microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 1-2. in memoriam pietro grilli di cortona: a dedicated scholar and a humane person maurizio cotta university of siena n july 16, 2015, professor pietro grilli di cortona, then president of the italian political science association (sisp) prematurely died at the age of only 61 years, after a long battle with a serious disease that he faced bravely. he is survived by his wife barbara and three children. the death of pietro is a sad loss for the whole community of italian political scientists. i was particularly moved by this event, as i had known him personally since the years when he was still a brilliant student in the cesare alfieri faculty of political sciences at the university of florence and i was a young assistant professor there. watching his academic progress, i remember that i was immediately struck by his serious commitment to the study of the great political phenomena of the twentieth century. shortly after graduating from the university of florence with a dissertation on stalinism and post-stalinism, under the guidance of professor domenico fisichella, he moved to rome. he became an assistant professor there in the faculty of political sciences at the university of roma la sapienza. his academic career continued in the university of trieste and he finally returned to rome at the roma tre university, where he became a full professor in 2000. pietro grilli should be remembered as a first-class scholar, a person ready to take up institutional responsibilities when it was required, and a deeply honest man. starting from his dissertation, his research interests were clearly focused: communist political systems, their internal crises, and their destinies after soviet rule broke down were the central focus of most of his books and articles. in his first work, le crisi politiche nei regimi comunisti. ungheria, cecoslovacchia e polonia da stalin agli anni ottanta (angeli, 1989), published just before the crisis of the soviet empire reached its climax, he had carefully explored the weaknesses of communist rule in three satellite countries and the decisive role of the soviet union in preserving these regimes. through a comparative analysis of the hungarian insurrection of 1956, of the czechoslovak crisis of 1968, and of the polish events of 1980– 81, grilli explored the factors leading communist regimes to the brink of collapse and discussed the limited reconsolidation enabled by external intervention. after his first work, it was almost an intellectual necessity for him to deepen his understanding of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes born from revolution and in particular of their power apparatus on the one hand; and on the other, to keep track of what happened when these regimes collapsed. he devoted the book rivoluzioni e burocrazie. continuità e mutamento negli stati rivoluzionari (angeli, 1991) to the first theme; and o cotta, in memoriam – pietro grilli di cortona 2 to the second his volume da uno a molti. democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in europa orientale (il mulino, 1997). the interest in what was happening in the post-communist countries continued to stimulate his research, which was conducted also in association with other scholars (transizione e consolidamento nell’europa centro-orientale, coedited with s. bartole, giappichelli, 1998). the study of communist and post-communist countries was also a stimulus for pietro to extend his research to a more general analysis of the problems of democratization: in this field of research we can mention his book come gli stati diventano democratici (laterza, 2009), the edited volume (with o. lanza) tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia (il mulino, 2011); and the recent crisis and breakdown of non-democratic regimes in the third wave. causes, trends and outcomes (washington, new academia publishing, forthcoming). his comparative interest in the political transformations undergone by european states led him to also analyze some of the underlying problems related to the stateand nationbuilding processes (stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in europa, bologna, il mulino, 2003). pietro grilli, while primarily being a dedicated and active scholar did not eschew his institutional responsibilities both in the academic world and outside it, which are not always gratifying, but must be taken up. at the roma tre university, he was director of the department of international studies, member of the senate, and was also asked to run for rector. until his death, he guided the italian political science association, ensuring a delicate equilibrium between innovation and respect for good traditions. in 1994, he was made a member of the national commission of the italian government for the reform of the constitution and of the electoral system, and in 2000 he was nominated by the president of the republic as an expert in the cnel (the national council for the economy and labor). having known pietro for many years i would like to remember him not only as a scholar and a good citizen, but also as a wise, deeply honest, and fully humane person. he had strong beliefs, but i do not think that anyone ever felt offended by him. we will miss you pietro, but the memories of who you were and of what you have done will stay with us. microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 3-5. pietro grilli di cortona, faculty colleague antonio agosta roma tre university, rome t has been two years since 16 july 2015, the day when pietro grilli di cortona left us after a short and inescapable illness. two months later, on 25 september, pietro would have turned 61. he left his family (wife barbara, his three beloved children bernardo, giovanni and sofia), his co-workers and pupils, his students, his friends and his colleagues too soon. his life and his career were suddenly interrupted in a period marked by great achievements and significant public recognition. he had been a candidate, supported by a close-knit group as an alternative to the majority, for the election of the rector of the roma tre university in the spring of 2013. in september of that year he was elected president of sisp, the italian society of political science (for which, in the previous year, he had coordinated the complex organisation of the annual conference, held at roma tre). he had recently produced (in collaboration with orazio lanza, barbara pisciotta and luca germano) a manual of political science published by utet. he had compiled a volume, published by laterza, of his master’s lessons which he was particularly attached to, dedicated as they were to the processes of democratisation. pietro grilli had become, in many cultural and institutional fields, a point of reference – for his human and professional style, marked by distinction and discretion, for the regularity and quality of his presence and for the clarity and consistency of his opinions on matters of university policy. and his very absence is, today, one of the most tangible and “present” elements in our national and local academic community. i shared fifteen years teaching courses in political science at the faculty of political science of the roma tre university with pietro, and i was witness, albeit for a small part of his activity, to his constant and intense academic commitment and the mark it has made on me. our dialogue has never stopped. i often find myself exchanging ideas with him, with his point of view. or at least with what i believe would have been his point of view on the many aspects of working in a university. i learned so much from him and i have tried, without fully succeeding, to internalise his rare and wide-ranging scientific and academic expertise. we were different, but – i believe – complementary, even in our understanding of political science and education. we underwent different training, he was a pupil of domenico fisichella and i of alberto spreafico. he tending to political theory and international comparisons and i to empirical research and the study of the italian political and institutional system. i agosta, pietro grilli di cortona, faculty colleague 4 many times i asked myself, over the years, if pietro had ever regretted wanting me in his faculty, if i had been effective in his project to develop our subject area. what i found, though, was that pietro was always willing to respect my independence, never taking on authoritative airs (which he could well have done given his prestige and rank). he was always close and supportive, especially in difficult periods of my life, in which he offered himself without reserve to help with my exams and with the needs of some of my undergraduate and phd students. pietro once recounted to me the opinion of professor sergio cotta – one of the greatest philosophers of law and a lecturer at the la sapienza university, where pietro had been a researcher for a decade – about the different vocations of university professors. there are those who favour teaching, those who are devoted primarily to research, and those who have special inclinations towards the administration and organisation of academic institutions. but pietro had all three gifts. by choice he was a researcher where he had had a long, rigorous and unique scientific career (and certainly not just a sequence of fleeting interests). starting, moreover, from his individual work, painstaking and lonely, to come in recent years to designing investigative programmes through which he stimulated, and involved the energies of, other political scientists and younger researchers from various universities. pietro held several positions of organisation, directing among other things first the department of political institutions and social sciences at our university and later the department of international studies. he presided over various undergraduate degree courses. he was a member of the academic senate of roma tre university. and, on behalf of the political science subject grouping, for a long time he was a member of the cun, the national university board. lastly, he headed the scientific board of the university’s political studies library which, for his tireless personal efforts right up to just a few days before his death, since 14 december 2015 has been named after him. only in the last two weeks of his life did pietro suspend his public activities. his email of the evening of 1 july aroused much emotion in those who received it. in it, in essential and realistic terms, he wrote to the members of the political science society that the deterioration in his health no longer allowed him to carry out the functions of president of the sisp (italian society of political science) effectively and therefore he surrendered the office into the hands of the steering committee. (so too with a view to the preparation of the annual conference, scheduled for 10 to 12 september at the university of calabria in cosenza). even in those dramatic circumstances, his rationality and spirit of service were highlighted, leading him to lucidly examine the possible procedures for his succession, in the absence of similar precedents or specific provisions in the charter. pietro was always like that – sober, balanced, without exaggeration, extremely kind and measured, even in moments of difficulty or conflict. always involved, authoritative and reliable in academic activities, family life and social relations. and these marks of genuineness, measured response and simple elegance is also reflected in his scientific output and writing style. in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 5 let me conclude by quoting a few lines of the last thing he wrote, posted on his blog on 22 april 2015, to remember his mother-in-law who had recently died. “sometimes the exceptional lies not in striking words or action but rather in a normal, honest life, marked by a sense of duty and great selflessness, and the absence of demands and self-pity.” i think it is a moral testament and also a summary of how pietro lived his life. as time goes on, we will feel his absence with ever greater understanding and regret. microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 15-19. democracies in transition political change in democratic regimes luca lanzalaco university of macerata to pietro, rare and precious person introduction students of political change focus mainly on the transitions from non-democratic regimes to democratic ones, and vice versa. much less attention is devoted to the transitions within the same type of regime, in particular the political change of democratic regimes. when, why and how do democratic regimes change? pietro grilli di cortona dealt with this topic in an article written in the turmoil of the italian transition from the first to the so-called second republic (grilli di cortona 1995) and in a book published ten years later (grilli di cortona 2017) when the italian endless transition was still open. in these two pieces pietro grilli takes into consideration various aspects of this type of transitions. from a theoretical point of view, he distinguishes between the changes of genus, when the type (democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian) of regime is involved (interregime transitions), and the changes of species when the regime remains the same but some of its important traits are transformed (intra-regime transitions). he also underlines that this second type of changes are much rarer in democratic regimes than in nondemocratic ones. and, as we shall see below, this is due to a specific characteristic of democracies. from a historical point of view, grilli analyses the italian case and its various institutional reforms from the legge acerbo (1923) up to the recent electoral and constitutional ones. thirdly, in a comparative perspective grilli contrasts the italian transition (from 1993 up to nowadays) with the french (1958-1962) and the belgian (1962-1993) ones. in the light of this comparison he proposes in the last chapter of his book an interpretative model of change within democratic regimes. the two contributions of pietro grilli on democratic transitions are relatively short, less that two hundred pages on the whole. however, they are very dense. full of hints of reflection, they open a relatively unexplored field of study. in particular, the analysis of pietro grilli goes far beyond the italian context and it has wider implications. in what follows i focus on: i) the way in which political change within democracies can be conceptualized; ii) the possible extension of the concepts usually used in the study of interregime transitions to the analysis of intra-regime changes (i.e. transitions within democracies); iii) the need for a general theory of political and institutional change. lanzalaco, democracies in transition 16 democratic change as a continuum grilli distinguishes among three types of political change of democracies.1 first, there may be a democratic breakdown and an involution toward a non-democratic regime, followed by a new process of democratization (italy). this is a widely studied type of transition. secondly, democratic regimes may change gradually in an incremental way, adapting to different domestic and the international challenges (great britain, united states, scandinavian countries). this is the most frequent type of change: democratic regimes are much more flexible than non-democratic ones. in these cases, the relative stability of constitutional and electoral models is often compensated by barely visible and scarcely disruptive administrative reforms.22 the third type of transition is characterized (a) by the continuity of the basic characteristics of a democracy in terms of civil and political rights but also (b) by discontinuities in the formal architecture of the regime, e.g. changes in the electoral system or in executive-legislative relations like in the case of france. the democratic genus remains unchanged, while the species of democracy may shift, for example, from a consociative to a competitive form of democracy, from a parliamentary to a presidential model of constitution, from a proportional to a majority electoral system or from a unitary to a federal form of state. this is just the type of change pietro grilli is more interested in for two reasons. firstly, because his research question is whether the italian transition is of the second or of the third type. secondly, because the logics of these democratic changes are relatively obscure and understudied. the typology proposed by pietro grilli is theoretically rigorous. it sharply distinguishes between the elements of continuity and those of discontinuity at the different levels of the political system. it also is historically well founded, since it is rooted in a comparative analysis of relevant case studies. but it needs a substantial update in the light of the recent evolution of the italian case that highlights at least three new elements. first of all, transition within democratic regimes is actually an open-ended process and it may become an infinite transition. secondly, transition can assume an oscillatory character: waves of reformism may alternate to phases of stasis or even to “return to the past” policies, as in the electoral system shifting from proportional to majority systems and then back to proportionality. and finally, recent events suggest that the distinction between the second and the third model of change is not so sharp as it could seem. what prevails in the italian case is a form of hybridization of the original model of consociative democracy with elements of competitive one.3 in this form of change the distinction between evolutionary adaptation and the change of species with the democratic genus tends to blur. following these observations, a different form of treatment of the concept of political transitions within democratic regimes can be proposed. in particular, a classification can be replaced by a continuum (see figure 1). in this continuum, adaptation, hybridization and change of the form of democracy are three types of institutional policies among which policy makers may shift depending on the cohesion of the dominant coalition and its capacity of consensus building upon specific reform projects. 1 a comparison of the main institutional changes in democratic regimes from 1946 to 2000 may be found in lanzalaco (2005, 32-44). 2 baldi (2000), for example, shows how democratic regimes may substantially change even if their constitution remains unchanged. 3 on this point, see morlino (2014). in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 17 figure 1. political change within democracies as a continuum conceptual analogies the second point i would like to focus on is the use that pietro grilli makes of some concepts excerpt from the theory of regime transitions. on the one side, both in his article and in his book grilli underlines the difference existing between transitions between regimes (change of genus) and transitions within regimes (change of species). on the other side, however, he brought about important analogies between the two types of transitions in so far he utilizes many concepts usually suited for the study of the first type of transitions, for interpreting also the second ones. is this a form of conceptual stretching, as sartori called it, or does it open new perspectives of analysis? the first conceptual analogy concerns the concept of consolidation, that as we know is well rooted in linz, stepan and morlino’s studies of democratic transitions. in his interpretative model of transitions within democracies grilli affirms that the timing of the process of consolidation of a new model of democracy is crucial for its stabilization. the quicker the process of consolidation, the more robust its stability. but, as we know from the study of democratic transitions, the success of the process of consolidation depends on the legitimacy of the new democratic regime. so, the question is: on what does it depend the legitimacy of a new form of democracy? and why did the old model lose its one? and, last but not least, what is the weight of the original model of democracy in determining the legitimacy of a new and different form of democracy? whatever the answers given to these questions, my point is that the transplantation of the concept of regime consolidation from the study of inter-regime transitions to the analysis of intra-regime democratic transitions is very fruitfully, even if not enough explored. the second conceptual analogy concerns the concept of gatekeepers. one of the cornerstones of the theory of democratic transition and consolidation is that political parties are the gatekeepers of democracy. only when democracy is the only game in town, political parties are the main players. the proposal pietro grilli advances, with his usual understatement, is to consider political parties not only as the gatekeepers of democracy tout court, but also of a specific form of democracy. following this line of reasoning, grilli distinguishes the traditional parties who were linked to the italian transition first republic from the new parties who tried to dismantle it. so, parties and party system assume a pivotal role in leading the process of transition within regimes, similarly to the role they play in transitions among regimes. lanzalaco, democracies in transition 18 these are only two examples of the way in which pietro grilli has extended the use of concepts from one field of inquiry (inter-regime changes) to another one (intra-regime changes). the creation of a new semantic field proposed by pietro grilli paves the way for the search of a general theory of political and institutional change. incubation, adaptive evolution, punctuated equilibrium as i already wrote at the beginning of this contribution, pietro grilli proposes in his book an interpretative model of transition within democratic regimes. this framework resembles what in organization theory is called incubation theory. the causal factors – whatever they be – remain at the latent level even for a long period of time. the political system seems to be operating with a satisfactory performance, even if elements of the crisis are already present. at a certain moment, there is a trigger, an external factor, often unforeseeable – such as an economic crisis, a challenge on the international arena, the initiative of the judiciary system – and then the crisis explodes and change seems to be necessary. but the external challenge is only the apparent cause of the crisis, it affects an already defective situation. this is not the only model to interpret institutional change. streeck and thelen (2003) have proposed a well-known typology of evolutionary change and pointed that institutions change even if they seemingly do not change. in other words, the functions of political institutions may be subject to deep transformations, even if they may seem extremely stable at the formal level. this model of change recalls what pietro grilli termed adaptive change. finally, there is a model of change proposed some years ago by sergio fabbrini (2000) in a book dealing with the same topic of grilli’s contributions, namely political change within democratic regimes, in particular italy and france. in his book fabbrini utilizes the punctuated equilibrium theory, a model originally proposed in contrast to the traditional darwinian approach of evolutionary change. in this model, gradualism and incrementalism are excluded: change entails a sort of “quantum leap” brought about by a new power balance between the political coalitions supporting or opposing institutional reforms. incubation, evolutionary adaptation, punctuated equilibrium. three different ways of explaining political and institutional change within democratic regimes. which of them is valid? this question obviously is still open both on the theoretical and on the empirical level. the merits of pietro grilli have been two. he has devoted a piece of his intellectual work to this relatively understudied topic. secondly, he has shed light on what happens before (incubation of the crisis) and after the crisis (consolidation of a new model of democracy) and emphasized that these phases are much more important than the crisis itself. these phases decisively influence the more or less incisive impact the crisis may, or may not have, on the history of democratic regimes. references baldi, b. (2000), il federalismo fra disegno costituzionale e pratiche paracostituzionali: una comparazione fra stati uniti e germania, in l. lanzalaco (a cura di), istituzioni, amministrazione, politica. analisi istituzionale e apparati amministrativi, napoli, esi, pp. 195-230. in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 19 grilli di cortona, p. (1995), seconda repubblica o prima repubblica-bis? osservazioni comparative sul cambiamento politico in italia, “quaderni di scienza politica”, 2, 3, pp. 469494. grilli di cortona, p. (2007), il cambiamento politico in italia. dalla prima alla seconda repubblica, roma carocci. fabbrini, s. (2000), tra pressioni e veti. il cambiamento politico in italia, roma-bari, laterza. lanzalaco, l. (2005), le politiche istituzionali, bologna, il mulino. morlino, l. (2014), transizione in stallo e conseguente instabilità, in m. almagisti, l. lanzalaco e l. verzichelli (a cura di), la transizione politica italiana. da tangentopoli a oggi, roma, carocci, pp. 197-221. streeck, w. and thelen, k. (2003), institutional change in advanced political economies, in w. streeck and k. thelen (eds), beyond continuity: institutional change in advanced political economies, oxford, oxford university press. microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 10-14. why do transitions to democracy fail? a tribute to pietro grilli di cortona leonardo morlino luiss guido carli university, rome 1. introduction as it is evident from the works by pietro grilli (see in this issue the articles by barbara pisciotta and by orazio lanza) the key questions that has been addressed in these years on the phenomenon of democratizations has also been object of research by him. especially when his books published in 2000, 2009, 2011 (see bibliography) are considered, complemented by those he edited with other colleagues (see e.g. 2014 and 2016), the quality and originality of his way of doing research on that topic can be fully appreciated. in this short piece i would like to pay a tribute to the scholar i first met as young, serious, passionate student at cesare alfieri in florence several years ago and to address a topic i guess we could have discussed together at length and would have received his interest. that is: reflecting on the research results and the very phenomenon of transitions to democracy that took place in a number of countries along last decades is it possible to single out the key obstacles to a successful transition to democracy? in the next pages i try to reply to such a question by referring also to another work where i addressed this issue (see morlino 2015). 2. approaches to transitions before making the attempt of replying to the question i have just addressed, it can be helpful to recall the main theoretical approaches to the topic. the starting point is the widespread negative view on the possibility of achieving accepted theories. the overall prospects were gloomy, to say the least. in fact, one of the most authoritative statements on the issue was made by o’donnell and schmitter: “we did not have at the beginning, nor do we have at the end… a ‘theory’ to test or to apply to the case studies.”1 several years later, mcfaul echoed this statement: “the project of constructing a general theory of democratization may very well fail… the unique patterns generated by the fourth wave of regime change in the postcommunist world suggest that the search for a general theory of democratization and authocratization will be a long one.”2 actually with the hindsight we can realize that there are at least three different theoretical approaches to the study of transition to democracy. thus, first, when asking about the main theoretical results in this field of research we can see that there is a dominant 1 o’donnell and schmitter (1986: 3). 2 mcfaul (2002: 244). in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 11 approach: the only way of conducting research and achieving salient empirical results on transitions seems to develop a theoretical framework where all possible actors and factors are included and, when empirically tested, each actor and each factor turns out to be combined in specific multidimensional configurations. moreover, when over the years the focus has been switching more and more to democracy as a result of transition, a stronger attention has been devoted to democratic installations and related aspects. second, a number of authors made an additional step by trying to find recurring patterns of successful transitions. among them two (small) groups emerged with different theoretical purposes. on the one hand, there is the goal of singling out comprehensive multidimensional ideal types or even typologies that characterize a small number of specific cases, usually very close in time and space, where the result is the focus on a combination of different set of factors and/or actors. on the other hand, at a higher level of abstraction and with possible regard to a broader area and a longer time span, ideal types or typology are proposed where one or more than one actor or factor is assumed as the key aspect, and the impact of it/them on the process or on the result of it is assessed and consequent patterns built. for example, a typology of transitions where the role of civil society is assessed or the role of international external actors is considered vis-à-vis domestic actors. third, for those who supported that theoretical approach suggesting that the search for and detection of key mechanism/s is the most important theoretical result that scholars of comparative democratization can and should achieve, then, the issue is to try to single out what is such a mechanism. despite the empirical problems and difficulties, at least one key mechanism emerged in the research on transition, which at least contributes to explaining critically successful transitions and indirectly suggests why other transitions are unsuccessful. this is the learning process, that is characterized by the interaction between past, perceived experiences and the present opportunities and involve both leaders and people (see morlino 2012, chap. 4). 3. obstacles to successful transitions with this in mind we can now ask what are the factors, or even the actors, which have prevented a successful transition to democracy by maintaining a non-democratic regime, the previous or a different one,3 or by stalemating it in a hybrid situation? this question has almost never been explicitly discussed in depth in the literature, except in the work edited by stoner and mcfaul.4 first, if the approach that stresses the necessity of developing a more or less detailed theoretical framework is taken (see above and morlino 2015), then the explanation of the failure is in a specific multidimensional set of reasons that can partially or largely vary from one case to another. accordingly, the simplest reply is to refer to the lack of conditions and aspects that assured the success of newly achieved democracies. in this perspective, there is not much to say except to analyse the specific cases with a reversed framework vis-à-vis the one adopted for the cases of success. 3 as happened in egypt. 4 stoner and mcfaul (2013). stoner and mcfaul devoted to this question four chapters on algeria, iran, china and azerbaijan. they are also two very distinguished experts of russia, but curiously put this country, which was a well-established electoral authoritarianism in 2014, among the successful cases of transition, only considering the collapse of 1991 and the transitional phase of 1993. morlino, why do transitions to democracy fail? 12 second, if alternatively we are able to single out patterns or models of transition with reference to specific set of few cases, then this is what stoner, diamond, girod and mcfaul actually do in the introductory chapter of stoner and mcfaul’s work.5 in doing this they stress how a failed transition is usually an elite-led one, that the lack of three domestic factors, such as mass mobilization, indigenous civil society organizations and independent media and communications technology, is crucial to explain the failure, and that the absence of any external international help for a number of reasons6 is also a salient aspect. the third theoretical path to reply to the starting question seems the most relevant and revealing one. in fact, if attention is devoted to the analysis of key mechanisms of change or, in an opposite perspective, to the mechanisms of continuity, then a few considerations are in order. to start with, when singling out the learning process as a such key mechanism at the core of transitions, the actual question is how elites and people change their minds, or do not, and choose or resist to the democratic path. the basic reply to this question is: through trial and error. elites and people learn the negative effects of nondemocratic arrangements and, with or without the help of external institutions and governments, they can come to try out democratic solutions that eventually appear more favourable and acceptable for everyone interested. maintaining this perspective, however, prompts a number of other important reflections. first, the learning process we have just mentioned may also work the other way: elites and people may follow other lessons and accept non-democratic solutions, or simply obey them. if we look back over past experience, it is very well known how, in the early 20th century and later on, southern european or latin american elites learned to stop changes toward a democratic direction by reflecting on their own experience or that of other nearby or related countries. second, there are ideologies and beliefs that retain strong identities and consequently set up serious, tough obstacles to changes in the mindset of people. the two strongest obstacles of this kind that we saw at work are religion – in recent years the islam religion has been especially effective in this – and ethnic identities, particularly in several african countries. such obstacles have usually been well institutionalized for years. this implies that beliefs and identities are powerfully strengthened by vested interests that support them. of course, there are exceptional cases where a democratic, charismatic leader or small groups are able to overcome these obstacles. in south africa in early 1990s nelson mandela was able to create a democracy in a situation where vengeance and conflict would have been broadly understandable and expected. with his moral authority and leadership abilities, he was able to win over other elites, the leaders closest to him included, and even to bring about a change in people’s attitudes on the political direction to undertake. more recently, during the arab spring and later in tunisia a democratic elite was able to find and follow a very narrow path by managing to have a mainly secular constitution approved in january 2014 and laying the foundations for a fragile, but possibly viable democracy. third, an unfavourable international context, such as being related to and dependent economically on a non-democratic country – as happened in 2014 in the middle east and the eurasian area with post-communist countries – and the related existence of an appar 5 stoner, diamond, girod and mcfaul (2013), introductory chapter of stoner and mcfaul’s work. 6 in the cases they analyze, the presence of oil altered the willingness of international actors to promote democracy (see stoner, diamond, girod, mcfaul, 2013, section on external influences). in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 13 ently successful non-democratic alternative, such as a number of non-democratic regimes in middle east or russia, form the basis for the failure of transition, if started. last, we should recall the most obvious aspect. the most robust basis for a failed transition is set up by the absence of a democratic elite. in other words, even a charismatic leader or a minoritarian elite – although, of course, not strongly minoritarian – can manage to bring about a successful transition within a favourable context (see above). but the absence of that leader or elite and an unfavourable cultural and international context dooms any transition to failure. it is a platitude to recall that, despite the positions of a very minoritarian elite, the largest part of the elite and the people who were active during the egyptian transition were not democratic, and the goals of some of them were religious ones, although characterized by varying degrees of fundamentalism.7 4. concluding remarks thus, especially on the basis of experience in the most recent years, singling out obstacles that make successful transition impossible can be done in connection with the different theoretical approaches and related goals that are set up. thus, if referring to a theoretical framework, the failure is explained by the lack of conditions and aspects that assured the success of newly achieved democracies. if singling out patterns or models is the theoretical goal, then a failed transition is an elite-led one and the lack of mass mobilization, indigenous civil society organizations and independent media and communications technology, as well as the absence of international help, are key aspects, above all in the recent postcommunist transitions. if the focus is on key mechanisms of continuity, then, in order to better understand the basic reasons of failed transitions, four aspects should be kept in mind: 1. the learning process, which was considered the key mechanism of change, may also work in the opposite way: elites and the people can work and opt for non-democratic solutions; 2. the two strongest obstacles to change are religion and ethnic identities, powerfully strengthened by vested interests; 3. an unfavourable international context and the related existence of a successful non-democratic alternative lay the basis for the failure of transition, if started; and finally, 4. the most robust basis of a failed transition is set up by the absence of a democratic elite, which may also be a minoritarian one. let us bear in mind that this is only the beginning of a reply. for more satisfactory results additional research and analysis will be necessary. there is no doubt that if pietro would have become interested in this question he would have contributed a lot to much better results. references bermeo, n. (1992), democracy and the lessons of dictatorship, in “comparative politics”, 24, pp. 273-291. germano l., p. grilli di cortona, o. lanza (eds.) (2014), come cadono i regimi democratici. primi passi verso la democrazia nei paesi della “terza ondata”, napoli, editoriale scientifica. 7 the cognitive heuristics weiland (2012) discusses in his analysis of the arab spring is actually what i label the “learning process” here (see above and also bermeo 1992 and pridham 2000). morlino, why do transitions to democracy fail? 14 grilli di cortona, p. (1991), rivoluzioni e burocrazie. continuità e mutamento negli stati rivoluzionari, milano, franco angeli. grilli di cortona, p. (2000), da uno a molti. democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in europa orientale, bologna, il mulino. grilli di cortona, p. (2009), come gli stati diventano democratici, bari, laterza. grilli di cortona, p. (2011), tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia, bologna, il mulino. grilli di cortona, p., b. pisciotta, e. r. terzuolo (eds.) (2016), crisis and breakdown of nondemocratic regimes. lessons from the third wave, washington, new academia publishing. mcfaul, m. (2002), the fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: non-cooperative transitions in the post-communist world, in “world politics”, 54, pp. 212-244. morlino, l. (2012), changes for democracy. actors, structures, processes, oxford, oxford university press. morlino, l. (2015), transitions to democracy. what theory to grasp complexity?, in “historein”, 15,1, pp. 13-31. o’donnell, g. and p. c. schmitter (1986) transitions from authoritarian rule. tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies, in g. o’donnell, p.c. schmitter and l. whitehead (eds.), transition from authoritarian rule, baltimore, the johns hopkins university press, pp. 53-56. pridham, g. (2000), the dynamics of democratization: a comparative approach. london: continuum. stoner, k. and m. mcfaul (eds.) (2014), transitions to democracy. a comparative perspective, baltimore, the johns hopkins university press. stoner, k., l. diamond, d. girod, m. mcfaul (2013), transitional successes and failures: the international-domestic nexus, in k. stoner and m. mcfaul (eds.), transitions to democracy. a comparative perspective, baltimore, the johns hopkins university press. weyland k. (2012), the arab spring: why the surprising similarities with the revolutionary wave of 1848?, in “perspective on politics”, 10, pp. 917-934. microsoft word pdf_issue_14_1_intro_galanti.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 1, march 2019 © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 1, i-iv. contact author: maria tullia galanti, university of milan. e-mail address: maria.galanti@unimi.it introduction to the special issue the last mile: when policies go local maria tullia galanti university of milan he study of local politics and policies in such a diverse country as italy can be both remarkable and hopeless. on the one hand, going local to study politics allows us to discover how political preferences vary in proximate contexts and how elected representatives distribute power across levels of government, placing emphasis on centre-periphery relations (page and goldsmith 1987). on the other, going local to study policies allows us to consider what public agencies do when they apply seemingly self-executory policy measures at the decentralized level, showing the importance of implementation (pressman and wildavsky 1973). ultimately, going local is a good way to discover how politics and policies are intertwined, by investigating the relationship between performance and perceived legitimacy (dente 1985; 1997; capano and lippi 2018), especially when the political system is geared towards a majoritarian logic that allows clear alternation in power after the polls – such as after the so-called direct election of a mayor in italy (bobbio 2005a). all in all, going local has proved to be innovative in both theory and empirics. in this sense, the ‘local’ is the natural scene for democratic and institutional experimentation. on the politics side, while putnam’s making democracy work came out as a study of democratic performance of the newborn italian regions, scholars such as caciagli, riccamboni, cartocci and trigilia described the political subcultures focusing on partisan organizations at the local level (baccetti and messina 2009). on the policy side, the implementation of national policies offered a unique opportunity for the application of problem-solving as the proper analytical perspective for policy studies in the country (dente et al. 1990). later on, the ‘local’ paved the way for studies about administrative reforms and democratic experimentation (bobbio 2002; 2005b). nowadays, it still offers a privileged perspective on policy innovation and learning (di giulio and vecchi 2018), on the effects of reforms on local public services (citroni et al. 2015; galanti 2016), and on the complex multi-level implications of austerity policies (lippi and tsekos 2019; bolgherini and dallara 2016), while disclosing emerging phenomena (bassoli and polizzi 2019). however interesting the ‘local’ might be, perils for unfortunate researchers abound. first, there is the accessibility problem. usable data can hardly be relied on for most dimensions related to the input, output or, most importantly, the outcome of the policy process. with the exception of the electoral ones, data on local politics and policies are incomplete or inaccurate or, more often than not, simply not there. second, there is the t introduction to the special issue, the last mile: when policies go local ii comparability problem. official data sources are often aggregated at higher territorial levels, so fine-grained and comparable measures about salient political and policy issues are scarce. third, there is the exceptionalism problem. comparison often seems at odds with the specificity of the local context, so that scientific explanations tend to apply only to one case, without making sense of different case studies. moreover, replicability is unlikely, also because accurate in-depth case study research relying on interviews and process tracing is extremely time consuming. last but not least, there is the theoretical problem, as the proximity between local actors and their sensitivity to contextual conditions makes it rather difficult to find a theory that fits, or to be able to generate hypotheses to generalize the empirical findings. still, going local still means dipping into the reality of politics and policies, and this often makes empirical research on local governments and policies highly innovative and insightful and, thus, necessary. the articles in this focus on ips offer examples of how to turn research problems into opportunities. first, the accessibility of data can be tackled by seeking other sources of data, building a new dataset, and ultimately focusing on unconventional research questions. most policies remain on paper until they arrive at the local level, where purposeful actors implement them following strategic considerations. searching for (as yet unused) data, collected by a number of institutions and organizations at the local level, allows us to shed light on side effects and unexpected consequences that anticipate future developments. this is what emerges in the analysis of elisa rebessi of the implementation of the italian code of public contracts (rebessi 2019, this issue). building a brand-new dataset on judicial decisions on the awarding of contracts by the regional administrative courts in milan, rome and turin, and using measures to assess competitivity in these contexts, rebessi shows that municipal officers act strategically in shaping the content of the contracts in order to avoid contestation. at the same time, the analysis unveils a side effect: by making the content of the contracts more detailed and rigid, local administrations may paradoxically experience accrued litigation from competing enterprises on the local market. second, the comparability problem can be faced by downsizing the analysis to more homogeneous units, amassing qualitative evidence from interviews with different stakeholders in the same cities, while collecting other structural information (e.g. on networks). the comparison between similar cases proves, then, to be empowered by a research question that is original, because it adds a new perspective to the existing literature. this is what emerges from the work of andrea pettrachin (2019) in this issue of ips. he analyses how sensemaking processes affect the implementation of social utility work as an instrument of migration policy in several cities in the veneto region. by considering not only the rational motivations of mayors but also their emotional component, the analysis unveils that mayoral decisions depend both on how the issue is perceived in the communities, but also on how they interpret their identity as mayors, including partisanship. in particular, the analysis of how these mayors make sense of their decisions on migration policies shows that partisan mayors tend to behave differently from independent ones. third, the exceptionalism problem is confronted by crafting better research designs. even when a case seems specific to one time and one place, the research should be designed, as the case is one instance among many others. in other words, the researcher has maria tullia galanti iii to be skilled at justifying the case selection, while acknowledging that also in a single case study there might be an explicit or implicit comparison with similar cases (gerring 2007). in this way, even a single case allows us to discover aspects that might configure as recurring trends for a phenomenon. by selecting a pilot study for the analysis of the implementation of rationalization of municipal corporations, stefania profeti reinforces existing knowledge about both policies and political parties. on the one hand, the analysis of rationalization policies in leghorn under the five star movement confirms that centre-periphery relations still matter for national parties, while the institutionalization of the movement translates into a centralization of decision-making, especially with regard to apparently ‘local’ problems laden with symbolic meanings. on the other hand, the analysis shows that mayors adapt national policies using a strategic reframing of the issues, and strategically choose from among an array of options, but with constant attention to perceived legitimacy and citizens’ expectations, as their political careers (also) depend on this. finally, there is the theoretical problem, which is not exclusive to local government studies. indeed, this is the most challenging one, but also the most rewarding. to find theories that fit the cases, the researcher has to think at a higher level of abstraction, to discard the aspects that are not relevant to the research question, and finally to take from the findings only those dimensions and relations that explain something – and that are more likely to be present in similar cases. this can be done either when the researcher already has a theory in mind and needs a local case to test it – such as positive political theory in the article by rebessi – or when he/she is struggling to make sense of a new phenomenon, such as the implementation of a top-down rationalization programme by a new political force in the article by profeti. all this requires a solid base of theoretical awareness, a steady orientation towards empirical knowledge, plus a good deal of stubbornness in seeking until you find (profeti 2010). the future of local politics and policies relies on the capacity of our community to develop proper research agendas to design a collection of case studies under a shared framework and research question, or to invest in a sort of ‘inventive individualism’, with in-depth case studies on understudied phenomena which are telling of trends in both politics and policies, from the distribution of power to the use of policy instruments. references baccetti c., and messina p., (eds.), (2009), l'eredità. le subculture politiche della toscana e del veneto, liviana, padova. bobbio l., (2002), produzione di politiche a mezzo di contratti nella pubblica amministrazione italiana, stato e mercato, 1, 111-141. bobbio, l. (2005a), “italy: after the storm, in denters b, and rose l. e. (eds.) comparing local governance. trends and developments, basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 29–46. bobbio, l. (2005b), la democrazia deliberativa nella pratica, stato e mercato, 1/2005, p67-88. bolgherini, s., and dallara, c. (eds.) (2016) la retorica della razionalizzazione: il settore pubblico italiano negli anni dell'austerity. bologna: istituto carlo cattaneo. capano g., lippi a., (2018), how decision-makers make the «right choice»? instrument selection between legitimacy and instrumentality: evidence from education policy in italy (1996-2016), rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche, 2, 219-254. introduction to the special issue, the last mile: when policies go local iv citroni g., lippi a. and profeti s. (2015), representation through corporatisation. municipal corporations in italy as arenas for local democracy, european political science review, 7(1), 63-92. dente b., (1985), governare la frammentazione. stato, regioni ed enti locali in italia, bologna, il mulino. dente b., bobbio l., fareri p., and morisi m., (1990), metropoli per progetti: attori e processi di trasformazione urbana a firenze, torino, milano, bologna, il mulino. dente, b. 1997. sub-national governments in the long italian transition, west european politics, 20 (1), 176–193. di giulio m., and vecchi g. (2019), multilevel policy implementation and the where of learning: the case of the information system for school buildings in italy, policy sciences, 52, 119. lippi a., and tsekos t. (eds.) (2019), local public service in times of austerity across mediterranean europe, london, palgrave. galanti m.t. (2016), sindaci e manager nel capitalismo municipale, bologna, il mulino. gerring j., (2007). case study research principles and practices. cambridge: cambridge university press. page e., goldsmith m., (1987), central and local government relation, beverly hills, sage. pettrachin a., (2019), when asylum policies go local: the case of socially useful works for asylum-seekers, italian political science, 14 (1). polizzi e. and bassoli m., (2019). all smoke, no fire? sharing practices and political investment in two italian cities. italian political science review/rivista italiana di scienza politica: 1-16. doi:10.1017/ipo.2019.12 profeti s., (2010), il potere locale tra politica e politiche, soveria mannelli, rubbettino. profeti s., (2019), reshaping policy solutions through local implementation: the rationalization of municipal corporations in leghorn and the case of aamps, italian political science, 14 (1). pressman, j.l., wildavsky, a. (1973), implementation, berkeley, university of california press. rebessi e., (2019), unintended consequences of fighting corruption: judicial decisions for the award of public contracts in three italian cities, italian political science, 14 (1). microsoft word pdf_issue_15_1_costalli_1-4.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 1, may 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 1, 1-4. contact author: stefano costalli, university of florence. e-mail address: stefano.costalli@unifi.it introduction to the special issue: italy in twenty-first century international politics stefano costalli university of florence t the time of writing, international politics seems almost frozen, and the whole world is focused on how to tackle the covid-19 pandemic. however, contemporary international politics shows many signs of transformation that predate – and go well beyond – the pandemic. the international system is more turbulent, multifaceted and unpredictable than it was during the whole of the twentieth century, and even though the two world wars represent two unmatched peaks in terms of total deaths and destruction, it seems difficult to claim that wars and armed conflicts are disappearing (braumoeller 2019). if we scratch below the pandemic surface and consider the conditions and actions of the great powers that play a central role in shaping the overall international system, we can see that these countries show a remarkable degree of activism. the united states is redefining its role in the world and reconsidering its strategy in europe, the middle east and asia, albeit through an ambiguous trajectory that is mainly the result of strong domestic tensions and high political polarization. china has launched a global initiative that could allow it to complete its transformation from economic giant to real hegemon. this long-term foreign policy plan stretches from intensifying military competition with the united states in the asian pacific to the gigantic belt and road initiative (bri) across asia toward europe (shambaugh 2018). however, the final outcome of these policies is still uncertain and it is producing contrasting reactions in many partner states (de oliveira et al. 2020). russia is increasingly active in its neighbourhood and in the middle east, vigorously reclaiming the role of great power, and using external interventions and armed force in a fashion that recalls nineteenth century european politics (malyarenko and wolff 2018). in this unstable situation, long-standing international organizations seem to have lost their grip and even the european union is going through a long and deep crisis. an important debate is open about the fall of the liberal order and several authors advance interpretations that stress links between the current features of international politics and the domestic politics of many western countries (on this debate see e.g. ikenberry 2018; mearsheimer 2019; lucarelli 2020). turbulent times and the activism of great powers are not new phenomena in international politics, but the present international system is also marked by the growing importance of non-state actors, transnational flows and unprecedented technologies, a introduction to the special issue ‘italy in twenty-first century international politics’ 2 which make calculations more difficult and policy-making increasingly complex. for instance, it has now become common knowledge that most contemporary armed conflicts involve non-state actors fighting states locally in civil wars or transnationally through terrorist attacks. moreover, huge private companies and economic flows heavily influence international politics and the domestic politics of many countries, causing tensions in various parts of the world. even individuals are increasingly at the centre of international politics, mainly due to the massive flows of refugees and migrants, which have been growing for years (unhcr 2019). in other words, policy makers who want to navigate the turbulent waters of contemporary world politics have to take into account a high number of variables in different dimensions. this situation is especially cogent for the governments of middle powers, which are not at the mercy of international phenomena as small states are, but at the same time are more bound by external conditions than great powers. italy has long been defined as a typical example of a middle power (santoro 1991) and – considering the tough challenges the country is facing nowadays – it seems appropriate to make a point about these challenges. this special issue has, therefore, been conceived to address the role of italy in twentyfirst century international politics, presenting a series of essays that could possibly be interesting for an audience that goes beyond the academic community, including policy makers and commentators. the main aim of these essays is not to advance a theoretical interpretation of italian foreign policy, a task that has already been successfully achieved by more purely academic initiatives (e.g. isernia and longo 2017). the main goal of this collection is rather to try to clarify the current challenges, identifying the available options for italy’s foreign policy, while considering major risks and opportunities. italy is directly involved in many of the global dynamics mentioned above, primarily for geopolitical reasons. it seems, therefore, crucial to identify its current position in the stormy seas of contemporary international politics and to understand its possible contribution. in the first article of this special issue, stefano costalli and andrea ruggeri seek to show the position of italy on a broad set of key issues for contemporary international politics, from military power to international trade and refugee flows. relying on a large amount of data, the authors show empirical trends and compare italy with its neighbours or with the great powers of the international system. it turns out that italy and the main european countries have converged on many dimensions and, according to the data, italy seems to have the capacity to have a say in many instances. however, it is crucial to be aware of strongpoints, as well as limits and ties, to identify the opportunities and the most appropriate partners. in the second article, lorenzo cladi and andrea locatelli study the role of italy in europe, vis-à-vis france and germany, in the aftermath of the brexit referendum. the authors show that, in addition to difficulties in detecting external ties and opportunities, italy’s ambivalent foreign policy in europe has been strongly influenced by the composition of its governments. when coalition partners’ ideologies converged, the leading party did not need to concede much to its partners. conversely, when coalition partners’ ideologies differed, a compromise had to be found and this has been true for proeu as well as euro-sceptic parties. two articles in the special issue directly deal with the relationships between italy and the great powers. gabriele natalizia and mara morini explore the relationship between stefano costalli 3 italy and russia, challenging conventional wisdom according to which the two countries enjoy constant cooperative relations. on the contrary, the authors show that even in this case italian foreign policy has been far from constant. here, the main reason for the variations is the degree of stability in the international order. italy is more prone to a cooperative stance towards russia when the international order is fundamentally stable, but italian and russian interests tend to diverge in periods of instability. simone dossi’s contribution looks at the relations between italy and china at the time of the bri. the bri is one of the most notable foreign policy initiatives in contemporary international politics and the author seeks to explain why italy and china, apparently so distant from both a political and an economic point of view, opted for cooperation under the bri and signed the ad hoc memorandum in 2019. in tune with the message of other articles in the special issue, dossi argues that while the bri is expected to be adjusted with a stronger emphasis on china’s own priorities, italy is missing a long-term vision for the future of the country’s relations with the asian rising power. two additional articles deal with the italian position on global issues that feature prominently in contemporary international politics: climate change and mass migrations. federica genovese investigates italy's position in global climate change politics and seeks to understand why this country, like similar middle powers, has adopted ambiguous positions on such a global public policy issue. relying on data for the pollution costs of italian industrial sectors and on public opinion surveys, genovese argues that italy gives importance to climate change, but mixed domestic incentives counterbalance each other and push the government to take mild and ambiguous positions. antonio zotti and enrico fassi look at italy’s position in the european debate about international migrations focusing on the peculiar feature of this issue, which is partly a matter that falls within the country’s foreign policy and partly a domestic issue, partly a national affair and partly a european concern. even in this case, italy’s stance has been somewhat ambiguous, depending, the authors claim, on the government coalitions and on the attitudes of these coalitions towards the eu. finally, two articles deal with international security issues, even though they tackle this subject from different perspectives. fabrizio coticchia and francesco n. moro study italian participation in military interventions abroad since the end of the cold war, following their increase between 1991 and 2011 and their subsequent decrease after the libyan war. the authors review this evolution and assess the arguments proposed to explain it. both international conditions and domestic factors contribute to explaining changing italian policy over time, but coticchia and moro also suggest that currently understudied factors such as the stance of armed forces and technological change play important roles. finally, ruth hanau santini looks at the italian role in the mediterranean, and especially in libya. the author analyses italian foreign policy in the mediterranean, arguing that italy acts in this area while reading the situation through the lenses of us policies and intra-eu dynamics. according to hanau santini, a fear of abandonment by the us and a fear of marginalization by european allies have strongly affected italian foreign policy in the mediterranean, eventually leading the country to carry out some ineffective and self-defeating initiatives. in libya this sort of syndrome has reduced italy to an invisible player in a heavily populated theatre. introduction to the special issue ‘italy in twenty-first century international politics’ 4 while considering different aspects of italian foreign policy and evaluating italy’s position in different dimensions of contemporary international politics, the articles of this special issue share a clear and important point. they explicitly or implicitly show that italy’s position is often ambiguous, ambivalent and erratic. adjusting the country’s foreign policy to changing circumstances can be a deliberate and rational strategy for a middle power, but the articles of this special issue show that this is not the case for italy. on the contrary, italian foreign policy in the twenty-first century seems to result from a lack of long-term vision and a systematic difficulty of italian political forces to correctly identify the risks and opportunities present in the turbulent contemporary world. a more structured and permanent debate involving academics, policy-makers and a broader audience through efficient media would be essential to this aim. we hope this special issue can contribute to achieving this goal. references braumoeller, b. (2019) only the dead. the persistence of war in the modern age. oxford-new york: oxford university press. de oliveira, g., murton, g., rippa, a., harlan, t. and yang, y. (2020) china’s belt and road initiative: views from the ground. political geography, 102225 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102225. ikenberry, g. j. (2018) the end of liberal international order? international affairs, 94 (1) pp. 7-23. isernia, p. and longo, f. (2017) the italian foreign policy: challenges and continuities. italian political science review, 47(2) pp. 107-124. lucarelli, s. (2020) cala il sipario sull’ordine liberale? crisi di un sistema che ha cambiato il mondo. milano: vita e pensiero. malyarenko, t. and wolff, s. (2018) the logic of competitive influence-seeking: russia, ukraine, and the conflict in donbas. post-soviet affairs, 34(4) pp. 191-212. mearsheimer, j. (2019) bound to fail: the rise and fall of the international liberal order. international security, 43(4) pp. 7-50. santoro, c. m. (1991) la politica estera di una media potenza. l’italia dall’unità ad oggi. bologna: il mulino. shambaugh, d. (2018) us-china rivalry in southeast asia. power shift or competitive coexistence? international security, 42(4) pp. 85-127. unhcr (2019) global trends 2019. available at: https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_1_interview_bosco_verney_[tp].docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 1 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 1, 40–45. a contribution to [the profession] series editing south european society and politics: a labour of love an interview with anna bosco and susannah verney introduction anna bosco is associate professor of comparative politics and politics of the european union at the university of florence. she has carried out research on parties and party systems change in italy, spain, portugal, greece and east-central europe. susannah verney is associate professor of european integration and european politics at the national and kapodistrian university of athens. she has carried out research on greek and south european politics, euroscepticism and eu enlargement. they are the editors of the journal south european society and politics and the related routledge book series. they have co-edited several comparative books, all published by routledge: crisis elections, new contenders and government formation: breaking the mould in southern europe (2018); protest elections and challenger parties: italy and greece in the economic crisis (2015); southern europe and the financial earthquake: coping with the first phase of the international crisis (with marina costa lobo, 2014); elections in hard times: southern europe, 2010–11 (2013); and a volume on turkey, the akp since gezi park: moving to regime change in turkey (with senem aydın-düzgit). the following interview was conducted by the editor of italian political science, nicolò conti, and edited by the two interviewees. nicolò conti [nc] can you summarise the history of south european society and politics? sesp is now in its 26th year of publication. the journal’s history reflects a quarter century of change, both in southern europe itself and in the way in which it is studied. the mid-1970s transitions to democracy in portugal, greece and spain, followed by these countries’ rapid requests to join the european community, were crucial to the initial development of scholarly interest in southern europe as a region. these three new democracies, together with italy, were perceived as a group with shared characteristics such as democratic fragility and difficulties in economic development. twenty years after the regime changes, there were academic periodicals dedicated to the study of individual south european countries, but no social science journal covering the region as a whole. sesp was founded to fill this gap. the timing was important as in the mid-1990s, the region was changing shape. the turkish, cypriot and maltese applications for european union membership were seen as triggering the emergence of a ‘new southern europe’, alongside the anna bosco and susannah verney [ab & sv] an interview with anna bosco and susannah verney 41 existing ‘old-4’. sesp’s mission was thus to deepen our understanding of a part of europe which had become a significant focus of interest. when the journal was launched in 1996, the study of southern europe was still somewhat in the shadow of transitology, a field which had been recently boosted by developments in eastern europe. this emphasis on its dictatorial past shaped a tendency to view southern europe as a region apart, in a different category from the rest of western europe and somewhat marginal to mainstream concerns. over the subsequent years, the journal has tried to change this by choosing to publish on topics of broader interest in the social sciences and highlighting the relevance of south european experience. characteristic were the special issues published in the journal’s first years addressing welfare states, immigrants and the informal economy, gender inequalities, and unemployment and its consequences. all were ‘hot topics’ at the time and indeed, remain so today. thus, a central goal of sesp has been to put southern europe on the map of important academic debates. for example, sesp’s contribution to europeanisation studies – from the late 1990s, arguably the next big theme of research on southern europe – has included three special issues, examining both europeanisation (published in 2000 and 2013) and de-europeanisation (2016). a key issue of the last 15 years, through which sesp has contributed to the growing literature on democratic backsliding, has been turkey’s democratic decline, leading to regime change in 2018. besides analyses of all the turkish elections and referendums during this period, articles in sesp have addressed key dimensions of this process such as the gezi park mobilisation and the ‘national will’ backlash, grassroots clientelism, the islamisation of turkish society, public attitudes towards regime change, and the impact of social assistance and welfare regimes on regime support. meanwhile, the decade of economic and political crisis after 2008-09 was crucial in placing southern europe centre-stage. the danger of sovereign debt defaults with the potential to destabilise the eurozone attracted the spotlight of global attention. after extreme austerity triggered intense public discontent, the region became a vanguard of european political change. phenomena identified in sesp as electoral and governmental ‘epidemics’, entailing party system mutation and difficulties in cabinet formation, soon spread to other european countries. sesp’s crisis coverage dealt extensively with the consequences for political representation and the rise of challenger parties including the far right. but it also went well beyond this to address the crisis years’ impact in multiple fields including the welfare state, administrative reform, environmental policy, emigration, centre-periphery relations, social capital, trust in the tax system, trade unions and even farms, as well as societal responses like the spanish housing movement. in the last few years, the eu’s southern members have moved beyond the eurozone crisis to a new phase and once again this is reflected in sesp. the reversal of crisis-era policy measures, the particular experience of post-bailout portugal and the politics of polarization are all topics of sesp special issues. and to bring the story right up to date, we also have a forthcoming special issue on the response to the covid pandemic in southern europe. [the profession] editing south european society and politics: a labour of love 42 nc: which theoretical approaches/methods are represented in the articles published by the journal ab & sv: all are welcome! sesp has a clearly delimited geographical scope but huge boundaries in terms of disciplines as well as theoretical and methodological approaches covered. the journal only publishes articles focusing on portugal, spain, italy, greece, cyprus, malta and turkey, either as case studies or in comparative perspective. at the same time, however, it accepts contributions by scholars of political science, sociology, political economy, social policy, social anthropology, contemporary history and socio-legal studies. as a consequence, there are no preferred theories or methods: any approach which serves our understanding of domestic politics and society in southern europe has a potential place in the journal. nc: south european society and politics is ranked in the first quartile of the journal citation reports (impact factor best quartile), an amazing achievement for a journal in area studies. how do you think this kind of ranking affects the authorship and readership of the journal? ab & sv: we are also amazed by how well the journal has done. the latest impact factor, published in early july 2021, was 3.771, ranking sesp in the top 25% of both political science and social affairs journals for the fifth year running. of course, we are thrilled with this result! with regard to authors, success breeds success and it’s clear a good if encourages increased submissions. this isn’t a surprise as it’s well known that in many countries, including italy, colleagues are under pressure to publish in highranked journals. but as far as readership is concerned, we tend to think the relationship works the other way round. we ourselves choose articles to read based on how they relate to our research and teaching interests rather than which journal they appear in. so, we think sesp articles are being read, not because of where they are published but because colleagues find the topics interesting and relevant to the profession. in this sense, rather than a good if bringing more readers, it’s the fact our articles are being read and cited that has made sesp a top quartile journal. one final word about the journal’s success so far: we don’t take it for granted. getting into the top quartile took a lot of hard work over many years. staying there means we have to be careful not to become complacent and relax our efforts. in that sense, every year presents a new challenge. nc: from your viewpoint, what are the main ingredients to a success story such as the one of south european society and politics? ab & sv: perhaps first and foremost – and this follows on from what we said before – it’s important to publish material that colleagues will actually want to read. we want our articles to be relevant to current debates and to address themes that people are concerned about. central to sesp’s mission is to deepen our understanding of our own region. but as a regional studies journal, it’s important not to become an interview with anna bosco and susannah verney 43 insular or parochial. so, while the journal publishes south european case studies, the goal is for these to resonate beyond the specific national or regional experience and speak to scholars without a particular interest in southern europe, but with an interest in the broader issues raised. this need to cover important subjects and debates isn’t always met by the regular submissions to the journal. one of the ways we try to ensure good thematic coverage is by promoting special issues on important topics. a themed collection of articles allows a broader and deeper investigation of a particular subject. download figures suggest readers recognise this, as special issues often attract special attention. second, we think one of the key ingredients of sesp’s success has been that we have a clear idea what kind of articles we are looking for. each week when we assess the latest group of submissions, we are on the lookout for cutting edge topics. timeliness is also an important aspect. scholars are still writing about the early years of the eurozone crisis. but this is now more than a decade in the past, the debate has moved on and it’s important that the content of the journal reflects this. we are also looking for articles with a strong empirical basis and presenting fresh data. south european societies have undergone significant changes in the last decade, so if we want to understand the region today, we need data which is as up-to-date as possible. implementing these criteria requires careful selection at the initial phase of editorial review. we think this is fundamental. we know that a desk rejection can be very hard to take and writing the letters informing authors about these decisions is the hardest part of our job. but in the long run it’s better for everyone to do things this way. in the journal’s early years, we were less selective with the result that editors, authors and referees often lost time in review processes that didn’t end with a decision to publish. a desk rejection frees an author to resubmit elsewhere immediately and, as should be clear from what we’ve said, doesn’t necessarily mean there is a problem with the quality of an article – it may not suit sesp, but be a perfect fit for another journal. third, a good peer reviewed journal needs good peer review. editors need constructive and unbiased guidance from colleagues with solid expertise in the topic. it’s also necessary to find a balance, choosing referees with complementary expertise who can comment on different aspects of an article. it often takes a lot of research, looking through google scholar profiles and reading other articles on the topic, to find the best people for the job. we wouldn’t say we always get it 100% right, but we try hard. and here we’d like to say a big thank you to all our referees – you are the unsung heroes of journal publishing and none of it would work without you. the fourth magic ingredient is editorial tender loving care. some people think editors essentially act as mailboxes, receiving referee reports and forwarding them to authors. this isn’t the case. between the first submission and the final published version, articles always change significantly. sometimes that change can amount to a transformation. building on the input of the referees, editorial direction is crucial. revising a journal article is a crafting process. the editor’s role is to guide the author on how to do this in a way which will lead to the [the profession] editing south european society and politics: a labour of love 44 work achieving its full potential. sometimes authors think we are pushing them too hard, but our goal is to help each article become the very best it can be. summing up what we have said so far, we could say that sesp’s successful recipe is based on two main elements. the first is editorial experience. unlike many society-based journals, there is no institutionalised turnover of the journal’s leadership. both of us have been involved in sesp’s editorial work from the late 1990s. this means we have a historical memory of how sesp has evolved and a constant view of what the journal stands for and where it should be going. over the past twenty years, we have also developed a deep understanding of what our readers want and whether and how an article can work for the journal. the second essential element is intensive editorial input at every stage of the publication process. our editorial style is very ‘hands-on’. we are fortunate to have the support of a truly excellent editorial team. many thanks are due to associate editors senem aydın-düzgit, sandra bermudez-torres, lorenzo mosca and leire salazar and to assistant editors fabio bordignon and elisabetta de giorgi for their irreplaceable role. on our part, editing sesp involves a huge time investment. our work is largely not visible and it has to be said that editing the journal has not been good for our careers. but for us, it is a true labour of love and we are deeply proud of sesp and everything it has achieved. nc: how does italian scholarship figure in the authorship of the journal (in terms of coverage, diversity, competitiveness, etc.). in your opinion, how does the logic of career progression in italian academia affect the decision of what to publish and where? ab & sv: these are interesting twin questions about the role of italy in the journal and the role of sesp in italian political science. there’s no doubt italy is a key country for sesp. if we look at the record of the last decade (2011-2020), articles with ‘italy’ in the title are 21% of total published articles (which means at least twice as many submissions). and this without taking account of comparative articles focused on three or more south european countries. italy is also one of the top citing countries together with the uk, turkey, spain and the usa – where scholars refer to sesp articles most. last, but certainly not least, italian contributors have been among the most widely read (and cited) by the national and international community. this is easy to see on the journal website: among the 10 most downloaded articles since 2011, five have italian subjects and italian authors. as this is an interview for ‘italian political science’, it’s worth stressing that despite sesp’s multidisciplinary nature, in 2011-2020 around 90% of the italian articles published in sesp were submitted by political scientists (with the remaining 10% submitted by members of different sociological schools). this is a tribute to the strength and vivacity of italian political science, which has been able to ‘populate’ sesp with articles on different and timely topics. the role of sesp for the career progression of italian political scientists is difficult to overestimate. besides being a first quartile journal, sesp has been ranked as an ‘a’ journal by the italian agency for evaluation of the university and research system. because publishing in ‘a’ journals is essential to receive an interview with anna bosco and susannah verney 45 the national scientific qualification and thus for career advancement, sesp has become a target outlet for many colleagues. it’s well known that italian political scientists can count on fewer ‘close-to-home’ journals than those available to other disciplines. compared to scholars working in the various branches of sociology, who have italian as well as international ‘a’ journals as outlets for their submissions, italian political scientists have a very limited number of journals ‘made in italy’. as a consequence, sesp, an international journal which hosts a group of italian political scientists in the editorial team, has often been considered as a ‘close-to-home’ journal and a good place to submit. this has led many junior colleagues to approach the journal. seniority is not an issue and sesp devotes special attention to the articles of junior submitters. if we find an article by a junior scholar convincing and the referees give it a ‘green light’, we are ready to ‘tutor’ the author through the publication process with help and suggestions of different kinds. we are proud to say that sesp does a great job in offering junior scholars the possibility to publish, be noticed and become wellknown in the scientific community. we have several success stories of this kind in our archive, not only for italy, but also for the other south european countries covered by the journal. this is an important part of sesp’s service to the profession. * * * microsoft word pdf_issue_15_2_pedrazzani_etal_intro.