Industrial production and temporary development
after the Emilian Earthquake

IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 1Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

Matteo Scamporrino

ISSN: 2239­267X

Phd Candidate in Urban and Regional Plannig
matteo.scamporrino@unifi.it
Dipartimento di Urbanistica e Pianificazione del Territorio ­ Università di Firenze

ABSTRACT
The earthquake that on the 20th of May hit Emilia has not been one of
the most disastrous in modern Italian history, but it has highlighted the
problem of preservation of industrial activities during a reconstruction
process. In addition, precisely this system, characterized by great
vitality and productivity but also by large seismic vulnerability, was the
most affected.
Through an analysis of the damages suffered by the industrial facilities,
not so much as single buildings but precisely as a system, we want to
highlight the challenges imposed by the earthquake: on the one hand,
the urgent need to provide for delocalizations and temporary structures
to avoid a stop in production in the short­term, and on the other, the re­
design and anti­seismic re­planning of productive areas.
A proposal was put forward to create temporary zones adjacent to the



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 2Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

INTRODUCTION
This paper takes into consideration the area called "Piana Emiliana”, hit by a
series of strong earthquakes from the 20th of May 2012, and focuses on the
relationship between the resurgence of productive activities and the use of
temporary solutions. This text presents part of a study carried out by the
working group "seismic vulnerability and urban planning" of INU (National
Institute of Urban Planning), which includes a document with the comments
to the L. Decree 74/20124, in the four months following the first destructive
earthquake. The first part is an analysis derived from interviews, documents
and reports about the main issues which characterised this specific case we
had to deal with. The second part takes into account some specific proposals
about the relationship between production and temporary solutions.
The challenges addressed are twofold: on the one hand, the need to re­start
producing in those sectors that were seriously damaged by the earthquakes
and, on the other hand, the need to prevent the relocation of economic
activities outside the damaged Zone in the transition to reconstruction.
In this case, as in previous reconstruction processes in Italy, actors might not
be able to understand how important it is to regulate and plan temporary
spaces especially in the medium to long term perspective. In addition, the
experts of urban planning and local administrations might see temporariness
as an external practice or solution. They might connect this concept to

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

damaged areas, on which temporary structures should be installed.
The latter would allow to limit relocations of medium­long range,
which are negative for the territory, and at the same time it would
allow the flexibility necessary to re­organize the supply chains.
However, in Italy, the management of temporary solutions is seen as a
practice too much linked to the emergency and too little to the
reconstruction process.
The first measures put into place by both the State and the Regions,
however, do not seem to show a true understanding of the importance of
management and regulations of temporary solutions in the medium­
long term.



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 3Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

emergency shelters and Civil Defence, rather than to a socio­economic
development of the territory.
In Italy, there is neither a national law, nor a real debate on the subject of
temporary solutions. However, both in Italy and abroad, similar experiences
have been made and perhaps they can prevent us from considering these
temporary zones as simple "parking areas" where people just wait for things
to go back to a post­reconstruction “normality”.
Yet, temporariness needs to be considered not only as a short­term measure
determined by the contingency of the disaster, but as a potential opportunity to
help the transition from emergency to "normality". We must not forget that the
decisions we take in the early stages of a reconstruction process have
consequences in the medium and long term and mark the future of the territory.
The “race” to reconstruction cannot sacrifice the regenerative capacity of the
Zone struck by the earthquake. To start a proper reconstruction,
administrators and politicians need to re­imagine the territory in a shared
and balanced way, and to include local communities and local actors, in this
case, entrepreneurs, trade associations and unions. And in order to do so, the
various local actors need both the help of local experts and resources, and
time and opportunities to re­plan their territory. During this process of
transition, the socio­economic system must be preserved. This is why
management and project­making of temporariness are fundamental.
Consequently, this proposal should be seen as mostly focused on a
regenerative approach in the medium and long­term perspective, rather than
as an emergency response to a shock.
FEATURES OF THE AFFECTED AREA AND TYPE OF DAMAGE
The area affected by the earthquake has the shape of a peculiar quadrilateral,
enclosed by highways on three sides, the A1 on the southern border, the A13
on the eastern and the A22 on the western, and by the River Po on the
northern border. At its vertexes, we find the cities of Mantova, Ferrara,
Bologna, Modena and Reggio Emilia. Within the quadrilateral, the most
affected area, there are three major systems: industrial, rural and urban.

