a new and improved whole life satisfaction account of happiness ahuvia, a., biswas-diener, r., frey, b. s., haybron, d. m., helliwell, j. f., mcmahon, d. m., ricard, m., & thin, n. (2011). felicitators. international journal of wellbeing, 1 (2), 193-194. doi:10.5502/ijw.v1i2.1 john f. helliwell university of british columbia john.helliwell@ubc.ca copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 193 editorial felicitators introduction this symposium is the result of our efforts to collect and present what we know about the creation and distribution of happiness. our aim is to help shift the focus of wellbeing research from the ‘i’ to the ‘we’ by celebrating people and places, ideas and institutions, that have made and can make the world a happier place. we call them ‘felicitators’ – producers of happiness. this has echoes of bentham’s felicific calculus, and reminds us that gnh, the gross national happiness concept, is rendered in brazil as fib, felicidad interna bruta. our unusual partnership is thanks to jean timsit, who two years ago invited a range of happiness researchers to pool their diverse skills and interests to expand and enrich what is known and can be used to improve lives. we are enormously grateful for his initiative and continued support. in january 2010, in the course of project discussions in tulum (mexico), we fell upon two ideas at once. the first was to use particular stories and examples as a way of assembling and explaining important results. the second was to encourage the spread of wellbeing by celebrating felicitators, and especially those whose ideas and actions have broad or universal applicability. we think that our eight papers, created collaboratively and gathered together in this symposium, are ideally placed in the international journal of wellbeing, whose mission, like ours, is to develop and freely exchange ideas that deserve and need to cross geographic and disciplinary borders. we will not attempt to stitch our papers too tightly together, or to claim any sort of completeness. we opted for examples, and examples are what you get. what, you might ask, following the alphabetical order of our names, could dr seuss, maria montessori, bruder klaus, central park, singapore prisons, moses, the dalai lama and music have in common? read on and see. you may, like us, be surprised to see how many common themes there are, and how very specific examples can open up very large discussions. authors aaron ahuvia university of michigan robert biswas-diener portland state university bruno s. frey university of zurich and university of warwick daniel m. haybron saint louis university felicitators: introduction ahuvia, biswas-diener, frey, haybron, helliwell, mcmahon, ricard, & thin www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 194 john f. helliwell canadian institute for advanced research and university of british columbia john.helliwell@ubc.ca darrin m. mcmahon florida state university matthieu ricard shechen monastery and mind and life institute neil thin university of edinburgh grenville-cleave, b. (2012). review of positive psychologists on positive psychology, international journal of wellbeing, 2(2), 146–149. doi:10.5502/ijw.v2i2.17 bridget grenville-cleave workmad ltd bridget@workmad.co.uk copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 146 book review positive psychologists on positive psychology aaron jarden, ed., amazon digital services, 2012 asin: b007ixu1ry, 136pp, us$2.99 also published as aaron jarden, ed., international journal of wellbeing, 2012 doi:10.5502/ijw.v2i2, 79pp review by bridget grenville-cleave abstract: this 130-page e-book, positive psychologists on positive psychology by aaron jarden, explores topics that all positive psychologists, experienced or novice, researcher or practitioner, will find interesting. it’s original, engaging and enjoyable, plus it provides plenty of inside information. the concept is very straightforward—transcripts of thirteen personal interviews with a variety of positive psychology experts on their favourite topic. but don’t let that simplicity fool you—at the same time this book will challenge your understanding of what positive psychology is, how to apply it, and how the field is developing. keywords: positive psychology, aaron jarden, interviews, wellbeing, well-being 1. introduction this 130-page e-book, positive psychologists on positive psychology by aaron jarden, explores topics that all positive psychologists, experienced or novice, researcher or practitioner, will find interesting. not only does the book provide answers to basic questions, such as ‚what is positive psychology?‛, it also addresses more challenging ones, such as:  when, where and how did positive psychology develop? (the answer to this one is a great lesson in how to do change management effectively, by the way).  who is doing cutting edge positive psychology research?  where is the field heading in the next five years?  what kinds of positive psychology research are being applied in the real world? 2. the usual suspects? the book consists of the transcripts of interviews which aaron jarden carried out with thirteen positive psychologists between july and october 2011, one chapter per person. if you’re not well versed in positive psychology, you will not have heard of all of them. in my view, that’s not a weakness but a great strength—it gives us diversity and breadth we wouldn’t otherwise http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ review of positive psychologists on positive psychology grenville-cleave www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 147 have and (if i can paraphrase todd kashdan) it’s important because there’s a great deal more to positive psychology than what you usually hear about in media-friendly sound bites about positive emotions, strengths, and gratitude. in alphabetical order, the positive psychologists featured are: ilona boniwell, mihaly csikszentmihalyi, ed diener, barbara fredrickson, todd kashdan, alex linley, sonja lyubomirsky, nic marks, ryan niemiec, acacia parks, denise quinlan, michael steger, robert vallerand. 3. the author dr aaron jarden is a senior lecturer in psychology at the open polytechnic of new zealand and president of the new zealand association of positive psychology (nzapp).1 he is also lead investigator of the international wellbeing study,2 co-editor of the international journal of wellbeing3 and director of grow international.4 aaron describes his goal as ‚complete understanding of human wellbeing, why it is as it is, and how it can be improved.‛ given this pedigree, i’m sure i’m not the only reader who wishes he’d provided answers to the questions he posed the other positive psychologists in the book. 4. the audience positive psychologists on positive psychology has been written primarily for those who are new to positive psychology or are thinking of entering the field. it is a great resource for that purpose. hearing what positive psychology means to the experts who are right there, working at the coal face every day, is invaluable. but even if you’re a relatively old hand in the positive psychology world, this book has much to offer. you get a lot of personal insights which you wouldn’t otherwise hear. the book is well balanced—the downsides are spelled out too, not just the age-old perception of positive psychology being too pollyanna-ish. it also includes emerging concerns about research being applied too quickly, and even misapplied. acacia parks suggests testing the effectiveness of positive psychology books written for the general public against non-science based ‘quackery’ such as the secret. all this is useful material for those of us who’ve been working in the field on an applied basis. 5. common questions what are the distinctive features of positive psychology? a simple question for experts to answer, you might think! we get three different types of response. some refer to the importance of positive psychology’s scientific grounding, and its focus on the positive and on optimal human functioning. others refer to a clear split between research and application. the third group answers in terms of specific positive psychology content, such as strengths and positive emotions. if you’re an experienced positive psychologist, how would you answer this question? what are some of the most valid criticisms of positive psychology? in the early days of positive psychology our old friend, optimism, took most of the flak. now the loudest criticisms focus on the speed and manner in which positive psychology is making its way into practice, 1 http://www.positivepsychology.org.nz/. 2 http://www.wellbeingstudy.com/. 3 http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/. 4 http://www.growhq.com/. http://www.positivepsychology.org.nz/ http://www.wellbeingstudy.com/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/index.php/ijow/index http://www.growhq.com/ review of positive psychologists on positive psychology grenville-cleave www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 148 and the way it’s communicated. nic marks, alex linley, todd kashdan and acacia parks refer to these concerns. according to acacia parks, ‚…in some ways we’re not as careful as we could be about the sound bites we release into the ether, or about maintaining the integrity of those sound bites so that they are accurate‛. nic marks supports this: ‚there have been far too many claims made far too quickly about certain interventions. …we need to be able to communicate things better…‛. a further criticism concerns cultural applicability. nic marks disputes any claim that positive psychology interventions are universally applicable. todd kashdan goes deeper and refers to the overriding importance of the situational context of research and applications. whilst there’s a lot to be learned from positive psychology’s strengths, there is much we can learn from its weaknesses. what are some of positive psychology’s achievements? there’s consistency here in the thrust of responses. they revolve around how positive psychology is communicated and disseminated. for example, mihaly csikszentmihalyi mentions getting the subject of positive human activity to be taken seriously, and creating a vocabulary for it; sonja lyubomirsky talks about gaining traction within the wider field of psychology; michael steger about gaining traction in other disciplines; whilst barbara fredrickson refers to getting positive psychology on the public radar. what is evident from reading this book is that the positive psychology field is so much wider than strengths and positive emotions, although these tend to dominate because they make good sound bites. the book suggests that we need to work harder to raise awareness about the importance to wellbeing of other, less glamorous, topics such as meaning, mindfulness, self-regulation, and time perspectives. 6. why you should read this book the aim of the book is to enrich our understanding of positive psychology as it currently stands. it succeeds very well, but it does much, much more. it provides the inside track on what positive psychology experts really think about positive psychology; where positive psychology is going next; what the hot topics for the next five years are; who the upcoming positive psychology researchers to watch are; and it also gives valuable advice for aspiring positive psychology researchers and practitioners. if that wasn’t enough, you get to hear from the horse’s mouth about new developments, such as the direction of the international positive psychology association (ippa)5 from the new president, robert vallerand, and the university of east london’s mapp program6 from the course director, ilona boniwell. if you want to find out more then you’re going to have to read the book! 7. recommendation this book is original, it’s a quick and easy read, it provides inside information but at the same time challenges your understanding of what positive psychology is, how to apply it and how it’s developing. the concept is very straightforward—transcripts of thirteen personal interviews with an assortment of positive psychology experts on their favourite topic—but don’t let that simplicity fool you. 5 http://www.ippanetwork.org/. 6 http://www.uel.ac.uk/postgraduate/specs/positivepsychology/. http://www.ippanetwork.org/ http://www.uel.ac.uk/postgraduate/specs/positivepsychology/ review of positive psychologists on positive psychology grenville-cleave www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 149 the only real downside is that the book (like most others in the field) is biased in favour of a traditional western perspective. all of those interviewed are from, have been educated in, or work primarily in, the usa, canada, the uk, and new zealand. it’s true that the cultural weakness of positive psychology as it stands is raised several times. i wonder whether the presence of more european and eastern researchers and practitioners would have enhanced the book. while you’d expect a lot of agreement amongst the positive psychologists featured in the book, there’s sufficient diversity in the knowledge and opinions to ensure that you can’t just take everything as read. you have to assess it yourself, assimilate it and make up your own mind. that, i think, is the power of a good book. this one gives you a foundation on which to craft your own positive psychology path. i wish it had been available when i did my mapp program in 2007. i highly recommend it. author bridget granville-cleave workmad ltd bridget@workmad.co.uk aames c., m. (2012). a scientific exploration of happiness: a review of the science in exploring happiness: from aristotle to brain science, international journal of wellbeing, 2(3), 288-291. doi: 10.5502/ijw.v2.i3.10 matthew aames c. university of colorado matthew.cucchiaro@colorado.edu copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 288 book review a scientific exploration of happiness: a review of the science in exploring happiness: from aristotle to brain science sissela bok, yale university press, 2010, isbn: 978-0-300-1329-7 (cloth), 224pp sissela bok, yale university press, 2011, isbn: 978-0-300-17810-4 (paper), 224pp review by matthew aames c. abstract: exploring happiness covers the vast terrain of happiness research from aristotle to brain science. but despite what the subtitle suggests, by far the greater part of the book concerns the remarks of various literary and historical figures on the concept while too few pages are reserved for the scientific findings that have surfaced in recent decades. this interesting read shines at times, most notably when it compares arm-chair theories from the distant past with modern scientific findings, but it leaves much to be desired from a perspective of scientific interest. keywords: happiness, satisfaction, science, measurement, psychology 1. introduction happiness: it is what americans report thinking about at least once a day (lyubomirsky & lepper, 1999), and what they reportedly confess to valuing even more than going to heaven (king & napa, 1998). perhaps unsurprisingly then, a course on the topic attracted 855 students in one semester at harvard, making it the most popular class at the university (lambert, 2007). and it’s not just harvard. the hundreds of happiness courses to have sprouted up in just the last decade suggest that students all over the world are in demand of a different kind of science class: the science of happiness. exploring happiness is one of a long and growing list of books released recently, aimed at meeting the high demand for enlightenment on the subject of happiness. as the title suggests, author sissela bok explores the vast terrain of happiness research from aristotle to brain science. she does this with clarity and eloquent prose throughout. but despite what the subtitle suggests, by far the greater part of the book concerns the remarks of various literary and historical figures on the concept while too few pages are reserved for the scientific findings that have surfaced in recent decades. even so, exploring happiness manages to (briefly) cover each of the major bases that social and neuro-science explores: how happy people are, what makes them happy, and what does not produce as much happiness as people tend to think. http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ a scientific exploration of happiness aames c. www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 289 2. are people generally happy? one of the most intriguing aspects of exploring happiness is the juxtaposition between what past thinkers have theorized and what scientists have more recently found. a nice example of this is found in chapter 7 where sigmund freud and bertrand russell speculate that most people are unhappy, if not greatly so (they do disagree over whether people can become happy). research, however, shows that most people, even in developing countries, report being happy above neutral levels. the settlement of this dispute will clearly depend on the nature of happiness itself. 3. what is happiness? exploring happiness includes a representative array of the various happiness definitions to have been penned over the many centuries, from aristotle’s account to the more ordinary usages of today. bok cites the definition of the economist, richard layard, as one of the more contemporary views of this latter kind about the nature of happiness. layard states that happiness is “…feeling good – enjoying life and wanting the feeling to be maintained” (layard, 2005, p. 12; quoted in bok, p. 39). bok does not address concerns nor does she express opinions regarding the various proposed definitions of happiness. thus, if one is looking for an argument which singles out the correct theory of happiness, from the recitation of what bok considers “discordant definitions” (p. 35), one will be sorely disappointed. according to bok, doing this is “needlessly restrictive” (p. 45). while the enterprise which bok undertakes concerns the exploration of happiness, this raises the question: how, then, can reliable measurements be made, if what we are measuring is not uniform? 4. happiness measured according to chapter 5 on measurement, most people think that one can be happy in multiple ways, including in the moment (“instant utility”), as well as being satisfied with one’s life (or certain aspects of it). researchers have latched on to these two definitions, which require differences in measurement. one means of measuring the latter is the satisfaction with life scale. exploring happiness does not relay the test-retest reliability of such surveys but bok correctly reports that the respondents’ answers are sometimes compared to their family and friends’ responses about the subjects’ satisfaction. bok does not attempt to give credence to such studies nor does she report that such surveys tend to “converge with informant and spouse reports” (van boven, 2003, p. 1196). this omission is disappointing from the perspective of a scientific analysis of the research on happiness, as it fails to even attempt to investigate the veracity of these measures. bok rightly gives attention to much more recent, and significant, methods of measuring one’s happiness as well: the experience sampling method and the day reconstruction method. bok, however, neglects to inform the reader of the significance of the paradigm shift in the way more recent research into happiness is conducted. prior to these research methods, which aim to capture happiness levels that people are currently experiencing (or have very recently experienced), happiness studies consisted almost exclusively of attempts to measure satisfaction levels. one important finding from these new methods is that what makes people satisfied does not always make them feel pleasure or positive affect (kahneman & riis, 2005, p. 287-288). this finding may have serious implications for, among other things, some of the a scientific exploration of happiness aames c. www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 290 decisions we make in life (should we pursue the things that are more pleasurable or the things that make us more satisfied, when we have the choice?). one area in which exploring happiness shines most is in its illumination on brain imaging studies and their uses. the shift in focus on how a person feels at any one time, rather than the satisfaction one reports, is what makes these happiness studies candidates for brain imaging research. bok explains that scientists document the rate of blood flow, using fmri studies, in various parts of the brain so that they can learn whether expressions of pleasure or pain stimulate particular brain areas. research shows that positive emotions are associated with more activity in the left pre-frontal cortex. the detailing of brain imaging studies in chapter 2, and the reporting that the left pre-frontal brain activity of buddhist monks is far more active compared to that of non-meditators, is noteworthy. unfortunately, it is especially noteworthy due to the fact that this is one of the only parts of exploring happiness that delves into the brain science of wellbeing. bok demonstrates an understanding of some of the important work that neuro-scientists perform related to happiness measurements, but she neglects to provide her reader with more than a taste of this stimulating and groundbreaking research. 5. can people become lastingly happier? exploring happiness provides a compelling look into the aspects of human biology that limit the level of increased happiness one can hope to experience long term. it describes the hereditary limitations on happiness and the strong link between sources of pleasure and our adapting to those sources: a change marked by a return to our normal state. the idea that we adapt to any ups and downs in circumstances is referred to by psychologists as the hedonic treadmill. the book mentions one of the most well known pieces of evidence for the treadmill. studies of both lottery winners and paraplegics show that they are not substantially happier or unhappier after a surprisingly short period of time than the non-wealthy and non-paralyzed, respectively. bok balances these studies with criticisms of them, reporting that there is conflicting research as well as a charge that the studies have insufficient sample sizes. chapter 7 of exploring happiness succeeds in highlighting the fascinating findings from psychology that one has around 40% control over one’s own happiness. the research states that about 50% of one’s happiness is in the hands of genetics and that a meager 10% is the product of one’s circumstances (wealth, material goods, etc.). the book explains that wealth tends to contribute to happiness, but the effects are often not large (e.g., many people on the forbes list of millionaires are reportedly unsatisfied). the 40% that is within one’s control and that does not seem to succumb to adaptation (at least to any great degree) includes exercise, practicing gratitude, and work that engages one. strong social relationships, unsurprisingly, are claimed to be the most important investment in one’s happiness. bok is careful to point out that the findings are averages and do not necessarily apply equally to everyone; and furthermore, that these positive interventions have not been tested over the long term. 6. conclusion this interesting read shines at times, such as when illuminating various theories on happiness over time and connecting the vast terrain on the topic, but it is wanting overall from a perspective of scientific interest. exploring happiness likely appeals most to a niche audience of those who have an interest in learning about the immense history on the subject from the perspective of mostly literary figures and who lack a need for much critical analysis. a scientific exploration of happiness aames c. www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 291 author matthew aames c. university of colorado matthew.cucchiaro@colorado.edu references kahneman, d. & riis, j. (2005). living, and thinking about it: two perspectives on life. the science of well being. eds. felicia huppert, nick baylis & barry keverne. oxford university press, oxford, uk. king, l. a. & napa, c. k. (1998). what makes a life good? journal of personality and social psychology, 75, 156-165. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.156 lambert, c. (jan.-feb. 2007). the science of happiness: psychology explores humans at their best. harvard magazine. http://harvardmagazine.com/2007/01/the-science-of-happiness.html layard, r. (2005). happiness: lessons from a new science. the penguin group, new york, ny. lyubomirsky, s. & lepper, h. (1999). a measure of subjective happiness: preliminary reliability and construct validation. social indicators research, 46(2), 137-155. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1006824100041 van boven, l. (2003). to do or to have? that is the question. journal of personality and social psychology, 85(6), 1193-1202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.6.1193 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.156 http://harvardmagazine.com/2007/01/the-science-of-happiness.html http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1006824100041 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.6.1193 a new and improved whole life satisfaction account of happiness suikkanen, j. (2019). the advice models of happiness: a response to feldman. international journal of wellbeing, 9(2), 8-13. doi:10.5502/ijw.v9i2.837 jussi suikkanen university of birmingham jussiphil@gmail.com copyright belongs to the author(s) 8 article the advice models of happiness: a response to feldman jussi suikkanen abstract: in his critical notice entitled “an improved whole life satisfaction theory of happiness?” focusing on my article that was previously published in this journal, fred feldman raises an important objection to a suggestion i made about how to best formulate the whole life satisfaction theories of happiness. according to my proposal, happiness is a matter of whether an idealised version of you would judge that your actual life corresponds to the life-plan, which he or she has constructed for you on the basis of your cares and concerns. feldman argues that either the idealised version will include in the relevant life-plan only actions that are possible for you to do or he or she will also include actions and outcomes that are not available for you in the real world. he then uses examples to argue that both of these alternatives have implausible consequences. in response to this objection, i argue that what is included in the relevant life-plan depends on what you most fundamentally desire and that this constraint is enough to deal with feldman’s new cases. keywords: happiness, whole life satisfaction, fred feldman, conditional fallacy 1. introduction it seems clear that happy people are satisfied with their lives – they must surely appreciate how well their lives are going. there is a long philosophical tradition of developing this simple observation into a full-blown theory of happiness.1 according to the resulting “whole life satisfaction” theories (hereafter “wls theories”), being happy is, in some way to be specified further, a matter of judging that your life compares well with your life-plan and especially a matter of feeling satisfied as a consequence. in an earlier article and in his recent book on happiness, fred feldman makes a powerful objection to the wls theories that challenges their very fundamental structure (feldman, 2008, 2010, ch. 5). it has the form of a dilemma. the objection begins from the idea that either we have to accept an actualist or a hypotheticalist version of the wls theories. it then argues that, whichever way we choose, we are led to implausible conclusions concerning how happy different agents are. the most basic actualist versions of the wls theories make the happiness of a person depend on an actual judgment which that person must make about how well her life is going compared to her life-plan. the problem here, however, is that many of us are so immersed in our daily activities that we have little time to form any life-plans or consider how well our actual lives would compare to them. yet we do not want to claim that we are necessarily for this reason unhappy. 1 for a list of references, see suikkanen (2011, p. 150 fn. 6). advice models of happiness suikkanen 9 to avoid this problem, the wls theorists could suggest that perhaps our happiness is instead a function of how well we would judge our lives compared to our life-plans if we were to form such plans and considered how well our lives matched those plans. yet, feldman’s insight is that these kinds of hypotheticalist accounts are flawed too. a spontaneous person who is forced to form life-plans and compare her new reflective life to it in the counterfactual condition is likely to judge that her life is now not going according to her plan, as she had no intention to form life-plans or engage in self-reflection in the first place. the point of my previous article in this journal (suikkanen, 2011) was to investigate whether the wls theories could be structured in a way that would enable them to avoid the previous dilemma. my diagnosis of feldman’s wonderful objection was that it revealed that the hypotheticalist wls accounts commit the so-called conditional fallacy.2 these views attempt to capture happiness in terms of subjunctive conditionals: what you would judge, if you were in certain circumstances. however, putting you into the relevant counterfactual conditions changes your life in the relevant respects, and so the judgments you make about your own life in those circumstances have little relevance with respect to how happy you are in your actual life. at this point, i noticed that similar conditional fallacies have recently been committed elsewhere in ethics, for example, in the debates concerning practical reasons where it has been suggested that we should understand reasons in terms of what we would desire if we were fully rational.3 the lesson of these debates has been that this doesn’t work: making you fully rational changes your situation in a way that makes your desires in that new situation irrelevant to the reasons you actually have in the real world where you are not as rational (smith, 1995, p. 111). these analogical debates gave me hope. in that context, michael smith has found a way of avoiding the conditional fallacy. in order to give an account of what reasons you actually have, smith (1995, sec. 1) formulated a distinct evaluating perspective from which an idealised version of you has certain desires with regards to what the real version of you is to do in the evaluated actual world where you remain the same. in this case, the idealising changes made to the desires of your idealised version cannot change the features of the evaluated actual situation and so the conditional fallacy is avoided. i used a similar strategy to construct a new structure for the wls views that could enable the resulting views to avoid the conditional fallacy horn of feldman’s dilemma (suikkanen, 2011, secs 5-6). this strategy relied on drawing the distinction between the actual person in the real world whose happiness is being evaluated and the idealised version of this person who is a theoretical construct responsible for forming an ideal life-plan on the basis of the person’s cares and concerns, and making a judgment of how well that person’s real life conforms to the hypothetical life-plan. this enables the wls views to avoid the problem of the happiness of spontaneous people, as the individuals who are happily immersed in their activities can continue to do just that. all the view requires is that their evaluating version comes to judge that there is a match between the life-plan they construct out of the real person’s cares and concerns and the real person’s actual life. these kinds of advice model versions of the wls theories then have the right structure to avoid feldman’s powerful objection that seemed fatal to the more traditional wls theories. i still think that this is exactly right, and nothing in feldman’s critical notice gives me reason to think otherwise (see feldman, 2019). the objection he puts forward does not challenge the idea that the advice model views have the right structure to avoid his previous 2 this type of fallacy was first made famous by shope (1978). 3 see, e.g., brandt (1979, ch. 1). advice models of happiness suikkanen 10 objections to the hypotheticalist versions of the wls theories. in fact, as we will see below, feldman’s new objections do not even turn on the advice model structure, as similar objections can be made to all versions of the wls theories. i also want to emphasise that, in the original article, i presented the advice model only as a flexible framework in which different versions that have different extensions can be formulated (suikkanen, 2011, sec. 6.1). in this respect, i was inspired by the recent debates about consequentialism in which it has been suggested that different versions of consequentialism share the same structure even if they can come to very different conclusions about which actions are right as a result of adopting different theories of value.4 in the same spirit, i thought that different versions of the advice model wls theory, which have different extensions, can be formulated by specifying the idealised version of the person whose happiness is being evaluated in different ways. perhaps i was not clear enough about this in my original article. this is shown by the fact that feldman’s objections make certain substantial assumptions about how exactly i would specify the idealised evaluator and the resulting version of the advice model. it was, however, never my intention to be so ambitious in my article. i assumed that finding out which version of the advice model turns out to be true should be done at a later stage by relying on the reflective equilibrium method.5 we could begin from certain intuitive assumptions, according to which the idealised evaluator has a more coherent version of the evaluated person’s set of desires, goals, intentions, cares and concerns, and he or she is also perhaps more informed. i thought that we can then compare the consequences of this basic view’s verdicts of which agents are happy to our own intuitions about different cases. if we find conflicts between the two, we can then both go back to re-evaluate our views of the idealised evaluator and also finetune our intuitions about the cases until we reach a reflective equilibrium. it is then fortunate that exactly the kind of cases which feldman’s describes in his critical notice allow us to apply the previous method and thus learn more about the advice model and happiness. in these cases, feldman specifies agents who are intuitively either happy or unhappy. his intention is to present these cases as ones in which my advice model version of the wls theory comes to wrong conclusions. however, the way i understand these cases is that they enable us to get a sense of how we should best understand the idealised evaluator. i will conclude this response to feldman by illustrating how this works. 2. feldman’s new cases consider smoky first (feldman 2019, sec. 3): smoky smoked like a chimney for many years. eventually it caught up with him and his health has been ruined. now, as he lies on his deathbed at t, smoky is miserable. he does best to cope with his fatal illness, but he cannot undo the mistakes of his youth… he is miserable. he deeply regrets the now unalterable errors of his past. if we are to have a plausible version of the advice model, it better not entail that smoky is happy. feldman, however, seems to suggest that my view will entail that he is. one reason for this is that feldman assumes that the relevant life-plan created by smoky+ will consist only 4 for an overview of these consequentializing debates, see portmore (2009). 5 see rawls (1971, 19-21 and 46-51). advice models of happiness suikkanen 11 of actions which smoky can do in his present situation. in that case, smoky+ might well judge that smoky’s life is going according to his life-plan. this, however, never was a part of the view. i took the idea of life-plans from john kekes’s brilliant 1982 article “happiness.” as kekes puts it, a “life-plan is the hierarchical ordering of the first-order wants” (kekes, 1982, p. 364). according to this view, we have firstorder desires for different outcomes – for our lives to have different general qualities. we then have to decide what role these wants are to have in our lives – we must make a commitment. these decisions then together amount to a life-plan that orders one’s cares and concerns in terms of their importance. this is what also happens when an actual individual constructs a life-plan and what i assumed likewise happens when the ideal versions of us construct lifeplans for us on the basis of the first-order desires they have inherited from us. at this point, i believe we can assume that some of the fundamental wants the real smoky has are health, long life, and taking part in the activities that he likes but cannot do when ill. so, if smoky+ constructs a life-plan for smoky by ordering all his wants in terms of how much they matter to smoky, that life-plan will presumably give a central place to having those very things which smoky deeply cares about. because of this, smoky+ is unlikely to judge that smoky’s life matches well with his life-plan, and so it looks like there are versions of the advice model that come to the correct conclusions about this case. feldman’s next case is the following (feldman, 2019, sec. 4): luckless… was born with a congenital condition that has made his life miserable. suppose luckless has done his best to cope with it, but to no avail. … but of course he is not [outstandingly happy]. in this case too, feldman suggests that the advice model theories will imply in an objectionable way that miserable luckless is outstandingly happy. this is because he speculates that, when luckless+ makes a life-plan for luckless, he will probably leave the unalterable components of luckless’s actual life in place, and so the ideal life-plan for luckless will contain all the misfortunes of his actual life. this is why luckless’s life will compare well with the ideal lifeplan and so the view will deem him happy. here i do not believe that plausible versions of the advice model will have this consequence, for the same reasons as in smoky’s case. i assume that many of luckless’s most fundamental and deepest wants, cares and concerns have to do with living a life free of pain, being able to do things that he knows he would enjoy and so on. this is because a very good explanation of why luckless feels so miserable is that he cannot get what he most desires. if these are luckless’s most fundamental wants, then presumably they will play an essential role in the life-plan which luckless+ constructs for him. this is why i believe luckless+ would not come to judge that luckless’s life is going according to his life-plan and so there are versions of the advice model that agree with feldman about what we should say about this case too. feldman argues, however, that the previous response makes the advice model unable to deal with his final case, mr. chipper (feldman, 2019, sec. 4): suppose mr. chipper wants to be healthy, wealthy, and wise. suppose he knows that he has always been healthy, wealthy, and wise. suppose, as a result, that he is satisfied with his life as a whole. mr. chipper might like to be healthier, wealthier, and wiser … [b]ut he knows that in virtue of his extraordinary health, advice models of happiness suikkanen 12 wealth, and wisdom, no improvement in these areas is possible. he is as healthy, wealthy, and wise as a person could be… he is very happy. feldman claims that the advice model cannot lead to this conclusion because in the previous example luckless+ includes things in luckless’s life-plan that are not possible for him to obtain. so, feldman suggests that mr. chipper+ will have to do the same. he too will form a life-plan for mr. chipper that will include taking the imaginary supplements that make him even more healthy, making the imaginary investments that make him amazingly wealthy, and taking the brain enhancing pills that make him even wiser. on the basis of this life-plan, mr. chipper+ will then come to judge that mr. chipper’s life is not going according to plan. this would make him an unhappy person, according to the advice model, which he is not. here the challenge is to explain in a principled way why mr. chipper+ would not include these impossible actions in mr. chipper’s life-plan. this explanation must also still enable us to continue to claim that luckless’s life-plan will include things that he just cannot obtain. this challenge does not seem too difficult to me. if we consider luckless, it is intuitive that many of his most fundamental and deepest actual cares and concerns are directed at living a pain-free life and also a life that allows him to take part in many of the important human activities that are not currently available for him. it is then plausible to think that luckless+ takes the fundamentality and centrality of these cares and concerns into account in formulating the life-plan for luckless. yet, the way in which feldman describes mr. chipper makes it clear that his most fundamental cares and concerns have absolutely nothing to do with being even healthier, wealthier, and wiser. as feldman puts it, mr. chipper merely “might like to be healthier, wealthier and wiser” (feldman, 2019, sec. 4). if these desires are in this way mere wishes or peripheral fleeting desires, then it’s not clear to me that they would play a role in mr. chipper+’s hypothetical life-plan for mr. chipper. this is exactly because the whole point of the life-plan is to structure mr. chipper’s actual wants in terms of how central a role they play in his psychological make-up. as a result, mr. chipper+ would not judge that mr. chipper’s life is not going according to his life-plan merely because these further wishes are not satisfied in his actual life.6 this makes me think that the solution to these new cases does not really have anything to do with whether the idealised agents should only include possible actions and outcomes in the life-plans or also things which the actual agents cannot do or achieve. rather, the life-plans are better understood in terms of what kind of outcomes the agents themselves want most – what kind of generic qualities the agents fundamentally want their lives to have. and, as the last two examples show, it is important to emphasise the fact that, when the ideal versions of the evaluated agents make life-plans for those agents, they will take into account how central a role the different cares and concerns out of which the life-plans are constructed play in the agents’ psychologies. furthermore, the ideal versions of the agents will also, in judging how 6 it could be objected that a version of mr. chipper could actually ultimately desire more health, wealth, and wisdom than he currently has and what he believes is achievable for him. in this case, his ideal version might include these seemingly impossible goods in his life-plan and judge that the actual life of mr. chipper does not match up to that plan. in this case, the proposed view would entail that this version of mr. chipper is unhappy. however, given that the ultimate desires of this mr. chipper are frustrated, and he is aware of this, this sounds like a plausible conclusion to draw. of course, it is true that many agents tend to desire less those things that they believe are impossible for them to achieve (but this is not always the case – see smoky’s case above). this seems to fit the way in which many empirical life satisfaction studies have found evidence of adaptation (see, e.g., luhmann et al. (2012)). advice models of happiness suikkanen 13 well an agent’s life matches up to her life-plan, focus on whether the agent’s life satisfies her core cares and concerns. if the more peripheral elements of the agent’s motivational set are left unsatisfied, this will not make the agent’s ideal version judge that the agent’s life is not going according to her life-plan.7 it seems to me that this is all we need to say in order to defend the advice model against feldman’s new challenge. despite this, i am still extremely thankful for feldman’s new cases, as they have helped us to get closer to how we should understand the ideal versions of the agents in the advice model and what their role is. author jussi suikkanen university of birmingham jussiphil@gmail.com publishing timeline received 15 january 2019 accepted 17 january 2019 published 9 july 2019 references brandt, r.b. (1979). a theory of the good and the right. oxford: oxford university press. feldman, f. (2008). whole life satisfaction concepts of happiness. theoria, 74, 219-238. feldman, f. (2010). what is this thing called happiness? oxford, england: oxford university press. feldman, f. (2019). an improved whole life satisfaction theory of happiness? international journal of wellbeing, 9(1), 1-7. doi:10.5502/ijw.v9i2.762 kekes, j. (1982). happiness. mind, 91(363), 358-376. luhmann, m., hofmann, w., eid, m., & lucas, r. e. (2012). subjective well-being and adaptation to life events: a meta-analysis on differences between cognitive and affective well-being. journal of personality and social psychology, 102(3), 592-615. portmore, d. (2009). consequentializing. philosophy compass, 4(2), 329-347. rawls, j. (1971). a theory of justice. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. shope, r. (1978). the conditional fallacy in contemporary philosophy. the journal of philosophy, 75(8), 397413. smith, m. (1995). internal reasons. philosophy and phenomenological research, 55(1), 109-131. suikkanen, j. (2011). an improved whole life satisfaction theory of happiness. international journal of wellbeing, 1(1), 149-166. 7 of course, this still leaves open many interesting questions about the proposal. for example, we can construct different versions of the view by varying exactly which fundamental desires should be taken into account by the ideal version of the agent. some agents change their fundamental desires, and so the question is whether their ideal versions should, in the construction of the life-plan, only take into account their actual version’s current desires, or, rather, some set of the ultimate desires both before and after the change. views that take a different stand on this issue will disagree about which agents are happy. the hope would be to use the kind of reflective equilibrium methodology illustrated here to discover what the most plausible version of the view is in this respect too. but carrying out this work will have to be left for another occasion. trust and wellbeing lambert, n. m., gwinn, a. m., fincham, f. d., & stillman, t. f. (2011). feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality. international journal of wellbeing, 1(3), 307-314. doi:10.5502/ijw.v1i3.1 nathaniel m. lambert brigham young university natemlambert@gmail.com copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 307 article feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality nathaniel m. lambert · a. marlea gwinn · frank d. fincham · tyler f. stillman abstract: people frequently speak of being tired, and chemicals like caffeine are consumed to make people feel energetic. how might one increase a sense of energy without resorting to substances? in three studies we document how sharing positive experiences with others makes people feel more energetic. study 1 (n = 197) showed a relationship between naturally occurring sharing of positive events and vitality, such that the more often participants shared positive events at time 1 the more vitality they reported three weeks later (controlling for initial levels of vitality). in study 2 (n = 188) participants who shared a positive event (versus not sharing an event) reported higher levels of vitality. study 3 (n = 96) showed that participants who shared a positive event with a partner (as opposed to engaging in a mildly positive interaction with their partner) reported higher vitality than did control participants. implications of the research are discussed. keywords: vitality, sharing experiences, capitalization, energy 1. introduction approximately 400 billion cups of coffee were sold in 2009 (coffee statistics report, 2010). it is reasonable to assume that people do not feel as energetic as they would like to feel and that this accounts, in part, for the high level of consumption. vitality is defined as having physical and mental energy (ryan et al., 2010) or an enthusiasm and excitement for life. vitality is related to several indicators of physical and mental health. in terms of physical benefits, vitality is negatively associated with coronary heart disease (kubzansky & thurston, 2007), sleep disturbance and somatic illnesses (stewart, hays, & ware, 1992), and headaches (ryan & frederick, 1997). with regard to mental health, higher vitality is associated with increased selfactualization (sense that you are fulfilling your potential), self-esteem, and self-determination (degree to which one’s behavior is self-motivated) (ryan & frederick, 1997), greater autonomy (ability to act freely and independently) (deci & ryan, 1991), greater motivation (ryan & frederick, 1997), perception that one’s problems in life are less severe (thayer, 1987) and less depression (de negri & moretti, 1971). given these implications for physical and mental health, it is important to identify factors that may contribute to or enhance vitality. one likely candidate is sharing positive experiences. 2. sharing positive experiences sharing positive experiences is correlated with higher degrees of positive affect and life satisfaction (gable, reis, impett, & asher, 2004) and people share their daily positive experiences between 60% and 80% of the time (gable et al., 2004). although people share feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality lambert, gwinn, fincham, & stillman www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 308 positive experiences quite frequently, little is known about the effects on mental health of such sharing. labott, ahleman, wolever, and martin (1990) found that when participants watched a happy video their immune system showed heightened activity, but only if they were instructed to express their emotions. this study suggests that the act of sharing a positive emotio n with another person has benefits above and beyond simply experiencing the positive event. another study found that sharing a positive event is correlated with heightened memory of that particular event (gable et al., 2004). it could be that as positive events are more easily remembered, they will be able to continue to have positive effects (later positive affect and coping). though a positive response should be partly due to the positivity of the actual event, langston (1994) found that sharing a positive event generated unique positive affect that went beyond the affect elicited from the valence of the positive event alone. 3. why sharing should translate into vitality we propose that sharing a positive experience with another person may translate into vitality for a few reasons. first, the feeling of relatedness (feeling significant and connected) engendered during an interchange should boost vitality in the same way that social relatedness has been positively related to vitality (gagne, ryan, & bargmann, 2003; howell & hill, 2009; reis, sheldon, gable, roscoe, & ryan, 2000). second, sharing positive experiences is a joint endeavour between the sharer and the listener, which has the potential to produce an effect on vitality that is greater than what might have occurred without the joint effort. during the sharing of a positive experience the sharer recruits the listener to perform a specific function—to assist in completing his/her appraisal of the experience and to validate the experience. for instance, imagine that sue shares her good news of receiving praise from her boss and eli replies, “that’s great! that should help you get that raise you’ve been hoping for.” eli’s acknowledgement of the potential positive implications of the event for sue’s future makes the impact of her positive experience more salient and may generate additional positive implications of the event that had not previously crossed her mind. finally, sharing something positive has the potential to boost the mood of the listener and thus the person sharing may gain excitement and energy by making someone else feel positively. for example, if tyler tells his wife deborah about increasing his sales during the month, this may have implications for deborah and would likely make her genuinely happy. seeing her pleasure is likely to make tyler more excited about his accomplishment and enhance his vitality. 4. overview of studies in three studies we tested whether sharing a positive experience increases vitality (energy, or enthusiasm for life) for the person who shared. study 1 tested whether people who shared positive experiences more frequently demonstrate greater vitality three weeks after sharing than do those who are disinclined to share positive experiences, controlling for initial vitality. study 2 examined the hypothesis that sharing a positive event leads to greater vitality than simply experiencing it. participants wrote about something good that happened to them in the past two weeks. then, half of the participants were randomly assigned to both share this event with a relationship partner and complete the dependent measure, while the other half simply completed the dependent measure. feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality lambert, gwinn, fincham, & stillman www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 309 study 3 sought to clarify the findings in study 2 by ruling out an alternative explanation that the interaction with a partner, rather than specifically sharing the positive event, is what provided a lift in vitality. taken together, the following studies provide evidence for a relationship between sharing positive experiences and feeling vitality. 5. study 1 the objective of study 1 was to test the relationship between sharing positive experiences and vitality. we hypothesized that participants who shared their positive experiences more frequently at time 1 would have higher levels of vitality at time 2, three weeks later, after controlling for initial vitality. 5.1 method 5.1.1 participants participants were 196 undergraduate students (162 women) who agreed to participate in exchange for extra credit. participants ranged in age from 18 to 41 with a median age of 19. 5.1.2 pre and post measures sharing positive experiences. we created a four-item measure that assessed the degree to which participants shared positive experiences with others. example questions included, “i am the type of person that loves to share it with others when something good happens to me,” and “i'm constantly telling people my good news.” choices ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” the alpha at time 1 was .89. vitality. we used ryan and frederick’s (1997) seven-item scale to measure vitality. sample items include "i feel alive and vital”, “i look forward to each new day”, and “i feel energized”. items were rated using a 7-point likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”). coefficient alpha at both time 1 and time 2 was .91. 5.2 results 5.2.1 attrition fifty-six participants failed to complete measures at time 2. to ensure that attrition did not affect the results, we compared time 1 scores of participants that dropped out with those who remained in the study. no differences between the groups was found for vitality, f (1, 251) = .49, p > .05. 5.2.2 sharing positive experiences and mental health: preand post-test results we used hierarchal regression analysis to determine whether initial sharing of positive news predicts later vitality when controlling for initial vitality scores and gender. given differences in communication styles between men and women, we controlled for gender. as predicted, greater tendency toward sharing of positive experiences at time 1 was associated with greater vitality scores four weeks later, controlling for initial vitality and gender (β = .21, p < .01). 5.3 discussion our hypothesis was supported inasmuch as the tendency to share positive experiences is positively related to changes in vitality over time. a limitation of the current study is that it is correlational and therefore causality cannot be confidently inferred. moreover, we are unable to feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality lambert, gwinn, fincham, & stillman www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 310 determine whether the positive events themselves or the sharing of them increased vitality. finally, the alternative explanation that more energetic people have a higher tendency to share positive experiences needs to be ruled out. we address these limitations in the experimental studies that follow. 6. study 2 the objective of study 2 was to experimentally test the relationship between sharing positive experiences and vitality. our hypothesis was that the participants who shared a positive event will have higher levels of vitality as opposed to those who simply thought and wrote about a positive experience. 6.1 method 6.1.1 participants in an introductory undergraduate course, 188 participants (135 female) completed an online survey for extra credit. participants came to the lab with either a romantic partner or with a close friend. 6.1.2 measures vitality. we again used ryan and frederick’s (1997) measure of vitality (α = .90). positivity of the recalled event. participants recalled a positive event. to ensure that the positivity of the event was not driving findings, we included two items: “how positive was the event?” and “how memorable was this?” that were summed. the items correlated highly, r = .79. 6.2 procedure participants were instructed to “think of something good that happened to you in the past two weeks. please write a paragraph describing what happened in the space below.” they were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions, a no-treatment condition and a sharing experience condition. those in the control condition completed the vitality measure after writing about the positive experience. those in the sharing condition were taken into a separate room and were asked to share what they wrote about with their partner or friend. specifically, the participants were instructed to take “two minutes to share with your partner what happened and how you felt. once you have had a chance to share, please ring the bell.” they then completed the measure of vitality. 6.3 results a one-way analysis of variance revealed that participants in the sharing condition reported higher vitality (m = 5.05, sd = 1.13) than those in the control condition (m = 4.65, sd = 1.36), f (1, 184) = 4.98, p < .05, η2p = .03, after controlling for gender and positivity of the event. 6.4 discussion consistent with our hypothesis, sharing a positive experience caused an increase in positive emotion, relative to a control group who also recalled the positive experience but did not share it with someone. this study provides evidence that sharing a positive experience has a stronger impact on vitality as opposed to thinking about the positive experience; however, it does not rule out the possibility that any interaction with a partner might produce a similar effect. feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality lambert, gwinn, fincham, & stillman www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 311 7. study 3 the objective of study 3 was to address an alternative explanation for study 2, namely that the higher levels of vitality of those who shared the positive experience were simply due to the interaction with a partner or friend. therefore, we added positive interaction as a control condition to more rigorously test whether sharing positive experiences increases vitality. we also added irritability as a control variable, given that such a feeling could come about during an interaction. our hypothesis was that the participants who share their positive event will have higher vitality than those who simply experienced a mildly positive interaction. 7.1 method 7.1.1 participants in an introductory course, 96 undergraduates (69 women) completed an online survey for extra credit. ages ranged from 18 to 24 with a median of 19. participants attended the session with either a romantic partner or with a close friend. 7.1.2 measures vitality. we again used ryan and frederick’s (1997) measure of vitality (α= .67). alertness. to ensure that a difference in level of alertness between conditions was not responsible for the observed effects, we controlled for it in the analysis. alertness was measured by one subtle item: “if you are paying attention, mark strongly agree.” irritability. to ensure that irritability towards one’s partner during the interaction was not driving the results, we controlled for it in the analysis. we measured irritability with the single item, “describe the extent you feel irritable” on a scale from “very slightly or not at all” to “extremely.” 7.2 procedure participants were instructed as follows: “please think of something good that happened to you in the past two weeks. please write a paragraph describing what happened.” participants were then randomly assigned to either a sharing positive experience condition or to a neutral interaction condition. 7.2 1 sharing of positive experience condition as before, participants were taken into a separate room and were asked to share what they wrote about with their partner. specifically, the participant was instructed to take “two minutes to share with your partner what happened and how you felt.” 7.2.2 neutral interaction condition: procedure this condition was developed to rule out the possibility that an interaction by itself could enhance vitality. participants were instructed to take “two minutes to share with your partner something he/she learned in class this week.” 7.3 results given differences in communication styles between men and women, we again controlled for gender. a one-way analysis of variance revealed that participants in the sharing positive experiences condition reported higher vitality scores (m = 4.38, sd = 1.15) than those in the feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality lambert, gwinn, fincham, & stillman www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 312 neutral interaction condition (m = 4.00, sd = .64), f (1, 91) = 5.48, p < .05, η2p = .06 when controlling for feelings of irritation, alertness, and gender. 7.4 discussion consistent with our hypotheses, participants who shared their positive event had more vitality compared to those in the writing/reflecting group that also had an interaction unrelated to the positive experience. this study provides further evidence that sharing positive experiences can generate positive affect above and beyond both recalling a pleasant experience and having a mildly positive interaction unrelated to the positive experience. 8. general discussion in the current investigation, we found evidence for a non-pharmacological means of increasing physical and mental energy, namely, sharing positive experiences with others. in study 1, we found that the tendency to share positive experiences with someone else at time 1 predicted later vitality, controlling for baseline levels of vitality. study 2 showed that participants who shared a positive event with a close friend reported higher vitality than those who simply wrote about a positive event. in study 3, those assigned to share a positive experience with a partner demonstrated greater vitality than those who simply interacted with a partner. vitality is an important marker of psychological wellbeing, and feeling mentally and physically tired is generally considered unpleasant. indeed, persistent fatigue is considered an illness (chronic fatigue syndrome). the current work demonstrates that sharing positive experiences with others can combat feelings of lethargy. as such, this work fits with other studies documenting non pharmacological ways of increasing vitality, such as spending time in nature (ryan et al., 2010). 8.1 limitations and future directions a limitation of our research is that the samples studied were limited to college-aged participants and may not be representative of more mature relationships. thus, these findings should be replicated in a variety of age groups. another limitation of the current studies is that individuals who shared the positive event spent more time thinking about the event than those who simply wrote about the event or who interacted about something other than the event. such a potential confound should be ruled out in future studies. finally, the current studies did not assess how the reaction of the partner affected vitality. it seems plausible that the reaction of the partner may potentially moderate the effects of sharing and this should be examined by future research. in an era where technology is prevalent, there are now many different outlets for people to share their positive experiences. blogging has grown to become one of the most popular methods of online expression. though blogging has many uses, most americans use their blogs to express themselves or reflect on their day (lenhart & fox, 2006). a fruitful area for future research would be to examine whether sharing positive events through blogging has a similar effect on mental health outcomes to in-person sharing or, alternatively, to determine what differences might exist between sharing through the blogosphere and in-person sharing. however, the results of study 2 suggest that in-person sharing may have a stronger impact than simply writing about the event. nonetheless, when writing in a blog there could be an effect of sharing with the “imagined audience.” could the imagined audience have just as strong an effect as sharing in person? this question should be examined further. feeling tired? how sharing positive experiences can boost vitality lambert, gwinn, fincham, & stillman www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 313 some initial research on blogging has found it to have positive effects on wellbeing and it has even been suggested as a form of therapy. for example, one study demonstrated that blogging improves social capital, which in turn has a positive effect on wellbeing (ko & kuo, 2009). relatedly, blogging has a positive effect on perceived social support, specifically social integration, reliable alliance, and friendship satisfaction (baker & moore, 2008). future research should build upon these initial findings, taking the results of the current study into account. 9. conclusion our research indicates that sharing positive events can increase vitality. the benefits go beyond simply having a positive experience or sharing a neutral experience: maximum vitality stems from a combination of both. the importance of increased vitality is emphasized by the documented association between higher energy and both physical and mental wellbeing. authors nathaniel m. lambert brigham young university natemlambert@gmail.com a. marlea gwinn the university of kentucky andreamarlea@gmail.com frank d. fincham florida state university ffincham@fsu.edu tyler f. stillman southern utah university tylerstillman@gmaill.com publishing timeline received 21 may 2011 accepted 27 august 2011 published 17 october 2011 references baker, j. r., & moore, s. m. 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(2000). daily well-being: the role of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. personality and social psychology bulletin, 26, 419–435. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167200266002 ryan, r. m., weinstein, n., bernstein, j., brown, k. w., mistretta, l., & gagne, m. (2010). vitalizing effects of being outdoors and in nature. journal of environmental psychology, 30, 159–168. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2009.10.009 ryan, r. m. & frederick, c. (1997). on energy, personality, and health: subjective vitality as a dynamic reflection of well-being. journal of personality, 65, 529–565. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.14676494.1997.tb00326.x stewart a. l., hays r. d., & ware j. e. (1992). health perceptions, energy, fatigue, and health distress measures. in a. l. stewart, j. e. ware & n. c. durham (eds.), measuring functioning and well-being: the medical outcomes study approach. london: duke university press, pp. 143–172. thayer, r. e. (1987). problem perception, optimism, and related states as a function of time of day (diurnal rhythm) and moderate exercise: two arousal systems in interaction. motivation and emotion, 11, 19–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00992211 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714044203 http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.64.12.1393 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167200266002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2009.10.009 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1997.tb00326.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1997.tb00326.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00992211 http://www.hqlo.com/sfx_links.asp?ui=1477-7525-7-22&bibl=b11 thin, n., tarragona, m., wong, p., jarden, r., bartholomaeus, j., & jarden, a. (2017). book review for international journal of wellbeing. estes, richard j., and m. joseph sirgy [eds] (2017) the pursuit of human well-being: the untold global history. dordrecht: springer. international journal of wellbeing, 7(1), 84-92. doi:10.5502/ijw.v7i1.636 neil thin university of edinburgh n.thin@ed.ac.uk copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 84 article book review for international journal of wellbeing. estes, richard j., and m. joseph sirgy [eds] (2017) the pursuit of human well-being: the untold global history. dordrecht: springer neil thin · margarita tarragona · paul wong · rebecca jarden · jonathan bartholomaeus · aaron jarden1 1. synthetic overview it’s hard enough to summarise an individual’s diverse experiences of wellbeing coherently, let alone summarise a nation. it’s a whole lot harder to offer comprehensive coverage of objective and subjective wellbeing worldwide, and harder still to combine this with historical depth and detailed cultural analysis. this collection therefore wins the prize for being the most ambitious collection on wellbeing to date. this is an immensely important milestone in the global cultural history of wellbeing, and it will be a superb resource for anyone wanting a comprehensive global overview of philosophies, concepts, and socio-economic and political histories relating to wellbeing, as well as a rich source of basic information on contemporary objective and subjective indicators. the editors have done an excellent job in asking good questions and finding scholars who can answer them. many of the authors are from the regions they write about, and together they represent an impressive diversity of disciplines including social policy, sociology, history, political science, psychology, religious studies, cultural anthropology, and economics. the inclusive approach to sources has been particularly impressive, allowing wide-ranging use of humanities and popular culture that enriches the scope and depth of wellbeing research. the editors offer a humanistic and dynamic definition of wellbeing as ‘central to the process of becoming a more fully developed human being’ (p. 3). this presupposes certain uniquely human qualities such as spirituality and the quest for meaning as essential for both our humaneness and wellbeing. although it is in some respects refreshing to see various conceptual approaches to wellbeing in the different chapters, the collection might have been more coherent if the editors had promoted a stronger overarching conceptual framework. most chapters look at objective living standards, physical life outcomes and subjective experience. but distinctions between these aren’t always clarified, and there are frequent slips between information on resources and living conditions to information about people’s subjective attitudes towards these. from one paper to 1 neil thin (editorial overview and chapters 4,11,12,13); margarita tarragona (chapters 2,5,8,15,16); paul wong (chapters 1,3,6,10); aaron jarden (chapter 20); jonathan bartholomaeus (chapters 9,19); rebecca jarden (chapters 14,18). mailto:n.thin@ed.ac.uk http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 85 the next there is no predictability concerning the indicators used no consistent coverage of things like income, violence, peace, democracy, education, health, longevity, gender relations, hedonic wellbeing, or life satisfaction. in the introductory chapter, p.6, the editors say they asked contributors to assess gains over time in ‘personal and collective well-being’. this is an important but elusive distinction that has rarely been clarified in wellbeing scholarship. but there’s no robust analytical treatment of this distinction even in the introductory chapter, although they do discuss several interactive social factors such as benevolence, forgiveness and gratitude. in chapter two (michalos and weijers) there is interesting discussion of enlightenment (smith, rousseau, and jefferson) and views on the trade-offs between private and public happiness (pp.46-49). it might have been helpful if all authors had been encouraged to explore regional manifestations of this kind of distinction. more importantly, from the start the editors avoid any distinction between means, satisfaction with means, and ends a basic threefold distinction that ought to be fundamental to any plausible account of wellbeing. both the introductory chapter and several regional chapters seem wilfully to mingle information on conditions, processes, and outcomes. the editors assert that ‘health, education, income, and wealth distribution’ are ‘considered to be core elements of well-being’ (p.7). some things, of course, like health, knowledge, and happiness, have both intrinsic and ultimate value. however, it surely does not help our understanding of wellbeing to use terms like ‘economic wellbeing’ and ‘educational wellbeing’ which so clearly confuse wellbeing with the conditions and processes that may or may not lead to it. arguably, too, the collection as a whole could have paid more attention to aspects of human life that make the pursuit of wellbeing so challenging. just as medical research pays heed to the physically dangerous environment of bacteria, viruses, and toxins, so wellbeing scholars need to recognize subjective and objective sources of adversity. humans live in a dangerous environment full of objective natural and human-made threats and inevitable suffering, as well as generating mental responses that can make matters worse as well as better. although the editors declared that they approached the task of editing this volume without any assumption regarding the nature and conditions of wellbeing, their writing indicates otherwise. in fact, it is virtually impossible for anyone to talk about wellbeing without some implicit or explicit models of wellbeing. some of the chapters struggled to offer clear analytical insights into the factors that influence wellbeing, and concerning the culturally embedded experiences of wellbeing. the implicit initial premise is that huge regions most of which have colossal and culturally diverse populations are a useful unit of cultural analysis. although most chapters pay more detailed attention to subpopulations, the overall the impression is that regional generalisation is assumed to provide an interesting antidote to universalistic treatments of wellbeing. yet perhaps the more interesting forms of cultural contrasts and distinctiveness are to be found in quite different kinds of cultural unit: countries; ethnic groups; interest groups; leisure clubs; gender; age; religious minorities; businesses; and the cultural attitudes and social processes associated with sports and academic disciplines. several authors have in effect adopted a posture of principled non-evaluation: they offer richly detailed descriptions and analyses of the cultural patterns in conceptualisations of wellbeing and prescriptions for good behaviour, without attempting to comment evaluatively on whether these have made people’s lives go well or badly. we learn a lot about how some people (mainly elite literati) have thought about wellbeing and virtue around the world in various eras, but we learn very little about the implications of that thinking for how people actually pursue wellbeing, or how well they live. book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 86 forgivably, given the scope and ambition of the collection, there is also some quirky structuring and sequencing. the introduction is followed by three regional chapters, then one on islam, and then bafflingly a chapter on measurement followed by ten more regional chapters with two more thematic chapters before the conclusions. there’s no obvious rationale for the selection of the three thematic chapters, and it’s disappointing that there’s no overall treatment of the wellbeing of special categories of people such as children or old people. equally strange is the idea of having two chapters on south asia in separate parts of the book (the earlier one is on ‘india’ but covers south asian history), and putting seven chapters in between the one on subsaharan africa and the one on north africa. instead of emulating this odd procession, we’ll tell you first about the three theoretical chapters, then the three thematic chapters, and the rest is about the regional chapters. 