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 2, september 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 2, 144-149. contact author: andrea pedrazzani, university of milan. e-mail address: andrea.pedrazzani@unimi.it introduction to the special issue changing politics: government, parliament and parties in italy at the dawn of the 18th legislature andrea pedrazzani university of milan elisabetta de giorgi university of trieste federico russo university of salento francesco zucchini university of milan the italian parliament: a delegitimised institution? he public’s distrust of the italian parliament has spread like a pandemic over the past few years. according to the eurobarometer data, in the last fifteen years the portion of the italian population declaring a measure of trust in the country’s highest representative institution has never exceeded one third.1 apparently, the italian political system has proven unable to tackle citizens’ distrust, as the gap between those who tend not to trust the italian parliament and those who tend to trust it still amounts to more than 20 percentage points, also after the start of legislature xviii in march 2018. this is perhaps surprising, as the italian elections held in 2018 brought about a number of novelties in the party system and in the institutional framework. at the same time, however, some political dynamics in the italian parliament did not change after the 2018 elections, and this has probably helped to preserve the image of the italian parliament as a ‘delegitimised’ institution. it is especially on these patterns of continuity and discontinuity with the past that could be observed at the start of legislature xviii that the present special issue focuses. trust in the italian parliament began to visibly decline in 2007, well before the effects of the economic crisis were felt. the image of parliament probably deteriorated due to a combination of various factors, some long-term and others of a contingent nature. 2007 was the year of the agony of the second prodi government, which lacked a legislative majority in the senate and was exhausted by continuous internal conflict. it was the year 1 data retrieved from the webpage of the eurobarometer interactive research system: https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/chart/getchart/charttype/linechart//themeky/ 18/groupky/89/savfile/201 (last accessed 7 january 2021). t pedrazzani, de giorgi, russo and zucchini 145 of v-day2 in the squares of many italian cities, an event that launched beppe grillo’s party, the five star movement (movimento 5 stelle, m5s). but 2007 was also the year of publication of a best-selling book entitled ‘la casta’, written by gian antonio stella and sergio rizzo, which was devoted to documenting and stigmatizing the less than honourable behaviour of the italian political class. a second marked fall in the level of trust in the italian parliament took place in the autumn of 2011 when the effects of the eurozone crisis became visible in italy and a technocratic cabinet led by mario monti was sworn in after prime minister silvio berlusconi had to resign. it seems hard to distinguish between factors such as the actual performance of the italian parliament, citizens’ disaffection with political institutions, the narratives put in place by political actors and how the media frame political events. these factors are intertwined and feed into each other by building an image of parliament that is perhaps more negative than what the institution deserves. undoubtedly, the functioning of italian political institutions during the so-called second republic has not fulfilled the expectations of many. seen through the eyes of scholars, the ‘alternation’ period appears marked by contradictory tensions. just to limit ourselves to the institutional aspects, we can mention the repeated and unsuccessful attempts to enact a ‘big reform’ aimed at giving parliament a structure compatible with the majoritarian aspiration of the party system and, on the other hand, the adoption of various measures to increase transparency and efficiency in the decision-making process. the general elections of 2013 marked another turning point, with the entrance into parliament of the five star movement, a new anti-establishment political force (at that time) that presented itself as an alternative to all political parties. the m5s was strongly opposed to the existing political elites, considered as being mainly responsible for the country’s poor economic performance and moral conditions. once in government, since 2018, the m5s has tried to carry out its radical reform programme of the representative institutions, but its main achievement has been to enact a reduction in the number of parliamentarians – a constitutional reform which was then approved in a referendum by italian citizens in september 2020. why this special issue the low levels of italian citizens’ trust in representative institutions and the political events just mentioned that have occurred in recent years may lead one (especially scholars of political science) to wonder whether this deficit can be attributed not only to politics in its strictest sense but perhaps also to how politics is studied and reported. back in september 2018, we – the standing group on government, parliament and representation – organised a panel on the study of representative institutions at the annual conference of the italian political science association (sisp) in turin. at the basis of that panel was the belief that going beyond the rigid boundaries between disciplines and the distinction between academics and professionals can improve our understanding of representative institutions in italy and abroad. 2 ‘v’ stands for an italian offensive exclamation. on v-day, this exclamation was generally addressed to italian politicians. introduction to the special issue: changing politics 146 a second event, held in rome again under the aegis of the sisp, was devised and organised with the same aim. that workshop, which took place in june 2019, involved a number of scholars (from political science and other disciplines) and professionals interested in understanding if and how the italian parliament has changed in legislature xviii. the current legislature indeed presents some elements of novelty if compared to the previous ones, both in terms of party system configuration and in terms of the institutional framework. the collection of articles in this special issue is a first output of the workshop we held in rome in 2019. this special issue involves not only political science scholars, but also practitioners in the italian political institutions. the contributions benefit from insights from disciplines such as public law, data science, political communication and linguistics. combining different skills is indeed essential to create a more complete, multi-faceted analysis of parliament and, more in general, of representative institutions. contents and findings of the special issue all the articles in this special issue highlight elements of continuity and discontinuity with the past that characterize the start of italian legislature xviii. the special issue opens with alice cavalieri’s article, showing that changes and inertia survive mixed together. in spite of the electoral victory of ‘populist’ parties – the five star movement and the league – in the 2018 elections, the budget law approved at the beginning of legislature xviii, probably the most important policy appointment and contentious moment of the year, did not testify unambiguously to an enduring radical change taking place. as cavalieri points out in her article, the most disruptive feature of the conte i cabinet’s budgetary process was the attempt to openly infringe the european commission restraints of the multiannual deficit. on the one hand, such an attempt was pretty successful in terms of symbolic position taking but much less successful in terms of concrete ‘financial’ outcomes. the prompt reaction of financial markets led the government to partially revise the planned deficit size. on the other hand, the budgetary law enacted by the so-called ‘yellow-green’ cabinet fulfilled two crucial policy promises made by the coalition parties – the five star movement and the league – during the electoral campaign, by increasing the financial amount spent on social protection, in particular on the ‘citizenship income’ and on the extension of pension eligibility criteria. according to cavalieri’s definition, the coalition between the five star movement and the league was ‘irresponsible’ as regards domestic and international systemic constraints, even if less so than in its intent, but perfectly ‘responsive’ towards the electorates of the two ruling parties. nevertheless, the ‘index of transformativeness’ used by the author shows that the overall rate of change associated with conte i’s original budget proposal with respect to the previous budgetary law was lower than the change brought about by other governments’ budgetary bills during the second republic in similar circumstances, namely after a government alternation at the beginning of a new legislature. interestingly, despite its different political nature, the conte ii government – formed in 2019 involving the five star movement together with the democratic party (partito democratico, pd) and other left and centre-left parties – was almost unable to correct the budget structure decided by the previous government, while it was sensitive to and respectful of the supra-national restraints. in other words, the coalition between pedrazzani, de giorgi, russo and zucchini 147 the democratic party and the five star movement, contrary to the previous one, was not very responsive (above all towards pd voters), but it was responsible. the season of radical changes seemed to have already expired. however, the aspect that reveals the greatest continuity with the past is the strong agenda-setting power of the government vis-à-vis parliament. this continuity can be seen not only between the two governments led by giuseppe conte, but also between these and the other governments of the last few years. the index of transformativeness computed by cavalieri shows that the budgetary law is always very similar to the budget scheme originally proposed by the government. in other words, what the italian government proposes in terms of budget structure is always substantially confirmed by parliament, no matter which parties are in government. italian legislature xviii was different from the previous ones not only with regard to the type of government formed after the elections but also in terms of formal rules. while several scholars have focused on the electoral system adopted for the first time in the 2018 elections, in their article andrea pedrazzani and francesco zucchini turn their attention to the reform recently made to the internal rules of the senate. in 2017, an extensive reform of the rules of procedure of the italian upper chamber was enacted, revising over one-third of the articles of the standing orders. the revision was celebrated as a crucial reform which would bring discontinuity in the way parliamentary business is conducted in the senate, as it was expected by many to make decision-making in the upper house more efficient and rapid. this is because the reform introduced more restrictive rules for forming new parliamentary party groups, rationalized several steps of bill examination, strengthened the role of permanent committees in the legislative process and modified the rules for bill assignment to committees. after summarizing the main contents of the reform and the process leading to its approval in 2017, pedrazzani and zucchini focus on the new rules for bill assignment in the senate. according to the new assignment rules, bills are now normally sent to committees acting in a drafting capacity or a legislating capacity, and not in a reporting capacity (as was the case under the previous rules in the senate and under the current rules in the chamber of deputies). this change was widely expected to enhance the legislative ‘efficiency’ of the senate. analysing the law-making data available so far, the authors offer a preliminary evaluation of the impact of the new rules, showing that the senate’s legislative efficiency has not (yet) increased since the reform. more specifically, two findings are highlighted in the article. firstly, the political circumstances at the start of legislature xviii have often led senators to resort to committees acting in a reporting capacity in order to approve bills – a procedure that has become more costly since the reform. hence, the new rules have failed to speed up the approval of bills through committees acting in drafting or legislating capacity. secondly, the post-reform senate of legislature xviii has systematically lower levels of legislative productivity if compared with the pre-reform senate of legislature xvii. quite unexpectedly, the productivity ‘gap’ seems wider when bills are examined in the same committees, well before being considered for approval on the floor. in her article, chiara de micheli analyses whether and how the unprecedented political landscape which emerged after the 2018 elections has affected the functioning of key aspects of the italian political system. in particular, the article offers a preliminary assessment of the impact of changes in the party system on dynamics observed in the sointroduction to the special issue: changing politics 148 called ‘government-parliament sub-system’. in so doing, patterns of continuity and change are highlighted with regard to law-making in the italian parliament at the beginning of legislature xviii. expanding on a growing research programme on the evolution of the italian political system during the second republic, the author examines the use of a number of law-making instruments and procedures such as ordinary laws, law-decrees, delegations, votes of confidence and the decentralized approval of bills. within the conceptual framework developed in the article, frequency in the use of these tools and practices can be associated with key factors like the degree of fragmentation in the party system and electoral volatility. preliminary findings on law-making data collected at the start of legislature xviii highlight links between parliamentary fragmentation, electoral volatility and the characteristics of the legislative process in italy. as pointed out by the author, persistently high parliamentary fragmentation is associated with the frequent use of decree-laws, delegating-laws and legislation protected through votes of confidence by the italian governments, at the expense of ordinary legislative procedures. moreover, high electoral volatility seems to lead governmental actors to promote the executive’s initiatives through non-ordinary instruments of legislation. by showing a high degree of decision-making efficiency, these instruments help government parties to respond – or at least, appear as more responsive – to the political demands of volatile voters. in his contribution, valerio di porto reviews the main events of the first conte government, seeking to establish a connection between the political-institutional aspects of this (unprecedented) government coalition and the use it made of legislative instruments, as well as between the devaluation of parliament and the success of legislative parliamentary initiatives. in this review the author also compares the first months of italian legislature xviii with the first months of the preceding legislative terms, going back to 1996. di porto concludes that the first conte government and the legislature in which it operated differentiate themselves from the preceding ones in terms of the types of action mainly orientated to the present and to constitutional reforms – apparently small but huge in terms of impact. an example was the reduction in the number of parliamentarians, which was strongly supported by the five star movement and then approved by the referendum held in september 2020. exactly like the other legislatures taken into account in di porto’s comparison, the current one will end with a government and a parliamentary majority which are different from the initial ones, but (so far) with the same prime minister. of course, the emergency and relative actions related to the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic (not covered by the author) have made the ‘present day’ mentioned in the article’s title even more significant and have thrown into the game further variables that will need to be explored at the end of the legislature, in order to have an overall view and evaluation of both conte governments. the last article in this special issue concentrates on elements of continuity and discontinuity in the nature of the main players of party competition at the start of legislature xviii. the elections held in march 2018 have been repeatedly described as the triumph of the populist parties. however, the characteristics which make a party ‘populist’ are still the subject of fierce debate. the article by claudia roberta combei, matteo farnè, daniela giannetti and luca pinto pays specific attention to political discourse to understand whether and to what extent prominent politicians belonging to pedrazzani, de giorgi, russo and zucchini 149 populist and non-populist parties focus on different topics. from a methodological point of view, this work utilizes – and contributes to – the growing body of literature using the text-as-data approach. in particular, the authors analyse party manifestos through a dictionary approach to estimate the degree of populism of italian parties and an unsupervised learning method to capture the policy content of tweets. moreover, the authors take a step forward to measure the populist tone of tweets. the results are interesting in at least two respects. on the one hand, the analysis of party manifestos considers both the m5s and the league as populists but denies that the extreme-right brothers of italy (fratelli d’italia, fdi) belongs to the same category. this finding, based on clear and explicitly declared criteria, has the merit of reinvigorating the debate on how to measure populism, going beyond impressionistic judgements. on the other hand, and on more substantive grounds, the article reveals that the issue dominating the agenda of both populist parties, albeit to a different degree, has been immigration, which has also been discussed in populist tones by the league. interestingly, also the tweets posted by politicians belonging to brothers of italy frequently addressed migration, but they did so in a non-populist tone. concluding remarks italian legislature xviii opened with great hopes for discontinuity from the past. the conte i government, formed by two anti-establishment parties, promised to finally deliver that ‘change’ which italian citizens had been expecting for a long time. with regard to the functioning of parliament, roberto fico – the new president of the chamber of deputies and a prominent figure in the five star movement – made several promises in his inaugural speech. first, in its role as the central representative institution, the new parliament would be able to resist external pressures. it would cut its costs. finally, the chamber of deputies would learn the lesson of the senate and reform its rules of procedure. a number of novelties are undeniable, starting from the reduction in the number of parliamentarians. at the same time, the contributions of this special issue reveal that, in several regards, the radical changes expected by many have not occurred: the most relevant policy outputs have been imposed by the government on parliament without much discussion and the new rules introduced in the senate have proved insufficient to improve the efficiency of the legislative process. in these respects, the keyword of this legislature has still been continuity rather than change. this conclusion is valid even when looking at the communication strategies of the parties: while the advent of new media imposes new ways to relate with the public, the most debated themes have not changed very much: migration, a topic that became salient on the public and political agenda about two decades ago, in the early 2000s, remains a signature issue for many parties. as mentioned above, in this picture one can risk overlooking the most important, and perhaps only significant change: the reduction in the number of parliamentarians approved by the italian parliament and confirmed by a large majority in the popular referendum held in september 2020. this institutional change – jointly with a likely new electoral system – will perhaps bring a major transformation in the way the italian parliament functions. in which direction it will go, though, it is too soon to say. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_1_interview_bull_[tp].docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 1 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 1, 46–51. a contribution to [the profession] series journal editing and the italian political science review an interview with martin j. bull introduction martin j. bull is professor of politics and associate dean for research & innovation at the university of salford, and former director of the european consortium of political research. he is currently editor of the italian political science review and the journal of contemporary european studies, as well as founding editor of the ecpr’s political science blog-site, the loop. he serves on the editorial boards of south european society and politics, modern italy, and contemporary italian politics. he is former editor of modern italy (2005-2010), european political science (2006-2013) and social sciences (2011-2018), as well as former associate editor of parliamentary affairs (2007-2012), and former editorial board member of several journals including west european politics and politics. the following interview was conducted by the editor of italian political science, nicolò conti and edited by the interviewee. nicolò conti [nc]: in your experience as editor of several scientific journals, what are the main ingredients to a success story for a journal nowadays? it depends, of course, on what you mean by ‘success story’, how you define ‘success’. readers might assume that success has to mean being in the top quartile of the social science citation index, with an impact factor of ‘x.’ but in my view that is simplistic for two reasons. first, despite the predominance of league tables for almost everything in our professional lives, journals do not simply have goals to rise in league tables. there is a very wide range of journals in any disciplinary area, and each has its own subdisciplinary orientation, identity, specific mission, and its own ‘community’ of scholars to which it appeals. second, a journal depends on its editors and most editors are in that role for a fixed period. that fixed period constitutes a specific stage in the life of a journal, so it depends on how long the journal has been in existence, what identity it is developing, the state of its copy flow, what objectives the editors set for their editorial period and so on. so, an editor of a journal that has been in existence for a few years only will have very different goals to achieve in a fixed period than an editor who takes over a journal that has been established for 30 years. martin j. bull [mb] an interview with martin j. bull 47 having said that, i think there are, at the same time, certain ‘constants’ of which editors should be aware if they want to (help to) make a success story of the journal they are currently editing. first, never ‘chase’ impact factors (in the sense of considering submissions from the perspective of whether they might be good ‘citable’ papers) or high rejection rates (by pushing up your desk-reject stats for the sake of doing so). anyone who has seen the detail on journal impact factors and what has produced them will realise that there is no science of prediction in this field. avoid it, stick to your scientific mission. the journal’s if is simply one of many outcomes (good or not so good) at the end of each year. second, avoid being influenced by papers on the basis of the particular subject area the authors are writing about, whether it’s ‘sexy’ or whether you are personally interested in it. you might get excited at receiving an article on ‘populism’ but that says nothing about its quality. at the same time, you might be missing a high quality case study on bureaucratic politics which you have overlooked because it didn’t really interest you. besides, what is ‘sexy’ today might quickly become old hat tomorrow, and your job is not just to publish ‘in the current period’ but to leave a legacy of high quality research for political scientists of the future to consult. third, and more generally, avoid trying overly to ‘shape’ and ‘construct’ the identity of the journal (within its formal scope or remit) you are editing. that identity will be primarily determined by the supply of material, not what editors anticipate might be in demand or what interests them. the very profile of an editor/editors/editorial team will and does, inevitably, influence somewhat the nature of the supply (i have witnessed that every time) but that is enough. the role of the editors is to be open, inclusive and genuinely welcoming of all research that falls within the formal scope of the journal, not picking and choosing according to other criteria than originality and excellence. fourth, do everything you can to avoid unconscious bias. although i have not yet edited a journal based on ‘triple blind’ evaluation processes, i helped launch one that is (political research exchange) and i think all journals should be thus. ‘triple blind’ means not just that referees do not know the author of a paper, and the author of a paper does not know who the referees are, but the editors of the journal do not know the authors either. the editors, therefore, make a final decision on the paper without knowing the identity or institutional affiliation of the authors. this protects the editors from unconscious bias related to ‘seniority’, gender, institutional affiliation, country of origin and so on. i find it curious that in countries such as the uk we have long adopted anonymity for students when we are marking their work, yet when we mark our own we don’t. it is the future for all journals in my view. in its absence, the best practice is simply to avoid checking the author’s profile: focus on the submission itself. it doesn’t matter who an author is, your job is to see whether they have something interesting, original and of high quality to say. fifth, be thorough throughout. there are a number of stages to be followed. is the article ‘in scope’? in other words, is it an appropriate submission for the [the profession] journal editing and the italian political science review 48 journal you are editing? check the mission of the journal and what it accepts, if it is clearly not in scope, do not persist with it, but reject it on procedural grounds. then, does the paper cross the quality threshold to be considered by referees? if not, desk-reject it; if it does, process it. when referees’ reports come in, consider them in some depth against the paper itself and reach your own verdict, consulting where appropriate with your co-editors. when not sure, do not hesitate to send revised papers back to one of the referees for further evaluation, and do not hesitate to ask authors for further (and yet further) revisions, if it is evident that the paper could, through further revision, reach the standard of being accepted for publication. sixth, be diligent and timely. you should ‘check in’ on a regular (my advice is daily) basis to your journal. there is always something to do. authors have spent a lot of time and care in producing their work, their work deserves to be processed in a timely manner. word gets around if authors are kept waiting interminably for decisions. if you cannot carve out the time to the necessary work, don’t take it on in the first place. seventh, despite the importance of the criterion of excellence, be realistic about your journal and what it is trying to achieve. there is no “universal” threshold of quality assurance in the market of journals that automatically dictates whether a paper should or should not be published. that standard can be different between journals, and that standard may move marginally according to the supply of material. whether a journal is owned by a publisher or a scholarly society, an editor is contracted to deliver a (normally) prescribed minimal level of published material each year. be aware of your contractual duties and the need to strike the right balance between keeping the journal on track with high quality published material. eighth, always remember your role, which is to facilitate the dissemination of relevant, original, high-quality research in a disciplinary area in which you have some expertise. it is a service to a professional community, not a chore, and certainly not a contest. be modest about your aims and likely contribution. you are not there to change the earth, but to build further on the good work of your predecessors and leave a solid legacy for those who come after you, thus helping the journal grow. nc: which are the theoretical approaches/methods represented in the articles published by the italian political science review? mb: it should be said, first, that we do not, in ipsr, favour any particular theoretical approaches/methods. we are open to all approaches and methods. our main principle is that papers aspire to, or embody, a ‘scientific approach’ to their research and writing. however, in terms of what is eventually published in ipsr, there are evident trends. in terms of approaches or methods, between 2015 and 2020, 52% of articles published were quantitative-inferential-statistical, 39% qualitativedescriptive-statistical and 9% theoretical. an interview with martin j. bull 49 in terms of subject area, in the same period, 38% of articles published were in the area of political institutions, 20% political behaviour, 12% international relations, 10% public policy/administration, 7% regimes, 6% public opinion, 6% media/communication, and 1% methodology. these, of course, are all broad categories, hiding a good deal of nuance, and i recommend readers to take a cursory glance at the journal’s “first view articles” and recent issues (on the website) to get a flavour of the rich diversity of subject matter and approaches that ipsr has been publishing. and, specifically regarding methods, we are devoting a special issue to this very topic in 2021. nc: how does italian scholarship figure in the authorship of the italian political science review (in terms of coverage, diversity, competitiveness, etc.)? mb: it is fair to say that italian scholarship figures highly in the authorship of ipsr. between 2015 and 2020, in terms of published articles, approximately 71% of authors were italian nationality and 29% from abroad. this strong presence of italy in the journal is reinforced if we look at the geographic area on which published articles primarily focus their content. between 2015 and 2020, 52% of articles had italy as their primary focus, 30% europe/eu, 13% other areas, and 5% global. three points should be made about this. first, ipsr is a journal which was, until the recent past, published in italian only, and it is owned by the italian political science association (sisp), whose members are primarily italian. although i don’t have the figures, i suspect that the ‘italian’ presence was even higher during the years of risp (an acronym many italian scholars still use today to refer to the journal!). sisp serves its members and one of the membership benefits is the journal. but sisp is also, i believe, in taking the decision to publish the journal in english, making it clear to members that it also regards a key benefit to be the gradual internationalisation of the journal, in keeping with the trends of internationalisation in italian political science. rightly so. indeed, second, the journal can help with that process of internationalisation by hopefully displaying, over time, an ever greater diversity in the sub-disciplinary expertise of italian political scientists. i have written elsewhere of the ‘(curious) elephant in the room’ in italian political science: “the historical and continuing preponderance of research on italian politics amongst italian political scientists. it is the (curious) elephant in the room: visible and clearly shaping italian political science but rarely mentioned; curious, because, for all this, italian political science remains dissatisfied with its lack of ‘relevance’ to the italian world beyond academe. the discipline’s future will likely be shaped by the possibilities of whether and how this preponderance is overcome”.1 third, we should not view this as a unique or deep-seated problem that has to be changed overnight. i suspect that analogous statistics can be found in a number of other european countries in relation to their house journals. a sudden enforced and artificial change in this situation, moreover, would be disruptive 1 see: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23248823.2015.1033927?journalcode=rita20. [the profession] journal editing and the italian political science review 50 and damaging. and it is worth emphasising the quality of coverage that ipsr offers. although it is not a strictly fair comparison (because ipsr is, of course, a general journal of political science), if you do a cite-score publication by year comparison over the past decade between ipsr and the three main english-language journals which are purely dedicated to italian studies, ipsr rose from bottom in 2010 to top in 2019. in any case, what is important is a gradual change which carries the journal’s (changing) community (of authors and readers) with it, as it shows an increasingly prominent international profile. nc: how does, in your opinion, the logic of career progression in the italian academia affect the decision of what to publish and where? mb: i assume this refers to authors and not to editors (since, as editors, we obviously do not take into account career progression of authors in our evaluation as to whether to publish a paper). and, if so, i am certainly not the best person to answer this question as i am located in the career structure of a different national political science community. however, from my experience of scores of communications with authors over many years of editing journals, and from serving on the panels of several of the italian political science research assessment exercises, it is clear that italian political scientists are undergoing very similar pressures (‘to publish or perish’) to political scientists in other countries. in terms of the ‘what’, the trend is obviously towards research which has, or can have, demonstrable impact or relevance to the ‘real world’. the publication of research can no longer be seen simply as an end itself; rather, it has to be seen as a mid-point in the process by which social scientific research influences what is done in government, politics and society. in terms of the ‘where’, it is now a fact of life that where you publish can make a difference to your career. some universities are becoming ever more prescriptive in terms of what is expected of their researchers in terms of publishing. one’s freedom to choose is, unfortunately, becoming increasingly constrained. the unfortunate consequence is that it can distort the choice of academics as to where to publish their papers towards journals according to their ‘ranking’, as opposed to their ‘appropriateness’ to the subject matter. nc: the italian political science review ranks in the first quartile of scimago (for both political science & international relations and political science and sociology). how do you think this kind of ranking affects the authorship and readership of the journal? mb: yes, and this is the second year running to secure first quartile ranking. and if you drill down into the detail of the scimago result you can see the progress of the journal over the past decade – where all the indicators are pointing in the right direction. there are other comparative indicators that are promising too. for example, in terms of cite score by year (for articles published 2016-2019), ipsr has made an interview with martin j. bull 51 a steady rise since 2013 compared with some other national community political science journals. the icing on the cake, of course, will be the journal’s acceptance into the social science citation index. that will be a watershed moment which will, i suspect, have a noticeable positive impact on submissions and the general standing of the journal – because that is how the world of academe works today. that will probably not happen on our watch, but (to return to my answer to the first question) that is not our main aim; and, in saying this, i think i can safely speak for my esteemed colleague, filippo tronconi, and the rest of our fantastic editorial team at ipsr, as well as the team at cup. ipsr, since it transformed itself from risp, has been on a new journey of internationalisation and growth. it is climbing a mountain, which is a slow but steady process, and in which each editorial team must play its part. our predecessors got us to base camp, and our achievements are simply building on theirs. wherever we get the journal to by the end of our tenures, we will establish camp 1 and pass the staffetta to our successors to continue the climb. it is a climb in which i am very pleased and honoured to be a participant. * * * microsoft word pdf_issue_14_2_introduction.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 2, october 2019 © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 2, 68–72. contact author: giuliano bobba, university of turin, and collegio carlo alberto, turin. e-mail address: giuliano.bobba@unito.it introduction to the special issue: a new page for europe? insights from the 2019 european elections in italy giuliano bobba university of turin collegio carlo alberto, turin mario quaranta university of turin uropean parliament (ep) elections are commonly described as ‘second order’ (reif and schmitt 1980). the idea behind this description is that these elections are less prominent. on the one hand, the election campaign is often focused on domestic issues, or at least european union (eu) issues that are domesticated and framed within a national dimension (marsh 1998; cayrol 1991; de vreese 2007). on the other hand, eu institutions and their functioning are missing a real and visible link to citizens’ choices and preferences (tsakatika 2007). since they cannot determine the composition of supranational executive bodies, such as head of the eu commission, eu citizens are cultivating a growing sense of detachment from the eu. in light of the above, the european elections have been characterized by a low turnout, failing to mobilize citizens to cast their vote at the polls (reif et al. 1997). the secondorder election model is based on the idea of ep elections where there is ‘little at stake’ other than distant institutions, which are hard to understand in their very functioning mechanisms and have an ambiguous influence on domestic politics. citizens lack strong incentives for engaging in these elections. this view, however, has been challenged in recent years. europe, indeed, is progressively acquiring salience and visibility within domestic political agendas. this is a result – or even an unintended consequence – of the great recession (hutter and kriesi 2019), which uncovered the deep interconnection between eu member states, especially in the economic and financial field. the loss of domestic governments of the ability to autonomously define economic policies corresponded with a rise of eu institutions that rapidly become prominent. in this regard, scholars have pointed out that the process of politicization of the eu is bringing european institutions to the centre of the public agenda, making the eu increasingly relevant in public debates (de wilde 2011; statham and trenz 2012; kriesi 2016; hutter and kriesi 2019). this politicization takes place in terms of higher visibility of the eu within the national public debate on eu and european related issues. for a long period, italy was considered an extremely europhile country, where permissive consent was high and interest in the eu consequently low. in the 1990s, however, the country entered a phase labelled ‘disenchanted europeanism’ (cotta 2005) e bobba and quaranta 69 characterized by the progress of the process of integration, the progressive enlargement to eastern europe and a growing politicization of specific eu related issues such as the euro currency and border control (bellucci and conti 2012).this situation of limited euroscepticism changed in the 2014 european elections when eurosceptic parties won about 50 per cent of the votes, placing italy with those countries that show comprehensive euroscepticism (hernandez and kriesi 2016). attitudes towards the eu are going through a process of redefinition, since the traditional europhile orientation towards the eu project is rapidly shifting towards more openly eurosceptic views among the public and political parties (conti and memoli 2015), while media systems seem to keep a more nuanced approach (bobba and seddone, 2018). however, italy still shows limited politicization of european integration: parties have developed new strategies on eu issues but citizens’ preferences seem not to be significantly affected by the pro/anti-european dimension (carrieri 2019). the 2019 european elections, for the first time, seriously undermined the paradigm of the ‘second-order elections’ defined by reif and schmitt in 1980. with first the eurocrisis and the great recession and then the rise of eurosceptic parties in all the member states, the issue of european integration as such has moved front and centre in domestic political arenas. the eu was not only criticized for its policies but increasingly also for its very existence as a source of authority. also, several politicians from different member states stated that the future of europe was at stake in these elections. all these new factors do not mean that the european elections as second-order elections has necessarily moved forward to the first order. but they are elements of enquiry into how and to what extent the eu and eu related issues have become relevant within the domestic political arena. this special issue deals with this burning topic, tackling three sets of questions. the first set of question is: what role is played during the election campaign by news media and politicians? how do they foster the processes of europeanization and domestication of the eu issues? often, and in particular during the campaign of the last ep elections in 2019, europe’s image might have been constructed not only by experience (whether citizens benefit from europe or not), but through the media. in the first article of the special issue, seddone et al. (2019) deal with this very issue by analysing the news coverage of europe in the italian news. the relevance of this issue is due to the fact that previous research has already shown that attitudes towards europe might be shaped by how the press covers europe (see vliegenthart et al., 2008). yet, in the context of italy there has been relatively little attention paid to this link, especially with regard to the negative coverage of europe which, it is known, has a more powerful effect than positive coverage (see soroka 2014), although european issues have become increasingly more present on tv and in newspapers. by analysing the content of five tv newspapers and newscasts, 50 days prior to the ep elections, seddone et al. offer an overview of the drivers of negative representations of europe in the media which might, in turn, provide suggestions to explain the changes in public opinion towards europe and perhaps the success of eurosceptic parties. they show, using an original dataset of coded news items, that tv and newspapers depict europe differently, although media negativity is a common trait, especially when domestic politics is involved. moreover, distinctions are made if eu politics vs. actors are considered. introduction to the special issue ‘a new page for europe?’ 70 other questions this special issue deals with are: how did italian political leaders communicate about europe during the last ep electoral campaign? what were their strategies? the article by cepernich and bracciale (2019) show that social media networks have been fundamental factors in the communication strategies of italian leaders. they argue that this is because of processes of ‘leaderization’, the transformation of political arenas, and social media allowing a direct relationship with the voters. by monitoring seven leaders’ social media activity for six weeks before the ep elections on facebook, instagram and twitter, they underline differences between their strategies in terms of fanbase, posting and communicative flow. moreover, the authors analyse how leaders manage issues on the most popular social media network, facebook, showing that leaders are able to engage their fanbase when they use some communication strategies rather than others, in particular when emotional elements are involved. finally, what factors explain the success of eurosceptic parties? two articles address this point, taking different perspectives. mancosu and ladini (2019) argue that the success of the lega can be found in historically rooted behaviours whose effects reach recent times. patterns of socialization, which are passed down through generations, might explain the success of the lega, together with a transformation of the party itself. indeed, the lega was not able to expand its support because of its ethno-regionalist characteristics. yet, as soon as these characteristics were left behind, the lega succeeded in regions where neo-fascist political traditions were relatively stronger, i.e. southern regions, although still minorities. the authors support these claims by relying on an analysis of survey data collected before the last ep elections and official data measuring the electoral strength of parties with neo-fascist heritage in 1976 and 2001. thus, the lega’s success could be also found in the fact that some contexts are more open to messages recalling neo-fascist claims. finally, the last article of the special issue by quaranta and martini (2019) argues that the success of eurosceptic parties at the last ep elections might be due to the rising eurosceptic attitudes of the italian public, which might have been driven by the complex issue of immigration. indeed, the ‘refugee crisis’ has hit the national debate, becoming a highly contested issue. such crisis has shown the inability of europe to find solutions, becoming the main target of criticism. therefore, cultural and security threats due to the refugee crisis might have played a role in the decline of positive attitudes towards the eu among italians, in particular among those with lower socio-economic resources. by using survey data over 25 years, the authors show that the number of refugees has a link with the declining trends in positive attitudes, especially among those with lower education and who are unemployed or not employed. as the process of politicization of the european union, for better and worse, is writing a new page in history, scholars are also addressing this topic from new and broader perspectives. this special issue offers a first attempt to provide empirical evidence of this ongoing process in the italian case. european elections appear far from being simply second-order elections, at least according to their original definition. nowadays eu and eu related issues are ubiquitous, and they are also increasingly relevant, not only across different elites but also across ordinary citizens. for these reasons, we hope the articles collected in this issue will inspire more scholars to set their research agendas and design towards the study of the processes of europeanization of domestic politics and politicization of europe. bobba and quaranta 71 references bellucci, p., and conti n. (eds.) (2012) gli italiani e l’europa. opinione pubblica, élite politiche e media. roma: carocci. bobba, g., and seddone, a. (2018). how do eurosceptic parties and economic crisis affect news coverage of the european union? evidence from the 2014 european elections in italy. european politics and society, 19(2): 147-165. carrieri, l. (2019). the limited politicization of european integration in italy: lacking issue clarity and weak voter responses. italian political science review/rivista italiana di scienza politica,1-18. doi:10.1017/ipo.2019.16 cayrol, r. (1991) european elections and the pre-electoral period. media use and campaign evaluations. european journal of political research, 19(1): 17-29 cepernich, c., and bracciale, r. (2019) digital hyperleaders: communication strategies on social networks at the 2019 european elections. italian political science, this issue. cotta, m. (2005) elite, politiche nazionali e costruzione della polity europea. il caso italiano in prospettiva comparata. in cotta, m., isernia, p. and verzichelli, l. (eds.) l’europa in italia. élite, opinione pubblica e decisioni. bologna: il mulino (pp. 17-59). conti, n., and memoli, v. (2015). show the money first! recent public attitudes towards the eu in italy. italian political science review/rivista italiana di scienza politica, 45(2): 203-222. de vreese, c.h., lauf, e., and peter, j. (2007) the media and european parliament elections: second-rate coverage of a second-order event? in w. van der brug and c. van der eijk (eds.) european elections and domestic politics. lessons from the past and scenarios for the future. notre dame: university of notre dame press (pp. 116-130). de wilde, p. (2011). no polity for old politics? a framework for analyzing the politicization of european integration. journal of european integration, 33(5): 559-575. hernández, e., and kriesi, h. (2016) turning your back on the eu. the role of eurosceptic parties in the 2014 european parliament elections. electoral studies, 44: 515-524. hutter, s., and kriesi, h. (2019). politicizing europe in times of crisis. journal of european public policy, 26(7): 996-1017. kriesi, h. (2016). the politicization of european integration. journal of common market studies, 54: 32-47. marsh, m. (1998). testing the second-order election model after four european elections. british journal of political science, 28(4): 591-607. mancosu, m., and ladini, r. (2019) the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega in the 2019 european elections: a multilevel approach. italian political science, this issue. quaranta, m., and martini, s. (2019) a sinking boat?the refugee crisis and attitudes towards the european union in italy, 1993-2018. italian political science, this issue. reif, k., and schmitt, h. (1980). nine second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of european election results.european journal of political research, 8(1): 3-44. reif, k., schmitt, h., and norris, p. (1997). second-order elections. european journal of political research, 31(1-2): 109-124. seddone, a., bobba, g, and roncarolo, f. (2019). european versus domestic politics: media negativity during the 2019 european elections campaign in italy. italian political science, 14(2): this issue. introduction to the special issue ‘a new page for europe?’ 72 statham, p., and trenz, h. j. (2012). the politicization of europe: contesting the constitution in the mass media. london: routledge. soroka, s. (2014). negativity in democratic politics: causes and consequences. cambridge: cambridge university press. tsakatika, m. (2007). governance vs. politics: the european union’s constitutive “democratic deficit”. journal of european public policy, 14(6): 867-885. vliegenthart, r., schuck, a. r., boomgaarden, h. g., de vreese, c. h. (2008). news coverageand support for european integration, 1990–2006. international journal of public opinion research, 20(4): 415-439. microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 6-9. comparative analysis in the scholarly contribution of pietro grilli di cortona. a personal recollection of my mentor barbara pisciotta roma tre university, rome hese words, written by a french author in 1953, a year before prof. pietro grilli was born, encapsulate the sense of my contribution: “to see a human being reveal really exceptional qualities one must be able to observe his activities over many years. if these activities are completely unselfish; if the idea motivating them is unique in its magnanimity; if it is quite certain they have never looked for any reward; and if in addition they have left visible traces on the world – then one may say, without fear or error, that one is in the presence of an unforgettable character”. jean giono, l’homme qui plantait des arbres, english translation, 1985 the contribution that prof. pietro grilli di cortona made to political science, and in particular to comparative analysis, is unquestionably visible and substantial. the originality of his works emerges first and foremost from their methodological approach and the attention focused on the comparatively overlooked area of communist and postcommunist europe. his studies can be divided into three major spheres, namely the analysis of nondemocratic regimes, the evolution and results of democratization processes, and the relationship between state and nation. despite the diversity of the questions addressed, it is possible to identify the guiding thread of a rigorously and exclusively qualitative comparative approach in his strategy. a marked preference is shown in most of his publications for diachronic long-term analysis both in the explanation of processes of institutional change and in the conceptual analysis of the relationship inherent in the construction of the state and the nation. the first sphere constituted the initial phase of his brilliant academic and scholarly career. his first article, ‘modelli d’interpretazione del sistema sovietico’, published in the rivista italiana di scienza politica in 1980, identified the specific characteristics of the soviet regime through painstaking reconstruction of the debate on the distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism and careful consideration of the position of the post-stalinist soviet union within the totalitarian model. his comparative studies t in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 7 subsequently concentrated on identifying factors of instability in the regimes of the soviet bloc with particular reference to the pre-communist political context, the role of the catholic church and appeals to national identity, thus looking forward to the events that then led to the collapse of the soviet union and the radical transformation of its satellite countries. his first monograph, le crisi politiche nei regimi comunisti. ungheria, cecoslovacchia e polonia da stalin agli anni ’80, appeared some months before the fall of the berlin wall and still constitutes a rigorous comparative analysis casting light on the origin and outcome of the processes of change that swept through the countries of the communist area as from the mid-1950s and constantly influenced the direction of political, economic and institutional developments. another important subject of his analysis is the complex relationship generated between the revolutionary processes that led to the foundation of many of the nondemocratic regimes and the administrative structures of the previous institutional order. in rivoluzioni e burocrazie (1991), comparative analysis of the major revolutions in russia, china, germany on the one hand and the smaller revolutions in cuba, nicaragua, iran and algeria on the other proves an essential tool to reconstruct the different forms taken by this relationship in the different cases. the assumption of an increase in the power of the post-revolutionary bureaucracies is refuted and the important presence is instead highlighted of elements of continuity capable of surviving the revolutionary, including the persistence of cultural and structural models rooted in the past, the shortage of qualified personnel and attempts to imitate the organization of the colonizing country in order to ensure efficiency. the other two central areas of study developed out of the first. the second, regarding processes of democratization, is unquestionably the most important, not least in terms of publications. use of the comparative method within his long-period strategy makes it possible in the context to develop a broad theoretical model capable of explaining regime change in terms of its genesis, succession of individual phases, and possible outcomes as well as the various factors, internal and international, which influence such change (come gli stati diventano democratici, 2009). comparative area analysis of the diachronic kind is instead employed for the rebirth of political parties in the countries of central and eastern europe (da uno a molti. democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in europa orientale, 1997), where the similarities and differences between the various party systems are primarily the result of historical variables in the political development of east europe and not only of contingent factors emerging from the respective political and institutional contexts. his work on the italian transition from fascism to democracy (il cambiamento politico in italia. dalla prima alla seconda repubblica, 2007), which extends up to the advent of the second republic, paints an interesting comparative picture. the cases of france in the 4th and 5th republics and belgium between 1962 and 1993 are thus also taken into consideration in order to explain the influence of the previous regime in the construction of republican italy. diachronic analysis and the subject of transition from one regime to another also inform major studies on the legacy of the previous institutional structures in the construction of democracy in europe and on the causes leading to crisis and, in some cases, to collapse in non-democratic regimes all over the world. two prin projects, funded pisciotta, comparative analysis in the scholarly contribution of pietro grilli di cortona 8 respectively in 2007 (tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il ruolo delle eredità delle democratizzazioni europee) and 2009 (perché democratizzare? le cause della crisi e del crollo dei regimi non democratici nella terza ondata), both supervised by prof. grilli, resulted in the publication of three collective volumes, the last of which posthumous, constituting an important part of his scholarly legacy. the first is a comparative diachronic analysis by area of eleven european countries – france and germany in the west, italy, spain and portugal in the south and poland, hungary, the czech republic, slovakia, romania, bulgaria and russia in the east – aimed at explaining the similarities and differences in the respective processes of democratization due to political, economic and institutional contexts inherited from the previous nondemocratic regime (tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia, 2011, edited with o. lanza). the second develops a multi-case qualitative comparison of 83 countries in every part of the world in an attempt to identify the causes of crisis and collapse in non-democratic regimes of the ‘third wave’ (come cadono i regimi non democratici. primi passi verso la democrazia nei paesi della ‘terza ondata’, 2014, edited with l. germano and o. lanza). the third and last is a broad comparative analysis of the internal and international factors that have led in the various areas of the world to the fall of non-democratic regimes during the ‘third wave’ (crisis and breakdown of nondemocratic regimes. lessons from the third wave, 2016, edited with b. pisciotta and e. terzuolo). another important area of comparative studies developed by pietro grilli regards the processes involved in constructing the state and the nation, in which connection he examines the aspects related to the territorial dimension of politics and highlights the different outcomes emerging in cases of where state and nation coincide or fail to coincide in the major european countries and the resulting dynamics as regards the institutional sphere (the formation of unified or federal states) and parties (the impact of the rift between centre and periphery and the birth of nationalist parties). all this is examined in stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in europa (2003). the study of parties and party systems is also developed through a comparative approach in collective works on east and west europe (partiti e sistemi di partito nelle democrazie europee, 2007, edited with g. pasquino). another area of analysis within the study of the building of the state and the nation regards the relationship between the italians and the european union, addressed in terms both of the supranational challenge to the nation state and of the highly topical question of euroscepticism (gli italiani e l’europa, 2004). further scholarly contributions worked on by prof. grilli up to june 2015 and published during 2016 include the following: • the second edition of capire la politica (2016), a textbook of political science coauthored with orazio lanza, luca germano and barbara pisciotta; • crisis and breakdown of non-democratic regimes. lessons from the third wave (2016, with eric terzuolo and barbara pisciotta), the above-mentioned american on the causes of crisis and collapse in non-democratic regimes in the various areas of the world; • las transformaciones de la democracia. miradas cruzadas entre europa y américa latina (2016, ed. osvaldo iazzetta and maria rosaria stabili), a collection of papers delivered at the italian-argentine conference organized by prof. m.r. in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 9 stabili, where the final version of prof. grilli’s contribution on the crisis of democracy was edited by prof. roberta modugno; • lezioni di scienza politica (2016, ed. rosalba chiarini and barbara pisciotta), a collection of previously unpublished contributions, proposed by prof. paolo carnevale and including a selection of his lectures on political science, published by editoriale scientifica in the political science and comparative politics series directed by pietro grilli. attention should also be drawn here to the numerous institutional and academic posts held by prof. grilli during his career: • 1994: member of the committee for reform of the italian institutions and electoral system appointed by the presidency of the council of ministers; • 1997–2006: member of the cun; • 2000–05: member of the cnel, appointed as an expert by carlo azeglio ciampi, president of the italian republic; • 2001–09: director of the department of political institutions and social sciences, and subsequently of the department of international studies; • from 2010 on: president of the educational board of the advanced degree course in european studies and international relations and of the advisory board of the library of political studies; • september 2013: elected president of the società italiana di scienza politica. two years after his death, my personal memories are still vivid and the sense of loss even more painful. pietro grilli was my mentor. i have him to thank not only for instilling in me a passion for research and supporting me in my academic career but also and above all for teaching me this profession and devoting many hours of his time to explaining what research actually means in concrete terms. these are all things i shall never forget. it was my good fortune to meet him at la sapienza university of rome at the end of 1993. newly appointed associate professor in trieste, he was standing in at the same time for prof. domenico fisichella, holder of the chair in political science, while i had only just started work on my degree thesis. i immediately realized that he was a serious, helpful, correct and well-balanced person, all qualities that he was always recognized as possessing. pietro was not only this for me, however. during the twenty-two years in which we worked together, i knew him also as a witty and amusing person with a keen sense of humour capable of defusing the tensest situations and seeing the positive side of things. many of us look back nostalgically to the cheerful and friendly atmosphere of the working lunches we shared, discussing scholarly projects or relating personal episodes of a humorous character. i miss all that more than ever today. i regard pietro as possessing a very rare gift in our world, namely the ability to separate people’s political opinions from their personal qualities. this is something i appreciated in him from the very first moment of our meeting. above all, however, i must stress that he always had the courage of his convictions, even when they proved awkward and he was well aware that they would be of no personal advantage to him. and this is exactly how i will always remember him, as an unforgettable person. pdf_issue_14_3_donà italian political science, volume 14 issue 3, february 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 3, 206-216. contact author: alessia donà, university of trento. e-mail address: alessia.dona@unitn.it a paper in [the profession] series who is afraid of ‘gender’? gender and politics research between institutionalization and contestation in italy alessia donà university of trento abstract gender and politics scholarship has challenged conventional political science with new political questions and research issues and enriched the discipline both theoretically and methodologically. however, genderbased analysis of political phenomena is confronted with the resistance of political science – a traditionally male-dominated discipline. in italy, gender research is still a weakly institutionalized academic field compared with other european countries. this contribution reflects on the state of gender within italian political science and discusses the present situation at the crossroads between slow academic institutionalization and strong political contestation. 