitals. these new nursing recruits later served in important intermediary roles between western professionals and the refugees.44 conclusion it cannot be denied that the humanitarian workers, the majority of whom were women, played an extraordinary role in the mass migration of middle eastern populations after the first world war. indeed, they were forced to contend with war, famine, contagious disease and the despair of a traumatized population. they had to mobilize material and human resources for their work, and train others to aid in the urgent care of refugees. as for the women doctors of the awh and the nurses of the near east relief and the red cross, their humanitarian work with women, mothers and children, was vital in saving a great many lives. thanks to their selfl ess acts and with the gratitude of their peers and the authorities, 40 near east relie. report of the near east relief for the year ending december 31, 1923 (washington: washington government printing offi ce, 1924), 13. 41 ibid. 42 michelle tusan, “the business of relief work: a victorian quaker in constantinople and her circle,” victorian studies 51, no. 4 (2009): 633-661. 43 near east relief,18. 44 isabel kaprelian-churchill, sisters of mercy and survival. armenian nurses, 1900-1930 (antelias-lebanon: armenian catholicoste of cilicia, 2012). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 91 their professional status as women doctors, nurses and medical health administrators – and their legacy – endures. this fascinating research is still in its early stages. we want to better understand the journey of those women actively engaged in humanitarian health and social work with armenian and greek refugees and orphans in the 1920s. we hope to shine a light on their professional and religious motivations, and analyse their actions in a transnational framework. it would be illuminating, for example, to compare our fi ndings to those of researchers examining the role of scandinavian missionaries providing humanitarian aid both during the armenian genocide and among refugees and orphans after 1919. three notable examples come to mind. first, there is maria smaberg’s study on the missionary alma johansson, who pushed back the boundaries of her role as a single woman while maintaining the societal norm of motherhood among armenian orphans.45 second, we could examine inger marie okkenhaug’s work demonstrating that for several female scandinavian missionaries such as karen jeppe, maria jacobsen and alma johansson, their humanitarian work with armenian refugees transformed their own personal and professional lives so much so that they are part of the collective memory of armenians today.46 finally, we would include matthias bjornlund’s work, which allows us to understand how the armenian genocide and the refugee crisis that followed the war ethically affected women missionaries and how their faith gave purpose to their transnational humanitarian commitment.47 ultimately, we would explore the social systems and the human milieu in which these women moved, grew, changed, and shaped their own and others’ lives. 45 maria smaberg, “mission and cosmopolitan mothering. saving armenian mothers and orphans, 19021947,” social sciences and missions 30 (2017): 44-73. 46 inger marie okkenhaug, “scandinavian missionaries, gender and armenian refugees during world war i. crisis and reshaping of vocation,” social sciences and missions 23 (2010): 63-93. 47 matthias bjornlund, “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 4, no. 1 (2019): 55-79. joceline chabot, sylvia kasparian: on the high seas with no place to land 40 hasmik g. grigoryan, ph.d. in history, cultural anthropologist, independent researcher research fields – the mechanisms of genocide implementation, perpetrators and victims of genocide, unarmed resistance during the genocides, post-genocide, and post-memory. e-mail: grigoryanhasmik86@yahoo.com 41 food procurement methods during the armenian genocide as expressions of “unarmed resistance”: children’s experiences hasmik g. grigoryan abstract the main objective of the article is to discuss whether food procurement methods during the armenian genocide could be considered as unarmed resistance. for this purpose, the first part of the article touched upon some scientific questions and the formation of the concept of unarmed resistance in the context of the holocaust. such scientific interest was inspired by the fact that though there had been instances of armed resistance during the armenian genocide, fights in self-defense, including those with victorious outcomes, as in van, nonetheless there existed an opinion that the armenians were to be blamed, to some extent, to have been “slaughtered like sheep,” i.e. without resistance. for that very reason, the purpose of this article was to offer a scholarly assessment of the concept of “resistance” by suggesting its subcategories as subjects for separate research. indeed, it is impossible to cover all the viewpoints on the problem and all the forms of resistance within one article; however, this article was an attempt to formulate new queries. in the second section of the article, an attempt is made to group food procurement methods during the armenian genocide and consider them in the context of the concept of unarmed resistance. special attention is paid to the experiences of children, trying also to identify the types of activities that the social groups were involved in and the extent of involvement. food acquisition methods that were part of the daily life during the armenian genocide are discussed as expressions of conscious and unconscious struggle against the genocidal policy of condemning people to starvation. the article is based on published memoires and oral histories of the armenian genocide survivors.1 although food procurement methods were diverse, the article offers the most common forms: feeding on wild grass, collecting fruits, berries, and nuts, begging, often referred to by the survivors as life and death struggle. keywords: armenian genocide, holocaust, children, unarmed resistance, food, memoirs, oral histories. the article was submitted on 23.08.2021 and accepted for publication on 08.10.2021. this is an extended version of the author’s article published in armenian. how to cite: hasmik grigoryan, “food procurement methods during the armenian genocide as expressions of “unarmed resistance”: children’s experiences,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 2 (2021): 41-52. 1 predominantly the oral history project materials were used in the article, which were collected since 1978. for more details about the project at https://umdearborn.edu/casl/centers-institutes/center-armenian-research/ armenian-assembly-oral-history-project, accessed 04.04.2019. 42 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0022 unarmed resistance: some scientific queries bread in my mind is associated with the contentment of being sated and the anguish of hunger. one centuries-long black summer my people and i were made destitute, starving. from that day on bread has been sacred to me, and my love for it comes close to veneration.2 aram haigaz (chekemean), survivor of the armenian genocide the jewish resistance with its diverse manifestations has been actively elucidated for more than half a century both in the historiography of the holocaust as well as in public discourse.3 whereas in the context of the armenian genocide the issue of unarmed resistance has been hardly studied.4 that is why, before moving to the main topic and considering food procurement methods during the armenian genocide as unarmed resistance let us briefly discuss some methodological issues based on the jewish experience. holocaust historian dan michman wrote that the issue of resistance to the nazis by the jews and non-jews came to the forefront of scientific and public attention still during wwii, as underground movements received a strong emotional and moral response. this interest particularly grew in european countries liberated immediately after the fall of nazi germany. in late 1960’s the semantic scope of the term “resistance” had already expanded in holocaust historiography, and a new concept was formed called “kiddush hahayim” (“the sanctification of god’s name”).5 two herbrew terms started to circulate in academic 2 aram haigaz, չորս տարի քիւրտիստանի լեռներուն մէջ [four years in the mountains of kurdistan] (lebanon, printing house of the armenian catholicosate of the great house of cilicia, 1972), 282. 3 for literature dedicated to the jewish resistance see: jewish resistance, a working bibliography (washington: center for advanced holocaust studies, ushmm, 2003). the first exhibits of the monument/museum in memory of the holocaust victims built in 1957 in israel presented the jewish resistance in the warsaw ghetto, uprisings in sobibor and treblinka extermination camps and the struggle of the survivors to get to israel. ten years later, in the spring of 1968, the first scientific gathering at the institute was also dedicated to the topic of resistance of the jews. for the collection of the reports see jewish resistance during the holocaust: proceeding of the conference on manifestations of jewish resistance, jerusalem, april 7-11, 1968, ed. grubsztein meir (jerusalem: yad vashem, 1971). 4 professor at columbia university, usa, khatchig mouradian is studying the topic of unarmed resistance in the context of the armenian genocide. see khatchig mouradian, the resistance network: the armenian genocide and humanitarianism in ottoman syria, 1915-1918 (michigan: michigan state university press, 2021); “the meskeneh concentration camp, 1915-1917: a case study of power, collaboration, and humanitarian resistance during the armenian genocide,” journal of the society for armenian studies 24 (2015): 44-55; “genocide and humanitarian resistance in ottoman syria, 1915-1916,” études arméniennes contemporaines 7 (2016): 87-103, https://doi.org/10.4000/eac.1023; “the role of armenian women during the genocide,” filmed 04 april 2017 at youtube, agbu, video, 08:06, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhjpzhsf1j4, accessed 10.02.2019; “not like a lamb to the slauhgter: humanitarian resistance during the armenian genocide,” filmed 11 february 2017 at youtube, program of armenian studies, video, 01:41:17, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=uptzty-7lhc, accessed 10.02.2019. still in 2011, the importance of studying the issue was touched upon also by ethnographer, chief researcher at the institute of archeology and ethnography of the academy of sciences of armenia dr. harutyun marutyan, “trauma and identity: on structural particularities of armenian genocide and jewish holocaust,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 1, no.1 (2014): 53-69. 5 for detailed comments on the term see rabbi aaron rakeffet, “the ‘kedoshim’ status of the holocaust 43 literature: “amidah” (הדימעה תליפת) and “hitnagdut” (תּודְּגַנְתִה). the first covered all the aspects of resistance, including armed resistance hitnagdut.6 so, what called forth the semantic expansion of “resistance”? generally, in the historiography of the holocaust, the following key queries had been circulating: was the history of the holocaust only about violence, annihilation, and suffering, was there no spirit of heroism during the holocaust, or did everyone go to die “like sheep to the slaughter” what should be described as resistance in general, what did people resist and ?(חבטל ןאצכ) how? after the armenian genocide and jewish holocaust both the armenians and the jews had developed the stereotype that people were “slaughtered like sheep,” without resistance. although in the case of the jews, this expression was considered as “old-testamentary” and had a long story,7 the historiography of holocaust had been tackling vilna ghetto underground fighter abba kovner’s appeal.8 on 1 january 1942 kovner announced: “we will not be led like sheep to slaughter. true we are weak and helpless, but the only response to the murders is revolt. brethren, it is better to die fighting like free men than to live at the mercy of the murderers. arise, arise with last breath. take courage!”9 during one of his interviews holocaust historiographer yehuda bauer noted: “… by using that metaphor, he tried to cause a rebellion against the very use of that term.”10 according to y. bauer, the using of the phrase after the holocaust differed greatly, as it had acquired an accusatory content.11 a facilitating circumstance to the latter was that in 1960’s some jewish intellectuals, including raul hilberg and hannah arendt suggested the approach, according to which, the jews were partially to blame for their extermination, as they did not resist. raul hilberg noted that the jews did not have any plans for fighting: neither by taking up arms, nor even by choosing psychological warfare tactics,12 while in hannah arendt’s assessment the behavior of the jews during the holocaust was more obedient than heroic.13 victims,” hirhurim musings torah journal 7 (2010): 185-198. 6 dan michman, историография катастрофы. еврейский взгляд: концептуализация, терминология, подходы и фундаментальные вопросы [holocaust historiography: a jewish perspective: conceptualizations, terminology, approaches and fundamental issues], trans. m. guba et all. (dnepropetrovsk: central ukrainian foundation for the history of the holocaust “tkuma,” 2005), 242. 7 reference has been made to the psalms and isaiah’s prophecy: “yea, for thy sake are we killed all day long; we are counted as sheep for the slaughter.” (psalm 44:22) and “he was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth; like a lamb that is led to the slaughter, and like a sheep that before its shearers is silent, so he opened not his mouth.” (isaiah 53:7). see աստուածաշունչ մատեան հին եւ նոր կտակարանների [the holy bible] (yerevan: bible league international, 2010). 8 for details, see yael feldman, “not as sheep led to slaughter?” jewish social studies 19, no. 3 (2013): 139169. 9 richard middleton-kaplan, “the myth of jewish passivity,” in jewish resistance against the nazis, ed. patrick henry (washington: the catholic university of america press, 2014), 6. 10 amos goldberg, “like sheep to the slaughter?” excerpt from interview with yehuda bauer, director of the international center for holocaust studies of yad vashem, 18 january 1998, yad vashem, jerusalem, at http:// www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/microsoft%20word%20-%203667.pdf, accessed 23.07.2017. 11 ibid, 1-2. 12 raul hilberg, the destruction of the european jews, vol. 3 (new haven and london: yale university press, 2003), 1104. 13 hannah arendt, eichmann in jerusalem. a report on the banality of evil (new york: viking press, 1964), 11. hasmik grigoryan: food procurement methods during the armenian genocide 44 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 although there have been many publications to date dedicated to the jewish resistance that criticize the “myth of passivity” of the jews during the holocaust, nevertheless it still persists in popular thinking and is frequently circulated in the media.14 the stereotype of passivity of the jews and “being slaughtered like sheep” left a deep imprint not only on the survivors, but also on the post-war jewish community, developing perceptions of incapacity, passivity, obedience and lack of courage.15 it is due to fighting the very stereotype that the term “resistance” expanded semantically to include the armed and unarmed forms of resistance formulated as the “jewish response to the holocaust.” the process was greatly facilitated by the fact that the studies centered on everyday life of the jews and simple, routine actions of people. various formulations of unarmed resistance emerged in european historiography, some of which pointed out certain actions like falsifying documents, supporting the family members of the arrested, hiding the evaders of compulsory labor, etc. in dutch literature such actions are primarily known as “nonviolent self-defense” (geweldloze verdediging), in french literature as “benevolent resistance activities” (activites caritatives), “cultural resistance” (resistance culturelle), in danish literature and that of other countries as “passive resistance” and “symbolic resistance,”16 there are also “spiritual resistance” and/or “moral resistance” expressions covering spiritual and cultural activities.17 in the context of the armenian genocide, the image of a “defenseless victim” was created in mid 1950s by the soviet leadership. harutyun marutyan writes about the policy of the soviet union in this period: “in fact, the soviet leadership, particularly from the second half of the 1950s, did not so much forbid discussion of the genocide, as it did foster the retention of memories in which armenians were exclusively presented as innocent victims who had lost the greater part of their historical homeland and therefore needed sympathy.”18 according to the author, the situation started to change since the 50th anniversary19 of 14 patrick henry, “introduction,” in jewish resistance against the nazis, ed. patrick henry (washington: the catholic university of america press, 2014), xiii. 15 feldman, “not as sheep,” 143. 16 michman, holocaust historiography, 248. 17 “moral and spiritual resisitance,” at https://www.holocaust.com.au/resources/moral-and-spiritualresistance/, accessed 10.02.2019; “spiritual resistance in the ghettos,” at https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/ content/en/article/spiritual-resistance-in-the-ghettos, accessed 10.02.2019; for more details about spiritual resistance see spiritual resistance: art from concentration camps, 1940-1945, ed. miriam novitch (new york: union of american hebrew congregations, 1981); rachile kostanian, spiritual resistance in the vilna ghetto (vilnius: vilna gaon jewish state museum, 2002); joseph rudavsky, to live with hope, to die with dignity: spiritual resistance in the ghettos and camps (northvale, nj: jason aronson, 1997). 18 marutyan, “trauma and identity,” 59. 19 in 1965 the armenian people in soviet armenia and entire diaspora universally commemorated the victims of the armenian genocide and celebrated the day of their remembrance. see “50th anniversary of the armenian genocide 1965 usa,” filmed 17 february 2017 at youtube, eboni coursey, video, 16:20, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=lalb9yb3b64&fbclid=iwar3x10scr9v4ew7rwzkcrfi2vh3dw8acuyh1yro3lrvfft7sodfqy2xeotw, accessed 05.11.2018; “armenian genocide 50th anniversary un debate, 1965,” filmed 31 october 2014, at youtube, the genocide education project, video, 18:12, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=h02u7pfmofg&fbclid=iwar2t2nc9i54jv1kaqwa_cqlfbnq9x98ojijnxnkuciulcxchnzi05ww2lec, accessed 05.11.2018; maike lehmann, “apricot socialism: the national past, the soviet project, and the imagining of community in late soviet armenia,” slavic review 74, no. 1 (2015): 10-31; avag harutyunyan, հայոց ցեղասպանության 50-րդ տարելիցը և երկրորդ հանրապետությունը [50th anniversary of the armenian 45 commemoration of the armenian genocide, after the karabagh movement in 1988 and the victory in karabagh war.20 nevertheless, among some layers of the armenian society, perhaps, mostly among the youth a belief has been shaped that “enough has already been said concerning the genocide: it distorts the psychology of our children and youth, and contributes to increasing xenophobia, etc.”21 according to the author, one of the factors shaping such thinking was that certain groups of the society held a perception that ostensibly “the armenians were slaughtered like sheep,” almost without resistance.22 in reality, neither the armenians, not the jews putting in resistance ever felt themselves as defenseless victims. on the contrary, they preferred to take up arms and die with dignity. accepting bauer’s viewpoint, we must note that in the context of the armenian genocide likewise armed self-defense seemed to be directed against that very perception. this is evidenced in particular by the fact that one of the heroes in the austrian writer franz werfel’s novel the forty days of musa dagh, a leader of the musa dagh self-defense, priest aram tomasian refused to die like a “defenseless sheep,” deciding to fight to the death: “i know how i mean to die − not like a defenseless sheep, not on the road to deir ez-zor, not in the filth of a concentration camp, not of hunger, and not of the stinking plague – no! i mean to die on the threshold of my own house, with a gun in my hand….”23 the novel written on real facts became symbolic for the zionist youth movement both in palestine and in europe, particularly in the ghettos.24 the holocaust historians considered that this perception was so widespread in the 1930s that when translating the book into herbrew the author had translated the expression “defenseless sheep” into “not as a sheep led to slaughter.”25 jewish historian yair auron writes that the story of the defense of musa dagh was something like a parable, also a model and a source of inspiration for the members of the jewish underground. they equated their fate to that of the armenians. the author states: “in both cases, the persecutor’s purpose was the uprooting, the exile, and the physical annihilation of entire communities, and in both cases, resistance embodied the idea of an honorable death as a nation, or a chance to be saved as individuals.”26 another instance of this was that back then the press wrote about the self-defense of the armenians in cilicia in 1915 (according to the source, likely in zeytun): “the massacre started also in the region of cilicia. the couriers were able to reach van. it was they, who hoisted up the flag of rebellion. this time they do not want to be slaughtered like sheep (the underline is the author’s h.g.). and that is the right decision. they are going to die as it comes, they might as well die fighting: it will do honor to them.”27 in may 1915, at the dinner held after the occupation of van by the russian army and armenian voluntary genocide and the second republic] (yerevan, noravank, 2015). 20 for details, see harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity. volume 1: the memory of genocide and karabagh movement (yerevan: gitut’yun, 2009). 21 marutyan, “trauma and identity,” 58. 22 ibid., 58-59. 23 franz werfel, the forty days of musa dagh ( new york, the viking press, 1934), 205. 24 for details see yair auron, the banality of indifference: zionism and the armenian genocide (new brunswick and london: transaction publishers, 2000), 293-311. 25 feldman, “not as sheep,” 158. 26 auron, the banality of indifference, 309. 27 «ապստամբութիւնը կիլիկիոյ մէջ» [the uprising in cilicia], arev (alexandria), № 19, 21 june 1915, 3. hasmik grigoryan: food procurement methods during the armenian genocide 46 groups, the leader of self-defense aram manukian addressed the russian commander [a. nikolaev] saying: “when a month ago we declared an uprising, we did not expect that the russians would come. our situation was hopeless: we either had to surrender and allow to be slaughtered like sheep [underline is the author’s h.g.] or perish, like the musicians of the titanic, to the solemn sounds of music. we preferred the latter.”28 the antipode of the latter was “to be slaughtered like sheep,” being martyred, suffering, becoming a scapegoat.29 generally, armed resistance could be viewed as an act of moral resistance also, as making such a decision by those who resort to self-defense takes deep morality, such as, for instance, the notion of honorable or mindful death.30 maybe that was why the holocaust historians considered armed resistance as an expression of “resistance” in its broader perception. based on this logic, bauer defined resistance as follows: “i would define jewish resistance during the holocaust as any group action consciously taken in opposition to known or surmised laws, actions, or intentions directed against the jews by the germans and their supporters.”31 thus, holocaust historians considered as resistance any action aiming at the protection of physical existence and maintenance of “human face,” any action against the policy of extermination or the “logic of extermination,” even intentions, any action, which would have served as a barrier to reaching the ultimate goal of crime. unarmed resistance during the armenian genocide in accordance with one of the provisions of article 2 of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide adopted by the general assembly of the united nations organization (un) on 9 december 1948, deliberately inflicting on a group conditions of life calculating to bring about its full or partial physical destruction committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such, means genocide.32 one of the tools of inflicting unfavorable conditions during the armenian genocide was condemning hundreds and thousands of people to starvation on the roads of deportation as well as in concentration camps. considering starvation as a policy of committing genocide, george shirinian points out the motives of such policy: 28 «վանի մէջ» [in van], armenia (sofia), № 25, 6 june1915, 1. 29 “be slaughtered like sheep, be a martyr, become a scapegoat” and similar expressions often are met both in the memoirs of the survivors of the armenian genocide, oral histories and the press of the time. for instance, “james pricey telegraphed from tiflis that of 160,000 population of sivaz only some 10,000 were left, and they are the elderly and the unable only. the person who telegraphed was an eyewitness who had managed to get over to tiflis. he said that many were slaughtered like sheep and thousands threw themselves into the rivers.” see «սվազի կոտորածը» [the massacre of sivaz], azg (boston), № 25, 31 january 1916, 1. 30 the concept of mindful death is best expressed in the following formula: mindless death is death; mindful death is immortality. see yeghishe, «վասն վարդանայ եւ հայոց պատերազմին դաւթի երիցու մամիկոնի հայցեալ» [about vardan and the armenian war by david elder mamikonean], chapter 2, 2. 31 yehuda bauer, the jewish emergence from powerlessness (toronto, buffalo: university of toronto press, 1979), 27. 32 convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. adopted by the general assembly of the united nations on 9 december 1948, 280, at https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/ volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 47 finally we explored the motives of the turks in using starvation as a tool of genocide, finding that it was partially to provide an excuse that the armenians died of natural causes, but also to inflict maximum punishment by way of a slow, organizing death, in order to extract vengeance and exert their domination over the armenians, who refused to stay in their subordinate position within the ottoman social and political system.33 below are described the means by which the armenians procured food on the roads of deportation or in concentration camps with a special focus on children’s experiences. the procurement of food and prolongation of physical existence were resistance to the armenian genocide and a barrier to achieving the ultimate goal of the perpetrators. the armenian genocide brought on times of trial for the children who often were wandering from place to place alone, passing through muslim households, ending up in the hands of various “masters” and struggling consciously or unconsciously to stay alive by displaying agility and cunning. as a rule, the memoirs of the survivors of the armenian genocide, as well as their oral histories started with descriptions of their peaceful life. it is noteworthy that when talking about the deportation the survivors frequently referred to their “happy childhood” as a period that was “left behind” or was over. the children having lost their happy childhood were facing new challenges. the five-year-old inmate of antoura turkish orphanage karnig banyan referred to their home as a chapel and their garden as a paradise: “our house was a temple of prayer with murmur of prayers heard year-round.”34 hitting the road of deportation, he understood that the world was wider. he states: “we were leaving, but unexpectedly in my mind’s eye i would go back to our town, our home, the warm ambience of our house, the fresh bread of our house, the delicious fruits in our garden, the trees casting shadow on our bench near the wall, the current of cool air gliding-passing through them … they all were left behind …”35 leaving behind a happy childhood the children seemed to grow up prematurely, sometimes also assuming the role of the “head of the household.” they were involved in the responsibilities of decision-making and securing the necessities of life, sometimes taking care of the members of the family alone. in fact, they were assuming these functions right from the beginning of deportation. the survivors themselves explained this by the fact that they were the eldest of the kids or even if they were not the eldest of the kids, they still perceived themselves as already mature. nicholas berberyan born in 1902 in caesarea tells: “so they said in seven days you’ve got to get out, so we put our stuff on the wagon and the whole family went out. my father was gone, so i was the head of the family, i was the oldest.”36 33 george n. shirinian, “starvation and its political use in the armenian genocide,” genocide studies international 11, no. 1 (2017): 29-30. 34 karnig banyan, յուշեր մանկութեան եւ որբութեան [memoirs of childhood and orphanhood] (anteliaslebanon: printing house of the catholicosate of the great house of cilicia, 1992), 17. 35 ibid., 84. 36 nicholas berberian, armenian assembly oral history project, https://umdearborn.edu/casl/centers-institutes/ center-armenian-research/armenian-assembly-oral-history-project, watched 08.08.2016. hasmik grigoryan: food procurement methods during the armenian genocide 48 the armenian children not only took part in the preparations for the exile, but also assumed the task of comforting and encouraging the adults on the roads of deportation. survivor ashkhen poghikian37 tells about what happened with their caravan in the autumn of 1915 in tigranakert: “the next day levonik died. i remained with mother; i was comforting and consoling her.”38 siranoush boyajian (maiden name ghazarian) born in 1907 in marash remembers with bemusement how she could have taken care of the family, including the new-born baby, at seven and run the entire household after her mother’s death. they reached homs with the caravan set out from marash then moved to mardin and settled there. she describes in detail the domestic overload that she had to manage after her mother’s death: “i’m the oldest. and then we buried my mother, and we came home …. there was a [newborn h.g.] baby, we do not now what to do. there’s nobody that we can say, give some milk, so i had to take care of that baby for a month. …how did god give me the strength to do it all?”39 the survivors speaking about their behavior, employed cunning and versatility inappropriate for their age, noted that hunger, death and witnessing the murder of their relatives had numbed their senses; they no longer felt fear and were aware that the alternative was death. as described by one of the survivors, eleven-year-old hamparsoum berberian, they had become “cruel” and “insensitive” as they realized that they might be the next victim.40 food procurement as a life or death struggle noteworthy is the fact that on the roads of deportation the behavior of the children often was controversial: much as they had resigned themselves to death, they sought for everything that would enable to survive. nine-year-old hovakim dishdishian tells: ...having spent bit by bit the supply of water that we had, we again were standing very close to death as the day before, and i must tell you, we have come to reconcile with it eventually... the more we made headway in the night, the thinner our ranks became, everyone lived with their own pains solely, the road became covered with the corpses of our fellow man sharing the same fate with us, but in the light of the moon and by its power my sister and i were proceeding to the stop over of the unspeakably excruciating caravan, that is the water that we craved... 41 taguhi antonian born in 1900 in bitlis speaks of the ways of feeding as a battle between life and death: “my aunt cooked the blood of a dead cow in a pot, we ate it. either we were going to die, or live. the horse hoof prints were full of urine, rain; we drank that as water; what could we do, we were thirsty.” 42 37 was born in 1908 in erzurum. the memoir was written down in 1978. 38 verjiné svazlian, the armenian genocide: testimonies of the eyewitness survivors (yerevan, gitut’yun, 2011), 223. 39 siranoush boyajian, armenian assembly oral history project. 40 hamparsoum berberian, armenian assembly oral history project. 41 hovakim dishdishian, դեր-զորի անապատում։ հիշողություններ [in the desert of deir ez-zor: memoires] (yerevan, gitutyun, 2006), 123-127. 42 svazyan, armenian genocide, 104. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 49 feeding on wild grass the children survivors of the armenian genocide were describing the road of deportation as a never-ending march controlled by armed police officers. despite the fact that many of them have witnessed the murder of their relatives and compatriots, nevertheless many youngsters frequently identified the road of deportation with the sense of hunger interpreting it first as absence of water and food. abraham aghbashian born in 1912 in one of the villages near tomarza recalls that on the road of deportation they were worried by nothing than food, even the armed police officers. as they were deported in summer, the survivor said that they fed on wild dandelions and rainwater: “for year, year and a half, we had nothing to eat but wild dandelion.”43 abraham aghbashian says that wherever they saw green grass “they ate like a cow” and “lap like a dog, the rainwater on the ground.”44 nvard aytnian from sivrihisar who was a kid during the armenian genocide testifies: our wayfarers of the divided train waited for some time in gonia as well and then we hit the road to mersin on foot loading our belongings on donkeys. …when we reached mersin, we started to gather grass in the fields and eat it. but even so, we would have been happy with it, had the swarms of locusts not attacked and destroyed the grass. we stayed in mersin for about two-three weeks. finally, after manifold and indescribable suffering we reached raqqa …45 the problem of foraging was constantly present not only on the roads of deportation, where people fed on wild grass, which often led to poisoning and death.46 the armenian deportees who took refuge in the mountains also lived on grass. “aravot” newspaper of 12 may 1919 published an article about seven orphans who were found by british soldiers and handed over to deportees from adana to be sent to constantinople. they were placed in haydar pasha orphanage. after living in the mountains for years, the small children had lost the ability to speak and only by making the sign of the cross did they manage to make people understand that they were armenians. the paper writes: “when they got to another station, they were given bread, they rejected it sternly, jumped down, gathered grass and ate it inside the car. having been used to herbivory for years they had forgotten about bread.”47 father vahan, a priest from caesarea, tells the following about feeding on wild grass and surviving: “all the men of our village were axed in the canyons by the criminals of ittihad, most of the women were thrown into the river or raped and islamized, so far of 570 people only 25 have been left who escaped the dreadful genocide by finding refuge in the mountains and feeding on grass.” 48 43 abraham aghbashian, armenian assembly oral history project. 44 ibid. 45 աղէտէն վերապրողներ, տէր-զօր [survivors of the disaster. deir ez-zor] (paris: p. elekean, 1955), 62. 46 haykanush melkonean, կեանք եւ մահ [life and death], series of books on the april genocide, no. 9 (antelias-lebanon, printing house of the armenian great house of cilicia, 1960), 26. 47 «լեռը գտնուած եօթը որբեր» [seven orphans on the mountain], aravot (constantinople), № 3, 12 may 1919. 48 “of 570 persons only 25 women were left,” ariamart (constantinople), № 17 (1832), 11 december 1918. hasmik grigoryan: food procurement methods during the armenian genocide 50 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 five-year-old andreas garamanian49 recalls about hunger, thirst and foraging on the roads of deportation: “the caravan would stop from time to time to rest, [people] would run to the rain water collected in potholes to quench their thirst elbowing one another, and hunt for wild plants to eat …”.50 babken inchearapean, an urfa orphanage inmate, tells: the next day, monday, the war would resume. and hunger with it. light soup and very little bread were the food ration. we were compelled to feed on grass. we would run from the orphanage through a hole to gather grass and eat it. we could even hardly find grass in those places. sometimes we would run away from the orphanage in the nights together with some orphans and go far away to get enough grass. so, we ate grass every day …51 gathering fruits, berries and nuts another way of foraging was to gather fruits, berries and nuts. seven-year-old arshaluys boyajian tells that she did not even remember for how many months they had walked, without socks and shoes, to get to aintab after leaving sebastia. she recalls that when their caravan was passing by small villages local people sold food to them; however, upon reaching aintab, they ate whatever they could gather from the orchards outside the city.52 this was actively practiced by the kids who had run away from kurdish, turkish or arabic families and were returning to their localities or hitting the road to aleppo alone. hambarsoum berberian, escaping from the train with his brother, set off for their hometown adana, where their military brother was. the survivor tells about food procurement on the road: “we were small. anyway. only, after going abit, there was a thing, a garden, we found a, what was it, tomatoes, tomatoes, from that garden, we found a tomatoe. we ate one or two of that.”53 begging another way of food procurement that the armenian deportees were resorting to not only when passing through villages and small towns on the way of exile but also in arab settlements was begging, also quite common among the children. the us consul to harput leslie davis writes: “ there were a number of children whom i found at one time or another and kept in the consulate, in addition to those who had come there with their mothers. the first one was a little boy about nine years old by the name of nerses der garabedian, who was born in haverhill, massachusetts, and had been brought to turkey by his parents just before the war. they were gone, together with his brothers and sisters, and he was begging in the market place….”54 49 born in kars bazar in 1911. 50 andreas (tavros) garamanean, տարագրեալի մը յուշերը [the memories of an exile], volume 2 (buenos aires, argentina, 1972), 10. 51 babken inchearapean, մեծ եղեռնի շրջանին հայ որբի մը ոդիսականը [the odyssey of an armenian orphan during the genocide] (paris: turabian press, 1951), 230-231. 52 arshalous boyajian, armenian assembly oral history project. 53 hamparsoum berberian, armenian assembly oral history project. 54 leslie a. davis, the slaughterhouse province: an american diplomat’s report on the armenian genocide, 51 zaruhi ayanian from kessab, who was six during the armenian genocide, tells that they had a cow with them when they were deported, which her mother was milking on the road. they were deported to the village of bazur, where they sold the cow, then they reached hama, homs, and from there the settlement of nebek near damascus. staying there for a year, she begged together with her mother to live on.55 abraham aghbashian who we already had mentioned and who was telling about eating dandelions, continues: “i had a stomach as big as a cow, because i was eating nothing but the wild dandelion. occasionally, i remember when my mother and i used to begging house to house for food.”56 ten-yearold karnig arpajian born in balu stayed in aleppo for two years before the british entered. here he was begging [in the streets] together with two orphan kids to survive: well, i wasn’t afraid no more, i said, the most, what they gonna do, gonna kill me. this is what i had in my mind. i always thought tomorrow is another day, the next day is another day, like that, i didn’t give a care for it, that’s the way i felt. i didn’t care nothing. i’m hungry, i’m starving, i’m begging here and there, two weeks of it, i beg, i beg. i ate apple cores, i ate pear cores, i ate watermelon peelings, and i ate melon peelings, you name it, i ate any doggened thing that could be eaten, it wasn’t eatable, but i had to eat it.57 suren papazean, born in 1901 in the village of havav of balu, writes about his experience: in the winter of 1917 i arrived in peri all alone. i did not know anyone; i walked in the market, in the streets, i saw that a group of armenian orphans of my age, smaller than i, would beg all day long, while at night they would go to the stable of government horses to sleep. i joined them, i found a desolate corner and huddled. everybody took out whatever they had begged, started to eat. i had been hungry all day long, and i slept hungry.58 haykanush mekonean told how the government provided food to the deportees in aghbunar to prevent the latter from begging and spreading diseases in aintab. she says: “my sister and i got to go to same village called aghbunar. there was a woman with us who had a fiveor six-year-old boy; the woman would go to the city to beg to be able to sustain the little one. the government would give a small loaf of bread a day so that we did not go to the city to beg and spread diseases there.”59 family solidarity and mutual help family solidarity and mutual assistance could also be considered as manifestations of 1915-1917 (new york, aristide d. caratzas, 1989), 113-114. 55 zarouhi ayanian, armenian assembly oral history project. 56 abraham aghbashian, armenian assembly oral history project. 57 karnig arpajian, armenian assembly oral history project. 58 suren papazean, վերապրողի մը ոդիսականը [the odyssey of a survivor] (yerevan: amaras, 2000), 113. 59 melkonean, life and death, 27-28. hasmik grigoryan: food procurement methods during the armenian genocide 52 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 unarmed/moral resistance in the context of organizing the daily life, particularly food procurement. in some cases, the survivors themselves described and interpreted this phenomenon as “a way to survive,” in some cases we assessed it as such. during the discussion of the topic in the context of the holocaust, of importance was the riskiness of mutual assistance, i.e. the existing danger and types thereof: to what extent people would risk their own life to help their family members or just relatives. this statement often helped to explain the notion why they did not come to each other’s help. “mutual assistance” in everyday life is viewed as “constructive behavior” contributing to survival.60 parantzem alexanian, a survivor of the armenian genocide from balu, tells that a turk took her out on the road of deportation, separating her from the members of her family. when passing nearby a bakery, he gave her some bread: “when he got piece of bread, i ran back to the way i came. the man followed me, understood that i wanted to give that bread to my mother. i reached, throw that bread to them, came and joined him.”61 abraham aghbashian proudly recalls how risking his own life he delivered bread to the armenian deportees personally when his mother had been working for an arab family.62 karnig arpajian tells about stealing from a grocer and helping his kin: “i started stealing, it’s not good, but reason i steal because i wanted to give it to my nationalities, they were hungry, i want to help my people. i’m ten, eleven years old but i still think of my nationality and my religion, i won’t change.”63 the above examples demonstrate that armenian children have understood that they are risking their own life, but still they have run the risk and extended help to their relatives. thus, the article touched upon an important scientific question: what is non-armed resistance and the purpose and problems of its study? based only a few distinctive examples from many thousands of testimonies, the notion that the various ways in which armenian children procured food during the years of the armenian genocide could be viewed as manifestations of unarmed resistance was put forward and corroborated. 60 boaz kahana, et. al., “the victim as helper-prosocial behavior during the holocaust,” humboldt journal of social relations l3, no. 1/2 (1985-86): 361. 61 parantzem alexanian, armenian assembly oral history project. 62 abraham aghbashian, armenian assembly oral history project. 63 karnig arpajian, armenian assembly oral history project. 74 dr. harutyun t. marutyan is a social/cultural anthropologist, director of the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation. he is also a cheif researcher in the institute of archaeology and ethnography, national academy of sciences, armenia. dr. marutyan's research fileds include genocide memory and national identity, iconography. e-mail: agmidirector@genocide-museum.am 75 the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial harutyun marutyan armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, armenia memorials are one of the most common forms of memorialization and may be understood as symbolic reparations for the victims and survivors of mass violence. they acknowledge the suffering and grief of the victims and pay tribute to the dead. at the same time, the memorials epitomises not only history but also teaches contemporary lessons of local and global character. the armenian genocide memorial as a symbol of grief and revival of the armenian nation serves all these aims. this article aims to address some points of history of the construction of the armenian genocide memorial, its local and global implications, the issue of absence of names in the memorial, as well as the feelings of patriotism and statehood embedded in the armenian genocide memorial. keywords: memory, memorials, armenian genocide, karabagh movement, national identity. the article was submitted on 04.07.2020 and accepted for publication on 26.10.2020. this is an extended version of the author’s article published in korean. how to cite: harutyun marutyan, “the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 2 (2021): 75-89. 76 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 https://doi.org/ 10.51442/ijags.0024 introduction globalization and, particularly, cultural globalization is creating a borderless world. as a result, many phenomena that had narrow, national implications are being re-evaluated and re-interpreted to stress their universal and democratic features and be presented to the world within the context of more understandable concepts. each generation must acquire the knowledge and skills needed to build the private and public dispositions necessary to support democratic values and understand the importance of respect for human rights. they should be used to combat discrimination, hate speech and other violations, being built through texts, studies and the power of example, consciously constructing and reproducing democracy, one generation after another. traumatic past experiences, memorials and museums accumulating the people’s memory thus gain new meanings and roles in civic education in the age of globalization. memorialization understood as the practice of remembrance by commemorations, writing history textbooks and establishing memorials. memorials as one form of memorialization, may be understood as symbolic reparations for the victims and survivors of mass violence, since they acknowledge their suffering and grief and pay respect to the dead. therefore, after mass violence, memorials can be understood as the physical loci of recognition and the imperative of not forgetting the atrocities of the past.1 public memorials such as historic sites, monuments and museums, certain public art or conceptual art projects and commemorative events have become critical elements in the current struggles for human rights and democracy. communities, in vastly different contexts, see public memorialization as central to justice, reconciliation, truth-telling, reparation and embracing the past.2 recognizing the power and potential of memorialization, ngos, victims’ groups, and truth commissions in various countries have advocated that memorialization be a key component of reform and transitional justice. such initiatives, for the victims of violence, are the second most important form of state reparation after financial compensation.3 memorials exist to tell us something about the past while seeking to affect the future. they and museums are embedded in local sites and function as nodes around which the fabric of remembrance unfolds in multifaceted and organic ways. some are sites where atrocities occurred, while others represent more abstract and conceptual places and can be constructed and placed anywhere.4 memorials are often seen as being established for the forming of collective memory, meaning and identity, with those of a difficult past being 1 julia viebach, “alétheia and the making of the world: inner and outer dimensions of memorials in rwanda,” in memorials in time of transition, eds. susanne buckley-zistel & stefanie shafer (cambridge-antwerpportland: intersentia publishing ltd., 2014), 69. 2 sebastian brett, louis bickford, liz ševčenko, marcela rios, memorialization and democracy: state policy and civic action, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ictj-global-memorialization-democracy-2007english_0.pdf, accessed 12.02.2020. 3 ernesto kiza, corene rathgeber, and holger-c. rohne, victims of war: an empirical study on warvictimization and victims’ attitudes toward addressing atrocities (hamburg: hamburg institute for social research, 2006). 4 judy barsalou, “reflecting the fractured past: memorialization, transitional justice and the role of the outsiders,” in memorials in time of transition, 47-68. 77 harutyun marutyan: the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial symbolically enacted and recounted at their sites. this symbolism is not, however, limited to the geographical site of the memorial site itself. through various processes and agents, these local memories and memorial sites are transformed into transnational spaces. even though memorials have always been present, they are becoming globalized as memories are released and shared.5 a perfect example of this is the armenian genocide memorial. aspects of the history of the construction of the armenian genocide memorial it seems that memorials are only meant to embody the memory which they are built to preserve and pass on, but actually solve immense problems. civic education of future generations is carried out through them, conveying basic values, some of which will be addressed below, using the armenian genocide memorial and museum as an example. it should be noted that the story of the construction of the memorial itself is an example of a struggle against violations of human/national rights and the result of civil disobedience and courageous civic behavior. what is meant by this statement? the point is that from the mid-1920s until the mid-1950s the armenian population of soviet armenia was deprived of the right “to grieve.”6 i do not know which article of the universal declaration of human rights embodies the right to “remember,” but being deprived of it was a reality for soviet armenian citizens. this thirty-year period is known in history as the “stalinist era.” during that time, talking about armeno-turkish relations, massacres of armenians, the fate of the armenians in western armenia, even hints of the need for the return of the armenian occupied lands by turkey were qualified as manifestations of nationalism and anti-soviet sentiment and were punished by execution, imprisonment or exile to siberia. it was only during the “khrushchev thaw” (from the mid-1950s to 1964) that historians, writers, and artists were allowed to reflect on the massacres of armenians in the ottoman empire, the experiences of individual genocide survivors and their later activities etc. armenian writers’ works, who were victims of stalinist repression; armenian classic writers, who were labeled as “nationalists” and the “enemy,” were gradually returned to the people and were seized upon, as were editions of books by western armenian writers that were published in tens of thousands of copies.7 perhaps it was due to inner political changes as well as a certain liberal approach toward the issue of the genocide, brought about by literature and art, that fomented, on the 50th anniversary of the genocide, the mass demonstrations that occurred in yerevan in april 1965. this was an unusual phenomenon in the soviet state of those times, with tens of thousands of people taking to the streets to commemorate the memory of the innocent victims of the genocide and to demand reparations.8 5 annika björkdahl, stefanie kappler, “the creation of transnational memory spaces: professionalization and commercialization,” international journal of politics, culture, and society 32 (2019): 383-401. 6 vardges petrosyan, “on the different sides of the ‘psychological barbed-wire’” in մեր ժողովուրդն իմն է՝ ինչպես իմ վիշտը [our people are mine as is my grief] in collection of articles, ed. levon ananyan (yerevan, hayastan, 2003), 132. 7 harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity. volume 1: the memory of genocide and the ka rabagh movement (yerevan: gitut’yun, 2009), 38-39. 8 avag harutyunyan, հայոց ցեղասպանության 50-րդ տարելիցը և երկրորդ հանրապետությունը [the 50th 78 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 the soviet armenian leadership (having received the kremlin’s permission in advance) marked the anniversary of the genocide in a solemn session in the opera house. thanks to the people’s request and the patriotic stance of the armenian soviet leadership, the armenian genocide memorial was built in 1965-1967. it is noteworthy that during the construction of the memorial there had always been a concern that the moscow/kremlin leadership of the soviet union may suddenly change its mind and stop construction. the memorial was therefore built quickly, without any reports being published in the press. roads leading to the memorial pass through a large park. the complex itself occupies an area about half a hectare and consists of three main structures: a one hundred metre long memorial wall with the names of the armenian settlements in the ottoman empire where major massacres took place inscribed on it, the open air memorial hall and the obelisk symbolizing “resurrecting armenia.” the circular open-air hall, 30 m in diameter, built of 12 huge basalt pylons inclined towards the eternal flame in the centre, symbolize the perpetual memory of the genocide victims. the 40 m high obelisk is the stone embodiment of the sprouting of two leaves that ascend with each other and symbolize the revival of the armenian people (pic. 1). pic. 1 the armenian genocide memorial: a general view. anniversary of the armenian genocide and the second republic] (yerevan: noravanq, 2015). by becoming acquainted with the roots of the armenian genocide memorial complex and also with the history of the construction of the monument itself, one may learn the essence of totalitarian/authoritarian systems and the need to struggle for fundamental human rights and freedoms, as well as the potential negative effects of hate speech. this information will educate a conscious citizen, whose role in building of a healthy society is of the greatest importance. 79 harutyun marutyan: the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial the local and the global in the genocide memorial being situated on top of a hill and separated from the urban environment, the memorial complex is, at the same time, in harmony with the scenery, particularly with the outline of mount ararat in the far distance (pic. 2, 3). in fact, two of the most important symbols of the armenian identity made by nature and by man are brought together in one place. the panorama of yerevan from the heigh monument site should be added to this, the symbol of the armenians who survived the genocide and as a symbol of the revived and resurrected armenian people. pic. 2 the armenian genocide memorial and mount ararat. pic. 3 the obelisk "resurrecting armenia" with mount ararat in the background. 80 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 the existence of mount ararat has another implication. in noah’s time a global catastrophe the great flood befell the world with the consequent salvation of mankind. noah’s ark grounded on mount ararat. the armenian genocide was also a global catastrophe in its local coverage when an attempt was made to exterminate an entire nation that had been living in its homeland for centuries. the remnants of the armenian nation have, however, spread throughout the world and regained the power to regenerate itself from ashes like a phoenix and has built a new life, the proof of which is armenia’s capital yerevan, spread before mount ararat and below the armenian genocide memorial. thus, even the location of the armenian genocide memorial relates to several global events. the memorial epitomises not only history but also teaches contemporary lessons. even though the armenian genocide has been recognized by genocide and holocaust scholars9 and the abundance of evidence, the republic of turkey, the perpetrator state and successor of the ottoman empire, has denied the fact of the armenian genocide at the state level for more than a century. therefore, it is quite natural that the process of international recognition of the armenian genocide is perceived by the armenians as the establishment of moral and legal justice. the presence of the world in the memorial, the recognition of the armenian genocide as a global catastrophe and its consequent remembrance by the world is visualised in the memorial spruce garden (pic. 4, 5) where the presidents and prime ministers of more than 40 countries, as well as statesmen, politicians and representatives of international organisations have planted more than 210 blue spruce trees in memory of the victims of the armenian genocide. not all the states who have planted a spruce have recognised the armenian genocide which is a foreign policy issue for them but planting a tree is a way of paying tribute to the memory of the innocent victims. every year in the second half of april, the “world” again “materially” appears near the memorial close to the spruce garden. it takes the form of a large sign showing the flags of the states that have officially recognised the armenian genocide (pic. 6). the effect of this soviet modernist-style monument on the visitor is due to the total lack of any decoration and the spiritual music permanently heard there. it is a unique example of a combination of architecture and music in the art world showing the limitless possibilities of stone to create a perfect structure by simple, strict and impressive means. in 1995 the genocide museum was added to the complex area (pic. 7) and was enlarged in 2015 without affecting the memorial in terms of its volumetric-spatial aspects.10 20th century world history shows that victims of genocides, as a rule, experience tremendous hardship in overcoming the calamities that have befallen them. but they also try, by remembering the bitter past, to learn lessons and build new lives. it is natural that the process of surviving and building a new life is a positive challenge. 9 statement by 126 holocaust scholars, holders of academic chairs, and directors of holocaust research and studies centers, https://www.armenian-genocide.org/affirmation.21/current_category.3/ affirmation_detail. html, accessed 12.02.2020. 10 marutyan, iconography of armenian identity, 39-46; idem, “formation, development, and current state of the armenian genocide victims remembrance day (part 2),” in ts’eghaspanagitakan handes 7 (2) 2018: 108-110. 81 harutyun marutyan: the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial pic. 4 the memorial garden. pic. 5 the memorial garden with its blue spruces: individual plaques indicate who planted each of them and when. 82 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 pic. 6 the special sign with the flags of the states that have officially recognized the armenian genocide on it. pic. 7 the armenian genocide memorial and museum with yerevan in the background. 83 harutyun marutyan: the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial the issue of presence or absence of names most monuments and memorials are structures dedicated to the victims of war. every nationstate considers it a sacred duty to remember and commemorate victims who have died for a just cause the defence of the homeland. memorials dedicated to the victims of war are often built in cemeteries and, if possible, have the names of those buried there inscribed on them. the names of the victims are also recorded on cenotaph-memorials dedicated to the residents of a particular region who went to war and never returned. similar memorials started to be built in armenia after the 20th anniversary commemoration of the great patriotic war (world war ii), that is since 1965. although they don’t have a particular pattern, memorials of national importance have the names of all the victims inscribed on them (such as the vietnam veterans memorial in washington). memorials dedicated to the victims of other catastrophes are slightly different. thus, many memorials built in europe and devoted to the holocaust also have the names of the victims of the crimes perpetrated in a particular location or state. this is, of course, natural, as people initially remember the victims of their region or state (fatherland or country). the case of the armenian genocide memorial differs somewhat. like the holocaust, the armenian genocide also happened during a world war. as in the jewish case, the armenians, although not a belligerent people, suffered the largest number of people killed about 1.5 million comprising both civilians and those conscripted into the ottoman army (the latter however, were not engaged in fighting), which was higher than the number of french killed at the front and twice as many as the number of british soldiers killed (including those from the colonies). if all the victims of wwi constitute 4.0-4.4% of the population of germany or france, 75% of the armenian population of the ottoman empire were victims of the armenian genocide. the majority don’t have graves, while the places where mass graves exist are within the territory of modern turkey. the names of the people buried there are unknown or are simply forgotten. the holocaust was recognized by the perpetrator-state and the world in general and memorials were built in many countries where the holocaust was perpetrated. the armenian genocide is not recognized by the perpetrator-state, the republic of turkey, which is the successor of the ottoman empire. there are no memorials there, and their specialistsarchivists are not interested in revealing the names of the victims. thus, the descendants of victims of the armenian genocide are deprived of the opportunity to build memorials in their ancestors’ fatherland and engraving the names of those deported from a particular region or massacred there on them. so, there are no memorials with a particular territorial or local coverage and, most probably because of that the names of the armenian genocide victims are not engraved on any memorial. instead, there is another reality: hundreds of big and small memorials not only in the republic of armenia, but also in many foreign cities with the armenian communities. this is because the existence of the armenian diaspora is a direct consequence of the armenian genocide, while nearly half the population of the republic of armenia is made up of the descendants of ottoman armenians. 84 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 according to armenian historiography, genocidal acts were also perpetrated in eastern armenia, in other words the current republic of armenia. the names of quite a number of armenian genocide victims are known from written and oral sources. in order that those names don’t disappear over time and to uncover those that are unknown, it is necessary to collect them in an online database. the armenian genocide museum-institute has declared the creation of the online database to be one of its primary projects and, in this way, to attempt to uncover the names of armenian genocide victims; in other words, to create a virtual database-memorial with the names of the victims of the armenian genocide being recorded. a similar task was carried out and results achieved to a great extent by holocaust scholars. thus, there is an attempt to create a new type of memorial a virtual one, with the help of the internet as medium for the birth of its globalization. the memorial and the war factor in the mid-1960s, when a project was created to build a memorial dedicated to the armenian genocide victims, there were no (even ideologically) similar memorials in the soviet union. the existing ones were devoted to well-known party, state, political and military leaders. meanwhile, the program of the construction of great memorials dedicated to the victory in the great patriotic war was launched, among them the piskaryovskoe memorial cemetery in leningrad (1956-1960), the memorial complex in mamaev kurgan dedicated to the heroes of the battle of stalingrad (1959-1967), the tomb of the unknown hero memorial in moscow’s red square (1966-1967) and the katyn memorial complex in belarus (19661969), etc. it was necessary to find a “place” within soviet ideology to justify the erection of a monument that would be devoted not to victory but to the victims of the armenian genocide during wwi. this was also “odd” because of the absence of any connection with communist ideology. thus, there had to be something greater than soviet ideology or a narrowly armenian connotation. the solution was found. in his letter addressed to the central committee of the communist party of the ussr in moscow, the first secretary of the armenian communist party, yakov zarobyan11 put the issue into a global dimension, stressing the need to remember not just victims who had died for victory in the war, but war in general as being the greatest evil, killing millions of people. in this context, through using the name of turkey, a universal formulation that “a similar tragedy must never happen in history again” was put forward, which was also acceptable to the soviet ideology. the opinion is that through this formulation the armenian genocide was been taken from being a purely armenian tragedy and placed in the realm of world history.12 the next important ideological concept in the above-mentioned letter was the following: to erect a monument devoted to the armenian martyrs of world war one in yerevan. the monument should symbolize the rebirth of the armenian people (author’s emphasis). the formulation “world war one” was not only a time indication but was also aimed at 11 while still a child, yakov zarobyan and his family was forced to leave the armenian city of ardvin (kars region, now in turkey). 12 harutyun marutyan, “museums and monuments: comparative analysis of armenian and jewish experiences in memory policies,” études arméniennes contemporaines 3 (2014): 65-66. 85 harutyun marutyan: the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial transferring the event to the “global” realm. on the other hand, soviet ideology, following leninist interpretations had, for decades, presented wwi as an “imperialist war,” with only the soviet union, leading the world’s socialist block, resisting “world imperialism” by all possible means.13 the issue of patriotism and statehood visiting to the armenian genocide memorial, different feelings arise in each and every armenian. initially there is a feeling of loss, as well as of patriotism, which is very important. to state that it is manifested unambiguously and very directly might not be right. us president donald trump in his speech at the 74th un session particularly emphasized: like my beloved country, each nation represented in this hall has a cherished history, culture, and heritage that is worth defending and celebrating, and which gives us our singular potential and strength. the free world must embrace its national foundations. it must not attempt to erase them or replace them. looking around and all over this large, magnificent planet, the truth is plain to see: if you want freedom, take pride in your country. if you want democracy, hold on to your sovereignty. and if you want peace, love your nation. wise leaders always put the good of their own people and their own country first. the future does not belong to globalists. the future belongs to patriots. the future belongs to sovereign and independent nations who protect their citizens, respect their neighbors, and honor the differences that make each country special and unique.14 the memorials dedicated to the victims of wars, in one way or another, have a function: to strengthen statehood. in the armenian case, the genocide memorial built during soviet times, through its rising obelisk, was promoting the idea of a peaceful life built by the efforts of soviet forces and within the large and powerful soviet state. after armenia regained independence, the accents on statehood were altered and the idea that the absence of a state and army assisted in the perpetration of genocide was endorsed in different forms. consequently, to face the modern challenges of the global world, a powerful state and a strong and efficient army is needed. if, within the area of the genocide monument and memorial in general only the idea of victimhood was stressed and heroism as a role model had no place there until 1990, then as a result of the first karabagh war, the idea of heroism showed itself by the burial of five freedom-fighters in the vicinity of the memorial. those graves directly emphasize the idea that the only way to avoid genocide is to struggle, and when necessary, to resort to arms (see details below). 13 ibid. 14 remarks by president trump to the 74th session of the united nations general assembly, https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-74th-session-united-nations-general-assembly/, accessed 23.06.2020. 86 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 in this sense “patriotism” and “democracy” are directly linked. the sense of patriotism among the armenians visiting the memorial is probably reflected in the view that just one hundred years ago the nation lost western armenia, with about two-thirds of its people being killed. surviving armenians found refuge in one-tenth of historic armenia and have built and are building a new, free and independent country that needs protection in order to prevent the repetition of the past.15 a vivid proof of what is said is the strong connection between the past and the present at the memorial. the point is that over the past half-century, the developments and challenges faced by armenia and its citizens have, to some extent, been reflected in the memorial’s area. this connection is indicated by two other things: the khachkars (cross-stones) dedicated to the victims of the armenian pogroms (1988-1990) in sumgait, kirovabad, and baku (pic. 8) and the graves of the five freedom fighters killed in the armenian-azerbaijani border battles (1990-1992) (pic. 9). pic. 8 khachkars (cross-stones) devoted to the memory of the victims of the anti-armenian pogroms in sumgait, baku, and kirovabad (1988, 1990). 15 measurement has not been made of the prevalence of this idea through quantitative or qualitative research, percentages, or interviews; such thinking has come from years of personal conversations by the author with various people. 87 harutyun marutyan: the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial pic. 9 the graves of five armenian freedom fighters killed during the armenian-azerbaijani border clashes (1990-1992). the above-mentioned cities are in azerbaijan. however, the massacres of the armenian population of those cities were the response of the soviet azerbaijani authorities to the events that took place many kilometers beyond those cities. as early as in 1921 nagornokarabakh (94.6% of the population of which was armenian then) located in the former elizavetpol district of the russian empire (which became one of the constituent territories of the newly formed democratic republic of azerbaijan in 1918) was, by the decision made by the caucasus bolsheviks and with the direct involvement of stalin and lenin, transferred to soviet azerbaijan as an autonomous region, instead of being joined to armenia. over the next six and a half decades, due to the policies followed by the soviet azerbaijani authorities, the armenian population decreased substantially to 75%. in 1985 gorbachev proclaimed the political policy of “perestroika” (restructuring), which also implied changes in national affairs. on february 20, 1988, the parliament of the nagorno-karabakh autonomous region decided to apply to the ussr parliament with a request to unite the region with armenia. mass demonstrations took place in the capitals of armenia and azerbaijan (yerevan and baku). on gorbachev’s request, they were suspended on february 26. starting on february 27 and for three days on, in the presence of soviet army units, “mass disorders” took place in sumgait during which, according to official data, “26 citizens of armenian origin were 88 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 killed.” the method of killing was the same as used by the turks during the genocide of armenians at the beginning of the twentieth century: they were beaten, tortured, raped, and thrown out of windows, slain with metal rods and knives, chopped up with axes, beheaded and burnt alive… the aim of these criminal actions was to block any possible solution of the issue, to terrorize armenians and, in particular, to alarm the central soviet authorities with the threat of further bloody actions and to force them to forego the demand for a just solution to the karabakh issue.16 in commemoration of the armenian victims of sumgait, a monument-khachkar (crosstone) was erected in front of the genocide memorial on april 24 1988. another is dedicated to the massacres of armenians in baku on january 13-20, 1990, in which according to unofficial data, 200-400 people fell victim. the third khachkar is dedicated to the armenians of kirovabad (the second-largest city in azerbaijan) who were killed or expelled. these crimes were regarded by the armenians as a manifestation of genocidal policy and were compared to the armenian genocide, the memory of which immediately came to the fore. it is worth mentioning that azerbaijanis share the same ethnic origins with the turks. it should be said that the armenian genocide is not a very distant story; but the massacre and exile of armenians, seven decades after the genocide, in 1988-1992, is a repetition of it on a small scale. everything should be done to prevent it happening again. indicators of this mentality are the graves near the memorial wall, which forms part of the memorial. five freedom fighters are buried near the genocide memorial who, in the absence of armenian armed forces, defended the borders of the country from azerbaijan in 1990-1992 at the cost of their lives. in this way, the slogan “never again” acquires a second meaning within the confines of the memorial, going beyond the boundaries of the armenian genocide (the purely historical past) and being closely linked to present-day reality. some of the actions linked to the “never again” slogan are the annual visits to the genocide memorial by armenian army conscripts and high school students. such visits are also aimed at strengthening the rarely-mentioned but very important element of civic education patriotism. the ideas of genocide memory, concerns for the future of the country (in other words, patriotism) and democracy in the memorial complex were strongly intertwined three decades ago during the years of the first armenian revolution (karabagh movement) in 1988-1990. in particular, rallies were banned in yerevan in 1988 and the spring of 1989. in both cases, however, on april 24, armenian genocide commemoration day, mass marches were held at the armenian genocide memorial with hundreds of thousands of people participating. the marches were not only dedicated to the victims of the armenian genocide, but directly linked the future of the country’s democratic development and the armenian genocide topic of 70-75 years ago. that is, the citizens relied on the past in their verbal and visual attitudes but were discussing the present and looking to the future. all this happened at the genocide memorial, which became a political platform. so, in the posters and banners that were displayed in those days, the following several things were stressed: 16 marutyan, iconography of armenian identity, 93-94. 89 harutyun marutyan: the local and global in the armenian genocide memorial • the soviet union was criticized for not officially recognizing the armenian genocide but, according to civil society, if it did, it would pose as a barrier to massacres on the ground of ethnicity in a multinational country; • the armenian genocide and sumgait massacres were put on the same level, as ideologies of pan-turkism, stalinism, fascism and nazism; • the soviet authorities were required to make a political statement on the sumgait events; • a demand for condemnation of the perpetrators of the sumgait massacres, who were perceived by demonstrators as enemies of perestroika (restructuring). some expressed doubts that the organisers were among the ussr leadership and in the kremlin; • the absence of punishment was interpreted as the inability of the soviet courts to hold a trial impartially and fairly, which was perceived as an overall weakness of the soviet system; • the conviction was that the citizens of armenia should protect themselves, and not rely on the soviet union, the soviet army or the russians; • it was highlighted that there was no need to mourn, but to resist, to fight and, for that purpose to have an army of its own; • finally, the prevention of future genocides or massacres was seen in the consolidation of armenians and the establishment of a democratic and independent armenia. during the first armenian revolution/karabagh movement (1988-1990) the armenian genocide memorial became one of the places used for the expression of revolutionary ideas. ideas that eventually appealed to the citizens of the country not only to remember the innocent victims of the armenian genocide and to claim justice for the solution of the armenian issue, but also to fight for democratic freedoms; fight against national and legal discrimination; fight for the country’s independence from the soviet union; fight for the restoration of national dignity; demand implementation of the constitutional provision of equality before the law envisaged by the constitutions of the ussr and soviet armenia. *** every year, from early in the morning till late night on april 24, nearly a million people visit the armenian genocide memorial. they lay flowers at the eternal flame dedicated to the victims of the armenian genocide as a sign of respect for the memory of the 1.5 million innocent victims of the armenian genocide (1915-1923) and bow in gratitude before the martyred and surviving heroes who struggled for their lives and human dignity, reiterating the commitment to achieve worldwide recognition of the armenian genocide, the restoration of rights, the establishment of historical justice and the elimination of the consequences of the genocide. jeff stonehouse has a master of arts from the university of british columbia. he is currently an author of horror fiction in kelowna, canada. email: jeffastonehouse@gmail.com mailto:jeffastonehouse@gmail.com 81 delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre jeff stonehouse “and it came to pass, when they had brought them forth abroad, that he said, escape for thy life; look not behind thee, neither stay thou in all the plain; escape to the mountain, lest thou be consumed.” genesis 19:17 (king james bible) “run to the hills, run for your lives.” iron maiden, “run to the hills,” the number of the beast (1982) this paper aims at conceptualizing the physical environment of genocidal violence. perpetrator organizations are understood to use artificial and natural settings to facilitate the task of mass killing. it is argued that mountains may be relatively distinct from other features of terrain because they offer advantages that strategically favor the defender. if targeted groups use these advantages to meet the goals of first arrival, maintaining biological needs, keeping the enemy at bay and alerting the outside world, they increase their chances of surviving destruction. three case studies are examined: musa dagh (1915), bisesero (1994) and sinjar (2014). key-words: musa dagh, bisesero, sinjar, armenian genocide, rwandan genocide, yazidi genocide, mountains, resistance. introduction facing genocidal violence, groups targeted for extermination seldom find solace or succor in the physical environment.1 outside of urban settings they face a variety of natural impediments, including deserts, frozen wastes, ravines, swamps and, rivers. in peacetime, these features are typically benign and incidental; in contrast, during mass atrocity events, the physical environment is strategically co-opted to meet the nefarious designs of perpetrator organizations. alternatively, terrain may instead introduce an unanticipated setback to a perpetrator’s plans. if an organized actor commits to a course of extermination, then no terrain is truly safe; nevertheless, some terrain functions to inhibit mass killing, even if only temporarily. 1. this paper was originally presented at the twelfth meeting of the international association of genocide scholars (july 8-12, 2015) in yerevan, armenia. i would like to thank my two anonymous reviewers, my graduate supervisor dr. adam jones, and the iags for hosting the conference. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 82 mountains, for instance, can offer a defensive refuge by postponing the forcible imposition of genocidal intent. mountainous terrain may delay massacre by ensuring that the task of extermination is rendered more problematic and time-consuming. targeted groups can extend this delay by pursuing four objectives: arriving first upon a mountaintop position, amassing the necessary biological requirements for survival, organizing a defensive effort, and alerting the outside world of their need for immediate rescue. if followed successfully, these four objectives are critical to the preservation of life. this paper is structured around three objectives. the first sections aim to conceptualize the physical environment in terms of its strategic or counter-strategic function. it argues that terrain either promotes the exterminatory goals of perpetrator organizations, or it imposes an obstruction to their plans. this paper uses mountains as a specific category of terrain. additionally, it contends that, from the perspective of targeted groups, mountains often possess a set of advantages that may be utilized to delay massacre. these advantages are outlined according to the ocoka framework. finally, three illustrative case studies are examined: musa dagh (1915), bisesero (1994) and sinjar (2014). it is shown in each case how mountainous terrain was used to counter a genocidal perpetrator’s exterminatory strategy. each case is detailed with an emphasis upon how the targeted groups pursued the goals of first arrival, survival, resistance and alerting, as well as how mountainous terrain was utilized to postpone massacre. genocide, terrain, and strategy this section aims to conceptualize the varied landscapes of extermination. the commission of genocidal violence and massacre invariably occurs within a tangible material context; this context constitutes the ambient surroundings of atrocity. the physical environment may be of an artificial, man-made origin or, alternatively, it may consist of pre-existing natural features. one-sided mass killing frequently occurs in situ, in urban, industrial and residential settings. during the holocaust, urban areas were transformed into ghettos, and specialized facilities, such as concentration, transit and extermination camps, were developed. moreover, prisons, from the lubyanka to tuol sleng, have been used to torture, to “disappear” and to house mass executions. conversely, violence may occur in areas that are less developed or uninhabitable, including forests, lakes, and mountains. in these instances, the natural environment has been used functionally to facilitate the process of mass killing. thousands of ottoman christians were driven into the syrian deserts to die of exposure, an experience shared by the herero and nama in german south-west africa. conversely, the frozen expanses of siberia and the soviet gulag system prevented escape while harming those within its icy embrace. forests and ravines have been utilized to assist the implementation of massacre, including katyn and babi yar. lakes and rivers have been used to kill undesirables, such as during the french revolution as hundreds were cast into the loire river; or, like the nyabarongo river in rwanda, they are used to dispose of bodies. in short, mass killing never occurs in a featureless vacuum; rather, it is committed indoors and out, from dank prison cells to openair executions at designated or impromptu killing sites. the terrain present within a process of exterminatory violence may be classified as delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre 83 either (1) instrumental or (2) detrimental.2 the terrain of the first type strategically serves the genocide, while terrain of the second interferes and slows down its operation. groups that conduct organized violence against civilian targets do so strategically; these strategies are understood here as the deliberate and routine use of the physical environment — including both artificial and natural terrains — to implement a genocidal policy or end-goal. when the physical environment is used strategically, a facet of terrain is instrumentalized in order to facilitate the commission of genocidal violence. where massacre occurs (i.e. upon what type of terrain) is largely determined by the strategy utilized by the perpetrators. locations were often sought out for their remoteness, for their difficulty to escape from and for how well they obscure the commission of atrocity; elsewhere, they were chosen for their centrality and ease of access. sometimes these sites have a history of violence, for others the introduction of violence is a novelty. when the same terrain is utilized within the same genocidal event or episode, the functional use of the physical environment is seen to result in patterns of killing in analogous physical contexts. what all these locations share is a functional role in facilitating perpetrator strategy. for instance, the rwandan genocide provides an excellent example of the routinized use of corresponding terrains of destruction. based upon his field research, scott straus contends that killing occurred in four main locations: (1) at central congregation points such as churches, schools, and government buildings; (2) at roadblocks; (3) during houseto-house searches; and (4) during searches through cultivated fields, wooded zones, and marshes.3 this paper would argue that the first three killing venues were the result of the perpetrator’s strategy. in contrast, category four describes areas of counter-strategy. the fields, swamps, and forests highlighted by straus were terrains that helped tutsis and moderate hutus to escape and hide from the agents of hutu power. these locations were sought out because they countered génocidaire strategy by relocating the meeting of hunter and hunted to areas less conducive to mass killing. counter-strategy draws violence towards locations that are not explicitly part of a perpetrator strategy; instead, these locations slow the overall task of killing and occasionally make it dangerous for the perpetrator to complete his task. a successful counter-strategy disrupts a perpetrator’s strategy by forcing the two parties to relocate their eventual engagement to an alternative setting, one more conducive to the defenders’ requirements. arguably, when beset by hostile forces, choosing where to die is one of the greatest acts of resistance. groups targeted for destruction are handicapped by what genocide scholar vahakn dadrian describes as the “critical disparity of power relations.”4 individually and collectively they are in an inferior position. they lack the resources, arms, and coordination 2. there is also a third category as well. when the physical environment is understood to be incidental, it accompanies genocidal violence but does not play a major part in the killing process; rather, it resides in the background without a meaningful impact. 3. scott straus, “the historiography of the rwandan genocide,” in the historiography of the rwandan genocide, ed. dan stone (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2008), 526-527. 4. vahakn n. dadrian, “the determinants of the armenian genocide,” journal of genocide research 1, no.1 (1999): 65. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 84 of the state that seeks their destruction. but by choosing where to resist, they disrupt the schemes of the perpetrators, and in doing so, they may be able to endure a genocidal onslaught. mountains: advantages and counter strategy from the perspective of resistance, mountains possess unique advantages. targeted groups may hide upon them or use them to flee to safer areas. most importantly, mountains possess certain characteristics that allow for fighting back. whether fleeing, hiding or fighting, mountains delay the killers’ plans whose strategies depend upon bringing targeted groups to terrain that facilitates their goals. the advantageous features of mountains may be elucidated by adapting the ocoka (observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach) framework of terrain analysis.5 developed and utilized by the u.s. military, this analytical framework provides a simple technique for determining the advantages of particular features of terrain. first, mountains allow for observation over long distances, even if unaided. this means defenders may identify and anticipate the advance of hostile forces well before their arrival. conversely, being able to see and communicate over longer ranges assists in locating potential rescuers; for example, a passing ship or vehicle. furthermore, in terms of defense, mountains are enhanced by their advantageous “fields of fire”. even with less than ideal firearms, those conducting mountain resistances may use the terrain to place themselves in a much better position than the approaching enemy. these advantages, however, are not guaranteed: inclement weather, fog, and cloud cover may act to conceal the advance of the enemy or obscure the vision of a potential rescuer. second, mountains often provide both cover and concealment. during combat, rocks and trees provide hardened positions from which to fight. in contrast, hostile forces advancing up a mountain often lack the advantage of cover. for non-combatants, concealment is made possible by forests, ravines, caves and dense vegetation. those incapable of fighting such as children, the elderly, sick, injured and women6 are able to hide while others do the fighting. the third advantage of mountains is the ubiquity of obstacles. the task of advancing upwards in the face of boulders, outcroppings and cliffs makes scaling a mountain more difficult. obstacles may prevent the refugees from successfully making their initial climb. however, if they can overcome these difficulties they may turn these natural barriers to their advantage. fourth, mountains also constitute a form of key terrain. by giving the defenders the advantage of height over their foes, the defenders are granted a position of dominance. key terrain is not only significant for repelling an attack, it also includes a protected base; here, supplies of scarce resources may be kept safely, and defenders and non-fighters alike can recuperate, work and plan without molestation by outside forces. 5. national park service, “ocoka military terrain analysis,” vicksburg national military park cultural landscape report (atlanta, georgia: national park service, 2009), 243-245. 6. it should be emphasized that women are equally capable as their male counterparts; resistance to their inclusion in defence efforts is more based upon social norms than capabilities. delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre 85 finally, mountains may possess avenues of approach and withdrawal. a viable route for withdrawal is fundamental; otherwise, the defending group has no options for escape and will eventually perish. they require an outlet to the sea or a corridor to a safer locale. an easy avenue of approach is also important, but is a double-edged sword: if it is a simple task for targeted groups to ascend the mountain, then their pursuers will likewise follow them with ease. groups escaping genocidal aggression have been known to flee to mountains because of the promise of these advantages. to promote the continued survival of its constituent parts, these groups must use these advantages in order to pursue four objectives. first, the refugees must arrive and secure a mountain base prior to the arrival of hostile forces. if the enemy arrives beforehand and occupies a superior position, the defenders are left at a major disadvantage. depending upon the duration of this window, the defenders may use this time to evacuate people from the base of the mountain to a protected position; they may also use this time to transport food and medicine, weapons, ammunition and other supplies. second, the defenders must maintain basic biological needs, including the necessary requirements for food, water, and shelter from the elements. likewise, medical supplies are scarce or non-existent. third, the defenders must organize a defense. by coordinating their efforts and using the mountainous terrain to their advantage, targeted groups may be able to hold hostile external forces at bay. finally, the defenders must alert the outside world to their plight in order to convince a friendly and able force to seek their rescue. this goal is the single most important of the four for two reasons. even with ample preparations, vital supplies invariably diminish and defense is made impossible without the energy to fuel it. without an external rescuer, even the most resolute of defenses must ultimately crumble. conversely, an early and successful attempt at alerting a rescuer compensates for shortcomings in reaching the other goals. even with scant preparations, a scarcity of food and water, and poor defensive capabilities, a quick and timely rescue ensures a greater chance for survival. sometimes the advantages promised by mountains are purely ephemeral. when the advantages are nonexistent, mountains are not refuges, becoming traps and a part of perpetrator strategy. in some circumstances, mountains possess all the necessary advantages, but the very possibility of survival is preempted by other factors. for instance, the level of perpetrator technology7 and available infrastructure diminishes the defensive strengths of mountains. furthermore, intelligence plays a factor; if the perpetrators are armed with prior knowledge of the terrain, the staying power of mountains is reduced. case selection: musa dagh, sinjar, and bisesero this paper draws upon three historic examples of mountain-based resistance in the context of a genocidal onslaught. first, we discuss the 1915 siege of musa dagh in the southeastern part of the ottoman empire. then, the focus turns to the 1994 violence on bisesero in western rwanda. finally, the most recent case occurred in 2014 in northern iraq on mount 7. airpower is one specific technology, but even here targeted groups may adapt. for instance, on the nuba mountains, civilians have dug foxholes in order to avoid bombardment by government jets. nicholas kristof, “a rain of bombs in the nuba mountains,” new york times, accessed 20.06.2015, www.nytimes. com/2015/06/21/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-a-rain-of-bombs-in-the-nuba-mountains.html?_r=0. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 86 sinjar. although arising in diverse historical, political, economic, and cultural contexts, each case represents examples of mountainous terrain being utilized to promote defense against group destruction. each mountain defense scenario is outlined in three parts. the first section provides the historical background, context, and sources. the next part documents to what extent the mountain-facilitated window of opportunity was utilized by the defenders. finally, each case concludes with the success or failure of external rescue. case no. 1: musa dagh the siege of musa dagh and tales of its legendary defense are more than a mere national myth. the story was popularized and gained international recognition when franz werfel published his forty days of musa dagh in 1933. however, from a historical and analytical perspective, the details of forty days must be treated with caution. he wrote the book 18 years after the events he describes. the cast of characters that populates werfel’s novel is largely his own invention and many of the events he recounts have been altered to fit his narrative; for instance, the siege lasted 53 days and not 40 as the title suggests. nonetheless, werfel can be credited with extensively researching the subject by drawing upon a diverse array of sources. one of the most significant documents he utilizes is the account written by reverend dikran andreasian.8 in his in-depth analysis of werfel and his sources, schulz-behrend concludes that andreasian’s report was the “chief source of musa dagh.”9 it is this source rather than werfel’s writings that this paper draws upon.10 there were six armenian villages around the base of musa dagh. the residents of these villages were wood carvers, craftsmen and silkworm cultivators. they were not soldiers and had not anticipated the need to make prior defensive preparations. while some of the inhabitants may have had military experience, they were certainly not an armed fifth column. what they did possess was an intimate appreciation of musa dagh’s terrain. andreasian notes that “every gorge and crag of our beloved mountain is known to our boys and men.” the ottoman government in antioch issued a banishment order for the six armenian villages on july 30, 1915. these orders were seen in other armenian settlements elsewhere. the ottoman strategy aimed at deporting the armenians and using the deserts as a means of extermination. they were collectively given a week to evacuate their homes. there was no immediate consensus on how to respond and, after debating long into the night, some decided to give in to ottoman demands. the rev. haroutine nokhoudian, a protestant 8. unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs draw upon dikran andreasian, “jibal mousa: the defence of the mountain and the rescue of its defenders by the french fleet; narrative of an eye-witness, the rev. dikran andreasian, pastor of the armenian protestant church at zeitoun,” in treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire, 1915-16, ed. viscount bryce (frankfurt am main: textor verlag, 2008), 512-521. 9. george schulz-behrend, “sources and background of werfel’s novel die vierzig tage des musa dagh,” germanic review 26, no. 2 (1951): 114. 10. for an overview that places andreasian’s account of musa dagh within the overall history of the genocide, see raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (new york: i.b. tauris, 2011): 610-612. delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre 87 pastor from beytias, argued that it was “folly to resist.” he was joined by over 60 families that ultimately chose to accept the ottoman order. the rest, however, chose the path of defiance. they used the one-week warning as a window of opportunity, utilizing this time to secure supplies, build fortifications and create a defensive organization. the remaining villagers immediately set to work to transport as many resources as was practicable. they moved supplies of foodstuffs to a secure spot on the mountain called the damlayik plateau. flocks of sheep and goats were herded up the mountain and away from the foothills and the soon-to-be-abandoned villages. they collected and hastily refurbished what few weapons they possessed. andreasian calculated that they possessed “a hundred and twenty modern rifles and shot-guns [sic], with perhaps three times that number of old flint-locks and horse pistols.” these quantities were sufficient to arm a mere half of the defending men. in addition to moving supplies, the armenians made defensive preparations on the mountain itself. andreasian recounts that “all hands went to work digging trenches at the most strategic points of the ascent of the mountain.” where the ground was not amenable to digging, they barricaded themselves by rolling together rocks to make nests for sharpshooters. finally, aware of the pressing need to coordinate their efforts, the armenians elected a committee of defense by secret ballot. this committee developed and implemented plans aimed at “defending each pass on the mountain” as well as protecting “each approach to the camp.” additionally, the committee established a division of labor. scouts and messengers were chosen among the agile, while those with good aiming abilities made up a central reserve of sharpshooters. true to their word, the ottomans sent an armed force to musa dagh on august 5, seven days later. this advance guard numbered around 200 ottoman regular soldiers. the force was led by a haughtily overconfident commander who, andreasian claims, “boasted that he would clear the mountain in one day.” the armenian defenders successfully rebuffed this attack, resulting in a number of ottoman casualties and the soldiers’ withdrawal. unfortunately, events later that day overshadowed this important early victory. during their frantic week of preparations, the armenians had not anticipated the impact of inclement weather and the need for adequate shelter. a torrential downpour happened that evening. their clothes were soaked and much of their bread became a “pulpy mess.” this failure would come to haunt them as the siege progressed and food reserves dwindled. luckily, they had the foresight to keep their powder and rifles dry. without those scarce arms, it would have been impossible to keep the ottomans at bay. the ottomans returned shortly after their first failed attempt. this time they anticipated resistance and brought with them two heavy field guns which they used to hammer the defenders’ base camp. in response, andreasian describes how one of their sharpshooters, a “lion-hearted young fellow,” stealthily crept down the mountain and handily killed four of the ottoman soldiers manning the gun. as a result, the guns were temporarily withdrawn, giving the defenders a needed respite. in the meantime, the ottomans gathered their forces for a large-scale attack. word of the upcoming assault was sent among the local muslim villages and over 4,000 responded international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 88 to the call and were armed by the government. 