2. theoretical chapters estes attributes four basic elements of wellbeing ‘peace, personal satisfaction, happiness, and wellbeing’ to ‘personal reflection and interpersonal exchanges.’ a humanistic approach of this sort might also have included other contributors to wellbeing such as personal development, character education, and self-transcendence as other. it is not clear, however, that estes’ emphasis on the ‘here and now’ is warranted. numerous wellbeing scholars have noted that valuable aspects of wellbeing may be oriented mainly to the past or to the future. in chapter 6, on wellbeing measurement, authors sirgy, estes, and selian argue that good historical information is available but that quantitative data are more limited. the global wellbeing measures often lack a component of meaning, which has been shown to be central to wellbeing. some data have indicated that people in poor countries report a stronger sense of meaning. a complete picture of wellbeing needs to provide both subjective and objective measures of the dark side of human existence. considering war-ravaged countries and the refugee crisis, such overwhelming evils and miseries makes it very difficult for people to experience wellbeing. it will take considerable fortitude and endurance to maintain human dignity. the objective misery indexes can include suicide rate, clinical depression prevalence rate, incarceration and execution data, pollution index, poverty rate, discrimination level, violence data, etc. the subjective misery indexes can include self-rating on stress levels, depression, anxiety, and perceived stress. the wellbeing data can be best interpreted in terms of misery index. death attitudes are importantly related to wellbeing. spiritual wellbeing is another component that deserves consideration. a complete model of wellbeing can be obtained by using a regression model that employs both positive and negative objective conditions to predict psychological wellbeing. this represents a mature happiness, which is more stable and more enduring because it is based on the reality of suffering. the final overview chapter reviews patterns in national and regional wellbeing findings reported throughout the book, in particular in parts iii and iv. this highlights the ambition of this book’s comprehensive treatment of wellbeing, noting major national, regional, and international changes: (1) philosophical advances in wellbeing; (2) global advances in population; (3) global advances in health; (4) global advances in education; (5) global advances in income and poverty reduction; (6) global advances in social welfare, in particular, the steadily increasing levels of income security provided to the world’s growing population via income security programs and other publicly and privately financed social initiatives; and (7) global advances in subjective wellbeing. book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 87 while these components relate to wellbeing, this last theme on subjective wellbeing is where most of the fruit of the chapter lies. as a wide-ranging summary of many of the pertinent points described in previous chapters, this chapter also provides concluding commentary about the major changes in wellbeing experienced by the majority of people residing in various regions of the world. 3. thematic non-regional chapters there are three chapters organized around cultural themes (islam, women, and technology). awkwardly, there is no sign of any rationale for choosing just these three. the imbalance between the very comprehensive coverage of the regional chapters and the meagre and tokenistic coverage of wellbeing themes is arguably an important weakness in the collection. the potential diversity of thematic chapters could have been limitless, but the structure of the collection would have made a lot more sense if they had either solicited a much more diverse set of thematic chapters, or else simply addressed crosscutting themes within the overview and regional chapters. the chapter on islam is the only one to focus on the wellbeing implications of a specific religious tradition, although several of the regional chapters have something to say about religions. one quarter of the world’s population is islamic (a proportion that is rapidly growing) and islam doesn’t fit into any one part of the world, although the same could be said of all major world religions. mohsen joshanloo argues that in islamic beliefs and philosophy, wellbeing is not defined in terms of subjective states or emotion. instead, to live well is to obey strict religious precepts that help solve the conflict between the innate tendency for good and the “devilish” aspects that all human beings have. tackling the contemporary and historical complexity and diversity of islam, he notes that traditional muslim philosophers were influenced by greek thought and valued rationality as the way to understand god, whereas sufis believe that only though the heart can human beings contact god. despite their diversity, islamic notions of wellbeing are all tied to religious regimes prescribed in the qu’ran. in chapter 18, elizabeth eckermann sets out to document the ‘global progress of women’, offering a narrative of the gradual improvement in women’s wellbeing across history. the historical development of international goals for gender equality and empowerment of women, and of measures of women’s wellbeing, has been very diverse. key events of this historical journey are illustrated in a timeline extending from 300 bce to 2015. the international coverage of this chapter includes key events in india, france, new zealand, bhutan, egypt, and kuwait. these events highlighted challenges and opportunities for improving women’s wellbeing, and influenced gendered understandings of individual and collective wellbeing. for example, matrilineal societies, such as the minangkabau in sumatra and the mosuo from southwest china, are explored in relation to their impact on the status of women. the chapter is an engaging and informative narrative drawing strength from historical visionary advocates of change, exploration of historical landmarks, and the worthy quest to document women’s refusal to accept the status quo. chapter 19, on technology, is subtitled ‘transformative market phenomena over time’. authors audrey n. selian and lee mcknight thereby announce the economistic emphasis of their approach. they discuss the empirical, philosophical, socioeconomic and developmental facets of technology and their impact on the evolution of wellbeing. the chapter proposes that there is a strong correlation or reciprocal relationship between the creation, utilization and dissemination of technology, all of which are linked to human development and therefore wellbeing. the authors use the human development index (hdi) metrics of life expectancy, book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 88 literacy, school enrolment, and income to operationalise the concept of wellbeing. they provide strong and clear arguments for the positive influence of technological progress on wellbeing throughout history. a well balanced discussion is presented as it is acknowledged that technology and innovation can have both positive and negative influences on human development and wellbeing. this chapter will be beneficial for anyone looking to understand how technology shapes human experience. 4. regional chapters the bulk of the collection (14 chapters) focuses on regional histories. in their chapter on western historical traditions of wellbeing, alex michalos and daniel weijers offer a thorough and engaging examination of the concept of human wellbeing and its pursuit in the western world from the 8th century bce until today. they present the views on wellbeing of ancient greek philosophers like plato, aristotle and epicure; the religious perspective on what is a good life, particularly within christianity; the enlightenment, utilitarianism, and the pursuit of meaningful goals; and, most recently, the debate about wellbeing as a public policy issue. they examine the roles of virtues, pleasure, harmony with oneself and society, wealth and power, spirituality and public good as important elements of western conceptions of wellbeing that have had different salience at various points in history. particularly helpful is their integration of the subjective and the objective dimensions of the quality of life, offering a conceptual matrix to understand wellbeing and they invite us to be aware of the risks of both the ‘fool´s heaven’ (having a positive perception of negative objective conditions) and a ‘fool´s hell’ (failing to appreciate a positive objective quality of life). chapter 3 on east asia, by shawn arthur and victor h. mair, has some significant weaknesses. for example, it misses some important recent references, and there is a rather questionable description of wellbeing in china without any supporting evidence (p. 60). a great deal of research has demonstrated that self-determination is essential for wellbeing, but corruption in china is notorious. according to the recent human freedom index, china ranks near the bottom, and human rights organisations continue to find evidence of continuing abuse in china. the second chapter on east asia, chapter 10 by takashi inoguchi and richard j. estes, paints a somewhat rosy picture of this region, considering the oppressive regimes in north korea and china, and the lack of freedom and self-determination of their people. there is enough objective evidence to question whether people in north korea and china actually experience ‘high levels of self-assessed wellbeing’. poverty, trauma, and human rights violation all affect wellbeing, especially in north korea. another concern is the lack of critique regarding self-rating scales in cross-cultural comparisons and the possibility of response biases due to cultural factors or due to perceptions of public surveys among people living under despotic governments. also, some of the graphs (e.g. fig. 10.22) are difficult to read. the africa chapter, by valerie møller and benjamin roberts, is unsurprisingly the most contemporaneous, as the historical records for africa are meagre and shallow compared with most other parts of the world. they emphasise that given the persistence of widespread poverty in this region, wellbeing assessment continues to focus on basic needs. in terms of self-reported life satisfaction, africa is by far the unhappiest part of the world, with few sub-saharan countries scoring above the midpoint. nonetheless, self-reported ‘affect balance’ reports (positive versus negative emotional experience) are overall positive for africa, begging the question (not discussed in this chapter) of whether africans are affectively optimistic and evaluatively pessimistic, or whether they just understand the life satisfaction scale differently. since they also book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 89 note that africa is ‘one of the most religious regions of the world’ (p.195), it is also possible that religious belief generate optimism at the same time as religious conflicts (endemic in many parts of africa) generate pessimism. be that as it may, in terms of sheer survival the authors note the spectacular and rapid gains in african longevity with life expectancy doubling in a couple of generations, despite prevalent warfare and epidemics such as hiv/aids. in the 21 countries of the middle east and north africa, according to authors habib tiliouine and mohammed meziane, there is great cultural and developmental variety. exploring the region’s complex history the authors also note the complexities of the present situation, since many countries experience persistent conflicts. sadly, most of the countries of the region are unstable and their social conditions are deteriorating. as shown on the “misery index”, several are experiencing collective misery, and they show low levels of happiness in the world happiness report. they also have high scores on the negative experience index, that measures levels of sadness, stress, anger, physical pain, and worry. there is widespread corruption and low levels of trust in institutions. despite these disturbing figures, the authors point out that the region has made important gains in some objective quality of life indicators, such as life expectancy and education, and they are hopeful that the rest of the world can contribute to the positive social changes that are occurring in this region. the india chapter, by anthropologist isabelle clark-decés and sanskrit scholar frederick smith, covers classical and modern periods and some of this concerns the whole south asia region. they note the persistent ‘cultural conservatism’ that has survived several turbulent periods, and trace the rich diversity of contemporary wellbeing discourse back to sophisticated ancient sanskrit texts on wellbeing and virtue. but they also quite rightly note that elite scholarly discourses on ‘prescriptive well-being’ in hinduism and buddhism never tell us much about the everyday experienced wellbeing of ordinary people. for example, it is not how much people’s lived experiences were actually influenced by the very strong textual association between wellbeing and theories of afterlife and rebirth, or by the theoretical division of the life course into behaviourally coded stages. as for islamic populations, however, the authors to assume that as was also asserted in the chapter on islam the pursuit of wellbeing is understood in terms of obedience to religious prescriptions. this fits well with the regional cultural theme of relativity which is discussed: the proper pursuit of wellbeing is relative to ‘the time and place of one’s birth, place of habitation, occupation, life stage, karma, dharma, and so on’ (p.98). the second south asia chapter, by economists vijay kumar shrotryia and krishna mazumdar, weirdly comes seven chapters later and the two chapters don’t refer to one another. actually the two chapters are very different the earlier one being on cultural history and this one being about contemporary socio-economic and demographic processes. like many other chapters, this offers a wealth of basic descriptive detail not all of which is specifically linked to any arguments about wellbeing. once wellbeing is introduced, half-way through the chapter, the authors follow the editors in defining health, education, income, and subjective wellbeing as wellbeing ‘domains’, hence neglecting the important distinction between means and ends that ought surelyto be central to any account of wellbeing. the overall argument, however, convincingly shows that the whole region faces common patterns and challenges for any wellbeing strategy: the combination of lower fertility rates and better health are producing a rapidly aging population which a weak health care infrastructure struggles to cope with, and there is a huge cohort of young working-age people with poor employment prospects who lack social security provision. in their chapter on latin america, mariano rojas and josé garcía vega state that what defines latin america is a shared set of values about wellbeing. the two economists give us a detailed book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 90 account of the history of the region and its objective quality of life, illustrated by provide impressive data on the development of latin america. for example, in 1900 life expectancy was 29 in brazil and 25 in mexico, the two most populous latin-american countries, while the average life expectancy in latin america today is 74. there have also been large improvements in literacy and medical care. despite these changes, latin america continues to be a very unequal region, where violence, corruption and crime are all too frequent. interestingly, the subjective wellbeing of people in latin america is “outstandingly good”, both in terms of positive emotions and life satisfaction. rojas and garcía vega attribute this to the importance of close human relationships and the centrality of the family, and they argue that public policy should be sensitive to this and promote wellbeing with a social focus that is congruent with these values. chapter 9, by estes, land, michalos, phillips, and sirgy (academics in the fields of social policy, sociology, applied philosophy and marketing research) investigates the development of wellbeing in north america, particularly since the end of world war 2. they begin by defining wellbeing as consisting of economic, health, educational, and subjective elements. economic, health and educational factors are commonly thought of as contributing to wellbeing and not, in and of themselves, elements of wellbeing however. using these three factors as indicators of wellbeing highlights the still disparate intraand inter-disciplinary understandings of personal wellbeing. the extensive historical context provided succeeds in establishing the main theme of the chapter; the historic and continuing inequality of wellbeing amongst ethnic minorities (black african slaves, native americans) and women. the comparison of wellbeing amongst subpopulations provides insight into how north american people perceive wellbeing. overall, a comprehensive overview of the history of north american wellbeing within an economic and social development framework is provided. it is a valued resource for understanding what drives wellbeing and how it has evolved in one of the world’s most developed nations. the chapter on south-east asia by mahar mangahas and edilberto de jesus offers a detailed and unavoidably complex but instructive account of the different wellbeing implications of various phases and varieties of colonial influence. the general picture that emerges is that despite horrific violence and bullying associated with pacification, de-colonization, and state-making, the region’s wellbeing was greatly enhanced over the longer term through peace-making, economic growth, public health planning, and provision of education and health services. education, for example, although sometimes treated as an instrument of colonial domination, was often promoted explicitly for the sake of wellbeing. they provide a good overview of indicators relating to contemporary wellbeing, and emphasise that as in most parts of the world, one of the best prospects for improved aggregate wellbeing will be to promote inclusive growth and reduced inequality. chapter 13 on europe, by wolfgang glatzer and jürgen kohl, is the most contemporary and the most statistically comprehensive chapter of the collection. the overall message is that european history, being uniquely rich in statistical evidence, most clearly illustrates the increasing policy relevance of subjectivity as societies achieve political, material, and socioeconomic progress. whereas history is replete with evidence of events and processes that we can be sure caused mass misery, since the end of world war ii europe has been increasingly confident of democratic rights, peace, and healthy life expectancy. and in contradiction of the current pervasive tide of cultural pessimism and anti-modernism, they provide clear evidence that most europeans do not report being lonely, and that loneliness is lowest in northern and western parts of europe. one of their most interestingly provocative points, although not very clearly expressed (p.449), is that critics who associate the promotion of ‘life satisfaction’ with selfish hedonism should bear in mind that it is quite likely that most people include empathic book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 91 interest in other people when they evaluate their own lives. this begs an important question that they don’t raise, and which challenges their mainly statistical approach: assuming that it matters a great deal how people interpret and respond to survey questions, how can we ever hope to make sense of statistical surveys about wellbeing without a much bigger effort to conduct and synthesise qualitative research that complements the number-crunching? in chapter 14 on oceania, by robert cummins and tanja capic provide a historical overview and discussion of the economic, health, educational and subjective wellbeing dimensions of the people of oceania’s three largest countries, namely australia, new zealand, and papua new guinea. the main overall story is one of illbeing before colonization, which worsened during and after colonization until things began to improve after world war 2. one contentious claim is that persistent disparities in wellbeing are likely to be made worse by continuing ‘success’ in modernization (p.457). they don’t explain this belief by specifying which inequalities are getting worse, and yet this kind of specification ought to lie at the heart of the assessment and analysis of wellbeing. several claims are unsubstantiated, some statistics are dated, and there are occasional typos, but they do provide some hard facts in relation to the wellbeing of indigenous populations. chapter 15 on the ‘transition’ countries of the former soviet union, by economists carol graham and aurite werman, looks at what happens to wellbeing when countries move from repressive regimes and planned economies to more democratic government and free markets. the answer is not as clear as many of us might have expected. this is a particularly complex task because, as the authors note, these countries had very different histories before they became communist states: some had been part of europe and had long experience in market economies and democracy, while others had been rural or nomadic societies. what happened to these countries after the dissolution of the soviet union was in large part predicted by this previous history, with eastern europe faring better, but they have all had to pay a price in wellbeing during their transitions to democracy and free market economies. in general, subjective wellbeing has followed a v-shaped trajectory over the years: dropping dramatically right after the transition began and partially recovering from around 2005 on, with marked differences between age cohorts (with younger people and those who are better off people adapt better that their older and poorer counterparts). interestingly, these countries in transition don´t show clear signs of the “democracy bonus” on wellbeing that characterizes other democratic countries. birger poppel’s chapter on arctic peoples is 37 pages long, of which only around 10% to 20% is concerned with psychological wellbeing. the rest of the chapter is an excellent overview of the history and development of the artic region, which does provide context for the psychological wellbeing focus of the last few pages. if you are interested in how the artic is defined and delimited (e.g., depending on definition this can range from 4 million to 10 million inhabitants) or various issues to do with social, economic, health or climate change, this is a very good resource. regarding wellbeing however, this chapter suggests that little quality information is available (i.e., a lack of comparable official statistics across regions), but does outline the main results of the current surveys. the general conclusion from current data is as would be expected; indigenous peoples of the arctic still engage in subsistence activities, suffer from a range of illhealth and ill-being (e.g., high mortality rates, high youth suicide rates), and their psychological wellbeing is lower than non-indigenous populations. as a distinct positive this is the first review available of artic people’s wellbeing. book review thin, tarragona, wong, jarden, bartholomaeus, & jarden www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 92 5. concluding comments as an extremely ambitious collection offering encyclopedic coverage of historical and contemporary information relevant to wellbeing worldwide, this is impressive. it will be a useful resource to those who can afford springer’s prices like some other publishers, they are no longer able to price their books at a level within the budget of most individuals and small libraries. either as a dip-in resource, or as an information-rich read for those who really want to get a sense of global historical and geo-political patterns of wellbeing, it will make significant contributions to wellbeing scholarship. authors neil thin university of edinburgh n.thin@ed.ac.uk margarita tarragona positivamente & grupo campos elíseos paul wong saybrook university, trent university and tyndale university college rebecca j. jarden auckland university of technology jonathan bartholomaeus south australian health and medical research institute aaron jarden flinders university & south australian health and medical research institute publishing timeline received 9 june 2017 accepted 9 june 2017 published 9 june 2017 mailto:n.thin@ed.ac.uk schwekendiek, d., & park, h.. (2020). the biological standard of living in early south korea: physical wellbeing based on body mass indices, 1940s to 1950s. international journal of wellbeing, 10(1), 54-66. doi:10.5502/ijw.v10i1.764 daniel schwekendiek sungkyunkwan university danjosch@gmail.com copyright belongs to the author(s) 54 the biological standard of living in early south korea: physical well-being based on body mass indices, 1940s to 1950s daniel schwekendiek · heejin park abstract: this study fills a gap in the literature on the physical well-being of humans by employing bmi measurements of 89 koreans measured from the early 1940s to mid-1950s. this period is of special historical concern since it coincides with the end of world war ii, during which japan utilized the korean peninsula as a supply base for its war efforts, the disruptive american occupation period of korea (1945-1948), the destructive korean war (1950-1953), and the chaotic early years after the war. this study draws on records of employees from a large korean bank. bmi values were lower in the latter period, indicating that living standards must have declined after the korean war. while the war destroyed korea’s economy, relief aid prevented a total collapse during war times. however, international massive grain programs such as pl 480 had not yet been implemented in the mid-1950s, leaving people vulnerable directly after the war. anthropometric comparisons with historical populations in the united states as well as with pre-modern to contemporary koreans are made in a latter section of this paper. keywords: korea, asia, human wellbeing, standard of living, economic history, anthropometry 1. introduction over the last few decades, the concept of “biological standard of living” has been established in the literature on human well-being (komlos and baten 1998; komlos and kriwy 2003; koepke and baten 2005; baten and blum 2012). in addition to income, the biological standard of living focuses on health and nutritional improvements in populations, thereby encompassing biological components of human welfare and economic development. the biological standard of living is typically proxied by demographic and anthropometric indicators such as morbidity, life expectancy, and frequently height (steckel 1995; steckel 2009). previous research on the biological standard of living in korea has focused on height trends of the pre-modern joseon dynasty (pak 2011; shin, oh et al. 2012; lewis, jun et al. 2013), colonial korea (kimura 1993; choi and schwekendiek 2009; kim and park 2011), as well as south korea (schwekendiek and jun 2010), and north korea (pak 2004; schwekendiek 2008a; schwekendiek 2008b). article http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 55 findings related to the height of korean men can be summarized as follows. while the mean height of people in underdeveloped north korea stagnated during the second half of the twentieth century (pak, 2004; pak et al., 2011), their counterparts living in developed south korea experienced a secular trend in height during the same period (schwekendiek and jun, 2010). south koreans were even found to be the tallest among east asians as a result of healthy and wealthy living conditions in combination with animal protein programs initiated by the government (schwekendiek and jun, 2010). heights of the lowest class (kim and park, 2011) as well as the lower to middle class in early colonial korea (choi and schwekendiek, 2009) slightly improved by 2 cm, which might be attributed to japanese agricultural, health, and sanitation reforms. the height of korean men born in the joseon dynasty was estimated at 161 cm based on osteometric reconstructions using modern japanese skeleton references (shin et al., 2012). however, the mean height of men was estimated at 164 cm based on ‘broad’ mongoloid skeleton references (pak, 2011). based on data measured from living males, the height of joseon dynasty korean men born from the mid-sixteenth to early eighteenth centuries was estimated at 166 cm (lewis et al., 2013), indicating that east asians enjoyed similar biological living standards as frenchmen at that time. while biological living standards in contemporary and pre-modern korea have been well studied, there has been no report on the critical interwar period in korea, which lasted from world war ii (1939-1945) to the korean war (1950-1953). this interwar period is of special historical concern since it coincides with the end of world war ii, during which japan utilized the korean peninsula as a supply base for its war efforts, the disruptive american occupation period of korea (1945-1948), the destructive korean war (1950-1953), and the chaotic early years after the war. the purpose of this paper is to shed light on the biological standard of living in interwar korea (and the immediate years before and thereafter), as this was a very critical period characterized by crises, wars, macroeconomic shock, corruption and, in short, chaos. previous studies focused on koreans born in the early colonial period of the 1910s to 1920s (choi and schwekendiek, 2009; kim and park, 2011), whereas studies on contemporary south koreans focused on those born as early as the mid-1950s (schwekendiek and jun, 2010). therefore, this paper fills a gap in the literature while offering a unique opportunity to study living standards under extreme conditions. indeed, after japan raided pearl harbor in 1941, living conditions noticeably deteriorated in colonial korea as the japanese fully mobilized for war against the united states. mineral, agricultural, and other vital resources were increasingly removed by the japanese, putting koreans under more pressure to survive. a korean experiencing colonization (kang 2001:16) remembers japanese strict rule as follows: grass and tree bark, and this is literally what we lived on … we also picked up acorns from the mountain in the autumn and ate them during the winter. these we had to soak for many days to get rid of the acrid smell and the caustic chemicals. yes, we really did live like that. of all the households in the village … only about five or six were still eating grains of any kinds. the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 56 since the japanese held all key positions in colonial korea and also refrained from training korean engineers and technicians, koreans were not able to repair and operate cars and machines on their own, which hampered agricultural and industrial production. after japan lost the war, the allies placed korea under a temporary northern and southern trusteeship (1945-1948). while the soviet union installed a korean puppet regime in the north, southern korea was ruled by an american military government. the provisional division of the korean peninsula into two halves posed large challenges for policy planners in both occupied zones. while the industrial north was cut-off from food production, the agricultural south was cut-off from stable energy supplies as well as fertilizers produced in the north, thereby hampering food production in the south. interestingly, the two germanys, which were also divided around that time through the outbreak of the cold war, faced a similar structural problem after division (giersch, paqué et al. 1992; steiner 2010). to make things worse, after japanese colonization, millions of koreans returned from japan, manchuria (now china), and sakhalin island (now russia) or fled from the communist north to the south, all of which dramatically increased food demand in korea and aggravated the situation. as noted by a foreign observer at that time (nahm 1993:227): [the] situation is getting worse. there is rampant inflation. consumer goods and coal are virtually nonexistent. food distribution is inequitable … transportation equipment is breaking down. unemployment is rising to dangerous proportions … hunger is rapidly spreading and will presently result in starvation in many areas by mid summer. in light of soviet-american antagonism after world war ii, separate elections were held in both occupied korean zones, which in turn led to formal establishment of the republic of korea (widely known as south korea) and the democratic people’s republic of korea (widely known as north korea) in 1948. in 1950, the cold war escalated into an armed war when north korea invaded south korea in order to take control of the entire peninsula. only the u.s.-led un intervention prevented defeat of the south but not without extremely devastating effects. in fact, the death toll among the civilian population exceeded that of the vietnam war (cumings, 2010). the united states, having complete air dominance, dropped more bombs on korea than on japan during world war ii in order to minimize american casualties, which resulted in major costs to the korean civilian population and local infrastructure. an american soldier fighting in korea (eargle 1952: 28) wrote in his diary the following: close to fifty-five tons of explosive were used during strike and pilots described one span of railroad bridge as ‘dumped and demolished’ after a two thousand pound bomb hit. one span of the highway bridge was knocked flat. some korean cities were literally “removed from the map” (cumings 2004: 19) due to the massive carpet bombings by the american military. as a result, food provisions further deteriorated and became irregular during the war. a korean remembers everyday life during the war as follows (kim 1989: 37): the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 57 rice was hard to come by then: none of the stores were open … we bought potatoes and barley and ate that, mixed with a little rice. people were making stew from zucchini leaves and whatever vegetables they could get, boiling them with some barley in lots of water. the korean war ended in an armistice in 1953, and a demilitarized zone (dmz) close to the original dividing line (i.e. 38th parallel) of the two occupied koreas was established. yet, living standards did not improve after the korean war. japanese exploitation during colonization, structural distortions after liberation, the artificial division of the peninsula into two koreas, and the korean war altogether led to rampant corruption and spread of black markets in the south (lie 1998:32). unlike socialist north korea, which installed a food rationing system for ideological reasons (i.e. a public distribution system), people in the capitalist south were fighting a battle of survival of the fittest, where individuals bribing government officials were altering the odds in their favor (lie 1998:33). access to scarce resources such as food and medicine were primarily subject to bribery after the war. due to extreme poverty, many officials barely made a living with their salary, thus becoming inevitably susceptible to bribery (lie 1998:33). entering a vicious circle of corruption and low economic growth, living standards of average koreans were not good even a decade after the war. a south korean remembers as follows (kim and yu 1997:37): when i was growing up in korea in the 1960s, life was very difficult. we were very regimented … i faced a lot of economic hardships. we did not always have enough to eat. sometimes all of my family members had to share one egg. dissatisfied with the chaotic and corrupt government, the south korean military launched a coup in 1961. as commonly known, the military government then rigorously advanced south korea into the world’s fastest growing economy of the second half of the twentieth century (maddison 2001) and eventually to an oecd nation by the 1990s, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 2. data this study employs data from the joseon siksan eunhaeng, which is today called the korean development bank (kdb). the joseon siksan eunhaeng (literally, “korean increasing property bank”) was established in 1918 under japanese colonization and was the largest bank in colonial korea, managing 41% of capital transactions, 28% of saving transactions, and 55% of loan transactions at that time. the joseon siksan eunhaeng changed its name to hanguk saneop eunhaeng (literally, “korean industrial bank”) after the korean war, and its many branches can still be seen all over south korea. in colonial times, employment at the korean increasing property bank was highly competitive and a highly desired job position. only one out of 30 candidates was selected, and there were two ways to land a job at the bank. first, high school or university graduates could apply for a job. particularly, university education was strictly regulated by the japanese, such that apparently only children of rich or influential korean parents could attend such institutions and thus apply for a job at the bank. secondly, people with respective career experience were recruited regardless of their educational status. however, as certain mathematical, reading, and writing skills were required the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 58 in the banking industry, non-privileged koreans were effectively barred from applying at the bank. therefore, the present data only represent the upper socioeconomic stratum of interwar korea. nevertheless, records on white-collar workers have been used in previous studies despite the fact that the data are commonly drawn from an upper socioeconomic stratum of a given population. for instance, gill (1998) analyzed height data on south koreans employed by the korean medical health insurance corporation. since they were government employees (mostly working as teachers in public schools), they were considered to be members of the mid-upper class. morgan (2004) analyzed the height of chinese men born during the period from 1880-1930 and working in state-run enterprises, mainly the chinese national railways and the post and telegraph administration. these employees were deemed to be a somewhat higher socioeconomic class (on account of their education and employment in government posts). 3. analysis successful applicants were physically examined in hospitals for their anthropometric measurements. further background data such as gender, age, residence, education, and so forth were recorded. table 1 shows all variables taken from records employed in this study. the total sample size was 89. bmi (weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters) was used as a proxy of biological living standards. since bmi can be used for both men and women, both sexes were combined. mean bmi was 22 units (table 1). men were strikingly over-represented in the current sample (91%). it is unsurprising that fewer women were employed by the bank since white collar jobs require the ability to read and write. traditionally, females had significantly higher illiteracy rates than men due to confucian gender discrimination. as an illustration, only 16% of korean males were illiterate as opposed to 40% of korean females in 1960 (mcginn et al., 1980). since the un world health organization recommends using bmi for adults aged 20 or over, all teenage workers were excluded from the analysis. the mean age of individuals in this sample is 24, with a minimum age of 20 and maximum age of 38. the mean measurement year is 1948, with a minimum year of 1941 and maximum year of 1956. most individuals (58%) were residing in southern korea (jeolla province, jeju island, gyeongsang province), followed by central korea (chungcheong province, gangwon province), the capital seoul, and northern korea (pyongan province). a majority (74%) had a high school or higher education (high school degree or tertiary educational degree), as opposed to 26% with a lower education (primary or secondary degree only). in comparison, only 18% of koreans were enrolled in high school and 3% in college in 1955 (mcginn, snodgrass et al. 1980). about 65% of individuals in this sample specified that their fathers were farmers (or working in farming-related business). in comparison, about 85% of the korean labor force was employed in agriculture in 1910 (jun 2012), indicating that the parents of individuals in the sample were more often of higher socioeconomic status as opposed to commoners. moreover, due to numerous missing values, the subsample size substantially drops from 89 to 37 individuals. we therefore limit our analysis of bmi values to measurement year and region. the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 59 table 1: descriptive statistics variables n percent min max mean sd bmi 89 17.5 34.0 21.5 2.4 current age in years 89 20.0 38.0 23.6 4.2 measurement year 89 1936 1956 1948 3.9 gender male 81 91 gender female 8 9 subtotal 89 100 northern korea 2 2 central korea 26 29 southern korea 52 58 current residence seoul 9 10 subtotal 89 100 lower education 22 26 high school or higher education 62 74 total 84 100 father farmer 24 64.9 father non-farmer 13 35.1 subtotal 37 100 bmi is taken as an indicator of biological living standards, with higher values indicating better living conditions. bmi is stratified by measurement period and residence at time of measurement, and the values are plotted in figure 1. our analysis reveals that individuals measured in the post-war period (1954-1956) had the lowest bmi values across all measurement periods. as an explanation, it is likely that international the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 60 relief aid was delivered during the korean war, but massive and permanent grain imports only started in 1956 in the form of u.s. loans under the public law 480 (pl 480) program (figure 2). figure 1: bmi by time of measurement and residence at time of measurement for illustration purposes, south korea imported about 1,633,000 metric tons of grain from 1956 to 1960, 3,442,000 metric tons of grain from 1961 to 1965, and 4,426,000 metric tons of grains from 1966 to 1970s (kim and joo 1982:32). most of these grains were given by the u.s. as a form of development aid to its allies during the cold war. in fact, south korea became one of the major beneficiaries of the program since the u.s. heavily invested into the south to prevent its collapse and contain the communist north. hence, individuals measured in the immediate post-war period from 1954 to 1956 were obviously cut-off from relief aid and thus unable to benefit from the massive and permanent pl 480 program. the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 61 figure 2: grain imports to south korea source: kim and joo (1982:32). individuals measured in the interwar period (1946 to 1949) had a relatively high mean bmi. for instance, among residents in seoul and southern korea, bmi peaked during the observed period. individuals measured during the critical japanese war mobilization period (1941-1945) did not fare too poorly, during which time korea was increasingly made a supply base for japan’s war efforts against the u.s. and its allies. it is possible that japan’s war mobilization did not strongly impact the korean peninsula, although further studies are needed to confirm this. indeed, mean height slightly improved in the early years of japanese colonization (choi and schwekendiek 2009; kim and park 2011), suggesting that biological living standards did not decline under colonial rule. expectedly, the korean war (1950-1953) negatively affected the biological living condition of koreans, although the post-korean war period was, as discussed, much more detrimental. another likely reason why the disruptive korean war did not affect the sample was that the bank employees were shielded from starvation during the war due to their better networks and resources. as put by an average korean housewife who barely escaped from the north korean troops all the way from the capital seoul to the port city of pusan in the southern tip of the peninsula during the war (kim 1989:39): i had earlier vowed to myself that no matter how badly off i was, i would never seek out small uncle [father's younger brother], because he had told us that he had no way to leave seoul. we found out later that he had gone to pusan in a truck sponsored by the bank where he worked. he took with him not only his entire family but even all his home furnishings. now, with my [starving] child almost dead, there was nothing i could do but go to the bank branch in pusan to find uncle, who was surprised and a little embarrassed to see me. he took me to the place where he was staying with his family: it was a huge house, big enough to hold many families. the floors were heated and the people were cooking and eating almost normally, very unlike refugees. the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 62 given the low sample size, let alone the extremely low subsample sizes by region, one has to take the analysis with caution. overall, one gets the impression that biological living standards first slightly improved during the occupation period, declined during the war period, and reached a trough in the post-war period. moreover, bmi values were consistently larger in the capital seoul compared to the other regions, perhaps due to better access to black markets and official food distribution centers. 4. comparison of findings how does the present sample compare to other historical populations? table 2 provides a bmi comparison with nineteenth century white american males, whereas table 3 references present data on males measured in pre-modern korea, colonial korea, and contemporary south korea. table 2: bmi status of interwar koreans according to united nations who classifications of bmi in comparative perspective with nineteenth century white americans target group underweight in % normal weight in % overweight in % total in % nineteenth century white americans (age 20s-30s) 2.3 81.6 16.1 100 early twentieth century koreans (age 20s-30s) 5.6 87.6 6.7 100 notes: overweight rates include obesity rates. source: this study and carson (2011). while most studies on biological standard of living have focused on height due to its availability over the centuries, only a few historical studies have made use of bmi data. carson (2011) analyzed the bmis of nineteenth century american prisoners, whereas komlos and brabec (2012) focused on nineteenth to early twentieth century american military recruits. only carson (2011) reported detailed bmi data, allowing a comparison with the present sample (table 2). however, bmi was reported according to international nutritional classifications. the bmi cut-offs for underweight, normal weight, and overweight individuals according to the un world health organization are as follows: underweight = bmi below 18.50, normal weight = bmi 18.50 to 24.99, and overweight (including obesity) = bmi 25.00 or higher. table 2 shows that interwar koreans were slightly more underweight (6%) than white americans (2%) in the nineteenth century. since americans in that sample were from the lower stratum (prisoners) and koreans in the current sample from the upper stratum (bank employees), underweight gaps between average koreans and americans were probably much larger. since bmi comparisons with other historical populations are difficult to make due to lack of data, table 3 adds the results of previous studies on korean height and weight. mean height of interwar koreans was 167 cm, indicating a minor improvement compared to joseon dynasty korea (166 cm) and colonial korea (166 cm). however, since interwar koreans were from the upper socioeconomic stratum, joseon dynasty koreans from the lower and middle strata (unfree ‘slaves’ the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 63 and commoners), and those from colonial korea from the middle and lower strata (political prisoners), one should take this comparison with caution. korean government employees (mostly teachers) born in 1954 had a final height of 169 cm, but they were also from the upper social stratum since their mean income was 50% higher than average (gill, 1998). however, koreans in the present sample (167 cm), who were born from the 1900s to 1930s, were somewhat shorter than korean government employees born some 25 years later (169 cm). whether or not the bank employees in the current sample or government employees born in 1954 were of higher socioeconomic status cannot be determined. lastly, comparison with a national sample of south koreans born in the 1970s revealed that contemporary people are strikingly taller (173 cm) and heavier (70 kg) as well as have a higher bmi (24 units) than interwar koreans (167 cm, 60 kg, 22 bmi units, respectively). table 3: bmi, height, and weight status of interwar koreans in comparative perspective with premodern, colonial, and contemporary koreans general historical period sample measurement period birth period anthropometrics mean bmi mean height in cm mean weight in kg joseon dynasty korea (1392 to 1910) militia recruits (males aged 2040) 1590s to 1720s mid sixteenth to early eighteenth century n/a 165.69 n/a colonial korea (1910 to 1945) political prisoners (males aged 2040) 1910s to 1940s 1890s to 1910s n/a 164.46 n/a occupied korea (1945 to 1948) and korean war (1950 to 1953) bank employees (males aged 2030s), this study 1930s to 1950s 1900s to 1930s 21.50 167.07 59.98 republic of korea (1948 to present) a: government employees (males aged 2040) 1994 1950s to 1970s n/a 169.27 (in 1954) n/a the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 64 b: national random sample (males aged 2529) 2002-2003 1970s 23.56 172.50 70.10 notes: the bmi of national random sample was calculated based on reported mean height and weight. source: this study and lewis et al. (2013:261), choi and schwekendiek (2009:260), schwekendiek and jun (2010), korean agency for technology and standards (2004:90, 120). 5. conclusion in summation, the biological standard of living in korea has been widely studied since the korean peninsula offers a rare opportunity to investigate the effects of colonialism, capitalism, and communism. however, previous studies have focused on joseon dynasty korea, colonial korea, south korea, and north korea by employing human height measurements. the present study fills a gap in the literature by employing bmi measurements of interwar koreans measured from the early 1940s to mid-1950s. this period is of special historical concern since it coincides with the end of world war ii, during which japan utilized the korean peninsula as a supply base, the chaotic foreign occupation period of korea (1945-1948), the korean war (1950-1953), and the early years after the war. this study is based on records of employees from a large korean bank, most of whom were of upper socioeconomic status. bmi values reached a trough in the latter period, indicating that biological living standards must have declined after the war. while the war destroyed korea’s economy, relief aid prevented the total collapse during war times. however, international massive grain programs such as the pl 480 program were still not implemented, leaving people vulnerable directly after the war. unexpectedly, bmi values were the highest during the chaotic occupation period. most individuals were probably shielded from economic depression at that time due to their higher socioeconomic status. the latter result is broadly in line with a study on final height of germans born during world war i (blum 2013), suggesting that wealthier individuals were more likely to purchase food on the black market. acknowledgements this work was supported by the ministry of education of the republic of korea and the national research foundation of korea (nrf-2018s1a6a3a01023515). the authors would like to thank seong-min paek for his assistance to compile the data. we also thank two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful suggestions to improve this paper. authors daniel schwekendiek sungkyunkwan university danjosch@skku.edu heejin park the biological standard of living in early south korea schwekendiek & park 65 kyungpook national university publishing timeline received 28 august 2018 accepted 14 october 2019 published 1 february 2020 references baten, j. and m. blum (2012). 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(2010). the plans that failed: an economic history of the gdr. new york and oxford, berghan books. table 1: descriptive statistics figure 1: bmi by time of measurement and residence at time of measurement figure 2: grain imports to south korea table 2: bmi status of interwar koreans according to united nations who classifications of bmi in comparative perspective with nineteenth century white americans table 3: bmi, height, and weight status of interwar koreans in comparative perspective with pre-modern, colonial, and contemporary koreans mise, t.-r., & busseri, m.a. (2020). the full life revisited: examining hedonia and eudaimonia as general orientations, motives for activities, and experiences of wellbeing. international journal of wellbeing, 10(4), 74-86. https://doi.org/10.5502/ijw.v10i4.951 michael a. busseri brock university, canada mbusseri@brocku.ca copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 74 article the full life revisited: examining hedonia and eudaimonia as general orientations, motives for activities, and experiences of wellbeing taysa-rhea mise · michael a. busseri abstract: we examined the concepts of hedonia and eudaimonia with respect to general orientations to life, motives for activities, and experiences of wellbeing among young canadian adults (n = 325; m age = 19.10, sd = 2.18; 87% female). within concepts, moderate positive correlations were observed across facets of hedonia and eudaimonia. between concepts, correlations were strongest for wellbeing and weakest for motives. unique predictive associations of eudaimonic general orientations and motives for daily activities were found for both types of wellbeing. in support of the ‘full life’ hypothesis the highest levels of each form of wellbeing were found among individuals characterized by high (top 33%) levels of hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motivations for recent activities. findings support distinguishing between hedonia and eudaimonia as related but independent concepts, and provide new insights concerning hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motivations for activities in characterizing the full life. keywords: hedonia, eudaimonia, orientations, motives, wellbeing 1. introduction psychological research on the concept of ‘wellbeing’ typically focuses on experiences of ‘hedonia’ – usually studied in terms of satisfaction and enjoyment of one’s life, or ‘eudaimonia’ – which encompasses various aspects of positive functioning, including personal growth, authenticity, and meaning in life (ryan & deci, 2001; waterman, 1993). hedonia and eudaimonia apply not just to experiences of wellbeing, but also to how individuals generally orient their lives and their motives for the activities in which they engage (huta & waterman, 2014; peterson, park, & seligman, 2005). understanding the similarities and differences between these concepts is a central issue in research on positive psychology. to advance this issue, the present study examined associations between hedonia and eudaimonia with respect to general orientations to life, motives for daily activities, and experiences of wellbeing. furthermore, we evaluated the combined and unique predictive effects of hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for activities on hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing. psychological research on wellbeing is dominated by two traditions: hedonia and eudaimonia (ryan & deci 2001; waterman, 1993). hedonic wellbeing is most often assessed as ‘subjective wellbeing’ (diener, 1984) and is typically studied based on three components: a subjective appraisal of satisfaction with one’s life overall, the presence of positive affect, and the absence of negative affect (busseri & sadava, 2011; diener, suh, lucas, & smith, 1999). various operationalizations of eudaimonic wellbeing have been proposed (huta & waterman, 2014), but it is often studied with respect to indicators of positive functioning including: positive about:blank hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 75 relationships, personal growth, life purpose, mastery, autonomy, and self-acceptance (ryff, 1989); as well as experiences of meaning, authenticity, and personal expressiveness (waterman, schwartz, zamboanga, et al., 2010). although conceptually distinct, self-report measures of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing are typically strongly and positively correlated (gallagher, lopez, & preacher, 2009; joshanloo, 2016; keyes, shmotkin, & ryff, 2002) leading some to question the validity (or value) of differentiating these two forms of wellbeing (kashdan, biswasdiener, & king, 2008). nonetheless, there remains strong interest in understanding the similarities and differences between hedonia and eudaimonia (huta & waterman, 2014), not only in terms of experiences of wellbeing, but also with respect to how individuals live their lives (ryan & huta, 2009), including their general orientations to life (peterson et al., 2005) and motives for personal activities (huta & ryan, 2010). general orientations refer to individuals’ underlying motives and goals for their lives, and are important contributors to wellbeing (diener & lucas 1999; peterson et al., 2005; ryan & deci 2001). although such tendencies guide behavior, situational constraints and immediate needs may also impact decisions concerning daily activities. thus, attention has been given to the types of motives that individuals pursue in their daily activities. whereas hedonically oriented individuals seek regular pleasure and enjoyment, eudaimonically oriented individuals seek meaningful and authentic experiences to becoming their best selves (huta & waterman, 2014; peterson et al., 2005). in contrast to the strong positive correlation typically observed between hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing, hedonia and eudaimonia as motives for activities may share considerably less overlap (huta, 2013; huta & waterman, 2014). furthermore, hedonic and eudaimonic motives may be related to similar as well as distinct aspects of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing (asano, tsukamoto, igarashi, & huta, 2018; huta, 2016; huta, pelletier, baxtor, & thompson, 2012; huta & ryan, 2010). in particular, some studies suggest that whereas hedonic motives may be linked with various aspects of hedonic wellbeing, such motives may not be uniquely related to indicators of eudaimonic wellbeing, controlling for eudaimonic motives. such findings suggest that hedonic motives such as seeking pleasure may be uniquely aligned with (or predictive of) hedonic wellbeing, rather than supportive of eudaimonic aspects of wellbeing such as personal growth and authenticity. in addition, whereas eudaimonic motives may be linked with eudaimonic wellbeing, such motives may not be uniquely related to hedonic wellbeing, controlling for eudaimonic motives (e.g. mcgregor & little, 1998; steger, kashdan, & oishi, 2008). such findings suggest that eudaimonic motives such as seeking meaning and purpose in one’s life may be uniquely aligned with (or predictive of) eudaimonic wellbeing, rather than supportive of hedonic aspects of wellbeing such as enjoyment and pleasure. other research suggests that eudaimonic motives for activities may contribute uniquely to both forms of wellbeing (e.g., huta et al., 2012). it is possible, therefore, that seeking meaning and excellence in one’s activities facilitates personal growth and authentic living as well as satisfaction and enjoyment (huta & waterman, 2014; waterman, 1993, waterman, schwartz, & conti, 2008). if so, hedonic and eudaimonic motives may work in complimentary, rather than opposing ways to promote a wide range of positive life outcomes (huta & waterman, 2014; ryan & huta, 2009). in support of this ‘full life’ notion (seligman, 2002), some studies suggest that the most positive outcomes (including wellbeing, psychological functioning, and academic success) are found among individuals reporting higher levels of both hedonic and eudaimonic orientations or motives. importantly, research on the full life has focused either on general orientations to life (peterson et al., 2005; schueller & seligman, 2010) or motives for activities (huta & ryan, 2010; kryza-lacombe, tanzini, & o’neill, 2019), but not both. yet to be determined is how hedonic hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 76 and eudaimonic general orientations towards one’s life are related to hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities, and how each of these relates to hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing. 1.2 the present study in this study our aim was to further the understanding of hedonia and eudaimonia with respect to individuals’ general orientations towards their lives, motives for daily activities, and overall wellbeing. we predicted positive associations between each facet of hedonia (i.e., general orientations, motives for daily activities, wellbeing) and between each facet of eudaimonia. we also expected positive associations between each corresponding facet of hedonia and eudaimonia (e.g., hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations), but that such linkages would be stronger with respect to wellbeing than daily activity motives (huta & waterman, 2014). to inform the combined and unique predictive effects, we also examined general orientations and motives for daily activities as joint predictors of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing, expecting positive correlations between each predictor and both forms of wellbeing (huta, 2016). we also expected the unique predictive effects of hedonic orientations and motives for activities to be limited to hedonic (rather than eudaimonic) wellbeing, whereas eudaimonic orientations and motives would uniquely contribute to the prediction of both forms of wellbeing (huta et al., 2012). finally, we evaluated the full life hypothesis (huta & ryan, 2010; peterson et al., 2005) based on consideration of general orientations and motives for daily activities. we expected that the highest levels of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing would be found among individuals characterized by high levels of hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and high levels of hedonic and eudaimonic motives for daily activities. 2. method 2.1 participants and procedure canadian undergraduate students from brock university, canada (n = 334; m age = 19.14, sd = 2.22; 87% female; academic majors included psychology, 31%, child and youth studies, 17%, and education, 11%) completed a questionnaire in small-group settings in return for course credit. nine participants were removed due to incomplete data (i.e., less than 50% of the data for at least one of the analysis variables described below). the final analysis sample thus comprised 325 participants (m age = 19.10, sd = 2.18; 87% female). 2.2 measures 2.2.1 hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for daily activities the hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities was developed by huta and ryan (2010) to assess individuals’ motives for their activities, using the following prompt: “to what extent do you typically approach your activities with the following intentions, whether or not you actually achieve your aim?”. the nine-item scale comprises five hedonic (e.g., “seeking pleasure”) and four eudaimonic (e.g., “seeking to use the best in yourself”) items, each rated on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all and 7 = very much). wording for all nine items is provided in huta & ryan (2010, table 1). ratings for the hedonic and eudaimonic items are averaged separately. this scale was modified for the present purpose to measure the extent to which individuals (1) had a general orientation toward hedonic and eudaimonic aims in life, and (2) had hedonic and eudaimonic motives for their recent daily lives. to do so, participants completed the scale twice, the first time in response to the following prompt: “in general, how important is each of the following to you in your life?” ratings were averaged separately for the hedonic and eudaimonic hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 77 items (αs = .75 and .74) such that higher scores indicated stronger hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations toward one’s life, respectively. on a separate page, participants completed the scale a second time in response to the following prompt: “during the past week, to what degree did you approach your activities with each of the following intentions, whether or not you actually achieved your aim?” ratings were averaged such that higher scores indicated stronger hedonic and eudaimonic motives for recent daily activities, respectively (αs = .80 and .78). 2.2.2 hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing the satisfaction with life scale (diener, emmons, larsen, & griffin, 1985) was used to measure global life satisfaction. participants indicated the extent to which they agree with five statements on a seven-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, to 7 = strongly agree). ratings were averaged across items such that higher scores indicated greater satisfaction with life (α = .86). the scale of positive and negative experience (diener, wirtz, tov, et al., 2010) was used to measure the frequency of an individual’s positive and negative affective experiences over the past four weeks. the scale contains six items related to positive feelings and six items related to negative feelings. answers are indicated by a self-rating on a five-point likert scale (1 = very rarely or never, to 5 = very often or always). ratings were averaged, such that higher scores indicated more frequent positive and negative affective experiences respectively (αs = .83 and .83). the 18-item scales of psychological wellbeing (spwb, ryff, 1989; ryff & keyes 1995) was used as a global measure of six dimensions of psychological wellbeing: autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. responses were indicated on a six-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree) with eight of the items reverse-coded. ratings were averaged across all 18 items, such that higher scores represented greater psychological wellbeing (α = .78). in addition, the 21-item questionnaire for eudaimonic wellbeing (qewb, waterman et al., 2010) was used as a general measure of six categories of eudaimonia: self-discovery, development of one’s potential, purpose and meaning, effort in pursuit of excellence, intense engagement, and enjoyment of personally expressive activities. responses were indicated on a five-point likert scale (0 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree) with seven of the items reverse-coded. ratings were averaged across all 21 items such that higher scores indicated greater eudaimonic wellbeing (α = .78). 3. results descriptive statistics for the study measures are shown in table 1 (below). 3.1 hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing in a preliminary analysis, confirmatory factor analysis was used to examine the structure of the five wellbeing indicators. a one-factor model was tested in which all five indicators were specified as loading onto a single latent factor (latent factor variance was fixed to 1; all loadings were freely estimated). the overall fit for this model was poor (χ2 = 76.71, df = 5, p < .001; cfi = .87, srmr = .07, rmsea = .21) owing to a large residual correlation between the pwb and qewb scale scores. a second model was tested comprising two correlated latent factors in which life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect loaded onto a latent hedonic wellbeing factor, whereas the spwb and qewb loaded onto a latent eudaimonic wellbeing factor (variances for each factor were fixed to 1, loadings on each factor were freely estimated). this model provided excellent fit (χ2 = 3.59, df = 4, p = .465; cfi > .99, srmr = .01, rmsea < .01). thus, prior to hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 78 subsequent analysis, a composite hedonic wellbeing score was computed by standardizing the life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect (reverse-scored) values, then averaging the three measures and standardizing the resulting composite score. a composite eudaimonic wellbeing variable was computed by standardizing the two scale scores, averaging the two measures, and standardizing the resulting composite score. table 1. means, standard deviations, and correlations among study variables variable m sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1. general orientation-hedonic 5.59 0.80 - 2. general orientation-eudaimonic 5.87 0.78 .44* - 3. activity motives-hedonic 5.04 1.09 .47* .08 - 4. activity motives-eudaimonic 4.79 1.19 .15* .41* .19* - 5. satisfaction with life 4.33 1.19 .05 .14* .16* .25* - 6. positive affect 3.78 0.57 .19* .26* .21* .24* .55* - 7. negative affect 2.65 0.73 -.05 -.12* -.04 -.12* -.47* -.59* - 8. spwb 4.47 0.56 .17* .43* .06 .29* .47* .50* -.45* - 9. qewb 2.65 0.43 .14* .45* -.04 .43* .35* .39* -.31* .64* - 10. composite hwb 0.00 1.00 .12* .21* .17* .25* .81* .86* -.82* .57* .42* - 11. composite ewb 0.00 1.00 .17* .48* .03 .40* .45* .49* -.42* .91* .91* .54* - note. n = 325. spwb = scales of psychological wellbeing score. qewb = questionnaire of eudaimonic wellbeing score. hwb = hedonic wellbeing. ewb = eudaimonic wellbeing. * p < .05. 3.2 correlations between hedonia and eudaimonia positive correlations were observed among the three aspects of hedonia (general orientations, motives for daily activities, and wellbeing); these correlations were stronger between general orientations and daily motives than between either of these scores and wellbeing. positive correlations were also observed among the three aspects of eudaimonia, with comparable magnitudes among general orientations, daily motives, and wellbeing. positive correlations also were observed between each corresponding pair of hedonic/eudaimonic concepts. the strongest correlation was found between hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing; the weakest association was found between hedonic and eudaimonic motives for daily activities. 3.3 general orientations and motives for daily activities predicting wellbeing consistent with predictions, hedonic wellbeing was positively correlated with each of the general orientation and motives for recent activities measures; eudaimonic wellbeing was also positively correlated with each of these variables except hedonic motives for daily activities. to evaluate the combined and unique predictive effects of the general orientation and motives for daily activities scores on each form of wellbeing, we ran two multiple regression models. in these models, hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing scores were regressed simultaneously onto the hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 79 hedonic and eudaimonic general orientation and motives for daily activities. results are shown in table 2. the regression model explained 9% of the variance in hedonic wellbeing (r = .30, p < .001), and three of the four predictors were uniquely significant, in that higher hedonic wellbeing was uniquely predicted by stronger eudaimonic orientation, as well as stronger hedonic and eudaimonic motives for daily activities. the regression model explained 29% of the variance in eudaimonic wellbeing (r = .54, p < .001), and two of the four predictors were significant, in that higher eudaimonic wellbeing was uniquely predicted by stronger eudaimonic general orientations and eudaimonic motives for daily activities. table 2. regression of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing on hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for recent activities hedonic wellbeing eudaimonic wellbeing predictor b se p β b se p β general orientation-hedonic -.04 .09 .614 -.04 -.03 .08 .713 -.02 general orientation-eudaimonic .19 .09 .028 .15 .51 .08 <.001 .40 activity motives-hedonic .13 .06 .028 .14 -.04 .05 .476 -.04 activity motives-eudaimonic .14 .05 .006 .17 .21 .04 <.001 .25 note. n = 325. unstandardized (b) regression coefficients, standard errors (se), p values, and standardized (β) regression coefficients are shown by predictor (row variable) for hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing (column variable). 3.4 testing the full life hypothesis for each participant, the number of hedonic and eudaimonic general orientation and motives for daily activity scores falling into the top 33% of each distribution was counted. this ‘full life’ count (ranging from 0 to 4) was treated as a categorical independent variable in two between-subjects anovas with composite hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing scores as dependent variables. main effects were significant for both hedonic wellbeing (f(4,320) = 6.75, p < .001, η2 = .08) and eudaimonic wellbeing (f(4,320) = 15.06, p < .001, η2 = .16). as shown in figure 1 (below), higher levels of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing were found among individuals characterized by high levels of two or more of the hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for daily activities. follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that individuals with a full life count of 2, 3, or 4 were characterized by significantly higher wellbeing than the other two groups. at the other extreme, the lowest levels of wellbeing were found among individuals not characterized by high levels on any of the hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for daily activities. follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that individuals with a full life count of 0 were characterized by significantly lower wellbeing than each of the other groups. 4. discussion 4.1 associations between hedonia and eudaimonia within hedonic and eudaimonic concepts, general orientations and motives for recent activities were positively but moderately correlated, suggesting that individuals who oriented their lives hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 80 figure 1. standardized mean levels of wellbeing (y-axis) by full life count (x-axis) for hedonic (panel a) and eudaimonic (panel b) wellbeing. note. 95% confidence intervals are shown for each mean. ns = 84, 83, 85, 49, and 24, respectively, for full life counts of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. toward generally seeking pleasure (for example) tended to report recently pursuing daily activities for similar reasons. although such findings may have resulted from the use of the same set of items to assess general orientation and motives for activities, these results may also suggest that hedonic and eudaimonic motives for daily activities provide some insight into individuals’ general orientations (as hypothesized by huta & ryan, 2010). yet such correspondence was not very strong, indicating that at least some individuals were engaging in recent daily activities for reasons that were inconsistent with their hedonic or eudaimonic orientations. these patterns are consonant with the separation between general motivation orientations and motive states proposed in other motivation research (carver & white, 1994; deci & ryan, 2008; elliot & thrash, 2010). the present findings thus support the value of examining general orientations and motives for daily activities as unique aspects of hedonia and eudaimonia. -0.80 -0.60 -0.40 -0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0 1 2 3 4 -0.80 -0.60 -0.40 -0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 0 1 2 3 4 a b hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 81 also noteworthy, associations between hedonia and eudaimonia were generally stronger for wellbeing than between motives for recent activities. such findings provide further indication that the separation between hedonia and eudaimonia may be clearer with respect to motives for daily activities than for experiences of wellbeing (huta & waterman, 2014). yet there was also evidence of an empirical distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing. specifically, measures of the three components of subjective wellbeing (life satisfaction, positive affect, negative affect) loaded strongly onto a latent factor which was correlated with, but separate from the two scales measuring various aspects of eudaimonic wellbeing. these findings indicate that the five wellbeing measures were not reducible to a single factor and thus support the separability of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing, an issue which continues to be debated (e.g., disabato et al., 2016; huta, 2016). 