1. introduction t was not long ago that both the journals european political science (mügge, evans and engeli 2016) and italian political science itself (padovani and vingelli 2016) hosted a symposium on the state of gender scholarship in european political science, addressing the contributions of gender research in studying political phenomena and challenges for the future. overall, they predicted a bright future for gender and politics studies due to the resurgence of the feminist movement across europe, the ongoing process of recognition within the political science discipline and the key role of the european union in funding and promoting gender politics and research. in sum, the feminist project was here to stay and would have an enduring life. this scenario strongly contrasts with the present climate of growing populism and ‘anti-genderism’, given that in 2018 gender studies were banned by prime minister orbán in hungary (university world news 2018), a member state of the european union and the council of europe, while in other european countries the subject is increasingly opposed by a variety of actors (verloo 2018). why are gender studies and scholars under attack today? what has happened in the recent period to lead some parts of politics and society to declare ‘a war on gender studies’? this short contribution aims to open a discussion within our discipline about the state of gender and politics studies and the challenges posed by the rise of far-right populist parties, with broader implications for academic freedom. i alessia donà 207 the article will proceed as follows. the first section outlines the relevance of adopting a gender perspective in studying politics and the results achieved over the past thirty years. the second section focuses on the state of gender research within italian political science. the third section discusses the current backlash against gender studies and gender scholars in times of far-right populism, a situation we also know very intimately in italy. the conclusion raises some questions involving the academic community as a whole. 2. the challenge of gender research to conventional political science the concept of ‘gender’ is rooted in the experience of the 1960s feminist movement. in the 1970s, it gained political significance and became an issue in the study of politics (lovenduski 1992). it also diffused erratically – neither with linearity nor in homogenous mode – across the field of social sciences (including economics, sociology, law, history and anthropology). using a gender perspective in research emphasized how the differences between men and women are structured, embedded and maintained by a variety of historically male-dominated institutions (for example, the state, family, church, labour market, politics, or education) (scott 1986). while ‘sex’ refers to the biological differences between men and women, the term ‘gender’ indicates the social and cultural construction of the differences between masculinity and femininity. this process occurs in more than one context, shaping a ‘gender order’, a term that refers to a power system which constrains the relationships between people (connell 2017). as political science is concerned with the exercise of power, studying gender and politics aims to ‘reveal and explain how and why political inclusion and exclusion are fundamentally gendered’ (bonjour, mügge and roggeband 2016, p. 304). the traditional focus of the discipline on the machinery of government, elections and party politics rendered women invisible (celis et al. 2013). historically, (white, rich and educated) men were the only ones who were active in the public sphere, while women were excluded because of their supposed inferiority and inability. however, male-dominated politics regulated women’s access to abortion and sexuality, intimate and family issues. this ideological and artificial separation between private and public spheres was strongly contested by the mobilization of feminism and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (lgbt) activism, which together broke the gender division and brought about a rethinking of traditional concepts and political questions. gender and sexuality research has shown the extent to which conventional traditional political science concepts are gendered, such as democracy, voting behaviour, citizenship, representation, state and party politics (goertz and mazur 2008). the early works of feminist scholars focused on the traditional topics of political science with the inclusion of women: the study of female voting behaviour (for italy, see the pioneering work of weber 1977), the electoral system’s gendered effects (dahlerup 2006), and the impact of male-dominated party politics and the recruitment process on women’s political representation (lovenduski and norris 1993; for italy, see guadagnini 1993 and del re 1999). following the inclusion project (aimed at integrating women in the traditional areas of political research), gender and politics scholarship took three broad research directions (celis et al. 2013): the study of women in politics on their own terms (with a focus [the profession] who is afraid of ‘gender’? 208 on women’s political mobilization); the study of gender regimes, gendered states, institutions and policies, given that they reproduce gender (in)equalities (mazur 2002) and finally, the ‘gender trouble’ (butler 1990) effect as a key to exploring the interplay between diversity and identity politics struggles to fight against discrimination and exclusion based on colour, race, class and sexuality. gender and politics scholarship also introduced new specific concepts, such as patriarchy (walby 1989), state feminism (mcbride stetson and mazur 1995), intersectionality and multiple inequalities (verloo 2006), in mainstream political science. feminist contributions also brought about methodological pluralism (ackerly and true 2010) and attention to the role of social actors inside the political system in promoting instances favouring and opposing gender equality (ferree 2006). after decades, the division between the public and private spheres was openly contested, and the issues of body and sexuality increasingly became the object of political science attention and research, giving rise to lgbt and queer political studies (paternotte 2018; thiel 2019; for italy see prandelli et al. 2019) it took time for feminist research contributions to receive recognition within political science, which remains a largely male-dominated and masculinized discipline. in the context of europe, feminist scholars have experienced a variety of modes to ‘gender mainstream’ a resistant discipline (vickers 2016). on taking stock of the situation, we see that some elements appear crucial in evaluating the gendering of political science. the first is the number of women, given that gender-related courses are mostly taught by women: recruiting more women means increased attention to gender issues. in the last two decades, the status of women in political science has improved in terms of the number of women (full) professors; women’s presence in major disciplinary handbooks; women’s participation as authors, editors and reviewers in relevant disciplinary journals, and women taking leading roles in the profession (e.g. presidency of a professional association). table 1. establishment of women/gender and politics sections across some professional associations. professional association section/ research committee year of foundation uk political studies association women and politics 1970s american political science association women and politics 1986 german political science association gender and politics 1992 spanish association of political and administrative science gender and politics 1997 austrian political science association gender and politics 1997–1999 italian political science association gender and politics 2018 european consortium for political research gender and politics 1985 international political science association gender politics and policy women and politics in the global south 1979 1992 international sociological association women, gender and society 1973 source: mügge et al. 2016 (with author’s updates and integration) another element supporting the academic recognition of gender studies is the foundation of a section on women/gender and politics within national professional alessia donà 209 organizations and european, transatlantic and international umbrellas: the european consortium for political research (ecpr), the international political science association (ipsa) and the international sociological association (isa) (see table 1). the aim is to diffuse the study of gender and politics, to support gender equality in the profession and to facilitate contact and communication between scholars engaged in the study of gender and politics by organizing group conferences and workshops, panels at general conferences and other events, and awarding prizes. following this broad scenario of what is meant by gendering political science, now we turn our attention to the field of political science in italy to reflect on the state of gender research. 3. the weak institutionalization of gender research within italian political science in italy, as elsewhere, gender research emerged in response to the issues brought up by the rise of the italian feminist movement in the late 1960s and the progressive inclusion of feminist scholars within academia. in their initial stage, gender studies were integrated in the education system in a ‘hidden way’ (di cori 2013), as gender-related teaching was mainstreamed into the general social science curriculum, including political science. given the institutional context of female academic underrepresentation and of curricula rigidity, many feminist scholars managed to introduce a focus on women into their courses, integrating new issues such as female electoral behaviour, female political representation and women’s movement activities. starting in the 1990s, gender studies centres and gender scholar groups formed at the university department level. this had the support of national initiatives such as the decision of the then minister of equal opportunities, the sociologist laura balbo, to sustain gender studies within academia and that of the central government to subsidise universities in organizing the course ‘women, politics and institutions’ in the period 2006–2013 (saraceno 2010). today we count at least 20 centres developed in many universities across italy and they are a key venue where seminars and conferences are organized, research on women and gender issues is conducted and training courses and advanced education are provided. a more recent development was the recruitment of a younger generation of female scholars, formed abroad or members of international gender research networks (pravadelli 2010). taken together, all these developments led to a process of institutionalization of women’s and gender studies in the early 2000s, despite the rigidity of the italian university system and a decline in public funding. what about gender in our discipline today? political science is quite a young discipline in italy compared to other social sciences, with a community of around 2381 members, of which 77 are women (32%). the female presence registers minoritarian numbers in the highest positions of full (10 women out of 52, 19%) and associate professor (37 women out of 95, 39%). it is no surprise, then, to note that most teaching materials and syllabuses are still gender blind and the main findings of feminist scholars are disregarded. as padovani and vingelli (2016, p. vi) remark, ‘the reflection [on 1 data taken from the website of the italian minister of university and research, 21 december 2019: http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php. [the profession] who is afraid of ‘gender’? 210 the potential of promoting and supporting gender-aware approaches to political science research and education] is ongoing across europe and beyond. yet the italian political science community has not been attentive to these debates; and (…) most of the above issues have seldom been addressed in our professional circles’. from the areas of party politics to public policy analysis, from comparative politics to european and international politics, the gender perspective has been absent, or without consistent and permanent scholarly activity, for a long time. the first generation of italian feminist political scientists did not establish a tradition of gender studies, mainly for two reasons: either they were marginalized within the discipline, with their work unacknowledged or undervalued as ‘unscientific’, or they decided to be outsiders to the italian community, preferring to build and be part of international research networks, where gender studies were recognized and funded. however, their pioneering work was precious for the succeeding generation of gender scholars who acknowledged their research and prosecuted it in an academic context which was more favourable to gender equality. such a context was also increasingly open to collaboration with researchers across countries (see the establishment of international gender research networks such as the research network on gender, politics and the state rngs launched in the late 1990s and which brought together more than 50 researchers to investigate and generate theories about the effectiveness of women’s policy machineries) and was supported by political science institutions such as ecpr, ipsa and others. in the last two decades, gender perspective has been slowly integrated into social sciences (for example, economics, history, sociology, law, literature, psychology), and a growing number of young (female) scholars with an interest in gender studies have achieved academic positions in italian universities. these changes have led research activity, supported by eu funding, to focus on the place of knowledge production, i.e. academia, and to question its supposed gender neutrality.2 as in other workplaces, the results show the persistence of sexism and gender inequality within the university system, with a masculine (almost) monopoly at the highest level (professore ordinario) of the academic hierarchy, negatively affecting the realization of justice and equal opportunities in the recruitment process. scientific knowledge and the environment where it is produced are not gender neutral, then, and this awareness underlies the recent equality measures adopted by some italian universities (among others, the university of trento in 2014 and scuola normale in 2016) aiming to increase the number of women in academia, from the early to the last crucial stages of their academic careers. the greater the efforts to fill the gender gap in academia, the more the presence of women numerically increases, and so it is reasonable to expect that gender studies will be reinforced in the near future. in this context of ‘structural gender awareness’, there are some, albeit small, positive signs of de-masculinization and of recognition of gender and politics research within the discipline. first, the italian political science association (società italiana di scienza politica sisp) has a female president for the second consecutive time since 2015. second, gender and politics topics have started, very humbly, to be incorporated in mainstream textbooks (see paragraph on female political representation in capano 2 among others; see, for example the eu funded project garcia – gendering the academy and research: combating career instability and asymmetries (http://garciaproject.eu/). alessia donà 211 et al. 2014). finally, after decades of scattered panels on gender issues, the foundation of the gender and politics standing group (gpsg) of the sisp in 2018 is good news (albeit with a significant delay in comparison with other european countries, as seen above in table 1). thanks to the commitment of a group of about 30 gender scholars from different italian and european universities and the support of the sisp organization, the gpsg was built to give visibility to gender and politics research, to reunite gender scholars coming from different disciplines periodically and to organize seminars and panels during the sisp annual meetings, with the overall goal of bringing about significant change in the knowledge and education of the mainstream discipline. the gpsg was active in organizing a plurality of gender panels at the 2018 and 2019 sisp annual meetings (with six panels in total, plus a roundtable), thus becoming a key reference institution for gender and politics scholars. the establishment of the gpsg might represent a further step towards the mainstreaming of gender within italian political science, as has already happened in other countries. much will depend on the capacity of their members to build alliances with other standing groups within sisp, to diffuse gender awareness across thematic fields, to collaborate with other national and umbrella professional organizations and to work with scholars of other disciplines, reinforcing the interdisciplinarity of gender studies. it has taken a long time for italian political science to reach this early stage of institutionalization. compared with other european countries, our discipline is a latecomer in recognizing the contributions of gender and politics research. things are slowly changing, thanks to the initiatives pursued over the years by a group of committed actors today and in the past within political institutions, political science associations and universities in favour of the institutionalization of gender and politics research. a critical point remains the weak inclusion of gender in university education3, political science courses included. moreover, there are great disparities between subfields within the discipline in the types and amount of gender scholarship that has been done. for example, international relations is a subfield where feminist contributions remain largely ignored despite the increasing amount of gender research available on topics such as international security, human rights and international political economy (on this debate see tickner and sjoberg 2011). hence, the main challenge for the future will be to increase the supply of gender in political science curricula at undergraduate, master’s and doctoral levels to equip students, future scholars and policymakers with a gender lens to understand power and politics and identify gender inequalities. gender studies need solid and consolidated roots to better contrast recurring gender backlash. today more than before we realize how institutionally weak this research field is in times when gender research and scholars have been contested and attacked by social and political actors. we will explore this last development in the next section. 3 in 2012, 16 universities out of 57 offered at least one module on gender studies (antonelli, sarra and sorrentino 2013). [the profession] who is afraid of ‘gender’? 212 4. the contestation of gender research and scholars outside the discipline as anticipated in the introduction, in many european countries gender studies are under attack, especially since the anti-gender movement – a constellation of conservative and religious associations and organizations acting in defence of a supposed ‘natural’ gender order – has converged with the anti-gender discourses of populist radical right and conservative party programmes (kuhar and paternotte 2017). in hungary, france, germany, poland and slovakia (kováts and põim 2015), the political agenda of populist radical right parties has been reframed in such a way as to intercept the claims of religious fundamentalist movements, with the establishment of a strategic alliance against so-called ‘gender ideology’. the latter is a label that represents the ‘symbolic glue’ behind which, attacks occur against the feminist project of equality and social justice (verloo and paternotte 2018). the rise of far-right populism in europe has meant a backlash against gender equality policies and academic gender studies programmes. italy has not been immune to this cultural backlash since lega, under matteo salvini’s leadership, was transformed from an ethno-regionalist to a populist radical right party (passarelli and tuorto 2018). gender scholars have pointed out that populist radical right parties can be characterized as conservative with respect to family values and traditional gender roles (köttig et al. 2017), and lega is not an exception. its 2018 electoral manifesto included the centrality of the natural patriarchal family as the fundamental unit of society and the need to defend it; the urgency to promote demographic growth policies; the exclusive role of parents in choosing the kind of education given to their children; and the necessity of alternative measures to abortion. in lega’s view, gender equality represents a threat to social values, contrasted with christian civilization, and it is considered the cause of the demographic crisis, the emergence of alternative family models, the diffusion of the practice of abortion and the disappearance of traditional male and female roles in society. hence, according to lega, the heterosexual family is the institution of moral values, currently under attack by liberal and secular ideas and elites. the conservative agenda and populist discourse of lega overlaps with the fundamentalist positions of the italian anti-gender movement (lavizzari and prearo 2018), and this explains the alliance between the two actors and why some members of catholic organizations decided to run for office under the lega flag in 2018 (donà 2020). close relationships were also previously established at the local level (where lega holds government positions) in contrast with the diffusion of so-called ‘gender ideology’ (ideologia gender). it suffices to mention a few examples of anti-gender radical right populism campaigns which confirm that we are not talking about isolated events, but about the result of a deliberated political strategy aiming to (re)politicize gender issues and counter the progressive policy changes introduced in the areas of lgbt, reproductive and sexual rights. what follows is not an exhaustive list of events. in may 2018, a workshop organized by the research centre politesse of the university of verona on ‘asylum seekers, sexual orientation and gender identity’ was cancelled due to protests from extremist and fundamentalist catholic groups against gender (0rsato 2018). in november 2018, the lega minister of university, marco bussetti, stopped an academic study on homophobic attitudes in education conducted by the alessia donà 213 university of perugia on the (undemonstrated) basis that the questions on sexual orientation exposed students to gender ideology (drogo 2018). in december 2018, gender equality programmes promoted for secondary school students under the scientific supervision of the centre of interdisciplinary gender studies at the university of trento were cancelled (and never reactivated) by the lega local government because they were accused of promoting gender ideology (baldo 2018). a contested event happened in march 2019 when the xiii world congress of families (wcf) took place in verona as part of the activities of the international organization for the family, a christian fundamentalist movement.4 since the first conference held in prague in 1997, the subject of the wcf has been the ‘natural family’ to mobilize against lgbt people’s rights and school programmes on gender and sex education. the event was sponsored and endorsed by lega politicians from local (the governors of the veneto region and trento province) and national government, including party leader salvini together with lorenzo fontana (then minister of family and disability) and bussetti (minister of university). all these initiatives were promoted in the name of the family, christian identity, and ‘real people’, not only to attack existing equality policies, but also to discredit the scientific standing of gender research and gender scholars. radical right populism and religious fundamentalism, for different reasons, are on the same side in the battle against ‘gender imposed on the people’, and they are acting together to contest gender studies and gender scholars, accusing them of destroying the ‘natural’ gender binary and the ‘natural complementarity of men and women’, thus weakening the basis of the ‘natural family’ made up of a man and a woman and, consequently, the ‘moral order’ of the nation itself 4. conclusions we are facing a paradoxical situation today. on the one hand, gender has started to be mainstreamed within italian political science and academia, while on the other, a growing opposition to gender studies has emerged outside academia. the fact that populist parties and religious factions contest and attack a research field in the name of ‘ordinary people’ is of immediate concern to those who do gender research.5 when a research field is under attack for political reasons, it should ring alarm bells for the entire academic community (corbett and gordon 2018). at stake here are scholarly knowledge, university autonomy and academic freedom. references ackerly, b.a. and true, j., 2010. doing feminist research in political and social science. basingstoke, hampshire: palgrave macmillan. antonelli,f., sarra g. and sorrentino r. 2013. il sesso mancante nell'università italiana. ingenere. july 18. available at: http://www.ingenere.it/articoli/il-sesso-mancantenelluniversit-italiana 4 for more information about the organization, mission and activities see the institutional website https://www.profam.org/mission/. 5 today grouped in the rete italiana degli studi di genere, intersex, femministi, transfemministi e sulla sessualità (gifts), https://retegifts.wordpress.com/. 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(2010), women and gender studies in italy. lack of institutionalization or a different kind of institutionalization? european journal of women’s studies. 1350-5068, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 269-274. scott, j.w., 1986. gender: a useful category of historical analysis. the american historical review, vol. 91, no. 5, pp. 1053-1075. thiel, m., 2019. queering scholarship?: lgbt politics as an analytical challenge for political science and international relations. in: m.j. bosia, s.m. mcevoy and m. rahman, eds. the oxford handbook of global lgbt and sexual diversity politics. online publication date: feb 2019, doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190673741.013.5 tickner, j.a. and sjoberg l., eds. 2011. feminism and international relations: conversations about the past, present and future. london: routledge. university world news. 2018, university world news, hungary’s leader orbán bans gender studies, 18 october, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20181020111651678 (last access 29 december 2019). verloo, m., 2006. multiple inequalities, intersectionality and the european union. european journal of women’s studies. vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 211-228. verloo, m., ed. 2018. varieties of opposition to gender equality in europe. london: routledge. [the profession] who is afraid of ‘gender’? 216 verloo, m. and paternotte, d., 2018. editorial. feminist project under threat in europe? politics and governance. vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 1-5. vickers, j., 2016. can we change how political science thinks? “gender mainstreaming” in a resisting discipline. canadian journal of political science. vol. 8, no.4 , pp. 747-770. walby, s., 1989. theorizing patriarchy. sociology. may, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 213-234. weber, m., 1977. il voto delle donne. torino: centro di ricerca e documentazione luigi einaudi.. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_1_interview_newell_[tp].docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 1 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 1, 52–57. a contribution to [the profession] series contemporary italian politics: italy from abroad an interview with james newell introduction james newell is an adjunct professor at the university of urbino carlo bo and former professor of politics at the university of salford, uk. his recent books include, silvio berlusconi: a study in failure (2019), corruption in contemporary politics a new travel guide (2019) (both with manchester university press), europe and the left: resisting the populist tide (ed. palgrave, 2020), italy’s contemporary politics (routledge, 2020). with maurizio carbone, he is co-founder of the quarterly journal, contemporary italian politics. the following interview was conducted by the editor of italian political science, daniela sicurelli, and edited by the interviewee. daniela sicurelli [ds]: can you summarise the history of contemporary italian politics? contemporary italian politics began life in 2009 as the twiceyearly bulletin of italian politics, which i co-founded with maurizio carbone. hosted on the web site of the university of glasgow, the bulletin was an open-access publication whose aim was to provide a forum for discussion of recent developments in italian politics and of their domestic and international implications. however, the journal’s origins actually go back to 2002 and the founding of the uk political studies association’s (psa’s) italian politics specialist group (ipsg) with which it has always been in some way associated. psa specialist groups, supported and funded by the association, are designed to bring together academics with research and teaching interests in specific areas of politics, in order to enhance the quality of activities within the given field by providing opportunities for group members to network, organise conferences and carry out joint publication projects. the aim in establishing the ipsg was therefore to create a vehicle for the further development of the study of italian politics in the uk. as such, the group soon became highly successful – in terms of the number of members it was able to recruit; its sponsorship of conferences, and of panels at the association’s annual meetings; the publication activities of its members; its ability to bring to the uk internationally known italian political scientists and so on (so much so that in 2017 the group was awarded the psa’s “specialist group of the year” prize) – and so the launch of the bulletin of italian politics was designed to build on that success. james newell [jn] an interview with james newell 53 contemporary italian politics was the name assumed by the bulletin after taylor and francis agreed to take over its production in 2013 when it became a thrice-yearly publication. the change of name was perceived as necessary in order the more accurately to reflect the journal’s aims. “bulletin” had been chosen in order to emphasise our concern to fill a gap by providing a forum especially for articles analysing the most recent events bearing in mind both the rapidity of change in italian politics at the time and the difficulties faced by conventional academic journals, with their long lead-in times, in doing this. its disadvantage was that it risked giving the impression that the journal was a newspaper. contemporary italian politics was therefore chosen in order both to emphasise the current relevance of the topics its articles cover and to remove any doubts about the academic rigour and analytic incisiveness we were aiming for. the aims and scope of the journal meant that it had much in common with the well-known annual, politica in italia (pit), published by il mulino under the auspices of the istituto carlo cattaneo in collaboration with the johns hopkins university sais europe. as most readers of ips will be aware, pit began life in 1986, bringing together italian and foreign scholars to provide description and analysis of the most significant events and developments of the year just passed. like the journal, it seeks to bring a knowledge of italian politics to a wide audience both in and beyond academia. like the journal, it seeks to respond to the ethical imperative of inclusivity in the sense of knowledge production that is accessible, rather than being the preserve of those with intellectual resources out of the reach of the many. like the journal, it provides a service both to contemporary historians (as volumes accumulate, allowing researchers to trace back developments and changes) and political scientists (looking for the empirical material that will enable them to include the italian case in comparative studies). it therefore seemed fitting that the tenth anniversary of the journal should be marked by an increase in the number of issues from three to four per year to enable the publication to host the english-language edition of pit, which in 2021 made its fourth appearance as an issue of journal, guest-edited by arianna giovannini and lorenzo mosca. ds: which theoretical approaches/methods are represented in the articles published by the journal? jn: the scope and the remit of the journal – to provide rigorous analysis of contemporary events and trends in italian politics – mean that it operates on the boundary between contemporary history and political science and that other disciplines, such as sociology and international relations, are also relevant to its concerns. consequently, as one would expect, the theoretical approaches and research methods represented vary considerably. both interpretive and positivist research paradigms are reflected in the published material as are cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, inductive and deductive approaches. since it began life in 2009, the journal has published a total of 254 articles (besides book reviews and, in its early days, dialogues, roundtables, news and events). of these 254, about 60% are based on quantitative data with about 50% [the profession] contemporary italian politics: italy from abroad 54 using the data for exploratory and about 10% for confirmatory analysis. the remainder of the articles are based on the qualitative analysis of text and/or interview transcripts. ds: how does italian scholarship figure in the authorship of the journal (in terms of coverage, diversity, competitiveness, etc.)? jn: the vast majority – meaning over 90% – of authors submitting articles to the journal are mother-tongue speakers of italian, with over 90% of these being based at an institution located in italy and corresponding proportions for the articles actually published. this means that with rare exceptions, most of the material is produced by authors whose first language is not english – with the result that in many cases the editors have to take considerable care, once articles have survived the refereeing process and been accepted for publication, to carry out the “polishing” necessary to bring them up to a publishable standard from a linguistic point of view. it is the policy of the journal not to release text for publication until it meets the standards one would reasonably expect of a mother-tongue speaker of english. ds: how, in your opinion, does the logic of career progression in the italian academia affect the decision of what to publish and where? jn: i believe that the logic of career progression affects the decision of what to publish and where in the same way in the italian as it does in other systems, although i am nonplussed by it. as i understand it, progression mostly depends on performance in terms of a number of publication and citation metrics. consequently, like their counterparts elsewhere, italian academics do want to publish in english; they don’t want to publish book chapters and they don’t want to publish in journals that are not in “fascia a”. if we do not tackle language loss, more than half of all of the world’s languages will become extinct in the next 100 years. one of the most influential works ever produced in political science is a book chapter (namely, kirchheimer’s chapter on the “catch-all” party). galileo galilei would have failed to publish his work in a “fascia a” journal had the category existed at the time. my point is that i am sorry that, as a profession, we seem unwilling to resist performance measurement and accountability for what we do. first, i think that it is inappropriate to hold academics accountable, for the same reason that it is inappropriate to make judges publicly accountable for their sentencing decisions. second, it is difficult to see on what basis the more “significant” and “original” work deemed to score highly in research assessment exercises could be produced at all in the absence of the underlying routine, empirical research of other scholars on which it inevitably relies. in short, research is ultimately a collective endeavour to which everyone can and does contribute. finally, assessment regimes underpin the marketization of higher education, the commodification of academic labour and the hegemony of the neo-liberal paradigm, so placing it beyond criticism. yet the sine qua non of the academic enterprise is that nothing be placed beyond potential criticism and intellectual scrutiny. an interview with james newell 55 ds: contemporary italian politics ranks in the first quartile of scimago (for both political science & international relations and political science and sociology). how do you think this kind of ranking affects the authorship and readership of the journal? jn: now i am compelled to take a position that clashes in many ways with what i have just argued since at a guess i would say that the journal’s ranking means that it attracts more submissions than it would do were its ranking lower, and that this in turn has a positive impact both on the quality of the articles published and on reader numbers. however, as you might expect me say, i like to think that we might have succeeded in generating such a virtuous circle in any event, had journal “league tables” not existed. ds: to conclude, from your viewpoint, what are the main ingredients to a success story such as that of contemporary italian politics? jn: i think, first, that timing has been significant. the journal was launched at the end of a twenty-five year period that had seen an explosion of interest in italian politics beyond its frontiers as attested to by the growing number of english-language books, both academic and popular, focussing on the area or some aspect of it. thus, in the mid-1980s there was (leaving aside very specifically-focussed research monographs) really only one general english-language text that teachers of italian politics at university level could call upon (frederic spotts’ and theodor wieser’s, italy, a difficult democracy, cambridge university press, 1986). the next quarter century then saw the appearance of roughly one new italian politics book every eighteen months. reasons for the expansion in interest were not hard to find and included growing european integration and therefore the increasing relevance of its member countries for political developments within other eu-member states (italy then being among the four largest and now, with brexit, among the three largest); the considerable expansion in the teaching of politics in higher education thanks to the expansion in university-student numbers in general; the new emphasis placed in american universities on the european union and its member states; the dramatic social changes associated with globalisation such as the growth in air travel and tourism, as well as the explosion of information available thanks to development of the internet, and so on. if many of these changes applied to areas of politics other than the italian case, then interest here was particularly sparked by the dramatic and profound changes that were set in motion by the great “bribe city” corruption scandal and the other upheavals of the early 1990s and by the emergence and growth of silvio berlusconi, whose activities, political success and dominance of the political scene were unprecedented, not just in italy but in europe in general if not more broadly. consequently, from being widely viewed as a country of “stable instability” – one where (for all that its political arrangements were fragile, inefficient and unpopular) the christian democrats were always in power and nothing important ever really changed – from the early 1990s the situation was one of almost “permanent revolution”. consequently, the future always appeared to be [the profession] contemporary italian politics: italy from abroad 56 completely open, with developments even in the near future incredibly hard to predict. and of course this fluidity, this sense of uncertainty, not to say anxiety, about the future has continued down to the present and extended well beyond the frontiers of italy to become the leitmotif of early twenty-first century politics generally. if this has deprived italy of much of its former distinctiveness, then by highlighting growing global interdependence it has helped to maintain interest in the country’s politics from abroad at its former high level. against this background, i think that when we launched the journal we successfully identified a real gap in the market. that is to say, there is a need for the journal because the space which articles focussing on contemporary italian politics can find in the two main, english-language journals focussing on italy – the journal of modern italian studies (jmis) and modern italy (mi) – is at least to some extent limited by the remit of these publications. of course, articles on current italian politics do find a home here, but the publications also have to give space to a much wider range of concerns which, in the case of the jmis include “the political, economic, cultural, and social history of modern italy from 1700 to the present”,1 in the case of mi, “the history, politics and social, economic and cultural life of italy and the italian peoples from the eighteenth century to the present”.2 finally, i think that the journal owes its success to the large quantity of highquality material written by academics who are mother-tongue speakers of italian who would otherwise publish their work in an italian-language journal but who seek a wider audience by publishing in english. as already implied, the launch of the journal coincided with a considerable and growing demand among non-english speaking political scientists to see their work published in english owing to the growing internationalisation of political science and the growing impact of research assessment exercises, university league tables, measures of “impact” and so forth – giving publication in the english language definite and considerable advantages to authors. and of course it also coincided with the dramatic expansion of politics as a discipline in general that had taken place in italian universities in the four decades leading up to its emergence. we live in a world in which the public sphere has become internationalised: in which issues on the political agenda in any one part of the world have a high profile at least in part because of their echoes and their relevance for similar issues in other parts. an example of such an issue being debated in italy at the present moment is the proposta di legge zan, in public discussion of which the positions being taken on similar issues by viktor orbán in hungary have featured highly as have the implications of failure to pass the proposal for italy’s record on the issue in comparison with that of other european countries. another is euro2020 and which teams, including italy, are or are not taking the knee and why. yet a third is the september 2020 referendum on the reduction in the number of parliamentarians which, as i wrote in a recent editorial for the journal, was in many respects italy’s answer to the uk’s june 2016 brexit 1 see: https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalinformation?show=aimsscope&journalcode=rmis20. 2 accessible online at: https://www.cambridge.org /core/journals/modern-italy. an interview with james newell 57 referendum. it may seem banal to say that events in any one part of the world cannot be fully understood without at least some knowledge of what is going on in the other parts, but it does mean that now more than ever there is a small but important part for the journal to play in dissemination of this knowledge. * * * microsoft word pdf_issue_14_1_rebessi.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 1, march 2019 © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 1, 38-49. contact author: elisa rebessi, university of milan. e-mail address: elisa.rebessi@unimi.it unexpected consequences of the implementation of the code of public contracts: judicial decisions on awarding procedures in three italian cities elisa rebessi university of milan abstract by building on spiller (2008) and moszoro and spiller (2012), this paper analyses the implementation of the italian code of public contracts. contracting authorities are expected to design tendering procedures strategically, using less discretion the higher the risk of third-party challenges, and more discretion the lower this risk. the analysis considers three cases: the municipalities of milan, turin and rome. after assessing the potential for third-party challenges with measures of competitiveness of the economic environment where the municipalities are located, the paper sheds light on how the municipalities apply the code, analysing judicial decisions that accept the reasons of the applicants on the awarding of public contracts issued by regional administrative courts (2006-2018). results confirm expectations on the strategic use of administrative discretion, and also reveal that the code is generating litigation when the contracting authorities rigidly assess the moral and contributory requirements of the economic operators. 1. introduction ollowing new public management reforms of public administration, the awarding of public contracts is nowadays a cornerstone in the delivery of services and public works. italy, affected in the 1990s by administrative reforms inspired by the principles of new public management and at the beginning of the 2000s by a constitutional reform that considerably strengthened local governments, provides a context in which local government plays an important role in the awarding of services and public works, including a considerable degree of discretion in shaping decisions and implementation (marcou 2016). decisions on the awarding of public contracts actually feed local economies and open opportunities for shaping public service implementation, with specific reference to the role of the administrative courts. nevertheless, at the present time there is no empirical evidence on the role of courts and their interactions with the other actors of local government in shaping the implementation of public awarding. this paper aims to fill this gap by focusing on the implementation in three italian cities of a key regulatory instrument: the italian code of public contracts. the italian code of public contracts aims to limit discretionary actions of the contracting authorities through a formalized, process-oriented legal framework (oecd 2016). this paper analyses the implementation of the code, building on spiller (2008) and moszoro and spiller (2012) who provide an institutional theory of public contracts and a rationale for the use of discretion in public contracting. in particular, by analysing the strategies that local contracting authorities use in designing public contracts, we show that the potential for third-party challenges f elisa rebessi 39 (i.e. legal challenges from competitors of the contractors) affects the use of administrative discretion in public contracts more than by-law prescriptions. scholars in positive political theory and rational choice have highlighted the role of third parties in supervising and controlling public contracts in democratic societies (mccubbins and schwartz 1984; mccubbins, noll and weingast 1987, 1989). these scholars have also extensively analysed rational anticipation of courts’ decisions by legislators (among others: ferejhon and shipan 1990, ferejhon and weingast 1992, steunenberg 1997, santoni and zucchini 2006, brouard and honnige 2017). this kind of theoretically driven and empirically grounded approach has not been applied to the study of local public procurement in europe, and in particular in the case of italy. by analysing the strategies that local administrations use in designing public contracts, the present contribution shows how rational anticipation of litigation affects the implementation of the code. hence, the present contribution enriches the literature in two ways. first, it investigates the empirics of implementation in public procurement in italy by considering actors such as the decision-makers, the courts, and the third applicants. second, it applies rational choice theories to the behaviour of these actors, considering also the rationality of the municipality, thus enriching the academic debate on their role in public procurement (wollmann et al. 2016). the paper addresses the following research questions: how are local government administrations implementing the code of public contracts and, in particular, how are they using administrative discretion in tendering procedures? what type of litigation is fostering the implementation of the code before the administrative judge? is litigation revealing unexpected consequences of legislation, once implemented by local governments? the paper is based on a comparative analysis of three cases: the italian municipalities of milan, turin and rome. the use of administrative discretion in the awarding procedures is assessed through a diachronic analysis of the decisions on the awarding of public contracts issued by regional administrative courts in the three municipalities between 2006 and 2018. the potential for third-party challenges, which is supposed to affect the use of administrative discretion, is approximated by measures of the competitiveness of the economic environment where the municipalities are located. results confirm that the administrations tend to use more discretional procedures in less competitive economic contexts, where the potential for third-party challenges is lower, and more rigid procedures in more competitive economic contexts, where the risk of potential challenges is higher. surprisingly, the implementation of the code is generating litigation when the contracting authorities rigidly assess the moral and contributory requirements of the economic operators. this outcome possibly reflects a controversial aspect of the code, which gives responsibility for the control of the participatory requirements to the same contracting authorities, and not to an independent body not involved in the awarding procedures. the paper is structured as follows: section one presents the theoretical framework, according to which one hypothesis is generated. section two presents the cases, the dependent and independent variables, and briefly outlines the regulatory framework of the code of public contracts. section three provides the analysis of litigation for the awarding of public contracts. section four concludes the paper. unexpected consequences of the implementation of the code of public contracts 40 2. institutional theories of public contracts and their implications for the use of administrative discretion following new public management reforms, public administrations have differentiated the provision of public works and services, opening up the traditional hierarchical production and delivery systems to contract-like relationships (pollit 2001). in this context, the awarding of public contracts has become the main instrument for local government administrations to purchase goods and services to achieve their institutional goals.the fundamental features of a contract depend on the nature of contracting hazards (williamson 1979) and specific forms of opportunism can arise in public contracting: opportunism from public agent (‘governmental opportunism’) and opportunism from interested third parties (‘third-party opportunism’) (spiller 2008). governmental opportunism consists in the government’s power to adopt new legislation to obtain part of the quasi-rents of the contracting partner. this might be the case of the adoption of a secondary legislation act that denies a tariff increase to a public utility. governmental opportunism however finds institutional limits, since the potential for the opportunistic use of legislative powers depends on the control of the executive over the legislature and on the presence of an independent judiciary. third-party opportunism relates instead to the incentives that competitors, interest groups and political opponents may have in challenging a public contract. the legitimacy of a public contract can be contested both in court and informally through the media. interested third parties play a fundamental role in democratic societies in supervising and controlling public contracts (mccubbins and schwartz, 1984; mccubbins, noll and weingast 1987, 1989); however, they can also challenge the probity of a public agent for the benefits they may receive in political and economic terms. a successful challenge in political terms entails the replacement of the public agent with an agent whose preferences are closer to those of the interested third party. a successful challenge in economic terms causes the replacement of the private contractor, or the terms of the contract are changed and become more favourable to the interested third party. moszoro and spiller (2012) claim that the higher level of contract specificity and rigidity in public contracting can be interpreted as a risk adaptation by public agents. more precisely, by limiting their discretionary actions and increasing contract formalities and rigidities, public agents would reduce their exposure to the risk of third-party challenges. marshall, meurer and richard (1994) similarly noted that agreements that can be contested by excluded operators tend to be more carefully delimited and governed by formal features. the strategies of the economic operators are affected in turn by the level of contract specificity and rigidity: the more discretion they observe in contract terms, the more room they have to challenge the contract while the less discretion they observe in the contract terms, the less room they have to challenge the contract. spiller’s (2008) institutional theory of public contracts and moszoro and spiller’s (2012) account of public contract rigidity can be used to analyse the strategies adopted by contracting authorities in local public procurement, and in particular to explain the room contracting authorities leave for their own discretionary evaluations in adjudication procedures. the presence of more rigid/less discretionary assessments in the adjudication process reflects the higher risk of third-party challenges. third-party challenges are expected to come from economic operators that would benefit from a private contractor’s replacement or from changing the rules of adjudication. contracting authorities are elisa rebessi 41 expected to perceive a higher potential for third-party challenges when local productive systems are more competitive, and firms are more numerous and competitive enough to enter the procurement market and eventually appeal against the adjudication decision before an administrative court. according to the argument just illustrated, i put forward the following hypothesis: h1. i expect tendering procedures to be more rigid (less discretional), the higher the potential for third-party challenges. 3. data and variables the analysis is based on three cases, the municipalities of milan, turin and rome, three of the biggest cities in italy, all characterised by advanced urban infrastructures and a valueadded service industry, sectors at the centre of the public procurement market. the dependent variable, the use of discretion in tendering procedures, is assessed through the analysis of the decisions that accept the reasons of the applicants on the awarding of public contracts (‘decisioni in materia di aggiudicazione’) issued by regional administrative courts against the municipalities of milan, turin and rome between 2006 and 2018. in decisions that accept the reasons of the applicants (from now on ‘accepting decisions’), the administrative court states that the reasons of the applicant who is challenging the decision of a municipality on the awarding of a contract are founded. for instance, the court can recognize that the procedures applied by the administration in a specific tender procedure, such as the use of weighting criteria to evaluate the offers, were not coherent with the tender notice or with specific provisions of the code. if the court states that the appeal is founded and assesses that the administration did not correctly apply the law or the procedures of the tender, the judicial decision considers the acts illegitimate and therefore it nullifies them. the administration can decide to present an appeal to the second instance court, the council of state; otherwise the awarding procedure is nullified. the dependent variable, which describes the use of discretion in accepting decisions, is assessed through the judges’ description of two fundamental aspects for the award of the contract: 1. the rigidity of the administration in applying the code in the selection of participants in the tender, and 2. the coherence of the acts of the administrations with the procedures declared in the tenders. judicial decisions on the awarding of public works and services are collected from the juridical database leggi d’italia. applicants are unsuccessful bidders: firms, consortia, cooperatives, ventures, associations and, less frequently, public institutions that appeal for the annulment of awarding measures and against measures of exclusion. the appeals are against provisions adopted by the municipalities, represented by their mayor pro tempore. decisions against provisions adopted by subsidiaries of the municipalities (e.g. expo milano 2015 s.p.a. and other public owned companies) were not included. judicial decisions are distributed as follows: 165 decisions against the municipality of rome (45 of which are accepting decisions), 135 decisions against the municipality of milan (21 of which are accepting decisions), and 49 decisions against the municipality of turin (5 of which are accepting decisions). unexpected consequences of the implementation of the code of public contracts 42 the italian code of public contracts1 aims to prevent corruption, promote transparency and achieve the opening-up of public procurement to competition in coherence with european directives.2 to this end, firms that intend to participate in a procurement procedure must meet a list of requirements, which include general morality requirements, financial capacities, absence of contributory negligence and technical skills. in order to certify their status, firms must produce a series of certificates, such as the durc ‘documento unico di regolarità contributiva’ which attests regular payments of social security and insurance contributions, the subscription to official registers (‘albi’), and other certificates of technical skills and self-declarations. the same contracting authorities are responsible for assessing firms’ requirements and are asked to verify the information provided by the applicants. the code of 2016 charged the italian national anti-corruption authority (anac) with the task of explaining through guidelines the evidences appropriate to justify operators’ exclusion. the code regulates procurement both above and below specific financial thresholds, established and periodically updated by the european commission (art. 35 of the code). procedural rules of the code must be applied to contracts above the eu thresholds and allow for any european firms or institution to participate in the procedures. ordinary awarding procedures include open and restricted tender procedures. open and restricted ordinary procedures are characterized by a limited use of discretionary powers in the selection of the bidders, who submit non-renegotiable offers. special awarding procedures, which can be applied to procurements below the eu financial thresholds, include competitive procedure with negotiation, negotiated procedure without previous publication of the call for tender and direct purchasing (‘affidamento diretto’) permitted only for low value tenders (art. 36 of the code). negotiated procedures are characterized by significant discretionary powers for the contracting authority, which consults potential suppliers and negotiates contract conditions with them (baltrunaite et al. 2018). unsuccessful bidders can apply to the regional administrative courts for any measure adopted during the awarding procedures (iclg 2019). this paper focuses precisely on the decisions issued by regional administrative courts in three cities (rome, milan, turin), in order to better describe the implementation of the code. in particular, we first describe whether the courts recognize that the complaints of the applicants are founded, thus we focus on the judges’ evaluation of tendering procedures and on the reasons why the applicants were successful before the courts (see figure 1). the municipality with both the largest number of disputes before the administrative judge and the highest rate of acceptance decisions is rome. indeed, the municipality of rome presents 165 judicial decisions, followed by milan (135) and turin (49). in all municipalities, rejection decisions are higher than acceptance decisions. in the city of turin, the rejection rate is particularly high and amounts to 84%. in milan, the rejection rate amounts to 68% and is close to rome’s 60%. the highest rate of acceptance decisions is achieved by rome, with 29% of accepted cases, followed by milan, with 16% of total 1 legislative decree no 163/2006, then abrogated by legislative decree no. 50/2016, as amended by legislative decree no. 56/2017 and law 96/2017 2 the public procurement code in its first version of 2006 implements the eu directives 2004/18/ec and 2004/17/ec; the second and present version of the code, of 2016, transposes the eu directives 2014/23/ue, 2014/24/ue and 2014/25/ue. elisa rebessi 43 decisions, and turin, with 10% of acceptance decisions. partially accepted cases, namely cases in which one instance is accepted, while the others are rejected or declared not admissible, amount to 16% in milan, 10% in rome and 6% in turin. two interesting features that emerge from data are the apparently low number of litigations in the city of turin, compared to rome and milan, and the relatively high rate of acceptance decisions in the municipality of rome. figure 1. distributions of judicial decisions on the awarding of public contracts for type of outcome, by municipality (2006-2018). to compare the scope of litigation, the number of administrative disputes is related to the amount of resources that the municipalities planned to spend on public works between 2006 and 2018. the code of public contracts requires the municipalities to publish the tri-annual plan for the commitment of public works with an estimated value equal to or greater than 10 thousand euro (from 2006).3 the total funds that the three cities planned to spend on public works between 2006 and 2018 are represented in figure 2. data show that the three cities present different levels of investment. according to the data provided by the municipalities, the city of turin presents a considerably lower level of planned investment in public works throughout the period considered: the yearly average value of planned funds for public works amounts to 161 million euro and the highest value observed, in 2009, does not reach half a billion euro. on the contrary, the total volume of funds is comparable in milan and rome, where, except for a few peaks, it is rarely lower than 1 billion and presents a yearly average value of 1.3 billion in the city of milan and of 1.5 billion in the city of rome respectively. it is 3 information on total planned funds for the commitment of public works are available on the official websites of the three municipalities in the section: ‘amministrazione trasparente’, ‘calls for tenders and contracts’, and on osservatorio regionale contratti pubblici of lombardy region and osservatorio dei contratti pubblici of lazio region. unexpected consequences of the implementation of the code of public contracts 44 reasonable to suppose that, in absolute terms, the lower number of litigations observed in turin can be due to the lower resources tendered for public works. hence, if we take into account the total planned resources, the number of decisions in turin is not lower than in the other municipalities. figure 2. total planned resources for public works (billion euro) in the three municipalities, by year source: personal elaboration of data from osservatorio contratti pubblici regione lombardia; osservatorio dei contratti pubblici regione lazio (sitarl); official websites of the municipalities of milan, rome and turin, sections ‘amministrazione trasparente’, ‘calls for tenders and contracts’ (‘bandi di gara e contratti’). 4. competitiveness of the economic environment the market of public procurement has a consistent local dimension and local firms are often the largest participants in the auctions (moretti and valbonesi 2015; coviello and gagliarducci 2010). the independent variable, the potential for third-party challenges, is approximated by measures of numerosity and competitiveness of the firms that operate in the main sectors affected by the public procurement market (manufacturing industry and service sector) in the regions to which the municipalities belong (regions of lombardy, piedmont and lazio). in addition, more comprehensive indicators of competitiveness of the firms, together with measures of the macro-economic context, are considered for the provinces to which the municipalities belong (provinces of milan, turin and rome). regional data come from the italian national statistics office (istat) database on firms’ economic indicators. data include information about firms’ local units, turnover, value added at factor cost, personnel costs, wages and salaries, gross investment in elisa rebessi 45 tangible goods, persons employed, and number of employees4. all economic indicators show that firms in the manufacturing sector are more numerous and competitive in the lombardy region. considering the most relevant indicators, the average number of local units in lombardy between 2008-2015 (equal to 94,070) is almost three times the number of local units in piedmont (35,787) and almost four times the number of local units in lazio (24,038). firms in lombardy are significantly more numerous also in the service sector5. manufacturing firms seem more competitive in piedmont than in lazio, while the same does not apply in the service sector, where the situation is reversed. in both the manufacturing and services sectors, lombardy presents more numerous and competitive firms. provincial data on competitivity of the firms and on macro-economic contexts are provided by ciccarelli (2006) who ranks the italian provinces according to a series of indicators6. the province of milan is in first place, followed by rome in 26th place and turin in 54th place as regards the competitiveness of local firms. the province of milan is in 6th place, followed by rome in 39th place and turin in 41st place as regards the competitiveness of the macro-economic context. all measures highlight that the municipality of milan belongs to a more competitive economic environment, in which firms are more numerous and efficient compared to turin and rome. since there is a larger number of economic operators in the market of public procurement and the risk of potential challenges increases, i expect that the municipality of milan uses less discretion in the awarding procedures in order to prevent litigation. on the contrary, given the lower number of economic operators in the market of public procurement and the lower risk of potential challenges, i expect that the administrations of turin and rome tend to use more discretion in their procedures. 5. analysis of the accepting decisions for the awarding of public contracts the analysis of the economic environment outlines two contexts: one more competitive, in which the municipality of milan is embedded, and where the public procurement market potentially involves more economic operators; the other less competitive, which concerns the municipalities of turin and rome, and that potentially involves fewer 4 firms are classified according to the economic classification ateco. letter c defines the manufacturing industry, letters i, j, n, m, q, r, and s define the service sector. data on the manufacturing industry are available between 2008 and 2015; data on the service sector are available between 2008 and 2014. 5 lombardy has on average more than twice the number of local units in the accommodation and food services sector (letter i, ateco) (46,393) compared to piedmont (21,620), and lombardy’s firms are rather more numerous than lazio’s firms in the sector (29,730). the same applies to information and communication services (letter j, ateco), where lombardy presents 25,971 local units, against 14,882 units in lazio and 8,242 units in piedmont. in healthcare and social assistance services (letter q, ateco), local units are on average 50,745 in lombardy, with 35,490 in lazio and 20,371 in piedmont. 