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 4Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

The industrial productive system in the area is vital. It is among the most
important ones in Italy and not only in the agro­industrial sector, but also in
the medical, mechanical, manufacturing and ceramic sector.
The rural system is historically organised in “Cascine a corte”, small
settlements connected as a network and spreading throughout the Pianura
Padana. In recent years, this system has gone through many changes, since
not only has it started a process of mechanisation and extensive cultivation,
but it has involved more and more farming, thus changing from a pure
agricultural system to agribusiness.
The urban settlement system is characterised by both small to medium sized

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

Figure 1 – Diagram of the Quadrilateral hit by Earthquake with its main features. Highlights
the relationship between heritage and production.



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 5Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

villages, often located very close to productive areas, and scattered houses.
Together with the old Cascinas, the latter create an urban sprawl1, a
“widespread city” intertwined with the other two systems in a way that is
often chaotic. It is therefore impossible to deal with the reconstruction and
rehabilitation of the productive system without taking into account the other
two systems and the “sprawl phenomenon”.
The earthquake, or rather the seismic swarm, hit an area characterized by a
strong urban / rural / industrial mix, in which functions, flows and different
structures are so interwoven that they almost merge into each other. The
damages, however, did not affect the three systems homogeneously, as the
industrial system was the most affected. With regard to the rural system, the
structures used for production, agro­food processing and animal shelters
were damaged the most, whereas rural houses, with the exception of those
already in a state of neglect and decay, were only partially hit. Within the
urban settlement system, functional structures such as schools, public
administration offices and historical buildings like churches, theaters and
museums were hit the most. Private houses, and thus the housing system,
suffered definitely less in comparison.
If we consider the official data released by the region Emilia­Romagna2
related to the inspections carried out in August 2012, we notice that the
productive sector had the highest number of unsafe structures. 23% of
houses were declared unsafe compared to 52% of productive structures. If
we consider the partial unavailability, we have a percentage of 25%
compared to 23% of private houses. This is a truly unique aspect in the
history of Italian reconstructions. Indeed, never were the damages in
industrial system higher than in the housing system.
During the previous earthquake, in Abruzzo, no disaggregated data based on
the function of the structures were collected, a direct comparison is therefore
not possible. Nevertheless, we can observe that in Abruzzo both sheds and
productive structures resisted much more than dwellings. This is confirmed
by many case studies about the use of productive facilities for other

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

territoriale­regionale
PTR Emilia Romagna http://territorio.regione.emilia­romagna.it/programmazione­territoriale/piano­1

agibilita
http://www.regione.emilia­romagna.it/notizie/2012/agosto/terremoto­oltre­39000­sopralluoghi­di­2



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 6Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

functions: the university was temporarily relocated in a productive structure
only a few months after the earthquake; shopping centers with structures
similar to those of industrial buildings were immediately declared safe and
became new meeting places; many ex­productive structures were immediately
allocated for both logistics and storage of activities related to relief and
reconstruction. It was immediately clear that the housing system was the most
affected, since more than 70,000 people were initially displaced and almost
other 25,000 in the three years following the earthquake.
Temporally, Abruzzo and Emilia are very similar, but they seem to be at the
polar opposites with regard to both the sectors and the types of structures
affected. Actually, they are two sides of the same coin: the lack of a central
idea adressing reconstruction in Italy. Abruzzo and Emilia face the same
problem: the need of a reconciliation of the local socio­economic
development with the rebuilding process.
On its side, Emilia has positive socio­economic trends and a solid and
innovative political and planning milieu. For this reason, the reconstruction
process must not only take into account the needs and issues related to the
earthquake, but also the way which Emilia­Romagna3 chose to take in relation
to the reorganization of the Ecologically Equipped Productive Areas (APEA)
together with the European Community with the Fund “POR FESR 2007­
2013”. The provinces of Reggio­Emilia4, Modena5 and Bologna6 incorporated
standards and guidelines for the design of APEA in their Provincial Plans. The
Province of Ferrara7 did that just before the earthquake.
The reconstruction can then become an opportunity not only to reorganize,
but also to renovate productive districts. Avoiding to consider this or
providing a simple reproduction of the plans created before the earthquake
would surely have a negative impact in the medium to long­term
environmental and socio­economic development.
But, if wrong strategic choices and policies weakened production, through