3,000 disciplined regular troops joined them. when this force began its ascent up the mountain, armenian scouts reported that the ottomans seemed to be “appearing at every pass in the mountain.” believing that the attack was coming from all directions, the defensive committee made the strategic blunder of dividing their reserve body of defenders to meet the assault at every point. this played directly into ottoman hands: with their forces divided, the defenders were unable to meet the main ottoman thrust. the ottoman forces advanced further up the mountain, eventually capturing the high ground and threatening the armenian camp. andreasian writes that by sundown, “three enemy companies had advanced through the dense underbrush and forest to within 400 yards of our huts.” all that lay between the armenian camp and the ottoman bivouac was a “deep, damp ravine.” the defenders were in a precarious situation and had to act fast. the defense committee resolved to use their intimate knowledge of the mountain to their advantage. andreasian describes their plan: the armenians would silently “creep around the ottoman positions in the dead of night thus carrying out an enveloping movement, closing in very suddenly with a fusillade and ending with hand-to-hand fighting.” the plan was immensely successful. the slumbering ottoman camp was thrown into chaotic disarray and the armenian encirclement had the effect of magnifying their presence in the minds of the panicked soldiers. the ottoman colonel ordered a retreat half an hour after the attack began. the result was a clear armenian victory: as the ottoman forces retreated, they left more than 200 dead, seven mauser rifles, and 2,500 rounds of ammunition behind them. the nocturnal encirclement and ensuing battle resulted in a major victory for the armenian defenders; however, as andreasian had to concede, “[we] knew that our foes were not defeated; they were only driven off.” no matter how many victories they won, the ottoman forces would always return stronger. while the mountain provided them a modicum safety, it was a tenuous sanctuary and time was running out. they not only faced more ottoman forces, but their food reserves were dwindling. their supplies of bread, potatoes, and cheese were consumed after only a week on the mountain; their bread was destroyed by a rainstorm, and very little flour had been brought up from the villages. they were able, fortunately, to avoid starvation by using the flocks of sheep and goats they had driven up the mountain. andreasian recounts how the armenians used the milk to feed the children and sick, and how some animals were slaughtered to ensure a steady diet of meat. however, even with rationing, andreasian estimated they only had enough food for two more weeks. the ottomans were aware of this and came to appreciate that a frontal assault was too costly. they decided to change their tactics to starving the armenians out. they gathered 8,000 muslim villagers around the base of musa dagh, encircling the landward side of the mountain. there were more attacks, but none quite as extensive as the last general engagement. these limited assaults were met by the armenians rolling boulders down the mountain to great effect. the mediterranean sea was on the opposite side of the mountain and the ottomans were unable to establish an armed presence there. this fact would later prove decisive. delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre 89 the armenians desperately needed a way off the mountain. they had sent a runner to aleppo 85 miles away through hostile ottoman territory during the early part of the siege. the runner intended to contact the american consul jesse b. jackson in aleppo and plead for assistance. what happened to this messenger is unknown. another messenger was sent 35 miles away to alexandretta harbor; it was hoped that an allied warship might be docked there. the messenger, chosen because he was a strong swimmer, was to swim towards any entente ship and convey the plight of musa dagh. when the messenger arrived, there were no allied ships there and he returned empty-handed. later, an appeal for assistance was written up and three capable swimmers were tasked with watching the seaward side of musa dagh and swimming out to meet any passing ship. when all these attempts to warn the outside world failed, andreasian suggested that the women create two massive flags, one of which said in english “christians in distress: rescue,” while the other bore the image of a giant red cross. the two flags were tied to trees and defenders were assigned to monitor the seas, day and night, for activity. it was this innovation that ultimately secured their rescue. the french cruiser guichen saw the giant flags while patrolling the coast. when the ship was spotted, a number of armenians dived into the water and swam towards it. they were welcomed aboard where they recounted the siege and the plight of the armenians clinging to life on musa dagh. the captain of the guichen sent a wireless message to the admiral of the fleet and more ships arrived, including the french flagship ste. jeanne d’arc and some battleships. the evacuation was difficult; the armenians built improvised rafts to ferry thousands through rough seas. despite the difficulties, the evacuation was largely successful. in the end, 4,058 men, women and children were rescued and brought to port said, egypt. case no. 2: bisesero on the evening of 6 april, 1994, the plane carrying rwandan president juvénal habyarimana was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile in the skies over the kigali. initially, the organized violence that followed the assassination was largely against political elites, most of whom were hutu. the presidential guards followed a strategy of house-to-house searches for individuals on their lists. the emphasis on targeting specific people, however, would soon change: “by the middle of the first week of the genocide,” writes alison des forges, “organizers began implementing a different strategy: driving tutsis out of their homes to government offices, churches, schools or other public sites, where they would subsequently be massacred in large-scale operations.”11 the best source for testimony on the fight for bisesero is found in resisting genocide: bisesero, april-june 1994. this edited work by african rights collected 71 survivors’ accounts.12 the book recalls how, rather than joining their ethnic kin at vulnerable public 11. alison des forges, “leave none to tell the story”: genocide in rwanda (new york: human rights watch, 1999), 9. 12. resisting genocide: bisesero april-june 1994 (london: african rights, 1997). this volume should be read alongside their other meticulously researched collection of testimonies african rights. rwanda: death, despair and defiance (london: african rights, 1995). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 90 sites, many tutsis chose instead to flee to the hills of bisesero. rwanda is a very mountainous country; it is referred to as mille collines, land of a thousand hills. while bisesero is not the highest mountain in rwanda, it is still quite high at 2,000 m.13 the tutsi inhabitants, known as the abasesero, developed a reputation for resilience; during previous bouts of anti-tutsi violence in 1959, 1962, and 1973, the abasesero emerged relatively unscathed. while génocidaire strategy emphasized concentrating tutsis at public sites, those who fled to bisesero jointly acted to counter this strategy by moving the fight to an alternative terrain, one less favorable to the attackers.14 as soon as word spread of habyarimana’s assassination, both tutsis and hutus fled up the sides of bisesero. here, tens of thousands of tutsis fought back for one and a half months. life on the hills of bisesero was fraught with difficulties. april is the peak of the wet season in rwanda and the absence of shelter meant that rain persistently inundated the refugees. they built fires and huddled together to keep warm. poor diet and sickness resulted in the spread of dysentery and those who arrived on the hills already injured lacked the medical supplies required to recuperate. the defenders organized themselves soon after their arrival. they elected leaders, including aminadabu birara, to organize their resistance.15 birara inspired discipline and ensured no defenders retreated until the signal was given. survivor accounts recall that he would hit those too afraid to advance and that he cleared the battlefield of tutsi dead.16 the defenders divided the people able to work into different groups. the defensive forces were divided into categories based on their capabilities. in the first rank were the strong men and youths. they made up the front line that was positioned about halfway up the hills and were responsible for the actual fighting. they formed a broad line and spread out to reduce the number of people likely to be hit by a barrage of gunfire. supporting them and making up the second line of defense were women and children, tasked with collecting stones. one of the benefits of bisesero’s terrain was the availability of natural projectiles. women and children were sent out with bags and cloths to collect as many rocks as they could carry. many were brought back to a central collection spot on muyira hill or else taken directly to the front line. the elderly and the cows were positioned at the summit of the hill as the third rank. many tutsis brought their cattle with them during their flight up the mountain. these animals proved essential; in order to regain their strength, the defenders drank their milk and slaughtered them for meat. the first battle occurred on 9 april on rurebero hill. in a pattern that would be repeated daily over the weeks to come, militia armed with guns, grenades, and machetes arrived and attempted to overcome resistance. the defenders retreated to kiziba hillonce rurebero was overrun; they were, however, pursued and many were slaughtered. ultimately, thousands 13. russell schimmer, “indications of genocide in the bisesero hills, rwanda, 1994,” gsp working paper no. 32 (2006). 14. tutsis also fled into the swamps of bugesera. swamps allowed for concealment but made coordinated resistance impossible. 15. resisting genocide, 16. 16. ibid. delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre 91 converged upon muyira hill, an area of bisesero covered with forests and bushes. this place became the defenders’ chief redoubt. many more battles would soon follow. for weeks, the defenders suffered a tragically heavy toll, but they were not completely overrun. they resisted with what few resources they possessed. the majority of the defenders were agricultural workers and they brought farming implements, such as hoes and machetes, with them. others brought traditional weapons, including spears and spiked clubs called massues. since many of the attackers were drawn from similar rural origins, their weapons were comparable to those held by the defenders. with sheer numbers on their side, the defenders could overwhelm smaller bands of similarly armed militia. when the organizers of the massacres brought supplies of firearms and explosives it seemed as though the balance would inexorably tilt in favor of the attackers. however, guns and grenades were a scarce commodity and deployed sparingly. occasionally these weapons fell into the hands of the tutsi defenders. in order to counter the advantages of the better-armed attackers, the refugees developed the tactic called mwiuangesha, which in kinyarwanda means “go and merge.”17 one survivor who helped organize the defense described the technique: when we saw them [the interahamwe] coming, i would go in front of everybody and tell them to lie down. the militia would approach us, shooting as they advanced. when they saw that we were all lying down, they would come up to us. i would then ask the abasesero to get up and mingle with the militia. in this way they would not be able to throw their grenades nor could they shoot us because there was a high risk that they would kill their own people.18 overwhelmed and caught off guard, many of the attackers fled. despite their handicaps, the defenders were able to kill or injure militiamen, communal policemen, and soldiers. although suffering from many injured or killed, the defenders held their ground for 36 days. however, by mid-may, their position deteriorated beyond repair. many hutus and twas climbed the hills in the chaos following the assassination. at night under the cover of darkness, the génocidaires infiltrated the hilltop encampment and persuaded the hutus and twas that the tutsis were the true enemy. on april 20, the hutus and twas left en masse.19 not only did the remaining tutsis lose capable fighters, the hutu turncoats divulged information about the mwiuangesha tactic. with this intelligence in hand, the attackers positioned a heavy gun to fire upon the refugees from a distance and made efforts to surround the defending tutsis’ key positions. there was a brief respite in mid-may; there were no attacks and the worst seemed to be over. this lull, however, was the result of the génocidaires making preparations for a final assault. then, over the course of two days, may 13-14, the defenders’ resistance was overwhelmed and untold thousands of tutsis were slaughtered. 17. ibid. 18. resisting genocide, 16-17. 19. ibid, 24. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 92 tragically, the defenders were unable to alert the outside world of their plight before being overrun. french forces from opération turquoise were altered weeks after the massacre by a passing journalist. by the time french troops arrived eighty days into the siege, only 2,000 refugees remained. to make matters worse, the french left, promising to return in three days. in the meantime, the interahamwe returned and killed half of the remaining survivors. by the end of the siege, an estimated 13,000 to 40,000 tutsis were killed, with a mere thousand surviving.20 case no. 3: sinjar sinjar mountain lies in nineveh province in northern iraq near the syrian border. abutting the mountain to the south is the town of sinjar, home to an ancient religious community of yazidis. the yazidis have come under assault by the islamic state of iraq and syria (isis) since 2014. isis justified their campaign as purging the area of so-called “devil worshippers.”21 however, this wasn’t the first time the yazidis had come under assault from hostile islamist forces. in august 2007 al-qaeda orchestrated one of the most lethal bombings iraq had seen as four simultaneous bombings targeted a housing compound at siba sheikh khidr. hundreds were killed or injured. the victims were largely yazidis, leading one us military official to describe it as “almost genocide.”22 at the time of writing [2016], the situation around sinjar is still a “current event.” while mount sinjar is in yazidi hands, the town is still occupied by the is. unlike the other two cases under consideration, in sinjar the fog of war is still thick and, consequently, this section relies upon recent witness testimony and media reportage. early in the morning of august 3, 2014, isis units advanced upon siba sheikh khidr and the town of sinjar. in the aftermath of the 2007 bombing, the iraqi government built a dirt berm perimeter to protect siba sheikh khidr.23 after initially failing to break through this defensive line isis deployed u.s.-made humvees that easily overran the barricades. looted after their victory in mosul, the use of these vehicles proved decisive, and after five hours of fierce fighting, the battle for the town was lost. much of the failure to defend sinjar has been attributed to the abrupt withdrawal of kurdish peshmerga forces. not only did they fail to forestall isis’ advance but they did 20. philip verwimp uses the lower estimates of 13,000, while the rwandan government agency, the national commission for the fight against genocide, uses the higher 40,000 statistic. see philip verwimp, a quantitative analysis of genocide in kibuye prefecture, rwanda, genocide archive of rwanda, accessed 20.04.2001, http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php?title=a_ quantitative_analysis_of_genocide_in_kibuye.&gsearch=bisesero. national commission for the fight against genocide, bisesero memorial site, http://www.cnlg.gov.rw/genocide/memorial-sites/. 21. shirley li, “a very brief history of the yazidi and what they’re up against in iraq,” the atlantic, accessed 08.08.2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/a-very-brief-historyof-the-yazidi-and-what-theyre-up-against/375806/. 22. “death toll reaching 500 in northern iraq,” reliefweb, accessed 15.08.2007, reliefweb.int/report/ iraq/death-toll-headed-500-northern-iraq. 23. “a child called tragedy,” al jazeera, accessed 26.08.2014, http://projects.aljazeera.com/2014/ new-iraqi-identity/. delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre 93 not warn the local yazidis of their retreat, nor did they make any efforts to evacuate the civilian population.24 nonetheless, despite losing the battle, the effort established a five-hour window for the residents to escape. as many as 50,000 yazidis are believed to have chosen to make the difficult ascent up the side of mount sinjar.25 some took vehicles with supplies, while others fled on foot. isis forces pursued them to the base of the mountain, but yazidi resistance kept them at bay. they set up lookout points over the city and along mount sinjar’s winding roads, watching for isis incursions. the yazidi defenders possessed ak47s, which could be used effectively from mountain cover but lacked the heavy weapons possessed by isis. isis committed numerous massacres around the base of mount sinjar. the yazda documentation project has produced a map of known mass graves and slaughter sites. these sites surround mount sinjar and are especially focused south and south-east of the town of sinjar. the highest incident on the mountain occurred when 13 to 17 yazidis were massacred near the switchbacks between town and mount sinjar itself.26 the mountain itself, however, remained largely unscathed. the islamic state was unable to gain a foothold on the mountain, thus buying the yazidis precious time. those who made the arduous climb faced numerous challenges. on mount sinjar temperatures could get as high as 120 degrees fahrenheit (nearly 48,8 in celsius). people, including dozens of children, started dying of thirst soon after arriving.27 many were forced to eat crushed leaves picked from the sparse vegetation. throughout the day the refugees sought out shaded gullies to escape the sun. although sinjar is dotted with over 300 caves, these proved insufficient.28 sinjar was the shortest of the three sieges presently under discussion, lasting a mere ten days. the yazidis’ plight was broadcast across the globe as the warning of an impending massacre swept social media. modern communication technologies allowed the yazidis to remain in constant contact with the outside world. after only a few hours into the siege, the plight of the yezidis became a global cause célèbre. on august 7, american president barack obama announced the authorization of airstrikes and the delivery of humanitarian aid. in a white house press conference, obama said that the yazidis were “faced with a horrible choice: descend the mountain and be slaughtered, or stay and slowly die of thirst 24. “if it wasn’t for the kurdish fighters, we would have died up there,” global post, accessed 28.08.2014, www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/140827/if-it-wasn-t-the-kurdish-fighters-wewould-have-died-there. 25. “obama authorises iraq air strikes on islamist fighters,” bbc news, accessed 08.08.2014, www. bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28699832. 26. “mass graves of yazidis killed by the islamic state organization or local affiliates on or after august 3, 2014,” yazda documentation project, accessed 26.01.2016, www.yazda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/yazda-report-on-mass-graves-jan-28-2016.pdf. 27. “iraqi yazidi lawmaker: ‘hundreds of my people are being slaughtered’,” cnn, accessed 06.08.2014, edition.cnn.com/2014/08/06/world/meast/iraq-crisis-minority-persecution/index.html?hpt=hp_t3. 28. “if it wasn’t for the kurdish fighters.” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 94 and hunger.”29 significantly, the white house did not prevaricate on describing the situation as “a potential act of genocide.”30 the americans were joined by iraqi, british and french airdrops of food, water and medicine.31 iraqi forces also arranged to airlift a few dozen refugees off of sinjar.32 one of these iraqi rescue missions crashed on the mountain, killing the pilot maj. gen. majid ahmed saadi.33 meanwhile, kurdish forces from the pkk and their syrian branch the ypg held isis at bay. they succeeded in opening a corridor on the opposite side of the mountain towards syria. this provided a secure route of for the yazidis to escape. the sick and elderly were rescued by the ypg from inaccessible areas using tractors. with further assistance by the peshmerga and american airstrikes, the majority of the yazidis were able to leave the mountain. the evacuation was so successful that a proposed american rescue mission involving v-22 ospreys was called off.34 comparative analysis and concluding remarks while all three cases of resistance against genocidal violence are seemingly drawn from incomparable historical contexts, there are many parallels between them. in each case, mountains were used as a counter-strategy to interfere and interrupt the plans of the assailants. the various genocidal forces depicted here — the ottoman army, the interahamwe militia, the islamic state, and their diverse accomplices — all wanted a trouble-free massacre committed on their own terms. in each case, the defenders refused to concede. the armenians who ascended musa dagh rebuffed the order to perish in the southern deserts; the tutsis of bisesero refused to congregate at public buildings turned into slaughterhouses; and the yazidis who managed to climb mount sinjar denied isis of forced conversions, sex slaves and mass killing. each group of defenders, albeit with varying degrees of success, strove towards four goals: arriving on the mountain, maintaining biological needs, keeping the attackers at bay, and alerting the outside world. of the three cases discussed, musa dagh and sinjar were successfully evacuated, while bisesero was not. what the cases examined tell us is that, although each goal is significant in maintaining a continuity of life, they are not of equal weight. defeat is inevitable and resistance be continued indefinitely. if the defenders fail to alert the outside world in a timely manner, a rescue will arrive too late. 29. “statement by the president,” white house, accessed 07.08.2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/08/07/statement-president. 30. ibid. 31. “us carries out air drops to help iraqis trapped on mountain by isis,” the guardian, accessed 08.08.2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/us-aid-iraqi-trapped-mountain-isis. 32. “militants’ siege on mountain in iraq is over, pentagon says,” new york times, accessed 13.08.2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/world/middleeast/iraq-yazidi-refugees.html?_r=2. 33. “the most important ride of his life,” telegraph india, accessed 18.08.2014, www.telegraphindia. com/1140818/jsp/frontpage/story_18731043.jsp#.vhiqxplvhbd. 34. “militants’ siege.” delaying annihilation: mountains and the postponement of massacre 95 the key to the armenian defense of musa dagh was their successful realization of all four of the survival goals. first, they used the weeklong advance warning to their advantage, using this time to make preparations. second, they secured supplies of food to ensure that the defenders avoided starvation. third, they competently fought back by organizing a defense and dividing the labor available. finally, they successfully alerted the outside world to their plight, enabling a full evacuation with relatively little loss of life. despite musa dagh representing an “ideal” mountain survival narrative, the situation immediately prior to their fateful rescue was becoming increasingly dire. their food reserves were diminishing and more and more turkish and arab reinforcements arrived around the base of musa dagh. it was only a matter of time before the starved and weakened armenian defenders were overrun by the next ottoman assault. without the well-timed arrival of an external rescue, musa dagh would have been remembered as a tragedy. bisesero began as a partial success that ended in catastrophic failure. like musa dagh, the refugees arrived on the mountain before the attackers appeared. they brought foodstuffs and livestock from their homes. even though they possessed inferior arms, they successfully organized a defense, developed new tactics, and organized an efficient division of labor. however, they failed to successfully alert the outside world to their plight. as a result, the defenders were overrun by mid-may. when help did arrive, it was too little, too late, and ended up costing even more lives. the final case of sinjar shows how alerting the outside world early in a defensive effort can overcome other shortcomings. the yazidis barely had time to evacuate and move up the hill, but they failed to bring sufficient supplies of food, water, and medical supplies with them and their defense was marred by disorganization. however, the yazidi plight was broadcast across the world, so that after a mere ten days a multifaceted array of actors arrived to extricate the refugees from the isis siege. had the yazidis been stranded on mount sinjar for weeks or months, they would certainly have perished. summing up, mountains may provide a degree of sanctuary that is unobtainable in other settings. whereas mountains can provide protection, other elements of the physical environment are often used instrumentally in the killing process. a perpetrator’s strategy determines how and where genocidal violence unfolds. conversely, refugee counter-strategy transfers violence to an alternative context; it shifts violence towards terrain that is more advantageous to the defenders and concurrently detrimental to the forces of destruction. mountains are one such geographical feature, giving substance to the old idiom head for the hills! nikki marczak is a genocide scholar and survivor advocate, who was awarded the 2016 lemkin scholarship with the armenian genocide museum-institute. her research focuses on women’s experiences of genocide, the transgenerational legacy of genocide, and recognition and justice. she has worked with armenian, jewish and yazidi communities, and is currently leading work on atrocity prevention at the asia pacific centre for the responsibility to protect at the university of queensland. email: nikki@carobtree.com.au mailto:nikki@carobtree.com.au 37 transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women nikki marczak during and after the genocide, armenian women resisted: silently, discreetly, but sometimes also loudly and overtly; and often in spiritual or cultural ways. a common thread through women’s testimonies is a spirit of defiance a sense of dignity, resilience and a refusal to allow their identity to be destroyed that they have passed on to future generations. this article presents the concept of transmitted defiance, a gendered process that occurs transgenerationally. a hundred years after the genocide, women who are descended from survivors often view their relatives’ actions as inspiration for their own lives. further, many have inherited rebelliousness and an indelible sense of armenian identity from their mothers, grandmothers and great-grandmothers, which manifests in their own contemporary acts of resistance. key-words: armenian women, armenian genocide, resistance, transgenerational trauma, resilience. introduction in 1918, aguline dertazyan was volunteering at a red cross hospital in the town of her birth, hadjin, when turkish forces attacked. a bullet penetrated the hospital window, passed through the body of another nurse, killing her; and then lodged itself below aguline’s rib. she survived. after the war, aguline, who had been educated at boarding school in constantinople, staged a play called the valley of tears in an adana theatre to raise relief funds for survivors of the genocide. moving to lebanon and eventually america, she continued to perform in the theatre until late in her seventies, the bullet still wedged in her flesh. in a characteristic act of rebellion, at the age of 86, aguline told her family she refused to be buried with a turkish bullet in her body. “she was very, very strong-willed, very stubborn,” explains her granddaughter, lory tatoulian, a performer in armenian theatre and film in los angeles. the admiration for her grandmother is palpable: “she gave birth to children; she functioned with a bullet in her body!”1 lory believes she has inherited some of aguline: her love of performance and an artistic nature, a dedication to preserving armenian culture and importantly, a characteristic she refers to in her grandmother as “tenacity”: “i see her story as a source of strength; when i face problems in my life i always think of my grandmother…and how she was so resilient.” to honor aguline’s wishes, when she died her family arranged for the bullet to be surgically removed and donated to the hadjin museum in armenia.2 1. interview conducted with lory tatoulian, may 15, 2016. 2. ibid. 38 during and after the genocide, armenian women resisted: silently, discreetly, but sometimes also loudly and overtly; and often in spiritual or cultural ways. a common thread in women’s testimonies (and unmistakable in the story of aguline dertazyan) is a spirit of defiance a sense of dignity, resilience and a refusal to allow their identity to be destroyed that they have passed on to future generations, in what i conceptualize as a process of transmitted defiance. a hundred years later, descendants of survivors view their relatives’ actions as inspiration for their own lives and appear to have inherited elements of rebelliousness and resistance from them. the memories of mothers, grandmothers, greatgrandmothers and great-aunts nurture their identity both as armenians and as women. in many cases, these have been passed directly from survivors to younger generations, especially from grandmothers to granddaughters. the usc shoah foundation’s online collection contains video testimony of survivors being interviewed by their granddaughters, often with an emphasis on cultural tradition and continuity, which has provided descendants with a deeply-held armenian identity and even perhaps, a capacity to transcend the trauma of the genocide. in one such video, siranoush boyajian follows her description of churches being burned down, with the memory of particular bread served at mass. she says she has been making this type of bread for her church in america for over 20 years: “we still have our customs… we try to teach our children… they’re proud to be an armenian, because they see what we went through to come this far.”3 the relationships between family members, and the role descendants take on in preserving their relatives’ memories, echo the historical importance of intergenerational relationships in pre-war armenian families. traditionally, many generations lived together, and cultural knowledge was transmitted between grandmothers, mothers and daughters. survivor bertha nakshian ketchian described her own grandmother, mariam, who refused to give her away to a turkish official, emphasizing her grandmother’s courage and the importance of having been able to preserve her armenian identity: she was afraid of nothing and nobody. … and now she was fighting with all her might and cleverness to protect what was left of her once thriving large family… you saved me from going to worse than death and staying in the house of the enemy to become a turk. … dear grandmother mariam, i appreciate what you did with all my heart. moreover, as the years go by, i realize more fully how very much it means to me to have lived as who i really am.4 spiritual resistance and memory non-military forms of resistance, so often the only option of resistance available to women, have generally been sidelined in genocide historiography. an important exception is found in the work of scholar yehuda bauer, who developed the concept of amidah or “standing up 3. interview of siranoush boyajian, usc shoah foundation visual history archive, armenian film foundation, http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingpage?testimonyid=56452&returnindex=0. 4. bertha nakshian ketchian, the zoryan institute survivors’ memoirs number 1: in the shadow of the fortress: the genocide remembered (massachusetts: zoryan institute for contemporary armenian research and documentation, inc., 1988), 15. http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingpage?testimonyid=56452&returnindex=0 39 against” to describe acts of survival and spiritual resistance by jews during the holocaust.5 i assert that such acts were fundamental to armenian women’s experiences of the genocide, firstly because it was predominantly women who endured the inhumanity of death marches across the desert, witnessing the murders of loved ones and attempting to survive and protect their children. further, women’s spiritual resistance was significant because of the centrality of cultural destruction and forced assimilation in turkish policy and practice. the very act of a woman maintaining her identity, if only in her heart, was embedded with resistance and carried the risk of punishment, even death. survivor testimonies highlight countless examples of armenian women clandestinely maintaining their language and traditional customs on deportation marches, and for those women who were abducted, in the homes of their captors. while acknowledging postgenocide attempts to find meaning in tragedy an issue i will return to it is important to note that women’s testimonies, in particular, do frequently refer to examples of “sisterhood”. some testimonies describe women helping each other during childbirth or working together to dig shallow graves for family members who had perished, in order to maintain a semblance of humanity in inhuman conditions. some child survivors describe how their mothers tried to instill a sense of pride, and urged them to remember their armenianness. in the early stages of the genocide, women faced the brutal searches for weapons in their homes, frequently alone after husbands had been arrested. occasionally women yelled at and cursed the gendarmes and other perpetrators. many women stood up to pressure to convert or alternatively feigned conversion, speaking only to one another of their continuing christian prayers. others kept their will to survive with small acts of disobedience, seemingly minor, yet significant in the context of dehumanization and genocide. in her memoir, rebirth, elise hagopian taft describes a young abducted girl, regularly forced to search through the hair of the woman of the house for lice: “instead of destroying those loathe-some parasites, mischievous beatrice would add to the woman’s colony the lice from her own head.”6 there is a risk of retrospectively reading resistance into the actions of survivors,7 yet testimonies are replete with examples of women’s defiance; and while such examples are generally omitted from official history, they tend to occupy a prominent place in the memory of descendants. it is possible that descendants’ reverence for women’s resistance is influenced by the desire to transcend the legacy of trauma and dehumanization. as arlene avakian asserts, “the impulse to impute agency is very strong because we don’t want to see people as merely victims, and resistance is the part of the story that is not told, especially regarding women. we want to see that part of the story, or maybe we need to see it.”8 avakian’s own grandmother told her story of fighting back against her son’s 5. yehuda bauer, rethinking the holocaust (new haven and london: yale university press, 2001). 6. elise hagopian taft, rebirth: the story of an armenian girl who survived the genocide and found rebirth in america (new york: new age publishers, 1981), 83. 7. for instance, in relation to the holocaust, shirli gilbert has noted the “tendency towards unsophisticated narratives of redemption and consolation,” in music in the holocaust: confronting life in the nazi ghettos and camps (oxford: clarendon press, 2005), 2. 8. arlene avakian and hourig attarian, imagining our foremothers: memory and evidence of women international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 40 abduction only once, yet it “had a profound impact on my life …my grandmother’s story, even with its silences, constructs women as agents in their own survival.”9 the way survivors remember and describe events requires some analysis by contextualizing survivors’ stories in a time of post-genocide healing and meaningmaking. in the aftermath of tragedy, survivors attempted to understand their experiences and this sometimes entailed the projection of meaning onto survival or death of loved ones, or onto particular events they had endured. meaning can take the form of viewing the experiences through the prism of heroism and constructing narratives that align. the creation of a narrative contains its own biases, even in the choice of what to include or omit. as vahe tachjian writes in his 2017 book, daily life in the abyss: genocide diaries, 1915-1918, “in the case of the armenian genocide, eyewitness testimony can take the form of retrospective narration, in which a survivor attempts to reconstitute his or her lived experience and transform it into common knowledge, whether in the guise of memoirs, correspondence, interviews, or art. when that happens, the narrative apart from already being personal testimony with its own inherent value simultaneously becomes subject to the influence of its present, that is, post-catastrophic times, and displays the traces of historical reconstruction.”10 in addition, in post-genocide times, when a community is rebuilding both physically and emotionally, the need for “heroes” or “champions” to look up to is particularly strong. the “heroism” in stories told by survivors can become mythologized and then passed down from one generation to the next. one question that is addressed in this paper is how stories of women’s defiance affect the identity of future generations. more broadly, it is important to frame this discussion of transmitted defiance within existing scholarly debates about heroism and resistance during genocide. in his 1946 book, man’s search for meaning,11 viktor e. frankl explores how and why some holocaust victims survived and others did not, attributing to survivors, at least partially, some notion of having controlled their own fate by refusing to succumb to hopelessness and despair. in contrast, some holocaust survivors viewed survival purely as a matter of luck and timing. arguably implicit in frankl’s concept is the notion that those who did not survive may have been themselves spiritually or psychologically responsible by “giving up hope.” further, it has been asserted that part of surviving the harsh conditions of ghettoes, camps or deportation marches involved compromising one’s moral code, by behaving in ways one would not normally consider acceptable, such as stealing, smuggling or in some way collaborating with the perpetrators. this is what primo levi refers to as the moral victims and survivors of the armenian genocide a dialogue, https://www.academia.edu/13700380/ imagining_our_foremothers_memory_and_evidence_of_women_victims_and_survivors_of_the_ armenian_genocide_a_dialogue_arlene_avakian_and_hourig_attarian . 9. ibid. 10. vahe tachjian, daily life in the abyss: genocide diaries, 1915-1918 (oxford: berghahn books, 2017), 3. 11. viktor e. frankl, man’s search for meaning (boston: beacon press, 2006). https://www.academia.edu/13700380/imagining_our_foremothers_memory_and_evidence_of_women_victims_and_survivors_of_the_armenian_genocide_a_dialogue_arlene_avakian_and_hourig_attarian https://www.academia.edu/13700380/imagining_our_foremothers_memory_and_evidence_of_women_victims_and_survivors_of_the_armenian_genocide_a_dialogue_arlene_avakian_and_hourig_attarian https://www.academia.edu/13700380/imagining_our_foremothers_memory_and_evidence_of_women_victims_and_survivors_of_the_armenian_genocide_a_dialogue_arlene_avakian_and_hourig_attarian transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women 41 “grey zone.”12 in levi’s analysis, “survival without renunciation of any part of one’s own moral world apart from powerful and direct interventions by fortune was conceded only to very few superior individuals, made of the stuff of martyrs and saints.”13 we cannot know what combination of factors contributed to the survival of the women whose testimonies are examined here; what their testimonies tell us is that they emphasize particular themes like endurance and fortitude, which in turn, their descendants admire and attempt to mirror. gender has an impact on how women not only experience genocide, but how they remember and retell their experiences.14 for example, in analyses of holocaust survivor testimony, it has been found that men tend to emphasize independence and autonomy while women, who have been “socialized to value relationships and interdependence,”15 often highlight their relationships with others. this could partly account for the many examples in women’s testimonies of protecting others, working together to find food or water, or collective acts of physical or emotional survival. it is also likely that as women, the survivors were influenced by entrenched historical and cultural tropes of self-sacrifice and gendered concepts of morality. the small, daily acts of resistance or defiance described by survivors, whether overtly directed towards perpetrators or subtly performed as spiritual resistance, are part of the story of genocide that has been transmitted to armenian descendants today. while taking a critical approach to the narratives, they undoubtedly contain a “truth” of human experience during genocide that tells us something about women’s experiences and the way in which they perceive those experiences in the aftermath. such accounts also present the diverse forms resistance can take, that is, not only military or physical resistance mostly performed by men, but also emotional, cultural and spiritual. these stories resonate with current generations and influence their own conception of post-genocide identity. building on testimonial literature with primary interviews, i aim to highlight the unbreakable thread of resilience and identity between armenian women today and their relatives who survived the genocide. i also rely on the extensive collections and archives housed at the armenian genocide museum-institute in yerevan, including unpublished testimonies which are not available elsewhere. the small numbers of in-depth interviews were conducted with armenians living in australia, america and armenia, individuals whose mothers, grandmothers or great-grandmothers were genocide survivors. oral histories can give scholars access to intimate aspects of genocide and its aftermath, aspects that are often omitted from written or official history. this is particularly important in accessing details of women’s lives, so frequently dismissed as domestic, private and hence insignificant. 12. primo levi, the drowned and the saved (london: sphere books, 1989). 13. primo levi, survival in auschwitz (new york: simon and schuster, 1996), 92. 14. pascale rachel bos, “women and the holocaust: analysing gender difference,” in experience and expression: women, the nazis, and the holocaust, eds. elizabeth r. baer and myrna goldenberg (detroit: wayne state university press, 2003), 31. 15. ibid, 36. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 42 this paper is not intended as a quantitative study, nor a psychological one, but rather an analysis of testimony and narrative, memory and identity. the concept of “transmitted defiance” captures how subsequent generations have been influenced by what they see as examples of resistance in the testimony of their relatives, whose stories remain sacred and fundamental to their identity. remembering and honoring women’s stories not only helps to counterbalance the legacy of trauma for descendants, but also to confront turkish denial today. as rubina peroomian writes, “these survivors have transmitted their memory to the next generation. armenians know that remembering is a tool to resist the genocide. remembrance is a form of resistance that outlasted genocide.”16 transgenerational transmission the analysis in this paper is grounded in established theory of transgenerational transmission of genocidal legacies, though much of that scholarship focuses on trauma and has developed primarily in the context of the holocaust. the theory of transgenerational trauma describes how survivors pass on trauma to their children (known as the second generation) and even to subsequent generations. whether this occurs environmentally (via social and relational processes between parents and children) and/or genetically (epigenetics)17 is disputed, but regardless, academic research and psychological studies have found patterns of transmission and evidence of effects among the descendants of genocide survivors.18 yet there is more to transgenerational transmission than trauma; this paper develops concepts of defiance, resistance and maintenance of cultural identity as elements that can be passed across generations. i locate the experiences of armenian women in the framework of marianne hirsch’s theory of postmemory, and uta larkey’s notion of transmemory. postmemory conveys the deep connection that the second generation has to their parents’ traumatic experiences, encompassing the idea that those experiences are felt by children of survivors like their own memories, although they were not themselves present.19 as psychologist natan kellermann has explained, “offspring of trauma survivors often feel that they carry the memory of their parents. they were not alive at the time. they were not supposed to know. often, they were not even told. but they know. they know it in their bodies, in every cell of their body. it’s almost as if they were born with that 16. rubina peroomian, armenian resistance to genocide: an attempt to assess circumstances and outcomes, http://asbarez.com/109615/armenian-resistance-to-genocide-an-attempt-to-assesscircumstances-and-outcomes/ . 17. rachel yehuda et. al, “influences of maternal and paternal ptsd on epigenetic regulation of the glucocorticoid receptor gene in holocaust survivor offspring,” american journal of psychiatry 171, no. 8 (2014): 872-880. 18. see the works of natan kellermann, including his book, holocaust trauma: psychological effects and treatment (indiana: iuniverse, inc., 2009). for an armenian study, see anie kalayjian and marian weisberg, “generational impact of mass trauma: the post-ottoman turkish genocide of the armenians,” in jihad and sacred vengeance, eds. j. s. piven, c. boyd, and h. w. lawton (new york: writers club press, 2002), 254-279. 19. marianne hirsch, “the generation of postmemory,” in poetics today 29, no.1 (2008): 103-128, https://doi.org/10.1215/03335372-2007-019. http://asbarez.com/109615/armenian-resistance-to-genocide-an-attempt-to-assess-circumstances-and-outcomes/ http://asbarez.com/109615/armenian-resistance-to-genocide-an-attempt-to-assess-circumstances-and-outcomes/ https://www.researchgate.net/journal/1535-7228_american_journal_of_psychiatry https://doi.org/10.1215/03335372-2007-019 transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women 43 knowledge.”20 hirsch’s postmemory concept is intended to apply to the second generation, yet it seems to extend beyond. i have found that granddaughters too sometimes describe a feeling of having inherited their grandmothers’ memories. marina khachaturyan, who grew up in tbilisi, georgia, with her grandmother, says that during the 2016 four-day war in nagorno-karabakh, she was imagining soldiers entering her house, killing her family. “but it wasn’t imagining, it was like genetic memory. i was already planning, if they take over yerevan, where will we go? but i feel angry, i am ready to die for my homeland.”21 her words speak to some of the questions hirsch has posed about manifestations and ramifications of postmemory, such as how descendants can carry these stories without appropriating them and importantly, whether “the memory of genocide [can] be transformed into action and resistance.”22 in her 2017 article, “transcending memory in multigenerational holocaust survivors’ families,” uta larkey builds on hirsch’s writing to explore a new notion – transmemory which she applies specifically to the experiences of grandchildren of jewish holocaust survivors. although transmemory, like postmemory, has been developed in the context of the holocaust, it is relevant to armenian descendants. as larkey writes: “… the grandchildren of the holocaust survivors, the so-called third generation, have come of age and have begun their own inquiries and research. they have reflected on their family history and discovered their potential to act as ‘memory facilitators.’”23 larkey’s theory explains why, for example, many members of the third generation view the maintenance of armenian identity, as a sacred legacy that honors their grandmothers, whereas second generation survivors have frequently written of their rejection of genocide stories and of an unwanted obligation to maintain armenian culture. further, larkey identifies a less loaded relationship between survivors and their grandchildren. where there was once a “wall of silence” or gaps that children of survivors perceived as secrets (and thus contributed to their sense of trauma), grandparents exhibit a willingness to share their memories, and many grandchildren actively invite them to do so. “it’s so important to me to remember that you survived,” said one armenian granddaughter to her grandmother, while encouraging her to share her story on video.24 women in particular have taken on the role as “memorial candles,”25 the responsibility of remembering and passing on survivors’ stories. armenian granddaughters like lory tatoulian, who recounts her grandmother’s story in an attempt to honor aguline and their 20. natan kellermann, hereditary memory: can a child remember what the parent has forgotten?, http://pro.psychcentral.com/hereditary-memory-can-a-child-remember-what-the-parent-hasforgotten/0010428.html?all=1# . 21. interview with marina khachaturyan, june 18, 2016. 22. hirsch, “the generation of postmemory,” 104. 23. uta larkey, “transcending memory in multigenerational holocaust survivors’ families,” in jewish families in europe, 1939-present: history, representation, and memory, ed. joanna beata michlic (waltham: brandeis university press, 2017), 209. 24. interview of siranoush danielian, usc shoah foundation visual history archive, armenian film foundation, http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingpage?testimonyid=56619&returnindex=0. 25. larkey, “transcending memory,” 221. http://pro.psychcentral.com/hereditary-memory-can-a-child-remember-what-the-parent-has-forgotten/0010428.html?all=1 http://pro.psychcentral.com/hereditary-memory-can-a-child-remember-what-the-parent-has-forgotten/0010428.html?all=1 http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingpage?testimonyid=56619&returnindex=0 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 44 close bond, are deeply impacted in their own lives by these transmitted memories but tend to focus as much, if not more, on the resilience, fortitude and tenacity of their relatives. this emphasis may be viewed as an attempt to break down traditional images of women as helpless victims or to balance the disturbing aspects of the history with images of heroism. in this paper, i explore some of these gendered aspects of transand postmemory, conscious of hirsch’s statement that “using feminist critical strategies to connect past and present, words and images, and memory and gender, allows me to understand different roles that gender plays to mediate which stories are remembered and which are forgotten, how stories are told, which tropes make traumatic histories bearable for the next generation.”26 women’s resistance the historiography and collective memory of resistance during the armenian genocide has tended to focus on acts of physical defense and although some women did participate in military resistance, most of their stories have been forgotten or sidelined.27 moreover, women’s testimonies contain common themes relating to spiritual and cultural resistance but these have not been integrated into the historiography of the armenian genocide, except as one-dimensional archetypes, such as the image of the woman who taught her children the armenian alphabet in the desert sands.28 yet the concept of spiritual resistance, which yad vashem describes as the preservation of dignity, identity and humanity in spite of unthinkable circumstances,29 permeates armenian women’s stories. in rethinking the holocaust, bauer includes both armed and unarmed acts in his concept of amidah, as well as strategies for survival such as smuggling food and acts of self-sacrifice to protect or save family members. indeed, these are common themes in armenian accounts. in adapting bauer’s theory to the context of women’s experiences during the armenian genocide, i focus primarily on what he refers to as “cultural, religious, and political activities taken to strengthen morale” as well as the concept of “sanctification of life” or “meaningful” survival.30 this is partly in order to focus on acts of rebellion that survivors and their descendants highlight, and partly to contain the scope of the paper, since not all of the myriad forms of resistance by women can be discussed in depth here. 26. online interview with marianne hirsch, author of “the generation of postmemory: writing and visual culture after the holocaust,” columbia university press blog, october 10, 2012, http://www. cupblog.org/?p=8066. 27. with a few exceptions, such as mariam chilingirian (urfa resistance), peroomian, armenian resistance to genocide; and vardouhi nashalian (moussa dagh resistance), see “the heroine vardouhi,” in verjine svazlian, the armenian genocide: testimonies of the eyewitness survivors (yerevan: gitutyun publishing house, 2011), 600, and testimony of movses panossian in svazlian, the armenian genocide, 463-465. also, interview of shooshanig shahinian, usc shoah foundation visual history archive, armenian film foundation, http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingpage?testimonyid=56458&returnindex=0. 28. vahé tachjian, “gender, nationalism, exclusion: the reintegration process of female survivors of the armenian genocide,” nations and nationalism 15, no. 1 (2009): 76. 29. yad vashem, the world holocaust remembrance center, jerusalem, http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/ education/lesson_plans/spiritual_resistance.asp; http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/newsletter/13/ main_article.asp#!prettyphoto. 30. bauer, rethinking the holocaust, 120. http://www.cupblog.org/?p=8066 http://www.cupblog.org/?p=8066 http://vhaonline.usc.edu/viewingpage?testimonyid=56458&returnindex=0 http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/lesson_plans/spiritual_resistance.asp http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/lesson_plans/spiritual_resistance.asp http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/newsletter/13/main_article.asp#!prettyphoto http://www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/education/newsletter/13/main_article.asp#!prettyphoto transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women 45 frequently, survivor and descendant testimony highlights the ways women developed innovative survival strategies and adapted to new challenges. daily survival and protection of children were imbued with the desire to live and overcome attempts at their destruction. early on, armenian women negotiated with authorities for the release of arrested relatives and hid weapons during searches. when preparing for deportation, they packed bedding and other essentials, organized donkeys and carts, and prepared bread and dried fruit for the journey. many sewed valuables into the lining of their clothes or buried them in their gardens to prevent looting by turks or perhaps in the hope they would one day return.31 on the deportation marches, they tied pieces of clothing together with a tin can on the end to pull water out of wells or used other makeshift vessels, and washed seeds from animal waste to fry in cans. 32 protection of children was paramount, and mothers hid their sons and daughters under blankets and mattresses, wrapped their feet in pieces of cloth, and repeatedly rescued them from peril.33 in rebirth, taft emphasizes the resilience of the women, their practical resourcefulness and their stoicism: ‘the women proved more resourceful and adapt able, and made do with the situation at hand. they put together what there was of bread and food... and it was the women who kept up morale by singing der voghormya (lord be merciful) “a religious chant.”34 spiritual resistance manifested in mothers and grandmothers imploring children to remember their armenian identity regardless of what the future might hold, and instilling a sense of dignity, as in the case of child survivor dirouhi highgas, who felt ashamed of having become a refugee. her mother told her, “you know what a diamond is, dirouhi? sometimes you put the diamond in the mud. but when you take it out, it’s a diamond. nothing will happen to it. so that’s what it’s going to be like for you and all the rest of the armenians. they think we’re just mud, but we’re not!”35 acts of resistance can be seen in survivors’ descriptions of women’s relationships and sisterhood, such as when unrelated women helped those unfortunate enough to endure 31. serpouhji tavoukdjian wrote: “i was only a little girl ten years old, but how vividly i remember those four sad days of preparation. my mother was ill from grief and sorrow, and my sisters sewed frantically on garments which we would wear on our long journey. into the seams of the wide bloomers we were to wear they sewed money and our few precious pieces of jewelry, which might be bartered along the wayside for food when the little supply we could carry was gone,” serpouhji tavoukdjian, exiled: story of an armenian girl (washington d.c.: review and herald publishing association, 1933), 24; see also margaret ajemian ahnert, the knock at the door: a mother’s survival of the armenian genocide (new york: beaufort books, 2012), 78-79. 32. story of sion abajian, https://genocideeducation.org/resources/survivor-accounts/; also several examples in donald e. miller and lorna touryan miller, survivors: an oral history of the armenian genocide (los angeles: university of california press, 1999); and in svazlian, the armenian genocide. 33. there are countless examples of women taking action to protect their children, including in serpouhji tavoukdjian, exiled; shahen derderian, death march: an armenian survivor’s memoir of the genocide of 1915 (california: h. and k. manjikian publications, 2008); arusiag manuelian, the secret exile and extermination of armenians (unpublished memoir, armenian genocide museum-institute collection); testimonies of kadjouni toros gharagyozian and angel srapian in svazlian, the armenian genocide, 234, 400. 34. taft, rebirth, 40. 35. interview with dirouhi kouymjian highgas in william s. parsons, “everyone’s not here: families of the armenian genocide: a study guide” (cambridge: intersection associates, 1989). https://genocideeducation.org/resources/survivor-accounts/ international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 46 childbirth while on the deportation marches (even continuing the tradition of burying the afterbirth),36 or assisted mothers to bury their dead children. carrying out traditions associated with death are a strong mechanism for retaining a sense of humanity during genocide. vartuhi boyajian recalled that when her sister starved to death, her mother’s friends collectively dug a hole in the sand and placed the baby in it.37 similarly, when a twelve year old girl died after being raped, a group of women helped her mother bury her and then wrote on the wall, “shushan buried here.”38 cultural preservation and clandestine maintenance of religious practices represent perhaps the most pertinent forms of resistance against perpetrators who, in both policy and implementation, attempted to erase armenian heritage and prevent its transmission to future generations. maritza chopoorian depoyan recalled survivors in der zor marking a bittersweet easter in 1916, noting both the gendered nature of the event and the turkish response to armenian survival. having been invited by the armenian women of salihieh village an hour from der zor, the survivors held a church service in the desert praying, crying, kneeling, crossing themselves. she remembered the turks saying to one another: “no matter what we do, we won’t be able to destroy the armenian nation these people who have such a strong faith.”39 even prior to the deportations, prohibitions on customs and language were ordered by the turkish authorities, including the burning of books and razing of churches and historical sites, restrictions on armenian language or writing, and the closure of armenian schools. despite this, one survivor’s grandmother led her students through a secret passage to the basement where she taught them classical armenian, reading and writing, and traditional songs.40 this account is echoed in a well-known armenian song about a school mistress ‘daring’ to teach armenian to her students. her tongue was cut out as punishment.41 here we can see how examples of resistance and martyrdom became part of post-genocide collective memory, with narratives of defiance and cultural maintenance leaving a lasting influence on descendants. peroomian has identified a shift during the 1800s, when armenian women transformed their traditional responses to persecution and war. she argues that in the context of increasing armenian desire for liberation from ottoman rule, acts of resistance were encouraged. 36. ajemian ahnert, the knock at the door, 96. 37. vartuhi boyajian, my autobiography – written in constantinople 1922: this is the story of the black days of my life (unpublished memoir, armenian genocide museum-institute collection). 38. takouhi levonian, cited in donald e. miller and lorna touryan miller, “women and children of the armenian genocide,” in the armenian genocide: history, politics, ethics, ed. richard g. hovannisian (new york: st martin’s, 1992), 160. 39. maritza chopoorian depoyan, “the easter of 1916 in the desert of deir-el-zor,” in marderos deranian, hussenig: the origin, history, and destruction of an armenian town, trans., revised and with additions by hagop martin deranian (belmont: armenian heritage press, 1994), 110; also armen anush writes of survivors in the desert marking christmas with special food, armen anush, passage through hell: a memoir (california: h. and k. manjikian publications, 2007), 53-54. 40. the story of goussineh basmadjian, http://www.spiritofchange.org/winter-2009/survivors-for-alltime-stories-of-the-armenian-genocide. 41. armenian song “ah alas!” in svazlian, the armenian genocide, 565, also available at http://www. cilicia.com/armo_geno-songs.html. http://www.spiritofchange.org/winter-2009/survivors-for-all-time-stories-of-the-armenian-genocide http://www.spiritofchange.org/winter-2009/survivors-for-all-time-stories-of-the-armenian-genocide http://www.cilicia.com/armo_geno-songs.html http://www.cilicia.com/armo_geno-songs.html transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women 47 the deaths of husbands and sons were not to be grieved but treated as a source of pride. in this context, women’s reactions shifted from sadness and grief to a focus on heroism. peroomian refers to a poem about a woman whose son is murdered in a turkish prison: “her lamentations… embody a rebellious spirit against the turk and against the god of the armenians… the mournful mother points to the enemy and calls for revenge…”42 in another poem, she explains, a dying son encourages his mother not to weep but to be proud of his sacrifice for armenian freedom. in an indication of how pervasive this became in armenian culture, even lullabies encouraged heroism on behalf of armenia.43 the rebellious spirit is clear in a host of survivor testimonies which reveal that women defied the gendarmes’ rules at great risk, and even questioned the perpetrators’ cruel acts. some refused to let go of their children’s hands on the marches despite orders and beatings;44 others chastised the gendarmes or questioned the perpetrators’ religious faith. one survivor’s grandmother persisted in cursing a gendarme as he stabbed her.45 a witness reported hearing a women yell at a group of gendarmes who were trying to extort money from her: “ever since leaving the city, all we do is give you money…where am i supposed to get more coins for you? you took everything we had… you snatched all our families…what’s next? all we’re left with is the breath of life. go ahead, take that away, too.”46 when a mother managed to buy vegetables and began cooking them, a group of soldiers kicked over the pan and stepped on the food. she asked them: “aren’t you afraid of god? it has been months since we have had a decent meal, so why can’t you give us a chance to have this?”47 in her unpublished memoir, arusyag manuelian described the “mischievous” defiance of her sister, arshaluys, in refusing to allow her home and belongings to be taken by the turks, thereby resisting the expropriation of armenian property: arshaluys said, “mother, i will go and shut the inside doors and windows of the house…” we waited for a while, but arshaluys did not come out of the house. being worried my mother went back into the house and to her surprise she saw that arshaluys had broken all the twelve glass windows which faced the back garden, poured petroleum on the carpets and furniture, and tried to set the house on fire.48 in cases where turkish men would proposition women or try to convince them to marry or give away their children, some armenian women not only refused but spoke back or 42. rubina peroomian, “when death is a blessing and life a prolonged agony: women victims of genocide,” in genocide perspectives ii: essays on holocaust and genocide, eds. colin tatz, peter arnold and sandra tatz, (blackheath, nsw: brandl & schlesinger pty ltd, 2003), 314-332. for more on resistance as part of armenian identity, see harutyun marutyan, “trauma and identity: on structural particularities of armenian genocide and jewish holocaust,” in international journal of armenian genocide studies 1, no. 1 (2014): 53-69. 43. ibid, peroomian, “when death is a blessing,” 319. 44. interview of sinan sinanian, in svazlian, the armenian genocide, 397. 45. story of haig baronian, https://genocideeducation.org/resources/survivor-accounts/. 46. derderian, death march, 45-47. the woman was subsequently tortured and shot. 47. florence m. soghoian, portrait of a survivor (hanover: christopher pub house, 1997), 25. 48. manuelian, the secret exile. https://genocideeducation.org/resources/survivor-accounts/ international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 48 insulted them, saying for example, “i don’t exchange a horse for a donkey,”49 or “i want neither your gold nor you.”50 while perhaps seemingly minor moments of women’s experiences of genocide, these capture something of their spirit of defiance, and are recalled vividly by survivors and their children. haykouhi azarian described her mother asking a gendarme for permission to sit in the shade; he agreed, if she would give him one of her daughters. “my mother said, ‘i won’t give you any and i’ll sit in the sun.’ i remember this well.”51 both common and enlightening are the examples of women and girls who were forcibly converted, but who retained their armenian identity over many years of captivity. in margaret ajemian ahnert’s book, the knock at the door, survivor ester’s comments to her daughter exemplify the kind of resistance that relies on an internal strength, knowing and holding onto one’s identity, and instilling this in the next generation: “that’s what they all tried to do to me. they beat me to bend, but i fooled them. i never bent in my heart, only with my body... you know the turks told me never to speak armenian. i obeyed. but they couldn’t stop me from thinking in armenian.”52 there are cases of girls subconsciously recalling the correct way to cross oneself, or being able to recognize an armenian lullaby their mother used to sing.53 one survivor attributed her successful escape to her continued practice of the armenian alphabet, as well as the memory she had retained of her name and birthplace, which proved to her rescuers that she was indeed a kidnapped armenian.54 resistance was a clear motivation, as in the case of a girl overtly asserting her identity after she had escaped from a turkish home: “first of all, my name is not ayshe. my name is ovsanna. my father’s surname is altoonian, my mother’s surname is gyokbashian. i am an armenian. i will stay with the armenians.”55 others revealed their armenian identity to their children once their husbands had died,56 or continued to carry physical symbols such as small crucifixes as a reminder of their religion.57 dirouhi avedian recalled her escape from captivity in her memoir, defying fate: 49. interview of yeghsa anton khayadjanian in svazlian, the armenian genocide, 259-260. 50. interview of hermine ter voghormiajian in ibid, 364-5. 51. interview of haykouhi azarian in ibid, 406. 52. ajemian, the knock at the door, 81 53. e.g., sirena aram alajajian in svazlian, the armenian genocide, 410-412; see also “song wins babe from turk,” in the red cross bulletin, august 18, 1919, reprinted in hayk demoyan, armenian genocide: front page coverage in the world press (yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute, 2015), 232-233. 54. rouben p. adalian, “the armenian genocide,’ in century of genocide: eyewitness accounts and critical views, eds. samuel totten, william s. parsons and israel w. charny (new york/london: garland publishing inc, 1997), 73-77. 55. tigranouhi movsessian, “ovsanna-ayshe, who remained an armenian,” in svazlian, the armenian genoicde, 538-539. 56. gevork chiftchian in ibid, 523. 57. “an aga from diyarbekir … took my mother-in-law on to his horse. her name is silva, he renamed her zeynep. they had always called her ‘gavur girl…’ she couldn’t bear this word. one day she had the cross in her pocket, the crucifix. the cross fell out when she was taking the key out. the lady of the house said, ‘gavur girl, are you still carrying this?’ then she ran away.” leyla neyzi and hranush kharatyan-araqelyan, speaking to one another: personal memories of the past in armenia and turkey (institut für internationale zusammenarbeit des deutschen volkshochschul-verbandes, 2010),63. transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women 49 one day an armenian shepherd (my future husband) came to visit us. my arab mother asked after he left: “who is that nesrani [christian] boy?” “he is sheikh eyara’s nesrani son,” i said. “i’m armenian; that’s why he came.” “so you’re still a gavur nesrani?” she asked. i replied, without any fear, “i was born a gavur, and even if i were to be washed with ten slabs of soap, i’ll still be a nesrani.” she lunged at me, gave me a fierce beating, and pulled my hair, which was very long. but that was the last time she could beat me.58 considering the post-genocide context of these memoirs and testimonies, survivors appear to have found meaning in particular themes and many embody bauer’s concept of amidah, or “standing up against.” in defying attempts to erase their identity and ensuring the continuity of armenian culture, these women resisted genocide and directly contributed to the survival of the armenian community. moreover, in passing on their memories to future generations, they tried to ensure that armenian identity would continue to thrive, and that the history of the genocide would not be forgotten. descendants remember for some armenian survivors, the need to tell their stories motivated them to try to endure the horrors of genocide;59 for others, it represented a final act of resistance after the genocide. one scholar has suggested that descendants participate in resistance by listening to survivors’ testimony: “the telling of the story is important in and of itself, but the transmission of the story to another transforms the telling into a collective act, which lends power to the voice by giving it agency.”60 many descendants of survivors, particularly the third generation, not only seek out their relatives’ stories but view keeping those memories alive as both a sacred duty and a way to challenge ongoing turkish denial.61 the profound need to remember their family stories combined with the emphasis on resistance and survival, and themes of heroism and ancient legends, emerges strongly in granddaughter astrid katcharyan’s affinity with night skies: i need to tell this story, for me, for all of them, but most of all, for astra. her story is our story and will not end with this book… i want to build a statue to her memory, for all our memories. i see her now, classic, heroic, noble, carved as a greek caryatid carrying the temple of her family on alabaster shoulders…i need to tell this story because not to do so would be to deny her, deny me, and all of them...62 58. dirouhi avedian (nee cheomlekjian), defying fate: the memoirs of aram and dirouhi avedian, genocide library volume 5 (california: h. and k. manjikian publications, 2014), 21. 59. e.g., manuelian recounts her mother saying “whoever survives must write down all the things which we have experienced on our endless road of exile,” in manuelian, the secret exile. 60. jennifer rinaldi, survivor song: the voice of trauma and its echoes (university of denver digital commons, electronic theses and dissertations, paper 552, 2011), 202. 61. for more details, see rubina peroomian, the armenian genocide in literature: the second generation responds (yerevan: armenian genocide museum-institute, 2015). 62. astrid katcharyan, affinity with night skies: astra sabondjian’s story (london: taderon press, 2005), 9. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 50 for descendants who are named after their relatives, as in astrid katcharyan’s case, the connection is further intensified.63 yerevan-based ani dekirmenchyan was named after her great-grandmother, aghavni: “they took the middle [of the name] and named me ani after her. i feel very proud to have her name. she was a very strong woman.”64 ani explains that when the round ups of armenians of adana began, aghavni protected her seven children by grabbing a skewer from the barbeque and killing the gendarme at her door. she says of her great-grandmother’s role in the family in later years, “everyone was afraid of her. even if her grandsons had problems with other boys, they would seek her help, not their father’s help. she could catch mice with her hands and kill them.”65 ani’s own powerful sense of identity has been influenced by this perception of resilience, as well as the importance instilled in her of cultural maintenance. although aghavni had only been allowed to speak turkish in adana, later in life she asked her relatives to speak to her and each other in armenian. ani now works as a language teacher with the armenian general benevolent union. she says: “it is hard to realize that another nation … wanted to kill you, to erase you, but you survived. and you have to live and talk about this, tell this to the world but not with tears in your eyes, like we are poor, we were killed. no, you have to tell the world… this happened to my people and i lived, my relatives lived, my people lived. we were strong and we are strong.”66 testimonies of descendants highlight the cultural and religious preservation of their relatives and how this nurtured their own identity. many survivors recall their own mothers and grandmothers consciously passing on armenian heritage and imploring them never to forget it. ajemian ahnert recounts ester’s grandmother urging her to continue walking on the deportation march, pulling a small iron cross from her neck and handing it to her. later, when ester was discovered by her abductor secretly praying with her grandmother’s cross, she was whipped every day for a week. similarly, either refusing or feigning conversion are acts of resistance frequently retold by descendants, with women imagining themselves in their grandmother’s place and wondering about the choices they may have made in the same circumstances. ilda deryan, the principal of an armenian school in melbourne, australia, vividly recalls the night her grandmother zarouhi shared with her for the first and only time the experiences she had endured during the genocide.67 ilda remembers that her grandmother was keeping her company while she nursed her newborn baby. this unique environment shared between grandmother, granddaughter and the next generation, proved conducive to opening up about tortures she had rarely revealed to anyone. zarouhi spoke of being taken with her sister-in-law to a big hall and told that 63. peroomian, the armenian genocide in literature, 9-10; and larkey writes of the bond created between grandchildren named after victims or survivors of the holocaust in larkey, “transcending memory,” 216. 64. interview with ani dekirmenchyan, june 26, 2016. 65. ibid. 66. ibid. 67. interview with ilda deryan, may 20, 2016. transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women 51 if they denounced christianity and became muslims, their lives may be saved. they were told to put their hands on a quran and repeat words they didn’t understand. her name was changed to zehra. ilda remembers zarouhi exclaiming, “these people were stupid, how can you change what’s in someone’s heart? we did what we had to do to survive.” having lost several relatives on the march, zarouhi and her sister in law were selling their remaining belongings when a turkish woman warned them they would all be slaughtered and asked zarouhi to hand over her baby to save her life. “grandma said a hundred thoughts raced through her mind… she says for a few seconds she was tempted but something made her say, ‘i’ll never give up my child, if i die she dies with me.’”68 zarouhi lived to the age of 99. her strength and ability to adapt to life’s challenges with grace have left their mark on ilda’s own identity: her story and the story of other survivors make me simmer with rage. these people deserved recognition… i’m a proud armenian with a love for our language and traditions… i will continue to live as armenian and fight to teach our history, culture and traditions to the young generations as i feel i owe it to my grandparents and relatives whose choices were brutally taken away from them. those turkish descendants who have discovered an armenian relative have complicated legacies to manage. in her pioneering memoir, fethiye çetin tells of the secret bond that developed between her and her elderly armenian grandmother, as heranus revealed the story of her abduction.69 in an effort to eliminate her armenianness, her captors converted her, forbade her from speaking her language, and gave her a turkish name. transmitting her history to her granddaughter her birth name, her parents’ names, her religion and culture was her final act of resistance in old age. çetin’s response to her grandmother’s story is relevant to the notion of transmitted defiance because of the emphasis she places on her grandmother’s agency. çetin notes her grandmother would never participate in the singing of turkish folksongs, and even more tellingly, she cites the clandestine practice of baking and sharing corek (braided sweet bread) at easter by armenian converts, even into their old age. she herself feels compelled to an act of resistance on behalf of her grandmother, an attempt to assert heranus’ identity and preserve the memory of her armenianness. at her funeral, çetin cried out: “but that’s not true! her mother’s name wasn’t esma, it was isguhi! and her father’s name wasn’t huseyin, but hovannes!”70 the secret continuity of armenian cultural tradition, such as marking the sign of the cross on dough before baking,71 represents ongoing resistance to forced assimilation. many survivors even attribute their survival to the retention of identity, as taft writes: “…i 68. ibid. 69. fethiye çetin, my grandmother: a memoir (london/new york: verso, 2008). 70. ibid, 3. 71. vardouhi voskian, “the muslim armenians of hamshen,” in svazlian, the armenian genocide, 536; see also armen anush, passage through hell, when she came across converted armenians in raqqa and der zor “they spoke the language of their fathers to describe the age-old virtues of their mothers. they were proud of their mothers.” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 52 survived by remaining armenian in a world which had sought to devour me. i would not let it destroy me [original emphasis]. and it was only my ‘armenianism’ and all that it implies in terms of survival — that saved me as a human being.”72 even in cases where granddaughters did not experience a positive relationship with their grandmother, the influence of resilience and temerity is striking. marina khachaturyan describes her grandmother’s negative, quarrelsome attitude, her constant singing of sad songs: “everyone in the building called her a witch. i was ashamed of her. i didn’t understand then, as a child, what she had experienced.” as an adult, however, she values the act of remembering and retelling the history of the genocide, saying, “if you shoot your past with a gun, the future will shoot you with cannon. one should never forget!”73 marina’s inherited spirit of defiance manifests partly in her choice of work teaching armenian language and culture, but further, in specific acts of assertiveness and resistance in her own life. she recounts an episode in tbilisi, when her azerbaijani taxi driver took an unexpected route through a forest. he asked her, “aren’t you afraid? i could do anything to you here in the forest and no one would know.” marina says, “so i took my umbrella, a very large umbrella, and i looked at him with this umbrella. i wouldn’t be afraid to kill him. at the end of the trip, he said, “because you are armenian, i am going to charge you ten lari” [instead of four] and i got out of the car and said, “and i am going to pay you nothing.”74 conclusion in 2013, lory tatoulian’s mother read aguline dertazyan’s memoirs out loud, as lory roughly translated them into english. lory describes with enormous pride how aguline was the only woman to participate in physical defense with the fedayis of hadjin, hiding in caves and shooting if any turks approached. when one of the group was shot, “aguline took his fatigues and gun … she chopped off all her hair so that she could look like a man… she didn’t want to be raped, or taken in … ‘i’d rather die like this than like that.’”75 but perhaps even more than physical resistance, lory admires her grandmother’s will to survive, describing how she took an eight-year old boy under her wing and “they walked – every time i say this i want to cry from hadjin to adana which is about 90 miles… and they ate whatever they could find animals, plants, cats, anything.” further, she emphasizes that aguline raised five children alone after her husband died, at the same time as working as a school teacher and performing in the theatre. lory is one of many of the third generation who has channeled their interest in the stories of their grandparents into political activism or artistic endeavors.76 her work as an actor has been inspired by her grandmother yet it is also influenced by contemporary armenian identity: “so i have a playbill where there are all these young people, their head shots, and then it’s [my grandmother], in her sixties! i 72. taft, rebirth, 141. 73. interview with marina khachaturyan, yerevan, june 2016. 74. ibid. 75. interview with lory tatoulian, may 15, 2016. 76. peroomian notes this is a frequent response by members of the third generation, the armenian genocide in literature, 310. transmitted defiance: genocide resistance across generations of armenian women 53 do this sketch comedy in english about the armenian community. in a way it is cathartic… making sense of who we are as diaspora armenians.”77 the act of transcending memory not by forgetting it but by remembering and retelling it aligns with larkey’s notion of transmemory, where the third generation honors their grandparents’ memories by transforming them into positive action. the focus of women descendants on the concepts of survival, resilience and resistance described in survivors’ stories is critical to this transformation. it has also developed from a longstanding culture of reverence for self-defense and resistance in the armenian community. where their relatives fought back against deliberate and gendered strategies to destroy family bonds and cultural heritage, armenian women today remember and celebrate such acts, from small moments of refusal to cooperate to continuous efforts to secretly maintain their identity. some descendants see themselves as resisting current attempts to silence the armenian community and distort or deny the history of the genocide. in writing of jewish spiritual resistance, bauer says, “it is wrong to demand, in retrospect, that these tortured individuals and communities should have behaved as mythical heroes. the fact that so many of them did is a matter of wonderment.”78 yet, whether they live in armenia or the diaspora, armenian women today are awed by their relatives’ endurance and honor it by efforts to speak the language with their children and send them to armenian schools, to perform in armenian theatre or write their family’s stories. the way the genocide is remembered and retold across the generations is as crucial to our understanding as the original experiences themselves. significantly, the culture of armenian women’s defiance as portrayed in memoirs and testimonies seems to have filtered down the generations. today, many armenian women embody an attitude that their grandmothers and other women either intentionally or unconsciously transmitted, perhaps best summed up by lory tatoulian as “nothing’s gonna bring me down.”79 acknowledgement thank you to the armenian genocide museum-institute for the opportunity to conduct this research and contribute to the journal. my heartfelt thanks to the descendants of survivors for sharing your family’s stories with me and for keeping their and your memories alive. 77. ibid. 78. bauer, rethinking the holocaust, 149. 79. interview with lory tatoulian, may 15, 2016. dr. hayk demoyan is the director of the armenian genocide museum institute in yerevan, armenia, since 2006. he is author of 12 books and 40 academic articles on such topics as the armenian genocide, turkish foreign policy and turkey’s involvement in the nagorno-karabakh confl ict of 1991-1994. he is a lecturer at yerevan state university. dr. demoyan is also the secretary of the state commission on coordination of the events dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the armenian genocide. his last book is "armenian genocide: front page coverage in the world press" (yerevan: armenian genocide museum&institute, 2014), 266 pages 7 patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes: armenian sports in the ottoman empire in the pre-1915 period1 hayk demoyan introduction sports, along with other national and social activities, became a special driving force for the defi nition of ethnic identity, especially in multinational states, and served as an important stimulus in the process of formation of nationalism, international competitions, as well as demonstration of superiority of a group. nowadays, sports play a crucial and decisive role in politics, already reserving for itself a unique place in international relations. international championships, olympic games, and especially football world cups emphasize a specifi c identity of a nation state, and are an important factor in securing authority and a special status among the other nations. at the same time, excluding certain episodes from the history of sports, especially the signifi cant role of other nationalities or the bitterness of a loss, sports are also important in the sense of emphasizing one’s own advantage. in the multiethnic societies it plays a unique role, becoming an effective factor of the identity formation and representation. this condition is more evident in the case of the history of development of sports life in ottoman turkey. in the case of the ottoman empire, sports were treated as a form of self-affi rmation and national competition in addition to being a means for a healthy lifestyle. in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the growing interest in sports, as well as the formation of armenian sports clubs proved to be signifi cant amongst the armenian population of the ottoman empire. during this time, similar processes began amongst the armenian population living within the russian empire. in 1908, after the young turkish revolution, the short-lived tolerant attitude towards freedom of national minorities and equality of rights was also expressed by awakening a sporty lifestyle. the formation of greek and armenian sport clubs and integration of sports into everyday life later on substantially stimulated the formation of similar turkish clubs and sport unions as well. thus, in terms of the initiators, sports in the ottoman empire were originated and mostly promoted by greek and armenian sportsmen and clubs. nowadays, turkish historiography either downplays the crucial role played by national minorities in almost all spheres of the social and economic life. it also concerns the armenian input in the formation and development of sports in turkey. the small amount of 1. to cite this article: hayk demoyan, “patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes: armenian sports in the ottoman empire in the pre-1915 period,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 1:1 (2014): 7-37. the author would like to express his deep gratitude to vartan matossian for reviewing this article, as well as for his valuable comments. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 8 credit attributed to the armenian community is very incomplete and distorted. the reason for this delicate silence is understandable, as it befi ts turkish nationalism and nationalistic historiography, and proves typical to national and memory related politics in turkey. this denial also encompasses the signifi cant role played by armenians in turkish theatre, music, media, book publishing, and several other fi elds. turkish historiography fi nds dangerous any credit given to armenians for their contributions, and therefore it avoids doing so altogether. however, in the beginning of the 20th century, the birth and development of armenian sports in the ottoman empire clearly evinced a pan-armenian undertaking within the borders of the empire, which was confi rmed by the idea of creating, as well as offi cially establishing a united structure responsible for armenian sport life. *** this article is dedicated to a less investigated, but nonetheless very important and intriguing area: the history of the athletic movement and development of sports within the armenian population in ottoman empire viewed in the context of national discourses and competitive nationalisms. the history of the development of armenian sport and athletic clubs and unions in the ottoman empire begins in the late 19th century, when the fi rst training groups were formed and physical training courses were taught in american colleges established on the ottoman land. the development of sports activities within the empire was fi rst of all the result of modernization processes, which mostly touched the armenian and greek populations and were dictated by specifi c inter-communal demands, notwithstanding ongoing discrimination and violence against christian subjects. the fi rst armenian sports clubs were formed in the early 20th century in constantinople and smyrna. this period was marked by the appearance of professionally educated sportsmen, such as shavarsh krisian, vahan cheraz, grigor hakobian, mkrtich mkrtichian, and others who had a considerable role in initiating and developing interest towards sports among armenians in the ottoman empire. the participation of two armenian sportsmen, vahram papazian and mkrtich mkrian, in the fifth international olympic games, held in stockholm in 1912, was a special episode from the chronology of empire’s sport life. the publication of marmnamarz (1911-1914), the fi rst sport magazine in the ottoman empire, created through the efforts of famous sportsman shavarsh krisian, became an additional stimulus for creating interest in sports and athletics among armenian youth residing both in and out of the empire. the history of armenian sports in the ottoman empire is yet another example of the leading role of armenians within the empire. it is noteworthy that their national advancement and their tendency to adopt contemporary values defi nitely strengthened demonstrations of intolerance by young turk authorities. the latter tried to oppose by all means the successes of minorities and, to that effect, launched its own mastermind of creation of exclusively turkish clubs and unions as a branch of the ruling committee of union and progress party (cup). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 9 the development of sports and athletics in the ottoman empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the development of capitalism and modernization processes opened new perspectives for the progress and social integration of national minorities in the ottoman empire. in this respect, an important role should be ascribed to foreign educational institutions in constantinople and in other cities of the empire. under the tyranny of abdul hamid ii, it was forbidden for turkish and foreign youth to establish sports institutions or to go in for sports publicly. in such conditions, sports life was active in american and french educational institutions of the empire, where mainly armenian, greek and jewish young men studied. this circumstance played an important role for national minorities to have more active and developed sport organizations, unlike turks, who carried this work on an individual basis. in 1908, after the young turk revolution, the question of urgent development of sports and physical training among the turkish population became an important part of the internal politics of the cup. it gained signifi cance as a tool to shape “a new type of turk,” which was to be a healthy generation and, most importantly, to prepare young turks for military service. it is known that, shortly after 1908, the leaders of the cup were consolidating positions of their one-party government, and, at the same time, encouraging demonstrations of turkish nationalism within the ottoman society, with special emphasis on intolerance towards national minorities – armenians, greeks, etc. an incentive for such political mood was the defeat of the ottoman empire during the fi rst balkan war in 1912. this brought the cup to the conclusion that the idea of the ottoman empire could not save relics of the empire and that it was necessary to create a new type of turkish society exclusively based on nationalist ideology. the latter became a factor in the evolution of the genocidal character of the cup politics towards minorities and later on resulted in the large scale genocide carried out against armenians, greeks, and assyrians. economic, cultural, and social efforts were all geared to work towards the upbringing of a new nationalistic turkish generation, and sports and physical training were not out of this goal. the fi rst exclusively turkish sport clubs were paramilitary institutions. the members of these organizations were mainly soldiers from military colleges who took part in the turko-italian (1911) and balkan wars (1912-1913). one of these institutions was the “turk guçu cemiyeti,” which was founded in the summer of 1913. its aim was to develop physical education and various kinds of sports among the turkish youth. “turk guçu cemiyeti” opened its affi liate offi ces not only in constantinople, but in other cities of the empire as well. their activity was mainly aimed at “improving health, regaining physical strength of turks and growing active generations, persistent against hard times.”2 the history of sports and athletic movement and physical training in the ottoman empire is closely connected with turkish military and turkish sportsman and cup member selim sırrı tarcan (1874-1957). selim tarcan began his pedagogical activities among the turkish youth in 1909. having settled in sweden, he attended physical training courses in the school of physical education of coaches in stockholm. as far back as the hamidian period, he would frequently appear in squares and schools in sportswear, in an 2. see hayk demoyan, armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire (yerevan: agmi, 2009), 14 (in armenian). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 10 attempt to install interest in sports among the turkish youth. selim sırrı tarcan succeeded in including physical training in the curriculum of turkish schools, as well as in madrasah schedules. at fi rst, he was collaborating with armenian sportsman and editor shavarsh krisian, who named tarcan as “our partner” in one of the issues of the armenian periodical marmnamarz.3 later, selim sırrı tarcan followed shavarsh krisian’s example and began publishing a turkish sports periodical, which, however, did not last long, because tarcan’s undertaking found no reception among the turkish youth and not many people showed interest in sports. on the threshold of wwi, another paramilitary sport organization, osmanli güç dernekleri, was created through the efforts of young turk nationalists zia gökalp and enver pasha, the minister of war. it pursued the same goals as the aforementioned organization. enver invited specialists from abroad, particularly from germany, to carry out activities aimed at an effi cient development of sports and athletics among the turkish youth. among those invited was von hoff, who created the youth partnership organization in april 1916, with selim sırrı tarcan as vice-president. there were 706 affi liate offi ces of ottoman turkish paramilitary organizations established, 351 of which were located in cities and the remaining 355 in provinces. it is worth to note that the leaders of the cup were actively involved in the formation of turkish sport clubs, helping their activities, as well as sponsoring the participation of turkish sportsmen in various international and local competitions and championships. in fact, enver pasha personally assumed the role of promoter, urging the members of these youth organizations to join the committee of union and progress party. he also became the president of the turkish scout organization, stressing the importance of the scout movement for training future soldiers and offi cers. among the armenians of the ottoman empire, the practice of sports was also regarded as an important means to be prepared for military service in the turkish army. in 1911, the christian subjects of the empire were given the right to serve in the army. the fi rst armenian graduate-offi cers had already begun their contribution and did not go unnoticed during the balkan wars (1911-1913). armenian sports circles were also aware of this approach, according to which the inspiration of training healthy citizens should serve for preparing one for further military service, rather than to be a self-oriented goal. from this standpoint, shavarsh krisian, the editor of the fi rst armenian sport magazine, marmnamarz, wrote: it is necessary to make sport and simple military trainings compulsory in colleges. during military service, the most disturbing problem for a newly recruited soldier is the disciplinary set-up. other mechanical movements will easily be caught. it is necessary to form school battalions (fr. bataillions scolaires) in colleges and prepare future recruits in this way. they have to respond to the recruit with a smile on their face and indirectly cause an increase in the duration of military service.4 though turkish and armenian concepts to shape the new generation were somewhere universal, their main approaches and specifi c undertakings differed greatly. these differences were in direct opposition with each other in some practical ways. the aforementioned fact 3. hayk demoyan, armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire, 16. 4. marmnamarz, vol. 1, no. 2 (march, 1911). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 11 becomes more evident when observing different episodes from the development of sport life and athletics both in constantinople and armenia, as well as an item published in marmnamarz. the birth of ottoman football football appeared in the ottoman empire as far back as the late 19th century. the fi rst football match in the empire was played by british residents of salonika back in 1875. some sources indicate that the fi rst football matches were held in smyrna too. nevertheless, these games were amateurish and occasional. in the early 20th century, the fi rst professional football players and teams appeared in the empire. in 1901, the istanbul football league was created by the efforts of englishmen james lafontaine and horace armitage. in the following years, kadikoy, rumeli, sunday, and other football leagues were created in the capital of the empire. the football games in constantinople were held in the districts of kadikoy and moda. as it was forbidden for muslims to participate in football and similar sport games, the only ones playing at the time were english, armenians, greeks and jews. the fi rst football teams were, as a rule, composed by representatives of different nationalities, including armenians. later, ethnically homogeneous football clubs and teams were formed, simultaneously to the development of this sport. the fi rst turkish sport clubs, beşiktaş (1903), galatasaray (1905) and fenerbahce (1907), which appeared in the early 20th century, could not run to their full potential during the sultan’s reign, and became full-fl edged organizations only after the young turk revolution in 1908. afterwards, they became known as football clubs. the main rivals of these turkish clubs were the armenian and greek football teams of constantinople. the young turk authorities also created a number of clubs and stadiums to organize football matches and other sport competitions. the most famous among them was the union club-i̇ttihat spor stadium, where the armenian olympic games were also held from 19111914. the development of armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire constantinople, the capital of the ottoman empire, was the national, cultural, and political metropolis of ottoman armenians. national self-governing bodies, various preparatory schools, colleges, and the religious, educational and intellectual potential of western armenians were centralized around the patriarchate. the city also became a center for armenian sport life. from the mid of the 19th century, the importance of athletics and physical education was mentioned within armenian educational circles. for example, the fi rst publication of the aramian educational society, established in 1840,, named “nkaragir usmants” (by h. m. gartashiants, vienna, 1845) had the following mention: “various schools received directions and i wish that the aramian educational society was also included in the list of those schools, and the college principals could understand that physical growth should contribute to national spirit.” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 12 in late 1853, the armenian educational council recognized the signifi cance of introducing physical education in colleges of constantinople.5 from 1886-1887, the importance of introducing courses of athletics in colleges became an issue. the education council mentioned: “the council regrets that, despite all efforts, it could not provide sport facilities for pupils, because of the lack of trainers. thus, the council suffi ced itself by entertaining them with different games during breaks.” in the late 19th century, the teaching of physical training was also included in the syllabus of the united armenian organization (հայոց մի ացեալ ընկերութիւն). along with the aforementioned discussions, there were publications of translated literature on physical training. this was an uncommon social phenomenon for ottoman armenians, and several illustrated books that served as guides for physical training were published in armenian. the fi rst one worth mentioning is dr. schreber’s short book, physical training without instruments. v. sargisian’s translation of this book was published in constantinople back in 1878. it was followed by the publication of a brief physical training manual for schools by vernel. this book, comprised of 228 pages, was translated by karen panosian and published in 1879, once again in constantinople. the primary sources have contradictory data about the creation of the fi rst armenian sports organizations within the ottoman empire. according to one of them,6 the fi rst football clubs, armenia and vaspurakan, were formed in 1900 in smyrna, and the homonymous teams were created at the same time. in 1901, thanks to the efforts of a. elmasian, more than a hundred people took part in an athletic show held in smyrna. during the following years, similar athletic shows were frequent. as a result of growing interest in physical exercises and sports, the fi rst armenian athletes appeared on the scene. they were mainly students from foreign, particularly american institutions. there were armenian sportsmen among the pupils of the american robert college in constantinople and the french college in galatasaray. students from those schools were mainly interested in olympic sports such as running, swimming, shot put, disc and javelin. several armenian sportsmen graduated from foreign athletic educational institutions in europe and later returned to constantinople. this became a strong encouragement for the development of armenian sport life, especially team sports and football. among them were shavarsh krisian, krikor hakobian, vahan cheraz and a few others. shavarsh krisian and grigor hakobian received their athletic education between 1903 and 1907, following courses in the training school of famous french athlete and coach edmond desbonnet. thanks to these three pioneers and their followers, the athletic movement and sport life received a solid support for further development among armenians, specifi cally those in constantinople. shavarsh krisian’s name deserves special mention among armenian sportsmen. upon his return to constantinople in 1909, he set about paving the way for armenian athletics and sport life, and prompting armenian youth to take up sports. he initiated the publication of an armenian sport periodical, with advice from a young intellectual, hakob siruni (18901973). the periodical, called marmnamarz, followed the principles and approaches of the 5. hayk demoyan, armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire, 22-23. 6. ibid, 36. patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 13 french periodical la culture physique. other important fi gures among the followers of shavarsh krisian were grigor hakobian and grigor merjanov. they played an important role in bringing up the youth of constantinople: hakobian worked in the district of uskudar and the villages of boyaci and ortakoy, while grigor merjanov was active in samatia and makrikoy, as well as involved in the formation of the training clubs “vahagn” and “titan.” yeznik kadjuni became the theoretician of the movement and held lectures on the usefulness of physical education. vahan cheraz, an alumnus from kedronakan college of constantinople, became one of the leaders of the armenian sport movement in constantinople. during a trip to england, vahan cheraz was fascinated by football and, upon his return to constantinople, started forming armenian football teams. the second team was called “santral” (i. e. central referring to kedronakan college). the joint efforts of alumni from robert and partizak american colleges brought about the formation of the “uskudar” football team in 1906. a year later, mkrtich mkrian founded the “raffi ” training club, which operated clandestinely. later on, another organization called “hayordiner” was formed in uskudar. [in the early 20th century, armenian students in foreign colleges of constantinople showed deep love and interest towards physical training and sports. this interest encouraged the promotion of the sport movement. some important publications were released in armenian by 1913, thus helping grow interest towards sports and physical training. examples of those publications are an l. kiumlien’s “amenun marmnamarz” (athletics for everyone), translated by eznik kadjuni, and a booklet called “boy scout and the purpose of his life,” co-authored by sh. krisian and h. hindlian. other publications such as “football book,” by varag pogharian, “physical training,” by arto galpakchian, and others were released later. other foreign institutions, particularly american colleges, had a signifi cant role in the promotion of sports and physical training within armenian circles beyond constantinople. among these institutions were the american colleges of harput, aintab, pardizag and marsovan. armenian sportsmen took part in the international sport competitions organized by turkish clubs in constantinople. on april 1-4, 1911 the turkish “galatasaray” club organized an international tournament on the occasion of the arrival of a hungarian sport team to constantinople. vahram papazian, performing in mile run, and mkrtich mkrian, alumnus of robert college competing in discus throw, distinguished them during the competition. martiros kuyumcian, who represented the robert college, became the fi rst winner in hurdling and pole vaulting. besides appreciating the turkish initiative, i. e. the organization of such international competitions, shavarsh krisian criticized the fl aws in the organization: “to be frank, we warmly welcome the new competition, but it is impossible not to remind our turkish countrymen that it left the impression of an oriental ceremony. the result of an inexperienced, not to say careless committee was extreme lack of order.”7 7. marmnamarz, vol. i, no. 4 (may 1911). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 14 vagharshak varjapetian and ashot papazian had no match in bicycle racing, while vahan cheraz and ararat krisian were remarkable in swimming competitions organised in constantinople. another armenian sportsman, vahram shiranian, alumnus of hayordiner union in constantinople, did not stay unnoticed during tennis competitions and won the turkish championship several times. substantial articles published in marmnamarz bear witness to the success of armenian sportsmen in international competitions organized in constantinople. the activities of armenian athletic and sport live witnessed the formation of a qualitatively new social fi eld of activity and were a new show of national self-organization that would have a decisive role in providing new features for the formation of new identities and national unity. the birth and rapid development of armenian sport life in constantinople encouraged the formation of similar unions and clubs in armenia and cilicia. these unions and clubs would later pave the way for the foundation of the armenian general athletic union. the birth of armenian football there are various data concerning the origins of the fi rst armenian football clubs and teams. it is known that as early as 1905-1906 shavarsh krisian formed the fi rst armenian football team, called “balta liman.” both armenian and foreign sportsmen performed in this team, including grigor and levon hakobian, shavarsh krisian, varag pogharian, vardges aghabekian, mihran nakashian, g. gasparian, s. poghosian, h. khupeserian and others. “balta liman” took part in international competitions held in constantinople from 19051906 and achieved a high score victory over the turkish “galatasaray,” winning the second place. this is actually the fi rst known evidence about a competition where armenian and turkish football teams played together. at that time, vahan cheraz graduated from university in england, returned to constantinople, and brought a ball and knowledge of football. having introduced the game rules to his classmates of kedronakan college and future teammates, he created the “santral” football team. he also fostered the creation of another football team in proti island, which included gabriel macharian, tigran khoian and others. “skutar,” “kum kapu,” “tork” and other clubs were formed later. the club “tork,” formed by the fusion of “kum kapu” and “santral,” united armenian young men of different districts of constantinople, particularly from gum gapu, who were also engaged in swimming, fi eld games, and hiking. after the proclamation of the constitution in 1908, “araks” was one of the best among armenian football teams. it played successfully with “tork” against other foreign teams, and took part in the armenian olympic games. the main players of “araks” were onnik frenkian, garegin darbinian, levon narlian, hayk chololian, hamazasp panosian, poghos nasipian, tat and miji tatian, petros savaian, marut marutian and others. furthermore, “araks” became the winner of the “rumeli” international league, held in 1911 in makrikoy. before world war i, football teams were formed in nearly all sport clubs of constantinople, as well as in many provinces. armenian football teams participated in league competitions, as well as international competitions organized by some leagues, mainly created in constantinople. judging from patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 15 preserved photographs, those football teams had their separate sportswear and signs; the players usually recorded the name of the current team and date on the ball before being photographed. the development of an athletic movement among the armenian youth in constantinople was unprecedented within ottoman armenian reality. other sports were also introduced before the development of football. on the threshold of world war i, about 40 armenian sport clubs were active, solely in constantinople. the birth of marmnamarz new demands emerged, simultaneously to the growing interest towards athletics and sports among the armenian population of the ottoman empire and the appearance of professional sportsmen. the birth of the fi rst armenian sports periodical, marmnamarz, was the result of these requirements. it may be defi nitely stated that, while foreign missionaries or american colleges active in the ottoman empire introduced the athletic movement in western armenian reality, the periodical marmnamarz, published in constantinople by shavarsh krisian (1911-1914), carried out its “armenisation.” this enterprise was wholeheartedly supported by hovhannes hindlian, doctor garanphilian, aram nikoghosian, and levon hakobian. karo unchian was appointed executive director. the periodical was published with hakob siruni’s direct participation and support. grigor chololian, a noted sportsman from constantinople and annalist of armenian sport history, has fairly stated that marmnamarz “was a publication based on personal undertaking, efforts and sacrifi ces.”8 it was the fi rst sport periodical in the empire and a unique phenomenon in the history of armenian periodical press. it refl ected customs and moods of that time, and certainly undertook the important mission of national education and formation, as well as the promotion of its ideological underpinnings. the fi rst issue of marmnamarz made a call to armenian youth in the following terms: one of our aims is to serve as means and support of armenian youth to get rid of this existent lifelessness, to unite and start opening clubs in every suburb, village and city, to organize competitions, to foster the development of athletics. all these should be carried out, fi rstly, in order to be prepared for an austere life, which will prove to be a few of their best years, and, secondly, to demonstrate the noble roots of armenian blood that has furnished powerful troops. armenians have not participated in international and local competitions until now, and the reason is neither their feebleness nor the different descent; they were unaware of the existence of similar competitions, and thus they were not ready to get involved.9 since its inception, marmnamarz tackled various issues: to promote sport life; to instill interest towards athletics and sports, especially in provincial cities and villages inhabited by armenians; to keep the public informed about ongoing sport events within and without the ottoman empire, as well as to coordinate the activities of armenian sport clubs and the organization of championships. 8. azdak, december 17, 1938. 9. marmnamarz, vol. i, no. i (february 1911). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 16 naturally, marmnamarz provided much space for armenian and foreign authors who focused on athletics, healthcare, teaching, and development of sports. it is noteworthy that the promotion of sports and athletics was not just an end in itself, but was conditioned by concern about bringing up healthy generations, especially in armenian schools. the organization of the armenian olympic games was possible through the mediation of marmnamarz, a fact that proves the considerable role played by the periodical. in his article “the voice of youth,” armenian sportsman vahram papazian, who represented the ottoman empire in the stockholm international olympic games in 1912, commended the activity demonstrated by greek sport organizations and the attention they devoted to athletics, but at the same time reproached the idleness and other useless morals and manners of armenian youth: be sure that if a single armenian athletic club were opened in constantinople, shortly thereafter armenians would achieve a leading role among all similar clubs in the ottoman empire.” we already have sportsmen who can compete with the glorious greek thorizas and emulate his achievements. europe did not recognize the armenian descent, so let it recognize our strength.10 marmnamarz also carried out activities directed to the creation of athletic and sport clubs. moreover, while sport was viewed as an indicator of civil awareness, the creation of sport clubs and especially the development of team sports were considered important tocreate a newly-shaped national character, a new philosophy for vitality and success, following ideas expressed by shavarsh krisian: the creation and development of sport clubs are very important especially for us, armenians, since sports will unite us. one of the most criticized aspects of armenian character is the instinct of individualism. it is always diffi cult for armenians to obey others in community life. the spirit of individualism should be diminished by the help of these clubs and love towards community life should be spread among armenian youth… in brief, sport clubs are furnaces where not only physical strength, but also organized unity and civic education are forged.11 active correspondence was maintained with marmnamarz from smyrna, kutahya, arabkir, partizak, caesarea, and other cities and villages. sport amateurs and sportsmen from the armenian communities in egypt, bulgaria and even the united states were also actively involved. dispatching periodical issues to provincial schools and colleges was another important issue; the promotion of periodicals among armenians outside constantinople was carried out through donation of issues to locals. the athletic movement that was gaining full speed brought forth the idea of creation of united sport structures. this idea was also led and backed by shavarsh krisian. in particular, the existence of several armenian football teams in istanbul and smyrna inspired the idea of a separate football league, but the invitations sent to the football clubs of constantinople did not have the expected result. 10. marmnamarz, vol. 1, no. 2 (march 1911). 11. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 18 (september 1912). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 17 the fi rst issues of marmnamarz were published as illustrated journals, while the following issues were introduced as daily newspaper on national physical revival, and later on as daily newspaper on national physical education. in this way, marmnamarz emphasized its real mission and became the most important tool for promoting sports within the armenian young men of the ottoman empire. in 1911, during the fi rst year of its publication, marmnamarz was published as a monthly journal and had 10 issues. the next year, it became a semi-monthly to fulfi ll the request of its readers and published 24 issues. the frequent change in the addresses of publishing houses and editorial offi ces was a hint that the newspaper confronted fi nancial diffi culties. the publication of marmnamarz was a unique phenomenon, as tigran khoian, a noted armenian sportsman and scout leader, remarked in his memoirs: “marmnamarz fi lled in a considerable gap and appeared just on time to help introduce the importance of physical education and assist those who were resisting the past efforts in this fi eld. it became an advisor and a guide for armenian youth...”12 marmnamarz was published until 1914. its founder, shavarsh krisian, was a victim of the armenian genocide. after world war i, hay scout, a different periodical substituted marmnamarz. besides dealing with issues of athletics and sport, hay scout was also the offi cial newspaper of the armenian general athletic union. sport and athletics in smyrna as it was mentioned above, the fi rst football games were held in smyrna. armenian football player zareh kuyumjian was among sportsmen and players of the town. arthur elmasian, after thorough studies of athletics in france, returned to smyrna and began work as a coach in the armenian national college. in 1900 elmasian managed to purchase sport facilities and other accessories to create a gym in the yard of the mesropian college. in june 1901 elmasian organized an annual sports show, involving more than a hundred people. the shows became periodical and they were clandestinely. however, in 1905 elmasian was denounced and had to leave smyrna. after elmasian’s departure, his associates continued the work of their coach and formed the mesropian union. during the harsh years of the reign of sultan abdul hamid ii, armenian sportsmen had no opportunity to perform in international competitions and sought to perform in foreign teams. for this reason, most armenian sportsmen performed in the greek team “pelops.” the majority of local armenian sportsmen were interested in football and the consequence of this interest was the creation of “football union,” the fi rst armenian football team in smyrna. over time armenian sportsmen created the sport clubs “qnar,” “vaspurakan,” and “sahakian.” the union of these four separate teams marked the creation of the “armenian hunters’ club.” the latter had its own regulation, but gave the above-mentioned four organizations a free rein to act independently. thanks to the zealous efforts of armenian sportsman mkrtich yangian, this newly-formed club reached 600 members, and had about 1000 active members in late 1912. in 1910 the four armenian teams held matches to choose 12. see hayk demoyan, armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire, 51. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 18 the best armenian football teams that would compete for the international cup tournament of smyrna. the football team of the “armenian hunters’ club” achieved great success during 1911-1912. the armenian team successively competed with the greek teams “pelops,” “apollon,” and “panionios”, and the english “burnabad,” and obtained glorious victories. in march 1912 the armenian team won the silver cup of smyrna. this achievement became a source of inspiration for armenians, especially in smyrna. grigor chololian noted in reference to the positive effect of the victory: this honorable victory was a strong moral, rather than material success for the union. it served as an encouragement to create a wholesome movement within the armenian community. all skeptic and indifferent people supporting the organization felt the expressive spirit of the race. 13 for obvious reasons, the sport and athletic movement of smyrna stopped during world war i and gained new momentum afterwards. the development of sports and athletics in western armenia and cilicia constantinople and smyrna were the main centers of armenian sport life within the empire. at the same time, the importance of the development of sports and athletics in the armenian populated provinces of the empire came into agenda. besides offi cially introducing physical training in its syllabus, the educational board of constantinople started training sportsmen for provincial cities and villages through the joint efforts of shavarsh krisian and aram nikoghosian. erzerum, with the armenian sanasarian college, certainly had a leading role among the athletic movements in the province. as grigor chololian attested, this important center of armenia “became an educational centre for art and literature in the depth of dark anatolia.” swimming and skating were put on strong basis in the colleges, which also had sport syllabi. surviving photographs that captured the demonstrative performances of sanasarian college students confi rm its high level of athletic physical training. another fact that supports the abovementioned statement is the special mention of athletics in diplomas issued for sanasarian college graduates. from this perspective it is noteworthy to mention shavarsh krisian’s opinion published in the armenian newspaper “harach” of erzerum: athletic exercises will become a blessing for armenians and will spread from constantinople to armenia. we should not spare anything for the propagation of these exercises. on the contrary, the youth sport clubs should be a part of our daily interests and should become our daily bread. the athletic courses should be held continuously for the improvement of the race or, as people would say, for the “national” standpoint. it is necessary to straighten spines through physical exercises in order to have healthy thought and soul.14 13. azdak, march 1, 1939. 14. see azdak, december 29, 1938. patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 19 the armenian olympic committee, referring to the idea of making the armenian olympic games as an all-armenian event and the need to include armenian sportsmen from other regions of the empire, mentioned the following in its call: the olympic subcommittee has always considered only the small part of the armenian population, yet never the armenians of constantinople as a whole. thus, it should always give preference to regional projects. after considering the existent facilities of constantinople, the subcommittee has to establish the fi rst gym in constantinople, train athletic coaches there, and send them to the provinces.15 the armenian revolutionary federation (arf) showed particular zeal to organize sport and athletic clubs in many regions of the ottoman empire. after the young turk revolution, arf clubs were operating both in and out of constantinople. some of these clubs were the arf sport club of adabazar, the “aramazd” sport union, and the “atlas” and “kaytsak” clubs in nikomedia and samsun respectively. similar sport clubs were also formed in zeitun, van, divrik, and hachin. football, shooting, fencing, boxing, and other sports were widely popular in these clubs. among the organizations operating in the ottoman empire before the armenian genocide were the young christian organization in van, the united club in hachin, the explorer’s union in mersin, the armenian explorer’s sport union in aintab, and the “masyats” sport union in konia. the latter was directed by mikayel bartikian. military and physical trainings were also obligatory in the jenanian college of konia. the college periodical wrote the following: alongside with moral and cognitive growth, physical training of pupils is under good care. each pupil should follow the important course of athletics. besides, each pupil is permitted to use sport facilities during holidays.16 “vahagn”, another armenian sport club, was established in van. yeghishe qadjuni, one of the founders of the “torq” club, left for van to propagate the movement there and shortly after his departure the alumni of colleges in van organized a sport show, swedish exercising and a rewarding ceremony. the local “vaspurakan” football team was also created with the efforts of qadjuni. deep interest towards sport tournaments and athletics was shown in sebastia (sivas). the “partev” club was established here by the initiative of fourteen members in 1911. this club was the leader of the athletic movement among armenian population of sebastia and in a due course the number of its members grew. the “varazdatian” club and the “artsiv” union also functioned in sebastia. in late 1911 the fi rst fi eld tournaments were held in the city and the “zavarian” club was established in the village kovtun. a football team was created in the town of niksar, located in the province of sebastia. the fast development of athletics in constantinople had an impact on the athletic movement of partizak (modern bahçecik). on june 2, 1911 the fi rst fi eld show and football matches with participation of armenian sportsmen were held in partizak. the “artsiv” sport union was also functioning actively in partizak, while mateos zarifi an (better known 15. marmnamarz, vol. 1, no. 9 (october 1911). 16. ikonion, jenanian college, konia, vol. i, no. 7-8, july-august, 1912. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 20 as a prematurely died poet) from the partizak senior college achieved a brilliant success in athletics. field tournaments and athletic games became widely spread in american and armenian colleges of the province. separate alumni clubs of the anatolia college were created in marsovan. these clubs merged in 1908 and formed the “shavarshian” union. along with football, the union also had a baseball team and a periodical called “ayg.” besides the anatolia college, active work was being carried out in the st. sahakian college. annual sport competitions were periodically organized by the “hayordi” student’s union of that college. four college teams of harpoot, i. e. american “euphrates” college, french, german colleges and the national kedronakan college, performed in the fi rst football matches that took place on may 20, 1911. these colleges also housed basketball matches and bicycle races. the fi rst sport show at the college took place on june 16, 1912 by the initiative of the alumni of national central college, under the presidency and guidance of archimandrite artavazd and coach hakob serikian. the coach bestowed “beautiful medals” upon the winners. according to the information found in marmnamarz, at the same time the trustees of st. karapet monastery of efkere, located in the caesarea district, “appreciated the useful role of sport and kindly provided sportsmen a beautiful spacious fi eld,” where sport games were held. the “artsiv” and “gayl” sport clubs were formed in vezir kyopru and ç enkiler. the “ariuts” club was established in the sahak-mesropian college of sivri hissar. in 1911 an armenian youth union was formed in yerznka (now erzincan), followed by the establishment of the “zhayr” sport club (1912). the latter was aimed at “revealing and developing the physical abilities of club members.” later on, the sport club “artsvi” was reorganized in trebizond and became known as “sharzhum.” a rare photograph showing sportsmen of the “artsiv” club, published in the december 1912 issue of marmnamarz, has been preserved.. the fate of the members of the club is unknown. in one of his articles, shavarsh krisian mentioned that: …sport clubs, especially, should be formed in armenian districts. for this purpose it is important to create networks and interconnect districts with distant small, minor cities and villages. for example, a network in van, erzerum, sivas, etc., where all [cities and villages] should be linked to their centers. we should consider local conditions to organize sport games according to these networks, as well as instructions received from centers a few months before the start of armenian general olympic games. the centers should allocated means to send the sportsmen who have achieved the best results in these contests to constantinople or to the city that has been determined as capital of the current year. of course, the rest of the amount should be disbursed by the committee.17 the excerpt shows that the pioneers of the armenian athletic movement, besides 17. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 7 (august 1912). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 21 their wishes, had a defi nite action plan, a visible strategy, and a policy for achieving their goals. the armenian athletic and sport movement was also spread to aleppo and beirut. in 1914 athletics was introduced to armenian colleges of aleppo for the fi rst time through the efforts of coach karapet hovakimian, who had arrived from harpoot. the “aghbyur marmnamarzakan” athletic club established in the nersesian college in aleppo also housed a library and a gymnasium. there were several fi eld exhibitions at the college, organized by the club. in beirut, armenian sportsmen mostly represented local american educational institutions. the “artsiv” club functioned in samsoun and had a great impact over the local armenian population, especially youngsters. in his memoirs, vahan minakhorian, a prominent armenian political fi gure, refers to the interest that the armenian youth had towards athletics, as well as to the organised fi eld exhibitions in samsoun.18 it is noteworthy that local turkish authorities also applied to armenian coaches and asked them to organize similar events within the turkish population. armenian athletic and sport unions and clubs were established in rodosto, ordu, izmit and in the armenian college of amasia. the “vishap” and “ararat” sport clubs started functioning in ovacık and manisa respectively. besides constantinople, the sport life also progressed in armenian populated cilicia. armenian clubs from iskenderun and adana participated in field exhibitions periodically organized in this region. most active were the “sisvan,” “hetum,” “levon” and “ruben” football teams from the armenian central college of dortyol and a number of pupils from cilician orphanages, whose number had grown after the terrible armenian massacres in the spring of 1909. the local armenian population realized the importance of developing self-defense abilities among the population. such trends were particularly evident in chorq-marzpan, known for its heroic selfdefensive struggle during the massacres, and in other neighboring cities. other coaches were invited from constantinople to adana to develop athletic sport life among the local youth. varag pogharian and mateos zarifian played an important role in the organization of the athletic movement in cilicia. the organization of the cilician olympic games deserves a special mention. they were held on april 1914, in a special venue north from chorq-marzpan. sport clubs from adana and alexandretta took part in this exceptional event. thousands of visitors, including about forty turkish offi cers, attended the competitions. a football match took place between the “sisvan” team from central college and the multiethnic team of alexandretta. it was followed by running and long jump competitions between teams of alexandretta, adana, chork-marzpan and the kelekian orphanage. the alumni of the central college performed swedish exercises that made a great impression upon local spectators. the participants were awarded special medals bearing the inscription “cilician olympic games, 1914, chorqmarzpan.”19 these events promoted the creation of new unions and clubs. 18. see photos in hayk demoyan, armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire, 83. 19. marmnamarz, vol. 4, no. 2 ( june 1914). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 22 armenian women and athletics the growing interest towards athletics and sports was mainly noticed among men. nevertheless, armenian women did not stay indifferent. it was surely diffi cult for women to get engaged in athletics within a muslim society. after the proclamation of the ottoman constitution in 1908, armenian women and girls were allowed to engage in the sports athletic movement. at fi rst, women were not involved in separate competitions, but performed in fi eld shows and in armenian olympic games. they took part in solemn ceremonies, such as the opening of competitions and the awarding ceremony. marmnamarz and its editor shavarsh krisian were instrumental to install interest towards sports among armenian women in constantinople. in the articles published by krisian and others, healthy life was considered as a guarantee for bringing up a healthy generation. for this reason, the inclusion of women in sports life took special importance. special articles were devoted to the need of introducing athletic courses in women’s colleges. in regard to this, krisian mentioned the following: if we consider a woman getting a physical education, we should realize that even in boy’s colleges athletics is still viewed as a precious activity and this course could not be used more “effi ciently” than by turning it into a limited reading lesson. i am sharing my personal experience. children may have the opportunity to run, jump and cry, but at least in colleges they perform a disgraceful act, because among us a playful and lively child is considered disgraceful and an obeying, calm boy is considered a good child. the fi rst is subject to punishment, while the second shows a sign of good conduct. nevertheless, this disgrace is somehow forbidden to girls, it is shameful for girls to run and jump like children. those girls who cannot conceal their natural instincts would be called tomboys… schools that took every step to prevent the slowly spreading perversion unconsciously furthered it, and we ascribe this phenomenon to schools that not performed their role. every ruthless person would try to take his/her revenge, but we shall hope that armenian women will not revenge on their children for their mistakes and even wrongs, on generations, shortly, on their nation.20 another article published by marmnamarz was more expressive. the author compared and criticized the customs and morals of armenian women, as well as the adoption of european customs, while the need to get involved in sports was neglected. pointing out that the involvement in sports and physical education was a precondition for bringing up a healthy generation, the editor of marmnamarz stated: women’s liberation movement is taking a meaningless direction among us. sometimes it is expressed by generous and useless luxury. it tries to come forth during fl eeting conversations, expressing through deceptive masks of sophism, argument, and female perception. we are not concerned with this, but with the demand of saving the race. well, we shall be educated, speak, argue, sing or play, but what should be done to secure the health of armenian race? the best, strong, and brave offspring depends on our future mothers. some would like to resemble western women and would carefully imitate them, but why wouldn’t they imitate 20. marmnamarz, vol. 1, no. 1 (february 1911). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 23 the affection that those women have towards not only the women’s movement, but also their health and physical strength?21 during the early 1910s the fi rst women sport clubs were established with the efforts of armenian sportsmen. for example, shavarsh krisian formed the “yesaian alumni union” in constantinople. it was the fi rst women’s sports athletic club in western armenian society. in 1912 the second sport club for women, called “izhi” (“health”), was established in the scutari district of constantinople by the initiative of a few women. in 1913 the alumna of nikoghosian college established the “yerand” athletic club for women, which soon had more than 60 members. by that time, the “zavarian” women’s union, using swedish training technique, was formed in sivri hissar. in 1913 armenian sportswomen took part, for the fi rst time, in the second armenian olympic games. the teachers of the yesaian college in constantinople were trained to introduce physical training among armenian girls and pupils in provinces. they were sent to dortyol, hachin, and other cities inhabited by armenians as teachers. athletic courses were also introduced in women’s provincial colleges. although conservative views and lifestyle were dominant within the armenian population, thanks to marmnamarz the propagation of athletic concepts among armenian girls and women created serious prerequisites for bringing up a healthy generation. this movement managed to overcome resistance from conservative circles and called to bring a new kind of involvement into the armenian athletic and sport movement. the participation of armenian girls in the scout movement greatly expanded women’s inclusion in the athletic movement, especially during the post-war period. besides the existence of health issues, this active involvement was also dictated by the necessity of national rebirth after the armenian genocide. armenian olympic games (1911-1914) the 1908 revolution gave new hopes to ottoman armenians in terms of security and respect of basic human rights. it was also viewed as a new opening for liberalism in social life and activities in different realms, including the development of sport life. shavarsh krisian and his followers brought forward the idea of organizing armenian olympic games in 1910 with the aim of bringing together armenian sport clubs and unions for intercommunity competition. various armenian sport clubs were much inspired and encouraged by this idea. vahram papazian published similar ideas in marmnamarz. four all-armenian olympic games were held during 1911-1914 and were resumed in the post-war period after a short interruption. these games were unique in ottoman armenian social life. participating armenian sport and athletic clubs and groups which were taking part in those games set a number of records. winners were awarded with medals, cups, and other prizes. grigor chololian presented the prehistory of the idea to organize the armenian olympic games. 21. marmnamarz, vol. 1, no. 7 (april 1 1912). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 24 hardly had “marmnamarz” been published, when it became a favorite armenian periodical. it was necessary to start a unique project to infl ame this spark of inspiration. one day we were sitting in a restaurant, as usual, when the conversation turned to the stockholm olympic games. suddenly we came with the idea of creating the armenian olympic games.22 a preparatory meeting was held with representatives from armenian sport clubs and unions of constantinople, by invitation of the editorial staff of marmnamarz. the organizational committee was composed by aram galenter, gevorg terjimanian, yeghishe qadjuni, levon hakobian, shavarsh krisian, martiros kuyumchian and hovhannes savaian. the fi rst armenian olympic games were held on may 1, 1911 in the stadium of the “union club” of constantinople, with nearly all local sport organizations participating: “aharonian” club from beşiktaş, “tork” club from kum-kapu, “asparez”, “arax” and armenian revolutionary federation’s (arf) club from pera, “joghovurd” circle from samatia, “people’s club” from kadikoy, “armenian club” and “masiats” club, “kukunian” circle from topkapu, armenian youth union from pera, armenian coeducational union from şişli, the armenian alumni of american “robert” college, “raffi ” union, the editorial staff of marmnamarz, “artavazd” sport club from guruçeşme, progressive union of scutari, and student’s self-development union. almost 2000 people attended this unprecedented event. further the games were held on june 3, 1912, june 16, 1913, and in the summer of 1914. the latter did not last long because of the beginning of world war i. shavarsh krisian, referring to the idea of armenian olympic games, mentioned: armenian olympics should stop uniting just sport institutions of constantinople; this fact will only limit its value. instead, people should encourage the games and thus make them a well-organized event. armenian olympic games should be an allarmenian event that would gather all armenian population of turkish armenia. it should become a gathering place of armenians from caucasus and from other centers densely inhabited by armenians. it should resemble the ancient greek olympics. for this purpose it is necessary that the provincial population get involved, be trained and organized. when a connection between different unions gathered for a single purpose is established and fi nancial means are available, all athletic and sport clubs will form a single union. this union will necessarily keep in touch with all other similar organizations, located in centers densely inhabited by armenians. thus, armenian olympics would become an all-armenian event, the national means for expressing harmonious power, and would thus prove its value.23 it was envisaged that sportsmen from armenian hunters’ club of smyrna would also take part in these games. however, they could not arrive in constantinople because of the quarantine imposed in the city. according to the written statement, the following competitions were held: 100 yard dash (for adults and children), quarter-mile run, half-mile run and one-mile run competitions, 22. azdak, january 3, 1939. 23. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 8 (april 1912). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 25 cross-country race, sack racing, and fl ag racing. preliminary records were set in shot put and discus throw. the games also included high jump, long jump, pole vault, tug of war, and two-mile bicycle racing. competitions were marked by the participation of sargis mkrian and martiros guyumchian from “robert college,” vahram papazian from “artavazd” club and varag pogharian from “tork” club. winners and runners-up were awarded golden and silver medals, respectively. the fi rst olympic games, despite organizational gaps, opened a new page within the history of armenian sport history and athletic movement. constantinoplebased athletic clubs and the ones in provinces were greatly inspired by this event, which was a prerequisite for developing the idea of the armenian general athletic union. the second armenian olympic games, held on june 3, 1912, were more organized in comparison. these competitions were also organized in the stadium of the “union club.” new records were set during the games, again with participation of most armenian sport clubs from constantinople. the following sports were included: 100 yard dash, half mile run, quarter-mile run, cross-country race, fl ag racing, standing long jump, pole vault, long jump, high jump, discus and javelin throw, shot put, and two-miles bicycle racing. by suggestion of noted sportsman grigor merjanov, various human pyramids were formed. the third armenian olympic games were held on june 16, 1913 under the patronage of the armenian patriarch of constantinople, zaven ter-yeghiaian, and were presided over by famous armenian musician komitas. the latter also led the award ceremony during the fi nal part of the games and “did not forget to kiss the winners’ foreheads.” armenian scouts and girl-scouts participated in the third olympic games, maintaining order during the competition alongside with acting offi cers. the patronage of the patriarch was criticized in the ottoman armenian conservative press. shavarsh krisian, however, raised his objection: the current state of affairs in the world is as follows: when a nation has the sympathies of others, its people will try to discover the past and present state of affairs, general intellectual, moral and physical traits of that nation. armenians were in a similar condition. effective physical trainings were the result of the adopted western values and even the most commendable movements that started within narrow circles could not be noticed and considered national. for this reason we wished to have the presence of the patriarch and at the same time give national features to the movement that has started. in this case, europeans could say “this is how armenians resemble us.24 the participation of two armenian scout groups in the olympic games, representing the hindlian college and the suburb of scutari, was a novelty. the armenian spectators were greatly impressed by the proud military march of scouts, accompanied by music. the third armenian olympic games were enriched with with the arrival of representatives from sport clubs of smyrna, adabazar, partizak and caesarea. the representative from armenian hunters’ club of smyrna, gevorg habetian, had an outstanding performance. he won the competitions in 100 meter run and long jump. sargis tarigian from adabazar also had a successful performance. 24. marmnamarz, vol. 3, no. 6 (june 1913). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 26 the other novelty during these competitions was the introduction of a new metric system of registering the records and scores. this was an officially approved method used during the international olympic games. the following sports were included: 100 meter, 400 meter, 800 meter sprints and 1500 meter run, flag racing, standing long jump, high jump, long jump, shot put, javelin throw and 5000 meters bicycle racing. the fourth and last armenian olympic games were held on june 14, 1914, just a couple of weeks before the beginning of world war i. the games were opened with the fl ight of doves that reiterated an ancient armenian custom coming from the navasard (new year) games. the fourth olympic games hosted 13 sport clubs and 81 armenian sportsmen from different cities of the empire. these clubs were mainly from constantinople: “armenian sport club,” “hayordi,” “perperian,” “tork,” “arax,” “artavazd,” “nor dprots,” “vahagn,” “euphrates,” “nor uzh,” “sasoun” and “andranik.” there were also sportsmen from smyrna, adabazar and marsovan. the participation of the “knar” orchestra, accompanied by v. srvandztiants and barsegh kanachian, aroused great excitement among the armenian spectators. the armenian olympic games had great importance for the further development of armenian athletic movement and sports, as well as for the creation of a joint body, which would coordinate the movement. armenian sportsmen at the 1912 stockholm international olympic games armenian sources, particularly the author of “marmnamarzin girqy” (the book of sportsman), alexan mkrtichian, referred to habet papazian as an armenian gymnast who took part in olympic games unoffi cially held in athens (1906). mkrtichian also mentioned that “…armenians were the fi rst among the eastern nations to participate in olympic games…”25 according to turkish sources, the ottoman olympic association was established on july 20, 1907 and registered by international olympic committee in 1911. the fi rst participant representing the ottoman empire in the international olympic games was hungarian aleko mulash. however, there are no grounds for asserting that his participation in the international olympic games of 1908 was the fi rst offi cial record on the participant from the ottoman empire. as a matter of fact, for the fi rst time in the history of turkish sports two armenian sportsmen, vahram papazian and mkrtich mkrian, had a unique chance of representing the ottoman empire in international olympic games. along with the idea of organizing armenian olympic games, the idea of sending armenian sportsmen to participate in the international olympic games was discussed within sport circles and in the pages of marmnamarz. this discussion was derived from the need of “upholding the honor of armenians.” 25. hayk demoyan, armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire, 113. patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 27 turkish athletic clubs also made some attempts to send representatives from ottoman turkey to participate in this worldwide olympic competition. referring to this question, turkish sportsman selim sııri tarcan writes: …we decided to take part in the 1912 international olympic games to be held in stockholm. through ikdam and sabah newspapers i invited young inexperienced people who wanted to take part in various competitions and to obtain a license. at the same time i sent a written request to the ministry of war and the ministry of navy to provide the names of those offi cers who wanted to participate in international competitions. at that time, the government did not properly estimate the political and social role of these international competitions. as a response to my request, the government did not consider the competitions important from military perspective and thus gave no adequate answer to my request. i did not receive answer from other formed unions, except for the one or two football clubs that were operating in istanbul…26 the question of sending armenian sportsmen to the 1912 stockholm olympic games was a widely discussed topic in the early 1912 issues of marmnamarz. as the participation in olympic games was quite a diffi cult and costly task, the “artavazd” sport union organised an all-armenian fundraising to cover the costs and send vahram papazian to stockholm. this idea was backed by marmnamarz: this is a great idea and we think that it is quite unnecessary to attempt to raise the strong sense of civilization during olympic games. we think that a desire to take part in olympic games means to understand one of the secrets and reasons of the majesty of being a great nation. resembling to such nations means to have lofty ideals on civility and it is just for this reason that we think that this ideal is promising for the future of armenian people. if we admonish our children and brothers to meet with people who are both intellectually and morally superior to them, why don’t we all do the same thing with superior and more enlightened nations? it is secondary for us whether papazian will take the fi rst or the last place. the important thing is to participate as an armenian. let papazian take even the last place, but be presented as an armenian; it is important that the name of armenia be recalled at the competition, involving participants from great nations. it is true that for about 30 years europeans have known armenians as a robbed, killed and ravished, wailed and bloodstained nation. many people pitied and then forgot us and now it is high time that our name reappears on their tongues. we want that the civilized world know us through our work and efforts.27 provincial armenian clubs were involved in fundraising activities too. the “partev” sports club from sivas granted an ottoman half-gold for that purpose. v. papazian and m. mkrian arrived in sweden thanks to these fundraisings and the personal contributions of ottoman armenians. 26. see şevki m. çapan, türk sporunda selim sııri tarcan (muğla: ünyay yayınları, 1999). 27. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 2 (january 1912). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 28 while arriving in stockholm, armenian sportsmen noticed that the fl ag of the ottoman empire was not fl ying among the fl ags of participating countries. they complained to both olympic organization committee and the embassy of ottoman turkey. they both demanded that the fl ag of the ottoman empire be displayed among the fl ags of other countries or else they would refuse to take part in the competition. papazian provided interesting details in his memoirs: when in the morning i got to stockholm, i noticed that the streets and important institutions were adorned with fl ags of all big and small countries participating in olympic games, but there was not a single turkish fl ag among them. i was much concerned with this fact. after all, i was offi cially representing turkey and this uncomely attitude assumed towards my country was a kind of reproach for me. i took a car and went straight to the turkish embassy to express my anger and demand immediate action, with the suitcases in my hand, not even having entered the fl at provided to me. after introducing myself and receiving congratulations on the part of ambassador, i said: “bey effendi, the air of stockholm is depressing for me and i would like to return to my country... the entire stockholm is adorned with foreign fl ags, except the turkish fl ags, and this fact is a kind of reproach for me and against my country. i’ll stay here only if measures are taken and the fl ag of my country waves beside all other fl ags. the turkish ambassador was petrifi ed in front of me…like many others, he couldn’t believe that an armenian might have such strong love and respect for the turkish country…in that moment, he was probably not realizing one clear fact: armenians have always loved their turkish country and it was the turks, who did not love their exemplary ottoman armenian population and were always chasing after them in every opportunity…28 vahram papazian continued his story: “two hours later the turkish fl ag was actually fl ying in every corner thanks to a young armenian, who after a few years was to wail upon the millions of unburied corps of patriotic armenians …all of them massacred by turks.”29 the olympic committee put ottoman fl ags in the streets and in the main stadium of stockholm. thus, for the fi rst time in the history of the olympic games, the fl ag of the ottoman empire was raised thanks to armenian sportsmen. further, the armenian sportsmen found out that, as a reaction to endless violence, committed by ottoman turkish government, the swedish had refused to raise the turkish fl ag among others fl ags of participating countries. it is noteworthy that the representative of turkish olympic committee, selim sııri tarcan, was not present during the opening ceremony to take part in the procession with armenian sportsmen, although he was in stockholm and had agreed to get in touch with the delegation. 2541 sportsmen from 28 countries took part in the stockholm international olympic games. besides ottoman empire, representatives from egypt, luxemburg, portugal, serbia, and japan took part in the competitions for the fi rst time. 28. v. papazian, love, love and love (beirut: sevan, 1962), 53. (in armenian) 29. ibid. patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 29 vahram papazian participated in 1500 meters run competition, displaying the ottoman state symbol on his shirt. it is interesting that the suggestion of sewing the fl ag of ottoman empire was made to the wife of the ottoman to sweden. mkrtich mkrian achieved great results in pentathlon and discus throw and took the fi fth place. vahram papazian was near the fi nish and was leading during the 1500 meters run competition. unfortunately, he fell to the ground several meters before crossing the fi nishing line and lost the winning place. the swedish mass media referred to the participation of armenians in the olympic games. the local “stadium” newspaper hosted mkrtich mkrian in its offi ce and interviewed him: mr. mkrtich mkrian is one of the few ottomans participating in the olympic games. mkrian, accompanied by the secretary of the ottoman consulate in stockholm, a sportsman, visited our editorial offi ce yesterday. mr. mkrian is 19 years old. he is a student of robert college and an alumnus of this year. mkrian is going to participate in decathlon and pentathlon, discus throw with right and left hands, iron and javelin throw. last year he was a winner in competitions held in athens. he has also strong skills in wrestling.30 although the two armenian sportsmen did not obtain any prize, their participation in such an important international competition was widely discussed inarmenian and turkish circles. this is how vahram papazian commented about his participation in the stockholm olympic games: in 1912 the international olympic games were to be held in stockholm. turkey was also invited to participate. nevertheless, turks had no sportsmen to send, unlike armenians. thus, they decided to send an armenian sportsman to represent the huge ottoman empire and succeeded. for the fi rst time in history, turkey was taking part in such international competition as a nation, thanks to two armenians, as it will be seen later. these two armenian sportsmen brought honor and were useful to their country. a few years later, a turkish wrestler dishonored the turkish people in the same country and was deported from sweden for having stolen a watch.31 during the next years, the question of sending armenian representatives to olympic games was hotly discussed. it was considered not only an important step to promote sports life among armenians, but also became a matter of national expression of the suppressed group before the international audience. thanks to vahram papazian and mkrtich mkrian, armenian sportsmen participated for the fi rst time in the modern international olympic games, opening a new page in the history of ottoman, as well as armenian sports. an article by shavarsh krisian in marmnamarz referred to the participation of the two armenians։ when turkey, an empire with ample means, could not send a single sportsman, two armenians had the honor of representing the ottoman empire again. we are glad 30. alexan mkrtichian, book of athlete (constantinople: arev press, 1926), 50 (in armenian). 31. v. papazian, love, love and love, 45. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 30 indeed and we hope that more armenians will participate in the sixth international olympic games to be held in 1916, in berlin.32 although the participation of two armenians in the international event was remarkable, no turkish circle give importance or praised the armenian community’s efforts to represent the empire in such an important gathering. this showed not only the negative attitude towards non-controlled self-expression of armenians in the world, but also disclosed an initial negative and nationalistic setting among turkish political and intellectual circles. sports and nationalist competition along with the promotion and development of sports and athletics, turkish nationalism was becoming more intense in all the fi elds of social activity. the purpose of this intensifying nationalism was to fi ght against national minorities and to oust them from their leading positions in the areas of economy, culture, and education. in other words, the main purpose of the policy adopted by young turk leaders was to ensure the domination of turkish element in the social and economic realm of the ottoman empire. the confl icts during the simultaneous development of armenian and turkish sports should be viewed in the context of post-1908 revolution developments, which enabled some sort of temporary liberalism for minorities, while putting the parallel discourse of both communities in development strategies. the participation of armenian sportsmen in the stockholm international olympic games of summer 1912 was widely discussed both in the armenian and ottoman turkish press, but from different viewpoints, shaping the importance of such participation or non-participation for national identity. in this respect, the efforts by turkish sportsman and founder of ottoman olympic committee selim sııri tarcan to send a turkish sportsman to stockholm failed, and they triggered an interesting evaluation of this fact in his writings. tarcan viewed sport competition as completion in the military fi eld, where the representatives of participating countries had to demonstrate superiority to their competitors. tarcan referred to the parade performed by sportsmen from participant nations and to the presence of national fl ags in the fi eld with evident disappointment: each chosen representative of the 26 countries was there, except us. this pain fi lled my eyes fi lled with tears. the huge ottoman empire that had once given to the europeans the phrase “as valiant as a turk” today is not taking part in this strong competition. this is a very painful setback. naturally, i applied to the government in order to send a few turkish sportsmen to this important event, since we have been accustomed for years to expect everything implemented by the government. however, i could not share my concern with anybody. the answer from the ministry of war made me even more grievous. as an answer to my both private and offi cial request, fuat pasha, the advisor to the ministry of war, replied: “the issue is not of military importance. thus, it is not necessary to send policemen to this event.” how can one not be despaired by similar answer? nevertheless, the olympic games were fi rstly important from the military perspective. it is enough to say that there were one general and 6 policemen 32. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 12 (june 1912). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 31 from germany, 1 commander and 5 policemen from france, 1 general and 30 policemen from russia, while italy, belgium, denmark, greece and serbia have sent more policemen with different titles. for the nations, which think that future war will not differ from sport competition, it is not diffi cult to understand the real essence of olympic games.33 those lines were written just a couple of months before the first balkan war and the overall rhetoric of the turkish sportsman is quite understandable. shavarsh krisian, the editor of marmnamarz, responded to the abovementioned statement. the article, entitled “our answer,” actually touched the topic of national competitiveness in sports, projecting broader nationalist competition in post-revolution ottoman empire. in his reply article, he put: we’ve attentively read the above-stated article by selim sırrı bey several times. there’s no need to state that we present this article to the readers only for the opinions and viewpoints it contains. the absence of turkish policemen during olympic games has never upset us. conversely, we feel offended that selim sıırı bey puts every effort to differ between a christian ottoman and turkish ottoman, if he ever admits that christians are ottomans. let’s not forget that this article is published in a turkish newspaper and is addressed to the turkish public. therefore, selim sıırı bey shows himself in his true colors before armenian and particularly turkish public. this means he doesn’t contemplate that his article would be read by non-turkish public. for this purpose, there is no need to keep bringing about the outdated formulae, which have lost their faded meanings long ago. let’s cut the long story short. two armenians travel to stockholm by their own means and fundraisings, introduce themselves not as armenians, but as ottomans, wear uniforms with the ottoman crescent depicted on them, struggle to introduce ottomanism among different teams and in europe, and win applauses from the public as ottoman sportsmen. and, at the end, selim sıırı bey falsifi es and distorts the facts by saying he could not fi nd turks participating in stockholm olympic, without ever mentioning two ottomans who happened to be armenians. isn’t this enough to reveal the psychology that unfortunately dominates in the mindset of, as it is considered, the most progressive elements of this country? either this country is for turks only and we armenians and other nationalities are not citizens of the empire, because we are not muslims, or this country is called the ottoman empire, where every individual and every nationality have equal responsibility and rights… today, when the ottoman empire, which is not a country for turks only, as selim sıırı bey thinks, wages a struggle for existence, armenians should also take arms and protect their ottoman country…34 the development of sport life and organized competitions contributed to some extent to divergences in the ottoman urban society and resulted in problems of political importance. 33. translated from ottoman turkish to armenian by shavarsh krisian, see marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 18 (september 1912). 34. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 20 (october 1912). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 32 the armenian argument about sport competitiveness also bore nationalistic character. namely, a victory of armenian sportsmen over turkish, greek, and other clubs was presented as a natural phenomenon, thus prioritizing armenian sportsmen and the signifi cance of records set by them. thus, after the victory of the armenian hunters’ club’s football team over the local greek “pelops” team in smyrna, the armenian comment on this success was: today we thank smyrna armenians and wish that they have supporters wherever they are, and from now on we are sure that armenian youth, who forms the basis of the armenian race, will have victories in sports as well, like in anything else. from that time onwards, armenians will have a different way of life and condition, will receive different treatment from foreigners, and will consequently have another future.35 the match between the armenian “balta liman” and the turkish “galatasaray” teams held in 1906 is of particular interest. about 3000 armenians, europeans, greeks, and turkish people attended the match. armenian football player stepan khanjian, who participated in the abovementioned game, recalled that among the guests there were also turkish high-ranking offi cers who “were invited by galatasaray to applaud their victory…” the match fi nished with an appalling victory of the armenian team that scored fi ve unanswered goals. on september 2, 1912 an international tournament organized by the “fenerbahce” club was held in the “union” club stadium in kadikoy, istanbul. armenian, turkish and greek clubs and sportsmen participated. the tournament was attended by various layers of turkish population and especially servicemen. taking advantage from the bayram holiday, they “hastened to come and encourage the participants. the turkish guests thought that they would win the match and show the outcome of four-year efforts.” then marmnamarz added: all expectations of turkish sportsmen died off, because in nearly all competitions armenians preserved their leading positions and performed under the applauses of guests and especially armenian visitors… as one can judge from the aforementioned results, armenians were chief leaders in the competitions. it is true that the records, compared to the ones set during the olympic games, were not that good, but clearly showed how much turks fell behind in sport competitions. they need to train in order to take good positions in competitions organized by them.36 another interesting extract found in the pages of marmnamarz shows the reaction of turks after armenian victories. it is even more interesting to view this paragraph in the context of different opinions and even clashing views concerning pan-ottoman ideology: when armenian visitors began applauding their compatriots, turks grieved and objected, asking why they were discriminating between them, since they were all ottomans, etc. there were many discussions that made us refl ect why turks exploit 35. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 17 (april 1912). 36. marmnamarz, vol. 2, no. 18 (september 1912). patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 33 the advantages of armenians and consider their traits and rights as ottoman, but during massacres and riots they have counted us as armenians and not ottomans. therefore, we are asking this question to them.37 some armenian clubs started to recruit turkish members in order not to be accused of having only armenian members and falling under the danger of being closed. the formation of scout organizations with its semi-militaristic character among armenian youth brought new impetus in the confl icting discourse, creating harsh and negative counter steps on behalf of the young turkey. the semi-military character of scout detachments and scout gatherings and marches of armenian groups in the ottoman capital city may have troubled young turkish authorities. the parallel creation of similar structures among turkish youth became strongly connected with the army and started to broaden its network under the aegis of war minister enver pasha, who headed ottoman turkish scout organizations. on april 1916, enver pasha made a special proclamation for youth organizations, where he referred to the situation in the country, as well as to the importance of social education and the realization of national desires. this was evidence that ethnic minorities in the ottoman empire were already being considered an alien element and therefore it was intolerable to see them as successful competitors in the fi eld of sport. one of the clear evidences of exclusion of christian minorities from the social strata of the ottoman empire was the solid support provided by the cup to turkish sport clubs and scout organizations with an aim to counteract the successes of minorities in the fi eld of sportive competitions. young turks paid special attention to the creation of turkish sport clubs and in some cases they sponsored such initiatives directly. in late 1913 celal bayar, the executive secretary of young turkish party, visited smyrna and allocated funds to form turkish athletic club. the turkish “altay” club was established on june 6, 1914. the fellows of this club were members of the “union and progress” party. it was not accidental that dr. nazim bey, who was one of the young turkish ultra-nationalistic fi gures and one of the main perpetrators of the armenian genocide, headed the “fenerbahce” sport club in 1916. the armenian sport life and genocide the policy of genocide implemented by the committee union and progress shortly after the first world war broke out resulted in a huge blow on the social, political and cultural life of ottoman armenians. hundreds of armenian intellectuals, among them also sportsmen, became victims of the genocidal policy. in 1915 nearly all armenian sport clubs and unions in the ottoman empire ceased their existence. one of the victims of the genocide was also the editor-in-chief of “marmnamarz,” shavarsh krisian, who was exiled to ayaş with a group of istanbul armenian intellectuals and shortly afterwards killed. the cruel retaliation against eminent ottoman armenian intellectuals committed by the cup government was conditioned by their violent intolerance to the leading positions of 37. ibid. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 1, issue 1 34 national minorities. they aimed to create a new turkish nationalistic ideology based on the leading motto “turkey for turks.” among the victims of genocide was galust arkhaian, from the gedig pasha subbranch of the “artavazd” sport club, who was exiled to deir el zor and died there. another armenian sportsman, vardevar yapuchian, also died during the exile to deir el zor. hayk chololian, a sportsman from constantinople and a football player in the “arax” team, joined the turkish army and served as an assistant to civil engineer in sivas. he was among 1700 armenian soldiers and offi cers killed during the general murder of armenian servicemen of the turkish army. among the victims of wwi and the armenian genocide were yervand nshanian and gevorg kerestechian, the founders of the “sasoun” athletic union in makrikoy, constantinople; hovhannes gorian, one of the best football players of “robert” college; ghazaros guyumchian, alumnus of the “sanasarian” armenian college of erzerum and a coach in the college of uchpek village, located near chemeshgezak; gevorg terjimanian, one of the organisers of the first armenian olympic games; poghos zenneian, representative of the scout movement, and many others. among the victims of the armenian genocide was sportsman avetis aychian, member of the “torq” athletic union in constantinople. he was in bitlis working as a teacher in a turkish college when he was deported and killed. the majority of armenian sportsmen who were members of clubs outside constantinople and smyrna were deported and killed. nothing is known of the fate of the trabzon based “artsiv” (eagle) club of armenian sportsmen, whose picture was printed in one of the 1912 issues of “marmnamarz.” the april 1920 issue of the periodical “hay scout” had an inscription on its cover that recalled the great loss: “in memory of martyred and killed sportsmen.” conclusion the establishment and development of armenian sports, scout clubs and unions in the ottoman cities and villages inhabited by armenians heralded a new shift in vital intercommunal relations among western armenians. the creation of sport clubs and the introduction of athletics in schools and colleges were regarded as signifi cant means for preserving armenian identity and promoting the idea of a new generation. the latter was to attain a leading role in the improvement and reorganization of national life. the creation of the armenian general athletic union was not just a mere idea and was not limited to the context of only athletic issues. it was set to realize and support the idea of uniting armenians and training a healthy generation out of orphanages. the animated athletic and sport life in the ottoman empire could not remain unnoticed to ottoman reactionary and nationalist circles; the success of armenian sportsmen and the development of armenian sport life were against the offi cially pursued policy to consider the turkish nation above everything. the newly-formed armenian sport movement incurred serious demages because of the premeditated plan of implementation of armenian genocide. during 1914-1915 all armenian sport clubs were closed, several armenian sportsmen were exiled and massacred. patriotism, competitive nationalism and minority’s successes 35 however, shortly after wwi the movement showed signs of rebirth. this rebirth marked another bright page in the chronology of armenian sports and athletic history. the scout movement served as an additional stimulus to spread the athletic athletic movement, as well as to speak for the demand of bringing up a healthy generation. this policy was especially expressed by athletic initiatives in armenian orphanages. after the defeat of the ottoman empire in wwi, the collapse of the empire brought a general recession, which also affected the sport fi eld. however, sports and sports competitions would soon become one of the key elements of intensifi cation of turkish nationalism; after the declaration of the turkish republic, the new nationalist authorities attributed great value to sport and physical training, and considered it a signifi cant means for claiming a new ideology and bolstering the supremacy of the turkish nation. 36 bibliography 1. agau and april 24, dedicated to 90th anniversary of armenian genocide, published on april 24, 2005 (antelias, lebanon: agau central administrative board, 2005). 2. bakhtikian nerses, abp., “armenian general athletic union in the near east,” in marzik, third issue, xxvii year (2008). 3. bakhtikian nerses, memorial book of agau, 1918-1958 (beirut: agau press, 1958), (in armenian). 4. çapan şevki m., türk sporunda selim sııri tarcan (muğla: ünyay yayınları, 1999) (in turkish). 5. demoyan hayk, armenian sports and athletics in the ottoman empire (yerevan: agmi, 2009), (in armenian). 6. hindlian h. t. , true pages (1890-1912) (constantinople: h. mathevosian press, 1913), (in armenian). 7. houlihan barrie, “sport, national identity and public policy,” nations and nationalism, 3(1) (1997). 8. khoian tigran, immortals of the martyred nation (beirut: altha press, 1983), (in armenian). 9. krisian sh. and hindlian h. , the boy scout and the purpose of his life (constantinople: g. paghtatlian press, 1913), (in armenian). 10. kumlien l., athletics for everyone (constantinople: manuk h. gochunian press, 1912), (in armenian). 11. minakhorian vahan, disastrous days of 1915 (venice, st. lazarus: mechitarists prees, 1949), (in armenian). 12. mkrtichian alexan, book of athlete (constantinople: arev press, 1926), (in armenian). 13. muratian varuzhan, “the foundation of agau,” marzik, 1-2 (4) (1984). 14. okay cüneyd, “sport and nation building: athletics and sport in the ottoman state and the committee of union and progress, 1908-18,” the international journal of the history and sports 20:1 (2003). 15. pahri zaruhi h., “armenian woman and scoutism,” hay kin, i, (november, 1919). 16. polley m., moving the goalposts. a history of sports and society since 1945 (london: routledge, 1998). 17. papazian v., love, love and love (beirut: sevan, 1962), (in armenian). 18. siruni hakob, autobiographical notes (yerevan: sargis khachents press, 2006), (in armenian). 19. teodik, yearbook for everyone, xvi year (constantinople: m. hovakimian press, 1922), (in armenian). 20. teodik arshakuhi, “gi rl-scouts,” hay kin 1, 3 (december, 1919), (in armenian). 21. torbörn sundquist och ian wiséhn, olympiska tecken. minnen från olympiska spleen i stockholm 1912 och 1956 (stockholm: kungl. myntkabinetten, 2004), (in swedish). 37 22. torikian byuzand, history of armenian general athletic union until 1939, vol. i, (beirut, 1995), (in armenian). 23. ulker erol, “contextualising ‘turkifi cation’: nation-building in the late ottoman empire, 1908-1918,” nations and nationalism, 11:4, 2005. 24. vernel, brief history of athletics in schools (constantinople, 1879), (in armenian). 25. yeghiaian byuzand, armenian history of adana, (antelias, lebanon: press of the armenian catholicosate of cilicia, 1970), (in armenian). 26. yurdadon ergun, “a brief evaluation of development of turkish sport from 1839 to 1923.” http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/sport-turkey-post-islamic-republicanperiod periodicals 26. azdak, beirut, 1938-1939. 26. marzik, beirut, 2008-2009. 26. marmnamarz, i-iv years, 1911-1914. archive collections 27. grigor chololian collection, agmi archive. 28. agbu beirut central administrative board archive. 6 bartłomiej krzysztan, ph.d. is an assistant professor at the institute of political studies of polish academy of sciences. graduate of political sciences at université libre de bruxelles and political science and cultural studies at the university of wrocław. his research interests include political anthropology, political and cultural memory, post-colonialism, ethnic and national identities, especially in the south caucasus region. bartłomiej krzysztan institute of political studies of polish academy of sciences orcid: 0000-0001-5632-6884 bkrzysztan@isppan.waw.pl 7 historical analogy and political continuity as technologies of power. the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict interrelation in the contemporary armenian politics bartłomiej krzysztan institute of political studies of polish academy of sciences, poland abstract analyses of the transformation and political change in armenia pays noticeable attention to the dominant role of discourses of the armenian genocide and the conflict over nagorno-karabakh for nation and state-building processes. at the same time, the two issues usually are investigated separately. attempts are rarely made to interpret the interrelation and connection between the two narratives. nevertheless, the trauma-based discourse of memory is linking the two narratives as technology of power through discursive structures/mechanisms of analogy and continuity. methods of discourse analysis combined with expert interviews, internet questionnaires and ethnographic field research aim to analyse the crucial discursive patterns and mechanisms. hypothetically, instrumentalized and ideological usage of combined narratives are impacting the political changes, in post-soviet armenia. the article touches upon only one aspect of the discursive interrelation between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh issue. thus, the subject under the question is the impact of the usage of historical analogy and the idea of continuity understand as technologies on contemporary armenian politics of memory. keywords: nagorno-karabakh conflict, armenian genocide, politics of memory, technologies of power, historical analogies, continuity. the article was submitted on 07.07.2021 and accepted for publication on 08.11.2021. how to cite: bartłomiej krzysztan, “historical analogy and political continuity as technologies of power. the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict interrelation in the contemporary armenian politics,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 2 (2021): 7-39. 8 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 https://doi.org/ 10.51442/ijags.0021 introduction this paper is a part of the broader project which core aim is to conduct in-depth research investigating the interrelation between the politics of memory about the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict with the notions of transformation and political change in armenia between 1988 and 2018. the aim of the study is also to reflect on and describe the experiences of the political revolution(s), ruptures and breakthroughs and subsequent possible changes in attitudes towards ideologized discourses. this interrelation and dependence operate on many different levels of discourse, so it is impossible to exhaust the topic completely in one paper. given this, this article has two objectives. first, it contains extended reflections on potential epistemological, methodological, and theoretical approaches to the issue. secondly, the case study presents the results of preliminary research of the exploratory case study focusing on the question of historical analogy and ideological continuity understood as technologies of power. these will be used in the further development of research on the specific issue itself that is the focus of the article. the case study of armenia could be used as a theoretical and methodological matrix for analysis of analogical processes of discourse instrumentalization, interrelated with transformation and change in post-soviet conflict spaces. recognition of the events of 1915 as genocide plays an extremely important role as one of the bases of the international policy of the republic of armenia after 1991. the impact of this issue on domestic politics is also significant, as exemplified by the lack of diplomatic relations with the republic of turkey, mainly determined by the negationist policy pursued by ankara. the consequence of the lack of diplomatic relations is, in turn, the blockade of the country, which has a significant impact on its economic situation. quite a few studies have been written about the political conditions related to politics, including the politics of memory towards the recognition of the armenian genocide.1 two of the rare examples of the analytical approach to the question of politics of genocide were proposed by thomas de waal and vartan matiossian.2 equally important is the nagorno-karabakh issue, which, through successive armed clashes and escalations, has an undeniable influence on the process and dynamics of change, including, above all, successive breakthroughs/ruptures within the armenian political system. the deep militarisation of the country and strategic decisions (such as the alliance with russia) have a significant impact on the internal situation. up to date, quite meticulous research and analysis has been carried out on this issue as well.3 however, attempts 1 maria koinova, “diaspora coalition-building for genocide recognition: armenians, assyrians and kurds,” ethnic and racial studies 42, no. 11 (2019): 1-21; ronald grigor suny, “they can live in the desert but nowhere else”: a history of the armenian genocide (princeton: princeton university press, 2017); taner akçam, a shameful act: the armenian genocide and the question of turkish responsibility (new york, ny: picador, 2007); cathie carmichael, genocide before the holocaust (new haven: yale university, 2009); donald e. miller and lorna touryan miller, survivors: an oral history of the armenian genocide (berkeley: university of california press, 1999). 2 thomas de waal, “the g-word: the armenian massacre and the politics of genocide,” foreign affairs 94, no. 1 (2015): 136-48; vartan matiossian, the politics of naming the armenian genocide. language, history and ‘medz yeghern’ (new york: bloomsbury publishing, 2021). 3 levon chorbajian, the making of nagorno-karabagh from secession to republic (new york: palgrave 9 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict to combine both issues/narratives within a single discursive space have so far received limited discussion.4 the objectives, the paradigm and the state of art allowed the following research questions to be posed: how the historical analogies and idea of continuity is instrumentalized as technology of power in the contemporary armenian politics? although in research that draws at least in part on the achievements of political anthropology to make any hypotheses seems to be a methodological abuse, for the sake of clarity of rhetoric, one working quasi-hypotheses can be made: being the subject to ideologization, the issue of the interrelation between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict used as a technology of power in contemporary armenian politics, is its significant variable. those question and hypothesis are complementary for the main question of the broader project: how the instrumentalized discursive interrelation between narratives of memory of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict impact the political change in armenia between 1991 and 2020? methodologies, materials, and methods the article is a stand-alone case study. as mentioned above in the objectives section, the premise is to present two levels of research on the discursive relationship between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict. thus, in the first dimension, the article undertakes theoretical and methodological reflections on ways to study the interrelation of these issues. this is because the question of how to study a particular phenomenon is important in the context of in-depth research. in the second dimension, the article presents the results of preliminary research conducted in armenia in april and may 2021. the research was designed as an exploratory case study. its primary purpose as an introduction to further in-depth research was to gather information along multiple dimensions. the primary aim of this research was to seek answers to the question of what discourse elements (narratives) are necessary to explore in the context of research problem. ultimately, this preliminary research was supposed to refine both the research questions and hypotheses. the next issue was to consider how to research the different narratives. the second methodological approach was a broad discourse analysis.5 both approaches are treated as methodologies macmillan, 2001); laurence broers, “‘from frozen conflict’ to enduring rivalry: reassessing the nagorny karabakh conflict,” nationalities papers 43, no. 4 (2015): 556-576; ohannes geukjian, ethnicity, nationalism and conflict in the south caucasus: nagorno-karabakh and the legacy of soviet nationalities policy (new york: routledge, 2016); claude mutafian, “the karabagh in twentieth century,” in caucasian knot: the history and geopolitics of nagorno-karabagh, ed. levon chorbajian, patrick donabedian, and claude mutafian (london: zed books, 1994).2001 4 geukjian, ethnicity, nationalism and conflict; vicken cheterian, “the uses and abuses of history: genocide and the making of the karabakh conflict,” europe-asia studies 70, no. 6 (2018): 884-903; victor a. shnirelman, the value of the past: myths, identity and politics in transcaucasia, senri ethnological studies 57 (osaka: national museum of ethnology, 2001); harutyun marutyan, iconography of armenian identity: the memory of genocide and the karabagh movement (yerevan: gitut'yun publishing house, 2009); henry e. hale, patronal politics: eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2014). 5 ruth wodak and michael meyer, methods of critical discourse studies (new york: sage publications ltd, 2015); the routledge handbook of critical discourse studies, eds. john flowerdew and john e. richardson (new york: routledge, 2017); marianne w. jorgensen and louise phillips, discourse analysis as theory and method, (london, thousand oaks, california: sage publications ltd, 2002). 10 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 rather than methods, to set out a certain paradigmatic approach to the materials and data collected through the methods used in the fieldwork. this multidimensional approach that juxtaposes seemingly strongly divergent issues, allows for an in-depth cognitive look. discourse analysis, in turn, seems to be the best way to analyse such disparate narrative representations as public memory spaces, expert narratives and results of survey questionnaires. to find appropriate research methods, various qualitative methods were used in the preliminary research. first, the method of expert interviews was used.6 as a supplement, a survey questionnaire with the same questions was distributed among the armenian university students. the questionnaire was used to conduct 11 in-depth expert interviews in a semi-structured format (same question, open-ended response option with no restrictions plus an open-ended comment option at the end).7 the same questions were used in the online questionnaire presented to the students however, the option to answer was reduced to closed answers (eight possibilities definitely yes, yes, rather yes, rather not, no, definitely not, difficult to say, don’t know). for question 2, the possible answers were as follows: definitely significant, significant, rather significant, not significant, definitely not significant, hard to say, don’t know. for question 8, the possible answers were as follows: definitely increased, increased, rather increased, rather decreased, decreased, decreased significantly, difficult to say, don’t know. this survey yielded 36 responses.8 the questionnaire contained 9 questions, additionally, 5 sociological questions were asked at the beginning of every interview (gender, age, education, field of study, place of origin). in the case of expert interviews and questionnaire research, it is important to make one essential annotation. the research was conducted in april/may 2021, less than six months after the end of the second karabakh war, on the eve of the early parliamentary elections held in june 2021. the political tension, the trauma of the experience of defeat in the war, resulting in the loss of control over a significant area of the nagorno-karabakh republic, certainly had a significant impact on the emotions, and therefore on the perception of the situation, and therefore also on the issue of the basic subject of the study. secondly, classical ethnographic fieldwork with usage of participant observation and visual anthropology was conducted.9 during the research, the most significant public representations of memory were visited and documented. as such, both state and private museums, sites of memory and carefully selected public representations are understood. the 6 alexander bogner, beate littig, and wolfgang menz, “introduction: expert interviews an introduction to a new methodological debate,” in interviewing experts, ed. alexander bogner, beate littig, and wolfgang menz, research methods series (london: palgrave macmillan uk, 2009), 1-13; stefanie döringer, “‘the problem-centred expert interview’. combining qualitative interviewing approaches for investigating implicit expert knowledge,” international journal of social research methodology 24, no. 3 (2020): 1-14. 7 interviews in digitized and transcribed form in the author’s archive. 8 the questionnaire is available as an annex. 9 d. soyini madison, critical ethnography: method, ethics, and performance (thousand oaks, california: sage publications, inc, 2011); sarah pink, doing visual ethnography (london, thousand oaks, california: sage publications ltd, 2006); marcus banks, “doing things with photographs and films,” in visual methods in social research (london: sage, 2001); marcus banks, “visual anthropology is not just ethnographic film: the visual as material culture,” in visual research methods, ed. peter hamilton (london: sage, 2006); michael angrosino, obserwacja w nowym kontekście. etnografia, pedagogika i rozwój problematyki społecznej, trans. filip rogalski, vol. 2 (warszawa: wydawnictwo naukowe pwn, 2010). 11 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict initial exploratory case study research presented in the article is the basis for undertaking in-depth explanatory research. results expert interviews and survey questionnaires the questionnaire entitled “on the relation between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict” was used in both the expert interviews and the online questionnaires completed by students. the questions were composed according to a cognitive key relating to the different dimensions of the existence, shaping, and changing relations of narratives about the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict. the first question was composed as follows: in your opinion, is there a connection between the nagorno-karabakh conflict and the armenian genocide issue? this is a question central to the whole discussion of the interrelation under investigation. it is an ontological question about the individual’s belief whether the relation between two phenomena really is. in the questionnaire, 38.9% of the interviewees indicated that such a relationship definitely exists, 41.7% answered that it exists, 11.1% that it rather exists. the remaining 8.3% indicated to answer “it is difficult to say”. the absence of a negative answer may be an indication of how potentially formed the social perception of the existence of the relationship is. in the interviews conducted with experts, the answers are varied, and the issue of interrelation is dealt in a more nuanced way compared to questionnaires. experts emphasise that to reliably describe the relationship between the two phenomena, it is necessary to separate the perspectives on it in different accounts of socio-political reality. the first criterion can be referred to as the perception criterion. it is based on the dichotomy between social perception and professional (scientific and political) perception. according to all interviewees, there is certainly a belief in the relationship between the two phenomena in public perception. it is mainly due to the deep “immersion” in the history of armenian society and the presence of history in political discourse as its essential component. it was repeatedly underlined in the interviews that, especially during the second karabakh war armenian politicians (mainly prime minister nikol pashinian), repeatedly stressed the issue of the “existential threat to armenians”, analogous to the experience of the armenian genocide of 1915. at the same time, “genocidal intentions” on the part of both turkey and azerbaijan were emphasised. meanwhile, at the level of professional perception, there was a clear tendency to emphasise the relationship between the two phenomena, which is realised in the creation of specific academic and political multi-level narratives. the second criterion of division can be referred to as the criterion of substantive content. it is based on three dimensions in which the interrelation between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict should be considered. the first dimension of the relationship is the question of ideological continuity. it was repeatedly stated in the interviews that in both public and professional perception, there is a belief that there is an ideological continuation of intentional actions against armenians. this continuity would be rooted in basing policies towards armenia, nagorno-karabakh, 12 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 recognition, and remembrance of the armenian genocide, both in turkey and azerbaijan, on pan-turkic ideas. an example of ideological continuity cited more than once was enver pasha’s role in the decision-making triumvirate of the committee of union and progress. his responsibility in the narrative came down to the implementation of pan-turkic ideas, above all the concept of uniting nations of turkic origin in anatolia, the caucasus, and central asia. armenians were to be an obstacle to the realisation of this goal, and a decision was taken to annihilate them, which was first carried out in the ottoman empire and then continued in the caucasus, above all in nagorno-karabakh, nakhijevan and baku. there, the continuation of the annihilation process was to be handled in 1918 by nuri pasha, enver’s younger brother and commander-in-chief of the army of islam.10 the second dimension of the interrelation is the question of historical analogy and the continuity of intentional actions. in this context, soviet policy towards the kemalist turkish republic, which was normalised in the 1920s, was emphasised at the expense of the armenians. at the same time, the turkish influence on the internal soviet decisions of the early 1920s, which resulted in the creation of the nagorno-karabakh autonomous oblast within the azerbaijani soviet socialist republic, and the annexation of nakhichevan to azerbaijan, was clearly emphasised. the decisions taken with the agreement of 10 november 2020, ending the second karabakh war, are considered historically analogous to the turkish-soviet agreements.11 the third dimension of the relationship is the issue of political instrumentalization, both within internal politics in armenia and in the assessment of turkish and azerbaijani policies. in this context, it is worth pointing out that serious doubts have also been raised about linking the two phenomena. they are supposed to stem primarily from an assessment of the systematic and organised policy of repression against armenians, which is completely different in the case of the ottoman genocidal policy and azerbaijan’s policy towards nagorno-karabakh. at the same time, an important aspect that unites all three dimensions in this criterion is the question of the externalisation of the causes of relations. it is the result not of internal decisions taken by armenians, but the consequence of ideological, historical, or political actions of the players directly involved the ottoman empire/turkey, azerbaijan, and the ussr/russia.12 despite the nuances, it can certainly be said that the relationship of interdependence, as well as the perception through the prism of historical analogy and ideological continuity, is indeed emphasised. the second question was composed as follows: if yes, how significant do you think the connection between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict is? this is a consequential question since the answer to it depends on the belief in the existence of a relation between two phenomena. if there is a recognition of existence, then it is possible to assess the significance of the connection/relation. in the online questionnaire, again, the prevailing view was that the connection was significant. 51.4% of respondents indicated the answer “definitely significant,” 37.1% significant, 2.9% rather significant. the answer “difficult to say” was indicated by 5.7% of the respondents. 2.9% of respondents stated 10 interview v, 8 may 2021. 11 interview ii, 29 april 2021. 12 interview iii, 4 may 2021. 13 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict that the connection is insignificant. in the case of the expert interviews, an indicated point was the different intensification of the presence of the discourse linking the two phenomena, depending on the political moment in question. a regularly repeated observation in the interviews was the comparable presence of the genocide narrative as a continuation/ analogy in the second half of the 1980s when the karabakh movement began its activities and during the second karabakh war. here the cited example was the use of the term “genocidal” to describe azerbaijan’s intentions towards the karabakh armenians during the war.13 at the same time, in the historical dimension, the significance of the account is emphasised by references to specific events. in this narrative, the events in the caucasus in the years 1918-1920 (the armenian-turkish war, the offensive of the army of islam, the massacres of armenians in baku and shushe), and then the pogroms and aggression against armenians in soviet azerbaijan in the 1980s (sumgait, kirovabad, baku) are an obvious consequence of 1915.14 one important element that plays a key role in representations in the public space also emerged in the interviews, namely the question of the survival of the armenians, threatened by the “turkic” alliance, whose aim is not only the recapture of nagorno-karabakh but also the subjugation of other armenian lands the provinces of syunik and gegharkunik (around lake sevan) and even yerevan.15 nevertheless, it is necessary to stress that equally clear, especially among younger experts, were the opinions that this is a socially constructed narrative that is not justified by the facts and that azerbaijani policy towards nagorno-karabakh and armenians, has nothing to do with the genocide of 1915.16 relevance thus comes down to a political exploration of the narrative in which armenians emphasise the turkish-azerbaijani connection and the genocide as a continuation. it is thus a significant connection in political terms. the third question was composed as follows: in your opinion, does the potential recognition of the armenian genocide by turkey depend on the resolution of the nagorno-karabakh conflict? this question is based on the issue of causality. assuming the existence of a relationship between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict, an answer was sought to the question of whether official political and legal recognition of the armenian genocide by republic of turkey could affect political change in nagorno-karabakh. causally, then, the existence of the interrelation here would be expected to affect political change. compared to the previous questions, it is not possible to assess causality because of the reception among the respondents. most respondents answered, “it is difficult to say” (22,2%). 41.6% of respondents perceived a correlation between the recognition of the genocide and the resolution of the karabakh conflict, of which 13.9% said it definitely exists, 19.4% said it exists and 8.3% said it rather exists. 36.2% of respondents stated that there is no such correlation, including 16.7% that there is rather not, 13.9% that there is not and 5.6% that there is definitely not. in the case of the in-depth interviews, doubts about the actual dependence are significant. in each interview, it was indicated that in the case of the policy of the republic of turkey during the thirty years of the independent republic 13 interview i, 28 april 2021. 14 interview ii, 29 april 2021, interview viii, 8 may 2021. 15 interview v, 8 may 2021. 16 interview i, 28 april 2021. 14 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 of armenia, the initiation of talks on the armenian genocide (reconciliation process), was dependent on the issue of ending the karabakh conflict. the interviewees also stressed that the stance towards this correlation was changing in armenia over time. the culmination of the attempt to move away from linking the two issues in international politics was the football diplomacy initiative in 2008.17 at the same time, it was pointed out that in the second decade of the 21st century, especially after the turkish-azerbaijani rapprochement and the aggravation of the situation around nagorno-karabakh after the april 2016 war, this dependency has ceased to be relevant.18 it was interesting to point to the interrelation between victim and perpetrator, which by using a minor issue such as the nagorno-karabakh conflict was supposed to change the perception of armenians as victims of the genocide of 1915. the use of the image of injustice suffered by the armenians of azerbaijan was to reassure international public opinion that the events of 1915 were not an unequivocally one-sided act of genocide committed against the armenians. it was to be one of the elements of a multidimensional negationist policy.19 some of the interviewees indicated that this correlation does not exist, regardless of how the nagorno-karabakh conflict would be resolved. this is supposedly due to the all too important place that denialism of the armenian genocide holds in the historical culture and identity politics of the turkish republic. recognition of the genocide would have to mean a complete redefinition, which is impossible under the current government.20 another element that has been pointed out as giving rise to doubts is the question of economic and political pressure. it has been pointed out that only political pressure from superpowers or a strong economic necessity can force turkey to consider discussing genocide, but that the nagorno-karabakh conflict is not such an issue.21 the fourth question was composed as follows: in your opinion, is the potential resolution of the nagorno-karabakh conflict dependent on turkey’s recognition of the armenian genocide? also, this question is related to the question of casuality, in reverse order. casually, then, political change in feedback would affect the existence and form of the relationship between the two phenomena. also, in the case of this question, reversed from the previous one, the answers were varied and ambiguous. the largest number of respondents (25%) indicated that the potential recognition of the armenian genocide by turkey could not influence the resolution of the nagorno-karabakh conflict (answer “no”). additionally, 2.8% stated that causality in this relationship is definitely not there, and 11.1% that it is rather not there. nevertheless, this represents 38.9% of the responses, while 55.5% of the respondents were of the opposite opinion (answer “definitely yes” 13.9%, “yes” 19.4%, “rather yes” 22.2%). 