Equalisation and Compensation Mechanisms in
the New Rome Urban Development Plan

ABSTRACT
The adoption of equalisation and compensation mechanisms within
the urban plan for Rome proved to be quite controversial. The
regional law provides nearly no provisions for governing such
planning tools, and the regulations set out by the plan introduce a
somewhat complex system. The present paper, after a brief
presentation of the history of land ownership and development within
the city, will focus on the main features of equalisation and
compensation practices which aim at governing the distribution of
development rights among landowners and developers.

IJPP ­ Italian Journal of Planning Practice 33Vol. I, issue 1 ­ 2011

Lorenzo Casini
Professor of Administrative Law
Via Flaminia, 72 ­ 00196 ­ Rome, Italy ­ Lorenzo.Casini@uniroma1.it
Dipartimento Design, Tecnologia dell’Architettura, Territorio e Ambiente, Sapienza ­ Università di Roma

1. INTRODUCTION
Within the different regional experiences of urban law, the case of the Lazio
Region has a unique feature: the presence of Rome. The analysis of

ISSN: 2239­267X



h, where it is stated that master plans shall indicate which modifications should be
implemented by public acquisition of exactly identified properties or by equalisation
forms, identified by urban development plans.

The term “perequazione” (i.e. equalisation) appears only once, in Article 30, subpara. 1, letter1

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equalisation and compensation mechanisms adopted in this region can be
focused on the Roman experience, and in particular on the new Rome Urban
Development Plan (UDP), which came into force in 2008. This choice
seems inevitable, not only for the importance of Rome, but also because the
new plan contains significant provisions about compensation and
equalisation (i.e. equal distribution) of building and development rights.
After illustrating the regional legal framework, attention will be focused on
three issues: the Rome planning experience, the new UDP, and the
mechanisms of urban compensation and equalisation, regulated by the
norms set out in the UDP.

2. THE “SILENCE” OF REGIONAL LAW
Compared with other Italian regions, Lazio has legislation characterised by
the absence of specific norms on urban equalisation and compensation. The
regional urban law no. 38/1999 does not contain this kind of provision1.
Although this law was approved when other regions had already issued rules
in this direction (Colonna, 2007) – and despite some important precedents at
a local level, such as the Rome urban development plan variant of 1997 –
the decision made in 1999 was to maintain a traditional planning system,
faithful to the national town planning act of 1942.
Therefore, the Lazio planning legislation reproduces, without any particular
innovation, the norms set by national law on “comparto edificatorio” (i.e. an
area in which forms of equalisation of building rights amongst owners are
adopted)2. Of course there have been, since 1999, attempts to introduce
some innovations, but none of them have been put into effect3.

n. 35/1978. In reference to “programmi integrati”, see Article 2, Lazio regional law n. 22/1997.
See Articles 39 and 48, Lazio regional law n. 38/1999, and Articles 21 et seq. of Lazio regional law2

regulations was drafted, but it was never approved; in that text there was an explicit
provision regarding urban equalisation and compensation.

Among these attempts, the most relevant was in 2003, when a Code that collected all the previous3



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In this context, the case of the Urban Development Plan for Rome provides
one of the most important experiences of equalisation and compensation
mechanisms in Italy (for a general discussion see Bartolini et al, 2009;
Police, 2004; Crosetti, 2004; Perongini, 2005; Casini; 2005).

3. THE CASE OF ROME
Before examining the solutions designed in the new Urban Development
Plan (UDP) of Rome, it is useful to underline some features of this unique
city (for an overview see Marcelloni, 2003; Ricci, 2005). Firstly, Rome,
129,000 hectares in size, is the largest municipality in Europe: the
metropolitan areas of Bari, Bologna, Catania, Florence, Genoa, Milan,
Naples, Palermo and Turin, added together, have more or less the same area
as Rome, namely 136,800 hectares.
Secondly, the history of Rome and its urban development presents
significant features. In particular, the Roman territory has been the subject of
speculation since 1800. Émile Zola, in 1896, described “un vol de
spéculateurs, venu de la haute Italie” which “s’était abattu sur Rome, la plus
noble et la plus facile des proies”, and he wrote that a “jeux exasperé, un
jeux formidabile dont la fièvre avait remplacé la petit train réglementé du
loto papal, un jeux à coups de millions où les terrains et les bâtisses
devenaient fictifs, de simples prétextes à des opérations de Bourse”4. Since
then, development projects within the city have continued incessantly,
including illegal projects, the so called “abusivismo di necessità” (Insolera,
1971).
Thirdly, in spite of such a huge expansion, the situation of the private
property in Rome has been characterised by large properties owned by a few
families. When Rome became the capital of Italy, around 40% of the whole
territory, i.e. 76,000 hectares, was owned by only eleven families, such as