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

attrezzate (APEA) at the internet Site: http://atlante.ervet.it/apa/main_login_page.php
ATLANTE AREE PRODUTTIVE ATTREZZATE, Programma regionale aree ecologicamente3
http://www.provincia.re.it/page.asp?IDCategoria=701&IDSezione=204674
http://www.economia.provincia.modena.it/page.asp?IDCategoria=228&IDSezione=45015
http://www.provincia.bologna.it/imprese/Engine/RAServePG.php/P/2519113605046
http://www.provincia.fe.it/sito?doc=6DCC208196F70FCCC1257824004ED99B7



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 7Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

an inefficient reconstruction, the socio­economic issues related to
reconstruction which afflict Abruzzo might occur anyway, even if at the
moment they seem so distant.
THE RECOVERY OF INDUSTRIAL ACTIVITIES BETWEEN TEMPORARINESS AND
DELOCALIZATIONS.
Administrators and politicians, in parallel with the reconstruction of the
historical and functional public heritage, identified an immediate goal: the
preservation of substantially damaged industrial facilities. Consequently,
immediately after the earthquake, trade associations and entrepreneurs
themselves requested both a certain flexibility in the reconstruction process,
in order to attract and encourage investments to preserve their productive
systems, and the possibility to install temporary structures to enable a
continuity of production.
Short­term issues are linked to the presence of a continuous seismic activity
which hinders the continuity of production. The goal is an immediate recovery
in productivity.
Straight after the first shock of the 20th of May –magnitude 5.8 – people
realized that the productive system had suffered the most and, indeed, five of
the seven victims were workers from industrial warehouses. Local
companies decided to re­start producing immediately, in order to avoid
losing job orders and to fulfil their commitments. A break within production
would have been tantamount to an exit from the dynamic and competitive
global market, where many of these enterprises were on top, and thus to
benefiting national and international competitors.
Nine days after the first big shock, there was another one of 5.8 magnitude.
Since production had re­started in many facilities, but without the necessary
safety measures and without any risk assessment, many buildings which had
resisted the first shake were severely damaged. Twelve of the twenty victims
of the second shock were working in buildings that had withstood the first
one. At this point, it was clear that a recovery of production within the
original structures would be very difficult. Not only collapsed or severely­
damaged productive facilities were obviously unsafe, but also those
buildings, slightly damaged, that had been built before 2003 *(year in which

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 8Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

the anti­seismic law was conformed) thus making nearly 75% of the structures
unsafe.
From 'INGV8, ENEA (Paolini, 2012) and the historical studies of Guodoboni
(2012), it is possible to notice that, historically, the earthquakes affecting the
area have always been followed by long and strong* earthquake swarms.
The ongoing aftershocks of medium intensity which followed the earthquake
of the 20th of May confirm this trend.
Companies had mainly two choices: relocate out of the area affected by the
earthquake or provide light and safer temporary structures while waiting for
an assessment of viability and the potential reconstruction of the original
buildings. Obviously, public administrators, associations and local
politicians had every interest in avoiding a relocation of local companies,
because they guarantee workplaces to the population still living in the
territory (the housing system suffered few damages) and they represent the
driving force for a socio­economic recovery. All efforts had to focus on
preserving production within the affected area. The issue was mainly how to
do things rather than what to do.
The DL 74/2012 of the 6th of June, after less than a month from the first
shake, Article 3 and paragraph 1, provides financial help for both damages
and potential relocations. According to the same article, paragraph 11, the
Mayors, after a consultation with both the Civil Defence and the Regions,
can choose the areas to be occupied for relocation. Faster procedures for the
release of certifications and simplified bureaucratic procedures were put into
place and the time required for the release of the Environmental Impact
Assessment was reduced by half. Any acquisition of soil was to be made
through emergency occupation ­ Presidential Decree no. 327 2001 TU in the
field of expropriation for public use – even though the decree does not
clarify whether this was intended before the expropriation. According to
paragraph 12, municipalities could provide a possible further increase of
20% of the usable surface during the reconstruction of the structure. The
goal of this Legislative Decree was to discourage the relocation of
companies by giving flexible criteria for the localization of temporary
structures. The decree also gives companies the chance, in perspective, to