5.6% of the respondents indicated “difficult to say.” in the case of expert opinion, they are also ambiguous. although dependency, as in the case of the earlier question, is emphasised, the prevailing view is also that there is no potential causality. the nagorno-karabakh conflict is perceived as a marginal element of turkish policy and therefore cannot be seen as dependent on the recognition of the genocide, importantly, regardless 17 interview iii, 4 may 2021. also alexander iskandaryan, “armenian-turkish rapprochement: timing matters,” insight turkey 11, no. 3 (2009): 37-44. 18 interview iv, 8 may 2021, interview viii, 8 may 2021. 19 interview vi, 8 may 2021. 20 interview iii, 4 may 2021. interview v, 8 may 2021. 21 interview x, 14 may 2021, interview xi, 12 may 2021. 15 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict of how the solution would look (whether it would be in favour of armenia or azerbaijan). importantly, in this case, the experts more clearly emphasize that the nagorno-karabakh issue is related to the geopolitical situation in the caucasus, while the issue of recognition of the armenian genocide is more of an issue of internal turkish politics.22 thus, recognition of the genocide does not necessarily entail facilitating the reconciliation process around nagorno-karabakh. the opposite statement also appeared in the interviews. according to experts, the recognition of the genocide by turkey, and thus the normalization of relations with armenia, could be associated with the reduction of azerbaijan’s aggressive rhetoric and policy towards the resolution of the nagorno-karabakh issue. at the same time, it would be a bargaining chip for yerevan in negotiations with baku, even if recognition in this context would be understood only as a right to memory and would not be linked to concrete consequences such as demands for compensation.23 the fifth question was composed as follows: in your opinion, does armenia have a policy that emphasizes the connection between the commemoration of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict? it is therefore a question about the politicisation of the relationship between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict. from the level of recognition of the existence of the relationship itself, considerations are already shifted to the issue of exploitation, and thus instrumentalization as a concrete technology of power. in this case, in the closed questionnaire, 19.5% of the respondents answered that such a policy was in place, with only 2.8% answering “yes” and 16.7% “rather yes”. 2.8% of respondents said they “don’t know” and 8.3% said it was “difficult to say.” the existence of such a policy was assessed unequivocally negatively by 69.7% of respondents. of these, 13.9% said that armenia “rather” does not have such a policy, 44.4% that it does not, and 11.1% that it “definitely” does not. among experts, opinion on this issue is unequivocal there is no official policy that combines both issues in domestic and foreign policy.24 however, there was also an indication that while there is no such official policy, there is potential for it to be conceptualised and used as a tool in foreign policy.25 nevertheless, experts stress that there is no doubt that in the statements of the most important armenian politicians, especially from the time of the second karabakh war, analogies and narratives indicating a kind of continuity appeared regularly. this was mainly due to turkey’s involvement on the side of azerbaijan. experts emphasise, however, that the use of correlations, both as analogies and continuations, was an ad hoc political exercise and there are no grounds to presume the existence of a specific political doctrine.26 according to experts, political linking of these issues in the dimension of rational use of resources may have dual consequences. on the one hand, it may lead to a deeper antagonization of relations with turkey and thus be dangerous for armenia (realist approach). on the other hand, the political linking is necessary for ethical reasons, as there is historical and ideological evidence that shows that the correlation between the experience of genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict 22 interview ii, 29 april 2021, interview xi, 12 may 2021. 23 interview x, 14 may 2021, interview i, 28 april 2021, interview v, 8 may 2021. 24 interview ii, 29 april 2021, interview vi, 8 may 2021, interview i, 28 april 2021, interview ix, 8 may 2021, interview x, 14 may 2021, interview xi, 12 may 2021, interview v, 8 may 2021. 25 interview viii, 8 may 2021, interview v, 8 may 2021. 26 interview i, 28 may 2021, interview vii, 8 may 2021. 16 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 is real (ethical approach).27 at the same time, some experts do not doubt that the linking of the two issues is socially constructed because of the belief of many armenians that there is no difference between azerbaijanis and turks at the ethnic, national, and cultural level. this makes the correlation between the two phenomena play a significant role at the level of primary “the political.”28 the sixth question was composed as follows: if yes, do you think that linking the armenian genocide to the nagorno-karabakh conflict is the right policy direction for armenia? this is a consequential question. it depends on the question of recognising whether the relationship of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict is a technology of power used in armenia. this is an evaluative question and implicitly raises the ethical dimension of the relationship under study. in the questionnaire, 12.5% of respondents indicated the answer “don’t know” and 18.8% answered “difficult to say.” for 31.3% of respondents this is not a valid policy, of which 3.1% answered “definitely not,” 18.8% answered “no” and 9.4% answered “rather not.” at the same time, 37.5% of respondents indicated that the correlation policy was correct, of which 21.9% answered “yes” and 15.6% “rather yes.” then, the dichotomy identified by experts regarding the validity of such policies and the conflict between ethical and realistic action is evident in the perception of respondents. differing opinions are also expressed by experts. some point out that such a merger works against armenia and should not take place.29 experts also point out that the harmfulness of the policy of merging the two phenomena is also related to the fact that two separate narratives are created in armenian politics for internal and external needs. in external politics, the message is carefully controlled in which the two phenomena are separated from each other, while in internal politics there is a merger, and nagorno-karabakh is part of the greater armenia project that includes the territories of western armenia (east of anatolia), so separation is impossible.30 at the same time, some experts point out that the development of the situation in nagorno-karabakh in the 1920s is a consequence of the actions of the young-turks and a direct result of the bolsheviks’ relations with the kemalists, so from an ethical and axiological point of view, the pursuit of such a policy would be most appropriate.31 the legitimacy of such a policy is also demonstrated from a more rational perspective as an opportunity to use the trauma and experience of genocide and loss as a tool in international politics.32 the seventh question was composed as follows: in your opinion, has armenian policy towards the relationship of recognition and commemoration of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict changed after the change of power in 2018? the question looks at the change over time in the approach to the relationship of the two phenomena. if 2018 and the so-called armenian velvet revolution were the last significant political change, the question aims to test the potential change in the use of the relationship of the memory of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict in current politics. 27 interview iv, 8 may 2021, interview vii, 8 may 2021 interview iii, 4 may 2021. 28 interview vi, 8 may 2021. 29 interview iv, 8 may 2021. 30 interview vi, 8 may 2021, interview ix, 8 may 2021. 31 interview ii, 29 april 2021, interview iii, 4 may 2021. 32 interview i, 28 april 2021, interview vii, 8 may 2021. 17 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict thus, the question is meant to indicate the relevance of an important assumption of the research, namely the belief in the processual dynamics of instrumentalization and its change, not only over time but also in context. for this question, 2.8% of the respondents answered, “don’t know” and 8.3% “difficult to say.” 36.1% of respondents believe that after 2018, a change in the policy of combining the two phenomena has not occurred. of this, 2.8% said it “definitely” did not occur, 11.1% said it did not occur and 22.2% said it “rather” did not occur. the opposite view was held by 52.7% of those questioned, of which 8.3% believe that it has “definitely” occurred, 25% that it has occurred and 19.4% that it has “rather” occurred. nuanced and ambiguous assessments, on the other hand, were presented by experts. an element highlighted is the issue of uncertainty about the direction of change in the real dimension, i.e., the actual blaming of nikol pashinian and his associates for the defeat in the second nagorno-karabakh war and causing azerbaijan and turkey to gain a narrative advantage. at the same time, it is questioned whether there is any indication of a political change of course in the context of the correlation of the two phenomena.33 according to some experts, this policy has not changed because of the transformations initiated by the so-called velvet revolution in 2018. nevertheless, also in these distanced opinions, there is a conviction about the political use of the narrative linking the two phenomena during the armed phase of the conflict in 2020. at the same time, it has also been highlighted those statements linking both issues, for example in the context of the lifting of the border blockade with turkey conditional on the resolution of the nagorno-karabakh conflict, have started to reappear in the discourse in turkey.34 an important observation made in the interviews is the question of the change of form (the language of politics) while there is no change of content in the context of combining the two phenomena.35 some experts also point out that, at the declarative level, there has indeed been an indication since 2018 of a desire to make changes in the approach to both phenomena considered both singularly and in combination. nevertheless, it was emphasised that the change was not finally realised and remained only at the level of ideas. the issues of democratisation and the fight against corruption, which dominated the actions of nikol pashinian’s government before the 2020 war, were pointed out as the reason for the lack of implementation of the proposed policy.36 an important aspect highlighted in the context of the 2018 political shift was the issue of the desire to separate armenian politics regarding the two phenomena and the expectations of the armenian diaspora in the west, which expected a more decisive combination of narratives about the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict.37 it is important to emphasise that if the thesis of a redefinition of the post-2018 policy is accepted, the change concerns only the issue of the approach to the potential resolution of the nagorno-karabakh conflict, while the approach to the commemoration and recognition of the armenian genocide remains unchanged.38 the eighth question was composed as follows: if yes, how would you rate the extent to 33 interview xi, 12 may 2021, interview iii, 4 may 2021. 34 interview v, 8 may 2021, interview vii, 8 may 2021, interview vi, 8 may 2021, interview iv, 8 may 2021. 35 interview v, 8 may 2021, interview ii, 29 april 2021. 36 interview x, 14 may 2021, interview viii, 8 may 2021. 37 interview x, 14 may 2021. 38 interview i, 28 april 2021. 18 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 which the use of narratives about the relationship between these issues has intensified after 2018? the question arising from the previous one concerns the assessment of the degree of intensification (or lack thereof) in the process of instrumentalization of the relations of the studied phenomena in politics. in this question, significantly, the highest percentage of “difficult to say” responses of 33.3% appeared. at the same time, 36.4% of respondents said that the intensity of the use of linked narratives had increased, of which 15.2% said it had “definitely increased,” 9.1% said it had “increased,” and 12.1% said it had “rather increased.” 21.2% of respondents felt that the use of linked narratives had decreased, of which 9.1% of respondents said, “rather decreased,” 3% said “decreased” and 9.1% said “definitely decreased”. in the case of the expert interviews, one of the elements highlighted in the case of this question was the doubt towards the intentionality of linking both phenomena for political purposes. the argumentation was based on the statement that what is obvious and understandable for experts, for example, academic experts, i.e., the obvious connection between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict, is not necessarily understandable by politicians.39 it is extremely important to point out that the intensified use in one narrative, was primarily due to the increasingly aggressive policies of azerbaijan and turkey towards armenia, and ultimately the armed conflict in 2020. at the same time, an additional connection was also indicated in the context of the “cultural genocide” affecting the armenian heritage in nakhichevan.40 the ninth question is composed as follows: in your opinion, should the issue of resolving the nagorno-karabakh conflict be combined with the issue of the armenian genocide? this is a crucial question. it concerns the legitimacy, validity, and correctness of using a combination of both narratives in armenian politics. it thus intertwines questions of pragmatic necessity, the ethics of such action, and value judgements on issues that are extremely important components of collective memory and collective identity. for this question, 58.4% of those asked indicated that the two phenomena should be combined. 13.9% of respondents indicated a “definitely yes” answer, 30.6% a “yes” answer and 13.9% a “rather yes” answer. the opposite opinion was held by 41.6% of the respondents, of which 22.2% answered “rather no,” 16.7% “no” and 2.7% “definitely no.” an important aspect highlighted in the expert interviews was the issue of the need to separate academic and expert knowledge from the use of history by politicians. according to the experts, knowledge about the connection based on analogy and continuity between the phenomenon of the nagorno-karabakh conflict and the phenomenon of the armenian genocide should be widely disseminated, which does not mean that at the same time it should be subject to manipulation, instrumentalization and ideologization for the achievement of specific political goals, whether defined as internal or external.41 the highlighted negative consequence of combining the two phenomena is the granting of a narrative side to turkey in the karabakh conflict, which is in clear contradiction to the armenian raison d’état.42 for some experts, the two issues should be separated, since their combination at the level of political realism has bad consequences for 39 interview ii, 29 april 2021, interview vii, 8 may 2021, interview iii, 4 may 2021. 40 interview i, 28 april 2021, interview v, 8 may 2021. 41 interview v, 8 may 2021, interview viii, 8 may 2021. 42 interview vi, 8 may 2021, interview ii, 29 april 2021. 19 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict armenia’s foreign policy goals, negatively affecting both the issue of a potential settlement of the nagorno-karabakh conflict in favour of yerevan and the promotion of recognition of the armenian genocide.43 in some cases, benefits that could be described as economic were highlighted as those that could serve as positive arguments for combining the two narratives.44 in addition to economic arguments, ethical and axiological ones were also raised, stressing the right of armenians to remember and recall their history, which at the same time justifies the validity of combining the two phenomena.45 the question of the inevitability of discursive fusion arising from the demand on a social level in a traumatised society also emerges in the interviews. in this case, the question of the rightness and correctness of the chosen political direction does not play a role.46 at the same time, among experts who support combining both narratives, there is the question of the rightness of such an action in the perspective of international law and building the image of armenia and armenians as victims, juxtaposed with the perpetrators, i.e., turkey and azerbaijan, who are not separated in such a narrative.47 representations of the past in the public space in the post-soviet space, the relevance of public representations of memory was considered from multiple perspectives.48 kiril stanilov, among others, has written about the space of the post-socialist city and the role that representations of memory play in it as elements of the consolidation process of transformation.49 also museums as both places of representation of the past and spaces of persuasion were analysed in the context of the former ussr and the south caucasus.50 in armenia, reflections on public representations of the communist past and their ambiguous legacy were undertaken.51 an important voice in the analysis of public spaces of memory in an anthropological perspective in armenia itself is the work of harutyun marutyan.52 representations of the past in public (understood as political) space, perform the function of places of memory. they are at the same time a representation of the 43 interview iii, 4 may 2021, interview iv, 8 may 2021. 44 interview x, 14 may 2021. 45 interview ix, 8 may 2021. 46 interview vii, 8 may 2021. 47 interview i, 28 april 2021. 48 julie fedor, “memory, kinship, and the mobilization of the dead: the russian state and the ‘immortal regiment” movement,’” in war and memory in russia, ukraine and belarus, ed. julie fedor et al., palgrave macmillan memory studies (cham: springer international publishing, 2017), 307-345; benjamin forest and juliet johnson, “monumental politics: regime type and public memory in post-communist states,” post-soviet affairs 27, no. 3 (2011): 269-288. 49 kiril stanilov, the post-socialist city: urban form and space transformations in central and eastern europe after socialism (dordrecht: springer, 2010). 50 clive gray, the politics of museums (london: palgrave macmillan, 2015); museums and sites of persuasion: politics, memory and human rights,eds. joyce apsel, amy sodaro (london, new york: routledge, 2019); malkhaz toria, “between traditional and modern museology. exhibiting national history in the museum of georgia,” in museums and sites of persuasion. politics, memory and human rights (london, new york: routledge, 2020), 39-55. 51 gayane shagoyan, “between memory and memorial: anastas mikoyan and ‘social lustration’ in armenia,” caucasus analytical digest 80 (2016): 2-5. 52 marutyan, iconography of armenian identity. 20 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 official discourse towards the past and play a creative role for the binding narratives.53 what is nuanced, but clearly manifested in the in-depth interviews and the online questionnaire, is represented very clearly in the public and individual memorials and realms of memory. representation (of memory) in this context is defined according to paul ricoeur’s conception, in which representation can be interpreted in three distinct senses. firstly, representation is thus the representation of the past in the present. secondly, representation is the reappearance in the space of discourse of what has hitherto been absent. third, representation is also a reference for the historian.54 the following are representations of the past in space, indicating a discursive connection between the phenomenon of the memory of the armenian genocide and the phenomenon of the nagorno-karabakh conflict. 53 andrzej szpociński, “miejsca pamięci (lieux de memoire),” teksty drugie 4 (2008): 11-20; pierre nora, “between memory and history: les lieux des memoires,” representations 26 (1989): 7-24. 54 paul ricœur, pamięć, historia, zapomnienie, trans. janusz margański (kraków: universitas, 2012), 252-253. 21 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict photo i and ii. exposition of the ministry of defence of the republic of armenia mother armenia military museum in yerevan. author's photo, yerevan, 07.05.2021 photos i and ii show representations at the mother armenia military musuem in yerevan. according to information, the museum was officially opened as a memorial on 29 november 1950, on the 30th anniversary of the establishment of soviet power in armenia. in front of the entrance to the complex, there is a pedestal, on which a sculpture of joseph stalin was placed. because of the “khrushchev thaw,” the monument was removed, and in its place, the mother-armenia monument was established in 1970. the interior of the complex was dedicated to the sacrifice of the armenian people made during the great patriotic war. in 1995 the complex came under the jurisdiction of the ministry of defence of the republic of armenia and was divided into two parts in the basement there is an exposition dedicated to the great patriotic war, and on level zero there is an exposition “the war of liberation in artsakh.” the first significant narrative element to note is the equating of the significance of two historical events the great patriotic war and the first nagorno-karabakh war. the contradiction of such a combination the soviet defence against the nazi invasion and the guerrilla war on the ruins of the empire is only apparent. the manner of exposition points to similar mechanisms and structures shaping the narratives. the individual heroic attitudes of armenians participating in both conflicts are highlighted. in the case of the exhibition on nagorno-karabakh, the heroic attitudes of armenians from the diaspora, such as monte melkonian, who decided to support the armenian cause, are emphasised. this also shapes the element of historical continuity. ideological underpinnings play no role concerning national identity in practice. nor does it matter what the dispute was about and whether the struggle took place in lands considered armenian or in distant europe. these similar mech22 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 anisms and structures of commemoration indicate the presence of a historical analogy. it is marked in the metaphorical figures used for presentation. as during the great patriotic war, the figurative basis for the representation of the first nagorno-karabakh war is the idea of sacrifice and martyrdom, often at the ultimate expense of lives. both narratives are also linked by the issue of liberation and throwing off unjustly imposed shackles, as well as the communal national-ethnic effort that must be made to preserve identity. what unites the two narratives shaping a kind of historical continuity at the narrative level is the question of survival. sacrifice and martyrdom must be made for the armenian ethnic and national identity to survive. the survival of the nation (group identity) and the individual testimonies of survivors that function through this are the basis for the commemoration and the struggle for recognition of the armenian genocide. strengthened as a form of living history by the experience of the great patriotic war, it had a chance to be preserved in the next generation, and then to be realised now of turning point and the necessity to take up the struggle for nagorno-karabakh.55 55 analysis based on the exposition descriptions and conversations with the museum staff. 23 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict photo iii and iv. exposition of fedayi museum in yerevan. author's photo, yerevan, 01.05.2021 photos iii and iv show museum representations at the museum of the armenian fedayi movement in yerevan. this is a small, private museum created through the efforts of ilyich beglarian and named after general andranik (ozanian), one of the most important commanders of the armenian fedayi movement at the turn of the 20th century. it is in the vicinity of the national pantheon in yerevan. it was established in 1995, then closed after the building was privatised and reopened in 2006. the fedayi movement emerged in the 1880s as self-defence groups and irregular militias whose main purpose was to protect armenians in western armenia from kurdish armed groups, hamidian militias and ottoman troops. attacks on armenian peasants intensified during the reign of sultan abdul hamid ii. fedayi units’ activity was particularly significant during the hamidian massacres, the zeytun rebellion, the defence of van, and the sasun resistance. an additional goal of the fedayi that formed over time was to obtain autonomy for armenians in the ottoman empire or independence.56 part of the exhibition in the museum (visible in the photos) is devoted to the “successors” of the fedayi, this time protecting the armenian territory of nagorno-kara56 richard g. hovannisian, “the armenian question in the ottoman empire 1876-1914,” in the armenian people from ancient to modern times. foreign dominion to statehood: the fifteenth century to twentieth century, ed. richard g. hovannisian, vol. ii (london: macmillan, 1997), 203-238. 24 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 bakh from the azerbaijani threat. the issue of the enemy is equated in representation by the analogy of turks and azerbaijanis. however, the question of teleology is also dealt with like the fedayi, the participants in the first karabakh war fight to defend the threatened armenians of nagorno-karabakh. at the same time, a second objective is also revealed, namely the desire to liberate territories considered to be occupied by foreigners. during the first nagorno-karabakh war, there was a regiment named after andranik, and the attitude of the general himself, and other fedayi, was meant to be inspirational for young armenians reaching the front.57 at the same time, it is worth pointing out an even more important connection. the greatest heroes of modern armenian history are military commanders meritorious in a theoretically lost cause like andranik and vazgen sargsyan, a commander from the first karabakh war. thus, the reference to specific figures is a historical analogy of a similar struggle, and incidentally also a continuation of the “turks” clash. at the same time, as the exhibition points out, also for general andranik karabakh was an important part of the armenian liberation struggle, which further highlights the analogy between the two narratives.58 57 patrick gore, tis some poor fellow’s skull: post-soviet warfare in the southern caucasus (iuniverse, 2008), 17-18. 58 analysis based on the exposition descriptions and conversations with the museum staff. 25 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict photo v and vi. sardarapat monument. author's photo, sardarapat, 10.05.2021. photos v and vi show public representations at the memorial site of the monument commemorating the battle of sardarapat which took place between 22-26 may1918 during the caucasus campaign of wwi between armenian forces and the ottoman army which invaded the territory of eastern armenia. the memory of the battle of sardarapat was marginalised in soviet historiography until the 1960s. only with the violent protests in armenia in 1965, on the 50th anniversary of the armenian genocide, did the soviet authorities agree to create a memorial at the site where the battle took place. the official opening of the memorial took place in 1968, on the 50th anniversary of the battle.59 today, the battle of sardarapat and the armenian offensive at bash-aparan and the defence of karakilisa (today’s vanadzor) are an important part of armenian memory. glorification is not only linked to the commemoration of the military victory that led to the establishment of the first republic of armenia on may 28, 1918. the battle of sardarapat is considered the decisive moment of the caucasus campaign, which not only halted the ottoman offensive into the caucasus, slowing the march on baku, but also prevented the final annihilation of the armenians.60 in the mid-1990s, after the end of the first nagorno-karabakh war, official commemorations of armenian soldiers who fell during the war were established on the memorial grounds. they have a specific character, combining individual remembrance in the form of tombstones with the politics of remembrance linking the issue of armenian defence 59 razmik panossian, the armenians: from kings and priests to merchants and commissars (new york: columbia university press, 2006), 251. 60 christopher j. walker, armenia : the survival of a nation (london: croom helm, 1980), 254-255. 26 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 against the ottoman offensive with the struggle for the liberation of nagorno-karabakh. the most prominent element in collective memory, therefore, is the question of continued resistance to turkish aggression resulting in the armenian genocide in western armenia, which, thanks to a self-sacrificing defence, was not extended to eastern armenia. photo ix and x. garegin nzdeh school and museum. author's photo, yerevan 07.05.2021. 27 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict photo ix and x shows representations in everyday life at the garegin nzdeh school and museum in yerevan. school no. 12 named after garegin nzdeh is in the yerevan district of shengavit, near the square of the same name. the school hosts a small museum whose exhibition depicts the life and work of garegin nzdeh, an armenian military officer and politician. he was associated with the armenian revolutionary federation, being one of the most important military commanders of the first republic of armenia. after the soviet invasion of armenia in november/december 1920, disagreeing with the plan to incorporate his native nakhichevan and nagorno-karabakh into soviet azerbaijan, he formed the republic of mountainous armenia in zangezur, fighting against the soviets until july 1921. he then carried out organisational activities for the arf. during wwii, he was a supporter of cooperation with the axis states.61 the figure of nzdeh, repressed in the soviet union, is also significant because, paradoxically, his openly anti-soviet and anti-ottoman stance is different from the standard more nuanced approach to the soviet legacy in armenia. at the entrance to the school, there is a significant plaque that highlights the historical continuity between the fedayi movement, the founders of the first republic of armenia and the fighters of the first karabakh war. in addition to highlighting elements indicated in the earlier case of representation, in this case, it is interesting to build a bridge between eastern and western armenia, of which garegin nzdeh was a representative, fighting against the ottoman empire in the bulgarian army during the balkan wars, as well as against soviet russia in zangezur. this representation thus becomes important due to the fact of linking anti-imperial resistance to oppression, of which the azerbaijani policy towards karabakh is also a contemporary manifestation in the narrative. 61 razmik panossian, “the past as nation. three dimensions of armenian identity,” geopolitics 7, no. 2 (2002): 132. 28 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 photo viii and ix. 106th anniversary of the armenian genocide. author's photo, yerevan 24.04.2021. photos vii and viii show representations of remembrance in anniversary commemorations 24 april, the symbolic date marking the beginning of the armenian genocide. on 24 april 1915, in constantinople and other centres of the ottoman empire after the decision of the state authorities, the most important representatives of the armenian intellectual elite were arrested. the arrests became the beginning of an organised deportations and mass slaughters against armenian subjects of the ottoman empire.62 on the anniversary of this day, the most important celebrations are held to commemorate the symbolic beginning of the armenian genocide. the celebration usually begins the day before late in the evening with the torchlit pocession to the genocide memorial. on 24 april, thousands of armenians visit tsisternakaberd, one of the hills in the centre of yerevan, where a monument commemorating the victims has been located since 1967 and, since the 1990s, the armenian genocide museum-institute has been operating. armenians come to yerevan from all over the country and from abroad, where armenians, as a consequence of the genocide, have formed a significant and influential diaspora. officials and embassy representatives from countries that recognise the genocide also pay visits. in their hands, they usually bring white and red flowers, symbolising innocence, and bloodshed. they are placed around an eternal fire that burns next to the spire that crowns the memorial site. participatory observation conducted during the commemoration of the 106th anniversary of the armenian genocide on 24 april 2021 made it possible to observe the mechanisms of linking the narratives of memory about 62 suny, they can live in the desert, 271-272. 29 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict. it is worth noting that this was a significant anniversary because its most important accent became the use of the word “genocide” by us president joe biden, which in political practice means its recognition. as can be seen in the attached photos, banners referring to the issue of international recognition of the artsakh republic appeared on the monument itself, linking these issues to the memory and recognition of the genocide. at the same time, banners referring to the karabakh issue could be seen throughout the day of the ceremony. in the context of the second nagorno-karabakh war, which ended with the signing of a ceasefire agreement entering into force on 10 november 2020, the visit to the memorial by soldiers who participated in the fighting, returning from the war with severe injuries, was particularly symbolically significant. most probably, the recognition of the genocide by one of the most important world powers, which came at a significant time immediately after the end of the second karabakh war, may result in an even more pronounced strengthening of the discursive connection. discussion and further research the research question of the study is stated as follows: how the historical analogies and idea of continuity is instrumentalized as the technology of power in contemporary armenian politics? the juxtaposition of the results of diverse research methods, allowed, in an interpretative perspective, to indicate the mechanisms and structures of the use of historical analogies and the idea of continuity in linking the phenomena of memory of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict. thus, it is not an abuse to confirm the initially stated hypothesis that being the subject to ideologization, the issue of the interrelation between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict used as a technology of power in contemporary armenian politics, is its significant variable. the discursive link is much more important, that is, the search for an answer to the question of whether this experience exists in the political consciousness in armenia. there are different ways of understanding the issue of historical analogy.63 in the first sense, it is a heuristic tool that helps analyse the technologies of power used in shaping hegemonic discourse. in the second sense, a historical analogy can be a justification or explanation in discursive space. in the third sense, the historical analogy functions as a reason for making specific decisions. in the fourth understanding, essentialist historical analogy occurs as the perception of a situation as analogous to prior experience. for this reason, it is 63 robert axelrod and larissa forster, “how historical analogies in newspapers of five countries make sense of major events: 9/11, mumbai and tahrir square,” research in economics 71, no. 1 (2017): 8-19; paul bartha, “analogy and analogical reasoning,” in the stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. edward n. zalta (2019); peter j. dortmans and eleanor eiffe, “an examination of future scenarios using historical analogy,” futures 36, no. 10 (2004): 1049-1462; james ferguson, “proletarian politics today: on the perils and possibilities of historical analogy,” comparative studies in society and history 61, no. 1 (2019): 4-22; hall gardner, ir theory, historical analogy, and major power war (london: palgrave macmillan, 2019); djouaria ghilani et al., “looking forward to the past: an interdisciplinary discussion on the use of historical analogies and their effects,” memory studies 10, no. 3 (2017): 274-285; yahya kamali and sedighe sheikhzadeh jooshani, “reasoning in foreign policy making from the analogy perspective: the case study of iran’s nuclear issue,” asian politics & policy 11, no. 2 (2019): 208-226; andrew mumford, “parallels, prescience and the past: analogical reasoning and contemporary international politics,” international politics 52, no. 1 (2015): 1-19. 30 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 difficult to have one precise definition, but referring to the wide spectrum of those proposed by researchers, it is possible to construct the following formulation: “a historical analogy is a present meaningful reference to a past situation and experience, in the context of a current discourse.” ideological continuity is understood similarly, as a kind of historical analogy. thus, it operates similarly to social memory, which, while focusing on the content of the past, functions dominantly in the present. at the same time, historical analogy and continuity are technologies of power that also requires explanation. the origin of the term is michel foucault’s reflections on “governmentality,” undertaken mainly during his lectures at the college de france.64 the use of this category allows for a broader analytical view of the problem under study. narratives in discourse are thus a form of social practice, discursive formations must pass an “institutional test” to become part of it. thus, what is significant goes beyond the causal understanding of political action (from sender to receiver). what means politically must be socially structured. consistently, then, “technologies of power” are not simple “political tools” that serve to establish dominance and sustain power. as monika bobako writes: “(...)[the technology of power is] productive and regulative, realized through a whole complex of practices, discourses, institutions, knowledge systems that make up complex tactics for managing populations and producing subjectivity.”65 nikolas rose shortly defines technologies of power (government) as “(…) those technologies imbued with aspirations for the shaping of conduct in the hope of producing certain desired effects and averting certain undesired events.”66 explanation of results the exploratory case study has proven that historical analogy understood as a technology of power stands as a useful heuristic tool of analysis. there is no doubt, based on the expert interviews, the online questionnaire, and the interpretation of the representation in the public space, that historical analogy occurs as the perception of a situation as analogous to prior experience. how historical analogy and ideological continuity are present in the discursive practice of contemporary armenia indicates that two other understandings of this category are present explicitly, intertwining with each other in narratives about the past and present. historical analogy is used as a justification or explanation in discursive space. this is especially true of how the narrative of the azerbaijani-armenian rivalry is constructed, constructed on the analogy of turkish-armenian relations over 100 years ago. “offensive defence” against the invasion of the “other” turk is thus a drawing, based on historical analogy, of an omission in the past that resulted in genocide. 64 michel foucault, society must be defended. lectures at the collège de france, 1975-1976, trans. david macey, vol. v, lectures at the collège de france, 1975-1976 (london: picador, 2003); michel foucault, security, territory, population: lectures at the collège de france 1977--1978, trans. graham burchell, (new york: picador, 2009); michel foucault, the birth of biopolitics: lectures at the collège de france, 1978--1979 (new york: picador, 2010). 65 monika bobako, islamofobia jako technologia władzy. studium z antropologii politycznej (kraków: universitas, 2017), 47. 66 nikolas rose, powers of freedom: reframing political thought (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1999), 52. 31 bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict the issue of defence is closely linked to the issue of explaining the sacrifice that armenians must make in the face of an external threat. as public representations indicate, in the case of the nagorno-karabakh conflict it is analogous to how sacrifice was understood during the defence of eastern armenia during the caucasus offensive of the army of islam, or during the great patriotic war. this way of thinking is coupled with a specific attitude of victory through sacrifice, which, originating in the commemoration of the great patriotic war, influenced the perception of armenian success in the first karabakh war. in this case, the historical analogy is combined with its subsequent understanding, that is, functioning as a reason for specific decisions. the limitation of sovereignty, both in the dimension of international alliances (russia) and civil subjectivity (especially during the rule of the republican party of armenia), is conditioned by the necessary, explained by references to the past. consequently, another figure of analogy emerges the idea of survival. the fact that a genocide has been survived makes the survival of the nation justify and explain political reality, but it also causes concrete decisions to be made. this is particularly important as the research indicates that these are not only reactive decisions but also proactive ones. the difference comes down to the fact that the use of survival issues in politics is explored. the traumatisation of society and the experience of genocide itself becomes a useful technology of power. an assumption that can be drawn from the results of the research is the issue of distinguishing the discursive exploration of the connection with the absence of an actual official policy pursued by the armenian state in the international arena. in this context, it is also significant to distinguish between a narrative created for internal use, in which the combination of two narratives must certainly be considered a technology of power, and a narrative constructed for external use, i.e., used in diplomacy and external relations. in the latter case, if references are made at all they are cautious, leaving aside categorical statements. it is thus a significant connection in political terms. the conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the material obtained from the preliminary research is that the narratives about the undoubtedly occurring interrelation between the two phenomena stem from armenian perceptions about the shape of discourse in turkey and azerbaijan. however, as vicken cheterian’s research indicates, the portrayal of this interrelation in both turkish and azerbaijani discourse is much more nuanced than it is presented in narratives in armenia.67 without in-depth historical research, as well as cross-sectional sociological studies in turkey and azerbaijan, there is no way to confirm the existence of a real “genocide” policy and continuity so deeply rooted in armenian discourse. nevertheless, even if the existence of an actual “genocide policy” pursued by the adversaries of the modern armenian state is questionable, there is no doubt that the notion of its facticity is an extremely significant technology of power and, consequently, a driving force in contemporary politics in armenia. 67 cheterian, “the uses and abuses of history”; ceylan tokluoglu, “the political discourse of the azerbaijani elite on the nagorno-karabakh conflict (1991-2009),” europe-asia studies 63, no. 7 (2011): 1223-1252. 32 unexpected findings the transformation and political change in armenia were analysed both as separate case studies and from a comparative perspective.68 these perspectives historical, political, and sociological need to be complemented by an analysis of the impact on political change and transformation of the combined discursive phenomena of the memory of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict. thus, the primary question of the extended research of which this preliminary case study is a part is: how the instrumentalized discursive interrelation between narratives of memory of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict impact the political change in armenia between 1991 and 2020? the broad hypothesis set for the in-depth study stated as follows: politics of memory has a decisive impact on the transformation and political change in post-soviet armenia. one element of this influence hypothesised is the use of historical analogy and the idea of continuity of historical experience as a technology of power. in this context, the study tested the potential change in this issue because of the armenian velvet revolution of 2018 and the second karabakh war of 2020. the findings indicate that the impact of instrumentalising the connection between the phenomena on political change, in this case, was not necessarily significant. however, this exploratory case study indicated that within this politics of memory, one of the most significant causal elements for political change is the correlation of the narrative of the armenian genocide and the issue of the nagorno-karabakh conflict. despite the existence of diversified perspectives on the interrelation between the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict (including the attempts of decisive separation), the instrumentalization and ideologization of narratives of memory profoundly dominate the mainstream pattern of past representation. consequently, it can have a definitive impact on the dynamics of political change. thus, for further research, it is required to analyse the impact of instrumentalized connection on the most significant political changes in contemporary armenian politics within the timeframe between 1991-2019. limitations and weaknesses it is necessary to draw attention to limitations and restrictions. the primary one is the qualitative nature of the survey itself, which results in the fact that they cannot be seen as representative surveys. as qualitative research, the results presented should be considered as 68 sven eliaeson, lyudmila harutyunyan, and larissa titarenko, after the soviet empire: legacies and pathways (leiden; boston: brill, 2015); nora dudwick, “political transformations in postcommunist armenia: images and realities,” in conflict, cleavage, and change in central asia and the caucasus, ed. karen dawisha and bruce parrott (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997); nora c dudwick, “memory, identity and politics in armenia,” (phd, 1994), 1-476; transcaucasia, nationalism, and social change: essays in the history of armenia, azerbaijan, and georgia, ed. ronald suny (ann arbor: university of michigan press, 1996); donnacha ó ó beacháin and abel polese, the colour revolutions in the former soviet republics: successes and failures (london and new york: routledge, 2010); alexander agadjanian, ansgar jödicke, and evert van der zweerde, religion, nation and democracy in the south caucasus (london and new york: routledge, 2014); taras kuzio, “transition in post-communist states: triple or quadruple?” politics 21, no. 3 (2001): 16877; hale, patronal politics; evgeny finkel and yitzhak m. brudny, “no more colour! authoritarian regimes and colour revolutions in eurasia,” democratization 19, no. 1 (2012): 1-14. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 33 a kind of descriptive for existing phenomena with an indication that there are many cracks and crevices in the discourse where the past is interpreted and represented differently. another significant limitation follows from this. when analysing two historical and political events, the leading question for the historian should be whether the combination and correlation of the two phenomena under study is justified in past events. this question is not the most important one in this research, because “truthfulness” and “validity” are secondary if, in the discourse, the discursive formation occurs. if at an imagined social and political level the validity of the connection can be confirmed, and this has been demonstrated by the research, then “historicity” is of secondary importance. in other words, the influence of this relationship is important for political change in armenia after 1991, regardless of whether its actual occurrence can be proven within the framework of a classically understood history. nevertheless, during further in-depth research, the historical perspective is necessary. the research has undoubtedly shown how instrumental the technology of power in contemporary armenian politics is in instrumentalizing the question of historical analogy and the idea of continuity. preliminary research also confirms the suitability of the theoretical framework adopted, with the clear indication that it does not exhaust the entire potential space of the object of analysis. more broadly, the research suggests the need for a wider exploration of the content, structures, and forms of narratives, which are not only political tools but also social discursive practice. conclusion the conclusion that can be drawn with certainty is that, as technologies of power, the instrumentalization of the connection between the two phenomena is of more than average importance in armenia. thus, the presented research fulfils the role of added value to the aforementioned case studies on memory and collective identity in contemporary armenia, addressing this issue from the rare perspective of investigation over interrelation between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict. because of this, the presumption of broader research about the possible significant impact of this connection on the issue of political change in armenia cannot be dismissed. moreover, the preliminary research suggests the potential for investigating the historical correlation. through broader archival research in armenia, the possibility of juxtaposing discursive technologies of power with historical analysis emerges. it makes the research appropriate to be continued. too little time has yet passed to indicate what impact the defeat in the second nagorno-karabakh war will have on the account of the memory of the armenian genocide and the narrative of nagorno-karabakh. nevertheless, the search for an in-depth answer as to how significant a variable defeat will be for the shape of the discourse represents an important space for future research. what matters here is not only the context of impact on political change in general but the dynamics of transforming the identity of victory through sacrifice (characteristic of the first karabakh war), into a new form. it is an open question to what extent it will be discursively intertwined with the idea of remembering the armenian genocide. bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict 34 acknowledgments i would like, with all sincerity of heart, to thank the armenian genocide museum-institute for the lemkin scholarship that made it possible to conduct research in armenia and to present its results in the form of an article. thank you for your openness, support and inspiration at an extremely difficult time marked by the consequences of the second nagorno-karabakh war, preparations for early parliamentary elections and the covid-19 pandemic. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 35 appendices tables with captions table i. in your opinion, is there a connection between the nagorno-karabakh conflict and the armenian genocide issue? table ii. if yes, how significant do you think the connection between the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict is? bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict 36 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 table iii. in your opinion, does the potential recognition of the armenian genocide by turkey depend on the resolution of the nagorno-karabakh conflict? table iv. in your opinion, is the potential resolution of the nagorno-karabakh conflict dependent on turkey’s recognition of the armenian genocide? 37 table v. in your opinion, does armenia have a policy that emphasizes the connection between the commemoration of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict? table vi. if yes, do you think that linking the armenian genocide to the nagorno-karabakh conflict is the right policy direction for armenia? bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict 38 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 table vii. in your opinion, has armenian policy towards the relationship of recognition and commemoration of the armenian genocide and the nagorno-karabakh conflict changed after the change of power in 2018? table viii. if yes, how would you rate the extent to which the use of narratives about the relationship between these issues has intensified after 2018? 39 table ix. in your opinion, should the issue of resolving the nagorno-karabakh conflict be combined with the issue of the armenian genocide? bartłomiej krzysztan: the armenian genocide and nagorno-karabakh conflict 6 regina galustyan is a researcher at the department of comparative genocide studies named after v. dadrian of the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation. she has earned her ma in history at the international scientific-educational center of nas ra. her research interests cover the armenian genocide, cup ideology, and turkish nationalism. she has published articles on the subjects in national and international journals and edited and annotated a memoir of a genocide survivor. e-mail: galustyan.regina@genocide-museum.am 7 the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress ideas, individuals, influences regina galustyan armenian genocide museum-institute, armenia the armenian, assyrian and greek genocides perpetrated within the ottoman empire by the turkish government at the beginning of the 20th century were not only the direct implementations of ideological convictions or a result of a single decision. those were, rather, the amalgam of certain theories adjusted to political and economic developments in the country and the desire to turn the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire into a turkish nation-state. stressing the importance of ideas and ideologies in the process of historical development, this article attempts to show certain strains of cup members’ worldview by deliberately singling out foreign thinkers and ideas that had a role on the formation of their worldview and on their political actions. this article refrains from discussing turkism as a whole, but rather examines certain paths of the introduction of european thought to the mindset of cup high ranking officials and ideologists, hoping to illuminate the background of their subsequent decisions and actions which had a tragic impact on the fate of millions of non-muslim people in the ottoman empire. keywords: cup, dictatorship, ideology, turkism, turkology, racial kinship, turan, central asia, language, pan-turkism, social-darwinism, gobineau, le bon, vambery, cahun, von der goltz, parvus, “the nation in arms.” the article was submitted on 12.12.2021 and accepted for publication on 06.04.2022. how to cite: regina galustyan, “the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress: ideas, individuals, influences,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 7, no. 1 (2022): 7-25. introduction the ideology behind policy has a crucial importance in genocides and any form of crime against humanity. the turkish government, formed from the committee (later party) of union and progress (i̇ttihad ve terakki cemiyeti, hereafter unionists, ittihadists, cup), made the decision of using radical solutions to the existing ethnic questions in the multiethnic, multi-religious ottoman empire, putting the country on the path to war and genocides. the committee harboured the ideology of turkish nationalism which was still in the process of being formed. this was a fusion of ideas, as the ideologists and founding fathers of turkism borrowed specific theories from nineteenth-century philosophers: 8 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0027 ideas about race, positivistic and materialistic thoughts on human society and civilization and accounts of travellers and scholars. this loose cluster of ideas clashed with imperial reality while attempting to bring it to life. neither the armenian nor the assyrian and greek genocides perpetrated by the turkish government within the ottoman empire at the beginning of the 20th century were the direct implementations of ideological convictions or a result of a single decision. those were rather the amalgam of certain theories adjusted to political and economic developments in the country, and the desire to turn the multiethnic and multi-religious empire into a turkish nation-state. stressing the importance of ideas and ideologies in the process of historical development, this article attempts to show certain strains of cup members’ mindset by singling out foreign thinkers and ideas that had a role in the formation of their worldview and on their political actions. referring to ideology as a system of ideas, values, or beliefs, which guide or underline a ‘concrete’ political agenda,1 i refrain, in the article set out below, from discussing turkism as a whole, but rather discuss certain paths of the introduction of european thought to the mindset of cup high ranking officials and ideologists, hoping to illuminate the background of their subsequent decisions and actions, which had a tragic impact on the fate of millions of non-muslim people in the ottoman empire. the cup, which emerged as a secret underground committee with a moderate revolutionary stance and aimed at limiting the power of the monarch and retaining the integrity of the empire, was an amalgamation of different groups, branches and clubs of intellectuals somehow concerned with the future of the country. the ethnic and religious background of the members and founding fathers were diverse, as were their ideological convictions. founded in 1889, it had several internal transformations and reorganisations, (significant years being 1902 and 1905); the committee that was responsible for the coup d’état of 1908 and won seats in the ottoman parliament was, already, a turkish-muslim organisation with the vision of a turkish nation-state. the cup saw the coup d’état of 1908 as its own achievement and allowed only a limited role to other political actors. cup leaders declared the cup “the soul of the state,” “the saviour of the fatherland” and “the sacred committee.”2 in 1909, however, the law on associations (cemiyetler kanunu) forced the committee to separate itself from the parliamentary union and progress group, which remained in existence only on paper. the cup continued to function as a parallel government in the ottoman empire.3 the organisation, as stated in a report by party secretary bahaeddin şakir, had 360 centres in the country, more than 850,000 members, and a majority in the parliament by the end of 1909. during the same period, the cup had also succeeded in deposing the sultan. the governments of ahmed muhtar pasha and kamil pasha between july 1912 and january 1913 were the only opposition that the 1 on different explanations of ideology see michael freeden, “ideology and political theory,” journal of political ideologies 11, no. 1 (2006): 3-22. 2 şükrü m. hanioğlu, preparation for a revolution: the young turks, 1902-1908 (oxford: oxford university press, 2001), 279. 3 derya bayır, minorities and nationalism in turkish law (farnham: ashgate, 2013), 51-52. 9 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress cup faced. the answer to the loss of power was the sublime porte raid of january 23, 1913, through which the party of union and progress established a dictatorial regime in the ottoman empire, only to lose it after the country was defeated in wwi. after the coup of 1913 the ministerial cabinets, minister of the interior, governors, deputy governors, district directors, the minister of justice, judges and even professors and teachers at universities, directors of education in the provinces and inspectors of education were all “self-sacrificing members” of the committee.4 stepan sapah-gulian, a prominent armenian journalist, political scientist, intellectual and a leader of the social democrat hnchakian party, correctly states: ittihad – turkish nationalism – was the authorised owner of the situation. it had all the power of the country in its hands, using the machine as it wished. its policy was to throw bait and crumbs to those who supported and agreed with it who came from any nation or people and to deceive and lull them [into a false sense of security] to gain time. meanwhile, it vigorously implemented the various parts of its program with the greatest audacity. cases were not lacking. but who was the investigator, the one to appeal to the court and to which institution? the parliament? the senate? state council? public opinion? journalism? but aren’t the links to all those in its hands? and in all of these, the ruling, presiding voice belonged to it.5 turkish nationalist halide edib made a similar remark immediately after the mudros armistice, during a meeting with commander c. h. heathcote smith of the british naval volunteer service, who was admiral somerset arthur gough-calthorpe’s (the british high commissioner) right-hand man in constantinople. concerning the cup politicians detained in malta before prosecution as war criminals and the need to form a new representative government, edib stated: “every man in this country was once a unionist in the past.6” decision-making in the committee took place through the following chain: the congress that was convened once a year, the central committee, branches located in the vilayets and clubs. decisive in this chain was the central committee, with 12-16 selected members.7 according to the party statute of 1909, the clubs carried out the social and cultural policies of the party in the regions and obeyed the local branches. they were the main tools of nationalistic propaganda.8 two medical doctors, bahaeddin şakir and dr. nazim, were prominent in the central committee. their power over the organisation 4 hanioğlu, preparation for a revolution, 286-288. 5 stepan sapah-gulian, պատասխանատուները [those responsible] (providence: yeritasard hayastan, 1916), 280-281. 6 halide edib, the turkish ordeal: being the further memoirs of halide edib (new york and london: the century co., 1928), 28. 7 arsen avagyan, геноцид армян: механизмы принятия и исполнения решений [genocide of armenians. mechanism of decision-making and implementation] (yerevan: agmi, 2013), 25. 8 ibid., 17. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/armenians https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/social_democrat_hunchakian_party 10 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 was fixed since 1905. although without any visible title or position, they were the main decision makers and the real power behind the government. turkish sociologist and political scientist serif mardin compared the role of bahaeddin şakir in the cup to that played by joseph stalin in the bolshevik party.9 the father of modern turkish nationalism and cup ideologist mehmed ziya gokalp was also the member of the central committee. many foreign diplomats, missionaries and journalists deployed in the ottoman empire testified to the fact that, starting from the successful 1908 coup, the state policy of turkification of the system of education and the economy was in force.10 while the constitution was based on the principle of equality for all ottoman citizens, regardless of ethnicity or religion, the government openly spoke of their plan to turkify everyone and the rightful dominance of the turkish race in the country.11 the cup, too, faced problems following the coup because of the appeals, usually anti-western and anti-christian in nature, issued before 1908 under the motto “turkey for the turks.” after several of these appeals were republished in the european press, cup had to provide explanations.12 the following episode clearly shows the ideological convictions and political agenda of the unionists. when the zionists made an approach to the cup leaders and stated their interest in the decentralisation of turkey, dr. nazim’s answer was: “the committee of union and progress wants centralisation and a turkish monopoly on power. it wants no nationalities in turkey. it does not want turkey to become a new austria-hungary. it wants a unified turkish nation-state with turkish schools, a turkish administration and a turkish legal system.”13 before coming to power in the ottoman empire in 1908, the cup tried to gather all the diverse opposition groups together in the fight against the empire’s despotic monarchy. pan-islamism, ottomanism and turkism were employed in parallel, using contradictory rhetoric, to attract different groups in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire, which was merely a revolutionary tactic.14 most prominent members remained true to their beliefs after coup and, in forming those beliefs, european thought, different ideas and theories, or their highly individual interpretations of western thought did not just have a minor role. in general, different european philosophical ideas and thought began to penetrate the ottoman empire actively from the mid-19th century through wars, concessions, reform programmes, military and economic missions and missionary activities. the structure of 9 hanioğlu, preparation for a revolution, 141. 10 george horton, the blight of asia, an account of the systematic extermination of christian populations by mohammedans and of the culpability of certain great powers; with the true story of the burning of smyrna (indianapolis, kansas city, new york: the bobbs-merrill company, 1953), 28; harry stuermer, two war years in constantinople: sketches of german and young turkish ethics and politics (london, new york, toronto: hodder and stoughton, 1917), 183. 11 a. d. hagopian, “the situation in constantinople,” armenia (ny), no. 8, march 1912, 235. 12 hanioğlu, preparation for a revolution, 188. 13 ibid., 260. 14 ibid., 177. 11 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress the committee also contributed to the adoption of european ideas. the organisation was made up of cells and, already in 1895, had two cells, one in paris and the other in geneva, whose members kept in touch with european intellectual and political circles. it may be assumed that, after the successful coup of 1908, when members in exile returned to the ottoman empire, they brought that influence with them. significant in the formation of the unionist worldview were muslim tatar intellectual members, who echoed 19th century nationalism earlier15 and who hoped for the future liberation and union of tatar subjects of the russian empire. the latter were subjected to pan-slavism and the pressures of the imperial policy of assimilation.16 before coming to the ottoman empire for “field work” representatives of the tatar intellectual elite and a middle-class bourgeoisie participated in the language reforms for russian muslims and convened congresses (1905,1906,1909) demanding the union of all russia’s muslims and representation in duma.17 based on european ethnological, sociological, and historical data, they considered themselves to be representatives of the same race and marked with the same cultural and psychological characteristics. arriving in the ottoman empire before the 1908 coup, tatar exiles joined the committee and started an active propaganda effort in the pages of its periodicals and organised open lectures and discussions. the best known among them were the caucasian tatars ali hüseyinzâde (turan), ahmed agayef (ahmet ağaoğlu) and crimean tatars yusuf akçura and ismail gasprinski (gaspıralı).18 some leading turkish nationalist writers recall how they were attracted to the french classics and enlightenment philosophers. after the 1908 coup the number of intellectuals included in the list increased. this period contains references to 19th century european academicians and scientists, that replaced french literature. names appeared such as arthur schopenhauer, ernst haeckel, ludwig buchner, charles darwin, john draper, ernest renan, hippolyte taine, herbert spencer, gustave le bon, theodule-armand ribot, john stuart mill, gustave flaubert and others who introduced rationalism, scientific materialism, evolutionism and naturalism, rejecting everything contrary to reason.19 although there were individual members of the committee who were influenced by european philosophers and whose personal writings reflected such views, they could not affect the majority of the members of the organisation. among those was a prominent unionist ahmed riza, who held positivistic views; he was influenced by positivism, not directly from auguste comte (who formulated the theory of positivism, 1798-1857), but by his own teacher positivist pierre laffitte (1823-1903).20 riza attended meetings of 15 zarevand, միացեալ, անկախ թուրանիա կամ ի՞նչ կը ծրագրեն թուրքերը [united and independent turania or what the turks plan?] (n.p., 1926), 16. 16 ibid., 68. 17 jacob m. landau, pan-turkism: from irredentism to cooperation (bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press, 1995), 9-10. 18 zarevand, united and independent turania, 74. 19 niyazi berkes, the development of secularism in turkey (london: hurst&company, 1998), 292. 20 sapah-gulian, the responsibles, 129. 12 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 positivists in paris and contributed to their journals. in conformity with his philosophical views, riza held an anti-revolutionary stand for a long time, claiming that progress could only be achieved through education, not violence. according to riza, the sultan could be inclined to a peaceful change of government and society could be improved only through enlightenment. this was contrary to the cup’s aims, although the positivists’ motto “order and progress” influenced the name of the committee which was “union and progress.”21 ziya gokalp, the founder of modern turkish nationalism, was heavily influenced by european sociologists‎ emile durkheim’s (1858-1917) and henri-louis bergson’s (1859-1941) theories on society, culture, civilization, nation, state, and the correlations of the latter. durkheim’s ideas helped gokalp to arrive at the definitions of the turkish nation, national identity and what a nation state should be.22 abdullah cevdet, an intellectual and physician of kurdish origin, one of the founders of the committee of union and progress, credited ernst haeckel as a thinker who had influenced him.23 several foreign thinkers and figures had a direct impact on the majority of cup members, whether by their presence in the empire and personal communications with cup, or just by imparting certain theories through their writings. many unionists fell under the influence of emerging european turkology, which what as a branch of orientalism.24 there were many disputes about the origin of the turks in the 19th century and inconsistency among the writers: some of them, especially the russian tatars, who saw them as being the mongols. it was a fact that as interest in races and peoples in europe increased, research in ottoman origins in central asia and eventually china, increased too. a number of western orientalists, foremost among them hungarian orientalist arminius vambery (1832-1913), french orientalist joseph de guignes (17211800), german archaeologist albert von le coq (1860-1930) and a german-born russian turkologist friedrich wilhelm radloff (1837-1918), in the latter half of the 19th century, had founded a new science, turkology. their studies referred to the racial origin and kinship of the turkic peoples, the history of their languages, and their “brilliant” civilization.25 several key ideas in ottoman and later republican racial discourses – such as the purity and superiority of the turkish race, the geographical extent of the turkish world, the antiquity of the turkish language, the historical homogeneity of turkish culture and the contribution of the turks to world civilization – were to be found outside the empire and within european intellectual discourses.26 21 ernest edmondson ramsaur, the young turks: prelude to revolution 1908 (new york: russell & russell, 1970), 29. 22 uriel heyd, foundations of turkish nationalism: the life and teachings of ziya gökalp (london: luzac and company ltd. and the harvill press ltd, 1950), 66-67. 23 şükrü m. hanioğlu, the young turks in opposition (new york, oxford: oxford university press, 1995), 209. 24 charles warren hostler, turkism and the soviets (london, george allen &unwin, 1957), 140. 25 zarevand, united and independent turania, 21. 26 berkes, the development of secularism in turkey, 293. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/germany https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/russia 13 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress gobineau and le bon the idea of racial kinship with the turkic peoples of central asia inherited by ottoman turkish intellectuals had an internationally diverse background. french aristocrat and thinker count arthur de gobineau (1816-1882) was among the first to reflect on the topic.27 eighteenth-century anthropology had already occupied itself with the racial classification of nations because of phrenology, a psychological theory claiming to know a person’s mental abilities from the size and shape of his skull. however, “scientific” racism came into its own only in the mid-nineteenth century with the publication of gobineau’s “essay on the inequalities of the human race.” although in his work, gobineau was content to offer an objective analysis of the history of civilization from the racial perspective, it is not always clear whether the author was writing about europeans, white people, or the french. his book kept the tendency of his day to use the terms “english race,” “english nation” interchangeably. 28 the french diplomat and writer divided mankind into races distinguishing them by external features, mainly skin colour: white, black, and yellow. he also stated that those races are inherently unequal and structured hierarchically, with the white race being “higher” and yellow and black “lower.” according to gobineau, only “higher” races possess creative power.29 weitz formulated the concept that, ethnic groups were crucial for mankind, nationalities and even social classes began to be “racialised” in different historical moments and places. gobineau’s essay demonstrates how easy the move between race and nation was.30 in his works, gobineau mentioned turks as representatives of the yellow race. based on “historical data,” without specifying them, he also stated that the oghuz ancestors of the turanic hordes were from altai which, in ancient times lived on the asian steppes.31 turkish intellectuals seem to share gobineau’s ideas. his influence was felt in “genç kalemler”, the young turk periodical published in 1911 in thessaloniki.32 gobineau’s 19th century racial views were developed by the french publicist and physician gustave le bon (1841-1931), at the end of the century. based on the works of his contemporary geographers and travellers, le bon argued that every nation, in addition to anthropological type, has a stable mentality, which determined its ideas, institutions, culture and religion.33 le bon believed in the mental and physical inequality of races. 27 taner akçam, a shameful act: the armenian genocide and the question of turkish responsibility (metropolitan books: henry holt and company, new york, 2006), 53. 28 eric weitz, a century of genocide: utopias of race and nation (princeton and oxford: princeton university press, 2006), 35. 29 arthur de gobineau, the inequality of the human races, trans. adrian collins (london: william heinemann, 1915), 111-112. 30 weitz, a century of genocide, 21. 31 gobineau, the inequality of the human races, 128. 32 akçam, a shameful act, 53. 33 gustave le bon, психология народов и масс [the psychology of peoples and masses] (москва: аст, 2018), 9. 14 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 using the japanese as an example, he argued that education could impart knowledge to the “lower” races, but never endow them with critical thinking.34 thus, the mindset in race thinking that essential characteristics of each race are seen to be borne “in the blood” by every individual member of the race and that the particular characteristics assigned to the group are immutable and hereditary, became crucial.35 agreeing with le bon’s idea that all political and social beliefs become perceptible to the masses only if they have a religious connotation,36 the unionists often covered up their actions with quotations from the quran. a common saying among them was: “science is the religion of the elite, whereas religion is the science of the masses.”37 le bon’s ideas were regularly cited by unionists as being by “the greatest living sociologist,” while tarde and durkheim, for example, never gained such popularity among them.38 abdullah cevdet translated le bon’s works, which became very popular reading among them. leading unionists shared cevdet’s opinion that those who seek to act as “social doctors” of the nation should be familiar with le bon’s works. although in scientific writings or personal correspondence unionists frequently discussed the importance of race, they did not develop a theory on the “turkish race.” there is little doubt that this was the result of existing european racial hierarchy, where turks were always assigned to the lower ranks. darwin himself had a prejudiced opinion about the turks.39 however, japan’s victory during the russo-japanese war (1904-1905) questioned the existing racial european hierarchy as a victory of the “yellow” race over the “white,” of which le bon was a proponent. in 1905, cevdet, in a meeting, questioned the philosopher about how the europeans made a misjudgement when placing the japanese at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, as the victory had cast serious doubt on the articulated racial structure and stimulated some unionist periodicals to openly claim that the turks and the japanese were from the same race. 40 vambery and cahun if gobineau and le bon talked about race and the racial kinship of turkic peoples, the lineage through language between the ottoman turks and turkic peoples of central asia was developed by arminius vambery (1832-1913). while travelling to central asia in 34 ibid., 42. 35 weitz, a century of genocide, 35. 36 le bon, the psychology of peoples, 242. 37 hanioğlu, preparation for a revolution, 308. 38 hanioğlu, the young turks in opposition, 206. 39 francis darwin, the life and letters of charles darwin, vol. i (new york: d. appleton and company, 1887), 285. 40 hanioğlu, the young turks in opposition, 210. 15 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress 1863, he visited constantinople where he met turkish statesmen and young ottoman41 intellectuals. he became acquainted with young ottoman writer and editor ibrahim şinasi (1826-1871) and contributed to the young ottoman periodical “hürriyet” [liberty] and “tasvir-i efkar” [picture of ideas]. 42 he was deeply concerned with the indifference of turkish intellectuals towards the kinship of turkish and central asian dialects, considering turkish as plebeian. so, vambery’s endeavour to travel to the khanates of central asia for linguistic and cultural purposes seemed to many of them as literary madness. but “absolute lack of higher ideals” did not stop him, as vambery recalls in his memoirs.43 from his travels, vambery noted the following observation: compared with the ottoman turks, the people in central asia, particularly kipchaks, stayed true in physiognomy and character as well as language and customs, to their ancestral type. in terms of language, vambery could not detect any foreign words in their spoken language, which he considered the best transition from mongolian to the chagatai language.44 at the same time, vambery noted that even under “corrupt islamism,” western or ottoman turks managed to retain some of their character traits.45 vambery also talked about the political potential of the union of ottoman turks with the peoples of central asia. he believed that the ottoman empire, by awakening its oriental essence and by uniting turkomans, kyrgyz, uzbeks and tatars could establish an empire stretching from the adriatic to china that would surpass the heterogeneous russian empire in power.46 returning to constantinople in the 1890s, vambery saw no change in turkish society’s nationalistic views.47 the identification of a turk with an uneducated peasant or nomad continued and a clear line was drawn in society between ottoman and ordinary turks. that is why vambery was surprised when sultan abdul hamid ii used words of turkic origin in a conversation with him and when he saw a huge collection of samples of turkic literature in the sultan’s library.48 there were no ideas of common ethnic origin with other turkic peoples or any interest in establishing any relationships with them existing. vambery attributed this to the effects of abdul hamid’s despotic regime and to islam’s denationalising tendency. vambery sadly mentioned that the ottoman was a man who only 41 a secret oppositional society established in 1865 by a group of ottoman turkish intellectuals. the young ottomans sought for new ways of government and constitution in conformity to islam. among the prominent members of this society were writers and publicists such as i̇brahim şinasi, namık kemal, ali suavi, ziya pasha, and agah efendi. 42 arminius vambéry, the story of my struggles: the memoirs of arminius vambéry, vol. i (london: t. fisher unwin, 1905), 143; ahmed emin, the development of modern turkey as measured by its press (new york: longmans, green & co, agents, 1914), 37. 43 vambéry, the story of my struggles, vol. i, 153. 44 arminius vámbéry, travels in central asia (performed in 1863) (london: john murray, albemarle street, 1864), 383. 45 ibid., 185. 46 ibid., 436. 47 akçam, a shameful act, 52. 48 arminius vambéry, the story of my struggles: the memoirs of arminius vambéry, vol. ii (london: t. fisher unwin, 1905), 353. 16 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 had a small amount of turkish blood flowing in his veins and whose physical features did not even bear the traces of a typical turk.49 the unionist intellectual organ “türk,” which began being published in cairo in 1903 and which promoted purely turkish identity, declared that turkish was the most advanced and superior oriental language. articles encouraging the purification of the turkish language frequently appeared in the journal. this radical attitude prompted arminius vambery to send a letter to the editor hailing his and his friends’ efforts, recalling that when he had written his first articles in “ceride-i havâdis” [journal of news] a long time before, those who advocated the purification of the turkish language had been mocked.50 vambery himself did not indoctrinate racial ideas (common origin, blood), emphasizing that it was impossible to divide people into races due to intermarriage and other factors. in defining a nation, he emphasised language and culture.51 however, there is the following idea with different formulations in his works: i was all ablaze with enthusiasm when in my childhood i became acquainted with the life of the national heroes of hungary. the heroic year of 1848 filled my youthful heart with genuine pride... i was intensely happy and in a rapture of delight. but i had soon to realise that many, nay most of the people questioned the genuineness of my hungarianism. they criticised and made fun of me, because, they said, people of jewish origin could not be hungarians, they could only be jews and nothing else.52 it is very likely that he shared these ideas with turkish intellectuals and politicians. vambery was also interested in the constitutional movement and knew the unionists who were in exile.53 french writer and orientalist leon cahun (1841-1900) was another writer who had influenced the unionist worldview. cahun, being the author of a number of literary and historical works, undertook the narration of the history of asia in his “introduction à l’histoire de l’asie.” it was translated and edited by necip asim (1861-1935).54 cahun declared that the turks are the “backbone” of world history and that new archaeological 49 hermann vambéry, das türkenvolk in seinen ethnologischen und ethnographischen beziehungen (leipzig: f.a. brockhaus, 1885), 594, 612. 50 hanioğlu, preparation for a revolution, 68. 51 arminius vambéry, the story of my struggles: the memoirs of arminius vambéry, vol. ii (london: t. fisher unwin, 1905), 431. 52 ibid., 436. 53 berkes, the development of secularism in turkey, 314. the review “türk yurdu” published several articles of vambery, also his obituary in 1913 (see the table of contents of “türk yurdu” in masami arai, turkish nationalism in the young turk era (leiden, new york, københavn, köln: e.j. brill, 1992), 127, 130-133). 54 together with vambery, asim (a turkish mp from 1927) was an honorary member of the hungarian turanic organization. 17 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress discoveries refute deliberate distortions of turks’ history.55 cahun notes that the application of the term “mongolian, uighur-finnish or turkic” to the diverse, mixed mass of people inhabiting central asia and the ottoman empire is not scientific, but that they speak the languages of the same language family. cahun also gives the anthropological description of these people (skin colour, height, bone structure, customs, language and religion), classifying them as of the yellow race. the book’s whole narrative has a derogatory tone and is prejudiced towards the mongolian race.56 cahun also argued that the essence of the politically fragmented turkic community, which has the same origin, is war and that military discipline is the basis of its existence.57 ziya gokalp, a member of the committee from the diyarbekir branch and later the main cup ideologist and the father of modern turkish nationalism, wrote that he contacted ali hüseyinzade, a caucasian tatar emigre and proponent of pan-turkism and bought leon cahun’s book when he came to constantinople for the first time.58 gokalp stated that his interest in turkish history arose after he read cahun’s work.59 tekinalp (moiz cohen), a unionist ideologist, also spoke positively about this book.60 a crimean tatar emigre yusuf akçura, another cup ideologue, reflecting on cahun’s attribution of turkish identity to lenk temur and genghis khan,61 was sceptical about the “noble object of uniting all turks” attributed to genghis by the author.62 nazim, secretary general of the committee, was also familiar with cahun’s work.63 von der goltz and parvus colmar von der goltz was one of the individuals that had a direct impact on the young turk mindset. he trained several generations of ottoman officers during a military mission to reconstruct the ottoman army in 1883-1895, many of whom joined the cup and organised the 1908 coup. in his book “das volk in waffen” published in 1883, he put forward the idea of “the nation in arms” and argued that an era of total war had begun, in which the state would win only by mobilising the entire nation and resources, amalgamating civic and military life and by exhausting the enemy in a long-lasting struggle. this theory expressed the author’s social-darwinist worldview, according to 55 léon cahun, introduction à l’histoire de l’asie. turcs et mongols des origins à 1405 (paris, armand colin et cie, 1896), 33. 56 ibid., 37. 57 ibid., 75. 58 hostler, turkism and the soviets, 141; heyd, foundations of turkish nationalism, 105. 59 akçam, a shameful act, 52. 60 tekin alp, the turkish and pan-turkish ideal (liberty press: london, no date), 76. 61 cahun, introduction à l’histoire de l’asie, 75. 62 yusuf akçura, ismail fehmi, “yusuf akçura’s üç tarz-ı siyaset [three kinds of policy’]” oriente moderno 61, no. 1 (1981): 9. 63 hanioğlu, preparation for a revolution, 489, 74. 18 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 which war was necessary, desirable, and unavoidable in the process of the development of any nation. in the course of the war and struggle for survival, “strong” nations would rightfully devour “weak” ones.64 he started to use the term “the nation in arms” or “soldier nation” (asker millet)65 in reference to turks, based on emerging european turkology, according to which the turks were turkic tribes from central asia, being born soldiers; therefore, war was their profession and they had a better chance of winning the “struggle for existence.”66 he sympathized with the young turk movement and emphasised the role of his student officers in the coup. he kept in touch with them after the coup, giving advice in his open letters: “be powerful so you will not be subjected to injustice.”67 his influence on ottoman officers was known beyond the ottoman empire68 but the idea of a “soldier nation” influenced the unionist civil wing as well. ahmed riza authored a booklet in 1907 titled “duties and responsibilities: soldier” (vazife ve mesuliyet’ler: asker) based on von der goltz’s teachings. in it, riza calls on every turk to fight against external and internal enemies. he classifies “non-ottomanized christians” as “internal enemies” or “secret enemies.” he was convinced that christian secret enemies would limit the army’s combat effectiveness during the war, thus they were dangerous.69 alexander helphand (also known as mustafa parvus, 1867-1924,) was the other individual who called the unionist for the strive, but this time in the economic sphere and about the significance of war in general.70 he played an influential role in the political 64 handan n. akmeşe, the birth of modern turkey: the ottoman military and the march to world war i (london: i.b. tauris, 2005), 22. 65 fuat dündar, modern türkiye’nin şifresi. ittihat ve terakki’nin etnisite mühendisliği (1913-1918) (i̇stanbul: i̇letişim yayınları, 2008), 66-68. 66 cahun, introduction à l’histoire de l’asie, 75. 67 akmeşe, the birth of modern turkey, 67. 68 i. i. goloborod’ko, старая и новая турцiя [old and new turkey] (moscow: pol’za, 1908), 189. 69 dündar, modern türkiye’nin şifresi, 70-72. 70 parvus was born into a middle-class jewish family in russia in 1867. he was influenced by russian marxists. in the 1890s, as a political exile in switzerland, he received a ph.d. in political economy from the university of basel. he joined german social democratic circles where he developed close friendships with karl kautsky, clara zetkin, rosa luxemburg and karl radek (asim m. karaömerlioğlu, “helphand-parvus and his impact on turkish intellectual life,” middle eastern studies 40, no. 6 (2004): 146). parvus actively participated in the revolution of 1905 and, together with his disciple trotsky, became one of the most important political figures in the st. petersburg soviets. helphand was arrested in 1906 and exiled to siberia, from where he fled, at about the same time as trotsky, to germany. he engaged in an export and import enterprise, continuing social democratic propaganda in parallel with his commercial activities. (george katkov, “революция и германское вмешательство,” в тайна октябрьского переворота. ленин и немецко-большевистский заговор. документы, статьи, воспоминания [“revolution and german intervention” in mystery of the october revolution. lenin and the german-bolshevik conspiracy. documents, articles, memoirs], compiler v. i. kuznetsov (saint petersburg: aleteĭia, 2001), 147). parvus convinced the german authorities to arrange the famous sealed train by which the emigre russian bolshevik leaders, including lenin, entered russia in april of 1917 just after the february revolution (karaömerlioğlu, “helphand-parvus…,” 150). although he financed and led the propaganda war for october revolution, the bolsheviks did not let parvus enter russia afterwards. “the cause of the revolution cannot be taken up with dirty hands,” lenin replied through radek to parvus’ desire to return to his homeland (karl radek, “парвус,” в силуэты: политические портреты /а. лунчарский, 19 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress and intellectual life of russia, germany and turkey. he was one of the leading marxist theoreticians and revolutionaries in the 1905 russian revolution and was a prominent german social democrat in germany, as well as being an economic adviser to unionists in 1910-1914 in constantinople.71 in the words of karl radek, a revolutionary comrade: “parvus is part of the revolutionary past of the working class, that was trampled into the mud.”72 turkologist erik j. zürcher rightfully defines him as “journalist, german agent, arms dealer and marxist intellectual.”73 during italo-turkish (1911-1912) war, he was sent as a war reporter for a german newspaper to constantinople. protected by liman von sanders,74 parvus became the main grain supplier from germany to the turkish army (and, for a short period, from russia). in fact, parvus was given the opportunity to conclude lucrative contracts for the delivery of bread and to earn money using this combination, a deal which, in his estimation, saved the unionist regime during the wwi.75 parvus offered “strategical information” to the turkish government about the balkans before and during the wars (1912-1913) and, in turn, was rewarded. it has been suggested that he smuggled old-fashioned german arms to the balkans and made a considerable fortune out of these deals.76 he criticised european economic penetration of the ottoman empire and put forward the need for a national economy, a pre-condition for which he declared to be the abolishment of the capitulations.77 he harshly attacked the public debt administration (düyûn-ı umûmiye) founded in 1881 as a european institution for collecting taxes and revenues on major ottoman goods.78 parvus, for the adherents of turkism, was a “european” mentor: “i wrote financial articles and was busy founding banks. once i made my first commercial gains, i put them aside because they were the lever for further advancement.”79 parvus’s ideas gained influence from the 1913 coup, with the state, now completely dominated by the cup, engaged with policies concerning the national к. радек, л. троцкий [“parvus” in silhouettes: political portraits /a. lunacharsky, k. radek, l. trotsky], eds. v. zhuravlev, v. loginov (moscow: politizdat, 1991), 253). he died of a heart attack in 1924 in germany. 71 karaömerlioğlu, “helphand-parvus…,” 145. 72 radek, “parvus,” 248. 73 erik j. zürcher, turkey, a modern history (london, new york: i.b. tauris, 2004), 125. 74 otto viktor karl liman von sanders (1855 –1929) was a german general who served as an adviser to the ottoman empire during wwi. in 1918 he commanded an ottoman army during the sinai and palestine campaigns. 75 sergeĭ aleksandrov, “немецкий агент парвус,” в тайна октябрьского переворота. ленин и немецкобольшевистский заговор. документы, статьи, воспоминания [“german agent parvus” in mystery of the october revolution. lenin and the german-bolshevik conspiracy. documents, articles, memoirs], compiler v. i. kuznetsov (saint petersburg: aleteĭia, 2001), 114; katkov, “revolution and german intervention,” 147. 76 karaömerlioğlu, “helphand-parvus…,” 158-159. 77 berkes, the development of secularism in turkey, 337. 78 karaömerlioğlu, “helphand-parvus…,” 152. 79 hans-lukas kieser, “world war and world revolution: alexander helphand-parvus in germany and turkey,” kritika: explorations in russian and eurasian history 12, no. 2 (2011): 398. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ottoman_empire 20 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 economy (milli i̇ktisat). parvus must have been in close contact with mehmed javid, the financial expert and minister of economics of the cup (1909-1911, 1914), and with the interior minister mehmed talaat.80 with the outbreak of the first world war, the ottoman government suspended payment on the national debt and the capitulations were abolished from october 1, 1914.81 parvus’ impact on young turk thinking in economic matters can be best seen in his writings published between 1912 and 1914. he was made an honorary member of various turkish organisations and contributed to turkish journals and newspapers such as “bilgi mecmuası” [information magazine], “le jeune turc” [the young turk], “türk yurdu” [the turkish homeland], “tasvir-i efkar,” etc. the most important among these was the review “türk yurdu,” established in 1911. the editor of this pan-turkist publication was the crimean tatar emigre yusuf akçura. the latter invited parvus to provide economic columns for the periodical. this was a topic, he insisted, that was highly important but for which no turkish author could be found. introducing parvus to the readers, akçura pointed out that he was a well-known social democrat in europe and, despite the ideological difference concerning nationalism between parvus and the “türk yurdu” circle, they shared the same populist concerns.82 during his further collaboration, parvus succeeded in confirming “türk yurdu” readers their feeling that the turks were the victims of european imperialism and capitalism and equated foreign financial penetration to a military invasion.83 he was himself an agitator and could use the mood of the crowd. in an address to the “turks,” during the final phase of the first balkan war in april 1913, parvus adopted an apocalyptic tone that contributed to turkish fears of extermination. he wrote that the great powers “…want to annihilate you like the native indians who perished in america…. they have closed all your roads and besiege you. if you cannot hold your positions and establish an economic force that meets modern demands, your death is certain…. henceforth the last minute has begun.”84 parvus changed his revolutionary ideas and became convinced that what was needed for the collapse of the capitalist system was not class struggle, but a war between states: “war carries all capitalist contradictions to extremes. a world war can only end with a world revolution,” he wrote in 1910. he promoted his concept of a german–ottoman war of destruction against russia.85 together with such politically diverse figures as the turkologist ernst jäckh, the orientalist max von oppenheim, the left-liberal politician friedrich naumann and officers like hans humann, who was a close friend of the ottoman 80 kieser, “world war and world revolution,” 397. 81 zürcher, turkey, a modern history, 125. 82 karaömerlioğlu, “helphand-parvus…,” 151. 83 kieser, “world war and world revolution,” 398. 84 ibid., 400. 85 ibid., 396. 21 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress war minister ismail enver, parvus was among the german friends of the cup regime and of supporters of the war in constantinople.86 he did not advocate ethno-religious nationalism, as seen in all his writings and in a letter addressed to wilhelm liebknecht: “i’m looking for a state where a person can buy a fatherland on the cheap.”87 he strongly opposed the armenian reforms and had clashes with armenian socialist organisations, in particular with the hnchaks on this matter.88 his writings served much greater ends and influenced the nationalist intellectuals considerably in perceiving the ottoman empire as being in an internal struggle between the nationalities of the empire and the imperialistic war over the parts of the empire. his constant contrasts and examples on armenian, greek and bulgarian peasants on one side and the turkish one on the other stirred anti-christian sentiments in the country. he always agitated for strikes against european goods, a strategy used in both the 1905 and 1917 russian revolutions. but in the end, it was the ottoman empire’s armenian and greek entrepreneurs that were the main victims of the anti-christian boycotts of goods and services, a strategy used in milli i̇ktisat. most german and russian socialists preferred to forget helphand.89 but alfred rosenberg, the leading nazi ideologist, never tired of using helphand as an example of the corrupting influence of eastern jews on germany’s national life.90 consequences two main areas in the cup worldview can be singled out as a result of european influence: racism and social-darwinism. european racial thought and developing turkology contributed to the flourishing of the cup’s racial nationalism. muslim emigre intellectuals from russia began to nurture pan-turkism as an ideology, expanding its borders from a mere cultural and linguistic definition and marking it with their own political aspirations.91 using the impact of harsh economic reality, the balkan defeats and the frustrations of european economic and political pressure, they attempted to shift turkism from romantic populism to grandiose schemes of pan-turkism. they were intellectual-revolutionaries, but unionist turks were statesmen with practical insights and had a very good understanding of the geographical and political obstacles. ali kemal, the editor of the journal “türk,” was severe in his criticism of pan-turkism, considering it to be an unrealistic policy. not only was its realisation precluded by geographic factors, but there was not even a strong turkist movement in central asia to give it a semblance 86 karaömerlioğlu, “helphand-parvus…,” 148; kieser, “world war and world revolution,” 408. 87 aleksandrov, “german agent parvus,” 110. 88 sapah-gulian, the responsibles, 275-280. 89 zbynek zeman, winfried scharlau, the merchant of the revolution: the life of alexander israel helphand (parvus), 1867-1924 (london: oxford university press, 1965), 276. 90 ibid., 265. 91 berkes, the development of secularism in turkey, 427. 22 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 of credibility, as kemal stated: “we could not defend the crimea, which is inhabited by tatars who are a kind of turk. should we fight for the unification of turks all over asia?”92 it is sufficient to bring an article published in the literary supplement of “peyam” [message] by ali kemal. first, kemal refers to tamerlane being perceived as the pride of turkishness, who made his greatness known to the world, then adds that the latter did not even recognize the ottomans as turks and referred to ottoman sultan bayezid i as the “greek emperor.” however: some among us, subject to the turkish spirit and similar sentiments consider tamerlane, like genghis, ancestors worthy of honour. unfortunately, those who adhere to turkishness with such extreme jealousy and ignore ottomanism are wrong about something. we are not the descendants of timur, but of bayazet, we are ottomans. the ottomans distanced themselves from other turks, left and joined non-turkish tribes, accommodated them in their country, and together with many of them, built a huge empire that exists today. and what happened to the other turks, what trace has they left?93 this was the attitude of the most high-ranking officials. as edib describes it in her memoirs: “pan-turanism never had a clear boundary, crystallised expression or an explanation. talaat pasha pleasantly and humorously remarked at times, that if any one criticised it, ‘it may lead us to the yellow sea.’”94 pan-turkism stayed as an elitist political ideology, nurturing the racial feelings of ordinary people and serving as a tool for manipulating them with the imaginary ideal of a turanian empire extending from the mediterranean sea to the great wall of china. the literary figures of turkism turned from the discomforting reality of the turkish people to pre-islamic turkish mythology and epics.95 writers like cahun and vambery, gobineau and le bon introduced the concept of race, defined turks as a race, providing linguistic and cultural kinship with the central asian turkic peoples and the mongolian race in general. afterwards, they helped to fix the racial characteristics of that race, considering them immutable and hereditary, emphasising the role turkic peoples played: “the hoof-print of the turanian “man on horseback” is stamped deep all over the palimpsest of history.”96 the number of key ideas on the turkish race were developed by cup ideologists and were passed into republican racial discourses97 – such as the purity and superiority of the turkish race, geographical extent 92 zarevand, united and independent turania, 48. 