6 the competitiveness of local firms is measured by indicators of the firms’ natality/mortality, presence of advanced manufacturing, general industry productivity, average dimension of local units, rate of corporate firms, failure rates, and cross-territorial dissemination. the competitiveness of macro-economic contexts is measured with indicators of value added per capita, number of employees out of total population and working age population, information on trade credit usage, solvency ratio of firms, firms’ propensity to export. unexpected consequences of the implementation of the code of public contracts 46 economic operators. i expect that the judicial decisions reveal a more rigid (less discretional) use of the tendering procedures in the first context, where challengers of the contracts are potentially more, and a more discretional use of tendering procedures in the second context, where challengers are potentially fewer. by reviewing the content of the judicial decisions, i expect to find that there is a less discretional and more rigid use of tendering procedures in the first context, where challengers of the contracts are potentially more numerous, and thus where competitiveness over public procurement is higher. conversely, i expect that the analysis of the judicial decisions in the less competitive contexts will show that the use of discretion in tendering procedures is higher. the analysis of judicial decisions for the awarding of public contracts in the three municipalities seems to confirm such expectations. the analysis of the 21 accepting decisions against the municipality of milan reveals a rather homogeneous content of litigations. indeed, 19 decisions concern cases where the applicants question their own exclusion, while the legitimacy of the choice of the contractor is contested in two decisions. of those 19 decisions in which applicants question their own exclusion, in 14 cases the applicants claim that the contracting authority has implemented the code too rigidly, in particular regarding the assessment of their moral and contributory requirements. this is the case for decisions 1314/2012, 1578/2012 and 2985/2012 where the applicants claim they were unfairly excluded from the tender, since the administration acknowledged irregularities in their tax and wage compliance certificate (durc), but without further assessing the real gravity of their social security infringements. in decisions 4842/2009 and 4843/2009, applicants claim that the administration decided on their exclusion because of their false declarations made in previous tender procedures, but without further investigating their position through the consultation of the register of public works observatory. in decisions 249/2018 and 250/2018, applicants claim that the administration interpreted too rigidly the provision of the code that provides for the exclusion of economic operators who have been convicted by definitive judgment of certain offences (in this case, the violations of norms on safety and health at work), since the offences were committed by a subject with a marginal role in the company (a member of the board of auditors) and in the capacity of legal representative of another firm7. five decisions contest the assessment by the administration of cartel formation: the applicants contend that the mere presence of a family relationship is unfit to signal cartel formation (289/2013, 444/2013, 502/2013), or, by referring to the jurisprudence of the council of state, that the elements considered by the contracting authority are insufficient to signal cartel formation (decisions 844/2015, 845/2015). a common feature emerging from decisions against the administration of milan is the unwillingness of the contracting authority to assess deeper, contextual evaluations of the cases when certain irregularities have occurred. in particular, when there are signals that violations of the code such as lack of moral requirements, or contributory negligence have taken place, the contracting authority reacts by limiting its own discretionary power and does not take responsibility for further investigations into the 7 on similar cases, the national anti-corruption authority (anac) and the supreme administrative court, the council of state, have expressed contrasting opinions. in the above-mentioned decisions, the tar of lombardy confirmed council of state jurisprudence against the interpretation of anac. elisa rebessi 47 operators. quite unexpectedly, the rigid assessment of moral and contributory requirements is generating litigation and is often the cause of the milan administration’s defeat. this outcome reveals how the assessment of participatory requirements presents several problems in practice. in particular, the analysis of accepting decisions shows that the contracting authorities can receive documents which are not fully updated and may fail to assess the most recent changes in the status of the economic operators. in this respect, a potential weakness of the code is that it assigns the responsibility for assessing the economic operators’ requirements not to an independent authority as is common in other regulatory frameworks (gilardi 2005), but to the same contracting authorities. conversely, the analysis of the accepting decisions in the municipalities of rome (45 decisions) and turin (5 decisions) reveals a more heterogeneous litigation, quite different from that against the administration of milan. in the municipality of rome, a first group of 8 decisions reflects administrative inertia and other administrative errors. this is, for instance, the case of decision 12400/2015, where the administration did not finalize the tendering procedure, nor did they conclude the agreement, and decisions 5336/2006 and 5337/2006, where the call did not clearly state the deadlines for participating in the procurement procedure. a second group of 29 decisions in the municipality of rome and the 4 decisions in the municipality of turin reflect an improper use of discretionary powers. this is, for instance, the case of: decision 2469/2008, where the administration of rome introduced new weighting criteria after the bids were already opened; decisions 7326/2014 against the municipality of rome, where the bids were not opened in public; decisions 2573/2011, 10313/2015 against the municipality of rome and 2300/2006 against the administration of turin where the weighting criteria used by the administration were judged unclear or applied inadequately; decisions 5607/2009, 122/2016, 1429/2017 against the municipality of rome and 155/2016 against the municipality of turin, which outline that the administrations did not comply with the principles of transparency and public access required by the tender-opening sessions; decisions 12348/2008, 7716/2009, 3766/2011, 2217/2014 against the administration of rome and decisions 1119/2014 and 1226/2017 against the municipality of turin, which ascertain misuse of powers and incoherence of the administrative action, since the tenders were awarded to operators that lacked the requirements; decisions 1969/2016, 1505/2018 against the municipality of rome and 160/2008 against the municipality of turin, which state that abnormally low bids were wrongly included. remaining decisions against the municipality of rome concern claims for damages (1), assessment of cartel formation (2), real estate procurement (2), execution of the judicial decisions (2), and revocation decision (2). most of the decisions against the municipality of rome concern negotiated procedures. for instance, in decision 5607/2009 the administration states that precisely because it was following a procedure below the eu thresholds, it did not expect that the formal procedures of the code, such as opening the bids in public, had to be applied. similarly, in decision 6839/2013, where an economic operator contested the admission of another participant in the tender, the administration declared that the contract was divided into two lots precisely so as not to incur in the above threshold legislation. in decision n. 1873/2016, the administration, which opted for a negotiated procedure for urgency reasons, interpreted the procedure too creatively, imposing excessively short time-limits on participants in order to apply. the analysis of litigation shows unexpected consequences of the implementation of the code of public contracts 48 that in implementing public contract legislation, the administrations of rome and turin tend to use more discretional procedures and often the use of discretion is considered illegitimate by the administrative judge. 4. conclusions this paper analyses the implementation of the code of public contracts in three italian cities: milan, turin and rome, adopting a theoretical framework which states that public contracts are designed strategically, by rational actors concerned with reducing the risk of litigation before the administrative courts. the local administrations may design public contract awarding procedures using more or less discretion, according to the likelihood of receiving legal challenges from third parties. by capturing potential for thirdparty challenges using measures of competitiveness of the economic environment in which municipalities are located, the paper identifies two contexts: one more competitive, where potential challenges from the economic competitors are expected to be higher, the other less competitive, where the potential for third-party challenges is expected to be lower. the municipality of milan belongs to the first context; the municipalities of rome and turin to the second. the analysis of judicial proceedings for the awarding of public contracts confirms that the administration of milan, which belongs to the first context, tends to use more rigid (less discretional) procedures. conversely, the administrations of rome and turin, which belong to the second context, tend to use more discretional procedures, and often the use of discretion is judged illegitimate by the administrative judge. in this respect, this paper shows that the italian municipalities also act strategically when they implement policies and, as positive political theory suggests, the interactions with other actors and interests can generate unexpected consequences. surprisingly, the analysis of litigation reveals that the rigid implementation of the code can also be the cause of defeat for the administrations. this outcome is, however, related to a specific and potentially controversial aspect of the code, which is the attribution of the responsibility for the control of moral and contributory requirements of the firms to the same local contracting authorities. it is reasonable to argue that such responsibility should be delegated to an independent body, not directly involved in the awarding procedures. references baltrunaite, audinga, giorgiantonio, cristina, mocetti, sauro and orlando, tommaso (2018) discretion and supplier selection in public procurement. bank of italy temi di 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(2016) public and social services in europe from public and municipal to private sector provision, london: palgrave macmillan microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 28-32. state building and nationalism: the lesson of pietro grilli di cortona giampiero cama university of genoa introduction the related development of states and nationalism in europe was one of pietro grilli’s several fields of research. also in this area of interest he showed his peculiar style, especially a peculiar ability to combine theoretical and empirical analysis and a skilful use of the historical comparative method. pietro addresses this issue mainly in a very interesting and seminal book, stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in europa (il mulino, 2003), where we can find a remarkable and exhaustive longitudinal analysis of the birth and evolution of states and nations in our continent. in this work he shows, as usual for him, his skill to organize different and complex variables in clear and effective conceptual and theoretical frameworks. in my tribute to a dear friend and to a prestigious scholar i will try to illustrate some relevant implications of this specific contribution. firstly, i think that the conceptual maps and the hypothesis used to explain different routes of state and nation development in europe could be successfully employed in the study of non-european countries. secondly, many theoretical insights contained in the book could be useful in order to address and understand some relevant issues of the contemporary world: the outbreak and solution of ethnic and civil wars, the uprising of neo-nationalism in western countries, the problematic relationship between democracy and nationalism. some of these topics will be discussed in the following lines. the conceptual and theoretical framework before illustrating the theoretical framework, it should be specified that there are two types of nationalism: state nationalism (or nationalism of majorities) and nationalism of minorities. the first one is characterised by states willing to create a single and homogeneous nation, based on common identity. this goal needs progressive reduction of cultural and linguistic differences (the path followed by france). the book’s focus, however, is on the nationalism of minorities, that holds out against centralisation and assimilation processes put forward by political centres. the latter is generated especially by stateless nations, that aspire to get political sovereignty or, at least, some form of self-rule. this type of nationalism is important because, as we will see later, it seems not doomed to decline in the contemporary world, but, instead, to transform its features, adapting to evolving circumstances. the book singles out the set of variables (related to each other) – the first two bringing together the principal independent variables, the third the intervener variables – that have variously shaped the evolution of state and nationalism in europe. in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 29 the first set concerns the state building configuration. in this regard pietro underlines the timing of state building along with the strength and precocity of nation building; and the type of relationship between centre and periphery. both variables, then, are connected to different models of state building: states that originate from a centralistic process, following a top-down project (centralistic model) and states arising as a result of voluntary agreements among different political communities (federal model). the centralistic model is less inclined to recognise and accept internal differences, while the federal model is ready to arrange them through institutional compromises. the relation between model of state-building and nationalism is not linear, but, nevertheless, precocious federal states are assumed, more likely, to limit nationalism and successfully defuse domestic conflicts. the second set pertains the sequences between state-building and nation-building. when state-building precedes nation-building and are both chronologically close, national mobilisation is supposed to decrease in number and frequency. the intervener variables that can modify, deviate and diversify the effect of the dependent ones are three. the first intervener variable refers to the international system. even when international events seem to be favourable, nationalist movements have to achieve a sufficient level of legitimacy that enable them to get consensus or, at least, not hostility from great powers. the second intervener variables relate to the emergence of mass politics and democracy. because of them, nationalism becomes a mass ideology, it undergoes a radicalisation process and amplifies its mobilising thrust. democratisation, moreover, transforms nationalisms conveying them toward party politics and giving them new opportunities of political participation and ideological expression. the third intervener variable, lastly, is the influence of other cleavages. when they overlap (or cross-cut), territorial cleavages can amplify (or mitigate) the politicisation and mobilisation of the nationalism of minorities. this variable, that refers to the rokkan works, explains why simple linguistic and ethnic differences are not sufficient to trigger a conflict. religious rivalries and economic antagonisms often have a decisive role depending on whether they were overlapping or cross-cutting with regard to ethnic-linguistic conflicts. in summary, the analysis of the complex relations between state and nation-building clearly shows as nationalism has exerted a double pressure towards states. on the one hand, it has been a powerful factor of state-building, but, on the other hand, it has contributed many times to dismantle and break up long-standing experiences of unified states, with volatile combinations of disruptive and constructive effects. civil war, ethnic-religious conflicts and terrorism: the relevance of this theoretical framework we believe that the contribution of this book could be appropriate in order to better understand some of the problems that are plaguing our time, particularly the spread in contemporary world of civil wars caused by ethnic and religious conflicts and the proliferation of terrorism. the conceptual map and the set of hypotheses suggested by pietro grilli can help us to clarify the origin and development of various conflicts that characterise many pluralistic states today, especially in african and asian countries. a large number of non-european countries, indeed, are an example, on the one hand, of countries without coincidence between state and nation (that is, housing pluralistic cama, state building and nationalism 30 societies), and, on the other hand, of stateless nations (like kurdish and palestinian people). in both cases the european history – illustrated in the book with abundance of empirical examples and analytical acuteness – has often anticipated problems and issues successively faced by the rest of the world. the cases of non-coincidence between state and nation, for instance, are subdivided by pietro into various subtypes (in their turn diversified on the base of other institutional and socio-economic details), that could be used to understand many situations characterising our day. the first one is the “predominant” model, in which a stronger nation has been the driving force of state-building, while other nations have endured, or even opposed to, this process (a potential source of future troubles). the second one is a sort of “equal model” where state-building is led by diverse nations, without the domain of any of them. this route usually generates multinational states, resulting from a compromise based on institutional features able to mutually ensure different social identities. in these cases the success (or, vice versa, the failure) of peaceful coexistence is only measurable in the long-term and relies on more specific, and often complex, set of factors well illustrated in the book. the third sub-type includes cases in which no coincidence between state and nation is due to a state that contains only part of the nation that carried it out. this situation can provoke a sort of “step by step” state-building, sometimes doomed to remain at length unfinished or prolonged. this, in turn, is supposed to stir up waves of mobilisation aiming at completing the state-building process and to bring about, obviously, political tension with neighbouring countries. equally interesting is the manner in which the cases of stateless nations are examined, one the most important determinants of ongoing political instability. firstly, in this regard, he distinguishes, on one side, region-nations striving for founding their own states and, on the other side, region-nations aiming only to escape from unwanted sovereignty (mainly to unify with kinship states). the implication arising from the two situations in terms of international relations can be, of course, very different. secondly, we can find a helpful enumeration of elements that could cause success or failure of stateless nations’ claims: intensity of political mobilisation (that can be weakened by socio-economic conditions or by migratory phenomena); impact of religion, when it supports resistance of peripheries and preservation of their traditions and identities; coexistence in the same territory of more opposing nations, a factor that makes peaceful solutions of antagonistic aspirations particularly difficult; availability (or not) and desirability (or not) of alternative solutions to remain in the hosting state. one final element is not related to domestic politics, but to the international system. in particular, he underlines the geo-political location of region-nations and, above all, the possible existence of a foreign country taking up the task of supporting and safeguarding interests and goals of a minority nation. also the general conditions of the international system are relevant, especially when it faces a transitional process in the balance of power, a situation that creates a window of opportunity for new political settings. the problematic links between nationalism and democracy the long and rich experiences in european history also illustrate the complex relation between nationalism and democracy. in his analysis pietro grilli highlights the concurrent presence of areas of contiguity and antagonism in this respect, helping us to in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 31 better understand and address many current political troubles. he treats democratic regimes both as independent and dependent variables. in the first case, he investigates the role of democracy in conflict prevention and solution. in this regard, the relation is not linear. liberalisation and democratisation are not ever the best way to avoid the outbreak of nationalistic conflicts. sometimes, on the contrary, they create more problems than they solve. claims for autonomy and collective rights, indeed, can provoke crises in the original polities and even their fragmentation, with risks for democracy itself. the european experience teaches us that when state and nation-building successfully anticipate democratisation, ethnic and national conflicts are less likely. when they are incomplete or weak, on the contrary, democratisation can probably trigger strong nationalist mobilisation. democracy can be evaluated, moreover, on the ability to manage and solve already existing nationalistic cleavages. in order to clarify this issue pietro identifies three configurations: states with consolidated democracies, states that have undergone regime instability (with alternation between democracy and authoritarian rule), and states suffering from discontinuity (following the breaking of their unity). the empirical analysis shows that in consolidated democracies nationalistic mobilisations achieve concrete results that, in the end, make the mitigation of political tensions easier. authoritarian regimes, instead, limit themselves to coercively freeze cleavages (often favouring a single ethnic or linguistic group), paving the way for future radicalisation of conflicts. other interesting cases are those in which, like in many areas of crisis today, the processes of democratisation and state-building have been concurrent and overlapping. these contexts are supposed to generate a sense of insecurity among ethnic and linguistic groups, that, in turn, jeopardise their pacific coexistence. even if democracies encourage political élites to pursue negotiated solutions and institutional compromises, the book underlines, however, that there is no lack of important exceptions, such as the cases in which (like northern ireland and other european countries) a minority group feels threatened by groups that could take on predominance in the near future. in these circumstances (like others pointed out in the work), therefore, also democracies encounter serious difficulties to peacefully settle nationalistic disputes. democracy has been considered by pietro as a dependent variable as well. like other scholars he highlights the problematic relation between this type of regime and ethnically divided societies. in particular, he contends that it is impossible to consolidate democracy without first setting a negotiated and consensual solution of state-building process, further evidence that nationalistic conflicts are the most difficult to handle also for democratic regimes. the lesson of method this book, like many other works, illustrates the peculiar approach of pietro to his fields of research. in general, he was very close to the “classic tradition” of political science, that of the great masters of the discipline, from weber to rokkan, etc. from them he took up the taste for wide-ranging studies and for comparative analysis. within this framework he shows, moreover, specific and remarkable skills. above all a peculiar attitude to manage complex sets of variables, without losing analytical clarity. in this way, he was able to elaborate useful systems of classification and cama, state building and nationalism 32 insightful middle-range theories for every topic he addressed. he was not very inclined to find out a general theory concerning his principal areas of interest, preferring instead a configurative approach, more appropriate, in his view, to the complexity and fluidity of political phenomena. that does not mean the abandoning of any theoretical ambition. he always tried, through his typology and his middle-range hypotheses, to make the apparently chaotic flow of political events intelligible. finally, he had another peculiar ability, that to make large cross-country comparative analysis using mainly a qualitative approach. at a time when cross-country studies are mostly carried out through quantitative approach, this aspect is in my opinion appreciable. pietro did not dislike quantitative methods, on the contrary he was interested in them and curious about their use in comparative politics. but his works, like that examined in this text, proves the usefulness of this traditional approach and its complementarity with the new ones. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_1_cladi_locatelli_29-41.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 1, may 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 1, 29-41. contact author: lorenzo cladi, university of plymouth. e-mail address: lorenzo.cladi@plymouth.ac.uk the me too syndrome reloaded: change and continuity in italian relations with france and germany after brexit lorenzo cladi university of plymouth andrea locatelli università cattolica di milano abstract the 2016 united kingdom european union membership referendum altered the european balance of power, leaving france and germany as the only major powers in the eu. as a would-be peer within eu institutions, italy was particularly exposed by this situation and adapted its foreign policy accordingly. noting that italy has displayed a mix of cooperation and conflict with france and germany, our article seeks to answer why this has been the case. focusing on the impact of party politics on foreign policy, we argue that italian foreign policy resulted from the political synthesis developed by each of the italian cabinets ruling since 2016. the political synthesis depended, in turn, on the interplay between party ideology (proor anti-eu) and coalition dynamics. a cooperative foreign policy is then related to ideologically divided coalitions and those sharing a pro-eu ideology. on the contrary, an oppositional foreign policy depended on homogeneous, anti-eu coalitions. 1. introduction ne of the most debated issues among scholars of italian foreign policy is to make sense of italy’s long-term trends amidst short-term variations. this problem has been evident since the end of the cold war, with the demise of the so-called ‘first republic’ and the consequential rise of a (sort of) bipolar political system. as witnessed most clearly in momentous times, like the 2003 war in iraq or the 2007 mission in lebanon, italian foreign policy has displayed significant alterations due to the succession to power of either centre-left or centre-right coalitions (andreatta 2008). along with fluctuations, however, italian foreign policy has shown remarkable continuities over the past three decades. some of these continuities have dragged on from the long decades of the cold war. successive italian governments, in fact, followed atlanticist and europeanist orientations in foreign policy. after the end of the cold war, successive governmental coalitions began to swing between an atlanticist and europeanist orientation in the pursuit of a foreign policy course. to put it like cladi and webber (2011: 216-17), a lack of consensus on foreign policy has emerged between the centre-left and centre-right coalitions […] the resulting controversies have constituted a problem in that successive governments have found it difficult to pursue a pragmatic o the me too syndrome reloaded 30 foreign policy programme and to define the country’s long-term security interests. a second, related, point of contention – one that touches not just upon students of italian politics, but ir scholars at large – relates to the relative weight of systemic and domestic factors in forging the conduct of foreign policy. this is also a long-standing issue in the political science literature, and one that has attracted significant attention over time (see among others milner 1997 and fearon 1998). in the case of italy, this is not just a theoretical conundrum but also an empirical problem, given the peculiar features of the domestic political system (notably, a fragmented party system, whose main outcome is government instability). moreover, the concomitant change in the early 1990s of the structure of the international system, along with the rise of the ‘second republic’, has made it difficult to identify their distinct causal effects. for this reason, any attempt to explain italian foreign policy in the long term needs to be eclectic to a certain extent (cladi and locatelli 2019), i.e., to blend variables at both levels of analysis. in this article, we aim to narrow down our dependent variable to italy’s relations with france and germany within the common security and defence policy (csdp) framework since the brexit referendum. we opt for this limited fraction of italian foreign policy and in such a limited span of time for a variety of reasons. firstly, france and germany are italy’s main (would-be) peers in the european union (eu) following brexit; rome’s approach to paris and berlin can then be taken as a proxy for its europeanism. secondly, since the 2016 united kingdom european union membership referendum, diplomatic relations between rome and paris have experienced nothing less than a political rollercoaster (darnis 2019); it is therefore a most evident case of foreign policy variation which needs to be explained. thirdly, very few studies have analysed the impact of brexit on eu member states’ foreign policy so far – none in fact, to the best of our knowledge, has paid attention explicitly to the italian case (although we tried to fill this vacuum in cladi and locatelli 2020). therefore, after brexit, italy displayed a mix of cooperation and conflict with its powerful european partners. our questions, simply put, are: why is this so? what explains such variation? how should we account for both cooperation and tension? in order to tackle this issue, we first provide a concise overview of the main features of italy’s foreign policy. we then focus on the impact of party politics on foreign policy from a theoretical perspective, and we assess the interplay of structural and domestic factors in the case of italy’s relations with france and germany. finally, in the concluding section we wrap up our argument. 2. the pillars of italian foreign policy foreign policy issues are rarely discussed during electoral campaigns. the march 2018 elections were no exception as the main political forces did not express a coherent foreign policy strategy (tocci 2018). yet, foreign policy can be very important and in italy foreign policy decisions can be a factor contributing to the resignation of a prime minister. this happened, for instance, when prime minister romano prodi resigned in february 2007, after losing a vote of confidence in the senate on the proposal to keep troops in afghanistan (bbc 2007). foreign policy decisions can bring down governments and they can also become ways to trumpet new courses. cladi and locatelli 31 nevertheless, italy has traditionally articulated its foreign policy priorities around three pillars: europe, the transatlantic partnership and the mediterranean. the ‘europe’ pillar involves italy being in favour of the process of european integration. backing the process of european integration allowed italy to pursue three aims: firstly, to secure the country’s newly formed democratic institutions after world war ii; secondly, to ensure further and continuous economic growth (bindi 2008), and thirdly, to make italy’s voice be heard in the international community. as far as the transatlantic pillar is concerned, italy relies on the us as a guarantor of security. membership of nato allowed italy to benefit from protection against the soviet threat during the cold war and to keep its defence spending at a minimum. in the aftermath of the cold war, italy continued to benefit from membership of nato but it began to invest more in defence and a lot in terms of political capital and goodwill in nato initiatives such as the nato-russia founding act of 1997 and the nato-russia council, established in 2002 at pratica di mare (stefanini 2014). finally, the mediterranean is also a very important pillar of italian foreign policy. whilst italy is undeniably a mediterranean country, the mediterranean’s importance as a foreign policy circle has been steadily increasing over the past decades and it came to include the balkans during the 1990s (carbone 2007). whilst italy had limited independence to develop its own foreign policy during the cold war, the dissolution of the ussr presented italy with challenges as well as opportunities. on the one hand, italy had the opportunity to pursue a pro-active foreign policy course (tercovich 2017; carati and locatelli 2017). on the other hand, italy was uniquely exposed to a wide array of security threats due to its proximity to the balkans, where the unravelling of former yugoslavia led to subsequent civil wars during the 1990s (dyrstad 2012). italian governments during the 1990s had to realise that membership of organisations such as the eu, nato and the un could no longer provide a low cost security option or guarantee of economic growth (andreatta 2001). nevertheless, these organizations provided a unique opportunity for italy to raise its profile on the international stage, as it could now seek to play a more influential role in contributing to their adaptation and transformation. subsequently, such opportunities came, for instance, as italy took part in the reform debate of the united nations security council, proposing, in particular, to create ten new permanent but shared sc seats to be assigned to twenty countries on the basis of certain criteria (salleo and pirozzi 2008). in terms of conflict resolution, italy joined the us, russia, france, great britain and germany to establish the contact group in 1994, with the purpose of coordinating crisis management efforts in bosnia-herzegovina and subsequently in kosovo (schwegmann 2000). as opportunities to make the most of membership of international organisations were not lacking, it is no wonder that successive centre-left and centre-right coalitions which alternated in power were in agreement that italy should remain committed to the eu and nato (alcaro 2010). the three circles of europeanism, atlanticism and the mediterranean would continue to influence the broad trajectory of italian foreign policy (croci 2008). however, the multitude of challenges which have arisen in recent years have exposed the need for italian governments to invest more and more resources to tackle them. the challenges and their diverse nature have also exposed the lack of cooperation between states, contributing to a waning of the importance of international institutions. italian governments have been called on to provide a response to the refugee the me too syndrome reloaded 32 crisis, to a resurgent russia, the syrian civil war and, lately, to the coronavirus. such challenges highlight the unique mix between inter-state, intra-state and transnational security threats, calling for an immediate response and long-term commitment to contain them. for a country such as italy, containing such threats presents a unique set of challenges. firstly, no matter how active a foreign policy course italy pursues, it is still vulnerable. secondly, italy was badly hit by the 2008 economic recession, with italian governments on both sides of the political spectrum being unable to provide a solution (di quirico 2010). thirdly, italy had to embark on a series of reforms to make sure it could remain engaged in areas of concern such as the mediterranean whilst continuing to make good its commitments to ongoing military operations (ronzitti 2016; dessi and olmastroni 2017). at the same time, italy needed to carefully manage the relationship with its two european partners, france and germany. this is an ongoing problem, as we will see. disagreements have arisen, and they shape the extent to which cooperation can be possible and far-reaching. most notably, despite the fact that italy and france share common interests in ending the libyan civil war, promoting stability in north africa and the sahel as well as managing the refugee crisis, their positions on these issues have often differed. italy’s relationship with germany was made more difficult by the dispute following the eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2012. 3. explaining foreign policy change: the role of parties and government coalitions these themes opened up opportunities for a theoretical treatment of italian foreign policy. drawing from different theoretical streams, several authors have attempted to account for continuity and variation in italian foreign policy. among others, lorenzo cladi and mark webber (2011) adopted a neo-classical realist perspective to assess the extent to which variables such as elite perception of the distribution of power and domestic instability played a role in explaining the variation in the ways in which successive governmental coalitions responded to the different pressures of the post-cold war international system. writing from a structural realist perspective, luca ratti (2012) argued that there was continuity in the ways in which italian foreign policy was conducted in the aftermath of the cold war, still looking for a balance between the tendency to bandwagon with the united states and the search for regional autonomy. on the other hand, taking their distance from the realist view, authors like paolo rosa (2014), fabrizio coticchia (2014) and piero ignazi et al. (2012) have focused on italy’s strategic culture (or lack thereof). finally, moving beyond mainstream theory, elisabetta brighi’s (2015) contribution analysed italian foreign policy comprehensively by drawing on the strategic relational model, which pays more attention to agency in conceptualizing foreign policy as dialectic rather than outcome (see also hyde-price 2013). differently from previous attempts, here we do not aim to elaborate or adopt a general theory of foreign policy. we will rather focus our attention on a narrower research variable – i.e., the weight of party politics on italy’s relations with france and germany. in doing so, we borrow from an established literature which generally dates back to the debate on the second level of analysis (waltz 1967). to be sure, we would not question cladi and locatelli 33 whether domestic politics matters – something that to a certain extent we believe is obvious and self-evident – but we will try to assess if, and to what extent, change in italian foreign policy can be attributed to variations in cabinet coalitions. in order to proceed in an orderly manner, we will first define our variables and, secondly, we will suggest our hypothesis. our dependent variable is italy’s behaviour vis-à-vis france and germany in the context of csdp after the brexit vote in june 2016. we take such a short span of time for our observation for a number of reasons: firstly, as we will see, due to government instability, italy has seen as many as four successive cabinets: renzi (2014-2016), gentiloni (20162018), conte i (2018-2019) and conte ii (2019-now). this allows us to observe significant variation in our independent variable. secondly, brexit has altered ‘the actor constellation and preference configuration around the brussels negotiating table’ (krotz and schield 2018, p. 1175): by shifting the regional distribution of power, brexit has forced most, if not all, eu member states to adjust accordingly. for italy, brexit meant losing a powerful ally to rely on (carbone et al. 2011) and as such, it amounts to nothing less than systemic pressure, to borrow waltz’s (1979) jargon. third, and partially related to this point, since 2016 france and germany have revamped their cooperation, both bilaterally and within the eu. to put it bluntly, they have launched a number of initiatives aimed at giving the eu new momentum and, perhaps most importantly, to consolidate their leadership within the eu (kempin and kunz 2017).1 subsequently, it is reasonable to expect that italy had to decide how to respond to the double challenge of a declining voice in the eu arena due to the loss of the uk, and the rising activism of the two main continental powers. we operationalize this variable in terms of available policy options to avoid the risk of irrelevance. in this connection, we assume that strategic adjustment vis-à-vis france and germany may take one of three forms: a) in a sort of balancing behaviour, one option could be to openly contrast the franco-german initiatives, with a view to thwarting their bid for leadership; b) an opposite option could be to bandwagon with the franco-german tandem, trying to open up the club to a third guest; c) the third alternative would be similar to the second one, but with a remarkable difference, i.e., to join arms with one of the two powers and exclude the other. simply put, in our analysis we expect that italian policy-makers follow at least one of these paths. our independent variable, as mentioned, takes party politics into account. of course, this term may imply a variety of different meanings (for an overview, see oktay and beasley 2017). in fact, the literature has investigated the difference between single-party and coalition cabinets in terms of (inter alia) war initiation (clare 2010), international commitments (oktay 2014) and extremity in foreign policy (beasley and kaarbo 2014; coticchia and davidson 2019). other scholars have focused on the role of junior partners within the coalition (vignoli, 2020), as well as the interaction between coalition dynamics and the foreign policy machinery (kaarbo 2012; oppermann, kaarbo and brummer 1 just to name the main initiatives undertaken since june 2016, both countries updated their security strategies; france also championed the idea of a european intervention initiative (eii), to be launched independently from the eu. most importantly, paris and berlin called for the advancement of csdp and permanent structured cooperation (pesco). finally, they increased bilateral cooperation in a series of meetings, like the one held in paris in july 2017 (soon after emanuel macron’s presidential victory) and aachen in january 2019 (krotz and schield 2018; kempin and kunz 2019). the me too syndrome reloaded 34 2017) and, most recently, on populist foreign policies (balfour et al. 2016; destradi and plageman 2019). the four governments under consideration relied on three different ruling coalitions. interestingly enough, two of them included populist parties. their different compositions deserve consideration: the renzi and gentiloni cabinets were supported by almost identical (grand) coalitions, which included as main partners their home party (partito democratico, pd), the centrist party scelta civica per l’italia (founded and led by former prime minister mario monti) and the centre-right party nuovo centro destra (ncd). although the pd was the heavyweight in the coalition, it had to negotiate with the ncd (later rebranded as alternativa popolare) to grasp a tiny majority over the opposition parties. the conte i cabinet, on the other hand, was supported by two main parties, the five star movement (m5s) and the league, in a more compact coalition, which to an extent was marked by a degree of ideological (i.e. populist) affinity. finally, the current conte ii government is supported by the m5s and the pd, plus matteo renzi’s own party italia viva, and the leftist party liberi e uguali. overall, these coalitions present striking differences both in terms of membership and ideological distance. as concerns the former, the grand coalitions supporting renzi and gentiloni included four parties to gain majority in both chambers of the parliament. differently from his predecessors, in his first cabinet conte was supported by a coalition of two, while in the current cabinet to have a majority in parliament he still needs four. however, the main difference relates to ideological orientation: the first two coalitions, although quite heterogeneous, saw an easy convergence towards a traditional – markedly pro-european – foreign policy course (lucarelli 2015; felsen 2018). the second coalition, as epitomized by the so-called ‘contract of government’ (contratto per il governo del cambiamento 2018), found a common denominator in a revisionist rhetoric (‘the government of change’) and a markedly oppositional political platform towards the eu. finally, the current coalition is marked by a deep ideological divide between the populist anti eu orientation of the m5s and the traditional pro-eu stance of the pd. summing up, we are left with three different configurations of cabinet coalitions: the first one features an ideologically homogeneous coalition, with a hegemonic party, plus three more crucial parties covering a wide section of the political spectrum (from centreright to centre-left). the second configuration is a two-party coalition, with one having the upper hand, and still no meaningful ideological divide in terms of foreign policy. the third configuration resembles the first one (still four parties with a dominant one), but is marked by a deep ideological division with respect to foreign policy orientation. we can now turn our hypothesis to how italian behaviour towards france and germany changed because of brexit. simply put, our argument is that italy’s behaviour towards france and germany depended on the political synthesis of the governmental coalition, which in turn is the result of the main party’s ideology and ideological homogeneity. more precisely, whilst the dominant party will try to enforce its own foreign policy vision, it will also need to negotiate with its coalition partners. therefore, in the absence of an ideological cleavage, the leading party will not have to concede much to the partners; however, in the event of other partners sharing opposing visions, a compromise must be found. for these reasons, we expect substantial continuity between renzi and gentiloni, cladi and locatelli 35 and change from gentiloni to conte as well as from conte i to conte ii. at first blush, a summary of our hypothesis is available in table 1. table 1. hypothesis on the impact of party ideology (pro-eu, or anti-eu), cabinet coalition, and italy’s behaviour towards france and germany independent variable: ideology of the leading party intervening variable: cabinet coalition dependent variable: italy’s behaviour towards france and germany pro-eu (renzi/gentiloni) ideologically homogeneous participate in franco-german initiatives anti-eu (conte i) ideologically homogeneous oppose franco-german initiatives mix of pro-eu anti-eu (conte ii) ideologically divided mix of participation and opposition 4. italy’s relations with france and germany after brexit as mentioned, within the eu context, the uk has been an important ally for italy. to put it bluntly, the weight of london in european institutions was perceived (and sometimes used) by rome as an asset to offset the all-too-evident prominence of paris and berlin. brexit, then, represented a double challenge for italian policymakers: not only did it undermine the achievements of the integration process, so potentially landing a fatal blow to the eu itself, but it also put the italian voice within the union at risk. following these considerations, the italian approach towards eu institutions and other member states was marked from the very beginning by a degree of cooperation and diplomatic activism. in chronological order, the first italian initiative dates back as early as august 2016 – i.e., just two months after the british vote and a few weeks in advance of the momentous bratislava summit. following an editorial authored by the then minister of foreign affairs paolo gentiloni and minister of defence roberta pinotti, the italian government officially called on other eu states to work on a series of initiatives aimed at pushing ahead the common security and defence policy (csdp). it is not possible to describe the details of the italian proposal; suffice to say that apart from some differences, the italian roadmap for furthering diplomatic and military cooperation displayed striking similarities to a parallel franco-german initiative. so, when european leaders met in bratislava in september 2016, they shared a broad consensus on which steps to undertake. in particular, as formalized in successive eu summits, eu leaders agreed to revamp pesco, a defence cooperation clause included in the 2007 lisbon treaty but never activated before (council of the eu 2017). so, while de facto a franco-german effort, pesco was made possible by the broader consensus it enjoyed. italy certainly contributed to selling the idea to other states, and probably helped paris and berlin frame the initiative in inclusive terms (marrone 2017). as evidence of the consideration enjoyed by rome in eu circles, france and germany invited italy (along with spain) to appear as co-signatories of the proposal at the eu summit in november 2017. the me too syndrome reloaded 36 italy’s involvement in pesco was not just a diplomatic move aimed at signalling its ambitions within the eu. quite the contrary, cognizant of its limited resources, italy found in pesco an opportunity to maximize its procurement capabilities and promote the italian defence technology industrial base (dtib) (marrone 2018). this is confirmed by the sheer number of defence projects launched so far within the pesco framework that include italy as a participating country: in the first batch (in the final days of the gentiloni government) italy was present in 15 projects out of 17 and took the lead in 4, while france participated in 8 and germany in 7 (marrone and sartori 2019). moreover, it is worth observing that the three countries are all present in 6 projects, an indicator of italy’s success in being taken as a worthy candidate for the leadership of the eu. of the three foreign policy options discussed in the previous paragraph, the diplomatic activism displayed since the summer of 2016 and the involvement in pesco seem to conform to the one suggested by our hypothesis: both renzi and gentiloni perceived the possibility of intruding on the franco-german tandem and turning it into a eu-wide triumvirate. these actions have been complemented with a well-known policy of presentialism, which led both prime ministers to portray themselves as honest brokers among eu major powers. for instance, at the end of august 2016, renzi organized a summit with his french and german counterparts on the tiny but highly symbolic ventotene island. similarly, gentiloni saw an opportunity to raise the italian status in a series of highprofile events, like the celebrations for the 60th anniversary of the rome treaties, which took place in the italian capital on 25 march 2017, and a couple of months later in the g7 summit held in taormina. ironically, the most evident effort to be treated as an equal by the two continental powers arrived too late: the draft of a quirinal treaty with france – a blueprint for future enhanced cooperation – was elaborated in the final days of gentiloni’s mandate, and could not be signed due to the opposition of gentiloni’s successor, giuseppe conte. as mentioned, the first conte cabinet was supported by the so-called yellow-green coalition (i.e. the m5s and matteo salvini’s the league). although the league was traditionally a right-wing party – something that can hardly be said for the m5s (mosca and tronconi 2019) – both parties shared a portion of their political platform due to their populist inspiration (see, among others balfour 2016; zulianello 2019, pp. 145-156). in particular, their rhetoric and ideology converged towards a radically more sceptical view of the eu and italy’s relations with european partners (verbeek and zaslove 2015; franzosi, marone, salvati 2015). euro-scepticism, combined with their populist attempt to portray themselves as a novelty in the italian political landscape, led to the specification in their ruling agreement of their ambition to reform eu policies (especially on migration and economic austerity) (contratto per il governo del cambiamento 2018, pp. 17, 26-28). coherently with the coalition’s political platform, the conte i government steered an impressive re-orientation of italian foreign policy towards its european partners, particularly france. in its few months of life, a number of disputes emerged between paris and rome that severely strained their diplomatic ties. obviously, tensions are an integral and deeply rooted part of the franco-italian relationship, so it should come as a surprise to no one if sometimes both states indulge in reciprocal finger pointing. however, what marked a significant departure from the past is the way these disputes were managed by cladi and locatelli 37 the government. in a nutshell, coalition leaders deliberately escalated tension with paris, with a view to increasing internal consensus. the lowest point was reached in february 2019, when france recalled the ambassador in rome due to the flamboyant declarations of some senior cabinet figures. but even before that, evidence of italian opposition to france came with the decision to drop out of the european intervention initiative (eii) – an extra-eu project aimed at developing an international rapid reaction force funded by a common budget and guided by a single doctrine. this initiative, championed by president macron a few months after his election, was met with favour (although half-heartedly) by gentiloni, who had agreed to participate. however, conte seemed suspicious of the initiative: apart from duplicating assets otherwise available as nato members, the main concern of the prime minister was to avoid the possibility of france gaining excessive influence in europe (marrone 2018, p. 7). thus, one may conclude that the heightened tension in relations with paris (and to a lesser extent with berlin) originated from the competition for consensus between the m5s and the league (darnis 2019, p. 4), but it is evident that such a strategy is also functional to curb the leadership of the franco-german tandem. after the league broke the coalition with the m5s, the conte ii government found an uneasy settlement with the pd. the empirical evidence available in the seven months since the conte ii government was sworn in makes it impossible to say a final word on its foreign policy course. for one thing, it is quite evident that the current approach to the eu and the allies has changed: even in times of hard negotiations with the commission and within the eurogroup on the controversial eurobonds, the current government’s approach has been at most one of negotiation, and not mere opposition. still, we recognise that the conte ii government is a counterfactual case study requiring further investigation as its stance towards the eu is fully revealed. 5. conclusions this article has tried to make sense of the variations which have characterised italian foreign policy towards france and germany since the 2016 brexit referendum. since then, three governmental coalitions have been in power and they differed in several respects. the main difference, in our analysis, relates to the proor anti-eu stance of the major party within the government coalition. secondly, as intervening variable, we observed whether this stance was shared or not by other government parties. in our argument, we tried to assess if and how government coalitions have an impact on foreign policy. following this logic, it should come as no surprise that there has been more variation than uniformity with respect to italy’s behaviour towards france and germany. whereas renzi and gentiloni sought to participate in franco-german initiatives, the first conte government decisively opposed and sought to thwart the influence of the franco-german tandem. whilst it is too early to tell in terms of the current conte ii cabinet’s relationship with france and germany, it is apparent that the approach has somewhat changed in favour of cooperation, thus resembling the attitude of renzi and gentiloni. in order to trace the causal link between government coalition and foreign policy, we added as an intervening variable the ideological homogeneity of the coalition: the political synthesis resulting from ideology and homogeneity gave rise to a unique foreign the me too syndrome reloaded 38 policy course. we found that each dominant party would seek to shape the foreign policy course in accordance with its ideological orientation but it would have to negotiate with its political partners. so, where coalition partners’ ideologies converged, the leading party did not need to concede much to its partners. conversely, where coalition partners’ ideologies differed, a compromise had to be found. this is true for pro-eu as well as eurosceptic parties: both the pd with renzi and gentiloni and the m5s with the conte i government could easily push their agendas, leading respectively to a cooperative and oppositional foreign policy towards france and germany; differently, while still the main coalition party under the conte ii government, the m5s had to come to terms with the pd, so forsaking its previous attitude. as mentioned, since the current government came into office just a few months ago, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive assessment of its 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(2019) anti-system parties. from parliamentary breakthrough to government, abingdon: routledge. microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 20-27. when political science and history meet. ‘legacies of the past and democracy’ in pietro grilli di cortona’s research orazio lanza university of catania he birth of a standing group on ‘history and political science’ was only approved and formalized on 5 june, 2015 during the last sisp executive board meeting, chaired by pietro grilli di cortona. its founding manifesto reminds us that, in italy, unlike other countries, meeting and confrontation between political science and historiography is still not a very widespread custom. in fact, ‘historical political science’ (‘politologia storica’ in the manifesto) is still considered a neglected area of research. in reality, the phenomena is not new; the complicated relationship between political science and history has interested many other countries and the distrust between disciplines is reciprocal. as far as modern political science and history is concerned, the success of the complex ‘movement’ called behavioralism (‘behavioral approach’) established between the 1930s and 1950s and centered in the usa, definitely had a fundamental role in this process. some decades ago, dahl pointed out that those mainly american scholars who were later called behaviorists or behavioralists: shared a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the achievements of conventional political science, particularly through historical, philosophical, and the descriptive-institutional approaches, and a belief that additional methods and approaches either existed or could be developed that would help to provide political science with empirical propositions and theories of a systematic sort, tested by closer, more direct and more rigorously controlled observations of political events (dahl 1961, 766). among the results of the introduction of this approach into the political science field, was a low sensitivity, if not a clear-cut oblivion, toward history. more than a discipline the ‘behavioral approach’ reject a method, used by historians, described as individualizing or idiographic, considered incompatible to the generalizing or nomothetic one used by political scientists. from hence, derived a new political science, whose original features had a strong inclination toward a-historicity (dahl 1961, 771) rather than anti-historicity (pasquino 1971, 13). the focus on the scarce compatibility of the two methods echoed in one of the first political science manuals, published in italy in the early 1970s (urbani 1970, 41-42). sartori himself, even though he considered history an immense deposit of experiences (but not of experiments) from which to draw, underlined how ‘historical control’ had an intrinsic weakness that limited its use in scientific analysis of politics (sartori 1979, 248-250). t in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 21 forgetting history is not the only limitation of behavioralism highlighted by those who gave the first account of its impact. pasquino, for example, in his introduction to another important political science text book, in vogue in the early 1970s, referring to dahl’s (1961) observations regarding behavioralism’s unsolved problems, saw how the question regarding observable behavior and its measurement/quantification had swayed many behaviorists to choose marginal investigation subjects and precipitous retreats into ‘methodologism’ and technicality. in other words, they retreated toward the opinion that adoption and constant improvement in specific techniques for detecting and interpreting political behavior was more important than scientist creativity and imagination (pasquino 1971, 20). however, as early as the 1960s and 1970s, the awareness of the limitations of behavioralism, the increase and widespread use of case-based comparative strategies, the development of approaches like historical institutionalism, encouraged even political scientists to revisit the question of the rapport between history and the social science, renewing interest for comparative-historical approaches and for systematic qualitative comparisons. in the united states, thanks also to seminal works such as barrington moore jr.’s social origins of dictatorship and democracy (1966) and the advent of approaches like the above mentioned neo-institutionalism, the academic climate changed so the apsa established a ‘politics and history’ section in 1989. in europe, where ‘historical political science’ has a rather significant tradition (just think, for example of max weber and otto hintze’s contributions), a mainspring towards revisiting the relationship between political science and history was provided by stein rokkan’s work, who, as we know, in attempting to understand and explain political development in western europe, turned his attention tenaciously to the weight of historical events. as morlino reminds us, italy instead, witnessed a sort of paradox. on the one hand, the difficult rebirth of political science after the second world war, made it almost mandatory to set discipline boundaries in respect to neighboring semantic domains (philosophy politics, constitutional law, history, sociology). furthermore, “…the most significant contributions came from the intermediate sectors themselves, midway between history and political science, between economics and political science, between sociology and political science” (morlino 1989, 5). the fact that an italian ‘history and political science’ standing group was instituted 26 years after the united states and the contents of its manifesto suggest that the historical political science tradition still needs to be constructed and that its difficult genesis has left a legacy that not even founding fathers like bobbio, leoni, and sartori were able to curb. when the historical political science tradition is developed in italy as well, we are sure that pietro grilli will be listed as one of its forerunners. as barbara pisciotta’s contribution in this issue reminds us, pietro grilli used history and long term, diachronic analysis as the underlying theme of his scientific contribution. obviously, he was not a lone pioneer; pietro grilli had a sound competence in political science methodology. it is not by mere chance that he authored a chapter on the subject in a political science textbook (grilli di cortona, lanza, pisciotta and germano 2016) used by various university courses. moreover, in a box on ‘history and social sciences’ he is noted in research work where he shows that the methodological boundaries between history and social sciences lanza, when political science and history meet 22 have not always been so clear-cut; how the use of the comparative method often unites the two disciplines and that striving to formulate general laws like those formulated for physics does not exclude that many social scientists are convinced that research -produced ‘laws’ often have ‘local’ characteristics. in other words, a spatio-temporally bounded application, often tends to fade (without annulling) the differences between social science and history, resizing behaviorist a-historical drives (ibid, 38). pietro grilli was fully aware of the unresolved academic controversies involving methods and approaches, used and usable in political science. he respected other people’s convictions, different from his own, but he did have his preferences, defending them passionately but without elbowing anyone else, never allowing himself to be swayed by fads. despite some extensive case studies, as barbara pisciotta points out, and diversity of topics, we see a second underlying theme in his constant recourse to comparative control, in his preference for qualitative analysis, in his attention to rigorous, accurate construction and treatment of concepts. finally, a third underlying aspect was seen when he had to choose research questions, facing gilpin’s dilemma, on explaining ‘trivial issues exactly’ or treating ‘important issues imprecisely’, he did not hesitate. since his graduation thesis in ‘dottrina dello stato’ on stalin and after stalin in the soviet union, he preferred the second path, often facing questions, treated very little by italian political science, like those relating to eastern european political systems, even when collecting data was difficult and empirical sources were in short supply. therefore, the choice of studying the role of legacies in european democratization processes after the second world war was the continuation of a path which pietro had already begun (see, for example, grilli di cortona 2009). curiosity regarding this subject was encouraged by the acknowledgement that a general democratization theory was – and still isnon-existent in political science (see in this issue the article by leonardo morlino). this is true, partly because it is rather difficult to report on a body of generalization processes which is distant both in time and in space. in the planning phase of petro grilli’s research, he tried to arrange the various factors that favor/influence the democratization boot processes and their outcomes, gathering them into two groups, not necessarily reciprocally exclusive: i.e. an international and an exquisitely national one. in addition, pietro grilli proposed a third group, the one labeled ‘old regime legacies’ which does not exclude the other two, assuming that some legacies were favorable and others contrary to democratization. so the working hypothesis for his research wanted explanations of differences in democratization outcomes, to pay particular attention to legacies that the past of each country transmitted to new political actors, thereby constraining their strategic choices and behavior. the legacies choice meant measuring up against one of the main ambitions of social sciences: to explain social change, implying that, however relevant it might be, it is difficult to create a ‘tabula rasa’ of the past; even the greatest social and political changes in the end, prove to be less fluid than they seem at first and finally – the past is never really the past at all, because it reappears again under many forms. from a theoretical-methodological point of view, attention on legacies enhances history and the role of historical inertia, recalling what was theorized by historical neoinstitutionalism, as it foresees the survival of norms and regulates institutions; taking into in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 23 consideration the role of routines, norms, procedures and what pre-existing organizational forms take in political processes (march and olsen 1989). therefore, the legacies theme links to two of the most well-known theoretical frameworks of path dependency (pearson 2000). this tries to explain continuities by theorizing that, once former choices have become institutionalized in organizations: rules/norms, agreements, and prerogatives, it seems difficult to modify them and the actors involved tend to conform, almost complying to inertia. this theory also underlines discontinuity, believing that the past does indeed exert influence, but not necessarily producing movement that goes towards the same direction. sometimes it causes totally opposite reactions, for example, fueling actors to break free from past constraints in any way they can. nevertheless, legacies have never been completely overlooked in the past by scholars of political change. tocqueville, for example (1856), picked up the connection between the outcomes of the french revolution and institutions, between processes and events dating back to the ancien régime, showing for the first time how the past that the revolution wanted to destroy (and surely destroyed in part) was not completely past and its weight and influence still continued to be felt. in addition, skocpol (1976, 309-310) notes that, regarding the revolution, “the old regime’s legacy modeled post-revolutionary differences directly and indirectly” and that that changes were also due to “certain structural models of former regimes” (ibid., 310). we have already mentioned barrington moore jr’s work. huntington (1991), who, in turn, reaffirmed that re-democratizations are more likely to succeed than democratizations because they are supported by a wealth of experience and a memory of the past, transmitted by institutions, collective actors and often by single political leaders. in recent decades, legacy studies of preceding authoritarian régimes have been concerned with inter disciplinary literature dealing with ‘coming to terms with the past’. essentially this means considering the way new democracies measure up to the problems of the violence by the preceding non-democratic régime. this issue has found fertile terrain in some countries (see, for example, hagopian 1993; aguilar 1996 and 2008; barahona de brito, gonzález enríquez, and aguilar 2001; hite and cesarini, 2004; costa pinto, 2006) and in some disciplines such as history and legal doctrine. particular attention was placed on historical memory and transitional justice. this latter concept summarizes an area of research centered on how society faces human rights abuse, mass atrocities or other forms of severe social traumas, including genocide and civil wars of the former régimes, in order to build a more just and peaceful democratic future (teitel 1997 and 2000; elster 2009; di gregorio 2012). in modern political science, studies on authoritarian legacies are few. even though a volume on this subject was presented in 1982, by herz, legacies has found some space on democratization studies’ agenda only in the past twenty years (see among others, larsen 1998; morlino 2003; hite and cesarini 2004; grilli di cortona and lanza 2011; costa pinto and morlino 2013). one of the reasons why it was so unpopular is that past legacies are rather allusive and ambiguous; their definition and operationalization far from simple. an important seminal work on the subject was carried out by leonardo morlino (2003) who states: lanza, when political science and history meet 24 i define as authoritarian traditions or legacies those behavioral models, rules, relationships, social and political situations, but also norms, procedures and institutions, that were introduced or reinforced by the authoritarian regime immediately preceding the democratic transition (…). the observable aspects of the authoritarian legacies are different. in the first place, an authoritarian legacy contains three elements, connected amongst themselves, but that can be present, even if only partially, in the new democratic settings. they are: a) a group of beliefs, values and attitudes; b) one or more public institutions, bodies or simple organizations; c) the behaviors derived from the relationships between the first two dimensions (…) (in substance), as suggested by the same definition, there are two fundamental types of legacies: a) those relative to values, to the institutions and to the behaviors desired by the authoritarian regime; b) those which reinforce precedent values and existing institutions, with new institutions, bodies or organizations and consequent behavioral habits. the second type of legacies is profoundly rooted in the political culture and tends to be stronger and more persistent (2003, 256-257). pietro grilli di cortona (2011a) noted that the few studies proposed by political science focused, above all, on the legacies of previous authoritarian régimes and that it would be useful to use other perspectives that did not set time limits. therefore, he proposed a distinction between historical legacies (the ‘trapassato/past imperfect’) and inherently authoritarian ones (past). historical legacies, which are defined by the same terminology used for the authoritarian ones and involve factors such as values, memories, identities, norms, institutions, organizations, élites, behaviors, routines and practices, which, even though they are filtered, reinforced or weakened by the authoritarian régime, always have an influence on democratization and consequently, on the following régime (pridham 2000, 42). furthermore, pietro grilli also advocated a thorough reflection on the concept of historical memory: its meaning, the different uses that political actors, called upon to build new democracies, could employ, and the concept of political learning, already embodied in some important studies on the subject (bermeo 1992; pridham 2000); in addition, grilli also identified a series of ways in which the influence of historical legacies could be utilized. in particular, past history could contain the following elements: 1. indirect influence occurs when legacies affect the non-democratic regime, which in turn will influence the transition to democracy and subsequent establishment of a democracy; 2. emulative reference occurs when symbols of the pre-authoritarian or pretotalitarian past, such as constitutions, norms, and institutions are restored, bringing back the previous stage; 3. political learning occurs when learning from past experiences and from previous mistakes have positive effects on democratization and its results. as far as the operationalization of strictly authoritarian legacies is concerned, based on morlino and grilli’s definition we have three predominant dimensions: a) élites; b) political institutions and structures and the cultural models on which they are based; c) socio-cultural aspects. during research, these three dimensions were further disarticulated. specifically, the category, ‘institutions, political structures and organization models’ in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 25 was further divided into: a) ‘institutions’, b) ‘parties and party systems’, c) ‘elites’, d) ‘stateness and related problems’, while the socio-cultural dimension was divided into e) ‘statalism’ and f) ‘mobilization, political culture and civil society’. for empirical verification, pietro grilli identified an articulated series of indicators, sub-divided into each subject matter with the aim of empirically checking, in selected cases, the degree of reliability in the research’s main hypothesis. regarding case choice, the research was projected as an area comparison, focused on the diachronic analysis of 11 western european countries (france and germany), southern european countries (italy, spain and portugal) and eastern countries (poland, hungary, czech republic, slovakia, romania, bulgaria and russia). the research objective was to explain the similarities and differences of their democratization processes, determined both by their political, economic and institutional legacies derived from former non-democratic régimes and by their widely-considered past history. the research results published by il mulino publisher (grilli di cortona and lanza 2011) confirm the strong incidence of legacies in democratization processes. traces of the past always last; hence every neo-democracy must deal with them. the success or failure of democratization is also based on legacies, in particular on the ability of new régimes to control or neutralize those ‘negative’ traces; that is, those least compatible with a democratic set-up. ‘positive’ traces, on the other hand, are those that lead to choices that can facilitate the establishment and consolidation of democracies. the main problem that builders of democracies have to face, is that often the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ characteristics of legacies cannot be determined ex ante, but only ex post. in fact, results often belie the evening’s forecast. in the cases under-consideration, arenas in which the transmission of legacies is more frequent and relevant, and on which a comparison can be made, are the ones relating to institutions, party systems, issues regarding stateness, élites, the role of state in society and in economy, and political culture and civil society areas. in addition to visible legacies (élites, institutions, organizations, political practices), we need to deal with invisible ones: mainly the memory of the past filtered by élites, mass media and institutions. this is a hard theme to circumscribe because of masses and élites’ changing and oscillating perceptions of the past. however, it is obvious that invisible legacies are relevant to democracy policy: the re-actualization of events happening many years before may seem absurd, but it is part of daily politics, having positive and negative aspects. the fascist, national-socialist, communist, francoist, ‘collaborationist’, nationalist past, as well as the complicity, the crimes and the responsibilities of the élites, continue to affect mutual legitimation between opposing political forces. in building a durable and quality-style democracy, a fundamental role is played by the élite and protagonist groups dedicated to democratic revival, which often represent a minority of the population. the delicate task of finding a balance between extremes is up to them: between a memory that is learning and warning for the future and one that is made up of continual irruptions of the past into the present, that bring back political agendas, which revive a past that does not go away, thereby fueling conflict and opposition. finally, to conclude, i would like to share some of my personal memories. although we occasionally met at academic events, my relationship with pietro grilli as scientific collaborator began at the annual sisp conference held in bologna in september 2006. lanza, when political science and history meet 26 together with gianfranco pasquino, he co-chaired the panel on ‘parties and party systems in european democracies’. i was at that time a paper presenter. in the following months, in order to prepare a handbook that we were compiling, we exchanged e-mails concerning opinions and suggestions on our respective chapters. what came about, was an on-going syntony regarding work methods and academic report styles. a few months later, pietro offered me a partnership, as local unit head of research, for the 2007 prin on the role of legacies in third wave democratization. the collaboration was then followed by the writing of a political science handbook for de agostini editors, with the 2009 prin on why democratizing? the causes of non democratic regimes crisis and breakdown in the third wave, and might have continued with a further prin project on stateness and democratization, which was only outlined, as pietro, who was meanwhile elected president of the sisp no longer wanted to participate in competitive tenders. i saw pietro grilli for the last time on june 5,2015, one month and eleven days before he passed away. i was at roma tre university for a phd/doctorate commission and pietro was at the department also to preside over the sisp directive board meeting convened for that afternoon. he was worn out due to his illness; we had a frugal lunch at a café near the department with colleagues who worked with pietro in rome and we chatted about our children and our families. he confided to me that he would have rather be lying down in bed resting. but his work-ethic and his keen sense of institutional duty obliged him to be there. these were values that i had learned to appreciate; they were part of his rich culture and value baggage. pietro grilli was endowed with out of the ordinary analytical skills, scientific rigor, great working and leadership skills, noteworthy authoritativeness, needed to carry out scientific undertakings with great efficiency and lucidity. in addition to his various professional skills, i was also aware of his extraordinary personal qualities; in particular, innate politeness, cordiality, reliability, irony and generosity. for all these reasons, i was happy to be able to work alongside this man, considering myself lucky to have had this opportunity. references aguilar, p. (1996), memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española, alianza editorial, madrid. aguilar, p. (2008), políticas de la memoria y memoria de la política, alianza editorial, madrid. barahona de brito, a., gonzález enríquez, c. and aguilar, p. (eds) (2001), the politics of memory: transitional justice in democratizing societies, oxford university press, oxford. bermeo, n. (1992), democracy and the lessons of dictatorship, in “comparative politics”, 24, 3, pp. 273-291. costa pinto, a. (2006), authoritarian legacies, transitional justice and state crisis in portugal’s democratization, in “democratization”, 13, 2, pp. 173-204. costa pinto, a. and morlino, l. (eds) (2013), dealing with the legacy of authoritarianism: the ‘politics of the past’ in southern european democracies, routledge, london. dahl, r. (1961), the behavioral approach in political science. epitaph to a movement for a successful protest’, in “american political science review”,55, 4, p.763-772. di gregorio, a. (2012), epurazioni e protezione della democrazia. esperienze e modelli di ‘giustizia post-autoritaria’, franco angeli, milano. in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 27 elster, j. (2004), closing the books: transitional justice in historical perspective, cambridge university press, cambridge. grilli di cortona, p. (2009), come gli stati diventano democratici, laterza, roma-bari. grilli di cortona, p. (2011a), il passato che non passa: il ruolo delle eredità nelle democratizzazioni, in grilli di cortona, p. and lanza, o. (eds) (2011), pp. 11-39. grilli di cortona, p. (2011b), conclusioni. eredità e democratizzazioni in prospettiva comparata, in grilli di cortona, p. and lanza, o. (eds) (2011), pp. 289-322. grilli di cortona, p. and lanza, o. (eds) (2011), tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia. il mulino, bologna. grilli di cortona, p., lanza, o., pisciotta, b. and germano l. (2016), capire la politica, utetuniversità, torino. hagopian, f. (1993), after regime change: authoritarian legacies, political representation, and the democratic future of south america, in “world politics”, 45, 3, pp. 464-500. herz, j. (ed.) (1982), from dictatorship to democracy. coping with the legacies of authoritarianism and totalitarianism, greenwood press, westport-london. hite, k. and cesarini, p. (eds) (2004), authoritarian legacies and democracy in latin america and southern europe, university of notre dame press, notre dame. huntington, s. (1991), the third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century, university of oklahoma press, norman and london. larsen, s.u. (ed.) (1998), modern europe after fascism. 