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

in­pianura­padana­emiliana.html
Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia. http://terremoti.ingv.it/it/ultimi­eventi/842­terremoti­8



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 9Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

expand their surface.
The future use of temporary structures is not specified. Although they are
built with the funds destined to reconstruction, in most cases these structures
are still private property, therefore some owners could expect land rights.
This is precisely what is happening in Abruzzo, where owners of damaged
houses were given the opportunity to build temporary shelters within their
own property, while waiting for the reconstruction of their houses. These
temporary structures had a concession of 36 months, at the end of which the
municipality decided to grant the owners an extension of one year. This
nurtured their hope to see their land rights recongnized, although in a
speculative perspective.
Context and scenario are certainly different in the two cases. In Emilia,
already affected by the problem of urban sprawl, this issue could alter the
complex territorial structure and make things worse.
The decree chose a certain flexibility to encourage companies to stay.
However, this decree was not accompanied by a comprehensive legislation,
nor by guidelines for the planning and programming of temporary areas. It
actually left companies and municipalities a lot of discretion, possibly too
much. Therefore, many companies decided to relocate their production in
tensile structures within their properties or in areas nearby their previous
lots. Others moved into available structures within the affected area, others
chose to relocate the production out of the crater, while leaving the
administrative headquarter inside it.
The law recognizes the need to provide temporary solutions for production.
However, the Legislative Decree 74/2012 sees this need as more connected
to an emergency rather than to a stage of reconstruction, even if this is just
another very delicate passage of a post­disaster process.
A POSSIBLE WAY: THE TEMPORARY ZONE
In Emilia, emergency measures are already in place. Camps and temporary
structures for production have already been set up.
The aim of this analysis is to propose a stage of reconstruction based on
temporariness. The goal is to keep the productive system within the
Emergency Zone and to make it compatible with the potential exposure to

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 10Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

more seismic activity. Temporary Zones must be immediately available and
should not require too much initial planning, since it could take too long.
If we consider the characteristics of the settlements in Piana Emiliana, we
could think of using a buffer, either around the industrial production area or
around company buildings. This would allow the installation of temporary
industrial facilities. A buffer creates a "Sector" that includes both the
previous and the new, temporary, productive areas. Temporary buffers can
be considered as a way to reduce the costs of urbanization and to favour the
re­inclusion of damaged companies in their original industrial areas. The
creation of sectors, thanks to the buffer, allows the prevention of temporary
sprawls that might worsen the problem of urban sprawl already existing in
the territory. Companies could also share structures more easily, since they
would be able to relocate freely, even if temporarily, within the sectors.
Undamaged and damaged companies could therefore work at the same time
within the sector, in a more compatible way, thus avoiding the imbalances
that new off­site locations or tax­free zones would create.
Very often, local companies do not own the buildings they were using before
the earthquake. In this case, the company is in disadvantage and may
consider relocation. In such cases, temporary sectors want to be a deterrent
to "migration", since they provide the opportunity to continue producing in
the area of origin, using facilities at zero cost, and potentially benefiting
from subsidies and tax relief. The main advantages of this proposal are:

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

• It is compatible with year­long seismic swarm, since the structures
are temporary and earthquake resistant.
It allows an immediate return to production through temporary
regulation. It avoids unplanned and informal solutions that could be
detrimental to the urban setting of Emilia.
It keeps the manufacturing districts as flexible entities, thanks to the
possibility of expansion or contraction and to the internal and
external flexibility of the sector, which are based on needs such as
sharing facilities with similar or compatible companies.

•

•

It provides the Reconstructive Planning with a real, clear and
dynamic frame about production, thanks to the monitoring of the
Sectors. It also allows a re­planning of the production within the area,

•



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 11Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

In order to create temporary zones, it is important to identify an appropriate
way to manage land use. Expropriation is definitely to be avoided since it is
definitive and very expensive. Moreover, while reconstructive processes are

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

• Being "stem"9, Temporary Zones allow productive rearrangements
and territorial reorganizations in a more flexible and dynamic way.
In the long term, the use of land is reduced, assuming that the areas
used for temporary production will be used again as before the
earthquake.
The Temporary Zones are to be considered as an extraordinary element
for the strategic planning of large areas in need of reconstruction.