4.2 predicting hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing further informing this debate, the present findings provide novel insights concerning similarities and differences between the two types of wellbeing based on their associations with hedonic and eudaimonic orientations and motivations for activities. importantly, the relative independence of hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for daily activities raises the possibility that they may have unique psychological significance. noteworthy in this regard were results from the regression models predicting hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing. higher levels of both types of wellbeing were uniquely predicted by the degree to which individuals reported approaching their lives in eudaimonic ways (i.e., seeking excellence and authenticity) and engaging in recent daily activities for eudaimonic reasons. in addition, greater hedonic wellbeing was uniquely predicted by the degree to which individuals reported seeking enjoyment from their recent daily activities. previous research has demonstrated unique links between hedonic and eudaimonic motives or activities with corresponding experiences of wellbeing (e.g., mcgregor & little, 1998; steger et al., 2008). the present findings extend this work by revealing aspects of general orientations and motives for activities that have independent connections to each type of wellbeing. one interpretation is that a stronger eudaimonic orientation to one’s life and daily activities are important precursors to a wide range of wellbeing experiences, including positive experiences (e.g., satisfaction and enjoyment of one’s life) and positive functioning (e.g., authenticity, excellence, and meaning). hedonic motives for daily activities, in contrast, may set the stage for more immediate hedonic wellbeing experiences, but have little unique bearing on an enhanced sense of purpose and self-expressiveness (huta & ryan, 2010). furthermore, hedonic general orientation was not uniquely predictive of either form of wellbeing. such findings may suggest that of the two general orientations, generally seeking pleasure and enjoyment in one’s life is not uniquely conducive to wellbeing. yet other research has indicated unique links between both hedonic and eudaimonic orientations to life and various indicators of wellbeing (e.g., peterson et al., 2005; schueller & seligman, 2010). no previous studies have examined hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for activities as joint predictors in the same study. consequently, the present findings might suggest that a hedonic orientation may simply be the most redundant of the various orientations and motives for activities that we examined. differences in the unique predictors of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing might also reflect an asymmetry in the measurement of wellbeing. specifically, hedonic wellbeing indicators are more heavily-valenced cognitive-affective reactions to one’s life than the indicators of eudaimonic wellbeing, which primarily reflect experiences of flourishing and positive ways of functioning (huta & waterman, hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 82 2014). further research is needed to examine these possibilities before conclusions can be drawn concerning the unique predictive associations involving the individual aspects of hedonia or eudaimonia. 4.3 the full life various facets of hedonia and eudaimonic may also be conceptualized as complementary, rather than opposing or competing, parts of a broader system of wellbeing (huta & waterman, 2014; ryan & huta, 2009). such a system may function to allow individuals to view their lives as manageable (if not enjoyable) and meaningful, even in the face of adversity and threat (shmotkin, 2005). previous studies examining the full life hypothesis have found the highest levels of wellbeing among individuals characterized by higher levels of hedonic and eudaimonic orientations to their lives (peterson et al., 2005; schueller & seligman, 2010) or above-average levels of both hedonic and eudaimonic motives for activities (huta & ryan, 2010; kryza-lacombe et al., 2019). the present study extends this research by showing that the highest (vs. lowest) levels of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing were found in individuals characterized by high (top 33%) levels of all four (rather than no) types of general orientation and motives for recent activities. seeking both hedonia and eudaimonia in general and through one’s daily activities, therefore, may promote a wider range of positive outcomes (including positive experiences, feelings, and functioning) than orienting one’s life and daily activities toward either pleasure and satisfaction or authenticity and meaning. we speculate that such complementarity has benefits in terms of the psychological coherence experienced when one’s motives for daily activities are congruent with core aspects of the self, including one’s general orientation to life (huta & waterman, 2014; mcgregor & little, 1998). nonetheless, comparably high levels of hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing were also found among individuals characterized by high levels of at least two of the general orientations and activity motives. such findings suggest that positive wellbeing outcomes may require only, or be supported by even a ‘partially full’, rather than a completely full life – a finding that may have practical significance given that it likely represents a more realistic goal for many individuals. future studies should seek to replicate this particular finding, however, and also further inform the significance of various combinations of hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and activity motives. 4.4 limitations and future directions in addition to the caveats discussed above, we note that future research is needed to examine the reliability and generalizability of our findings beyond the present sample of younger (primarily female) adults from canada. additional testing with more diverse samples of participants, including with respect to age, health status, and other sociodemographic factors relevant to hedonic and eudaimonic orientations, motives, and wellbeing would be valuable. given differences between western and eastern conceptualizations of happiness and wellbeing (joshanloo, 2014), cross-cultural testing is also critical. also noteworthy, the present predictive results did not inform the underlying mechanism(s). one possibility is that general orientations and motives for daily activities are connected to wellbeing via the types of daily activities in which one engages and resulting experiences of hedonia and eudaimonia in such activities (e.g., henderson, knight, & richardson, 2013; steger et al., 2008). such activities may also lead to greater hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing by satisfying basic psychological needs (ryan & deci, 2001). further studies are needed to assess hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 83 such potential mediating factors. we further note that such interpretations assume a causal direction flowing from general orientation and motives for daily activities to wellbeing. additional research employing a longitudinal design (e.g., huta & ryan, 2010) is needed to test these dynamics. we also note that some evidence suggests that hedonic and eudaimonic motives may comprise three, rather than two, factors (asano et al., 2018; bujacz et al., 2014). in future research it may thus be valuable to consider whether such distinctions are also relevant to general orientations and motives for recent daily activities, and their connections to wellbeing. furthermore, the motives scale from which the measures employed in the present work were modified (i.e., huta & ryan, 2010) does not assess the motivation to avoid negative outcomes (e.g., pain, distress). as a result, the extent to which this scale fully captures the key components of hedonia (huta & waterman, 2014) is unclear. further work is needed, therefore, to determine how results concerning the issues addressed in the present work may differ if hedonic orientations and motives for activities are assessed in terms of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. in addition, because the general orientations and motives for daily activities scales employed the same set of items, it may have artificially inflated the correlation between corresponding hedonic and eudaimonic scale scores. in future research, it would be valuable to use an alternative measure of general orientation such as the orientations to happiness measure (peterson et al., 2005) in order to provide additional information concerning the associations between hedonic and eudaimonic general orientation and motives for activities. finally, beyond the theoretical and scientific implications of the present findings, practical relevance also needs to be tested. in particular, the applied meaningfulness of the distinctions examined in the present work (i.e., hedonia vs. eudaimonia with respect to general orientations, motives for daily activities, experiences of wellbeing; pursuit of one versus multiple types of hedonic and eudaimonic activities) needs to be determined though, for example, intervention studies and qualitative analysis aimed at informing the implications of the present findings for the lives of individuals. 5. summary and conclusions hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing were identified as related but distinct factors. general orientations and motives for recent activities were related but separable, both within and between hedonic and eudaimonic concepts. eudaimonic (more so than hedonic) general orientations and motives for daily activities were uniquely associated with both forms of wellbeing. yet, consistent with the full life notion, both hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing were highest among individuals characterized by high levels of hedonic and eudaimonic general orientations and motives for daily activities. we conclude, therefore, that studying hedonia and eudaimonia as related but distinct concepts provide valuable new insights, not only with respect to experiences of wellbeing, but also in terms of individuals’ general orientations to their lives and motives for their daily activities. acknowledgements this work was supported by the social sciences and humanities research council of canada. conflict of interest statement the authors report no conflicts of interest. hedonia and eudaimonia mise & busseri www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 84 authors taysa-rhea mise brock university michael a. busseri brock university mbusseri@brocku.ca publishing timeline received 17 july 2019 revised submission received 18 march 2020 accepted 18 august 2020 published 30 september 2020 references asano, r., tsukamoto, s., igarashi, t., & huta, v. 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(2010). the questionnaire for eudaimonic well-being: psychometric properties, demographic comparisons, and evidence of validity. journal of positive psychology, 5, 4161. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760903435208 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2007.03.004 https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.4.678 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10902-006-9020-7 https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760903435208 ivtzan, i., gardner, h. e., & smailova, z., (2011). mindfulness meditation and curiosity: the contributing factors to wellbeing and the process of closing the self-discrepancy gap. international journal of wellbeing, 1(3), 316-327. doi:10.5502/ijw.v1i3.2 itai ivtzan university college london itaiivtzan@awarenessisfreedom.com copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 316 article mindfulness meditation and curiosity: the contributing factors to wellbeing and the process of closing the self-discrepancy gap itai ivtzan · hannah e. gardner · zhanar smailova abstract: actual/ideal self-discrepancy is the measurable difference between an individual’s beliefs about who they think they are (actual self) and their image of the person they would ideally like to be (ideal self). when the self-discrepancy gap is small, higher psychological wellbeing exists. mindfulness meditation, by means of greater awareness of the continuous fluctuation of thought from one point to another, has been shown to increase self-acceptance, which can lead to minimizing self-discrepancy. additionally, curiosity is an important third factor in motivating the change required to reduce self-discrepancy. this study hypothesises that mindfulness meditation reduces actual-ideal self-discrepancy. additionally, it hypothesises that higher trait curiosity will lead to a larger reduction in self-discrepancy. one hundred and twenty participants took part in a mindfulness meditation course. before and after this, participants completed a selves questionnaire and the curiosity and exploration inventory. the findings confirm that mindfulness meditation can effectively reduce the gap between actual/ideal self attributes. in addition, curiosity is an influencing factor in making the largest changes in selfdiscrepancy after meditation. keywords: mindfulness meditation, curiosity, actual-self, ideal-self, self-discrepancy, positive psychology 1. introduction 1.1 self-concept self-concept is an innate drive to define ourselves based on our evaluation of how our behaviour compares with the behaviour of others, and the judgments of others about our own behaviour (sebastian, burnett, & blakemore, 2008). self-concept is our self-identity, a schema consisting of an organised collection of beliefs and feelings. in other words, self-concept provides a framework that determines how we process information about ourselves, including our motives, emotional states, self-evaluations, and abilities (back, schmukle, & egloff, 2009). self-concept is dynamic, as it responds to time alterations, challenges in the environment, and proactively motivates an individual towards change (gordon & gergen, 1968; markus & wurf, 1987). markus and nurius (1986) suggested that at any given time a self-concept is open to change in response to new experiences. in order to change our self-concept, various selfrepresentations exist which can serve as incentives or deterrents for our future behaviour (markus & nurius, 1986). self discrepancy theory (sdt; higgins, 1987) describes three selfconceptions: one that represents the ‘actual’ self, which is the representation of the attributes an individual possesses, and is often what is meant by self-concept (e.g., erikson, 1963; lynch, la http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ mindfulness meditation and curiosity ivtzan, gardner, & smailova www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 317 guardia, & ryan, 2009; mcdaniel & grice, 2007); one that represents an ‘ideal’ self, or the attributes an individual would ideally possess; and one that represents an ‘ought’ self, or characteristics the individual feels they should possess as their duty or obligation (radu & loué, 2008; higgins, 1989). a discrepancy can exist between any two self-concepts. if a person possesses an actual versus ideal discrepancy, their current state of attributes does not match their ideal state. when we believe a negative event will occur, anxiety is felt; if we believe a positive event will never occur, depressive affect is felt (higgins, bond, klein, & strauman, 1986; woodman & hemmings, 2008; scott & o’hara, 1993). longitudinal studies have found that an actual/ideal discrepancy is associated with later depressive symptoms, as the positive ideal leads to disappointment; actual/ought discrepancy is associated with social anxiety, as responsibilities can lead to worry over future events going wrong (strauman & higgins, 1988). various other researchers have also found evidence that a felt discrepancy between the actual self and what one hopes to be can lead to disappointment and dissatisfaction (e.g., boldero & francis, 2000; bruch, rivet, & laurenti, 2000; fairbrother & moretti, 1998). furthermore, accessibility to this discrepancy, through focusing on a potential or real negative event, can lead to heightened negative emotions (scheier & carver, 1977; higgins, bond, klein, & strauman, 1986). therefore, given the psychological distress caused by a discrepancy of the actual and ideal self, an individual is motivated to reduce the gap between their ideal and actual self. 1.2 meditation as a way of minimising self-discrepancy self-discrepancy occurs from false expectations – a prospect of something good which fails to happen – or the prospect of something threatening happening. meditation can be used to reduce the self-discrepancy gap. this is because meditation techniques aim to focus attention in a non-analytical way and attempt not to dwell on discursive, ruminating thought (moore & malinowski, 2009; shapiro, 1982). the present study uses mindfulness meditation, which involves individuals directly participating in each moment as it occurs with as much awareness as possible (ivtzan, 2008; zeidan, johnson, diamond, david, & goolkasian, 2010). mindfulness meditation is more specifically called ‚insight meditation‛ in buddhist traditions, or vipassanna, which in sanskrit means ‚to see clearly.‛ ‚mindfulness‛ refers to orienting one’s self to the present moment. definitions commonly emphasize maintaining an awareness of one’s immediate experience, as opposed to being distracted by the past or future, or being engaged in avoidance of one’s experience. mindfulness meditation is a formal discipline that attempts to create greater awareness and therefore foster greater insight in the practitioner. to support these definitions, teasdale and his colleagues (2002) offer a model of mindfulness meditation which allows the practitioner to engage with and interrupt negative thinking (that otherwise might contribute to psychological distress) in a healthy way. la toree (2003) discusses the benefits of mindfulness meditation in relation to the emotional benefits of self growth. her explanation is based on the idea that overwhelming emotions are better able to be accepted and processed because an individual is able to accept and own these feelings and experience them with a sense of safety provided by the experience. hundreds of empirical studies have been carried out on the range of effects of meditation (e.g. jain et al, 2007; murphy, donovan, & taylor, 1999). the practice of meditation has been used in psychotherapy, for promoting general wellbeing, as well as for the treatment of anxiety, addictions and pain management (marlatt & kristeller, 1999; rubin, 1996; kabat-zinn et al., mindfulness meditation and curiosity ivtzan, gardner, & smailova www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 318 1992). the link which explains the reasons behind the positive effects of meditation on wellbeing, however, is largely unexplored. 1.3 meditation and the self-concept one important benefit of meditation is the improvement of the self-concept and of selfacceptance (jimenez, niles, & park, 2010; turnbull & norris, 1982). this is underlined in a study by easterlin and cardena (1998) which reveals that more experienced ‘meditators’ were more likely to report a higher sense of ‚acceptance‛ towards their self-concept when under stress. in a study by turnbull and norris (1982) data were collected from participants before and after starting the regular practice of tm (transcendental meditation). results indicated that meditators began to perceive their actual selves as increasingly similar to their ideal and social selves (as they are envisaged by others), and that they developed a more strongly defined concept of their actual selves that involved increased self-acceptance. although mindfulness meditation is reported as having a powerful impact on the participant’s attitude towards himself and others (e.g., kabat-zinn, 1990) only a few studies have dealt with its influence on the self-concept (crane et al., 2008). as discussed by crane et al. (2008), there are two other links between mindfulness meditation and self-discrepancy. the first is that instead of trying to change and experience conflict through cognitive processing, mindfulness meditation invites practitioners to observe their thoughts in an open, accepting, and non-judgmental way. by doing this, mindfulness meditation protects the practitioner against over-engagement with their potential self-discrepancy and therefore reduces the accessibility of self-discrepancy in challenging experiences. the second is that practitioners focus on self-acceptance and self-kindness whilst removing the need to change. this attitude encourages them to re-evaluate problematic or perfectionist goals thus reducing levels of selfdiscrepancy. over time, the practice of mindfulness increases dispositional openness, through receptivity and curiosity (costa & mccrae, 1987). 1.4 trait curiosity leading to personal growth mindfulness is characterised by what is often referred to as ‘beginners mind’; being aware and interested in seemingly mundane and established environments. it is unsurprising, therefore, that both everyday mindfulness and mindfulness meditation practice are highly correlated to the personality trait openness to experience (baer, smith, hopkins, krietemeyer, & toney, 2006; ivtzan & conneely, 2009; lau et al., 2006; brown & ryan, 2003; thompson & waltz, 2007), which is strongly associated with trait curiosity (kashdan & steger, 2007). trait curiosity involves recognition, pursuit, and intense desire to investigate novel, challenging, or puzzling phenomena (kashdan, rose, & fincham, 2004; izard, 1977). two factors encapsulate the trait: exploration and absorption (kashdan, rose & fincham, 2004). by intentionally seeking new and challenging experiences, individuals can stretch or expand their knowledge, skills, and goal-directed efforts (e.g., ainley, hidi, & berndorff, 2002; fredrickson, 1998). additionally, curious people are able to engage for prolonged periods because the search for knowledge is in itself enjoyable (kashdan & steger, 2007), as are the thoughts about what remains to be discovered (bryant & veroff, 2007; wilson, centerbar, kermer, & gilbert, 2005). because of these characteristics, curiosity is linked to greater wellbeing in a number of different ways (e.g., naylor, 1981; park, peterson, & seligman, 2004). firstly, physical health is associated with curiosity, with those who are more curious aged 60-86 being more likely to be alive after five years, even after accounting for age, smoker status, and various diseases (swan & carmelli, 1996). secondly, curious people report more satisfying social interactions and mindfulness meditation and curiosity ivtzan, gardner, & smailova www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 319 relationships, and their partners describe them as interested and responsive (burpee & langer, 2005; kashdan & roberts, 2004). less curious people often rely on stereotypes, and avoid uncertainty by rejecting those who fail to conform (sorrentino, holmes, hanna, & sharp, 1995). finally, of the 24 via character strengths, curiosity was one of the most strongly linked to global life satisfaction, work satisfaction, living a pleasurable life, living an engaging life, and living a meaningful life (brdar & kashdan, 2009; park, peterson, & seligman, 2004; shimai, otake, park, peterson, & seligman, 2006). a higher propensity to seek out novel and challenging events leads to participation in growth-oriented behaviours such as meditation, from which meaning in life, personal growth and wellbeing derive. trait curiosity is important in relation to this study in two ways. firstly, it may be directly related to attempting to practice meditation, and being open to the positive changing effects of meditation. secondly, curiosity may be directly linked to a reducing self-discrepancy. this is because minimising a self-discrepancy gap requires motivation to alter one’s thought processes and/or behaviour. curiosity is a personality trait which is highly correlated with intrinsic motivation to cognate (cacioppo, petty, feinstein, jarvis, & blair, 1996), and motivation altering behaviours (reiss, 2004). 1.5 the present study despite promising findings on the effects of mindfulness meditation on wellbeing (carboy & baer, 2008; hjelle, 1974), further research is required to test the effectiveness of a mindfulnessbased intervention on self-discrepancy reduction. the current study expanded upon previous research by examining the potential benefits of a curiosity trait to cultivate mindfulness, a link not previously addressed. the first hypothesis was that mindfulness meditation would reduce a self-discrepancy gap between an actual and ideal self, because it encourages a nonjudgemental acceptance of the self. the second hypothesis was that the higher the individual’s trait curiosity, the more helpful the mindfulness meditation would be, as shown in a larger reduction in the self-discrepancy gap. this is because curiosity motivates an individual to change behaviour, and increases openness to the positive effects of meditation. 2. method 2.1 participants the sample consisted of 120 meditators attending a meditation workshop weekend in the ‚osho leela‛ meditation centre in gillingham, uk. of the 120 participants, 73% were female and 27% were male. participant ages ranged from 16-to-61 years (m = 36, sd = 15). 2.2 measures participants provided relevant demographics and completed the following measures to assess curiosity levels and their self-discrepancy score: curiosity and exploration inventory (cei; kashdan, rose, & fincham, 2004). the cei is a selfreporting instrument which assesses individual differences in the recognition and pursuit of novel and challenging experiences. it uses a seven-item likert-type scale with two factors. the first is exploration, which refers to striving for novel and challenging experiences (e.g., ‚i would describe myself as someone who actively seeks as much information as i can in a new situation‛). the second is absorption, which refers to the tendency to deeply engage in activities (e.g., ‚when i am participating in an activity, i tend to get so involved that i lose track of time‛). mindfulness meditation and curiosity ivtzan, gardner, & smailova www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 320 selves questionnaire (higgins, klein, & strauman, 1985). the selves questionnaire was used to measure participants’ level of self-discrepancy between actual and ideal selves. participants generated lists of up to 10 adjectives for each domain of the self: a) actual self, ‚your belief of the attributes and characteristics you currently possess‛ and b) ideal self, ‚your beliefs of attributes and characteristics you would ideally like to possess: that is the type of person you desire to be‛. participants were asked to generate the lists from their own standpoints. a two stage process (higgins, 1987) was used to quantify the discrepancy between the actual selfconcept and the ideal self-guide. the first stage involved a comparison of attributes in the actual self-concept to the attributes in the ideal self-guide using webster's new world thesaurus (laird, 2002). four types of attribute-pair relationships were calculated: (1) synonymous attributes that were found in the list of synonyms associated with the word, and were given a two-point weighting to the participant’s score, were classed as matches; (2) attributes that were not found in the list of synonyms in the dictionary but were associated with one of the words in the list were classed as mismatches of extent. these attributes were given a one-point weighting. (3) attributes that were antonyms were classed as mismatches; (4) attribute comparisons that yielded neither synonyms nor antonyms were considered nonmatches. nonmatches were not included in the calculation of self-discrepancy scores. in the next stage the magnitude of discrepancy was quantified. discrepancy scores were calculated by subtracting the total number of matches from the total number of mismatches, with true mismatches (attributes that were found in the list of antonyms in the dictionary) weighted twice as much as synonymous mismatches (attributes that were not found in the list of antonyms in the dictionary but were associated with one of the words in the list) and matches. 2.3 procedure the meditation workshop emphasised the need for spiritual development and used a variety of exercises as a way of experiencing mindfulness meditation. the workshop was intensive and lasted three days, throughout which participants learned mindfulness meditation in different environmental settings (e.g. walking outside in the garden or sitting still with eyes clo sed in a room). at the beginning of the workshop, participants were briefed and asked to fill in the two questionnaires. they completed the curiosity and exploration inventory (kashdan, rose, & fincham, 2004) and then filled in the selves questionnaire (higgins, klein, & strauman, 1985). at the end of the workshop they were asked to fill in the selves questionnaire again in order to measure their level of self-concept after the course. 3. results a two-stage process (higgins, 1987) was used to quantify the discrepancy between the actual self-concept and the ideal self-guide for each participant before and after meditation, as shown in figure 1 (below). mindfulness meditation and curiosity ivtzan, gardner, & smailova www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 321 figure 1: discrepancy scores for the first 20 participants before and after meditation table 1 shows that self-discrepancy mean scores after meditation (m = 7.70) decreased in comparison with scores before the intervention (m = 11.00). table 1: means, standard deviations and range of the discrepancy scores preand postmeditation n range mean sd minimum maximum pre-meditation 120 7.00 18.00 11.00 3.06 post-meditation 120 .00 11.00 7.70 3.11 the first hypothesis was that there would be a decrease in real-ideal discrepancy as a result of meditation practice. to test the difference in self-discrepancies preand post-meditation, a paired samples t-test was computed. the difference between scores pre(m = 11.00, sd = 3.06) and post-meditation (m = 7.70, sd = 3.11) was statistically significant: t(19) = 3.18, p < .005. curiosity scores, using the curiosity and exploration inventory (cei), were calculated for each participant. cei results indicated a higher than average level of curiosity in all participants (m = 5.09; sd = 0.72). to test the assumption of the second hypothesis, pearson product moment correlation coefficients were computed between cei scores and change in selfmindfulness meditation and curiosity ivtzan, gardner, & smailova www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 322 discrepancy scores. there was a statistically significant relationship (r = .69, p < .001) showing that a reduction in self-discrepancy scores is associated with a higher curiosity level.1 4. discussion 4.1review of findings this study aimed to analyse the association between meditation and a reduction in a discrepancy between ‘actual’ and ‘ideal’ selves. additionally, it aimed to explore the process by which meditation is most effective, by analysing the effect of a third variable in this process; trait curiosity. the first hypothesis was that there would be a decrease in real-ideal discrepancy as a result of mindfulness meditation practice. the study found that the practice of meditation had a salutary influence on a subject’s psychological state as measured by the selves questionnaire. an analysis of the profiles showed that after meditation the gap between participants ideal and actual selves reduced compared to before meditation. therefore, participants practising mindfulness meditation moved towards a psychological state to which they were aspiring when learning the technique. another purpose of the study was to test whether the changing scores in the actual-ideal discrepancies are positively correlated with levels of trait curiosity. the results reveal that the correlation was significant, suggesting that there is a relationship between curiosity and the psychological process of closing the gap between their actual-ideal self-concepts. in addition, a higher than average level of curiosity in all participants may suggest that people who are attracted to meditation and events that encourage personal growth and meaning in life, in general, are initially more curious than those who are not. thus, the results suggest that trait curiosity predicts wellbeing by leading to minimising the level of discrepancy between the actual and ideal selves. the results of this study indicate that mindfulness meditation leads to a psychological transformation from which participants feel more comfortable with themselves (lykins & baer, 2009). furthermore, meditating individuals might become accepting towards their self -concept and their self-representations, and as they experience relative peace, their vulnerability to dejection-related emotions reduces (woodman & hemmings, 2008; scott & o’hara, 1993). in a study by shapiro, schwartz, and bonner (1998), mindfulness based stress reduction (mbsr) was offered to medical and pre-medical students. this study included reduced self-reports of overall psychological distress including depression, reduced self-reports of anxiety and increased scores of empathy levels. the current study suggests that this process may at least partly depend on a decrease in self-discrepancy. the current study, therefore, encourages the understanding of mindfulness meditation as an important intervention tool leading to psychological wellbeing. any health practitioner might benefit from understanding mindfulness meditation as a potential intervention which might allow clients and patients a more coherent sense of self which is accompanied with a deeper feeling of acceptance. the findings that curiosity is (1) an important factor in how successful mindfulness meditation is in reducing self-discrepancy, and (2) higher in the meditators overall, suggests that curiosity is crucial to providing a sense of life direction and purpose. findings are also in line with tomkins’ (1962) conclusion that curiosity has a distinct function of motivating the exploration of the self and the world, and thus expanding knowledge and skills. finally, the 1 it should be noted that the veracity of this surprisingly strong result has been questioned since the publication of this article. the authors maintain that the result is legitimate, but they were unable to obtain the original data that could have verified this result. mindfulness meditation and curiosity ivtzan, gardner, & smailova www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 323 results of this investigation are consistent with the behavioural congruence model (côté & moskowitz, 1998), which states that people high in trait curiosity tend to extract greater meaning and satisfaction from life. the present research focused on the consequences of mindfulness meditation for wellbeing, but future research could explore a number of related avenues. firstly, a longitudinal study would allow the discovery of whether meditation can alter trait curiosity. assessing individuals over a significant time would additionally analyse long-term benefits of mindfulness training on self-discrepancy. secondly, personality traits such as neuroticism may negatively impact on the effect of meditation. finally, we are as yet unclear about the positive effect of personality traits paired with meditation on other factors which influence wellbeing and selfand other-acceptance. therefore, extended research beyond this paper would greatly develop our limited understanding of the interplay of mindfulness meditation and personality on wellbeing. this study advocates that mindfulness meditation can effectively reduce the gap between actual and ideal self attributes, leading to potential greater wellbeing. in addition, curiosity may act as a tool for searching and obtaining engagement with personally meaningful activities which might be beneficial to wellbeing. both internal factors (e.g. curiosity) and external factors (e.g. accessibility of meditation) interplay to produce higher psychological wellbeing. authors itai ivtzan university college london itaiivtzan@awarenessisfreedom.com hannah e. gardner university college london h.gardner@psych.york.ac.uk zhanar smailova university college london z.smailova@ucl.ac.uk publishing timeline received 30 july 2011 accepted 25 september 2011 published 25 october 2011 updated 14 february 2013 references ainley, m., hidi, s., & berndorff, d. 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(2010). mindfulness meditation improves cognition: evidence of brief mental training. consciousness and cognition, 19, 597-605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.03.014 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.03.014 dodge, r., daly, a., huyton, j., & sanders, l. (2012). the challenge of defining wellbeing. international journal of wellbeing, 2(3), 222-235. doi:10.5502/ijw.v2i3.4 rachel dodge cardiff metropolitan university radodge@cardiffmet.ac.uk copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 222 article the challenge of defining wellbeing rachel dodge · annette p. daly · jan huyton · lalage d. sanders abstract: wellbeing is a growing area of research, yet the question of how it should be defined remains unanswered. this multi-disciplinary review explores past attempts to define wellbeing and provides an overview of the main theoretical perspectives, from the work of aristotle to the present day. the article argues that many attempts at expressing its nature have focused purely on dimensions of wellbeing, rather than on definition. among these theoretical perspectives, we highlight the pertinence of dynamic equilibrium theory of wellbeing (headey & wearing, 1989), the effect of life challenges on homeostasis (cummins, 2010) and the lifespan model of development (hendry & kloep, 2002). consequently, we conclude that it would be appropriate for a new definition of wellbeing to centre on a state of equilibrium or balance that can be affected by life events or challenges. the article closes by proposing this new definition, which we believe to be simple, universal in application, optimistic and a basis for measurement. this definition conveys the multi-faceted nature of wellbeing and can help individuals and policy makers move forward in their understanding of this popular term. keywords: definition, equilibrium, challenges, resources 1. introduction research in wellbeing has been growing in recent decades (e.g., diener, suh, lucas, & smith, 1999; kahneman, diener, & schwarz, 1999; keyes, schmotkin, & ryff, 2002; stratham & chase, 2010; seligman, 2011). however, very early on in the research ryff and keyes (1995) identified that ‚the absence of theory-based formulations of well-being is puzzling‛ (pp. 719–720). the question of how wellbeing should be defined (or spelt) still remains largely unresolved, which ‚has given rise to blurred and overly broad definitions of wellbeing‛ (forgeard, jayawickreme, kern, & seligman 2011, p. 81). this deficit can be traced back as far as ryff (1989a), who believed that ‚there has been particular neglect < *in+ the task of defining the essential features of psychological wellbeing‛ (p. 1069). indeed, thomas (2009) argued that wellbeing is ‚intangible, difficult to define and even harder to measure‛ (p. 11). a theme that will run through this paper is the difference between the ‘description’ of a construct and its ‘definition’. as interest in the measurement of wellbeing grows, there is a greater necessity to be clear about what is being measured, and how the resulting data should be interpreted, in order to undertake a fair and valid assessment. therefore, any new definition must go beyond an account or description of wellbeing itself, and be able to make a clear and definite statement of the exact meaning of the term. consequently, the aim of this paper is to propose a definition of what constitutes wellbeing: ‚a complex, multi-faceted construct that has continued to elude researchers’ attempts to define and measure‛ (pollard & lee, 2003, p. 60). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 223 2. the historical background to wellbeing research knowing the historical background to the study of wellbeing is necessary to the definition of wellbeing. two approaches emerged: the hedonic tradition, which accentuated constructs such as happiness, positive affect, low negative affect, and satisfaction with life (e.g., bradburn, 1969; diener, 1984; kahneman, diener, & schwarz, 1999; lyubomirsky & lepper, 1999); and the eudaimonic tradition, which highlighted positive psychological functioning and human development (e.g., rogers, 1961; ryff, 1989a; 1989b; waterman, 1993). however, despite the differences in approach, most researchers now believe that wellbeing is a multi-dimensional construct (e.g., diener, 2009; michaelson, abdallah, steuer, thompson, & marks, 2009; stiglitz, sen, & fitoussi 2009). consequently, the diversity of dimensions has created a ‚confusing and contradictory research base‛ (pollard and lee, 2003, p. 2). an early attempt to define wellbeing was bradburn’s (1969) classic research on psychological wellbeing. his work marked a move away from the diagnosis of psychiatric cases to the study of psychological reactions of ordinary people in their daily lives. his discussion stemmed from his interest in how individuals coped with the daily difficulties that they faced. bradburn highlighted how psychological wellbeing (which he also referred to as happiness) was the variable that ‚stands out as being of primary importance‛ (p. 6). he linked this to aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia, which is now more commonly translated as wellbeing. aristotle believed this to be the overarching goal of all human actions. the majority of bradburn’s research focused on the distinction between positive and negative affect. his model specified that: an individual will be high in psychological well-being in the degree to which he has an excess of positive over negative affect and will be low in well-being in the degree to which negative affect predominates over positive (bradburn, 1969, p. 9) 3. what constitutes wellbeing? although ryff (1989a) criticised bradburn’s work for not defining the basic structure of psychological wellbeing, an emphasis on positive and negative affect has been central to the work of diener and suh (1997). they believed that: subjective well-being consists of three interrelated components: life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect. affect refers to pleasant and unpleasant moods and emotions, whereas life satisfaction refers to a cognitive sense of satisfaction with life (diener & suh, 1997, p. 200) headey and colleagues (headey, holmstrom, & wearing, 1984a; 1984b; headey, 2006) picked up on the need for positive and negative affects to be seen as distinct dimensions, rather than opposite ends of the same continuum (bradburn, 1969) as they are ‚only moderately negatively correlated‛ (headey, 2006, p. 2). this was more recently supported by lee and ogozoglu (2007) and singh and duggal jha (2008). ryff’s early work (ryff, 1989a) identified aspects that constitute wellbeing: autonomy; environmental mastery; positive relationships with others; purpose in life; realisation of potential and self-acceptance. more recent research has placed different emphases on what wellbeing is: ability to fulfil goals (foresight mental capital and wellbeing project, 2008); happiness (pollard & lee, 2003) and life satisfaction (diener & suh, 1997; seligman, 2002a). however, again, this highlights the problem that researchers have focused on dimensions or descriptions of wellbeing rather than on definitions (christopher, 1999). the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 224 over 30 years ago, shin and johnson (1978) seemed to move closer to defining wellbeing by stating that it is ‚a global assessment of a person’s quality of life according to his own chosen criteria‛ (p. 478) and this judgement is still reflected in today’s literature (zikmund, 2003; rees, goswami, & bradshaw 2010; stratham & chase, 2010). but what, exactly, is ‚quality of life‛? the world health organization defined quality of life as: an individual’s perception of their position in life in the context of the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, expectations, standards and concerns. it is a broad ranging concept affected in a complex way by the person’s physical health, psychological state, personal beliefs, social relationships and their relationship to salient features of their environment (world health organization, 1997) this emphasis on achieving goals reflects the work of emerson (1985) and felce and perry (1995), who believed that wellbeing stems from individuals’ perception of their current situation and their aspirations. however, a problem with the term ‘quality of life’ is that it is used interchangeably with ‘wellbeing’ in a variety of disciplines. many believe that this has made the task of defining wellbeing ‚conceptually muddy‛ (morrow & mayall, 2009, p. 221). however, stratham and chase (2010) argue that the term wellbeing has enabled psychologists to ‘de-medicalise’ (p. 5) the concept of health. consequently, it is now possible to consider quality of life separately from ideas of illness. this neatly reflects the seminal work of herzlich (1973), who placed great emphasis on the attitude of the individual towards health, very like the current emphasis of wellbeing research using subjective wellbeing measures. herzlich explained how health can be viewed in both a positive and negative light. firstly, it can be seen as an ‚absence of illness‛ (p. 53). indeed, she discussed how individuals might not notice health until something affects it. on the other hand, herzlich proposed that health can be seen in a positive light ‚as a presence of which one is fully aware because of one’s feelings of freedom and of bodily and functional well-being‛ (p. 53). another useful point made by herzlich is how important it is to define ‚what constitutes normality‛ (p. 55). however, she admitted that normality was very difficult to evaluate. this difficulty of reaching a definition of normality also reflects the current problem of attempting to define wellbeing. herzlich believed just identifying an ‚absence of illness‛ was inadequate in terms of defining normality. furthermore, she suggested that ‚some writers have insisted that it may be futile to try to treat health as a single concept‛ (p. 55). this view is reflected in a recent article by forgeard and colleagues (2011), who propose that: some researchers have preferred to ignore the multifaceted nature of wellbeing and equate it with one construct (often life satisfaction), leading to the unfortunate omission of other important aspects of wellbeing (p. 81) consequently, it seems that a narrow emphasis on quality of life cannot adequately help us to define wellbeing. indeed, it would seem that quality of life appears to be a dimension of wellbeing rather than an all-embracing definition. the focus on positive functioning that has attracted increased attention in the past few years (duckworth, steen, & seligman, 2005; linley & joseph, 2004; linley, joseph, harrington, & wood, 2006) dates back to william james' writings on healthy mindedness (james, 1902), and spans nearly 60 years to the work of rogers (1961), who discussed wellbeing in terms of ‚the good life‛ (p. 186). he believed that each individual strived towards becoming a ‚fully functioning person‛ who is open to experience, is trusting in his/her own organism, and leads the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 225 an increasingly existential life (rogers, 1961, p. 187–189). his work has partly influenced the work of ryff and singer (2008) in their development of core dimensions of psychological wellbeing (pwb): self-acceptance; purpose in life; environmental mastery; positive relationships; personal growth; and autonomy. an interesting development is the way in which this area of wellbeing has impacted on clinical psychology. joseph and wood (2010) have called for clinical psychology to adopt measures of positive functioning. this is because they believe that psychiatry has adopted a restricted view of wellbeing, seeing it as ‚an absence of distress and dysfunction‛ (p. 831). therefore, the adoption of positive function would naturally broaden the field. they also believe that there is a possibility that this new slant on measurement will allow for prediction and treatment of distress and dysfunction. research in this area has been undertaken by keyes (2002; 2005), who views mental health as a syndrome of wellbeing symptoms. he believes that mental health is created ‚when an individual exhibits a high level on at least one symptom of hedonia and just over half the symptoms of eudaimonia, i.e., positive functioning in life‛ (keyes, 2009, p. 15). in his 2002 research, keyes asked youths to report the frequency of three symptoms of emotional wellbeing, four symptoms of psychological wellbeing and five symptoms of social wellbeing. keyes made a ‚diagnosis of flourishing‛ if the individual displayed a third of the emotional symptoms, four of the psychological symptoms and five of the nine symptoms of positive flourishing ‚almost every day‛ or ‚every day‛ in the past thirty days. the work of keyes has led to the use of the terms ‘flourishing’ and ‘languishing’ as scientific concepts, rather than as philosophical ideals, as they had been previously presented (e.g., griffin, 1986; sumner, 1996; hurthouse, 1999; nussbaum, 2000). keyes’ work had a direct influence on the formulation of ‚a well-being manifesto for a flourishing society‛ by shah and marks (2004). this rather uplifting and encouraging document highlights that one of the key aims of any democratic government should be ‚to promote the good life: a flourishing society, where citizens are happy, healthy, capable and engaged – in other words with high levels of well-being‛ (p. 2). the manifesto goes on to clarify what shah and marks consider wellbeing to be: well-being is more than just happiness. as well as feeling satisfied and happy, well-being means developing as a person, being fulfilled, and making a contribution to the community (2004, p. 2) unfortunately, again, this appears to be more of a description of wellbeing rather than a definition. the term ‘flourishing’ has now become synonymous with the positive psychology movement. indeed, gable and haidt (2005) explain that ‚positive psychology is the study of the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups, and institutions‛ (p. 104). in a systematic examination of literature, alkire (2002) noted 39 varying endeavours between 1938 and 2000 to define a ‘flourishing’ life. the undeniable leader of the positive psychology movement is martin seligman. on the first day of his presidency of the american psychological society (apa) in 1998 he stated that: i realized that my profession was half-baked. it wasn't enough for us to nullify disabling conditions and get to zero. we needed to ask, what are the enabling conditions that make human beings flourish? how do we get from zero to plus five? (seligman, 1998, cited in wallis, 2005, online) the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 226 more than ten years on, seligman has recently published his latest book entitled flourish (seligman, 2011), in which he outlines his new ‘dynamic’ concept of wellbeing, which moves away from theories based purely on happiness. the rationale behind this welcome departure from a now rather over-used term is because, according to seligman (2011), the notion of ‘happiness’ is an awkward construct that hides the true, complex, nature of human flourishing. he clearly states the rationale behind this change in direction: i used to think that the topic of positive psychology was happiness< i now think that the topic of positive psychology is well-being, that the gold standard for measuring well-being is flourishing, and that the goal of positive psychology is to increase flourishing. (seligman, 2011, p. 13) flourish discusses his theory with great clarity, but in terms of resolving the debate on defining wellbeing, it is disappointing. his 24-page chapter entitled ‘what is well-being?’ fails to achieve its aim. in fact, seligman states: well-being theory denies that the topic of positive psychology is a real thing; rather the topic is a construct – well-being – which in turn has several measurable elements, each a real thing, each contributing to well-being, but none defining well-being. (2011, p. 15) instead, his new theory of wellbeing concentrates, yet again, on elements of wellbeing which he believes are a set of building blocks for a flourishing life: positive emotion, engagement, relationships, meaning, and accomplishment (perma). at this stage, the pursuit of a definition of wellbeing may appear bleak. however, we disagree with seligman that wellbeing is a construct. this would imply that wellbeing is ‚not presently observable or objectively measurable but is assumed to exist because it < gives rise to measurable phenomena‛ (reber, 1995, p. 157). from the discussion so far, this obviously is not true. instead, it is proposed that wellbeing should be considered to be a state – ‚a condition of a system in which the essential qualities are relatively stable‛ (reber, 1995, p. 750). 4. equilibrium a theory that supports reber’s proposal is the dynamic equilibrium theory of wellbeing (now more often referred to as set-point theory). this was originally proposed 23 years ago by headey and wearing (1989) and suggested links between personality, life events, wellbeing and illbeing. the theory built on the work of brickman and campbell (1971), who had previously demonstrated that individuals tend to return to a baseline of happiness even after major life events. headey and wearing continued to research their model (1991; 1992) and believed that ‚for most people, most of the time, subjective well-being is fairly stable. this is because stock levels, psychic income flows and subjective well-being are in dynamic equilibrium‛ (1991, p. 49). this emphasis on equilibrium is not new and reflects, yet again, the work of herzlich (1973). her research emphasised that individuals saw equilibrium not only as a norm but also as a state that they would like to ‚attain or keep‛ (p. 59). interestingly, in contrast to headey and wearing’s idea that most individuals have stable wellbeing, herzlich’s interviewees saw it as a rare occurrence. however, herzlich noted how often equilibrium was referred to by her participants and that it had a wide variety of applications. she found that the word ‚expresses a whole area of individual experience. it serves, in a way as a distillation of the language of health‛ (p. 59). she went further to fully explain what equilibrium is, in terms of health: the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 227 concretely, equilibrium comprises the following themes: physical well-being, plenty of physical resources; absence of fatigue; psychological well-being and evenness of temper; freedom of movement and effectiveness in action; good relations with other people. (herzlich, 1973, p. 60) the continued aim of headey and wearing’s research has been to ‚understand how people cope with change and how their levels of well-being are affected‛ (1992, p. 6). they propose that a change in wellbeing occurs only when, due to external forces, ‚a person deviates from his or her equilibrium pattern of events‛ (1992, p. 93). consequently, headey and wearing propose a definition of wellbeing in which wellbeing is shown ‚as depending on prior equilibrium levels of wellbeing and of life events, and also on recent events‛ (1992, p. 95). this reflects their framework for analysing subjective wellbeing (swb), which considers the relationship between stocks and flows: figure 1. headey & wearing’s (1991) stocks and flows framework (p. 56) in this model, headey and wearing proposed that differences between individuals in terms of swb are due to ‘stable stocks’ (otherwise known as stable personal characteristics). ‚as a result of stable stocks each person has a level of subjective wellbeing which represents his/her own ‚normal‛ equilibrium level‛ (1991, p. 57). stocks are drawn upon to deal with specific life experiences (‘flows’) so that satisfaction is enhanced and distress is diminished. consequently, ‚it is more appropriate to regard subjective well-being as a fluctuating state rather than a stable trait‛ (p. 56). the theory has received much empirical investigation (ormel & schaufeli, 1991; ormel & wohlfaryh, 1991; suh, diener, & fujita, 1996). suh and colleagues (1996) tested the dynamic equilibrium theory by tracking 222 psychology students (aged 20–21) during a transitional period of their life (which was their college graduation) and examined the effect of this life event on their swb and the time it took these participants to adjust (to return to their state of equilibrium). their findings supported the dynamic equilibrium model by demonstrating that social background  sex  age  socio-economic status personality  extraversion  neuroticism  openness social network  intimate attachments  friendship network favourable events which yield satisfaction (income gains) adverse events which yield distress (income loss) life satisfaction positive affect negative affect stocks flows/psychic income subjective wellbeing the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 228 ‚only recent life events influence swb and that the impact of magnitude drops quickly afterward‛ (p. 1095). consequently, in trying to define wellbeing, it is justified to consider the state of equilibrium as central. 5. challenges a more recent extension of this theory has been explored by cummins (2010). now the term ‘equilibrium’ has been replaced by ‘homeostasis’; and the term ‘life events’ with the term ‘challenge’: figure 2. cummins’ changing levels of swb cummins’ theory focuses on the strength of a challenge and how this affects the level of swb. this includes a derived set-point range (70 to 80 points) that was determined by previous research undertaken by cummins (1995; 1998). the emphasis of the model is the role of homeostasis in defending the set point of swb. the model may be a little confusing and complex at first glance. however, it tries to demonstrate different phases denoted by the letters ‘a’ to ‘c’.  when an individual experiences no challenge, swb stays at the set-point.  when an individual experiences mild challenge, the level of swb will vary slightly within the set-point range (phase a)  phase b signifies where swb is prevented from decreasing below the set point, due to the strong homeostatic defence.  phase c signifies a situation where the challenge is too strong for homeostasis to manage. swb would now fall sharply. consequently, it would seem appropriate that any definition of wellbeing centres on a state of equilibrium or balance that can be affected by life events or challenges. set homeostasis point defensive range challenging conditions 80 70 a b c upper threshold lower threshold strong homeostatic defense lower threshold swb very strong challenge 50 no challenge strength of challenging agent the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 229 6. resources linked to challenges is the idea that each individual develops relevant skills or resources to cope with the trials they face. this balanced rationale between skills and challenges has been central to mihaly csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) concept of ‘flow’ – ‚the state in which people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter‛ (2002, p. 4), which in turn leads to happiness. the original model assumed that enjoyment would happen when the strength of challenge and skills were both very low as well as when they were both high, as demonstrated in the following diagram: figure 3. demonstration of the relationship between challenges and skills (csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 74) ∞ (high) c h a ll e n g e s (low) 0 0 (low) skills (high) ∞ however the new model predicts flow only when challenges and skills are relatively in balance (csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 252). hendry and kloep’s (2002) lifespan model of development also explores the interaction between life challenges and personal resources. their theory is based on five key principles: 1) to stimulate development, individuals need challenge. 2) successful solving of the challenge leads to development. 3) if a challenge is not solved, this will lead to problems in meeting future challenges. 4) the process of solving challenges is ‚an interactional, dialectical process‛ (p. 16) that leads to changes in the individual and/or the environment and accordingly stimulates development. 5) individuals will have differing levels of resources to meet the challenges. although this theory is not directly linked to wellbeing, it reflects dynamic equilibrium theory in terms of challenges that an individual faces and in terms of how wellbeing is a fluctuating state. it also links to cummins’ idea of a homeostasis defensive range in terms of the resource pool that hendry and kloep discuss. 7. a new definition of wellbeing the concept of wellbeing is undeniably complex, considering the aspects previously discussed. this paper has highlighted the difficulty that researchers have had with defining wellbeing but it has also recognised that previous research has been driven by dimensions and descriptions rather than definitions. in order to move closer to a new definition of wellbeing, therefore, this paper has focused on three key areas: the idea of a set point for wellbeing; the inevitability of anxiety flow channel a3 a4 a1 a2 boredom the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 230 equilibrium/homeostasis; and the fluctuating state between challenges and resources. consequently, we would like to propose a new definition of wellbeing as the balance point between an individual’s resource pool and the challenges faced: figure 4. definition of wellbeing the see-saw represents the drive of an individual to return to a set-point for wellbeing (brickman and campbell, 1971; headey and wearing 1989, 1991, 1992) as well as the individual’s need for equilibrium or homeostasis (herzlich, 1973; cummins, 2010). now, however, the stocks and flows of headey and wearing (1992) have been replaced by the resources and challenges of hendry and kloep (2002) and are the elements that can affect the individual’s equilibrium; tipping the see-saw from side to side, supporting csikszentmihalyi’s (2002) updated concept of ‘flow’. this works just as kloep, hendry and saunders (2009) described: each time an individual meets a challenge, the system of challenges and resources comes into a state of imbalance, as the individual is forced to adapt his or her resources to meet this particular challenge (p. 337). in essence, stable wellbeing is when individuals have the psychological, social and physical resources they need to meet a particular psychological, social and/or physical challenge. when individuals have more challenges than resources, the see-saw dips, along with their wellbeing, and vice-versa. the definition supports headey and wearing’s (1992) aim to ‚understand how people cope with change and how their levels of well-being are affected‛ (p. 6). however, the proposed definition contradicts cummins’ idea of swb being static when the individual is not challenged. instead, we would argue, in line with hendry and kloep’s theory, that a lack of challenge will lead to ‚stagnation‛ (hendry & kloep, 2002), which will also affect the balance of the see-saw. the dynamic nature of the definition also reflects the viewpoint of nic marks, of the new economics foundation. he recently spoke of his interpretation of wellbeing on bbc radio 4’s reasons to be cheerful: wellbeing is not a beach you go and lie on. it’s a sort of dynamic dance and there’s movement in that all the time and actually it’s the functuality of that movement which actually is true levels of wellbeing (nic marks, radio 4, 7 january 2012) 8. the considered strengths of the new definition the authors of the current paper advocate that the vigour and freshness of this new proposed definition embraces a number of strengths: simplicity, universal application, optimism and basis for measurement. challenges psychological social physical wellbeing resources psychological social physical the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 231 8.1 simplicity firstly, the simple, yet precise nature of the definition answers forgeard and colleagues’ (2011) plea to move away from ‚broad definitions‛ (p. 81). as much as we are indebted to the work of headey and wearing (1992) and cummins (2010), each of their models was complex and difficult to follow at first glance. wellbeing has become a term used by the lay person, and is not just for the consideration of academics. consequently, the authors believe that we have a duty to communicate what wellbeing is, in a clear and effective manner. indeed, lilienfeld (2012) talks in a forthright manner about the public’s scepticism in regard to psychology and explains that we should be ready to communicate effectively when we ‚dare to venture outside of the hallowed halls of academia or our therapy offices to that foreign land called the ‘real world’<‛ (p. 1). consequently, we believe that the definition will be accessible in this forum. 8.2 universal application secondly, a true asset of the definition is its universal nature. the definition can be applied to all individuals regardless of age, culture and gender. however, this universal nature does not reflect ‚a pronounced increase in the popularity of reductionist explanations of human behaviour‛ (lilienfeld, 2012, p. 120) that has existed during the past several decades. instead, it allows for the notion that each individual has a unique resource pool which ‚determines whether or not a task an individual meets turns out to be a routine chore, a challenge < or a risk‛ (hendry & kloep, 2002, p. 24). 8.3 optimism the definition also reflects the current emphasis on positive psychology. it views individuals ‚as decision makers, with choices, preferences, and the possibility of becoming masterful, efficacious‛ (seligman, 2002b, p. 3). in a similar vein, csikszentmihalyi (2002) makes it clear that ‚happiness is not something that just happens < *it+ is a condition that must be prepared for, cultivated, and defended privately by each person‛ (p. 2). this puts the pursuit of wellbeing in the hands of individuals by teaching them that they can increase their resources or challenges to maintain a sense of equilibrium. as well as reflecting this new direction in psychology, it also echoes current trends within the national health service in the uk with the expert patient programme (epp) that was launched in 2002. this programme supports the idea of self-management: ‚whatever we do to make the most of our lives by coping with our difficulties and making the most of what we have‛ (martyn, 2002, p. 4). 8.4 basis for measurement finally, the proposed definition answers a number of the concerns expressed at the start of this paper. with wellbeing becoming tangible (thomas, 2009, p. 11) and operationalised, measurement becomes easier. this would extend the qualitative work undertaken by hendry and kloep (2002) on resources and challenges with the potential for developing a quantitative measure of wellbeing based on these two aspects and adds to the theoretical ideas already reviewed in this paper. the authors have already used the definition to develop a new wellbeing questionnaire that is currently being applied in a further education setting. this questionnaire was developed through focus groups that explored the challenges faced by students aged 16-18, and the level of resources they felt they currently had to deal confidently with these challenges. the questionnaire is helping students to identify for themselves what resources need further the challenge of defining wellbeing dodge, daly, huyton, & sanders www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 232 development in order to maintain a stable level of wellbeing and it will be supported by a newly designed pastoral programme. although our current research is being undertaken in an educational location, if our proposed definition is accepted as a valid definition of wellbeing the questionnaire could easily be adapted and applied across a wide range of settings. to conclude, the publishing of this definition is timely given the intention of the uk government to implement measures of wellbeing for the uk as a whole. indeed, the office of national statistics recently opened a discussion paper on domains and measures of national wellbeing (beaumont, 2011). the paper states that the question of individual wellbeing ‚is an area which the national debate showed was important to people‛ (beaumont, 2011, p. 4) and which has consequently been placed at the heart of the national wellbeing framework. we believe that using the proposed definition of wellbeing could aid the measurement of national wellbeing and further the understanding of wellbeing as a whole. authors rachel dodge cardiff metropolitan university radodge@cardiffmet.ac.uk annette p. daly cardiff metropolitan university jan huyton cardiff metropolitan university lalage d. sanders cardiff metropolitan university publishing timeline received 14 january 2012 accepted 22 april 2012 published 29 august 2012 references alkire, s. 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(2020). measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport: validation of the eudaimonic wellbeing in sport scale. international journal of wellbeing, 10(1), 93-106. doi:10.5502/ijw.v10i1.776 despina kouali the university of western ontario dkouali@uwo.ca copyright belongs to the author(s) 93 measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport: validation of the eudaimonic wellbeing in sport scale despina kouali · craig hall · paige pope abstract: the purpose of this study was to create and validate a sport-specific eudaimonic wellbeing measure (ewbss; eudaimonic wellbeing in sport scale) and included three phases. in phase 1, an initial pool of 19 items was developed and five items were selected by five experts to represent eudaimonic wellbeing in sport (ewbss). four hundred athletes (mage = 24.32, sd = 6.69) from various individual and team sports participated in phase 2. factorial validity and reliability scores were examined using confirmatory factor analysis and alpha coefficient calculations. results indicated initial evidence for both factorial validity and internal consistency of the ewbss. in phase 3, further psychometric testing of the ewbss with two independent samples (i.e., competitive and recreational athletes) ensued. the findings provided further evidence of sound validity and reliability scores of the ewbss in competitive athletes. partial support for the psychometric properties of the ewbss was provided in recreational athletes. as the validation of an instrument is an ongoing process, more research is needed to further evaluate the validity of the ewbss. keywords: eudaimonic wellbeing, validity, motivation, sport introduction within the literature, mental wellbeing has been viewed and used interchangeably with various terms such as quality of life, happiness, life satisfaction, vitality, and self-esteem (e.g., verkooijen, van hove, & dik, 2012). it is widely accepted that wellbeing has been derived from two distinct philosophical traditions: the hedonic view, which focuses on the pursuit of pleasure and pain avoidance, and the eudaimonic view, which focuses on living a meaningful life and self-realization (ryan & deci, 2001). while the hedonic perspective is perceived as to what constitutes a good life and targets specific outcomes, the eudaimonic perspective targets the content of an individual’s life together with the processes of a life well-lived (ryan, huta, & deci, 2008). based on the hedonic approach which was initiated from the greek philosopher aristippus, wellbeing refers to maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain to achieve human happiness (as a positive subjective state) and is assessed through subjective wellbeing (swb; diener, 1984). swb incorporates both cognitive (i.e., life satisfaction) and affective (i.e., presence of positive affect and article http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 94 absence of negative affect, summarized as happiness) components and emphasizes individuals’ own evaluation whether a good life is being lived (i.e., subjective assessement of life; diener, 2000). initiating from aristotle’s philosophy, the eudaimonic approach emphasizes living well and reaching human potential and defines wellbeing in terms of the level to which an individual is fully functioning (ryan & deci, 2001; ryan & huta, 2009). based on this approach, wellbeing is operationalized as a set of wellness (i.e., the process of living well) aspects, such as vitality (ryan & deci, 2001; ryan et al., 2008). ryan and deci (2001), the originators of self-determination theory (sdt; deci & ryan, 1985a) introduced the term of eudaimonic wellbeing (ewb) in a review regarding the two traditions and defined it as a construct that refers to optimal experience and psychological functioning. sdt, as a theory about human motivation and personality, was developed by incorporating aspects from aristotle’s views about eudaimonia (ryan et al., 2008). ryan and colleagues, described eudaimonia as living well with specific characteristics: pursuing intrinsic goals, behaving autonomously, being mindful, and satisfying basic psychological needs (i.e., autonomy, competence, and relatedness). based on this view, ewb is portrayed as an outcome of eudaimonic living. accordingly, for optimal wellbeing, the fulfillment of the basic psychological needs of autonomy (i.e., sense of volition and choice), competence (i.e., sense of efficacy and mastery), and relatedness (i.e., sense of closeness to others) is required. specifically, when the psychological needs are completely satisfied, an individual’s motivation is self-determined (i.e., the pursuit of an activity by an individual because it is inherently enjoyable), resulting in enhanced wellbeing (e.g., high subjective vitality, growth; ryan & deci, 2000). in contrast, when the needs are thwarted, wellbeing is diminished (e.g., low subjective vitality, impaired functioning; bartholomew, ntoumanis, ryan, & thogersen-ntoumani, 2011). although the two approaches namely, hedonia and eudaimonia serve distinct roles in different forms of wellbeing (i.e., swb and ewb), there is evidence of considerable overlap (e.g., huta & ryan, 2010; waterman, schwartz, & conti, 2008). for instance, when an individual experiences eudaimonic living, he/she will also experience hedonic pleasure and enjoyment. sdt researchers have used a diverse set of wellness elements to operationalize ewb (ryan & deci, 2001). for example, the general causality orientation scale (deci & ryan, 1985b) has been used to assess motivational (i.e., autonomous) orientations, while the aspiration index (kasser & ryan, 1993) has been used to measure intrinsic goals or aspirations (i.e., relationships, personal growth, and community contributions). additionally, the subjective vitality scale (ryan & frederick, 1997) has been used to assess the degree to which an individual feels vital, energized, and alive, the mindful attention and awareness scale (brown & ryan, 2003) to measure awareness of and attention to what is occurring at the moment, and the basic psychological needs scale (gagné, 2003) to assess the extent to which a person feels satisfied by the need for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. employing a diverse set of wellness elements to operationalize ewb can be problematic as it adds burden to participants due to the sheer number of items, and there is potential of overlap in the operationalization of the elements included. wellbeing in sport individual’s wellbeing is influenced by different life domains (e.g., work, family). in a review regarding work settings, the specific life context was indicated to be critical for an individual’s perceived overall wellbeing (page & vella-brodrick, 2009). thus, context-specific wellbeing measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 95 measures targeting specific life domains may provide more detailed and precise information for peoples’ wellbeing (daniels, 2000). research in sport has underlined that sport engagement is associated with optimal levels of wellbeing and other positive outcomes (e.g., verner-filion, vallerand, amiot, & mocanu, 2017). however, negative experiences in sport may also occur with athletes often facing challenges and obstacles that have a detrimental influence on their physical and psychosocial health, and diminishing their wellbeing (bartholomew et al., 2011). several studies examining wellbeing in athletes have either neglected to provide a definition of the construct, used different labels to describe the construct resulting in conceptual ambiguity, or failed to distinguish between general wellbeing and wellbeing specific to the sport context (for a review see lundqvist, 2011). given that different factors may influence wellbeing in sport compared to wellbeing in general, assessing sport-specific wellbeing is warranted. global measurement tools that have been used to assess swb in athletes (e.g., golby & wood, 2016; kipp & weiss, 2015) are the satisfaction with life scale (swls; diener, emmons, larsen, & griffin, 1985) and the positive and negative affect schedule (panas; watson, clark, & tellegen, 1988), which primarily address hedonic wellbeing. in regards to the eudaimonic approach, the scales of psychological well-being (spwb; ryff, 1989) has been employed with athletes to assess ewb on a global level (e.g., ferguson, kowalski, mack, & sabiston, 2014; lundqvist & raglin, 2015). for example, lundqvist and raglin (2015) used the 18-item version of spwb to examine the effects of basic need satisfaction, motivational climate, and personality on elite active orienteers’ wellbeing. additionally, ferguson, kowalski, mack, and sabiston (2014) explored self-compassion and wellbeing in young women athletes by employing the 84-item version of the spwb, and baltzell and akhtar (2014) investigated the effectiveness of a mindful meditation training intervention on wellbeing of women soccer players by assessing the 54-item version of the spwb. the subjective vitality scale (svs; ryan & frederick, 1997) is another ewb measurement tool that has been utilized to assess athletes’ subjective vitality, a perceived dimension of wellbeing. although many studies have employed svs, it does not incorporate all the components of ewb (e.g., adie, duda, & ntoumanis, 2012; mack et al., 2011). as a result, the lack of an instrument for measuring athletes’ wellbeing in the sport context has been noted as a caveat in the literature (lundqvist, 2011). lundqvist (2011) has underlined the importance of developing a sport-specific wellbeing instrument in examining how the competitive environment influences athletes’ wellbeing. a sport-specific wellbeing measure might be valuable in better understanding athletes’ wellbeing by examining potential relationships with other variables that either enhance or diminish wellbeing. considering the gap within the sport literature in measuring wellbeing in sport, the purpose of the present study was to create and validate a sport-specific ewb measure. our instrument was grounded in sdt and based on the ewb literature (e.g., ryan et al., 2008). phase 1 the purpose of phase 1 was to develop a pool of items that might best represent ewb in sport. recently, kouali, hall, and pope (2018) adapted an existing eudaimonic wellbeing global instrument (i.e., scales of psychological well-being; ryff, 1989) for the sport context, and examined the content and factorial validity of this adapted three-factor instrument. based on their results, they determined that ewb in sport is likely best represented as a unidimensional construct. measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 96 method participants. a panel of five experts (nmales = 3, nfemales = 2) participated in the study. all participants were academic researchers working at different universities in canada and who had published articles related to sdt and ewb within the sport context and were currently conducting research on either/both areas. procedure. ethical approval was granted by the institutional research ethics board. the 19 items originally developed by kouali et al. (2018) served as the basis for the new sport-specific ewb measure. two investigators re-assessed the technical qualities (i.e., length, readability, and clarity) and the item-content validity (i.e., the extent to which the content of each item is relevant to measure the construct; lynn, 1986) of these items. after finalizing the items by making alterations (i.e., rewording and deleting phrases from items), the investigators contacted five experts via email to determine their willingness and availability to participate in the study. all experts agreed to provide their feedback on the set of items. each expert first read the definition of the construct and then selected the items that best represent ewb in sport. a comment box was also provided so the experts could explain any of their answers or make any comments. the panel of experts sent back their answers in a document that was attached in the email invitation. results and discussion based on the percentage of consensus among experts’ responses, each item was retained or removed from the item list. of the 19 items, 80% agreement was found for five items, 60% for four items, 40% for five items, and 20% for three items. also, two items were not selected by any expert. generally, there are basic guidelines that researchers should follow regarding the items that identify a construct (devellis, 2012). devellis suggested that the initial pool of items should be three or four times larger than the number of items that will be included in the final scale. each item should be simple, parsimonious, clearly phrased, and concise, while double or triple barreled, negatively worded or reversed score items should be avoided (hinkin, tracey, & enz, 1997). in terms of the appropriate number of items that should represent a scale, costello and osborne (2005) suggested that five or more items should indicate a solid factor, whereas hinkin et al. recommended four to six items for the development of a quality scale. furthermore, when a scale is short it helps to reduce the burden on respondents compared to a longer scale (devellis, 2012). therefore, the five items with the highest level of agreement (80%) were retained to represent ewb in sport (table 1) termed the eudaimonic wellbeing in sport scale (ewbss) and to be further examined in the next phase (phase 2). phase 2 the purpose of phase 2 was to test the ewbss by examining the factorial validity and reliability of the instrument. method participants. four hundred (nmales = 299; nfemales = 101) competitive athletes (mage = 24.32, sd = 6.69) from 25 different team and individual sports (47% indicated engaging in soccer) participated in the study. athletes played at varsity (n = 34), regional (n = 20), provincial (n = 293), national (n = 23), and international (n = 20) levels. on average, the athletes practiced 11.54 hours per week (sd = measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 97 4.07) and had been participating in their sport for 12.16 years (sd = 5.71). participants reported that they were at the pre-season stage (n = 269), early season stage (n = 46), middle season stage (n = 22), late season stage (n = 12), and off-season stage (n = 51), while 97% indicated currently having a coach. in terms of athletes’ ethnicity, the majority described themselves as caucasian (n = 364). measures. demographics. the demographic questionnaire included information about age, gender, ethnicity, major sport, years of participation in respective sport, hours practiced per week, competitive level, stage of competitive season of major sport, and if they currently had a coach or not. table 1 descriptive statistics, factor loadings, and error terms of the eudaimonic well-being in sport scale items m sd skewness kurtosis fl er as an athlete, i feel that i continue to learn more about myself. 