1943-1980s, columbia university press, new york. march, j. g. and olsen, j. p. (1989), rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis of politics, free press, new york. moore, b. jr. (1966), social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world, beacon press, boston. morlino, l. (1989), introduzione. ancora un bilancio lamentevole, in morlino, l. (ed.), scienza politica, edizioni della fondazione giovanni agnelli, torino, pp. 5-52. morlino, l. (2003), democrazie e democratizzazioni, il mulino, bologna. pasquino, g. (1971), prefazione all’edizione italiana, in charlesworth j.c. (ed.), teorie e metodi in scienza politica, il mulino, bologna, (or. edit. charlesworth j.c. (ed.) (1967), contemporary political analysis, the free press, new york). pierson, p. (2000), increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics, in “american political science review”, 94, 2, pp. 251-267. pierson, p. (2004), politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis, princeton university press, princeton. pridham, g. (2000), confining conditions and breaking with the past: historical legacies and political learning in transitions to democracy, in “democratization”, 7, 2, pp. 36-64. sartori, g. (1979), la politica, sugarco, milano. teitel, r. g. (1997), transitional jurisprudence: the role of law in political transformation, in “the yale law journal” 106,7, pp. 2009-2080. teitel, r. g. (2000), transitional justice, oxford university press, new york. tocqueville, a., (1856), l’ancien régime et la révolution, michel-lévy frères, paris. urbani, g. (1970), metodi, approcci e teorie. introduzione, in sartori, g. (ed.), antologia di scienza politica, il mulino, bologna, pp. 31-53. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_3_seddone_bobba.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 3 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 3, 257–272. contact author: antonella seddone, university of turin. e-mail address: antonella.seddone@unito.it is something changing? the impact of the covid-19 emergency on italians’ attitudes towards the eu antonella seddone university of turin giuliano bobba university of turin collegio carlo alberto, turin abstract the covid-19 outbreak has had a strong impact on several aspects of private and public life all over the country. this article in particular deals with the impact of the pandemic crisis on attitudes towards the european union. based on an opinion survey administered after the covid-19 first wave to a representative sample of italians, this article provides preliminary results on whether the health crisis has impacted italians’ perceptions of eu membership. findings suggest that one fifth of the respondents changed their minds about the eu in a relatively short time span. among possible explanations for this shift, party cueing is shown to be the most important factor in transforming public perception of europe, while the pattern is less clear for the perception of the pandemic risk and the economic outlook. 1. introduction he covid-19 outbreak has had a strong impact on several crucial fields in democracies, such as politics, economy, and social organization. although the pandemic and its management are still ongoing and therefore a complete interpretation is not yet possible, several studies have addressed the consequences of the pandemic on citizens’ political attitudes, with conflicting results (schraff 2020). on the one hand, some research shows that the pandemic crisis has favoured incumbent governments, which means that citizens tend to ‘rally around the flag’ in times of crisis (bol et al. 2020; baekgaard et al. 2020; devine et al. 2020). at the same time, however, other studies show that citizens have responded to this crisis by relying on their previous political values and beliefs (calvillo et al. 2020). people reacted in different ways to pandemic-related policies, based on their level of support for the leader/party proposing a policy (allcott et al. 2020). even in these pandemic times, therefore, party cues have an influence on citizens’ behaviour, such as compliance with anti-covid measures (painter and qiu 2021; grossman et al. 2020). against this backdrop, the impact of the pandemic on attitudes towards the eu is still underexplored. the few studies currently available lead to divergent interpretations also in the field of eu integration. gianmarco et al. (2020), through an online survey experiment in italy, spain, germany and the netherlands, have found a growing demand for t is something changing? 258 competent leadership and that the covid-19 crisis has led to severe drops in interpersonal and institutional trust, as well as less support for the eu. focusing on italy, basile et al. (2021) show, however, that the picture is more complex: although in a trend of decreasing support, italian citizens are willing to support burden-sharing to face the costs of the most urgent crises affecting eu countries. this includes, but is not limited to, the covid19 pandemic: the multiple crises affecting europe may have produced the ideal conditions under which the eu could take a step towards deeper integration in the future. in this global crisis — characterized by territorial specificities concerning both the pandemic and the economic dimension — the eu has had to overcome several problems in acting as a single political player. lacking a common health protocol, during the first phase of the covid-19 emergency, the eu commission focused on the economic side. it adopted a slightly different approach from the past, calling for coordination between member states within the european council. in particular, it called for measures aiming at softening the impact of the economic crisis via a massive programme of investment and financial flexibility, rather than austerity measures (pacces and weimer 2020). nonetheless, and to some extent unsurprisingly, the pandemic emergency has re-ignited most of the classical divides within the eu, echoing the debate in the aftermath of the great recession in the second half of the 2000s about the economic solidity of northern and southern countries (de la porte and jensens 2021). agreement on a set of measures — the recovery plan — came in late july 2020. the consequences of this situation, however, still appear contradictory and uncertain. the emphasis on a shared plan of interventions supporting the countries most affected by the pandemic emergency — and the concomitant relaxation of austerity — signals a drastic change in the eu approach (luo 2021). this prolonged emergency situation has produced (and is producing) intertwined effects on both the supply side and the demand side. with respect to the focus of this article, three different dimensions emerging from this crisis situation are relevant: citizens’ perception of the risks associated with covid19, the perceived economic consequences of the management of the pandemic, and the political positioning of the parties regarding europe. the aim of this article is to clarify whether, in the aftermath of the covid-19 crisis, the pandemic has changed people’s attitudes1 towards the eu and, if so, whether they have improved or worsened. as mentioned above, there is no consensus in the literature on the consequences of such a crisis on citizens’ attitudes. the main contribution of this article, therefore, is to provide new empirical evidence and add literature on this ongoing process, also testing the likely factors that explain these changes. relying on evidence based on an opinion survey with a representative sample of italians after the covid-19 first wave, this article provides preliminary results on whether the global health crisis has impacted italians’ perceptions about eu membership. findings suggest that one fifth of the respondents changed their minds about the eu in a relatively short time span. we also noted that in most cases this change of heart goes towards an improved attitude towards the eu institutions. when investigating factors 1 in this article we use the term ‘change’ to indicate the shift in individual attitudes before and after the pandemic outbreak. this change is not measured through a panel design, but through questions regarding the prospective evaluation of the respondents. see methods section below. seddone and bobba 259 driving this change, the voters’ reliance on parties emerges as the most relevant, while the pattern is less clear about perceptions of the pandemic risk and the economic outlook. in what follows, the next section will provide a general background on attitudes toward the eu and the covid-19 emergency in italy while the third section summarises the theoretical framework and articulates the hypotheses. the research design will then be discussed in section four, while section five presents the data and results of analysis. the discussion and limitations of the study are presented in the last section 2. attitudes toward the eu and the covid-19 emergency in italy as is well known, italy has long been one of the strongest supporters of the european project (cotta et al. 2005). this situation started to change in the 1990s, moving the country towards a more ‘disenchanted europeanism’ (cotta 2005: 35). the effects of the 1992 maastricht treaty and the financial recovery necessary for participation in the economic and monetary union process (ferrera and gualmini 1999), together with further transfers of national sovereignty contained in the 2007 lisbon treaty, led to an increase in euroscepticism (verney 2011; down and wilson 2008). in the 2009 european elections, this initial euroscepticism was ‘stronger among citizens than in the party system, socioeconomic elites and the media’ (bellucci and conti 2012). the attitude towards the eu of a growing share of citizens went in those years ‘from enthusiasm to scepticism’ (bellucci and serricchio 2012). in the following years, the great recession and the need to comply with eu financial requirements had several consequences on the attitudes of italians towards the eu (bellucci 2014; armingeon et al. 2016). while eurobarometer data shows that the percentage of those evoking a positive image of the eu had already started to decline in the early 2000s and latent dissatisfaction had started to rise (figure 1), it was in the 2011-2013 period that opinions worsened significantly, decreasing by up to 20 percentage points. figure 1. image of the eu in italy source: eurobarometer interactive. note: reply to the question, “in general, does the european union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?” is something changing? 260 figure 2. trust in the eu in italy source: eurobarometer interactive. note: reply to the question, “i would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and institutions. for each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: the european union”. figure 3. european identity source: eurobarometer interactive. note: reply to the question, “in the near future, do you see yourself as...?”. however, in this critical climate of opinion surrounding the eu integration project, one particular figure emerging from eurobarometer data is especially interesting. while the figures concerning trust in the eu signal a decreasingly supportive mood (figure 2), when asked about their identities as european citizens, italians still appear relatively close to the european ideal and there is no evidence of decreasing trends. rather than a seddone and bobba 261 rejection of the european project in principle, the italian respondents seemed to express discontent as a consequence of the ‘spiral of euroscepticism’ that has involved citizens, parties and representative institutions in the last decade (conti et al. 2020). it was within this context of mixed signals, of decreasing support but stable pro-eu identity, that the pandemic broke out. the consequences on citizens’ attitudes are not entirely clear and are currently under the spotlight of researchers. the consequences on the political system, on the other hand — although not necessarily clear — have been much more evident: the pandemic has forced parties in europe to tackle an issue that has strong supranational implications. this has led people to question, and in some cases redefine, their orientation towards the eu. this certainly happened in italy where the need for management of the pandemic modified (and is still modifying) the orientation of several parties towards the eu. as regards the parties in power when the survey was administered (late june 2020), they supported the pro-eu government led by giuseppe conte (conte ii). while this support is completely coherent for the democratic party (pd, partito democratico) — which has always had a pro-european vocation (bobba and seddone 2020) — it is something new as far as the five star movement (m5s, movimento 5 stelle) is concerned. listed for a while among italian eurosceptic parties (emanuele et al. 2016; maggini and chiaramonte, 2019; pirro and van kessel 2018), its positioning towards the eu in the european parliament has also been defined as confused (salvati 2019). it is therefore no coincidence that, even before the covid-19 pandemic, the m5s started changing their minds about the eu by endorsing ursula van der leyden as the president of the ec and by forming the governing alliance with the pd in september 2019. further, since the pandemic outbreak, the m5s have become more likely to support european integration, conveying europhile messages to their voters. this orientation also seems to be confirmed by their support for the pro-european government led by mario draghi, a controversial figure in the m5s narrative, defined as an ‘apostle of the elite’ by one of the movement’s leading figures.2 besides, it is worth noting that the m5s supported the conte government’s strategy and position leading to the next generation plan and it justified its europhile position by stressing the need to address economic hardship at the national level. the opposition parties have also been affected by the consequences of the pandemic crisis. after a season of partly ideological and partly strategic criticism of the eu (quaglia 2011), go italy (fi, forza italia) moved towards a more mainstream pro-eu position, starting with the 2014 european elections (conti et al. 2020). since the start of the pandemic, fi has further endorsed the government’s initiative and clarified its support for the eu, distinguishing itself from its alleged allies the league (lega) and brothers of italy (fdi, fratelli d’italia). these two parties are certainly the most eurosceptic as they have introduced some positions of rejection such as exit from the euro and suspension of the schengen treaty to reintroduce border controls (conti et al. 2020). however, while fdi has maintained unchanged its positions even during the pandemic, rejecting any possible collaboration with all the latest governments (conte i, ii and draghi), the ideological and strategic euroscepticism of the league has instead wavered in the face of the possibility of drawing benefit from the management of next generation eu funds. this probably explains the decision of its leader, matteo salvini, to support mario draghi’s 2 the guardian view on mario draghi: the right man for italy ... for now. the guardian, february 4, 2021. is something changing? 262 government: ‘i prefer to be involved and manage 209 billion rather than stay outside [the government]’.3 in short, even if for different reasons and at different times, the pandemic has had an impact on the main parties, shifting, at least temporarily, the axis of their political orientation from substantial euroscepticism to a moderate pro-eu orientation. 3. determinants of attitudes toward the eu the literature has identified several determinants that may contribute to shaping citizens’ attitudes toward european integration. for this article we rely on (a) literature about the eu institutions conceived as a rescuer-actor for solving particular crises or societal needs requiring transnational governance; (b) the utilitarian approach, in terms of individuals’ economic outlook perceptions; (c) party cueing, meant as a common heuristic used by citizens to disentangle complex issues, such as eu matters. a first branch of literature, which is particularly relevant considering the current situation of the pandemic crisis, reads the eu institutions as a fundamental part of the multilevel governance system operating in europe. in this perspective, when policy problems or societal needs are transnational and require coordination at the european level, the eu institutions play a crucial role and eu citizens are likely to recognize their responsibility (hobolt and tilley, 2014). the covid-19 emergency, in this respect, has opened up new scenarios in the relationship between member states and especially between domestic and european politics. the very dynamics of a pandemic emergency like the covid-19 outbreak have indeed required coordination and cooperation between countries. after initial hesitation, the eu in this respect has put in force extraordinary economic measures for fighting the economic crisis (through the european stability mechanism and the next generation fund) and started a centralized strategy to accelerate the purchasing, development, manufacturing and deployment of vaccines against covid-19 (eu commission 2020). previous research has demonstrated that in the case of critical issues, citizens tend to perceive the eu institutions as more competent and effective in facing these societal challenges. as regards the migration crisis and eu immigration policy, for example, conti et al. (2019) found that citizens worried about this issue are likely to delegate the definition of policy solutions to the eu institutions. this kind of result is consistent with the literature maintaining that citizens (still) tend to identify the eu as a reliable transnational rescuer able to address (and solve) critical issues at the national level (milward 1992), even despite the great recession crisis (isernia and cotta 2016). drawing from this literature, the first hypothesis aims at assessing the relationship between perception of the pandemic risk and evaluation of the eu: h1: higher levels of pandemic risk perception are related to a positive evaluation of eu integration. as concerns the utilitarian perspective, studies suggest that the economic dimension has an effect on individual attitudes towards the eu. indeed, the literature has found that a personal capacity to better adapt (or not) to the eu’s setting of rules on the 3 la giravolta moderata di salvini: ‘preferisco mettermi in gioco e gestire 209 miliardi che stare fuori’. open, february, 6, 2021. seddone and bobba 263 economic dimension impacts how individuals perceive the very role of the eu. for example, those benefitting from market liberalization prove to be more likely to support the eu integration project (anderson and reichert 1995). in addition, studies also found that people’s feelings towards the eu are often consistent with their economic interests (gabel 1998). besides individual assessment of the economy, scholars have underlined that people’s perceptions of the eu are also affected by a more general evaluation of their country’s economic performance (eichenberg and dalton 1993; anderson and reichert 1995). in this respect, studies argue that the level of eu support depends also on individual perceptions of the country role within the eu and in particular the relationship/connections with other member states. precisely, dimensions such as country security, national trade interests within the eu, or even the country’s ability to get net returns from the eu budget, are said to shape citizens’ attitudes towards the eu (eichenberg and dalton 1993; anderson and reichert 1996). this literature led us to formulate a specific hypothesis to test whether and to what extent individual perception of the country’s economic outlook affects attitudes towards eu integration. specifically, we expect a congruence between economic outlook and eu evaluation. accordingly, our second hypothesis is spelt out as follows: h2: citizens’ positive expectations of the country’s economic outlook are related to a positive evaluation of eu integration in general, citizens are said to lack general political sophistication; they have a limited ability to think in the abstract about political matters and they also lack factual information about politics (e.g., campbell et al. 1960; converse 1964; delli carpini and keeter 1996). nonetheless, despite this scarce knowledge and a limited availability of information, the literature underlines that they may overcome their information shortfalls by relying on heuristics to infer their position on an issue (snidernman et al. 1991; lupia 1992; 1994; dancey and sheagley 2012; kuklinski and quirk 2000). citizens, indeed, use diverse kinds of information shortcuts to fill the information gap, relying on party identification, election campaigns, media contents or elite endorsements (downs 1957; lodge et al. 1995; iyengar and kinder 1987; lupia 1994). as concerns the european union, an extensive literature has demonstrated that messages from political parties have a strong influence on citizens’ attitudes to the eu (see for example pannico 2017; torcal et al. 2018; stoeckel and kuhn 2018; pannico 2020). eu matters, indeed, prove particularly difficult to understand and european issues are usually marginal in national politics (van der eijk and franklin 2004). even from an electoral point of view, ep elections are interpreted as ‘second order elections’, implying that citizens tend to perceive these elections as being less at stake, which disincentivizes voting mobilization (reif and schmitt 1980; hobolt 2014). furthermore, studies have also highlighted that european citizens are actually poorly informed about eu politics (anderson 1998; baglioni and hurrelmann 2016; hobolt 2007). therefore, they are more likely to align their evaluations of the eu with the positions of the parties to which they feel closest. relying on this literature, we therefore expect that partisanship has an impact on individuals’ evaluations of the eu. precisely, the last hypothesis reads as follows: h3: citizens’ evaluations towards the eu are congruent with the orientation of their party. is something changing? 264 4. methods 4.1. data the data employed in this study are based on an opinion survey from the project ‘the impact of covid-19 pandemic crisis on social and institutional trust’.4 interviews were administered to respondents through cawi/cati (computer-assisted web interview) mode between 26 june and 3 july 2020. respondents were selected from an opt-in community maintained by swg (a private italian research company). the sampling design accounts for age, gender and geographical distribution of the italian population. in total, the dataset includes 2,265 respondents. it is worth noticing that the period of data collection is shown to be particularly appropriate for the purposes of this study. as concerns the pandemic emergency, indeed, the contagion rate signalled a cooling phase. therefore, containment measures and restrictions were no longer in force. instead, focusing on the eu dimension, the end of june coincides with negotiations within the european council about the definition of recovery measures. as a result, eu issues were again at the top of the public agenda, emphasizing the prominence of eu political actors such as the eu commission in this phase of mediating between diverse (and often conflicting) domestic interests (botta et al. 2020). 4.2. mesures: the dependent variable our hypotheses have been tested through a multinomial logit model investigating kinds of individual opinions about the eu. we were specifically interested in identifying which factors contributed to shaping eu evaluation in positive or negative terms. the dependent variable (dv) was computed by combining two different items referring, respectively, to the retrospective and prospective evaluation of italian eu membership (see table 1). the first item, thus, is spelt out as follows: with regard to the last few years, do you think that eu membership has been [good, bad, neither good or bad] for italy?. the second item, instead, was deliberately framed around the pandemic and allows the respondent a near-future prospective evaluation: in the light of the covid-19 crisis, do you think that eu membership will be [good, bad, neither good or bad] for italy in the next few months? we then computed a trichotomous variable accounting for the direction of changes in prospective attitudes towards the eu in the light of the pandemic emergency. those confirming their opinion on italian membership in both retrospective and prospective evaluations have been coded as neutral (=1). the group of respondents whose evaluations worsened is composed of those moving from a positive to a negative or neutral evaluation, as well as those shifting from neutral to negative opinions (=0). finally, an improved perception of eu membership is identified in respondents who move from negative and neutral opinions towards a positive prospective evaluation of eu in the light of the pandemic emergency. respondents moving from neutral to fully positive opinions also fall into this category (=2). 4 the project was funded by the collegio carlo alberto and the department of cultures, politics and society, university of turin. seddone and bobba 265 table 1. dependent variable detail in the light of the covid-19 crisis, do you think that eu membership will be for italy in the next few months? good neither good nor bad bad with regard to the last few years, do you think that eu membership has been for italy? good same worsened worsened neither good nor bad improved same worsened bad improved improved same 4.3. measures: independent variables as concerns individual outlook on the economic dimension, this was operationalized by means of a 1-5 scale variable measuring the individual’s economic prospective evaluation where 1 indicates an improvement in personal economic conditions, while 5 refers to a worsening of personal economic conditions.5 as regards, instead, the partisanship dimension we relied on a set of dichotomous variables accounting for respondent voting behaviour in the 2019 ep elections. we focused on those parties that allow for a reasonable numerosity to be tested, that is: fi, fdi, m5s, league and pd. finally, for assessing h3 — testing the effects of pandemic concerns on eu evaluations — we considered two items accounting for individual concerns on the pandemic side. accordingly, the first variable measures on a 0-10 scale the respondent’s perceived risk of getting infected,6 while a second variable measures, still on a 0-10 scale, the respondent’s perceived risk that the country will face a second wave of contagion.7 in both cases, 0 was meant as a minimum/null level of concern while 10 indicated the maximum level of concern. table 2. descriptives variable obs mean std. dev. min max eu change attitude 2165 1.05 .44 0 2 eu retrospective evaluation 2201 1.779 .822 1 3 eu prospective evaluation 2186 1.73 .821 1 3 risk of 2nd covid-19 wave 2216 6.576 2.174 0 10 risk of covid-19 infection 2131 4.643 2.059 0 10 economy evaluation (next 12 months) 2172 3.389 .867 1 5 fi vote in 2019 ep elections 2265 .04 .195 0 1 fdi vote in 2019 ep elections 2265 .037 .188 0 1 m5s vote in 2019 ep elections 2265 .159 .366 0 1 lega vote in 2019 ep elections 2265 .174 .379 0 1 pd vote in 2019 ep elections 2265 .246 .431 0 1 5 the original wording of the question was: “looking to the future, do you expect your economic situation over the next 12 months to be...?”. 6 the original wording of the question was: “in your opinion, how possible is it that you will get infected by the covid-19 virus?”. 7 the original wording of the question was: “in your opinion, how possible is it that in the next few months there will be a second wave of contagion in italy?”. is something changing? 266 5. findings a general overview of our data suggests that most of the respondents have not changed their minds about the eu. as detailed in table 3, indeed, the prospective evaluation about eu membership in the light of the covid-19 pandemic does not show relevant differences compared to the retrospective evaluations. about 80.37% of the sample confirmed their opinions while those changing their attitudes about their country’s eu membership account for one fifth of the sample. notably, given that rapid and sudden changes in attitudes are usually quite rare — even if minor — this portion of respondents must be considered as a potential (and remarkable) signal of the pandemic’s impact on citizens’ perceptions about the eu. also, it is worth noticing that when looking at the direction of the switch in attitudes we found that 7.3% of the respondents have moved towards worsened feelings, while 12.3% have instead improved their sentiments towards the eu (table 3). table 3. switch in attitudes towards eu membership percent worsened eu attitude 7.30 same eu attitude 80.37 improved eu attitude 12.33 n 2,165 in order to identify the potential factors contributing to explaining changes in respondents’ attitudes towards eu membership, we ran a multinomial logistic model assessing the impact of independent variables accounting for pandemic, economic and political dimensions on the direction of shifting attitudes towards the eu. interestingly, we found that the worsening and improving of individuals’ opinions on eu membership are affected by a diverse set of factors working differently in terms of both significance and direction of the impact. in particular, our analyses suggest that the covid-19 pandemic has an effect on attitudes towards the eu. in this respect, h1 — testing the eu rescuer argument — has quite blurred results. while concern about a second wave of covid-19 contagion is not significant, meaning that it does not affect prospective evaluations of the eu, we found that concern about individual infection has an impact on decreasing the chances of improving evaluation of eu membership, while it has no effect on the worsening of individuals’ attitudes, as compared to those maintaining a stable attitude towards the eu. conversely, the economic factors (h2) have an effect only on the latter. indeed, a negative outlook towards the economy decreases the chances of a turn towards negative eu attitudes if compared with those maintaining their opinion of the eu. finally, h3, focusing on the party cueing dimension, is instead fully confirmed, signalling that partisanship plays a crucial role in orienting citizens’ feelings on eu matters. it indeed proves significant in any case. the analyses show that — compared with those respondents maintaining their opinion on the eu — the vote for fdi, lega in the 2019 ep is less likely to have a negative effect on the individual’s attitudes towards the eu. also, for respondents voting fi and m5s, the model shows a greater likelihood of change towards a positive attitude, as compared to those maintaining their evaluation on seddone and bobba 267 eu membership. finally, it should be noted that the electoral support for pd in the 2019 ep elections does not increase the chances of changing the evaluation on eu matters in either a positive or a negative direction. all in all, we find partial confirmation of our hypotheses. the three dimensions tested in our model indeed prove to have an impact on the switch of individual attitudes towards the eu. however, the kind of impact is different when investigating the direction of change. table 4. multinomial logit model (dv: worsening, improving and same eu attitudes) rrr st. err. sig worsening evaluation of eu membership risk of covid19 infection (0-10 scale) .968 .04 risk of covid19 2nd wave (0-10 scale) .967 .038 economy evaluation (next 12 months) .821 .085 * fi .96 .35 fdi .38 .218 * m5s .615 .195 lega .422 .106 *** pd .392 .118 *** constant .431 .179 ** improving the evaluation on eu membership risk of covid19 infection (0-10 scale) .926 .031 ** risk of covid19 2nd wave (0-10 scale) .993 .032 economy evaluation (next 12 months) .995 .081 fi 1.662 .474 * fdi 1.116 .384 m5s 2.124 .42 *** lega .928 .168 pd .448 .122 *** constant .262 .091 *** number of obs. 1988.000 pseudo r-squared 0.027 log likelihood -1271.394 source: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1. same evaluation on eu membership is the base outcome. 6. conclusions the pandemic emergency has, of course, impacted the public debate redefining political priorities, reshaping the political agenda also at the eu level. in this study we were interested in verifying whether and to what extent italians’ attitudes towards the eu may have changed in the immediate aftermath of the first wave of contagion and, more specifically, we investigated factors determining the worsening or else an improvement of italians’ opinions of eu matters. relying on individual survey data, we found that about one fifth of the respondents changed their attitude towards the eu. given that feelings about the eu are not usually subject to drastic and radical shifts, this quota should be considered relevant, signalling that the pandemic emergency may have produced a re-definition of the eu image. in is something changing? 268 particular, among these respondents, we can see a greater tendency to improve their opinion of eu matters, rather than turn to more negative evaluations. when tested via inferential analysis, however, our results appear less univocal. if there were any doubts regarding the impact of party cueing on citizens’ evaluations towards the eu (e.g., carrieri 2020), in line with previous literature (see hobolt 2007) findings suggest that partisanship affects individuals’ perceptions of eu matters. conversely, results on the utilitarian dimension are blurred, and the same applies to the pandemic dimension. more precisely, data suggest that even if the pandemic is interpreted exactly as one of those societal challenges needing a transnational policy intervention where the eu represents the fundamental (and leading) institution the path (and impact) of this health crisis is still unclear. in this respect, the eu may emerge as a rescuer. for sure, the pandemic emergency, combining both the health and economic crises, requires a sound ability to adapt and it could be interpreted as a trigger for a more profound change at the institutional level (wolff and ladi 2020). the limitations of the article are clear both in terms of theoretical expectations and data availability. this study was carried out during a peculiar period that is still ongoing. its merit is probably to have identified a notable change (about 20%) in the opinions of italian citizens towards the eu — namely attitudes that normally don’t change quickly. however, the reasons for this change do not emerge clearly from our analysis. on the one hand, when testing for diverse and possible changes in eu attitudes, the results do not appear robust enough, due to the limited number of cases. on the other hand, the availability of other variables — such as vertical and horizontal trust, territorial data about the management of the pandemic, reduction in income levels — could have offered additional interpretations. besides, our data are a snapshot of a very precise phase of the pandemic crisis: the end of the first wave. obviously, it is conceivable that the persistence of the crisis and the role 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(2020). european union responses to the covid-19 pandemic: adaptability in times of permanent emergency. journal of european integration, 42(8), 10251040. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_2_combei_et_al.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 2, september 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 2, 223–241. contact author: daniela giannetti, university of bologna. e-mail address: daniela.giannetti@unibo.it populism and policy issues: examining political communication on twitter in italy 2018-2019 claudia roberta combei university of bologna matteo farnè university of bologna luca pinto university of bologna daniela giannetti university of bologna abstract this study inductively explores the policy and populism dimensions of italian political discourse on twitter. starting from a corpus of 25,000 tweets posted by a number of italian political actors throughout a year (march 4, 2018 – march 4, 2019), we apply the structural topic model to uncover the policy content underlying their political communication. our results suggest that actors representing populist parties (i.e. m5s and lega) were mostly interested in emphasizing the immigration issue, although to a different extent. in particular, the debate on immigration was dominated by the lega, suggesting that the party kept prioritizing the issue that occupied center stage in its electoral campaign. the m5s emphasized infrastructure that had been an essential component of its pro-environment stance, but they also gave room for immigration. interestingly, our analysis also shows that populist tones are associated with different issues, with topics related to immigration displaying the highest populist tone. on the whole, our results are consistent with previous research showing that some issues such as immigration as closely aligned with populist parties. 1. introduction n the last few decades, ‘populism’ has come back on the scene, especially in europe, as either rightor left-wing political parties labelled as populist have been voted for by an ever-growing number of europeans: circa one in four (lewis et al., 2018). scholars have repeatedly correlated the rise of populist parties to the great recession affecting the target countries (kriesi et al. 2015; guiso et al. 2017) and to the recent immigration flows towards the old continent (muis and immerzeel, 2017). the debate about the notion of populism is vast and can only be briefly summarized here. a great deal of discussion revolves around the proper definition or conceptual understanding of populism (see rooduijn 2018 for a review). another strand of literature focuses on measurement issues with the purpose of providing populism ‘scores’ through content analysis of the parties’ manifestos or other political documents (jagers and walgrave 2007; i populism and policy 224 rooduijn and pauwels 2011; pauwels 2011). on the explanatory side, political science literature has mainly examined the pre-conditions for the formation of populist parties (norris 2005; rydgren 2007; golder 2016). more recently, attention has shifted to the variables − economic versus cultural − affecting electoral support for populist parties (norris and inglehart 2019; hawkins, rovira kaltwasser and andreadis 2018). italy has been regarded as a conspicuous epicentre of populism. the national elections on 4 march 2018 revealed how the campaigns of the movimento 5 stelle (m5s) and the lega (former lega nord northern league) – run in clear opposition to what they called ‘elitist’ politics both at the national and supranational, i.e. eu level – helped them obtain 50% of vote share (bobba and roncarolo 2018). the two parties were able to form a coalition government that took office on 1 june 2018 and lasted about a year. in this work we focus on italy to explore the political communication of a number of politicians from different parties who were active on social media in the period 4 march 2018 4 march 2019. such a wide time frame covers the formation of the conte i government and its first nine months of activity, terminating just before the ep elections that were held on 26 may 2019.1 although our study is mainly inductive, we aim to contribute to the literature by highlighting the role played by social media in spreading populist rhetoric, attracting supporters and ultimately increasing the populist parties’ vote share (ceron, curini and iacus 2017; mazzoleni and bracciale 2018). we select twitter as a main arena of political communication, as various studies have shown the growing impact of the twitter network not only on the electoral process, but also its influence on news coverage and agenda setting (vaccari and valeriani 2015; ceron 2017; davis et al. 2017; de sio et al 2017). we apply the structural topic model (stm) (roberts et al. 2014) technique to an original dataset of over 25,000 tweets collected over one year to estimate the themes political actors focus on in their communication. the paper is structured as follows: in section 2 we propose a way of categorizing italian populist parties; in section 3 we describe data and methods used in the empirical analysis of twitter data; in section 4 we present and discuss our results. concluding remarks follow. 2. measuring populism prior to the upsurge of populism in western europe, the notion was mostly applied to latin american politics, to identify a set of ‘fiscally irresponsible’ policies implemented by governing leaders or parties (acemoglu et al. 2013). although scholars have raised doubts as to whether the term ‘populism’ has any analytical utility, being a ‘zeitgeisty one-word explanation for everything’ (baker 2019), research on the concept of populism as applied to western european and us politics has in recent years inspired a fast-growing literature. undoubtedly, the predominant framework has been provided by mudde (2004), who argues that populism is not a fully formed political ideology like socialism or 1 it is worth mentioning that in the time frame under consideration several local elections were held both at the municipal (in june 2018) and at the regional level (molise and friuli venezia giulia in april 2018, valle d’aosta in may 2018, trentino alto adige in october 2018, abruzzo and sardinia in february 2019, basilicata in march 2019). according to many commentators, these elections contributed to creating a climate of ‘permanent campaign’. combei, farnè, pinto and giannetti 225 liberalism – it is rather a ‘thin-centred’ ideology, made up of just a few core beliefs. first, the most important division in society is antagonistic between ‘the people’, understood as fundamentally good, and the elite, understood as fundamentally corrupt. second, populists claim that politics should be an expression of the ‘general will’ – a set of desires presumed to be shared as common sense by all ‘ordinary people’. mudde’s definition has been widely criticized for its theoretical and methodological inconsistencies. this has led some scholars to assert that if we accept a definition of populism as an ideology, we should grant it full status (pappas 2013), while leading some others to reject a definition based on ideology. for example, weyland (2001: 14) defined populism as ‘a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers’. other scholars focusing on the rhetorical component of populism suggested that it has to be interpreted as a ‘discursive frame’ – a mode of talking about politics, rather than an ideology – that frames politics in terms of the ‘supremacy of popular sovereignty’ (aslanidis 2015). finally, a number of scholars understand populism as a specific ‘constitutional project’ (see also blokker 2017) or a set of institutional preferences/choices against those liberal checks and balances that ‘obstruct the expression of a genuine popular will’ (müller 2014) in a similar way to what others have labelled as ‘extreme majoritarianism’ (urbinati 2017). scholars agree that populism is a multifaceted notion, whereas all the features underlined above may be seen as different, although related components (graziano 2018). the conceptual debate about populism provides the background for several attempts to measure populism for the empirical purpose of identifying populist parties. this goal has been addressed mainly in two ways. the first is proposed by inglehart and norris (2016) who classify a party as populist if it scores more than 80 points on a standardized 100-point scale, built using thirteen selected indicators contained in the chapel hill expert survey, ches (polk et al. 2017). in this survey, experts rate the position of european parties on a range of policies such as support for traditional values, liberal lifestyles and multiculturalism, as well as their economic stance towards market deregulation, state management of the economy, and preferences for either tax cuts or public services. the second approach focuses mainly on the rhetorical component of populism. relying on mudde’s definition, scholars have operationalized the core elements of populist language (for example, the dichotomy people vs. elites) and then used dictionaries for content-analysing the parties’ manifestos or other political documents in order to assess the ‘degree of populism’ of political parties or candidates (rooduijn and pauwels 2011).2 we contend that the distinction between policy and non-policy factors grounded in the rational choice approach to party competition (adams et al 2009) may help capture an important aspect of populism. rational choice models provide a policy-based account of party competition, assuming that voters evaluate the candidates’/parties’ policy positions over key issue dimensions and select the candidate/party whose policy positions 2 related to this, a growing body of literature in the political communication field investigated the type of language employed in campaign materials such as, for instance, the tone or sentiment in campaign messages (young and soroka 2012; haselmayer and jenny 2017) or the level of complexity of campaign messages, suggesting that populist parties employ significantly less complex messages than mainstream parties (bischof and senninger 2017). populism and policy 226 are most similar to their own. however, it has also long been recognized that factors other than policy positions influence the voters’ preferences. these factors can be understood as a ‘valence’ component that has been interpreted both in terms of issues eliciting a broad consensus among voters (stokes 1963) or in terms of any non-policy advantage a candidate or party might have, including candidate characteristics such as personal integrity or competence (groseclose 2001). the distinction between policy and non-policy factors may facilitate the task of categorizing populist vs. non populist parties. we argue that differences in policy positions may account for the existence of ‘rightwing’ and ‘left-wing’ populist parties. however, we conjecture that non-positional factors such as valence issues (i.e., ‘corruption’) or character-based valence appeals (i.e., ‘honesty’ or ‘integrity’) should play a major role in populist rhetoric. in this study we rely on previous considerations to build a dictionary of populism to content-analyse the manifestos of italian parties. although our dictionary does not appear very different from others existing in the literature (e.g., rooduijn and pauwels 2011; decadri and boussalis 2019), it includes words that seem capable of capturing reference to valence issues or character-based attributes other than considering the basic dichotomy people vs. elites upon which there is a general consensus among scholars. table 1. populism dictionary. word translation into english ingann* deceive* tradir* betray* traditor* traitor* promett* promis* promess* promise* corrott* corrupt* corruzion* corruption elit* elit* casta caste popolo people legal* legal* onest* honest* amic* friend* privilege* privilege* politici politicians in what follows we provide a unidimensional map of the italian political space in 2018 that is based on party positions on the left-right axis taken from giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto (2018). the authors used expert survey data to analyse the structure of the policy space in italy from 2013 to 2018 and to estimate party positions on a number of policy dimensions.3 we weight parties’ labels by their degree of populism as 3 party positions were estimated by means of an expert survey fielded in march 2018 following the benoit and laver (2006) format. experts were asked to locate italian parties on the general left-right axis as well as on a set of nine substantive policy issues or dimensions (such as economic policy, immigration, combei, farnè, pinto and giannetti 227 measured using our dictionary-based approach applied to parties’ manifestos (see appendix for further details). figure 1. a unidimensional map of left-right populism in italy 20184 source: own elaboration. consistently with common understanding, our data assign the m5s and the lega the highest populism scores, as both exceed 50 points on our 0-100 populism scale. our data do not classify as populist the right-wing parties fdi and fi. on the left side, none of the left-wing parties is classified as populist according to our dictionary-based approach. our categorization matches only partially similar efforts in the literature. those efforts are based on expert judgements or, alternatively, rely on content analysis of official documents such as party manifestos. it should be pointed out that there is no agreement in the literature about classifying populist parties. for example, norris and inglehart (2019) classify fi as a non-populist party, while other sources do the opposite (albertazzi and mcdonnell (2015), zulianello (2020), and popu-list (2019)). as regards fdi, albertazzi and mcdonnell (2015), zulianello (2020), and popu-list (2019) identify the party as populist whereas decadri and boussalis (2019), who applied a dictionary-based approach to press releases, found that fdi is more similar to mainstream parties in terms of populist word frequencies. as regards left-wing parties, norris and inglehart (2019) classify the pd and other left-wing parties as populist but this result, which is the product of the aggregation of different scales measured by the ches, is in stark contrast to other classifications available in the literature. to conclude on this point, as the chapel hill expert survey also provides a measurement of populism based on expert judgements, we performed a correlation among our measures and those based on the ches scale.5 our scores are moderately correlated (r = 0.76), suggesting that we can at least partially rely on the validity of the dictionary we built. to sum up, our data indicate that the pd and m5s are very close on the left-right continuum but register extremely different degrees of populism. the three parties belonging to the centre-right coalition (lega, fi and fdi) tend to converge on the left-right dimension; however, they show different degrees of populism. the existence of these differences justifies the use of the previous categorization of italian parties – both in terms of their position on the left-right scale and their populism scores – to analyse the policy content of their communication using twitter data. environment, eu authority) using 20-point scales. experts were also asked to locate parties on the general left-right continuum. see giannetti, pedrazzani, and pinto (2018) for further details. 4 the acronyms used in the figure: fratelli d’italia (fdi), forza italia (fi), lega, liberi e uguali (leu), movimento 5 stelle (m5s), partito democratico (pd) and piùeuropa. 5 ches uses a 0-10-point scale ‘people vs. elite’, which measures anti-elitist attitudes (polk et al., 2017). populism and policy 228 3. data and methods besides information dissemination and networking functions, twitter may reveal the users’ opinions and attitudes on various topics (ceron 2017). in fact, this micro-blogging platform has become one of the main tools of communication worldwide, including in italy. for this reason, twitter has been recently regarded as an opportunity for political leaders to reinforce individualized communication with potential voters and to achieve visibility. de sio et al. (2017:11) stress the fact that, regardless of how unrepresentative the twitter audience might be in a given country, political actors use twitter to communicate their desired messages to the media, just like in a press release. in other words, the literature highlights the increasing importance of both the direct as well as the indirect effects of twitter messages in the wider environment of political communication.6 the use of twitter as a primary source of textual data in corpus-based analyses of political communication is advantageous as twitter’s standard search api gives the possibility to collect large quantities of data in an effortless way (barberá et al. 2015). although tweets have been widely employed to analyse political discourse, we recognize the limitations of such data: the language of twitter is simple, concise, and often informal, traits that altogether could affect the results of large-scale analyses using unsupervised techniques (combei and giannetti 2020). keeping in mind the nature of twitter and its shortfalls in this study, we select several italian political actors from fratelli d’italia (fdi), forza italia (fi), lega, liberi e uguali (leu), movimento 5 stelle (m5s), partito democratico (pd), and piùeuropa. the selection of these politicians was based on their role in their party and their activity on twitter (i.e. the most active users for each party were preferred).7 while we are aware of the fact that other political actors might have been included as well, the choice of those listed in table 2 was determined mainly by quantitative considerations, corpus balance requirements, representativity, as well as by data availability (e.g. silvio berlusconi did not have a twitter account in the time frame taken into account in this study; matteo renzi was not particularly active on the political scene the year after the 2018 general elections; etc.). our corpus consists of tweets collected from 4 march 2018 (the elections day) to 4 march 2019. prior to the topic modelling, tweets are processed as follows: functional words (i.e., articles, prepositions, determiners), numbers and one-character tokens were removed. we chose not to stem the words in our corpus, since stemming does not perform particularly well on highly inflected languages like italian with the tools at hand (saharia et al., 2013; singh and gupta, 2016).8 after textual processing and cleaning, the final dataset contained 13,522 original tweets. 6 de sio et al (2017) use manual coding to analyse the policy content of twitter messages in the framework of the issue-yield theory developed by the author. 7 since matteo salvini was by far the most active italian politician on twitter, the lega is represented in our corpus by him alone; fdi, leu and piùeuropa are represented by two leaders each, fi and pd by three leaders, while m5s by three mps and by giuseppe conte who was indicated as prime minister by the m5s. 8 we are aware that pre-processing decisions can influence final results (denny and spirling 2018). it should be noted, however, that we follow standard practices in text analysis in order to process our data (grimmer and stewart 2013). combei, farnè, pinto and giannetti 229 table 2. selected politicians. to explore the content of italian political communication on twitter during our one-year timeframe, we opt for a topic model approach instead of manual coding, as the former is effortless, and less time-consuming and more unbiased than the latter. in particular, in this work, we employ the structural topic model (stm) (roberts et al. 2014; roberts et al., 2016) to inductively identify the content of the selected political actor’s communication. stm is a generative model of word counts and it is part of the unsupervised learning methods that use modelling assumptions and text properties to estimate general semantic themes (i.e., topics) within a corpus, and to simultaneously organize texts on the basis of word co-occurrences. unlike other methods for topic modelling such as the latent dirichlet allocation (blei et al. 2003) and correlated topic model (blei and lafferty, 2007), in the stm, the prior distribution of topics may be varied as a function of covariates (roberts et al. 2014). this feature enables the examination of relationships among variables in a regression-like scheme, to uncover covariation with respect to topical prevalence. in this study we use the stm approach on single words to examine whether the content of political communication on twitter varies as a function of the ideology and populism scores introduced in the previous section. for this reason, we use as covariates in our model some party-based variables, namely left-right positions, ‘populism in manifestos’ scores, a measure of the anti-establishment attitude and the party dummy. we also add the temporal metadatum of tweets (more precisely, the week). as a result, we model how the party structure impacts on the occurrence of topics over time. in order to establish the ideal number of topics, we perform several tests, such as heldpolitician party office ignazio la russa fdi senate giorgia meloni fdi chamber of deputies anna maria bernini fi senate maria rosaria carfagna fi chamber of deputies antonio tajani fi presidency of the european parliament vice-presidency of fi matteo salvini lega senate laura boldrini leu chamber of deputies pietro grasso leu senate giuseppe conte m5s head of the council of ministers roberto fico m5s chamber of deputies luigi di maio m5s chamber of deputies danilo toninelli m5s senate roberto giachetti pd chamber of deputies maurizio martina pd chamber of deputies nicola zingaretti pd secretary of pd emma bonino piùeuropa senate bruno tabacci piùeuropa chamber of deputies populism and policy 230 out likelihood, semantic coherence and residual analysis. accordingly, we select the 20 topics-model, which has high held-out likelihood and semantic coherence as well as low residual deviance. finally, after topic extraction, we apply a fractional logit model to explore the populist tone of political communication by examining the language through which the various issues are debated on twitter. 4. results in this section we first present the topics identified by means of the stm, then we analyse the covariance structure of topical prevalence, and finally, we show which topics seem to display populist tones. figure 2 shows the 20 topics of the stm analysis together with the labels we assigned them based on our examination of the first 10 words that characterize each topic and our reading of the most exemplary documents, for example, tweet chunks that have the highest proportion of words associated with each topic (see appendix b for examples). based on our reading, we were able to cluster topics into four main issues or policy areas: economic policies, immigration, infrastructure/environment and the eu. this implies that political communications display policy content. by examining the topics regarding the economic policies, the content of topics 5 (see tajani’s tweet in appendix b) and 13 (see giachetti’s tweet in appendix b) is associated with the 2018 annual budget bill (‘manovra’), a key measure where the government agreed on plans to increase spending, in an unprecedented move against the eu. moreover, the immigration issue is heavily present in our data (topics 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 16, 20). a closer look at most of these topics shows that the word ‘immigration’ is strongly associated with terms such as ‘security’ (see salvini’s tweet for topic 8 in appendix b) and ‘border controls’ (see meloni’s tweet for topic 6 in appendix b). consistently with other evidence from the literature (urso 2018), this suggests that the immigration issue was framed mostly in securitarian terms. topics 9, 11, 14 and 17 refer to environmental policy, mentioning the most debated infrastructure measure, namely the tav project (see fico’s tweet for topic 11 and di maio’s tweet for topic 17 in appendix b). the dispute over the eu, which permeated the public debate over the time period under consideration, is only slightly reflected in topics 12 (see di maio’s tweet in appendix b) and 19 (see bernini’s tweet in appendix b). other topics do not refer to policy issues, being related to intra-party dynamics within the pd (topic 1 refers to pd’s primaries, see giachetti’s tweet in appendix b) and in an explicit way to the local elections, such as topics 2 (see meloni’s tweet in appendix b), 3 and 15 (see salvini’s tweets in appendix b). however, topics related to the immigration issue are the most prevalent, as they show an overall estimated topic proportion larger than 0.35. the stm also manages to grasp the variation in the attention to the issues that occupied the centre stage in the public debate over the year taken into consideration in this study.9 topics related to immigration prevail throughout the year, but several significant peaks are reported, for instance, at the end of april 2018 when italy, cyprus, greece and malta sent a document to the european commission against the eu reform on the 9 we do not report a graph about temporal distribution of topics for the sake of brevity. see combei and giannetti (2020) for further details. combei, farnè, pinto and giannetti 231 reception of asylum seekers by the landing countries; and in february 2019 when the interior minister salvini refused to allow the asylum seekers on two rescue boats in the malta sea to dock at italian ports. topics concerning infrastructure (topic 9, see di maio’s tweet in appendix b) are mostly debated in mid-august 2018, when the morandi bridge collapsed, killing 43 people. also, in the first months of 2019 the discussion regarding the turin–lyon high-speed railway (tav) was intense, and this peak was mainly reflected in topics 14 and 17. the debate on economic policy remains constant throughout the year, with an increase in attention prior to the approval of the annual budget bill for 2019. the stm also captured variations in the attention devoted to local elections when the time of their occurrence approached (topic 2, 3 and 15). the topic descriptions as well as their temporal distributions highlight the fact that tweets posted by italian political actors tended to reflect everyday politics (e.g., local elections) and real-time events (e.g. the collapse of the morandi bridge). this notwithstanding, policy issues emerge as the main content of public communication, providing evidence that political actors use twitter to address policy demands. figure 2. distribution of topics. source: own elaboration. to explore explicitly the impact of populist attitudes on the political debate, we build another stm model where we test the interaction effect of the variables related to ideology and populism on topic distribution and topical prevalence.10 the two covariates are the left-right continuum and a dummy variable that assigns 0 to non-populist parties (i.e., fdi, fi, leu, pd, piùeuropa) and 1 to populist parties (i.e., lega and m5s). we opted 10 we also run different model specifications without including the interaction. since the results do not change significantly across the different specifications, and since the maximum of the lower bound on the marginal likelihood of the observed data occurs with our original model (grimmer 2011), the latter is the one that we present here. populism and policy 232 for using a dummy variable coding the parties with a populism score higher than 50 as populist, and those with a score lower than 50 as not populist. despite the fact that our categorization is based on a continuous variable, the previous choice aims to make it easier to interpret the data. the topics remain mostly the same as those in figure 2, apart from topic 15, which in this new model is related to immigration. figure 3 suggests that a right-wing populist party – such as the lega − was mainly concerned with the immigration issue (e.g., in topics 7, 8, 15) and with local elections (e.g., topic 3). a left-wing populist party such as the m5s focuses on infrastructure/environment (e.g., topics 9 and 11) but also on immigration (e.g. topics 6 and 10). the configuration of topics 4 and 16 shows that more traditional right-wing parties such as fdi also focus on the immigration issue (see meloni’s tweets in appendix b). in general, the left-right positioning of parties and their populist attitude seem to interact differently depending on the topic. this control works as an implicit validation of the first stm output. figure 3. topic distribution as a function of ideology and populism. source: own elaboration. on the whole, these results highlight that high populism scores lead to high expected topic proportions on issues concerning immigration and, less often, infrastructure/environment. in our corpus, economic issues and the eu were mostly discussed by the representatives of non-populist parties. the analysis carried out so far deals with the content of political communication, i.e., topical prevalence as a function of ideology and populism. in what follows we shift our focus to the tone of political communication, exploring the extent to which different topics displayed a populist character. we estimated a fractional logit model (papke and woolridge, 1996) where the average populism score of any single topic is related to the combei, farnè, pinto and giannetti 233 average populism score in the entire corpus of tweets.11 the populism scores in topics are obtained by applying our dictionary to the tweets pertaining to each topic. figure 4 reports the conditional boxplot of populism scores by topic prevalence. topics 11 and 17, related to infrastructures, present the highest medians, while topics 6 and 10, related to immigration, show the most prominent positive outliers. below, we report the fractional logit model results, which are intended to test the significance of the different populism score levels across topics. topics 10 and 17 present on average the highest populism score compared to all the other topics, with a p-value of 0.0201 and 0.0377 respectively (see di maio’s tweet in appendix b). topics 4 and 16 show the lowest ones, with a p-value of 0.0905 and 0.0781 respectively. predictably, topic 10 mainly deals with immigration from the viewpoint of populist parties, while topic 17 deals with infrastructures from the viewpoint of m5s. topics 4 and 16 also deal with the immigration issue but from the much more traditional stance of giorgia meloni, the leader of fdi (see meloni’s tweets in appendix b). figure 4. conditional boxplot of populism score by topic prevalence. source: own elaboration. in order to detect the most significant pairwise differentials among topics in terms of populism score, we then re-estimated four times the same fractional logit model. in particular, we set the expected populism score of each of the four mentioned outstanding topics as a reference level. as a result, we can derive the following ranking among significant and positive populism score differentials: 1) topic 17 (infrastructure in the m5s view) and topic 16 (immigration in the fdi view); 2) topic 10 (immigration in the m5s and lega view) and topic 16; 3) topic 17 and topic 4 (immigration in the fdi view); 4) topic 10 and topic 4; 5) topic 11 (infrastructure in the m5s view) and topic 16; 6) topic 1 (pd primary elections) and topic 16; 7) topic 11 and topic 4; 8) topic 1 and topic 4. the differentials listed above can be interpreted as maximal polarities in terms of populist language. for example, the infrastructure issue is mostly permeated by populist 11 the estimation is performed via the glm() function in the r studio environment and relies on the work on quasi maximum likelihood by gourieroux, monfort and trognon (1984). populism and policy 234 tones in topic 17 in comparison to topic 16 or topic 4. also, regarding the immigration issue, populist tones are more prevalent in topic 10 as compared to topic 4. to sum up, the described ranking of topics in terms of populist tone seems to reflect the different language of political parties associated with some crucial issues. our analysis shows, in fact, that the most populist tweets are written by m5s on infrastructure and by the lega on immigration, while the least populist tweets (for different reasons) are written by fdi and pd on immigration. 