•

•

not according to the scenario prior to the earthquake, radically changed,
and not according to projections and estimates, as was done before.
Indeed, the latter, in the case of post­earthquake scenarios, have often
proved distorted and have led to missed opportunities in the field of
socio­economic development (Irpinia is the best example of this).

as they wish within the local production system, without predetermined variables and
specific production functions.

The use of the word "stem" should be understood in the sense of creating areas ready to re­develop9

Figure 2 – Example of application of Temporary Zones in Cavezzo, a settlement hard hit by
the earthquake. Highlights buffers around industrial damaged areas.



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 12Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

extremely dynamic, expropriation is inherently static.
In case of emergency, lands are often bought on the ground of "a temporary
occupation for the utmost urgency". However, in case of a temporary
reconstruction, this utmost urgency is not applicable. The relationship
between reconstruction and productive network should not be spoiled by
contingency and emergency, but by a shared goal: a return to normality and
a collaboration to create a plan for reconstruction.
This is why there is an attempt to evaluate, experimentally, an instrument
called Servitù10. The definition according to the Civil Code of Servitù Prediale
(art. 1027 cc) is:“servitù prediale consists of a tax imposed to a fund in order
to use another fund which belongs to a different owner”. This legal instrument
is the only ordinary one regulating the temporary use of a lot for public benefit
not included in the TU on expropriation, Presidential Decree 327/2001.
It may seem a stretch, but the goal is to make a distinction between temporary
and emergency measures, especially expropriation. A system based on
temporariness created using the Servitù would connect the occupation of a lot
to a regenerative process, reducing the risk of an excessive prolongation of the
occupation. The Servitù is temporary by definition and cannot be converted
into a definitive acquisition, since it is connected to public benefit and more
specifically to the reason why it was created: rebuild.
The cost is well below the cost of an expropriation and of an emergency
occupation. And, since public money is spent on reconstruction, saving is a
priority. This method can be provided for public benefit within the temporary
zone and can be required by both the public and the private sector.
The Servitù is now used for specific works, such as power lines or aqueducts,
and, more commonly, for passages to and from a dominant holding. In our
case, it is necessary to consider the damaged industrial area as a site of public
interest and the dominant holding, even if privately owned, together with the
buffer of Temporary Zone, as an area functional to repairing.

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake

make limited use of the property owned by another person, usually referring to a right of
access.

In English, this legal term is translatable by “easement” which refers to the right of a landowner to10



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 13Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

ANOTHER MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW UP A STRATEGY FOR A SOCIO­
ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE TRANSITION TO RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH
TEMPORARY SOLUTIONS.
The document presented by INU in July 2012, which includes this study,
presented two proposals as first point: the relocation of productive activities
nearby previous industrial sites (temporary zones) and the use of the Servitù.
With the law 122/2012, the Government actually followed the LD 74/2012
and chose to avoid a definition of tools and criteria for relocations and
temporary de­localisations. It also left discretion to individuals and local
administrations, therefore leaving the current planning as point of reference.
According to this law, the Regions, body of Territorial Government, are
responsible for potential plans for reconstruction.
Therefore, the Law 122/2012 has not allowed any step forward in the
management of temporary solutions so far, it simply lets regional laws
prevail. This is logical if we consider that local territories are administered
by the Regions in the medium term. However, it is not, if we think that no
indications or guidelines are provided and that it would be appropriate to
outline some, by using previous experiences combined with the excellent
skills of specialized structures and higher institutions.
The Regions know both context and places, but it is the Government that
must understand the post­earthquake scenario properly and must suggest an
idea­guide. In Italy, unfortunately, there is no national idea­guide providing
practices and strategies, and it is contingency, if not improvisation, that rules
(Nimis, 2009).
The Region Emilia Romagna, with Lr. 16/2012, should have given precise
details about the rules to follow to draw up a plan for reconstruction and to
plan the interventions and the management of funds, and even details of
temporary solutions, from regulations to management, including the
decisions about time and way to remove them.
Article 4, paragraph 14, rightly extends the maximum of 90­day period of
those works whose goal is to meet objective emergency and temporary
needs. The limit is postponed until these needs are met, and “anyway no
later than the date in which the properties destined to production, repaired,