93 «թիմուրլենկի մասին» [about tamerlane], azatamart (constantinople), no. 1420, 21 january 1914, 2. 94 halide edib, memoirs of halide edib (london, new york: the century co, 1926), 315. 95 berkes, the development of secularism in turkey, 428. 96 t. lothrop stoddard, “pan-turanism,” the american political science review 11, no. 1 (1917): 16. 97 for more see nazan maksudyan, “the turkish review of anthropology and the racist face of turkish nationalism, cultural dynamics 17, no. 3 (2005): 291-322; illia xypolia, “racist aspects of modern turkish 23 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress of the turkish world, antiquity of the turkish language, historical homogeneity of turkish culture and the turks’ contributions to world civilization. race functions as part of a general category of group formation,98 and served the unionists’ political agenda of establishing a turkish nation-state and framing turkish national identity. crucial for the then still multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire was that, although in the given period (1908-1918) the ruling party was debating over the definition of the term turk, it could easily define who was not a turk.99 in that definition, the role racial affiliation played was not minor. a great deal of research dealt with the cooperation of race with nationalism and genocide, showing that racial discourses have a great mutability in their meaning and operation within different settings.100 what should also be stated is that modern nationalism and racism are not indigenous thoughts, rather were imported western strains of thought that served as raw material in the turkish sociological milieu. the reason why racial thought resonated most among the turkish intellectual elite was the existing belief in the concept of the “ruling nation” (millet-i hakime), which prevailed among the empire’s muslim turks. according to this, as the conquerors of the land, they were superior to the empire’s other peoples and therefore had the inherent right to rule over them.101 thus even before turkish nationalism was fully formed as a political ideology, the turks viewed themselves as the ruling nation.102 racial definitions and groups are not logical, being merely constructed entities, as stoddard explains the awakening of turkish nationalism: “for his blood-race he will not stir: for his thought-race he will die,” as race is “not what men really are, but what they think they are!”103 it was only after racial immutability attached itself to turkishness and constructed it as an identity that belonging and citizenship started to differ: turkic peoples of central asia belong to the turkish world whereas ottoman citizens from minority origins were considered to be foreigners. this was a period in which race marked a domain beyond citizenship.104 for fast and effective political and national consolidation, cup affiliated propagandists targeted armenians as a group, which had been marginalised over the entire 500-year history of the ottoman empire. they were already suspect in the eyes of many turks because of their religion and occupations, but the cup articulated old nationalism,” journal of balkan and near eastern studies 18, no. 2 (2016): 111-124; on the emergence of sun-language theory see ben kiernan, blood and soil: a world history of genocide and extermination from sparta to darfur (new haven: yale university press, 2007), 401402. 98 kathryn a. manzo, creating boundaries: the politics of race and nation (boulder: lynne rienner, 1995), 52. 99 uğur ümit ungör, the making of modern turkey: nation and state in eastern anatolia, 1913-1950 (oxford: oxford university press, 2011), 52. 100 weitz, a century of genocide, 21-22; mark levene, “why is the twentieth century the century of genocide?” journal of world history 11, no. 2 (2000): 329-331. 101 akçam, a shameful act, 48. 102 ibid., 50. 103 stoddard, “pan-turanism,” 13. 104 murat ergin, “‘is the turk a white man?’ towards a theoretical framework for race in the making of turkishness,” middle eastern studies 44, no. 6 (2008): 830. 24 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 racial prejudices,105 linked them to current anxieties (mainly the defeats in the balkan wars and the question of armenian reforms) and created the “stab-in-the-back” myth, which was intensified with the outbreak of wwi. as manzo stated: “nationalism’s dominant conceptual partners are not simply nation and state. they are also race and aliens, for without the racialised kind of alien there can be no national kin.”106 the existence and continuation of a national system of inclusion and exclusion in the ottoman empire over centuries nurtured this process. the theory of social-darwinism had some manifestations in all the communities of the ottoman empire. an example of this is the fact, that in syrian and lebanese missionary schools, the works of darwin and spencer were included in the curricula and spencer’s “synthetic philosophy” was used as a teaching manual.107 in the empire’s armenian reality, we could meet references to darwin and spencer as well. in particular, the first issue of the periodical “lusaber”, published in cairo, began as follows: the struggle for life is waged against conflicting elements. countless species are erased, and the one which has sufficient vitality in it and is in favourable conditions, struggles and remains. in one word, the worthy live, the unworthy die, according to darwin’s theory (the survival of the fittest). the newspaper asked the armenian reader for support to win the “struggle for existence” by preserving armenian culture.108 however social-darwinism was fully absorbed in the mentality of the unionists’ military and political elite, partly synthesised with their racist and elitist ideas and partly based on the turkish perception of the ruling nation.109 the “survival of the fittest” in the eternal struggle for existence is the key idea of social-darwinism, a philosophical theory that was established by the english sociologist herbert spencer in the 1850s.110 according to spencer and social-darwinist thinkers, the formula of social life is the following: the struggle for existence – natural selection – survival of the fittest. destruction of the maladapted or weaker species is considered natural. despite their economic and educational backwardness, turks considered themselves to be the country’s ruling element. forming the military-bureaucratic class of the empire, they were the title nation of the empire thus, according to some thinkers, proving their “biological fitness for the 105 for more on this see stephan h. astourian, “modern turkish identity and the armenian genocide: from prejudice to racist nationalism” in remembrance and denial: the case of the armenian genocide, ed. richard hovhannisian (detroit: wayne state university press, 1999), 25, 31. 106 manzo, creating boundaries, 3. 107 marwa elshakry, reading darwin in arabic, 1860-1950 (chicago and london: the university of chicago press, 1973), 82-86. 108 «մամուլը» [the press], loussaper (cairo), no. 1, 1 december 1904, 1. 109 akçam, a shameful act, 48. 110 robert g. perrin, “herbert spencer’s four theories of social evolution,” american journal of sociology 81, no. 6 (1976): 1356. 25 regina galustyan: the roots of the racial nationalism of the committee of union and progress living conditions.” von der goltz was one of the individuals that contributed heavily to the spread of social-darwinism, injecting the officers with the need for external and internal war, with the confidence that the turks would be able to win because of their racial characteristics. subsequently, in compliance with the social-darwinist mindset, the committee saw war as a significant stage in the development of the nation. many highranking cup officials considered pacifism a threat to the survival of the empire. the racial perceptions of the committee of union and progress, as a ruling party, intertwined with social-darwinism, were crucial, both in decision-making and the “justification” of the destruction of the empire’s non-turkish populations. 54 lance levenson is a doctoral student in the seymour fox school of education at the hebrew university of jerusalem, israel. his research interests lie in sociology and anthropology of education, international education, nationalism and identity, genocide and intergenerational memory, and the education of ethnic and religious minorities. he has conducted extensive ethnographic fieldwork within jerusalem’s armenian diaspora community and its school, where he also serves as a teacher for the secondary grades. email: lance.levenson@mail.huji.ac.il 55 “everything is connected to the genocide.” intergenerational memory, diaspora mobilization, and armenian youth identities in jerusalem lance levenson the hebrew university of jerusalem, israel considering commemorative practices of postmemory, past presencing, and transnational memory, this study considers how genocide memories and the conflict in artsakh intersect to shape the performance of diasporic armenian youth identities in jerusalem as members of a disempowered minority community. drawing on ethnographic research in jerusalem’s armenian school, participant-observation in community events, and interviews with youth and community leaders, this article documents processes of intergenerational memory transmission within educational and community settings and suggests ways in which inherited narratives of victimization find new expressions via transnational acts of citizenship. as jerusalem’s multilingual armenian youth engage in commemorative ceremonies and take protests to the streets in acts of diaspora mobilization, memories are (re) interpreted to construct novel identity narratives tied to an imagined armenian transnation. keywords: intergenerational memory, armenian genocide, diaspora mobilization, youth identity, ethnography the article was submitted on 13.07.2021 and accepted for publication on 25.10.2021. how to cite: lance levenson, “everything is connected to the genocide.” intergenerational memory, diaspora mobilization, and armenian youth identities in jerusalem,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 2 (2021): 55-73. 56 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 https://doi.org/ 10.51442/ijags.0023 introduction since the armenian genocide’s centennial, the entrance to the armenian quarter of jerusalem’s old city has been adorned with a large banner bearing an outline of the armenian genocide memorial complex in yerevan, the official purple forget-me-not flower emblem, and the slogan “i remember and demand” written in armenian, english, arabic, and hebrew. as is the case elsewhere in the diaspora, the genocide has long been considered a defining symbol of armenian collective identity within the jerusalem community. but what are the memories and demands which shape the identities of today’s jerusalemite armenian youth as members of a marginalized community in israel? in many ways, this banner represents the multiple facets of armenian youth identity negotiation in jerusalem: the historical trauma of the genocide, the connection to the armenian homeland, and the demand for recognition faced by a double minority armenian christians living amongst the primarily muslim arab minority within a jewish majority population in a region plagued by intractable conflict. against this background, israel’s non-recognition of the genocide and complicity in recent azerbaijani aggression during the last artsakh war further complicates the process of identity negotiation. drawing on the theoretical concepts of postmemory, past presencing, and transnational memory as practices of remembering, this study considers how intergenerational memories of the genocide and the ongoing conflict in artsakh intersect to shape the performance of diasporic armenian youth identities in jerusalem. i first consider how practices of postmemory (ways in which youth relate to trauma endured by their ancestors) and past presencing (how youth perform genocide memories in the present) contribute to identity constitution through the retelling of collected stories and the experience of day-to-day life behind the walls of the armenian quarter. i then discuss how the community’s sts. tarkmanchatz armenian school and organized rallies around genocide recognition, in particular, function as sites and spaces for identity-building through the performance of intergenerational memory and transnational citizenship. finally, i examine how diaspora mobilization for genocide recognition and support of armenia in the artsakh conflict two major events which are linked in community memory constitute localized ways of commemorating. while such localized practices of transnational memory have the potential to forge collective identities, given the complexities of the geopolitical landscape, they also prompt jerusalemite armenian youth to question their very sense of belonging as they navigate the space between homeland and diaspora. diaspora nationalism and identity construction in contrast with traditional conceptions of nationalism tied to the nation-state, whose geopolitical borders are understood to define citizenship, diaspora or long-distance nationalism forges cohesion among dispersed populations, such as the armenians.1 following ander1 benedict anderson, long-distance nationalism: world capitalism and the rise of identity politics (amsterdam: centre for asian studies, 1992). 57 lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide son’s understanding of the modern nation as an imagined community,2 werbner conceptualizes diasporas as “deterritorialised imagined communities which conceive of themselves, despite their dispersal, as sharing a collective past and common destiny, and hence also a simultaneity in time.”3 considering cohen’s features common to diasporas,4 this “collective past and common destiny” is rooted in (traumatic) dispersion, shared collective memory, the idealization of and commitment to the homeland, and a strong ethnonational collective consciousness extending across national boundaries. this diaspora consciousness5 creates an imagined transnational community6 connected by ties of moral co-responsibility,7 reflected in the armenian case by the notion of hay dat, “the armenian cause.” according to khachig tölölyan, the concept of transnation encompasses both the homeland and diaspora communities, while emphasizing such ties and interconnectedness.8 we must also recognize that diasporas are fluid and dynamic constructs,9 allowing for the continuous (re)construction of ethnonational identity, which lies “at the very core of diaspora and its influence in home and hostland.”10 likewise, postmodern conceptions of identity demand that we reject the metanarrative of static, unified identities, and instead, understand identity as fluid, in-process, and even contradictory.11 diasporans are constantly negotiating their identities to cultivate social capital, those resources (e.g., knowledge, norms, supportive networks) linked to facilitating and sustaining group membership.12 given that the homeland “may serve as the physical embodiment of the shared national identity,”13 homeland tragedy both past and present becomes a key channel through which sense 2 benedict anderson, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (london: verso, 2006). 3 pnina werbner, “the place which is diaspora: citizenship, religion and gender in the making of chaordic transnationalism,” journal of ethnic and migration studies 28, no. 1 (2002):121, https://doi. org/10.1080/13691830120103967. 4 robin cohen, global diasporas: an introduction (london: routledge, 2008), 6-8. 5 steven vertovec, “three meanings of ‘diaspora,’ exemplified among south asian religions,” diaspora: a journal of transnational studies 6, no. 3 (1997): 277-299, https://doi.org/10.3138/diaspora.6.3.277. 6 victoria redclift, “the demobilization of diaspora: history, memory and ‘latent identity, ’” global networks 17, no. 4 (2017): 500-517, https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12150. 7 werbner, “the place which is diaspora,” 121. 8 khachig tölölyan, “elites and institutions in the armenian transnation,” diaspora: a journal of transnational studies 9, no. 1 (2000): 107-136, https://doi.org/10.1353/dsp.2000.0004. 9 homi k. bhabha, the location of culture (london: routledge, 1994); avtar brah, cartographies of diaspora: contesting identities (london: routledge, 1996); rogers brubaker, “the ‘diaspora’ diaspora,” ethnic and racial studies 28, no. 1(2006):1-19, https://doi.org/10.1080/0141987042000289997. 10 jennifer m. brinkerhoff, digital diasporas: identity and transnational engagement (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2009), 31. 11 anthony elliott, concepts of the self (oxford: polity press, 2014); jean-françois lyotard, the postmodern condition: a report on knowledge (minneapolis: university of minnesota press, 1984); stuart hall, “introduction: ‘who needs ‘identity?’” in questions of cultural identity, ed. stuart hall and paul du gay (london: sage, 1996), 1-17. 12 pierre bourdieu, “the forms of capital,” in handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education, ed. john g. richardson (westport, ct: greenwood, 1986), 241-258; janroj yilmaz keles, “digital diaspora and social capital,” middle east journal of culture and communication 9 (2016): 315-333, https://doi. org/10.1163/18739865-00903004; robert d. putnam, “the prosperous community: social capital and public life,” american prospect 13 (1993): 35-42. 13 yossi shain, “the role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution,” sais review 22, no. 2 (2002): 138. 58 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 of belonging is established.14 for the armenian diaspora, national identity is “suspended” between homeland and hostland,15 yet anchored in the memory of the historical genocide and the ongoing conflict with azerbaijan over artsakh. practices of remembering: postmemory, past presencing, and transnational memory research has consistently revealed how intergenerational memories of the armenian genocide are central to armenian collective identity in the diaspora.16 from a praxeological perspective, memory is understood as an ongoing, interactive social practice which can be performed, (re)produced, confirmed, discussed, and felt and linked to identity, spaces, places, and time. practices of remembering are embedded within specific social contexts, subject to rules of how to remember that are associated with particular memory communities.17 following chernobrov and wilmers’ analysis of diaspora armenian youth identities in france, the united kingdom, and russia,18 and gül kaya’s research on armenian youth identities in canada,19 the current research draws on the theoretical concepts of postmemory, past presencing, and transnational memory to understand the role of the genocide and practices of remembering in shaping youth identities within the specific context of jerusalem’s armenian community. postmemory refers to how those in subsequent generations relate to the cultural trauma experienced by ancestors who came before.20 although those individuals comprising the second, third, and fourth generations did not directly experience the traumatic events of the past themselves, their effects persist into the present: “they ‘remember’ only by means of the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up. but these experiences were 14 yossi shain and aharon barth, “diaspora and international relations theory,” international organization 57 (2003): 449-479, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818303573015. 15 razmik panossian, “between ambivalence and intrusion: politics and identity in armenia-diaspora relations,” diaspora 7, no. 2 (1998): 149-196, https://doi.org/10.3138/diaspora.7.2.149. 16 see for example, sossie kasbarian, “the politics of memory and commemoration: armenian diasporic reflections on 2015,” nationalities papers 46, no. 1 (2018): 123-143, https://doi.org/doi:10.1080/00905992.2017. 1347917; razmik panossian, “the past as nation: three dimensions of armenian identity,” geopolitics 7, no. 2 (2002): 121-146, https://doi.org/10.1080/714000931l; susan pattie, “new homeland for an old diaspora,” in homelands and diasporas: holy lands and other places, ed. andré levy and alex weingrod (stanford: stanford university press, 1999), 49-67. 17 danielle drozdzewski and carolyn birdsall, “advancing memory methods,” in doing memory research, ed. danielle drozdzewski and carolyn birdsall (singapore: palgrave macmillan, 2019), 1-20; gabrielle rosenthal, “the social construction of individual and collective memory,” in theorizing social memories: concepts and contexts, ed. gerd sebald and jatin wagle (london: routledge, 2016), 32-55. 18 dmitry chernobrov and leila wilmers, “diaspora identity and a new generation: armenian diaspora youth on the genocide and the karabakh war,” nationalities papers 48, no. 5 (2020): 915-930. https://doi. org/10.1017/nps.2019.74. 19 duygu gül kaya, “memory and citizenship in diaspora: remembering the armenian genocide in canada,” citizenship studies 22, no. 4 (2018): 401-418, https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1462503; duygu gül kaya, “100 voices after 100 years: remembering the armenian genocide in diaspora,” popular communication 16, no. 2 (2018): 128-140, https://doi.org/10.1080/15405702.2017.1378889. 20 marianne hirsch, “the generation of postmemory,” poetics today 29, no. 1 (2008): 103-128, https://doi. org/10.1215/03335372-2007-019. 59 transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to seem to constitute memories in their own right.”21 postmemory narratives of the genocide transmitted between generations have become a fundamental component of diasporic armenian identity. for example, azarian-ceccato’s study of the great-grandchildren of armenian genocide survivors in central california22 demonstrates how communities of memory linking the past and present are formed through the narrativization of collected stories, in which the experiences of another are incorporated into one’s own life history.23 likewise, research on long-distance nationalism among armenian youth in southern russia finds that “the retelling of genocide experiences is an overarching, cultural narrative that defines family and ethnic group beliefs and identity.”24 meanwhile, gül kaya describes how canadian-armenian youth used an audiovisual postmemory project to reconstruct their connections with the past and engage in activism for historical justice in the present25. such a reshaping of the past within contemporary contexts summons macdonald’s concept of “past presencing,” which considers how “people variously draw on, experience, negotiate, reconstruct, and perform the past in their ongoing lives.”26 from armenian diaspora communities in brazil27 to those in iran,28 performance of the memory of the genocide at commemorative events plays a cohesive role in developing and maintaining collective identity given the familiarity of the trauma and its relevance to collective imagination. considering commemorations as “performances of the past which are central to the politics of the present,”29 such practices of past presencing function to cement scattered, diverse armenian diaspora communities into a collective imagined armenian transnation. yet, localized ways of commemorating mean that past presencing is performed in distinctive ways because of varying socio-historical and geopolitical contexts.30 this localization of past presencing practices recalls rothberg’s located approach to transnational memory, which pays “rigorous attention to the local . . . but it situates such attention in relation to other scales: from 21 ibid., 107. 22 natasha azarian-ceccato, “reverberations of the armenian genocide: narrative’s intergenerational transmission and the task of not forgetting,” narrative inquiry 20 no. 1 (2010): 106-123. https://doi.org/10.1075/ ni.20.1.06aza. 23 brian schiff, chaim noy, and bertram j. cohler, “collected stories in the life narratives of holocaust survivors,” narrative inquiry 11, no. 1 (2001): 159-194. 24 ulrike ziemer, “belonging and longing: armenian youth and diasporic long-distance nationalism in contemporary russia,” studies in ethnicity and nationalism 10, no. 2 (2010): 294. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.17549469.2010.01079.x. 25 gül kaya, “100 voices,” 130. 26 sharon macdonald, “presencing europe’s pasts,” in a companion to the anthropology of europe, ed. ullrich kockel, máiréad nic craith, and jonas frykman (west susex: wiley-blackwell, 2012), 234. 27 pedro bogossian-porto, “accounts of a genocide: collective memory among armenians in brazil,” haigazian armenological review 38 (2018): 449-466. 28 james barry, armenian christians in iran: ethnicity, religion, and identity in the islamic republic (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2018): 206-244. 29 camilla orjuela, “mobilising diasporas for justice: opportunity structures and the presencing of a violent past,” journal of ethnic and migration studies 44, no. 8 (2018): 1366, https://doi.org/10.1080/136918 3x.2017.1354163. 30 sabrina papazian, “the cost of memorializing: analyzing armenian genocide memorials and commemorations in the republic of armenia and in the diaspora,” international journal for history, culture and modernity 7 (2019): 55-86, https://doi.org/10.18352/hcm.534. lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 60 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 the regional to the national to the global.”31 the concept of transnational memory, rooted in a processual and generative approach to cultural memory, reflects the deterritorialization of memory-making, aided by transnational flows of peoples and new media technologies.32 according to gül kaya, public commemorations in canada, in which the transnationalized memories of the armenian genocide are performed and reproduced, are central to the construction of armenian ethnic identity and inform local practices of citizenship.33 in this manner, performances of memory can function as acts of citizenship34 in tandem with diaspora mobilization and engagement.35 diaspora mobilization and the armenian case as an expression of diaspora nationalism, diaspora mobilization is a political activity that crosses one or more borders and aims to influence the political situation in the homeland or influence public opinion in the country of residence on political events abroad.36 common examples of diaspora mobilization include economic remittances, philanthropy, volunteering in the homeland, political lobbying, engagement on digital platforms, and organizing protests and demonstrations in support of the homeland. however, mavroudi cautions that we cannot assume that long-distance nationalism and an emotional attachment to the homeland will necessarily galvanize diaspora populations.37 rather, diasporas are embedded in local, national, supranational, and global contexts which shape, and are shaped, by their activism.38 past presencing, ways in which the past is experienced, performed and represented in the present, is at the heart of diaspora identity and mobilization.39 diasporans may mobilize to express their identities, motivated by a sense of obligation or guilt and/or in response to feelings of marginalization in the country of residence.40 identity-focused conflicts, such as the conflict over artsakh, engage diasporas as mobilized transnational actors41 or “third 31 michael rothberg, “locating transnational memory,” european review 22, no. 4 (2014): 652, https://doi. org/10.1017/s1062798714000441. 32 chiara de cesari and ann rigney, “introduction,” in transnational memory: circulation, articulation, scales, ed. chiara de cesari and ann rigney (berlin: de gruyter, 2014), 12. 33 gül kaya, “memory and citizenship,” 414. 34 engin f. isin, “theorizing acts of citizenship,” in acts of citizenship, ed. engin f. isin and greg m. nielsen (london: zed books, 2008), 17. 35 michael rothberg and yasemin yildiz, “memory citizenship: migrant archives of holocaust remembrance in contemporary germany,” parallax 17 no. 4 (2011): 32-48, https://doi.org/1 0.1080/13534645.2011.605576. 36 lea müller-funk, “diaspora mobilizations in the egyptian (post)revolutionary process: comparing transnational political participation in paris and vienna,” journal of immigrant & refugee studies 14, no. 3 (2016): 353-370, https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2016.1180471. 37 elizabeth mavroudi, “deconstructing diasporic mobilisation at a time of crisis: perspectives from the palestinian and greek diasporas,” journal of ethnic and migration studies 44, no. 8 (2018): 1309-1324, https:// doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2017.1354159. 38 maria koinova, “diaspora mobilisation for conflict and post-conflict reconstruction: contextual and comparative dimensions,” journal of ethnic and migration studies 44, no. 8 (2018): 1251-1269, https://doi.org/10 .108010.1080/1369183x.2017.1354152. 39 orjuela, “mobilising diasporas for justice,” 1359. 40 jennifer m. brinkerhoff, “diasporas and conflict societies: conflict entrepreneurs, competing interests or contributors to stability and development?” conflict, security & development 11, no. 2 (2011): 115-143, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2011.572453. 41 armine ishkanian, “diaspora and global civil society: the impact of transnational diaspora activism 61 level” players in transnational communal politics.42 consequently, we can understand diaspora mobilizations as acts of citizenship43 in which performances and acts produce and define citizenships, which may lie outside legal and political categories of citizenship. the confrontation and memorialization of past and present atrocities in the homeland involving human rights violations are key impetuses behind diaspora mobilization and engagement.44 in the armenian case, the genocide and artsakh conflict have historically served as focal points for patriotic mobilization in the diaspora, where commemorative events and protests take place across the globe, in locations far removed from where the atrocities actually happened. genocide recognition is the primary political cause around which diaspora organizations unite, with cooperation taking place between different political parties and across generations because of the shared cultural trauma.45 as such, diaspora nationalism and mobilization around genocide recognition provide a reference point for identification, especially for marginalized armenian communities in the middle east.46 given that the artsakh conflict and the genocide share the same symbolic enemy (regarding the close cultural, linguistic, and military ties between turkey and azerbaijan), this unresolved dispute has functioned as a secondary rallying point around which armenian diasporas mobilize.47 after the escalation of the conflict during the four day war of april 2016, chernobrov and wilmers noted that postmemories and practices of past presencing became increasingly important for armenian youth identity negotiation in the diaspora as the genocide and present conflict were linked.48 in light of the 2020 nagorno-karabakh war, the ensuing ceasefire, and the significant territorial losses endured by the republic of artsakh, the current research explores how intergenerational memories of the genocide shape the performance of diasporic armenian youth identities in jerusalem considering these new realities. case study: the armenian community of jerusalem and its youth occupying approximately one-sixth of the old city, the armenian quarter of jerusalem constitutes one of the oldest armenian diaspora communities. centered around the monason armenia’s post-soviet transition” in central asia and the caucasus: transnationalism and diaspora, ed. touraj atabaki and sanjyot mehendale (london: routledge, 2004), 113-139. 42 shain, “the role of diasporas,” 117. 43 isin, “theorizing acts of citizenship,” 17. 44 maria koinova, “diasporas and secessionist conflicts: the mobilization of the armenian, albanian and chechen diasporas,” ethnic and racial studies 34, no. 2 (2011): 333-356, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870 .2010.489646; maria koinova and dzeneta karabegovic, “diasporas and transitional justice: transnational activism from local to global levels of engagement,” global networks 17, no. 2 (2017): 212-233. 45 sossie kasbarian, “the ‘others’ within: the armenian community in cyprus,” in diasporas of the modern middle east: contextualizing community, ed. anthony gorman and sossie kasbarian (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 2015), 241-273; maria koinova, “conflict and cooperation in armenian diaspora mobilisation for genocide recognition,” in diaspora as cultures of cooperation, ed. david carment and ariane sadjed (cham: palgrave macmillan, 2017), 111-129. 46 kasbarian, “the ‘others’ within,” 256. 47 chernobrov and wilmers, “diaspora identity and a new generation,” 926; khachig tölölyan, “the armenian diaspora and the karabagh conflict since 1988,” in diasporas in conflict: peace makers or peace wreckers, ed. hazel smith and paul stares (new york: united nations university press, 2007), 106-28. 48 chernobrov and wilmers, “diaspora identity and a new generation,” 926. lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 62 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 tery of st. james, the headquarters of the armenian patriarchate of jerusalem, the community’s origins can be traced to at least the fifth century. following a massive influx of refugees who had survived the genocide, the monastery was transformed into a neighborhood in the 1920s.49 serving as a major cultural center, today the monastery compound houses three churches, clerical residences, administrative offices, lay residences, social clubs, a library, health clinic, football field, and the sts. tarkmanchatz school. a theological seminary, located across the road from the monastery, trains young men for the priesthood. most of the community’s youth attend the sts. tarkmanchatz school, founded in 1929 to educate the children of the growing lay community. operating under the auspices of the armenian patriarchate of jerusalem, the sts. tarkmanchatz school functions as an ethnic community mother-tongue school,50 with goals of armenian language maintenance and the development of armenian identity. in addition to instruction in a variety of armenological subjects (armenian history, language, culture, and religion), the school uses the british-based international general certificate of secondary education (gcse) curriculum (in lieu of israeli bagrut or palestinian tawjihi matriculation). given use of the british curriculum, english is the primary language of instruction in all courses, except for the armenological subjects (taught in armenian) and arabic and hebrew language classes. students speak armenian (western dialect) and/or arabic as their mother tongue(s) and receive mandatory instruction in the armenian, arabic, hebrew, and english languages.51 alongside formal education at the sts. tarkmanchatz school, many youngsters are active participants in scouting programs run by the two main social clubs (homenetmen and hoyetchmen), which have traditionally played central roles in the socialization of armenian diaspora youth.52 despite the efforts of community institutions, such as the social clubs and the sts. tarkmanchatz school, to preserve jerusalem’s armenian enclave, its population has experienced a marked decline since the establishment of the state of israel in 1948. this trend is not unique to the armenian community, but is also characteristic of jerusalem’s other christian 49 on the history of armenians in jerusalem see victor azarya, the armenian quarter of jerusalem: urban life behind monastery walls (berkeley: university of california press, 1984); bedross der matossian, “the armenians of jerusalem in the modern period: the rise and decline of a community,” in routledge handbook on jerusalem, ed. sulaiman mourad, bedross der matossian, and naomi koltun-fromm (london: routledge, 2018), 396-407; george hintlian, history of the armenians in the holy land (jerusalem: st. james press, 1976); raymond kevorkian, “from a monastery to a neighbourhood: orphans and armenian refugees in the armenian quarter of jerusalem (1916-1926). reflexions towards an armenian museum in jerusalem, contemporary levant 6, no. 2 (2021): 141-157, https://doi.org/10.1080/20581831.2021.1898124; daphne tsimhoni, “the armenians and the syrians: ethno-religious communities in jerusalem,” middle eastern studies 20, no. 3 (1984): 352-369. 50 joshua a. fishman, “ethnic community mother tongue schools in the u.s.a.: dynamics and distributions,” international migration review 14, no. 2 (1980): 235-247, https://doi.org/10.2307/2545475. 51 on the multiple discourses present in the armenian school’s curriculum see lance levenson and julia resnik, “between ethnonational and international curricula: competing identity discourses in the armenian school in jerusalem,” british journal of sociology of education 42, no. 2 (2021): 213-228, https://doi.org/10.1 080/01425692.2021.1877528. 52 pedro bogossian-porto and thiago bogossian, “the school is not enough: the role of non-formal educational spaces in preserving armenian identity in the diasporic community,” international studies in sociology of education (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/09620214.2021.1912632; nicola migliorino, (re)constructing armenia in lebanon and syria: ethno-cultural diversity and the state in the aftermath of a refugee crisis (oxford: berghahn books, 2008), 200. 63 communities, whose waning population can be attributed, in large part, to their uncertain position in relation to the israeli-palestinian conflict.53 writing about the armenian community in particular, harry hagopian explains it cannot separate itself from the conflict, “since the deleterious social and economic consequences (such as emigration) of this conflict have been visited upon them as a direct result of the political situation and the israeli occupation.”54 given the precarious situation of christian communities vis-à-vis the ongoing struggle over jerusalem, as well as contentious citizenship statuses, limited access to higher education, and a lack of affordable housing, many armenians have emigrated over the years to diaspora centers in europe and north america in pursuit of higher education and career opportunities. for those jerusalemite armenians who have remained despite these challenges, israel’s non-recognition of the genocide and collaboration in recent azerbaijani belligerence in artsakh complicates matters even further especially for youth in the midst of negotiating identities. like elsewhere in the diaspora, most of today’s jerusalemite armenian youth are descendants of genocide survivors. for the jerusalem armenian community, turkish denial of the genocide is compounded by israel’s refusal to recognize the armenian genocide,55 despite the jewish state having been established in the aftermath of the holocaust. furthermore, during the second artsakh war in the fall of 2020, israel provided military support for azerbaijani aggression, including the sale of kamikaze drones used in attacks on armenian soldiers and civilians.56 finally, many jerusalem armenians perceive a real “turkish threat” in jerusalem. turkish president erdogan has claimed that “jerusalem is our city,” while media outlets have reported on turkish schemes to purchase armenian and christian properties in the old city.57 amid the jerusalem armenian community’s marginalization, the protracted israeli-palestinian conflict, and israel’s non-recognition of past and present armenian suffering, this article explores how the complexities of the geopolitical landscape interact with intergenerational memories of the genocide. how do intergenerational memories of the genocide (transmitted within family, school, and community settings) shape the performance of diaspora armenian youth identities in jerusalem? how are collected stories around the genocide and the artsakh conflict linked within communities of memory? how do mobilizations 53 daphne tsimhoni, “christians in jerusalem: a minority at risk,” journal of human rights 4, no. 3 (2005): 391-417, https://doi.org/10.1080/14754830500257695. 54 harry hagopian, the armenian church in the holy land (nottingham: russell press, 2016), 30. 55 yair auron, the banality of denial (new brunswick, nj: transaction publishers, 2003); israel w. charny, israel’s failed response to the armenian genocide: denial, state deception, truth versus politicization of history (boston: academic studies press, 2021). 56 seth j. frantzman, “israeli drones in azerbaijan raise questions on use in the battlefield,” the jerusalem post, 1 october 2020, at https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/israeli-drones-in-azerbaijan-raise-questions-onuse-in-the-battlefied-644161; yossi melman, “as nagorno-karabakh conflict expands, israel-azerbaijan arms trade thrives,” haaretz, 7 october 2020, at https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-israel-azerbaijan-arms-trade-armenia-iran-1.9212986, accessed 07.08.2021. 57 tobias siegal, “erdogan: jerusalem is our city, a city from us” the jerusalem post, 3 october 2020, at https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/erdoan-jerusalem-is-our-city-a-city-from-us-644306; baruch yedid, “turkey working to take over armenian quarter in jerusalem’s old city,” the jewish press, 13 february 2020, https://www.jewishpress.com/news/middle-east/turkey/exclusive-turkey-working-to-take-over-armenian-quarter-in-jerusalems-old-city/2020/02/13/, accessed 08.08.2021. lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 64 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 around collective memories intersect with local geopolitics to construct identity narratives among jerusalem’s armenian youth, as members of a disempowered minority? methodology this research draws on extensive participant observation from over six years (2015-2021) of fieldwork in the armenian jerusalem community and in the sts. tarkmanchatz armenian school, where i have served as a teacher in the secondary grades since 2013. in addition to my daily presence at the school within the framework of my teaching responsibilities, during this time period i took part in countless assemblies, marches, protests, memorials, and prayer services organized by the school, the armenian patriarchate, the social clubs, and various advocacy organizations. public commemorations and ritual performances, abundant with cultural codes and symbols,58 play a pivotal role in shaping collective identities as values, memories, and meanings are passed between generations.59 when feasible, on-site fieldnotes were taken during the events, with full observation protocols typed as soon as possible following their completion. in several cases, audio and video recordings of events were used to supplement the fieldnotes. in conjunction with participant observation, i conducted ten intensive interviews with jerusalem armenian youth and youth leaders in the community social clubs to understand identity construction from a phenomenological perspective. all interviewees are graduates of the community’s sts. tarkmanchatz school, including three alumni who are current or former teachers at the school. occupying a dual role as a teacher-ethnographer, i often engaged in commemorative events, by necessity, as a “complete participant.”60 while permission to conduct research in the school was granted by the school administration, my presence at school and community events was not unexpected, given my position as a member of the social setting. marching in the streets with youth, carrying banners, chanting slogans, delivering speeches, and lighting candles, i functioned as an “insider-outsider” occupying a “space between.”61 despite years of “insider” experience within the community, i always possess some degree of “outsiderness” as a non-armenian within the armenian quarter, where i must navigate a space, culture, and language not my own. the embodied ethnographic approach employed in this study permits an analysis of multiple memory dimensions, including the social, spatial, and material. as diaspora youth engage in practices of postmemory and past presencing within a transnational field, i seek to identify those interactive processes through which past traumas are bestowed with collective meaning(s) in the here and now. 58 don handelman, models and mirrors: towards an anthropology of public events (new york: berghahn books, 1998), 1-20. 59 paul connerton, how societies remember (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2013), 41-71. 60 raymond l. gold, “roles in sociological field observations,” social forces 36, no. 3 (1958): 217-223, https://doi.org/10.2307/2573808. 61 sony corbin dwyer and jennifer l. buckle, “the space between: on being an insider-outsider in qualitative research,” international journal of qualitative methods 8, no. 1 (2009): 54-63, https://doi. org/10.1177/1609406918788176. 65 intergenerational trauma, collected stories, and youth ethnonational identity construction for the typical passerby, the armenian quarter, located in the southwest corner of jerusalem’s old city, is easy to miss. while it is the smallest of jerusalem’s four quarters, it is not its diminutive size that simply prevents its discovery. rather, most of the armenian quarter lies obscured from view, its residents and institutions isolated from the general public behind nearly impenetrable stone walls. wandering tourists are repeatedly turned away at the entrance; only members of this diaspora armenian community, or those who are connected to it, are allowed to continue onward. a simple armenian greeting to the vigilant guards serves as an informal password which enables your safe passage into the confines of the armenian convent (known simply as the vank) behind heavy iron gates which lock nightly at midnight. not only does the armenian quarter’s physical isolation from the outside world maintain a monastic environment, but it also functions to preserve, on a daily basis, the experience of siege and threat that has characterized the history of the armenian nation. sako62 referenced the closed nature of the jerusalem armenian community: “we’re survivors of a genocide, you know. we really need, it’s embedded in us to stay together, stay somewhere safe.” taleen also described the genocide as a unifying, yet isolating force on identity construction: i think it [i.e., the genocide] made us more patriotic than most other nationalities would be. i think the fact that there is a large part of our history, especially because it’s unrecognized, it makes us very, sort of fight for the justice that we deserve, and do all that. i think it really did bring us closer together. because if it wasn’t for the genocide, most of us wouldn’t even be in jerusalem. . . . and as people, it did bring us closer together, it did make us stay attached to our roots, and not just get lost amongst israelis or palestinians. taleen links the community’s existence to the genocide, while highlighting the armenian patriotism it has fostered, and which has kept them from assimilating within local cultures and identifying with either party to the regional conflict. unlike the dual loyalties documented in armenian communities elsewhere,63 taleen and the other interviewees described their national identity solely as “armenian.” the genocide, and the protective walls of the vank, were also fundamental forces in shaping kohar’s identity: so i grew up in jerusalem, but i always knew that i’m armenian and i’m nothing else but armenian. . . . i grew up identifying as jerusalemite, but i’ve never identified myself as either israeli or palestinian. and i think it’s the community here, and the 62 all participant names used are pseudonyms to protect anonymity. 63 see for example, anny bakalian, armenian-americans: from being to feeling armenian (new brunswick, nj: transaction publishers, 1993); vered amit talai, armenians in london: management of social boundaries (manchester: manchester university press, 1989); gül kaya, “memory and citizenship,” 406. lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 66 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 convent itself, and the literal walls of the convent, that kind of allow that identity to form. . . . as diaspora armenians, we grow up kind of with that identity like molded, because you know it’s a reality that you have to live with. because of the genocide we’re here. but you know, we have to make do with what we have. but there’s always this idea of an armenia that maybe we can hopefully go back to. if not my parents, then me. if not me, then my children. like taleen, kohar associates the suboptimal diasporic condition and her armenian jerusalemite identity which lies outside the bounds of traditional political or legal citizenship with the genocide. kohar’s reference to the “idea of an armenia to go back to” is striking. despite the existence of the modern republic of armenia, it is the ideal of an “imagined” armenian homeland to which she aspires to return. interviewed youth frequently referred to the overwhelming nature of the genocide and the intergenerational transfer of trauma. lilit explained how the genocide seems to touch every facet of her life: so this is something every armenian has to grow up with. the genocide. it has to be mentioned at least thirty times a month. everything is connected to the genocide. . . . and in school, you learn about this from a very young age. you have lectures about it, many books about it. it’s always there. it’s part of our identity. that’s how we look at it. it’s not just some topic in a textbook. for lilit, postmemories formed through family stories, books, and lessons in school are a fundamental part of her identity. positioning himself as a victim of the genocide, sako describes an inherited trauma rooted in postmemories of events experienced by his great-grandparents. “growing up and learning about all this, knowing that you had some homes over there, and everything taken away, all the factories or the shops that you had. just like, it’s all gone, it’s not for you anymore. learning that as a kid i think was pretty traumatizing, in a sense that you can’t really trust a lot of people.” sako’s narrative, in which he makes claims to homes, factories, and shops in eastern anatolia as if he personally experienced the losses, illustrates the power of postmemory rooted in cultural trauma to connect generations. meanwhile, past presencing can be observed in sako’s remark concerning how this intergenerational trauma conferred an inability to trust others today. vahan’s narrative similarly features collected stories, using the first person plural pronoun “we,” which inserts himself into the genocide memory: we were merchants. so we had that going on, and then the genocide happened and we ran away. we had to. we lost all the assets. so, my great-grandmother, pregnant with my grandfather, of course, ran all the way through syria and there was this turkish soldier. it turns out he held her at gunpoint while she was pregnant. . . . he let her go. turns out, obviously, had he pulled the trigger, i wouldn’t be sitting here today, teacher lance. so the thought of that, that event, that single decision of pulling 67 or not pulling the trigger more than a century ago, led to my existence here, is mind boggling. vahan’s existential musings, tied-up with internalized collected stories and intergenerational memories, provide yet another example of how the practice of past presencing links the past with the present. practices of past presencing and an internalization of the genocide are also observed in kohar’s narrative, in which she asserts she feels as if she was born with genetic memories of the collective trauma, and explains how this influences her everyday performance of identity in jerusalem: i don’t remember the day my parents told me about the genocide. . . . it was something, as if i was born knowing this, you know. and i think part of that is because it’s always talked about, whether it’s talked about, you know, in the home, like my grandma telling stories of her grandparents that died there, or her parents that fled from armenia, or western armenia. or whether it was from school or the protests that we’re taken to, you know, you’re a one-year-old, you go to the protest . . . . so, i think it’s a huge, huge part of my identity, the genocide itself. . . . i owe it to my ancestors that survived, and those that didn’t survive, to preserve that identity and culture that, whether it’s through going to dance practice or going, or singing armenian, or when i’m walking by the school and the kids are speaking in english, telling them to speak in armenian. . . . i do that as a result of the genocide. kohar describes her identity as rooted not only in the past events themselves, but in how she continuously reconstructs the meaning of the genocide in her day-to-day life through those activities which strengthen both individual and collective armenian ethnonational identity. the sts. tarkmanchatz school and community protests are highlighted by kohar as significant mediators of this identity entrenched in genocide memories. i will now examine how intergenerational memory is transmitted within these contexts. youth performance of genocide memories and transnational citizenship in the school and at community protests from giant maps documenting forced deportations perpetrated by the ottoman empire to black-and-white portraits depicting well-known armenian genocide victims, the physical walls of the sts. tarkmanchatz school bear witness to the memory of past atrocities. lining the hallways are annual school pictures, in which the entire student body and school staff pose on the steps of the old orphanage to re-enact a photograph of child survivors from the 1920s, which is currently featured in the exhibition at the armenian genocide museum in yerevan. taking the annual school photograph in this exact location is a past presencing practice which reinforces the intergenerational memory of the genocide. students are actively involved in past presencing in the curriculum, as students are enlance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 68 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 couraged to express intergenerational memories through the visual and performing arts. a bulletin board display created by grade 6 students to commemorate the 106th anniversary of the genocide in april 2021 linked the genocide with both identity and the armenian homeland. drawings of trees and references to roots (e.g., “cut my branches, burn my leaves, but you’ll never touch my roots!” and “24 april 1915. armenian genocide. from the roots we came.”) emphasized the rootedness of youth identities in the events of 1915. meanwhile, the armenian tricolor, maps of armenia, images of the armenian genocide memorial, pomegranates, mother armenia, and armenian landscapes served as expressions of transnational identities rooted in memories of the genocide. the annual school ceremony commemorating the armenian genocide in late april provides opportunities for student to perform the past, for example, through the performance of survivor testimonies. with the melancholy music of the duduk64 sounding softly in the background, a ninth-grade student read a survivor testimony as she actively took on the role of the victim: “the crowds were huge in meskeneh. we were in the middle of a vast sandy area and the armenians there were from all over, not only from marash. we had no water and soldiers would not give us any. . . . .we used to eat grass. we used to pick grains from animal waste, wash them and then in tin cans fry them to eat.” when the student takes the stage before the school community, she transforms into the survivor, obscuring temporal boundaries as past suffering, performed in the present moment, becomes that of all armenians. each year on 24 april, the jerusalem community organizes protests and marches in acts of diaspora mobilization in which commemorative practices function as transnational acts of citizenship. takvor described the importance of this day as a unifying, identity-building event for the community: “remembering the dead is important, it’s . . . one of the days that brings the community together. . . . i’m not a victim anymore. we’re not victims today of that genocide. we’re victims, we are victims of the genocide, but we have demands.” while at first glance, takvor’s remarks may seem contradictory. initially, he declares that he’s not a victim anymore, but then immediately reverses course and states that “we are victims of the genocide, but we have demands.” however, takvor’s statement can be interpreted to reflect a lingering sense of collective victimization that extends beyond a personal sense of trauma. through these protests, inherited narratives of victimization find new expressions via transnational acts of citizenship in which claims and demands are shouted in the streets of jerusalem. on 24 april 2019, armenian youth took part in one such ritualized protest facing the turkish consulate, following the annual custom in jerusalem on armenian genocide remembrance day. gathered behind the police tape cordoning off the permitted demonstration area, the youth, bearing the flags of armenia and artsakh, were clad in red t-shirts bearing the three words: “recognition. condemnation. reparation.” with bodies transformed into political posters, youth publicly re-enacted the role of bleeding victims in 64 the duduk, or armenian oboe, is a symbol not only of the historical trauma of the genocide but also a symbol of armenian national identity. see andy nercessian, the duduk and national identity in armenia (laham, maryland: scarecrow press, 2001). 69 front of the oppressor. one of the youth leaders shouted into the megaphone, demanding an end to the ongoing turkish and israeli denial: we call upon the international community and countries like the usa,65 the united kingdom, and israel to stop using the armenian genocide as a political card, and fulfill their moral and historical obligation by recognizing the armenian genocide. turkey, you cannot run away from your own shadow. in the name of the armenian people, and especially its youth, i pledge an oath that we will never rest until the armenian genocide is recognized. standing under the scorching sun, staring down the red star and crescent flag flapping in the wind across the street, i joined those assembled in the scathing chant: “shame on turkey! turkey run, turkey hide, turkey’s guilty of genocide!” lilit described her experience as a participant in these protests, in which genocide memories are performed and transnational citizenships enacted: posters. armenian flags everywhere. your hair, pins, everything is the flag. you just feel patriotic and you have that moment where you say, “i’m happy i’m armenian.” you just feel that moment of pride, when you’re with your people and you have purpose there. and you’re going after something. . . . of course we want israel to recognize, because as citizens, we’re doing our part. . . . i think we deserve that from our country. i’m saying our, because we’re technically citizens. we have the passport, we were born here.66 something so important to us. some people still today are struggling. you know, post-traumatic syndrome. ptsd. . . . their parents saw the war, and they saw their parents die in front of them. lilit’s narrative seamlessly flows from visual displays of armenian pride and support of the homeland, which constitute transnational acts of citizenship, to local acts of citizenship in which she demands recognition from the country in which she resides and holds a passport. she then returns to the lingering trauma of genocide postmemory, which is exacerbated by the lack of israeli recognition. sevan also decried israel’s moral failure, which he attributed to political motives: “especially them [i.e., jewish israelis], they have been through a genocide, so they know the grief and the pain. . . . they have been through a holocaust. they should recognize it. . . . it’s inhumane not to [recognize the genocide] because of politics. but again, politics is another world. it’s a world of lies, let’s say.” politics is also at the heart of israel’s involvement in the recent artsakh conflict. jerusalemite armenians, such as sevan, must contend not only with israel’s non-recognition of the genocide and by extension their collective identity but also with israeli military 65 on 24 april 2021, united states president joe biden formally recognized the armenian genocide. 66 while lilit and her family are israeli citizens, a sizable number of jerualemite armenians do not, in fact, have israeli citizenship, but rather have the status of “east jerusalem resident,” which does not entitle them to an israeli passport. lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 70 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 support for azerbaijan. i now turn to the role of intergenerational memory and diaspora mobilization in shaping youth identities during the conflict’s most recent escalation in the autumn of 2020. from the genocide to the second artsakh war: diaspora mobilization, transnational memory, and questions of identity like elsewhere in the diaspora, in the jerusalem community, the artsakh conflict is often linked with the genocide. in the words of takvor: “the genocide, this topic is very much alive in the community. add to that the present conflict with azerbaijan, which adds also like an alarm to the genocide. we connect the two stories together. . . . israel today is not recognizing the genocide because of azerbaijan. ” referencing the economic and military partnership between israel and azerbaijan, takvor not only couples the genocide with the current hostilities but also associates israel’s non-recognition of turkish responsibility with the strengthening of israeli-azerbaijani cooperation. given this linkage, and considering the prominent role played by genocide postmemory in mobilizing diaspora armenians and shaping contemporary youth identities in jerusalem, it follows that the artsakh conflict functions in a similar capacity. emulating the annual 24 april genocide protests, jerusalemite armenians took to the streets in acts of diaspora mobilization in october and november 2020. decked out in red, blue, and orange, youth pounded the pavement, marching in the streets of downtown jerusalem as they belted out lyrics to patriotic and revolutionary songs rooted in intergenerational memories. “today we’ll take artsakh, tomorrow van!” proclaims the penultimate line of the song yelek hayer baykari, connecting the present-day war with the lost historical homelands of western armenia. protestors carried an array of glossy posters, including one featuring a black-andwhite hitler-erdogan composite, complete with the turkish flag and nazi swastika pinned to either of the hybrid supervillain’s suit jacket lapels. hebrew text printed on the sign read: “erdogan is the turkish hitler. to arm azerbaijan is to arm hitler.” this poster links the genocide, the artsakh conflict, and the jewish holocaust together in an appeal to the israeli government to halt arms sales to the armenian adversary. invoking the popular mantra of “never again,” often used in public discourse on the holocaust, kayane also linked these events together, even labeling the armenian losses in artsakh a second genocide: whoever attacks us, we need to stay strong, be one hand. . . . if everyone gives their own opinion, nothing is going to work and we’re going to lose another country. which we did. that, in my case, is another genocide that happened. another hundred years passed, and we didn’t learn from the mistake that happened a hundred years ago. we go outside for protests, “never again, never again, never again.” and what? it happened a couple months ago. and we lost a lot of boys, young boys, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen. it’s sad we lost a generation. it’s hard to talk about this topic because we’re not progressing. 71 echoing vahan’s use of the first person plural “we” in the narration of collected stories as a practice of past presencing described previously, here kayane’s repetition of the word “we” refers to a unified armenian transnation shaped by transnational memories of loss situated within a cyclical perspective of historical time. lamenting a lack of progress and the seeming ineffectiveness of diaspora mobilization efforts, kayane experienced the recent armenian defeat through the lens of genocide postmemory. as a frequent participant in community demonstrations against israeli weapon sales to azerbaijan, levon also described the sense of loss and disillusionment he experienced during the second artsakh war: “it was kind of like a dream. . . . after the war, we really felt what it was like being in a war. . . . even if the event didn’t directly affect me. because it’s my nation, and we suffered for being armenian. the protests that i went to every day, shouting that never really got anywhere, you know? ” similar to genocide postmemories, transnationalized memories of the recent war facilitated largely by social media can transcend space and time to mold identities rooted in the collective suffering of the armenian transnation. notably, levon’s grief is not only vicarious, but bound up with personal feelings of defeat given that his shouting appeared to fall on deaf ears. referring to protests around both the genocide and artsakh issues, kohar also questioned whether such acts of diaspora mobilization really get anywhere: “but in terms of the activism, whether it’s social media or actually going to these protests, i think those are a little bit useless. . . . i think those protests are more for us than to actually make any change.” both levon and kohar express the inability of these mobilization efforts to effect change, considering the politics of non-recognition in israel and the relative powerlessness of the small armenian christian minority. likewise, sako also describes acts of mobilization as diasporan identity-building events, whose political effectiveness is limited: “i don’t think the protests would do anything, for the government, at least. . . . i think it’s more about us than anyone else. yeah, i think it’s more about us, like going out and being able to chant and say all of those things on that day. . . . i’m an armenian, we went through a genocide. so it’s much easier for us, just being relieved, to let that off our chests for a bit.” despite the perceived uselessness of demonstrations for influencing policy changes within the israeli government, these community events provide opportunities for armenian youth to engage in performances of transnational memory, through which they shore up ethnonational identities and forge transnational allegiances. even though diaspora mobilizations may function as acts of transnational citizenship, several jerusalemite youth described tensions between the homeland and the diaspora related to the artsakh issue and the genocide. such tensions often raised challenging questions about their identities. as an israeli citizen, levon described the criticism he received on facebook during and after the artsakh war because of israel’s involvement in supplying arms to azerbaijan: “we were criticized a lot by other armenians because we live here. . . . because of the selling, you know? they call us, “jew,” you know, “go to your weapons-selling government. . . . you don’t belong to armenia, it’s not your country, you have an israeli passport.” lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 72 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 2, 2021 while levon previously declared his transnational allegiance to armenia as “my nation,” his loyalty and even ethnonational identity is called into question by homeland nationals due to his legal citizenship status and israeli complicity in the armenian defeat. recalling family vacations to armenia, lilit also discussed how she does not feel as if she belongs in the homeland, despite the patriotic displays of “armenianness” during the community protests which she recounted earlier: when we go to armenia, they look at us as foreigners . . . . and that’s because of the genocide. . . . there are tensions between two armenians, one from armenia and one from the diaspora. . . . i thought to myself, “where do i belong?” it’s a bit cheesy. you don’t belong in armenia because they think you’re an outsider. you don’t belong in your country. it’s just, it’s part of the identity that you learn in school, eventually. lilit reiterated a lack of belonging in israel, where her diaspora armenian identity, grounded in memories of the genocide, is not recognized, and the protective walls of the vank preserve armenian roots while preventing youth from assimilating within local israeli and palestinian societies. the experiences of levon and lilit shed light on how transnationalized memories of the armenian genocide and the artsakh conflict inform both local and transnational practices of citizenship and belonging. concluding remarks one hundred and six years after the armenian genocide, intergenerational memories remain at the forefront of diaspora consciousness. within the jerusalem armenian community, genocide memories function as both unifying and isolating forces of identity construction as diaspora youth engage in practices of postmemory and past presencing within a transnational field. intergenerational memories, collected stories, and inherited trauma are key factors in youth identity construction, as the past is linked with the present four generations after the genocide and given renewed meaning in light of armenian losses during the second artsakh war. the community school and organized demonstrations function as sites for intergenerational memory transmission and identity performance as youth engage in transnational acts of citizenship tied to an imagined armenian transnation. as youth participate in these performances of memory dramatizing survivor testimonies, carrying signs in protest, chanting slogans, and belting out patriotic songs identities are molded as meaning is created through thoughts, feelings, and affects shaped by intergenerational memories. given politics of non-recognition within israel, diaspora mobilizations primarily serve as transnational identity-building events, while the locatedness of transnational memories also shapes citizenship practices at home. yet homeland-diaspora tensions, and the complexity of the local socio-political landscape, present challenging questions about identity and belonging for jerusalem’s armenian youth. lilit’s simple query of “where do i belong?” reflects this intricate challenge of identity formation for jerusalem’s armenian youth. such questions of belonging stem from the community’s marginalization, transmission of inter73 generational memories, non-recognition in local milieus, and regional geopolitics all of which are, indeed, connected to the genocide. acknowledgments: i would like to express my sincere gratitude to the entire jerusalem armenian community, the faculty and students of sts. tarkmanchatz armenian school, and all the participants who trusted me with their stories and opened their hearts to share their thoughts and experiences with me. lance levenson: everything is connected to the genocide 48 dr. shushan r. khachatryan is a theologian and head of the armenian genocide victims’ documentation and data collection department at the armenian genocide museum-institute foundation. her research interests include theological and religious studies of genocides, religious clashes during the genocides, philosophy of holocaust, theodicy, persecutions of christians in 20th 21st centuries, etc. email: khachatryan.shushan@genocide-museum.am 49 halide edip and the turkification of armenian children: enigmas, problems and questions dr. shushan r. khachatryan armenian genocide museum-institute foundation, armenia it is a well-known fact that the islamisation of christian children in the ottoman empire has a long history. in the great majority of cases islamisation was carried out forcibly, accompanied by the erasure of a child’s ethnic-religious identity for those who remembered it and totally hiding their ethnic roots and religious affi liation from those who didn’t. the whole process of cultivating a new identity and character was a matter of time and of contested methods. this article identifi es a problem area, raising questions and analyzing the role of turkish intellectual halidé edip in the state policy of turkifi cation of armenian children at the antoura orphanage during the armenian genocide. it draws comparisons between the three memoirs of armenian orphans from that orphanage that are known to date, those of garnik banean (karnig panian as written in his english language memoir), harutyun alboyajyan, and melgon petrosean and that written by halidé edip. as a result, certain essential differences, ploys, as well as facts disguised by edip have been collected and presented in this article. therefore, the research carried out identifi es the problems areas relating to various aspects of the antoura orphanage by raising new questions, offering explanations and new approaches as well as highlighting issues that need to be researched further. keywords: armenian genocide, djemal pasha, halidé edip, adnan adıvar, antoura orphanage, armenian orphans, islamisation, eugenics. the article was submitted on 05.02.2021 and accepted for publication on 19.03.2021. this is an extended version of the author’s article published in armenian. how to cite: shushan khachatryan, “halidé edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children: enigmas, problems and questions,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 6, no. 1(2021): 49-79. acknowledgment: the work was supported by the science committee of ra, in the frames of the research project № 19yr-6f036. 50 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0017 introduction “i saw halide edip adıvar, the woman who had stayed behind afterjemal pasha’s visit. she would often lean against the sundial and watch us play. she seemed carefree. sometimes she journeyed to beirut and returned a few days later with stacks of books under her arms. some said that she was writing a book about the orphans; others claimed that at night, she sucked the blood out of the necks of the older boys. we didn’t know what to believe.”1 the imperial institution instrumental in the islamisation of christian children was known as devshirme – the blood tax imposed on christians, consequently producing janissary soldiers to serve the sultan, who were notorious for their exceptional cruelty and bloodthirsty reputation. interestingly, although the janissary corps had already ceased functioning offi cially (albeit perhaps not yet culturally) since the early 18th century,2 the forced conversion of christian children did not end. the social signifi cance of the conversion institution was enhanced and, during the armenian genocide, the forced islamisation and turkifi cation of armenian children was carried out both in a sporadic, commonplace fashion and by the state elite and offi cials, through intentional selection and usage of them as slaves. forced conversions and forced marriages to armenian girls were characteristic in both cases. additionally, particular attention was focused on turkish state orphanages, where armenian children were collected during the armenian genocide. generally being the majority of the christian children, they went through a forced erasure of their armenian identity and the cultivation of a muslim one. one such place where this happened was the antoura orphanage, the history and diverse ideological aspects of which will be scrutinised in this article. the young turk government opened orphanages in aleppo, beirut, antoura, mardin, urfa, diyarbekir, kayseri, malatya, armash and in some other places with the aim of assimilating a part of armenian orphans. there are also references to turkish orphanages or conversion and turkifi cation centres in ankara, arabkir, adana, marash, kastamuni, kharni, kharberd, dort yol, boghazlyan, mezre, sebastia, samsun and other locations. armenian children were often transported from place to place, being kept in one place for only a short time so that their relatives would not be able to fi nd them.3 they were distrib1 karnig panian, goodbye, antoura: a memoir of the armenian genocide (stanford: stanford university press, 2015), 94-95. 2 artak shakaryan, «արյան հարկը» օսմանյան կայսրությունում․ դևշիրմե [“blood tax” in the ottoman empire: devshirme] (yerevan: author’s edition, 2006), 128. 3 comparing the stories of no. 1778 and 1779 in the list of inmates of the aleppo rescue home and about the turkish orphanage in arabkir, it may be seen that the orphans were not left in the same orphanage for very long, staying there for a month, then being transferred to different villages. see united nations archives in geneva (unog), refugees mixed archival group (nansen collection) 496 (1919–1947), armenian orphanage in aleppo, admission fi les. 51 shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children uted among turkish families and ottoman offi cials who would choose them and take them away in person.4 there are very few studies on the activities of the structures engaged in islamisation and turkifi cation under the direct supervision of the young turk party elite, central fi gures and supporters of the party during the armenian genocide. one or two researchers are carrying out targeted studies on the activities of these orphanages, particularly of antoura.5 one is narine margaryan6 with her fi rst armenian-language scientifi c article dedicated to the topic. another is the turkish historian selim deringil.7 narine margaryan provides rich material about offi cial decrees that served as the basis for the islamisation of armenian children at state level, the specifi cs of the state policy, historical events and the pedagogical methods employed, using the antoura orphanage as an example. she also uses the orphans’ stories, details of the punishments administered in the orphanages, as well as describing the activities aimed at the return of the orphans to their armenian identity. the object of selim deringil’s research, as in our case, was halidé edip.8 in his article 4 hovakim hovakimian (arshakuni), պատմութիւն հայկական պոնտոսի [history of armenian pontus] (beirut: mshak, 1967), 524. 5 collège saint joseph, antoura – a school founded by french jesuit clergy in 1834 in the antoura valley of lebanon within their mission building (constructed in 1773). it is considered to be the oldest preserved school in the middle east. during the great war, the turks banished the lazarist monks and turned the college into a turkish orphanage under djemal pasha’s and halidé edip’s management. the real owners of the school returned after the end of wwi, in the spring of 1919, when the children that were formerly turkifi ed and then put in care of the red cross were being moved to different orphanages – jebeil, ghazir, antelias and marzvan (merzifon). the school was reopened and operates to this day as a french catholic school with preschool (“maternelle”) and 1-12 school grades. see the school’s website at http://www.college-antoura.edu.lb/, accessed 19.06.2021. 6 narine margaryan, «հայ երեխաների թրքացման գործընթացն օսմանյան կայսրության պետական որբանոցներում (1915 – 1918 թթ.)» [the turkifi cation of armenian children in the ottoman empire’s state orphanages (1915-1918)], ts՚eghaspanagitakan handes 4, no. 1 (2016): 25-43. 7 selim deringil, “your religion is worn and outdated,” at https://journals.openedition.org/eac/2090, accessed 20.06.2021. 8 halidé edip (edib) adıvar (1884-1964), turkish novelist, political fi gure; an ideologist of pan-turanianism – creation of turan nationalist and fi ghter for women’s rights. the “mother of the turks,” as they often call her in turkey, was born in istanbul. her father, mehmed edip was abdul hamid ii’s secretary. her mother, fatma bedirfem hanim, died when she was very young (see halidé edip’s only grandson omer sayar’s (hikmatullah zeki sayar’s son) interview, where he says that halidé came from a jewish family exiled from spain that adopted islam. her father mehmed edip was a manager under ceyb-i hümayun, who was in charge of the treasury at the sultan’s palace, “bu dünyadan halidé edip adıvar geçti-1,” at http://www.24saatgazetesi.com/ bu-dunyadan-halide-edip-adivar-gecti-1/, accessed 02.07.2021. she obtained her education, with interruptions, between 1893-1901 – attending one of the greek schools in constantinople, learning greek, as well as at her father’s house through private tutors, then by attending the american college for girls in istanbul, where she particularly deepened her knowledge of different languages. she was the fi rst unmarried turkish girl to graduate from this college. halidé edip’s father was an anti-monarchist and an advocate of ittihadism and their house was a gathering place for the intellectuals of the time; halidé edip later revived this tradition. for her ideas, opinions and approaches in march 1909 when anti-ittihadist outbursts began, halidé edip had to fl ee for some time and hide in egypt with her two children. during this time she travelled to england where she was the guest of a british woman named isabel fry. it was there that she became acquainted with individuals who had certain social and political infl uence. she and her sister nakiye hanım were appointed superintendents of government schools and orphanages in damascus, beirut and antoura under djemal pasha’s supervision in 1916-1917. she married her fi rst husband, the teacher-mathematician salih zeki bey (from 1901-1910). her second marriage was to doctor adnan adıvar (from 1917-1964). she joined ataturk’s nationalist movement with her second husband, but assumed an oppositional stance after the proclamation of the republic and had to live outside turkey 52 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 he wrote about the forced transfer of armenian children from one group to another, collected studies carried out by genocide scholars around this issue and presented the story of the transformation of antoura into a turkish orphanage by djemal pasha. he dealt, individually, with the memoirs of the three antoura orphans and halidé edip’s frequently contradictory words, as well as the testimonies of contemporaries. greatly valuing and appreciating the research efforts made by narine margaryan and selim deringil, this study aims to contribute to the study of the institutions engaged in turkifi cation. this article will try, through “micro-queries,” to invite the attention of scholars to some of the contextual-ideological aspects of the activities which took place within the antoura orphanage and to identify issues for further research. special attention has been paid here to two fi gures in the young turk hierarchy the erudite pan-turkist, feminist and writer halidé edip who enjoys the reputation of being a heroic woman and an ideological fi ghter in contemporary turkey and her second husband, the positivist physician, ideological champion of the philosophy of science, editor-in-chief of the encyclopedia of islam, author of publications in various european journals, the modernist abdülhak adnan adıvar.9 a point of view has occasionally appeared, saying that these two historical fi gures did not advocate the policy of genocide carried out against the armenians, nor participated in violence and persecutions but, on the contrary, even saved armenian children from death. until ataturk’s death. she was a member of the national assembly of turkey from 1950 to 1954, having been elected by the city of izmir. she is buried in merkezefendi cemetery in istanbul. halidé edip was an infl uential fi gure of her time, whose opinion and work were important for the ottoman empire and later for the turkish republic. her intellectual world embraced literature, various branches of science (philosophy, sociology and history) and religion, as well as various artistic trends – music and theatre. the outline of halidé edip’s biography was extracted from her biographical and ideological works: memoirs of halidé edib (new york, london։ century & co, 1926), the turkish ordeal (london, 1928), confl ict of east and west in turkey (delhi: maktaba jamia millia islamia, 1935), turkey faces west (new haven: yale university press, 1930). 9 abdülhak adnan adıvar (1882-1955), turkish medical doctor, political fi gure, writer and theoretician, he was engaged in philosophy of science and history. he was an adherent of the young turk party and one of the fi rst supporters of feminist movements in the ottoman empire. he was halidé edip’s second husband (they married on 17 april 1917). he was born in gallipoli but moved to istanbul with his father at a very early age, when his father was appointed deputy minister to the bab-ı meşihat, [sheikh ul-islam’s offi ce]. he came from a notable ottoman scholarly family with its roots going back to aziz mahmud hudayi efendi, founder of the 17th-century sufi order called jelveti tarikat. he studied at istanbul medical university, then at the friedrich wilhelm university (berlin’s humboldt university). he left his studies unfi nished and returned to istanbul immediately after the young turk revolution took place. he took a leading role in hilal-i ahmer [red crescent] activities, becoming its chief manager; he was awarded the military rank of major during the great war and elected chairman of the hilal-i ahmer association after the war. in the last period of young turk rule, he was elected a deputy to the ottoman parliament and, when the kemalists came to power in istanbul in 1919, he and his wife joined the turkish nationalist movement. he was health minister, interior minister and deputy speaker of the national assembly of turkey successively in ankara before mustafa kemal occupied all of turkey and established his centre of power there. accused of complicity, with his wife, in plotting to assassinate kemal ataturk in 1926, the couple fl ed turkey and moved to europe. they returned to turkey after ataturk’s death, during ismet inönü’s presidency. abdülhak adnan adıvar is buried in merkezefendi cemetery in istanbul. he wrote scientifi c articles and monographs and was the chief editor of the encyclopedia of islam. his works, including those on philosophy and history of science, oriental mysticism and anthropology (for instance: yeni adam, belphégor, isis, oriente, oriente moderno, etc.) were published in turkish and european journals. see hakan arslanbenzer, “adnan adıvar: science historian and liberal politician,” daily sabah, at https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/ portrait/adnan-adivar-science-historian-and-liberal-politician, accessed 20.06.2020; m. cavid buysun, “doktor abdülhak adnan adıvar,” at https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/38327218.pdf, accessed 20.06.2021. 53 shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children science does not tolerate uncertainty, especially in issues concerning genocide studies, and especially when it comes to the problem of saving or not saving people. in this case, at the heart of the “saved or not saved” argument, are armenian children taken to orphanages opened under the state auspices which were instrumental in turkifi cation, and that – the practice of moving children from one group to another also fi ts into the defi nition of genocide as formulated by raphael lemkin.10 attempts were made, during the preparation of this article, because of the paucity of material, to fi nd clues to events linked to one another. this was done by taking contemporary intellectual pivotal trends of thought, the spirit of the age and the philosophy of history which bordered on the veneration of science, into account. in addition, the peculiarities of european-style salons and clubs frequented by the ottoman elite were considered, as were the concepts and culture that dominated them. attention was even focused on the image of halidé edip presented in the cinema and the overall attitude shown towards her in the west.11 choosing the content path of this article was a rather complicated problem due to the lack of sources. there are more or less accurate sources and memoirs that may be used for only one of the orphanages engaged in turkifi cation – the antoura orphanage in lebanon. the memoirs of three inmates of the orphanage are well known. one is possibly unpublished, existing as a memoir as a computer fi le, while the other two have been published. there are, in addition, halidé edip’s english-language memoirs and several other supporting text sources and photographs. however, relying on halidé edip’s memoirs would have been at the very least unscientifi c, as by studying them a subjective, one-sided, negative attitude to events and fi gures was discovered. in fact, this attitude was not just aimed at armenians and was imbued with one-sided, subjective, manipulative thoughts and obser10 edita gzoyan, «երեխաների բռնի տեղափոխումը որպես ցեղասպանական գործողություն. ձևավորումից դեպի քրեականացում» [forcible child transfer as a genocidal act: from conceptualization to criminalization] ts՚eghaspanagitakan handes 8, no. 1 (2020): 99-118. 11 see, for instance, the following artistic serial – “the adventures of young indiana jones” (usa, 1991-1992, directed by george lukas), part 17, titled “the masks of evil.” the general plotline of the serial revolves around indiana jones, the son of a family representing the american elite, depicting his encounters with famous people and fi gures in various countries, thus presenting social, political and cultural aspects, revolutionary characters and events of a given country that distinctly deviated from the usual historical line. further instances are lev tolstoy, pablo picasso, the suffragette movement, the great war, the birth of jazz and blues in the usa, the paris peace conference in 1919-1920, etc. in this serial, particularly, a reference was made to halidé edip as a philanthropist, pedagogue and intellectual saving and taking care of children, including those of armenian descent, orphaned because of the war. in those 6-8 minutes, edip’s character has the following role: she hugs and kisses a girl and then tells jones and his fi ancé: “such a strong little creature! and yet what she needs most – simply to know that she is loved. i brought her with me from syria. i don’t know whether she’s turkish, armenian or kurdish. at fi rst, she was too shocked even to speak. i believe she saw her parents butchered before her eyes. now it seems you understand why this terrible war must end.” at https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=7sosegrrynm, accessed 25.06.2021. these words uttered in the movie encompassed halidé edip’s approaches refl ected in her memoirs, particularly about the issue of the armenian genocide. she performed extraordinary efforts to present or interpret everything, starting from the massacres at adana, in a different light, as though the adana events were carried out by the supporters of the old ottoman regime and armenian parties’ ‘efforts’ to martyr their own people and attract attention (see memoirs of halidé edib, 283-284). the armenian genocide is also called mutual slaughter, an equal massacre directed by foreign forces (ibid., 266, 428, 447). in this context, halidé edip may be considered to be one of the fi rst denialists of state-planned genocidal intent; moreover, her model of denial may be classifi ed as typical of the later period of armenian genocide denial. 54 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 vations. hence more and more basic questions began to emerge which particularly focused on the problem that the erudite halidé edip, who possessed a unique way of thinking and intellect, also had a well-cordinated work style which used half-truths and concealed events. this took account of her time, future audiences and possible developments into consideration. therefore, her memoirs, containing multiple inaccuracies and secrets, give rise to a host of “whys” and “hows” and compel the researcher to focus on one key question: what is the truth, what are half-truths and what is fi ction in her writing? in addition, edip’s memoirs have engendered doubts concerning her honesty and impartiality, after the portrayal of the director of antoura in a less than positive light, to put it mildly, in the memoirs of two former armenian orphans. the authenticity and credibility of the memoirs of the former armenian orphans, written independently of one another, may be used without any doubts, as they completely complement each other; there is no question concerning the level of accuracy of the description of events either. those memoirs were also compared, based on scholarly objectivity, without provoking any general questions, except for some minor inconsistencies in the descriptions of some events and a discrepancy related to the armenian names of the head boys (chavush)12 of classes at antoura.13 in this context, certain questions emerged about the specifi cs of dr. adnan adıvar’s activities, as a darwinist, positivist physician. it is well known that there were two doctors in the young turk core leadership raising intellectual and policy questions and making and implementing decisions, who also stood behind medical experiments performed on armenians. they were dr. nazim and dr. behaeddin. this was touched upon in vahagn dadrian’s article.14 behaeddin shakir, with his medical education, was in charge of the hilal-i ahmer [red crescent] organisation15 and was provably one of the masterminds behind the armenian genocide plan, as well being as the leader of the teskilat-i mahsusa secret organisation. he could not but have contact with dr. adnan adıvar, who also worked in hilal-i ahmer and was a notable and honoured fi gure in ataturk’s turkey during that period too. at the same 12 chavush, turkish. “headman/corporal” the title corporals of turkish troops were historically called. the head boys of the classes in antoura orphanage were referred to by that title too. 13 panian, goodbye, antoura, 84, 149, and մելգոն պետրոսեանի յուշերը եղեռնի օրերէն, ամփոփուած վարդիվառ յովհաննէսեանի կողմէ [the memoirs of melgon petrosean from the days of yeghern, compiled by vardivar hovhannissian]. agmi collection, s-8, folder 148, no. 231, p. 15. 14 vahakn dadrian, “the role of turkish physicians in the world war i genocide of ottoman armenians,” holocaust and genocide studies 1, no. 2 (1986): 169-192. 15 hilâl-i ahmer cemiyeti or red crescent committee, was founded on 11 june 1868, as a humanitarian charity organization bearing the symbol of the ottoman red crescent, which was used for the fi rst time during the russo-turkish war of 1876-78. it was renamed the ottoman red crescent society in 1877, then the turkish red crescent community in 1923 and mustafa kemal renamed it turkish red crescent society in 1935. it was given the name of turkish red crescent association [kızılay derneği] later, in 1947. its curernt name is turkish red crescent [türk kızılayı or simply kızılay]. it is a part of the international red cross and red crescent movement, with a goal, like the general organisation, to provide medical aid to war prisoners, injured and sick military men and humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups affected by disasters, wars and infectious diseases, both in the past and in the present. halidé edip was an active volunteer in the red crescent (chris gratien, seçil yılmaz “red crescent archives (turkey),” at http://hazine.info/turkish-red-crescent-kizilay-archives-ankara/, accessed 20.06.2021, “150 years – from hilal-i ahmer to kızılay (red crescent),” at https://www.skylife.com/en/201906/150-years-from-hilal-i-ahmer-to-kizilay-red-crescent, accessed 20.06.2021). 55 shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children time, the young turk elite, during the years of the realisation of the armenian genocide, never showed a negative attitude towards the adivar couple: if the latter really were saving armenian children, then that should have been enough for their alienation and the creating of a negative attitude towards them by the elite circle of the ruling party. if nothing else, it is proper to fi nd out how and whether they were loyal adherents carrying out orders who enjoyed their leadership’s trust. because to claim otherwise, that they were insignifi cant fi gures, is just out of the question. interestingly, halidé edip, in her memoirs published for the fi rst time in english in 1923, in which she devoted 43 pages to the antoura orphanage (pp. 428-471), generally never spoke of her husband’s role, whereas in harutyun alboyajyan’s memoir, adnan adıvar was not only present, but also had a very clear role. using psychology, it was he who persuaded the orphans to move to antoura and accompanied them from their temporary shelter in one of the damascus mosques to jounieh and fi nally to antoura in the company of two military offi cers and several women, probably teachers.16 the reason behind a more in-depth view of the problem were these very persons, with their roles and specialisms, who had to be concerned with turkifi cation, whose activities were perhaps broader than just that. however, adnan adıvar, his activities and his position in the criminal hierarchy of the young turks and therefore his participation in genocidal acts against the armenians and association with the antoura orphanage, will be dealt with in a separate article. to clarify the details of the roles specifi c people had, it is advantageous to raise questions fi rst. this is what this article aspires to do as a minimum when broaching the subject. no attempt will be made in this article to provide answers to all the questions put forward here, only addressing several of them. the work of searching for answers to further derivative questions will be left until later. concerning one peculiarity of the islamisation of armenian children at the antoura orphanage: were they cultivating “new janissaries”? reading the memoirs of the inmates of the antoura orphanage reveals the fact that it was organised on military lines and that the children were being prepared for military service. harutyun alboyajyan who, apart from relating his memoirs also gave verjiné svazlian his biography with some very interesting differences and characteristics. for instance, he called their orphanage in antoura a “military orphanage”17 with special rules. this defi nition is essential for this research. it is therefore expedient to also draw the readers’ attention to the conscription activities that took place before the children were moved to antoura. according to garnik banean’s memoirs, the group of children witnessed the honorary reception of a military man at hama station, the point of departure for antoura: the name “ 16 harutyun alboyajyan, խաչելության ճամփաներով [through the roads of crucifi xion] (yerevan: vmvprint publishing house, 2005), 36-37. 17 verjiné svazlian, the armenian genocide: testimonies of the eyewitness survivors (yerevan: gitutyun, 2011), harutyun alboyajyan’s testimony (no. 247), 427. 56 “‘ mahmud shevket pasha’18 was heard from various directions. the pasha, with a smiling face, passed in front of the orphans, then had a word or two with the high-ranking military offi cers and the protestant pastor who were present. the orphans, witnessing all this, stood stock-still.”19 judging from this, at fi rst glance it could be thought that the pasha, whose name they were calling, was the same military man who passed in front of the orphans, but mahmud shevket pasha was already dead by that time. calling his name out could indicate something else. it could be, for instance, that the orphans were taken to be prepared for a military education, particularly in military aviation, the founder of which, mahmud shevket pasha, was the ittihadists’ guardian but had been assassinated in the ottoman empire by then. he was a great military authority and uttering his name would have been a sign of remembrance and a sign of belonging. perhaps it was that being a child, the name had been stamped on banian’s memory, i.e. a name to be voiced while another was remembered, as mahmud shevket’s name was also chanted in glorifying songs sung by the antoura orphans.20 harutyun alboyajyan relates that the very fi rst and only lesson in the orphanage was military marching drill. other lessons were added later, when the number of children increased; they started to have lessons facilitating turkifi cation, such as the turkish language and literature, islam and its history.21 melgon petrosean conveys a detail which is important for the inference that boys in the antoura turkish orphanage were being specially prepared for military service; this, at any rate, applied to healthy children. he wrote that they “… were doing military exercises so that we all could be soldiers to go to harbiye mekteb-i,22 the military school.”23 that this result had been partially achieved was shown by the following refl ection by the same inmate: in spring 1918 they tightened up much more; they separated 50 boys from the rebellious and those more or less big than us and one or two teachers and took them to 18 mahmud shevket pasha (mahmud şevket paşa, 1858-1913), was of chechen origin. he was a graduate of the mekteb-i harbiye [military academy] and was an ittihadist fi gure and considered to be the founder of ottoman military aviation (1911). he was the commander of the third army stationed in thessaloniki after the 1908 revolution and suppressed the counterrevolution. he banished abdulhamid ii from constantinople on 31 march 1909, holding him in thessaloniki. he was appointed ottoman grand vizier from january 1913 but was killed by a relative of the assassinated nazim pasha as a revenge for the assassination of the latter six months later: “mahmud şevket paşa” at https://www.britannica.com/biography/mahmud-sevket-pasa, accessed 15.06.2021. 19 garnik banean, յուշեր մանկութեան եւ որբութեան [memoirs of childhood and orphanity] (antelias-lebanon: armenian catholicossate of the great house of cilicia, 1992), 129. it is noteworthy that a number of very important passages were omitted from the english edition of garnik baeian’s memoirs, one of which was this one, where the memoirist mentions mahmud shevket’s name. considering this fact, this and several other passages will be quoted from the armenian edition in translation. 20 ibid., 155. “mahmud şevket paşa, sen binlerde yaşa՜,” which can be translated in english as follows: “mahmud shevket pasha, live forever and ever!” 21 alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 40, 44. along with those mentioned, the children also had lessons in geography, arithmetic, etiquette, medicine, biology and zoology, music and singing and physical education. the memoirs of melgon petrosean, 14, also, panian, goodbye, antoura, 89, 92. 22 harbiye mektebi (ottoman: mekteb-i erkân-ı harbiyye-i şâhâne or erkân-ı harbiye mektebi or, shorter: harbiye mektebi), the ottoman empire’s military academy. its foundation date is considered to be 1834. it was an educational institution preparing career offi cers for the army of the ottoman empire. at present, offi cially it is called kara harp okulu, but it is colloquially known as harbiye mektebi, preserving its historical name. 23 the memoirs of melgon petrosean, 14. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 57 polis [armenian abbreviation for constantinople-sh.kh.]