5. conclusions in this study we performed an inductive study of the political discourse on twitter with the purpose of examining the policy and populism dimensions of political communication. we collected an original data set of about 25,000 tweets posted by a number of italian politicians from different parties over a year, starting from the day of the 2018 general elections in italy. we applied the stm technique to capture the policy content of the debate on the twitter public forum in the period under consideration. we categorized italian political parties using estimates of their policy positions on the left-right and the populism dimensions. to assign populism scores we used an ad hoc dictionary through which we content-analysed party manifestos. the ideological position and populism scores were instrumental in explaining the covariation of topic prevalence. our results suggest that actors from populist parties were mostly interested in emphasizing the immigration issue, although to a different extent. the debate on immigration was dominated by the lega, suggesting that the party kept prioritizing the issue that occupied centre stage in its electoral campaign. it is remarkable that also the m5s was active, although to a lesser extent, on the issue of immigration. moreover, the m5s emphasized infrastructure that had been an essential component of its pro-environment stance. the immigration issue was also emphasized by fdi which, according to our data, belongs to the more 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(2001). clarifying a contested concept: populism in the study of latin american politics. comparative politics, 34(1), 1 populism and policy 238 appendix a the populism dictionary was applied to the scaled and normalized texts of the party manifestos of each of the parties considered in this study. before this, we validated the dictionary on the m5s and pd platforms issued for the 2018 general elections (see table 1 below). even if party manifestos are generally used to estimate policy positions, the two documents were judged to be different also in terms of populist rhetoric on the basis of a priori knowledge. to test the accuracy of the populism dictionary, we used normalized frequencies (per million) for each of the stemmed words of the dictionary (see table 1, in section 2) and we compared their values between the two parties. our assumption seems to be justified, as words such as ‘popolo’, ‘corruz*’, ‘elite’, ‘cast*’, ‘onest*’ are more frequent for m5s than for pd (see the validation table below). it is also confirmed by the results of a chi-square test showing statistical significance in terms of the differences between the frequencies obtained for m5s and pd (chi-squared = 1072.6, df = 20, p-value < 2.1e-16. table a1. validation of the populist dictionary – descriptive statistics. frequency per million in m5s party platform frequency per million in pd party platform mean 83.66 mean 33.86 standard error 38.59 standard error 15.87 standard deviation 144.40 standard deviation 59.40 confidence level (95.0%) 83.37 confidence level (95.0%) 34.30 combei, farnè, pinto and giannetti 239 appendix b exemplar documents – examples of tweets pertaining to each topic topic 1: “ho appena chiamato nicola zingaretti, che sarà il prossimo segretario del pd per complimentarmi per il suo risultato ed anche per il risultato della partecipazione alla quale abbiamo contribuito tutti #altrochemacerie” (roberto giachetti @bobogiac on twitter, 3 march 2019) topic 2: “#molise complimenti e buon lavoro a #toma. questa vittoria ottenuta col fondamentale contributo di #fdi, unico partito che cresce rispetto alle politiche, è un'altra indicazione per #mattarella: gli italiani vogliono un governo e un programma di centrodestra st.” (giorgia meloni @giorgiameloni on twitter, 23 april 2018) topic 3: “grazie! dalle elezioni politiche a oggi se c’è una cosa certa è che su sei consultazioni elettorali, la lega vince 6 a 0 sul pd. e come in abruzzo anche in #sardegna è la prima volta che ci presentiamo alle regionali. grazie per la fiducia, amici! 💪😊 #elezioniregionalisardegna” (matteo salvini @matteosalvinimi on twitter, 25 february 2019) topic 4: “pazzesco! 41 migranti della #diciotti chiedono il ‘risarcimento danni’ al governo. ecco a voi la gratitudine per averli salvati e accolti...” (giorgia meloni @giorgiameloni on twitter, 21 february 2019) topic 5: “i cittadini sono preoccupati per i loro risparmi, per il lavoro e per il futuro dei figli. il governo deve fare marcia indietro. #manovra” (antonio tajani @antonio_tajani on twitter 2 december 2018) topic 6: “servono centri di protezione europei nei paesi di origine e di transito per accelerare identificazione e richieste di asilo dei migranti. è una delle soluzioni che proponiamo per arginare traffici di esseri umani e rispettare i diritti umani.” (giuseppe conte @giuseppeconteit on twitter, 15 june 2018) topic 7: “uomo avvisato, mezzo salvato: stamattina mi hanno informato che c'è una nave di una ong tedesca in arrivo verso la libia: sappiano che con il loro carico di immigrati clandestini questi signori non arriveranno mai.” (matteo salvini @matteosalvinimi on twitter, 19 february 2019) topic 8: “stroncato ‘tour operator’ di clandestini 25 indagati (quasi tutti somali), 11 arrestati e 5 ricercati. la centrale operativa era l’ex moi di torino, occupato da immigrati dal 2015, che abbiamo iniziato a populism and policy 240 sgomberare. #dalleparoleaifatti!” (matteo salvini @matteosalvinimi on twitter, 16 february 2019) topic 9: “se chi ha fatto la concessione regalo ad autostrade e chi non l'ha annullata ha causato un danno alle casse dello stato sarà denunciato alla corte dei conti per danno erariale! è ora che i ministri che hanno autorizzato tale follia paghino di tasca propria.” (luigi di maio @luigidimaio on twitter, 28 august 2018) topic 10: “queste sono le parole che ha pronunciato macron. sono offensive e fuori luogo. la vera lebbra è l'ipocrisia di chi respinge gli immigrati a ventimiglia e vuole farci la morale sul diritto sacrosanto di chiedere una equa ripartizione dei migranti. la solidarietà o è europea o non è.” (luigi di maio @luigidimaio on twitter, 21 june 2018) topic 11: “la mia lettera a @lastampa sulle grandi opere: la battaglia #notav è una battaglia ambientale, sociale e di visione del mondo diversa.” (roberto fico @roberto_fico on twitter, 12 december 2018) topic 12: “’i mercati vi insegneranno a votare’. le parole del commissario europeo #oettinger sono assurde. questa gente tratta l'italia come una colonia estiva dove venire a passare le vacanze. ma tra pochi mesi nascerà un governo del cambiamento e in europa ci faremo finalmente rispettare.” (luigi di maio @luigidimaio on twitter, 29 may 2018) topic 13: “in parlamento ci siamo opposti all’assurda manovra di lega e m5s. l'hanno approvata lo stesso, in barba a tutte le regole democratiche e al buonsenso. oggi siamo in piazza per discuterne con i cittadini. è il governo delle tasse e delle bugie. #promessemancate #cambiodirotta” (roberto giachetti @bobogiac on twitter, 12 january 2019) topic 14: “la revisione della relazione costi benefici sulla #tav per adattarla a quello che hanno deciso di fare è incredibile. #toninelli se ne deve andare a casa perché è un ministro totalmente inadeguato. giusta la mozione di sfiducia.” (maurizio martina @maumartina on twitter, 1 march 2019) topic 15: “amici abruzzesi, domani torno da voi e trascorro la mia domenica in provincia di #chieti! vi aspetto in tantissimi a #vasto alle 16 e a #lanciano alle 18. alle elezioni del 10 febbraio, se siamo in tanti, mandiamo a casa il pd anche da voi! passaparola. #10febbraiovotolega” (matteo salvini @matteosalvinimi on twitter, 19 january 2019) topic 16: “#seawatch, lo ripeto per la milionesima volta, esiste una terza via tra accogliere tutti e la chiusura dei porti: è il blocco navale. l’unica soluzione seria per fermare le partenze, le ong e gli scafisti e impedire così le morti in mare e tutelare la salute dei migranti.” (giorgia meloni @giorgiameloni on twitter, 25 january 2019) combei, farnè, pinto and giannetti 241 topic 17: “bene la votazione del consiglio comunale di torino sul tav! presto io e @danilotoninelli incontreremo @c_appendino per continuare a dare attuazione al contratto di governo” (luigi di maio @luigidimaio on twitter, 29 october 2018) topic 18: “manovra approvata, più di 20 miliardi restituiti ai cittadini. gli italiani non hanno nostalgia di monti, renzi e fornero. avanti tutta! live” (matteo salvini @matteosalvinimi on twitter, 30 december 2018) topic 19: “@ottoemezzotw non c’è un’ #europa buona e una cattiva. l’europa è uno straordinario strumento e non ci sta certamente ricattando. spesso gli diamo responsabilità che sono legate a nostre incapacità, come ad esempio quelle di utilizzare al meglio i fondi comunitari. #ottoemezzo” (anna maria bernini @berniniam on twitter, 15 may 2018) topic 20: “sull’immigrazione è arrivato il momento di cambiare pagina: chi mette piede in italia, mette piede in europa. e nessuno, in europa, può pensare di restare estraneo e lavarsi le mani rispetto a questo problema.” (giuseppe conte @giuseppeconteit on twitter, 15 june 2018) microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 43-44. pietro grilli di cortona and argentina maría matilde ollier university of san martín osvaldo iazzetta hugo quiroga university of rosario ietro grilli di cortona shared with us a desire for understanding the challenges faced by contemporary democracy across national borders. in the last years of his life, pietro participated in a joint academic venture involving roma tre university – which he was part of — and a group of argentinian researchers belonging to las nuevas formas políticas (a research team at university of buenos aires’ instituto gino germani) and university of san martin’s school of politics and government. the first academic meeting in that exchange program was held in rome (2014) and hosted by pietro. in 2015, the second meeting took place in buenos aires, but pietro excused himself for not being able to travel and sent us his article. soon after that, we were told he had passed away. our joint venture, however, lived on, and the articles discussed in both meetings were gathered in 2016, in a book that obviously included pietro’s work and was published in memoriam for him. this book was launched at roma tre in november 2016,1 giving us the opportunity to pay tribute to him with his closest relatives and fellow researchers. pietro had already earned renown and respect for his work both in italy and beyond. in 2013, he had been elected as chairman of the società italiana di scienza politica (sisp) and authored a vast array of books and papers on democratization, democratic regimes, and the fall of non-democratic regimes. the books he wrote or co-wrote with other prestigious italian authors will continue to be a key source of knowledge for those who share his interest on those issues.2 we could mention all the subjects he broached along his academic career, but we find ourselves specially attached to the article he prepared for our meetings, which was finally included in the book we launched in rome (2016). under the title ¿crisis o transformación? cómo cambia la democracia [crisis or transformation? how democracy changes], he wrote a solid scholarly chapter that brilliantly, yet disappointedly, addresses the main challenges facing contemporary democracy. his deep insight into the world around us strikes us as much as his sensitivity throughout the discussion of such challenges. pietro 1 osvaldo iazzetta and maria rosaria stabili (eds), las transformaciones de la democracia. miradas cruzadas entre europa y américa latina, buenos aires, editorial prometeo, università roma tre, 2016. 2 for a detailed review of his work, see barbara pisciotta’s article in this volume. p ollier, iazzetta and quiroga, pietro grilli di cortona and argentina 44 identifies the main sources of unrest hurting contemporary democracy, and he notices that, rather than a crisis, a transformation is taking place which will gradually and systematically redirect it towards a new dimension for its liberal features. major threats no longer come, as they used to, from external enemies that openly oppose democracy, but from self-proclaimed democrats who seek to transform it from within. it seems paradoxical that these dangers are lurking in a period when democracy is spreading all across the world as a successful model and few people dare to explicitly question its value. growing citizen dissatisfaction with democracy’s institutional performance and with its meager results is a breeding ground for such threats. there are multiple signs of unrest and discontent over old democracies, stemming not only from their representatives’ failure to comply but also from the systemic limitations faced by democracy in a globalized world where politics have become less central and have proven to be powerless in avoiding the transfer of decision-making processes to domains that fall outside the scope of democratic control. this is bringing into crisis some key democratic institutions, such as elections, which are seeing an increase in citizen abstention. indeed, pietro poses the following question: how can we expect constituents to still believe that voting is useful, effective, and essential for a democracy while elections are becoming increasingly irrelevant when it comes to defining the course of the policies adopted by our governments? these concerns, expressed by pietro in the article he wrote in 2015, have turned out to be premonitory, as they anticipate with an insightful perception some of the events that would later shake the democratic scene in europe and the united states, such as brexit, president trump’s victory, mr renzi´s defeat in the referendum on italy’s political reform, and the specter of populism spreading its wings all over europe. all of them are signs of public discontent and they account for an anti-establishment cleavage that feeds on said discontent. there lies the key worth of his article, and we suggest that it be read in this tone. although there is a sense of disenchantment hovering over pietro’s concerns, he is wise enough to recognize that democracy is no longer –and will never bewhat it used to be, while still trying to find new ways to understand and exercise it as a condition to provide it with some relevance and density in today’s world. pietro’s hopeful disenchantment is a goodbye of sorts, a true legacy that deserves to be valued in its full dimension. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_3_capano [tp].docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 3 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 3, 305–315. contact author: giliberto capano, university of bologna. e-mail address: giliberto.capano@unibo.it a paper in [the profession] series we did well enough. systemic reforms, changes in recruitment procedures and the evolution of italian political science giliberto capano university of bologna abstract italian political science has evolved over time, dealing with various reforms and changes in the structure of academic careers and procedures for recruitment that have characterised the recent decades of the italian university system. this paper reflects on how these changes have challenged the foundational identity of italian political science and how they have influenced its development as a community of scholars. three relevant dynamics emerge: the shift from a national and centralised community to a set of local networks of scholars, the capacity to perform well in terms of professional standards, and the risk that the capacity to reproduce the discipline’s identity, or at least its foundational core, could be significantly weakened. 1. introduction he institutionalisation of political science in italy has been the subject of a complex diachronic path whose different drivers and results have already been convincingly dealt with. we know a lot about the process of autonomisation from other disciplines (graziano 1986; morlino 1989; 1991), about the different drivers that have led to the asymmetric distribution of political science in italian universities and thus a significant concentration of political scientists in only a few of them (capano 20005; capano and verzichelli 2010), and about the level of internationalisation and social impact of the discipline (capano and verzichelli 2016). but while there is enough convincing research on various dimensions of the evolution and reality of italian political science, there is an analytical gap in grasping how the discipline has been reproducing itself and whether and how its foundational identity has been able to survive external challenges and changes. to embark on this kind of analysis it is important to remember that academic ‘disciplines are reservoirs of ways of knowing which, in dynamic combination with other structural phenomena, can condition behavioural practices, sets of discourses, ways of thinking, procedures, emotional responses and motivations. together this constellation of factors results in structured dispositions for disciplinary practitioners who, in conjunction with external forces, reshape them in different practice clusters into localised t [the profession] we did well enough 306 repertoires’ (trowler 2014, p. 24). thus, it has to be assumed that the evolution of italian political science, intended as a set of knowledge territories and common practices, has been embedded, constrained and influenced by external factors; of these, the characteristics of the higher education system are unavoidable drivers. according to the comparative literature on higher education policy, two factors are specifically relevant to understand the evolution of italian political science: systemic governance arrangements and the design of academic career structures. systemic governance arrangements design the field of action of universities and thus the set of constraints and incentives that structure their autonomous strategies regarding the development of academic disciplines (including hiring and promoting academics). the characteristics of the academic career structure directly influence both the choices of universities as well as individual strategies (bleikliem and michelsen 2013; fumasoli, goastellec and kehm 2015). thus, what italian political science actually is can be seen by understanding how its foundational identity has been touched or modified in practice by the changes that occur over time in university systems, in the rules structuring academic careers and in the practices of recruitment. by assuming this analytical perspective, in this short piece i analyse how changes in systemic governance arrangements, as well as in the rules structuring career paths, have impacted how italian political science originally defined itself and how it has had the opportunity to reproduce over time. the analysis is based on applying what we know about the evolution of the italian university system and some qualitative and quantitative data with my personal experience in a more-than-30-year career as a political scientist (with some experience in institutional positions and in recruitment committees at national and local levels). the analysis shows how many changes, at both the systemic governance level and in the rules on careers, have had some interesting implications for italian political science: first, the shift from a national, hierarchical but cohesive community with a mentionable propensity to internationalisation to a set of local networks of scholars in which there are some highly internationalised people; second, the capacity to perform relatively well, from a qualitative point of view, in each of the stages of the diachronic reforms; third, the risk that the decentralised structure of the community of political scientists could weaken the capacity to reproduce the discipline’s identity, or at least its foundational core. the paper is structured as follows: in the second section i will sketch out the foundational identity of italian political science. in the third section i will summarise changes at the systemic level and their effects on political science; in the fourth section i will reconstruct the diachronic evolution of the rules on academic hiring and career together with some considerations on its impact on political science. in the fifth section i will assess what have we done, where we are and what we should do. 2. the foundational identity of italian political science italian political science developed and was institutionalised between the 1960s and 1980s. it was a long and complex process of community-building and delimiting the borders of the disciplinary territory of knowledge by a group of masters (the founding father, giovanni sartori, together with alberto spreafico, domenico fisichella, giacomo sani, giliberto capano 307 giorgio freddi, giuseppe di federico, paolo farneti and giuliano urbani) who invested intellectual resources and time in making political science an autonomous field of study and embedding it in the university system (graziano 1986). there were two pillars in this community and disciplinary building: a deliberate empirical approach and ‘americanization’ (due to the close relationship that most of the masters had with the us in terms of training) (morlino 1991). this group of people and the following generation (stefano bartolini, luigi bonanate, mauro calise, maurizio cotta, roberto d’alimonte, carlo guarnieri, alfio mastropaolo, leonardo morlino, gianfranco pasquino,) built the national community (the rivista italiana di scienza politica being founded in 1971 and, in 1981, the italian association of political science). since the beginning, the founding community of italian political scientists has shared the idea of belonging to the international community of political scientists. thus, an international attitude has always been a constitutive part of the discipline. giovanni sartori accumulated a strong international reputation; the first chair-holder in public administration, giorgio freddi, earned his phd at berkeley, as did giacomo sani. the following generation of scholars, who are now retired (for example, stefano bartolini, maurizio cotta, bruno dente, carlo guarnieri, alfio mastropaolo, leonardo morlino and gianfranco pasquino), cannot be considered a parochial group: they have extensively published in international venues and were part of international research networks. furthermore, it was a strong community that decided to maintain its unity (notwithstanding a natural fragmentation due to different theoretical approaches and topics of research) on the basis of its foundational identity (empiricism, the sharing of basic common epistemological and methodological choices that can be applied to the various forms of the political phenomenon). what was being studied (international relations, bureaucracy, political parties, public policies, etc.) was not important; what was important was to be part of a community sharing the same way of knowing and professional practices. so, we could say that notwithstanding the characteristics of university systems and career structure, italian political science from the 1970s to the turn of the century was anchored to the international community. thus, publishing in international venues was not unusual (as it was in other disciplines among the so-called ‘political and social sciences’) (morlino 1989; 1991), and this helped maintain a common sense of belonging to a community bigger than the various subdisciplines and research topics. the high propensity for internationalisation is also demonstrated by the attachment and the persistent involvement of the founding fathers and the following generation in the activities and steering of the international political science association and of the european consortium of political research. the sense of community was so relevant that it pushed political scientists against their own interests in terms of expansion of the discipline in the university system. notwithstanding the university system’s prized division of disciplines, formally recognised by the ministry of education as scientific disciplinary sectors (the basic units for assigning academic positions and distinguishing the courses to be taught), italian political scientists have always been willing to maintain their unity and thus stay together in only one scientific sector. for example, in 2004, during the annual conference of the italian political science association, a proposal to divide into two scientific sectors was rejected by the assembly. if that choice had been made, it can be estimated that the academic [the profession] we did well enough 308 positions in political science could be 25-30% more than they are. but italian political scientists preferred to stay united. 3. systemic reforms and italian political science the italian university system has undergone various reforms in the last three decades (capano 1998; donina, meoli and paleari 2015; capano, regini and turri 2016). since the end of the 1980s, everything has changed in the main systemic arrangements. here it is relevant to focus on those systemic changes that have directly affected the evolution of political science in terms of a ‘reservoir’ of way of knowing and professional practices, among which the most relevant are the following: 1. the concession of institutional autonomy to universities; 2. the establishment and subsequent reforms of the phd programmes; 3. the introduction of a national research exercise. these changes contributed on the one hand to weakening the institutional incentives to maintain a cohesive community at the national level while, on the other hand, showed how the discipline has been capable of maintaining its original attitude towards internationalisation. institutional autonomy was introduced in 1989 and started to be fully operationalised in 1994 (capano 2010; capano, regini and turri 2016). this meant a significant change in how the university system works, especially in terms of increasing the freedom of universities to choose how to spend their resources and to be responsible for them. this has had a relevant impact in terms of the development of academic disciplines because its quantitative development has been completely dependent on local choices. without this change, we could not explain, for example, the incredible expansion of the discipline at the state university of milano (from three political scientists at the end of the 1980s to 24 today), or the decrease in florence (from 17 in 1999 to 10 today). institutional autonomy drastically changed the rules of the game in many dimensions of the dynamics of italian higher education, and, above all, it has weakened the role that academic guilds have played at the national level (clark 1983; capano 2008). one of the consequences of institutional autonomy has been, as we shall see, to give the power of recruiting to universities, thus softening the previous vertical coordination existing in political science that influenced the processes and choices in academic recruitment and promotions. the phd degree was established at the national level in 1980 and first implemented in 1985. this represented a watershed in the italian university system because it had been the only country in the western world that did not offer phd degrees. the phd level was established according to a highly centralised architecture: the number of positions (around 2,000-2,200 per year for all disciplines) was established and funded by the ministry of education, and they were distributed to a consortium of universities. in this centralised arrangement, the universities in which there was a significant presence of political scientists joined together to offer a unique national phd programme. it has to be underlined that during its existence, this national programme in political science offered between four and seven positions per year (fully covered by scholarships). this innovation was important for the institutionalisation and reproduction of political science. the programme had a three-year duration, and the students had to attend compulsory courses, mainly in florence (but also in bologna and pavia). this programme was designed to train a small number of prospective political scientists giliberto capano 309 according to a unified vision of the discipline. starting from 1999, a new national regulation, along with the autonomistic policy begun ten years before, changed the system by shifting from national to local phd programmes. the consequence was the establishment of various phd programmes in political science in pavia, milan, turin, siena, bologna (for a few years) and florence, which enrolled more than 25 students each year. this development significantly enlarged the number of younger political scientists (in a context of an increasing number of positions in the university system) while pushing towards a kind of partial specialisation of the offered programmes (which had an average of three to four positions each) (tronconi 2007). a new reform was introduced in 2013, and it completely changed the institutional framework by imposing very constraining rules that made it almost impossible to offer phd programmes purely in political science (above all, the requirement that each programme must offer at least six scholarships per year). thus, there is no phd which is fully devoted to political science in italy (except for one in milan), while there are many phd programmes in political and social sciences. these are offered by departments of political and social sciences that are composed of scholars belonging to various disciplines (law, history, sociology, political thought and philosophy, political science, and others). thus, due to the asymmetric distribution of political scientists within the university system (capano and verzichelli 2016), these phd programmes can offer very few positions in the discipline nationwide. the evolution of the institutional arrangement of phd degrees has thus contributed to softening the original national cohesion of the community of italian political scientists the establishment of the national research exercise (vqr) represented a watershed in the governance arrangements of italian higher education. inspired by the uk experience, it impacted how universities are funded, as well as how the academic community publishes. the reaction of italian political science is noteworthy. in fact, in both rounds of vqr (which assessed the research outputs of the periods 2004-2010 and 2011-2014), the discipline showed itself to be a forerunner in the field of social and political sciences when assessed in terms of internationalisation (measured as the percentage of submitted outputs published in international venues, mostly international journals). these data are interesting because they show the tendency of the discipline to overcome national borders and to consider internationalisation as a constitutive asset that predates (verzichelli 2014) the reform of 2010 and the recruitment system itself, as underlined above. 4. changes in recruitment procedures and their effects on italian political scientists the design of an academic career system can be seen from three different points of view (olsen, kyvik and hovdhaugen 2005): • from the systemic side, it is a tool for increasing the performance of the higher education system (the better professors are, the more probable it is that the systemic performance will increase in teaching and research). • from the institutional side, it is a tool to increase the quality of staff and to cover new, specialised fields. [the profession] we did well enough 310 • from the individual side, it is a tool that should be competitive and meritocratic and capable of motivating in terms of career recognition. these characteristics have been mixed together in different ways and have produced various paths; in many countries, especially in recent decades, these characteristics have been reformed to find a better equilibrium, especially in europe (fumasoli, goastellec and kehm 2015). the italian university system has changed the rules regarding the careers of academics various times since the unification of the country in a continuous attempt to find an equilibrium between systemic, institutional and individual interests. however, the adopted solutions have been characterised by a recurrent pendulum movement between the centralisation and decentralisation of choices and by the cyclical use of the same tools (for example, members of national or local selection committees are elected, drawn or both in various combinations; the need to obtain a qualification as a necessary condition to apply for a post vs free ability to apply for a post). this is done in a context in which, since the beginning, the pillar of the system has been the so-called ‘concorso pubblico’, a type of formal competition that is based on the selection of the best candidates without any specific reference to the strategic plan or mission of the hiring institution, and based on apparently strict formal procedures. however, what is interesting in this diachronic evolution is that it has been characterised by a never-ending process of changes to the rules (moretti and porciani 1997). this is due to the fact that the system has always been considered unsatisfactory because it is characterised by particularism, nepotism, favouritism and patronage due to the prevalence of the interests of academic guilds (giglioli 1979; moscati 2001; palermo 2010). it has been underlined that these characteristics have been a favourable condition for a high rate of academic inbreeding, especially after the reforms to recruitment in 1998 (see below). the major relevant changes for political science in italy are those starting from the 1970s. however, it is relevant that in 1970 the old system of recruitment, established in 1933, was abolished. one of the pillars of that system was the so called ‘libera docenza’, a national qualification (similar to the german privatdozent) granted in a national contest by a committee composed of full professors. earning this qualification was a prerequisite for applying for the position of professor, as well as being granted tenure in the position of ‘assistente ordinario’ (a mix of the assistant and associate professor positions). when this qualification was abolished, there were in italy around 3,200 professors in the university system, while the number of those qualified to be professors (‘liberi docenti’) was around 17,000, even though only 6,114 were actually giving courses in the university system (martinotti 1972). during the 1970s there were various innovations in the recruitment system, and there was also an increase in the number of professorial positions. therefore, there were chances to appoint new professors in political science, and the positions were more numerous than the candidates. in 1980, a structural reform to career paths and the process of recruitment was approved, providing for a tripartition of academic careers and for a recruitment process based on national competitions for a fixed number of posts established by the ministry of education, which were assigned by committees of professors chosen through a mixed procedure (elections and draw). this system has been highly giliberto capano 311 criticised because it was considered a way to reproduce the power of academic guilds, schools and networks, while it left little choice to the universities. however, it has to be observed that if we focus on how this system impacted the development of italian political science, these cons were partially counterbalanced by two pros. first, the system was obliged to have some level of mobility (very often, the posts of associate and full professor were at different universities from those to which the winners belonged). second, in the case of political science, unlike many other disciplines, this centralised procedure and the related power in the hands of the national ‘barons’ did not produce significantly negative outputs as seen from an aggregate and diachronic perspective.1 this system was abandoned in 1998 with law 210 (the so-called berlinguer reform) that deeply re-decentralised the recruitment system. this law provided for a system in which the competition for posts became local and universities could decide in which disciplines to activate positions. for each competition, the elected committees should choose the two best candidates (three for the first two years following approval of the law) who thus obtained the qualification to be appointed. those qualified could be directly appointed by the universities. this new system was in force until 2007 when, under the pressure of italian rectors, who could not resist the pressure of those who were qualified and who wanted to be appointed, it was established that there could be only one qualified candidate per each local competition. the 1998 reform was highly impactful for the university system because it delegated all powers locally. this implied a significant decrease in mobility as well as a dramatic asymmetry in the chances of being promoted because the possibility of being appointed at a higher rank was dependent only on the financial capabilities of single universities and local academic logics and games of power. these general effects also applied to political science. first of all, the decentralisation of the recruitment system deeply weakened the previous national coordination dynamics. on the one hand, this could be considered positive because the new local-centred processes favoured the possibility of developing local strategies based on specific choices of specialisation and development. on the other hand, there has been a negative effect, which is the easing of the requirements to earn a professorial promotion/position. under centralised coordination, the criteria of assessment were negotiated between all the major ‘barons’, while in the decentralised system, all the decisional powers are in the hands of the local ‘barons’. the consequence was a mix of local practices that have fragmented standards and weakened disciplinary identity. political scientists also experienced the asymmetric distribution of chances for promotion and a dramatic freezing of mobility. finally, the 1998 reform has been highly criticised because it is considered coherent with the historical vices of the italian system. while it was designed to escape from the logics of power of national academic guilds and give more power to institutions, its implementation produced a triumph of local patronage and institutionalised a high level of academic inbreeding. this paradoxical effect was not unexpected: in the absence of any rule to avoid inbreeding (by law as in france or by institutionalised practices as in the anglo-saxon systems) there is a structural incentive to promote scholars belonging 1anyone can view the lists of the winners of the national competitions for associate and full professors held from 1980 to 1998 (there were three rounds for associates and three rounds for full professor); unlike in other disciplines, there are very few questionable cases. [the profession] we did well enough 312 to the same institution (this is also due to the fact that internal promotions cost much less than external recruitments). after 2010, the pendulum swung again, with the new system designed by the gelmini reform attempting to contrast localism. it was decided to establish a national system for earning the qualification for associate or full professor which became a requirement to apply for local competitions. furthermore, the 2010 law changed the career structure: from the three tenured positions introduced by the 1980 reform to a system based on two tenured positions (associate and full professor) and with the establishment of the assistant professor tenure track position (after three years, associate tenure is substantially guaranteed if the assistant professor has the national qualification to be an associate). regarding the qualification procedure (abilitazione scientifica nazionale, or asn), the new rules substantially propose a new systemic application of the ‘qualification’ procedure, mixing together the previous system of the ‘libera docenza’ and the local procedure established with the 1998 reform. the logic behind this choice was to impose some minimal standards for potential candidates applying for local competitions and thus to limit the discretion of committees and universities. this new system did not change the prevalence of localistic interests or the asymmetric chances of being promoted. at the systemic level, 83% of the competitions for associate or full professor posts have been won by scholars belonging to the institutions that launched the calls. substantially, the new system works mostly to promote internal candidates (abramo and d’angelo 2020). the results at the systemic level are confirmed for political science: out of 21 positions open from 2010 to december 2020, 13 were won by internal candidates and the other eight by external ones, but in the latter cases there were no internal candidates with the right qualifications to be full professors.2 the same dynamics are seen in the competitions for associate professor posts (only those without internal candidates with qualifications were won by external candidates). the new system significantly limited any kind of mobility and further increased the inbreeding dynamics. it appears that the new procedure has developed like the ‘libera docenza’ system, in which many obtained qualifications without any real chance of attaining positions. for example, at this time, there are around 50 scholars (mostly associate professors) working in italy with the qualifications for full professor: without some extraordinary national funding, very few of them will have the chance of promotion. the chances of being promoted in the same institution depend on its financial wealth, while the chances of being promoted in another institution depend on the eventuality that the competition is not constrained by the presence of internal candidates. all in all, the new career system, together with the new recruitment and promotion procedure, may allow some real room to recruit only at the level of assistant professor, while at the levels of associate and full professor, the institutional constraints drive universities to use the local competition to upgrade their internal members when they possess the national qualifications. 2 these data refer to open contests, while the law provides also for another procedure allowing also for internal calls where only internal candidates can apply (in effect a promotion procedure). this type of internal call has been used only four times in three universities since 2012. giliberto capano 313 it has to be remembered that the asn has also provided for the establishment of a national list of scientific journals in which scholars (including political scientists) are incentivised to publish in order to reach the minimal standards required to apply for the national qualification for a professorship. this institutional provision has further pushed italian political scientists to reach for international publishing targets for the results of their research. as is shown by the vqr data, italian political scientists have been forerunners in social sciences in the country regarding the internationalisation of their publications. so, the effect of this new rule has been to boost one of the constitutive elements of foundational identity (a strong propensity to internationalisation): indeed, in the last rounds of the asn the candidates presented a massive number of international publications. this is surely a positive effect because it shows a full inclusion of the discipline in the international debate. on the other hand, however, this would call for a change in methods of assessing the scientific profiles of new generations of political scientists. in other words, if most people publish their research outputs in international venues, the added value of being internationalised, which was rewarding until a decade ago, is nullified. therefore, there should be a collective reflection on what quality is and how to assess it to become a tenured political scientist. 5. we did well enough, but we should not forget the core of our foundational identity contemporary italian political science has the luck of having been founded by a group of highly distinguished scholars who had a strong vision of what the discipline should be. the original imprinting based on empiricism and internationalisation imposed a demanding standard for becoming a political scientist and has contributed to institutionalising the discipline as a clearly distinct way of knowing that has persisted across different systemic contexts and maintained a relevant, shared sense of belonging to a national community. this is because at every age of the diachronic development of the university system, political science has been capable of performing well enough in terms of training, recruiting and promoting and internationalisation. the standard was always above average until the centralisation of the recruitment system. with the full working of the autonomistic policy and with recruitment and phd systems being decentralised, the situation has become more complex. the national community of political scientists has been weakened by these changes, and now it is more fragmented not only in terms of hierarchy but also in terms of standards and disciplinary practices. it is more local. however, to counterbalance these dynamics, political science’s constitutive propensity for internationalisation has increased the number of italian political scientists involved in international networks and research groups. thus, the hegemony of the national dimension has been substituted by a plurality of differentiated local networks and practices (with a general individual propensity to internationalisation in publishing and a few scholars being highly internationalised) that sometimes are in competition or conflict with each other. this result is indicative of the richness of italian political science: varieties of perspectives and research practices can reinforce the scientific progress of a discipline and make it more competitive and reputed in an international environment (balietti, maas and helbing 2015). at the same time, this fragmentation can originate too many differences in standards of assessment [the profession] we did well enough 314 and in career paths that can undermine the persistence of the original identity of the discipline. these dynamics of localisation are common in other disciplines and are reinforced by the pressure for interdisciplinarity. these phenomena are unavoidable, but this does not mean that they should structurally determine specific consequences for italian political science. all in all, we have done well enough, and we are still doing well, notwithstanding the structural conditions and dynamics in higher education policy. contrary to the notion that the conditions of political scientists (in terms of quality and career chances) are better today compared to the past, i have tried to show that this judgement is misleading. italian political science has been capable of performing well enough in the different systemic contexts that have characterised the university system in the last 50 years. however, if we are not aware of where we come from, of what has been done and of what (and why) the situation is, we risk being unable to maintain a common way of knowing and developing an excessive amount of local practices. thus, there is a high risk of losing that ‘common background knowledge about key figures, conflicts and achievements’ (trowler, 2014, p. 25) that is fundamental to maintaining disciplinary identity and the capacity to preserve the foundational core of italian political science. this is something on which a community of scholars should reflect and try to determine if there is room for a collective attempt to influence the destiny of the discipline against structural and environmental changes. references abramo, g. d’angelo, c.a. (2020) were the italian policy reforms to contrast favoritism and foster effectiveness in faculty recruitment successful?. science and public policy, published in early view 8 december. balietti s., mäs m., helbing d. (2015). on disciplinary fragmentation and scientific progress. plos one 10(3): e0118747. bleiklie, i., & michelsen, s. (2013). comparing higher education policies in europe—structures and reform outputs in eight countries. higher education, 65(1): 113–133. capano, g. (1998). la politica universitaria. bologna: il mulino. capano, g. (2005). abbiamo quello che meritiamo? l’insegnamento della scienza politica nelle università italiane. rivista italiana di scienza politica 35(3): 495-524. capano, g. (2008). looking for serendipity: the problematical reform of government within italy’s universities. higher education, 55(4), 481–504 capano, g. (2010). a sisyphean task. evaluation and institutional accountability in italian higher education, higher education policy 23(1): 3962. capano, g., and verzichelli l. (2016). looking for eclecticism? structural and contextual factors underlying political science’s relevance gap. european political science 15(1): 211– 32 capano, g., regini, m., and turri, m. (2016). changing governance in universities. italian higher education in comparative perspective. london: palgrave. clark, b. (1983). the higher education system. academic organization in cross national perspective. berkeley: university of california press. donina, d., meoli, m. & paleari, s. (2015). higher education reform in italy: tightening regulation instead of steering at a distance. higher education policy 28(2): 215–234 giliberto capano 315 fumasoli, t., goastellec, g., and kehm b. (eds.) (2015). academic work and careers in europe: trends, challenges, perspectives. dordrecht: springer. giglioli, p. (1979). baroni e burocrati. il ceto accademico italiano. bologna: il mulino. graziano, l. (a cura di), la scienza politica in italia. bilancio e prospettive, milano: franco angeli martinotti, g. (1972). italy. in archer, m. (ed.), student, university and society. london: heinemann, pp. 167-195. moretti, m. and porciani i. (1997), il reclutamento accademico in italia. uno sguardo retrospettivo. annali di storia delle università italiane 1: 11-39 morlino, l. (ed.) (1989). ancora un bilancio lamentevole? in l. morlino (ed.), scienza politica, torino: edizioni fondazione agnelli, pp. 5–52. morlino, l. (1991). political science in italy: tradition and empiricism. european journal of political research 20(3–4): 341–358. moscati, r. (2001). italian university professors in transition. higher education 41(1): 103– 129. olsen, t.b., kyvik, s. & hovdhaugen, e. (2005). the promotion to full professor – through competition or by individual competence? tertiary education management 11(3): 299– 316. palermo, g. (2010). storia della cooptazione universitaria. quaderni storici 45(1): 71-213. tronconi, f. (2007). training tomorrow’s political scientists. italian phd programmes in political science presented by their directors. italian political science, issue 0. trowler, p. (2014). academic tribes and territories: the theoretical trajectory. osterreichische zeitschrift fur geschichtswissenschaften 25(3):17-26. verzichelli, l. (2014). signs of competitiveness? the presence of italian research in international political science journals. italian political science 9(2): 37-43 microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 33-37. the study of change and institutional persistence in ‘rivoluzioni e burocrazie’ by pietro grilli di cortona rosalba chiarini roma tre university, rome rofessor pietro grilli di cortona passed away on 16 july 2015, but for all those who had the good fortune to work alongside him, as i did, his rigorous and independent thinking, his generous, measured academic style, and the warm, gracious way in which he unfailingly engaged with others represent an immense legacy. we first met in 2002, the year in which grilli asked me to take on some temporary teaching in public administration at the roma tre university. i accepted his invitation with great pleasure, and it marked the beginning of a relationship of reciprocal understanding, which matured above all from 2007, following my transfer from the university of calabria to the faculty of political science at roma tre. at the time, grilli was director of the department of international studies, and his scientific and academic prowess, combined with his teaching skills and human qualities, were apparent to me from the very start. so it is an honour for me, on this occasion, to look back on one of his many scientific contributions, which have enriched political science in italy and further afield. the work in question is rivoluzioni e burocrazie. continuità e mutamento negli stati rivoluzionari (grilli di cortona 1991), which perfectly reflects an intellectual passion for studying and understanding phenomena of crisis and regime change that would distinguish his entire output. the book focuses on a number of important questions concerning the role of revolutionary processes in relation to the bureaucracies of the old and the new regime. they are dealt with by investigating the relationship between revolutions and bureaucracies in a number of countries where a revolutionary process took place in the course of the twentieth century: the communist revolutions of russia and china, and the nazi one in germany – the so-called “great revolutions”, together with the political, economic and cultural repercussions they had in europe and asia – and the four “small revolutions” of algeria, cuba, iran and nicaragua. the algerian revolution was anticolonial in inspiration, the ones in cuba and nicaragua combined anti-western sentiment and a longing for national liberation with elements of social freedom and renewal, while in iran religion was the key factor in revolutionary mobilization. the seven revolutionary processes were marked by profound differences, which impacted on the institutional outcomes of the revolutions. the first step in grilli’s research is to define revolution. a recent disciplinary work (calise, lowi, musella 2016) proposes two analytic dimensions for the study of this concept: the outcome of the change (political/social) generated by the revolutionary process p chiarini, the study of change and institutional persistence in ‘rivoluzioni e burocrazie’ 34 and the type of change (greater openness/closure of the system) that results (paparo 2016). in the first dimension a distinction is made between political revolutions, which simply transform the political organization of a state, and social revolutions, which overthrow both the political and social organization and entail a broader and deeper change. the second dimension takes into account the direction of change, and distinguishes between liberal and authoritarian/totalitarian revolutions: in the first case, civil liberties and political rights are recognized, and the revolutionary process sets out to establish a polyarchic regime (dahl 1972); conversely, in the second case dissent and competition are strongly limited (authoritarian regimes), if not totally suppressed and replaced by an absence of political pluralism and by the high mobilization and ideological penetration of society (totalitarian regimes). this framework helps to make it clear that grilli chose to focus on revolutions that led to authoritarianisms and totalitarianisms – the former capable of overthrowing the political order, the latter of sweeping away the social one as well. after signalling 1789 as a decisive watershed in establishing the more recent meaning of the term, he writes: “i consider revolutions to be those processes that entail, on the one hand, the crumbling and fall of a political regime and its juridical order, by internal means, in illegitimate and violent forms and through phenomena of mass mobilization; and on the other, the establishment of a new juridical political regime” (grilli di cortona 1991, 20). it is with this meaning, comprising both a “revolutionary situation” and a “revolutionary outcome” – which assimilates the lesson of fisichella (1987) but looks also to the contribution of huntington (1968) – that the three fundamental components of any revolution emerge: the process of discontinuous transition from one regime to another, political mobilization and the presence of violence. grilli’s comparative analysis of revolutionary bureaucracies goes on to examine these dimensions, given his stated aim to “formulate generalizations about the relations between, on the one hand, the nature of revolutionary change, the characteristics of political mobilization and the type and amount of violence produced; and, on the other, the qualitative and quantitative features of the bureaucracies that emerge (and/or partially survive) in the revolution” (grilli di cortona 1991, 29). the research thus looks at revolutions from the point of view of their effects on state administrative institutions, and the second phase of the research involves framing the revolutionary phenomenon in the ambit of the modern state. the development of legal-rational bureaucratic apparatuses is the principal element in the formation of the modern state (weber 1922). precisely because they are constitutive of state power (poggi 1978), administrative structures are so indispensable that it seems hard for them to be attacked by revolutionary processes. the analysis of individual cases begins at this point, exploiting data drawn from history to reconstruct the changes undergone by military and civil bureaucracies following their impact with revolution. so, for instance, the transition from the russian bureaucracy to the soviet one displays elements of both discontinuity and continuity. the former includes quantitative and qualitative differences in the recruitment base, a party apparatus parallel to the state apparatus and predominant over it, and a distinguishing between civilian and military roles. elements of administrative continuity between tsarism and communism include entrenched inequalities within apparatuses, high administrative centralization and strong state involvement in running the economy. in china, in the switch-over from the imperial mandarinate to in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 35 the communist administration, a fundamental contribution was made by the ussr and the chinese red army. the break with the past was profound: the new communist officials came from previously excluded social orders; mobilization was intense and frequent changes were made in the administration; every level of the administration was subordinate to the power of the chinese communist party; and there was a big expansion of the bureaucracy. in this case too, however, it is possible to discern elements of continuity, such as the strong centralization of power, the close link between the armed forces and the masses, and even the system of reciprocal surveillance and the educational practices of the old regime, onto which the communists grafted their own indoctrination and re-education programmes. in hitler’s regime as well, the transformation of the state was accompanied by the retaining of certain structures and procedures, which would curb the processes of internal nazification, in turn hindered by war abroad and by the fear that the professional capabilities of the bureaucracies might be negatively affected by excessive politicization and ideologization. in all three of the cases included in the “great revolutions” category, the revolutionary process played on the weakness of the old political set-up: russia was fighting the crimean war; china saw the collapse of its empire in 1911; and germany, from 1918 onwards, experienced a climate of civil war. moving on to the four countries exemplifying the “small revolutions”, grilli notes that in third world nations “not all revolutions are communist”; he also observes that there are differences in the revolutionary outcomes, but: “while it is true that states and their bureaucracies are the main target of revolutionary movements, it is also true that the latter subsequently make use of state and bureaucratic structures to complete change, consolidate results and protect their power (grilli di cortona 1991, 179-180). it is with history and comparative analysis, his favourite methodological choices, that grilli sheds light on a further key feature of change: it does not occur in a vacuum, nor is it totally unanchored from a pre-existing set-up. as a clear demonstration of his enduring interest in phenomena of political transformation, exactly twenty years later he wrote that “no form of change takes place on a tabula rasa, and no attempt to understand its real scale and causes can ignore the role played by the past, which expresses itself in different shapes and forms: by creating obstacles for, slowing down and rendering more fraught the change itself, and by conditioning and channelling change in certain directions. tackling ‘heritage’ therefore means, at least to some extent, ‘obscuring’ and downplaying the role and implications of great changes” (grilli di cortona 2011, 11). he is constantly urging us to attend to the past and its institutions, even when events acquire a profoundly innovative and discontinuous dimension, as in the case of revolutions. the discussion of the results, above all ones relating to differences in revolutionary outcomes, is dealt with in the final chapter of the book, which offers a synthesis and a comparative analysis of the impact of revolutions on bureaucracies in the countries considered. they range in time from 1917 to 1980, and take in various continents. first of all, he surveys the shared dimensions of revolutionary change: the change of the élites and the upward mobility of previously excluded groups and classes; the transformation of the public apparatus and the possibly central role of the single party; political mobilization and the politicization of society; the growth of state interventionism and of bureaucratic personnel. secondly, he singles out strands of continuity with the pre-revolutionary set-up. chiarini, the study of change and institutional persistence in ‘rivoluzioni e burocrazie’ 36 generally, their impact becomes apparent over the long term, not in the period of the revolutionary crisis. they consist of things like the persistence of cultural and structural models, the emulation of the administrative organization of the ex-colonizing nation, processes of modernization put in motion before the revolution, the conditions of development of the old bureaucracy and the degree of violence of the revolutionary process. finally, with regard to the different effects of revolutions on bureaucracies, four factors seem to require consideration: the role of ideology, the structure of the revolutionary army, the type of leadership (charismatic or otherwise) and the presence in society of institutions capable of curbing the revolutionary drive (for instance, the catholic church in the case of nicaragua). grilli concludes that “the more totalitarian political power is, the more bureaucracy will be subject to that power, and that there is no rigid relationship between revolutions and the growth of bureaucratic powers. indeed, the majority of cases considered here show, besides a quantitative development (…) of state administrations, a reduction in the autonomy of the post-revolutionary bureaucracies” (grilli di cortona 1991, 217). the lack of autonomy of state institutions is all the greater where a very strong role is played by ideology. the reclassification of the cases at the end of the book identifies russia, germany, china and iran as analogous cases, where the single party is articulated as a parallel bureaucracy, besides being the principal decision-making actor; in the case of the iranian regime, there is also the supreme authority of the religious leader over the entire state apparatus, the single party and the revolutionary militias. it seems possible to say, then, that these conclusions are closely bound up with the reflections on power and on the structures of political authority and their degree of institutionalization. this is a crucial theme in politics and political science: institutions are fundamental for converting power into political authority, supported by legitimatization and autonomous from the control of the resources pertaining to social actors (ieraci 2003; 2015). pietro grilli dedicated his working life as a political scientist to studying regime crises and changes, and to processes of democratization, in the awareness that understanding the actors, processes and structures of power and political authority is fundamental in keeping at bay, as far as possible, the risks and dangers facing democracy, that most extraordinary of human inventions. references calise, m., lowi, t.j., musella, f. (eds) (2016), concetti chiave. capire la scienza politica, bologna, il mulino. dahl, r.a. (1972), polyarchy: participation and opposition, new haven, yale university press. fisichella, d. (1987), totalitarismo. un regime del nostro tempo, roma, nuova italia scientifica. grilli di cortona, p. (1991), rivoluzioni e burocrazie. continuità e mutamento negli stati rivoluzionari, milano, franco angeli. grilli di cortona, p. (2011), il passato che non passa: il ruolo delle eredità nelle democratizzazioni, in p. grilli di cortona and o. lanza (eds), tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia, bologna, il mulino, pp. 11-39. in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 37 huntington, s.p. (1968), political order in changing societies, new haven, yale university press. ieraci, g. (2003), teoria dei governi e democrazia. ruoli, risorse e arene istituzionali, bologna, il mulino. ieraci, g. (2015), revolutions and democracy, in “quaderni di scienza politica”, 22, 2, pp. 319-338. paparo, a. (2016), rivoluzione, in m. calise, t.j. lowi, f. musella (eds), concetti chiave. capire la scienza politica, bologna, il mulino, pp. 223-232. poggi, g. (1978), la vicenda dello stato moderno, bologna, il mulino. weber, m. (1922), wirtschaft und gesellschaft, tubingen, mohr (en. tr. economy and society, berkeley, ca., university of california press 1978). microsoft word pdf_issue_15_1_moro_coticchia_114-131.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 1, may 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 1, 114-131. contact author: francesco niccolò moro, university of bologna. e-mail address: francesco.moro4@unibo.it from enthusiasm to retreat: italy and military missions abroad after the cold war fabrizio coticchia university of genoa francesco niccolò moro university of bologna abstract italy represents an important case of defense policy change after the cold war. while during the bipolar era the country rarely intervened abroad and was deeply constrained in its defense policy by domestic as well as international factors, in the post-cold war era, italy has constantly intervened in major conflicts in the balkans, the middle east and afghanistan. yet, in the past decade, and especially after the 2011 libyan intervention, italian activism has consistently diminished. the purpose of this article is to describe this trend and to review theories that have been put forward to explain italian activism (and retrenchment). while several insights can emerge from multiple studies dedicated to the topic, we argue that some elements such as legacies and institutional constraints have been somewhat overlooked and actually open promising avenues for research. 