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 14Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

restored or reconstructed, are available again". According to the same article
(Art. 4), temporary productive structures will have to be removed
permanently, but the owner is given the opportunity to acquire a final permit
for his/her temporary structures, only if established by the Reconstruction
Plans. Article 4 does not solve the problem, since many owners still
potentially expect to obtain a permit for their temporary structures.
In order to define the use of soil, this law once again proposes both
expropriation (Art. 14) and temporary employment for the utmost urgency.
These solutions are temporary and definitely not flexible. They are more related
to the need to create new spaces to cope with an emergency, rather than to an
assessment of the effects of these occupations in the medium to long term.
Once again, the region has given priority to temporary solutions implemented
in private lots, that cannot be controlled directly, and to rigid temporary
solutions such as expropriation, leaving the post­reconstruction fate of
expropriated areas unclear. This does not seem to be a very good choice, and
neither is the decision to allow relocations if there is a perspective plan in
force, but which is not working at the moment of the earthquake. In fact, a
dynamic scenario, radically changed during the transition, may not
automatically make pre­earthquake predictions appropriate.
The risk is that the reconstruction of productive structures will be
completed, while in the meantime companies are relocating elsewhere, thus
producing negative effects especially in the medium to long term
perspective. In case of food or ceramic companies this risk is low, since the
quality and the unique characteristics of the product make it inconvenient to
relocate, but it could be very high in case of mechanical or medical
companies. Both the crisis and globalization, even before the earthquake,
made it particularly convenient to relocate abroad and, once tax incentives
and subsidies related to reconstruction are reduced, a temporary or definitive
“migration" of companies could be a reality.
Today, six months after the earthquake, it is impossible to assess whether
any of these trends is real, we need to see what happens in the next few
months. However, it is possible to conclude that, even in a region which is
the best example of good governance, with positive socio­economic trends,
which did not suffer excessive damages, we failed to put into place a
reconstruction process based on strategies, practices and innovative or

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 15Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

regenerative actions that might take into account the period of transition
before a future settlement.
In the end it is incomprehensible as it sought immediately to bind the
reconstruction of the industrial areas to the principles of APEA. Certainly
the ordinary planning contains them, but reaffirm the criteria of
rationalization and sustainability of these areas in the laws of reconstruction,
would be very useful also in consideration of the phenomenon of sprawl and
the need to "rationalize" the Emilan territory.
Reconstruction, once again, was seen as a "black hole" from which we had
to get out quickly and informally, not as a useful process, functional to an
improvement of the area.
The temporariness and the transition are still conceived as contingencies to
standardize and regulate as little as possible in expectation of a return to the
“ordinary” government of the territory and planning.

Scamporrino ­ Industrial production adn temporary development after the Emilian earthquake



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 16Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

REFERENCES

EARTHQUAKES AND EMERGENCY
ANZALONE M. (2008), L’urbanistica dell’emergenza: Alinea.
CAMPO G. (2000), Città e territorio a Rischio: Gangemi.
CASTELLI V., BERNARDINI F., CAMASS R., CARACCIOLO C., ERCOLANI

E. et al. (2012), “Looking for missing earthquake traces in the Ferrara­Modena
plain: an update on historical seismicity”, in Annals of Geophysic, vol. 55.

CREMONINI I. (1994), Rischio sismico e pianificazione nei centri storici: INU­
Alinea edizioni.

CRESPELLANI T. (2009), “La resistibile ascesa della Protezione Civile”, in
Democrazia e Diritto, vol. 1.

DE PAOLI R. (2010), Rischio sismico e centri urbani. Verso nuove di pianificazione
del territorio e di recupero dei centri urbani: Franco Angeli.

DRUIDI M. (2012), “Sisma emilia­romagna: interviste e dichiarazioni del
presidente Maurizio Marchesini ­ agosto 2012” Confindustria Emilia­Romagna.
Available at: http://www.confind.emr.it/

FABIETTI V. (2001), Linee guida per la riduzione urbanistica del rischio sismico.
Il recupero dei centri storici di Rosarno e Melicucco: INU Edizioni.