5.12/5.26/4.92 0.98/0.78/0.96 -1.2/-0.95/-1.38 1.63/1.11/3.18 0.56/0.57/0.54 0.65/0.41/0.65 i have a sense of direction in sport. 4.9/5.19/4.92 1/0.87/0.95 -1.25/-1.06/-1.29 2.4/1.32/2.87 0.69/0.63/0.56 0.53/0.45/0.62 my goals in sport have been a source of satisfaction. 5.07/5.17/5.16 0.97/0.88/0.84 -1.18/-1.93/-1.33 1.71/1.49/2.83 0.71/0.74/0.83 0.47/0.34/0.22 in general, i feel positive about myself as an athlete. 5/5.16/5.07 0.96/0.80/0.80 -1.9/-0.98/-0.70 1.59/1.39/0.83 0.53/0.81/0.91 0.66/0.22/0.11 i like most aspects of myself as an athlete. 5.02/5.17/5.04 1.02/0.90/0.90 -1.36/-1.68/-1.37 2.42/4.34/3.67 0.53/0.66/.051 0.75/0.46/0.60 note. m = mean; sd = standard deviation; fl = factor loading; er = error term. values presented before the first slash (/) refer to athletes' scores on the corresponding statistic in phase 2. the values presented before the measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 98 second slash represent competitive athletes' scores from phase 3, whereas the values presented after the second slash represent recreational athletes' scores also from phase 3. eudaimonic wellbeing. the eudaimonic wellbeing in sport scale (ewbss) was used to measure athletes’ wellbeing. the ewbss consists of five items (e.g., “as an athlete, i feel that i continue to learn more about myself”; see table 1). athletes were asked to circle the number that best describes their present agreement or disagreement with each item using a six-point likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). procedure. once approval was granted by the institutional research ethics board, one of the investigators identified coaches’ contact information via official websites of varsity teams and contacted them via email in order to receive permission to contact their athletes. after receiving permission from coaches to approach their athletes, the investigator contacted the athletes before or after their practice, explaining to them briefly the purpose of the study and providing them a letter of information. the athletes who agreed to participate, completed the corresponding paper and pencil (without the presence of the coaches) or online questionnaire. an email script with the questionnaire link was sent to the participants that wished to complete the survey online. completion of the questionnaire indicated athletes' consent to participate. data analysis. after screening the data for outliers, missing and incomplete data, the factorial validity of the ewbss was examined with confirmatory factor analysis (cfa) using amos 24.0 software (arbuckle, 2016). the goodness-of-fit of the hypothesized model was tested using four indices suggested by kline (2005): the chisquare statistic (χ2), the comparative fit index (cfi), the root mean square error of approximation (rmsea), and the standardized root mean residual (srmr). hu and bentler (1999) for cfi recommended that values above .95 indicate an excellent fit, while more recently marsh, hau, and wen (2004) suggested that values greater than .90 indicate a good fit. additionally, rmsea values equal or less than .06 are desired, while srmr values less than .08 denote acceptable fit (hu & bentler, 1999). cronbach alpha coefficient was also calculated for the ewbss. results and discussion the descriptive statistics of the final five items are presented in table 1, including the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis scores. additionally, the scale showed acceptable internal consistency (α = .74). moreover, the factor loading scores and error term scores for the final five items are also provided in table 1. the cfa model with the five items representing the ewbss revealed an excellent fit to the data (χ2 (5) = 7.55, p = .18; cfi = .99; rmsea = .04; srmr = .02). therefore, initial support for the factorial validity and reliability of the ewbss was provided when it was tested on a large sample with competitive level athletes. however, further validation of the five items was needed. phase 3 the purpose of this phase was to further test the psychometric properties of the ewbss. accordingly, factorial validity, nomological validity, convergent validity, and reliability of ewbss were evaluated with two independent samples, competitive athletes and recreational athletes. while it is widely accepted that physical activity and sport participation is associated with psychological benefits including enhanced wellbeing (e.g., adie et al., 2012), there is evidence showing that there are differences in wellbeing between the various levels of the competitors. for example, chatzisarantis and hagger (2007) examined the effect of recreational and competitive sport participation on the wellbeing of uk athletes and found that recreational athletes reported higher levels of both swb and ewb compared with competitive athletes. in another study with australian women (eime, harvey, brown, & payne, 2010), club sport participants demonstrated higher levels of swb than participants measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 99 engaging in gym activities or walking. while the ewbss was designed to be suitable for any sport level, in the present phase competitive athletes and recreational athletes were examined separately to determine if the ewbss was equally appropriate for both groups. the nomological and convergent validity were examined in relation to constructs of sdt. following lonsdale, hodge, and rose’s (2008) approach providing evidence regarding the nomological validity of the behavioral regulation in sport questionnaire (brsq) with elite and non-elite athletes, nomological validity was measured in relation to the six types of motivation based on sdt (ryan & deci, 2000). the sdt framework postulates that different types of motivation lie on a continuum relative to self-determination and internalization (ryan & deci, 2000). specifically, intrinsic motivation (participation in an activity by an individual for its own sake), integrated regulation (engagement in a behavior because it is an important part of individual’s identity), and identified regulation (engagement in a behavior because it is highly valued) are characterized as autonomous types of motivation. introjected regulation (engaging in an activity in order to avoid guilt or anxiety or to maintain the feeling of worth), external regulation (the desire to obtain an award, social recognition, or avoid punishment) are characterized as controlled types of motivation, and amotivation is a lack of intention to engage in a behavior (ryan & deci, 2000). accordingly, sdt posits that autonomous types of motivation are positively associated with ewb, whereas controlled types of motivation and amotivation are negatively associated with ewb (ryan & deci, 2000). to evaluate convergent validity, the association between ewbss and svs was tested. svs has been broadly used in sport psychology studies (e.g., mack et al., 2011) to measure subjective vitality as a dynamic aspect of ewb, as well as an outcome of eudaimonic living (ryan et al., 2008). it was hypothesized that a) evidence of the factorial validity and reliability of ewbss would be provided, b) autonomous types of motivation (i.e., intrinsic motivation, integrated regulation, and identified regulation) would be positively related to ewbss, while controlled types of motivation (i.e., introjected regulation and external regulation) and amotivation would be negatively related to ewbss (nomological validity), and c) ewbss would be strongly correlated with svs (convergent validity). method participants. the two samples consisted of 139 (nmales = 46; nfemales = 93) competitive athletes (mage = 19.76, sd = 1.44) from 21 individual and team sports (35.3% indicated engaging in track and field), and 104 (nmales = 48; nfemales = 56) recreational athletes (mage = 20.46, sd = 2.43) from 22 individual and team sports (25% indicated playing soccer). the majority of the competitive athletes played at varsity level (n = 108) and were at the early season stage (n = 79), whereas the majority of recreational athletes were at the off-season stage (n = 40). on average, the competitive athletes practiced 12.06 hours (sd = 4.89) and had been participating in their sport for 9.64 years (sd = 4.91). the recreational athletes practiced less hours per week (m = 5.13, sd = 3.29) and reported that they had been participating in their sport on average for 9.74 years (sd = 4.56). most of the participants from both samples described themselves as caucasian (ncompetitive = 123; nrecreational = 70). additionally, 97.5% of competitive athletes and only 32.7% of recreational athletes indicated currently having a coach/instructor. measures. demographics. the same demographic questionnaire used in phase 2 was employed. eudaimonic wellbeing. the ewbss was used to measure athletes’ wellbeing as in phase 2. motivation. the behavioral regulation in sport questionnaire (brsq; lonsdale et al., 2008) was used to assess athletes’ motivation by indicating the reasons they participate in their sport and responding on a sevenpoint likert scale from 1 (not at all true) to 7 (very true). the 24-item questionnaire includes six subscales: intrinsic motivation (e.g., “because it’s fun”), integrated regulation (e.g., “because it’s an opportunity to just be who i am”), identified regulation (e.g., “because i value the benefits of my sport”), introjected regulation (e.g., “because i measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 100 would feel guilty if i quit”), external regulation (e.g., “in order to satisfy people who want me to play”), and amotivation (e.g., “but i question why i continue”). supportive evidence regarding the reliability and factorial validity of the brsq has been reported in four studies conducted by lonsdale and colleagues (2008) and the brsq has been effectively employed in a number of studies (e.g., lonsdale & hodge, 2011). subjective vitality. the six-item version of subjective vitality scale (svs; ryan & frederick, 1997) was used to assess the degree to which participants feel vital, energized, and alive in their life as athletes. the items (e.g., “i feel alive and vital”) are answered on a seven-point likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 7 (very true). the reliability and validity of the scale has been supported by previous research (e.g., bostic, rubio, & hood, 2000). procedure. approval for the study was granted by the institutional research ethics board. after receiving permission from instructors teaching university kinesiology courses, one of the investigators contacted students (at the end of the class) explaining to them briefly the purpose of the study. a letter of information and the questionnaire were then administered to them using a paper and pencil format. by completing the questionnaire implicit consent was obtained to participate in the study. the instructors were not present during class recruitment and data collection. data analysis. descriptive statistics and cronbach alpha coefficient scores of both samples’ responses were calculated for all the examined variables. similar to phase 2, the factorial validity of the ewbss scores for each sample was examined with cfa, and the goodness-of-fit of the hypothesized model was tested using the same indices (χ2, cfi, rmsea, and srmr). bivariate correlations (pearson correlation) were also computed to test patterns of association between the constructs. results descriptive statistics, scale reliabilities, and cfa. the descriptive statistics and cronbach alpha coefficient scores of competitive and recreational athletes’ responses for all variables are presented in table 2 and table 3. on average, both competitive and recreational athletes scored above the midpoint for the ewbss, svs, and autonomous types of motivation subscales. participants’ responses from both samples were on average below the midpoint for the non-autonomous types of motivation subscales. all the examined variables had acceptable levels of internal consistency with alphas ranging from .76 to .90 with the exception of the identified regulation subscale for the recreational athletes which indicated a poor level of reliability (α = .59). while the results for this variable are reported, the findings that include identified regulation for recreational athletes must be interpreted with caution. similar to phase 2, the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, factor loading, and error term scores for all items are presented in table 1. for the sample with competitive athletes, fit index scores reflected adequate fit with the exception of one index (rmsea) which did not reach the cutoff criterion (χ2 (5) = 27.21, p < .001; cfi = .90; rmsea = .18; srmr = .06). for the sample with recreational athletes, the cfa model representing the ewbss revealed a much poorer fit to the data (χ2 (5) = 27.28, p < .001; cfi = .88; rmsea = .21; srmr = .08). measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 101 nomological and convergent validity. the bivariate correlations between all the variables are also presented in table 2 and table 3. competitive and recreational athletes’ autonomous types of motivation were positively associated with ewb. negative relationships were found between the controlled types of motivation (including amotivation) and ewb in competitive athletes, whereas only amotivation was found to be negatively associated with ewb in recreational athletes. positive correlations were found between ewbss scores and svs scores of both competitive and recreational athletes. discussion the results from this phase provided further evidence supporting the factorial validity of the ewbss, but primarily for competitive athletes. support was provided for the nomological validity of the ewbss with competitive athletes, but only partial support for nomological validity was found with recreational athletes as table 2 descriptive statistics, reliability coefficients, and bivariate correlations between study variables for competitive athletes from phase 3 variables m sd scale range α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. intrinsic motivation 6.13 0.92 1-7 .90 2. integrated regulation 5.60 1.08 1-7 .81 .59** 3. identified regulation 5.94 0.90 1-7 .76 .49** .61** 4. introjected regulation 3.43 1.64 1-7 .88 -.25** -.04 -.10 5. external regulation 2.45 1.32 1-7 .86 -.23** -.10 -.12 .60** 6. amotivation 2.35 1.28 1-7 .86 -.50** -.30** -.26** .54** .56** 7. subjective vitality 4.85 1.05 1-7 .85 .44** .45** .32** -.15 -.08 -.23** 8. eudaimonic well-being 5.19 0.64 1-6 .81 .49** .45** .45** -.34** -.31** -.44** .59** note. m = mean; sd = standard deviation; α = cronbach alpha coefficient; ** p < .01. table 3 descriptive statistics, reliability coefficients, and bivariate correlations between study variables for recreational athletes from phase 3 variables m sd scale range α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1.intrinsic motivation 6.50 0.65 1-7 .78 2. integrated regulation 5.33 1.10 1-7 .80 .46** 3. identified regulation 5.72 0.85 1-7 .59 .36** .54** 4. introjected regulation 2.81 1.35 1-7 .78 -.27** -.10 .07 5. external regulation 2.16 1.11 1-7 .82 -.36** -.00 .07 .57** 6. amotivation 1.91 1.00 1-7 .83 -.52** -.12 -.09 .65** .65** 7. subjective vitality 5.06 0.90 1-7 .80 .27** .28** .42** -.13 -.07 -.16 8. eudaimonic well-being 5.02 0.67 1-6 .80 .49** .59** .52** -.14 -.15 -.31** .46** note. m = mean; sd = standard deviation; α = cronbach alpha coefficient; ** p < .01. measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 102 introjected regulation and external regulation were non-significantly correlated with the ewbss. as was expected, ewb as assessed by the ewbss was significantly related to subjective vitality, which provided support for the convergent validity of the ewbss with both athlete samples. the findings from this phase also provided support for the reliability of the ewbss with both competitive and recreational athletes. general discussion research in sport has examined athletes’ ewb demonstrating positive relationships between sport participation, autonomous motivation, and wellbeing (e.g., adie et al., 2012). however, a notable limitation of this research is the absence of a sport specific measure of ewb. the first purpose of this research was to create an initial pool of items that capture wellbeing based on the eudaimonic perspective. grounded in sdt, the initial 19 items were reduced to five items based on the feedback provided by five expert judges. the second purpose of the present research was to examine the factorial validity and reliability of the fiveitem ewbss. thus, the new instrument was tested on a large sample with high level competitive athletes. the findings provided initial support for the factorial validity and reliability of the ewbss. given the ewbss was a new instrument, further validation of the five-item structure with other samples was imperative. accordingly, the factorial validity and reliability of the instrument were re-examined with a sample of competitive athletes and a sample of recreational athletes, and further psychometric testing of nomological and convergent validity was conducted. supportive evidence concerning the different types of validity and internal consistency of the ewbss was found in the sample of competitive athletes, while only partial support for the psychometric properties of ewbss was found with recreational athletes. in an attempt to understand why the ewbss was more applicable to competitive athletes than recreational athletes, we asked participants from both samples to tell us in their opinion how applicable they felt that the ewbss items are for themselves and their lives as athletes. pelliccia et al. (2005) defined competitive athletes as individuals who participate in systematic training on a regular basis and compete in official sporting events, whereas recreational athletes were described as individuals who engage in sport activities without requiring consistent training. while the competitive athletes thought all items of the instrument were applicable to them, the recreational athletes commented that items 2 and 5 are not really suitable for their level of play. it seems that for the individuals that participate in sport primarily to experience enjoyment (i.e., intrinsic motivation), which is characteristic of recreational athletes, they lack specific goals or direction in sport (item 2) or they have goals that are not directly related to their sport (e.g., to be physically fit, to have meaningful relationships; chatzisarantis & hagger, 2007). furthermore, as recreational athletes do not have a very strong athletic identity (lamont-mills & christensen, 2006), aspects of themselves are not identified by their sport (item 5). therefore, based on the nature of the items, ewbss appears to be more suitable for competitive athletes. our research is not without limitations. we only classified athletes as competitive and recreational. in addition to confirming the differences between competitive and recreational athletes in responding to ewbss, it would be worthwhile to examine the instrument with other levels of competitive athletes (e.g., masters athletes, high school athletes) in order to determine if this instrument is appropriate for all competitive athletes. additionally, it would be worthwhile for scholars to compare various samples of athletes (e.g., individual versus team sports, different age groups, male versus female athletes) and determine if they exhibit differences in their wellbeing levels. in this research we only considered the nomological and convergent validity of the ewbss. given the validation of an instrument is an ongoing process, more research is needed to examine other types of validity such as discriminant, predictive, and concurrent validity. the test-retest reliability of the instrument also needs to be investigated. measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 103 the ewbss was developed to represent eudaimonic aspects as indicators of optimal functioning and experience in the sport context. however, recently ryan and deci (2017) used the term of thriving to describe full functioning by including two main components: a eudaimonic component (i.e., vitality) and a performance component (i.e., exercise of one's human capacities). similarly, brown and colleagues (brown, arnold, reid, & roberts, 2018; brown, arnold, standage, & fletcher, 2017) investigated thriving in sport and suggested that the experience of thriving incorporates some similar characteristics with the experience of ewb and eudaimonic living (which align with sdt) combined with aspects of athletic performance. more specifically, thriving was described as the experience of both a high-level of wellbeing and a perceived high-level of performance following adversity or successful events. therefore, future research should consider incorporating the dimension of subjective performance together with the ewbss in order to capture a more holistic view of being fully functioning in sport, instead of using separate measures to assess wellbeing and performance (brown et al., 2017). previous studies have assessed ewb in sport by employing a global measure of wellbeing (e.g., spwb) or by employing multiple measures to assess various aspects of ewb (e.g., subjective vitality, awareness). our attempt to provide a measure that is relatively short and easy to administer, while still encompassing the main components of ewb in sport, should encourage researchers to use the new instrument in order to further examine and understand athletes’ wellbeing. researchers in future studies should investigate whether athletes’ wellbeing varies with athletes’ characteristics (e.g., age, gender, sport, stage of the competitive season, and cultural background). future research should also examine the relationship between the ewbss and other constructs of sdt (e.g., basic psychological needs) to see if the findings are consistent with tenets of sdt. the findings from the present study have implications for coaches and practitioners working with athletes. as the ewbss is a relatively straight forward instrument that reduces the burden on athletes, it can be easily administered multiple times throughout the season. therefore, practitioners can design interventions that may enhance athletes’ wellbeing and effectively assess these interventions employing the ewbss. authors despina kouali the university of western ontario dkouali@uwo.ca craig hall the university of western ontario paige pope university of lethbridge publishing timeline received 3 october 2018 accepted 14 october 2019 published 1 february 2020 measuring eudaimonic wellbeing in sport kouali, hall, & pope 104 references adie, j. w., duda, j. l., & ntoumanis, n. 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(2012). differences in the association of subjective wellbeing measures with health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions among residents of an eastern cape township. international journal of wellbeing, 2(1), 54–67. doi:10.5502/ijw.v2i1.4 jane m. cramm erasmus university cramm@bmg.eur.nl copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 54 article differences in the association of subjective wellbeing measures with health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions among residents of an eastern cape township jane m. cramm · anna p. nieboer abstract: objective: the use of variably self-reported measures of wellbeing may produce differing outcomes. this study examined the differences in association with health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions (marital status, social capital) of two widely used cognitive subjective wellbeing measurements: cantril’s ladder and diener’s five-item satisfaction with life scale. methods: a stratified sampling design was used to collect data from representative households in the 20 neighborhoods of rhini, a deprived suburb of grahamstown in the eastern cape province of south africa. correlation and stepwise multiple regression analyses investigated differences in the associations between wellbeing and health, demographics, socioeconomic status, and social conditions determined by the three measurements. results: we found that the multiple-item satisfaction with life scale elicited more discriminating responses that took into account a broader range of life domains. this scale reported more significant relationships between subjective wellbeing and health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions. cantril’s ladder produced a narrower range of career-like comparisons. the direction of association between measures of wellbeing and socioeconomic characteristics never changed according to the measures used. conclusions: policy-makers, researchers, and practitioners using these instruments should be aware of the differences between singleand multiple-item wellbeing measures, and recognize that the choice of instrument will affect the life domains found to be associated with wellbeing. keywords: wellbeing, measurement, social indicators, socioeconomic, satisfaction with life scale 1. introduction the study of subjective wellbeing (swb) is growing exponentially (kahneman, 1999). swb is ‚a broad category of phenomena that includes people’s emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgments of life satisfaction‛; it thus differs from happiness, although the terms are often used synonymously (diener, suh, lucas, & smith, 1999: 277). questions concerning swb are increasingly included in population surveys, reflecting the emergence of a new science of swb. scholars in a wide range of disciplines have recently attempted to define, measure, and analyze swb in various contexts (hoorn, 2007). some researchers have brought attention to the importance of the analytical and empirical separation of various forms of swb (diener, kahneman, tov, & arora, 2010; lucas, diener, & suh, 1996). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 55 measures of swb are obtained through self-reporting: respondents are asked to evaluate their lives as a whole or some aspect thereof. kahneman (1999) described a major distinction between global evaluative judgments and people’s cumulative feelings of pleasure and displeasure. specifically, reported swb consists of two distinctive components (diener 1994: 106): an affective component, which refers to the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect, and a cognitive component. the affective component is a hedonic evaluation guided by emotions and feelings, whereas the cognitive component is an information-based appraisal of one’s life with respect to an envisioned ‚ideal‛ life. a global measure of ‚life satisfaction‛ taken at a single point in time may be more heavily weighted with judgment and cognition, whereas reported happiness may be more saturated with affect. swb measures with an affective component ascertain how often an individual reports experiencing positive or negative affect (such as smiling or crying). in contrast, life satisfaction is more broadly measured: an individual’s satisfaction with life is assessed in general and in various life domains (e.g., health, employment, income, social conditions) (diener, 1994). this distinction implicitly requires the researcher to collect separate measurements of affective experience and life satisfaction, and to conduct separate analyses of their determinants. most discussion of the need for swb measures has focused on cognitive/judgmental life evaluations, rather than affective measures, because they are considered to be direct measures of overall swb. these measures are sufficiently reliable to allow multiple individual responses to be averaged, providing summary measures of swb in neighborhoods, cities, regions, and countries, and across population sub-groups. changes in the balance of swb made visible by regular reporting are likely to guide the thinking of policy-makers and those affected by policy implementation. swb measures allow an improved understanding of the elements that lead to a better life and clearer insights into the links between policies and swb. diener and colleagues (2010) investigated swb measures at both ends of the cognitionaffect continuum and found that different measures led to different outcomes. affect-oriented questions were typically less related to income than were cognitive questions. a variety of measurement techniques may be employed to assess swb on the cognitive side of the continuum, which may also produce differing outcomes. this study therefore compared two widely used measures at the cognitive side of the continuum. cantril’s ladder and diener’s satisfaction with life scale (swls) are two of the most commonly used cognitive swb measures (bartels & boonsma, 2009; bjørnskov, 2010; kashdan, 2004). they differ in the framing of satisfaction questions and the anchoring of responses. cantril’s technique asks respondents to rate satisfaction with life on a scale anchored by selfidentified minimum and maximum values. it solves the problem of evaluating absolute satisfaction on a closed scale by anchoring answers within an individual’s conception of their best possible life. in other words, the question prompts an individual evaluation of the respondent’s position in his/her life relative to where s/he would ideally like to be (larsen & mckibban, 2008; stutzer, 2004). the use of a ladder technique may thus infuse respondents’ answers with aspirations for and expectations of the future to a greater degree than is the case with the use of the swls. the respondent’s relative ranking of himself/herself on this ladder may indirectly reflect differences in his/her access to scarce resources (e.g., income) more than it addresses differences in social conditions. we thus hypothesize that these two cognitive swb measures will correlate differentially with known swb indicators. cantril’s ladder and diener’s swls also differ methodologically. early measures of swb, such as cantril’s ladder, were often single-item instruments. more complex, multiple-item measures of swb and life satisfaction are often desirable. the multiple items in diener’s swls differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 56 solicit responses from individuals about the extent to which they agree or disagree with statements designed specifically to capture satisfaction with life (pavot & diener, 1993). nevertheless, single-item measures have dominated large-scale surveys, many of which have relied on general and simple life satisfaction questions, such as cantril’s ladder (blanchflower & oswald, 2004). although these simpler single-item instruments have been proven to be reliable and valid swb measurements (pavot & diener, 1993), their reliability is typically lower than that of multiple-item measures. although some research has indicated that multiple-item life satisfaction scales provide a more structured frame of reference than single-item questions, the presence and degree of associations between health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions measured by these swb instruments are currently unknown. using multiple-item measures of swb, the swls is expected to identify a more broadly conceived wellbeing containing a larger variety of indicators than single-item swb measurements. we therefore additionally hypothesize that the more complex, multiple-item swls will lead to identification of a broader range of swb indicators than will cantril’s ladder. this study thus used cantril’s ladder and diener’s five-item swls to investigate whether these two widely used cognitive swb measures lead to different associations with known swb indicators. our primary aims were to determine whether the two swb measures showed the associations expected based on previous research, whether they performed differently, and whether differences in the strength of associations with conditions known to affect swb (e.g., health, socioeconomic status, social conditions) could be identified. the study used data gathered in rhini, a small township of grahamstown, in the eastern cape province of south africa. this community is characterized by poverty, unemployment, and low income levels (cramm & nieboer, 2011a; cramm, koolman, & nieboer, 2011; cramm & nieboer, 2011b; møller & erstad, 2007; møller, erstad, & zani, 2009). rhini has a mean swb score of 4.6 on the 10-point cantril’s ladder (møller, 2007), which is substantially lower than that reported for the whole nation of south africa (5.7; marks, abdallah, simms, & thompson, 2006). the population of rhini can serve as a case study for policy makers and development organizations aiming to improve the swb outcomes of people living in economicallyand health-deprived regions, such as the eastern cape (noble, barnes, wright, & roberts, 2010). 2. methods 2.1 participants and sampling this study applied a neighborhood-level stratified sampling design that randomly selected households in proportion to the total number of households in each of rhini’s 20 neighborhoods. moving systematically through the neighborhood from a randomly defined starting point, the researchers selected every tenth household for inclusion in the sample. this method ensured that all households in all neighborhoods of rhini stood an equal chance of being included in the survey. eligible respondents were identified in each target household; they were at least 18 years of age and had resided in rhini for at least six months of the past year. one respondent per target household was selected using a kish grid to ensure that all eligible persons in the household stood an equal chance of being included in the survey. the respondent was then interviewed and swb was assessed using both measures. if this person was not available, arrangements were made to conduct the interview at a later time. up to four attempts were made to interview selected respondents. an interview was obtained in 1,020 of the 1,042 (97.9%) targeted households. reasons for not achieving an interview included not finding the respondent at differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 57 home after four visits to the household, old age or poor health, and disinterest or unwillingness. staff from development research africa, a well-known organization experienced in undertaking national probability-based samples in deep rural and urban areas, administered the questionnaires. the interviewers gathered demographic information about the participants, such as gender, age, health status, education level, living arrangements, and employment, in addition to the swb measures. a detailed description of this study population can be found in møller (2007, 2008) and research of møller and colleagues (2011), cramm, møller, finkenflügel, & nieboer (2010), cramm, van exel, møller, & finkenflügel (2010), and cramm, møller, & nieboer (2010a, b). 2.2 subjective wellbeing measurements cantril’s ladder was the framed single-item measure of swb used to assess respondents’ satisfaction with life. respondents were asked to rate their lives in comparison to the best and worst possible lives they could imagine, on a scale of zero (worst possible life) to ten (best possible life) (cantril, 1965). respondents were asked, ‚on which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?‛ the swls was the structured multiple-item measurement used to assess respondents’ satisfaction with life. this instrument consists of five items (‚in most ways my life is close to my ideal‛; ‚the conditions of my life are excellent‛; ‚i am satisfied with my life‛; ‚so far i have gotten the important things i want in life‛; ‚if i could live my life over, i would change almost nothing‛) to which respondents rated their level of agreement on a five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = neither agree/disagree; 4 = agree; 5 = strongly agree) (pavot & diener, 1993). cronbach’s α for the swls used in this study was 0.88, indicating that the scale was reliable. multiple items provide a more discriminating response scale than single-item swb measurements. for example, a measure containing three items (i) with seven-point response scales (r) has 343 (ri) unique response patterns and 19 possible total scores (i × r – [i – 1]) (bergkvist & rossiter, 2007). the relatively large number of total scores makes it possible to ‚make relatively fine distinctions among people‛ (churchill, 1979: 66) or to categorize people into a large number of groups (bernstein, 1994: 67). a multiple-item predictive measure should thus show an increased association with the outcome measure; that is, it should exhibit higher predictive validity. the multiple-item swls has been shown to have favorable psychometric properties, including high internal consistency, temporal reliability (diener, emmons, larsen, & griffen, 1985a), internal reliability (cronbach’s α = 0.87), and test-retest correlations (2-month stability coefficient = 0.82; diener, horwitz, & emmons, 1985b). 2.3 indicators of subjective wellbeing (self-reported) health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions have been identified as potential indicators of swb (ahuvia & friedman, 1998; andrews & withey, 1976; campbell, converse, & rodgers, 1976; clark & oswald, 1994; cramm et al., 2010a; diener et al., 1985a). studies have consistently found a high positive correlation between swb and health (diener & biswas-diener, 2002; diener & scollon, 2003; dolan, peasgood, & white, 2008; frey & stutzer, 2002; hoorn, 2007). individuals reporting higher levels of swb tend to live longer than those with lower swb outcomes. good health is probably both a cause and an effect of high swb levels (diener & biswas-diener, 2002). differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 58 this study measured self-rated health, which is considered a valid and robust measure of general health status (idler & benyamanini 1997; mossey & shapiro 1982; wen, browning, & cagney, 2003). a large body of evidence has demonstrated that self-reported health assessment has high predictive validity for mortality, physical disability, and chronic disease status. furthermore, self-assessed health is a stronger predictor of mortality than physician-assessed health (idler & benyamanini, 1997; idler & kasl, 1995; mossey & shapiro, 1982). as a measure of health status, it captures personally experienced physical problems that may impair swb (wen et al., 2003). respondents were asked, ‚how would you describe your health these days?‛ respondents could rate their level of agreement on a five-point scale (1 = very poor; 2 = poor; 3 = average; 4 = good; 5 = very good). much early research focused on the relationship between swb and socioeconomic factors, such as education, employment, and income (diener & biswas-diener, 2002). evidence for the impact of education on swb has been mixed. some researchers (diener & scollon, 2003; frey & stutzer, 2002) have suggested a positive relationship, whereas a study conducted with an english population (clark & oswald, 1994) found a negative impact that may be due to changing aspirations and the creation of expectations for a higher income. it remains unknown whether such findings are applicable to more deprived populations. education is closely correlated with income, occupational status, and social class; these factors have likely influenced the results of these studies. unemployment shows a consistently negative association with swb that has been suggested to have severe long-term negative impacts (clark & oswald, 1994; hoorn, 2007). extensive research on the relationship between income and swb has revealed that individuals with high incomes have better swb outcomes than those with low incomes (cramm et al., 2010b; diener & biswas-diener, 2002; easterlin 1974; fahey, whelan, & maitre, 2005; keck & krause 2007). this study assessed income by asking respondents their average monthly household income (in south african rand: 0-100; 101-200; 201-500; 501-750; 751-1,000; 1,001-1,500; 1,5012,000; 2,001-3,000; 3,001-4,000; 4,001-5,000; 5,001-6,000; 6,001-7,000; 7,001 or higher). to assess education, respondents were asked to state their highest educational level (none or some primary; some secondary; completed secondary and/or postsecondary). social conditions also affect swb. most married people report higher levels of swb than do single people (diener & scollon, 2003; frey & stutzer, 2002; hoorn, 2007). social capital is also increasingly acknowledged to be an important social determinant of swb (bjørnskov, 2003, 2005; easterlin, 2000; grootaert, 2002; haggerty et al., 2001; wilkinson & pickett, 2006; yip, sybramanian, mitchell, lee, wang, & kawachi, 2007). this factor is defined as ‚the set of cooperative relationships between social actors that facilitate collective actions‛ (requena, 2003: 331). the core components of social capital are civic engagement and mutual trust among community members. social capital shelters people from the harmful effects of unemployment and poverty (camfield & skevington, 2008; cramm et al., 2010b; winkelman, 2009). people with friendly, helpful, and trustworthy neighbors tend to report higher levels of swb than those who are more solitary (wilkinson & pickett, 2006). marks, abdallah, simms, & thompson’s (2006) investigation of the correlation between social capital and swb also indicated a relationship between greater social capital and higher life satisfaction. we assessed social capital with three items (‚people in this neighborhood are friendly‛; ‚people in this neighborhood help each other without having to be asked‛; ‚people in this neighborhood trust their neighbors‛) to which respondents rated their level of agreement on a four-point scale (1 = very dissatisfied; 2 = dissatisfied; 3 = satisfied; 4 = very satisfied). the cronbach’s α of this scale was 0.87. the questionnaire further probed factors previously differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 59 implicated as potential predictors of swb, such as unemployment (yes/no) and marital status (married/living together; single/divorced/widowed). 2.4 statistical analysis descriptive statistics are reported as mean values and standard deviations (sds). correlation analyses were performed to detect significant associations between the two cognitive swb measures and the domains of health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions. regression analyses were performed to identify any life domains that predicted responses to each of the measures, and to examine the differences in swb scores obtained with the two measures. we tested the equality of the covariance matrices with the null hypothesis that the observed matrices of the swls and cantril’s ladder would be equal. all statistical analyses were performed with statistical package for the social sciences (spss) software (ver. 17, spss inc., chicago, il, usa). 3. results table 1 provides descriptive summary statistics (mean ± sd) for the dependent and independent variables of swb. one-third (33%) of the respondents were married and the others were single, widowed, or separated/divorced. thirty-five percent of respondents had no formal schooling or had received only primary education. forty percent had received some secondary education and 25% had matriculated and/or received postsecondary education. sixty-two percent of the respondents were unemployed. table 1. descriptive statistics for the variables used in the correlation and multiple regression analyses (n = 1020). mean sd min max cantril’s ladder 4.63 2.07 0.00 10.00 satisfaction with life scale 2.62 0.86 1.00 5.00 health 3.55 1.01 1.00 5.00 income 1,250 2.13 0,000 >7,001 social capital 2.97 0.54 1.00 4.00 table 2 shows the univariate effects of health, unemployment, education, income, marital status, and social capital on swb scores obtained with cantril’s ladder and the swls. we found that health, unemployment, education, income, and social capital were associated with cantril’s ladder scores (all p ≤ 0.001), followed by marital status (p ≤ 0.05). all independent variables were associated with the swls (all p ≤ 0.001). the direction of association between measures of wellbeing and socioeconomic characteristics never changed according to the measures used. differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 60 table 2. correlations between independent variables and subjective wellbeing (n = 1020). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 patient 1. health 2. unemployment -0.26*** 3. education 0.39*** -0.22*** 4. income 0.11*** -0.50*** 0.22*** 5. married -0.03 -0.12*** -0.06 0.08* 6. social capital 0.08* -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 7. cantril’s ladder 0.11*** -0.21*** 0.10*** 0.26*** 0.08*** 0.08* 8. diener’s satisfaction with life scale 0.17*** -0.15*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.41*** notes: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. regression analysis revealed that unemployment was weakly associated with swb determined by cantril’s ladder, and showed no association with swb determined by the swls (table 3). the observed covariance matrices of the two instruments were equal. comparison of the swls and cantril’s ladder showed strong associations between swb and income (both p ≤ 0.001); analysis of covariance matrix equality revealed that the relative strength of this association did not differ significantly between measures (cantril’s ladder: β = 0.20; swls: β = 0.13). table 3. comparison of scores produced by the cognitive wellbeing measurements in the domains of health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions. cantril’s ladder (β) satisfaction with life scale (β) health 0.05 0.12*** unemployment -0.08* -0.03 education 0.03 0.06 income 0.20*** 0.13*** married 0.06 0.12*** social capital 0.07* 0.15*** adjusted r² for equation 0.11 0.12 notes: *p ≤ 0.05; **p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001. further comparison revealed additional differences in the results obtained with the two instruments. swls scores indicated that health was significantly related to swb (β = 0.12; p ≤ 0.001), whereas cantril’s ladder scores did not. moreover, analysis of covariance matrix differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 61 equality showed that the relative strength of indicators differed significantly between measures (p ≤ 0.001) for this variable. the results for social capital and marital status also differed between measures. cantril’s ladder scores indicated a weak association between swb and social capital (β = 0.07; p ≤ 0.05) and no association with marital status; swls scores indicated the strongest associations with these social domains of swb (marital status: β = 0.12, p ≤ 0.001; social capital: β = 0.15, p ≤ 0.001). the test for the equality of the covariance matrices showed that the relative strength of both indicators differed significantly between measures (marital status: p ≤ 0.05; social capital: p ≤ 0.001). neither measure found education to be significantly related to swb in this poor community. in the univariate analyses described above, however, education was significantly related to swb by both measures. we found no difference in the instruments’ explained level of variance (cantril’s ladder: β = 0.11; swls: β = 0.12). 4. discussion this study investigated whether two widely used cognitive/judgmental measures of swb (cantril’s ladder and diener’s swls) were differentially associated with the life domains of health, socioeconomic status, and social conditions. we hypothesized that cognitive swb measures correlated differentially with known swb indicators, postulating that a more complex, multiple-item swls would lead to the identification of a broader range of swb domains than would a single-item measure (cantril’s ladder). as expected, the employment of different measurement techniques to assess swb produced differing outcomes. our first hypothesis, that these two cognitive swb measures correlate differentially with known swb indicators, can be confirmed. these findings are important for policy-makers who seek to evaluate policies based on swb outcomes over time. although cantril’s ladder did not find health to be associated significantly with swb, multivariate analyses of swls results did find such an association. moreover, the relative strength of health differed significantly between measures. unemployment was significantly associated with swb as measured by cantril’s ladder, but not as measured by the swls. these findings indicate that data produced by the administration of slightly different questions, or of similar questions asked under slightly different conditions, can differ substantially. the difference between ‚life satisfaction domains‛ and ‚best possible life‛ led to significantly different responses. the two cognitive swb measures thus tapped into two different concepts of satisfaction. this difference may be due to the cognitive processes that occurred during the administration of these instruments. cantril’s technique asks respondents to rate satisfaction with life on a scale anchored by self-identified aspirations and ideals (larsen & mckibban, 2008; stutzer, 2004), which may elicit more aspirational responses. the aspirations and expectations of the poor residents of rhini are related to income, employment, and social capital, all of which are particularly scarce in this township. health, education, and marriage appear to be less influential in shaping their future expectations. people may consider these resources to be more stable over time, and although their control over income, employment, and social capital is likely to be limited, their aspirations to improve their socioeconomic and social conditions explain the variation in swb levels among respondents. the framework defined by the best and worst possible lives may trigger career-like comparisons in which income and employment are more important than, for example, health. the relationship between swb and unemployment differs strikingly between measures. cantril’s ladder found a strong significant association between swb and unemployment, whereas the swls found no significant association. unemployment is widely considered to differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 62 generate negative externalities. higher unemployment rates lead the employed to feel less secure about keeping their job in the future, while the unemployed suffer from worse prospects of finding a new job. in addition to these negative effects, however, the unemployed may experience a counteracting positive impact termed the ‚social norm effect of unemployment‛: one’s own unemployment may be easier to bear when more people suffer the same fate (kessler turner, j., & house, 1988; cohn, 1978). this may be due to the reduced stigmatization of unemployment in such situations. for example, kessler and colleagues (1988) found that the unemployed established social contacts more easily when others in the local area were also unemployed. cohn (1978) found that unemployed persons’ satisfaction with self was lower when unemployment could not be attributed to an external cause, such as generally high unemployment rates in a region. clark (2003) found that the swb of the unemployed rose with the regional unemployment rate, even at the household level; people reported higher swb scores when they were not the only unemployed person in the household. similar results have been found for the united kingdom (shields & wheatley price, 2005), australia (shields, wheatley price, & wooden, 2008), south africa (powdthavee, 2007), and switzerland (stutzer & lalive, 2004). our findings suggest that social norms were a more important component of responses produced with the swls than of those elicited by cantril’s ladder. the swls appears to be more susceptible to the wider context of social norms within the community than cantril’s ladder. it incorporates factors such as high unemployment, which results in less social disapproval, and other sources of swb, such as a partner who provides social approval. for this reason, social domain indicators appeared to be more important in the swls results than in those obtained with cantril’s ladder. the relative strengths of marriage and social capital were also significantly higher when measured by the swls. when a respondent is asked to consider multiple aspects of life, social norms and social approval, such as behavioral confirmation and affection, may become more important in his/her consideration of swb. consequently, health, social capital, and marriage are visible as important swb indicators in the results of multiple-item instruments. in contrast, asking a respondent about the ‘‘best possible life’’ using cantril’s ladder may elicit a response based more on (economic) status than on social norms. the swls questions asked respondents to consider a broader scope of life satisfaction than did cantril's ladder. whereas cantril's ladder triggers career-like comparisons focused mainly on income and employment, the swls produced responses indicating significant relationships with a larger variety of domains, such as health, socioeconomic status, social conditions, and swb. thus, we can also confirm our second hypothesis, that a more complex multiple-item swb measure would identify a broader range of swb indicators than a single-item swb measure. although we expected that the multiple-item swls would show higher predictive validity, the two swb measures showed equal degrees of explained variance. some limitations must be considered when interpreting our study findings. given the location of our study in the community of rhini, our results may apply only to similarly economically deprived regions. within-nation comparisons typically result in small but significant correlations between income and swb. in studies using large population samples, diener and oishi (2000) compared 19 nations, finding a mean correlation coefficient of 0.13, and lachman and weaver (1998) found similar results in a study of the united states (0.18). in our study, the mean correlation coefficients measured with the swls (0.17) and cantril’s ladder (0.26) differed significantly (p ≤ 0.05). income has been found to be relatively more important for swb in economically deprived regions, such as the community of rhini (diener, sandvik, differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 63 seidlitz, & diener, 1993). neither measure found education to be a strong determinant of swb in the rhini sample. because the majority of respondents (75%) had received none or only some primary or secondary education, these results likely reflect the deprived situation of the community as a whole. another limitation of the study’s community-level location is the relatively low explained variance. as with previous studies (ahuvia & friedman, 1998; diener & biswas-diener, 2002), we found that factors such as income, employment, education, and marital status accounted for only a small amount of variance in swb. although previous research defined six broad groups of swb determinants (personality, contextual and situational, demographic, institutional, environmental, and economic factors; hoorn, 2007), we included only health, demographics, socioeconomic status, and social conditions in the present study. exclusion of the other determinants may in part have caused the relatively low explained variance. further, objective indicators are often not strongly associated with swb, because of substitution processes and buffer effects. people are resourceful in substituting across different life-domains and different forms of wellbeing (nieboer & lindenberg, 2002). cantril’s ladder and the swls use direct questions of wellbeing focusing on very general dimensions of wellbeing, which has its disadvantages. direct wellbeing questions are criticized because individuals are biased by their present state and what they remember at that moment (kahneman, 1999; nieboer, lindenberg, boomsma, & van bruggen, 2005). one can try to identify the major dimensions of swb and ask questions that refer to activities and experiences related to these dimensions avoiding direct questions on wellbeing (nieboer et al., 2005) and opening up possibilities to pinpoint alternative means for the realization of swb. these alternative means help us say something about which means are more essential (i.e., less substitutable) than others (diener & lucas, 2000). 5. conclusion this research has provided preliminary insight into the issues that may emerge with the use of different self-reported cognitive measures of swb. the direction of association between measures of wellbeing and socioeconomic characteristics never changes according to the measures used. however, our findings revealed that the multiple-item swls provided a more discriminating response scale that took into account a broader scope of life domains and found the most significant relations between swb and health, demographics, socioeconomic status, and social conditions. cantril’s ladder elicited responses with a narrower focus characterized mainly by career-like comparisons. since many other researchers have found swb to be associated with health, it is striking that multivariate analysis of the cantril’s ladder data found no such association. further longitudinal studies, including those conducted in less-deprived communities, are necessary to confirm our findings. researchers and practitioners using these measures should be aware of the differences between singleand multiple-item swb measurements and recognize that the choice of swb instrument will affect the relationships found between life domains and swb. acknowledgments this research project was funded by the south africa netherlands research programme on alternatives in development (sanpad). the views expressed in the paper are those of the authors. the authors declare that they have no competing interests. authors jane m. cramm differences in the association of subjective well-being measures cramm & nieboer www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 64 erasmus university (ibmg) cramm@bmg.eur.nl anna p. nieboer erasmus university (ibmg) nieboer@bmg.eur.nl publishing timeline received 16 december 2011 accepted 13 march 2012 published 29 april 2012 references ahuvia, a. c., & friedman, d. 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(2012). happiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge. international journal of wellbeing, 2(3), 277-283. doi:10.5502/ijw.v2.i3.8 sissela bok harvard university sbok@hsph.harvard.edu copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 277 invited article happiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge sissela bok abstract: can the study of philosophy lead to happiness—whether after death, as socrates claimed, in plato’s dialogue ‚the phaedo‛, or while one is still alive, as epicurus, the roman stoics, and other ancient thinkers maintained? in his dialogue ‚hermotimus or on philosophical schools‛, the second-century satirist lucian of samosata cast a skeptical eye on all such teachings. how can students know which of the many paths to happiness and wisdom to choose, which guide to trust? might signing on with any one teacher be a waste of time? what if some are charlatans who not only fail to provide a path to happiness but actually mislead and profiteer from their hapless charges? i argue that lucian’s cautionary attitude is equally useful today for anyone confronted with the profusion of courses, books and websites offering help in finding or ‘choosing’ happiness. i would now wish to include his irreverent voice among the many that i found helpful in writing exploring happiness: from aristotle to brain science. but i would hope to invite him, in turn, to go beyond his skeptical approach and reach also for the sympathetic understanding of different experiences and perspectives needed to deepen one’s understanding of happiness. keywords: happiness, philosophers, skepticism, morality, empathy, resilience.    socrates: those who are found to have excelled in holy living are freed from these regions within the earth [hades] and are released as if from prisons; they mount upward into their pure abode and dwell upon the earth. and of these, all who have duly purified themselves by philosophy live henceforth altogether without bodies, and pass to still more beautiful abodes. – plato , ‚the phaedo‛1 cerberus: when socrates had peeped into the chasm [of hades], and seen the darkness, and i had bitten him and dragged him by the foot, because he was still slowed down by the hemlock, he shrieked like an infant, and cried for his children, and went frantic. < then [when he could see that his fate was inescapable] he put on a bold front, pretending he would be glad to accept what 1 plato, ‚phaedo‛ in plato, vol. i, euthypro, apology, crito, phaedo, phaedrus, tr. harold north fowler (loeb classical library, harvard university press, 1971), 391. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ happiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge bok www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 278 was quite inevitable, all to win the admiration of the onlookers. – lucian, dialogues of the dead2 can the study of philosophy lead to happiness—whether after death, as socrates claimed, in plato’s dialogue ‚the phaedo‛, or while one is still alive, as epicurus, the roman stoics, and other ancient thinkers maintained? true, teachers in the different schools proposed incompatible visions of happiness to students and followers; this only showed how important it was not to be led astray by erroneous doctrines. by contrast, lucian of samosata cast a skeptical eye on all such hopes in works such as his dialogues of the dead or philosophers for sale. an itinerant lecturer, born in syria around ad 125, lucian presented satires and dialogues in public performances throughout the roman empire. he delighted in needling philosophers for their high-flown discourse, which masked what he saw as the hypocrisy with which they could enlist the gullible in their schools. many in lucian’s audiences were highly educated and thoroughly familiar with greek mythology and schools of philosophy. the scathing familiarity with which he portrayed philosophers and the adepts who slavishly imbibed their views could seem disrespectful to traditionalists even as they admired the humor and the elegant brevity of his writings. it is hard to exaggerate the contrast that lucian’s listeners must have found between his evocation of socrates’ distraught arrival in the gloomy realm of the dead and plato’s famous account of his high hopes for a blissful existence in afterlife in the company of gods and the noblest of humans. lucian knew the competing philosophical schools well, having spent several years in athens in his youth. he may have traveled there in a spirit of inquiry—a self-taught man from the provinces seeking answers in the legendary city, still the intellectual center of the western world, where plato and aristotle and epicurus had once taught, and where their successors, along with pythagoreans, stoics, and others held forth to students of all ages. but lucian had found precious little agreement on questions about the pursuit of happiness, the nature of virtue, and how best to lead one’s life to link the two. he had looked in vain for wisdom and guidance, whether in the gatherings where stoic philosophers taught under the covered porticos near the academy that plato had founded; among the platonists discoursing in that academy; listening to aristotle’s successors in the lyceum; puzzling over mystical teachings by pythagoreans and mystics; or visiting the world-famous garden that epicurus had created hundreds of years before, still piously maintained by epicureans who resided there. it would be only natural for someone coming from the provinces to athens and witnessing the disputes among teachers of philosophy to feel bewildered at first. how, confronted with such incompatible doctrines, can one know which path to happiness and wisdom to choose, which guide to trust? might signing on with any one teacher be a waste of time? what if some are charlatans who not only fail to provide a path to happiness but actually mislead and profiteer from their hapless charges? these are the questions that lucian raises in his dialogue ‚hermotimus, or on philosophical schools‛—questions as important for students of happiness in our time as in his. 3 in this 2 lucian, ‚dialogues of the dead” in lucian, tr. m. d. macleod, vol. vii (loeb classical library, harvard university press, 1961), dialogue 4, 21. 3 lucian, ‚hermotimus or on philosophical schools,‛ in c. d. n. costa, tr., lucian: selected dialogues (oxford university press, 2005), 88-9. see also ‚hermotimes or concerning the sects,‛ tr. a. m. harmon, in lucian (loeb classical library, harvard university press, 1915), vol. v, 260-415; and a recent french translation by jean-paul dumont, hermotime: ou comment choisir sa philosophie (presses universitaires de france, 1993). i have drawn on all happiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge bok www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 279 dialogue, lycinus, a stand-in for lucian himself, challenges an old man, exhausted from twenty years spent as the disciple of a stoic teacher, yet still hoping to attain the heights where he has been told he will find happiness, virtue, and wisdom. when lycinus suggests that the goal must surely be in sight after such long efforts, hermotimus wistfully admits that, so far, he has nothing to show for his exertions. why, then, should he have continued studying philosophy for so long? hermotimus answers that he must persevere: ‚philosophy is unattainable even if you spend a long time over it unless you keep your gaze fixed intently on it; and the stakes are high—whether to perish miserably among the populace or to win happiness through philosophy.‛4 but with the stakes so high and the journey so long and arduous, it must be crucial to know that one has signed on with the right guide. why choose one path rather than another? after all, stoics were far from the only teachers holding out promises of happiness to those who studied their doctrines. lycinus presses hermotimus to explain how he came to choose to follow his stoic teacher in the first place, given that platonists, epicureans, peripatetics, pythagoreans, and others were also inviting followers: when you first began to study philosophy, and there were many doors open to you, you passed by the others and came to the stoic door which you entered on your way to virtue, believing it was the one true door which opened up the straight path, while the others led to blind alleys. what made you believe this? what signs guided you?5 all the reasons that hermotimus advances—that he saw most people taking the stoics’ path, that the stoic teachers inspired him with hope for finding the happiness he sought, that many said they were manly and understood everything, that he admired watching them, with their dignified way of walking, their neat dress and thoughtful expressions—lycinus promptly demolishes. suppose, he asks, that he himself had chosen the path hermotimus had taken, trusting him as a friend, only to find that some god had brought back to life plato, pythagoras, aristotle and other thinkers. what if they asked him to explain his reasons for esteeming the stoics more highly than them, ‚not giving us a chance to speak and not testing any of our claims‛? merely to answer that his friend hermotimus had told him to choose the stoics would be worthless, in the absence of carefully comparing the arguments and deciding what is true and what is false. but such comparisons would take a great deal of time, if carefully entered into. they would preclude merely deciding on the stoics’ path, as hermotimus had done. hermotimus agrees that such comparisons would ordinarily be indispensable; it is just that, in this case, the stoics speak the truth. if someone tells you that two plus two makes five, this would be false ‚even if countless platos and pythagorases say so.‛ in the same way, one can learn the truth from the stoics without checking other creeds. well, counters lycinus, but does he not have to admit that all the philosophers who disagree about philosophical issues do agree that two and two makes four; but that comparing conflicting arguments and conclusions is precisely what he has to accept as necessary before deciding on one and only one path to happiness? and yet, devoting enough time to the philosophical schools might take more than a three translations in quoting this dialogue. all three titles combine to convey the meaning of the greek ‚haireseon‛ which carries meanings of ‚sects,‛ ‚schools‛ and also ‚choices.‛ choosing among the sects or schools could involve, as in this dialogue, choosing a philosophy. 4lucian, ‚hermotimus or on philosophical schools,‛ in c. d. n. costa, tr., lucian: selected dialogues (oxford university press, 2005), 88. 5 ibid., 94. happiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge bok www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 280 lifetime, lycinus facetiously adds: even if one were to restrict the number of schools to ten and devote twenty years to learning the doctrines of each, it would add up to two hundred years. when hermotimus is driven to reply that he simply cannot give adequate reasons for his choice, he has to consider, once again, the questions lycinus first put to him: why is he still carrying on with his philosophical studies, day after exhausting day? might he in fact be wasting his life in a fruitless quest? barking up the wrong tree? distraught, he finally agrees: ‚i am grieving for all the time i’ve been fool enough to waste, and, what’s more, the high fees my labors have cost me.‛6 he thanks lycinas for having pulled him out when he was being whirled about by a rough and turbid torrent, abandoning himself to being carried along by the stream. from a true believer, he has turned into a doubter of all faiths. he hates not just his teacher, not just stoicism, but all philosophical creeds. ‚and if i ever again, even unintentionally, meet a philosopher as i am walking on the road, i’ll turn around and avoid him like a mad dog.