gli occhi di Émile Zola”, in “La costruzione della Capitale. Architettura e città dalla crisi
edilizia al fascismo nelle fonti storiche della Banca d’Italia”, in Roma moderna e
contemporanea, 2002, n. 3, 543.

Zola É., Rome (1896), Paris, 1999, 395. This story is in Catini R., “Roma dopo la crisi edilizia con4



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Torlonia, Borghese and Doria Pamphili5. In the twentieth century, important
development companies have acquired similar large areas of property,
inevitably exercising strong influence on planning decisions and decision
making processes (Insolera, 1971). The planning process, which has led to
the new Rome urban development plan, started in 1994 and has been
extremely long and complex. A fundamental stage within this process was
the adoption of the “Piano delle Certezze” in 1997, which set the basis for
future decisions. Indeed, the “Piano delle Certezze” provided a specific
compensation mechanism that was unsuccessfully challenged in the courts6.
This mechanism was applied to development rights, cancelled by the “Piano
delle Certezze” itself, in order to realise a new environmental safeguard
system. Such development rights were to have been used within two kinds
of areas – the “City to be transformed” and the “City to be completed” –
which were not regulated by the “Piano delle Certezze”. The new urban
development plan had to regulate and relocate development rights deriving
from the compensations disposed of by the Piano delle Certezze.
3.1 THE NEW URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN (UDP) OF ROME
In 2003 the city of Rome adopted its new Urban Development Plan (UDP).
The Plan was then re­adopted in 2006, after the consultation process, and
finally approved in 2008, almost fifty years after the previous plan (Rome
City Council decisions n. 33, 19­20 March 2003; n. 64 21­22 March 2006;
n. 22, 12 February 2008).
As to the plan making process, it is worth mentioning two circumstances.
The first concerns the length and complexity of the proceedings which led to
the adoption and approval of the plan. The second regards the fact that, in
order to have the plan approved before the expiry of the so­called “safeguard

tardo Ottocento, in La costruzione della Capitale, cit., 583 ss., in particolare 587 ss.
See N. Flores, Dalla terra all’edilizia. L’avventura speculativa di Paolo Borghese nella Roma di5

against the Plan’s decision of changing building areas back into agricultural areas.
However, the claim was rejected on the basis of the “public nature” of the compensation
tool provided within the plan, which was to be considered within the process of land use
planning as an indemnity, in the form of “equalisation”, for the loss of the betterment
value and urban rent cancelled in favour of environmental quality.

Lazio Regional Administrative Court, section I, judgement n. 1652/1999. Some companies appealed6



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measures”, a new collaborative planning procedure between the Municipal
Authority, Province and Region has been used7 (Mazzarelli, 2007). In fact,
the length of the process, mostly due to the large dimensions of the city of
Rome, determined the legal implications of the safeguard measures (Council
of State, n. 2 /2008). Over 7,000 written representations were submitted, of
which some 30% were totally or partially accepted.
As regards the Plan’s contents, the city has been divided into three different
systems: urban system (about 36,000 hectares ­ 28%)8; environmental and
agricultural system (about 88,000 hectares ­ 68%)9 and infrastructures and
community facilities system (about 5,000 hectares ­ 4%)10. The Plan has
allocated about twenty million square metres of gross floor area11 for future
admissible developments (in terms of volume, about sixty six million cubic
metres). In this respect, the gross floor area amounts to an increase of about
9% to the existing city, with a future estimated population of over three
million inhabitants.
In this context, the UDP has defined different equalisation and compensation
tools for its implementation. During plan preparation, the norms, made up of
109 articles, were subject to important modifications, especially with regard
to the articles regulating these planning practices and mostly with regards to
equalisation. Indeed, the fundamental importance of equalisation is
underlined by the first article, subsection 2, where it is stated that:

Regional Act n. 4./2006.
See article 66­bis, Lazio Regional Act n. 38/1999, introduced by the article 70, subsection 7, Lazio7

Projects, Areas with restricted developments.
Including: Historical City, Built­up City, City to be Regenerated, City to be Transformed, Structuring8
Composed of: Protected Natural Areas, Hydrological network, agricultural land and parks.9
Including public services, private services and play areas, mobility and technological infrastructures.10

the perimeter of the building.
Gross Floor Area is defined by the UDP norms as the sum of the floor surfaces comprised within11

“the Plan pursues regeneration and revitalisation objectives on the basis
of sustainable development and equalisation principles, following criteria
such as efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and simplification of
administrative actions, complying with the legislation in force”.

Articles 17­22 regulate equalisation criteria and mechanisms.



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3.2. CRITERIA AND MECHANISMS FOR THE EQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS

Article 17, subsection 1, of the UDP norms clarifies that the plan introduces,
as a general rule, the need to parcel out development rights between areas
and individuals, according to principles of equality and uniformity, and
taking into account: pre­existing urban plans; legally existing building(s);
the pursuit of public or general interest”12. Indeed, the equalisation system
provided by the new plan aims at parcelling out the “advantages” and
compensating the “disadvantages” produced by new planning provisions, as
well as compensating the “disadvantages” caused by previous conditions of
decay of existing building property. Therefore, it is a widespread and a
priori equalisation, in terms of both finances and of building volumes.
In particular, five cases of equalisation are described in articles 18 et seq.
These are: areas of compensation; planning compensations; special
contributions; incentives for building renewal; compensatory transfers.
These equalisation methods, singly or combined, and access to incentives or
compensation therein provided, are applied through bid processes and a
specific planning instrument (“Programma Integrato”), and are consistent
with State regulations for participation in administrative procedures.
Moreover, the UDP distinguishes building rights exercisable in situ from
those to be transferred to other areas, as well as – in the same area ­ building
rights assigned to owners from those reserved to the local government.
Firstly, the areas of compensation are specific portions of land where the
UDP distinguishes between development rights assigned to owners
(quantified according to pre­existing urban planning), on one hand, and

building forecasts, the UDP ensures fair distribution of building forecasts for owners
concerned with executive planning instruments, apart from specific destinations
assigned to each area and proportionally to the owned areas.
Moreover, apart from criteria and methods to allocate building forecasts, the UDP
ensures that the distribution of charges due to the administration is proportional to the
assigned building forecasts and it distinguishes ordinary building forecasts ­ which
correspond to ordinary charges ­ from additional building forecasts – which correspond
to extraordinary charges.

Article 17, subsection 6, clarifies that, with the exception of criteria for differentiated allocation of12



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development rights, reserved to the local government for the public interest
(urban redevelopment, environmental protection, social housing, urban
services), on the other hand (article 18 of UDP norms). In such areas,
intervention can be indirect, either public or private. This implies that, when
the implementation planning instrument is approved, the owners (of the
defined areas) have to transfer, with no charge, the property which conforms
to the planned developments to the local government itself or to a third party
appointed by the local government.13
Secondly, planning compensations are related to building rights “promised”
by the “Piano delle Certezze” but not yet assigned. Indeed, one of the
purposes of the new UDP has been to implement the compensations
identified by that planning variant.14 Building rights must be located firstly
in the compensation areas, but they can be located in other building areas,
only if owners and compensation holders reach an agreement. It should be
pointed out that building rights to be located are determined – as far as
quantity and land use are concerned – assuming that the real estate value and
the building rights to be compensated are equivalent. Finally, bid processes
are provided to assign areas to those who receive compensation.15
Thirdly, a special contribution is applied to the most relevant real estate
enhancements produced by the new Plan, compared with pre­existing urban
plans (Article 20 of UDP norms). This contribution is worth two thirds of
the real estate value which can be obtained due to the dispositions of the
Plan (it may either increase or reduce). The contribution can be paid directly
to the local government or be deducted through the direct execution of
works.
Fourthly, incentives for building renewal are used to achieve urban
standards, to realise and manage public works and services and to renovate
the existing building stock. In the latter case, the incentives consist of the

area, the conveyance doesn’t take place.
If the final receivers of building forecasts reserved to local government is the owner of the assigned13

“Casal giudeo” were added to “Piano delle Certezze” compensations.
Article 19, UDP norms. In a second instance, compensations provided for “Tor Marancia” and14

issues a specific notice addressed to compensation receivers, so that they can send in the
proper application within the final term indicated in the notice (not less than six
months).