FERA G. (1991), La città antisismica: Gangemi.
FERA G. (1998), “Prevenzione del rischio sismico e protezione civile", in

Urbanistica 110 ­ Dossier.
FERNANDEZ M.A. (1996), Ciudades en Riesgo: La Red.
FRISCH G. J. (2009), L’Aquila. Non si uccide così anche una città?: Clean Edizioni.
IUFFRIDA G. (1992), Territorio e città nell’Italia fascista: Laterza.
JOHNSON C. (2007), “Strategic planning for post­disaster temporary housing”, in

Disasters, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 435­458.
MARCENARO R. (2011), Mobile City: Franco Angeli.

Miccadei, Piacentini ­ The role of knowledge in the prevention of natural hazards



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 17Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

MONACO A., MONACO R. (2005), Urbanistica e rischio sismico: Esselibri.
NICCOLIN P. (1983), Dopo il terremoto: Quaderni di Lotus, Electa.
SEGNALINI O., (2001), “Rischio e pianificazione urbanistica”, in Urbanistica 117

dossier.
PULIAFITO A. (2009), Protezione civile S.P.A.:Aliberti.

RECONSTRUCTIONS
BARBERI F. (ED.) (2007), DALL’EMERGENZA ALLA RICOSTRUZIONE, RACCOLTA 1997­2007.

DIECI ANNI DAL SISMA. OLTRE LA CALAMITÀ: SVILUPPO E INNOVAZIONE: QUATTRO
EMME.
CANNAROZZO T. (1996), “La ricostruzione del Belice: il difficile dialogo tra

luogo e progetto”, in Archivio di studi urbani e regionali 55/1996.
COMITATUS AQUILANUS (2009), L’Aquila. Non si uccide così una città: Clean.
GUIDOBONI E., VALENSISE G. (2011), Il peso economico e sociale dei disastri

sismici in Italia negli ultimi 150 anni: Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e
Vulcanologia.

NIMIS P. (2009 ), Terre mobili: Donzelli.
NIGRO G., SARTORIO F. (eds.) (2002), Ricostruire la Complessità. I PIR e la

ricostruzione in Umbria:Alinea.
PAOLINI S., MARTINI G. et al. (2012), “The May 2012 seismic sequence in

Pianura Padana Emiliana: hazard, historical seismicity and preliminary
analysis of accelerometric records”, Enea site (www.Enea.it) Energia
Ambiente e Innovazione n. 4­5 luglio­ottobre 2012 Parte II.

VENTURA S. (2010), “I ragazzi dell’Ufficio di Piano. La ricostruzione urbanistica
in Irpinia. I frutti di Demetra”, in Bollettino di storia ambientale, 22.

RECONSTRUCTIONS (INTERNATIONAL CASES)
ABHAS K. (2010), Safer Homes, Stronger Communities: The International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development.

Miccadei, Piacentini ­ The role of knowledge in the prevention of natural hazards



IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 18Vol. III, issue 1 ­ 2013

ALEXANDER D. (2004), Planning for Post­Disaster Recostruction: grif.umontreal.ca
AUGÉ M. (2004), Rovine e Macerie: Bollati Boringhieri
BOENI T., JIGYASUII R. (2005), “Cultural consideration for Post Disaster

Reconstruction and Post­Tsunami Challenges", UNDP Conference.
CALAME J. (2005), Post­war Reconstruction: Concerns, Models and Approaches:

Macro Center Working Papers.
CHOAY F. (2008), Del destino della città: Alinea.
EDGINGTON DW. (2009), Recostructing Kobe: University of British Columbia Press.
HASS J.E., KATES R.W., BOWDEN M.J. (eds.) (1977), Recostruction Following

Disaster: MIT Press.
KLEIN N. (2006), Shock Economy: Bur.
KATES W., COLTEN C.E., LASKA S., LEATHERMAN S.P. (2006),

Reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: A research
perspective: PNAS.

NAKABAYASHI, I. (2007) “Preparedness for Recovery and Reconstruction from
The Next Tokyo Earthquake”, in Earthquake, pp. 1­6.

OTERO R.C., MARTZ R.Z. (2005), The Impacts of Natural Disasters on
Developing Economies: Implications for the International Development and
Disaster Community.

Miccadei, Piacentini ­ The role of knowledge in the prevention of natural hazards