‛ the hermotimus dialogue expresses the perplexity many experience when meeting up with individuals fervently convinced of extraordinarily different and often incompatible philosophical views; and in turn with teachers and gurus promoting disparate paths to virtue, wisdom, and happiness. the experience of wonderment for outsiders at coming face to face with multiple belief systems promising insight and happiness after often lengthy studies has rarely been more tellingly conveyed. how, given so many avenues to hoped-for happiness, do people end up pursuing this or that particular doctrine? as lycinus explained to hermotimes, it would be folly simply to embark on any one path with any one teacher or doctrine, before comparing the arguments made by each. lucian’s skeptical challenges to the competing philosophical sects and his critique of hypocrisy and greed among those offering guidance to the gullible resonated in later ages. erasmus praised him as ‚the adamantine persecutor of all superstition‛ even as martin luther, among protestants, and roman catholic inquisitors alike excoriated him for his irreverent treatment of deities, heroes, and philosophers. lucian’s cautionary attitude might be equally useful today for anyone confronted with the profusion of courses, books and websites offering help in finding or ‚choosing‛ happiness. why not, he might ask those seeking paths to happiness, much as lycinus advised hermotimus, stop to compare the various approaches to happiness and scrutinize the evidence their sponsors offer? why not probe, also, any vested interest some of the latter may have in enlisting as many followers as possible? i took special pleasure, while writing exploring happiness: from aristotle to brain science, in exploring different lines of study as if i were in the company of individuals engaged in the same pursuits. i would now wish to include lucian among the many that i found helpful in that regard. he might well be fascinated by the rich scientific resources now becoming available for happiness studies, in fields such as psychology, economics, health care, genetics, and the brain sciences. his skeptical questioning of claims about happiness is as needed today as in his time; but i would hope to invite him, in turn, to reach also for that sympathetic understanding of different experiences and perspectives needed to deepen one’s understanding of happiness. in my book, i aimed to bring together the striking new results from research by natural and social scientists with long-standing traditions of reflection by philosophers, religious thinkers, historians, poets, and others about happiness. lucian’s irreverent attitude toward the latter 6 ibid., 127. happiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge bok www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 281 would have served as one more challenge in the effort to draw on both the past and the present, spanning the various disciplines. taken together, these disciplines can contribute to a fuller, deeper understanding of the scope of happiness, even as some among them can challenge and point to shallowness, tunnel vision, or errors in others. examining divergent conceptions of happiness side by side, i suggested, would allow us both to fathom their richness and to weigh the clashing arguments about what contributes to it or detracts from it, how it might be defined and measured, and how it relates to income, say, or to temperament, sociability, marriage, or religious faith. against this background, i wanted to consider perennial moral issues about how we should lead our lives and how we should treat one another. what are the wisest steps to take in the pursuit of happiness? what moral considerations should set limits to such pursuits? what else should matter in human lives aside from happiness? these issues are no different from those debated by the thinkers lucian had studied in athens and met during his peregrinations; but some are now more sharply etched in the light of new information and the advent of modern media: how should we weigh our own happiness against that of others in a world where we are aware, as never before, of extremes of misery and opulence? how might we best take into account what we are learning about the effects of our individual and collective choices on the prospects for the wellbeing of future generations? bypassing such issues makes it all the easier to give short shrift to assumptions that form the subtext to even the most innocuous-seeming views of happiness. these assumptions, familiar in philosophy and political science, concern power—power exerted or defended against, whether in families, communities, or political and religious institutions. often unspoken, these assumptions are about who has the right to pursue his or her own happiness, who does and does not deserve happiness, and whether the happiness of some may require the exclusion or exploitation of others. they resonate in debates over authority and obedience, control and resistance, duties and rights, allegiance and independence. today, conflicts over them are playing out on a far larger stage than ever before, reaching billions of individuals across the globe, their fortunes affected by global economic shifts beyond their control, their hopes fanned by mass media promotion of methods for achieving happiness in daily life or for finding the path to eternal bliss. to refocus attention on the moral dimensions of the pursuit of happiness, i asked, throughout my book, what i call ‚yes but‛ questions in the face of claims that a particular action or personality trait or belief or way of life will bring greater happiness. some of these questions are of an empirical nature, requesting evidence to support the claims or voicing caution in the face of their frequently cheery, upbeat appeal. others are of a moral nature, asking whether it would be right to seek the kind of happiness held out as desirable or to enjoy it, once it was achieved. will pursuing such happiness involve us in deceit? will it require that we break a promise? is it cruel, unjust, exploitative? does it call for us to blind ourselves to needs we would otherwise feel duty-bound to address? stepping back to ask such questions creates space for reflection, for seeking to perceive more fully and to deliberate more attentively in the face of the many conflicting claims about what happiness is and how it should be pursued—precisely the approach that lucian proposed to hermotimes. i likened efforts to achieve such understanding to the journeys undertaken in the myths and folk tales by young persons setting out to seek their fortune. they have no assurance of success, no assurance that happiness is owed to them. they have to traverse unknown regions, encounter seductive lures, take high-stakes risks, sometimes come back empty-handed. they must find the right balance between empathy and resilience—between fellow-feeling and selfhappiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge bok www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 282 protection—as they learn to perceive the humanity and the urgent needs of many a strangelooking creature, while remaining wary of all who claim to know the one and only path to happiness. just as the seekers in myths and folk tales need more than a little luck in order not to emerge empty-handed, so does anyone exploring the role of happiness. even as those seekers benefit from combining sympathetic understanding with a dose of healthy skepticism, so do those who venture into the jungle of claims and counterclaims about happiness, especially when they meet up with conflicting appeals by religious, political, and other authorities to set aside all misgivings and place faith in their dictates. finding the right balance between empathy and resilience matters as much for the study of happiness as for those engaged in its pursuit. resilience, unless it is accompanied by empathy, helps shut out full awareness of the needs of others. a measure of individual resilience is necessary for sheer survival; but people also need empathy to thrive in the company of others, beginning with families. both resilience and empathy are present in rudimentary form early in human life at the neurological level. both can be nurtured, strengthened, or on the contrary neglected, stunted, even completely eroded through misfortune and abuse. and the erosion of one can debilitate the other: those who become more fearful, say after witnessing or enduring violence, can adapt by become less caring, sometimes taking vicarious or active pleasure in maiming and killing—exhibiting a form of what i have called, elsewhere, ‚learned pitilessness.‛7 the more i have had a chance to study the clashing views about happiness and the passionate advocacy the subject can inspire, the more intrigued i have become with the voices of the thinkers who have embarked on a similar study. in listening to them, i have been struck by the difference between persons so sure of their convictions that they block off all dialogue, at times attempt to silence all critics, and those who, like lucian, relish dialogues with friends and adversaries, present and past—and who, in so doing, invite the rest of us to strive to reach beyond our own limited perspectives. author sissela bok harvard university sbok@hsph.harvard.edu publishing timeline received 25 april 2012 accepted 30 april 2012 published 29 august 2012 references plato (1971). ‚phaedo‛ in plato (1971) plato, vol.1:, euthypro, apology, crito, phaedo, phaedrus (h.n. fowler, trans.). loeb classical library, harvard university press. lucian (1961). ‚dialogues of the dead‛, in lucian (1961) lucian: vol. vii (m.d. macleod, trans.). loeb classical library, harvard university press. lucian (2005). ‚hermotimus or on philosophical schools,‛ in lucian (2005) lucian: selected dialogues (c. d. n. costa, trans.). oxford university press. 7 see my mayhem: violence as public entertainment (perseus books, 1998); and ‚violence, free speech, and the media,‛ in perspectives on crime and justice: 1998-1999 lecture series (national institute of justice, 1999), 51-72. happiness studies in ancient greece? a 2nd century skeptic’s challenge bok www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 283 lucian (1915). ‚hermotimes or concerning the sects,‛ in lucian (1915) lucian: vol. v (a. m. harmon, trans.). loeb classical library, harvard university press. lucian (1993). hermotime: ou comment choisir sa philosophie (j-p. dumont, trans.). presses universitaires de france. bok, s. (1998). mayhem: violence as public entertainment. perseus books. bok, s. (1999). ‚violence, free speech, and the media,‛ in national institute of justice (ed.) (1999) perspectives on crime and justice: 1998-1999 lecture series. national institute of justice. bok, s. (2010). exploring happiness: from aristotle to brain science. yale university press. wang, f., tian, c., & qin, w. (2020). the impact of epidemic infectious diseases on the wellbeing of migrant workers: a systematic review. international journal of wellbeing, 10(3), 7-25. doi:10.5502/ijw.v10i3.1301 fei wang case western reserve university, u.s.a. fxw125@case.edu copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 7 the impact of epidemic infectious diseases on the wellbeing of migrant workers: a systematic review fei wang · chao tian · weidi qin abstract: background: the covid-19 outbreak poses challenges to people across the world and puts marginalized populations in an even more precarious position. migrant workers, with their marginal socio-legal status in host countries, are especially vulnerable during the pandemic. the wellbeing of migrant workers, specifically low-wage laborers, is greatly compromised. objectives: this study aims to systematically review the existing literature on how epidemic infectious diseases affect the wellbeing of migrant workers and what are the interventions to improve their wellbeing. method: following the prisma guideline, studies on migrant workers’ wellbeing or interventions to improve wellbeing during five major epidemic infectious diseases (i.e., covid19, sars, ebola, h1n1, mers) were searched. eleven electronic databases were used: cochrane library, who global research covid-19 database, apa psycinfo, cinahl plus, eric, medline, social index, pubmed, proquest, social care online and eppi-mapper. in total, 17 articles that met the criteria were included. an assessment guide was developed to examine the quality of the studies. results: overall, the studies consistently show that major epidemic outbreaks negatively affect the physical, financial, psychological and social wellbeing of migrant workers. migrant workers face a wide range of challenges such as risks of contagion, job insecurity, psychological distress, and discrimination. factors associated with migrant workers’ marginal socio-economic status were attributed to these challenges. several interventions were discussed including increased access to vaccinations, health screening at the border, promotion of hygiene strategies, and financial assistance in medical fees. discussion: the findings highlight the need for a greater public awareness and stronger response to migrant workers’ wellbeing during an epidemic outbreak. implications to practice and research were discussed. this review calls for more open-access data to advance research on migrant workers, and evidence-based interventions with a long-term effect. keywords: migrant worker, wellbeing, intervention, epidemic infectious disease article about:blank epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 8 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org practice implications based on the findings and gaps in the existing studies, the present review provides important implications for practice with and research on migrant workers during epidemic outbreaks. • given that limited interventions regarding psychological wellbeing were identified in the studies, practitioners should focus their efforts in developing and tailoring interventions that can improve the psychological wellbeing of migrant workers during epidemic outbreaks. in view of the difficulty in providing in-person support due to social distancing, new interventions that involve technology should be considered, such as online counseling or online support groups. • practitioners can disseminate evidence-based information on the cause and transmission of the disease using social media, combating rumors and misinformation that could lead to xenophobia against migrant workers. furthermore, through sharing migrant workers’ stories and voices, practitioners can raise the public awareness to migrant workers’ challenges and advocate for migrant-inclusive response measures. • interventions that address the long-term impact of epidemics on migrant workers should be developed. migrant workers face the risks of unemployment and deportation due to economic downturn post-outbreak. governments should register migrant workers to the official unemployment record, conduct a demand and supply analysis in different industries, and relocate migrant workers to the industries where there is a labor shortage. • more evidence-based research is needed to examine the effectiveness of interventions for migrant workers during epidemics. this could be supported by increasing data accessibility. specifically, the international organization for migration can collaborate with research institutes and ngos to develop a migrant worker data sharing platform. the data will not only boost migrant worker research, but also provide evidence for service delivery and policy development in preparation for future epidemics. introduction the outbreak of a new coronavirus (covid-19) has spread internationally since the initial report of cases by the wuhan municipal health commission, china on 31 december 2019 (who, 2020). it was declared a pandemic by the world health organization on march 11th 2020 and has as of june 2020 seen over 5 million confirmed cases and over 356,000 related deaths worldwide (john hopkins university & medicine, 2020). it has become evident that the pandemic will have a long-lasting and substantial influence on people’s wellbeing, far beyond physical health. although there is an increasing body of research on the wellbeing of vulnerable populations in the covid-19 pandemic such as healthcare workers and older adults, little attention has been paid to migrant workers. migrant workers (used interchangeably with “migrants”), are defined as “foreigners admitted by the receiving state for the specific purpose of exercising an economic activity remunerated from within the receiving country” (united nation statistical division, 1998, p.14). the life of migrant workers often consists of multiple layers of precarity as a result of their marginal socio-legal status and labor market position, and limited rights in the host country (baey & yeoh, 2018). during the covid-19 pandemic, this precarity has risen to an unprecedented level. of the 164 million international migrant workers worldwide, 95% reside in the five who regions in which covid-19 cases have been confirmed (liem, wang, wariyanti, latkin, & hall, 2020). some countries (e.g., singapore, india) have seen a surge in covid-19 cases among migrant workers. the wellbeing of migrant workers, specifically unskilled laborers, is greatly epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 9 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org compromised. with the effect of travel bans, many are not able to travel home. they have been stranded at public transit and risk being exposed to the virus (erizanu, 2020). migrant workers who work in essential critical infrastructure (e.g., healthcare, deliveries, and agriculture) continue working through the pandemic, which increases their risk of being infected. in addition, migrant workers in the hardest-hit industries (e.g., tourism, construction, and accommodation and food services) experience financial strain due to possible loss of employment following the pandemic, more so than native-born workers (world bank, 2020). these crises are exacerbated by a series of social factors such as language barriers, limited social contacts, and being unjustly discriminated against for spreading the covid-19 virus (guadagno, 2020), which could trigger negative emotions and ultimately affect mental health. in the wellbeing literature, although there is no consensus around a single definition of wellbeing, a general agreement is that at minimum, wellbeing includes a positive judgment of one’s life, the presence of positive emotions, and the absence of negative emotions (the u.s. centers for disease control and prevention, 2018). in addition, scholars generally acknowledge that wellbeing is a multi-faceted concept, with several important aspects identified across disciplines such as physical, financial, psychological, and social (diener & biswas-diener, 2008; kobau et al., 2013; andrews & withey, 1976; frey & stutzer, 2002). several theories highlight the interrelationships between socioeconomic status, resources, and wellbeing, all of which help explain why migrant workers are particularly vulnerable during the pandemic. hobfoll’s conservative of resource theory (1989) suggests that people strive to retain, protect and build resources in order to maintain their wellbeing. however, because resources are not distributed equally across different socioeconomic statuses, those with a low socioeconomic status are most vulnerable to a depletion of resources (hobfoll, 1989). furthermore, they are more likely to be caught in loss spirals because they lack resources to prevent the further loss of other resources (menaghan, 1983). fisher (2019) expanded on hobfoll’s idea and developed the public wellbeing theory. he suggests that well-being is largely dependent on the objective nature of the situation as well as people’s subjective evaluation. therefore, the inequalities in well-being are both shaped by the social conditions people are exposed to, specifically by differences in socioeconomic status, and negative evaluations people receive from the society (fisher, 2019). for migrant workers, their vulnerability lies in low socio-economic status and disproportionate exposure to social discrimination. during this pandemic, the existing social inequities have been exacerbated, leaving them with limited resources or no resources to meet the challenges and maintain their well-being. study objectives despite seemingly apparent anecdotal evidence as to the negative impact on migrant workers’ well-being, few studies, if any, have examined this impact. this study aims to fill the research gap by addressing the following questions: 1. what are the impacts of major epidemic infectious diseases on migrant workers’ wellbeing? 2. what community and population-level interventions have been taken to improve the well-being of migrant workers following an epidemic outbreak? methods a systematic review was conducted to address the research questions above. to the best of our knowledge, there are no prior systematic reviews specifically focus on migrant workers during the covid-19 pandemic. reviews that included the previous epidemic outbreaks are epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 10 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org minimal (wilson et al., 2018). the sweeping impact of covid-19 calls for an urgent response. a systematic review is an efficient approach to synthesize available research evidence and deliver it to healthcare providers, researchers, policymakers, and the general public. furthermore, by critically examining existing interventions, this review will help inform new interventions to meet the challenges posed by the current pandemic as well as epidemics in the future. type of study the inclusion criteria for study types were intervention study, observational studies using cross-sectional or longitudinal designs, mixed-methods studies, qualitative studies, descriptive, correlational studies or case studies, theoretical or position paper, editorial, commentary, systematic reviews, and practice guideline. anecdotal accounts and news articles were excluded. study subjects the subjects for the review were unskilled migrant workers – a group which is especially vulnerable during epidemics due to low socioeconomic status and limited resources. we adopted the un definition of migrant workers (see introduction; united nation statistical division, 1998). we also included internal migrant workers people who move within their own country of residence for the purpose of employment (international organization for migration, 2005). this inclusion is justified by the significant number of internal migrant workers across the world (international organization for migration, 2020). like international migrant workers, internal migrant workers also experience the challenges such as discrimination and difficulties in integration (jane, 2016; qiu, 2011). search strategy the following 11 electronic databases were used to search literature: cochrane library, who global research covid19 database, apa psycinfo, cinahl plus, eric, medline, social index, pubmed, proquest, social care online and eppi-mapper. articles were searched from 2000 to 2020. the rationale for the time range is that it includes the major epidemic infectious diseases in the 21st century. these diseases are middle east respiratory syndrome (mers), influenza a virus subtype h1n1 (h1n1), severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars), ebola virus disease, and coronavirus disease 2019 (covid-19). because the review focuses on emerging infectious diseases, that is, one that appears for the first time in a population or rapidly increases in incidence or geographic range (world health organization, 2014), studies looking at seasonal influenza were excluded. the search string used for the database was: (migrant workers or foreign workers or internal migrant workers or domestic helpers) and/or (interventions) and (psychological or physical or economic or social) and (covid-19 or sars or ebola or h1n1 or mers) the search string was conducted in the field of title and abstract and was consistent across the databases. anecdotal accounts or news articles resulting from the searches were filtered out in the databases. data management all identified citations were imported to mendeley, a bibliographic reference management tool, and de-duplicated. a table was created as a data extraction form to record 4 parts: study epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 11 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org information, initial screening, eligibility decisions and quality assessment (see appendix i). the de-duplicated citations in mendeley were imported to the data extraction form for coding. selection of studies two coders screened the titles and abstracts of articles for initial screening and completed the data extraction form independently. articles about unskilled migrant workers and major epidemic infectious diseases were included for the full-text review. a study was also included for full-text review if its title and abstract were insufficient to determine its inclusion. disagreements on initial screening were resolved by a third coder. after initial screening, two coders reviewed the full-text of the articles independently to determine their eligibility. an article is considered eligible if it is about (1) the wellbeing of migrant workers or (2) the interventions to improve the wellbeing of migrant workers. disagreements on eligibility decisions were resolved by a third coder. final decision on eligibility and reasons for exclusion of studies were documented on the data extraction form. assessment of quality after identifying the eligible studies, the coders further assessed the quality of these studies using a checklist (see appendix ii) adapted from joanna briggs institute checklist for prevalence studies and qualitative studies (joanna briggs institute, 2017). the checklist comprised 9 items such as use of clearly defined participants, scientifically valid sampling technique, and the scope of wellbeing and interventions discussed. two coders independently rated the items in the checklist, and marked as yes (1), no (0), or “uncertain” on the assessment form. any items marked as “uncertain” were rated by the third coder. studies scoring 1-3 were defined as low quality, 4-6 as medium quality, and 7-9 as high quality. studies were not excluded on the basis of their quality score to increase transparency and to ensure all available evidence in this area was reported. results the study selection process and reasons for exclusion followed the preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analysis (prisma), as illustrated in figure 1. epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 12 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org the impact of epidemic infectious diseases on the well-being of migrant workers figure 1. preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analysis (prisma) flow diagram. records identified through cochrane library (31), who global research covid19 database (13), search across multiple databases (apa psycinfo, cinahl plus, eric, medline, social index; 18), pubmed (27), proquest (988), social care online (309) and eppi-mapper (162) total (n = 1548) records excluded (n = 1460) with reasons: not about migrant workers (n = 756) not about the major epidemic/pandemic infectious diseases (i.e. mers, sars, h1n1, ebola and covid-19) (n = 704) full-text articles assessed for eligibility (n = 60) studies included in the systematic review (n = 17) full-text articles excluded (n = 43) reasons for exclusion: not about the well-being of migrant workers or the intervention to improve the well-being of migrant workers (n = 43) id e n ti fi ca ti o n records screened (n = 1520) s cr e e n in g e li g ib il it y in cl u d e d records after duplicates removed (n = 1520) epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 13 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org in total, 1548 studies were identified through database searching; 17 studies met the inclusion criteria and were further analyzed for the present review. the characteristics and main findings of these studies are presented in table 1. table 1. study characteristics and main findings author (year) & study type target populati on & country epidemic types type of wellbeing discussed interventions summary of findings quality of study1 the lancet (2020) commentary migrants & refugees global covid-19 physical physical ● challenges in accessing essential supplies and medical care due to migratory status 2 bhopal (2020) commentary migrants u.k. covid-19 physical social physical ● difficulty applying precautions due to poor living environment ● limited access to healthcare services due to migratory status social ● lack of trust in the government and employer ● lack of legal rights ● cultural and language barriers in understanding public health information ● high risk of becoming victims of social discrimination 2 lin et al. (2015) commentary migrant workers china ebola social yes social ● racial discrimination and stigma against african migrant workers who lived in china during the ebola outbreak interventions ● temperature monitoring ● immigration border health screening ● location tracing 3 rothstein & coughlin (2019) commentary migrants u.s. infectious diseases (e.g. sars) physical social physical ● limited access to healthcare services due to migratory status social ● lack of trust in the government and employer ● fear of being arrested or deported if work with healthcare authority ● fear of being separated from their families during quarantine 6 1 the quality of the studies is measured using an 9-item checklist adapted from joanna briggs institute checklist for prevalence studies and qualitative studies (joanna briggs institute, 2017). studies scoring 1-3 are defined as low quality, 4-6 as medium quality, and 7-9 as high quality. epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 14 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org macpherson et al. (2007) commentary migrants global infectious diseases (e,g. sars) physical yes physical ● migrants face challenges in accessing healthcare services due to a lack of integrated migration and health policies. intervention ● collaboration between neighboring countries at the border; health screening at the border 6 5 steege et al. (2019) commentary migrant workers u.s. influenza (e.g. h1n1) physical social psychologi cal financial yes physical ● poor living environment, difficulty complying with social distancing and precautionary measures social ● limited access to public health information due to cultural/language barriers and low literacy psychological ● stress caused by social, employment, and financial status during the epidemic financial & physical ● concerned about jobs over health ● limited use of healthcare services due to financial difficulties ● limited access to television, radio, telephones, and the internet for information intervention ● increase migrant workers’ access to vaccinations 7 hickey et al. (2014). quantitative study migrants thailand h1n1 social physical yes social ● migrant workers do not have proper attitude to the precautions due to cultural and linguistic barriers intervention ● non-pharmaceutical interventions (npis) such as personal hygiene, cough etiquette, social distancing, and border measures 7 hutchins et al. (2009) commentary migrant workers u.s. influenza (e.g. h1n1) physical social financial yes physical ● poor living environment, ● lack of access to healthcare service due to their migratory status social ● poor awareness to public health information due to cultural/language barriers financial ● worry about losing jobs rather than being infected with the disease intervention ● a multi-agency intervention model 6 kluge et al. (2009) commentary migrant workers global covid-19 physical social financial physical ● crowded living environment, difficulty complying with social distancing and precautionary measures 4 epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 15 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org social ● limited awareness to public health information in the host country due to cultural/language barriers financial & physical ● worry about being unemployed and losing income ● limited use of healthcare services due to financial difficulties biao (2003) qualitative study migrant workers china sars social financial physical yes social ● lack of trust in the government and employer ● virus outbreak led to mass mobilization of migrant workers, which increased the spread of the virus financial & physical ● migrant workers were less concerned about their health, more concerned about their job due to their unstable employment status ● continue working during the outbreak in order to support the family and pay off collateral loan intervention ● a multi-agency intervention model 9 schochspana et al. (2010) qualitative study migrant workers mexico h1n1 physical social financial physical ● high rates of pre-existing medical conditions ● poor living conditions lead to difficulty taking precautions social ● limited access to public health information due to cultural/language barriers and low literacy ● lack of social support ● fear of being deported ● social discrimination and stigmatization financial & physical ● worry about being unemployed ● limited use of healthcare services due to financial difficulties 7 onoma (2017) commentary migrants senegal ebola social social ● racial discrimination and stigmatization 3 liem et al. (2020) commentary migrant workers global covid-19 psychologi cal social psychological ● migrant workers suffer from mental health issues (e.g., depression) due to their limited social resources social • stigmatization • limited access to public health information and are easily affected by misinformation due to cultural/language barriers and low literacy 4 epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 16 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org ding (2014) theoretical paper migrant workers china & north america sars & h1n1 physical financial psychologi cal yes physical ● poor living conditions result in difficulty in practicing precautions financial & physical ● worry about being losing jobs ● limited use of healthcare services due to financial difficulties psychological ● stress and anxiety during the epidemic outbreaks due to uncertainty about the future interventions • quarantine • a multi-agency intervention model • special government fund for migrant workers with sars • employers were required to continue paying wages to workers even though their work was suspended during the outbreak 7 daniels (2020) commentary migrants venezuel a covid-19 physical social yes physical ● lack of food and medical supplies ● limited access to healthcare services due to migratory status social ● social discrimination and stigmatization interventions • quarantine • border control • cross border permission for migrant workers who need ongoing treatment in the host country 4 picum (2020) commentary migrants europe covid 19 physical social financial physical ● limited access to healthcare services due to migratory status social ● limited social support financial ● worry about losing jobs 5 overall, a majority of the studies adopted a global perspective (n = 4) whereas others were conducted across a wide range of countries and regions, including the u.s. (n = 3), china (n = 3), europe (n = 2), the u.k. (n = 1), mexico (n = 1), senegal (n = 1), venezuela (n = 1) and thailand (n = 1). the studies are mostly commentaries while only a few are empirical studies (n = 4). with regards to the disease type, the majority of the studies focused on covid-19 (n= 7), followed by sars (n = 4) and h1n1 (n = 4), and ebola (n = 2). the overall quality of the studies is medium, with an average score of 5.06. compared to studies on other epidemics, covid-19 related articles are of lower quality (covid-19 = 3.71; other epidemics = 6). 1. wellbeing overall, all 17 studies discussed the negative impact of epidemic infectious diseases on the wellbeing of migrant workers. while the majority of the studies focus on physical, social and financial wellbeing, only a few studies have examined psychological wellbeing. nonetheless, the epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 17 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org negative impact of epidemics is consistently described across studies focusing on different aspects of wellbeing. physical wellbeing twelve studies focused on migrant workers’ physical wellbeing. manual laborers who live in crowded environments are most vulnerable to diseases due to difficulty complying with social distancing and precautionary measures (ding, 2014; steege, baron, davis, torres-kilgore, & sweeney, 2019; bhopal, 2020; hutchins, truman, merlin, & redd, 2009; kluge, jakab, bartovic, danna, & severoni, 2009; schoch-spana, bouri, rambhia, & norwood, 2010; eupha, 2020). in addition, studies show that migrant workers do not have full-access to healthcare services due to their migratory status (daniels, 2020; bhopal, 2020; rothstein & coughlin, 2019; picum, 2020; hutchins et al., 2009; the lancet, 2020; macpherson, gushulak, & macdonald, 2007). social wellbeing fourteen articles focused on social wellbeing. migrant workers received limited social support during epidemics (picum, 2020; schoch-spana et al., 2010). also, migrant workers’ lack of trust in their employers and the government could hinder them from seeking help from either party (bhopal, 2020; rothstein & coughlin, 2019; biao, 2003; eupha, 2020). furthermore, social discrimination and cultural stigma targeting migrant workers could create barriers for them to access resources during epidemic outbreaks (lin, hall, khoe, & bodomo, 2015; liem et al., 2020; daniels, 2020; bhopal, 2020; schoch-spana et al., 2010; onoma, 2017). in addition, migrant workers may be easily affected by misinformation about diseases due to language and cultural barriers in the host country (liem et al., 2020). furthermore, linguistic barriers in understanding public health information could result in poor awareness to disease control regulations (steege et al., 2019; kluge et al., 2020; hickey, gagnon, & jitthai, 2014; bhopal, 2020; hutchins et al., 2009; eupha, 2020). financial wellbeing seven studies found that epidemic outbreaks cause economic disruptions, creating a financial burden on migrant workers. migrant workers often limit their use of healthcare services when they are sick due to financial difficulties (ding, 2014; steege et al., 2019; kluge et al., 2020; schochspana et al; 2010). during an outbreak, migrant workers were concerned about their jobs over health (biao, 2003; steege et al., 2019; hutchins et al., 2019; kluge et al., 2020; schoch-spana et al; 2010; ding, 2014; picum, 2020). many chose to continue working in order to support their families or pay off collateral loans (biao, 2003). psychological wellbeing only 4 articles discussed the psychological wellbeing of migrant workers. studies show that migrant workers suffer from stress, depression and anxiety during an epidemic outbreak, given a wide range of challenges they face such as limited access to proper medical treatment, unemployment, and uncertainty about the future (steege et al., 2019; liem et al., 2020; ding, 2014). in addition, undocumented migrant workers live in constant fear of being deported if they work with healthcare authority (rothstein & coughlin, 2019). they also worry about being separated from their families in the host country during quarantine (rothstein & coughlin , 2019). 2. intervention eight studies discussed interventions to improve the physical or financial wellbeing of migrant workers. no interventions regarding psychological or social wellbeing were identified in these studies. epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 18 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org the measures to promote physical wellbeing include quarantine, increased access to vaccinations, health screenings at the border, and promotion of hygiene strategies (daniels, 2020; hickey et al., 2014; steege et al., 2019; lin et al., 2015; macpherson et al., 2007). of these interventions, only one is covid-19 related (daniels, 2020) whereas others are about sars, h1n1 or ebola. furthermore, the covid-19 study focuses on specific strategies such as strengthening border control but allowing migrant workers who need ongoing medical attention (e.g. dialysis) to continue their treatment in their host country (daniels, 2020). compared to this covid-19 study, studies on other epidemics identified interventions that are more systematic. for example, studies on sars (biao, 2003; ding, 2014) and h1n1 (ding, 2014; hutchins et al., 2014) introduced a multi-agency intervention framework, which details the responsibilities of disease control in government organizations, healthcare institutions, public transportation, and employers of migrant workers. only one study has discussed the interventions to address the financial issue of migrant workers. in view of migrant workers’ unstable financial status and possible income loss during the sars outbreak, special government funds were set up in china to pay for migrant workers’ treatment fee (ding, 2014). in addition to this, employers were required to continue paying wages to migrant workers even though work had been suspended during the outbreak (ding, 2014). discussion this study represents one of the first to review the impact of major epidemics (including the covid-19 pandemic) on the wellbeing of unskilled migrant workers. overall, our findings consistently show that epidemic diseases have a negative impact on migrant workers, creating health risks, job insecurity, distress, and social discrimination. these findings are in line with an existing systematic review on migrants and refugees (wilson et al., 2018). in discussing the wellbeing of migrant workers, the majority of the studies have taken different social factors into account (e.g., living condition, migratory status, linguistic and cultural barriers), which further elaborate on the wellbeing theories about how pre-existing socio-structural inequity affects one’s wellbeing. our findings reviewed and analyzed migrant workers’ experiences during epidemic outbreaks in 13 countries/regions. each country/region has its own socio-demographics, disease situations, and social policies that could uniquely contribute to migrant workers’ experiences. therefore, cautions should be taken when interpreting these findings. nonetheless, the negative impact of epidemics on migrant workers’ wellbeing found across different countries suggests a global challenge that requires action from countries across the world. despite the consistent findings across the studies, several research gaps are identified. compared to studies on physical, financial and social aspects of wellbeing, studies examining psychological wellbeing were limited. the multi-faceted nature of wellbeing suggests that each aspect of wellbeing has different impacts on an individual and each aspect interacts with the other (kiefer, 2008). limiting the discussion on psychological wellbeing will not only provide a biased view of migrant workers’ experiences, but also underestimate its impact on migrant workers, such as their physical health and social engagement. fewer studies have focused on interventions. furthermore, these studies mainly discussed interventions with an immediate effect (e.g., health screening and vaccination) while ignoring the approaches to assist migrant workers in the long run. one of the major issues that may have a long-lasting effect on migrant workers is unemployment. research on disasters and natural hazards shows that economic downturn often occurs following an epidemic outbreak. an epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 19 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org epidemic outbreak decreases people’s demand for services due to fear of contagion, leading to closed businesses and loss of job in most sectors (e.g., retail, travel, insurance; lee & mckibbin, 2004). it is expected that the covid-19 pandemic will wipe out equivalent to 195 million fulltime workers globally in the second quarter of 2020 (international labour organization, 2020). migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to job loss due to their lack of social protection and citizenship entitlements, and the temporary nature of their jobs (berntsen, 2016). many migrant workers are the main breadwinners of their families and have been sending remittances home. being jobless will create greater financial hardship for their families. further, because migrants’ rights to residence are tied to their employers, losing their jobs renders them vulnerable to deportation (banki, 2013). currently, there is a lack of official unemployment record for migrant workers across the countries. the most useful statistics available was reported by international labour organization (2020), which estimated that the relative poverty rate for informal workers (i.e., no employer’s contribution to social security, no paid sick leave or annual leave) and their families will increase by 34% globally due to the pandemic. therefore, what migrant workers need is not only healthcare interventions to survive the disease, but assistance to survive in the labor market post-pandemic. the effectiveness of the interventions was largely unknown in these studies. as one of the guiding principles in the cdc field epidemiologic manual (hadler, varma, vugia, & goodman, 2018), developing evidence-based interventions helps to determine the feasibility of implementing an intervention in the population and provides evidence to improve the response to future outbreaks. the current pandemic has demonstrated its sweeping impact in the world through its unpredictable nature of outbursts, the rapid spread of the virus, and the large number of people affected. using the components of the existing evidence-based interventions could improve the efficiency of the response to such a pandemic in the future. in addition to the research gaps, some methodological limitations were identified in these studies. only a few empirical studies were found on this subject, possibly due to the limited open-access data and pressure of time following an epidemic outbreak (hadler et al., 2018). among the empirical research, the majority utilized non-probability sampling, rendering the study subject to self-selection bias. one exception was hickey et al (2014)’s study, which used random sampling to strengthen the external validity. in addition, there is a limitation associated with cross-sectional design employed by the quantitative study (hickey et al., 2014) because the temporal precedence between the variables was unclear and no causal links can be drawn from the study. the research gaps and methodological limitations are also reflected in the quality assessment of this review as the majority of the studies were rated as medium quality. implication to practice and research the substantial findings relating to the physical wellbeing of migrant workers reinforce the need for a universal health coverage during healthcare emergencies. as outlined in the sustainable development goals (who, 2017), a universal health coverage includes benefits such as access to essential healthcare services and affordable medicines and vaccines. these benefits are crucial to migrant workers, considering the health disparities they experience in the host country. the lack of long-term intervention in the studies calls for an approach that looks beyond an episode of disease and addresses its long-lasting impact on the society. as the covid-19 pandemic persists, the issue of unemployment will continue to be a major challenge for migrant workers. the traditional approach is to deport migrant workers to their home countries. this not only deprives them of means of living, but also creates labor shortages once the economy epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 20 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org starts to recover in the host country, especially in essential critical infrastructure. one possible solution is to register migrant workers in the government's unemployment record, conduct a demand and supply analysis, and relocate migrant workers to the industries where there is a labor shortage. in addition, the findings suggest that the psychological needs of migrant workers have been overlooked during the epidemics. it is important for practitioners (e.g. social workers, counselors) to step in. given the difficulty of providing in-person support due to social distancing, new interventions that involve technology should be considered. for example, with the “cyber social work” strategy, the singapore government has set up computers in migrant workers’ dormitories for them to attend counseling sessions. migrant workers can also use the computer to obtain covid-19 information through an online translation portal. in view of the increasing discrimination against the migrant workers amid the epidemics, practitioners can disseminate evidence-based information on the cause and transmission of the disease using social media, combating rumors and misinformation. furthermore, through sharing migrant workers’ stories and voices during an epidemic outbreak, practitioners can raise the public awareness to migrant workers’ challenges and advocate for migrant-inclusive response measures. in terms of research implications, more evidence-based research is needed to examine migrant workers’ wellbeing during epidemic outbreaks. for example, quantitative research can be conducted to compare the mental health outcomes between migrant workers and nonmigrant workers in the same country. using a longitudinal study design, researchers can follow up with migrant workers post-outbreak to understand how their wellbeing is affected in the long run. also, in order to gain a better insight into the effectiveness of an intervention, researchers can examine the changes in the wellbeing of migrant workers pre-and postintervention. these research agendas can be better achieved with more open-access data. specifically, an international data sharing platform designated to migrant worker research could be established. currently, there are several covid-19 open data sharing portals (e.g., figshare, crowdfight covid-19). building upon the existing efforts, the international organization for migration can collaborate with research institutes and ngos to develop an international migrant worker data sharing network. the data will not only boost migrant worker research, but also provide evidence for service delivery and policy development in preparation for future epidemics. authors fei wang case western reserve university, u.s.a. fxw125@case.edu chao tian ng teng fong general hospital, singapore weidi qin case western reserve university, u.s.a. publishing timeline received 15 june 2020 accepted 21 july 2020 published 13 august 2020 epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 21 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org references andrews, f. m., & withey, s. b. 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(2020). refugee and migrant health in the covid-19 response. the lancet, 395(10232), 1237–1239. doi: 10.1016/s0140-6736(20)30791-1 kobau, r., bann, c., lewis, m., zack, m. m., boardman, a. m., boyd, r., lim, k. c., holder, t., hoff, a. k., luncheon, c., thompson, w., horner-johnson, w., & lucas, r. e. (2013). mental, social, and physical well-being in new hampshire, oregon, and washington, 2010 behavioral risk factor surveillance system: implications for public health research and practice related to healthy people 2020 foundation health measures on well-being. population health metrics, 11(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.1186/1478-7954-11-19 lee, j. w., & mckibbin, w. j. (2004). estimating the global economic costs of sars. in learning from sars: preparing for the next disease outbreak: workshop summary (p. 92). washington, dc: national academies press. liem, a., wang, c., wariyanti, y., latkin, c. a., & hall, b. j. (2020). the neglected health of international migrant workers in the covid-19 epidemic. the lancet psychiatry, 7(4). https://doi.org/10.1016/s2215-0366(20)30076-6 lin, l., hall, b. j., khoe, l. c., & bodomo, a. b. (2015). ebola outbreak: from the perspective of african migrants in china. american journal of public health, 105(5), 5. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2015.302649 macpherson, d. w., gushulak, b. d., & macdonald, l. (2007). health and foreign policy: influences of migration and population mobility. bulletin of the world health organization, 85(3), 200–206. https://doi.org/10.2471/blt.06.036962 menaghan, e. g, (1983). individual coping efforts: moderators of the relationship between life stress and mental health outcomes. in h. b. kaplan (ed.), psychosocial stress: trends in theory and research (pp.157-191). new york: academic press. onoma, a. k. (2017). the making of dangerous communities: the “peul-fouta” in ebola-weary senegal. africa spectrum, 52(2), 29–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971705200202 picum. (platform for international cooperation on undocumented migrants; 2020). the covid-19 pandemic: we need urgent measures to protect people and mend the cracks in our health, social protection and migration systems. https://picum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/covid-19statement-march-2020.pdf qiu, p., caine, e., yang, y., chen, q., li, j., & ma, x. (2011). depression and associated factors in internal migrant workers in china. journal of affective disorders, 134(1-3), 198–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2011.05.043 rothstein, m. a., & coughlin, c. n. (2019). ensuring compliance with quarantine by undocumented immigrants and other vulnerable groups: public health versus politics. american journal of public health, 109(9), 1179–1183. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2019.305201 schoch-spana, m., bouri, n., rambhia, k. j., & norwood, a. (2010). stigma, health disparities, and the 2009 h1n1 influenza pandemic: how to protect latino farmworkers in future health emergencies. biosecurity and bioterrorism, 8(3), 243–254. https://doi.org/10.1089/bsp.2010.0021 steege, a. l., baron, s., davis, s., torres-kilgore, j., & sweeney, m. h. (2009). pandemic influenza and farmworkers: the effects of employment, social, and economic factors. american journal of public health, 99(suppl. 2), 308–316. https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2009.161091 https://www.iom.int/wmr https://joannabriggs.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/jbi_critical_appraisal-checklist_for_prevalence_studies2017_0.pdf https://joannabriggs.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/jbi_critical_appraisal-checklist_for_prevalence_studies2017_0.pdf https://joannabriggs.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/jbi_critical_appraisal-checklist_for_qualitative_research2017_0.pdf https://joannabriggs.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/jbi_critical_appraisal-checklist_for_qualitative_research2017_0.pdf https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map https://doi.org/10.1016/s2215-0366(20)30076-6 https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2015.302649 https://doi.org/10.2471/blt.06.036962 https://doi.org/10.1177/000203971705200202 https://picum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/covid-19-statement-march-2020.pdf https://picum.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/covid-19-statement-march-2020.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2011.05.043 https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2019.305201 https://doi.org/10.1089/bsp.2010.0021 https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2009.161091 epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 23 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org the lancet. (2020). covid-19 will not leave behind refugees and migrants. the lancet, 395(10230), 1090. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0140-6736(20)30758-3 the u.s. centers for disease control and prevention. (2018). the well-being concepts. https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/wellbeing.htm united nations statistics division. (1998). recommendations on statistics of international migration, revision 1. united nations. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_58rev1e.pdf wilson, l., rubens-augustson, t., murphy, m., jardine, c., crowcroft, n., hui, c., & wilson, k. (2018). barriers to immunization among newcomers: a systematic review. vaccine, 36(8), 1055–1062. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2018.01.025 world bank (2020). covid-19 crisis through a migration lens. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/989721587512418006/pdf/covid-19-crisisthrough-a-migration-lens.pdf world health organization. (2014). a brief guide to emerging infectious diseases and zoonoses. who regional office for south-east asia. https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/204722 world health organization. (2017). sustainable development goals 3: ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages. https://www.who.int/sdg/targets/en/ world health organization. (2020). who timeline covid-19. https://www.who.int/newsroom/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19 https://www.cdc.gov/hrqol/wellbeing.htm https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_58rev1e.pdf https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2018.01.025 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/989721587512418006/pdf/covid-19-crisis-through-a-migration-lens.pdf http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/989721587512418006/pdf/covid-19-crisis-through-a-migration-lens.pdf https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/204722 https://www.who.int/sdg/targets/en/ https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19 https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline---covid-19 epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 24 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org appendix i data extraction form for screening part a: study information part b: initial screening part c: eligibility decisions part d: assessment of study quality a1. ref id a2. title and author (s) a3. date of extraction a4. type of study [1] intervention [2] observational (quantitative): cross-sectional, longitudinal [3] mixed method [4] qualitative [5] descriptive, correlational or case studies [6] theoretical or position paper, editorial or commentary [7] systematic review on the wellbeing of migrant workers or related interventions during the major epidemic infectious diseases (stop, code as harvest on c1) [8] practice guideline [if can't tell, retrieve full text] b1. is this paper about migrant workers/foreign workers/internal migrant workers/domestic helpers? [1] yes [2] no (stop, code as excluded on c1) [if can't tell, retrieve full text] b2. is this paper about the epidemic infectious diseases during the past 20 years [i.e. covid19, sars, h1n1, mers, ebola]? [1] yes [2] no (stop, code as excluded on c1) [if can't tell, retrieve full text] c1. is this paper about the wellbeing of migrant workers, or the intervention to improve the wellbeing of migrant workers? [1] yes [2] no (stop, code as excluded on c1) c2. paper status: [1] excluded [2] included [3] harvest [4] full text n/a c3. if excluded, what was the reason? list the question number that determines the study should be excluded [choose from part b or c] d1. overall score of the study epidemic infectious diseases and well-being of migrant workers wang, tian, & qin 25 www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org appendix ii guideline for assessing the quality of the included studies reviewer: date: author: year: ref no. 1. were study participants sampled in an appropriate way? (yes/no/uncertain) 2. were the study subjects clearly defined for the coder to identify their eligibility of the current review? (yes/no/uncertain) 3. did all study subjects meet the eligibility of the current review (e.g. all unskilled migrant workers versus a combination of unskilled and skilled professionals) (yes/no/uncertain) 4. was there appropriate statistical analysis? (yes/no/uncertain) 5. was the study about the well-being of migrant workers and intervention for improving the well-being? (yes/no/uncertain) 6. did the study discuss more than one aspect of well-being of migrant workers? (yes/no/uncertain) 7. did the study propose specific steps or protocol for the intervention? (yes/no/uncertain) 8. did the study assess the effectiveness of the intervention? (yes/no/uncertain) 9. did the study discuss the implication of the intervention for future epidemic infectious diseases? (yes/no/uncertain) total score _____ *yes = 1 no = 0 uncertain: the third reviewer to review and then give a score quality (low/medium/high) *low 0 – 3 medium 4 – 6 high 7 – 9 a new and improved whole life satisfaction account of happiness morse, j. l., o’donnell, m. b., walberg, a. r., & dik, b. j. (2019). meaning interventions in schools: strategies for supporting healthy development and wellbeing in the lives of youth. international journal of wellbeing, 9(4), 43-58. doi:10.5502/ijw.v9i4.983 jessica l. morse colorado state university jessica.morse@colostate.edu copyright belongs to the author(s) 43 article meaning interventions in schools: strategies for supporting healthy development and wellbeing in the lives of youth jessica l. morse · maeve b. o’donnell · arissa r. walberg · bryan j. dik abstract: human beings inherently make meaning of the world, interpreting themselves in context and utilizing these representations to determine what to think, how to feel, and in what way to act. developing meaning in life appears to be a highly nuanced, personal journey and yet, research suggests that those who experience their lives as meaningful enjoy multiple physical and psychological benefits and are protected from various health risks. beyond establishing a firm sense that life is meaningful, studies suggest that people of all ages who can ‘make meaning’ of their experiences, especially difficult experiences, may be protected from developing some mental and physical health concerns. childhood and adolescence may be pivotal periods for the development of this well-being resource, and school offers an especially promising context for fostering meaning. yet, there have been few articles that have explored how meaning and meaning-making can be woven into the school day. the current article attempts to address this gap in the literature by defining meaning and meaning-making, discussing the relevance of meaning from a developmental framework, and offering suggestions for applications for teachers and providers during the school day. keywords: meaning in life, health, eudaimonic wellbeing, positive psychology introduction schools provide opportunities for students to acquire knowledge, develop effective thinking skills, problem-solve, and build relationships with peers, teachers, and mentors. yet when parents are asked to consider what is most important for a child’s future, they often provide answers beyond critical-thinking and analytical skills, knowledge, and relationships. they want their children’s lives to be healthy, happy, and meaningful (seligman et al., 2009). in this vein, positive psychology urges a “more open and appreciative perspective regarding human potential, motives, and capacities” (sheldon & king, 2001, p. 216). school may provide an ideal context for engaging students in activities that leverage their strengths to promote personal growth and well-being, yet few empirical studies or theoretical papers have provided specific recommendations about how this can be accomplished during the school day. this paper addresses this gap in the literature by describing the importance of meaning across meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 44 development, highlighting school as an important context for meaning, and providing recommendations for actionable strategies for fostering meaning in school settings. meaning in life and well-being meaning in life is considered to reflect an individual’s subjective, global sense about the nature of her or his existence. people have a sense that life is meaningful when they experience purpose, significance, and coherence (steger, frazier, oishi, kaler, 2006; steger & martela, 2016). purpose refers to an overarching, personally relevant aim for one’s life, significance is the sense that one’s life matters, and coherence refers to one’s understanding of what one’s life means (steger, 2009). meaning is thus defined as the degree to which people make sense of how they fit in the world, perceive their life as having an overarching mission or goal, and feel as though their life, or contributions, matter (steger, 2009). scholars typically distinguish between search for meaning, defined as the extent to which people are looking for meaning, and presence of meaning, or the extent to which people’s lives feel meaningful (steger et al., 2006). whereas presence of meaning is widely accepted as a key indicator of psychological health, search for meaning in the absence of experiencing meaning has been associated with increased risk for mental health concerns and impaired well-being (steger et al., 2006). meaning has often been considered a facet of well-being, and yet, teasing apart contributing factors to well-being can often prove difficult. one example is the relationship between meaning and happiness. although meaning and happiness are often paired as facets of well-being, there are conceptual differences between them. whereas meaning has primarily been conceptualized from a eudaimonic perspective, happiness has largely been considered hedonic in nature (ryan & deci, 2001). the hedonic tradition targets the pursuit of sensation and pleasure while eudaimonic perspectives focus on living consistently with the true self, with less emphasis on subjective well-being (ryan & deci, 2001). happiness has been defined in multiple ways—from a fleeting emotional state to feelings of accomplishment—and as a subjective judgment by which people assess their quality of life favorably (veenhoven, 1991; delle fave, brdar, freire, vella-brodrick, & wissing, 2011). positive emotions and life satisfaction have dominated the hedonic tradition (diener et al., 1985; diener, 2000; pavot & diener, 2008). seligman and colleagues suggest that happiness per se should not be the target of intervention due to its fleeting nature, but rather pleasure, engagement, and meaning are sustainable pathways to more frequent experiences of happiness (seligman, 2004; peterson & seligman, 2004). indeed, engagement and meaning account for the majority of variance in predicting happiness (peterson et al., 2005; vella-brodrick et al., 2009; gander, proyer, & ruch, 2016; but see kashdan, biswas-diener & king, 2008, and king, hicks, krull, & del-gaiso, 2006, for an alternative perspective). although happiness and meaning are related, focusing on meaning and meaning-related activities may provide benefit beyond exclusively targeting happiness, subjective well-being, or pleasantness. experiencing meaning in life is associated with several facets of psychological wellbeing and physical health. for example, meaning is linked to positive affect (coffey, wraylake, mashek, & branand, 2014), self-acceptance (steger, kashdan, sullivan, & lorentz, 2008), motivation (bailey & phillips, 2016), and relatedness (coffey et al., 2014). meaning also predicts improved physical health and longevity (roepke, jayawickreme, & riffle, 2014), which is meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 45 partially explained by engagement in health-promoting behaviors and avoidance of healthrisking behaviors (e.g., brassai, piko, & steger, 2011). thus, people who experience their lives as meaningful tend also to report high levels of psychological well-being and physical health. people who have a steady sense that life is meaningful may also cope more effectively with stressful life events. when individuals’ global sense that life is meaningful is discrepant from their appraised meaning of a stressful situation, they tend to engage in meaning-making processes focused on resolving the discrepancy (park, 2010). these processes are varied and nuanced, but they include cognitive and emotional processing of the event motivated by a desire to make sense of it. as a result of this meaning-making process, a person may feel like they have made sense of the situation: accepting it, growing from it, experiencing an identify shift, changing their beliefs about the world, and/or restoring their sense of meaning in life. as a hypothetical example, consider jared, a 15 year-old high school sophomore who experiences the sudden death of his father in a car accident. because jared believed the world was stable and predictable, the meaning of this highly stressful event could be highly discrepant with his global meaning framework. according to park’s (2010) meaning-making model, jared would engage in processes to understand and make meaning of the tragic loss. jared may eventually accept his father’s death, and even perceive it as an opportunity for growth (“this means that i have to step up and help care for my siblings”). alternatively, he may change his global beliefs (“the world is harsh and cruel") in ways that negatively impact his well-being. this model provides a framework from which to understand diverse experiences in responding to unexpected events that require adjusting previous conceptions of who we are, what we believe, and how we go about our lives. research reveals that many people experience highly stressful events during childhood. in a large-scale survey that assessed adverse childhood experiences (aces), more than half of participants reported at least one stressful event, such as experiencing psychological, physical or sexual abuse, witnessing violence, or living with people at high-risk for causing instability in the home or harm (e.g., substance abusers, mentally ill or suicidal, or previously imprisoned; felitti et al., 1998). as adults, people who reported aces had significantly higher incidence of disease and were at increased risk of engaging in health-risking behaviors (e.g., smoking). however, adults who reported strength in meaning-making were protected to a significant extent from the negative impact of aces on their health and well-being as adults (banyard, hamby, & grych, 2017). although we cannot presume from this study that adults who are good at making meaning of difficult events were necessarily able to do so in childhood, it seems reasonable to conclude that the presence of meaning-making abilities in adulthood resulted from the development and fine-tuning of these capabilities throughout childhood and adolescence. thus, providing opportunities for youth to engage in meaning-making and explore meaning in a supportive environment may buffer against the deleterious effects of stressful childhood experiences on adulthood health. meaning in childhood and adolescence whereas there is a vast body of research on meaning in adolescents and young adults, research on children’s experiences of meaning in life is just beginning to grow with the recent development of tools to adequately measure meaning in this population. in the past, little meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 46 research focused on assessing meaning in childhood due to the assumption that children lack the abstract thinking capacity and reflective mechanisms to support meaning processes (e.g., piaget, 1952). however, evidence suggests that children as young as 8 years old can think abstractly (davydov & kilpatrick, 1990) and that young children can understand and express aspects of meaning (e.g., beliefs about the world, the self, and how the self interacts in the world, i.e., “self-in-world”; park & folkman, 1997). the “why?” questions so heavily prevalent in childhood may reflect this curiosity about how the world works, who they are, and if what they do matters. thus, the comprehension and mattering aspects of meaning are arguably especially important in childhood. qualitative research reveals that children can describe their experiences and sense of meaning (e.g., kang, kim, song, & kim, 2013; salter & stallard, 2004) and make meaning from negative experiences (orvell, kross, & gelman, 2018). recently, researchers developed and validated a measure to assess the presence and sources of meaning in the lives of children (mil-cq; shoshani & russo-netzer, 2017). using this scale, researchers have found children who report high levels of meaning also report high levels of life satisfaction and positive affectivity (shoshani et al., 2017). others have found that children’s self-reported meaning is positively associated with their overall well-being (st. john, 2017). furthermore, research on the effects of positive psychology interventions for preschool through middle-school suggest that children are aware of meaning and can increase their sense of meaning, as we review shortly. thus, evidence is accumulating to suggest that meaning is a crucial component of children’s well-being, and that meaning can be measured and fostered among children. far more evidence suggests that meaning is important in adolescence. research with adolescents suggests meaning is associated with key positive psychological indicators such as subjective well-being (burrow, o’dell, & hill, 2010), life satisfaction (bronk, lapsey, talib, & finch, 2009) and resiliency (bernard, 1991; masten & reed, 2002). the importance of meaning during adolescence is unsurprising given its relevance to development and identity formation (schwartz, côte, & arnett, 2005; burrow & o’dell, 2010). theorists such as erikson (1968) described adolescence as a time of self-exploration and self-discovery, and substantial research demonstrates that establishing meaning is central to healthy identity development (e.g., damon, menon, & bronk, 2003; burrow, o’dell, & hill, 2010; kiang & fulignu, 2010). emmons (1999) suggested that meaning also influences adolescents’ aspirations and life trajectories. that is, establishing meaning in life involves sensemaking and identifying an overarching purpose from which smaller goals are set in order to pursue that purpose. research is beginning to identify the specific pathways through which meaning in life may facilitate optimal youth development. meaning in life involves understanding one’s personal fit in the world, which aids in feeling connected to life in general and to specific life domains. for youth, the role of student ordinarily is central to their identity, yet without a coherent sense of global meaning, it may prove difficult to envision how their education links to a long-term sense of purpose and significance. indeed, youth who do not identify their lives as meaningful are less motivated by academic achievement (damon, 2009), whereas higher levels of purpose predict better academic performance (martin sanz, rodrigo, garcia, & pastrana, 2017). adolescents who report higher levels of meaning also report greater intrinsic motivation and better academic performance (bailey & phillips, 2016). meaning in life also meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 47 appears to play a significant role in feeling connected to school and various career-related outcomes. in a sample of 9th graders in hong kong, presence of meaning positively predicted participants’ feelings of connectedness to school, career curiosity, and career confidence (yuen & yau, 2015). thus, experiencing a sense of purpose or meaning may enhance engagement and performance in school and promote feelings of confidence and future efficacy, which likely reinforces positive identity development and optimal growth. although a sense of purpose may result in positive outcomes, it is relatively common for adolescents to lack a clear sense of direction. bronk and colleagues (2009) described many youth as “drifting,” defined as a lack of engagement in purposeful goals and low levels of intention. conversely, youth who engage in higher levels of exploration (perhaps motivated by a stronger search for meaning) are more likely to report higher purpose commitment as they get older (burrow, o’dell, & hill 2010). in fact, in the sample of chinese students described above, high levels of searching for meaning were also positively associated with career curiosity, confidence, and connectedness to school. thus, a motivation to find meaning and a willingness or openness toward vocational and identity exploration can promote growth. it would not be surprising to find that meaning in life and exploration facilitate one another in a mutually causal loop for adolescents. encouraging youth to engage in exploration in order to find meaning will likely help them form stronger identities and take a more active approach to their future goals (e.g., lawford & ramey, 2015). beyond academic achievement and engagement, meaning in life is tied to healthier lifestyle choices as well as better psychological and physical health among adolescents. adolescents who report high levels of meaning in life are less likely to use substances or engage in other risky behaviors (aloise-young, hennigan, & leong, 2001; brassai, piko, & steger, 2010). beyond behavioral choices, youth who report presence of meaning in life endorse better psychological health (french & joseph, 2009; schochet, dadds, ham, & montague, 2006; brouzos, vassilopoulos, & boumpouli, 2016; vela et al., 2015), whereas youth who report low levels of meaning also report poorer mental health and psychosocial adjustment (shek, 1992). similarly, adolescents who report high levels of purpose also endorse greater life satisfaction and emotional well-being (burrow et al., 2010; kiang & fuligni, 2010; king et al., 2006), hope (feldman & snyder, 2005), and agency (schwartz, côte, & arnett, 2005). meaning in life may also augment other psychological resources in reducing risk for psychopathology. for example, in a sample of filipino high school students, presence of meaning mediated the effects of grit in reducing depression (datu, king, & valdez, 2018). in sum, research suggests that meaning in life plays an important role in adolescents’ current and future physical and emotional health. theoretical assertions and research results also support the role of meaning as a protective factor for adolescents who are