1. introduction n 2019, italy deployed around 6,300 soldiers in military missions abroad. in 2005 there were almost 11,000. in 1990, before the end of the cold war and national involvement in the operations desert shield and desert storm (iraq, 1990-91), just fewer than 100 italian troops were involved in (united nations) military interventions around the world. in the 1945-1989 time frame, italy participated in seven un missions with military personnel. in 2001 italy deployed its soldiers in ten un operations at the same time (coticchia 2014). these numbers summarily describe the trend in italian interventionism after the end of the cold war. starting in the 1990s, overall commitment grew fast, then further expanded in geographical scope and intensity of commitment, and has finally been declining steadily since 2009-2010, maintaining in the most recent years the same average (around 6,000) of personnel deployed abroad. furthermore, italian troops were mostly (re)located to the most vital area for italian interests – the so-called ‘enlarged mediterranean’ (white paper 2015). what explains this pattern? the purpose of this article is two-fold. first, the article reviews three decades of italian military operations abroad, dissecting the major trends. we do not look at all defense policy changes or their relationship with foreign policy, as i coticchia and moro 115 this has already been well dissected elsewhere (carati and locatelli 2017; isernia and longo 2017; cladi and locatelli 2019; colombo and magri 2019). we do not, either, look in detail at interventions on the ground (coticchia and moro 2015, 2016; ruffa 2018). while most analyses focus on post-2001, we believe a detailed analysis of the 1990s is in order as it is essential to understand subsequent developments. as we briefly argue below, looking at this not-so-distant past allows us to consider factors that play a considerable role over time. the 1990s constitute, in fact, a decade of upheaval in italian defense policy, featuring important military commitments abroad – which started with participation in the gulf war and proceeded with large deployments in somalia and (especially) in the balkans – and with key reforms that have re-shaped the institutional landscape of italian defense. second, the article reviews the most compelling explanations for how interventions unfolded and for variations across time. we reconstruct the debate and the different approaches, singling out what different contributions have said to explain each phase. we also argue that factors such as domestic political context, and especially institutional constraints and legacies, have been somewhat overlooked and actually open promising avenues for research. we mention three types of factors particularly for understanding italian military missions abroad. first, one element of remarkable continuity across these three decades is the relative bipartisan consensus by major parties on foreign interventions. second, italian institutional context provided favorable conditions for military interventions to occur: parliamentary veto powers were never really a hurdle for governments willing to intervene. in the last decade, we show that endogenous changes interacted with external ones to reduce the margin of action of executives. finally, change in italian defense policy has been deeply shaped by experience on the ground. in other words, by being extremely active, italian armed forces have undergone a process of thorough change that has been elsewhere defined as ‘transformation in contact’ (foley et al. 2011). the article – part of a research agenda that has involved the authors for more than a decade now – preliminarily shows how these elements contribute to explaining why interventions occurred, but also how the italian armed forces effectively acted on the ground and implemented change ‘at home’. the focus of the analysis is on force deployment over time, although inevitably defense reforms will be touched upon as they both reflected the lessons of interventions and subsequently shaped them (coticchia and moro 2014). the article proceeds as follows. section 2 looks at interventions in the nineties. rather than providing a complete overview of such interventions (ignazi et al. 2012), the section aims to present the ‘key decisions’ that were made and that are needed to understand subsequent choices. section 3 looks into the post-9/11 phase, delving into afghanistan and iraq (but also lebanon). section 4 discusses the intervention in libya and italian retrenchment in the last decade. the key question here is related to how the political parties that are emerging as leading the restructuring of the political system view military operations abroad. the conclusion summarizes findings and suggests four themes to advance the current research agenda. 2. searching for a new role: interventions in the 1990s the military intervention in the 1991 gulf war signaled a clear watershed in italian defense policy. italian armed forces had participated in some relevant un-mandated from enthusiasm to retreat 116 missions during the cold war, such as onuc in congo (1960-1964) and unifil in lebanon (1978), but the gulf war represented a clear scaling up in terms of size and intensity of commitment. for the first time since the end of world war ii, italian warplanes were involved in air strikes against a sovereign country. the decision to intervene was made with the andreotti government, invoking article 11 of the constitution, interpreted as mandating participation to un-led missions that consisted of ‘international police’ functions (coticchia and moro 2020). the mission clearly proved the operational limits of armed forces that were designed for territorial defense in the cold war scenario, were based on conscription and had a fairly limited number of troops deployable in complex military operations. yet, the iraqi endeavor was just the first of a long series of undertakings. italian armed forces participated in the un missions in somalia and then in bosnia-herzegovina as well as in the nato airstrikes against serbia in 1999. in 1997 italy also led a (successful) multinational mission in albania. somalia showed another key feature of the postcold war environment and the role of western armed forces in it. originally designed as a non-combat mission within the unitaf umbrella (unified task force), whose primary objective was to guarantee the possibility of aid and immediate relief action to go through in a large-scale humanitarian crisis, the situation on the ground for intervening forces rapidly deteriorated (loi 2004). the following un-mandated unosom ii recognized the need for more combat-ready troops, and italy sent armored vehicles, attack helicopters, carabinieri and army paratroopers. somalia was important for two major reasons. first, it was an early (and, by future standards, quite limited) attempt to deploy troops in highintensity environments. second, it showed the type of activities italian armed forces would engage in while deployed: a focus on social and economic development and reconstruction, especially through civil-military cooperation (later known as cimic), as well as on the training of local police and military forces. at the same time, the operation ‘ibis’ in somalia revealed a problem that would (dramatically) also affect other italian missions abroad in the post-cold war era: a dangerous gap between the war-like reality on the ground and the peacekeeping/peacebuilding setting of the operation, with limited availability of appropriate military assets and inadequate rules of engagement (ignazi et al 2012), a gap that in mogadishu, as later in iraq (and, especially, nasiriya), led to dramatic consequences. the interventions in the balkans, from albania to bosnia, from macedonia to kosovo, reveal the transformation of italian armed forces and their growing capabilities in carrying out multiple operations with very different tasks, such as peacekeeping, peacebuilding, naval blockade, humanitarian intervention, and even air strikes. national military engagement in the balkans, from 1991 onwards, was constant and remarkable, with thousands of troops deployed – and employed – on the ground (as well as at sea and in the air). italy provided its significant contribution to allies as well as to regional and international organizations (nato or un), thus transforming its foreign policy role from ‘security consumer’ – as it was in the post wwii era – to ‘security provider’ after the end of the bipolar era (walston 2011). italy became an ‘international peacekeeper’ (giacomello and veerbek 2011), adopting the armed forces as the main tool of its foreign policy. such a stunning evolution is well described, supported, and justified by official documents such as ‘nuovo modello di difesa’ (1991) and the 2002 ‘white book’ (2002). coticchia and moro 117 what are the major drivers of such an important commitment? on the whole, by adopting concepts and terminology provided by foreign policy analysis (fpa) literature (hermann 1990), we can affirm that the transformation of italian foreign and defense policy in the 1990s represented something between a ‘goal change’ and even an ‘international orientation change’, which modified italy’s global role and activities. notwithstanding such a striking evolution, the overall debate on the topic has been relatively limited, also due to cultural constraints in discussing defense matters in public (panebianco 1997; rosa 2014, 2016; coticchia 2019). however, reviewing the scholarly debate, we can distinguish several potential explaining factors, connected to different ir paradigms and approaches. in this context, four main variables that the literature has emphasized to explain the specific directions of italian defense policy in the 1990s can be identified: systemic changes and national interests, prestige, multilateral institutions, and norms. first, some authors looked at the broader levels of analysis as a vital premise to understand the transformation that has occurred: the end of the bipolar era and the collapse of the italian party system, along with their cold war constraints (andreatta 2001; cotta and verzichelli 2008; brighi 2013), were identified as clear watersheds. andreatta (2001) argues that the end of the cold war opened an unprecedented space of action for italian foreign and defense policy. in a similar vein, carati and locatelli describe the passage as a change in terms of ‘permissive cause’ of italian military engagement in multinational operations (2017). second, in line with a traditional structural realist approach, some authors focused on the strategic adjustment (coralluzzo 2012) required by the evolution of the international system, which posed new threats (such as regional instability, affected by the spread of civil conflicts at the beginning of the 1990s) that italy had to address for protecting ‘vital national interests’ (bonvicini and silvestri 2015), also with military tools (croci and valigi 2013). second, rooted in the neo-classical realist approach, other scholars argued that the military dynamism of a ‘middle power’ like italy (santoro 1991) was mainly aimed at improving its ‘prestige’ (which is conceived as the social recognition of their power) abroad (davidson 2008, 2011, cladi and webber 2011, coticchia 2019). third, in line with neoliberalism, the desire to maintain strong involvement in multilateral institutions (attinà 2009; bonvicini et al 2011) is another crucial explaining variable in italian military activism, from somalia to the balkans, where the italian contribution to the un mission has been most relevant. this explanation is sometimes linked to alliance politics, which is a crucial variable from a realist perspective. ‘realists also expect states to act in ways that may be costly – even in domestic political terms – in order to preserve valued alliances’ (coticchia and davidson 2019, ratti 2011).1 in other words, italy was ‘a multilateral actor’ (ratti 2011). finally, authors emphasized the influence played by humanitarian norms and strategic culture in shaping foreign and defense policy decisions since the beginning of the 1990s (ignazi et. al. 2012, rosa 2014). according to this viewpoint, italy modified its national role conception (holsti 1970), adopting the function of ‘international peacekeeper’. 1 the literature on italy and coalition building through the use of “allied payments” is still limited, if not absent. on state-to-state payments (i.e. “deployment subsidies” or “political side deals”) as practices to convince allies to take part in multinational operations see henke (2019). from enthusiasm to retreat 118 these (non-mutually exclusive) explanations certainly contribute to our understanding of the motives that have pushed italian governments to intervene abroad since the collapse of the berlin wall. three types of factors have been somewhat overlooked by the afore-mentioned analyses. first, starting in 1992, political support for troop deployment has been very broad, including all major parties on both sides of the political spectrum. recent empirical analyses (coticchia and vignoli 2019) confirm the existence of a long-standing bipartisan consensus on military operations. especially the un multilateral frameworks and non-combat operations are correlated with a high level of parliamentary support. on the contrary, the ‘politically contested missions’ (e.g., iraq in 2003), which rarely eroded the bipartisan consensus, had a strong combat component without a clear multilateral framework (coticchia and vignoli 2019). this consensus is also forged on the basis of a shared narrative that takes hold: military interventions are always labelled as ‘peace missions’, no matter their differences in terms of context (more or less violent) and type of activities that are undertaken (more or less combat-prone) (battistelli et al 2012, ignazi et al. 2012, coticchia 2014, iai-lasp 2017). the narrative of ‘peace missions’ is an enduring feature of all subsequent interventions, despite the evolution of italian missions on the ground. the second factor that should be looked at more closely is the level of parliamentary scrutiny. literature on parliamentary war powers (peters and wagner 2011, mello 2014, dieterich et al. 2015) has shown how different arrangements in terms of legislative-executive relations can affect the propensity to intervene: cabinets that deal with parliaments that have fewer formal and informal powers of authorization and oversight of the missions face a favorable opportunity structure that allows them to act more freely. this is the story that unfolds in italy after the cold war. the italian parliament rarely intervenes ex ante, that is before the mission, and generally is presented with a fait accompli and the ensuing pressure to approve the deployment of troops once these are already operating on the ground (coticchia and moro 2020). mandates and rules of engagement are debated here, but rarely, if ever, has this meant that parliament was able to affect how missions operated on the ground. besides, debates in parliament also raise minimal attention in public opinion: street protests against interventions occurred in the nineties – especially before the interventions in iraq and kosovo (bellucci and isernia 1996; battistelli 2004) – but they were rarely translated into meaningful parliamentary debates as minorities could do little to affect the legislative outcomes (ronzitti 2016; coticchia and vignoli 2019; coticchia and moro 2020). a third, and often overlooked, element is linked to how the first military interventions contributed to shaping future ones. this happened indirectly and also directly, as armed forces operating in new environments started identifying a series of practices, operational procedures, and doctrines that were passed on to units that were intervening in the same and subsequent missions. this ‘transformation in contact’ was at first relatively informal, embedded in the practices of the deployed units (coticchia and moro 2016). but effects on future interventions were not limited to such outcomes of transmission. the experience of the early interventions, in fact, also shaped major defense reforms in the 1990s. for sure, the overall change in the security environment mattered a lot: the end of the soviet threat meant in italy, as elsewhere, a reduction in the overall defense budgets and a shift from territorial defense. yet, experience on the ground contributed to shaping coticchia and moro 119 the direction taken by italian armed forces. in 1991, the so-called ‘new defense model’ represented a clear move toward power projection capabilities, paving the way for the suspension of conscription, and also focusing on the need for digitalization of the armed forces. the lessons of the 1991 gulf war were clearly a strong push in that sense (briani 2012). in 1997, a major overhaul of the defense establishment (the so-called andreatta law of 1997, after the minister of defense that promoted it) led to an increase in jointness and interoperability, with increased coordination between the armed forces seen as essential to operating in the new threat environment (as proven by the missions undertaken until then, from somalia to the balkans). at the beginning of the new century, conscription was suspended. an all-professional force, again, was the only one deemed capable of deploying rapidly and effectively (coticchia and moro 2016a). 3. interventions in the age of the global war on terror (2001-2011): threats, followership, ideas and the role of domestic factors enthusiasm towards the so-called liberal interventionism of the 1990s soon gave way to a different context in which military interventions took place. 9/11 and the us administration’s response to it, in fact, drastically changed the overall rationale for interventions, with the global war on terror substituting for the humanitarian paradigm (weiss 2004). the literature has illustrated the gradual convergence between the goals of the defense policy adopted by western countries in the bipolar era: from territorial defense towards expeditionary crisis-management missions (dyson 2008). such a process was marked by a fast transformation in the new century, when countries like italy started to be constantly engaged also in complex and dramatic missions within the framework of the ‘war on terror’ (farrell et al 2013). the italian contribution to international operations in the post2001 era was remarkable: in the first decade of the century italy had an average of 8,000 units employed abroad (carati and locatelli 2017). moreover, contrary to european countries like germany, france and even the uk, italian troops were deployed in all the relevant crises that occurred: afghanistan, iraq, lebanon and, on the eve of the following decade, libya. italy contributed to both nato’s international security assistance force (isaf) mission, becoming the leading nation of the western area in 2006, and operation enduring freedom (oef, 2001-2006), participating in the mission nibbio (2003) at the afghanistan-pakistan border. isaf is the most important mission that italy has undertaken since the end of wwii, as well illustrated by its length and dramatic (economic and human) costs. the italian government deployed troops also in the controversial operation ‘antica babilonia’ (2003-2006) in iraq. italy provided its contribution to the us some months after the beginning of the operation, which was the most contested at the domestic level (battistelli et al 2012). only when the iraqi regime collapsed did the italian troops arrive on the ground in southern iraq. peace rhetoric, here, has been deemed as severely affecting operational requirements (coticchia 2018, 118), with dramatic consequences in terms of adequate equipment, caveat, and rules of engagement. indeed, on november 12th, 2013, italy suffered the bloodiest attack in its post-wwii defense: 17 soldiers and 2 civilians were killed by a suicide truck (petrilli and sinapi 2007). the military operations in iraq and afghanistan laid emphasis on the role of counterinsurgency as a crucial approach to addressing the crisis on the ground (kilcullen 2011), from enthusiasm to retreat 120 revealing how the post 2001 interventions were qualitatively different from those of the nineties. the mission in lebanon was, in this sense, an exception (cladi and locatelli 2019). this is both because of its traditional peacekeeping nature and also for the substantial support from italian public opinion which, on the contrary, has generally provided limited backing to post-2001 italian interventions (battistelli et al 2012). finally, at the beginning of the next decade, italy participated in the operation ‘unified protector’, nato’s intervention against the gaddafi regime in 2011, exactly one century after the italian war in libya with the first air strike against civilians in history. despite its initial reluctance, due to the close economic and political relationship with the regime, the italian government provided its relevant military contribution to the mission. how can we explain the significant military activism that marked the italian defense policy in the new century? different possible explanations exist. first, the terrorist threat posed to national security, along with the never-ending instability at the borders, have been interpreted as vital reasons behind national military dynamism, from afghanistan to libya (coralluzzo 2012). however, analyses of the parliamentary and public debates, as well other empirical assessments of the decision-making process, have revealed how the threat posed by transnational terrorism in the post-2001 period did not play a significant role (ignazi et al 2012; ceccorulli and coticchia 2017). nonetheless, the existence of crucial economic and strategic interests has often been viewed as fundamental in the case of libya (croci and valigi 2013). second, despite recognizing the relevance of new multidimensional threats to international instability (pirani 2010), several scholars have focused on values and global norms. for instance, the so-called ‘responsibility to protect’, r2p, shaped unsc resolution 1973, paving the way to the military intervention in libya (bellamy 2015). from a constructivism point of view, the cultural interpretation of global norms shaped italian defense policy, fostering an active humanitarian role in regional and humanitarian crises. the case of the italian mission in haiti, after the earthquake of 2010, could be adopted as another clear example (ceccorulli and coticchia 2016). third, the interplay of prestige and alliance politics can be considered the mainstream variable adopted within the scholarly debate to explain the italian military involvement in dangerous combat operations. according to this perspective, italy has deployed troops from afghanistan to libya in order to acquire prestige in terms of social acknowledgment, increasing its relative power (davidson 2011). it must be noticed how in this period, and especially in the case of iraq, the prevailing view in going for troop deployment was linked to increasing the country’s place within the alliance, by being a loyal and reliable ally to the major power (at least more loyal and reliable than, for instance, france and germany). finally, from a broader viewpoint, the search for status has been identified as a driver of italian military activism. status-seeking has been defined as an attribute that is ‘granted or accorded by others’ (dafoe et al. 2014). unable to have recognition due to its institutionalized role, as happens to comparable countries in terms of gdp such as france and the uk that have a un permanent seat, italy has increasingly viewed contribution to multinational and multilateral military operations as a means to acquiring the reputation and prestige that would give italy the ‘right place’ among nations. in this vein, carati and locatelli (2017) developed the concept of ‘followership’: italian military commitment as a tool coticchia and moro 121 for seeking status and recognition in the international community. for the authors, followership “is more than just a quest for status” but rather a “deliberate policy that finds its ultimate goal in ‘being part’ of the international community” (2017, 10). such an interpretation offers an explanation for the relevance of multilateralism for italy, despite its potential costs (as indeed illustrated by the expensive and dramatic missions in iraq, afghanistan and libya). academic debate was (temporarily) lively on the specific theme of the supposed discontinuity of the italian defense policy under the berlusconi government with reference to multilateralism (ignazi 2004; brighi 2008; croci 2008; walston 2011). the berlusconi government’s decision to intervene in iraq after the us unilateral mission, along with the manifold bilateral relationship personally developed by the then italian prime minister, were the main disputed issues. as noticed, iraq represented a turning point in foreign policymaking as it created an unprecedented need to balance between solidarity with america and with key european allies such as germany and france (parsi 2006). this discussion paved the way for further reflections on the role of new drivers behind italian post-bipolar defense. on the one hand, mainly thanks to berlusconi’s personal activism abroad, several scholars started to pay attention to the role of leaders in italian defense policy (ignazi 2004, diodato and niglia 2018). on the other hand, the assumed discontinuity in foreign and defense policy was interpreted by looking at the role of ‘foreign policy paradigms’ that for brighi (2013) represent mediating factors between domestic and international levels. all the above-mentioned analyses help in providing a comprehensive picture of the (not mutually exclusive) mechanisms that led to italian military activism in the new century. nonetheless, factors such as domestic political context, and especially institutional constraints, have been generally overlooked also in explaining national involvement in the most important italian operations since wwii. some authors have occasionally focused on the links between the contingencies of domestic political debate and foreign and defense issues (carbone 2007, calossi and coticchia 2009, coticchia and davidson 2018), or on the relevance of electoral politics to explain the (timing of) decisions, such as to intervene in iraq in 2003 (davidson 2008). yet, the recent so-called ‘domestic turn’ in ir and fpa (kaarbo 2015), featuring growing attention towards the role of domestic factors such as parties and parliaments, has not been dominant within the italian scholarly debate on defense policy (an exception is d’amore 2001). relatedly, three elements should be emphasized concerning the italian military missions in 2001-2011. first, as stressed by coticchia and vignoli (2019), an analysis of the votes by italian parties on military operations in the new century confirms – despite the controversial debates which occurred in the case of iraq – the permanence of the above-mentioned bipartisan consensus on operations, revealing also how the italian case corroborates the curvilinear model of the relationship between partisanship and foreign policy (wagner et al 2017; osterman et al 2019), increasing from the left to the center-right and then declining again towards the radical right. second, the dynamics of government–opposition are extremely relevant in explaining the support of parties towards specific operations (coticchia and vignoli 2019), revealing a considerable ‘instrumentality of the votes’, that mainly change according to the current position of parties. third, despite the approval of the ‘ruffino resolution’ (2001), which introduced the practice of voting on the (re)financing of missions, italian parliamentary oversight remained limited in practice. through from enthusiasm to retreat 122 legal decrees, the government informed parliament of all the missions abroad but presented them all together (every six months or annually), without providing details on the overall financing, roe, and nature of the operation. for instance, as reported by coticchia and moro (2020), italian mps complained regarding the lack of information relating to the significant changes in the structure, aims, and caveats of the isaf mission in afghanistan over almost 13 years of intervention. in that sense, the executive autonomy was remarkable, without incurring audience costs (fearon 1994). a final driver that merits further attention in explaining the evolution of italian missions at the beginning of the new century is the way through which the experience on the ground in complex military interventions such as isaf has contributed to shaping italian defense policy, fostering organizational learning. for instance, italian defense was able to learn and adapt regarding the protection of forces after the massive efforts made in the ied’s counter-warfare across afghanistan, iraq and also lebanon (coticchia and moro 2016b). in this regard, the emulation of allies on the ground was vital, while the influence exerted by the nato framework – after been involved for years in a combat scenario like afghanistan – was crucial in shaping the direction of italian military transformation in italy, also in terms of doctrinal review. the perception of how precious operations on the ground were in terms of bringing about innovation by allowing the improvement of interoperability and cross-country learning was widely viewed by the leadership of italian armed forces. for example, the italian air force pushed strongly in 2011 to have a nato framework in the libyan intervention (coticchia and moro 2016b). multilateralism was not just a guideline for italian defense but also a required framework for members of the italian armed forces who had ‘got used’ to specific common (nato) procedures and rules after years of engagement. more junior officers seemed to share the belief that participation in international missions was a major driver of military transformation (moro et al. 2018). 4. the age of restraint: domestic crisis, deployment fatigue and the return of national interests? the new decade opens with renewed commitment in afghanistan, strictly linked to the stepping up of the american effort in the region. while afghanistan, as said, was clearly the most important mission undertaken by the italian armed forces in the post-wwii era, it was possibly the libyan war of 2011 that had more visible consequences for the development of italian defense. on the whole, the ‘failures’ of most of the post-2001 missions – among which, the negative effects of the libyan interventions on italian interests being more easily perceived by political leaders and public opinion (e.g., instability, rising security threats from terrorism to smuggling, collapse of previous economic ties, etc.) – may represent one of the key variables in explaining the considerable shrinkage of italian military commitment abroad after 2001. indeed, two main puzzles emerge by observing the evolution of italian defense in 2011-2020. first, as stated, following decades of rising military engagement in operations, the numbers of troops deployed in international missions decreased. the overall number of italian military personnel deployed abroad varied from 9,000 in 2001 to less than 5,000 in 2013 (coticchia and moro 2015). second, italy started to relocate troops towards a strategic area for vital national interests, defined as the ‘enlarged coticchia and moro 123 mediterranean’ (brighi and musso 2017; grandi and strazzari 2019). such a strategic shift, which has yet to receive sustained scholarly attention (exceptions are marrone and nones 2016, ceccorulli and coticchia 2020), has been stressed by both official documents (such as the white paper 2015) and (bipartisan) political decisions to send troops in new missions in niger, tunisia, and libya. therefore, two questions need to be addressed: what are the causes of the reduction in italian military commitment? what were the drivers of the italian strategic relocation towards the ‘enlarged mediterranean’? with reference to the first question: we group together four major hypotheses: ‘war fatigue’, change in the external environments, the impact of the financial crisis, and a changing domestic political landscape. as stressed above, scholars have noticed how ‘war fatigue’ and disappointment over the outcomes of major missions abroad – starting with the inability to achieve a satisfactory end state in afghanistan and iraq – led public opinion and policy-makers in the west to increasingly doubt that large scale projects of political transformation, supported by considerable troop commitment to guarantee security, were viable at all (belloni and moro 2019). at the same time, changes in the external environment have been seen as deeply affecting the italian posture. first, us retreat – rhetorically magnified under the trump administration but started earlier under obama – signaled shifting us priorities. while overall troop decline in the us, linked to the reduction in deployed personnel in afghanistan (with iraq-related reductions starting much earlier) has not been linear, (for instance the end of 2014 saw an increase in deployed troops linked with the anti-isil fight), it is clear that the us has adopted a much less interventionist approach in the last decade. the impact on italian military operations has been seen through realist lenses: the overall shift of the us posture has required italy to focus more directly on direct management of its immediate threat environment (see also infra). in theoretical terms, realist lenses – and especially neo-classical realist ones – can be a good starting point to observe the current wave of change (for a review see coticchia 2019). domestic factors have played an important part as well. first, italy had to absorb the heavy effects of the financial crisis which started in 2008, which deeply impacted italian public expenditures, especially since 2011 (with the advent of the caretaker government led by mario monti). budget shrinkage was a crucial determinant of this decline: starting from 2012, the defense budget was reoriented in order to reduce expenditures as a whole while maintaining a relatively high level of operational efficiency. defense minister di paola, previously chief of the italian defense general staff, supervised one of the most radical reforms of defense since the 1990s, entailing a restructuring of the organizational setup that affected overall numbers of personnel as well as careers, offices and structures. the key logic underpinning this reform was that the italian military could maintain ‘deployability’ in different missions as a key asset, notwithstanding some cuts: effectiveness was guaranteed by the ability to learn from a now large body of operations. where operating, in other words, italian forces would be able to exploit the advantages of their experience and ensuing transformation. the question of ‘where operating’, though, became more and more pressing. the financial crisis, in fact, affected the sustainability of large-scale military commitments in operations abroad. besides political reasons, willingness to limit the extension of national commitments was behind the non-involvement of italy in operations in mali and from enthusiasm to retreat 124 in syria. this is clearly connected also with the shift in public opinion. amid a context of a severe financial crisis, surveys revealed how italians favored a reduction in global military engagement (iai-circap, 2014). in sum, italian governments have become more reluctant to commit the country to costly and unpopular (battistelli et al. 2012) military operations abroad. finally, rising criticism towards the italian military operations from new and electorally successful (populist) parties such as the m5s (tronconi 2015) has perhaps shaped the debate and may have contributed to revising italian military dynamism all around the globe (coticchia and vignoli 2020). despite their ‘pacifist’ rhetoric, however, the m5s when in government, voted for all the missions supported by the previous italian government, sharing the new strategic focus on the ‘enlarged mediterranean’ (see coticchia forthcoming). two factors seem particularly appropriate in explaining the italian strategic relocation in the enlarged mediterranean, where italy acted – as it did in niger – without the traditional multilateral framework that almost always featured in national military engagement in the post-cold war era. first, the role of new and rising threats to national interests appears fundamental. as well illustrated by official documents (white paper 2015, gilli et al. 2015), public and parliamentary debates (ceccorulli and coticchia 2020), and surveys on threat perceptions in the armed forces (moro et al. 2018), the interlinked challenges posed by regional instability, terrorism and illegal human trafficking have apparently been a crucial element in shaping political decisions regarding italian involvement in the region. ceccorulli and coticchia (2020) have highlighted how the italian strategic considerations related to the ‘pivot to africa’ – with the ‘relocation of troops’ from afghanistan and iraq to the sahel and northern africa – were strongly connected to the perceived need to support the capabilities of local states, such as niger, in fighting against terrorism and, especially, migrant smuggling/trafficking. second, domestic factors matter in explaining the evolution of italian defense policy and military engagement abroad. the political preferences of italian parties clearly converged (as illustrated by the bipartisan votes in parliament in 2018 and 2019) around the goal of re-focusing military interventions in the enlarged mediterranean, where national interests are perceived to be at risk. moreover, this consensus seems to be in line with the rising attention and concern of italian public opinion towards the challenges posed by terrorism and, above all, by illegal immigration (eurobarometer 2016; 2017; 2018; iai-laps 2018). in sum, the salience devoted by domestic actors (parties, leaders, and public opinion) towards the threats caused by instability in the enlarged mediterranean contributes to explaining the evolution of italian defense policy in recent years. a last change is worth mentioning, as it refers to institutional constraints. in 2016, a comprehensive law on missions (law 145/2016) was introduced. while in the previous decades voting on missions had been, in substance, reduced to a choice over whether to finance all ongoing missions (with troops already operating on the ground), the new law allowed opposition parties to finally discriminate between the various (groups of) operations (ronzitti 2017). this would permit parliament to take back some of its ‘war powers’, ending a long period in which executives were largely free of constraint. it is yet too early to assess the impact of the reform. at the time of writing, only four votes have occurred with the new law. delays in parliamentary discussion have remained dramatically unaltered: in the case of coticchia and moro 125 the mission in niger deployment was again precedent to parliamentary vote. thus, de facto, parliamentary oversight of the executive seems to be still quite limited. 5. conclusions italian defense policy has undergone major transformation in the three decades since the end of the cold war, with frequent participation in military interventions abroad that lasted from the 1991 gulf war to the 2011 libyan war, to then somewhat diminish in the past decade. the objective of this piece is to review this evolution and to assess the arguments brought to the fore to explain it. table 1 provides a map of the major explanations of italian military operations in different phases and across different interventions. we do not argue that some theories ‘do better than others’, but simply state that theories under the chosen labels have been used to shed light on italian interventions. there is no pretense of exhaustivity, and we have selected articles and authors that make somehow explicit reference to the different drivers of military interventions mentioned here. perhaps in the future further studies will close gaps and address the phenomenon under new lenses or re-adapt existing ones. as revealed also by table. 1, the nature of the specific subset of foreign and defense policy represented by military missions lends itself to multiple interpretations. a starting point is the changing systemic incentives to which italy has to respond. several authors have indeed focused on the strategic adjustment imposed by the end of the bipolar confrontation to italian defense, which acted in a different scenario mainly to protect its vital national interests. other scholars insist that power, in this context, should not just be intended in strictly material terms. in fact, the search for prestige and status has been identified as a powerful driver of italian military policy. within the same perspective, the concept of followership allows for the illustration of the italian need for recognition among allies in the international community. from a different viewpoint, international organizations are crucial, especially in spreading global norms (such as the ‘responsibility to protect’) that have been received (and then socialized) at domestic level. multilateralism – as a value as well as an international framework within which to act abroad – has a fundamental function in explaining italian involvement in missions abroad. relatedly, a specific strategic culture has been gradually affirmed, transforming the italian role into ‘an international peacekeeper’. in this sense, ideas and discourses represent a mediating factor between the two levels of analysis. with reference to domestic variables, other authors argue that looking at the domestic institutional and political landscape provides answers to describe both the macro-trend as well specific decisions to intervene. recently, specific attention has been devoted to (limited) parliamentary oversight in affecting the calculation made by executives before sending troops abroad as well as to the participation in government as main explaining variable in the parties’ decisions whether or not to support military operations. further studies will better examine the influence played by successful populist parties in shaping the italian decision-making process regarding military operations abroad, contributing to the rising, but still limited, scholarly debate on populist parties and foreign policy (verbeek and zaslove 2015; coticchia and vignoli 2020). from enthusiasm to retreat 126 table 1. explaining italian military missions. a review. phase mission type of mission strategic adjustment & vital national interest prestige, status & followership international norms, ideas & strategic culture institutional constraints, electoral & party politics economic interests of domestic actors 1 iraq 1990/1991 air strikes cucchi 1993; diodato 2015 santoro 1991 ignazi et al 2012 aliboni 1991; coticchia & moro 2020 somalia 1992/1994 stabilization ignazi et al 2012 coticchia & moro 2020 bosnia 1995 peace keeping foradori 2007; pirani 2010 albania 1997 stabilization cladi and webber 2011 coticchia 2013; foradori 2018 greco 1998 kosovo 1999 air strikes andreatta 2001 cladi and webber 2011; davidson 2011; carati & locatelli 2017 ignazi et al 2012; foradori 2018 greco 2000; coticchia and moro 2020 paolicelli and vignarca 2009 2 afghanistan (2001-) stabilization bonvicini and silvestri 2015; coralluzzo 2012 davidson 2011; ratti 2011 brighi 2013 coticchia and moro 2020; coticchia and vignoli 2020 mini 2003; paolicelli and vignarca 2009 iraq 2003/2006 stabilization coralluzzo 2012; bonvicini and silvestri 2015 cladi and webber 2011; davidson 2011 brighi 2013; ignazi et al 2012 andreatta 2008; davidson 2008 mini 2003; paolicelli and vignarca 2009; caruso 2018 lebanon 2006 peace keeping cladi and locatelli 2018 attinà 2009; ignazi et al 2012; cladi and locatelli 2018 andreatta 2008; cladi and locatelli 2018 libya 2011 air strikes lombardi 2011; croci and valigi 2013 carati & locatelli 2017 miranda 2011; ceccorulli and coticchia 2015 coticchia and moro 2020; coticchia and vignoli 2020 lombardi 2011; ceccorulli and coticchia 2015 3 iraq (2014-) stabilization coticchia 2018 olmastroni 2014; coticchia and davidson 2019 authors’ notes: we have provided general definitions to the types of missions waged by italian forces according to their mandate and tasks. it is worth noticing that general definitions of complex operations are just attempts to connect each mission to broad labels for the sake of a (parsimonious) categorization. while ‘air-strikes’ (raids carried out by italian aircrafts) and ‘peacekeeping’ (neutral interposition by ‘blue helmets’ after wars) do not require further clarification, we are aware that the selected category ‘stabilisation’ is vast. despite referring to the shared aim of providing stability in different civil war/post war contexts, this category encompasses – to a different extent – combat activities (afghanistan, somalia, and iraq 2003-2006), military assistance and training of local forces employed on the ground (iraq 2014) and peacebuilding and capacity building measures (albania 1997). coticchia and moro 127 finally, despite still playing a marginal role in the scholarly debate, also the economic interests of relevant domestic actors (from the military-industrial complex to oil and gas companies) have been identified as important drivers of renewed italian activism. in sum, table 1 provides a (concise) picture that collects different views and interpretations concerning the drivers behind italian military operations in the post-cold war era. beyond reconstructing the debate, this paper has also illustrated the factors that merit additional interest in order to explain or understand italian defense policy. for instance, we stressed that factors internal to the armed forces – starting from learning while deployed – has been shaping how subsequent operations have been undertaken and, to an extent, defense policy reforms. this last set of factors is just sketched in the present manuscript and constitutes what we believe to be a promising research agenda. another two agendas could deserve further attention. the first one revolves around how external factors will reshape italian military interventionism in the near future. increasing american de-commitment in the mediterranean and the middle east has created a power vacuum where european countries, and italy to begin with, have not yet played the role of substitute. how this will occur, and how the european union will enter this scenario, remains pretty uncertain and clearly constitutes a relevant research avenue. the second theme is related to how interventions are changing. if the last decade saw an overall decrease in the number of troops deployed, it 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(2004). the sunset of humanitarian intervention? the responsibility to protect in a unipolar era. security dialogue, 35(2), 135-153 . pdf_issue_14_3_gallina_decastellarnau_newtemp italian political science, volume 14 issue 3, february 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 3, 149–166. contact author: marta gallina, université catholique de louvain. e-mail address: marta.gallina@uclouvain.be is it all about education? a study of the impact of media exposure on political knowledge in italy marta gallina université catholique de louvain anna decastellarnau sociometric research foundation abstract this article investigates the individual predictors of political knowledge by means of a test that takes into account both ‘traditional’ factors (i.e. education and interest) and media exposure. we argue that, as media level out the knowledge gap between more and less educated and motivated voters, education and interest might be deprived of their role in explaining political knowledge. empirically, we assess this by looking at whether the impact of education and political interest on political knowledge vanishes when media exposure variables are included in the estimates. analyses rely on the 2014 european election study, selecting italy as case study and correcting for measurement errors. results after the correction for measurement errors show that exposure to news about the 2014 european elections on television does have a significant positive effect on knowledge about european affairs, while this is not the case for exposure to newspapers and the internet. moreover, we find that the impact of education and interest persists also in the model containing indicators of media exposure. this finding confirms that, regardless of the role of media, education and interest are significant predictors of voters’ political knowledge about european affairs. 1. introduction cholars investigating the individual determinants of political knowledge have often found that education is the strongest predictor of political knowledge (bennett 1988, delli carpini and keeter 1996). more recently, there have been a few attempts to revise the relationship between educational attainment and political knowledge (highton 2009) and to stress the importance of pre-adult causes (abendschön and tausendpfund 2017), as well as of personality traits (rasmussen 2016). yet, the idea that education is of paramount importance in explaining what people know about politics is still well established in the literature (grönlund and milner 2006). at the same time, political communication research has produced abundant evidence that exposure to news media can affect voters’ political knowledge. the key mechanism behind this is that tv viewers, newspapers readers and internet users are more likely to encounter political news than other voters and thus be more knowledgeable about public affairs. in particular, scholars have investigated whether the increasing s is it all about education? 150 availability of media choice affects citizens’ knowledge gap. two main interpretations have been formulated. on the one hand, the active learning argument (prior 2005) claims that people select their most preferred contents and avoid information they do not find interesting, which suggests a widening effect of media choice on knowledge gap. on the other hand, the passive learning argument (aalberg and curran 2012) stresses that media consumption is shaped more by situational factors than by personal preferences, indicating that media might instead narrow differences in knowledge among the public. as shehata (2013, 201) explains, it seems that “due to a lack of strong interest in politics [among the population], information acquisition is primarily based on passive forms of learning”. indeed, there is strong evidence that television works as knowledge-leveller, favouring a growth in learning especially among the least politically interested voters (shehata 2013, fraile and iyengar 2014, shehata et al. 2015). moreover, along with the interest-based gap, traditional media seem also to reduce the education-based knowledge gap. indeed, wei and hindman (2011) showed that the education-based knowledge gap is significantly large among internet users, and to some extent among newspaper readers, while this is not found for tv viewers. in other words, more highly educated citizens learn more than the less educated from the use of digital media, while this does not apply to broadcast news media. the recent findings about the narrowing educationand interest-based knowledge gap lead us to question the role of education and interest as predictors of political knowledge. indeed, as long as less educated and less interested people are able to surmount the knowledge gap by assimilating information – even inadvertently – from the news media, education and interest might be deprived of their role in explaining levels of political knowledge. against this background, this paper aims to enquire into the individual predictors of political knowledge by means of a test that takes into account both ‘traditional’ factors (i.e. education and interest) and media exposure (to different media). the insight behind this is that, because of the narrowing knowledge gap, the effect of education and interest on knowledge might be eroded by the impact of other factors, i.e. exposure to television, newspaper and the internet. to test this, in the paper we first run models containing only traditional predictors and then we replicate the analyses introducing three variables of media exposure. the intention is to check whether the effects of education and interest survive (or, on the contrary, vanish) when the variables of news consumption are introduced. moreover, since past research has emphasized that getting rid of measurement errors can change the substantive conclusions of the analyses (bartle 2000, pirralha and weber 2014), in this paper we correct the analyses for measurement errors (decastellarnau and saris 2014, saris and gallhofer 2014, revilla and saris 2013) by means of the survey quality predictor (sqp) software,1 version 2.1 (saris 2015). this online platform allows us to easily obtain a prediction of measurement quality of the variables employed in the analyses, enabling us to implement regression analysis with structural equation modelling (sem) corrected for measurement errors. 1 sqp is free software available online that enables scholars to obtain a prediction of the measurement quality of survey questions. saris and colleagues (saris et al. 2011) have developed it, using data from more than 250 multitrait-multimethod experiments carried out in the first 3 rounds of the european social survey and 87 experiments carried out by other research agencies and combined with up to 60 characteristics of survey questions (saris and gallhofer 2014). gallina and decastellarnau 151 in terms of data sources, we rely on the 2014 european election study (ees), regressing political knowledge on a set of individual characteristics. in particular, alongside the impact of education, we seek to test whether exposure to campaign-related information in the four weeks before the 2014 european elections increased voters’ political knowledge about european affairs. we select italy as case study because of its media system characteristics. as mosca and quaranta (2016, 4) describe it, “italy epitomizes the polarized pluralist model where media markets are elite-oriented, newspaper circulation is limited and television represents by far the most important channel for political information; a strong state intervention in the media is in play, while journalists tend to be politically regimented and engage in forms of political parallelism” and also “italian public broadcasting is highly commercialized to the detriment of information capacity and quality” (7). in the light of this, focusing on the italian case permits us to put our hypothesis to the test, since the low quality/capacity of the provided information might reduce the effect of media exposure on voters’ learning.alongside the peculiarities of media system characteristics, italy is an interesting case study also from a political behaviour perspective. in particular, previous research focusing on the study of voters’ political cognition in italy has already questioned the role of education and interest in explaining the formation of sophisticated thinking. baldassarri and schadee (2006) have indeed found that, although scholars often operationalize political sophistication as education or interest, “political sophistication at least in italy can be better measured by voter’s capability in organizing political information rather than by education or interest in politics” (baldassarri and schadee 2006, 464). this suggests that the italian context represents a relevant case in which to explore and possibly revise the relationship between education/interest and political knowledge. results after the correction for measurement errors show that exposure to news about the 2014 european elections on television does have a significant positive effect on knowledge about european affairs, while this is not the case for exposure to newspapers and the internet. moreover, we find that the impact of education and interest persists also in the model containing indicators of media exposure. this finding confirms that, regardless of the role of the media, education and interest are significant predictors of voters’ political knowledge about european affairs. 2. political knowledge and education the literature studying political behaviour and public opinion has often linked political knowledge to educational attainment. most scholars presume the existence of a close connection between what people know and, in particular, university education (delli carpini and keeter 1996). higher education indeed helps citizens to develop the skills to both retrieve and understand political information. not only that, as highton (2009) points out, “the effects of education are theorized to influence sophistication through its effects on social and career paths that subsequently leave people in environments that facilitate the development and maintenance of political sophistication” (1566). in this sense, the mechanism that relates knowledge to education involves both cognitive resources and social opportunities and has influenced the literature since the early sixties (campbell et al. 1960, converse 1964). in his seminal work, converse (1964, 207) defined a belief system “as a configuration of ideas and is it all about education? 152 attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional dependence” and he argued that its level of sophistication is largely a function of the level of political information that a voter has. he also showed that only a minority of the population, the elite, were able to develop an ideological belief system and to understand common political labels such as conservative and liberal. besides several studies that tried to endorse or confute converse’s minimalistic view of the electorate’s capacity (achen 1975, nie, verba and petrocik 1976, smith 1989), luskin (1987; 1990) revised the concept of sophistication, overlapping it with the notion of political expertise. he built a ‘sophistication equation’, a number of variables that worked as triggers of the individual level of political expertise. he focused specifically on three aspects, arguing that “the conditions that promote any particular behaviour can be grouped under the headings of opportunity, ability, and motivation” (1990, 334). in his equation, interest in politics represented the internal motivation, since interested citizens notice more the political information they encounter and think more about it (chaiken 1980). education was partly motivation, since “in educated society, the blankest ignorance of politics may be a solecism” (1990, 335); partly opportunity, since students are more exposed to political information; partly ability, since education “can sharpen ability” (1990, 341), even though intelligence is better able to grasp this aspect. moreover, exposure to political information in the mass media (in luskin’s words, both printed and general media) constituted the source of political information; thus, degree of exposure represented the opportunity to be politically knowledgeable. lastly, intelligence corresponded to cognitive ability, occupation was a source of mobilization (e.g. workers directly affected by the legislation are more motivated to seek information) and gender/age/parental interest in politics were used as control variables. luskin found that interest and intelligence had major effects on political sophistication, while education and media exposure did not. a few years later, in their seminal book what americans know about politics and why it matters, delli carpini and keeter (1996) referred again to the idea that political knowledge is driven by abilities, opportunities and motivations. in particular, they argued that “the primacy of formal education as a facilitator of political knowledge lies in its relevance to all the components of the opportunity-motivation-ability triad” (1996, 190). they indeed showed, as many others before them (neuman 1986, bennet 1989, smith 1989, etc.), that education is (one of) the primary causes of political knowledge. more recently, the literature studying the determinants of political knowledge has investigated both contextual factors (gordon and segura 1997, berggren 2001, fraile 2013) and individual predictors other than the traditional socio-demographic variables (rasmussen 2016, abendschön and tausendpfund 2017). on the one hand, it has been shown that voters’ political knowledge is “a factor of the socio-economic, political and communicational contexts in which citizens develop their daily lives” (fraile 2013, 123). in this debate, findings are consistent in showing that the complexity of the information environment counts in determining what people can learn about politics (jerit, barabas, and bolsen 2006, marinova 2016). moreover, grönlund and milner (2006) found that political knowledge depends less on education in egalitarian countries (according to the gini index) and proportional systems. gallina and decastellarnau 153 on the other hand, research has investigated whether individual predictors such as personality traits (the so-called big five) and intelligence could lower the effect of education on political knowledge (rasmussen 2016). data showed that this is not the case and that education retains the strongest effect on knowledge even when other predictors are taken into consideration (ibidem). other studies have also tried to revise the relationship between education and knowledge. highton (2009), for instance, found that attending college has no significant effect on political knowledge and that, in order to explain the existing political knowledge gap, scholars should pay attention to pre-adult causes. similarly, it has also been illustrated that gender together with socio-economic factors can explain levels of political knowledge and that these differences do not disappear during the first year in school (abendschön and tausendpfund 2017). yet the debate is still open between those who claim that education is one of the most powerful predictors of knowledge (grönlund and milner 2006, rasmussen 2016) and those who indicate that other variables exhibit a stronger influence (highton 2009, abendschön and tausendpfund 2017). in addition to this, the political communication literature has also contributed to the study of the determinants of political knowledge by inquiring into the effects of media exposure. the following paragraph briefly summarizes the main findings. 3. political knowledge and media the political communication literature has looked at how exposure to news media can affect voters’ political knowledge, but it has not always produced consistent results. although in the 1970s and 1980s scholars doubted the role of television as a source of political knowledge (patterson and mcclure 1976), more recent studies have stressed the importance of broadcast (and print) news in informing citizens. in this regard, chaffe and frank (1996) have shown that television is indeed a powerful tool, especially for those who are not politically active, and it provides information about the candidates, while the print media tell more about differences in policies between parties. subsequent research has generally confirmed these findings (aalberg and curran 2012, fraile and iyengar 2014, strömbäck 2016), even though some studies have delivered more pessimistic results (jensson 2009, fraile 2011). yet scholars agree in saying that the growth of political knowledge is associated with watching public service tv, while there is no (or a lower) effect of exposure to commercial tv (fraile and iyengar 2014, strömbäck 2016). moreover, drew and weaver (2006, 38), studying voter learning in us presidential campaigns since 1992, found that “television news, televised debates, and now internet information are important predictors, or at least correlates, of voter learning of the issue positions of the leading candidates and interest in a presidential election campaign” and that paying attention to newspapers is associated with a higher intention to vote. alongside all this, academics have investigated the effect of digital media, but also in this case, research has delivered contradictory results. some have argued that the use of social media has weak effects on knowledge (kenski and stroud 2006, kaufhold et al. 2010, groshek and dimitrova 2011), while others have been more optimistic about the effects on participation and knowledge (hendricks and denton 2010, norris 2001, papacharissi 2002). by means of panel data, dimitrova et al. (2011) have shown that different types of digital media clearly differ in how they affect political knowledge and participation. in is it all about education? 154 particular, only the use of some news websites was found to favour voters’ learning (their effect was significant but weak), while party websites and social media did not have any impact. besides this, scholars have also investigated the impact of the use of social media on political mobilization. in this regard, theocharis et al. (2014) argued that twitter is used for political discussions, but it does not have the effect of mobilizing protest. gil de zúñiga and chen (2019) discussed the importance of social media as a source of discussion and coordination, but also as a possible cause of dissemination of misinformation and fake news. moreover, mosca and quaranta (2016) demonstrated that some forms of non-institutional political action are associated with new diets and social media use (with clear differences between twitter and facebook). another branch of literature has explored how media widen or narrow the knowledge gap between more and less educated and motivated voters. in this regard, prior (2005), following the active learning argument, claimed that, because of the wide range of media choice, people who are interested in getting more information become more knowledgeable, while those who prefer entertainment can avoid the news and reduce the possibility of learning about politics. conversely, shehata (2013) provided evidence of passive forms of learning, proving the knowledge-levelling role of television. analysing the individual growth in knowledge over time, shehata et al. 2015 confirmed the argument of inadvertent learning by showing that public service channels have positive effects on the knowledge of voters, regardless of their political motivation and news attention. fraile and iyengar (2014) demonstrated that exposure to broadsheet newspapers narrows the knowledge gap, whereas public broadcasting does not have the same effect. moreover, according to wei and hindman’s (2011, 229) analyses, “the differential use of the internet is associated with a greater knowledge gap than that of the traditional media”. this illustrates that the use of the internet widens the knowledge gap between the more and less educated, while this is not the case for television, and it applies only partially to newspapers. all together, these findings suggest that exposure to media should have – at least to some degree – an effect on voters’ learning about politics. moreover, it seems that the educationand interest-based knowledge gap is narrowed by the use of television (so far, there is no agreement about the effect of newspapers and the internet), according to a process of inadvertent learning. in the light of all this, we can hypothesize that the effect of education and interest on knowledge is eroded by the impact of media exposure when variables are considered all together in a comprehensive model correcting for measurement errors. this being the case, we expect to see that the impact of education and political interest on political knowledge about european affairs vanishes when media exposure variables are included in the estimates. moreover, we expect also to see a positive and significant effect of the exposure to information about the 2014 european elections on different media outlets (television, newspapers and internet) on political knowledge about european affairs. 4. data for the analysis, we utilize data from the 2014 ees voter study. this dataset is based on probabilistic samples of roughly 1100 people in each country (with the exception of malta, cyprus and luxembourg). in italy, the sample size is 1091 interviews. gallina and decastellarnau 155 to measure political knowledge, we rely on a battery of three items (cronbach’s alpha=0.45) of political information (see table 1 for the formulation). since we want to test how exposure to news media during the 2014 european elections campaign affected political knowledge about european affairs, we select questions of factual knowledge about the eu. in particular, we rely on two strictly eu-related questions and a third item concerning internal politics, which is still linked to the eu campaign.2 based on these three items, we compute an additive index, distinguishing between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ answers and recoding ‘don’t know’ answers as ‘incorrect’ answers.3 in this way, knowledge maintains all the observations. the variable that results from this computation varies from 0, which refers that a minimum level of political sophistication (respondents answered incorrectly or refused to answer to all the three questions on factual knowledge) to 3, which indicates the maximum level of political sophistication (respondents answered correctly to all three questions on factual knowledge). as regards the independent variables (see table 1 for the wording of variables), we include three indicators of campaign-related media exposure before the 2014 european elections, regarding the use of tv, newspapers and the internet. although we could expect to see that richer media diets positively affect knowledge (the more voters combine the three sources of information, the more they are likely to be knowledgeable), we opt not to sum the three items in an additive index in order to take into account how different media can affect knowledge in various ways. we recode these three variables as 0 if respondents indicate that they have watched or read campaign-related news sometimes or never, and 1 if they indicate that have often been exposed to political news. in this way, we can test the effect of frequent exposure to media versus the effect of more sporadic exposure. the two other main independent variables are education and interest. interest has simply been reversed to have higher interest at higher values. as regards education, ees does not provide a measure of educational attainment, but instead asks age upon leaving education. for this reason, we have recoded this variable, redistributing the still-studying category to other groups by age. in this sense, we include respondents that are still studying and are less than 19 years old among the 16-19 group (i.e. middle education) and those who are more than 20 years old are included in group 20+ (i.e. high education). no full-time education and those who left schools before 15 are recoded together, while ‘don’t know’ answers are considered as missing values. in addition to this, we consider as control variables (according to luskin’s equation, 1990): gender, age and perceived economic situation. for all the dependent and independent variables, we calculate measurement quality in order to correct the analyses for measurement errors. the method of calculating the measurement quality and the procedure of correction are described exhaustively in the appendix. 2 matteo renzi was indeed particularly active during the 2014 european campaign and we can assume that his name came up frequently in the campaign-related news before the elections. 3 the reason for this is that we care whether or not a person gave a correct answer, regardless of whether (s)he failed because (s)he did not know or because (s)he was incorrect. is it all about education? 156 table 1. english formulation of the questions used in this paper from the ees 2014 survey. variable question answer options variables of political knowledge (dependent variable)4 1st item of knowledge switzerland is a member of the eu true false i don’t know 2nd item of knowledge each member state elects the same number of representatives to the european parliament true false i don’t know 3rd item of knowledge matteo renzi belongs to pd true false i don’t know explanatory variables gender gender of respondent female male age how old are you? open-ended education how old were you when you stopped full-time education? i don’t know 15 16-19 20+ still studying no full-time education perceived economic situation could you please tell me where you would place yourself on the following scale? where '1' corresponds to ‘the lowest level in society’ and '10' corresponds to ‘the highest level in society’. from 0 to 10 political interest you are very interested in politics yes, definitely yes, to some extent no, not really no, not at all i don’t know exposure to television in the four weeks before the recent european elections, how often did you watch a programme about the european elections on television? often sometimes never i don’t know exposure to newspapers in the four weeks before the recent european elections, how often did you read about the european elections in a newspaper? often sometimes never i don’t know exposure to the internet in the four weeks before the recent european elections, how often did you read about the european elections on the internet (websites, social media, etc.)? often sometimes never i don’t know 5. results as mentioned above, we run two structural equation models. the first one includes only traditional predictors at the individual level of knowledge, namely interest and education, together with the control variables. we expect to see a positive and significant 4 introduction text of the question: “for each of the following statements about the eu, could you please tell me whether you think it is true or false. if you don't know, just say so and we will skip to the next”. gallina and decastellarnau 157 effect of education and interest on knowledge. the second model adds also the effect of media exposure to the variables already included in the first model. in this case, we expect to see that the impact of education and interest vanishes since the variables of media exposure (which work as knowledge-leveller) are included. we also expect to see a positive and significant effect of all the three variables of news consumption. both these models are run twice, before and after correction. the correction for measurement error significantly changes the substantive conclusion of the analyses. table 2 shows the results before and after correction for measurement error of the model including only traditional predictors. even before correcting for measurement errors, education and interest show a positive and significant effect on knowledge. this is in line with the previous findings about individual predictors of political knowledge, as well as with our expectations. after correction, the model gains explanatory power (r2 increases from 0.10 to 0.20) and we witness also some changes in terms of statistical significance. indeed, perceived economic situation becomes significant in the model after correction, while it is the opposite for age. more importantly, the positive effect of education and interest is confirmed, and it resists the correction, supporting the idea that these two variables are indeed important predictors at the individual level of political knowledge. by introducing the indicators of media exposure, we seek to test whether education and interest are still able to exert an effect vis-à-vis the levelling action of media. table 2. regression model containing only ‘traditional’ predictors of knowledge (before and after correction for measurement errors). variables before correction after correction education 0.16*** 0.18*** (0.033) (0.034) political interest 0.24*** 0.40*** (0.029) (0.027) gender -0.015 0.010 (0.029) (0.027) age 0.06** 0.04 (0.031) (0.029) perceived economic situation -0.04 -0.111*** (0.031) (0.031) observations 1091 1091 r2 0.103 0.208 note: standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 table 3 illustrates the results before and after correction for measurement error for the model adding exposure to different media. before applying the correction for measurement errors, three variables have a significant effect on political knowledge, i.e. education, political interest and exposure to television. the control variables gender, age and perceived economic situation have no significant impact and the same applies to is it all about education? 