. we learned that they were kept in confi nement in one of the districts in polis under strict control. we learned this news from an escapee from there, a boy from ainteb who was called mehmet.24 harutyun alboyajyan also maintained that antoura inmates had been moved to constantinople, mentioning a lesser number, 20-30 boys; but it is hard to say whether the two orphans speak of the same transfer or those transfers to constantinople were regular practice. the text clearly indicates that the transfer took place before the autumn of 1918: “in those days a turkish naval offi cer visited our orphanage with his bodyguard rejab onbashi [corporal], who was a very resourceful man. they came to take 20-30 orphan boys from the orphanage to study at maritime school. after making their choice and staying for 10-15 days, they went away. as the political situation was unstable, several of the leaders of the orphanage left. among them was reshad bey.”25 in any case, it is clear that at least some of the children, who were fi t for the task, were being prepared for military service, perceived as them being “new janissaries”. this was because, among other things, of the roles and titles given to the children: chavush, oghlu/ oghlan, etc., which were also common in the janissary corps, which in their time, besides being the core of the military system, also possessed the fundamental attributes of an order (“bektashi” order of dervishes).26 in other words, a group of antoura orphans had, nevertheless, been used in the turkifi cation process undertaken by the turkish government to achieve a certain goal. it is important to know what happened to them: did the armenian rescue services or individuals searching for orphans returned them to their armenian identity after the war, or were they permanently lost to the armenian nation; perhaps it was both, which is also probable. narine margaryan provides a quotation from such a testimony in her article: an armenian child, khoren glchyan, not an antoura inmate, reported that he was taken to the harbiye mekteb-i: “khoren glchian was taken from aleppo to the harbiye central military school in constantinople. here they were all given copper seals with their new turkish names on them. he got a seal bearing the name “ali oghlu islam,” which he had to wear around his neck as instructed by the management.”27 the turkish military authorities forcibly transferred the armenian children of one of the aleppo armenian orphanages, among whom was khoren glchyan, to the ingliz bahche. they gave khoren’s mother the same answer as they did to the protestant pastor who was the principal of banean’s hama orphanage: “…go home, mother, take care of yourself, your son will go to istanbul to become a man.” 28 feeding and entertaining the children on the way, they took them to haydarpasha station 24 ibid., 16. 25 alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 49. 26 georgiï vvedenskiï, янычары: история, символика, оружие [yanissari: history, symbols, weapons] (st. petersburg: “atlant” publishing house, 2003), 21. 27 margaryan, “turkifi cation of armenian children,” 33. in this passage, the word “seal” is most probably used to mean a badge, which was used both in the military and police system, as well as in prisons. 28 khoren glchian,վերապրող որբի մը յուշերը [memoirs of an orphan who survived], (handwritten memoir), agmi collection, s-8, no. 44, p. 21: shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 58 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0008 in constantinople, then to the harbiye mektebi, where thousands of orphans had already been gathered.29 therefore, one of the above-mentioned questions has been answered by khoren glchyan: the selection and transfer of armenian children was a regular occurrence as shown by the number of children collected there. it is a fact worthy of special note that, according to khoren glchyan, both talaat and enver pashas visited the harbiye mektebi in 1917, when he was seven years old.30 however, the writer of this memoir testifi es that afterwards the children did not stay long in the harbiye mektebi, the whole orphanage being moved to buyuk ada [big island] on the sea of marmara, with the children being housed in a building previously owned by greeks. here the lessons and discipline were raised to a higher level; they even started giving money to the children. according to the memoir, an armenian catholic priest named father hovhannes nalbandyan came to their orphanage after the end of the war with a special document-order issued by the british mandatory authorities, to separate the armenian children and return them to their nation. this was done with some diffi culty, because the armenian children who remembered their nationality were afraid to confess they were armenians. glchyan reports that about 200 armenian children, with the signatures and mutual consent of the turkish and armenian representatives, were released from turkish orphanage and placed for a time in the school attached to the convent of the immaculate conception in constantinople.31 garnik banean, already more mature, provided just such a description in a single paragraph: antoura with its regime, its understanding of pedagogy, its cruelty of giving the orphans nothing to eat for a long time was forcing us to become thieves, raiders and street swindlers. only whatever was happening, was not in our hands. it was the state of things in life severing us from humanity and maiming our souls. so, if it were not for our conscious or instinctive opposition and if we were turkifi ed one day, we would have added over a thousand of thieves, rogues and unspeakable people to the turkish nation, very convenient for forming new janissary regiments.32 we believe that turkifi cation was only an intermediate, though important phase and that the ultimate goal was to turn the orphans into servants of the state by erasing their armenian and christian identities which, in case of some of the children, as we saw above, was most likely achieved. the prospect of making military men of the boys stemmed, initially, from a lack of manpower. men were needed who would be capable of mastering the use of military machinery that was being developed and updated during the war. hence the remnants of the exterminated christian nations of the ottoman empire – those children with their intellectual abilities– could be guided in that direction. 29 ibid., 22-23. 30 ibid., 24-25. 31 ibid., 30-31. 32 banean, memoirs, 215. 59 by an interesting coincidence, one of halidé edip’s books, published over a decade later, titled turkey faces west could be singled out for the ideas expressed in it about the janissary tradition being quite democratic. one of these ideas ran as follows: “to combine love of order and discipline with democratic principles demanded the association of every race of the empire in this important class [the military class sh.kh.]. they [the turks sh.kh.] accomplished this by conscripting a certain number of children from all the subject races... though the christian historians have spoken of the system as the ‘blood tribute.’”33 edip was against calling the system “blood tribute” following the words used by christian historians and added that it should not be viewed from the ethical standpoint, but from the perspective of whether it was worthwhile for the state or not. she had one answer: it was worthwhile before the institution of bourgeois favouritism had it pushed into the background and it was dissolved.34 these ideas naturally show the attitude and approach that halidé edip, the erudite writer had when she cooperated with the young turk elite when participating in the turkifi cation of the armenian genocide orphans. at least the sacrifi cing of ethics for the sake of expediency, which the young turks practiced with respect to the armenians by carrying out the genocide from 1915 to 1923, may be seen. moreover, we believed that if, at the time of publication of the book, the transfer of children from one group to another was criminally punishable under the international law, edip positioning herself as an advocate of the values of the western enlightenment and deeply concerned about her image and reputation, would have passed over and avoided expressing these ideas. we think that she was indeed taking care of her reputation by leaving out, from her memoirs, many undesirable episodes related to the turkifi cation of armenian children in which she and her husband had both been involved. this was because their international reputation also was needed to pursue the important goal of them appearing to be enlightened and progressive to the west. it would not be surprising, if one day it turned out that, for instance, the armenian woman called sabiha gökçen-khatun sebiljian had also been in antoura or in an orphanage like it, where all those instruments of islamisation and turkifi cation were used. by an interesting coincidence, she had been prepared for a military career, and turkologist ruben melkonyan even characterized her as a “janissary.” … if we put aside unnecessary sentimentality, we could say that sabiha gökçen or khatun sebiljian with her biography and career as a combat pilot, no matter how rude it sounds, qualifi es as a ‘janissary’. she was turkifi ed and islamised in early childhood; given a military education and was brought up with a mentality of being the daughter of the “father of the turks.” the supposed fl ashes of national self-consciousness that various sources testify about have always been subordinated to the image of the fi rst turkish pilot, in other words “janissary.”35 this notion of being the “daughter of the father of the turks” also has its counterpart in the concept of the janissary corps. that is, the janissaries being the property of the sul33 edib, turkey faces west, 20. 34 ibid., 21. 35 ruben melkonyan. իսլամացված հայերի խնդիրների շուրջ [on the issues of islamized armenians] (yereshushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 60 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 tan, acting to protect him and his power and being directly subordinate to him, perceived themselves as the “sultan’s children” and the sultan as their father; they were ready to die for him.36 it was an elite military corps made up of children of christian origin specifi cally trained since childhood, converted to another religion and at the same time brought up with ruthlessness and inhumanity. thus, in this context, it is believed that the negative traits listed in the last passage quoted from garnik banean’s memoirs (“thieves, raiders and street swindlers…”) were being nurtured on purpose: they may be called both new janissarism or psychological experiments and torture. the antoura management was inciting the children to develop resilience and fi ght for survival through starvation and thirst, being provoked into stealing and banditry, using physical torture (falakha; beating, mostly on the head) as well as psychological impact, changing their psychology, outlook and mentality by means of images, for instance by using the theatre.37 by starving the children, for example, the issue of islamisation was addressed in the following context: we ate fl our soup the next morning; before we left [the dining room-sh. kh.] they announced that those who chose to adopt the “hakk din” (the turkish faith) had to choose a name and be registered. they would then have a meat meal privately in the afternoon, with as much bread as they wanted, etc… we were like skeletons eating the soup made of fl our mixed with water, and when we smelled the meat, some registered while we, with our fellow-villagers, waited in a corner for the fl our soup.38 the purpose of feeding children with fl our mixed with water was obvious: offering good food instead of physical exhaustion and recurring unpleasant fare on condition that children agree to convert to islam. here too are the direct signs of efforts to break their will, urging them to satisfy their instincts and physical needs. aram antonyan also testifi ed in his book that armenian children were really made into new janissaries: van: noravank, 2009), 26-27։ 36 vvedenskiï, yanissari, 12, 13. 37 see alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 46, where the author referred to a performance of a play titled “joseph the handsome,” put on in pure turkish at a girls’ orphanage in beirut (the name of the orphanage was written as “nkhatkhana” in the text, possibly being the result of misreading the handwriting, because an orphanage with such a name could not be found) that the orphans playing in the orchestra watched regularly on their visits to beirut. alboyajyan said that it was strange that a biblical episode was performed by the turks. as it turned out, the actresses were armenian girls who had been turkifi ed and “adopted” by halidé edip in constantinople and had moved to beirut with her (ibid., 48). we believe that this biblical plot was not chosen at random, as the story was about a youth who achieved certain success after being betrayed and abandoned by his brothers, after deprivation, captivity and slavery, which could fi t into the general logic of turkifi cation – exciting the orphans with parallels of their possible future in their minds. at the same time, it is thought that the author of the play the orphans watched was halidé edip herself and that alboyajyan watched edip’s play “shepherds of canaan”: see halide edib, kenan cobanları (istanbul: orhaniye matbaası, 1918). it touched upon concepts of feminism as well as the lives of the jewish patriarchs, thus turkish society was quite astonished by this new theatrical fashion – and not necessarily in a positive way: see selahattin çitçi, “halide edip adivar’ın feminist ve semitik bir operası: kenan çobanları,” turkish studies international periodical for the languages, literature and history of turkish or turkic 4/3 (2009):655-668. 38 the memoirs of melgon petrosean, 13. 61 … the later instructions specifi ed that only children under fi ve were only to be spared. they would be converted to become turks and raised as turks in private orphanages they would then one day serve to make up for the human losses the turks suffered that were caused by the war, and graft a race so endowed with high qualities, the armenian race, onto the turkish race. just like in the past with the janissaries39 [the italics used in this and other quotations have been inserted by the author – sh.kh.]. this section is closed with this remark by aram antonyan, highlighted by us, is materially signifi cant. first, the revival of the idea of the “new janissaries” (seconded by antoura orphan garnik banean in the abovementioned passage), which seemed to have gone down in history, and second, “…graft a race so endowed with high qualities, the armenian race, onto the turkish race …,” which shall be dealt with next in this article. the “new man” (yeni adam) of pan-turkism and eugenics40 confl icting with banean’s foregoing question-provoking report is a corresponding episode from halidé edip’s memoirs. banean reported that before being moved to antoura, their group of armenian children had found refuge in a protestant pastor’s orphanage in hama. however, their happy life in the orphanage, which was apparently a private one, in other words outside the supervision of major humanitarian organisations, quickly came to an end, as military offi cials dispatched by djemal pasha arrived and demanded that the pastor hand the orphans over to them to be transported to antoura. this was grave news and there were no possibilities for refusal for the armenians; it became clear to them that the orphans were going to be turkifi ed. an interesting detail particularly attracted attention: “djemal pasha is the military commander in this area. the visiting military offi cers said that djemal pasha would like to collect all the armenian children into his care, to educate them, bring them up and make them worthy human beings and eventually give them back to their people at the end of the war.”41 banean’s testimony is at odds with the words attributed to djemal pasha in halidé edip’s memoirs, the dialogue taking place between the two of them. it is deemed necessary to quote the passage completely, as each sentence is relevant to this study: you have been as good to armenians as it is possible to be in these hard days. why do you allow armenian children to be called by moslem names? it looks like turning the armenians into moslems, and history some day will revenge it on the coming generation of turks. 39 aram antonian, մեծ ոճիրը [the great crime] (yerevan: arevik, 1990), 178-179. 40 eugenics – a doctrine concerning the improvement of the hereditary traits of the human race with the objective of actively infl uencing human evolution, perfecting human nature, enhancing the inheritance of talent and restricting the transmission of hereditary diseases to future generations. the term “eugenics” was fi rst used by francis galton, a cousin of charles darwin, in 1883. this teaching especially enjoyed popularity in social and political circles during the fi rst few decades of the 20th century. it subsequently developed a negative connotation resulting from its use by nazi germany and identifi cation with the latter among other ones. nevertheless, the term eugenics has its modern substitutes and further developments. 41 banean, memoirs, 122. shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 62 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 you are an idealist, he [djemal pasha sh.kh.] answered gravely, and like all idealists you lack a sense of reality. do you believe that by turning a few hundred armenian boys and girls moslem i think i benefi t my race? you have seen the armenian orphanages in damascus run by armenians. there is no more room in those and there is no more money to open another armenian orphanage. this is a moslem orphanage, and only moslem orphans are allowed. i send to this institution any wandering waif who passes into syria from the regions where the tragedy took place. the turks and the kurds have that orphanage. when i hear of wandering and starving children, i send them to aintoura. i have to keep them alive. i do not care how. i cannot bear to see them die in the streets.42 edip replied, as written in her memoirs, that she did not want anything to do with such an orphanage. djemal pasha then said that she would want everything to do with it if she saw their misery and suffering… a question: in that case why, according to banean’s testimony, did they move hundreds of orphans to antoura from the protestant pastor’s orphanage, where they already had found refuge, instead of the thousands of homeless orphans wandering about under the walls of the orphanage, if the reason was the purely philanthropic urge to collect wandering children? this passage naturally raises a few more questions in connection with the following point attributed to djemal pasha by halidé edip: “do you believe that by turning a few hundred armenian boys and girls moslem i think i benefi t my race?” why would the islamisation and turkifi cation of just the armenians be referred to as benefi cial in such a defensive question? this therefore alluded to eugenics, echoing what aram antonyan said: “…graft a race so endowed with high qualities, the armenian race, onto the turkish race. just like it once was with the janissaries.”43 the subject had at least been discussed in those days as well; it could, however, have been edip’s attempt at self-justifi cation. this begs another question: who was such philanthropy for, as it was defi nitely not for the armenian race? beatings and torture and other forms of abuse were used, as testifi ed by the orphans, at the antoura orphanage to ensure the erasure of christianity and the forced forgetting of the armenian language. it is believed, therefore, that the human beings they wanted to shape the armenian children into were intended to fulfi l the ideas of ottoman turkey and for the future. “djemal pasha had ordered that we should be given proper care and attention, since he appreciated the armenians’ brains and talents and hoped that, in case of victory, thousands of turkifi ed armenian children would, in the coming years, ennoble his nation and we would become his future support.”44 it was this vision, this idea conveyed by the military personnel who came to the pastor’s orphanage to fetch the orphans: “…․ djemal pasha will run [it] as a school, not an orphanage and educate and prepare decent people for the homeland.”45 42 memoirs of halidé edib, 428-429. 43 antonian, the great crime, 178-179. 44 svazlian, the armenian genocide, 426. 45 banian, memoirs, 127. 63 this quite neatly fi ts in with the idea of a new pan-turkic country, halidé edip’s new turan [yeni turan], a new homeland [yeni yurdu], a new nation, the new man [adnan adıvar played quite an active role in the yeni adam [new man] magazine of this genre published in republican turkey] and the close links with the new culture, the realisation of which was one of the ideological aims of the young turks and related circles.46 it is a well-known fact that during wwi the warring parties, including germany and austria-hungary, carried out medical experiments, as did ottoman medical establishments and various international relief organizations operating within the ottoman empire. in this regard, harutyun alboyajyan conveyed the following: the next day all the orphan boys were given a piece of bread, and we again hit the road. we reached the station shortly after. there was this most sumptuously dressed offi cer at the station, whose name was adnan bey… adnan bey said that we should now go to an orphanage, where we would be very well taken care of; we would have whistles at the end of our spoons to express our wishes. adnan bey was a doctor, the husband of one of the progressive turkish women, halidé khanum. apparently, he was telling very good things about the orphanage, so that we would not put our minds to running away, but we had no place to escape.47 a whistle has always been an interesting children’s’ toy: it is convincing that, in this episode doctor adnan adıvar has been using a psychological mechanism for the children to go with him or them, as it was very important for the children to follow them for some reason. at the same time, we cannot forget that, for example in nazi germany, doctor josef mengele48 used to bribe children with sweets then subject them to medical experiments. what attracts attention at this point is adnan adıvar’s profession, his presence and role, combining all this with another fact: the presence of the second antoura director, lutfi bey who succeeded naid or nahid bey49. the second director referred to in the orphanage’s inmates’memoirs, lutfi bey was, according to them, also a physician. our research was then 46 for this ideology of “new,” as well as about halidé edip’s participation see, for instance, umit kurt, dogan gurpinarb, “the young turk historical imagination in the pursuit of mythical turkishness and its lost grandeur (1911–1914),” british journal of middle eastern studies 43, no.4 (2016): 564-565, 568-569, 573. 47 alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 36-37. 48 josef mengele (1911-1979), an ss offi cer and physician in nazi germany, known by the nickname of “the angel of death.” he is best known for performing medical experiments on people at the auschwitz concentration camp, often resulting in death. josef mengele was also part of the medical staff selecting the victims to be killed in the gas chambers. mengele had a doctorate in anthropology and medical science, possessed in-depth knowledge of then-current genetic/racial theories and conducted tests and experiments in person. he lived in disguise in various countries after the war and was buried under a pseudonym. see, for instance, gerald l. posner, john ware, mengele: the complete story (new york: cooper square press, 2000). 49 naid or nahid bey, a military man, was referred to only in harutyun alboyajyan and melgon petrosean memoirs. according to alboyadjian he was a military offi cer from marash who, after some time, was transferred to palestine (alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 43), while petrosean only mentioned the name (the memoirs of melgon petrosean, 12). a young turk activist was found with this name who was a european-educated military man named mehmet nahid kerven, but he wasn’t from marash. see “mehmet nahid kerven,” at https://www.bu.edu/ckls/home/mehmet-nahid-kerven/, accessed 02.06.2021. the identifi cation of the fi rst director of antoura might well prove helpful in answering many antoura-related questions. shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 64 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 centred on one individual, dr. lutfi kırdar50 who, it is believed, was the abovementioned dr. lutfi . this person later held high level government positions in republican turkey, becoming health and social security minister, as well as being the mayor and governor of istanbul. it is believed that it was not merely by chance that physicians were present before the transfer of the children and before they met adnan adıvar, about which the same harutyun alboyajyan said that when their caravan of deportees stopped at a caravanserai in the city of homs, which was already full of deportees, a doctor appeared: …we were approached by a well-dressed arab or turkish offi cial. before approaching, he was looking around carefully. he spoke turkish very well. he approached me and asked whether i would want to be his son, but i resented bitterly and said that i would not leave my mother. he took out a purse of gold from his bosom and showed it to my mother. there were other boys next to us, who wanted to go with him, but he absolutely wanted to take me. he said that he was a doctor and would give me a good education if my mother and i agreed to his offer. so, every day he was coming for me and urging me to agree to go with him. seeing that he could not persuade me, he started to threaten us that he would take me with the help of the police. i found a way out; the moment i saw him coming from a distance, i hid so that he would not see me․․․51 the doctor’s interests might not have been limited to just one child. his fi eld of operations was defi nitely wider and, from the same passage, it may clearly be seen that he was cooperating with the chief of police. he probably had permission for his activities from state bodies too. it is impossible not to pay attention to the presence of physicians in various episodes recounted in the antoura orphans’ memoirs. passages concerning eugenics may be seen in the memoirs of the armenian inmates of antoura: far from being for philanthropic reasons, djemal pasha’s decision of placing the armenian orphans in “caring hands” was a brutal and mean trap, a shameless attempt to turkify the orphans and thus ennoble the turkish blood. the turks are well familiar with the armenians. having fed on the armenian bread, armenian labour for centuries, today also, in these hapless days of the armenians, he has been putting into operation the devilish plan of assimilating the armenian children.52 50 lütfi kırdar (1887-1961), turkish physician, public and political fi gure, health and social security minister (1957-1960) and mayor of istanbul in republican turkey. he was born in kirkuk (now in iraq). he studied intermittently in the department of medicine of istanbul university from 1908 and graduated in 1917. after the great war, he joined the turkish red crescent organisation and participated in the kemalist movement as the head of the military medical service. upon the proclamation of the republic in 1923, he left for vienna and munich, retraining as an ophthalmologist. returning a year later, he assumed various government positions before dying of a stroke in 1961 while defending himself against accusations before a military tribunal (“lütfi kırdar,” at https://www.beyaztarih.com/ansiklopedi/lutfi -kirdar, accessed 02.06.2021, also, “lütfi kırdar,” at https://www.biyografi .net/kisiayrinti.asp?kisiid=1415, accessed 02.06.2021). 51 alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 26. 52 banian, memoirs, 126. 65 or: halidé edip would look at the boys and rejoice in her heart, as in several years these boys would be turkifi ed and ennobling the turkish blood.53 the same was reported by harutyun alboyajian in his testimony given to verjiné svazlian and quoted in the previous section; however the focus of this section is on another matter, therefore the part of the passage presented in italics is also different, in line with this section’s subject: djemal pasha had ordered that we should be given proper care and attention, since he appreciated the armenians’ brains and graces and hoped that, in case of victory, thousands of turkifi ed armenian children would, in the coming years, ennoble his nation and we would become his future support. towards that aim djemal pasha had teachers brought from constantinople; he had brought physicians, because most of the orphans fell ill with scurvy and died.54 at the same time the medical and sanitary situation in antoura gave rise to many questions: the number of children getting sick was increasing among the orphans, the completely vacant hospital during the fi rst days was starting to feel cramped and nobody knew how professional was the physician at the orphanage, he would examine the patients coming to him, give them medications, and yet instead of getting better, they would shut their eyes not to open them again. eight to ten of them have already died in a few weeks.55 consequently, the propensity of the young turk pan-turkic ideologists and elite for relevant medical, biological, anthropological, genetic and racial theories, as well as for medical services used and perhaps, also, the likelihood of experiments being carried out at the antoura orphanage. to this aim can serve, for example, examination of bone remnants of the buried orphans of antoura orphanage. this must be studied in the usual way to perhaps reveal many new aspects and phenomena of the young turks’ overall genocidal ideas and to complete existing ones. 53 ibid., 168. 54 svazlian, the armenian genocide, 426. 55 banian, memoirs, 146. shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 66 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 the veil of secrecy and hoax: halidé edip’s memoirs versus those of the armenian orphans halidé edip may rightly be considered as one of the fi rst revisionists of the armenian genocide; in fact her model may be classifi ed within that of the denialism of the armenian genocide, typical of the modern period, in which the actual reality of the massacres is not being rejected time and again, but interpreted as a mutually administered, equal massacre, a confl ict in the war56 and never as a state, planned genocidal policy. “they were turks, kurds and armenians. each child had a drama and each had its parents massacred by the parents of the other children, and now we’re all stricken with the same misery and disaster. each child had a turkish or moslem name.”57 the following “confession,” made by edip, is noteworthy in the context of being concerned about antoura and the orphans’ living conditions: “the two months from september to november, 1916, were to me the most painful during the war. i was in utter despair; the great calamity and hopeless misery which overwhelmed my country seemed to be everlasting. the war seemed endless and human suffering unlimited. i was unable to write a line, and if there had been a monastic life for women in islam i should have entered it without hesitation.”58 garnik banean contradicted this account of halidé edip, saying: i saw halide edip adıvar, the woman who had stayed behind after jemal pasha’s visit. she would often lean against the sundial and watch us play. she seemed carefree. sometimes she journeyed to beirut and returned a few days later with stacks of books under her arms. some said that she was writing a book about the orphans; others claimed that at night, she sucked the blood out of the necks of the older boys. we didn’t know what to believe.59 even if this is about various periods of halidé edip’s life, such contraditctions should be brought together to reveal their links and address them in the context of her image, role and relation to the orphans of the armenian genocide. halidé edip never referred to her husband’s involvement in persuading the children to move to antoura as already noted above; however, she mentioned his name twice in the section about antoura: once relative to her decision to marry him and the marriage itself (which took place on 23 april 1917 in brusa),60 and for the second time, about his arrival to syria in june 1917 “dr. adnan, who was inspecting the hygienic conditions of the turkish armies, came to syria in june, and we traveled home together.”61 as seen from halidé edip’s memoirs, she stayed in antoura until the last moment; par56 edib, turkey faces west, 142-144, 165-166, 174․ 57 memoirs of halidé edib, 428. 58 ibid., 431. 59 panian, goodbye, antoura, 94-95. 60 memoirs of halidé edib, 450. 61 ibid., 452. 67 ticularly illustrative is the following passage where she explicitly indicated that the incident occured during one of her last visits: in connection with another kurdish child i have another dramatic but happy picture fi xed in my mind. it happened in one of my last visits to antoura. after the announcement that the parents able to prove their identity could take their children away, some armenian women had appeared. but as there are very few turks and kurds in beirut and lebanon, none of these nationals had turned up to claim their children.62 such an order to return the children might have been and was issued at the end of the war, (at the end of 1918), as patriarch zaven recalled, when the turks lost their positions in the middle east and were defeated.63 therefore, returning children could seem to be an extremely humanitarian act, whereas it had been imposed on the ottoman authorities and the military. as she stayed at the orphanage till the end and at was at least privy to the events that took place there, it is very suspicious that she hid many details or used manipulative stories to present them as a normal state of affairs. the reasonable doubts raised about the veracity of halidé edip’s memoirs reaches its culmination with the description of the closing events of antoura as a turkish orphanage. she presented everything as if it was the result of her exhortations: she particularly presented the arrival of the red cross workers and assuming the management of the orphanage as an expression of her humanitarian attitude: “i requested dr. bliss and mr. dodge to come and see me and begged them to take antoura under the auspices of the red cross as soon as the clashes broke out in beirut. for four months, the children were provided for thanks to major kemal, and the director had to stay with some of the staff members until the last minute.”64 this notion prompts some questions, if not enigmas and one of these was the following: the memoirs of the orphans read that the turks left ubruptly with only the orphanage’s pharmacist staying behind, whose name was given by both melgon petrosean65 and harutyun alboyajian, as being the military doctor riza bey, who had been ordered to poison the children before leaving: ․․․ unexpectedly, the pharmacist of the orphanage, riza bey (a military doctor with the rank of colonel) entered the dining room. walking along the room, he approached enver, the chavush of the highest grade and said: “enver chavush, son!” enver chavush stood up. riza bey asked: “enver, son, what is your armenian name, do you remember it?” “yes, i do, toros.” thus, repeating the same thing with everyone, he approached and asked me the same question; i told him that my name was harutyun. 62 ibid., 467. 63 archbishop zaven. պատրիարքական յուշերս. վաւերագիրներ եւ վկայութիւններ [my patriarchal memoirs։ documents and testimonies] (cairo: nor astgh, 1947), 254. 64 memoirs of halidé edib, 469. 65 the memoirs of melgon petrosean, 12. shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 68 then he asked the chavushes and orphans to take their seats. he said that no one from the management of the orphanage was there, no soldiers either. he himself might not have been there as well, but in that case, the orphans would not have been there too. later we learned that while running away the turks had ordered the pharmacist riza bey to poison the orphans during their last supper and then leave. but riza bey refused to agree to such a crime.66 edip did not present the antoura closure in a complete way; it is true that the red cross mission arrived when the turks left, but many questions were left unanswered or were omitted. it is not thought that halidé edip might simply have been unaware of all this and that inhuman orders and atrocities had been issued and carried out only by the military leadership headed by djemal pasha, because at the time of publication of the memoirs in 1926 edip at least should have been aware of what had happened about seven or eight years earlier. in addition, the last quotation from her book, which was cited above, was immediately followed by the following continuation, indicating that she had been very well informed of the details of further developments:“i also begged them to pass the armenian children to the armenians through the red cross, and the moslem children to the red crescent in constantinople, if the necessary moment came. they promised, and they kept their promise. they sent up mr. crawford in the name of the red cross when the allied armies entered. this was my last service to antoura.”67 she fi nished her memoirs with a tale about antoura, indicating that they stayed in syria until 4 march 1919.68 did this abovementioned notion “… [to hand over sh.kh.] the moslem children to the red crescent in constantinople” not serve to gloss over the fact that several dozen children were moved to constantinople and kept in a secret place as reported by the orphans, among whom were some who were armenians, of which one escaped, as mentioned above? moreover, why did halidé edip, who recommended herself as a philanthropic and impartial intellectual, conceal those facts, if she honestly did not have anything to do with them? perhaps she had feared for her own life; after all, she would have been relating things that would have given rise to multiple moral issues and, if she had divulged everything, might have lost her her position and authority. finally, it could have ended with her disclosing military secrets. selim deringil quoted a passage from halidé edip to ismail hakki bey, the mutasarrif of lebanon, which is another piece of evidence of halidé edip’s complicity. it said: in the eventuality of the situation [of the war] going against us, it would be a political and humanitarian error to abandon such a large group, whose parents were killed by 66 alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 50, see also, svazlian, the armenian genocide, 429: “he [the pharmacist fevzi of the antoura orphanage-sh.kh.] did not continue, but later we learned that they had asked the pharmacist to poison our last supper, but he had refused to obey their order. and really, soon they came with arab sheriff, put handcuffs on his hands and took him away. we all were sad and silent. when they were taking him out.” 67 memoirs of halidé edib, 469. 68 ibid., 471. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 69 turks, [ebeveyni türkler tarafından őldürülmüş] to the foreigners. to abandon the orphanage would be an error enabling them to use it as political and humanitarian evidence against us. for this reason, i am in favor, for now, of immediately transferring antoura to istanbul […]. the children can be moved to istanbul in relative safety only if you provide transport for the staff. if antoura is indeed to be abandoned i request that you leave mount lebanon.69 with all this in mind halidé edip could confi dently be called an accomplice, as she could have concealed, but avoided, the urge to present all this under a manipulatively positive light, which was something she didn’t do in her memoirs or decades later. she never edited her own work in any way, even though she was active in politics and society until her death in january 1964. therefore, her memoirs are and at the same time cannot be a source concerning the antoura orphanage, state islamisation and the turkifi cation policy as they raise a host of questions and issues and contradict the orphans’ memoirs. the methods of persuasion chosen by the teacher of religion or hoja to coerce the orphans, which might have been of service in previous times, are also interesting. moreover, the words used were diametrically opposed to what halidé edip was trying to communicate to us through djemal pasha’s words. there is no doubt about islamisation being on fi rm foundations, nor was there any doubt about the desire to create turks from armenian children and speaking armenian had been forbidden too. but halidé edip’s diplomatic efforts to conceal those facts are of interest too. thus, melgon petrosean, compared to garnik banean for instance, had some knowledge of turkish and remembered some of the phrases used to convert armenian children by the teachers at the antoura orphanage: “my dear children, in olden times you have been children of turks, the infi dels converted your mothers into “gavurs” forcibly, you should go back to your mother religion. your religion is old and outdated like the fi re worship. your prophet jesus is also worn out and like a worn-out shirt we throw it away and put on another.”70 ziya gökalp71 was, in the later years of the ottoman empire, the father of the idea that christianity was an old and outdated religion and that islam was new and innovative, tending towards novelty and modernity and containing layers of thought that were in line with western thinking. halidé edip followed that ideological line both virtually and in her writings, as was well known. in this sense, the islamisation of christians, unifi ed with the approaches developed by the ideologists of pan-turkism, was used for the fi rst time and at least the ideological line is noticeable. this, then, is another point that adds doubt to halidé edip’s direct quotation above, stating that she was against the idea of the islamisation of 69 see no.68 reference of the article: deringil, “your religion is worn and outdated.” 70 the memoirs of melgon petrosean, 12-13. the expressions were in turkish and we express our deep gratitude to agmi researcher, turkologist dr. elina mirzoyan for converting the turkish text in armenian script into literary turkish. 71this was briefl y touched on in our following article: shushan khachatryan, «երիտթուրքերի գաղափարախոսական ուղենիշները: կրոնը՝ քաղաքականության, քաղաքականությունը կրոնի մեջ» [the young turks’ ideological guidelines: religion in politics and politics in religion] ts՚eghaspanagitakan handes 4, no. 1 (2016): 125-126. shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 70 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 children, as christian religious identity was regarded as an impediment to the establishment of pan-turkism. in other words, future studies must allow for the following question: was the islamisation carried out at antoura orphanage by its staff headed by halidé edip done for the sake of religion, as carried out in the ottoman empire in previous centuries, or did it have political, civilizational, cultural and ideological foundations conspicuous in pan-turkist writings and its ideological line? it is believed that the second was a link in the chain dependent on the fi rst, as islam was only one element of a synthesis the primary link but not the ultimate aim. there was an urge to create a new cultural environment, а new cultivated and cultured man within the substantial solidity of pan-turkism. armenian children were turkifi ed in this sense. this phenomenon, fi tting into the concept of pan-turkism, has been studied many times on various occasions by different specialists, but needs further, extensive coverage and detailed elaboration in the context of the antoura orphanage and the subtext of the turkifi cation of armenian children, which has been outlined in this article and is its subject. it is necessary, at the same time, to draw parallels with the phenomenon of the sunnifi cation72 of non-muslim and non-sunni groups carried out in previous centuries under the vertical subordination of the leadership of the ottoman empire and recently conceptualised with the much-cherished agenda of religious and ideological homogenization of the ottoman empire. this is the context in which studies should be made as to which generalities exist and what differences there are and whether the above phenomenon was the precursor of pan-turkism and if the genocidal mentality cultivated against armenian christians also has its roots in this pan-sunnitisation phenomenon. conclusion the aim of this question-posing research is to open up the fi eld for various sub-studies, where the future work of various specialists able to take advantage of an important area of the philosophy of islamisation and turkifi cation of armenian children at the antoura orphanage and generally during the armenian genocide may be seen. the foregoing indeed only contributes to the number of questions and problems requiring clarifi cation, but this is the true purpose of this article. the name for what halidé edip did at the antoura orphanage is genocide. research carried out concludes that halidé edip’s character should fi rst and foremost be the subject of a psychological study. a female leader having infl uence not only on political leaders, but also on the masses, who was one of the future-builders of turkey was an unprecedented event in ottoman history. she was rushing, with her right foot to the west and her left to the east to turkify orphaned and homeless armenian children. she also had her right hand on the concept and implementing of the ideas of modernizing turkey, while her left was conceiving and realising the ideas of the erasure of the identity of armenian children. she would put on a smiling face when associating with the elite of western cultural life, 72 for this phenomenon see derin terzioğlu, “how to conceptualize ottoman sunnitization: а historiographical discussion,” turcica 44 (2012-2013): 301-338. 71 while scowling at infl uential ladies and gentlemen and playing a painful role in the life of the world-famous genius komitas vardapet, even denying that he was an armenian. what did she hate so much in armenians? what was the reason for her obviously metaphysical hatred? if a professional interdisciplinary group could be tasked with answering these questions, there would be a new set of phenomenological explanations as to why the armenian genocide was planned. historical examination of this woman’s character may lead to errors being committed but that is up to the court of psychologists, scholars of religious and cultural studies, anthropologists and others. at the same time, without repeating what kind of research problems have occurred, it is relevant to highlight that each person, place-name, profession and every action relating to antoura must be made the subject of examination and thorough collation. the antoura orphanage may be called a touchstone not only the issues of forcible turkifi cation of armenian children, but also generally of the revelation of many aspects of the armenian genocide. the mere existence of this orphanage with its methodology, staff and ideology combines, within itself, the implementation of pan-turkism, assimilation, as well as the new methods and scientifi c theories of nation-building that were employed by young turk offi cials and theorist-adherents. the names of antoura inmates, their stories and the staff of the orphanage should also provide subjects for study, particularly focusing on the collection of the memoirs or testimonies of inmates still unknown to us and the biographical and ideological details of the turkish staff. to keep things in order, an appendix containing relevant tables is attached to this article. it should be noted that the issue of the existence of the antoura orphanage is broader and fi ts into the framework of contemporary scientifi c and anti-scientifi c theories as well as in ideologies and philosophical-political phenomena. in this sense the involvement of halidé edip’s second husband adnan adıvar in the establishment of the antoura orphanage that has been concealed so far will be the subject of our next study when a suffi cient number of relevant sources have been identifi ed. shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 72 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 appendix table 1. antoura orphanage staff position name [+profession] n general inspector halidé edip 1 directors naid/nahid bey [military] lutfi bey [physician] reshad bey abraham bey romashvili 4 overseers-controllers favzi/fevzi bey [military, internal affairs mudir] mukhtar bey ≈273 teachers nejmeddine [hodja/mullah, teacher of religion] nabihe hanim [turkish teacher] x [rules of etiquette and medicine teacher] aishe [a teacher who praises the fruits of turkey and teaches geography] x [arab music teacher] ≈5 pharmacist / physician riza bey [doctor with military rank] x74 x ≈1 offi ce staff x arabs x accountant muhasabaji bey ≈1 storekeeper shukri ≈1 responsible for the canteen and cleanliness emine hanim ≈1 73 the approximately symbol ≈ was used as it is not clear whether there have been others or not, or because the orphans mentioned others in their memoirs but their number is still unknown to us. 74 the x indicates that there was a reference in the text also to other people occupying the given position, but no name or exact number has been indicated. 73 carpenter josef (arab) ≈1 guard ≈30 total ≈47 table 2. the antoura orphanage curriculum n subject 1 marching drill 2 religion and history of religion 3 turkish 4 writing exercise 5 music 6 etiquette 7 medicine 8 arithmetic 9 natural science or “talks about wildlife, domestic plants and animals in turkey”75 10 geography table 3. armenian children in the antoura orphanage according to the memoirs written by g. banean, h. alboyajyan and m. petrosean n baptismal name surname /other notes orphanage number new turkish name birthplace, origin other available data 1 melgon petrosean (1905-1990)76 8 nezhip [=nejip/ nejep] sarılar, amanos 75 banean, memoirs, 135: 76 fabrice grognet, “les mémoires d’un père en heritage,” hommes & migrations 1281 (2009): 174-179, at http://journals.openedition.org/hommesmigrations/404, accessed 09.09.2021. shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 74 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 n baptismal name surname /other notes orphanage number new turkish name birthplace, origin other available data 2 harutyun alboyajyan (1904-1994) 534/53577 a․ saleh, b․ shukru finticak 3 garnik banean (19101989) 551 ahmed kyurin 4 toros karapetyan or big toros78 enver chavush / küçük enver kyurin according to m. bedrosian he only one circumcised willingly and the 10th grade chavush 5 vardan djemal chavush /küçük djemal kyurin chavush of m. bedrosian’s class 6 hrand? talaat chavush / küçük talaat 7 küçük hasan 8 hovsep mahmud chavush trumpeter 9 izzet chavush 77 in harutyun alboyajyan’s memoirs, 534 (alboyajyan, through the roads of crucifi xion, 40), and in verjiné svazlian’s miscellanea, 535 (svazlian, the armenian genocide, 439). 78 küçük enver or enver chavush, real name toros karapetyan, was referred to in the memoirs of all the three orphans. the most detailed account of him was given by harutyun alboyajyan, as they stayed in touch with each other even after the antoura orphanage was closed and later the orphans were repatriated and settled in soviet armenia. toros karapetyan apparently was one of the most important fi gures in the antoura orphanage. a small personal investigation revealed the names of his grandchildren and great grandchildren, and it is hoped that it will be possible, in the near future to contact them to fi nd more details about his persona and stay at the antoura orphanage, thus make new discoveries about it. 75 n baptismal name surname /other notes orphanage number new turkish name birthplace, origin other available data 10 shekir chavush chavush of h. alboyajyan’s class 11 nshan midhat sis 12 manuel leader boy cursing the turkish fl ag, related to g. banean 13 mkrtich leader boy cursing the turkish fl ag 14 gevorg muhamed sis 15 yusuf adana 16 serob 17 murad [?] murad [?] 18 grigor orphanage storekeeper, karnig banean’s cousin 19 mihran one of the leaders of k. banean’s secret group 20 galust sebastia brother of the next two 21 poghos sebastia shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 76 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 n baptismal name surname /other notes orphanage number new turkish name birthplace, origin other available data 22 hovhannes sebastia 23 vagharshak erzrum 24 sarı marash the only completely islamized 25 aysha m. bedrosian’s sister 26 lutfi a m. bedrosian’s sister 27 abraham ibrahim blind from forced looking at the sun. 28 toros tadevosian/ zhamkochyan or little toros ahmed79 29 arshak 549 ahmed80 30 hovhannes karapoghosian81 31-32 tadevos and sedrak khashkhashians 79 an orphan by the name of ahmed was referred to in both garnik banean’s and harutyun alboyajyan’s memoirs; the latter mentions his armenian name, while garnik banean twice referred to an orphan by the same name with his number mentioned as 549 in one place and his armenian name in another. not being sure about the particulars of the number given by banean or whether the reference was made to the same person or not, it was preferred to footnote it. 80 see the previous footnote. 81 there is hovhannes karapoghosian’s brief unpublished memoir mentioning about the antoura orphanage: through the valley of the shadow of death: autobiography by john jacob karaboghosian, 36 pp. agmi collections, s-40, no. 1316: 77 n baptismal name surname /other notes orphanage number new turkish name birthplace, origin other available data 33 minas n i c k n a m e d “kyalaji” 34 mustafa 35 hrach 36 tovmas h. alboyajyan’s friend 37 karapet h. alboyajyan’s brother 38 taguhi gyurjian h. alboyajyan’s friend 39 emmi oghli 40 izyat adana after antoura orphanage he was studying at the maritime college 41 verjiné gyulumian 42 vertahim svazlian 43 hovsep m. bedrosian’s relative 44 panos m. bedrosian’s relative 45 mehmet ainteb one of those who were locked in near constantinople, who had escaped from there shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children 78 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 6, no. 1, 2021 n baptismal name surname /other notes orphanage number new turkish name birthplace, origin other available data 46-48 three boys from the same village as melgon bedrosean with who the latter fl ed from antoura orphanage 49 garnik banean characterizied him as a spirited boy making anti-turkish speeches 50-51 harutyun alboyajyan’s two cousins who died early 52-54 three armenian boys helping intendant and physician riza bey, one of whom was called arif [hovhannes karapoghosian’s name was arif] 55 a boy from adana who was beaten for trying to escape, he limped afterwards 56 a boy who developed mental problems because of forcible conversion and died 57 an 8-year-old kid subjected to beating for wearing a cross [+50] in the spring of 1918, some 50 boys and several teachers were moved to istanbul and kept in confi nement under strict control in one of the districts there. here is where mehmet from aintab escaped from table 4. the route taken by garnik banean and other children in his group to antoura, starting from conscription to transportation hama [armenian reverend’s orphanage] homs baalbek beirut antoura orphanage 79 shushan khachatryan: halide edip and the turkifi cation of armenian children table 5. the route taken by harutyun alboyajyan and other children in his group to antoura, starting from conscription to transportation mismiyah dera mismiyah damascus mosque* jounieh* antoura orphanage* *accompanied by adnan bey table 6. the route taken by melgon petrosean and other children in his group to antoura, starting from conscription to transportation hama baalkek rayak beirut antoura orphanage dr. phil. tessa hofmann, magistra artium, prof. h.c., studied philology (slavic literatures and languages, armenian studies) and sociology at the freie universität berlin (fub); 19832015 research associate at the institute for eastern european studies of the fu berlin; research associate in international research projects (e.g. “out-migration from armenia and georgia”, 2008-2012); since 2015 independent scholar; author of numerous publications on the history, culture and present situation of armenia and its diaspora, on genocide research with a focus on ottoman genocide, on minorities in turkey and the south caucasus (https://independent.academia.edu/ tessahofmann). since 1979 volunteer human rights work, e.g. as chair of the non-profit working group recognition against genocide, for international understanding; spokeswoman of the board of the association for the promotion of an ecumenical memorial for genocide victims in the ottoman empire. email: tessa.hofmann@katwastan.de https://independent.academia.edu/tessahofmann https://independent.academia.edu/tessahofmann 7 syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective tessa hofmann he who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster. and if you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss also gazes into you. friedrich nietzsche, aphorism 146 this contribution explores the narrations and narrative styles of three syriac authors and genocide survivors from the diyarbakır province of the ottoman empire: naaman abed qarabashi, ishāq bar armalto (armale) and henno, comparing them with the armenian and greek survivors rev. grigoris balakian (գրիգորիս պալագեան, grigoris palagean), yervant odian (երուանդ օտեան – eruand ōtean1), elias venezis and dido sotiriou, who all wrote and published memoirs of events they were close to. the three syriac authors developed an antagonistic narrative shaped by biblical narrative styles, christian martyrology and their perception of contemporary events as inter-religious war and traditional jihad. the non-syriac authors that have been considered here replaced, in various degrees, this approach by internalization. greek authors from asia minor, such as venezis or dido argued, in their narrations, against the ethnic or religious ascription of guilt by emphasizing cases of solidarity between ottoman turks (muslims) and orthodox greeks. the two armenian authors examined here represent a middle position between syriac moral antagonism and the differentiating introspection of greek authors. in spite of their very different backgrounds and professions as clergyman and secular journalist, both tried to present their testimonials as documentary, unvarnished and “unliterary” as possible. is it possible to survive in a system based on violence and terror without the loss of human empathy and dignity? the syriacs saw this possibility mainly in individual martyrdom. elias venezis and dido sotiriou, however, named culprits and victims on both sides of the ethno-religious divide and included muslim rescuers in their narrations. the armenian authors yervant odian and grigoris balakian focused their narrations on suffering as such. in the face of their numerous compatriots who had been silenced forever, they cleared their “survival debts” by writing about the unspeakable and witnessing genocidal destruction. key-words: survivor’s memoirs, syriac christians, christian minorities, ottoman empire, genocide, literary narration, literary narratives. 1. also transcribed as yervand otyan (otian). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 8 introduction the experience of genocide frequently leaves survivors, eyewitnesses and sometimes rescuers speechless. the high degree of traumatization that their parents underwent also affects the post-genocidal generation, i.e. the children of genocide survivors, and, to a lesser degree, subsequent generations. besides psychological and inter-generational longterm effects, there are further reasons for the delayed attention given to testimonials and reports on the ottoman genocide against christians and, in particular, against syriac christians by academia. not only was the number of syriacs lower by a factor of 3.5 compared to armenians and by more than a factor of 4 if compared to greek orthodox christians but, as david gaunt, a swedish scholar of the assyrian genocide pointed out, high denominational fragmentation appears as an additional major obstacle: the declining ottoman empire found oriental christians that, for centuries, were split into antagonistic churches which had been locked into denigrating one another. each cult had a strong exclusive in-group identity that militated against the very idea of a multi-layered pan-assyrian identity. (…) one aspect of this invisibility is that the narratives of the assyrian genocide are built on testimonials of survivors whose perception was limited to local issues such as the struggle with nomadic tribes for agricultural land and the religious fanaticism of local muslim sects. in the final analysis the assyrians had no clear idea why they were being annihilated. they recognized only the local dimensions of their sufferings and had no understanding of the overall policies and interests of the young turk government.2 in addition, most of the people that identified themselves as suryoye, suraya, assyrians or chaldeans lived dispersed over vast territories in remote and rural areas, with the exception of some more urban communities in provincial cities such as diyarbakır, bitlis, mamuret-ül-aziz or kharberd (harput), in district towns such as mardin, midyat, siirt, nusaybin, hakkari, başkale or the iranian towns of salmast and urmia. moreover, the societal fragmentation of syriac christians was increased by tribalization, which seemed to be particularly strong among the eastern syriacs, who, perhaps under kurdish influence, described themselves as “ashirets,” or “tribes,” as did patriarch benyamin shimun in his declaration at salmast in october 1918: my people comprise 80,000 souls, who live in turkey as free ashirets. like kurdish ashirets, they neither have taxes to pay nor men to send to conscription. not a single turkish functionary ever set foot in our regions. our tribes have been armed since time immemorial and our children are taught from the age of ten how to use weapons so that, with our 20,000 armed men, we can always defend ourselves against attack from the kurds that surround us.3 2. david gaunt, “failed identity and the assyrian genocide,” in shatterzone of empires: coexistence and violence in the german, habsburg, russian and ottoman borderlands, ed. omer bartov, eric weitz (bloomington, indianapolis: indiana university press, 2013), 317. 3. joseph yacoub, year of the sword: the assyrian christian genocide: a history (oxford: oxford university press), 52. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 9 western syriac christians in diyarbakır province were characterized by extended families or clans. as the syriac scholar joseph yacoub summarized, the testimonials of syriac survivors recount “in detail, with striking similarities, the nature of the tragedy.”4 despite their small numbers, geographic dispersion and denominational fragmentation, there are numerous accounts and testimonials written close to the events by syriac survivors, usually in aramaic, and in some cases in foreign languages such as arabic, french or english. most authors and editors of such testimonials were male clerics or tribal leaders and their descendants such as malik yacoub, chief of the upper tyari tribe, or joseph malik khoshaba, son of the leader of the lower tyari. the memoirs of surmad’ bait mar shimun, sister of the murdered nestorian patriarch benyamin shimun, were released in london as early as 1920 in an english edition, but this was a rare exception. journalism in aramaic or arabic languages existed predominantly in clerical contexts, for example in the monthly journal mghalto phatriarqueto, the review of the syriac orthodox patriarchate in damascus, where articles on the events that took place during the first world war were published. as was the case with armenian memoirs, recollections and testimonials, most accounts were translated into internationally used languages, english in particular, only six decades after their first release in the original eastern languages. only with the emergence of syriac communities in europe were translations into english and german released from the 1980s onwards. qarabashi, armale and henno: survivors, witnesses, documentarists this contribution explores the narrations and narrative styles of three syriac authors from the diyarbakır province of the ottoman empire, comparing them with the armenian and greek survivors grigoris balakian (palagean; 1876-1934), yervant odian (1869-1926) and elias venezis (a nom-de-plume; he was born in mellos in 1904 and died in 1973), who all wrote and published similarly contemporary memoirs. chronologically, the first survivor and collector of survivors’ testimonials was naaman abed (abdal) mshiho qarabashi (abd al-masīḥ numān, 1903-1983)5 from the syriac village of qarabash (qarabashi), east of diyarbakır. he was a novice at the seminary of the fortified zafaran monastery (dayro d-mor hananyo, in ottoman turkish deyrüz zaferân manastırı) and, at the age of just 15 years old, began to write down and cross-check the testimonials of those co-religionists who had sought refuge in that monastery during the years 1915-1918. in the introduction to his collection, known under the title “spilled blood,” qarabashi explains the motives of his work: 4. yacoub, year of the sword, 62. 5. aydin polycarpus, george kiraz, “qarabashī, ʿabd al-masīḥ nuʿmān,” in the gorgias encyclopedic dictionary of the syriac heritage, eds. sebastian p. brock et al. (piscataway, nj: gorgias press, 2011), 343. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 10 i have also recorded them so that they, on the one hand, can sound in the ears of future generations like a warning voice as they open their ears to hear the complaints of the oppressed and, secondly, as a warning presented to the sight and mind of mankind in order to stir it to tears of repentance. it is also presented as a terrible example, in order to show this unjustly treated people the truth, once it has been relieved and can breathe freedom once more.6 father ishāq bar armalto (isaac armale, 1879-1954) was a syriac catholic archpriest and scholar from mardin who survived the massacres, deportations and kidnappings there and where he spent his entire time during the first world war. he was one of those christian clerics who were used by the ottoman authorities as a point of contact, among other things: these “clerical, responsible people” as armale called them, had to communicate orders from the authorities to their congregations and ensure their implementation. the authorities expected christian clerics to betray deserters in their denominations and to surrender suspected weapons caches. on various occasions, armale conveys the tremendous psychological pressure put on the clergymen. although the author lived deep in the province, he received information and news from abroad, to which he could compare official ottoman information. in his epilogue, armale speaks with the authority of an eyewitness who also included the testimony of other survivors and eyewitnesses: if you ask what has happened to me, i’ll answer you only with tears. for i have seen how my parents and brothers were thrown into prisons without any explanation, beaten, slapped, whipped like sheep, humbled and obediently led to slaughter, as well as actually being slaughtered as despised people in the mountains, in caves and being thrown, thirsty and hungry, into rivers and wells. (…) dear reader, please note that what we did not see with our own eyes, we took from the mouths of eyewitnesses who were saved from death by divine care, to tell us what they had had to endure with the purpose of having their reports spread in order to reprimand the oppressors and to comfort the mourners.7 6. abed mschiho na‘man von qarabasch, vergossenes blut: geschichten der greuel, die an den christen verübt, und der leiden, die ihnen 1895 und 1914-1918 zugefügt wurden (glane/losser: bar hebraeus, 2001), 19. 7. the first and original edition of armale’s memoirs was published in harissa (lebanon), 1919, in arab under the title “al-qusārā fī nakabātin-nasārā” and translates as “the worst of all catastrophes for the christians” (harissa: imprimerie des paulistes, 1919). in 2017, a french edition was released: père isaac armalet, les calamités imposées aux chrétiens: par un témoin oculaire recueil des évènements malveillants, injustices, kidnappings, déportation, massacres, exode, injures et autres actes hideux survenus en mésopotamie, principalement à mardin, en 1895-1914-1919 (paris: l’harmattan, 2017). the references and quotations used in this article come from a recent german translation from the arab original, which will soon be released in the peter lang publishing house. i relate to the unpublished manuscript, which was provided by courtesy of amill gorgis. the full title and subtitle of the german edition read: “die schlimmsten aller katastrophen für die christen: eine seltene historische abhandlung, die ausführlich beschreibt, was den christen in der türkei und in mesopotamien, insbesondere in mardin, an unterdrückung, übergriffen, entführungen, vertreibung, verschleppung, massakern, ermordung und vielfältigen abscheulichkeiten widerfahren ist, die sich im jahre 1895 und in den jahren 1914 bis 1919 zugetragen haben.” armale, katastrophen, 10. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 11 in 1919, armale settled in the syriac catholic monastery of dayr charfe (sherfat)8 in harissa (lebanon), to which he belonged from the age of 16 and where he spent the rest of his life. there he transcribed the notes that he had secretly made and preserved, in constant fear of being discovered during the period of persecution, i.e. from july 17, 1914 until the end of the war.9 in the same year, armale published, still in fear of persecution, a voluminous book of 504 pages, sub-divided into five parts, as an anonymous eyewitness.10 during the war years and the period of deportation, writing a diary or taking notes was a highly hazardous pastime for ottoman christians. the armenian deportee and journalist yervant odian mentioned in his memoirs that only in hama (syria) did he feel safe enough to keep a diary: “in this way i’d filled three notebooks, which i kept with great care in the niche above my window.”11 armale’s book appeared at a time, when france, enthusiastically paraphrased in armale’s recollections as the “mother of kindliness and helpfulness,” controlled the north of syria, lebanon and alexandretta according to the sykes-picot agreement of may 1916 and when the surviving ottoman christian deportees in syria and lebanon gained hope for the return to their homelands and the restitution of, or compensation for, their properties. in contrast to qarabashi and armale, the syriac orthodox sub-bishop and archpriest süleyman henno (sleman henno, 1918-2006) was neither an eyewitness, nor a survivor. born in the village of arkah (harabali) in the tur abdin region, he served the community of syriac refugees in syria as an ordained priest; he gathered the information used in his account gounhé d’souryoyé d’tour abdin, which was published in the netherlands in its original aramaic version as late as 1987, from among his flock. again, in contrast to armale and qarabashi, henno’s account saw translations into turkish (athens, 1993), swedish (örebrö, 1998), german (glane/losser, 2005) and arabic (syria, 2004). syriac “historicism” typically, syriac authors of genocide accounts do not limit their self-imposed task to the documentation of more-or-less recent events, but reach far back into history, including ancient and medieval times, in order to contextualize the present. armale, for example, starts his historical introduction with the assyrian ruler tiglath-pileser i (1114-1076 bc), but as it is the case with other syriac authors, his focus is on the christian period 8. sébastien courtois, the forgotten genocide: eastern christians, the last arameans (piscataway, nj: gorgias press, 2004), 160; yacoub, year of the sword, 51. 9. “on thursday, april 22, ḥabīb tarzī dī ğarwe delivered, through a high-ranking person, the following message to the syriac community: “hide all your letters, documents and books related to politics, as well as any french and armenian writings because the government is determined to seek inexorably and severely punish the holders of such writings!” all (...) began to burn, among other things, their letters and to hide the important ones. for example, the author hid his manuscripts, the transcript of the daily events which he had written since the declaration of the world war until that day, in a pit, and burned all armenian and french books out of fear.” armale, katastrophen, part ii, chapter 19, 78 10. armale, katastrophen, 9. 11. yervant odian, accursed years: my exile and return from der zor, 1914-1919, translated by ara stepan melkonian (london: gomidas institute, 2009), p. 111. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 12 and the christian denominations of the near east. in this context, much attention is given to the history of the armenian people (chapter 11) and their church (chapter 12), albeit with several flaws and inaccuracies; for armale, the “armenian church” is almost synonymous with armenian catholicism (uniates). in general, armale narrates and evaluates history from a non-secular, clerical and catholic perspective. for example, he praises the reign of the early armenian catholicos nerses i the great (died 373) for the harmony between church, state and society: “thus armenia at that time became like a group of monks: a monastery with an abbot.”12 by and large, armale’s extensive historical introduction represents an enumeration of atrocities and cruelties committed against oriental christians by non-christians, mainly by muslims; only turning to the present in the 15th chapter of part i. by contrast, abed mshiho na’man qarabashi focused his 7th chapter (“suffering and persecutions to which christians have been exposed throughout the centuries”) on the early christians and their persecution by jews, romans and persian rulers, while the events that took place between the islamization of mesopotamia and the reign of the ottoman sultan abdül-hamid ii (1878-1908) are treated summarily. henno starts his historical introduction relatively “late” in the 15th century. as a result of the historicist approach, the events of wwi appear as the continuation or climax of events that had developed centuries before. the persecution, deportation and subsequent annihilation of ottoman christians are therefore embedded in a literary tradition, which is characterized by the authors’ self-perception as being martyrs of faith. thus, martyrology and its enumeration of the martyrs’ virtues are the models for armale’s narration.13 german guilt? interpreting the motives for war and extermination in addition to the continuity of religious antagonism and subsequent persecution, armale and qarabashi (the latter perhaps under the influence of the former) blamed the great powers and germany in particular for the persecution of ottoman christians during 12. armale, katastrophen, part i, chapter 11, 22. 13. for example, he presents one of the syriac catholic victims from diyarbakır in the following way: “al-maqdasī ḥabīb belonged to the noble dī ğarwe family from aleppo, known for their zeal for the catholic faith since the mid-eighteenth century. he is the son of malkē, son of ğabrā’īl, son of deacon yūsuf, son of noble miḥā-īl, son of cavalier ğabrā’īl, son of deacon ni’matullāh, son of miḥā-īl, son of’aṭallāh dī ğarwe. his grandfather migrated from his home town of aleppo to mardin. he liked the weather there, so he stayed there. out of this family emerged the very ingenious thinkers and heroes who defended the catholics and protected aleppo and mardin by their influence and power. the bestknown among them are: ġriġōryōs šukrallāh dī ğarwe, the metropolitan of ‘urshalīm (✝1773), the blessed patriarch miḥā-īl (✝1880), the late patriarch buṭros (✝1851), the archpriest rafā-īl (✝1892), son of fatḥallāhdīğarwe and the priest miḥā-īl, son of shukrallāh, son of the deacon ni’matullāh dī ğarwe. maqdasi ḥabīb was, like his great and noble grandfathers deeply faithful, eager in his faith. he went to syria several times. he was arrested on june 14, 1915, imprisoned with the other christian prisoners, and after six days taken away from the city with the others, where he was martyred.” – armale, katastrophen, part i, chapter 16, 32. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 13 wwi. as many reports in the political archives of the german foreign office reveal, the assumption that germany, as the most important military ally of the ottoman empire, had extraordinary political influence on the ruling nationalist committee for union and progress (c.u.p.: ittihat ve terakki cemiyeti) was widespread among christian and muslim ottomans at the time. for example, grigoris balakian was convinced that the c.u.p had planned the systematic destruction of the two largest christian nations of the ottoman empire the armenians and greeks for years “with the tacit agreement and indirect encouragement of the militaristic and imperialistic hohenzollern government.”14 for armale, germany was not only a tacit accomplice and beneficiary of armenian forced labor on the berlin to baghdad railway, but a direct culprit, because it had incited muslim hatred of christians. as an ardent catholic, he was especially shocked that catholic austria was in alliance with the ottomans, too, without any consideration for religious or denominational solidarity: if so, how could austria, the catholic empire, go with germany and let the crime against christians happen for no reason? the same question can also be raised as far as germany is concerned, for it is also a christian empire and today more than 30 million catholics live there. how could it harbor hatred and resentment against christians among the turks, instructing them to shed the blood of the guiltless? (…) unfortunately, we met neither an austrian nor a german who condemned the genocide of christians (in the ottoman empire) or fought for their rights. on the contrary, they, the germans and austrians, gave the turks a free hand to do what they wanted, inciting them against christians, encouraging them to do the most frightful and inhuman things to them. it went so far with the germans, that when they came to mesopotamia after the massacres and abductions, when we thought they would help us to gain our rights and to get out of our poverty as well as protecting us from attack, they did not recognize us; on the contrary, they settled in our homes, ignoring the injustices committed against us. their main concern lay in their personal interests, the increase of the importance of their state and the extension of their rule over all countries.15 qarabashi, who treats the ottoman entry into the world war, including some of armale’s errors,16 in a very similar way, blamed german business and lust for power: the germans do not even have a false reason to escape the responsibility of participating in the slaughter of christians. for if they wanted to save these wretched souls, a hint by them would suffice to put an end to, or relieve, all the 14. grigoris balakian, the armenian golgotha: a memoir of the armenian genocide, 1915-1918 (new york: alfred a. knopf, 2009), 48. 15. armale, katastrophen, part ii, chapter 3, 48. 16. for example, armale and qarabashi believed that field-marshall otto liman von sanders was the german ambassador to constantinople; both mention an incident in dört-yol, where four germans allegedly disguised as british, provoked the local armenians to rebel against the ottoman authorities, as evidence for german complicity. both mistook the prussian cavalry general and ottoman marshal otto liman von sanders with the german ambassador to constantinople, wrongly accusing sanders of having ordered “kill the christians.” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 14 ferocity of reckless repression, but their sole and only aim was to conquer, even if all christendom is destroyed and annihilated.17 both armale and qarabashi mention the “dörtyol unrest” of early march 1915 as a key event in terms of german treachery against the indigenous ottoman christians18: woe to mankind if germany had won the war! the germans were not content with words alone, but their treacherous spirit led four spies to dörtyol, where several influential armenians lived, with the order to pretend to be english and to demonstrate. and when they reached the agreed end point of the demonstration, they were to gather the inhabitants of the village around them, have them write on a sheet of paper words of reproach, reproach, and abuse about turkey, and make an urgent appeal to the english to save them from the claws of their enemies. then, in january 1915, they delivered those leaves of the capital, rushed the turks against the christians, especially against the armenians, and so the turks burned in rage and hatred, shed blood of christians and planned their annihilation.19 neither armale, nor qarabashi were residents of the town of dörtyol, which was mainly inhabited by armenians and surrounded by turkish villages. nevertheless, both syriac authors constructed an implausible tale about alleged german intelligence activities by german spies, disguised as englishmen, whose purpose was to discredit the ottoman christians and, specifically, the armenians in the eyes of the central ottoman government. although armale does not disclose his sources on the alleged german spies and their mission in dörtyol, we may assume that this “information” stems from catholic and/or french channels. like many ottomans, armale and qarabashi had rather exaggerated ideas of german influence in the ottoman empire and on its ruling muslim elites. but this belief in german omnipotence somehow contradicts the fantastic dörtyol episode: if germany had direct influence on ottoman decisions it would not need to disguise germans as englishmen to incite hate against ottoman christians. an opposing and more detailed contemporary report, written by the armenian simon agabalian, who was an assistant official at the german consulate at adana, was sent to the german ambassador wangenheim in constantinople on 13 march 1915,20 indicating 17. qarabasch, vergossenes blut, 48. 18. qarabashi’s version of the “dörtyol unrest” starts with the same phrase as armale’s dörtyol paragraph: “woe to humanity if germany had won victory. it would destroy humanity. one of the diabolical means the germans used to justify the extermination of the christians was that they had disguised four germans as englishmen, sent them to dörtyol to the armenians, where they met in secret with the armenian leaders, who were deceived into writing letters of complaint about the torments inflicted by the turks, appealing to the english to help them and to quickly come to their aid in order to free them from the evil deeds of the turks. in january 1915, the four men brought these letters to constantinople and incited the turks to persecute christians, and especially armenians. from that time began the torments and hardships that weigh heavily on the christians, for the turks called them ‘traitors.’” qarabasch, vergossenes blut, 49. 19. armale, katastrophen, part ii, chapter 3, 48. 20. “a few weeks ago a former deserter by the name of saldshian, who received his education from the local jesuits and who later taught french at the armenian school, went to dört-yol. he had gone to cyprus two years before and had most likely joined the english. he went with an armenian from alexandretta to dört-yol and stayed there for 6-7 days. you could almost say he tried to recruit the syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 15 that behind the “dörtyol unrest” were just two or three local armenian residents with links to the british fleet, which nevertheless served the ottoman authorities as a pretext for mass arrests and forced labor among dörtyol’s armenian population. in his report to the german chancellor bethmann-hollweg, ambassador wangenheim summarized the information in the following way: at the beginning of march [1915], after englishmen from the fleet had repeatedly landed and made various purchases undisturbed, there were two armenians staying in the armenian town of dörtyol who originated from that area and who were acting on behalf of the british. one of these emissaries fell into the hands of the turkish authorities and was executed in adana. a further consequence was that the whole of the male population of dörtyol was conscripted and led to the aleppo vilayet where they were set to building roads; three individuals, because they tried to flee, being shot. another fact was that at the time of these occurrences numerous deserters were hiding in dörtyol; it had also not been forgotten that the townspeople had defended themselves against the turks with weapons in their hands during the massacre of 1909.21 with his focus on germany, armale scarcely mentions internal ottoman political factors and developments that led to the “catastrophes,” as he paraphrased the deportations and massacres of ottoman christians (“nazarenes” in the arabic original). neither the unionist coup d’etat of 1908, nor the c.u.p. are mentioned at all; nor is the triumvirate of the “three pashas” talaat, djemal and enver, as architects of the “catastrophes.” instead, armale singles out the 1914-1918 war minister ismail enver, whom he presented as a german-friendly and corrupt traitor to his ottoman homeland: inhabitants for the british foreign service. it is not known how far he succeeded and some merchants’ claim the trip involved saldshian’s private business and had nothing to do with the general public. the notables of the town did not know about the visit and some of them were not even there at that time. saldshian managed to obtain identity papers and introduced himself as a merchant. even the police were informed of his presence. by sheer coincidence, after saldshian returned to the english warship, the police became aware of the fake merchant, and could only arrest the man who had accompanied him. a few days later another armenian by the name of köshkerian from the village of ocaklı came ashore from the warship. after the murder of his wife during the massacre by the turks he had gone abroad. this man is supposed to have carried money with him amounting to 40 ltq. one cannot deduce, from all these actions and events, that the armenians had any kind of conspiratorial or revolutionary organization. but one can surely say that the arrival of the warships and their aggressive behavior generated joy among the majority of the christian populace and especially among the armenians. if it should ever be possible for the english or french to reach land, they would be heartily welcomed by the christians. one night all the male armenians of the town were arrested and sent from the area due to the emphatic requests from the turkish population of the neighboring houses to remove the armenians from dörtyol and because they wanted to arrest deserters and avoid any unforeseen actions. the armenians were sent to aleppo under strict supervision and are now employed on road construction. during the arrests the armenians were submissive and did not resist the officials. three people were shot while trying to flee. even these did not use any weapons. – politisches archiv des auswärtigen amtes (pa/ aa), botschaft konstantinopel, bd. 168, zitiertnach, http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende. nsf/$$alldocs/1915-03-13-de-012. 21. report of 15 april 1915 at http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/191504-15-de-002 http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-03-13-de-012 http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-03-13-de-012 http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-04-15-de-002 http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-04-15-de-002 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 16 as a result, we can say that turkey, germany’s friend and accomplice, consecrated itself to death, according to enver’s plans, because enver was a puppet in the hands of the german ambassador, who played with him whenever and wherever he wanted, like a game ball. it must be noted that the decline of turkey was not without price: enver received large sums of money from germany and turkey in return for his contribution to the demise of his country. in 1916, his share in money alone was 40 million. he thus became one of the richest people in a very short time and continued to collect wealth until recently, removing some people from office, while hiring new ones, until he himself left office, turned his back on turkey, and went to the land he had loved, honored, and did everything to make his name famous. his love for germany was so great that he even betrayed his homeland.22 remarkably, none of the three syriac authors mentioned the prominent german military commander, field marshal colmar von der goltz pasha, who was commissioned by the german foreign ministry on 26 september 1915 to mediate between the ottoman authorities and the “rebelling” syriacs (and some armenians) in azakh (in arab azekh). however, this mediation materialized not en lieu, but in correspondence, for von der goltz did not want to delay his advance with the 51st and 52nd ottoman divisions to baghdad. on november 12, 1915, the german embassy in constantinople notified the consulate of mosul in the name of the field marshal: the minister of war wishes to achieve a peaceful settlement with the rebels near hazik23 [azakh; azekh, sic!] in return for their immediately laying down their arms, but he refuses to allow participation by german officers and public officials. the 4th army commander and vali of diyarbekir informed along these lines. i will approve instruction for vali with the minister of the interior. goltz.24 on february 14, 1916, the german chargé d’affaires in constantinople, paul count wolff-metternich zur gracht, notified the german chancellor: the difficulties that have arisen between the syriac christians near mardin and midia, and the turkish authorities have now been resolved. part of this was due to the influence which field marshal freiherr von der goltz was able to exert in the military field.25 next to the germans and minister enver, armale ascribed the responsibility for the destruction of ottoman christians to the muslims, emphasizing once again the continuity of their collective guilt and their wickedness. according to armale, the muslims’ main motive was revenge. however, it remains unclear why the muslims wanted revenge on the christians and how this vindictiveness related to the massacres of 1895: 22. armale, katastrophen, part ii, chapter 2, 47. 23. in german diplomatic correspondence also spelt “azik”. 24. the diplomatic correspondence about the azakh/azekh mediation is available on http://www. armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-11-04-de-001; see also carl alexander krethlow, generalfeldmarschall colmar freiherr von der goltz pascha; eine biographie (paderborn, münchen, wien: schöningh, 2012), 690, footnote 787. 25. http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1916-02-14-de-001 http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-11-04-de-001 http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1915-11-04-de-001 http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$alldocs/1916-02-14-de-001 syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 17 we cannot mention all the hardships to which christians were initially exposed: capital crimes, the looting of their wealth and the damage suffered later for these reasons. those responsible, yes, all muslims without exception, hated the christians since 1895, but hid their feelings, waiting for a suitable opportunity to avenge them. when they realized that the government was willing to oppress the christians, their evil souls rejoiced and waited until the beginning of summer 1915, then showed their malice, attacking christians and doing everything god forbade (…).26 events during world war i which events were covered in the accounts and testimonials and are the basis for the three syriac collections mentioned above, and how do they differ from the narratives of armenian and greek survivors? suleyman henno’s gounhé d’souryoyé d’tour abdin recounts, village by village and town by town, the massacres and atrocities in the tur abdin region and adjacent areas that were committed by combined forces of ottoman regular soldiers and kurdish irregulars. father armale’s narration covers, in chronological-thematic order, events in diyarbakır province during 1895 (part i, chapter 16) and the deportations and massacres of the period 1914-1919; of these, the “hamidiye massacres” of 1895 are described town by town. mardin, “lying in the heart of syriac territory,”27 was the center of an administrative unit – (kaza) of same name, with a population of “12,609 orthodox syriacs and 7,692 armenians, the vast majority of them catholic. all were arabic-speaking.”28armale gives a total of 20,000 christians in mardin “before the terrible war”.29 in order to understand and interpret the events of 1915, it is necessary to remember that in the ottoman political and societal system, ethnicities in the sense of the german term “volksgruppen,” did not exist. the ottoman millet system differentiated between muslim and non-muslim populations, the latter traditionally divided into the jewish, greek-orthodox and armenian millets, or religious communities, to which, under austrian, french and british pressures, catholic millet and protestant millet were added in the 19th century. however, as was the case in mardin, denominational and linguistic commonalities blurred the boundaries between armenian and syriac catholics. it should be noted that several christian families from mardin that were counted as belonging to the armenian catholic denomination did not automatically derive from the armenian community in the ethnic sense of the word. many syriac families that wanted to convert to catholicism during the 18th century turned to the catholic armenian church since there was no syriac catholic clergy in the city. in fact, the 26. armale, katastrophen, part ii, chapter 5, 54. 27. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (london, new york: i.b. tauris, 2011), 371. 28. ibid. 29. armale, katastrophen, part i, chapter 1, 11. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 18 notion of “nationality” did not exist between armenians and syriacs, since they were all arabic speakers, like the armenians from aleppo. an “armenian” could become a “syriac,” and vice versa, by simply changing churches.30 starting in summer 1914, house searches, confiscations of property, general conscriptions into the army, recruitment into the teşkilat-ı mahsusa units and massive arrests of priests and secular notables all preceded the deportations and massacres that took place as they did in all other ottoman settlements. frequent, arbitrary actions created a general atmosphere of terror and helplessness. after the arrival of mardin’s new police chief memduh and the replacement of the mutasarrıf hilmi by government officials more to the liking of the c.u.p., the majority of mardin’s christians were all deported, starting from june until late october 1915. father armale mentions deportations to aleppo and ras al-ayn (turkish rasüleyn) taking place on june 10, june 14 and july 2, 1915, comprising “‘martyrs of all denominations.”31 the first convoy comprised mardin’s christian elite of more than 400 men – 405 according to the catholic father simon, 417 according to father armale, 470 according to patriarch rahmani32 – which left mardin very early on the morning of june 10, 1915, through the west gate. mardin’s leading citizens were killed in three groups: 100 were massacred in caves in şeyhan; 100 more had their throats slit and were thrown into the “roman wells” at zirzavan, an hour from şeyhan; the last 200 were liquidated the following morning, 11 june, in a gorge further north.33 the death toll in the second convoy was 88 and in the third convoy 600, according to armale.34 most scholars of genocide studies dispute that syriacs were deported during wwi. hans-lukas kieser stated in a recent article: assyrian christians were not deported to syria. in the provinces of diyarbekir, bitlis and van, 250,000 of them were massacred, with regional representatives of the unionist government responsible. explicit orders from istanbul are not known.35 30. courtois, the forgotten genocide, 171. 31. ibid 166. 32. ibid 166. 33. kévorkian, the armenian genocide, 374. 34. armale, katastrophen, part iii, chapter 18, 135. 35. hans-lukas kieser, aus anlass der beratungen des bundestagesam, 2 juni 2016: deutschland und der völkermord an den armeniern von 1915, accessed june 06, 2019, http://www.zeitgeschichteonline.de/kommentar/aus-anlass-der-beratungen-des-bundestages-am-2-juni-2016. the conclusion is, however, that the unionist turkish central government in constantinople accepted the indiscriminate “persecution of christians” in the province of diyarbakir. after a formal diplomatic protest by the german embassy in constantinople on 12 july 1915 against the conduct of provincial governor mehmet reşid şahingiray, minister of the interior talaat reprimanded him in two telegrams (12 and 25 july 1915), but kept him in office without the governor improving his conduct. for a more detailed characterization cf. tessa hofmann, “statt eines nachworts: eine ergänzung,” in die verfolgung und vernichtung der syro-aramäer im tur abdin 1915, gesammelt vom erzpriester sleman henno aus arkab, tur abdin (glane/losser: bar hebräus-verlag, holland, 2005), 159-167. https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahukewj59lw19cxyahvhfowkhqcqbhuqfgg8mai&url=https%3a%2f%2fde.wikipedia.org%2fwiki%2fra%25ca%25bes_al-%25ca%25bfain&usg=aovvaw3lbdxgcybvh2sdhyxjm1fm http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/kommentar/aus-anlass-der-beratungen-des-bundestages-am-2-juni-2016 http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/kommentar/aus-anlass-der-beratungen-des-bundestages-am-2-juni-2016 syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 19 but even in the case of the armenians, explicit deportation orders were not given: the ottoman sevkve i̇skân kanunu (relocation and resettlement law) passed by the ottoman parliament on 27 may 1915, which was enacted on 1 june 1915, does not contain any ethnonym, neither “armenian(s)” nor others. instead, it paraphrases the designated victim group as “suspicious persons” and as the “population of towns and villages that they [the military commanders; th] suspect guilty of treason or espionage.”36 the common practice of the central government was to send emissaries into the provinces in order to personally (and in oral form) interpret how such paraphrases were to be understood.37 on the other hand, the law was very explicit on those groups that were to be exempted from deportation: (1) the ill, (2) the blind, (3) catholics, (4) protestants, (5) soldiers and their families, (6) officers, (7) merchants, some workers and masters. as a rule, these provisions were violated in countless cases, when armenian catholics and protestants, the wives and families of armenian ottoman officers and soldiers, merchants and craftsmen, ill and disabled persons were deliberately and indiscriminately deported. armale “quotes” the relocation and resettlement law of 14/27 may 1915, in a very deliberate way: from the other side, the “committee of unity and progress” said: “because the armenians act against the law and use every opportunity to disturb the government, store weapons, bombs and explosive substances to fuel the fire of revolution in the country in order to kill muslims and support russia, we have decided to deport them to the regions of mosul, syria and deir-ez-zor and to accommodate them there. their honor, souls and wealth will stay intact and will be protected against invaders and offenders. we have already enacted the necessary laws to settle them in those regions until the end of the war.”38 armale added that “this official announcement concerned only the armenians.”39 in contrast to this qualification are the numerous depictions of “all christians” as victims of local, regional or central c.u.p. officials and local muslim tribes. were the “calamities” directed against the armenians alone, or were all ottoman christians equally targeted? there are various indicators that armenians were the main targets, even in a multi-denominational province like diyarbakır, where in the districts (kazas) of mardin and diyarbakır “conditions have led to a true persecution of [all; th] christians,” as the german vice-consul at mosul, walter holstein, telegraphed to his embassy in constantinople as early as on june 13, 1915. in the town of mardin, armenian and syriac christians were conscripted and formed into labor units (amele taburları) of the ottoman army for road works and construction and a syriac orthodox christian 36. deutschland und armenien 1914-1918, sammlung diplomatischer aktenstücke, ed. johannes lepsius (potsdam: der tempelverlag in potsdam, 1919; reprint, bremen: donat and temmen verlag, 1986), 78. 37. the usual practice was that a central government deportation inspector (müfettiş inspector) presented the government’s deportation order to the regional and local incumbents, or read it out, explained it, but did not hand it over. 38. armale, katastrophen, part iii, chapter 2, 91. 39. ibid. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 20 was appointed to head this unit. but soon the armenians were singled out to be killed, presumably on order of mardin’s mayor: then came šukrī bēg al-mullī [şükrü; th] with a notebook in his hand containing the names of the remaining workers, with the armenians’ names marked in red ink, a color that only the mutasarrıf was allowed to use. they let the syrians go and kept the armenians there. on the morning of august 11, elyās went to the citadel to visit the armenian workers who had been detained there. he was told that they had been transported to zinnār and thrown into the well there. only one could escape: elyās ǧirǧī, which stayed in that well for about a month. then he returned to mardin and still lives today.40 equally indicative of the particular hazards faced by the armenians is their camouflage as members of other christian denominations. qarabashi mentions an incident in the village of akpinar near mardin, where mkrtich, one of the armenian laborer soldiers claimed to be a syriac, in order to escape certain death. the syriac salim, whom the armenian had named as a witness for his claim, confirmed this and was killed together with the armenian laborers.41 the two other cases of massive killings (“liquidations”) of christian labor units, mentioned by qarabashi, were indiscriminate (190 men on 16th june, 1915) and selective (112 armenians out of 212 workers).42 in the 10th chapter of his memoirs, the greek author and survivor elias venezis narrates the young pianist jacques of soma’s story. he had to join elias’ labor unit. his strange greek accent and his inability to read greek betrayed jacques’ non-greek origin, but it is only after the young armenian’s death that elias learnt the tragic details about this comrade in suffering: it must have been something like pleurisy. he did not last more than a week. one night he remembered me. in his feverish delirium he had called me: “elias, elias.” then he seemed to call another person, with a lower voice, tenderer. they did not know whom he meant but assumed that it was his mother. he spoke armenian to her, and they realized that he was an armenian. just think, a comrade said, “for how long we’ve not noticed! they are a cunning people, the armenians, are they not?” in tears, i listened to him silently. just a movement of the head yes, yes, a cunning people ...43 according to armale, armenians in the entire ottoman empire were the main victims. in mardin and its vicinity, however, he saw both armenian and syriac catholics as the main victims. this may be explained with the above-mentioned fact that in the early 20th century there were still no precise ethnic boundaries between the two christian denominations; linguistic, denominational and cultural commonalities made it obviously difficult for the ottoman authorities and muslim perpetrators to differentiate between armenian and syriac catholics, at least in mardin and midyat. an even more relevant reason, emphasized by armale, is the fact that on april 14, 1915, the local syriac 40. armale, katastrophen, part iii, chapter 34, 172. 41. qarabashi, vergossenes blut, 68. 42. ibid. 43. elias venesis, nr. 31328: leidensweg in anatolien (mainz: philipp zabern,1969), 126. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 21 orthodox community gained an “amnesty” from deportation,44 seemingly as the result of bribing and successfully distancing themselves from their less fortunate armenian and syriac catholic brethren: on tuesday, when the jacobite metropolitan, the priest elyas dolabani, and a band of their responsible men were in the government house, their church bell rang. young and old hurried to the church. the catholics inquired about the reason. “the news has arrived that the government would be sending soldiers to massacre the armenians in their homes. that is why we hastened to the church so they will not destroy the guilty and innocent indiscriminately.” then their metropolitan came and ordered his followers to return to their homes immediately. after the jacobite men had been released from the prison, thanking the government and praying for its victory, the leaders of the wicked began to torture the catholic men.45 summarizing the difficult question of main and collateral targets and the subsequently difficult inter-denominational relations, one cannot but agree with the conclusion of the french-armenian scholar raymond kévorkian, who differentiates between the town and the kaza of mardin: in the whole kaza of mardin, as we have seen, only the non-armenian christians of the administrative seat of the kaza were, to a certain extent, spared. elsewhere, in the countryside, the inhabitants of the syriac villages were condemned to a fate similar to that of the armenians. the procedures used were similar.46 all christian chroniclers of ottoman history in the first world war emphasized the corruptibility of ottoman officials at all administrative levels. to a certain degree, this particular feature undermined the unionist intention to carry out extermination; for as long as arrested and deported christians still possessed money or other valuables, they were able to bribe and to buy food or protection from attack by muslim residents, in particular by kurdish and arab tribesmen. however, in order to get hold of the possessions in the hands of the deportees and arrestees more quickly, the guards would make sure that these possessions changed hands as soon as possible, if not by violence, then by guile. armale quotes an example from the report of a syriac catholic priest: the tribes and kurds circled around us like the wasps, carrying axes, rifles, daggers, knives, swords and batons. they wanted to do us evil. we all started to tremble with fear. then the officer came and started talking to us: “my children, you will spend the night here, but i am afraid that the kurds and the tribes will attack you and take away your money, gold and silver rings. it is better for you if you trust them all to me, and i shall register them on a piece of paper; i will give them back to everyone when you reach diyarbakir.” so the officer collected a lot of jewelry, filled his bag with gold, silver, watches, rings and chains, with which he made off in exultation; then the soldiers came and searched for what was left, taking what remained of our valuables, shoes, fezzes and clothes, leaving nothing but what we wore.47 44. armale, katastrophen, part iv, chapter 21, 228. 45. ibid, part iii, chapter 4, 95. 46. kévorkian, the armenian genocide, 376. 47. armale, katastrophen, part iii, chapter 13, 120. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 22 bribery didn’t always save the endangered christians. monsignor gabriel tappouni, the metropolitan of the “syriacs,” as armale usually paraphrases the syriac catholics to differentiate them from the “jacobites” or syriac orthodox christians, paid 2,000 turkish gold liras to the police chief memduh. nevertheless, monsignor tappouni could neither have the already deported syriac catholic families of mamarbaşi and doqmaq returned, nor could he prevent the deportation of more families, such as the ayn malak family.48 it is not quite clear whether this bribe included the release of the monks of the syriac catholic monastery of mar afram (efrem), who had been temporarily jailed, or whether tappouni had to pay an additional amount of 2,000 gold liras to do so. furthermore, memduh confiscated the valuables that armenian and syriac catholic people of mardin and other places had trusted to the abbot of mar afrem.49 jihad or genocide? in recent genocide studies, the wwi genocide carried out by the c.u.p. regime is generally perceived as a crime that was committed in a transitional period, i.e. during turkey’s nation-building process. most scholars of today agree that the crimes were rather motivated by nationalism and the intention to forcibly homogenize the multi-religious and multi-ethnic ottoman empire into a culturally and linguistically unified and stabilized state. interestingly, neither sleman henno, nor qarabashi mention the ittihadists, or “young turks” at all, father armale refers to them only six times in passing. did the young turks’ responsibility for the “catastrophes” escape their attention? to answer this question, we have first of all to remember that the present perception of those events differs greatly from those of ottoman contemporaries in the early 20th century. second, until today the role of religion and its instrumentalization for genocidal purposes has not been fully clarified. obviously, the c.u.p. regime used islam and traditional religious antagonism to implement its genocidal intentions. when on november 14, 1914, the sheikh-ul-islam, as the spiritual leader of sunni muslims, declared a holy war, or jihad, in the fatih mosque in constantinople, this was understood to be not just a call to all muslim citizens of the empire to fight against foreign non-muslims, but also against the ottoman christians who had already been branded as internal enemies since the balkan wars (1912/3). on the other hand, the young turkish coordinators of this genocide did not intend to convert the armenians and other ottoman christians to islam, but to destroy them. time and again, the young turkish leadership and the interior ministry pointed out that the conversion of the “suspected persons,” i.e. the armenians, would not save them from deportation. however, as was often the case, this policy of the central government and the c.u.p.’s central committee was undermined at local and regional levels. yervant odian mentioned that hayri (khayri) feruzan, the mutasarrıf of hama (province of damascus), whom the author praised as “a very good, noble and enlightened man, who had the affection of both arabs and armenians,” ordered the armenians’ conversion to islam within two days; otherwise he would not be able to protect them. this 48. ibid, chapter 29, 159. 49. ibid, chapters 30-31, 161-169. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 23 official was obviously seriously intending to save the armenian deportees in his realm from further persecution and destruction. that sort of suggestion, concluded odian, coming from such a man, was indeed very strange and showed that we were under the threat of something dire. the mutesarrif, by suggesting conversion, was trying to keep the danger away. we learnt later that it was exactly at this time that the terrible massacres at der zor were taking place.50 odian himself did convert but admitted that conversion was far easier to accept for individuals than for families or fathers as the heads of families, who feared that their daughters might be compelled to marry muslims to prove the seriousness of their conversion. the perspectives and the style of syriac narrations differ greatly from armenian or greek orthodox testimonials. as mentioned before, syriacs from the diyarbakır province interpreted the events as a continuation or the apex of a permanent religious antagonism. this point of view was seemingly confirmed by the attitude of muslims, kurdish tribal leaders in the province of diyarbakır “mistook” ethnic homogenization for religious war or traditional “jihad.” the ideological intricacies of the essentially irreligious, “modern” approach of the young turks’ demographic policy may have escaped their notice. for them, the “grand alliance” with turkish nationalism was predominantly religiously based, i.e. a pan-islamic alliance, which sultan abdül hamid ii was the first to forge when, in 1892, he founded the irregular kurdish hamidiye cavalry that was named after him. this idea of religious war between islam and christianity was still common among the kurds in the first world war and shared their perception with their syriac victims, who, according to the syriac authors, opted in large numbers for a martyr’s death, instead of gaining survival by denying their christian identity. in this “jihadist” spirit, sleman henno interprets the massacres of 1915 as an integral part of repeated muslim persecution of christians: since the emergence of islam, the christians have been killed, robbed and plundered wherever they were. the turks and the kurds, who are known for their hardheartedness and injustice, with or without reason, are especially to be mentioned in this regard. (...) each epoch records testimony about the bloodbaths they organized.51 henno also refutes the assumptions that the reason for the treatment of the armenians in 1915 was of a secular or political nature: “just because they were not muslims, they (the armenian; th) were merciless exterminated.”52 henno’s account mixes elements of a documentarist and biblical, archaic style of narration, including many quotations from poems, the traditional genre of lyrical lament or elegy in particular, called dourekta53 in aramaic. his narrator frequently appeals to the reader: “o knowledgeable reader, see and reflect on this unparalleled barbarism!”54 such 50. odian, accursed years, 13. 51. die verfolgung und vernichtung, 29. 52. ibid, 34. 53. yacoub, year of the sword, 57. 54. die verfolgung und vernichtung, 33. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 24 stylistic peculiarities are likewise to be found with armale and qarabashi. typically, the focus of armale’s interpretation is on the unshaken steadiness of the christian martyrs and their refusal to renounce their faith; with their principled morals, they excelled over their tormentors: i see the faces of the muslims and their women radiate with joy among the christians, whose eyes are full of tears. they could freely choose among them whoever they liked: children, boys, women and especially girls. they forcibly tried to make them renounce their faith, but without success! they promised to save them from death if they said “yes” to conversion, but without success! the christians, though they suffered greatly and were subjected to various torments and sufferings, showed great courage and faithfulness which confused their tormentors. they repeatedly said, “we do not renounce our faith, we do not deny our god. rob us, plunder us, abduct us, kill us, send us into the sahara, throw us into the wells! we will endure everything until god brings us and you to account, since he is the righteous judge.”55 armale idealizes the christian martyrs of both sexes as triumphant heroes, giving numerous examples of prominent victims, such as the armenian catholic bishop ignatios maloyan (1869 6 june 1915), and other examples of anonymous victims, such as a mother with a six-year-old son, who decided to be slaughtered rather than to accept the “offer” of a muslim: the soldiers arrested two women at a time and handed them over to the kurds standing at the mouth of a well, who told them, as usual: “convert to islam or we’ll kill you!” then they slaughtered them and threw them down the well. finally, they called the steadfast woman. the man who wanted her tried to approach her, making big promises. but she said to him fearlessly, “do you want me to betray my god and go with you, you mean man? do you want me to deny my beliefs and confess your religion, you low person? no, no! kill me, i’m no better than the others.” then she grabbed her son, threw him into the well with her own hands, laid her neck for slaughter and said, “kill me and let me follow my son!” full of anger, he killed her and threw her into the well. she and her child, crowned with the crown of victory went to heaven, to eternal life.56 in chapter 54, titled “divine signs and various narratives that indicate the firmness of christians in their faith,” qarabashi tells the incredible story of an orphaned christian baby in mardin that refused to be breastfed by muslim women, but recognized and accepted christian breasts. in the rigid, antagonistic structure of syriac chronicles, converts appear as despicable anti-heroes. while armale displays some understanding for christian women who converted to islam – the weak sex he does not accept the conversion of men. in the 28th chapter of part iii, titled “armenians, who renounced their faith,” he lists the full names of armenian converts.57armale’s magniloquent narrative style corresponds with that of a ubiquitous narrator, who allegedly recites the last words 55. armale, katastrophen, part iii, chapter 23, 147. 56. ibid, chapter 37, 178f. 57. armale, katastrophen, part iii, chapter 21, 143. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 25 of the dying, executed or raped victims, who all express their motives with the same eloquence. there is a remarkable contrast between armale’s, henno’s or other syriac authors’ attempt to overwhelm their reader with emotion and to convince them of the wickedness of the muslim perpetrators on the one hand, and the approach of the armenian satirical author, journalist and survivor yervand odian on the other. the latter’s autobiographical recollections accursed years (aniceal tariner), about his deportation to deir ez-zor were printed shortly after the events in constantinople in 1919 as a series in the armenian paper žamanak. in his memoirs, the professional journalist resigns himself as an author, and reports only as far as necessary about his personal fate. on january 23, 1919, odian wrote in a letter about the challenges of his task as documentarist: after three and a half years of a terrible, unimaginable odyssey, i am alive. i was driven to der-zor and beyond to el-busera (...), where ezekiel had his vision. i do not know if i can adequately describe what i saw, but i will try. it will be a great work, perhaps in several volumes. 58 at the end of his report odian summarized: this is the story of the three and a half years of my exile. the reader will, of course, have noticed that i have written them in the simplest manner and in a non-literary style. but above all else i wanted it to be a truthful story in which no fact was distorted, no event was exaggerated.59 odian’s aesthetic ideal of a ‘photographic’, undisguised truth-log is especially evident in the conscious withdrawal of the evaluating and commenting narrator. in direct opposition to the narration of sleman henno, isaac armale or other syriac survivors, yervand odian leaves evaluation and interpretation largely to the reader, before whom the author places all stages and actors of the genocide drama with equal distance: the victims and the perpetrators, the traitors and the countless informers. odian himself remained faithful to satire in his “accursed years,” but, as in his other work, this satire seems cool and distant, so that the protagonists appear neither sympathetic nor contemptuous. “divine laughter” is, according to odian’s conviction “free from resentment and hatred.” in a similar vein, father armale claimed preciseness as the guiding principle of his account: we tried very hard to be as precise as possible, which is why we made sure to cite only those accounts that we heard from the very mouths of the rare survivors who escaped death, in our work.60 but the literary approaches that armale chose are the reverse to those used by odian, and he is far from not being resentful and hateful. the question about the historical reliability of syriac accounts, in particular those of syriac church leaders, has been raised. the french scholar sébastien de courtois pointed 58. odian, accursed years, xii. 59. ibid, 307. 60. cited from: courtois, the forgotten genocide, 160. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 26 out that the comments made by the syriac orthodox patriarch barsaum on the events of 1915 and other events frequently coincided with those of the official turkish version. “how could such indulgence on the patriarch’s part be justified?”, asked de courtois in his doctoral thesis, giving the following explanation: “the reason is to be found in the more recent history of the syriac orthodox church, for as the patriarch was writing his memoirs after the second world war, the majority of the syriac community was still living in turkey, in tur abdin, and he had reason to fear reprisals. this could also explain the syriac orthodox authorities’ hesitation to defend the memory of the genocide.61 the long-lasting dependence of the syriac orthodox church on the turkish state caused self-censorship. as late as 2013, david gaunt stated: “until recently it has sometimes been impossible to discuss the genocide issues within the official framework of the syrian orthodox church.”62 the strong influence of biblical, archaic narratives on syriac chronicles and testimonials shows also in the key word that is used to summarize the experience of extermination and catastrophe. while armenian contemporaries used the term medz yeghern (or mec yeğern)63, i.e. the great sacrilege or heinous deed and greek orthodox christians spoke of sphagi, or massacres, distinguished into red and white massacres as synonyms for massacres and deportation or indirect killings, syriac contemporaries from the diyarbakır province used individual and rather vague paraphrases: “fatalities” (gunhe in aramaic; s. henno;), “bloodshed’ (d’mo zliho; qarabashi), “calamities” (armale). in more recent usage, the aramaic noun sayfo – sword prevails. the semantic connotation of “sword” comprises both the victimization, as suffered between 1914 and 1918 and one’s own violence, as exerted during cases of self-defense and retribution. this ambivalent term also includes the connotation of martyrs and the militia dei, i.e. spiritual or armed fighters for the sake of the faith. seen from a psychological perspective, it is certainly easier to focus on cases of successful or attempted self-defense, than to face the profound helplessness, humiliation and destruction that victims of genocide suffer. subsequently, sleman henno interprets the events in tur abdin as an inter-religious war: from the following chapters the reader will learn how the war in the tur abdin ran, who was killed, who waged and lost the war, who fought, won and could not be conquered by any enemy.64 the besieged village of aynvardo (invardo) that withstood attacks for several weeks and, in particular, the large village of azakh, holding out until the end of the first world war and existing even until 1926, are recalled as epitomes of successful christian self61. ibid, 108. 62. gaunt, “failed identity and the assyrian genocide,” 330. 63. remarkably, this term contains a juridical connotation, for a “deed” or a “sacrilege” are crimes in secular and/or religious context. in difference to yeghern as related to the 1894-96 massacres during the reign of abdülhamit ii. 64. die verfolgung und vernichtung, 43. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 27 defense. according to sleman henno’s interpretation, god himself was on the side of the syriacs: the syriacs attacked the enemy with great rage. god helped them and they won a victory over the godless, who had lost the fight, escaped, and had to leave some dead.65 as this quotation also indicates, henno explicitly qualified the turkish and kurdish besiegers as infidels, and at many other places as devious, wicked, bloodthirsty enemies; the same vocabulary is used by armale and qarabashi. however, henno does not conceal the retributive violence exerted by syriacs, such as the plunder and destruction of the kurdish village of shveshka by 350 young syriacs from the village of kafro on august 21, 1915: then they attacked the village, killed everyone they found and the rest fled from the village. (...) they plundered the village and then set it on fire.66 the syriac retribution is morally justified by the previous massacre in the district town of nusaybin (nisibin) on june 15, 1915, that became the epitome of the destruction of syriac orthodox christians in the province of diyarbakır. father armale conjures divine retribution and quotes, starting with kain, biblical examples of the divine punishment, if the blood of the innocent was shed.67 elias venezis sees retributive blood feuds as a senseless succession of mass violence that always hits the innocent and is harmful for civilization. to illustrate this opinion, his narrator mentions the approximately 40 greek soldiers who had been horseshoed then slaughtered near pergamon (bergama) by turks during the hellenic occupation of western anatolia (1919-1922). this atrocity first caused numerous retaliations by the 4th hellenic regiment then, after the withdrawal of the hellenic army, brutal acts of violence by the local turkish population against local ottoman greeks.68 two sub-chapters of henno’s account are titled “thanksgiving.” the first contains the explicit gratitude to the kurdish sheikh fathallah, son of sheikh ibrahim and head of the village aynkaf, who attempted to mediate between the government forces and kurdish tribes that besieged aynvardo. according to henno, fathallah “…reprimanded the muslims, telling them not to kill christians, for there is no difference between the killing of a christian and of a muslim. murder is murder. and he damned every muslim who killed a christian.” the second muslim who sparked henno’s praise was çelebi ağa, son of isma’il, the head of the haferkan tribe from mzizah: “he was a well-known chieftain under the tribal leaders at that time. individuals who resided with him testify that he treated all the people belonging to his area of influence equally and without any difference, whether they were christians, muslims or yazidis.”69 65. ibid, 89f. 66. die verfolgung und vernichtung, 73. 67. armale, katastrophen, part iii, chapter 36, 174 f. 68. venesis, nr. 31328, 59. 69. die verfolgung und vernichtung, 140. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 28 unfortunately, during the first world war, çelebi ağa was imprisoned in ayntab and subsequently unable to exert his influence in favor of the christians. father armale dedicated three chapters to the ezdi (yazidi, yezidi) people of the sinjar mountains (jabal sinjar), where many christians found refuge during 1915-1918: the muslims, for their part, are disgusted by the name yezīdī, reviling their dogma and their customs. but the yezidis performed great deeds these days, showing nobility and self-sacrifice that will honor their memory, and also because they did no harm to christians, but on the contrary, helped them, welcomed them warmly, were hospitable, defended them, made their lives easier.70 yervand odian explains the pro-armenian stance of the yezidis in a more political way, quoting a discussion with an arab in el bousera: “is it true that the yezidis are friends with the armenians?” “yes, because they’ve [the armenians; th] rebelled against the turks. no turk or arab can approach their [the yezidis’; th] mountain. but they accept armenians with pleasure.”71 empathy, internalization and self-criticism as shown before, syriac authors framed the genocidal events in the diyarbakır vilayet a) in the tradition of muslim jihad and religious conflict between muslims and christians and b) in the tradition of christian martyrology. subsequently, armale’s ideal is the female martyr, happily accepting the complete loss of her home, possessions and family, and even accepting sexual violence and, finally, her conscious death instead of conversion: we cannot fail to mention how christian women rejoiced while they were being led away. they sang happy and cheerful hymns as if they were going to a wedding to feed their eyes on the sight of their favorites, who had sacrificed themselves for them.72 in the concept of antagonizing religions there is scarcely a mention of rescuers, with the previously cited exception of the yezidis and a few kurdish chieftains or neutral protagonists. ottoman society, as perceived by henno, qarabashi and armale, is divided into christians and muslims, just and unjust, faithful and infidel. this dualistic perspective excludes differentiation, self-criticism or criticism of members of one’s own ethno-religious group, as displayed by odian. he was an acute observer, not just of the misery of his people; he also realized the sufferings of others. his criticism is likewise indiscriminate and includes armenians. in aleppo odian met greek deportees from the syrian coast73 and hellenic nationals who were deported once greece had entered the war.74 in deir ez-zor he learnt 70. armale, katastrophen, part iv, chapter 8, 204. 71. odian, accursed years, 157. 72. armale, katastrophen, part iv, chapter 21, 229. 73. odian, accursed years, 235. 74. ibid, 251. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 29 …that the police had requisitioned the chaldean church and transformed it into a brothel … to satisfy the germans,75 who had demanded the establishment of controllable brothels in the name of hygiene. it must be said that a few armenian women preferred to leave work, resign from honorable wages and find their living in dirty voluptuousness.76 odian described the late ottoman empire as a police state that was shaped by denunciation and spying; armenians were an integral part of that system. in his place of exile, el bousera, odian encountered the armenian “betrayer and spy” santur oğlu aram (aram, son of santur) from hajin (cilicia), whose crimes against his compatriots even aroused the otherwise disinherited odian with considerable indignation: “i think there are very few people to be found who are monsters with such evil, corrupt, detestable characters. this young man had no moral sense and he would tell us of his evil deeds and crimes with a sort of boastful pride and bragging.”77 aram had been arrested in his hometown with six other armenians as a revolutionary and sentenced to death. he escaped execution because he offered his services to the authorities and betrayed not only the arsenals of the hadjin armenians, but also the 36 notables of the same town, whom he heavily burdened by his false statements. he whispered to odian, “i was present at this ceremony [of execution, th] and pulled the chairs away from under the feet of some of them myself.”78 asked about his motives, aram frankly admitted, “simply for pleasure and to give the turks a good impression.” aram then married the 14-year-old daughter of one of his victims and moved up to become a deportation official and even a police lieutenant. in this position he blackmailed the armenians of adana with threats of deportation. after returning to hajin, he brutally whipped his own father for a bet during an interrogation. but since aram failed to smash an armenian resistance group at islahiye according to orders, he was released and finally, after another blackmail attempt in adana, deported to deir ez-zor.79 elias venezis narrates a similar case of profound betrayal among ottoman greeks: in a concentration camp near manisa, the greek overseer (kapo) mikhál and a turkish officer sold a column of greek laborer soldiers to the turkish population of manisa who wanted to take bloody revenge for the burning of their city during the withdrawal of the hellenic army from anatolia;80 they bought the defenseless slave laborers in order to torture and eventually kill them. venezis wrote his memoirs as early as 1924, soon after the massive greek-turkish exchange of populations. a greek youth of just 18 years from ayvalık (kydonies in greek), venezis was conscripted into a labour battalion and “remained a slave without 75. ibid, 197. 76. ibid. 77. ibid, 169. 78. ibid. 79. ibid 170. 80. venesis, nr. 31328, 160f. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 30 any rights and even without any official recognition of existence for fourteen months.”81 in his memoirs, venezis tells how the ayvalık conscripts were kept in the local prison several nights, and how 15 were singled out to march outside the town to be bayoneted to death while the remaining 43 were marched to the various labour and concentration camps of western anatolia. his group was the fourth such convoy from ayvalık, but in contrast to the first three convoys, numbering hundreds, his was fated to die in a slower way.82 despite the time of the year and the already cold nights – it was the end of october 1922 – the ayvalık conscripts had to undress, with the exception of their underwear and were marched, without proper footwear, to the town of manisa (magnesia, magnisa). en route, they were not allowed to drink anything but polluted swamp-water, with the clear calculation that typhus and other epidemics would decimate the undernourished, exhausted men. they were deliberately kept under catastrophic conditions without hygiene. under such fatal circumstances, the mortality rate of the greek slave labourers from western anatolia was extremely high. out of the roughly 3,000 male labour conscripts from ayvalık, only 23 survived – less than one percent!83 one of the first tasks of venezis’ taburu in manisa was to clear the area of the corpses of 40,000 christian men, women and children from manisa and smyrna who had been tied to one another with wire before being killed and dumped in a huge ravine of mount sipylo (kirtikdere). the corpses had already begun to disintegrate, and the water drove them to the ravine’s edge, where “they reached the road and railroad tracks.”84 the turkish authorities feared that the floating remnants of the massive killings might be seen by the spanish official dellara, who was appointed to examine the conditions and treatment of the prisoners.85 the most repugnant feature of genocide is its corruptive nature. venezis exemplified this by two episodes as experienced by his narrator during the march from ayvalık to manisa. the completely exhausted greek deportees were compelled by their guards to carry an infant whose parents lacked the strength to carry the child themselves. but each deportee tried to avoid this additional burden: my turn came. it was a real martyrdom because we had to walk; we were naked and starving and so exhausted that we ourselves fell at any given moment. i staggered away, then called out that someone else should take the child. everyone ran to escape to the front ranks. (...) the child had become a specter. anger hardened more and more in our tortured hearts. “why doesn’t it want to die?” one suddenly said wildly. “it will not last anyway,” said another, looking for a reason. “someone should kill it, so it could rest.” 81. speros vryonis, “greek labor battalions in asia minor,” in the armenian genocide: cultural and ethical legacies, ed. richard hovannisian (new brunswick, london: transaction publishers, 2007), 276. 82. vryonis, “greek labor battalions,” 278. 83. ibid, 288. 84. venesis, nr. 31328, 207. 85. ibid. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 31 nobody said that it would be a pity. was that hatred for a baby? yes, it was hatred.86 the growing lack of empathy also showed when the military escort of the convoy raped the girls that had been captured by the soldiers: the two girls we had with us since pergamon provided us with a lot of relief. they were still untilled ground and there were always rests. the soldiers divided them among themselves, withdrew with them, returned; then we marched on again. these marginal ornaments of the march did us good. we rested.87 the interludes with the girls provide not only frequent rests for the exhausted deportees, but also saved the two 18-year-old male greeks in the battalion from being raped themselves, as the narrator’s friend arjiris realizes: “without the girls it would have been our turn, the two boys…”88 sexual violence against boys and men seems to have been a taboo among armenian contemporaries, for it is not mentioned in the testimonials of armenian survivors. the most outspoken in this context is father armale’s report on the young syriac īsā qaryō, who was raped, tortured and murdered in mardin on may 23rd, 1915.89 even more taboo-breaking is venezis’ revelation about the sexual exploitation of greek captives by greek kapos.90 it is interesting to compare the syriac authors with the armenian survivor and later bishop grigoris balakian, who had the same theological background and vocation as armale, qarabashi and henno, albeit with the difference that he was the only one of the six authors under consideration here with a higher education gained abroad, in germany. as the biblical title of balakian’s memoirs – “armenian golgotha” – indicates, this armenian author mostly remains in the tradition of antagonistic narration and jihadist traditions, for example, in his summary of the description of a massacre, committed against armenian deportees on the road between maraş and bahςe: it was obvious that the killers, after murdering these deportees, had played with their corpses for hours, stripping them naked and cutting them to pieces. that which centuries of human history had never witnessed in its blackest pages was carried out here, in the name of the koran, in the name of jihad.91 however, parallel to the traditional concepts of religious antagonism and martyrology, balakian also offers a secular and political explanation of the event, contradicting the merely religious interpretations by differentiating between turkish and non-turkish muslims. for balakian the divide between the evil and the innocent runs between the young turks and others, including non-turkish muslims. this becomes evident in his volume ii, chapter 8, where he deplores the sufferings of british prisoners of war who were brought to the baghdad railway construction sites in order to replace 86. ibid, 61 f. 87. ibid, 75. 88. venesis, nr. 31328, 78. 89. armale, katastrophen, part ii, chapter 21, 83. 90. venesis, nr. 31328, 188. 91. balakian, armenian golgotha, 292. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 32 the armenian workers, the vast majority of whom had been deported on the orders of the ottoman war ministry. balakian explains the inhuman treatment of the british indian pows, of whom many were muslims, in the following way: as we gradually became familiar with these officers and enjoyed their friendship, they told us of the horrible suffering they had endured in the deserts. thirteen thousand british and indian soldiers, along with their general, had been awaiting reinforcements from the auxiliary british army in kut-al-amara, near baghdad. they had been unexpectedly besieged by a large turkish army and taken prisoner. they had walked for more than two months from baghdad via der zor to amanos. (…) the ittihad officers had selected the roads across the longest deserts, in order to subject the defenseless prisoners to “white massacre.” they had committed all sorts of cruelties so that the prisoners would die along the way. (…) these loyal agents of the turkish state, who had formerly sent propaganda to the hundred million muslims of india, now treated the muslim indian prisoners even more harshly for having dared to serve the christian armies against the muslim caliph and take up arms against the turks. isn’t it true that the turks had always burned, broken, destroyed, violated, and massacred arabs, albanians, circassians, and persians under their dominion, even though they were their muslim brothers? for this reason, all the muslim races had wished to throw off the turkish yoke, attempting revolt down the centuries. (…) the turks were deeply convinced that in the end, owing to the invincible german armies, they would defeat the allies; they would occupy the caucasus, persia, india, egypt, and all the muslim lands of north africa and establish a huge muslim world empire… image the likelihood that a turkish race numbering bare four million – two thirds of whose farflung empire had already been lost, the remainder facing the threat of division – would be able to realize this dream. this says something about the extent of the chauvinism, panislamism, and pan-turkic dreams that the young leaders of turkey had embraced.92 summary and conclusion all six christian survivors and authors who are under consideration in this article relate to the same events during the last decade of the ottoman rule with, however, with strong differences. shaped by biblical narrative styles, christian martyrology and the perception of contemporary events as inter-religious war and traditional jihad, the three syriac authors developed an antagonistic narrative. nearly all muslims without exception are perceived as evil, while martyrs offer role models for the behavior of good christians. members of other religions or denominations are good – like the yezidis – if they protect christians, and suspicious, if they, like some syriac orthodox, collaborate with the ottoman authorities. as mentioned before, such an approach gives meaning to otherwise unbearably irrational genocidal destruction, at least in retrospect. even more relevant perhaps is the fact that it allows survivors to interpret themselves as the moral 92. balakian, armenian golgotha, 296f. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 33 victors despite all humiliation and degradation that the victims suffered before they were eventually physically destroyed. a martyr’s conscious decision to die for his or her faith is an act of self-determination instead of the extreme abuse of a helpless victim. however seductive such literary procedures may be, they are useless in analyzing the most troubling aspects of mass violence and genocide because the dualistic view of the world does not permit differentiation and, above all, no internal, self-critical exploration or insight. the non-syriac authors that have been considered here replaced, in various degrees, the dualistic and antagonistic approach by internalization. greek authors from asia minor such as elias venezis, or dido sotiriou (1909-2004)93 argued in their narrations against the ethnic or religious ascription of guilt by emphasizing cases of solidarity despite the religious divide between ottoman turks and greeks. these authors also touched upon the aspect of guilt for violence against muslim ‘others’ as well as against greek compatriots. in chapter 17, venezis wrote about the elder anatolian deserters of wwi, who were recruited after the war to guard the greek “slaves,” as the deported greek ottoman laborers were called. but soon these men from both sides of the divide discovered that they suffered equally from the violence, ill-treatment and corruption of the kapo system: the soldiers who guarded us were elderly. all were from the interior of anatolia. what made them different, whether they were christians or turks? how did they differ? we were unbelievers, captives. and they who were free? the blood ran in streams from all nine bodies what was the difference? (…) so, over time, unexpectedly, without realizing it, we came closer to each other, the soldiers and us. in the evenings they came more regularly to keep us company. we told each other our sufferings. and in conversation, they no longer called us ‘yes, sir’ (prisoner). with their deep anatolian voices, they spoke with warmth and kindness, calling us “arkadás,” comrade. when we went to work, they no longer beat or cursed us. if none of our greek ks were around, they acted as if they saw nothing and let us sit down. these kapos, however, feared their merciless officers. (…) ‘what should we do, comrade? god have mercy on you and us.’ he may have mercy on “you and us”’. that became almost a permanent saying for them. they could no longer distinguish the two destinies, theirs and ours. they were afraid of their officers and our kapos. we hated the same people, too. they longed for their homes: huts somewhere. like us. so?94 venezis replaced the typical ethnic or religious divide of armenian and syriac narrations by a moral, transnational divide. during deportation, physical suffering led to 93. her novel “matomena chomata” (“bloodied soil”, 1962; english title “farewell, anatolia!”), bases on the 360 handwritten pages that were trusted to her by the ionian survivor and eyewitness manolis axiotis from the village of kirkica (today şirince). cf. tessa hofmann, “‘only those who look back, move forward!’: four literary responses to genocidal trauma in greek and transnational prose,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 2, no. 1 (2015): 19-37. 94. venesis, nr. 31328, 199-205. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 34 the loss of empathy and humanity, bringing the greek captives closer to their tormentors, while in the camp and during slave labor, the segregation between ‘them’ and ‘us’, between the evil and the good materialized differently. the discovery of similarities and even commonalities between the old turkish soldiers and the exploitation by their own greek compatriots, i.e. the kapos, is a counterweight to the loss of humanity and to a certain degree a way of healing: the camp became better organized. we were, so to speak, a small state. with each passing day, it got harder and more merciless. our kapos knew who the good artisans and workers were; they made a list of them and agreed it with the turkish camp commander, a major. all these “cream” workers and artisans would each be hired out to private individuals for a day’s wages. most of the money accrued as a result would go to the turkish major with a little going to the corrupt slaves. (...) thus, two camps gradually emerged from the one. on one side were the slaves who gave the orders and received bribes; on the other we, the people that sweated and polluted the air with our moans. (...) after money started circulating in our camp, our kapos thought of something else: they opened canteens. they sold tobacco, salted fish, white bread, whatever was wanted. these small shops did golden business over time. the ‘aristocracy’ bought things and cooked them separately. we saw them and our mouths would start salivating. evening after evening, the kapos invited one of the slave companies to be their hosts. they also drank schnapps secretly. they also had hashish. (...)95 the exploration of the dehumanizing force of genocidal violence connects venezis with the polish author and auschwitz survivor tadeusz borowski (1922-1951). similar to venezis, he described the kapo system as the ruthless exploitation of profound human suffering, including the exploitation of compatriots. both authors featured the genocidal system as a self-sustaining, profitable and hence corruptive mechanism. in his story “please, the gentlemen to the gas!”, borowski described the routine work of the international “canada” command, which consisted in emptying the railway wagons with which jews deported to auschwitz arrived a privileged activity offering the “canadians” and especially their kapo extensive opportunities for personal enrichment and for their survival in the genocidal universe:96 the kapo is busy with a big teapot stuffing silk, gold, and coffee into it. this is for the sentries at the gate, so they will let him pass the command post without being checked. the camp will live off this transport for a few days, will eat its ham and its sausages, drink its liquor and its liqueurs, wear its linen and trade with its money and its jewelry. (...) for a few days the camp will speak about the transport “bendzin-sosnowiec.” a good, rich transport it has been.97 is it possible to survive in a system based on violence and terror without the loss of human empathy and dignity? the authors from the ottoman empire give diverging 95. venesis, nr. 31328, 187. 96. tadeusz borowski, die steinerne welt (münchen: erzählungen, 1963), 105-133. 97. ibid, 132. syriac narratives on the ottoman genocide in comparative perspective 35 answers. the syriacs saw this possibility in individual martyrdom. elias venezis and dido sotiriou, however, named, albeit to different degrees, culprits and victims on both sides of the ethno-religious divides and included muslim rescuers into their narrations. the armenian authors odian and balakian focused their narrations on the suffering as such. in the face of their many compatriots who had been silenced forever, they cleared their “debts of survival” by writing the unspeakable and witnessing genocidal destruction. “i faced a painful and weighty responsibility,” wrote grigoris balakian. “writing this history meant reliving, on a daily basis, all those black days, whose very reminiscences filled me with horror. while i felt physically healthy, i was spiritually ill. yet i had a sacred obligation to write this bitter story for future generations.” 98 98. balakian, armenian golgotha, 430. matthias bjørnlund is an archival historian, translator, and lecturer at danish institute for study abroad in copenhagen. as a researcher, he has published books and articles on genocide in the ottoman empire/turkey, conceptual and comparative aspects of genocide, and missionaries and relief workers in the ottoman empire and beyond in particular. as a teacher, he focuses on modern european and american history, including the armenian genocide, the holocaust, and the cold war. email: matthiasb@webspeed.dk 55 “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-19201 matthias bjørnlund based on extensive studies of archival material and little-known contemporary published sources, this article will explore how and why danes – famous in certain circles like maria jacobsen, virtually unknown like hansine marcher and jenny jensen, but all women – ended up in remote corners of the ottoman empire before and during the armenian genocide. they were sent out as field workers for one of the world’s first proper ngos, the danish branch of the evangelical organization women missionary workers. what did these women from the european periphery experience, and how were they perceived at home and abroad during peace, war, massacre, and genocide? why did the armenians among all the suffering peoples of the world become their destiny, even after the genocide? and how did they try to make sense of it all, from everyday life and work before 1915 to the destruction of the ottoman armenians and the immediate aftermath? the article will put the missionary and experiences into an ideological, institutional, local, regional, and international context, and consider to what extent the danish women could be considered feminist and humanitarian pioneers. key-words: armenian genocide, missionaries, humanitarianism, gender studies, christian millenarianism, armenophilia, middle east, turkey, ottoman empire. 1. this paper is based to a large extent on heavily edited and updated parts of my two monographs in danish: matthias bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab fra begyndelsen til enden (copenhagen: kristeligt dagblads forlag, 2013) (the armenian genocide from the beginning to the end), and idem, på herrens mark: nødhjælp, mission og kvindekamp under det armenske folkedrab (copenhagen: kristeligt dagblads forlag, 2015) (in god’s field. relief work, mission, and suffragettes during the armenian genocide), as well as a paper i wrote for the workshop for armenian-turkish scholarship (wats) conference in berlin, 2017. for a more complete list of primary and secondary sources used, see https://www.academia. edu/18733050/komplet_kilde-_og_litteraturliste_til_matthias_bj%c3%b8rnlund_p%c3%a5_herrens_ mark._n%c3%b8dhj%c3%a6lp_mission_og_kvindekamp_under_det_armenske_folkedrab_2015. see also, “the league of nations in aleppo: armenian women and children survivors 1921-1927,” eds. dicle akar bilgin, matthias bjørnlund, and taner akcam, 2014, http://www.armenocide.de/ armenocide/orphan-children.nsf!opendatabase; matthias bjørnlund, “danish missionaries in the kharpert province: a brief introduction,” houshamadyan: a project to reconstruct ottoman armenian town and village life, http://www.houshamadyan.org/mapottomanempire/vilayetofmamuratulazizharput/ harputkaza/religion/missionaries.html, november, 2015; idem, “the big death’: finding precise terminology for the murder of the armenian people,” armenian mirror-spectator, 23 april 2015; idem, “‘armenia as a state of mind: 100 years after the genocide,” april 2015, 100lives.com; the armenian genocide and scandinavian response, ed. matthias bjørnlund, hayk demoyan, suren manukyan (yerevan: agmi, national academy of sciences, 2014); matthias bjørnlund, “‘a fate worse than dying’: sexual violence during the armenian genocide,” in brutality and desire: war and sexuality in europe’s twentieth century, ed. dagmar herzog (london: palgrave macmillan, 2009), 16-58; idem, “at skabe håb i helvedes forgård: da industrimissionen i armenien kom til grækenland,” serialized article in dansk armeniermission (may and december 2017), 2-4 and 4-6. all online resources were accessed 03.12.2018. https://www.academia.edu/18733050/komplet_kilde-_og_litteraturliste_til_matthias_bj%c3%b8rnlund_p%c3%a5_herrens_mark._n%c3%b8dhj%c3%a6lp_mission_og_kvindekamp_under_det_armenske_folkedrab_2015 https://www.academia.edu/18733050/komplet_kilde-_og_litteraturliste_til_matthias_bj%c3%b8rnlund_p%c3%a5_herrens_mark._n%c3%b8dhj%c3%a6lp_mission_og_kvindekamp_under_det_armenske_folkedrab_2015 https://www.academia.edu/18733050/komplet_kilde-_og_litteraturliste_til_matthias_bj%c3%b8rnlund_p%c3%a5_herrens_mark._n%c3%b8dhj%c3%a6lp_mission_og_kvindekamp_under_det_armenske_folkedrab_2015 http://www.armenocide.de/armenocide/orphan-children.nsf!opendatabase http://www.armenocide.de/armenocide/orphan-children.nsf!opendatabase http://www.houshamadyan.org/mapottomanempire/vilayetofmamuratulazizharput/harputkaza/religion/missionaries.html http://www.houshamadyan.org/mapottomanempire/vilayetofmamuratulazizharput/harputkaza/religion/missionaries.html international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 56 prologue: “the misses jacobsen, jensen, and petersen are still at their posts and in good health” it was early 1916 that the armenia committee of the danish branch of women missionary workers (kvindelige missions arbejdere, hereafter kma) wrote a letter from their headquarters in copenhagen to the danish diplomatic minister at constantinople (istanbul), carl ellis wandel, with a simple, urgent question: are there any news from our four missionaries in the towns of harput (kharpert) and mezreh (elazig) in the province of mamouret-ul-aziz? that was the province or vilayet that came to be known as the slaughterhouse province when the armenian genocide began in 1915, where tens of thousands of armenian men, women, and children from this and other regions were murdered, enslaved, or died of thirst and exhaustion in front of the missionaries. from november 1914, when wwi reached the ottoman empire after the attack on russia, censorship and other conditions of war had seriously hampered communication between the missionaries and their homeland. and now, february 1916, virtually nothing came through; no one knew if the missionaries were alive or dead. the kma committee already informed through the press and visiting or returning western missionaries about the ongoing genocide were well aware that no news might just be bad news.2 in the absence of information, the armenia committee saw no other solution than to contact wandel posted at the posh pera palace hotel near grande rue de péra (istiklal avenue) in the ottoman capital with what amounted to a missing persons-report on “danish women missionaries who are at the moment staying in asiatic turkey”: 1) “miss maria petrea jacobsen, born 6 november 1882 in dover parish, jylland [jutland, mainland denmark]. father: jens jacobsen, factory worker, now living in horsens. sent to turkey in the year 1907 by the association women missionary workers which sponsors her. works for the american mission association american board in harpoot. nurse and evangelization. 2) miss karen marie petersen, born 8 february 1881 in nykøbing sjælland. daughter of jens ulrik petersen, customs manager, now living in i skælskør. sent out in the year 1909 by the association women missionary workers which sponsors her. works in mezereh as leader of an orphanage (danish). 3) miss jenny kristine jensen, born 2 january 1873 in lemvig. daughter of now deceased draper jensen; mother: widow m. jensen – address: mr. dr. andersen, lemvig. sent out in the year 1905 by deutscher hülfsbund für christliches liebeswerk im orient which sponsors her. works in mezereh as leader of an orphanage (german). 4) miss hansine franciska marcher, born june 1874 in allinge, bornholm. father dead, mother: widow h. marcher, allinge. (address in copenhagen: merchant hans marcher, 12-14 vesterbrogade.) sent out in the year 1904 by deutscher 2. leslie a. davis, the slaughterhouse province: an american diplomat’s report on the armenian genocide, 1915-1917 (new rochelle, new york: aristide d. caratzas, 1989). see also below, where karen marie petersen describes mezreh as “the great slaughterhouse.” “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 57 hülfsbund für christliches liebeswerk im orient (frankfurt am main) which sponsors her.”3 there was in fact reason to be worried. that same month, for instance, february 1916, jacobsen wrote extensively in her diary about the dire circumstances and tense atmosphere in the ottoman province, where “many turks openly acknowledge that this is the punishment for their sins.” “their sins” were obviously the extermination of the armenians, while “this” was the approaching russian army from the north. that army never reached the slaughterhouse province, but, according to jacobsen, still for a while it managed to simultaneously create widespread panic, occasional introspection or pangs of guilt, and plans for further atrocities among local turks: “‘why did we kill the women and children, they were innocent?’ but at the same time they make plans to completely annihilate the armenians before they leave the town themselves.”4 no one knew were that would leave westerners protecting armenians such as the danish missionaries – at that point, jacobsen was co-responsible with american board of commissioners for foreign missions (abcfm) for hundreds of armenians at american compounds, while karen maria petersen was sheltering more than 100 armenian women and children at kma’s emaus orphanage, some of them secretly, and working with local kurds to smuggle them to safety.5 the main part of the genocide had been completed in the region the year before, but it was by no means a finished project. in january 1916, for instance, the armenian children from the german orphanage elim (right next to emaus in mezreh) were taken by the local ottoman authorities, allegedly to be reunited with their parents. the parents were dead, of course, and the children were sent to be murdered, burned or drowned a few hours journey from the town. kma’s jenny jensen, head mistress of the elim orphanage, could not believe that this could be true, but the next day she rode out herself and saw the charred bodies of the children with her own eyes.6 all four kma missionaries had also witnessed the initial phases of the genocide, from dehumanization and fake accusations to imprisonment, torture, massacre, and death marches, which they describe in detail in letters, meeting protocols, diaries, and published works. here is how karen marie petersen remembers the massive, previously announced deportation from mezreh, 3 july 3. rigsarkivet (danish national archives), udenrigsministeriets arkiver (foreign ministry archives; um), 2-0355, konstantinopel/istanbul, diplomatisk repræsentation, 1822-1920, korrespondancesager. korrespondance om sunheds[sic] og humanitære sager, 1897-1920. 4. maria jacobsen, maria jacobsen’s diary 1907-1919, kharput – turkey (antelias, lebanon: the armenian catholicosate, 1979), 444 in the original danish diary. on the advance in north-eastern anatolia in early 1916 that was halted a few months later, see, e.g., ronald grigor suny, “they can live in the desert but nowhere else:” a history of the armenian genocide (princeton and oxford: princeton university press, 2015), 296-297. 5. matthias bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab & på herrens mark : nødhjælp, mission og kvindekamp under det armenske folkedrab (kristeligt dagblad, 2015). 6. raymond kévorkian, the armenian genocide: a complete history (new york: i. b. tauris, 2011), 402; james bryce and arnold toynbee, the treatment of armenians in the ottoman empire, 1915-1916, uncensored ed. (princeton, new jersey: gomidas institute, 2000 (1916)), 286-289. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 58 1915, which she and some of her danish, german, and american missionary colleagues followed as far as the ottoman gendarmes would let them. it was an experience that, as she puts it, left the missionaries paralyzed at the time and served as the stuff of nightmares for her for years to come: the summer morning when we had to bid farewell to our dearest friends in mezreh who were driven from their homes that day was so awful! early in the morning, i walked through town to say goodbye. everyone is busy breaking up and loading their clothes on donkeys or carts. in the poor neighborhood in particular there is total confusion, since many have refused to believe it would become serious and have thus made no preparations, so they are being forced out as they are. they do not want to go, they cry and throw themselves to the ground: “let us die here!,” they plead. the gendarmes hit them with their rifle or drag them out by the hair, lock the door behind them, and put the key in their pocket. they have no home anymore – and walk with the crowd. – down the road they move, constantly, until late in the afternoon. young and old, the blind and the crippled, women so exhausted from fear and emotion that they cannot stand up, and old men with canes, struggling, wavering. a head of family surrounded by his children yells when he sees us: “we have taken up our cross and follow jesus!” i have met [german missionaries] mr. and mrs. ehmann, and together we walk part of the way on the road with the caravan. they all want to shake our hands to say goodbye while the tears stream down their faces, and they say: “we walk to our deaths, pray for us!” it is as if our heart [sic] will burst; to watch this misery and not be able to do anything! still the crowd grows; we see ox carts with a sun screen over a group of smiling children’s faces, cows loaded with bedding and kitchenware, and finally whole columns of mounted gendarmes armed with rifles, filled cartridge belts, and knives and revolvers by their side – they go out “to protect,” it sends shivers down our spine to see them!7 the danish envoy carl ellis wandel, well-informed and well-connected in the heart of empire, knew better than most people the precarious situation for armenians and missionaries, particularly in the eastern provinces. he had at this point already written numerous reports on various aspects on the genocide for the danish foreign ministry, like in september 1915, when he outlined the cup’s (committee of union and progress; young turks) “road of turkification” and “xenophobic and nationalistic” policy, “which at the moment has as its main purpose the extermination of the armenian population in the empire.”8 but 24 march 1916, after having examined the case through us consul leslie davis in mezreh, wandel could inform kma in copenhagen that three of the missionaries were in fact still in the vilayet and in good health (a bit of an exaggeration, as maria jacobsen was still recovering from serious illness), while the fourth, hansine marcher, had just left the province on a perilous and eventful journey home through 7. quoted in amalie lange, et blad af armeniens historie. kvindelige missions arbejdere 1910-1920 (kma, 1920), 47-48. 8. matthias bjørnlund, “‘when the cannons talk, the diplomats must be silent’: a danish diplomat in constantinople during the armenian genocide,” genocide studies and prevention 1, no. 2 (2006): 203. “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 59 diyarbekir, urfa, and constantinople. not because she wanted to, none of the danish missionaries wanted to leave their flock voluntarily, but because of what seems to be pressure from her german employers and the ottoman authorities.9 on that journey marcher was accompanied by a german colleague and an assyrian assistant and, like several other eyewitnesses, including karen marie petersen, passed through an area “sown with human bones” around the great massacre site at lake göljük (hazar gölü/ gölcük/dzovk), witnessed how the great armenian cathedral in diyarbekir had been turned into an auction house for stolen armenian goods, and how forcibly assimilated armenian survivors lived in fear under turkified or kurdified names in the city, etc.10 marcher, who was leader of a german girl school with 200 armenian and assyrian children in mezreh as well as nurse at the local german red cross hospital, reached copenhagen later that year. here, she told kma’s armenia committee about how the children in her care were sent to their deaths. as it is put in the minutes of this 15 june 1916 meeting: “after miss marchers return most of the ladies of the committee were gathered with her to learn about conditions in mezreh, and at this meeting she elaborated on those matters. it may be that none of our sisters over there have suffered more personally from the systematic extermination of a people than her, as she has witnessed her whole school work destroyed and all her students leave, crying and wailing, with the expelled”.11 march 1915, before the genocide began, hansine marcher had been informed by a visitor, the strongly armenophobe and anti-semitic german vice consul at erzerum, max erwin von scheubner richter, that the newly appointed vali, sabit bey (sagiroglu), had claimed that all armenian in the empire were to be exterminated, as they had allegedly grown so numerous and prosperous that they threatened turkish dominance. many such rumors or pieces of information floated around at the time, but few western missionaries or diplomats would believe them, including marcher. in the summer of 1916, soon after marcher had left, jenny jensen embarked on a similar journey with her adopted 9. bjørnlund, “when the cannons talk,” 197-223; www.armenocide.de – this website contains 80 documents (reports from wandel on the armenian genocide and other relevant archival sources) in danish as well as in english and german translation. 10. hansine marcher, oplevelser derovrefra (kma, 1919), 10. 11. rigsarkivet (danish national archives), kvindelige missions arbejdere, (kma), 10.360, pk. 42, “1912-1921,” protokol fra møde i armenierkomitéen, 15. juni 1916. on the persecution of assyrians/ nestorians/syriacs in the region and on the assyrian genocide/seyfo/sayfo in general, see, e.g., anahit khosroeva, “assyrians in the ottoman empire and the official turkish policy of their extermination, 1890s-1918,” in genocide in the ottoman empire: armenians, assyrians and greeks, 1913-1923, ed. george s. shirinian (new york and oxford: berghahn books, 2017), 123; jozef nacim, “turkarnas folkmord på assyrier-kaldéer och armenier,” in händelserna i karme/xarput/harput, ed. jan bethsawoce, sayfe beth-nahrin (1920), 71ff; sargon george donabed and shamiran mako, “harput, turkey to massachusetts: immigration of jacobite christians,” chronos, revue d’histoire de l’université de balamand, no. 23 (2011): 20; let them not return: sayfo – the genocide against the assyrian, syriac and chaldean christians in the ottoman empire, eds. david gaunt, naures atto, soner o. barthoma (new york and oxford: berghahn books, 2017); the assyrian genocide: cultural and political legacies, ed. hannibal travis (london: routledge 2017); sargon donabed and ninos donabed, images of america: assyrians of eastern massachusetts (charleston, arcadia publishing 2006), 13. http://www.armenocide.de international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 60 armenian daughter margarit, a genocide survivor, while maria jacobsen and karen marie petersen ended up staying in harput and mezreh to the bitter end.12 the experiences of the danish missionaries during the genocide will be dealt with in some detail below, but why were they there, in the ottoman empire, in the first place, why was there such a relatively large representation of danish women working with, for, and among armenians and other ottoman populations in the first decades of the 20th century (there were, as we will see, quite a few more during those years than the four abovementioned kma missionaries), and why did they not all return home during the genocide and its aftermath when they had the chance? the start of activities of women missionary workers “the church bells chimed on new year’s eve. […] solemn, full-toned, strangely earnest they sounded over the capital of denmark in the beautiful moonlit night in the first hour of the new century, while resounding salvos, rockets, and the thunder of the cannons from the battleships anchored outside the harbor spoke their festive language.” that is how women missionary workers ten years later with some pathos describe that fateful night in copenhagen that marked not only the beginning of the 20th century, when 1899 became 1900, but also of the creation of danish kma. kma was an organization explicitly founded in the service of sanctity with “women working for women,” as the official motto went, and on the agenda was first and foremost easing the continuing suffering of ottoman armenian women and children in the wake of the 1890s massacres during the reign of sultan abdülhamid ii (the hamidian massacres). like in the rest of the western world, the massacres had been extensively covered in the media, creating public debate between armenophiles on one side and armenophobes (who were often pro-turkish/ muslim as well as anti-semitic) on the other. mostly, though, the coverage created sympathy towards the persecuted in “the land of blood and tears,” as ottoman armenia was often referred to.13 but what to do in small, neutral, peripheral denmark about the armenians living in poverty and fear? to h. v. sthyr, danish bishop and conservative minister of culture, writing on the occasion of a large-scale pro-armenian petition in 1896 supported by some of the most influential danes at the turn of the century, including royalty, clergy, 12. davis, the slaughterhouse province, 40-42; bryce and toynbee, the treatment of armenians, 286; elise bockelund, høsten er stor – kma’s historie gennem 50 år (københavn: kma, 1950), 37; 191508-05-de-002, enclosure 1. by scheubner-richter, a few years later one of adolf hitler’s most faithful supporters, is counted as a particularly reliable and well-informed source. already early 1915, he reported on violence against armenians in erzerum and of the likelihood of a coming great massacre, www.armenocide.de; hilmar kaiser, “‘a scene from the inferno’: the armenians of erzerum and the genocide, 1915-1916,” in der völkermord an den armeniern und die shoah/the armenian genocide and the shoah, ed hans-lukas kieser and dominic schaller (zürich: kronos verlag, 2002), 130ff. alma johansson likewise reports on how local officials in mush such as ekran bey talked openly about massacres and extermination as early as november 1914 and april 1915; göran gunner, folkmordet på armenier: sett med svenska ögon (stockholm: artos norma bokförlag, 2012), 189. 13. matthias bjørnlund, “virtuous victims? imagining armenians in the west,” armenian weekly, special issue (april 2012): 38-42. http://www.armenocide.de “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 61 intellectuals, and representatives of all major political parties, “we danes could do absolutely nothing in a political sense; but everyone with a heart hurting for their suffering could give a little to ease their suffering. the petition is particularly meant for those sensing a brotherly bond with everyone who shares our faith in our lord and savior.” the women of kma were inspired by, supported, and initiated such initiatives, though the bond they felt with ottoman armenians was definitely more of a sisterly kind. but, like the other large danish association dedicated to helping the ottoman armenians around the year 1900, the largely secular danish friends of armenians (da) that were to employ the famous teacher and relief worker karen jeppe in urfa and aleppo, a supporting role was not nearly enough for kma. they wanted to go out, be on the frontline, and actively save the remnants of a people. thus, with the creation of kma and da, began the first large-scale, long-term, country-wide, professional danish humanitarian grassroots initiatives on behalf of a faraway, persecuted, “exotic” minority: the armenian aid.14 for danish kma a main inspiration to enter the field of mission, humanitarian relief, and developmental aid came, as noted, from outrage and pity after learning about the hamidian massacres through mass media reports that travelled faster and farther than ever before due to the proliferation of the telegraph, while newspaper correspondents and eye-witnesses had easier access to, e.g., constantinople with the orient express as well as by sea. when trying to collect money for the ottoman armenians in the immediate aftermath of the 1890s massacres, ingeborg marie sick, novelist and founding member of danish friends of armenians, succinctly described the broad appeal of this new cause célèbre as well as the genuine outrage over these sometimes very public atrocities, like the 1896 slaughter of some 6,000 armenians in the ottoman capital following the arf (armenian revolutionary federation; tashnag/dashnag) takeover of the ottoman bank in august that year: “the first contribution was given by the queen [queen louise of denmark]. the next by a captain of a ship anchored at constantinople when the armenians were beaten to death in the streets; he saw cut-off ears, noses, and fingers float in the red water of the gutter. that was when he decided that the people who were treated like this should receive all the money he made from his journey.”15 but in order to explain the sudden creation of a proper broad and viable armenophile movement at that particular time and place, denmark c. 1900, a number of factors have 14. bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab, 105 and passim. 15. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, 125; arman j. kirakossian, the armenian massacres 1894-1896: u. s. media testimony (detroit: wayne state university press, 2004), passim; selim deringil, conversion and apostasy in the late ottoman empire (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2012), 206; fuat dündar, a crime of numbers: the role of statistics in the armenian question (1878-1918) (new brunswick & london: transaction publishers, 2010), 143; armen garo (karekin pastermadjian), bank ottoman: memoirs of armen garo, the armenian ambassador to america from the independent republic of armenia, translated by haig t. partizian (detroit: armen topouzian, 1990); yair auron, the banality of indifference: zionism and the armenian genocide (new brunswik, nj: transaction publishers, 2000), passim; keith david watenpaugh, bread from stones: the middle east and the making of modern humanitarianism (berkeley: university of california press, 2015), 63-64. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 62 to be considered. there were, for instance, vital outside influences on the population in general and on kma and da in particular. da was founded in 1902 after several members had attended the pan-armenian congress in brussels in july that year, and further outside influences included european and american organizations such as pro armenia, national armenian relief committee, and friends of armenia. a few years earlier, the impetus to create danish kma came when letters and visits were received from swedish kma (formed in 1894) urging a small danish bible study group of upper class copenhagen women to form a committee of a similar nature, with lutheranevangelical women working for women based on a fundamentalist, personal, deeply devotional reading of scripture. the letter writer was teacher and headmistress fredda hammer, who had a background in various swedish women’s organizations, and now, after having received a calling from god, aimed at uniting “the women of the north” – sweden, denmark, and norway (in 1900 still part of sweden), as well as smaller groups in finland, a russian principality – to help the armenians and proselytize abroad, where “souls were to be won for christ.”16 “winning souls for christ” was in fact a rallying call for the new millenarian evangelical movement emerging mostly outside established, mainstream religious circles worldwide. it was a virtual “protestant international,” as it has been called, aimed at reviving global ties between the faithful, revitalizing christianity, and proselytizing at home and abroad in the face of modernity, darwinism, and secularization, ideally to prepare the second coming of christ, no less. though in reality riddled with what some may deridingly call “white savior complexes,” often orientalist, and at times in the service of western imperialism and colonialism, this international was envisioned as a trans-national peaceful love revolution conquering every inch of every soul and corner of the world through intense bible study, mission work, education, and aid to the poor. it was simultaneously aimed at returning to the roots of faith, whether imagined or real, and at a new way of living, thinking, and acting that gave women a relatively prominent role. while most evangelical organizations were still male dominated (not counting the scandinavian kma branches, obviously), it was widely recognized that without active female participation, no movement could be truly global or effective, especially when it came to reaching out to women and children at home and abroad. all of this deeply appealed to and influenced the women of kma, who not only read about that broad, heterodox movement, but sought it out at conferences round the world.17 16. svenbjörn kilander, “en nationalrikedom av hälsoskatter”: om jämtland och industrisamhället 1882-1910 (gidlunds förlag, 2008), 191-192; kvinnliga missions-arbetare [women missionary workers] (1894). secretary: miss anna baeckman, brunnsgatan 3, stockholm. object: the spread of the gospel, and the winning of souls for christ, especially among the women in non-christian lands. income: 23,611 kr. organ: “när och fjarran.” fields: china, india, africa, armenia, russia, sweden, lapland. in world atlas of christian missions, eds. james s. dennis et al.(new york: 1911). encyclopedic entry on swedish kma; great need over the water: the letters of theresa huntington ziegler, missonary to turkey, 1898-1905, ed. stina katchadourian (ann arbor, mi: gomidas institute, 1999), xv. 17. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, passim; hans-lukas kieser, “johannes lepsius: theologian, humanitarian activist and historian of völkermord. an approach to a german biography (1858-1926),” in logos im dialogos: auf der suche nach der orthodoxie, eds. anna briskina-müller, armenuhi drost“if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 63 by creating their own evangelical organization, danish kma could actively work to answer that cry for help from armenia which they genuinely believed in hearing, but also be part of an international movement to spread the christian message of love through mission as well as seek or create opportunities for personal expression and growth, leadership, career, influence, respect, philanthropy, and adventure. not always on equal terms, as there was an actual class divide in kma in the early phase – danish field workers tended to come from working class or lower middleclass backgrounds, while committee members were most often upper class. but fields workers, while having fewer privileges and taking greater personal risks, still gained opportunities in the ottoman empire and elsewhere they rarely had at home, including meaningful roles in a religious community other than, say, making coffee while the men were talking.18 to name one example, the danish lutheran state church only ordained the first women priests in 1948, while missionaries like maria jacobsen and relief workers like karen jeppe could and would on occasion go as far as to function as de facto priests at ecumenical services for what remained of their flock during the genocide, when all other spiritual leaders were absent, killed or in exile. as another trailblazing danish missionary, andrea gehlert, expressed it around 1900: at home as well as abroad women have an important and ever growing role in “the crusade of our time, the struggle for heavenly jerusalem.”19 to find religious and historical justification for this active role the missionary women would, e.g., refer to early christian communities at the time of jesus and paul that could have more liberal views on women as active and prominent in religious matters, and they also seem to have been inspired by certain empowering interpretations of the ancient concept of “the priesthood of all believers” (a.k.a. universal priesthood) that was particularly popular among lutherans.20 abgarjan, axel meissner (berlin: lit verlag, 2011), 209-229. on an earlier incarnation of a protestant international, see, e.g., david e. lambert, the protestant international and the huguenot migration to virginia (new york: peter lang publishing, 2010). 18. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, passim. in contrast, the two norwegian missionary field workers in the ottoman empire at the time, bodil biørn and thora von wedel-jarlsberg, came from wealthy, influential backgrounds: biørn’s father owned a shipping company, while wedel-jarlsberg was a baroness. they both witnessed aspects of the armenian genocide: see, e.g., inger marie okkenhaug, “women on a mission! scandinavian welfare and the armenians in the ottoman empire, 1905-1917,” in interpreting welfare and relief in the middle east, eds. nefissa naguib and inger marie okkenhaug (leiden and boston: brill, 2008), 57-82. 19. n. dalhoff, en kvindelig missionær. efter hendes egne breve (copenhagen: diakonissestiftelsens depot 1893), 4. andrea gehlert went to proselytize among the karen-people in burma (myanmar) in 1888, but, after encountering scandinavian sailors in rangoon, decided they needed saving more than the “heathens”: karin lützen: “andrea gehlert franks (1857-1942),” http://www.kvinfo.dk/side/597/ bio/1307/origin/170/. for an early appraisal of female missionaries, see “kvinden som missionær,” in gudelige smaaskrifter, ed. foreningen til gudelige smaaskrifters udbredelse, vol. 11 (copenhagen: 1868), 269-296. the term “crusade” often used by missionaries such as gehlert should rarely, if ever, be taken literally. as it was put, christians needed to be careful “not to imitate the example of the crusaders, those deluded champions of the cross.” quoted in judd w. kennedy, american missionaries in turkey & northern syria and the development of central turkey and aleppo colleges, 1874 – 1967, unpublished ma thesis (virginia: college of william and mary, 2008), 11. 20. see, e.g. christine lienemann-perrin, “den frauen in der missionsgeschichte namen und gesichter http://www.kvinfo.dk/side/597/bio/1307/origin/170/ http://www.kvinfo.dk/side/597/bio/1307/origin/170/ international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 64 kma was and remained at heart an evangelical organization, unlike the nonproselytizing, largely secular organization danish friends of armenians – created and mostly run by danish-jewish-icelandic linguist and free thinker aage meyer benedictsen, himself an eye-witness to the immediate aftermath of the hamidian massacres when traveling in the ottoman empire, the russian caucasus, and iran; with leading members and supporters from protestant, catholic, jewish, and nonconfessional danish circles; and led in the field by karen jeppe, a liberal and somewhat unconventional lutheran with a deep distrust of mission work as well as a deep respect for the armenian apostolic church. but in vital matters such as creating possibilities not only for themselves, but, for instance, for armenian girls and women too, da and kma were united rather than divided. danish kma’s hansine marcher is thus rather typical (although unusually direct) in her denunciation of gender inequality and oppression of females at home and abroad from fellow christians as well as from muslims in this 1911 letter from the german school for armenian girls at mezreh published in a danish christian women’s journal: ...it is so wonderful to know that christian women back home are awakening and fight for their rights [marcher is referring to the feminist struggle in denmark that, e.g., finally allowed women the right to vote and be elected for parliament in 1915 through a referendum, a struggle where some christian women’s organizations participated alongside more militant suffragettes, mb]. out here we feel how painfully backwards women are, and the strange thing is that some may be interested in the matter, but those same persons easily come to look at the surface and lose focus of the matter itself. it is not difficult to get a class of children interested in a subject like this so that their thoughts are set in motion, but, e.g., once you begin to work with the female teachers you feel how inexperienced they are when it comes to logical thinking. and yet these women are living in a wonderland when it comes to freedom. they get to attend the teachers’ meeting friday night and sit on chairs (though only on those close to the door). and since that meeting is also a prayer meeting they are not forbidden to pray as they are elsewhere. indeed, we have even taken it so far that the female teachers are doing the introduction. that took 3 months of struggle! i felt violated on behalf of the female teachers when they had to sit on the floor and were generally treated with contempt, while the young male teachers sat on chairs; i therefore told the german missionary, who is leading the meeting, and the armenian badwilli (priest) that either this had to change, or the female teachers had to have their own prayer meeting. when they would not agree with the second proposal they had to put up with the first. and when one of the teachers at the girl school that i lead was to introduce the next meeting i asked him to hand over that task to me. after having spoken with the female teachers first, the meeting was held in my living room, with the best seats given to the geben,” in “die mission ist weiblich”: frauen in der frühen hermannsburger mission, ed. jobst reller (berlin: lit verlag, 2012), 7-24; malcolm b. yarnell iii, “the priesthood of believers: rediscovering the biblical doctrine of royal priesthood,” in thomas white et al., restoring integrity in baptist churches (grand rapids, mi: kregel publications, 2008), 221ff; timothy george, “the priesthood of all believers,” first things (31 october 2016), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/10/the-priesthood-ofall-believers. https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/10/the-priesthood-of-all-believers https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2016/10/the-priesthood-of-all-believers “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 65 female teachers, while the male teachers sat down by the door. they did not feel at home there at all; with the female teachers it was different, they participated enthusiastically in everything, and then i finally declared to the whole group (we have more than 30 male and female teachers) that the female teachers would hereafter lead the meetings. for two weeks the male teachers went along, then they started to long for supremacy again and speak against the agreement. the storm has passed now, though, and, even if the female teacher leading the meeting is not granted the spot that according to oriental customs belong to the person introducing the meeting, the female teachers are joining in with death-defying energy. – at our teachers’ conferences it is always the same struggle! – and yet we demand as much from a female teacher as we do from a male, even though she only gets less than half the salary! – and we, who have gone out here, are trampled upon by armenian and turkish men if we don’t time and again force them to show us even a moderate amount of respect. and with every single new male teacher who arrives here at the girl school there is a fight – without words – before he understands how he must behave. for the first couple of days he does not even greet you, while he bows down almost to the ground for a man. the badwilli (the priest) is for instance in a protestant congregation like a monarch; that you as a woman dare tell him the truth if he does not follow the school schedule is so unheard of that he is not capable of giving that bold woman a single answer.21 field work was challenging in many ways for western women, not least when they met resistance from patriarchal individuals and structures such as described by marcher here. but the possibilities this work created for the missionaries, the spiritual and material rewards gained when, say, a life or a soul was saved and a hospital or an orphanage built, outweighed the negative aspects for most. it is thus no coincidence that if missionary wives (who very often played active roles with mission, relief, nursing, teaching, book keeping, etc.) are counted alongside women missionaries, there were perhaps twice as many women as men sent by missionary organizations to regions such as the ottoman empire.22 there were, of course, also practical reasons for this break with traditional gender roles in evangelical circles. for instance, as mentioned above, women missionaries 21. hansine marcher, “af et brev fra frk. marcher i armenien,” kristeligt kvindeblad 2, no. 10 (1911): 78-79. on jeppe’s background in the liberal protestant movement grundtvigianism, the second major revivalist religious as well as socio-cultural 19th century movement in denmark besides inner mission, see matthias bjørnlund, “karen jeppe, aage meyer benedictsen and the ottoman armenians: national survival in imperial and colonial settings,” haigazian armenological review 28 (2008): 9-43. 22. engelsviken, in smt 91, no. 4 (2003): 498-99. on the importance of having specialized female missionaries, see world missionary conference (1910): 313, where miss rouse, world’s student christian federation, states: “we have passed through one stage and arrived at another as regards the requirements concerning the preparation and training of women for foreign missionary work. during the first stage the missionary societies, through their candidate’s department, and in other ways, called for, on the part of the women they sent out, earnestness, love of souls, zeal, and success in the winning of souls at home, and christian experience. but they did not call for specialized preparation. later on, and now, we find the call coming from the mission field in every direction and from the boards in every direction for women that have had specialized training. there is a call on all sides for trained teachers for kindergarten workers, for those with m.a. degrees, and doctors and nurses, even for those who have special training in literature, in music, and i have even had demands for specialists in agriculture. the specialist training is right if the specialist demand is right.” international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 66 had easier access to working among women and children in the ottoman empire and elsewhere.23 still, in most missionary organizations women were marginalized.24 but, all things considered, the protestant international did significantly overlap with a movement of what has been dubbed “missionary feminism” with scores of active, assertive women acting and negotiating on equal terms with men nationally and internationally, a direct consequence of the utopian protestant millenarian belief of a radically new and different social and religious order at home and abroad. here, beliefs in “progress” – which included “civilizing” measures such as modern approaches to teaching and health as well as ideas of increased gender equality – were combined with a transboundary, revolutionary, evangelical spirituality that would in turn help inspire contemporary and later feminist, pacifist, and anti-imperialist movements. because in the ideals of these missionary feminists there were many things, including a good deal a critical potential directed not only against what they saw as ills of contemporary society – atheism, depravity, materialism, alcoholism, the destruction of family values, etc. – but also against inequality, violence, oppression, and imperialism.25 conquering denmark and coming to armenia: danish kma as a global actor the women running danish kma were well aware from the beginning that in order to take the leap from local to international affairs meticulous preparation was needed. so, besides from their sisters in swedish kma, they sought inspiration from the british evangelical keswick movement in particular in the early phase, and they received visits from charismatic individuals involved with the protestant international such as the influential and controversial welsh pentecostal missionary, activist, and writer jessie penn-lewis, as well as by british revivalist preacher lord radstock, who had shocked the russian nobility by trying to bring english evangelical protestantism to orthodox russia. other sources of inspiration were local, such as rev. h. l. larsen from the bethlehem church in one of the largest and poorest working-class neighborhoods in copenhagen, where the nucleus that were to become danish kma was already involved with charity and mission work. larsen had a background in another major source of inspiration for kma, inner mission, a rural danish evangelical movement founded in 1861 on the fringes of the lutheran state church. he went on to become an early and active male 23. see e.g. dalhoff, en kvindelig missionær, 16. 24. anne-lise schou, ydre og indre mission i vendsyssel 1870-1920 (københavn: g.e.c. gad, 1987), 82. 25. elisabeth e. prevost, “introduction: missionary feminism,” in the communion of women: mission and gender in colonial africa and the british metropole (oxford: oxford university press, 2010); kristin fjelde tjelde, “lærerinnenes misjonsforbund gjennem 100 år” in norsk tidsskrift for misjon 56, no. 2 (2002): 78-79; http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hic3.12383/full; hans-lukas kieser, “some remarks on alevi responses to the missionaries in eastern anatolia (19th – 20th cc.),” 2000, http://www.hist.net/kieser/pu/responses.html; inger marie okkenhaug, “women in christian mission: protestant encounters from the 19th and 20th century,” http://kilden.forskningsradet.no/c18372/artikkel/ vis.html?tid=17564. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/hic3.12383/full http://www.hist.net/kieser/pu/responses.html http://kilden.forskningsradet.no/c18372/artikkel/vis.html?tid=17564 http://kilden.forskningsradet.no/c18372/artikkel/vis.html?tid=17564 “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 67 supporter of women’s mission and the ottoman armenians, and, as such, a natural ally of kma, especially in the early phase when they met significant resistance from circles within and outside the lutheran establishment who believed women should not play too active a role in religious matters.26 further impulses came from german pastor ernst lohmann from bad freienwalde, who toured scandinavia with his brother and fellow priest johannes on a lecture tour in 1897 arranged by local ymca/ywca branches to speak on the suffering armenians. they had witnessed those sufferings themselves among survivors from the mountains of tarsus through the plains of mesopotamia to the river tigris and the black sea.27 ernst lohmann was outraged like so many others about the official german-ottoman alliance and the resulting poor coverage of the massacres in the german press, where they compared to, say, the danish or us press, were more often justified or denied. so, he dedicated most of his time to collecting money and raising awareness of the plight of the armenians in and outside of germany. in 1896 he founded deutschen hülfsbund (hilfsbundes) für christliches liebeswerk im orient, the abovementioned organization for “christian labor of love” in the orient that soon was to employ danish kma-missionaries jenny jensen and hansine marcher in mezreh.28 as noted, the women of danish kma now knew what they wanted, which was to go beyond mere local charity work and bible study to become active parts of mission and relief among ottoman armenian survivors. to achieve this they needed more than support and inspiration: they needed to grow as an organization, which they quickly did through a fivepronged strategy: 1) writing bylaws, getting permissions, and making a long term outline for operations; 2) write newspaper articles, pamphlets, etc., to highlight the armenian cause, to show the general public that armenians were worthy of sympathy and support, and to explain and defend why they, as women, had the right to not only play such an active role in religious life, but to do it in a potentially dangerous place such as the ottoman empire; 3) networking among copenhagen high society to get the (semi-)official stamp of approval and additional funding they needed as an ngo with no state support; 4) cultivating their international network and professionalizing prospective field workers through academic and vocational training at home and abroad; 5) creating an increasing base of support through numerous meetings, lectures, and bazaars in churches, meeting houses, etc., all over the country. through this activity, kma managed to get into contact with thousands of supporters over the years who would contribute through membership of the organization (the only role men could play in danish kma were as passive – but paying – members), as sponsors of armenian children, etc. 26. bjørnliund, på herrens mark, passim. 27. h. l. larsen, in “industrimissionen i armenien,” vol. 1, no. 1 (juli-august 1922): 1-2. rev. larsen, who later was to co-found jensine ørtz’s industrimissionen i armenien, functioned as an interpreter at these meetings. see also ernst lohmann, från blodets och tårernas land: en reseberättelse från armenien, (københavn & jönköping, no year), 1. 28. ernst lohmann, 1860-1936: pioner, gründer, evangelist, ed. martin knispel (berlin, 2011), 17-18 and passim; uwe feigel, das evangelische deutschland und armenien: die armenierhilfe deutscher evangelischer christen seit dem ende des 19. jahrhunderts im kontext der deutsch-türkischen beziehungen (vandenhoeck and ruprecht, 1989), 72. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 68 after some initial skepticism (not only because of the gender and lack of formal theological training of the kma women, but also because of the foreign influences on their religious practice that some regarded as suspicious and alien), they had a major breakthrough when the new, unorthodox chairman of inner mission, dean and war veteran frederik zeuthen, in 1902 gave them permission to use the more than 500 mission houses all over the country to hold meetings as they pleased. that was a radically and sometimes frightening new experience for kma as well as for pretty much everyone else. because letting women speak in such facilities where merely men thus far had spoken, facilities that, besides from the regular parish church, quite often were the only religious, social, and cultural meeting places in any given village or small town, was nothing short of revolutionary. here was a unique chance to speak to congregations – only women at first, then increasingly diverse groups started attending, including men – about the suffering armenians and the active role women could play in their salvation, as well as in the salvation of humankind, even in the farthest, most inaccessible and conservative corners of the small kingdom of denmark. for the aristocratic, urban women leading kma, those parts of their own country were about as exotic as the ottoman empire.29 so, with “the lord’s permission,” as kma put it, the organization grew rapidly: by 1907, out of a population of some 2,5 million danes, there were 2,600 loyal paying members plus a significant number of children’s groups and sympathizers, a wide net to back up kma’s international ambitions. they also established a professional mission school in copenhagen attended by almost all scandinavian missionaries in the ottoman empire before and during the genocide, published numerous books and pamphlets, e.g., by ernst lohman, irish-protestant writer deborah alcock, and swiss missionary teacher beatrice rohner, as well as the journal bring lys (bring light) and a journal specifically for the youth branches.30 the women and children that danish kma worked for were no longer found only in denmark and the ottoman empire. in the years leading up to wwi, the organization’s mission fields reached from the danish west indies (virgin islands) to china, syria, and north africa. but even when kma went truly global, the armenians were never forgotten, “armenia” – whether understood as a state, a part of the ottoman empire or the turkish republic, maybe a small group of exiled armenians in an orphanage or a memory, an idea of past freedom and glory – remained the primary focus of danish kma until the end of the organization in 1981. the first impression of the suffering of armenian women – “our sisters” – and children was permanent, inescapable, as expressed in kma’s very first flyveblad for armenien (leaflet for armenia) from 1900, a humble, cheap four-page publication: “as women, our hearts are bleeding for our sisters in armenia. they have suffered the very worst a woman can suffer. no one 29. kma, jubilæumsskrift (1910), unpaginated; ringsted folketidende (7 may 1902), 1; viborg stiftstidende (7 september 1907), 3. 30. d. alcock, for kristi skyld, kma pamphlet no. 2 (copenhagen: missionstrykkeriet, 1900); beatrice rohner, kristus vort liv, kma pamphlet no. 29 (copenhagen: missionstrykkeriet, 1903); ernst lohmann, ruiner: skildringer af armeniske forhold og tilstande (copenhagen: kristeligt dagblads bogtrykkeri, 1905). “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 69 can imagine what armenian women and little girls have gone through in the hands of the turks, and many of these victims live in turkish harems, in kurdish towns, or wander about in their misery like those who seek death but do not find it. something must be done! christian women like us must do something for the multitude of miserable, homeless children. many have already been taken in by christian schools and homes, but thousands are still outside, exposed to worse things than we can speak of.”31 something had to be done, and done by them. they wanted to be in the frontline, for they had a vision: “a crowd of women slide past the eye; praying women, women united hand in hand, woman for woman across the globe. […] the curtain is torn and the women from the forecourt have gained access to the holiest of holy by the blood of christ. the world of women, conquered by a woman’s hand […], the nauseating prison of the harem opened to sun and air, women’s hearts – lonely, empty, sad – opened to jesus!”32 orientalism, infantilization, western arrogance, it is all there – the vision of the middle eastern woman sitting passively, imprisoned in her harem, waiting for the emancipated, enlightened western woman to rescue here. that, though, is only part of it. the full kma vision was in fact more universalist and christian humanist than orientalist, and, unlike some colleagues, they were highly skeptical of being used for any worldly cause, including western imperialist purposes. rather, their stated ideal goal, which i have no doubt they were sincere about, was to create god’s kingdom on earth through mission, relief work, and developmental aid – a free, healthy, enlightened, grateful populace was believed to be more receptive to the words of the gospel. helping the poor, emancipating women, and educating the uneducated were also goals in themselves (and it was throughout the years what the women spent by far the most time and energy doing), but it was never the final goal.33 it may appear a paradox that while the women of kma had such grand ambitions and were extremely active, outspoken, and wrote extensively – reports, letters, post cards, books, etc. – we actually know little about them in terms of biographical details. as opposed to, e.g., danish relief worker and teacher karen jeppe, the subject of several 31. flyveblad for armenien, no. 1 (københavn, 1900); bring lys 58, no. 4 (april-may 1960): 2; suzanne e. moranian, “the armenian genocide and american missionary relief efforts,” in america and the armenian genocide of 1915, ed. jay winter (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2003), 185; urd 6, no. 32 (8 august 1902): 380; elise bockelund, en tjenergerning blandt martyrfolket. kvindelige missions arbejdere 1900-1930 (kma, 1932), 18; kma, jubilæumsskrift, unpaginated; leon arpee, a history of armenian christianity: from the beginning to our own time (new york: the armenian missionary society of america, 1946), 275; johanne blauenfeldt, “hvorledes tysklands troende kvinder kom med i kvindebevægelsen,” kristeligt kvindeblad 2, no. 5 (1911): 34-35; dalhoff, en kvindelig missionær, 34-35. 32. kma, jubilæumsskrift, unpaginated. see also lange, et blad af armeniens historie, 10-11: “the armenian woman, too, has been degraded under the yoke and influence of mohammedanism to such a degree that her situation is little better than the mohammedan woman and, like her, will often be veiled in public.” 33. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, passim; maria småberg, ambivalent friendship: anglican conflict handling and education for peace in jerusalem, 1920-1948 (lund university, 2005), 27; lange, et blad af armeniens historie, 10-11; jensine ørtz, fra armenien, kma (no year), 18. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 70 monographies, knowledge of the background of the women of danish kma, especially life before they received their calling and went into the field, is mostly sketchy at best. like jeppe, they rarely find their personal relations and early life particularly interesting. but unlike jeppe, there are only few examples where the kma women violate that unspoken principle for pr-reasons.34 the answer lies in the ideal of self-sacrifice, even of “the death of the self,” as it was put at the danish kma’s third conference in copenhagen in 1907, a state where one only lived and worked for the lord and those who were suffering.35 for the danish women such ideas never excluded pragmatism when confronted with real world problems, nor did it stand in the way of love of life and the living, but those ideas were nevertheless seriously meant, even to the extent that they were ready and willing to pay the ultimate price as martyrs for the cause, as can be seen from this description in an official kma publication from an international meeting of missionaries in the german city of rostock in 1902: we were a small crowd who had travelled there together from sweden and denmark, and days of earnest introspection with many blessings became a milestone on k. m. a.’s journey; a new carpet was added to the others. we saw the work of other women, heard the voice of other women bring new impulses, add new subject matters. […] for all of us countess elisabeth waldersee’s earnest words on, like esther, “daring all to win all” were also an inspiration to not live oneself, not dwell on the “soft blanket”’ in the paneled houses, but, like esther, to want to say and dare to say: “and if i die, i die” (esth. 4, 16).”36 “and if i die, i die.” those were not empty words: late summer 1901, some 18 months after establishing danish kma, they were ready to send the first missionaries into the ottoman field. at this point they already sponsored some 40 orphaned armenian girls at german orphanages in and around mezreh and harput in the mamouret-ul-aziz province and in bitlis by lake van, as well as a smaller number of armenian girls and boys in american board facilities further to the east and south in marash, mush, and diyarbekir. but even that was not enough, well-aware of the risks and challenges of field work the danish women wanted full control of an operation with mission, relief, and an orphanage of their own. so, in august 1901, head nurse christa hammer was sent to mezreh as the first danish kma missionary in the ottoman empire, at first to gain experience at the german elim orphanage for girls and to learn armenian and turkish. but, as planned, she quickly began to search for a suitable building for kma’s own orphanage. 34. meddelelser fra armenien, k.m.a.s komité for armenien (1901), 4; et tilbakeblik. k.m.a. (kvindelige missionsarbeidere) 1902-1912 (kristiania: kma, 1912), 5, 11, 12-13; inger marie okkenhaug, herren har givet mig et rigt virkefelt. kall, religion og arbeid blant armenere i det osmanske riket,” historisk tidsskrift, vol. 88 (2009), passim; great need over the water, xii; bring lys, vol. 6, no. 7 (september-october 1908): 1-5. 35. kvindelige missions arbejderes 3. konference i københavn, fra 13. til 15. oktober 1907 (copenhagen, 1907). 