struggling or facing difficult life circumstances. in other words, meaning in life may protect or buffer against the influence of known risk factors for later psychopathology. for example, machell, disabato, and kashdan (2015) found that adolescents living in poverty were less likely to engage in antisocial behaviors if they reported having a sense of purpose. research also supports the role of meaning in reducing risk for suicidal ideation and behavior. meaning in life has been found to predict decreased suicidal ideation over an 8-week period of time (kleiman & beaver, 2013), reduced severity of suicidal ideation (tan, et al., 2017) and decreased lifetime odds of experiencing suicidal ideation and meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 48 suicide attempts (kleiman, adams, kashdan, & riskind, 2013). likewise, meaning in life has been found to moderate the relationship between mental health status and suicidal ideation such that children and adolescents who report less meaning are more likely to experience suicidal ideation when they report poor mental health (tan et al., 2017). similarly, meaning in life has been found to play a moderating role between bully victimization and subsequent suicidal ideation among 6th-12th grade boys and to mediate the relationship between bully victimization and suicidal ideation among 6th-12th grade girls (henry et al., 2013). in essence, meaning may be a protective factor for adolescent boys who are bullied, while decreases in meaning may explain the relationship between bullying and suicidal ideation for girls. finally, research also suggests that meaning in life may moderate the relationship between trauma history and psychological distress including symptoms of depression (krause, 2007; owens, steger, whitesell, & herrera, 2009) and ptsd (craig et al., 2013; owens et al., 2009). in a sample of adults with a history of trauma, participants with a strong sense of meaning in life reported lower levels of depression compared to those with a weak or average sense of meaning (krause, 2007). similarly, among samples of college students with a history of trauma, both well-being (triplett, et al., 2012) and posttraumatic growth (kashdan & kane, 2011) have been shown to correlate positively with meaning in life. shortly after the september 11th terrorist attacks in the united states, students with high levels of meaning in life reported posttraumatic growth, while those with low meaning in life experienced higher levels of posttraumatic distress (steger, frazier, & zacchanini, 2008). although research has not yet examined the role of meaning for trauma victims during adolescence, it is plausible that the same patterns found among adults and college students would be present for an adolescent sample, pointing to the adaptive role of meaning in life in coping with substantial challenges. to summarize, building and maintaining a sense of meaning in life offers substantial advantages for youth and adolescents across many life domains. this points to the need to introduce interventions and strategies that foster meaning. positive psychology in schools school mental health systems are generally not equipped to sufficiently prevent and treat the plethora of mental health concerns experienced by students (stephan, sugai, lever, & connors, 2015). positive psychological interventions in schools, however, are easily delivered by teachers and other school professionals and may supplement treatment for those experiencing mental health concerns and serve as a preventative measure for those who are not. research on positive youth development suggests that strength-based approaches that focus on developing competencies (e.g., resilience, social skills, emotional regulation, a positive sense of identity) yield significant benefits that extend beyond addressing problem behaviors (catalano et al., 2004; larson, 2000; rashid, 2015). positive psychology interventions for adults have been found to decrease depressive symptoms even without a direct focus on doing so (seligman, steen, park, & peterson, 2005), suggesting that such interventions may be well-suited for building strengths among all students while also assisting those experiencing mental health concerns. recent research on “positive education” interventions has focused on the effects of programs that combine traditional academic skills with competencies that foster well-being (seligman et al., 2009). the most studied positive education program to date is the penn meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 49 resiliency program (prp), which targets cognitive-behavioral and social skills for older elementary and middle school students in a structured format. evidence suggests that prp participation is related to reduced hopelessness, fewer behavioral problems, and less anxiety among students (seligman et al., 2009). furthermore, a recent meta-analysis reported that the prp appeared to reduce and prevent depressive symptoms (brunwasser, gillham & kim, 2009). another curriculum, the positive psychology programme, focuses on character strength development for 9th grade students in the united states. although depression and anxiety were not impacted, students who participated in this program reported increased enjoyment and engagement in school. furthermore, teachers (who were blind to intervention assignments) reported that character strengths related to learning (e.g., creativity) increased among participating students (seligman et al., 2009). another school-based positive psychology intervention, the maytiv program (shoshani & slone, 2017; shoshani, steinmetz, & kanat-maymon, 2016), has been implemented in israeli preschools and middle schools. the program focused on enhancing students’ well-being, school engagement, and school achievement through eight components, including meaning (based on the perma framework; seligman, 2011). the maytiv program sought to enhance students’ sense of meaning through content directed at developing character strengths, mindfulness, and focus (shoshani et al., 2016). results of longitudinal randomized control trials indicate that preschoolers who took part in the program demonstrated more positive learning behaviors and increases in well-being, and middle school children who partook reported more positive emotions, better peer relations, greater emotional and cognitive engagement, and higher grade point average scores than did students in control conditions (shoshani, et al., 2016, 2017). to summarize, research on positive education conducted to date suggests that such interventions can reduce depressive symptoms and may promulgate a more positive attitude toward school. future research is needed to identify the “critical ingredients” of such interventions, addressing the question of which specific positive psychology constructs offer the most benefit for students. future intervention work also needs to propose interventions that serve as an adjunct to already established routines in school, as it is not reasonable to expect that schools would want to or have the resources available to implement a positive psychology curriculum in addition to the regular curriculum. based on the review of literature in the present paper, it is proposed that meaning in life may be one of the key ingredients in promoting well-being for students and can be plausibly implemented in schools. therefore, the subsequent sections focus on 1) current meaning interventions and 2) proposed meaning interventions that can be implemented by teachers and other school professionals. meaning in life interventions to date, meaning intervention research has followed two primary paths. the first path can be described as studies that investigate meaning as a mediator for another primary outcome of interest. for example, one study found that meaning increased as a result of substance abuse treatment (flora & stalikas, 2012), which supports meaning as a subsidiary outcome. the second path includes studies designed with the goal of enhancing meaning as the outcome of meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 50 interest in its own right. for example, a study of college students who were assigned to take pictures of meaningful aspects of their lives experienced their lives as more meaningful as a result (steger, shim, barenz, & shin, 2013). recent efforts have used randomized control trial methodology as well, as in the case of meaning-centered group psychotherapy for cancer patients, which was found to significantly improve patients’ sense of meaning relative to a control group (breitbart et al., 2010). to summarize, available evidence suggests that meaning is indeed malleable and that focused interventions can enhance meaning. however, although purpose interventions have been piloted (e.g., dik, steger, gibson & peisner, 2012), comprehensive meaning interventions remain untested in school-aged populations. steger and martela (2016) defined meaning as the extent to which one understands oneself (i.e., comprehension), pursues goal-directed avenues in the world based on this understanding (i.e., purpose), and feels that one’s existence is important (i.e., mattering). this definition lends itself well to interventions tailored to children and adolescents as activities can be designed to focus on developing each of the three components, recognizing also that interventions directed at purpose, for example, may also impact one’s sense of mattering. to enhance comprehension of the self, activities that promote self-exploration, evaluation of strengths, exploration of values, and what things/people/ideas are meaningful to them may be beneficial. fostering comprehension of the self may be especially beneficial for youth who experience low self-esteem, who over-identify with one aspect of their identity (e.g., “an athlete”), who do not have a well-developed sense of identity, or who are undergoing a critical transition or making a big decision (e.g., puberty, college decision making). to foster a sense of purpose, effective intervention strategies may encourage action, such as assigning students tasks that align with their purpose and interests, encouraging them to engage with the outside world in concrete ways. for example, a student with a heart for animal welfare may volunteer for the humane society or start a neighborhood pet-sitting service. meaning also can be considered a reflexive process, such that feedback from engaging with their purpose(s) may help students to understand themselves better. youth who might particularly benefit from interventions focused on developing purpose include those who feel unmotivated, lack efficacy, or experience depression and students who struggle in traditional school domains but thrive in creative, artistic, athletic, or other activities. finally, to tap into mattering, interventions may focus on helping students identify times when they feel that they matter or are important, times when they feel connected to others through the work they do or interactions they have, or times when they feel what they are doing may make a positive impact on their communities. mattering-focused interventions may be especially critical for youth who are depressed, feel socially isolated, experience bullying or teasing, receive minimal attention at home, or experience low self-esteem. table 1 provides suggestions for schoolbased activities that teachers of children and adolescents can employ in the classroom to promote meaning. previously researched and novel interventions are presented below: table 1. school-based meaning activities comprehension purpose mattering childhood 1, 2, 4, 16 6, 7, 8 14 adolescence 3, 4, 5, 16 9, 10, 11 12, 13 meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 51 1. point out strengths when a student is participating in activities, including how a student uses strengths to accomplish a task or to help another student. this may expand students’ perceptions of their strengths, enhance self-understanding, and improve selfesteem and self-efficacy. for example: “hannah, i noticed that you were frustrated at first with these math problems, but you were able to use your strength of perseverance to finish the task.” (park & peterson, 2008) 2. point out student values by identifying how a student uses a value to make a choice or to help another student. this may expand students’ understanding of what is important to them, encouraging thoughtful decision-making and perspective-taking and perhaps reducing impulsivity. for example: “charlie, i saw that you were deciding between working with the legos or spending time with steve. you chose to play with legos. it seems like it was important to you to be building in that moment.” (park & peterson, 2008) 3. ask students to complete a strengths test whereby they respond to a series of questions related to their strengths. ask them to come prepared with their reactions to the survey, including strengths that made sense for them and if they were surprised by anything as related to the survey. this may expand students’ knowledge of their strengths, enhance self-understanding and reflective abilities, and improve self-esteem by allowing them to see themselves at their best. for a list of strengths, visit www.viacharacter.org (peterson & seligman, 2004) 4. ask students to take pictures of aspects of their life that they find meaningful. ask students to choose 1-2 pictures that they would share with the class (steger et al., 2013.). this activity may encourage planning, reflective skills, social connectedness, and a deeper understanding of what is important to them and why. 5. ask students to choose a song that they find meaningful. play a portion of the song in class and ask the student to elaborate on what makes this song meaningful to them. this activity allows for creativity and use of reflective skills and may promote social connectedness and a deeper understanding of what is important to them and why. 6. take students on a field trip and encourage them to do something that fits with an area of strength. for example, if the class goes to a nursing home, encourage students to choose ways to be helpful based on skills or competencies they possess (seligman, 2004). this activity may promote students’ sense of purpose by providing opportunities for them to enact their strengths and act consistently with their values. 7. encourage students to ask their parents/caregivers about times when they have exhibited their strengths. encourage students to ask their parents/caregivers about other ways to use their strengths. consider making this a homework assignment. this activity may expand students’ understanding of themselves through feedback from others and may encourage flexibility in self-views as well as expansiveness in potential ways to express strengths. 8. encourage students to ask their parents/caregivers about times when they have exhibited their values. encourage students to ask their parents/caregivers about other ways to use their values. consider making this a homework assignment. this activity may expand students’ understanding of themselves through feedback from others and http://www.viacharacter.org/ http://www.viacharacter.org/ meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 52 may encourage flexibility in self-views as well as expansiveness in potential ways to employ values. 9. provide experiential homework, whereby students choose one strength and engage in an activity that demonstrates this strength. ask students to come back to school prepared to share their experience. this activity encourages active engagement that may provide students with a sense of efficacy, enhance their sense of purpose, clarify who they are and what they care about, and potentially feel connected to others and motivated to continue engaging in activities that utilize strengths. 10. provide experiential homework, whereby students choose one value and engage in an activity that demonstrates this value. ask students to come back to school prepared to share their experience. this activity encourages active engagement that may provide students with a sense of efficacy, enhance their sense of purpose, clarify who they are and what they care about, and potentially feel connected to others and motivated to continue engaging in activities that align with their values. 11. ask students to tell a story about a time when they used a strength/value. if this is difficult, begin by inviting students to identify strengths/values they admire in movie characters or books (niemiec, & wedding, 2013). this activity provides youth with an opportunity to reflect on times when they or others are at their best. this may enhance self-esteem and self-efficacy and may encourage action in engaging with strengths and values. 12. encourage students to keep a “why i matter” journal to document ways they made a difference in the lives of others. encourage students to evaluate their responses and determine if there are themes in their responses. research suggests that reflective journaling promotes self-examination, self-discovery, understanding of the self in the context of the world, critical thinking skills, as well as positive behavior changes and use of coping skills (e.g., kelley, cunningham, & branscome, 2015). reflective writing on the topic of “why i matter” may specifically promote students’ sense of meaning and understanding of what contributes to their sense of mattering. 13. encourage students to keep a “connectedness” journal. each day students can write about a time when they felt most fully themselves and/or times when they most felt connected to other people or to their environment. reflective writing on the topic of connectedness may promote students’ sense of social well-being, self-and-other knowledge, and their overall sense of the ways in which connectedness promotes a sense of meaningfulness. 14. encourage students to ask their parents/caregivers for feedback about ways they see their child making a difference in the world. students can ask parents/caregivers to share stories about times the student did something that mattered or made a difference in the lives of others. this activity may expand students’ understanding of themselves through feedback from others and may encourage flexibility in self-views and may provide an experience of feeling recognized and of value to others. 15. ask students to write about the most difficult circumstance that occurred during the last week. provide time to reflect on how they can make meaning from their experience (e.g., acceptance, change in identity, change in global meaning, etc.). reflective writing meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 53 about difficult experiences with a focus on how to make meaning of the experience may provide students opportunities to examine difficult experiences from a meaning-making lens that enables them to develop an understanding of how they typically make sense of difficult events, and perhaps develop alternative ways of making sense that promote growth and well-being. 16. encourage students to write down “three good things” that occurred each day and reflect. research suggests that gratitude journaling (e.g., “three good things”) enhances students’ sense of meaning and their engagement in the classroom (e.g., flinchbaugh, moore, chang, & may, 2012). summary and conclusion despite our theoretical and empirical assertions that fostering meaning in schools would be beneficial for youth, it is likely that schools will experience barriers to implementation of positive psychology interventions (white, 2016). the stringent, standardized requirements of many public school systems in the united states may make it difficult for schools to acquire the approvals and resources necessary to train school personnel and effectively implement interventions. although many positive psychology interventions do require extensive training and rigorous standardization, the activities contained in this article were designed to be brief and accessible and build on the foundational knowledge teachers possess in implementing and debriefing activities. buy-in from teachers, parents, communities, and policy makers is critical in the efficacy of any intervention. thus, psychoeducation about the nature, purpose, and benefits of integrating positive psychology interventions in the classroom is crucial in securing support. ideally, a member of the school personnel would champion the efforts and serve as the primary resource for dissemination of knowledge and problem-solving as concerns arise (sánchez et al., 2014). although barriers to implementing meaning-focused interventions are inevitable, schools are environments with abounding intellectual, social, and structural resources with which to help youth understand what makes their lives meaningful. risks to youth and adolescent health are a concern that has garnered worldwide attention. positive psychological interventions designed to promote human flourishing may be a critical piece in addressing youth health needs and to provide opportunities for students to flourish even in the midst of difficult life circumstances. broadly speaking, positive psychological interventions in schools demonstrate compelling results, including reductions in depressive symptomatology and increases in academic strengths and engagement. as research attempts to identify those facets of well-being most important for intervention, meaning in life appears to impact several domains of children’s and adolescent’s health, including mental wellbeing and physical health, perhaps through the promotion of positive behavior and the reduction of health risk behavior. meaning is also highly relevant to the school setting as youth tend to perform poorly and are at higher risk for dropping out of school when they do not perceive of school as meaningful. easy-to-implement and accessible interventions in schools that help promote domain-specific meaning (e.g., school) and global meaning may serve as an antidote to the emotional and behavioral risks to which youth are particularly prone and promote optimal psychological and identity development. meaning interventions in schools morse, o’donnell, walberg & dik 54 authors jessica l. morse colorado state university jessica.morse@colostate.edu maeve b. o’donnell colorado state university & university of washington arissa r. walberg community health of central washington bryan j. dik colorado state university publishing timeline received 14 may 2019 accepted 23 september 2019 published 26 september 2019 references aloise-young, p. a., hennigan, k. m., & leong, c. w. 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(2016). what happiness science can learn from john stuart mill. international journal of wellbeing, 6(1), 164-179. doi:10.5502/ijw.v6i1.464 willem van der deijl erasmus university rotterdam vanderdeijl@ese.eur.nl copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 164 article what happiness science can learn from john stuart mill willem van der deijl abstract: many researchers studying subjective wellbeing (swb) understand swb as a concept that is close to bentham’s notion of happiness. this conception of happiness is philosophically controversial, because it treats pleasure as a homogenous experience. i analyze an important deviation from bentham in john stuart mill’s utilitarianism and its relevance for swb research: qualitative differences in pleasurable experiences. i argue that in cases where lives involving qualitatively different experiences are compared, mill’s qualitative perspective is incompatible with an important assumption in the swb literature: that happiness can be meaningfully rated by people on a scale. i illustrate the problem by means of the question of whether becoming a parent makes people happier. i analyze whether the problem can be avoided on alternative views of happiness, but argue that on all plausible accounts of happiness, the problem persists. i conclude that the problem it poses for self-reported happiness is genuine and should be acknowledged by swb researchers. i end by discussing the ways in which this conclusion can help the study of happiness move forward. keywords: happiness, measurement, pleasure, john stuart mill, jeremy bentham, subjective wellbeing it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. and if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. the other party to the comparison knows both sides. john stuart mill, utilitarianism 1. introduction: happiness and subjective wellbeing “taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?” (european social survey). if you answer this question – on a scale from 0-10 – with a high number, and you answer it faithfully, is your life going well for you? this question, and variations thereof, is the key measurement instrument defining the concept of subjective wellbeing (swb) – a popular approach to the measurement of wellbeing in the social sciences. not every swb researcher would answer the question with a clear “yes,” but many believe that swb can capture happiness, and that happiness is, in the very least, an important part of wellbeing (e.g. kesebir & diener, 2008)1. many researchers seem to understand swb as a concept that is close to bentham’s notion of happiness (see fleurbaey & blanchet, 2013). in fact, explicit references to bentham’s philosophy are not at all rare in the swb literature (e.g. kahneman, wakker, & sarin, 1997; kahneman et al., 2004; veenhoven, 2010; dolan & metcalfe, 2012). the particular conception of happiness that social scientists use is closely connected with the question of how 1 by “wellbeing” i mean prudential value: how well a life is going for the person whose life it is (sumner 1996, 20). http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 165 – if at all – happiness can be measured. on bentham’s hedonistic perspective, measuring happiness by means of asking people about their experiences seems a straightforward methodology. bentham understands happiness as a unidimensional quality of experience. on this view, it seems plausible that people are able to recognize and evaluate their own happiness. nevertheless, bentham’s hedonism is quite controversial in philosophy for its treatment of pleasure (e.g. nussbaum, 2004; cf. tännsjö, 2007). much criticism of the swb approach about the measurement of happiness or wellbeing seems to have focused on the unsatisfactory features of the hedonist conception of happiness underlying the approach in one way or another (o’neill, 2006; nussbaum, 2008; sen, 2008; raibley, 2012; fleurbaey & blanchet, 2013; stewart, 2014; crespo & mesurado, 2014). in a critical essay of the hedonistic foundation of positive psychology, martha nussbaum writes: “modern psychology follows bentham. indeed, kahneman explicitly traces his own conception of ‘hedonic flow’ to bentham (see, for example, kahneman and krueger 2006, p. 4). and yet, is bentham correct?” (2008, s82). nussbaum certainly believes that bentham was not, and represents many fellow philosophers in this. one way in which hedonism can be made more acceptable to those who oppose the view is by moving towards a qualified version of hedonism, such as john stuart mill’s view on happiness (mill, 1871; see e.g. sen, 2006; nussbaum 2008). mill retained bentham’s view that happiness is constituted by pleasure, but departed from bentham by suggesting that pleasures – that is, pleasurable experiences2 – do not only differ in terms of duration and intensity3, but also differ qualitatively. because mill’s view on happiness seems more plausible to critics by virtue of its more nuanced treatment of pleasure, his view on happiness is sometimes proposed as a more attractive alternative (e.g. nussbaum, 2008). by virtue of its more nuanced treatment of pleasure, mill’s account seems to provide a more attractive and plausible basis to serve as a foundation for the study of happiness. however, mill’s view also makes happiness more difficult to measure. as i will argue, there is a perspective in mill’s view on happiness that problematizes the orthodoxy within the swb literature to use self-reports as measures of happiness, particularly in cases where qualitatively different lives are compared. in this essay, i will analyze this perspective and its relevance for swb research. i illustrate the problem mill’s perspective poses with the example of swb research on the happiness of parents compared to the childless. i argue that the perspective does not rely on a metaphysically demanding interpretation of mill’s qualitative hedonism, but is based on a simple and plausible assumption about the quality of experience. while on some conceptions of happiness it may seem plausible that people have the ability to evaluate their happiness independently of the kind of experiences they have already had, i argue that mill’s rejection of this idea is convincing and compatible with a variety of views on happiness. hence, it raises serious doubts that swb can capture happiness in a satisfactory fashion, particularly in cases where lives with qualitatively different experiences are compared. sections 2 and 3 are preliminaries. in section 2, a necessary condition for measuring happiness by means of self-reported swb measures is discussed, and in section 3, mill’s qualitative perspective on pleasure is presented. section 4 presents the main argument: mill’s qualitative perspective on happiness is plausible, but creates doubt it can be measured by self reports. section 5 discusses the example of swb research on the effect of parenting on happiness. objections and the relevance of mill’s perspective for alternative views on the 2 i follow schmidt-petri (2006) here in making a distinction between “a pleasure” and “pleasure” in mill. 3 to bentham, pleasures – meaning pleasurable experiences – also differ in other categories that seem to be less central here: certainty, propinquity, fecundity, purity and extent. lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 166 nature of happiness are discussed in sections 6 and 7 respectively. in section 8, i discuss the relationship between this argument and another objection to swb: the adaptation problem. section 9 concludes and discusses implications for future happiness research. 2. measuring swb there is a large variety of swb research. nevertheless, we can say that swb roughly comes in two types of constructs, which are sometimes considered to be similar in meaning, and sometimes considered to be different views on what swb should capture: life satisfaction and happiness (e.g. veenhoven, 2010; hansen, 2012). on the benthamite view, swb captures pleasurable – or enjoyable4 – experiences in life, and many swb researchers would see an evaluation of enjoyable experiences in life to be a very similar exercise to evaluating satisfaction with life5 (e.g. mackerron, 2012). however, some researchers do take life satisfaction to be an altogether different conception of happiness (see haybron, 2007b for a discussion), and thereby deviate from the benthamite underpinnings i have thus far described. it is also common to understand life satisfaction as a whole different concept from happiness altogether. for the purposes of simplicity, i will focus my attention on swb research that aims to capture a hedonistic notion of happiness. however, in section 6 i will address some of the implications of the argument for research aimed at capturing life satisfaction conceptions of happiness as well. the study of subjective wellbeing is not necessarily committed to the view that subjective wellbeing is a sufficiently good measure of wellbeing simpliciter, though many authors are (see, angner 2010). what the field of study is committed to is the view that subjective experiences, or attitudes towards life, can be meaningfully rated on a scale with a reasonably limited amount of error6 (e.g. ferrer-i-carbonell, 2002). this does not imply that someone with a higher self-reported happiness rating is necessarily happier than someone with a lower rating (see angner, 2013); people may be imperfect in their judgment. people may make mistakes. however, in order for swb to capture happiness, it is required that these errors occur randomly – in other words, that they are not structural. the precise formulation of this requirement may depend on the kind of comparison of swb that is made. but consider, for example, that we want to compare two different groups. a significant share of one group may be overly-optimistic about their subjective wellbeing, such that two equally happy people would rate their happiness differently, due to such optimism. for example, if educated people tend to interpret a happiness scale differently than others, we may draw the wrong conclusions about the effect of education on happiness. in that case, swb would be an unsatisfactory measure of happiness. more generally, in order to draw conclusions from self-reported swb data on happiness, errors of this sort – reporting errors – need to be random. we can formulate this as follows: ratability: in order for a self-reported measure of subjective wellbeing to be meaningful, people need to be able to rate their subjective wellbeing – be it 4 bentham uses the word “pleasure,” but modern formulations of hedonism often replace “pleasurable” by “enjoyable” (crisp, 2006) to de-emphasize the connotation with bodily pleasures. i will use the two terms interchangeably throughout the article. 5 ruut veenhoven, for instance, writes: “satisfaction is also the subjective experience jeremy bentham had in mind”. 6 george mackerron, for instance, writes: “swb data consist, more or less by definition, of the aggregated selfreports of individuals—what people say about themselves when asked” (2012, 708). lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 167 happiness or life satisfaction – such that reporting errors do not occur structurally. in other words, different people – or, alternatively, people over time – may evaluate the same level of happiness differently, but these deviations should not have any relevant structural patterns. 3. mill and qualitative hedonism hedonism is the view that happiness is constituted by the balance of pleasurable experience over painful experience. hedonism as a theory of wellbeing additionally holds that wellbeing is constituted by happiness. this latter view is particularly controversial in philosophy7, but as a view about happiness, hedonism is quite popular (see haybron, 2005). bentham, as well as mill, held both views of hedonism, but for the present purpose we will focus on hedonism as a view on the nature of happiness. while both hedonists, mill’s view deviates from bentham with respect to the nature of pleasure. bentham’s view on happiness is characterized by the idea that pleasure is a homogenous sensation which is shared by all pleasurable experiences (sumner, 1996; nussbaum, 2004; 2008; crisp, 2006). this feature is central to its appeal to happiness researchers. if pleasure is, indeed, a homogenous sensation, it seems plausible that it can be readily detected, and, consequently, rated by people. moreover, the homogeneity of bentham’s view on pleasure seems to play an important role in its liberalism with respect to pleasure, such as illustrated in his well-known view that there is nothing particularly better about poetry compared to pushpin. nevertheless, there are two problems with bentham’s account of happiness as constituted by homogenous sensation. firstly, bentham’s homogenous hedonism is vulnerable to the problem that there are certain experiences that we would call enjoyable that feel very different from typical enjoyable experiences – for example, enjoyment from masochism, or from running a marathon. but there are also less trivial examples, such as fred feldman’s (2010) example of a woman who gives birth. while she is feeling ecstatic about holding her newborn in her arms, she is also in deep physical pain. what these examples show is that pleasure does not seem to share any specific phenomenological trait. another problem for a homogenous view of pleasure is that on that view, any pleasurable experience can be equated with a certain amount of another pleasurable experience to produce the same amount of pleasure. in other words, while someone who likes poetry may find it more enjoyable than pushpin, as long as she enjoys pushpin as well, at some point a large amount of pushpin will be more enjoyable than some amount of poetry. this can lead to deeply counterintuitive conclusions. one well-known counter-example illustrating this problem is the example of the long oyster life (crisp, 2006). while an oyster may only experience some pleasure, a very long oyster life would have to be more pleasurable than a human life that lasts eighty years. if it is not, the life of the oyster can be extended, such that at some point, the pleasure enjoyed in the oyster’s life must compensate for the more intense pleasure of a human life. many find the conclusion that the very long life of an oyster is more enjoyable than a normal human life counter-intuitive. 7 the most widely discussed argument against this view is the experience machine objection, originally formulated by robert nozick (1974; cf. kawall, 1999; silverstein, 2000; weijers, 2011; see weijers & schouten, 2013 for a contemporary discussion). the argument is based on the following example: consider a machine which you could plug in that would create a virtual world for you in which you would have the most amazing experiences. someone in this machine would have incredibly pleasurable experiences, and would be happy, but, nozick argues, would not lead an enviable life. lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 168 these problems for bentham’s account resonate in some of the criticism on the conceptual framework employed by swb researchers. nussbaum, for instance, writes: “the apparent fact that pleasures differ in quality, that the pleasure of steak eating is quite different from the pleasure of listening to mahler’s tenth, bothered bentham not at all; he does not discuss such examples” (2008, s83; see crespo & mesurado, 2014 for similar worries). mill was aware of such criticisms of hedonism – in particular, by the problem that any pleasure can be compensated for by some amount of another pleasure – and addresses them in utilitarianism. mill believed that many classical hedonist theories were able to deal with such objections to some extent by arguing that mental pleasures were better than bodily pleasures in terms of “permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc.” (mill, 1871, 56). however, mill believed that such solutions were not sufficiently able to distinguish higher and lower experiences, such as that of a human life, and that of an oyster. mill argued that there is a difference in kind between some pleasures in life: “it would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone” (56). intuitively, there is something very attractive about mill’s account of happiness. the experience of climbing kilimanjaro does not only differ from a day of playing board games in the amount and intensity of pleasure involved, the experience also seems qualitatively different. in a recent defense, roger crisp (2006) argues that what all such different enjoyable experiences share is that they are enjoyable, but that apart from that, they may all feel different. there are different interpretations of how mill’s view should be made more precise. while it is clear that mill believed that some pleasures were qualitatively different from others, there is a variety of views on why that is. in particular, there is much debate about the question of whether mill’s qualitative hedonism implies that a pleasure of a certain quality is preferred to any amount of pleasures of a lower quality. in other words, are qualitatively different pleasures lexicographically ordered? in utilitarianism, mill attempts to clarify his meaning of qualitative difference by reference to competent judges: “if one of two [pleasures] is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.”(1871, 56) on the classical view of interpreting mill – the lexicographical view – the passage is read as explaining a lexicographical difference between qualitatively different pleasures (riley, 2003; see booher, 2007). on this view, the pleasure experienced from higher pleasures can never be compensated by any amount of lower pleasures. this view is wedded to the idea that pleasurable experiences are intrinsically different from each other with respect to the pleasure they produce (schmidt-petri, 2006). on the lexicographical view, either higher pleasures feel infinitely better, or they simply are infinitely more pleasurable than lower pleasures for other reasons. jonathan riley (1999; 2003) defends the view. the view is controversial because it begs the question of what it is about pleasures that makes them qualitatively different. surely some experiences feel different in kind, but why would we assume that some are of such a higher quality that they are lexicographically ordered with respect to pleasure? reading poetry does not really seem to feel infinitely more pleasurable than pushpin. however, if poetry is infinitely better despite it not feeling infinitely better, the view seems to deviate from hedonism (scarre, 1997). riley (1999) argues that some experiences do indeed feel infinitely more pleasurable than lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 169 others. while such a defense is internally consistent, it relies heavily on the existence of an infinite difference of pleasure in felt experiences, a view that is highly contestable. a second reading – the epistemological view – is provided by christoph schmidt-petri (2003; 2006; but also booher, 2007; crisp, 2006; see also saunders, 2011 for a discussion). in his view, mill’s qualitatively different pleasures need not imply that the higher pleasures are preferred to any amount of lower pleasures. a higher pleasure is definitely a lot more pleasurable than a lower one, but that does not mean that their difference in pleasure needs to be considered lexicographic. in schmidt-petri’s account, mill’s passage suggests that if competent judges prefer one pleasure over an infinite amount of another pleasure, they are justified in ascribing a difference in quality between the pleasurable experiences, but it need not imply that any qualitative difference means that the experiences are infinitely more – or less – pleasurable. schmidt-petri understands mill’s passage as making an epistemological point: people who have not experienced higher pleasures are not able to appreciate them and compare them to lower pleasures. some enjoyable experiences last equally long, and are equally intense as other experiences, but nevertheless produce more pleasure. the only way to learn whether this is the case is to experience both and judge. in short, while there are two radically different interpretations of mill’s views on qualitative differences in pleasure, both views consider a person who has not experienced a certain pleasure to be in a disadvantaged position to evaluate it. we can call this the qualitative view of pleasure, or more generally, the qualitative view of experiences (qve). qve: there are differences in the quality of experiences, and the variety of qualities of experience we have had influences the way we evaluate them. two experiences that are of a different quality can only be fully evaluated by someone who has experienced both8. a person who has not fully experienced higher pleasures may believe her life is happy. but, as the addendum to mill’s famous passage cited in the epigraph illustrates: mill believes that a person who has only experienced lower pleasures is in a bad position to make a comparison of happiness between the higher and lower pleasures. for mill, this has an important implication for people’s own perceptions of their happiness, or for the importance of their sense of satisfaction. mill argues: “whoever supposes that … the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior, confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content” (57). a person can be content, feel satisfied, and believe herself to be happy, but when this is based on having pleasurable experiences of a low quality, her happiness may not weigh up against the higher quality experiences of a person who does not feel quite as satisfied, and does not believe herself to be happy. mill’s language may be archaic and elitist. but consider the example of someone who has never been in a committed relationship. she may believe it to be dull and restrictive, and be perfectly satisfied with the situation as it is. mill’s perspective indicates that it may happen that – if being in a committed relationship is a higher pleasure for her – after being in such a relationship, she learns that it is much more enjoyable than not being in one. she may, after learning this, be equally satisfied, or even less satisfied, but this need not imply that it is less 8 this need not imply that people cannot make justified guesses about other people’s happiness. we may be justified in judging people in deprived circumstances to be unhappy, without having experienced it. our imaginative powers are likely to be roughly reliable, especially if it comes to obvious misery. however, the qve implies that when we experience something new, it changes how we evaluate our own happiness. lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 170 enjoyable. according to mill’s perspective that i want to defend here, such experiences can alter the way we evaluate our own happiness. 4. mill’s qualitative perspective and swb qve, if correct, poses a problem for ratability, in case lives are compared that are constituted by qualitatively different experiences. if correct, a person who believes herself to be unhappy may, in fact, be happier than a person who perceives herself as happy. in other words, if we use people’s own perception as a basis for judging happiness, people who have experienced few high pleasures would be judged overly optimistically. in order to meet ratability, people should not evaluate their current experiences differently purely on the basis of what they have experienced in the past. in order to meet ratability, the judgment of “very happy” for someone who has experienced few higher pleasures should correspond to the level of happiness of someone who has experienced a lot of higher pleasures and also judges herself to be “very happy”. however, if qve is true, their judgments have different consequences for happiness, and they cannot be considered equally happy. this consequence is particularly clear on a lexicographical interpretation of qualities. in order to see this, consider the following objection to ratability from a lexicographical perspective: 1) there are lexicographical differences in the quality of experiences, such that some pleasurable experiences are lexicographically more pleasurable than others. 2) because of this lexicographical difference, the difference between higher and lower pleasures can only be evaluated by those who have experienced both. (the lexicographical version of the quality view of experiences (qve i)). 3) those who have experienced only lower pleasurable experiences are not able to evaluate the value of higher pleasurable experiences in the same way as those who have experienced both. 4) in order for self-reported swb research to meet ratability, different subjects – or, depending on the research question, subjects over time – need to be able to evaluate the same pleasures in the same way. 5) subjects who have experienced only the lower pleasures cannot evaluate higher pleasures in the same way as people who have experienced both. 6) swb does not meet the ratability requirement. on this objection, a qualitative hedonist would not accept that differences in swb correspond to differences in happiness if there are qualitative differences in the experiences they have had. this may not be so surprising, nor may it be bothersome to an swb researcher. the lexicographical interpretation of mill’s view may be more acceptable to people who are critical of bentham, but may not be an attractive position for swb researchers. after all, arguably, mill’s conception of higher and lower pleasures seems somewhat elitist: favoring some activities – typically those that people of higher classes would like – over others, on seemingly arbitrary grounds. some swb researchers have taken an explicit liberal stance on this issue. if a person playing simple video games says he is happy, a researcher should accept this person’s judgment. there is no reason to overrule it because the researcher finds this person’s judgment implausible. martin binder calls the liberal character of swb an attractive normative feature of lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 171 swb, as it avoids the danger of paternalism (binder, 2014)9. swb researchers may reject the lexicographical account and ignore the lexicographical qve objection, because its first premise (1) is rejected. much of the work in the lexicographical qve objection is done by the first two premises. however, on an epistemological interpretation of mill’s view, qve still follows, even if premises (1) and (2) are false. the beginning of the argument – the epistemological formulation of the qve objection – would then be as follows: 1*) there are differences in the quality of experiences, such that knowing how long and intense a certain pleasurable experience is, is not sufficient to evaluate how pleasurable it is. 2*) because differences in quality of experiences can only be known after they have been experienced, the difference between two qualitatively different experiences can only be evaluated by those who have experienced both (the epistemological version of the qualitative view of experience (qve e)). the argument would continue in the same way as the lexicographical version of the objection. on this reading, a person who spends her days playing simple computer games (a modern variant of pushpin, perhaps) would be satisfied, and may believe herself to be very happy, but could only know if her life is happier than that of a poet, or scientist, when she has, in fact, experienced the life of a scientist or poet. as a poet or scientist has probably known the experience of playing a computer game, they are in a better position to evaluate both lives. the experiences are clearly different in kind. knowing what it is like to spend your days playing computer games probably puts you in the position to evaluate how the pleasure of playing one hour compares to playing two hours. these are differences in quantity. however, it does not put you in the position to evaluate how the pleasure of playing video games compares to finishing a beautiful poem. this view of qualitative difference in pleasure comes with fewer problematic commitments than the lexicographical view. we need not presuppose that the pleasure of finishing a beautiful poem is infinitely, or lexicographically more pleasurable than playing computer games, in order to appreciate that the pleasures are different epistemically: experiencing one pleasure tells you little about experiencing the other. qve is thus not committed to an elitist view that certain kinds of experiences are infinitely more enjoyable, despite them not feeling as such. at the same time, it is not committed to identify every person who says she is happy as indeed being happy, because it illustrates that people may have a perception of their own happiness that is contingent on their past experiences. to sum up: mill provides an account of happiness in which happiness is constituted by pleasure that seems richer and more plausible than bentham’s account of happiness that is often cited in the swb literature. however, mill’s qualitative view and his perspective on happiness evaluation (qve) clash with a fundamental assumption in current swb research: ratability. while one reading of mill’s view comes with its own difficulties, qve can be formulated so that it relies only on a very commonsensical assumption that mill stresses: some experiences can only be compared to others by those who have experienced both (1* and 2*). 9 as discussed above, within philosophical discourse there is also some debate about whether qualitative hedonism in its lexicographical interpretation is a coherent and plausible position to hold (scarre 1997; cf feldman 1995; riley 1999). lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 172 5. example: children and happiness the literature on swb is expansive and various. it is not fair to make general statements regarding the neglect of the qualitative perspective in pleasurable experiences in the literature. however, one example in which the qualitative perspective seems particularly relevant, but has not been sufficiently recognized, is the study of major life changes, in particular, that of becoming a parent. perhaps surprisingly, the literature seems in agreement that the average effect of becoming a parent on happiness is negative or close to zero. in a review of the literature, thomas hansen (2012) describes a common “folk view” on parenting – that it makes parents happier – but argues that the empirical evidence points in the opposite direction. people generally do not become happier from having children, if we accept the evidence from swb research. others are milder in their judgment of the evidence, and report that happiness may be positively affected by having children, but only “under the right conditions” (angeles, 2009). does this count as sound evidence that becoming a parent does not make us (or most people) happier? on mill’s qualitative view this is problematic. having children and not having children are qualitatively very different experiences. in fact, the two are so different, that it is hard to imagine what it is like to have children until we have them. this is exactly the point made in a recent article by laurie paul entitled “what you can’t expect when you’re expecting”. in her view, having children is an epistemically transformative experience: at least in the normal case, one has a uniquely new experience when one has one’s first child. before someone becomes a parent, she has never experienced the unique state of seeing and touching her newborn child. she has never experienced the full compendium of the extremely intense series of beliefs, emotions, physical exhaustion and emotional intensity that attends the carrying, birth, presentation, and care of her very own child, and hence she does not know what it is like to have these experiences. (2015, 8) some empirical evidence supports the claim that parents do not have clearly worse experiences in general, but have different experiences. parents may experience more stress and less pleasurable moments, also when they are with their children, but nevertheless find their activities more rewarding and find more meaning in them (white & dolan, 2009; nelson et al., 2013). if paul is correct in her judgment that having children is an experience that we cannot evaluate until we have experienced it, having children and not having children are qualitatively different experiences in the qve sense. consequently, on mill’s qve, asking people about their satisfaction or their rated happiness will not be informative about which of the two experiences produces more happiness. based on the widespread view that children do make us happier, hansen describes the finding that parents are not happy as paradoxical. however, on mill’s perspective, the conclusion that there is a paradox does not follow10. a possible way forward to judging the effect of parenting on happiness on mill’s account would be to give evidential priority to the opinion of parents, perhaps by asking whether they believe their experiences have improved, or if they would want their old life back. after all, the parents seem to be the “competent judges,” having experienced both a childless life and a life 10 qve does not imply that the common belief about parenting and happiness is correct. it merely implies that in cases where qualitatively different lives are compared, drawing conclusions about happiness on the basis of people’s self-assessment is problematic. lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 173 with children. there is little scientific study that follows this, and it would deviate significantly from standard swb methodology11. 6. objections to the qve objection there are a number of possible objections to the claim that happiness is constituted by a combination of qualitatively different experiences whose contribution to happiness can only be judged after they have been experienced, and the problem i have argued this poses for swb research. a first objection may be that while ratability is often assumed in swb studies, when more sophisticated statistical methods are used, the assumption can be relaxed without altering the results of swb studies. this would be wrong. an influential paper about statistical methodology in swb research is ada ferrer-i-carbonell and paul frijters’s (2004) often-cited methodological contribution that derives important conclusions from germany’s socioeconomic panel (gsoep) on minimal assumptions about the structure of subjective wellbeing reports. their statistical methodology assumes that people’s satisfaction reports have an individually fixed ordinal relationship to an underlying function (in their case, welfare). in other words, it does not assume that my 7 on a life satisfaction scale is equal to yours, but it does assume that my 7 this year is higher than my 6 last year. this statistical methodology is significant in reducing the measurement requirements of happiness or satisfaction data greatly. however, it still implies that if a person’s swb score improves, so does her actual happiness, or wellbeing (see also ferrer-i-carbonell, 2002). on qve, this assumption would be problematic in instances where people go through new experiences that alter their perspective. the problem goes deeper than statistical methodology. if qve is correct, a person may evaluate happiness in a different manner now, than after having experienced something new. this goes to the heart of swb research: a person rating her happiness lower than before may not be less happy. a second objection may be that any view that presupposes that there are qualitatively better and worse pleasures is problematically paternalistic, even if these qualities are understood in a non-lexicographical way. this is probably a good objection against some of mill’s examples, such as his view that poetry is better than pushpin. presupposing such hierarchies on no clear evidential ground may be considered paternalistic. nevertheless, these views should be separated from the more abstract view that there are differences in quality between pleasures. mill might have been wrong about the former – poetry may not be better than pushpin – but right about the latter – qualitative differences do exist. pushpin may be of higher quality than poetry. the quality of specific experiences could even differ between different people. for me pushpin may be qualitatively better, while for others poetry may be better than pushpin. the qve is thus not based on the view that certain specific pleasures are of a higher quality, but only that there are qualitative differences between pleasures that make the comparison between them difficult if both have not been experienced. 7. alternative views on happiness both mill’s and bentham’s conceptions of happiness are based on the view that happiness is constituted by pleasure. a possible defense of the qve objection can be that it does not go 11 an assumption of such a methodology would be that a childless life is similar to that of the life of parents up to the moment they have children, and that having a child does not bias a person’s judgment about happiness. these assumptions may be false. if that would be so, it could turn out that the question of whether parents are happier than non-parents would not be empirically answerable. lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 174 through on alternative conceptions of happiness. however, what is important about the second formulation of the qve objection is that it seems compatible with a number of different views on what constitutes happiness. without subscribing to the view that some experiences feel infinitely more pleasurable than others, or are lexicographically more pleasurable, despite people not feeling infinitely more pleasure, it seems plausible that some experiences are harder to compare to others without having experienced both. premises a* and b* in the argument are not based on a particular conception on happiness, but could apply to all conceptions of happiness that acknowledge that some form of experienced happiness can only be compared to others once they have been experienced. in order to avoid the problem qve poses for ratability, swb would require a conceptual view of happiness that would avoid having to commit to such qualitative differences in experiences12. one alternative to hedonism is the view that happiness consists of an attitude towards your life: the life satisfaction view (e.g. sumner, 1996) – a view that is popular among swb researchers (see haybron, 2007b). mill seems to reject the view that attitudes are ultimately the constituents of happiness, as can be read in the distinction between happiness and contentment that he employs. nevertheless, prima facie, it seems that an attitude view of happiness may avoid the epistemic formulation of the objection. if a person’s attitude towards life is all that matters to her happiness, why would it matter whether an attitude is based on higher or lower quality experiences? while this objection stands, it does point towards a counter-intuitive conclusion of the life satisfaction view of happiness. consider the same person from our earlier example who spends most of her time playing computer games. this person may have a good attitude towards her life. she likes her life as it is. however, at some point, she gets a purposeful job at which she flourishes, which changes her life in many ways. in the newly-gained perspective she feels that her old attitude towards the gaming life had been inappropriate, and feels that while she has similarly positive attitudes towards her new life now as she did in the past, she is now happier. on a strict interpretation of the life satisfaction view she would have to be mistaken. after all, if her attitude towards her life is roughly the same over time, then so would be her happiness. she cannot be wrong about the attitude she had in the past. this would seem highly counterintuitive. if we would accept that attitudes can contribute differently towards happiness depending on their appropriateness, it would be conceptually possible that she is correct. however, we have now made the life satisfaction view of happiness vulnerable to qve: the qualities of the experiences we have had can now affect the way we evaluate comparisons between different experiences, or different lives we lead. in other words, there are qualitative differences between experiences that are sufficient for qve e. another recently developed view maintains that happiness is an emotional state quality (haybron, 2005). according to daniel haybron, happiness is not an experiential state, but describes our emotional state. we may be under stress, but not experience stress. in these cases, we are less happy than we would be if we were not under stress, but it is not due to a difference in pleasure. does qvee still pose a problem to swb on this conception of happiness? on a first look it might not. if our emotional state were independent of our experience, we 12 the epistemic version of the qve objection to ratability could even apply to a benthamite conception of happiness, once it is acknowledged that while pleasure may be unidimensional, pleasurable experiences are not, and that experiencing one pleasurable experience may alter your attitude towards others. on this view, pushpin and poetry may result in the same output – pleasure – but in order to know which of the two produces more, they need to be experienced. lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 175 could see that the way we compare two emotional states would not depend on the qualities of the types of experiences that we have had. on the other hand, if we do evaluate our own emotional state, we are surely guided by our own experiences. haybron himself is skeptical about our ability to know how happy we are on the grounds that we often fail to appreciate our emotional state (haybron, 2007a). in his view, there are reasons to question ratability, independent of qve. however, some of his reasons come close to mill’s perspective. in an example, haybron describes a person, glen, who has lived in the city for years under severe stress, but always had the impression he was happy. but now he moves back to the rural town where he grew up. the stress falls from his shoulders and he now realizes that his life in the city was not so happy after all. what this person experienced seems to be easily described in terms of qvee. glen experiences a new kind of experience – even though it is in some ways similar to his childhood, and he re-learns appreciating it: living a peaceful stressless life in the countryside. he now can fully appreciate the difference between two experiences: living a stressful life in the city, and a stressless one the countryside, and judges the countryside life to be superior in quality. 8. qve objection and adaptation the qve is by no means the first philosophical objection against the identification of swb with happiness. in particular, the qve objection seems to have some similarity to the adaptation argument introduced by amartya sen (sen, 1985; see qizilbash, 2006). both objections are based on a discrepancy between satisfaction, or people’s own perception of their happiness, and their actual happiness. mozaffar qizilbash reads in the passages from utilitarianism cited above the same view that sen expresses when he discusses examples of people in deprived circumstances who nevertheless believe themselves to be happy, but clearly do not lead highquality lives. moreover, qizilbash believes mill’s view addresses sen’s adaptation concerns. while i believe adaptation and mill’s qve address similar concerns, the points are different and qve is more general. originally, adaptation was formulated as a problem regarding people who changed their preferences due to the unavailability of a preferred option, which is a narrow and specific problem. moreover, the term “adaptation” itself seems to suggest that it applies only after a change in desires, preferences, or ability to be happy. qve need not involve such change. a person may have low aspirations, and be content with low pleasures, only because that person has never had the experience of higher pleasure. if anyone adapts, in mill’s examples, it is the person who learns to appreciate the higher pleasures. for mill, examples of people who are content with little do not illustrate that they have adapted, but they illustrate that they have not fully developed their desires. the qve objection to swb is thus more general. consider, for instance, the example of the gamer discussed above. in the example, the gamer is both satisfied and needs not to have adapted aspirations. however, as i argued, on mill’s account there is still a difference in happiness between her life as a gamer and her later life as a person with a successful career. in brief, the adaptation problem illustrates a problem with the satisfied that have decreased their aspirations; the qve objection illustrates a problem with the satisfied that have never developed their aspirations. there is another important difference in relevance to the current literature between the two problems. while the adaptation argument has been argued to be empirically falsified, as people do not, in fact, adapt to deprived circumstances (e.g. helliwell & barrington-leigh, 2010), the same could not be said for the qve objection. lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 176 9. conclusion and discussion in this essay i have presented and assessed a perspective found in mill’s utilitarianism that illustrates a problem for taking self-reported swb as sufficient evidence for happiness, in particular, in cases that involve qualitatively different experiences. while the argument is inspired by mill’s qualitative view on hedonism, it is broadly compatible with a variety of plausible views on happiness. i have argued that the problem is based on plausible foundations. out of the currently most prominent views on happiness, only on some benthamite and life satisfaction views of happiness can the charge be avoided. however, given the charges of superficiality that have been raised against such views, we should wonder if happiness is still a prudentially interesting concept if we accept them. the argument presented in this essay presents a problem for the measurement of happiness by means of swb, in particular, in contexts involving happiness comparisons on the basis of swb between qualitatively different experiences. nevertheless, my aim in this paper is not to criticize the swb project as a whole. happiness is an important feature of our lives – arguably the most important feature. it deserves to be treated in its full depth, but it also deserves to be studied. the qve objection indicates a limit of swb research. there are important ways in which the qve objection can help swb move forward. firstly, there is a large variety of cases in which the rating of the enjoyment of experiences is not affected by the qve objection. a straightforward example is the question of whether watching television or going to the cinema is more enjoyable to a certain group of people. the qve objection does not seem to apply to the usage of swb research for answering this question. in so far as watching television and going to the cinema are qualitatively different, the differences can be appreciated by those who have experienced both. the qve objection thus helps to clarify which questions can and which questions cannot be answered by means of swb methodology. by doing so, the qve objection does not only indicate problems for swb research, but also provides a stronger foundation for applications of swb to which the qve objection does not apply. another way in which the qve may be helpful relates to the large number of puzzles and paradoxes that are characteristic of the swb literature (e.g. deaton & stone, 2013). just like in the case of parenting discussed above, the qve objection may help explain certain paradoxical results. lastly, i hope the qve will inspire new empirical ways to research happiness. following mill, people with a rich experiential basis could be an important source of knowledge about happiness. as haybron’s example of glen illustrates, studying how people experience transitions between qualitatively different lives may be an important source of information about how happy different lives are. it may be that qualitatively different experiences should be addressed by means of different research methodologies. happiness is a complex concept, and studying it will never be easy. however, awareness of the limitations of existing methods will ultimately bring the field of study forward. acknowledgments i would like to thank constanze binder, philippe verreault-julien and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. i presented a version of the article in the eipe phd seminar in rotterdam, 21 september 2015. i would like to thank the audience for helpful feedback. author willem van der deijl erasmus university rotterdam vanderdeijl@ese.eur.nl lessons from john stuart mill van der deijl www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 177 publishing timeline received 17 august 2015 accepted 18 december 2015 published 14 may 2016 references angeles, l. 