Apart from these procedures, within 12 months after the UDP approval, the local government15



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increase of the existing Gross Floor Area, which – if not localised in situ ­
can be transferred to the areas of compensation, according to the criterion of
economic equality. “Programmi integrati” will set the interventions and the
modalities and levels of incentives, as well as the timing of a possible
transfer of incentives to other areas.
Lastly, compensatory transfer is an alternative tool for the expropriation of
areas for public use (Ricci, 2005). These areas can be bought through giving
the owners development rights, which have to be localised in situ or
transferred to the areas of compensation. Therefore, the areas are acquired
by conceding rights to build, based on the extension of the area, but this can
be concentrated just in a part of the area or transferred to another area; the
transfer of the areas must be done through a registered and transcribed
public act. The acquisition of an area takes place either with a direct
intervention or through participation in the “Programma integrato”. In the
first case, the rights to build are 0,04 square metres, to be realised on 10% of
the area, against the transfer to the Municipality of the remaining 90%16. In
the case of participation in the “Programma integrato”, the right to build is
about 0,06 square metres and will be transferred to the City, to be
restructured, or in other areas of compensation, adopting permitted land
uses, while the whole area will be given over to the Municipality17.

4. CONCLUSIONS: “LE LIVRE TUERA L’ÉDIFICE”?
The system described above is very complex and is the result of the use of
different equalisation techniques: equalisation, compensation, and
incentives. In sum, and with specific reference to the rights to build, there
are three consequences: there is the use of a general principle of
equalisation, mainly used through “Programmi integrati”; urban
compensations are limited to specific circumstances; forms of compensatory

services.
On the area that remains in public use only some specific uses are allowed, such as small private16

the City to be regenerated, can be transferred only within the same kind of areas from
which they come.

The private Gross Floor Area, generated from the application of the “compensatory transfer” to17



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transfer are regulated and they are applicable in order to find areas
designated for public use.
One of the most interesting aspects is that the above­mentioned mechanisms
create a very complex system of “supply” and “demand” (Stella Richter,
2006). The demand is constituted by the building rights to be localised
(resulting from interventions within the areas of compensation),
compensatory transfers and urban incentives or even in some cases of
special contribution. On the other hand, the supply side, in addition to the
areas regulated by the “Programmi integrati”, is constituted by the “Ambiti
di compensazione”. These operate like containers in which the building
rights to be localised can be concentrated. For this aspect, the most
significant example is the so called “Ambiti di riserva a trasformabilità
vincolata”, unbuilt areas formerly assigned to Agro Romano, which now
have a mainly residential allocation (for a total of 79 ha and almost 300.000
square metres of Gross Floor Area)18.
The new Rome UDP thus contains a number of provisions concerning
mechanisms of both compensation and equalisation. Such a system is based
on three main factors: the former plan, the existing built city and the new
plan’s objectives (goals). From those factors some “guiding rules” are then
extracted and the characteristics of the system are defined that is “unitary,
organic and generalised”; it does not substantially affect existing urban
development rights; it provides for extraordinary disbursements only to

0.15 to 0.45 on the basis of planning decisions and directives made within action plans. Of
such a building index, 0.06 square metres are attributed to landowners while the remaining
part is attributed to the Commune. Implementation of urban developments is subject to
approval of action plans which should involve the whole development area (“Ambito di
riserva”). These plans are drawn on the ground of a planning decision, based on article 13
subsection 3 and article 14, which should provide, even in different phases: determination
of requirements, necessities and priorities; determination of criteria on the basis of which
to define those “Ambiti di riserva” which are to receive development rights; modalities
and deadlines for activating expropriation procedures. The above planning decision and
directive can foresee a general plan which concerns, where needed, along with the “Ambiti
di riserva”, other essential infrastructures so that access through any means of transport
can be guaranteed. After the planning decision is made, and based on it, the Commune can
prepare for an open bidding procedure with the objective of encouraging or verifying the
availability of developers and landowners to form an “Ambito di riserva”.