36. kma jubilæumsskrift, unpaginated. “paneled houses” is a reference to haggai 1:4, “is it time for you yourselves to dwell in your paneled houses while this house lies desolate?”, http://biblehub.com/ haggai/1-4.htm . http://biblehub.com/haggai/1-4.htm http://biblehub.com/haggai/1-4.htm “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 71 kma never shied away from close cooperation with foreign or male dominated organizations – organizations such as abcfm and deutsche hülfsbund could after all provide vital know-how, security, connections, and infrastructure in the ottoman empire, an unsafe and largely unknown environment for the danes, however well-prepared they were. but it was always the ambition that core operations were run solely by the women themselves. it was not an easy job. hammer came straight from relatively uneventful copenhagen to an area still struggling with the effects of the 1890s massacres – many armenian men, traditional breadwinners, were gone, women abducted or living in poverty, orphaned children roaming the streets. also, the local ottoman authorities were actively trying to prevent this new western, christian missionary organization from establishing a foothold, even threatening to forcibly remove armenian children from the emaus orphanage; apostolic armenians were mostly welcoming aid, schools, hospitals, and orphanages, but, especially after the many forced conversions to islam in the wake of the 1890s massacres, they were naturally against losing more believers to protestant and catholic proselytization that often followed relief work; while oppression and violence were still widespread, according to sources such as kom og hjælp os! (come and help us!), kma’s pamphlet no. 16, 1902: indeed, in the year 1901 too much blood has been shed, many tears have been cried in armenia, in the land of blood and tears. besides from the abovementioned atrocities, considerable massacres have taken place in the vicinity of van and bitlis in july and august; the country is still flooded, partly by kurds, partly by regular turkish troops, and both parties ravage and grind down the land, kill men and ravish women, rob and plunder wherever they can. many orphaned and homeless children still wander around, and a good many miserable widows suffer endlessly. and what is being done to relieve the suffering? the various european powers have made their suggestion to the sublime porte, but since they do not act in unison the porte has yet to change the way it treats the armenians, and the eerie silence which by and large has settled over the events in this miserable country is not a good omen. so there is not much help to expect from the world’s mighty empires and powers.37 in 1907, the situation had hardly improved according to american board missionary, priest, and dean of the anatolia college at marsovan (merzifon), george e. white: there is no direct hindrance to religious liberty other than the usual one: no permission to build anything for religious purposes. many during the past two years have come into the protestant community, and there have been encouraging additions to the churches in several places. but the outlook is not very encouraging to evangelical christianity, chiefly because of government oppression. they have begun collecting the arrears of the soldier-taxes remitted three years ago. they are also forcing those armenians who have been to america to leave the country, arresting, imprisoning, and expelling them under guard. oppressive and depressive as things are here, van, bitlis, and the eastern turkish 37. kma, 10.360, pk. 40, “protokol for armenien. k.m.a. komite for armenien. maj 1900-dec. 1902,” meeting 26/11 1902; kom og hjælp os!, kma pamphlet no. 16 (copenhagen: kristeligt dagblads bogtrykkeri, 1902). international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 72 border are far worse. in van the merciless exaction of taxes leads to the taking of bedding, furniture, implements of trade, and standing crops. the armenians of the province of van are ground to powder between two mill-stones, the revolutionists and the government officers, and their cry goes up, lord! how long! were it not for this, spiritual prospects there would be bright. but how can men think of their souls, when they are in terror for their lives? there is an enormous exodus to america, and it sweeps away preachers, teachers, and those who should be the backbone of the church and of society.38 and there were the diseases, which destroyed the health and lives of many locals and westerners alike, including christa hammer: sister christa’s departure took place from copenhagen central station on 30 august [1901], where we met her wise, mild eyes and felt the warm, firm shake of her hand for the last time … two years! years filled with happiness in the service of the lord, years filled with difficulties, longing, and hardship, until the hour came when the lord called his servant home after only 14 days of sickness – typhoid, which she most likely contracted by nursing a german sister. then the white casket was lowered into the soil of armenia, the soil that has drunk the blood of so many christians and chosen witnesses.39 but before that, hammer had managed to accomplish her task by gaining vital local knowledge, establish a network of contacts among ottomans and westerners, and acquire a building for the danish kma orphanage, emaus, with some 40-60 armenian orphan girls in the years before wwi. and other well-trained, highly motivated women kma missionaries, all with relevant educations and practical experience – teaching, nursing, midwifery, administration, etc. – were sent to work among armenians in the harput region in the years before the genocide. they included nurse christiane black, wilhelmine and sigrid grünhagen (a widowed mother and her daughter), maria jacobsen, hansine marcher, jenny jensen, jensine ørtz, and karen marie petersen, as well as swedish kma’s alma johansson and norwegian kma’s bodil biørn, who mostly worked further to the east in the empire, but kept close contact with their danish friends and colleagues, most of whom they knew from the mission school in copenhagen and from meetings and conferences around the world. they were there to, first of all, learn the necessary ottoman languages, then as soon as possible to build schools, hospitals, orphanages, and to change the world – and be changed, because the meeting or clash of cultures and religions in or outside a colonial context leaves no one and nothing untouched. few converted to the missionaries’ preferred branch of christianity (ottoman armenians and other local populations were rarely uncritical or passive recipients of whatever missionaries and relief workers had to offer) – and, the occasional propaganda 38. maintaining the unity: proceedings of the eleventh international conference and diamond jubilee celebration of the evangelical alliance held in london, july 1907 (london: the council of the british organization of the alliance, 1907), 328-29. see also, e.g., “die armenischen forderungen,” sonnenaufgang: mitteilungen aus dem orient, vol 7, no. 1 (october, 1904): 4. 39. kma, jubilæumsskrift, unpaginated. “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 73 piece for public consumption aside, it is doubtful whether conversion of apostolic armenians was ever a goal for kma. they rather wanted the same thing for armenians as they wanted for danes: a faith that went beyond tradition and rituals to become a deep, intimate, lived experience that filled the hearts of the practitioners and would ultimately transform the world. anyway, many ottomans were ‘saved’ in a more material sense. last, but not least, the missionaries witnessed the transformation of the ottoman empire from 1900-1920. at first with hope and joy mixed with caution during the 1908 young turk revolution, then, from the 1909 massacres in and around adana, with increasing disillusion and pessimism until the outbreak of world war and genocide.40 life during genocide the systematic implementation of the genocide in the harput region has been touched upon above and dealt with extensively elsewhere.41 in short, by the end of 1916, some 40. karen vallgårda, “omvendte omvendelser: om to danske missionærers møde med indien i første halvdel af det 20. århundrede,” historisk tidsskrift 108, no. 2 (2008): 389-426; bjørnlund, på herrens mark, passim; kurt e. larsen, “var indre mission og grundtvigianismen hinandens modsætninger?,” kristeligt dagblad (21 november 2017). 41. see bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab & på herrens mark, passim. see also, e.g., ara safafian, talaat pasha’s report on the armenian genocide (london: gomidas institute, 2011), 21 and passim; leslie a. davis, “turkey, harput, 15 march 1915,” supplement to commerce reports: daily consular and trade reports issued by the bureau of foreign and domestic commerce, no. 18a (washington d. c.: department of commerce, 1915), 1; kévorkian, the armenian genocide, especially chapter 7; davis, the slaughterhouse province, passim; armenian tsopk/kharpert, ed. richard g. hovannisian (costa mesa, ca: mazda publishers 2002); a village remembered: the armenians of habousi, ed. vatche ghazarian (monterey: mayreni publishing, 1997); jacobsen, maria jacobsen’s diary, passim; helle schøler kjær, danske vidner til det armenske folkedrab (forlaget vandkunsten, 2010); the united states official records of the armenian genocide, 1915-1917, ed. ara sarafian (princeton & london: gomidas institute, 2004), passim; hagop s. der-karapetian, jail to jail: autobiography of a survivor of the 1915 armenian genocide (new york, lincoln, shanghai: iuniverse, inc., 2004 (1957)), 9-20 and passim; vahakn n. dadrian and taner akcam, judgment at istanbul: the armenian genocide trials (new york and oxford: berghahn books 2011), passim; james l. barton, turkish atrocities: statements of american missionaries on the treatment of armenians in ottoman turkey 1915-1917 (london: gomidas institute, 1998), passim; henry h. riggs, days of tragedy in armenia. personal experiences in harpoot, 1915-1917 (ann arbor: gomidas institute, 1997); mardiros chitjian, a hair’s breadth from death (london and reading: taderon press, 2001), 81-82; ruth a. parmelee, a pioneer in the euphrates valley (princeton: gomidas institute, 2002 (1967)); abraham d. krikorian and eugene l. taylor, “filling in the picture: postscript to a description of a well-known 1915 photograph of armenian men of kharpert being led away under armed guard,” 13 june 2013, armenian news network/groong; idem, american missionary physician dr. ruth a. parmelee describes the 1915 ‘harpoot deportations’: with appendix of some rare imagery from our files to complement what she wrote; included is the infamous ‘deportation proclamation,’” armenian news network/groong, 29 september 2017, http://groong.usc.edu/orig/ak-20170929.html; bryce and toynbee, the treatment of armenians; the armenian genocide: evidence from the german foreign office archives, 1915-1916, ed. wolfgang gust (new york and oxford: berghahn, 2013), passim; tacy atkinson, “the german, the turk, and the devil made a triple alliance”: harpoot diaries, 1908-1917 (princeton, nj: gomidas institute, 2003); vahé tachjian, “building the ‘model ottoman citizen’: life and death in the region of harput-mamüretülaziz (1908-1915),” in world war i and the end of the ottomans: from the balkan wars to the armenian genocide, ed. hans-lukas kieser, kerem öktem, maurus reinkowski (london and new york: i. b. tauris, 2015). http://groong.usc.edu/orig/ak-20170929.html international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 74 80-90% of local armenians were killed in the region or on the death marches, while the rest were exiled, forcibly assimilated, or living in fear protected by western missionaries. all four danish kma missionaries make abundantly it clear in their diaries and memoirs that it was an experience of utter horror, as when karen marie petersen describes her encounter in mezreh with survivors of death marches from the north and north-east early july 1915. everyone now knew that deportation meant extermination: it was then that another crowd of people came to the town – expellees from erzinjan and erzerum, who had left their homes one month earlier, just as our friends had done today [petersen is referring to the deportation of mezreh armenians that same day, 3 july 1915, described above in the prologue, mb]. all were ragged and halfnaked, starved and exhausted. they camped in a field outside of town. it was mostly women and children, with a few old men and adolescent boys. the strong, powerful men were killed after one day’s journey. they yelled and screamed for something to eat. at the orphanage we cooked for in big containers in a hurry and drove it to them in a wagon. they threw themselves at us like wild animals, we were nearly crushed to death. in a moment all the food was gone – it had been like a drop in the ocean. many were lying on the ground, sick with fever and begging for milk; their tongues were swollen, and they had not been able to eat for days. their arms were burnt by the sun, their skin was shredded, and their feet were swollen so that they could hardly walk. the air was filled with stench; most had dysentery – around us dead people were lying, but dead was greeted with joy, as a liberator! this was the first time i came into close contact with the expelled, but it was not the last. indeed, all summer the same event was repeated; one group after another went through the town, that was now dubbed: “the great slaughterhouse” – because the dreadful thing was that when they reached our town all men were killed a few hours from there.42 at this point there was little talk about evangelical world revolution in the letters, diaries, and postcards of the danish kma women. disease and famine raged, no armenian was safe anywhere in the empire, not even at western compounds, so for maria jacobsen, karen marie petersen, and their colleagues it was purely a matter of saving lives, even if that meant breaking ottoman laws and decrees for the normally extremely law-abiding missionaries. for instance, petersen reported on the decree ordering everyone, christian or muslim, sheltering armenians to be hanged in their doorway while their house was burned down, but she still kept 121 armenian women and children at the emaus orphanage, double the normal maximum capacity, filling all floors of the building to such a degree that when bodil biørn and alma johansson came by on 42. lange, et blad af armeniens historie, 3-4. on the temporary concentration/death camp outside mezreh at a place called the four fountains and at an armenian cemetery, see also jacobsen, maria jacobsen’s diary, 232-233, 269-273, 288; rouben paul adalian, “american diplomatic correspondence in the age of mass murder: documents of the armenian genocide in the u.s. archives,” in america and the armenian genocide of 1915, 160; bryce and toynbee, the treatment of armenians, 297, 306; atkinson, “the german, the turk, and the devil”, 40, 53; riggs, days of tragedy in armenia, 146-147; barton, turkish atrocities, 68; esther mugerditchian, from turkish toil: the narrative of an armenian family’s escape (new york: george h. doran co., 1918), 15. “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 75 their journey home after having witnessed the genocide in mush, they had to sleep in a tent in the garden.43 some of the armenians at emaus the ottoman authorities knew about and tolerated, although they could never feel safe, as petersen later related: “the turks looked at us with evil eyes, and they often threatened us, saying that our turn to be sent away would come. it also happened quite often that turkish officers walking on the street looked at the orphanage and talked about what they would use the building for when we had been chased out by them. indeed, we had no other choice than to count on possibility that we would be sent away, so we had, among other preparations, made knapsacks for the children to carry on their backs containing their clothes and some bread.”44 others, like a number of former students at emaus who had escaped or been thrown out from muslim households, were there secretly. vartanush lusigian was the name of one of them; according to the orphanage protocol she was “taken in sept. 1915. 14 years old. orphaned, her whole family has been killed. quiet, appealing, modest.” that was also the case with the only adult male at the orphanage, the priest durdad. he had brought his wife and six children to karen marie petersen and wanted to leave immediately, willing to sacrifice his own life in case he was wanted by the authorities. petersen would have none of that, she conveniently heard god speaking to her through the book of proverbs 24:11-12, “deliver those who are being taken away to death, and those who are staggering to slaughter, oh hold them back. if you say, ‘see, we did not know this,’ does he not consider it who weighs the hearts? and does he not know it who keeps your soul? and will he not render to man according to his work?” so durdad was hidden in a secret compartment in the wood shed.45 people like durdad were obviously not safe in the region, nor were it safe to hide them, so during the genocide, some or all of the danish missionaries at mezreh and harput not only protected armenians. they also became part of the proverbial “underground railway,” where armenians and westerners cooperated with some of the many kurds who opposed the regime and aided armenians for political, humanitarian, and/or economic reasons in order to smuggle the most immediately threatened armenian survivors to the dersim area (tunceli) north of harput and beyond. august 1915, for instance, emaus became a stop on the escape route to freedom when misag, a local 43. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, 154. see also, e.g., taner akcam, “mahmut kamil paşa’nın ilk telgrafı: ’evinde ermeni saklayanın evi yakılacak ve evi önünde idam edilecektir,’” agos, may 3, 2017. on alma johansson and bodil biørn: alma johansson, ett folk i landsflykt: ett år ur armeniernes historia (stockholm: kma, 1930); maria småberg, “witnessing the unspeakable – alma johansson and the armenian genocide of 1915,” (lund, 2009) (unpublished paper, which i thank maria småberg for sharing); idem, “‘the swedish mayrik’: saving armenian mothers and orphans 1902-1941,” in in times of genocide 1915-2015, ed. lars hillås lingius (studieförbundet bilda, 2015); inger marie okkenhaug, “religion, relief and humanitarian work among women refugees in mandatory syria, 1927-1934,” scandinavian journal of history 40, no.3 (2015): 432-454. 44. lange, et blad af armeniens historie, 45. 45. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, 154-155; kma, 10.360, pk. 112, “protokol over plejebørn i børnehjemmet ’emaus’ i mezreh, 1909-1917”; http://biblehub.com/proverbs/24-11.htm; lange, et blad af armeniens historie, 45. http://biblehub.com/proverbs/24-11.htm international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 76 armenian barber, arrived disguised as a veiled turkish woman to hide in the danish orphanage until nightfall, as karen maria petersen later recalled: one afternoon a silk-clad turkish woman came; it turned out to be – misag the barber. the evening before he had come out of his hiding place and came to us to hide until the evening, when he would leave with the kurds. [a footnote is added in the original text here: “in the final part of the time of deportation kurds helped armenians escape.”] they had sent a man back to pick him up and waited by the river with the other refugees. the barber’s wife, a portuguese woman with two children, was here, and it is touching to see his joy when he was reunited with his children. his beard had grown completely wild, and when he was later dressed as a kurd he could pass as one. he said that he had been hiding 8 hours from here on the other side of gølsjik [lake göljük]. god alone had miraculously saved him, because it was a nest of robbers. he saw how they attacked people sent into exile. once they had brought a woman to the house and promised to defend her – and then they killed her right in front of his eyes. he had paid one lira a week, but they did not dare to keep him any longer. he thanked me with tears in his eyes because i had taken in his wife, because otherwise they would have all been dead by now. had she and the children been with him on the road he would not have been able to escape.46 those who did not manage to get away were often found dead shortly after, or they remained in virtual imprisonment such as digin (mrs.) versjin, a close personal friend of several missionaries, including karen marie petersen. there are several reasons (besides, perhaps, plain luck) why it was possible for the missionaries to stay in the region and help surviving armenians, even during a genocide.47 among those reasons the most important one was perhaps bribery, which danish kma also resorted to when they managed to get small shipments of gold safely through to harput with the help of the danish and us legations and abcfm headquarters in constantinople. luckily, many local soldiers and officials, including vali sabit bey himself, were corrupt. furthermore, many wanted to be on a good footing with the missionaries in case the russians occupied the area, but missionaries were often also genuinely respected by local muslims and christians alike, as they worked tirelessly to save the lives of not only armenians, but also of ottoman soldiers and civilians.48 january 1918 maria jacobsen was thus nominated for an ottoman medal of bravery for having helped a large number of sick and wounded ottoman soldiers at the risk of her own life. it was an ottoman army doctor who nominated her via turkish red crescent, at this point in reality a young turk outfit.49 46. bockelund, en tjenergerning blandt martyrfolket, 45-46. 47. peter balakian, the burning tigris: the armenian genocide and america’s response (new york: harpercollins, 2003), 237; burcin gercek, taner akcam and ömer türkoglu, turkish rescuers: report on turks who reached out to armenians in 1915, http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/wp-content/files_ mf/1435335304reportturkishrescuerscomplete.pdf, 57ff. 48. bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab & på herrens mark, passim. see also, e.g., susan billington harper, “mary louise graffam: witness to genocide,” in america and the armenian genocide of 1915, 222. 49. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, 157; kévorkian, the armenian genocide, 943, note 39. http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/wp-content/files_mf/1435335304reportturkishrescuerscomplete.pdf http://www.raoulwallenberg.net/wp-content/files_mf/1435335304reportturkishrescuerscomplete.pdf “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 77 22 april 1917, the ottoman empire and the usa broke diplomatic relations. that had severe repercussions in the harput region, as leslie davis and those remaining of the originally 72 american missionaries left the country mid-may. the consul tried to take armenians with us citizenship with him, but at this point the authorities allowed no ethnic armenians to leave the country.50 hereafter, it was basically left to maria jacobsen, a neutral citizen working for both kma and abcfm, and a handful of armenian coworkers who had survived this far to care for what remained of the vast american board operation and the armenians in their care. the danes were short on funding and had to choose who to feed among starving armenian survivors in harput and mezreh. they had to focus on the survivors at emaus and the american compound, all in all 800-1,000, as well as some additional 1,000-1,500 armenian women and children in the final phase of the war.51 as maria jacobsen wrote in an uncensored letter 11 february 1917 that had been smuggled out with german help to elise blædel from danish kma’s armenia committee, poverty and misery were boundless, worse than ever before. the danish missionary expressed clear frustration that it was hard to explain to the committee exactly how bad the situation was: there were 5,000 armenian survivors in harput and mezreh at this point, most of whom had until recently been abducted to turkish and kurdish households as wives and slaves. but now they had been put on the street as the muslim “owners” no longer could or would feed them. those armenians had nothing, they were dirty, starved, abused, and ragged, there was no work and no help to get from the authorities or the local population, there were only the missionaries.52 finally, in 1919, the last danish missionaries in the empire, maria jacobsen and karen marie petersen, where relieved by their american board colleagues. the few remaining armenians were expelled, evacuated, or left behind facing continuing oppression, turkification, forced conversion, and constant threats.53 in lieu of a conclusion the armenian genocide was aimed at destroying the physical, religious, and cultural presence of a people in their ancient lands. but even such a cataclysmic event left survivors. almost all were exiled, most in the immediate vicinity of what was to become 50. the united states official records of the armenian genocide, 683-684; barbara j. merguerian, “kharpert: the view from the united states consulate,” in armenian tsopk/kharpert, 305. 51. jacobsen, maria jacobsen’s diary, 764, 792. 52. kma, 10.360, pk. 13, “1917”, letter from maria jacobsen to elise blædel, 11/2 1917; jacobsen, maria jacobsen’s diary, 932; parmelee, a pioneer, 50-51; levon marashlian, “finishing the genocide: cleansing turkey of armenian survivors, 1920-1923,” in remembrance and denial: the case of the armenian genocide, ed. richard g. hovannisian (detroit, mi: wayne state university press, 1999), 113ff. 53. jacobsen, maria jacobsen’s diary, 932 and passim; parmelee, a pioneer, 50-51; marashlian, “finishing the genocide,” passim. on the similar fate of deported greeks in the harput region post -wwi, see robert shenk, america’s black sea fleet: the u.s. navy amidst war and revolution, 1919-1923 (annapolis, md: naval institute press, 2012), passim. international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 4, no. 1 78 the turkish republic, so this was where the danish women missionaries and relief workers of kma and da went from 1919: to constantinople before the kemalists came, and then to greece, syria, and lebanon. karen jeppe went to aleppo and became a league of nations commissioner working to free armenian women and children from muslim households. among her staff was jenny jensen, formerly of kma in mezreh. no matter the ideological differences between kma and da, there was always agreement that saving the remnants of a nation, also spiritually through education, religion, and language, was of primary importance. jensine ørtz of women missionary workers, posted in malatya until the summer of 1914 when she went home on sick leave, started her own organization to help armenian survivors in greece from 1921, an organization that still exists today. and maria jacobsen and karen marie petersen worked among the armenians in the lebanese refugee camps from 1922 before establishing the bird’s nest orphanage for armenian girls and boys, first in zouk mikhail and sidon outside beirut, then in byblos (djbeil). more kma missionaries followed over the decades, including maria jacobsen’s younger sister.54 like numerous international relief worker and missionary colleagues and, not least, armenian organizations, the danish women literally dedicated their lives to the starving, traumatized survivors. the genocide and what was viewed as the subsequent betrayal of the armenians by the western powers did at times lead to depression and a temporary loss of purpose and hope for some missionaries. but almost all bounced back. their faith could be shaken, but it was fundamentally strong, and they even sometimes found some meaning in meaningless slaughter – during and after 1915 the armenians are, for instance, quite often referred to as “the martyred people,” suffering not in vain, but for faith, and therefore for all of us. besides from faith and meaning, the women definitely found a purpose with their own lives again when learning that they were still needed among the survivors. it is thus no coincidence that maria jacobsen, karen jeppe, and lesser-known kma worker dorthea kulager pedersen all laid buried in the faraway field. like kma’s christa hammer, who died in mezreh in 1903, and else kjærsgaard, a danish female agronomist employed by jeppe who succumbed to illness in urfa in 1909 while helping to establish agricultural colonies in the area before them, they all willingly once more gave up their “normal,” arguably safer lives in denmark for idealistic and ideological reasons as well as to seek meaning, opportunities, challenges, and adventure.55 the christian world revolution desired by the women of kma did not materialize, however, and there is little evidence that the danish women even managed to convert a single non-protestant armenian, let alone a muslim, in the empire. but, all rhetoric aside, kma was from the beginning more concerned with “vitalizing” the allegedly petrified apostolic armenian faith than in actual proselytizing as noted above. and while working for their revolutionary ideal they furthered a transnational cause that may in a broad sense be called humanitarian. at the very least it was a cause that involved “the practices of building trust through close relationships and responding to actual needs of concrete others and the values of interdependence, empathy, sensitivity to the context and 54. bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab & på herrens mark, passim. 55. bjørnlund, det armenske folkedrab & på herrens mark, passim. “if i die, i die”: women missionary workers among danes, armenians, and turks, 1900-1920 79 responsiveness – in contrast to abstract universal principles of impartiality, individual rights and justice.”56 and, according to at least one precise, meaningful, non-anachronistic definition, it was a feminist cause: the women did indeed have “a gender-based, but egalitarian vision of social organization.” furthermore, by caring for the most vulnerable, they saved thousands of lives and mobilized thousands of others in the process, creating an enduring legacy from denmark to armenia and beyond.57 56. maria småberg, “on mission in the cosmopolitan world. ethics of care in the armenian refugee crisis, 1920-1947,” scandinavian journal of history 40, no. 3 (2015): 409. 57. bjørnlund, på herrens mark, passim. the definition of feminism is found in karen offen, “defining feminism. a comparative historical approach,” signs 14, no.1 (1998): 135-136. 26 vartan matiossian is the executive director of the eastern prelacy of the armenian apostolic church (new york). he holds a ph.d. in history from the institute of history of the national academy of sciences of armenia. his interests include armenian ancient and modern history, as well as literature and cultural issues. he has published extensively in armenian, spanish, and english, including many scholarly articles, reviews, commentaries, almost two dozen books in translation and several edited volumes, as well as five books of his own in armenian, one in spanish, and three in english: armenian language matters (new york, 2019); the politics of naming the armenian genocide: language, history, and “medz yeghern” (london, 2022), and a woman of the world: armen ohanian, the “dancer of shamakha” (fresno, 2022, with artsvi bakhchinyan). 27 medz yeghern, the silenced name language, politics, and the armenian genocide vartan matiossian this study overviews some of the issues surrounding the use, abuse, and misuse of medz yeghern, the most common proper name for the genocide of the armenian, tracing the genealogy of the term yeghern and the evolution of its primary meaning from “evil” to “(heinous) crime,” “massacre,” and “genocide” over the past century and half. an erudite conflation of the classical armenian homophone words yeghern (եղեռն, “evil, crime”) and yegher (եղեր, “lamentation”) in the nineteenth century resulted in the secondary meaning “tragedy, calamity, catastrophe.” it also marked the conflation of cause and consequence in a single word, despite the use of yeghern accompanied by active verbs only, which indicates cause. the use of medz yeghern, therefore, point out to the central role of the perpetrator; the word yeghern has been used to translate “cultural genocide” and “genocide recognition” as synonym to tseghasbanutiun (ցեղասպանութիւն). this ambiguity was exploited during the first two decades of the current century, especially in turkey and the united states. interpretive denial adopted the name medz yeghern to avoid the use of “genocide,” choosing the meanings “great catastrophe” and “great calamity” and turning the cause into consequence. the article offers a reconsideration of the semantic and political issues behind the use of medz yeghern and suggests, on the basis of linguistic evidence, that the literal translation of the proper name, according to context and time of use, should be “great (heinous) crime” or “great genocide.” keywords: medz yeghern, genocide, armenian genocide, denial, semantics, crime, relation of cause and consequence this article was submitted on 05.04.2022 and accepted for publication on 06.05.2022. how to cite: vartan matiossian, “medz yeghern, the silenced name: language, politics, and the armenian genocide,” international journal of armenian genocide studies 7, no. 1(2022): 27-48. introduction the annihilation of the armenians in the ottoman empire was a searing open wound when bertha sullivan papazian pointed out to its symbolic representation in 1918: “how shall we name the dastardly crime which robbed them of life and homeland? how shall we describe that catastrophe?”1 this study will overview some of the issues surrounding the use, abuse, and misuse of medz yeghern (մեծ եղեռն, great [heinous] crime), the most common proper name for the genocide of the armenians, which also had the variant abrilean yeghern (ապրիլեան 1 bertha s. papazian, the tragedy of armenia: a brief study and interpretation (boston and chicago: the pilgrim press, 1918), 112. 28 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 https://doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0028 եղեռն, april [heinous] crime), almost discontinued nowadays. it entails the testimony of an eloquent but neglected survivor, the armenian language, whose evidence sheds light over the misrepresentation of facts and words in the politics of genocide. it is noteworthy that in november 1918, the first issue of the newspaper artaramard, organ of the armenian revolutionary federation (arf), evoked in constantinople the editorial board of its predecessor azatamart, arrested and exiled to death on april 24-25, 1915, as victim of “the [heinous] crime of crimes [yegherneru yeghern],”2 thirty years before raphael lemkin characterized genocide as “the crime of crimes” that “must be treated as the most heinous of all crimes.”3 armenian instrumentalization for the goal of recognition has subsumed the generic legal denomination “genocide” into the formula “armenian genocide,” which discounts the unique characteristics of the annihilation of 1915. “today, [armenians] are using a common name as a proper name. they do not respect the identity of the event that has shaped them for the past 80 years. they do not respect their own memory of the event,” has observed marc nichanian.4 several questions are at the core of the issue: 1. what does the common name yeghern mean? 2. does medz yeghern explicitly point to the perpetrator’s central role or implicitly leave the executing agent out? 3. is there a direct relationship between medz yeghern and genocide? this study summarizes some of the findings of my recent book,5 which may be subsumed into the following answers: 1. languages abound in words that have changed their meaning over time. the primary meaning of yeghern (evil > crime > massacre > genocide) indicates cause. 2. since yeghern indicates cause, then medz yeghern points out to the central role of the perpetrator. 3. yeghern and tseghasbanutiun/ցեղասպանութիւն (“genocide”) have become synonyms. the use of yeghern in the phrases “cultural genocide” (մշակութային եղեռն, mshagutayin yeghern) and “genocide recognition” (եղեռնի ճանաչում, yegherni janachum) for instance, supports their interchangeable nature. the literal translation of 2 artaramard, 20 november 1918. see the use of yeghernneru yeghern in the book review by hagop oshagan, «մեր խաչը (տր. մ. սալբի)» [our cross, by dr. m. salpi], djakatamart, 17 october 1921. it also appeared in the gruesome description of the ordeal of a group of armenian women in malatia, where “the heinous crime of crimes [yeghernneru yeghern] was committed” (bedros bondatsi, «եղեռնային հարսանիք», in «երեւան»ի տարեգիրք ["criminal wed ding" in yerevan yearly], constantinople: yerevan, 1920, 30). thanks are due to lerna ekmekcioĝlu for this reference. 3 raphael lemkin, “genocide as a crime under international law,” un bulletin, 15 january 1948, 70. 4 david kazanjian and marc nichanian, “between genocide and catastrophe,” in loss: the politics of mourning, berkeley and los angeles, eds. david l. eng and david kazanjian (california: university of california press, 2003), 127. 5 vartan matiossian, the politics of naming the armenian genocide: language, history, and ‘medz yeghern’ (london: i. b. tauris, 2022). the adjective medz may be elided as native speakers frequently do, with yeghern standing alone for the sake of brevity. 29 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name medz yeghern, according to context and time, may be either “great (heinous) crime” or “great genocide.” the historical facts of the armenian annihilation document exhaustively all five acts enunciated in article 2 of the genocide convention that are “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, any national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such,” from killing members of the group (clause a) to forcibly transferring children to another group (clause e). its perpetration three decades before raphael lemkin’s coinage of genocide shows that the issue belongs more to language than to sociology.6 during the first two decades of the current century, medz yeghern was the subject of extensive interpretive denial, a process that acknowledges the existence of facts, but introduces a different set of views through euphemism, technical jargon, or word change, re-allocating the meaning given to an event to a different type of event.7 three key episodes should be mentioned, although they did not resemble each other in their details: pope john paul ii’s visit to armenia (2001), the turkish apology campaign (2008-2009), and the “armenian remembrance day” statements of u.s. presidents george w. bush (2003, 2005), barack obama (2009-2017), and donald trump (20172020). except for discourse analysis of the statements by bush and obama, the politics surrounding the name has not been addressed by the scholarship.8 it is hardly accidental that the instrumentalization of medz yeghern was recorded in turkey, the country that practices denial as state policy, and the united states, the country where a veneer of self-righteousness fails to cover the preeminence of power politics in american-turkish relations. john paul ii prayed in 2001 for god to listen “to the call of the dead from the depths of the metz yeghérn” at the memorial of tsitsernakaberd in yerevan. the prayer was contextualized within his own recognition of the genocide, and his successors benedict xvi and francis explicitly used the translation “great evil,” even though “great crime” was also widely recorded. in the wake of the pope’s visit, however, media reporting gave primacy to translations of yeghern like “catastrophe,” “calamity,” “disaster,” or “tragedy” without further elaboration or acknowledgment for their source. the mentions of “great calamity” in george w. bush’s statements of 2003 and 2005, which their official armenian translations rendered as medz yeghern, laid the logical groundwork for the statement of the turkish apology campaign in late 2008. the latter adopted the major premise medz yeghern = büyük felâket = “great catastrophe,” which 6 irving louis horowitz, genocide: state power and mass murder (new brunswick: transaction publishers, 1977), 183. 7 stanley cohen, states of denial: knowing about atrocities and suffering (cambridge: polity press, 2001), 8. 8 vicky tchaparian, “the armenian genocide in american presidency discourses from george w. bush to barack obama: a political discourse analysis study,” haigazian armenological review 34 (2014): 221–56; suren zolyan, ամն նախագահները հայոց ցեղասպանության մասին (խուսանավող դիսկուրսի իմաստագործաբանական վերլուծություն) [american presidents on the armenian genocide: the semantic and pragmatic analysis of the evasionist discourse] (yerevan: limush, 2015), 40–82; idem, “how not to do things with the word: barack obama on the armenian genocide,” russian journal of linguistics 1 (2019): 62–82. 30 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 minimized agency to the point of its elimination.9 the equation involved the minor premise that catastrophes have no legal standing and the obvious conclusion that medz yeghern does not have it either. it trivialized medz yeghern (= büyük felâket / “great catastrophe”) in the public discourse as a name that was claimed to reflect the reality lived by the survivors and would have supposedly advanced turkish-armenian reconciliation much further due to its “more human, more dignified” character, as imagined by thomas de waal,10 while “genocide” was said to be a term of legal and political contents lacking humanity. the statement became a forerunner, from a different ideological standpoint, to the discourse of “just memory” and “shared pain” briefly embraced by the justice and development party (akp) as a variation on continuing denial. the turkish misleading use of medz yeghern and the absence of an armenian appropriate response became the driving force behind the follow-up: the mention of “meds yeghern,” untranslated, in the statements of barack obama and donald trump, which reflected the conventional wisdom of “great calamity” = medz yeghern at the white house and the department of state. this silver line of semantics threaded in the upper echelons of government used medz yeghern without translation as a compromise between genocide and the preferred turkish formulas, “events of 1915” or the unofficially used “catastrophe.”11 the policy of “no context” adopted by the apology campaign and the presidential statements was matched by the armenian response of “no contest.” the refusal to consent terms of recognition other than the word “genocide” or the formula “armenian genocide” admitted those translations without further question and likened the use of medz yeghern to plain whitewash without any attempt at owning the name. remarkably, president joseph biden mentioned both “genocide” and medz yeghern in his statements of 2021 and 2022, and the use of the armenian name elicited no objections from the armenian side. 9 see ayda erbal, “mea culpas, negotiations, apologias: revisiting the ‘apology’ of turkish intellectuals,” in reconciliation, civil society, and the politics of memory: transnational initiatives in the 20th century, ed. birgit schwelling (bielefeld: transcript, 2012), 85-86. 10 “armenian-turkish relations by a ‘historian of the present,’” agos, 3 february 2017, www.agos.com.tr/en/ article/17632/armenian-turkish-relations-by-a-historian-of-the-present, accessed 06.05.2022. de waal appears to have adopted “great catastrophe” (thomas de waal, armenia and turkey: bridging the gap, carnegie endowment for international peace, policy brief 87, october 2010, 7) following the apology campaign of 20082009, preceded by “great calamity” (idem, the caucasus: an introduction (oxford and new york: oxford university press, 2010), 58) following george w. bush’s statements of 2003 and 2005. interestingly, he had originally used “great slaughter” (idem, black garden: armenia and azerbaijan through peace and war (new york: new york university press, 2003), 103, crediting nora dudwick, “armenia: paradise regained or lost?,” in new states, new policies: building the post-soviet nations, eds. ian bremmer and ray taras (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997), 475). 11 tessa hofmann, “մեծ եղեռն: das ultimate verbrechen,” pogrom 6 (2014): 46, 51. 31 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name the dastardly crime against humanity the notion that ottoman turkish perpetrators committed a criminal act against armenian victims has sufficient factual ground to override claims of unsophistication, notwithstanding the demand for a nuanced approach to an extremely complex issue. incidentally, the concept of “crime against humanity,” which had been previously mentioned since the mid-nineteenth century, was used by three allied governments for the first time ever in may 1915 to charge another government with its perpetration. during march-april 1915, the western bureau of the armenian revolutionary federation (arf) managed to send reports to the central committee of the balkans in sofia about local massacres and removals of armenian population before becoming victim of the police roundup of the armenian political and intellectual elite in constantinople on april 24-25.12 on april 18, a summary of those reports was dispatched from sofia to the armenian national bureau in tiflis (tbilisi), capital of the viceroyalty of the caucasus.13 two days later, gevorg v, catholicos of all armenians, cabled russian foreign minister sergei sazonov upon the suggestion of viceroy ilarion vorontsov-dashkov to ask italy and the united states, the neutral powers, to stop the massacres “for the love of christianity and humanity.” he also cabled their leaders, king victor emmanuel iii “in the name of christian faith and humanity” and president woodrow wilson “in the name of humanity and our holy christian faith.” the catholicos drafted appeals to president raymond poincaré of france “in the name of humanity and christianity” and king george v of england “in the name of christianity.”14 gevorg v’s cable to wilson was forwarded by russian ambassador georges bakhmeteff on april 27 and the next day, the ottoman government tried to mollify american ambassador henry morgenthau sr. and his italian colleague eugenio garroni with claims of having issued orders to protect innocent people and punish disobeying officials.15 on april 28 and may 5, sazonov suggested to his french colleague théophile 12 see yervant pambukian (ed.), նիւթեր հ. յ. դաշնակցութեան պատմութեան համար [materials for the history of the armenian revolutionary federation], vol. 11 (beirut: armenian revolutionary federation, 2015), 228–242. 13 letter from the armenian national bureau vice-president h. khununts to gevorg v, 6/19 april 1915, in վաւերագրեր հայ եկեղեւոյ պատմութեան [documents of the history of the armenian church], vol. 13, ed. sandro behbutian (yerevan: mughni, 2005), 355–356. the date of the document has been misread in the publication as september 6 (september 19 in the gregorian calendar). 14 mkrtich nersisian (ed.), геноцид армян в османской империи. сборник документов и материалов [the genocide of the arme nians in the ottoman empire: collection of documents and materials] (yerevan: hayastan, 1983), 278; «թիւրք[ական] պատերազմը եւ հայերը» [the turkish war and the armenians], mshak, 2 [15] may 1915. the appeals to victor emmanuel iii and wilson were sent on april 22 (yves ternon, the armenians: history of a genocide, transl. by rouben c. cholakian (delmar, ny: caravan books, 1981), 336; boghos nubar’s papers and the armenian question 1915–1918, ed. and transl. by vatche ghazarian (waltham: mayreni, 1996, 17). for a less known appeal by gevorg v to wilson in june 1915 “in the name of humanity and our holy christian fate,” see simon payaslian, united states policy toward the armenian question and the armenian genocide (new york: palgrave macmillan, 2005), 95. 15 “appeal to turkey to stop massacres,” the new york times, 28 april 1915; “morgenthau intercedes,” the new york times, 29 april 1915. see sarafian, united states official records, 18–9, 22; zaven messerlian, 32 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 delcassé to release an allied statement holding ottoman officials responsible. probably on sazonov’s cue, gevorg v sent his appeals to poincaré and george v on may 6. sazonov drew upon their language on may 11 in a draft statement denouncing “these fresh crimes of turkey against christianity and civilization.” delcassé and grey, weary of fallout with muslim subjects, objected to the use of christianity.16 the draft was still in limbo on may 23, when the british press bureau surprisingly published an english version of the statement using the expression “these fresh crimes committed by turkey.”17 after russia consented to drop or replace her formula, the official statement in french condemned “these new crimes of turkey against humanity and civilization” on may 24, declaring that all government members and others involved would be held responsible.18 the orders for regional deportation issued by interior minister mehmet taleat between may 10 and may 27, 1915, prompted morgenthau to report to the state department on may 25 that ottoman policy was breaking up the armenians “by wholesale deportation which must deprive them of their ordinary means of livelihood.”19 the news of the allied statement probably spurred talat to draft a temporary law of deportation (tehcir kanunu) and send it to grand vizier said halim on may 26 with a memorandum on the official anxiety aroused by armenian claims for reforms, which stated that “a radical solution was needed to end and to completely wipe out the problem.”20 the draft was signed off by said halim and war minister ismail enver the next day. after the formality of cabinet approval on may 30, it became law with its publication in the official journal takvim-i-vekayi on june 1. the english translation of the allied statement was cabled to the u.s. state department on may 28 and forwarded the next day to morgenthau, who delivered it to said halim on june 3.21 the response, on june 4, used a draft provided by the german embassy to deny the existence of massacres; allege armenian treason, massacres of muslims, and collusion before and after the armenian genocide, transl. by maral o. sarkissian-kaloustian (beirut: chemaly and chemaly, 2015), 39. 16 arthur beylerian (ed.), les grandes puissances, l’empire ottoman et les arméniens dans les archives françaises (1914–1918). recueil de documents (paris: publications de la sorbonne, 1983), 18–20, 22, 26–27; messerlian, before and after, 40–41. 17 “allies’ stern warning to turkey,” the times, 24 may 1915; “allies to punish turks who murder,” the new york times, 24 may 1915. see christopher j. walker, armenia: the survival of a nation (new york: st. martin’s press, 1990), 231. 18 “les massacres en arménie. la triple-entente tiendra par responsable le gouvernement turque,” le matin, 25 may 1915. see beylerian, les grandes puissances, 29–30. 19 ara sarafian (ed.), united states official records on the armenian genocide, 1915–1917 (princeton and london: gomidas institute, 2004), 33. see wolfgang gust (ed.), the armenian genocide: evidence from the german foreign office archives, 1915–1916 (new york and oxford: berghahn, 2014), 183–193; kamuran gürün, the armenian file: the myth of innocence exposed (new york: st. martin’s press, 1985), 209–210. 20 muammer demirel, birinci dünya harbinde erzurum ve çevresinde ermeni harekitleri (ankara: general staff, 1996),52–53, quoted in vahakn dadrian, warrant for genocide: key elements of turko-armenian conflict (new brunswick and london: transaction publishers, 1999),124. 21 beylerian, les grandes puissances, 31; sarafian, united states official records, 29–30. 33 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name with the entente, and argue matters of internal security and national sovereignty.22 outside constantinople and smyrna, where deportations were relatively small in number, the armenian population from eastern thrace to the ottoman-russian border was massacred, forced to convert to islam, or expelled toward syria and northern mesopotamia between june and november. morgenthau first informed the state department on july 10 that many reports hinted at a “systematic attempt” of destruction through arrests, tortures, wholesale expulsions, and deportations often accompanied by rape, pillage, and massacre,23 and warned in a cable of july 16 that “a campaign of race extermination is in progress under a pretext of reprisal against rebellion.”24 the report of the american committee on armenian atrocities, formed in new york under his inspiration, highlighted in october 1915 that “the crimes now being perpetrated upon the armenian people” surpassed anything recorded during the prior millennium,25 and the american ambassador stated to secretary of state robert lansing in a confidential letter of november 18: “i am firmly convinced that this is the greatest crime of the ages.”26 the armenian patriarch of constantinople, archbishop zaven der yeghiayan, wrote to morgenthau on december 24 that the perpetrators could boast “that not a single armenian is to be found in the districts under their jurisdiction” more than seven months after “history began to register the most horrible crime ever recorded in the annals of the human race, the carefully planned ignominious project of exterminating a whole nation.”27 the ottoman army group east led by enver’s uncle, halil kut, which invaded eastern armenia in april 1918, proposed onerous conditions of peace aimed at “the definitive occupation of the armenian districts and the extermination [ausrottung] of the armenians,” major general otto von lossow, german delegate, reported on may 23.28 a last stand allowed the proclamation of the first independence of the republic of armenia (1918-1920). in august, during a brief visit to yerevan, halil gave a speech from the balcony of his hotel where he offered “an amazingly clear insight into the thinking of a senior young turk leader” with an “astonishingly open confession”:29 22 esat uras, the armenians in history and the armenian question, transl. by süheyla artemel (istanbul: documentary publications, 1988), 869–873; sarafian, the armenian genocide, 198–201. 23 payaslian, united states policy, 95. 24 sarafian, united states official records, 55. 25 “tell of horrors done in armenia,” the new york times, 4 october 1915. 26 sarafian, united states official records, 373. 27 ibid. 423. 28 johannes lepsius, deutschland und armenien 1914–1918. sammlung diplomatischer aktenstücke (potsdam: tempelverlag, 1919), 388–389. 29 thomas de waal, great catastrophe: armenians and turks in the shadow of genocide (new york: oxford university press, 2015), 72. the literal correlation of halil’s threat with article 2 of the genocide convention (“acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part”) has been overlooked by the author’s sophism that the use of crimes against humanity (art. 7 of the rome statute) instead of genocide (art. 6 of the same statute, repeating verbatim art. 2 of the genocide convention) is applicable to the armenian case, arguing that “the perpetrators may not have intended to eradicate an entire nation but have still killed an awful lot of innocent people” (idem, “the g-word: the armenian massacre and the politics of genocide,” foreign affairs, january-february 2015, 148). 34 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 the armenian nation that i tried to destroy down to the last individual [son ferdine kadar yok etmeye çalıştığım ermeni milleti] for attempting to erase my homeland from history as slave to the enemy during my homeland’s most terrible and painful days (…). yet if you stand attached to a group of mindless committee members and try to betray the turks and the turkish homeland, then i will order my army surrounding your entire country not to leave a single breathing armenian on the face of the world [dünya üstünde nefes alacak tek ermeni bırakmayacağım].30 eight months after the ottoman defeat, on 17 june 1919, grand vizier damad ferid pasha submitted a memorandum to the peace conference. he stated that “almost the entire civilized world was shocked by the account of the crimes that the turks had reportedly committed” and targeted the cup leaders with the declaration that his goal was “to show to the world, with supporting proofs, who are truly responsible for these horrific crimes.”31 the nationalist movement headed by mustafa kemal (atatürk) reacted to the ottoman defeat with strong support and participation of former cup elements. the proposition that “the turks are a people who speak turkish and live in turkey” cleared the road to start “one of the major revolutions of modern times, involving a radical break with the social, cultural, political traditions of the past,”32 with blood. after the annihilation, ethnic cleansing, and expulsion of armenians, greeks, and assyrians were finalized, the treaty of lausanne marked the burial of the armenian question in july 1923. it declared amnesty for all crimes related to political events between 1914 and 1922, concealing the foundational crime that set up the state-nation of turkey under a cloak of oblivion. genocide and literal denial the history and politics of the annihilation, like any murder case where the suspect claims innocence and blames someone else, have been suffused since its very perpetration with denial. ottoman diplomats argued that the reports about massacres were fabrications;33 government propaganda books concocted rebellions and conspiracies,34 and the 30 ittihat ve terakki’den cumhuriyete bitmeyen şavaş: kutülamare kahramanı halil paşanın anıları, ed. taylan sorgun (istanbul: yedigün, 1972), 241. halil was imprisoned by the british in 1919 and boasted to a visiting british officer about having killed around 300,000 armenians by using reserve forces to punish those he claimed as rebels and by asking to deport those likely to rebel (idem, 274). 31 “la turquie devant la conférence,” la renaissance, 20 july 1919. see the armenian translation in «թիւրքին մահավճիռը» [the death sentence of the turk], transl. by g. m. manavian, gochnag hayastani, 5 july 1919, 851–852, where “crime” was first translated as vojir and then as yeghern. 32 bernard lewis, the emergence of modern turkey (london: oxford university press, 1961), 1. 33 “les arméniens,” journal de geneve, 28 august 1915; “turkish official denies atrocities,” the new york times, 14 october 1915. 34 verité sur le mouvement révolutionnaire arménienne et les mesures gouvernementales (constantinople: n. p., 1916); ermeni komitalarının amâl ve harekât-ı ihtilâliyesi: ilân-ı meşrutiyetten evvel ve sonar (istanbul: matbaa-i amire, 1332 [1916]). 35 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name architects of the annihilation managed to set the parameters of an alternative narrative for generations to come.35 atatürk completed and canonized that narrative as official history, with silence reigning unopposed as language of denial despite bernard lewis’ farfetched claim that his healthy and reasonable nationalism neither trampled on the rights of other nations nor rejected responsibility for the past.36 the arf english-language weekly in boston, hairenik weekly, made the following summary in an editorial of 1951: on the contrary, they tried to put the blame of their crime on their victims, and completed their abominable action by trying to destroy the very traces of their victims, closed their country against those who had miraculously survived their barbarous slaughter, and even tried to destroy the remnants of the armenian people in the caucasian section of their homeland.37 the memory of a step by step program has historically coalesced around the intent to destroy symbolized by genocide. the perpetrator is prone to rationalize the deed; his refusal of the evidence and his penchant for blaming the victims eliminate the possibility of mourning and sanction the impossibility of closure, putting the onus on the survivors and their descendants “to prove time and again that they have indeed been wronged, individually and collectively.”38 as part of the denier’s agenda to which the victims are bound, the narrative based on the insanity of repetition demands to prove the factuality of the fact and relive the genocide, forcing “to enter into the endless game of proving it, to detach ourselves from ourselves in order to come forward as proofs, as so many living proofs of our own death.”39 in january 1965, spyros kyprianou, foreign minister and later president of cyprus, mentioned the “wholesale massacre” of armenians for the first time at the united nations in a rebuttal to a claim of presumed destruction of the turkish cypriot community. turkish representative orhan eralp criticized the reference “to certain massacres alleged to have been committed by turks in the past.”40 in april, turkish prime minister ali suat hayri ürgüplü regarded the worldwide commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the “armenian massacres,” as they were known then, as an attempt “to revive a series of events which had no connection whatsoever with the turkish republic after these 50 long years,” while president cemal gürsel affirmed that “there is no such thing as armenian 35 “posthumous memoirs of talaat pasha,” transl. by m. zekeria, the new york times current history, november 1921, 287–295; djemal pasha, memoirs of a turkish statesman 1913–1919 (new york: george h. doran, 1922). 36 lewis, the emergence, 386. 37 “striking contrast,” hairenik weekly, 25 october 1951. 38 richard g. hovannisian, “the armenian genocide and patterns of denial,” in the armenian genocide in perspective, ed. richard hovhannisian (new brunswick and london: transaction publishers, 1986), 131. 39 kazanjian and nichanian, “between genocide and catastrophe,” 133. 40 “1915 armenian atrocities cited at un by cyprus foreign minister,” hairenik weekly, 4 february 1965. 36 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 massacres.”41 an editorial of the new york times rejected the comparison of the armenian and jewish cases, equalized armenian and turkish deaths, and invited to “let the dead past bury the dead,” insinuating that “armenians, naturally, cannot forget, but perhaps they can forgive.”42 altemur kiliç, press attaché of the turkish embassy in the united states, doubled down in a letter to the editor with the suggestion to “forget and to strive together for a better future for all citizens of turkey in a better world.”43 the litigation of the facts has completed the presentation of suffering in the production of history with a war of words. in the march 1974 session of the un commission of human rights, turkish representative osman olçay criticized the preliminary version of the report on genocide by special rapporteur nicodème ruhashyankiko for its mention of the armenian “genocide myth” derived from the deportation of “those rebel populations (living in minority) (…) toward other regions of the ottoman empire where they could not threaten the rearguard of the defensive front.”44 journalist jean-marie carzou commented with thinly veiled irony: “then what? did we imagine this genocide? no. it is a perfect genocide: it has not happened …”45 in the 1980s, mustafa șükrü elekdağ, turkish ambassador to the united states, pushed forward the “complex tragedy” of a civil war coupled with famine and epidemics claiming 2 million turkish and a “grossly exaggerated” number of armenian victims.46 the cupkemalist narrative blamed the victims, lined up untoward circumstances, and minimized casualties, and western scholars sympathetic or openly adept to it have added a patina of “tragedy” as a pseudo-humanistic concession: “unrelieved tragedy”;47 “part of a general tragedy that engulfed all peoples of the empire”;48 “an appalling human tragedy” derived from the struggle for a single homeland;49 “a special tragedy” due to famine, epidemics, 41 “turkish president, prime minister deny massacre,” hairenik weekly, 20 may 1965. 42 “armenia remembers,” the new york times, 24 april 1965. 43 “turkish citizens all,” the new york times, 3 may 1965. 44 levon keshishian, “the turkish genocide of armenians and the u.n. commission on human rights,” the armenian reporter, 20 june 1974. 45 jean-marie carzou, un génocide exemplaire: arménie 1915 (paris: flammarion, 1975), 210. 46 “turks protest inclusion of armenians in holocaust memorial,” the armenian reporter, 24 july 1980; “turkish-armenian issue: the complex tragedy of 1915,” the new york times, 5 may 1983. 47 lewis v. thomas and richard n. frye, the united states and turkey and iran (cambridge: harvard university press, 1951), 60–61. 48 stanford j. shaw and ezel kural shaw, history of the ottoman empire and modern turkey, vol. 2 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1978), x (emphasis in the original). similarly, valerii soldatenko, former director of the institute of national memory of ukraine, echoed russian historians in his claim of 2012 that the holodomor was a “common tragedy shared by all the people of the former soviet union” (quoted in olga andriewsky, “towards a decentred history: the study of the holodomor and ukrainian historiography,” east/ west: journal of ukrainian studies 1 (2015): 29). 49 bernard lewis, semites and anti-semites: an inquiry into conflict and prejudice (new york and london: w. w. norton and company, 1986), 21, quoted in rouben paul adalian, “the ramifications in the united states of the french court decision on the denial of the armenian genocide and princeton university,” revue du monde arménien moderne et contemporaine 3 (1997): 110. 37 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name and warfare.50 the foundations of the past should not be stained by doubt or moral opprobrium, frank mankiewicz – vice chairman of hill and knowlton, the public relations firm then representing turkey – railed in 1990: “when you start talking about genocide or extermination or systematic elimination of people – those are terrible words to say.”51 the exhortation to study the history of armenians and turks “as a great human loss” and abandon “propagandistic terms”52 was echoed by mankiewicz, who stated that the turkish government was open to terminological transactions: “tragic loss of life, brutal loss of life, widespread killings, sure. but on both sides.”53 the denialist discourse has continued unabated across the political spectrum of turkey, embracing “an overdetermined forgetfulness to spare [the] worldly embarrassment of making a full account of what they did and a willingness to assume responsibility for it.”54 in december 2008, the far-right nationalist action party (mhp) drew upon the decadesold playbook to denounce the campaign of apology for the “great catastrophe” launched by a group of leftist intellectuals: “there is no single page in the honorable history of the turkish nation for which we should be embarrassed, and no crime for which we should apologize.”55 the akp went down the same path after the recognition of the genocide by the german parliament in june 2016. prime minister binali yıldırım repeated that “there is no shameful incident in our past that would make us bow our heads,”56 while president recep tayyip erdoğan raised the stakes: “we have nothing in our past to be ashamed of, but those countries that often accuse turkey of ‘armenian genocide’ have the blood of millions of innocent victims.”57 historian mark mazower’s remark carries the same weight twenty years later: the question of whether they were victims of genocide now matters intensely to the armenians, whose lobbying has brought this issue to the fore again and again in the past few years; and it matters equally to the turkish authorities, who do not seem to blanch at the term ‘massacre’ but are beside themselves when the g-word is mentioned.58 50 guenter lewy, the armenian massacres in ottoman turkey: a disputed genocide (salt lake city: utah university press, 2005), 241. see also lewis, the emergence, 356. 51 elizabeth kastor, “the armenian tragedy that has no name,” the washington post, 25 april 1990. 52 justin mccarthy and carolyn mccarthy, turks and armenians: a manual on the armenian question (washington, dc: assembly of turkish american associations, 1989), 66. 53 kastor, “the armenian tragedy.” the same transactional model allowed suggesting that armenians abandon the use of genocide in exchange for recognition of their suffering (lewy, the armenian massacres in ottoman turkey, 271). 54 harry d. harootunian, the unspoken as heritage: the armenian genocide and its unaccounted lives (durham, nc: duke university press, 2019), 142. 55 esra özyürek, “a turkish ‘i apologize’ campaign to armenians,” los angeles times, 5 january 2009. 56 “german parliament recognizes armenian genocide, angering turkey,” the new york times, 3 june 2016. 57 “armenian issue exploited to blackmail turkey, president erdoğan says,” daily sabah, 4 june 2016. 58 mark mazower, “the g-word,” london review of books, 8 february 2001, 21. 38 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 medz yeghern and interpretive denial the repetition of unproven claims gives further voice to a trend as old as the crime itself to rationalize, refuse, and rewrite what happened more than a century ago. the perversion of the meaning of medz yeghern brought its own share to the efforts to silence the name of the act and its recognition, maintain it as an ongoing event, and keep its identity in flux, preventing the annihilation from gaining a place in history.59 the essence of genocide is denial, marc nichanian has remarked: “why? because those who conceived and carried out the extermination conceived and carried out, by the same token, the elimination of every trace of their act.”60 the survivors, immersed in the harsh task of rebuilding their life and deprived of the power to have their voice heard, were forced to speak to themselves in their own language, except for a brief hiatus when claims for restitution of armenian territories were made after wwii. the words aksor (աքսոր “exile; ban; banishment”), chart (ջարդ “massacre; butchery; carnage; slaughter”), and godoradz (կոտորած “carnage; massacre; slaughter; butchery”)61 translated what the survivors had experienced and lived through, beyond and above legal issues or epistemological nuances. “when they were children in armenia terrible things happened to them and hundreds of thousands of others,” a reporter of the washington post wrote in 1990. “the chart, they call it – the kill. the kodoradz – the genocide [sic].” the daughter of a survivor recalled that, unlike other families who told fairy tales to their children, armenian families would gather at a social event “and at the end of the evening they would start talking about the chart.”62 in a different take, parents and grandparents rarely spoke, and when this happened, it was a private talk in whispers: “was it a ‘grownups’ secret’? what had happened? what was this ‘akhzor’ and ‘chardt’ [sic]?”63 “those who avoided the great horror for any reason – say, for being born under a lucky star – probably assess the savagery of the crime [yeghern] with whatever images imagination may create and the words ‘massacre’ [chart] and ‘exile’ [aksor],” as one survivor wrote three decades after the annihilation: it is not perhaps an exaggeration to say that the crime [yeghern] and its consequences went far and beyond the hopes and the imagination of its savage planners. they massacred, but not just the armenian body, but particularly the soul. 59 michael stanford, the nature of historical knowledge (oxford: blackwell, 1986), 32, quoted in gregory f. goekjian, “diaspora and denial: the holocaust and the ‘question’ of the armenian genocide,” diaspora 1 (1998): 14. 60 kazanjian and nichanian, “between genocide and catastrophe,” 133. 61 z. d. s. papazian, a practical dictionary armenian-english (constantinople: h. matteosian, 1905), 65, 232, 410. 62 kastor, “the armenian tragedy.” 63 haig sarajian, the silent generation (n.p.: n.p., 2009), iv–v. 39 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name they exiled people on the road and into the human-forbidden deserts. the armenian soul was particularly exiled, and later became a wanderer. that was the most terrible blow dealt by the crime [yeghern]: the destruction of the armenian collectivity, the dissolution of the armenian national soul.64 despite their use in everyday language, aksor and chart, along with godoradz, reflected a partial side of the events, which explains why neither of them ever became a proper name. conversely, yeghern (եղեռն) encapsulated all three words: deportation and massacre were the two essential components of the crime. it became a concept of intergenerational transmission. “i am not a writer, i am a humble worker,” a survivor attested in 1937. “i had barely seen a school when the medz yeghern drowned everything in its blood.”65 it became commonplace to label april 24 as a darkest date in the annals of humanity, “when the criminal turks gave the first signal of the unprecedented crime [vojir] known as the armenian great crime [haygagan medz yeghern],” and to refer to talat, the architect of the genocide, as “the great criminal [yeghernakordz].”66 a sixth grader from the village of anjar (lebanon), descendant of survivors from the selfdefense of musa dagh in 1915, wrote in 2004: “i have heard about the yeghern from my grandfather and grandmother, from my parents, from scouts and youth clubs, from armenian language and history teachers.”67 the current state of the etymology of yeghern, the original meaning and evolution of the word, and the grounds to translate it as “crime” have been recently discussed in a few articles.68 a conceptual history of the word, its origin and usage from the beginning of written literature in the fifth century ad until the end of the nineteenth century, when the end of classical armenian as literary language and the early stage of modern armenian overlapped, shows that the initial meaning of moral transgression (“evil”) gradually evolved to one of legal transgression (“crime”). this meaning of yeghern continued unaltered during the reign of sultan abdul hamid ii, the massacres of cilicia (1909), and the annihilation of 1915 and its aftermath, even developing to “heinous crime” (translated 64 arsen jamgochian, դրուագներ հայկական եղեռնէն եւ վերածնունդ [episodes from the armenian yeghern and rebirth] (paris: h. turabian, 1947), 4–5. 65 harutiun kefelian, աշխարհադաշտ (եղեռնի դրուագներ անդրէասի եւ շրջաններու) [world field: episodes of the yeghern in antreas and surroundings] (paris: araz, 1937), 3. 66 «նահատակներու պատգամը» [the message of the martyrs], asbarez, 25 april 1948. 67 shiraz tashjian, «մեծ եղեռն» [medz yeghern], in մուսա լեռ տարեգիրք [musa dagh yearbook] (beirut: vahe sethian, 2003–2004), 46–47. 68 antranik granian, «բառերու միւս երեսը (գ.)» [the other side of words iii], haigazian armenological review xv (1995): 34–35; idem, «բառերուն միւս երեսը. ջարդաբանութիւն եւ մասամբ նորին» [the other side of the words: words denoting massacres, etcetera], haigazian armenological review xxxv (2015): 422; parandzem meytikhanian, «եղեռն բառի լեզվական քննություն» [linguistic examination of the word yeghern], vem 1 (2009): 144–147; seda gasparyan, «եղեռն բառի համարժեքության դաշտը անգլերենում» [the field of equivalence of the word yeghern in english], vem 1 (2010): 125–135, transl. in idem, the armenian genocide: a linguocognitive perspective (yerevan: yerevan state university press, 2014), 167–186; vazgen hambardzumian, «հայերեն եղեռն բառի ծագումը և տիպաբանությունը» [the origin and typology of the armenian word yeghern], lezu yev lezvabanutyun (2016): 40–49. 40 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 into french as forfait). this heightened meaning of crime accounts for its preeminence over the more pedestrian word vojir.69 among the many examples unrelated to the genocide that are backed by translations from and into armenian, we can mention one brought by noted eastern armenian historian leo (arakel babakhanian, 1870–1932) in the first book of his multivolume history of the armenian people, published in 1917. there, he referred to the capture of king artavazd ii of armenia in 34 b.c., scapegoated by roman general mark antony after he had been routed by the parthians in a humiliating defeat two years before. artavazd, imprisoned in egypt, would be beheaded by order of queen cleopatra three years later, before her own suicide after her lover antony took his own life following their devastating defeat against octavian, the founder of the roman empire as augustus. leo wrote that antony had inflicted a terrible blow to rome’s influence in armenian with his callous behavior, “which the famous roman historian tacitus characterized with the word ‘yeghern.’”70 tacitus wrote about “the crime of antonius, who had enticed artavasdes, the king of the armenians, in a display of friendship, then weighing him down with chains and finally killing him.” 71 the first use of yeghern to name the annihilation may be traced back to hayastan, a biweekly published by the arf balkans central committee between march and october 1915 in sofia. the armenian historical core was being emptied, making impossible “to penetrate the essence of the new exodus,” an editorial of june 1915 wrote, “because we do not know the name of this horrifying turkish heinous crime [yeghern].”72 another editorial about the mourning day held by armenians of the balkans in august 1915 used medz yeghern for the first time to point out to the responsibility of the civilized world as “accomplice to the great crime [medz yeghern].” the survivors would become a monument to it: “thus, the future will be unable to forget the great crime [medz yeghern] ever.”73 the meaning “crime” was backed by various sources translated from and to armenian, although a minority of authors still preferred “tragedy.” the secondary meaning “tragedy, catastrophe, calamity” for yeghern, derived from the conflation of the distinct words yeghern (եղեռն “crime”) and yegher (“lamentation”) in the new haigazian dictionary (նոր հայկազեան լեզուի բառարան), the best dictionary of classical armenian published in 1836-1837,74 was defined as defunct or obsolete in the modern language 69 matiossian, the politics of naming the armenian genocide, 19-50. 70 leo, հայոց պատմություն [history of the armenians], vol. 1 (tiflis: slovo, 1917), 436. 71 tacitus, the annals, transl. by a. j. woodman (indianapolis and cambridge: hackett publishing co., 2004), 43. 72 «հայաստանը կը պարպուի» [armenia is being emptied], hayastan, 3 [16] june 1915. the dates of the newspaper are in the julian calendar used in bulgaria until late march 1916. 73 «պատմութեան եւ ոչ մարդկութեան համար» [for history and not for humankind], hayastan, 3 [16] august 1915. 74 matiossian, the politics of naming the armenian genocide, 22-23. 41 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name by the 1940s75 and excluded by most monolingual and bilingual dictionaries published afterwards. however, it persisted as the outcome of a post-genocidal mindset relying on antiquated sources or received wisdom and oriented toward the idea of mourning. yeghern was capitalized alone or with the adjective medz (մեծ), which highlighted the scope of the destruction. medz yeghern was mentioned in countless speeches and editorials, memoirs and testimonies, political discourse and historiography, inscriptions and advertisements. the semantic pattern continued in the diaspora and soviet armenia and the understanding of yeghern as “crime” or “heinous crime” underwent a passage to collective crime in the period 1920–1950. in april 1939, the first issue of the literary monthly hay kir (beirut, 1939–1944), edited by kevork baghdjian, bore the following dedication: “we dedicate the first issue of hay kir to the unforgettable memory of the martyr writers of the medz yeghern.” the dedication was also published in french, with medz yeghern translated as grands massacres (“great massacres”): a la mémoire éternelle des ecrivains martyrs, des grands massacres d’arménie, nous dedions le premier numéro de “haï kir.”76 the metaphoric identification of medz yeghern with genocide led gradually to their semantic identification after 1965, which was paralleled by the normative use of tseghasbanutiun (ցեղասպանութիւն, literally “race murder”) as calque word for “genocide” over competing terms like azkasbanutiun (ազգասպանութիւն, literally “nation murder”) and zhoghovrtasbanutiun (ժողովրդասպանութիւն literally “people murder”). a sizable number of books, newspapers, memoranda, presidential speeches, and other sources between the 1960s and the 2010s feature medz yeghern along the translations “genocide,” “armenian genocide,” “genocide of the armenians,” or “holocaust.” the double meaning “great [heinous] crime” and “great genocide” eliminates the artificial opposition of medz yeghern and genocide by default as it upends and transcends denial. the evolution of yeghern from “massacre” to “genocide” mirrors the arabic word ibādah (“annihilation, extermination, eradication, extirpation”), which was adapted to the generic term “genocide” (ibādah jama’iyyah “collective extermination”) and its particular cases (e.g., al-ibādah al-armaniyah “the armenian genocide”). the identification of the common name yeghern and the legal label “genocide,” which became more widespread after the turning point of the karabagh movement in 1988, goes beyond the generic relationship of signifier (medz yeghern) and signified (genocide). medz yeghern became fully dominant as proper name of the annihilation and remains in use to this day, although subordinated to hayots or haygagan tseghasbanutiun (հայոց / հայկական 75 two authoritative linguists established the parameters. hrachia adjarian’s etymological dictionary stated that the meaning of yeghern in the “modern literary language” was “crime” (hrachia adjarian, հայերէն արմատական բառարան [dictionary of armenian roots], vol. 2 (yerevan: yerevan university press, 1928), 694. on the other hand, stepanos malkhasiants’ dictionary of the armenian language marked the meaning “evil, catastrophe, calamity” with the sign of “obsolete” (stepanos malkhasiants, հայերէն բացատրական բառարան [armenian explanatory dictionary], vol. 1 (yerevan: armenian academy of sciences, 1945), 558. 76 «ձօն – in memoriam» [dedication – in memoriam], hay kir, april 1939, 1. 42 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 ցեղասպանութիւն “armenian genocide”).77 the absence of a conscious decision or intent to injure someone is typical of “acts of god” or force majeure, recorded in the case of natural (e.g., earthquakes, floods, pandemics) and human-made disasters (e.g., ship collision, nuclear accident) of unplanned origin and uncontrollable characteristics. the logical relation of cause-effect between a malevolent action and its outcome makes unlikely that yeghern may singlehandedly represent both cause (e.g., crime, massacre, genocide) and effect (e.g., tragedy, calamity, catastrophe, disaster) in modern armenian. semantic contradictions and political misrepresentation account for the failure to take this premise into consideration. in fact, the principle of causation reflects a binary relation that connects victimizer, who commits an evil action, and victim, who submits to that action. the victimizer performs the action (e.g., execution, explosion, arson, poisoning, death march) through active verbs (to do, make, cause, perpetrate, commit, execute, inflict) to effect agency (e.g., assassination, crime, plunder, mass murder, genocide). at its turn, the use of passive verbs (befell, fall upon, strike, happen) reflects the victim’s physical (e.g., injury, death, trauma) and mental/ spiritual perception (e.g., catastrophe, calamity, disaster, tragedy, cataclysm) of the action. for this reason, the linguistic worldview including but not limited to english and armenian vocabulary establishes that, for instance, neither a crime can befell a victim nor a catastrophe can be committed. indeed, the word yeghern has not been used in a contextual vacuum. its agency was thoroughly enhanced by the roots kordz (գործ “work”) and portz (փորձ “attempt, try”) in the compound words yeghernakordz (եղեռնագործ “criminal, perpetrator of a crime”), yeghernakordzutiun (եղեռնագործութիւն “crime, criminal action”), and yeghernaportz (եղեռնափորձ “criminal attempt”), and specialized terms like yeghernatad adean (եղեռնադատ ատեան “criminal court”) or yeghernapan (եղեռնաբան “criminologist”). the active verbs kordzel (գործել “to work; commit”) and kordzatrel (գործադրել “to put into action, execute, perpetrate, implement”) have strengthened the meaning “crime” in phrases like yeghern kordzel (եղեռն գործել “to commit, perpetrate [a] crime”) and yeghern kordzatrel (եղեռն գործադրել “to execute, implement [a] crime”). the criminal code of the state of maine (united states) offers a telling example of the straightforward relation between cause and effect: 1. a person is guilty of causing a catastrophe if the person recklessly causes a catastrophe by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of a structure, release or dissemination of poison, toxin, radioactive material, bacteria, virus or other biological agent or vector or other such force or substance that is dangerous to human life and difficult to confine. (…) 4. causing a catastrophe is a class a crime (title 17-a, §803-a). 77 matiossian, the politics of naming the armenian genocide, 72-85. 43 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name the characterization of intentional actions as events without agency contributes to create or affirm a narrative of unspecified calamity. hundreds of articles in the armenian press throughout the world have used the word “tragedy” in different languages with mentions always contextualized, explicitly or implicitly within agency. “a tragedy of such monstrous proportions,” a sentence typically stated in 1979, at a time when the genocide of namibia was barely recalled, “it was indeed the first genocide of the 20th century – a genocide premeditated and perpetrated by the turkish government.”78 the practitioners of interpretive denial, whether they appear on the stage or work behind the scenes, have agency as the last of their worries, however. at a white house reception in may 1978, u.s. president jimmy carter left agent, time, and place undefined in his reference to “one of the greatest tragedies,” which was tantamount to the omission of the cause: “but it’s generally not known that in the years preceding 1916, there was a concerted effort made to eliminate all the armenian people, probably one of the greatest tragedies that ever befell any group. and there weren’t any nuremberg trials.”79 lack of agency was even more obvious in his successor ronald reagan’s “statement about the armenian genocide” during his first presidential campaign in 1980. the text referred to “one of the greatest tragedies in the annals of recorded history” with the proviso that the 1980s were going to be “when americans and its [sic] allies throughout the free world resolve that the tragedy of 1915 never again be repeated,” but without any mention of genocide, agent, or place.80 all genocides become a tragedy, but since not all tragedies derive from genocide, the u.s. state department adopted the formula “the armenian tragedy” while actively opposing genocide resolutions during reagan’s years,81 and israeli foreign minister shimon peres reached the apex of denial in april 2001: “we reject allegations to create a similarity between the holocaust and the armenian allegations. nothing similar to the holocaust happened. it is a tragedy what the armenians went through but not a genocide.”82 the armenian orphan rug, weaved by genocide survivor girls in lebanon and presented to president calvin coolidge in 1925 as token of appreciation for american humanitarian assistance, had been kept in storage at the white house since 1982. in november 2013, the u.s. national security council pretexted potentially inappropriate use of government property and transportation risks to deny its loan to the smithsonian museum for the launch of a book on its history. after public outcry, this remarkable rug 78 vahan h. tootikian, “what does april 24 means for us today?” the armenian weekly, 28 april 1979. 79 the armenian genocide: facts and documents (new york: st. vartan’s press, 1985), 48. 80 “gov. reagan issues statement on april 24,” the armenian reporter, 24 april 1980; “ronald reagan’s letter to hairenik publications,” the armenian weekly, 26 april 1980. for the original text, see www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/digitallibrary/smof/cos/cicconi/box-6/40-94-6914308-006-008-2016, accessed 06.05.2022. the original title appears in michael bobelian, children of armenia: a forgotten genocide and the century-long struggle for justice (new york: simon and schuster, 2009), 169. 81 john m. evans, truth held hostage: america and the armenian genocide – what then? what now? (london: gomidas institute, 2016), 71. 82 “israeli foreign minister says no similarity between genocide and holocaust,” the armenian weekly, 14 april 2001. 44 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 was exhibited at the white house visitor’s center in november 2014, along gifts by france and japan after american help for homelessness following wwi and the tsunami of 2010. ironically, the rug was shown without proper identification of the orphans and how and where they had become orphans, blurring the distinction between a criminal act (genocide) and catastrophic events (war, tsunami).83 in june 2018, a motion was submitted to the australian house of representatives to acknowledge the humanitarian relief efforts of the country after the armenian annihilation. during the ensuing debate, rep. tim wilson noted that previous speakers had mentioned events like loss of life, desert marches, and people in desperate need, “but did not dare to speak the tragedy’s name: genocide.”84 aghed (աղէտ), one of the denominations referring to 1915, has been cited along yeghern as most used proper name.85 literary works used aghed most often to name the catastrophic elimination of western armenians, which they represented and narrated beyond historical testimonies or documents.86 nichanian has borrowed the word from survivor writer and literary critic hagop oshagan and expanded it into a metahistorical concept that encompasses the notions of catastrophe of memory and meaning. he has argued that aghed is “the proper word for the armenian genocide, one that expresses the complete annihilation of a people” as exact equivalent of shoah,87 while making a clear distinction between genocide as a historical event and object of historical discourse, and aghed as an event that “does not belong to history as historians conceive it.”88 nevertheless, some historians have mistakenly cited aghed as proper name for 83 richard simon, “white house urged to display armenian orphan rug commemorating genocide,” los angeles times, 12 november 2013; rafael medoff, “with armenian orphan rug, obama stumbles again on genocide,” the jewish press, 20 october 2014. 84 “mp to australia – ‘speak the tragedy’s name on armenian genocide,’” panarmenian, 26 june 2018, www. panarmenian.net/eng/news/257213/mp_to_australia__speak_the_tragedys_name_on_armenian_genocide, accessed 07.05.2022. 85 boghos levon zekiyan, l’armenia e gli armeni. polis lacerata e patria spirituale: la sfida di una sopravvivenza (milan: guerini e associati, 2000), 35; idem, “armenianturkish relations in the framework of armenian and turkish scholarships,” iran and the caucasus 14 (2010): 371. 86 krikor beledian, “l’expérience de la catastrophe dans la littérature arménienne,” revue d’histoire arménienne contemporaine 1 (1995): 131; idem, “from image to loss: the writers of kharpert and provincial literature,” in armenian tsopk/kharpert, ed. richard hovhannisian (costa mesa, ca: mazda publishers, 2002), 271–272; marc nichanian, writers of disaster, vol. 1 (the national revolution, princeton and london: gomidas institute, 2002), 10. 87 marc nichanian, “sarafian: the conquest of the exile,” in the bois de vincennes, transl. by christopher atamian (dearborn: the armenian research center, university of michigan-dearborn, 2011), 9. the french original was published in 1993. 88 nichanian, writers of disaster, 247; idem, the historiographic perversion, transl. by gil anidjar (new york: columbia university press, 2009), 9. despite the claim that oshagan was the first to use systematically aghed or invent it as proper name in his interview published in 1932 and his posthumously published monograph of 1944 about aram andonian (idem, “the truth of the facts: about the new revisionism,” in remembrance and denial: the case of the armenian genocide, ed. richard hovhannisyan (detroit: wayne state university press, 1999), 269; kazanjian and nichanian, “between genocide and catastrophe,” 128; nichanian, the historiographic perversion, 15), the word always appears lowercased (peniamin tashian, «մայրիներու շուքին տակ (գրական զրոյց յ. օշականի հետ)» [under the shade of cedars: literary conversation with h. oshagan], 45 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name the genocide,89 despite the fact that its absence from newspaper advertisements and memorial inscriptions shows that it was not used either to publicize commemorations or to memorialize the annihilation. it failed to prevail in popular awareness and daily language, and today occupies a marginal place as a literary term.90 the survey of a bibliography of armenian books on the genocide has yielded a total of five volumes published between 1915 and 1965 with aghed in their title, while general bibliographies of armenian books published in the united states (1915–2011) and lebanon (1915–2012) show only one use as subtitle for the same book in both countries. in comparison, twenty-three books were published worldwide with the word yeghern in their title from 1915 to 1965, nine in the united states (1915–2011), and twenty-five in lebanon (1925–2012).91 conclusion the power of language frames memory and legitimizes the knowledge of history, which makes possible to understand the past, but may limit the ways to see it.92 more than just the representation of a certain concept, words may sometimes be an embodiment of collective memory. medz yeghern, the name born from the vocabulary and the experience of hairenik monthly, march 1932, 128–31; hagop oshagan, համապատկեր արեւմտահայ գրականութեան [panorama of western armenian literature], vol. 9 (antelias: catholicosate of the great house of cilicia, 1980), 255, 267, 282–3, 286. 89 donald bloxham, “determinants of the armenian genocide,” looking backward, moving forward: confronting the armenian genocide, ed. richard hovhannisyan (new brunswick and london: transaction publishers, 2003), 24; mark levene, genocide in the age of the nation-state, vol. 1: the meaning of genocide (new york and london: i.b. tauris, 2005), 70; stefan troebst, “europäisierung der vertreibungserinnerung? eine deutsch-polnische chronique scandaleuse 2002–2008,” in verflochtene erinnerungen: polen und seine nachbarn im 19. und 20. jahrundert, eds. martin aust, krzysztof ruchnewicz and stefan troebst (cologne, weimar, and vienna: böhlau, 2009), 245 (“aghet or yeghern [genocide of the armenians in the ottoman empire]”). stephan astourian, who used aghed as denomination in the early 1990s (stephan astourian, “the armenian genocide: an interpretation,” the history teacher 2 (1990): 113, 145, 147, 159; idem, “genocidal process: reflections on the armeno-turkish polarization,” the armenian genocide: history, politics, ethics, ed. richard hovhannisian (new york: st. martin’s press, 1992), 5, most recently has cited medz yeghern translated as “great crime” (idem, “hybrid warfare, a pseudo-scandal and the armenian genocide museum institute,” evn report, 21 june 2020 (www.evnreport.com/raw-unfiltered/hybrid-warfare-a-pseudo-scandal-and-the-armenian-genocide-museum-institute, accessed 06.08.2020). 90 nichanian, “the truth of the facts,” 269; kazanjian and nichanian, “between genocide and catastrophe,” 128. taline voskeritchian, “between massacre and genocide: on eric friedler’s ‘aghét: nation murder,’” jadaliyya, 16 may 2011 (www.jadaliyya.com/details/23990/between-massacre-and-genocide-on-ericfriedler’s-aghét-nation-murder, accessed 05.05.2022). 91 nersisian, armenian genocide, 621–38; hovsep nalbandian, ամերիկահայ գիրքի պատմութիւն 1858–2011 [history of the armenian-american book 1858–2011] (los angeles: yerevan, 2011); antranik dakessian and armen urneshlian (eds.), լիբանանահայ գիրքը 1894–2012. մատենագիտական ցանկ [the armenian lebanese book 1894–2012: bibliographical list] (beirut: haigazian university press, 2012). 92 jay winter, war beyond words: language of remembrance from the great war to the present (cambridge and new york: cambridge university press, 2017), 124–125. 46 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 survivors, becomes the most suitable way to liberate the meaning of the annihilation from the shackles of semantic relativism and give a historical explanation of the experience of crime, in the same way that aghed, “the name that will come at the end of history, when history as a series of denials will come to an end,”93 gives a metahistorical explanation of the experience of catastrophe. language has occupied an important place in armenian identity, becoming a fundamental component when the process of cultural awakening was underway in the nineteenth century. powerless children witnessed the rape of their mothers and sisters, namely, the victimization of the mother tongue. the popular image of mother armenia, created in the early 1860s, was periodically subjected to ottoman censorship from the 1880s, along with other cultural artifacts.94 mother armenia became ravished armenia, to paraphrase the title of survivor aurora mardiganian’s (1901–1994) memoir and the silent film she starred in 1919: mother armenia seated among the ruins, weeping – many of us grew up with that picture as children, and you can still see it here and there from los angeles to new york to paris to buenos aires to beirut. ruins and graves make nations, and we armenians have also millions of our unburied dead.95 most speakers of western armenian and its dialects disappeared with the destruction of the milieu that fostered their sustainable development. the descendants of survivors worldwide are the remainder of the linguistic heritage that included some of the finest names in the letters. however, when outsiders who lacked “either the moral or the scholarly authority to assert what terms should or should not be used”96 started dictating the terms of engagement with the past, those descendants forfeited their right to speak, namely, they rejected the words of their own language and refused bearing witness to a cornerstone of their identity. in the ultimate stage of genocide, those bound to fight against denial were ensnared in the cruelest of ironies: denying themselves. the meaning “tragedy, catastrophe, calamity” fostered a misrepresentation of facts when interpretive denial managed to cross the language barrier and turn medz yeghern into collateral damage of the war of words. the innate ability of native speakers to be the final arbiters of what their own words mean had the potential to thwart the ongoing assault on substance that victimized language once again. its manipulation by euphemism 93 kazanjian and nichanian, “between genocide and catastrophe,” 128. nichanian paraphrases a sentence by hagop oshagan that prefaced his inquiry into the moral grounds of the perpetrators: “history can prove nothing, since it is a display [hantes] of denials” (oshagan, համապատկեր, 276). 94 m. hakobian, «մայր հայաստանի գաղափարը հայ ազատասիրական մտքի ոլորտներում» (the idea of mother armenia in the realms of armenian freedom-loving thought), echmiadzin, april 1985, 73–75. 95 leon surmelian, “wanted: a new armenian image,” the armenian mirror-spectator, 24 february 1973. thanks are due to hagop gulludjian for bringing the concept of victimization to my attention. 96 marc mamigonian, “a commentary on the turkish ‘i apologize’ campaign,” the armenian weekly, special issue, 25 april 2009, 21. 47 vartan matiossian: medz yeghern, the silenced name and equivocation offered armenians an unexpected path to achieve the literal recognition that had been studiously avoided. emphasis on the synonymous character of yeghern, tseghasbanutiun, and “genocide,” as well as of medz yeghern and hayots tseghasbanutiun (“armenian genocide”) would have likely countered the logical fallacy behind the translations “great catastrophe” and “great calamity.” however, their uncritical acceptance squandered the opportunity for a proactive response and legitimized medz yeghern as an outdated expression without agency. the connection of “abrilean yeghern” (ապրիլեան եղեռն) and “armenian genocide” in the memorial of soghomon tehlirian in fresno, california, and “1915 yeghern” (1915ի եղեռն) and “1915 genocide” in the april 24 memorial in niagara falls, new york, for instance, was lost in the fog of genocide politics amid no less than two dozen memorials featuring similar translations worldwide. word meanings are not etched in stone, but words etched in stone have a meaning.97 foreign proper names and words are no longer exotic. hebrew and ukrainian speakers have thrown their substantial weight behind shoah and holodomor. official statements, press, and academia have adopted shoah from europe to the americas following the impact of claude lanzmann’s homonymous film and the polemics over the meaning and trivialization of the name “holocaust.”98 holodomor (“killing by hunger”), which appears to have been coined in the ukrainian community of north america in the 1960s and popularized in ukraine during the final years of the soviet union, has replaced both “famine” and “ukrainian holocaust” as name of choice, since no “single locution in english articulates what stalin inflicted in 1933 on the people of the ukrainian countryside.”99 the use of shoah and holodomor outside their ethnic realms disproves the claim that medz yeghern may be meaningless outside the armenian realm. as a matter of fact, the word “genocide” originally happened to have no meaning for the common reader, given the absence of genos in english and french vocabulary.100 medz yeghern, which should be translated as “great crime” for any context prior to the first published use of “genocide” in 1945, with the option to use “great genocide” in contemporary contexts, enjoys a gradual recognition in the media, academia, and even popular publications (paolo cossi’s graphic novel medz yeghern: il grande male, for instance). it has the potential to become a meaningful carrier of memory in english like shoah and holodomor, along other foreign, older proper names like reconquista, renaissance, or risorgimento. 97 see a catalog of 114 memorial inscriptions containing the words yeghern and/or “genocide” and its analysis in matiossian, the politics of naming the armenian genocide, 147–160. 98 charles passy, “new word to replace holocaust wins favor,” palm beach post, 18 april 2004; philologos, “roots of the holocaust,” forward, 16 september 2005. see also robert s. c. gordon, the holocaust in italian culture, 1944–2010 (stanford: stanford university press, 2012), 177–178. 99 michael naydan, “a lasting imprint,” the ukrainian weekly, 22 january 1995. see also andriewsky, “towards a decentred history,” 25–26. 100 perry s. bechky, “lemkin’s situation: toward a rhetorical understanding of genocide,” brooklyn law review 2 (2012): 614. 48 international journal of armenian genocide studies: volume 7, no. 1, 2022 the heirs of the original perpetrators are prone to uphold the foundational sin embedded into turkish identity with a replay of hackneyed assumptions and clichés, echoed by toned-down versions from outside purveyors with credentials of dubious objectivity. “words cannot change or rewrite history,” turkish foreign minister mevlüt çavuşoğlu tweeted on 24 april 2021, in response to joseph biden’s statement using “genocide” and medz yeghern.101 the irony should not have been lost to a keen observer. although words do not change the past, the ultimate goal of their corruption is to rewrite the facts or, in other terms, “to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind” (george orwell). context matters even more than words, because “the nameless tell us what happened and that is all the evidence that we need,”102 including the proper name of the century-old crime that they bequeathed to their descendants and remains under a cone of silence that awaits to be lifted. 101 twitter.com/mevlutcavusoglu/status/1385988990080360448, accessed 24.04.2021. 102 harootunian, the unspoken as heritage, 127.