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(2019). motivational orientations to mindfulness and wellbeing. international journal of wellbeing, 9(1), 1-19. doi:10.5502/ijw.v9i1.725 hanna suh university at buffalo, state university of new york hannasuh@buffalo.edu copyright belongs to the author(s) 1 article motivational orientations to mindfulness and wellbeing hanna suh abstract: adopting self-determination theory as a guiding framework, this cross-sectional study examined how motivational orientations (perfectionistic strivings, perfectionistic concerns) relate to mindfulness, core self-evaluation, and outcomes of life satisfaction, depression, and anxiety. a total of 273 college students responded to measures of perfectionism, mindfulness, core self-evaluation, life satisfaction, depression, and anxiety. results supported that mindfulness and core self-evaluation sequentially mediated the associations between perfectionistic concerns and outcomes, but the hypothesized serial mediation model was not supported for perfectionistic strivings. findings suggest that decentering with awareness may build positive self-evaluation and thus mitigate the effects of perfectionistic concerns on life satisfaction, depression, and anxiety. on the other hand, not mindfulness but positive self-evaluation alone functions as a binder in the association between perfectionistic strivings and outcome variables. this study concludes that perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns, each positioned to reflect autonomous motivational orientations and controlled motivational orientations, relate to wellbeing with or without the role of mindfulness. keywords: mindfulness · perfectionism · motivational orientations · wellbeing 1. introduction amidst the surge in interest regarding mindfulness, one line of research focuses on understanding possible mechanisms through which the effects of mindfulness lead to wellbeing (e.g., sauer, walach, & kolhs, 2011; schutte & malouff, 2011). the definition of mindfulness is met with little consensus, but ivtzan and hart (2016) provide a useful way of delineating different historical and theoretical backgrounds upon which mindfulness is defined. specifically, ivtzan and hart (2016) note that the western definition of mindfulness from langer and colleagues investigates mindfulness as a “cognitive mode” grounded in a person’s disposition (langer, 1994). according to this definition, mindfulness refers to one selfregulating consciousness by directing attention to an external stimuli and engaging with the external stimuli in a creative way. in other words, this definition of mindfulness emphasizes paying effortful attention to an external stimulus (e.g., experiences) and also emphasizes a new engagement pattern. on the other hand, the eastern definition of mindfulness is derived from motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 2 meditative practices guiding kabat-zinn’s definition that emphasizes awareness, attention, and remembering. this definition emphasizes having metacognitive skills with acceptance as an indicator of presence of mindfulness. ivtzan and hart (2016) summarize the difference between these two definitions of mindfulness by stating that: “the western approach describes mindfulness as an effortful attentive-creative mode of awareness, where one engages closely with an external experience of environment. the eastern approach, on the other hand, depicts mindfulness as a metacognitive mode, in which one attends to internal or external experiences in a manner that paradoxically involves an intimate engagement with the experience, and at the same time an ability to disidentify oneself from the cognitions and emotions that the experiences provokes” (p. 20). clarifying the definition of mindfulness is important because it has implications for understanding its pathways to wellbeing, although these two definitions of mindfulness appear to have been used interchangeably in the literature. theoretically, the associations between mindfulness and wellbeing can be explained within the framework of self-determination theory (sdt; brown & ryan, 2003; ryan & deci, 2017). sdt posits that mindfulness allows for “clarity and freshness that can liberate people from automatic responses and foster more selfendorsed behavior” (p. 271, ryan & deci, 2017). in other words, mindfulness facilitates a more thorough observation of internal and external experiences by creating a “space” for reflective and autonomous regulation of actions. with high mindfulness, individuals act more autonomously, which then affects emotional wellbeing (brown & ryan, 2003). brown and ryan (2003) indicate this process as a “healthy regulation” in which a person is focused on abiding by their values, needs, and true demands of situations through mindfulness. such healthy regulation is linked to autonomous functioning (weinstein & ryan, 2011). studies conducted on mindfulness within the framework of sdt appears to adhere to the eastern definition of mindfulness, although mindfulness measures that reflect the western definition of mindfulness (e.g., mindfulness attention and awareness scale; maas) also seem to have been used in these studies (e.g., brown & ryan, 2003). indeed, the maas was developed to reflect the eastern definition of mindfulness. notwithstanding some theoretical and conceptual differences, this study chose to use the maas to reflect mindfulness, given its original usage within the sdt framework. consistent with theoretical propositions, empirical findings show positive links between mindfulness and wellbeing. numerous studies have now established links between mindfulness and wellbeing (e.g., for a review, see khoury et al., 2013). studies that examine mechanisms through which mindfulness exerts its effects on wellbeing appear to focus on selfreferent processing (e.g., self-esteem, self-efficacy). for example, mindfulness is associated with self-esteem (brown & ryan, 2003; thompson & waltz, 2008), and some find that mindfulness influences self-esteem (pepping, o’donovan, & davis, 2013). in explaining the link from mindfulness to self-esteem, pepping, o’donovan, and davis (2013) explained that being nonreactive, aware, and non-judgmental toward arising negative thoughts about the self prevents negative evaluations becoming a true reality. a construct that encompasses both self-esteem and self-efficacy, along with two other components (emotional stability, locus of control), is core self-evaluation. defined as having positive view of oneself and confidence in one’s own motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 3 abilities, core self-evaluation is linked to wellbeing (judge, erez, bono, & thoresen, 2003). one way in which a high core self-evaluation level allows experiencing high satisfaction in life is by letting individuals set goals that are self-concordant (judge, bono, erez, & locke, 2005), perhaps clarified through greater mindfulness. extended to include outcome variables reflective of wellbeing, kong, wang, and zhao (2014) found that the extent to which one positively evaluates oneself fully mediates the association between trait mindfulness and life satisfaction. at the same time, individual differences in the propensity towards healthy and unhealthy regulation will likely influence mindfulness, core self-evaluation, and wellbeing. one factor that is relevant is motivational causality orientations. causality orientations theory (cot) is one of six mini-theories within sdt and outlines individual differences in motivational styles (ryan & deci, 2017). specifically, causality orientations refer to “motivational sets or characteristic ways of perceiving and organizing motivationally relevant perception and information” (p. 217, ryan & deci, 2017) and indicate that there are individual differences in orienting towards the environment (e.g., social context) and individuals’ own motivations (e.g., personal needs, values). in the orientation towards contexts, autonomous motivational orientation indicates taking contexts as a source of information and being directed by choice and self-determination. controlled motivational orientation indicates interpreting the environment as controlling and being directed by external rewards and social pressures (ryan & deci, 2017). in orienting to individuals’ own motivations, autonomous motivational orientation reflects the degree to which people tend to be attuned to inner needs, interests, and values, and the controlled motivational orientation taps onto the degree to which people tend to refer to external cues and controls in the environment to guide their behaviors. accordingly, individuals functioning upon autonomous motivational orientation are inclined towards using inner anchors (e.g., values, needs) as guidance towards behaviors. on the other hand, those who function upon controlled motivational orientation are sensitive to, and their behaviors are largely dictated by, “external demands, rewards, threats and self-esteem contingencies” (p. 665, ryan & deci, 2008). these motivational causality orientations are linked to how individuals self-regulate. following the organismic integration theory (oit), another one of six minitheories of sdt, high autonomous motivational orientation is associated with identified and integrated styles of regulation, while high controlled motivational orientation is associated with preoccupation with external judgments and contingencies, which then regulate behaviors (e.g., introjected regulation). a recent meta-analysis by howard, gagné, and bureau (2017) again concluded that motivation falls along the continuum of self-determination, wherein autonomous motivational orientation is reflective of integrated or identified regulations, while controlled motivational orientation is reflective of introjected regulation and external regulation. not surprisingly, motivational orientations differentially influence wellbeing. for example, gillet, lafreniѐre, vallerand, huart, and fouquereau (2012) found that autonomous motivational orientation was positively correlated with positive affect, whereas controlled motivational orientation was negatively associated with affect among university students. similarly, in an experimental study with college students, nix, ryan, manly and deci (1999) found that individuals assigned to an autonomous motivation condition (self-directed motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 4 condition) showed a vitality level that was maintained; however, those who were assigned to the controlled motivation condition (other-directed condition) showed a drop in vitality level. interestingly, there was no difference between conditions for happiness levels. expanding to employee wellbeing in work settings, slemp, kern, patrick, and ryan (2018) found through their meta-analysis that autonomous work motivation is strongly and positively correlated with leader autonomy support (supervisor behaviors that facilitate self-determined motivation in employees) but leader autonomy support was uncorrelated with controlled work motivation. leadership autonomy support was, in turn, associated with hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing respectively (ρ = .46 [ci .39, .53], ρ = .40 [ci .29, .52]). in sum, results that show the linkages of autonomous motivational orientations and controlled motivational orientations to wellbeing seem to be mixed, and this inconsistency could be clarified through exploring perhaps divergent pathways between motivational orientations and wellbeing. the relations between motivational orientations and mindfulness is also unclear. two plausible relations may exist. first, motivational orientations may facilitate mindfulness. if one is driven by self-concordant values and needs (i.e., autonomous orientation), this may lead to clearer attention and awareness of present moment experiences, ultimately leading to positive self-evaluation and wellbeing. similarly, if one is driven by external demands, rewards, and self-contingencies (i.e., controlled orientation), such preoccupation may also thwart being able to pay attention to present moment experiences because meeting the demands and contingencies are of utmost priority. such preoccupation can then negatively influence one’s self-evaluation and wellbeing. second, mindfulness may influence motivational orientations. for instance, heightened awareness may allow one to orient towards certain motivations, needs, and values. based on theoretical propositions of sdt and empirical findings, this study proposes that motivational orientations should be considered when examining the link between mindfulness and wellbeing. specifically, this study posits that mindfulness and core selfevaluation will sequentially mediate the association between motivational orientations and wellbeing. this proposition is informed by brown and ryan (2003), as they note: “the effect of mindfulness lies not necessarily in creating psychological experiences … but in allowing for choicefulness in whether to endorse or veto the directives that consciousness brings to awareness” (p. 118). in other words, mindfulness may function as a carrier to an already established tendency toward self-regulation, guided by autonomous or controlled motivations. according to olesen (2011), motivational orientations can be conceived as characteristic adaptations, following the delineation proposed by mcadams and pals (2006). perfectionism is a multidimensional personality disposition that is relatively stable over time and distinguishable from dispositional personality traits (rice, ashby, & slaney, 2007; stoeber & otto, 2006) that may reflect distinctive motivational orientations. composed of two dimensions, perfectionistic strivings refer to setting high performance expectations while not experiencing discrepancy as to meeting such self-set expectations, whereas perfectionistic concerns refer to similarly setting high bars for one’s performance while also constantly feeling inadequate at meeting such standards (stoeber & otto, 2006). bolstering this contention, stoeber, damian and madigan (2018) recently argued that different motivational qualities may characterize motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 5 perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns. specifically, perfectionistic strivings generally showed positive relations with autonomous motivation (e.g., harvey et al., 2015), whereas perfectionistic concerns primarily showed positive relations with controlled motivation (e.g., miquelon, vallerand, grouzet, & cardinal, 2005). the adaptiveness and maladaptiveness of perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns have largely been witnessed through their associations with criterion variables, and results appear rather mixed. although perfectionistic strivings are often considered an “adaptive/healthy” component of perfectionism, and perfectionistic concerns are often referred to as a “maladaptive/unhealthy” aspect of perfectionism (e.g., dunkley, mandel, & ma, 2014), a growing number of studies finds both dimensions of perfectionism as risk factors to psychological distress (smith et al., 2016; smith et al., 2017). following the adaptive and maladaptive qualities and implications of perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns may or may not mirror the generally adaptive or maladaptive nature of and implications of autonomous and controlled motivations. perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns are associated with mindfulness and core self-evaluation. across studies, perfectionistic strivings were either not significantly associated or significantly negatively associated with mindfulness (r = -.27, p < .01), whereas perfectionistic concerns were strongly negatively associated with mindfulness (rs ranged from .47 to -.58, all ps < .01) (argus & thompson, 2007; short & mazmanian, 2013; wimberley, mintz, & suh, 2016). the findings on the association with mindfulness appear rather inconsistent for perfectionistic strivings, but consistent for perfectionistic concerns. the association between perfectionism and core self-evaluation does not appear to be assessed, but given that core selfevaluation is reflective of self-esteem, self-efficacy, neuroticism, and locus of control (judge et al., 2003), findings that examined the associations between perfectionism and self-esteem (selfefficacy) can suggest directionality of associations (e.g., grzegorek, slaney, franze, & rice, 2004; stoeber, hutchfield, & wood, 2008). the present study extending kong et al. (2014) in two ways, this study first considers the role of a relevant yet unexamined covariate of motivational orientations (perfectionistic strivings, perfectionistic concerns) in the associations between mindfulness, core self-evaluation, and life satisfaction. second, this study expands outcome variables of interest by including depression and anxiety as indicators of psychological distress. serial mediation models in which mindfulness (m1) and self-evaluation (m2) mediate the relation between perfectionism (x) and outcomes (y) were tested. serial multiple mediation models were run with bootstrapped indirect effects to test the following hypotheses: h1a (h1b, h1c): perfectionistic strivings will be indirectly associated with life satisfaction (depression, anxiety), serially mediated by mindfulness and core self-evaluation. h2a (h2b, h2c): perfectionistic concerns will be indirectly associated with life satisfaction (depression, anxiety), serially mediated by mindfulness and core self-evaluation. 2. method 2.1 participants and procedure motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 6 a total of 273 college students (211 female, 58 male, 1 transgender, and 1 declined to answer, 2 did not report) from a large public university participated. participants were recruited from an undergraduate psychology research participant pool and several psychology courses, in exchange for research credit or extra credit. for extra credit, recruitment advertisement emails were sent to course instructors for distribution consideration. initially, a total of 303 individuals logged onto the survey link; one indicated “disagree” at the informed consent stage, 26 agreed at the informed consent stage but did not proceed further, and three did not complete the survey and thus were excluded. full final participant demographic information appears in table 1. questionnaires were presented online in a random order, using an online software, qualtrics. the study took approximately 30 minutes to complete and was approved by the university institutional review board. participants were recruited over two school semesters (spring and summer semesters of 2014), within approximately 7 months. table 1. sample characteristics (n = 273) age mean = 19.56 (sd = 2.72) gender female (n = 211) male (n = 58) transgender (n = 1) declined to answer (n = 1) did not report (n = 2) race/ethnicity white or european american (56.4%) asian or asian american (14.3%) hispanic/latino/a (12.8%) black or african-american (7.7%) multicultural (3.7%) native american (0.7%) pacific islander (0.4%) other (3.3%) did not report (0.7%) academic classification first-year students (42.9%) sophomore (25.6%) junior (19.0%) senior (10.6%) did not report (0.4%) 2.2 measures perfectionism. the almost perfect scale-revised (aps-r; slaney et al., 2001) was used to assess perfectionistic strivings (seven items) and perfectionistic concerns (12 items). sample items include, “i have high expectations for myself,” and “i often feel frustrated because i can’t meet my goals,” for perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns respectively. participants responded to a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater perfectionistic tendencies. internal consistency was sound for perfectionistic strivings (.82) and perfectionistic concerns (.92) among college students (grzegorek et al., 2004), motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 7 and validity was evidenced (rice & ashby, 2007). internal consistency was .92 for perfectionistic strivings and .97 for perfectionistic concerns in the present study. mindfulness. the mindfulness attention and awareness scale (maas; brown & ryan, 2003) was used to assess trait mindfulness that refers to an open or receptive awareness and attention to what is taking place in the present. sample items include, “i find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present,” and “i find myself doing things without paying attention.” composed of 15 items, participants respond to a 6-point scale (1 = almost always, 6 = almost never), higher scores indicating higher levels of mindfulness. internal consistency was sound, with .86 among college students (allan, bott, & suh, 2015). brown and ryan (2003) supported the convergent, discriminant, and criterion validity of the maas. internal consistency was .94 in the present study. core self-evaluation. the core self-evaluation scale (cses; judge et al., 2003) was used to assess one’s appraisal of their worthiness, effectiveness and capability. the cses is composed of 12 items tapping into self-esteem, self-efficacy, emotional stability, and locus of control, and it is generally suggested to use the items to indicate a uni-dimensional factor (judge et al., 2003). sample items include, “i am confident i get the success i deserve in life,” and “i determine what will happen in my life.” participants respond to a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater self-evaluation. internal consistency ranged from .83 to .87 among college students, and validity was supported (judge et al., 2003). internal consistency was .96 for the total score in this study. satisfaction with life. the satisfaction with life scale (swls; diener, emmons, larsen, & griffin, 1985) is a 5-item measure that was used to assess perceived general satisfaction with life as an aspect of subjective wellbeing (pavot & diener, 2008). participants respond to a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), with higher scores indicating greater levels of life satisfaction. sample items include, “i am satisfied with my life,” and “if i could live my life over, i would change almost nothing.” internal consistency of the measure among college students was .84 (steger, frazier, oishi, & kaler, 2006), and convergent validity was supported (pavot & diener, 2008). internal consistency was .98 in the present study. depression. the center for epidemiological studies – depression (ces-d; radloff, 1977) was used to assess symptoms of depression. sample items include, “i thought my life had been a failure” and “i was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.” composed of 20 items, participants responded using a 4-point scale (0 = rarely or none of the time, 3 = most or all of the time), with higher scores indicating higher levels of depressive symptomatology. following several recommendations (e.g., edwards, cheavens, heiy, & cukrowicz, 2010), 15 items from the original 20 items were used to create a single indicator of depression. good internal consistency was evidenced (.87) among a large adult sample (edwards, cheavens, heiy, & cukrowicz, 2010), and convergent and discriminant validity of the original measure was supported (radloff, 1977). internal consistency of 15 items was .95 in the present study. anxiety. the self-rating anxiety scale (sras; zung, 1971) was used to assess symptoms of anxiety. sample items include, “i get upset easily or feel panicky” and “i feel more nervous and anxious than usual.” the scale is composed of 20 items, and participants are asked to respond using a 4-point scale (1 = none or a little of time, 4 = most of all of the time), with higher scores indicating higher levels of anxiety. olatunji, deacon, abramowitz, and tolin (2006) reported motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 8 adequate internal consistency of .81 among college students, and validity was evidenced (e.g., tanaka-matsumi & kameoka, 1986). internal consistency was .99 in the present study. 3. results this study first tested whether mindfulness and core self-evaluation sequentially mediate the influence of perfectionism on wellbeing. serial meditation analyses (process model 6) were conducted with 10,000 bootstrapped samples (hayes, 2013). all variables were z-transformed in order to compare effect sizes, but raw score descriptive statistics are reported in table 2. table 3 summarizes path coefficients, standard errors, and model summary information of these models. table 2. descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, correlation) variable mean sd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1. perfectionistic striving 40.88 6.19 2. perfectionistic concerns 48.74 15.42 .08 3. mindfulness 55.62 11.90 .03 -.38** 4. core self-evaluation 40.73 7.28 .16** -.66** .37** 5. life satisfaction 24.06 6.23 .18** -.37** .19** .60** 6. depression 12.62 8.39 -.01 .49** -.27** -.57** -.33** 7. anxiety 37.58 8.85 -.05 .52** -.33** -.58** -.39** .67** note. **p < .01. table 3. regression coefficients, standard errors, and model summary of the serial multiple mediator model consequent m1 (mindfulness) m2 (self-evaluation) y (life satisfaction) antecedent coeff. se p coeff. se p coeff. se p x(perfectionistic strivings) a1 .031 .061 .610 a2 .158 .056 .005 c’ .079 .049 .109 m1 (mindfulness) d21 .363 .056 <.001 b1 -.030 .052 .568 m2 (self-evaluation) b2 .601 .053 <.001 constant .001 .061 .992 .005 .056 .923 -.003 .048 .957 r2 = .001 r2 =.161 r2 = .370 f(1,270) = .261, p = .610 f(2,269) = 25.786, p <.001 f(3,268) = 52.403, p <.001 m1 (mindfulness) m2 (self-evaluation) y (depression) coeff. se p coeff. se p coeff. se p x (perfectionistic strivings) a1 .030 .061 .617 a2 .152 .056 .007 c’ .081 .051 .108 m1 (mindfulness) d21 .364 .056 <.001 b1 -.065 .054 .227 m2 (self-evaluation) b2 -.556 .054 <.001 constant .000 .061 1.000 .000 .056 1.000 .000 .050 1.000 r2 = .001 r2 = .158 r2 = .332 f(1,271) = .251, p = f(2,270) = 25.426, p f(3,269) = 44.564, p motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 9 .617 <.001 <.001 m1 (mindfulness) m2 (self-evaluation) y (anxiety) coeff. se p coeff. se p coeff. se p x (perfectionistic strivings) a1 .027 .061 .658 a2 .149 .056 .008 c’ .041 .050 .409 m1 (mindfulness) d21 .358 .056 <.001 b1 -.136 .053 .011 m2 (self-evaluation) b2 -.534 .054 <.001 constant .006 .061 .925 .004 .063 .950 .004 .049 .938 r2 = .001 r2 = .154 r2 = .349 f(1,270) = .196, p = .658 f(2,269) = 24.433, p <.001 f(3,268) = 47.803, p <.001 m1 (mindfulness) m2 (self-evaluation) y (life satisfaction) coeff. se p coeff. se p coeff. se p x (perfectionistic concerns) a1 -.381 .057 <.001 a2 -.606 .049 <.001 c’ .036 .066 .587 m1 (mindfulness) d21 .141 .049 .004 b1 -.027 .053 .612 m2 (self-evaluation) b2 .637 .066 <.001 constant -.003 .056 .946 .000 .045 .999 -.003 .049 .954 r2 = .143 r2 = .447 r2 = .364 f (1,270) = 44.949, p < .001 f (2,269) = 108.734, p <.001 f (3,268) = 51.207, p <.001 m1 (mindfulness) m2 (self-evaluation) y (depression) coeff. se p coeff. se p coeff. se p x (perfectionistic concerns) a1 -.376 .056 <.001 a2 -.606 .049 <.001 c’ .205 .067 .002 m1 (mindfulness) d21 .141 .049 .004 b1 -.036 .054 .503 m2 (self-evaluation) b2 -.419 .066 <.001 constant .000 .056 1.000 .000 .045 1.000 .000 .049 1.000 r2 = .141 r2 = .451 r2 =.348 f(1,271) = 44.510, p <.001 f(2,270) = 110.755, p <.001 f(3,269) = 47.958, p <.001 m1 (mindfulness) m2 (self-evaluation) y (anxiety) coeff. se p coeff. se p coeff. se p x (perfectionistic concerns) a1 -.372 .056 <.001 a2 -.605 .049 <.001 c’ .225 .065 .001 m1 (mindfulness) d21 .136 .049 .006 b1 -.102 .053 .055 m2 (self-evaluation) b2 -.391 .065 <.001 constant .005 .056 .935 .004 .045 .940 .004 .048 .940 r2 = .139 r2 = .448 r2 = .375 f(1,270) = 43.589, p <.001 f(2,269) = 109.251, p <.001 f(3,268) = 53.510, p <.001 motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 10 3.1 perfectionistic strivings and outcome variables the total effect of perfectionistic strivings (c) on life satisfaction was significant (β = .180, t = 2.998, p = .003), but the total effect, removing the effect of the mediators (c’), was not significant (β = .079, t = 1.606, p = .109). the total indirect effect that sums all specific indirect effects was significant at a point estimate of .101 (95% ci = .032 to .173). the specific indirect effect through mindfulness only was not significant (a1b1 = -.001; 95% ci = -.016 to .003), but the specific indirect effect through self-evaluation only was significant (a2b2 = .095, 95% ci = .033 to .165). the serial multiple mediation model, with the specific indirect effect of perfectionistic strivings on life satisfaction through both mindfulness and self-evaluation, was not significant (a1b2d21 = .007, 95% ci = -.019 to .035), indicating that perfectionistic strivings do not affect life satisfaction serially through first mindfulness and then through core self-evaluation. see figure 1 below. the total effect of perfectionistic strivings (c) on depression was not significant (β = .011, t = -.180, p = .858), and the total effect, removing the effect of the mediators (c’), was not significant (β = .081, t = 1.611, p = .108). the total indirect effect that sums all specific indirect effects was significant at a point estimate of -.092 (95% ci = -.172 to -.024). the specific indirect effect through mindfulness only was not significant (a1b1 = -.002; 95% ci = -.023 to .005) but the specific indirect effect through self-evaluation only was significant (a2b2 = -.084, 95% ci = -.156 to -.028). the serial multiple mediation model, with the specific indirect effect of perfectionistic strivings on depression through both mindfulness and self-evaluation, was not significant (a1b2d21 = -.006, 95% ci = -.034 to .015), indicating that perfectionistic strivings do not affect depression serially, through first mindfulness, and then through core self-evaluation. see figure 2 below. results on anxiety appeared similar to that of depression. the total effect of perfectionistic strivings (c) on anxiety was not significant (β = -.047, t = -.778, p = .437), and the total effect, removing the effect of the mediators (c’), was not significant (β = .041, t = 0.826, p = .409). the total indirect effect that sums all specific indirect effects was significant at a point estimate of -.088 (95% ci = -.171 to -.019). the specific indirect effect through mindfulness only was not significant (a1b1 = -.004; 95% ci = -.026 to .011), but the specific indirect effect through self-evaluation only was significant (a2b2 = -.080, 95% ci = -.147 to -.025). the serial multiple mediation model, with the specific indirect effect of perfectionistic strivings on depression through both mindfulness and self-evaluation, was not significant (a1b2d21 = -.005, 95% ci = -.032 to .015), indicating that perfectionistic strivings do not affect anxiety serially, through first mindfulness, and then through core self-evaluation. see figure 3 below. 3.2 perfectionistic concerns and outcome variables it was tested whether mindfulness and self-evaluation sequentially mediate the influence of perfectionistic concerns on outcomes (h2a, h2b, h2c). the total effect of perfectionistic concerns (c) on life satisfaction was significant (β = -.373, t = -6.562, p < .001), but the total effect removing the effect of the mediators (c’) was not significant (β = .036, t = 0.543, p = .587). the total indirect effect that sums all specific indirect effects was significant at a point estimate of -.409 (95% ci = -.539 to -.296). the specific indirect effect through mindfulness only was not significant (a1b1 = .010; 95% ci = -.029 to .056), but the specific indirect effect through self-evaluation only was motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 11 significant (a2b2 = -.385, 95% ci = -.516 to -.279). the serial multiple mediation model, with the specific indirect effect of perfectionistic concerns on life satisfaction through both mindfulness and self-evaluation, was significant (a1b2d21 = -.034, 95% ci = -.070 to -.007), indicating that the serial mediation model of perfectionistic concerns predicting life satisfaction sequentially through mindfulness and core self-evaluation was supported. see figure 4 below. the total effect of perfectionistic concerns (c) on depression was significant (β = .494, t = 9.361, p < .001), and the total effect, removing the effect of the mediators (c’), was significant as well (β = .205, t = 3.076, p = .002). the total indirect effect that sums all specific indirect effects was significant at a point estimate of .289 (95% ci = .186 to .395). the specific indirect effect through mindfulness only was not significant (a1b1 = .014; 95% ci = -.026 to .067), but the specific indirect effect through self-evaluation only was significant (a2b2 = .254, 95% ci = .157 to .353). the serial multiple mediation model, with the specific indirect effect of perfectionistic concerns on depression through both mindfulness and self-evaluation, was significant (a1b2d21 = .022, 95% ci = .006 to .049), indicating that the serial mediation model of perfectionistic concerns predicting depression sequentially through mindfulness and core self-evaluation was supported. see figure 5 below. the total effect of perfectionistic concerns (c) on anxiety was significant (β = .519, t = 9.991, p < .001), and the total effect, removing the effect of the mediators (c’), was significant as well (β = .225, t = 3.444, p = .001). the total indirect effect that sums all specific indirect effects was significant at a point estimate of .294 (95% ci = .191 to .409). the specific indirect effect through mindfulness only was not significant (a1b1 = .038; 95% ci = -.002 to .093), but the specific indirect effect through self-evaluation only was significant (a2b2 = .237, 95% ci = .142 to .346). the serial multiple mediation model, with the specific indirect effect of perfectionistic concerns on anxiety through both mindfulness and self-evaluation, was significant (a1b2d21 = .020, 95% ci = .004 to .045), indicating that the serial mediation model of perfectionistic concerns predicting anxiety sequentially through mindfulness and core self-evaluation was supported. see figure 6 below. motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 12 perfectionistic strivings mindfulness core self-evaluation life satisfaction perfectionistic strivings mindfulness core self-evaluation depression a1 = .030 a2 = .152** d21 = .364*** b1 = -.065 b2 = -.556*** c’ = .081 total indirect = -.092† (ci = -.172, -.024) figure 3. model 1: serial multiple mediation model of perfectionistic strivings on life satisfaction, with m1 as mindfulness and m2 as core self-evaluation †95% ci of the estimate indicates a significant total indirect effect. note. ***p < .001, **p < .01. –> significant path; > non-significant path. figure 2. model 2: serial multiple mediation model of perfectionistic strivings on depression, with m1 as mindfulness and m2 as core self-evaluation †95% ci of the estimate indicates a significant total indirect effect. note. ***p < .001, **p < .01. –> significant path; > non-significant path. perfectionistic strivings mindfulness core self-evaluation anxiety a1 = .027 a2 = .149** d21 = .358*** b1 = -.136* b2 = -.534*** c’ = .041 total indirect = -.088† (ci = -.171, -.019) c’ = .079 total indirect = .101† (ci = .032, .173) figure 1. model 3: serial multiple mediation model of perfectionistic strivings on anxiety, with m1 as mindfulness and m2 as core self-evaluation †95% ci of the estimate indicates a significant total indirect effect. note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. –> significant path; > non-significant path. a1 = .031 d21 = .363*** b2 = .601*** a2 = .158** b1 = -.030 motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 13 perfectionistic concerns mindfulness core self-evaluation life satisfaction a1 = -.381*** a2 = -.606*** d21 = .141** b1 = -.027 b2 = .637*** c’ = .036 total indirect = -.409† (ci = -.539, -.296) figure 4. model 4: serial multiple mediation model of perfectionistic concerns on life satisfaction, with m1 as mindfulness and m2 as core self-evaluation †95% ci of the estimate indicates a significant total indirect effect. note. ***p < .001, **p < .01. –> significant path; > non-significant path. perfectionistic concerns mindfulness core self-evaluation depression a1 = -.376*** a2 = -.606*** d21 = .141** b1 = -.036 b2 = -.419*** c’ = 205** total indirect = .289† (ci = .186, .395) figure 5. model 5: serial multiple mediation model of perfectionistic concerns on depression, with m1 as mindfulness and m2 as core self-evaluation †95% ci of the estimate indicates a significant total indirect effect. note. ***p < .001, **p < .01. –> significant path; > non-significant path. perfectionistic concerns mindfulness core self-evaluation anxiety a1 = -.372*** a2 = -.605*** d21 = .136** b1 = -.102 b2 = -.391*** c’ = 225** total indirect = .294† (ci = .191, .409) figure 6. model 6: serial multiple mediation model of perfectionistic concerns on anxiety, with m1 as mindfulness and m2 as core self-evaluation †95% ci of the estimate indicates a significant total indirect effect. note. ***p < .001, **p < .01. –> significant path; > non-significant path. motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 14 4. discussion this study examined whether the relation between motivational orientations (perfectionistic strivings, perfectionistic concerns) and wellbeing is sequentially mediated by mindfulness and core self-evaluation. all three hypotheses on perfectionistic strivings (h1a, h1b, and h1c) were not supported, rejecting sequential mediation models with life satisfaction, depression, and anxiety. first, in understanding the total (c) and direct effects (c’), perfectionistic strivings were positively correlated with life satisfaction (c = .180, p = .003), but this relationship was no longer significant once multiple mediators were included in the model (c’ = .079, p = .109). perfectionistic strivings with depression and anxiety were not significantly correlated respectively (c = -.011, p = .858; c = -.047, p = .437), and even when mediators were included respectively (c’ = .081, p = .108; c’ = .041, p = .409). in other words, perfectionistic strivings alone are not a risk factor to depression and anxiety, whereas perfectionistic strivings alone can facilitate experiences of life satisfaction. this result aligns well with the adaptive conceptualization of perfectionistic strivings (stoeber & otto, 2006), and to conceptualizing perfectionistic strivings as reflective of autonomous motivational orientation, given that autonomous motivational orientation is linked to greater wellbeing. based on sdt, autonomous orientation is an important precedent to psychological health (ryan & deci, 2017). regarding specific indirect effects, perfectionistic strivings influenced life satisfaction, depression, and anxiety indirectly through positive appraisal of one’s worthiness, effectiveness, and capabilities in the expected directions. in other words, one’s striving for excellence grounded in inner needs, values, and goals may guide one to favorably perceive and assess oneself, which subsequently leads to wellbeing and low distress. this finding again suggests that perfectionistic strivings is an “adaptive” characteristic that orients and energizes people to approach and achieve self-set expectations and goals (stoeber, damian, & madigan, 2018). interestingly, mindfulness did not mediate the effects perfectionistic strivings had on either core self-evaluation or outcome variables. it is unclear what this finding points at, other than acknowledging that when individuals are driven by autonomous motivational orientation, they are being driven via internalized regulation with clear values and intrinsic motivations, which might already be sufficient to be linked to core self-evaluation and outcomes. as for perfectionistic concerns, all three hypotheses (h2a, h2b, and h2c) were supported. first, perfectionistic concerns were negatively correlated with life satisfaction, but this relationship was no longer significant once multiple mediators were included. perfectionistic concerns significantly positively correlated to depression and anxiety both with and without mediators. second, examination of direct effects of perfectionistic concerns on outcome variables showed that striving for excellence in the presence of self-doubt was associated with low life satisfaction and with high depression and anxiety, even controlling for the effects of mediators. this finding is consistent with propositions arguing perfectionistic concerns as a risk factor to depression and anxiety (egan, wade, & shafran, 2011). this result also supports positioning perfectionistic concerns as reflective of controlled motivational orientation from sdt. sdt argues that individuals guided by controlled motivation are sensitive to failure cues and negative feedback, while behaviors are likely driven motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 15 by introjected demands; this culminates in lifestyles or activities that are thwarting basic needs, which then predict “antagonist outcomes” (deci & ryan, 2012). thus, individuals driven by controlled motivation set high expectations out of fear of failure, while constantly monitoring personal inadequacies. consequently, this hinders them from meeting basic needs of autonomy and competence, and hence put them at greater risk for poor wellbeing. regarding indirect effects, perfectionistic concerns influenced outcome variables sequentially via mindfulness and core self-evaluation. thus, those with a tendency to be critical and preoccupied with perceived inadequacies have inhibited experiences of paying scant attention to internal and external processes, and those who had a low mindful tendency perceived themselves to be not worthy and capable. core self-evaluation was positively related to depression and anxiety and inversely related to life satisfaction. indeed, many studies note that a brooding ruminative responsive style is linked to poor psychological health (o’connor, o’connor, & marshall, 2007; olson & kwon, 2007). moreover, when one is preoccupied with locating personal inadequacies, paying attention to a full range of thoughts and emotions, even those that are positive attributes and success experiences, is hindered, leaving less margin for favorable self-evaluation. in sum, if motivational orientation is propelled by external demands, rewards, and self-contingencies, and such orientation has been continuously reinforced, one becomes incapable of being attentive and aware of present moment experiences, given that meeting demands and contingencies are of utmost priority. for instance, shapiro, carlson, astin, and freedman (2006) note that mindfulness is composed of attention, intention, and attitude, and suggest that “intentionally cultivating nonjudgmental attention leads to connection, which leads to self-regulation and ultimately to greater order and health” (p. 380). this process through which controlled motivation leads to low mindfulness, which then leads to poor core self-evaluation, also may reflect introjected regulation in sdt. schultz and ryan (2015) note that introjected regulation is aimed at getting selfand othercontingent approval to avoid guilt, while building self-esteem through ego-enhancement, and that the consequence of introjected regulation is stress and low wellbeing. thus, controlled motivational orientation in the absence of mindfulness boosts negative self-evaluative emotions (e.g., guilt, shame), which then tarnishes evaluating oneself favorably. the consequence is poor psychological health. in sum, this study suggests that there are different pathways between motivational orientations and wellbeing that should be considered. specifically, efforts to build wellbeing among those with perfectionistic strivings can focus on relating the positive effects of perfectionistic strivings to building a “healthy self,” as reflected in higher scores in core selfevaluation. on the other hand, deleterious effects of perfectionistic concerns on wellbeing can be attenuated by increasing mindfulness as a way to weaken its path to negatively influencing core self-evaluation and wellbeing. limitations this study has several limitations. first, this was a cross-sectional study, and hence causality cannot be inferred. future studies should verify the direction and effects of identified relations. second, the sample was composed of college students only, limiting the generalizability of motivational orientations to mindfulness suh 16 current findings. future studies could examine whether similar patterns of results are evidenced in other age groups or non-college attending peers. this is especially relevant, given a recent review by curran and hill (2017) that reported a continuous increase in perfectionism levels over the past 26 years among college students, referring to the hyper-competitive nature of the context in which they are embedded. comparing college students’ and non-college attending peers’ perfectionism levels can give hints at whether and to what extent the competitive context is a university culture, or a new societal culture. unfortunately, we could not locate any studies that directly compared perfectionism levels of college students and. noncollege attending peers. third, the measure that was used to assess mindfulness in the current study does not fully capture the non-judgment, or self-acceptance component, of mindfulness (bishop et al., 2004). utilizing measures that reflect both aspects more explicitly would be beneficial (e.g., the five facet mindfulness questionnaire), which reflects the eastern-based mindfulness conceptualization (ivtzan & hart, 2016). in particular, in light of suggestions made by hart, ivtzan, and hart (2013), comparing the role of mindfulness in the self-regulation process with two lineages of mindfulness measures (eastern-based mindfulness to reflect “meditative mindfulness” vs. western-based to reflect “creative mindfulness”) could be the next step of research that can point to the validity of using these two distinct operationalizations of mindfulness, and assessing any similarities or differences of mindfulness relating to self-regulation. despite these limitations, this study supports one mechanism through which motivational orientations affect outcomes, and future studies should explore whether this model holds for various samples utilizing other measures that reflect motivational orientations or mindfulness. for instance, given that perfectionistic strivings and perfectionistic concerns are only one possible indicator of motivational orientations, examining how other indicators of motivational orientations relate to mindfulness, core self-evaluation, and outcomes would be beneficial. it might be also useful to explore whether motivational orientations relate differently to mindfulness influencing other wellbeing indicators that reflect eudaimonic wellbeing (e.g., meaning in life). author hanna suh university at buffalo, state university of new york hannasuh@buffalo.edu publishing timeline received 14 march 2018 accepted 12 november 2018 published 3 april 2018 references allan, b. a., bott, e. m., & suh, h. 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(1971). a rating instrument for anxiety disorders. psychosomatics, 12(6), 371-379. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0033-3182(71)71479-0 fors connolly, f., johansson sevä, i., & gärling, t. (2020). how does time pressure influence emotional wellbeing?: investigating the roles of domain satisfaction and neuroticism among small-business owners. international journal of wellbeing, 10(2), 71-88. doi:10.5502/ijw.v10i2.805 tommy gärling 71 university of gothenburg tommy.garling@psy.gu.se copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org how does time pressure influence emotional wellbeing? investigating the roles of domain satisfaction and neuroticism among small-business owners filip fors connolly · ingemar johansson sevä · tommy gärling abstract: emotional wellbeing is related to the balance of positive and negative emotions associated with activities at work and in free time. we conjecture that time pressure is a factor reducing positive emotions and amplifying negative emotions, such that it has a negative relationship to emotional wellbeing. we found this to be the case in two studies based on survey data derived from samples of small-business owners in sweden. in study 1, the relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing is negative for small-business owners as well as for employed wage earners, although at work the former group experience both higher time pressure and higher emotional wellbeing than the latter. no differences in free time between the groups are observed. study 2 provides support for the hypothesis that, both at work and in free time, domain satisfaction partially mediates the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. supporting two additional hypotheses, the results indicate that neuroticism has a direct negative relationship with emotional wellbeing, and also an indirect relationship with emotional wellbeing mediated by time pressure, and furthermore moderates the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. keywords: time pressure, emotional wellbeing, domain satisfaction, neuroticism, small-business owners 1. introduction in contemporary western societies, people are frequently over-committed such that they experience time pressure. although positively correlated with literal time scarcity, time pressure is not experienced unless people are actually aware of time limits, resulting in the experience of having too much to do in too little time (e.g., strazdins et al., 2011). several experimental laboratory studies demonstrate that time pressure has harmful consequences for work performance (for a review, see proctor and van zandt, 2018). negative effects of time pressure are also observed in free time. leiter and durup (1996) found that long work hours impair performance of household tasks and caring duties. in further support, a cross-national survey (haller et al. 2013) showed that a majority of people feel “rushed” even in free time. in affluent consumer societies, people face many competing opportunities that are attractive and affordable. it appears difficult then to not over-commit oneself article about:blank time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 72 (goodin et al., 2005). for instance, shopping is almost becoming a compulsion for many people (manolis & roberts, 2012), to such an extent that it presumably infringes on time for other activities. in previous studies, subjective wellbeing is often conceptualized as having two components: a cognitive judgment of satisfaction with life; and affective experiences of positive versus negative emotions (busseri & sadava, 2011; diener & suh, 1997; tov, 2018). the latter component is frequently referred to as emotional wellbeing, whereby of interest is the balance of the frequency (or duration) and intensity of experiences of positive and negative emotions (diener et al., 1985; kahneman, 1999). emotional wellbeing may be lowered by factors that reduce positive emotions and amplify negative emotions such as, for instance, worries for economic hardship (mani et al., 2013), poor sleep quality (kahneman & krueger, 2006), or long work commutes (novaco & gonzales, 2009). 1.1 time pressure and emotional wellbeing in this paper we investigate the relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. two previous studies have demonstrated a negative relationship between these two factors (gärling et al., 2016; ng et al., 2009). from a public health perspective, it is important to further investigate this negative relationship, since morbidity and mortality are found to increase with prolonged low emotional well-being (diener & chan, 2011). from a policy perspective, in terms of looking for improvements at both the individual and societal levels, it is worth considering how time pressure may be alleviated by changing life circumstances (e.g. reducing work hours), as well as how coping with time pressure should be supported (e.g. providing restorative opportunities). to inform policy, it is therefore important to investigate (1) whether time pressure has a negative relationship to emotional wellbeing, (2) whether the relationship is related to life circumstances at work and in free time, and (3) whether there are differences between individuals and occupational groups. a meta-analysis by klug and maier (2013) found that goal progress is positively related to emotional wellbeing. conversely, impediments to goal progress may therefore have a negative relationship to emotional wellbeing. gärling et al. (2014) proposed a conceptual model positing that time pressure is negatively related to emotional wellbeing by impeding progress of work, family, and free time goals associated with everyday routines. an empirical study by gärling et al. (2016) supported this conceptual model, showing that the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing is mediated by impediments to goal progress. based on this 2016 study, here we investigate whether the relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing is mediated by domain satisfaction, and specifically satisfaction with work and free time. since previous research has shown that domain satisfaction is related to goal progress (lent et al. 2005), this mediation is theoretically plausible. a first hypothesis that we test in this paper is therefore whether a negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing is mediated by domain satisfaction. self-reported stress symptoms were found by gärling et al. (2016) to be a parallel mediator of the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. this finding suggests that unsuccessful coping with time pressure may result in time stress, with characteristic changes in physiology, cognitions, feelings, and behavior (e.g., hill rice, 2012). we therefore raise the question of whether time pressure is stronger, or possibly more frequently experienced as time stress, by less emotionally stable people. individuals scoring high on the big-five personality trait neuroticism are more likely to experience anxiety, worry, fear, anger, and depressed mood (costa & mccrae, 1985). they have furthermore been found to be more prone towards more negative perceptions of ambiguous and threatening stimuli (lommen et al., 2010). in line with these findings, we conjecture time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 73 that individuals high in neuroticism are likely to report higher time pressure than individuals low in neuroticism. no previous research has demonstrated this, but several studies have shown that neuroticism is negatively related to emotional wellbeing (e.g. steel et al., 2008). combining this finding with the possibility that time pressure is negatively related to emotional wellbeing, our second hypothesis is that time pressure mediates the relationship between neuroticism and emotional wellbeing. previous research has shown that neuroticism is related to emotional responsiveness to negative events (suls, 2001). for instance, hutchinson and williams (2007) found that individuals who score high on neuroticism respond more strongly to daily hassles than individuals who score low on neuroticism, thus resulting in a stronger positive relationship between daily hassles and depression for these individuals. we argue that time pressure is an important component of daily hassles. byrne et al. (2015) found that individuals high in neuroticism performed worse in a decisionmaking task than individuals low in neuroticism when confronted with both social pressure and time pressure. an explanation of why neuroticism moderates the relationship between stressful events and emotional distress may be that maladaptive coping strategies are adopted. for instance, highneuroticism individuals tend to use emotion-focused instead of problem-focused coping more frequently than low-neuroticism individuals do (hutchinson & williams, 2007). our third hypothesis is that neuroticism moderates the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. 1.2. vulnerability of occupational groups individuals strongly engaged at work, perhaps in combination with demanding family obligations, are likely to have little free time for recreational activities that otherwise reduce time stress and increase emotional wellbeing (trougakos et al., 2008). a lack of resources for recreation would reduce the capability to cope with time pressure, thus making people vulnerable to time stress. stress is in turn negatively related to emotional wellbeing (ng et al., 2009). a key component of recreation activities is to psychologically maintain a distance from work and other demands that otherwise depletes mental resources and aggravates negative feelings (sonnentag, 2012). psychologically being away from work is commonly regarded as an affordance of the home, but work frequently performed at home diminishes the latter’s recreation potential (hartig et al., 2003). some occupational groups may be more vulnerable than other groups to time pressure and stress. according to previous research, one such potential group is small-business owners, whom we investigate in this study. even though small-business owners display relatively high job autonomy, job satisfaction and life satisfaction, owning small businesses has been described as a “double-edged sword” (prottas & thompson 2006). compared to employed wage earners, small-business owners work longer hours (parasuraman & simmers, 2001), experience more work-family conflict (johansson sevä & öun, 2015), and face higher demands at work (nordenmark et al., 2012; prottas & thompson, 2006). small-business owners may therefore experience higher time pressure and lower emotional wellbeing than employed wage earners. it is also possible that, even in their free time, they may experience higher time pressure and lower emotional wellbeing if time pressure at work has a negative spill-over effect. 1.3 overview of studies time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 74 in study 1 we use a survey of a representative sample of the adult swedish population to examine whether small-business owners experience higher time pressure than employed wage earners at work and in free time, and whether the relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing is negative. in another larger sample of small-business owners, we test in study 2 our three hypotheses of mediators and moderators of the relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. also in this study we measure time pressure and emotional wellbeing experienced at work and in free time. 2. study 1 the aim of study 1 is to investigate whether small-business owners at work and in free time experience higher time pressure than regular employed wage earners. we also provide an initial analysis of the relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing that we then examine more closely in study 2. 2.1 sample and procedure we used data from one of the society, opinion, and media’s (som) annual surveys of random samples of the swedish population. in total 3,400 residents, in the age span 16 to 85 years, were randomly drawn from the swedish national registry. the survey was then distributed to these individuals by mail in the fall of 2016. the net response rate was 52% (arkhede et al., 2017). the sample did not meaningfully differ from the swedish population with respect to sex, education, and region. we only include in the following analysis participants who answered the questions about time pressure and emotional wellbeing at work and in free time. for our analysis we therefore retained 850 participants, 63 of whom reported that they were small-business owners, and 787 who reported that they were employed wage earners. 2.2 measures 2.2.1 time pressure we used separate measures of time pressure at work and in free time. participants rated their degree of agreement to two statements using a 4-point scale with the response categories “agree completely”, “agree somewhat”, “do not agree”, and “do not agree at all”. the at-work statement was “i frequently feel that i don't have enough time to complete my job assignments”, and the infree-time statement “i frequently feel that i don't have enough time to do what i want in my free time”. 2.2.2 emotional wellbeing we also used separate measures of emotional wellbeing at work and in free time. to measure emotional wellbeing at work, participants were asked “if you think about your job during the past days, how would say that you felt?”, and to measure emotional wellbeing in free time “if you think about your free time during the past days, how would say that you felt?” answers to both questions were recorded on an 11-point numerical scale with the endpoints “in a very bad mood” (0) and (10) “in a very good mood”. time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 75 2.3 results table 1 shows means, standard deviations, and skewness of the ratings of time pressure and emotional wellbeing. as may be seen, small-business owners experienced significantly higher time pressure at work than the employed wage earners, t(104.23) = 3.18, p = .002, d=0.34, and at work emotional wellbeing is also higher for small-business owners than for employed wage earners, t(102.85) = 3.01, p = .003, d=.38. in free time there are no significant differences between the two groups. the product moment correlations between time pressure and emotional wellbeing are negative at work (r = -.19, p=.089, for the small-business owners; r = -.17, p<.001, for the employed wage earners), and negative but weaker in free time (r = -.07, p=.508, for the small-business owners; r = -.11, p=.001, for the employed wage earners). 2.4 discussion although the results of study 1 are only suggestive because of the single-item measures of time pressure and emotional well-being, they confirm that time pressure at work is indeed higher at work for small-business owners than for employed wage earners. this is consistent with the results of previous studies showing that small-business owners work longer hours than employed wage earners (parasuraman & simmers, 2001), and face higher work demands (nordenmark et al., 2012; table 1. means (m), standard deviations (sd) and skewness (skew) of ratings of time pressure and emotional well-being at work and in free time made by small-business owners and employed wage earners (study 1). time pressure emotional wellbeing at work in free time at work in free time group n m (sd) skew m (sd) skew m (sd) skew m (sd) skew small-business owners 63 3.13 (0.90) -0.67 3.01 (0.90) -0.64 7.60 (2.20) -1.25 7.44 (2.12) -1.01 employed wage earners 787 2.80 (0.96) -0.28 2.99 (0.93) -0.57 6.85 (2.27) -0.81 7.47 (2.05) -0.97 prottas & thompson, 2006). however, the difference in time pressure was only observed at work and not in free time. hence, our results do not show spill-over effects from higher time pressure at work to free time, which is unexpected given that previous research has documented that many smallbusiness owners experience high work-family conflict (johansson sevä & öun, 2015; prottas & thompson 2006). another expected finding is that for both small-business owners and employed wage earners, and both at work and in free time, there is a negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. we also found that at work, although not in free time, emotional wellbeing is higher for small-business owners than for employed wage earners. this is in line with previous research (binder & coad, 2016) showing that work satisfaction is higher among self-employed workers, whereas satisfaction with free time does not differ. a possible explanation is that other positive factors influence small-business owners’ satisfaction and emotional wellbeing at work, such time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 76 as work autonomy (lange, 2012). this may also explain the paradoxical finding that small-business owners experience both higher time pressure and higher emotional wellbeing than wage earners. 3. study 2 in study 2 we used survey data from a larger sample of small-business owners in sweden to estimate regression models (see figure 1) corresponding to our three hypotheses. model 1 posits that experience of time pressure is negatively related to domain satisfaction and therefore to emotional figure 1. models of the relationships between neuroticism, emotional well-being, time pressure, and domain satisfaction tested in study 2. wellbeing. model 2 holds that neuroticism is negatively related to time pressure and therefore to emotional wellbeing. model 3 posits that neuroticism moderates the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. 3.1 sample and procedure participants were recruited from an internet panel consisting of 4,323 small business owners in sweden. we expected and obtained a sample size equal to the previous study by gärling et al. (2016), in which the data analyses had an acceptable statistical power. in response to an invitational email, 1,208 participants agreed to participate corresponding to a response rate of 27.9%. they were asked to complete an online survey including 109 questions. we decided in advance which of these questions to be used to construct the measures (described below). in the analyses we retained 1,102 participants who answered all these questions. a majority were men (814 or 73.0%), aged between 45 and 64 years old (988 or 89.7%), and cohabiting with a partner (931 or 85.9%). time pressure emotional well-being domain satisfaction model 1 time pressure emotional well-being domain satisfaction neuroticism model 3 neuroticism time pressure model 2 emotional well-being time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 77 3.2 measures 3.2.1 neuroticism all big-five personality traits were measured with the mini-ipip scale (donnellan et al. 2006). participants were asked to rate agreement or disagreement to four statements for each trait (e.g. “have frequent mood swings”). response alternatives ranged from 1 (“disagree strongly”) to 5 (“agree strongly”). an index of neuroticism was constructed by first reverse-coding the positive items (e.g. ”am relaxed most of the time”), and then averaging the four items to an index. although we only planned to use neuroticism, we correlated the measures of all the big-five personality traits with the measure of time pressure (described next). in addition to neuroticism, only conscientiousness had a significant correlation with time pressure at work (r = -.17, p<.001) and in free time (r=-.13, p<.001). 3.2.2 time pressure we constructed separate measures of time pressure at work and in free time by adapting the overall self-report measure used in gärling et al. (2016). the measure of time pressure at work was obtained from agreement ratings on 7-point scales, ranging from 1 (“disagree strongly”) to 7 (“agree strongly”), in response to the statements: “i frequently feel that i don't have enough time to complete my job assignments”; “at my job, i frequently feel i need to hurry to be in time”; and ”i frequently feel rushed due to insufficient time at work”. the parallel statements of time pressure in free time were: “i frequently feel that i don't have enough time to do what i want to do in my free time”; “during my free time, i frequently feel i need to hurry to be on time”; and “i frequently feel rushed due to insufficient time during my free time”. indexes were constructed by averaging the ratings of the statements about time pressure at work and the ratings of time pressure in free time. time pressure at work was strongly correlated with time pressure in free time (r = .71, p < .001), and the reported number of hours worked per week was positively correlated with both time pressure at work (r = .44, p < .001) and time pressure in free time (r = .36, p < .001). 3.2.3 domain satisfaction domain satisfaction at work was measured using three items capturing satisfaction with work as a small business owner. ratings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction were made of the “business as a whole”, “revenue”, and “profitability”, using a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (“very dissatisfied”) to 6 (“very satisfied”). an index of domain satisfaction was constructed by averaging these ratings. to obtain an index of domain satisfaction in free time, the average was calculated of participants’ ratings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with “free time”, “family or close relationships,” and “friends” using the same scale. 3.2.4 emotional wellbeing a measure of emotional wellbeing was obtained from retrospective ratings of how frequently different emotions had been experienced the last month, at work and in free time respectively. six unipolar adjective scales were used, with seven steps ranging from 0 (never) to 6 (very often). the adjectives were taken from the swedish core affect scale (västfjäll et al., 2002), which is based on russell’s (1980, 2003) theory of core affects varying in the two orthogonal dimensions of valence and activation. each scale was defined by three adjectives. the adjectives were either: high in valence time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 78 (glad, pleased, happy) or low in valence (sad, displeased, depressed) for a neutral activation; high in both valence and activation (engaged, interested, optimistic) or low in both valence and activation (indifferent, bored, pessimistic); and high in valence and low in activation (serene, calm, relaxed) or low in valence and high in activation (tense, anxious, nervous). an index of emotional wellbeing at work was obtained by first averaging the ratings of the positive-valence adjectives and the reversecoded ratings of the negative-valence adjectives, then transforming the averages to a scale from -6 (maximally negative) to 6 (maximally positive) through 0 (neutral). an index of emotional wellbeing in free time was obtained in the same way. 3.3 results in order to test our three hypotheses, the variables (see descriptives in table 2) were inputted to ols linear regression analyses, followed by mediation analyses with process version 2.16.2 for spss (hayes, 2013) to test the statistical significance of indirect effects. in table 3 we show that the first requirement of mediation analyses is fulfilled (zhao et al., 2010), in that the regressions of time pressure on domain satisfaction and emotional wellbeing, and the regressions of neuroticism on time pressure and emotional wellbeing, all have significant coefficients with the expected signs. 3.3.1 model 1 our first hypothesis was that domain satisfaction mediates the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. table 4 shows the results of regressions of emotional wellbeing on domain satisfaction, controlling for the direct effect of time pressure on emotional wellbeing. the indirect effect of time pressure through domain satisfaction is significant, as shown by bias-corrected time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 79 t a b le 2 . m e a n s (m ), s ta n d a rd d e v ia ti o n s (s d ), s k e w n e ss ( s k e w ), c ro n b a c h ´s  s, a n d p ro d u c t m o m e n t c o rr e la ti o n s b e tw e e n i n d e x e s a t w o rk a n d i n f re e t im e ( s tu d y 2 ). a t w o rk in f re e t im e v a ri a b le m (s d ) s k e w  e w b n t p m (s d ) s k e w  e w b n t p e m o ti o n a l w e ll b e in g ( e w b ) 2 .7 9 ( 1 .7 8 ) 0 .6 7 . 8 2 2 .9 9 ( 1 .8 9 ) 0 .8 2 . 7 4 n e u ro ti c is m ( n ) 2 .9 9 ( 1 .1 0 ) 0 .3 4 . 6 8 -. 5 9 2 .9 9 ( 1 .1 0 ) 0 .3 4 . 6 8 -. 5 7 t im e p re ss u re ( t p ) 4 .0 6 ( 1 .5 9 ) 0 .0 8 . 8 9 -. 3 9 . 3 7 3 .6 2 ( 1 .5 8 ) 0 .1 0 . 8 7 -. 4 6 . 3 6 d o m a in s a ti sf a c ti o n 4 .8 9 ( 1 .2 8 ) 0 .5 2 . 8 2 . 4 2 -. 2 4 -. 1 7 5 .5 3 ( 1 .0 5 ) 0 .9 5 . 7 4 . 6 0 -. 3 4 -. 3 3 t a b le 3 . u n st a n d a rd iz e d c o e ff ic ie n ts ( b ), s ta n d a rd e rr o rs ( s e ), a n d t s ta ti st ic s a t w o rk a n d i n f re e t im e f ro m r e g re ss io n s o f ti m e p re ss u re o n d o m a in s a ti sf a c ti o n a n d e m o ti o n a l w e ll b e in g , a n d r e g re ss io n s o f n e u ro ti c is m o n t im e p re ss u re a n d e m o ti o n a l w e ll b e in g ( s tu d y 2 ). t im e p re ss u re d o m a in s a ti sf a c ti o n e m o ti o n a l w e ll -b e in g b s e t p r2 b s e t p r2 b s e t p r2 a t w o rk t im e p re ss u re -0 .1 4 0 .0 2 -5 .7 6 < .0 0 1 .0 3 -0 .4 4 0 .0 3 -1 4 .2 0 < .0 0 1 .1 6 n e u ro ti c is m 0 .5 4 0 .0 4 1 3 .1 4 < .0 0 1 .1 4 -0 .9 7 0 .0 4 -2 4 .2 7 < .0 0 1 .3 5 in f re e t im e t im e p re ss u re -0 .2 2 0 .0 2 -1 1 .8 6 < .0 0 1 .1 1 -0 .5 5 0 .0 3 -1 7 .1 8 < .0 0 1 .2 1 n e u ro ti c is m 0 .5 2 0 .0 4 1 2 .7 4 < .0 0 1 .1 3 -0 .9 9 0 .0 4 -2 3 .0 3 < .0 0 1 .3 3 time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 80 table 4. unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors (se), and t statistics at work and in free time from regressions of emotional well-being on domain satisfaction controlling for time pressure (study 2). at work in free time b se t p b se t p constant 1.86 0.23 7.98 <.001 -0.74 0.30 -2.99 .013 time pressure -0.37 0.03 -12.79 <.001 -0.35 0.03 -12.09 <.001 domain satisfaction 0.50 0.04 13.87 <.001 0.90 0.04 20.82 <.001 adj r2=.28; f=214.62 adj r2=.44; f=422.43 95% confidence intervals (ci) calculated for 2,000 bootstrap replications (-0.07, 95% ci[-0.10, -0.04] at work; -0.20, 95% ci[-0.25, -0.16] in free time). a partial mediation is indicated since the direct effect of time pressure is significant. 3.3.2 model 2 according to our second hypothesis, time pressure is expected to mediate the relationship between neuroticism and emotional wellbeing. the regression of emotional wellbeing on time pressure reported in table 5 shows that the coefficient associated with time pressure is significant when controlling for the direct effect of neuroticism on emotional wellbeing. as shown by bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals calculated for 2,000 bootstrap replications, the indirect effect on emotional wellbeing of neuroticism through time pressure is significant (-0.12, 95% ci[-0.16, -0.09] at work; -0.18, 95% ci[-0.23, -0.14] in free time). the direct effect of neuroticism on emotional wellbeing remains significant, thus indicating a partial mediation. table 5. unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors (se), and t statistics at work and in free time from regressions of emotional well-being on time pressure controlling for neuroticism (study 2). at work in free time b se t p b se t p constant 6.25 0.14 49.03 <.001 6.68 0.14 46.65 <.001 neuroticism -0.84 0.04 -20.25 <.001 -0.81 0.04 -18.59 <.001 time pressure -0.23 0.03 -8.01 <.001 -0.35 0.03 -11.72 <.001 adj r2=.35; f=343.47 adj r2=.40; f=366.71 time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 81 3.3.3 model 3 as shown by bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals calculated for 2,000 bootstrap replications, the indirect relationship between emotional wellbeing and neuroticism through time pressure is significant, both at work (-0.05, 95% ci[-0.08, -0.03]) and in free time (-0.16, 95% ci[-0.20, -0.13]). in table 6, neuroticism is furthermore shown to significantly moderate the direct effect of time pressure on emotional wellbeing. time pressure has stronger direct relationships with emotional wellbeing at high levels of neuroticism (+1 sd=4.08), both at work (b=-.26, se=.037, p<.001) and in free time (b=-.30, se=.035, p <.001). the relationship is weaker at low levels of neuroticism (-1 sd=1.90), both at work (b=-.15, se=.035, p <.001) and in free time (b = -.16, se = .036, p <.001). the moderation by neuroticism of the relationship between time pressure and emotional well-being is displayed graphically in figure 2, with the x-axis representing percentile ranks of neuroticism, and the y-axis the effect of time pressure on emotional wellbeing. as can been seen, the strength of the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing increases with neuroticism. 3.4 discussion our main findings for both work and free time are consistent with the proposed hypotheses. firstly, time pressure is negatively related to emotional wellbeing, both directly and also indirectly through domain satisfaction. secondly, neuroticism is negatively related to emotional wellbeing in three ways: directly; indirectly through time pressure; and by moderating the direct negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing. we interpret the mediation by domain satisfaction of the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing to be consistent with the results of gärling et al. (2016) and the conceptual model proposed by gärling et al. (2014). in gärling et al. (2016), a direct measure of goal progress was used. this posited that satisfaction should increase with the outcomes of progress table 6. unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors (se), and t statistics at work and in free time from regressions of emotional well-being on the interaction between neuroticism and time pressure controlling for neuroticism, time pressure, and domain satisfaction (study 2). at work in free time b se t p b se t p constant 3.35 0.35 9.57 <.001 0.91 0.38 2.39 .017 neuroticism -.053 0.10 -5.07 <.001 -0.37 0.09 -4.15 <.001 time pressure -0.05 0.07 -0.65 .513 -0.03 0.07 -.44 .661 domain satisfaction 0.39 0.03 12.03 <.001 0.74 0.04 18.29 <.001 neuroticism x time pressure -0.05 0.02 -2.36 .018 -0.07 0.02 -3.07 .002 adj r2=.46; f=233.12 adj r2=.54; f=327.56 time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 82 figure 2. moderation by neuroticism of the relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing in study 2. (the x-axis represents percentile ranks of neuroticism and the y-axis the effect of time pressure on emotional well-being.) toward different goals (e.g., business revenue, close social relations), and therefore domain satisfaction would become an aggregated indirect measure of goal progress (lent et al. 2005). the results may hence be considered to be a conceptual replication of the results of gärling et al. (2016) that strengthens the theoretical position of gärling et al. (2014). the mediation by domain satisfaction here was partial, as goal progress was in gärling et al. (2016). in the previous study, a parallel mediator was self-reported stress symptoms. this suggested that, at least for some people or for most people in many situations, time pressure has stress effects. in line with this, we found that neuroticism strengthened the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing, both at work and in free time. our aim was not to investigate explanations for this interaction. still, we note that a possible explanation is that individuals high in neuroticism use maladaptive strategies to cope with time pressure, for instance, by using emotionfocused coping strategies instead of problem-focused strategies (hutchinson & williams, 2007). future research should investigate potential explanations of the interaction between neuroticism and time pressure on emotional wellbeing. confirming previous research (e.g. steel et al. 2008), we found a negative relationship between neuroticism and emotional wellbeing. this relationship was only partially explained by time pressure, suggesting other potential mediators, such as loneliness, poor sleep quality, and low social status, all of which have been shown to decrease emotional wellbeing (anderson et al., 2012; kahneman & krueger, 2006; steptoe 2008) and have a higher prevalence in high-neuroticism than low-neuroticism individuals (anderson et al., 2001; hintsanen et al., 2014; saklofske & yackulic, 1989). neuroticism may also reduce emotional wellbeing independently of situational factors, since individuals high in neuroticism appear to have a higher set-point for negative emotions than individuals low in neuroticism (ormel et al., 2012). 