Within such areas the average building index is 0.3 square metres/square metres, ranging from18



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“new and wider planning provisions”; it does not affect the whole plan’s
provisions; it is implemented through bid processes; it complies with
legislation” (Rome City Council, 2008).
From a broader perspective, looking at the dynamics of the interests
involved, it emerges that these solutions involve both public and private
interests. Firstly, there is the interest in delivering services and public works,
and in creating an extensive environmental system (almost 70% of the entire
municipality). The new UDP, in fact, pays due attention to the public sector
for an appropriate allocation of services, the achievement of which is
pursued through innovative tools introduced by the Lazio regional
legislation, such as compensation transfer.
Another aspect of the public interest that the plan aims to preserve through
equalisation and compensation mechanisms is the protection of competition,
secured through bid processes19. However, such mechanisms provide an
advantage to the actor directly involved in the specific development in
respect to other potential investors.
On the other hand, in the new UDP, the interests of the land owners seem to
be the main concern, similar to what is provided by the “Piano delle
certezze”, where the owners could achieve substantial advantages for their
land through equalisation and compensation; they could even increase of
their previous building rights. In that case, in fact, the reduced or cancelled
development provisions in relation to the then existing plan were considered
as “granted development rights”. That is in contrast with a correct
interpretation of constitutional provisions (Article 42), whereby the social
function of property allows the limitation of building rights, even without
compensation. The change of the building indexes is in fact in the ordinary
power of the public administration (Urbani, 2007).
In any event, the lawfulness of equalisation and compensation arrangements
prepared by the new UDP does not seem to be in question, since they are
based on a consensus of the land owners and are designed to extend his/her
guarantees (Urbani, 2008). In addition, the use of powers to provide reserves
of generalised areas and building rights in favour of the Municipal Authority

See Italian Constitutional Court decisions no. 129/2006 and no. 269/2007.19



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of Rome, that in other Regions has been challenged before the courts20, has
been considered lawful by the Italian supreme administrative court
(“Consiglio di Stato”)21.
These options, so favourable to the private sector, sometimes are designed
merely to solve problems of consent. They could even be unsustainable
economically, that is why the alternatives should not be considered optimal
as such, as they are based on arguments of a political nature. They should be
seen as one possible solution among others, to be chosen if it is
economically advantageous (Miceli and Segerson, 1996; Heller and Krier,
1999; Cooter, 2000).
The complexity of such mechanisms, along with their costs, may mean that
they may not prove to be as efficient as expected. At the same time, the costs
of implementing a wide environmental system through the acquisition and
management of green areas could be so high that benefits to the community
could disappear. In fact, the complexity of such tools represents one of the
major issues in the plan’s implementation (De Petris, 2007). For example, in
the case of the “Ambiti di Riserva”, in these areas, development
interventions cannot be carried out until an implementation plan has been
approved.
However, the main doubts concern the excessive complexity of the UDP
norms. Although such dense regulation could be justified by the lack of a
specific regional legislation, the number of provisions set by the new Rome
UDP could remind us of Hugo’s warning: “Le livre tuera l’édifice” or
“l’imprimerie tuera l’achitecture”.

Region relative to the modifications to the plan of Bassano del Grappa. Such decisions
modified the plan’s norms by providing that “a 50% share of development rights is
attributed to the Municipal Authority”. In fact, the administrative jurisprudence stated that
in the absence of national legislation, such a provision does not find any legislative
background which can justify such a restriction on property rights, outside the guarantee of
the Article 42 of the Constitution.

Case law of Council of State, IV, n. 4833/2006, which stated as unlawful the decision of the Veneto20

Administrative Court, regarding the compensatory transfer and the incentives regulated by
the UDP. On these issues, see Corrado R. (ed.), L’urbanistica italiana dopo le sentenze del
TAR sul PRG di Roma, Roma, 2010.

See decision no. 4545/2010, of July 13 2010, which reversed the decision no. 1524/2010 of Lazio21



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