4. general discussion -0.35 -0.3 -0.25 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th time pressure at work time pressure in free time time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 83 study 1 showed that, in a representative sample of the adult swedish population, there is a negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing, both at work and in free time. the study also showed that time pressure at work was higher among small-business owners than employed wage earners. the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional wellbeing was replicated in study 2 for a larger sample of small business owners. these findings are consistent with the results of two previous studies of swedish wage earners (gärling et al., 2016). although the use of single-item measures of time pressure and emotional wellbeing in study 1 is a limitation, study 2 used reliable multi-item measures, yielding similar results. whether the results generalize to other populations and contexts should be addressed in future research. the relationship between time pressure and emotional well-being may differ depending on culturally-influenced value orientations, such as whether these orientations emphasize materialistic or non-materialistic values (see delhey, 2010). since the swedish culture emphasizes relatively non-materialistic values, and therefore the importance of leisure time over work, the relationships may differ for people in other countries with other value orientations. in more materialistic cultures, for instance, people in general are more likely to prioritize work over leisure time, which likely increases the negative effect of time pressure on emotional wellbeing, since such values imply that work goals should be relatively more important than goals pursued in free time. in order to implement policies that aim at reducing the negative effects of time pressure on emotional wellbeing, it is important to understand which factors mediate and moderate their relationship. study 2 demonstrated the mediating role of domain satisfaction, and the mediatingmoderating roles of the big-5 personality trait neuroticism. both findings clarify and extend the results of gärling et al. (2016), namely that goal progress and self-reported stress symptoms are parallel mediators of the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional well-being. mediational analyses of the type of cross-sectional data we analyzed have however been criticized (e.g., maxwell & cole, 2007; maxwell et al., 2011) for providing biased estimates of mediation parameters based on time-lagged measurements. according to our hypotheses, at an individual level, changes in time pressure precede and cause changes in domain satisfaction (interpreted as an indicator of progress toward different goals), which in turn precede and cause changes in emotional wellbeing. these influences are assumed to be short-term but to occur repeatedly. in individuals high in neuroticism, the influences may be more frequent than in individuals low in neuroticism. in the survey, we measured time pressure, domain satisfaction, and emotional wellbeing by means of retrospective self-reports. if our measures then reflect invariant correlations repeated across time, our data should not be open to the suggested criticism. in the absence of longitudinal or experimental data, there are still limitations in terms of inferring the causal directions implied by the models we have tested. thoemmes (2015) argued that causal inferences are justified if verified by other experimental or longitudinal research. we therefore note that studies have demonstrated positive effects on emotional wellbeing of training in time management (macleod et al., 2008), and that in the meta-analysis of klug and maier (2013), experimental studies are included that permit inferences that the relationship between goal progress and emotional wellbeing is causal. furthermore, in a review of time-lagged observations, schimmack (2008) concludes that the reverse direction of the influence of emotional wellbeing on domain satisfaction is weak or absent. neuroticism is generally found to be substantially inherited and therefore stable (mccrae et al. 2011), thus negating a reverse causal direction of the relationship between neuroticism and the strength of the response to changes in time pressure. time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 84 our proposed mediational-moderator models are not compared to alternative models. doing this is a practice not recommended (kline, 2015; thoemmes, 2015). the models are tests of the hypotheses we proposed, and we conclude that the hypotheses are not refuted by the results. this does not preclude additional research aimed at developing theory and refining the hypotheses. one avenue for such research is to distinguish positive from negative emotions. the value of doing this is supported by a recent meta-analysis showing that accumulated neuropsychological evidence favors the theoretical position that positive and negative emotions are not end-points of a bipolar continuum (lindquist et al., 2015). it is recognized that time pressure has both positive and negative effects (garhammer, 2002). a question that may be asked is therefore whether positive effects of time pressure –– such as mobilization of mental resources, sharpened attention, and improved achievement –– are accompanied by positive emotions. although it was not our aim to answer this question, it seems worthwhile to try to do so in future research. we have demonstrated that both time pressure and emotional wellbeing are higher for smallbusiness owners than employed wage earners, whereas the relationship with emotional wellbeing remains negative. however, our results also showed that this relationship does not pertain equally to all small-business owners, since neuroticism strengthens the negative relationship between time pressure and emotional well-being. a possible interpretation is that high-neuroticism individuals are more susceptible to time stress than low-neuroticism individuals. another worthwhile purpose would be to investigate in future research how and why time pressure results in time stress. the fact that small-business owners experience both high levels of time pressure and high emotional well-being suggests that owning a small business has both positive and negative consequences (prottas & thompson, 2006). if policy makers want to stimulate small-business ownership, they need to recognize the negative relationship between small-business owners’ time pressure and emotional experiences. one possibility would be to offer training programs, providing small-businesses owners with adequate strategies for coping with the stressful conditions associated with owning a small business (e.g. macleod et al., 2008). another possibility is to make changes to decrease the work load, for instance, by providing administrative support. if nothing is done, the disadvantages associated with owning a business may hinder the development of small-businesses in society, which in turn would have negative consequences for economic growth and job creation. we finish by arguing that the negative relationship between time pressure and wellbeing is likely to exist in many other occupational groups in western societies (haller et al., 2013). this also needs to be investigated and documented. whether the relationship is always mediated-moderated by the factors identified in the current studies is an open question. acknowledgements the data collection was funded by the swedish federation of business owners. we thank rené bongard who conducted the data collection and andré hansla for advice about the mediational-moderation analyses. we thank three reviewers for valuable comments. compliance with ethical standards we have followed ethical standards in conducting the survey including request of informed consent, permitting voluntarily withdrawal at any point of the survey, and anonymizing data records. none of the authors have any conflict of interest. time pressure and emotional wellbeing fors connolly, johansson sevä, & gärling www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 85 authors filip fors connolly umeå university ingemar johansson sevä umeå university tommy gärling university of gothenburg tommy.garling@psy.gu.se publishing timeline received 27 november 2018 accepted 4 february 2020 published 1 june 2020 references anderson, c., john, o. p., keltner, d., & kring, a. m. 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(2017). a cross-state comparison of measures of subjective wellbeing. international journal of wellbeing, 7(1), 65-83. doi:10.5502/ijw.v7i1.561 younghwan song union college songy@union.edu copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 65 article a cross-state comparison of measures of subjective wellbeing younghwan song abstract: using data drawn from the 2010 american time use survey well-being module, this study examines the relationship between three measures of subjective wellbeing based on timeuse data and an objective measure of wellbeing. whereas the measures of affect—net affect and the u-index—are uncorrelated with the objective quality-of-life ranking of the 50 states in the united states, the measure of meaningfulness shows a significant correlation with objective ranking. the reason for the significant correlation between the measure of meaningfulness and the objective measure of wellbeing is because, when engaged in similar activities, people living in states with better quality of life felt, after controlling for their individual characteristics, their lives to be more meaningful than those living in states with poor amenities, not because time use varies substantially by state. keywords: time use, subjective wellbeing, u-index, net affect, meaningfulness 1. introduction recently, economists and policy makers have increased their interest in measures of subjective wellbeing (di tella & macculloch, 2006; dolan & metcalfe, 2012; frey & stutzer, 2002; stiglitz, sen, & fitoussi, 2009). for example, stiglitz et al. (2009) pointed out that quality of life depends on multi-dimensions—material living standards, health, education, personal activities, political voice and governance, social connections and relationships, environment, and personal/economic security—but many of these dimensions are not included in conventional income measures, and hence they suggested employing both objective and subjective measures to get information about people’s wellbeing. recently, in addition to the often-used measure of global life satisfaction, various other measures of subjective wellbeing, such as net affect and the u-index, have been developed. because one of the main reasons economists and policy makers are interested in measures of subjective wellbeing is to better monitor progress in quality of life beyond simple measures of income and to better guide public policy, it is important to examine how well various measures of subjective wellbeing reflect the objective differences in quality of life, so that policy makers can develop better and more appropriate policies to improve wellbeing in society. using the 2010 american time use survey well-being module, this paper contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between the three measures of subjective wellbeing based on time-use data—net affect, the u-index, and meaningfulness—and the objective qualityof-life ranking of the 50 states in the united states. specifically, by employing these measures of subjective wellbeing based on time diary data, this paper expands and also improves on the analysis of oswald and wu (2010) that first provided evidence for a significant association http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 66 between global life satisfaction and the quality-of-life rankings at the state level in the us. first of all, in addition to global life satisfaction, these new measures of subjective wellbeing potentially offer more and different ways to examine various dimensions of quality of life. second, because these measures of subjective wellbeing are based on moment-to-moment feelings, they can overcome the limitations of the measure of global life satisfaction, which is based on a single survey question and thus likely to be affected by contexts and moods at the time of the survey. third, because these measures of subjective wellbeing are based on time diary data, they allow us to disentangle the sources of their variation: differences in time use and/or differences in feelings for the same activity. the results show that whereas the measures of affect—net affect and the u-index—are uncorrelated with the objective measure of wellbeing, the measure of meaningfulness has a significant correlation with the objective ranking. the reason for the significant correlation between the measure of meaningfulness and the objective measure of wellbeing is because, when engaged in similar activities, people living in states with better quality of life felt their lives to be more meaningful than those living in states with poor amenities, not because time use varies substantially by state. interestingly, the differences in meaningfulness by state-level of quality of life are found for just three groups of activities: work, shopping, and leisure. the remainder of the paper is organized as follows. in section 2, i summarize the literature on various measures of subjective wellbeing. section 3 describes the data and methodology. in section 4, i present the empirical results and discuss the findings. finally section 5 provides concluding remarks. 2. literature review an often-used measure of subjective wellbeing is based on a single survey question regarding global life satisfaction, such as, “in general, how satisfied are you with your life?” in the behavioral risk factor surveillance system (brfss). the four valid responses to the question— very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied—are ordinal but can be treated in a cardinal way by assigning 1 to 4, where “very satisfied” is assigned 4 (oswald & wu, 2010). however, it is well known that reports of subjective wellbeing based on a single question on global life satisfaction do not reflect stable inner states of wellbeing: they are, rather, judgments that individuals form on the spot and thus are influenced by contexts and moods, and neglect the duration of the life episode (schwarz & strack, 1999). as a way to overcome these problems, kahneman, krueger, schkade, schwarz, and stone (2004a) suggested collecting moment-tomoment feelings by using the day reconstruction method (drm). in the drm, respondents first fill out a detailed time diary of the previous day and then provide numerical responses. for example, the drm uses a scale from 0 to 6 about how they felt during each episode on selected affect dimensions, such as happy, warm/friendly, enjoying myself, frustrated/annoyed, depressed/blue, hassled/pushed around, angry/hostile, worried/anxious, and criticized/put down. though the drm involves a retrospective report on an emotional state, kahneman, krueger, schkade, schwarz, and stone (2004b) showed that the drm achieves accurate recall: the diurnal patterns of affect and tiredness from the drm match those from the more expensive experience sampling method, which collects information on respondents’ experiences in real time through an electronic diary. kahneman et al. (2004a) defined net affect as the average of positive emotion less the negative ones for each episode, and suggested the population average of duration-weighted net affect as a new measure of national wellbeing. one common problem with both global life satisfaction and net affect is that respondents may interpret and use the response categories differently, making interpersonal comparison measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 67 difficult. as an alternative measure of subjective wellbeing, kahneman and krueger (2006) and krueger, kahneman, schkade, schwarz, and stone (2009) proposed the u-index, which is based on an individual’s time-use data and measures the percentage of time the respondent spends in an unpleasant situation. an episode is classified as unpleasant if the highest rating on any negative affect dimension is strictly greater than the ratings of positive affect dimensions. therefore, even if different respondents interpret and use the response categories differently, the u-index still allows for interpersonal comparison, as long as each individual uses the same response categories for both negative and positive affect dimensions. while global life satisfaction represents a respondent’s assessment of how well one’s life desires and goals are satisfied, both the u-index and net affect represent a respondent’s assessment of moment-to-moment positive and negative affect dimensions and the use of time in activities with various affect dimensions during a short period, usually a day. because of these differences, global life satisfaction is moderately correlated (0.38) with daily net affect at the individual level (kahneman et al., 2004b, p. 1779). similarly, knabe, rätzel, schöb, and weimann (2010) found that, at the individual level, the correlation of the self-reported general life satisfaction with the two measures of experienced utility—net affect, and the u-index—are weaker (around 0.36 in absolute values) than that between the u-index and net affect (around 0.73 in absolute values). furthermore, the measure of global life satisfaction and the u-index may even portray different pictures regarding the wellbeing of the same people. for example, in an international comparison of 810 women in columbus, usa and 820 women in rennes, france, krueger, kahneman, schkade, et al. (2009) and krueger, kahneman, fischler, et al. (2009) showed that whereas american women are more satisfied with their lives than french women, the u-index is lower among french women than among american women, which means that french women spend less of their time engaged in unpleasant activities than american women. knabe et al. (2010) found that although the employed are more satisfied with their lives than the unemployed, the two measures of experienced utility—net affect and the u-index—do not differ between the two groups because the unemployed can compensate for having more negative affect for similar activities by using the time the employed are at work on more enjoyable activities. based on the idea of the u-index, krueger, kahneman, schkade, et al. (2009) suggested the development of national time accounting (nta) as a complement to the national income and product accounts, and nta can be used to compare the wellbeing of groups of individuals, countries, and eras. to facilitate nta, they have recommended adding a module on affective experience to the american time use survey (atus). loewenstein (2009), however, argued that the u-index, by categorizing an activity simply as either pleasant or unpleasant, discards useful information to allow for interpersonal comparability. he suggested that the module should also ask if a particular activity was a “valuable use of time,” because the u-index measures the quality of a person’s life in terms of happiness only, but individuals might have different criteria for what makes their own life worthwhile. similarly, white and dolan (2009) showed that, in addition to affect, thoughts—measured as responses to the statements “i feel the activities in this episode were worthwhile and meaningful/were useful to other people/helped me achieve important goals”—also influence subjective wellbeing. for example, some activities with relatively low scores of positive feelings, such as work and time with children, are nonetheless rewarding and contribute to overall subjective satisfaction. as a result, the module added to the 2010 atus includes affect questions as well as a question on the meaningfulness of the activity. oswald and wu (2010) are the first to provide evidence that the measure of global life satisfaction from the brfss contains objective information about the quality of lives across the measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 68 50 states in the united states. using a sample of 1.2 million individuals drawn from the 20052008 brfss, they first estimated the state dummies in a subjective wellbeing regression analysis, where the cardinal coding of the responses to the question on global life satisfaction is the dependent variable, and various respondents’ characteristics are the independent variables. they then showed that these state dummies are substantially correlated (-0.598) with the stateby-state quality-of-life rankings in the united states from gabriel, mattey, and wascher (2003), generated by the compensating-differentials approach based on objective state-level indicators, such as precipitation; humidity; heating degree days; cooling degree days; wind speed; sunshine; coast; inland water; federal land; visitors to national parks; visitors to state parks; number of hazardous waste sites; environmental regulation leniency; commuting time; violent crime rate; air quality-ozone; air quality-carbon monoxide; student-teacher ratio; state and local taxes on property, income and sales and other; and state and local expenditures on higher education, public welfare, highways, and corrections. relying on the concept of a compensating differential, that is, pecuniary differences across geographic locations for wages, housing, and other costs of living should compensate for the differences in non-pecuniary characteristics that affect quality of life, gabriel et al. (2003) estimated the weights for these indicators in three price equations (wages, housing, and non-housing cost of living). then the weighted average of these indicators determined their quality-of-life rankings. table a1 in the appendix shows the state-by-state quality-of-life rankings from gabriel et al. (2003). applying the same approach as oswald and wu (2010) to data drawn from the 2010 american time use survey well-being (atus wb) module, the first data source based on a large, nationally representative sample of the us population that links self-reported wellbeing information to individuals’ activities and time-use patterns, this paper examines the relationship between the three measures of subjective wellbeing based on time-use data—net affect, the uindex, and meaningfulness—and the objective quality-of-life ranking of the 50 states in the united states from gabriel et al. (2003).1 by doing so, one can observe how well these measures of experienced utility reflect the objective differences in the quality of human lives across states. this paper also analyzes whether the variations across states in the three measures of subjective wellbeing based on time use come from the variations in activities and time-use patterns and/or from the variations in self-reported wellbeing for the same activity. 3. data and methodology the atus is a time-use survey based on a nationally representative sample of the us population and has been conducted continuously since 2003 by the us census bureau. the atus sample is drawn from households that have completed their final interview with the current population survey (cps), a monthly survey of almost 60,000 households that is the primary source of information on the labor force characteristics of the us population. two to five months after the last cps interview, one individual aged 15 or older from each selected household was randomly chosen to participate in the atus. respondents were asked to sequentially report their own activities on a 24-hour, pre-assigned day of the week (the diary day), starting at 4:00 a.m. on the day before the interview and ending at 4:00 a.m. on the day of the interview. the diary days of the atus are inclusive of all days in a year: weekdays, weekends, and holidays, except 1 although the state-by-state quality-of-life ranking from gabriel et al. (2003) is computed using data for the year 1990, this paper still uses this ranking because it seems to be the most recent estimate in the literature. though the ranking is likely to have changed since 1990, it seems to be relatively stable over time. for example, according to the author’s calculation, the spearman’s rank correlation of the state-by-state quality-of-rankings reported in gabriel et al. (2003, pp. 635-636) between 1981 and 1990 is 0.88 and is statistically significant at 1% level. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 69 thanksgiving day and christmas day. all atus data were collected using computer-assisted telephone interviewing. in the 2010 atus, a well-being (wb) module was added to capture how people felt during three randomly selected activities reported by each respondent. the selected activity must be at least 5 minutes in duration and the following activities and responses were not selected: sleeping (0101xx), grooming (0102xx), personal activities (0103xx), don’t know/can’t remember (500106), and refusal/none of your business (500105).2 for each selected activity, respondents were asked seven questions: five affect questions (pain, sadness, stress, happiness and tiredness) 3 , one question about how meaningful the activity was, and one question about whether the respondent was interacting with anyone during the activity. for the five affect questions and the one question about how meaningful the activity was, the respondent was asked to use a scale from 0 to 6, where a 0 means he/she did not experience the feeling at all and a 6 means the feeling was very strong.4 after excluding the episodes with missing responses or activity codes, and respondents below the age of 18 and those from dc, this paper used 35,356 episodes of activities from 12,164 respondents in the 2010 atus wb module.5 3.1 u-index using the responses available in the atus wb module, i have constructed three measures of wellbeing: the u-index, net affect, and meaningfulness. following kahneman and krueger (2006), and krueger, kahneman, schkade et al. (2009), an episode is classified as unpleasant if the highest rating on any of the three negative affect dimensions (pain, sadness, and stress) is strictly greater than the rating of the positive affect dimension (happiness). then the u-index for state j, 𝑈𝑗, can be constructed as the weighted average of these classifications over the episodes from the respondents in the state. specifically, 𝑈𝑗 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑘𝑖 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑘𝑖 (1) where i denotes the respondent, k denotes the sampled activity, 𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑗 denotes an indicator variable for an episode k being unpleasant for respondent i in state j, and 𝑤𝑖𝑘𝑗denotes the wb module activity weight (wufnactwtc) attached to activity k for respondent i in state j. the weights account for both i) differences between activities in the fraction of time spent in eligible activities and ii) differences between persons in the probability of having a specific eligible activity selected due to variation in the number of eligible activities. in the end, this u-index is an estimate for the fraction of time the individuals in the state spend in an unpleasant situation. 2 in parentheses are the atus activity codes. 3 the order of the five affect questions was randomly determined for each respondent. 4 the atus wb module data files also contain four general health questions: general health status (excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor); whether the respondent was told he/she has hypertension by a doctor in the last five years; whether the respondent took any pain medication on the diary day; and how well rested the respondent felt on the diary day. a small number of atus respondents (431 out of 13,260) who do not meet the following criteria are not counted in the wb module: i) answer at least four of the seven questions about the activity for at least one of the three activities selected, and ii) answer at least one of the final four general health questions. 5 the number of episodes per state, excluding dc, is 707.1 on average, with the maximum of 3,650 for california and the minimum of 54 for alaska. in addition to alaska, the following four states have fewer than 100 episodes: delaware (92), north dakota (89), vermont (81), and wyoming (60). measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 70 even though the u-index is based on cardinal responses, it relies only on an ordinal ranking of the feelings in each activity.6 3.2 net affect and meaningfulness net affect for each episode (kahneman et al., 2004a) is defined as the difference between the positive emotion (happiness) and the average of the negative ones (pain, sadness, and stress) for the episode. similar to equation 1, net affect for each state is defined as the weighted average of net affect over the activities from the respondents in the state. in a similar fashion, meaningfulness has been constructed for each state as the weighted average of the responses to the question about how meaningful the episode was over the episodes from the respondents in the state. 3.3 regression residuals the focus here is not on the simple differences in these wellbeing measures across various people from different states, but, rather, on the differences due to socio-economic, institutional and geographic characteristics of states, after excluding other differences among the respondents. hence, using each of these three unweighted measures of wellbeing for each episode (for example, 𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑗 for the u-index) as the dependent variable, i first estimated episode regression controlling for the following respondents’ characteristics: age and its square; a female dummy; five dummies for respondents’ race/ethnicity (black, hispanic, asian, native american, and other; the reference group being white); four education dummies (some high school, high school, some college, and college or more; the reference group is less than some high school education); two marital-status dummies (married and partnered; the reference group being single); three employment-status dummies (self-employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force; the reference group being employed); a dummy for interacting with anyone; eight dummies for family income during the last 12 months ($10,000-$19,999, $20,000-$34,999, $35,000-$49,999, $50,000-$74,999, $75,000$99,999, $100,000-$149,999, $150,000 and over, and family income missing; the reference group being less than $10,000); a holiday dummy; six dummies for the days of the week (the reference group is sunday); and eleven month dummies. table a2 in the appendix shows the unweighted descriptive statistics of most of these variables. then, similar to equation 1, the residuals from these regressions are weighted to produce state-level average residuals. because i need to get comparable residuals for all three measures of subjective wellbeing, i have used ordinary least squares for all regressions, instead of using different estimation methods, such as logit or ordered logit, depending on whether the dependent variable is a dummy variable (unpleasantness) or an ordered category between 0 and 6 (meaningfulness). 3.4 global life satisfaction similar to oswald and wu (2010), i have also calculated the state-level average life satisfaction from the 2010 brfss so that i can compare the magnitude of the correlations between various measures of subjective wellbeing and the qualify-of-life rankings. the brfss is a large healthrelated telephone survey that collects data from more than 400,000 us residents 18 years and 6 this assumes that an individual uses that same scale for both negative and positive affect dimensions. however, layard (2009) pointed out that it is difficult to compare the reported numbers for negative and positive feelings, and, as a result, the process increases measurement errors and loses much of the information, compared to other cardinal measures. for example, even if two people have the same true value of unobserved feelings, a more optimistic person may over-report positive feelings and underreport negative feelings compared to the other person. then the u-index may not be the same for the two people. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 71 older each year regarding their health-related risk behaviors, chronic health conditions, and use of preventive services. since 2005, the question on global life satisfaction has been included in the brfss. using a sample of 409,583 individuals drawn from the 2010 brfss, i regressed the individual level global life satisfaction, treating it a cardinal way, to the same set of individual control variables as oswald and wu (2010), except the state dummies.7 then i have calculated the state-level average life satisfaction from the regression residuals. obtaining state-level life satisfaction by including state dummies, as oswald and wu (2010) did, is more or less the same as obtaining them by averaging the individual-level residuals by state.8 i have adopted this method of averaging the residuals because, as described in the prior section, i have already used the same method for all measures of subjective wellbeing from the atus wb module. for the measures of subjective wellbeing from the atus wb module, the unit of analysis in the regression is an episode, not an individual, and the episode-level residuals from the regressions have to be weighted to produce state-level average residuals, which is not possible when statelevel dummies are used instead. 4. results to control for the differences in individual characteristics, as described in the prior section, i first estimated the episode-level regressions using each of the unweighted measures of subjective wellbeing for each episode as the dependent variables (unpleasantness, net affect, and meaningfulness). table 1 below shows the coefficients from these ordinary least squares regressions. because three episodes of activities have been selected for each respondent, the error terms of these episode-level regressions are unlikely to be independent at the respondent level. therefore, the standard errors have been adjusted for clustering by respondent.9 because the dependent variables in this paper are the unweighted measures of subjective wellbeing for each episode, while those in the related literature are the weighted measures of subjective wellbeing by individual, it is not easy to directly compare the regression results in table 1 below to those in the literature. nevertheless, the findings that unpleasantness increases with age at a decreasing rate and net affect decreases with age at an increasing rate in columns 1 and 2 of table 1 below are similar to those found in krueger (2007, p. 207) with the u-index, and knabe et al. (2010, p. 882) for net affect. in column 3, meaningfulness of an episode also increases with age but at a decreasing rate. different from the result in krueger (2007) with the u-index, women have higher unpleasantness per episode than men, shown in column 1. however, women feel more meaningfulness than men, as shown in column 3. while unpleasantness and net affect do not significantly vary by education (see columns 1 and 2), more educated people have lower meaningfulness (see column 3). 7 a few minor differences between oswald and wu (2010) and my brfss sample are i) they have excluded those above the age of 85; and ii) they have excluded those with income missing. the results are weighted by using the final weight (_finalwt) from the brfss. 8 the pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between the state-level life satisfaction based on state dummies and the state-level average life satisfaction from the regression residuals is 0.9988. when there are no controls in the regression, the pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between the two is 1. 9 alternatively, i have also employed multilevel modeling (demidenko 2004; robson & pavelin 2016) to address the issue of clustering at the individual level. in this paper, however, only the results based on ols regressions with clustered standard errors are reported because i) for some cases, multilevel models have failed to converge in maximum likelihood estimation, and ii) when the results are available for both ols regressions with clustered standard errors and multilevel models, they are very similar. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 72 table 1a. coefficients of episode regressions coefficient (1) (2) (3) unpleasantness net affect meaningfulness age -0.010*** -0.083*** -0.029*** (0.001) *** (0.007) *** (0.005) *** age squared (/100) -0.010*** -0.088*** -0.017*** (0.001) *** (0.007) *** (0.005) *** female -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.188*** (0.005) *** (0.038) *** (0.028) *** black -0.022*** -0.367*** -0.530*** (0.008) *** (0.060) *** (0.042) *** asian -0.003*** -0.053*** -0.283*** (0.014) *** (0.106) *** (0.080) *** hispanic -0.004*** -0.180*** -0.408*** (0.009) *** (0.062) *** (0.044) *** native american -0.043*** -0.432** -0.527*** (0.030) *** (0.230) *** (0.159) *** other -0.062*** -0.140*** -0.215*** (0.028) *** (0.199) *** (0.122) *** some high school -0.006*** -0.115*** -0.040*** (0.018) *** (0.144) *** (0.091) *** high school -0.012*** -0.192*** -0.067*** (0.017) *** (0.131) *** (0.081) *** some college -0.000*** -0.096*** -0.159*** (0.017) *** (0.131) *** (0.082) *** college or more -0.014*** -0.115*** -0.361*** (0.017) *** (0.132) *** (0.083) *** married -0.044*** -0.445*** -0.276*** (0.006) *** (0.043) *** (0.031) *** partner -0.012*** -0.107*** -0.112*** (0.014) *** (0.102) *** (0.079) *** self-employed -0.008*** -0.091*** -0.120*** (0.010) *** (0.071) *** (0.050) *** unemployed -0.043*** -0.360*** -0.125*** (0.012) *** --(0.085) *** (0.060) *** not in labor force -0.037*** -0.293*** -0.124*** (0.007) *** (0.053) *** (0.038) *** interacting with anyone -0.026*** -0.411*** -0.667*** (0.004) *** (0.030) *** (0.024) *** family income missing -0.069*** -0.348*** -0.148*** (0.018) *** (0.132) *** (0.091) *** family income $10,000-$19,999 -0.026*** -0.111*** -0.072*** (0.015) *** (0.107) *** (0.071) *** family income $20,000-$34,999 -0.051*** -0.243*** -0.110*** (0.014) *** (0.099) *** (0.067) *** family income $35,000-$49,999 -0.073*** -0.426*** -0.193*** (0.014) *** (0.102) *** (0.070) *** measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 73 table 1b. coefficients of episode regressions coefficient (1) (2) (3) unpleasantness net affect meaningfulness family income $50,000-$74,999 -0.077*** -0.402*** -0.162*** (0.014) *** (0.099) *** (0.069) *** family income $75,000-$99,999 -0.069*** -0.374*** -0.174*** (0.015) *** (0.105) *** (0.073) *** family income $100,000-$149,999 -0.077*** -0.453*** -0.249*** (0.015) *** (0.105) *** (0.075) *** family income $150,000 and over -0.082*** -0.429*** -0.356*** (0.016) *** (0.110) *** (0.080) *** holiday -0.067*** -0.512*** -0.361*** (0.015) *** (0.126) *** (0.095) *** monday -0.049*** -0.403*** -0.030*** (0.010) *** (0.071) *** (0.050) *** tuesday -0.035*** -0.309*** -0.022*** (0.010) *** (0.068) *** (0.050) *** wednesday -0.049*** -0.430*** -0.059*** (0.010) *** (0.068) *** (0.049) *** thursday -0.042*** -0.320*** -0.013*** (0.010) *** (0.068) *** (0.051) *** friday -0.027*** -0.285*** -0.048*** (0.009) *** (0.069) *** (0.050) *** saturday -0.010*** -0.060*** -0.001*** (0.007) *** (0.052) *** (0.038) *** constant -0.014*** -4.390*** -2.899*** (0.030) *** (0.224) *** (0.160) *** number of observations 35,356*** 35,356*** -35,356*** r-squared 0.023*** 0.038*** -0.060*** note: robust standard errors are in parentheses. the regressions also include 11 month dummies. * statistically significant at the .10 level; ** statistically significant at the .05 level; *** statistically significant at the .01 level. consistent with knabe et al. (2010, p. 878), the coefficients on those who were unemployed (in columns 1 through 3) show that the unemployed experienced more unpleasantness, had lower net affect and felt less meaningfulness per episode than the employed. finally, an episode in which respondents interacted with someone usually felt less unpleasant, had more net affect and felt more meaningful. kahneman, krueger, schkade, schwarz, and stone (2006) found a weak relationship between income and experienced affect. they explained that such a weak relationship could be because of hedonic adaptation—as people make more money, their aspirations quickly rise at the same time, resulting in no permanent gain in experienced affect—or because as income increases, although people experience more positive affect per episode by increasing consumption of material goods, people shift their time use toward activities that are associated with higher tension and stress, such as work and commuting. in table 1 above, on the contrary, higher income, relative to the reference group of family income less than $10,000, decreases unpleasantness per episode in column 1 and increases net affect in column 2. the main reason measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 74 for this difference between table 1 and the findings of kahneman et al. (2006) could be because the dependent variables in table 1 above are unweighted measures of subjective wellbeing for each episode, and the amount of time spent on each episode is not yet considered. nevertheless, the findings in table 1 above are still consistent with the second explanation by kahneman et al. (2006), that, as income increases, people at least experience more positive affect per episode. however, the fact that higher income is associated with feelings of less meaningfulness for each episode in column 3 seems to be at odds with both explanations and merits further research.10 finally, the coefficients on the days of the week shown in columns 1 and 2 indicate that measures of positive affect decrease during weekdays compared with the weekend. however, column 3 shows that there is no change in meaningfulness between weekdays and weekends. table 2 shows the correlations among the state-level measures of subjective wellbeing obtained from the residuals of the above regressions. table 2. spearman’s rank correlation among state-level measures of wellbeing, controlling for individual characteristics u-index net affect meaningfulness life satisfaction ranking u-index 1*** net affect -0.775*** 1** meaningfulness -0.340*** 0.357** 1*** life satisfaction -0.183*** 0.120** --0.125***** 1*** ranking -0.066*** -0.144* -0.424*** -0.486*** 1 note: only 50 states, excluding dc, are included because the quality-of-life ranking does not include dc. * statistically significant at the .10 level; ** statistically significant at the .05 level; *** statistically significant at the .01 level. because the quality-of-life rankings are an ordinal measure, i have reported the spearman’s rank correlation coefficients. 11 table 2 above illustrates that while the u-index and net affect are negatively and significantly correlated between the two, neither of them is significantly correlated with the quality-of-life rankings, although the signs of the correlation coefficients are in the right direction: positive for the u-index and negative for net affect. this is because in the quality-of-life rankings, the number 1 corresponds to the highest ranking of quality of life and the number 50 corresponds to the lowest ranking of quality of life. meaningfulness is significantly and negatively correlated with the u-index, -.340, but significantly and positively correlated with net affect, 0.357 at the state level, suggesting that those states with higher values of meaningfulness also tend to report, if anything, higher values for positive affect dimensions. more importantly, meaningfulness has a significant and negative correlation with the objective quality-of-life rankings. in the last row of table 2 above, the absolute value of the spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the two is 0.424, which in behavioral science is between a medium association, 0.3, and a large association, 0.5, according to cohen’s rule of thumb (cohen, 1988). this supports the notion that the measure of meaningfulness reflects state-level differences in quality of life, and those states with higher quality of life tend to also have, if anything, higher values of meaningfulness. in table 2 above, the small value of correlation between 10 using country-level data, oishi and diener (2014) also found that meaning in life was higher in poor nations than wealthy nations. but they attributed this to the fact that people in poor nations were more religious than those in wealthy nations. 11 though unreported, the pearson product-moment correlation coefficients show more or less the same pattern as the spearman’s rank correlation coefficients in all tables. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 75 meaningfulness and life satisfaction, 0.125, indicates that these two are substantially different measures of subjective wellbeing. finally, life satisfaction, obtained from the residuals of the regression described in section 3.4, has a correlation coefficient of around -0.486 with the qualityof-life rankings, which is smaller than the value of -0.598 found in oswald and wu (2010).12 overall, the results in table 2 above show that only meaningfulness and life satisfaction are significantly correlated with the quality-of-life rankings. as shown in equation 1, the three measures of state-level subjective wellbeing based on time use are averages of regression residual measures of affect or meaningfulness, using the weight based on activities and episode duration. therefore, the variations across states in the three measures of subjective wellbeing based on time use could come from two sources: i) variations in activities and the duration of the activities, and ii) variations in affect and meaningfulness for the same episode, controlling for respondents’ characteristics.13 in an effort to discover the main source of the correlation between meaningfulness and the quality-of-life rankings found in table 2 above, i have created two counterfactuals. first, to control for the differences in the activities, i have included 305 detailed activity dummies to the regressions. also, to remove the effect of episode duration, i have divided the activity weight by the duration, because the activity weight variable in the atus wb module, wufnactwtc, already contains the duration of the selected episode. second, to control for variations in affect and meaningfulness residuals for the same episode among individuals, i assigned the overall average regression residuals of affect and meaningfulness to the same activity, while keeping the activities and duration unchanged. table 3 shows that when only the differences in time use are controlled for, while keeping the variations in affect and meaningfulness unchanged, the correlation coefficient between meaningfulness and the objective rankings becomes -0.363, somewhat smaller than the value in table 2 above, but still statistically significant.14 table 3. spearman’s rank correlation among state-level measures of wellbeing, controlling for individual characteristics, activities, and duration u-index net affect meaningfulness life satisfaction ranking u-index 1*** net affect -0.739*** -1** meaningfulness -0.310*** -0.290** 1*** life satisfaction -0.196*** -0.047** -0.195*** 1*** ranking -0.032*** -0.087** -0.363*** -0.486*** 1 note: only 50 states, excluding dc, are included because the quality-of-life ranking does not include dc. * statistically significant at the .10 level; ** statistically significant at the .05 level; *** statistically significant at the .01 level. in table 4 below, however, when only the variations in affect and meaningfulness residuals across individuals are removed, by using the overall average value of regression residuals of affect and meaningfulness, while keeping the activities and duration unchanged, the correlation 12 when the state-level life satisfaction based on state dummies is used instead of the state-level average life satisfaction from the regression residuals, the correlation coefficient with the quality-of-of life rankings is -0.484. 13 this is similar to the analysis of knabe et al. (2010), who decomposed the difference in the experienced utility between unemployed and employed persons into two components: a saddening effect (differences in affect) and a time-composition effect (differences in time use). 14 because no such counterfactuals are possible, the state-level measures of average life satisfaction in tables 3 and 4 above are the same as in table 2 above. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 76 coefficient between meaningfulness and the objective rankings, -0.202, decreases by about half of that in table 2 above, and becomes insignificant. table 4. spearman’s rank correlation among state-level measures of wellbeing, controlling for individual characteristics, with the same affect and meaningfulness residuals for the same episode u-index net affect meaningfulness life satisfaction ranking u-index 1*** net affect -0.961*** 1 meaningfulness -0.153*** -0.089 -1 life satisfaction -0.161*** -0.227 -0.142 -1*** ranking -0.102*** -0.053 -0.202 -0.486*** 1 note: only 50 states, excluding dc, are included because the quality-of-life ranking does not include dc. * statistically significant at the .10 level; ** statistically significant at the .05 level; *** statistically significant at the .01 level. these results in tables 3 and 4 above indicate that controlling for respondents’ characteristics, those people living in states with better amenities tend to provide higher values for meaningfulness for similar activities than those living in states with poor amenities, but there is not much variation in time use across states.15 given these findings, it would be interesting to examine whether better amenities tend to be associated with higher levels of subjective wellbeing, in particular, meaningfulness, for all activities across the board or for a few select activities only.16 based on the 17 first-tier major activity codes available in the atus, table 5 below shows how various measures of subjective wellbeing by activity are correlated with the quality-of-life rankings, after controlling for individual characteristics. in table 5 below, furthermore, i have also examined the spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between each of the direct responses to the four affect questions (pain, sadness, stress, and happiness) and the quality-of-life rankings. this is to investigate if the lack of correlation between the u-index/net affect and the quality-of-life rankings is because the u-index and net affect are transformations of the direct responses, and, as a result, may have measurement errors or lose valuable information available in the direct responses (layard, 2009; loewenstein, 2009). in column 1 of table 5 below, the number of observed episodes for each tier 1 activity category varies from 15 for “10 government services & civic obligations” to 8,432 for “18 traveling.” due to the small number of observed episodes, the regression and correlation analysis results are not available in table 5 below for “09 household services” and “10 government services & civic obligations.” 15 considering the findings in the literature that net state in-migration is an increasing function of positive quality-oflife factors (cebula and alexander, 2006), it is possible that the reason why people living in states with better quality of life tend to provide higher values for meaningfulness for similar activities is because of selective migration: those people who value meaningfulness are more likely to live in or move to those states with better quality of life. 16 i am very grateful to one of the reviewers for suggesting this analysis. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 77 table 5. spearman’s rank correlation between state ranking and state-level measures of wellbeing, by activity, controlling for individual characteristics tier 1 time-use code & activities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) no. of episodes no. of states u-index net affect meaning -fulness pain** sadness stress happiness 01 personal care activities 205 41 -0.005*** -0.155** -0.233*** -0.107** -0.100** -0.044 -0.143*** 02 household activities 6,534 50 -0.051*** -0.100** -0.010*** -0.079** --0.003** -0.089 -0.243*** 03 caring for household members 1,969 50 -0.491*** -0.282** -0.112*** -0.140** -0.184** -0.102 -0.277*** 04 caring for non-household members 362 47 -0.114*** -0.058** -0.027*** -0.030** -0.031** -0.081 -0.037*** 05 work & work-related activities 2,511 50 -0.153*** -0.223** -0.347*** -0.055** -0.073** -0.053 -0.367*** 06 education 175 39 -0.006*** -0.192** -0.081*** -0.069** -0.151** -0.211 -0.164*** 07 consumer purchase 1,424 50 -0.103*** -0.250** -0.410*** -0.006** -0.063** -0.038 -0.372*** 08 professional & personal care services 210 39 -0.173*** -0.081** -0.118*** -0.088** -0.004** -0.015 -0.056*** 09 household services 29 na -na*** -na** -na*** -na** na** -na -na*** 10 government services & civic obligations 15 na -na*** -na** -na*** -na** na** -na -na*** 11 eating & drinking 5,468 50 -0.158*** -0.095** -0.118*** -0.136** -0.194** -0.038 -0.144*** 12 socializing, relaxing, and leisure 6,389 50 -0.209*** -0.177** -0.346*** -0.343** -0.252** -0.163 -0.167*** 13 sports, exercise, & recreation 571 49 -0.160*** -0.130** -0.042*** -0.022** -0.325** -0.136 -0.063*** 14 religious and spiritual activities 427 46 -0.133*** -0.118** -0.226*** -0.138** -0.142** -0.124 -0.105*** 15 volunteer activities 272 44 -0.041*** -0.161** -0.104*** -0.109** -0.246** -0.167 -0.179*** 16 telephone calls 363 47 -0.080*** -0.001** -0.233*** -0.051** -0.076** -0.036 -0.010*** 18 traveling 8,432 50 -0.148*** -0.081** -0.184*** -0.254** -0.011** -0.119 -0.121*** all activities 35,356 50 -0.066*** -0.144** -0.424*** -0.146** -0.095** -0.047 -0.188*** note: results are not available for 09 household services and 10 government services & civic obligations due to the small number of observed activities. * statistically significant at the .10 level; ** statistically significant at the .05 level; *** statistically significant at the .01 level. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 78 even among the 15 remaining categories of activities for which the regression and correlation analysis results are available in table 5 above, column 2 shows that only seven of them with the number of episodes greater than 1,000 cover all 50 states.17 except for sadness for “13 sports, exercise, & recreation” in column 7, none of the remaining eight categories of activities with the number of episodes fewer than 1,000 are statistically significant, perhaps due to the small number of observed episodes. there are a few interesting things to note in table 5 above. first, the last row of table 5 above shows that the correlation coefficients with the quality-of-life rankings are 0.146 for pain, 0.095 for sadness, 0.047 for stress, and -0.188 for happiness, and none of them are statistically significant. these results indicate that, in addition to the u-index and net affect, even the direct responses to the affect questions are not significantly correlated with the quality-of-life rankings. second, it seems that better amenities tend to improve the meaningfulness of a few select activities only. in column 5 for meaningfulness, out of the seven categories of activities with the number of episodes greater than 1,000, only three of them are significantly correlated with the quality-of-life rankings: -0.347 for “05 work & work-related activities,” -0.410 for “07 consumer purchase,” and -0.346 for “12 socializing, relaxing, and leisure.”18 since the major activities with the two largest numbers of observed episodes—“18 traveling” with 8,432 episodes and “02 household activities” with 6,534—are not statistically significant, it is not the number of episodes that is behind the significant results. third, even among other measures of subjective wellbeing that failed to show significant associations, when all activities are considered with the qualityof-life rankings, some of them display significant associations at the major activity level. for example, both the u-index and net affect based on “03 caring for household members” are significantly correlated with the quality-of-life rankings, and so is the measure of pain based on “12 socializing, relaxing, and leisure” in column 6. interestingly, similar to the results in column 5 for meaningfulness, two measures of happiness based on “05 work & work-related activities” and “07 consumer purchase” are also significantly correlated with the quality-of-life rankings. these results suggest that although some of the measures of subjective wellbeing might not be informative indicators of the overall quality of life in all activities, they could still serve as useful gauges of the quality of life for some specific major activities. for example, the u-index and net affect could be used to measure the quality of life when caring for household members, and happiness could be used to measure the quality of life for work and shopping. 5. discussion in an effort to examine how well various measures of subjective wellbeing reflect the objective differences in quality of life, this paper has analyzed the relationship between the three measures of subjective wellbeing based on the 2010 atus wb module—net affect, the u-index and meaningfulness—and the objective quality-of-life ranking of the 50 states in the united states. the results show that whereas the u-index and net affect are uncorrelated with the objective quality-of-life ranking of the 50 states in the united states, the measure of meaningfulness shows a significant correlation with the objective ranking. the reason for such a correlation between meaningfulness and the objective ranking is because people living in states with better quality of 17 these seven activities—“02 household activities,” “03 caring for household members,” “05 work & work-related activities,” “07 consumer purchase,” “11 eating & drinking,” “12 socializing, relaxing, and leisure,” and “18 traveling”—account for 93% (32,727 episodes) of the total number of episodes of 35,356. 18 “12 socializing, relaxing, and leisure” includes socializing and communicating with others; attending or hosting social events; relaxing and leisure, such as watching television, playing games, and reading for personal interest; and arts and entertainment other than sports. measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 79 life felt, controlling for their characteristics, more meaningfulness when engaged in similar activities than those living in states with poor amenities, not because time use varies substantially across states. further analysis discovers that better amenities are associated with higher levels of meaningfulness for three select activities only: work, shopping, and leisure. these empirical results certainly raise a few interesting questions. the first is whether the absence of significant correlation between the u-index and the quality-of-life ranking and between net affect and the quality-of-life ranking is because the u-index and net affect are relying on three randomly selected activities from a single day, which might be insufficient to provide enough information on respondents’ subjective wellbeing. however, the fact that meaningfulness, another measure based on the same three randomly selected activities from a single day, is well correlated with the quality-of-life ranking, shows that those activities in the atus wb module provide enough information on respondents’ subjective wellbeing. the u-index and net affect both measure the presence of pleasure and the absence of displeasure, which corresponds to affective (or hedonistic) views of subjective wellbeing, while meaningfulness and life satisfaction measure a cognitive state or a positive attitude towards one’s life, which corresponds to cognitive (or attitudinal) views of subjective wellbeing (angner, 2010; brülde, 2007). then the difference in correlations found in this paper might be because of the fact that both the u-index and net affect are rather affective (or hedonistic) measures of subjective wellbeing, while both meaningfulness and life satisfaction are rather cognitive (or attitudinal) measures. however, further research is needed to understand why there are such differences, depending on the nature of subjective wellbeing measured. krueger, kahneman, schkade, et al. (2009) suggested development of nta based on the uindex to compare the wellbeing of groups of individuals, countries, and eras. however, the finding in this paper that, except for caring for household members, the u-index is not correlated with the objective differences in the quality of human lives across states, raises concerns about using it to monitor progress in overall quality of life beyond simple measures of income. between the two cognitive measures of subjective wellbeing found to be correlated with the objective quality-of-life ranking, meaningfulness, unlike the measure of global life satisfaction, is not likely to be influenced by contexts and moods, and also takes the duration of the life episode into account. in this sense, meaningfulness seems to be a better and reliable indicator of subjective wellbeing. this is the first study that has used the newly available 2010 atus wb module to examine the external validity of the measures of subjective wellbeing in the united states. because the findings in this paper are based only on us data, they might not generalize to other countries. as more and more countries collect data on time use and subjective wellbeing, it would be fruitful to examine whether the same pattern of correlation is observed between the measures of subjective wellbeing and objective differences in quality of life. authors younghwan song union college songy@union.edu publishing timeline received 2 september 2016 accepted 21 april 2017 published 9 june 2017 measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 80 references angner, e. 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(2009). accounting for the richness of daily activities. psychological science, 20(8), 1000-1008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02392.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797613507286 http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1180606 http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/stiglitzreport.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02392.x measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 82 appendix table a1. quality-of-life ranks by state, 1990 state quality-of-life rank state quality-of-life rank alabama 26 montana -4 alaska 23 nebraska 16 arizona 20 nevada 29 arkansas -3 new hampshire 43 california 42 new jersey 47 colorado 34 new mexico 14 connecticut 32 new york 50 delaware 30 north carolina 17 florida 10 north dakota -6 georgia 36 ohio 33 hawaii 38 oklahoma 21 idaho -5 oregon 22 illinois 48 pennsylvania 35 indiana 44 rhode island 12 iowa 15 south carolina 18 kansas 19 south dakota -2 kentucky 24 tennessee 28 louisiana -8 texas 25 maine -9 utah 39 maryland 45 vermont 13 massachusetts 27 virginia 31 michigan 49 washington 41 minnesota 46 west virginia 11 mississippi -7 wisconsin 37 missouri 40 wyoming -1 source: table 3 of gabriel, mattey, and wascher (2003, pp. 635-636). measures of subjective wellbeing song www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 83 table a2. descriptive statistics of individuals, unweighted variables mean minimum maximum unpleasant 00.157 -0 1 net affect 03.340 -6 6 meaningful 04.280 -0 6 age 48.020 18 85 female 00.564 -0 1 white 00.666 -0 1 black 00.142 -0 1 asian 00.033 -01 hispanic 00.141 -0 1 native american 00.007 -0 1 other 00.012 -0 1 less than some high school 00.037 -0 1 some high school 00.082 -0 1 high school 00.267 -0 1 some college 00.285 -0 1 college or more 00.328 -0 1 married 00.509 -0 1 partner 00.034 -0 1 single 00.458 -0 1 self-employed 00.073 -0 1 unemployed 00.064 -01 not in labor force 00.309 -0 1 employed 00.553 -0 1 interacting with anyone 00.555 -0 1 family income missing 00.042 -0 1 family income less than $10,000 00.068 -0 1 family income $10,000-$19,999 00.117 -0 1 family income $20,000-$34,999 00.174 -01 family income $35,000-$49,999 00.134 -0 1 family income $50,000-$74,999 00.180 -0 1 family income $75,000-$99,999 00.111 -0 1 family income $100,000-$149,999 00.101 -0 1 family income $150,000 and over 00.071 -0-1 holiday 00.016 -0 1 sunday 00.259 -0 1 monday 00.097 -01 tuesday 00.103 -0 1 wednesday 00.102 -0 1 thursday 00.098 -0 1 friday 00.098 -0 1 saturday 00.242 -0 1 number of observations 12,164 trust and wellbeing gokcen, n., hefferon, k., & attree, e., (2012). university students’ constructions of ‘flourishing’ in british higher education: an inductive content analysis. international journal of wellbeing, 2(1), 1–21. doi:10.5502/ijw.v2i1.1 nesrin gokcen university of east london n.gokcen@uel.ac.uk copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 1 article university students’ constructions of ‘flourishing’ in british higher education: an inductive content analysis nesrin gokcen · kate hefferon · elizabeth attree abstract: the potential to flourish as a student has emerged as a topic of debate amid the current period of economic transition in british higher education (he). the present study sought to explore the concept of ‘flourishing’ as it is constructed by students in british he. an open-ended questionnaire was distributed to 222 students across two post-1992 (former polytechnic) british universities to elicit written qualitative data on their understandings of ‘flourishing’ and ‘flourishing at university’, and of their characterisations of ‘flourishing’ and ‘non-flourishing’ students. data was content analysed using an inductive approach. prominent categories emerging from the data sets constructed ‘flourishing’ primarily as self-actualisation (personal growth, potential realisation) and success. however, engagement (both academic and social) emerged as a significant facet of ‘flourishing at university’. the ‘flourishing student’ was characterised as academically and socially engaged, committed to learning, and oriented towards personal growth. conversely, the ‘non-flourishing’ student emerged as having a general sense of lacking, a disengaged attitude towards academic work, and a lazy/withdrawn outlook. results provide inductively derived support for four components of wellbeing theory – positive emotions, engagement, relationships, and achievement (seligman, 2011) and allow generic understandings of ‘flourishing’ to be contextualised within a he setting. further implications of the study and suggestions for future research are discussed with regard to the findings. keywords: flourishing, higher education, wellbeing, university students, content analysis 1. introduction to ‘flourish’ is defined by the concise oxford dictionary (1964) as to ‚grow vigorously; thrive, prosper, be successful; be in one’s prime‛ (p. 467). the word derives from the latin flor, meaning flower, coming from the proto-indo-european *bhlo – to bloom. metaphorically, too, flourishing can be likened to the blooming of flowers: the phenomenon signifies fulfilment of an organism’s inherent nature, cultivating its own wellbeing and also that of others in an ecological or social system. colloquial use of the term ‘flourishing’ tends to centre on ideas of realising one’s potential (spiritually, developmentally, economically, etc.), succeeding, achieving, or making some significant contribution to society. one of the first appearances of flourishing in philosophical thought was in aristotle’s virtue ethics, which focused on collective flourishing as an ideal state of society in which citizens fulfil their inherent nature to act virtuously (aristotle, 350 bc/2000; hill, 1999). the idea of flourishing as a collective phenomenon has also been evident in marxist philosophy, in which a reorganisation of society is called for that better facilitates citizens’ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ university students’ constructions of ‘flourishing’ gokcen, hefferon, & attree www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 2 virtuous conduct, leading to widespread flourishing in society (leopold, 2007; marx, 1959/1988). more recently, there has been a change of focus from collective to individual flourishing, and from studying flourishing philosophically to empirically (seligman, 1999). positive psychological perspectives on flourishing have generally moved from happinessor life satisfaction-oriented theories (e.g. seligman, 2002) to models of total wellbeing or global flourishing (forgeard, jayawickreme, kern, & seligman, 2011; seligman, 2011). earlier approaches to wellbeing have focused on psychological need satisfaction as a key requirement for positive human functioning or psychological health (e.g. deci & ryan, 1985; ryff, 1989). later accounts have assimilated these approaches into positive psychological understandings of flourishing or wellbeing (e.g. deci & ryan, 2008a, 2008b; ryan, huta, & deci, 2008; ryff & singer, 2006). mental health perspectives on flourishing (particularly keyes, 2002) assert that flourishing is a form of positive mental health distinct from the mere absence of mental illness, with the majority of individuals falling somewhere in the middle of the flourishing-languishing mental health continuum (keyes, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). recent cross-national studies of european populations have confirmed that flourishing is a construct distinct from subjective wellbeing, both with regard to its multidimensionality and to the generally low rate of co-occurrence of flourishing and indicators of subjective wellbeing such as life satisfaction (huppert & so, 2009, 2011). more recently, global wellbeing perspectives on flourishing have built on both need satisfaction and mental health approaches to produce models of complete optimal functioning of the individual (seligman, 2011; vittersø, 2009). wellbeing theory is perhaps comprehensive in bringing together the current known facets of flourishing in its ‘perma’ model, which incorporates positive emotions, engagement, relationships, meaning, and achievement (seligman, 2011). existing approaches to flourishing, particularly within positive psychology, tend to adopt a consistently positivist epistemology (bauer & perciful, 2009). although this has enabled scientific understandings of flourishing to be developed, it does not enable subjective understandings of flourishing to be acknowledged or incorporated into existing theories of wellbeing. consequently, little is known about the ways flourishing may be conceptualised by individuals. it is well documented (e.g. krippendorf, 2004; miller & hoogstra, 1992; vygotsky, 1986) that individuals’ use of language and vocabulary in relation to concepts is essentially a manifestation of their interpretations of sociocultural constructions of such concepts. given this, it cannot initially be assumed that empirically derived theories of wellbeing necessarily account for the experience and sociocultural construction of flourishing in a comprehensive sense. research to date has not addressed flourishing in specific life domains, perhaps with the exceptions of work (fredrickson, 2003; losada, 1999; losada & heaphy, 2004) and marriage (gottman, 1994), with the majority focusing on global flourishing (catalino & fredrickson 2011; diener, personal communication, 2 november 2010; huppert & so, 2011; seligman, 2011). higher education presents a relevant domain in which flourishing merits further research, particularly in the context of ongoing reductions in public funding in a variety of academic subject areas and an increased focus on ‘value for money’ in he (browne et al., 2010). such economic change appears to have come with a rise in consumerist attitudes in students as well documented in north america (delucchi & korgen, 2002; fairchild et al., 2007) and, to a lesser extent, the united kingdom (kaye, bickle, & birtwistle, 2006; naidoo & jamieson, 2005). development of an inductively derived understanding of ‘flourishing’ specific to the subuniversity students’ constructions of ‘flourishing’ gokcen, hefferon, & attree www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 3 population of individuals who are learners in he will conceivably make a number of contributions to both educational practice and positive psychology. firstly, positive psychological perspectives on flourishing may be broadened by lay conceptualisations of the construct, allowing a more comprehensive, socially grounded understanding of students’ potential to flourish. secondly, by understanding students’ conceptualisations of ‘flourishing’ and ‘non-flourishing’ students, recommendations may be developed as to how educationalists can contribute to the flourishing of their students. finally, an inductively derived understanding of flourishing may be used to support future research investigating the relationships between a range of contemporary issues in he (e.g. student consumerism, instrumental learning) and students’ potential to flourish. the present study employed an inductive content analysis to develop a conceptualisation of flourishing from the perspective of students in british he, where reductions in public funding and increases in tuition fees in 2010-12 have initiated debate about how students may flourish in the context of significant economic change. specifically, we adopted three research questions: 1) how do students in british he understand ‘flourishing’? 2) how do they understand ‘flourishing at university’? 3) how do they characterise ‘flourishing’ and ‘non-flourishing’ students? 2. method 2.1 participants we used a sample of 222 students enrolled on a variety of undergraduate and postgraduate courses (including psychology, engineering, computing, management and sports therapy) across three campuses of two post-1992 (former polytechnic) british universities in the southeast of the uk. the students (95 males, 92 females, 35 data withheld) were recruited in lectures and seminars through personal affiliation with lecturers. their ages ranged from 18 to 52 (213 valid cases, m=25.9, sd=7.77). although students were not asked to identify their ethnic background, they were recruited from institutions known to be inclusive of ethnically diverse student populations (business in the community, 2010). of the 185 students who reported their mode of study, 156 (84.3%) identified themselves as studying full time. 2.2 questionnaire format a one-page questionnaire was developed for the purpose of data collection from students (see appendix a). the questionnaire included two open-ended questions (what does ‘flourishing’ mean? what does it mean to flourish at university?) and two prompts (please list the characteristics of a student who is flourishing at university / please list the characteristics of a student who is not flourishing at university). thus, the questionnaire elicited four separate data sets; one in response to each item. demographic data was entered at the top of the questionnaire.1 2.3 coding strategy data sets obtained in response to each questionnaire item were analysed separately. in all data sets, a single inductive coding strategy was used as opposed to traditional deductive analysis. 1 the raw data can be seen in the supplementary file for this article. university students’ constructions of ‘flourishing’ gokcen, hefferon, & attree www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 4 first, comments in each data set were read through by the first author to gain insight into the range of keywords used. ‘keywords’ were defined as any word or phrase used to convey a substantial idea within a comment (hsieh & shannon, 2005). however, in order for the analysis to remain grounded in the data, this meant virtually all words were taken into account, leaving only prepositions (e.g. in, on) and some pronouns (e.g. he, she) excluded. all keywords were counted. individual keyword frequencies ranged from one to 148 across all questionnaire sections. keywords were then arranged into clusters within their respective data sets based upon consideration of two indicators: semantic and contextual (see figure 1). semantic indicators referred to the popular or colloquial meanings of keywords. contextual indicators referred to the social, cultural, or political context(s) in which keywords were used in individual comments. in combination, consideration of semantic and contextual indicators allowed all keywords to be grouped into meaningful clusters. these constituted our ‘concepts’. figure 1. exemplification of the coding strategy with the keyword ‘grow keyword: grow (growing, growth) ‘personal growth’ this concept was conceived as a group of ideas relating to general growth, development and progress in personal domains such as personality, skills acquisition and learning. the concept also included keywords such as develop, progress, excel, better and improve ‘self-actualisation’’ axial coding used to merge ‘personal growth’ with 2 related concepts: ‘personal expansion’ (expand, bigger, increase) and ‘personal potential realisation’ (thriving, potential, actualisation). semantic indicators: colloquial meanings center on expanding, developing, maturing contextual indicators: comments included phrases such as growing as a person, personal growth and development, to grow to your full potential following this, a form of axial coding was employed in which concepts were coded together to form over-arching categories. the ‘coding together’ of concepts was once again based upon consideration of semantic and contextual similarity between concepts (krippendorf, 2004; see figure 1). reliability of the coding procedure was confirmed in an independent audit conducted by the second author. 3. results data in our sample’s understandings of ‘flourishing’ generally centred on ideas of self actualisation and success, with secondary categories focusing on the individual/personal nature of flourishing and on positive affect. engagement with academic work and with the social university students’ constructions of ‘flourishing’ gokcen, hefferon, & attree www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 5 learning environment was a significant category emerging from the data on ‘flourishing at university’, although ideas of success and wellbeing were also prominent. the ‘flourishing’ student was generally constructed as behaviourally and attitudinally engaged, committed to learning and as having vitality and an orientation towards personal growth, while the ‘nonflourishing’ student was portrayed as having a general sense of ‘lacking’, and as being disengaged, lazy, withdrawn, struggling, and unwilling to strive for progress. an overview of the main categories emerging from our data is presented in figure 2. figure 2. overview of categories emerging from inductive content analysis of 4 written data sets elicited from 222 students ‘flourishing’ self-actualisation success individual/personal phenomenon positive affect data set 1 ‘flourishing at university’ academic/social engagement success wellbeing data set 2 ‘flourishing student’ engaged committed to learning vitality, personal growth data set 3 ‘non-flourishing student’ disengaged lacking lazy/ withdrawn/ struggling absence of striving/ vitality data set 4 note: prominent categories (those mentioned by 50% or more of our sample) are given in bold. several contradictions also emerged from our data which concerned an introversionextraversion paradox in flourishing, individual vs. collective flourishing, and whether an individual’s flourishing is determined by intrinsic or extrinsic parameters. university students’ constructions of ‘flourishing’ gokcen, hefferon, & attree www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 6 3.1 data set 1: ‘what does ‘flourishing’ mean?’ 3.1.1 self-actualisation the category of self-actualisation emerged from references to personal expansion, growth, and potential realisation (summarised in table 1). these were mentioned by 80% of the sample (219 valid comments). thirteen per cent of comments referred to increases in size (keywords included increase, expand, bigger) in the context of personal expansion of skills, knowledge, or life view. relating to this, 69% of comments mentioned some form of personal growth with a specific emphasis on growth in quality rather than size (e.g. development, progress, better). finally, 23% of comments referred to personal potential realisation, encompassing ideas about striving to reach personal potential, thriving, and blossoming (e.g. blooming, blossoming, prospering). table 1. concept and category codebook for data set 1 category overview keyword examples text examples 3.1.1 selfactualisation personal expansion personal growth personal potential realisation mentions of increases in size (expansion). mentions of getting better, developing or improving (growth). mentions of reaching or striving for some higher potential (potential realisation). expand increase greater improve develop grow progress excel prosper thriving potential blooming ‚to allow for an expansion of knowledge and experience.‛ (p. 243) ‚to grow into something bigger and better.‛ (p. 214) ‚grow and develop in a healthy way.‛ (p. 192). ‚it is a term associated with growth and getting better<‛ (p. 157) ‚growing, extending, to thrive.‛ (p. 76). ‚