158 exposure to newspapers and the internet. as regards the direction of the effects, education, political interest and exposure to tv news are confirmed to be facilitators of voters’ political knowledge, being a positive predictor of it. this is in line with the findings of the extant literature. the r2 for this model is 0.11. table 3. regression model (before and after correction for measurement errors). variables before correction after correction education 0.152*** 0.173*** (0.029) (0.034) political interest 0.213*** 0.37*** (0.032) (0.037) television 0.099*** 0.096*** (0.033) (0.036) newspaper 0.033 0.031 (0.034) (0.036) internet -0.026 -0.055 (0.031) (0.033) gender -0.008 0.014 (0.029) (0.027) age 0.048 0.027 (0.031) (0.030) perceived economic situation -0.05 -0.119*** (0.031) (0.031) observations 1091 1091 r2 0.114 0.221 note: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 after correcting for measurement errors, we mainly want to check whether the effect of education and interest has vanished in the corrected model considering the influence of the media. contrary to what was expected, education and interest conserve a positive and significant effect also in the corrected model, showing that their role in determining levels of knowledge is not eroded by the impact of different types of media. in addition to this, the analysis shows that tv viewers are more likely to be knowledgeable about politics: exposure to political news about the european election on television does have a positive impact on knowledge about the eu. yet, this is not true for exposure to newspapers and the internet, whose coefficients remain not significant after correction. this finding is in line with previous research, which has often found a connection between exposure to news on (mostly public service) tv and political learning (fraile and iyengar 2014), while the effect of internet usage turns out to be significant only for certain types of websites (dimitrova et al. 2011). unfortunately, in our analysis, we cannot distinguish between different sources of internet exposure. moreover, in the gallina and decastellarnau 159 literature, it has been shown that newspapers provide more complex information than tv channels and therefore do not promote fast learning in the less educated segments of the population (kleinnijenhuis 1991). this could stand as a partial explanation of the not significant effect of exposure to newspapers. in terms of control variables, only the perceived economic situation presents a significant but negative effect on knowledge. to understand this finding better, we can rely on previous studies about economic conditions and political learning. recently, marinova and anduiza (2018) dealt with the contradictory effect of the economy on what people know about politics. on the one hand, an objective deterioration of economic conditions should lead citizens to be more prompt to acquire political information. on the other hand, a perceived decline in economic opportunities does instead depress the tendency to retrieve and retain information. this being the case, we should expect selfpositioning at a high level of the social staircase (i.e. our indicator of perceived economic situation) to positively affect political knowledge. however, data suggest that this is not the case. an explanation of this unexpected finding can be found in the fact that, if on the one hand people who experience a bad economic situation have more important concerns (marinova and anduiza 2018) than learning political facts, on the other hand people who feel they are in a good economic situation simply do not have enough motivation to care about politics. as luskin (1990) argued, a citizen needs to be in the situation where learning about politics makes the difference to his/her economic condition in order to make the effort to retrieve political information. taken all together, in the model after correction these variables are able to explain roughly 22% of the variance of political knowledge. undoubtedly, we should expand the range of the individual variables and also account for contextual factors in order to better understand what the determinants of political knowledge are in a comprehensive way. yet the aim of this analysis was to check whether the impact of education and interest persists when media exposure is introduced in the model, or it vanishes as a consequence of the knowledge-levelling effect of media. our findings suggest that the role of education and interest in positively affecting political knowledge does exist even when media exposure is taken into account. moreover, following the news on tv favours learning about politics. yet this does not apply to exposure to newspapers and the internet. 6. discussion in this paper, we aimed to revise the relationship between education and political knowledge, focusing on the role of media exposure. the main purpose was to study the impact of education and interest on political knowledge, while information about news consumption is also included in the model. the expectation was that, according to the knowledge-levelling role of the media, the effect of education and interest vanishes when other facilitators of knowledge, i.e. exposure to different types of media, are considered. methodologically speaking, the correction of the analysis was suggested by previous works that have demonstrated how measurement errors can lead to a mistaken conclusion about voters’ political awareness (achen 1975, bartle 2000). theoretically speaking, mechanisms were built on two strands of literature: the first focusing on political behaviour and public opinion and the second related to political communication studies. in is it all about education? 160 particular, the narrowing knowledge gap hypothesis and evidence about tv consumption as knowledge-leveller have been discussed. to test this, we focused on the italian case (characterized by a particular media system where information quality and capacity is questioned) and we ran models with and without indicators of media exposure correcting for measurement errors. analyses have confirmed that being exposed to tv news about the 2014 european elections increases the likelihood of knowing about european affairs. however, reading the news in the newspapers or on the internet does not positively affect political knowledge. moreover, contrary to our expectations, the impact of education and interest does persist also in the model containing indicators of media exposure. this confirms that, regardless of the role of the media, education and interest are significant predictors of voters’ political knowledge about european affairs. nonetheless, the positive and significant effect of exposure to television news indicates that, besides the determinants that have already been proposed in the literature (i.e. pre-adult causes, personality traits, information environment, and contextual factors), it is also worth considering media exposure, together with education and other individual factors, as efficient predictors of political knowledge. it goes without saying that this analysis presents some limits. first, it considers just one point in time and only one country. furthermore, the set of independent variables used here was limited to 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reason why we correct for measurement error is simple: we know that survey questions always bring about measurement errors and correcting for them means being able to trust our results more (decastellarnau and saris 2014). it is no coincidence that other works focusing on political knowledge have already relied on correction for measurement error (achen 1975, bartle 2000). in survey research, measurement errors can derive from different sources: the interviewer, the respondents, the mode of data collection, the interview setting, the information system, and the questionnaire. not accounting for errors implied by these sources means that we might expose our estimates to a series of important distortions. there are two types of measurement error: random and systematic, and both are able to affect the analyses. this is why we should take both into account when we aim to extract conclusions from society based on data provided by surveys (saris and gallhofer 2014). knowing the size of measurement quality of survey questions is necessary to correct for measurement errors. obtaining such information is usually an expensive and timeconsuming task. however, the software sqp can provide predictions of the size of measurement quality by means of the characteristics of survey questions. sqp allows users to specify (stated more correctly, to code) between 29 to 60 characteristics of survey questions. based on these codes, sqp is able to provide a prediction of measurement quality using an internal algorithm and thousands of data about multitrait-multimethod (mtmm) experiments (saris and gallhofer 2014). measurement quality is defined in sqp as “the strength between the latent concept of interest and the observed response to the measure or survey question”. it is composed of reliability (strength between the true score and the observed variable) and validity (strength between the simple concept of interest and the true score). it varies between 0 and 1. the higher the quality, the better the measurement (saris and gallhofer 2014). a list of the variables’ measurement reliability, validity and quality and their descriptive statistics is displayed in table a. the quality of background variables, such as gender, age and education, was not calculated using sqp since it can only be used for attitudinal questions.5 for such variables, we employed the reliability provided in alwin’s book (2007). alwin’s reliability measure is comparable to the measurement quality in sqp. it goes without saying that quality of socio-demographic variables is generally very high, even 1 in the case of gender. this means that they are less or not affected by measurement error. as regards media exposure, political interest, social class and the four factual knowledge items, instead, quality varies between 0.5 and 0.7. in this case, measurement quality was obtained using sqp. since questions from the ees 2014 were not yet included in the sqp database, we introduced them in the study called ‘ees 2014’ and the calculation is based on own coding6 for the italian formulation of the questions.7 5 that is further explained in limitation 3: http://sqp.upf.edu/loadui/#l3. 6 this is publicly available (after registration) at: http://sqp.upf.edu/loadui/#questionlist/page:1 by filtering for the study ‘ees 2014’. 7 since italy was not involved in mtmm experiments on which the current version of sqp is based, it is not able to provide quality predictions for the italian case. in this respect, it is important to point out that sqp requires choosing a country for which the prediction is available in order to get an approximation of gallina and decastellarnau 165 table a. variables’ descriptive statistics and their measurement quality. variables nº of obs. min. max. mean std. dev. measurement source of measurement quality rel. val. quality gender 1091 0 1 0.52 0.499 1 alwin (2007) age 1091 18 86 48.038 15.950 0.994 alwin (2007) education 1057 1 3 2.019 0.765 0.972 alwin (2007) perceived economic situation 1020 0 10 5.698 1.372 0.747 0.791 0.591 sqp own coding television 1086 0 1 0.182 0.386 0.673 0.965 0.650 sqp own coding newspapers 1082 0 1 0.113 0.317 0.663 0.954 0.632 sqp own coding internet 1077 0 1 0.081 0.274 0.935 0.678 0.634 sqp own coding political interest 1079 1 4 2.240 0.836 0.733 0.944 0.692 sqp own coding 1st item of knowledge 1091 0 1 .748 .433 0.651 0.906 0.59 sqp own coding 2nd item of knowledge 1091 0 1 .401 .490 0.653 0.922 0.602 sqp own coding 3rd item of knowledge 1091 0 1 .883 .320 0.657 0.923 0.606 sqp own coding knowledge index 1091 0 3 2.034 0.872 0.647 own calculation turning to the independent variable, computation of quality has followed a different path. knowledge is an additive index composed of three items of factual knowledge. sqp only predicts the quality of single questions, not indices or sum scores. therefore, we implemented the step-by-step procedure described in chapter 7 by decastellarnau and saris (2014). the calculation is thus manually undertaken. the first step consists in obtaining the quality of the items used for the additive index from sqp (as described above). we then proceed with the formula for the calculation of the quality of additive indices, also known as composite score. the quality of the unweighted additive index is defined as (saris and gallhofer 2014, 297, decastellarnau and saris 2014, chapter 7): 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑆 = 1 − 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒!) 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑆) where s refers to the additive index, var(es) is the variance of the errors in s and var(s) is the variance of the additive index. the variance of errors is calculated as follows: 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 (𝑆) = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒!) = 41 − q" #8 · 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑦") + 2=(𝑟" · 𝑚" · 𝑟$ · 𝑚$)(𝑠" · 𝑠$) where: • q2i is the measurement quality for each indicator of the index • var(yi) is the variance of each indicator of the index • ri,j is the reliability of each indicator of the index, where j≠i the measurement quality. that is further explained in f.a.q. 5 : http://sqp.upf.edu/loadui/#5. therefore, in this case, coding has been based on italy, using italian as language of reference, and we employed france as the country for the prediction. is it all about education? 166 • mi,j is the method effect (computed as √1-v2, where v is the validity) of each indicator of the index, where j≠i • si,j is the standard deviation of each indicator of the index, where j≠i the result is the measurement quality of the composite score composed of the four items of knowledge, whose value is 0.647. using the information about the measurement quality, we ran a sem regression analysis with correction for measurement errors. to do so, we transformed the observed correlation matrix (table b) by subtracting the common method variance from the variables that share the same method and replacing the variances in the diagonal by the measurement quality. thus, the correlation matrix becomes a covariance matrix (table c) and is used as input for the new regression corrected for measurement errors. table b. observed correlation matrix, input of the regression before correction. table c. covariance matrix, input of the regression after correction. k n o w le d g e g e n d e r a g e e d u ca ti o n e co n o m ic si tu a ti o n in te re st tv n e w sp a p e rs w e b knowledge 1 gender -0.05 1 age 0.02 0.03 1 education 0.19 -0.01 -0.34 1 economic situation 0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.38 1 political interest 0.28 -0.15 0.08 0.27 0.19 1 television 0.21 -0.10 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.36 1 newspapers 0.17 -0.14 0.04 0.22 0.14 0.32 0.46 1 internet 0.10 -0.11 -0.08 0.17 0.07 0.31 0.32 0.36 1 k n o w le d g e g e n d e r a g e e d u ca ti o n e co n o m ic si tu a ti o n in te re st tv n e w sp a p e rs w e b knowledge 0.64 gender -0.05 1 age 0.025 0.03 0.99 education 0.19 -0.01 -0.34 0.97 economic situation 0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.38 0.59 political interest 0.28 -0.15 0.08 0.27 0.19 0.69 television 0.21 -0.10 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.36 0.65 newspapers 0.17 -0.14 0.04 0.22 0.14 0.32 0.36 0.63 internet 0.10 -0.11 -0.08 0.17 0.07 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.63 microsoft word pdf_issue_15_2_diporto.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 2, september 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 2, 209–222. contact author: valerio di porto, dirpolis institute, pisa. e-mail address: vdiporto@gmail.com making laws fit for the present day: the government of change and the precariousness of choices during italy’s long transition valerio di porto dirpolis institute, pisa abstract this article retraces the events of the first conte government from its difficult birth by contract through to its foreseen death and seeks to establish a connection between the political-institutional aspects of this unprecedented government alliance and the use of legislative instruments, as well as between the devaluation of parliament and the successes of legislative parliamentary initiatives. this reconstruction also compares the first months of the 18th legislature with the first months of the preceding legislatures of the so-called ‘second republic’. the conclusion will be that this legislature distinguishes itself from certain preceding long-term legislatures (the 13th, 14th, 16th and 17th) by an approach orientated exclusively to the present and to constitutional reforms that are very small in dimension but huge in impact (such as reducing the number of parliamentarians). like the other legislatures, it will end with a government and a majority which are different from the original ones, but perhaps with the same prime minister. when that will happen is obviously unclear. 1. a slow gestation mong the legislatures under the so-called second republic, the 18th took the longest time to become fully operational: seventy-five days to form a government and ninety to establish the permanent parliamentary committees. the 17th legislature, which also had a weak start, required less time despite undergoing elections for the president of the republic. the first ballot for the presidential election took place more than a month after the start of the parliamentary term and the process was fast-tracked to a conclusion thirty-six days after the first meeting of the chambers, with the sixth ballot reelecting giorgio napolitano. the letta cabinet was formed ten days after the election of the president of the republic and passed a vote of confidence forty-six days after the start of the parliamentary term; the permanent committees were formed one week later (fiftythree days after the start of the term). in the 18th legislature, the first two and a half months were needed to untangle a complex political situation and form an unprecedented and unexpected parliamentary majority out of two parties (the lega and five star movement) which had been antagonistic during the elections, the one ‘sovereigntist’ and the other ‘populist’, or both differently populist (caiani 2019). for the first time in the republic’s history, the two majority parties did not converge on a common agenda, i.e., forming a synthesis of their proposals, but a making laws fit for the present day 210 signed a ‘contract’. with the two parties constantly invoking the contract, an ‘unprecedented phenomenon’ was observed in which ‘the populist-sovereigntist forces that have largely become the majority’ used (or at least tried to use) parliamentary institutions ‘against the system itself’ (manzella 2019). 2. to each their own: not a programme produced by synthesis, but a contract resulting from aggregation already the choice of the term ‘contract’ underlines the divide between the two partners in government, linked by a private document rather than a common political programme to sanction the birth of their political alliance. the government had a prime minister, chosen from outside either party (although closer to one of them), who acted as mediator and arbitrator rather than as the engine of the executive.1 it had two deputy prime ministers who between them headed three ministries and who were also, respectively, the heads of the two political parties. this led to a progressive weakening of the boundaries between their roles as members of government and their roles as political leaders, something that has perhaps not been sufficiently noted by either mass media or academia. nevertheless, an interior minister – in his constitutional role, the guarantor of electoral procedures – had never before been seen to be involved in such a harsh and prolonged electoral campaign. i believe that an official meeting of a political party (five star movement) in the office of a minister (economic development), evidently perceived by the party as the home of its leader – such as occurred in the aftermath of the european elections – has also never before been witnessed. the contract did not synthesise but rather aggregated the aspirations of the two leaders and their parties, obliging one side reluctantly to accept the other’s objectives in exchange for achieving their own goals. we saw this often-painful exchange continue throughout the fourteen months of the first conte government, which, to be achieved, required procedures to be ‘adjusted’ quite a bit within both government and parliament. 3. placing all bets on two parties, four issues the contract and all the government’s efforts – albeit obviously facing many issues – focussed on four principal topics. the hobbyhorses of the five star movement were citizenship income and a substantial elimination of cases to which the statute of limitations applied (part of a much larger theme concerning the justice system); and the lega’s prerogatives were security/immigration and the proposed ‘quota 100’ pension reform. probably, the lega was better able to affect the government’s policy priorities than the m5s (giannetti, pinto and plescia 2020); the m5s focussed more on parliamentary initiative. decree no. 4 of 28 january 2019 combines the first and fourth issues with the title urgent provisions for citizenship income and pensions, to which chapters 1 and 2 of the 1 in every sector, the two majority parties had between them to cover three executive positions (the minister and the respective presidents of the permanent committees in both the chamber of deputies and senate). balance was therefore never possible, and in two cases the imbalance was evidently in favour of the five star party: the department of health was entirely in their hands (minister and both committee presidents), and the same applies to the political commissions of the european union for both the chamber of deputies and the senate. valerio di porto 211 decree are respectively dedicated. in chapter 3, before the provisions on funding and the implementation date, there is one concerning gambling, useful for generating income. this decree is possibly the most significant example of how the government operated. it derived from adding together one key objective from each governing party, accepted in exchange for an undesirable one from its partner, in order to achieve their respective objectives: citizenship income vs. quota 100. to obtain these objectives all obstacles were overcome: the past was disregarded (‘inclusion income’) or denied (quota 100), but in a transitional and experimental fashion (for the three years between 2019 and 2021), thereby also losing sight of the future; regional responsibility in social policy was not taken into account, initiating a clash with the regions; no study was made of the effects of the two measures, and they were approved (as almost always happens, with any government) regardless of any cost-benefit analysis.2 concerning justice, the two government parties stood far apart but the five star movement, being the majority shareholder, was able to achieve quite a few results. on the issue of immigration, the distance between the parties was more elastic, but it expanded when conte’s first government was succeeded by his second. 4. moving on from the past, looking to the present, disregarding the future: the choice of fleeting legislation and a dislike of delegated legislation perhaps the most profound difference between the so-called first and second republic lies in their different relationships with the past. in the first, policy continuity prevailed: in the second, discontinuity. to highlight the discontinuity, policy interventions such as those used in the past are not needed, but smaller or greater reforms are, and thus we become entangled in continuous, inconclusive reform processes. each new legislature generally tends to dismantle the reforms implemented by the preceding one: it begins again from scratch, making it difficult to achieve completed, tested and verified reforms. overcoming or disagreeing with the past is the theme on which the electoral campaigns of the opposition parties are founded, who then must deliver results once they become the majority. thus, the reforms follow one another without having the time to take root. the examples are numerous, but i will limit myself to narrating the reforms concerning the job market, education and public administration. up until the 17th legislative term, ambitions that included overcoming the past and focussing on the present did not preclude also looking to the future; on the contrary, in order to make themselves last, the legislatures were structured around extensive 2 this is not the place to deal with impact analysis and the reasons for the absence of an evaluation culture in italy. i limit myself to recalling an emblematic story. the impact assessment office was established in the senate in the seventeenth legislature, in the wake of the constitutional reform, rejected in the referendum of 4 december 2016, which attributed to palazzo madama competences in the evaluation of public policies. in the 18th legislature, the office was initially very active, producing 12 documents between may and november 2018. after this date, there is evident stagnation. the web pages of the office, also due to this stasis, give the overall idea of being still suspended between the xvii legislature and the current one, evidently at a stage in which the uvi model is subject to rethinking. the uvi story and, more generally, the difficulties in implementing serious and effective impact analysis of the ex ante evaluation are accompanied by an inability to look ahead, typical of public policies in italy, especially in this legislature. making laws fit for the present day 212 constitutional and/or structural reform processes. the latter were based on a previously unknown use of delegated legislation. the legislatures lasting approximately five years each (13th, 14th, 16th and 17th) experienced wide and challenging reform paths, and the 17th survived a resounding failure in constitutional reform. using the work of di porto and piana (2019 i, pp. 9-12), i shall try to summarise what happened in the past for a comparison with the present. in the 12th legislature, which lasted two years, the only delegation with any ambition – initially only short-term – was present in the law ratifying the acts implementing the results of the so-called uruguay round (law no. 747 of 29 december 1994). the 13th legislature revolved around reform processes – set in motion, less than a year from its beginning, by the so-called bassanini laws (laws no. 59 of 15 march 1997 and no. 127 of 15 may 1997) – which culminated in the final period of the parliamentary term in the reforms of title 5, part 2 of the constitution. in the 14th legislature, two phases of important delegated reforms can be identified: the first a few months from the start of the parliamentary term, in the autumn of 2001, the second, with a much slower maturation, during the central years (2003-2004). this second phase concerned itself with institutional structures, education, employment, social security, the environment, energy, agriculture and tax, and its implementation committed both chambers until the end of the parliamentary term. the so-called environment code bears the date of 3 april 2006 (no. 152) and was quickly and heavily modified in the following legislature (decrees no. 284 of 8 november 2006 and no. 4 of 16 january 2008). a similar fate occurred to the code for equal opportunities (decree no. 198 of 11 april 2006, modified and above all integrated by decree no. 196 of 6 november 2007). the 15th legislature was born weak and did not approve any wide-ranging enabling acts. instead, it was active in intervening through supplementary and corrective decrees3 to reform what had just been approved by an opposition majority, proceeding with urgent decrees and budget laws, the size of which remains unsurpassed to this day. during the 16th legislature, a little more than three months from its start, the government presented to the chamber of deputies a draft universal enabling law (no.1441), composed of 75 articles, which would be broken down and considered separately during examination. from it originated three laws of extensive size and breadth: no. 69 of 18 june 2009, setting out provisions for economic development, simplification and competition, as well as concerning civil proceedings (72 articles); no. 99 of 23 july 2009, setting out provisions for the development and internationalisation of businesses, as well as concerning energy (64 articles); no. 183 of 4 november 2010, delegating powers to the government regarding heavy and arduous work, leave entitlement, social welfare, employment services, the reorganisation of institutions, employment incentives, training and the employment of women, as well as measures against undeclared work and provisions for public works and labour disputes (50 articles). 3 to amend the reforms approved by the preceding legislature, it is not necessary to modify the enabling laws’ guiding principles and criteria, which are so loose that they leave room for quite different or even entirely opposite interpretations. valerio di porto 213 the chambers, while engaged in the review of the three laws mentioned above, also had the time to approve two important laws, no. 15 of 4 march 2009, delegation to the government designed to optimise the productivity of public works and the efficiency and transparency of public administrations, as well as supplementary provisions for the operation of the national council for economics and labour and the court of auditors, and no. 42 of 5 may 2009, delegation to the government concerning fiscal federalism, implementing article 119 of the constitution. the 17th legislature, after the failure of the constitutional reform, was able to unite around the reorganisation of public institutions laid down in much-cited law no. 124 of 2015. in implementing the law, except for errors and omissions, 28 decrees were issued (eight corrective ones, of which two were issued during the 18th legislature). at the time of the referendum, many of the principal delegated powers had been exercised (14 decrees). during 2017, six principal and six supplementary and corrective decrees were issued, some concerning particularly important areas (such as affiliated companies). the 18th legislature presented many similarities to and a few differences from the 15th. to move on from the past, the executive, formed as the ‘government of change’, used urgent decrees more than anything else. it ignored delegated legislation and introduced a significant number of provisions to the budget laws in a very brief, fast-tracked process. in the first two years, no enabling law of significant impact on the legal system was approved. the first conte government presented a package of draft enabling laws covering: tourism (senate act no. 1413, approved in the chamber of deputies); the simplification, rationalisation, reorganisation, coordination and integration of legislation concerning public contracts (senate act no. 1162); revision of the civil code (senate act no. 1151); the simplification and rationalisation of legislation concerning the military (senate act no. 1152); and modification of the highway code (chamber of deputies act no. 1661). to date, the second conte government has presented a draft enabling law regarding the efficiency of civil proceedings and the revision of the regulation of alternative dispute resolution methods (senate act no. 1662). this is confirmation of a dramatic and compulsive focus on the present, and of the inability to and/or the impossibility of looking ahead, probably with the sole intention of capitalizing on the consensus obtained in the numerous electoral appointments that follow each other from year to year. awareness of the difficulty of implementing long-term reforms and their precariousness in the presence of changes of government and legislatures also weighs heavily. a key difference from the 15th legislature is the succession of two governments led by the same prime minister, in which the five star movement remains a majority shareholder (albeit declining sharply in all elections). however, the minority shareholders have changed: the lega was succeeded by the partito democratico (growing electorally) as principal minority shareholder and two small minority shareholders, both formed, at different times, out of splits from the partito democratico (liberi e uguali and italia viva). the minority shareholders feel a strong need to mark discontinuity with the first conte government, a need only partially shared and for the most part opposed by the majority shareholder. the result is substantial stagnation, exacerbated by the dramatic coronavirus that is monopolising attention and making the present problem so pressing making laws fit for the present day 214 it leaves no room to look to the future. this at least solidifies the political majority, but constrains parliamentary institutions into inaction, relaunching – mutatis mutandis – the idea of digital democracy, so dear to the majority shareholder.4 the scarce attention given to the future is reflected, among other things, in one emblematic fact: in the fourteen months of the first conte government, a marginal reference to the 2030 agenda occurred in just four acts: decree no. 97 of the president of the council of ministers of 19 june 2019, regulation of the organisation of the ministry for the environment and protection of land and sea, by the independent body of performance evaluation and of the offices for direct collaboration;5 law no. 92 of 20 august 2019, introduction of civic education into school teaching; law no. 42 of 8 may 2019, ratification and implementation of the accord of political dialogue and cooperation between the european union and its member states and the republic of cuba made in brussels on 12 december 2016; and law no. 145 of 30 december 2018, provisional budget of state for the 2019 financial year and three-year budget for the period 2019-2021.6 the first conte government (imitated by the second) therefore made a precise choice: to focus on fleeting legislative instruments to overcome the past and regulate the present with measures that were often transitory, experimental and unstable. hence the use of the urgent decree, particularly congenial to a government founded on a contract. the second conte government, although founded on various government partners, does not look towards the future. the outbreak of the pandemic has plunged it into a dramatic present. the government's response is through decree-laws and decrees of the president of the council of ministers (dpcm).7 the prospects for a structural use of the resources deriving from the recovery plan do not seem the best. some figures are useful: during the period of the first conte government, which lasted around fourteen months, 68 laws were approved, among which were three conversion bills and one ratification bill presented by the gentiloni government. 46 were government initiatives (of which 22 were conversion bills), 20 were parliamentary initiatives (of which eight were ratification bills) and two were a mixture of parliamentary and popular initiative (di porto and piana 2019 ii). 4 in this case, the use of technology is considered necessary to ‘save’ representative democracy by allowing parliamentarians to discuss and vote remotely. stefano ceccanti, an mp and professor of comparative public law, is particularly insistent on this subject. an interview with him released by radio radicale on 12 march 2020 can be found at https://www.radioradicale.it/scheda/600718/emergenza-coronaviruslintroduzione-del-voto-a-distanza-e-i-regolamenti-parlamentari. in recent weeks, a great debate has been taking place among politicians and academics. at institutional level, a confrontation is taking place that was initiated by the meeting of the board for the regulation of the chamber of deputies on 4 march 2020 and continued in the meeting of 31 march. 5 article 9 is limited to granting authority in the area of ‘strategy for sustainable development at national and international level and verification of its implementation in accordance with the 2030 agenda’s sustainable development goals and of other international instruments’ to the director general for sustainable growth and quality of development. 6 article 1(337) justifies the modifications made to law no. 125 of 11 august 2014 with the objective to ‘reinforce italy’s action in the field of international cooperation for development, including through strengthening the role of the cassa depositi e prestiti spa bank as a financial institution for international cooperation for development, also in accordance with the sustainable development goals of the united nations’ 2030 agenda’. 7 the comments of the doctrine on the subject are very numerous. the latest released is arcuri 2020, which contains a convincing reconstruction of the phenomenon. valerio di porto 215 table 1. the laws approved during the conte i government laws no. with vote of confidence government initiative 46 10 conversion of law decrees 22 8 budget laws 3 1 laws related to the budget law 2 european laws and european delegation laws 1 ratification laws 12 other laws 6 1 parliamentary initiative of which: 20 ratification laws 8 mixture of parliamentary and popular initiative 2 total 68 source: own elaboration. 5. to devaluate or respect parliament? parliamentary legislative initiatives and the forcing of procedures the high percentage of laws originating from parliamentary or mixed parliamentarypopular legislative initiatives has an explanation in common with the forcing of procedures: the scope for parliamentary involvement during the first conte government both shrank and expanded. it shrank when the two government partners were in total accord on certain topics; it expanded when agreement had to be reached, defined or perfected in the parliamentary chambers or when dealing with areas outside the contract. often it shrank again, once agreement had been found, to strengthen the agreement, sometimes calling for a vote of confidence. reaching total accord across government is never easy: many decrees require long negotiations and are adopted with the formula ‘unless otherwise agreed’, which involves finalising the text weeks after formal approval by the council of ministers. the committee for the legislation of the chamber of deputies intervened in this practice on 9 october 2018, recommending to the government that, “in order to respect article 15 of law no. 400 of 1988, it should avoid an excessive time interval between the deliberation of a decree in the council of ministers and its coming into effect after publication in the official gazette. in this regard, a more consistent and systematic use of the possibility to approve the measures with the formula ‘unless otherwise agreed’ during the first deliberation by the council of ministers, followed by a second definitive deliberation, should be evaluated”.8 the government followed the committee’s suggestion on four 8 opinion regarding the bill converting decree no. 109 of 28 september 2018, laying down urgent provisions for the city of genoa, the security of the national infrastructure and transport grid, the seismic events of 2016 and 2017, work and other emergencies, in the preamble to which the committee annotates that “the decree, approved by the council of ministers in the meeting of 13 september 2018, was published in the official gazette a good fifteen days later on 28 september 2018. in this legislature, a similar time interval between issue and publication in the official gazette, equal to or greater than ten days, occurred for decree no. 86 of 2018 (‘dl ministers’, ten days) and for decree no. 87 of 2018 (‘dl dignity’, making laws fit for the present day 216 occasions.9 when an agreement is reached, the texts are modifiable to a specified limited extent. a vote of confidence was called for, in total, fifteen times in connection with ten laws: during the three readings of the budget law, during the two readings of decree no. 113 of 2018 (security and immigration),10 no. 34 of 2019 (urgent measures for economic growth and for resolving specific crisis situations) and no. 53 of 2019 (urgent provisions for order and public safety) as well as another five conversion laws and ordinary law no. 3 of 9 january 2019 (measures to combat crime against the public administration, as well as regarding the statute of limitations and the transparency of political parties and movements – the so-called ‘corruption-sweeping law’). thus, the budget law and three conversion laws were approved on the basis of a ‘take it or leave it’ vote regarding one decisive part of the text (article 1 of the budget law) or its entirety. particularly interesting was the fact that a vote of confidence was called for ten times in the chamber of deputies, where the majority was able to count on an ample majority, and only five times in the senate (where the majority was smaller). keeping this information in mind, some clear conclusions can be drawn. first, the government was clearly in difficulty when dealing with economic or financial issues, starting with the budget law, which had the difficult goal of reconciling economic and financial constraints with the parties’ election promises (codogno and merler 2019). the two governing parties addressed the budget session with displays of suffering and intolerance towards the european union’s regulatory framework. secondly, when the subject discussed was the hobbyhorse of one of the two governing parties, ill humour and arguments arose from the other party: decrees concerning security and immigration, and security and public order, with two votes of confidence in both the chamber of deputies and senate; the ‘corruption-sweeping’ law with three passages through parliament and a vote of confidence in the senate; and the law concerning self-defence with three passages through parliament. these difficulties explain the unexciting numbers of the legislative activity of the first conte government: while the propaganda conducted above all by the two deputy eleven days) and it has now been repeated for decree no. 113 of 2018, currently under scrutiny by the senate (‘dl security and immigration’, ten days). in the previous legislature, the phenomenon was registered on another twenty occasions […]; in this regard, it would appear opportune to study the consequences of this process, in terms of legal certainty and compliance with the requirement of immediate application of decrees under article 15 of law no. 400 of 1988”. 9 these are the decrees that refer to the double passage through the council of ministers in their preamble: no. 199 of 2018 (urgent provisions for fiscal and financial issues), respectively on 15 and 20 of october; no. 27 of 2019 (urgent provisions for relaunching the agricultural sectors in crisis and for sustaining agri-food businesses affected by adverse atmospheric events of exceptional nature and for the emergency at the stoppani plant in cogoleto), respectively on 7 and 20 march; no. 32 of 2019 (urgent provisions for relaunching the public contracts sector, for accelerating infrastructure interventions, urban regeneration and reconstruction following seismic events), respectively on 20 march and 18 april (thereby at a distance of about a month); no. 34 of 2019 (urgent measures for economic growth and for resolving specific crisis situations), respectively on 4 and 23 of april. 10 decree no. 113 of 4 october 2018, urgent provisions in the area of international protection and immigration, public safety, as well as measures concerning the functionality of the ministry of the interior and the organisation and operation of the national agency for the administration and destination of assets seized and confiscated from organised crime, converted, with modifications, into law no. 132 of 1 december 2018. valerio di porto 217 premiers announced epochal changes in many policies, there were not many legislative initiatives and they struggled to be approved.11 i shall limit myself to a simple recap from memory of the events relevant to the budget law of 2019, the draft of which was presented to the chamber of deputies on 31 october 2018, more than ten days late according to the terms provided by the law of public finance and accounting, and approved by the assembly on 8 december, with a vote of confidence on the entire first part (once the subject of the stability law) which had been merged into a single article. the discussion in the senate took place while tense negotiations intensified with the european commission concerning the level of net debt (fixed at 2.4%; in the economic and financial document approved in april it was equal to 0.8%). the senate budget committee discussed – or rather, pretended to discuss, since many meetings were convened and then disbanded – a text that would have to be rewritten. the rewriting of article 1 (already approved with a vote of confidence in the chamber of deputies) came with a major amendment whose approval the government sought by again calling for a vote of confidence (ex multis, buonomo and cerase 2019, lupo 2019 ii, sorrentino 2019).12 the senate concluded its own work on 23 december; the chamber of deputies only had time for a rapid pro forma examination, which led to the definitive approval of the law with a third vote of confidence on 30 december (lucianò 2019).13 the forcing of procedures (ruggeri 2019 does not hesitate to speak of ‘a black page for democracy and the constitution’) induced 37 senators of the partito democratico group to file a petition with the constitutional court to resolve a dispute about constitutional roles. the court issued an order (no. 17 of 2019) defined by nicola lupo (2019 i) as ‘arbitration, but which provides the foundations for a legislative procedure which is more respectful of the constitution’. for michela manetti (2019), the order ‘highlights the unresolved transition between two politico-constitutional cultures: the older one that reserves judgement over the legitimacy of parliamentary procedures entirely for the assemblies; and the current one that calls the constitutional judge to the thankless task of deciding, case by case, whether a disputed issue is political or constitutional’. finally, the order distinguished itself particularly – according to an authoritative commentator (onida 2019) – “both through the clarity with which it has sought to reaffirm the right that the constitution grants to individual parliamentarians to raise such a dispute in a court of law, as well as for the arguments with which, in a delicate balancing game, it has, on the one hand, substantially acknowledged the constitutional anomaly of the procedure followed in the senate and, on the other, specifically avoided the interpretation 11 marangoni and verzichelli (2019) use the title for a paragraph of their interesting essay change without action. the initial months of the conte government’s legislative activity. thus, they highlight the modesty of the initiatives taken compared to the striking announcements. i also refer to them for an analysis of the legislative and communication strategy used. 12 from the petition presented by the partito democratico senators, cited widely by sorrentino (p. 2), it seems that ‘on the text of the draft budget law of 2019, approved in first reading by the chamber of deputies, considerable substitute amendments were presented by the government (first amendment 1.7000 and then amendment 1.9000) on which it gave notice of a vote of confidence, with the result that the responsible fifth budget committee took little more than twenty minutes to express its opinion and that, in little more than six hours, the senate approved the entire law (that is amendment 1.9000)’. 13 lucianò reconstructs the budget sessions for 2017, 2018 and 2019, showing elements of continuity and new anomalies. making laws fit for the present day 218 that, in this case, we are looking at a ‘glaring’ impairment in the powers of the petitioners”. other comments are much more severe: curreri 2019, for example, defines the order as a ‘lost opportunity’.14 on the other hand, as has been noted by many commentators (caterina 2019, rossi 2019), there was a very strong reason preventing the constitutional court from assuming a clear position: the possible consequences of a finding in favour of the petitioners (leading to the annulment of the entire budget law and the necessity to resort to the provisional budget). the petition filed by the partito democratico senators was nothing more than the latest episode in a series of several signals previously received regarding addressing the clash between majority parties and opposition in relation to correct parliamentary procedure (fabrizzi 2019). i would like to point out, incidentally, that the following year, the second conte government presented the draft budget law in parliament on 2 november. definitive approval, after a tight and forced process, was received on 24 december (gianniti 2020). 6. the laws initiated by parliamentarians: the five star movement’s monopoly and the perfect functioning of alternating bicameralism if we analyse in detail the laws originating from parliamentary or mixed parliamentarypopular initiatives, we can note that, out of a total of 22 laws, only three were the outcome of a merger between bills sponsored by majority groups and bills initiated by opposition parties. these are two laws originating from mixed parliamentary-popular initiatives15 and law no. 99 of 2018 (establishment of a parliamentary inquiry committee dealing with mafia and other criminal organisations, including foreign ones), the latter resulting from the confluence of bills sponsored by the partito democratico, movimento 5 stelle, forza italia and the mixed group. the other 19 laws originating from parliamentary initiatives are as follows: 15 from members of the five star movement, three from members of the lega, and one from members of fratelli d’italia. regarding the 15 laws initiated by members of the five star movement, three of them establish parliamentary inquiry committees, and four ratify international agreements (with montenegro, laos and cuba, as well as with the international development law organisation (idlo) concerning the headquarters of the organisation). another six deal with justice, the most relevant of which is probably the one about vote exchanges involving mafia (it is no coincidence that, among the laws originating from parliamentary initiatives, this law was the only one that required two readings in the senate before 14 comments on the order of the court are numerous and among them, obviously, there is no unified voice. please refer to the bibliography at http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2019/0017o-19.html. 15 one of these two laws is law no. 36 of 2019 on self defence, a politically sensitive topic, which originated from a merger between eight different bills: one popular initiative and seven private members’ bills (two initiated by members of the partito democratico, three by members of forza italia, one by members of fratelli d’italia, and one by members of the lega). the other law is law no. 92 of 2019 (introduction of the civic education subject at school), which originated from a merger between 16 bills: one popular initiative, one bill sponsored by fratelli d’italia, one sponsored by the partito democratico, one sponsored by the lega, five bills submitted by forza italia, four bills initiated by movimento 5 stelle, and three bills sponsored by distinct components of the mixed group. valerio di porto 219 approval). the remaining two concern, respectively, the entrusting of the management of transportation services in tourist railways (law no. 71 of 2019), and the prorogation of terms to adopt additional and corrective measures for revising the pleasure boating code (law no. 84 of 2019). four of these 15 laws were signed (as first signatory) by senator patuanelli, who was deputy leader of the m5s parliamentary group, then leader (from 6 june 2018) of the same group, and later minister in the conte ii cabinet. the three laws initiated by members of the lega are really heterogeneous. law no. 33 of 2019 deals with criminal law (modifications to articles 438 and 442 of the penal code. inapplicability of simplified and shortened proceedings in the case of crimes punished with a life sentence). law no. 65 of 2019 is about declaring the bridge over the brenta river (also known as the old bridge of bassano) as a national monument. law no. 73 of 2019 amends some previous provisions regarding compulsory boat licence and water rescue training. the first to be approved among the laws originating from parliamentary initiatives was a law (the only one) initiated by members of a parliamentary party group that was outside the majority coalition (but close to the lega). this law makes it compulsory to install acoustic and lighting devices in locked vehicles to prevent child neglect (law no. 117 of 2018). a further interesting aspect has to do with the legislative procedure of the 20 laws originating from parliamentary initiatives. just one of these (the one about vote exchanges involving mafia) was approved after more than two readings in parliament. the other 19 were enacted after one single reading in both parliamentary branches (of these, ten were introduced in the chamber and nine in the senate). this seems to be further evidence of the perfect functioning of alternating bicameralism, whereby usually only the house where a bill starts its process can revise it. 7. divergent parallels: the turning point of the european elections from the data presented so far, the picture of a non-cohesive but strong majority emerges, which continued thanks to mutual impositions, where the majority shareholder had difficulty in imposing itself at the government level but knew how to impose its own parliamentary initiatives. perhaps the most robust element that the two political forces shared with each other was their anti-europeanism, which marked the government's action16. the election campaign for the european elections of 26 may 2019 increased open competition between the two government partners. the european elections drastically changed the electoral balance between the two anti-establishment parties – the m5s and the league – and opened the way to a period of open conflict between the main government actors (cotta 2020). in fact, there was a reversal of the electoral result as compared to the general election of 2018: the league exceeded 34% of votes while the five star movement dropped to 17%. after an initial post-election phase, the m5s adopted a less hostile attitude towards the european institutions and on 16 july it voted for the new president of the european commission, which proved decisive in her election. 16 the data concerning infringement procedures is also interesting: the conte government inherited 59 infringement procedures from the gentiloni government (51 for violation of european law and 8 for nonimplementation) and closed its mandate with 81 procedures (of which 71 for violation of law and 10 for non-transposition). see di porto piana 2019 ii, p. 10. making laws fit for the present day 220 the unifying element of the government majority was consequently lost, and a break-up seemed inevitable. the deputy prime minister, minister of the interior and lega leader salvini immediately denounced the new 5stelle-renzi axis. there then followed a rapid fall towards the government crisis, apparently incomprehensible to most people, also due to the way in which it occurred. 8. a death foretold and the palingenesis of conte almost a month passed between the announcement of the crisis and its epilogue, in which matteo salvini did not withdraw the league delegation from the government and listened, from the nearby government benches, to the harsh attack of prime minister conte, who in this way carried out the first step towards his palingenesis. when salvini was about to speak, he was invited by the president of the senate to do so from the league benches. thus, in those few steps from the government benches to the hemicycle, the transition of salvini and the league from government to opposition was definitively accomplished. the crisis of the conte i government was a paradoxical event in many ways, but i will not pause to reflect on that in order to reach the conclusion: i.e., the birth of the conte ii government, in which the majority shareholder remained the same with a reshuffle of m5s ministers, while the minority shareholders changed and became three. this writing stops when conte’s palingenesis starts. the most recent events teach us three things about the legislatures of the ‘second republic’ that reached their natural term: 1. they developed around large delegation laws, approved or in any case at an advanced stage of examination already in the first year of the legislature. 2. almost all of them – with the sole exception of the xvi legislature – saw ambitious and controversial constitutional reform projects (xiii legislature: commission d’alema and reform in extremis of title v of the constitution; xiv legislature: 2006 referendum; xvii legislature: 2016 referendum). 3. they came to an end with a government (and a parliamentary majority) that was different from the one appointed at the beginning of the legislature; only in the xiv legislature did the prime minister stay the same from beginning to end (while changing the government composition). in this legislature government and parliament have chosen different paths: they do not seem to believe in the instrument of delegated legislation and are proceeding with the technique of micro/macro constitutional reforms: micro because they touch single points of the constitution, macro for their impact (the reduction of the number of parliamentarians is a striking example). no long-term reform process has been launched, and today (end of march 2020) parliament is dramatically stagnating due to the epidemic emergency. the legislature will come to an end with a government and a majority which are different from the original ones. the prime minister could, surprisingly, be the same. however, making predictions about its duration is really impossible, given the number of variables involved. valerio di porto 221 references arcuri, a., cose vecchie e cose nuove sui d.p.c.m. dal fronte (…dell’emergenza coronavirus), nel n. 28/2020 della rivista on line federalismi.it (12 ottobre 2020) buonomo, g. e cerase, m., la corte costituzionale ancora irrisolta sul ricorso delle minoranze parlamentari, in ‘forum di quaderni costituzionali’, 13 febbraio 2019 caiani, m., the populist parties and their electoral success: different causes behind different populisms? the case of the five-star movement and the league, in ‘contemporary italian politics’, n. 3/2019caterina, e., è possibile dichiarare costituzionalmente illegittima una (intera) legge di bilancio?, in ‘osservatorio sulle fonti’, n. 1/2019 codogno, l. e merler, s., the willing suspension of disbelief: the contract for government and the budget, in ‘contemporary italian politics’, n. 3/2019 contieri, a., un monito inedito al senato nell’ordinanza n. 17/2019, nel n. 7/2019 della rivista on line federalismi.it (3 aprile 2019) cotta, m., the anti-establishment parties at the helm: from great hopes to failure and a limited resurrection, in ‘contemporary italian politics’, n. 2/2020curreri, s., l’occasione persa (prime note sull’ordinanza n. 17/2019 della corte costituzionale), nel n. 4/2019 della rivista on line federalismi.it (20 febbraio 2019) di porto, v., piana a., il primo anno delle legislature nella cosiddetta ‘seconda repubblica’, in ‘osservatorio sulle fonti’, n. 1/2019 di porto, v., piana a., dal referendum costituzionale del 4 dicembre 2016 al governo gialloverde: i numeri della legislazione in due legislature sopravvissute a se stesse, in ‘osservatorio sulle fonti’, n. 3/2019 fabrizzi, f., il conflitto tra poteri quale strumento a tutela del procedimento legislativo, in ‘osservatorio aic’, fasc. 5/2019 giannetti, d., pinto, l. and plescia, c., the first conte government: ‘government of change’ or business as usual?, in ‘contemporary italian politics’, n. 2/2020gianniti, l., le sessioni di bilancio del 2018 e del 2019: procedure di bilancio, poteri del parlamento, rapporti con l’unione europea, in ‘astrid rassegna, n. 2/2020 lucianò, f., la legge di bilancio in parlamento tra nuove regole e vecchie abitudini, in ‘forum di quaderni costituzionali’, 29 aprile 2019 lupo, n., un’ordinanza compromissoria, ma che pone le basi per un procedimento legislativo più rispettoso della costituzione, nel n. 4/2019 della rivista on line federalismi.it (20 febbraio 2019) lupo, n., i maxi-emendamenti e la corte costituzionale (dopo l’ordinanza n. 17 del 2019), in ‘osservatorio sulle fonti’, n. 1/2019 manetti, m., la tutela delle minoranze parlamentari si perde nel labirinto degli interna corporis acta, in ‘rivista aic’, n. 2/2019 manzella, a., l’opposizione in regime di parlamentarismo assoluto, nel n. 4/2019 della rivista on line federalismi.it (20 febbraio 2019) marangoni, f. and verzichelli l., goat-stag, chimera or chameleon? the formation and first semester of the conte government, in ‘contemporary italian politics’, n. 3/2019 onida, v., la corte e i conflitti interni al parlamento: l’ordinanza n. 17 del 2019, nel numero speciale 3 della rivista on line federalismi.it rossi, e., l’ordinanza n. 17/2019 e il rischio dell’annullamento della legge di bilancio, in ‘forum di quaderni costituzionali’, 21 febbraio 2019 making laws fit for the present day 222 ruggeri, a., il ‘giusto’ procedimento legislativo in attesa di garanzie non meramente promesse da parte della consulta, in ‘rivista aic’, n. 2/2019 sorrentino, f., la legge di bilancio tra governo e corte costituzionale: il parlamento approva a scatola chiusa, nel n. 4/2019 della rivista on line federalismi.it (20 febbraio 2019) microsoft word pdf_issue_15_2_pedrazzani_zucchini_173-190.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 2, september 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 2, 173–190. contact author: andrea pedrazzani, university of milan. e-mail address: andrea.pedrazzani@unimi.it ineffective changes for hard times. the 2017 reform of the italian senate’s rule of procedure and its effects andrea pedrazzani university of milan francesco zucchini university of milan abstract in 2017, an extensive reform of the rules of procedure of the italian senate was enacted. the revision was soon welcomed as a step towards a more efficient and rapid upper house. in this article, we focus on one crucial aspect of the reform: the changes made to the rules governing the assignment of bills to parliamentary committees. in particular, we analyze the costs associated with the different assignment procedures and develop some theoretical expectations about the change brought about by the reform in terms of decision-making efficiency. these expectations are empirically evaluated against data on lawmaking in the senate before and after the reform. a comparison is also carried out using data from the chamber of deputies. preliminary results show that the new rules have not improved the efficiency and productivity of the italian senate so far. 1. introduction n late 2017, an ambitious reform of the rules of procedure of the italian senate was enacted. in purely quantitative terms, over one-third of the articles of the standing orders were modified. more substantively, the reform revised several important aspects regulating the lawmaking process in the senate and the functioning of the upper house more in general. in particular, the reform introduced more restrictive rules for forming new parliamentary party groups, strengthened the role of permanent committees in the legislative process, and rationalized several steps of bill examination in the senate. not only the proposers of the reform, but also many observers welcomed the 2017 revision as a reform which would increase the decision-making efficiency of the senate. just one year before the reform, the italian senate had ‘survived’ a constitutional referendum attempting to reduce its role in the lawmaking process. by revising its internal rules, the senate then seemed to take ‘revenge’ on all its detractors. the reform in the senate was even more appreciated due to the fact that, in the same period, a similar attempt to reform the standing orders of the chamber of deputies proved unsuccessful. in this article we focus on one crucial aspect of the 2017 reform, namely, the changes made to the rules governing the assignment of bills to parliamentary committees. accounts of the legislative process in italy have typically focused on patterns of governmentopposition cooperation (di palma 1977; cotta 1994; capano and giuliani 2001; giuliani i ineffective changes for hard times 174 2008; de giorgi 2016), on the agenda setting role of the government (zucchini 2013; de micheli 2014), on intra-coalition dynamics (pedrazzani and zucchini 2013; pedrazzani 2013, 2017; conti and marangoni 2015), or on the impact of bicameralism (zucchini 2008; pedrazzani and zucchini 2020). studies of how bill assignment procedures affect legislative outcomes are rare. however, bill assignment procedures can be a crucial aspect in the legislative process. as to bill assignment procedures, in both the italian chamber of deputies and the senate, bills are assigned to a standing committee according to three possible procedures. the committee can act: a) in a reporting capacity (sede referente), i.e. the committee is charged with a preliminary examination of legislation to be reported on in the assembly, where the bill can be amended and possibly approved; b) in a drafting capacity (sede redigente), i.e. the committee examines the bill and proposes a draft bill to the floor, which can either approve or reject it; or c) in a legislating capacity (sede legislativa in the chamber, sede deliberante in the senate), i.e. the committee can approve the bill with no further steps on the floor. before 2017, in both chambers, bills were normally assigned to committees in their reporting capacity. while in the chamber of deputies these rules have not changed, the 2017 reform introduced new assignment rules in the senate, whereby bills are now normally sent to committees acting either in a drafting capacity or in a legislating capacity. to what degree have these new rules improved the legislative ‘efficiency’ of the senate? has the 2017 reform made the italian upper house able to examine and approve a greater volume of bills than before? this study offers a preliminary answer to these questions using the lawmaking data available so far. more specifically, we collected data on bill assignment to committees and bill examination from the start of legislature xviii up until december 31 2019. we compare these data with legislative data concerning the chamber and with similar data covering the initial phase of (pre-reform) legislature xvii. this article is organized as follows. in the next section we sketch the process leading to the 2017 reform of the rules of procedure of the senate, from the early steps at the onset of legislature xvii to its revitalization after the failure of the constitutional referendum held in 2016. we also outline briefly the main contents of the reform. the third section analyzes the costs associated with the different assignment procedures and develops some theoretical expectations about the change brought about by the 2017 reform in terms of the senate’s decision-making efficiency. the following section evaluates these expectations against empirical data on lawmaking in the senate and in the chamber in the preand post-reform period. concluding remarks follow in the final section. 2. revision of the rules of procedure of the italian senate in 2017: an unexpected reform although the institutional framework established in italy by the republican constitution of 1948 has been able to survive almost ‘untouched’ up until now, several reforms have occurred in the electoral system and in the internal rules of both houses of the italian parliament. four electoral reforms were approved from the 1990s onwards during the highly unstable political phase known as the ‘second republic’ (verzichelli and cotta 2000; zucchini and pedrazzani 2020). substantial changes in the standing orders of both branches of parliament took place during the early 1970s, the late 1980s and the pedrazzani and zucchini 175 1990s (giannetti and pedrazzani 2020). thereafter, no major revisions were enacted until the reform of the rules of procedure of the senate approved in 2017. 2.1. the reform process the process leading to the approval of the 2017 reform of the internal rules of the senate is intertwined with an attempt to revise the italian constitution which occurred during legislature xvii (2013-2018). during legislature xvii, a major revision of the italian constitution promoted by the ruling center-left coalition was approved by the italian parliament. the reform aimed at reducing the prerogatives of the senate, thus abolishing symmetric bicameralism with respect to policy-making and increasing the powers of the executive as an agenda setter (tsebelis 2017). in addition, the constitutional amendment included provisions to centralize policy-making powers in the hands of the national government vis-à-vis regional governments. such a broad reform project has never been implemented, as it was stopped by popular vote in a constitutional referendum held in december 2016 (vercesi 2019). however, it considerably affected the history and outcome of the reform of the parliamentary rules in the senate. the process leading to the enactment of the 2017 reform started well before the legislative procedure of the constitutional revision. in this process a crucial role was played by the president of the senate pietro grasso, a former anti-mafia magistrate who had been elected senator in the list of the democratic party (partito democratico, pd) in the general elections of february 2013.1 on april 9 2013, during the first meeting of the committee on rules2 of legislature xvii, the president of the senate charged two expert senators – marco minniti (pd) and gaetano quagliariello (people of freedom, popolo della libertà, pdl) – with the task of examining all the amendments to the rules of procedure that would be submitted thenceforth. two months later, after minniti and quagliariello became members of the cabinet and hence left the committee on rules, their task was entrusted to anna finocchiaro (pd), donato bruno (pdl) and roberto calderoli (northern league, lega nord, ln) (june 19 2013).3 in autumn, the three rapporteurs reported in the committee on rules on the received amendment proposals (october 15 2013), and in january they informed the other members that they were about to circulate a draft of the project of reform (january 21 2014). the proposed amendments included a revision of the organization and competences of permanent committees. some days later, a first stop in the process occurred, as the committee on rules decided to postpone the discussion on the revision of the parliamentary rules of the senate, given the start of negotiations on an overall reform of the constitution (january 30, 2014). not only had the main italian parties started bargaining over a constitutional reform, but 1 later, grasso left the pd. in december 2017 he founded a new leftwing party called free and equal (liberi e uguali, leu). 2 the committee on rules is one of the select committees of the italian senate. when a new legislative term starts, the president of the senate appoints the members of this committee, taking into account the size of parliamentary party groups. the committee on rules usually comprises ten senators and is chaired by the president of the senate. it examines and introduces changes to the rules of procedure, and issues opinions on the interpretation of the rules submitted to it by the president of the senate. 3 in late april 2013, after two months of negotiations, a ‘grand coalition’ government headed by enrico letta was formed, relying on the support of the pd, pdl and the main centrist parties. the northern league was in the opposition. ineffective changes for hard times 176 also the overall political landscape had changed meanwhile. the letta government was replaced by a new cabinet headed by pd secretary matteo renzi (february 22, 2104). the new cabinet relied on the support of a pdl splinter known as new centerright (nuovo centrodestra, ncd), while the pdl itself had withdrawn from the government some time before and was re-labeled go italy (forza italia, fi). in the ensuing meeting of the committee on rules, the draft circulated by the rapporteurs was adopted as a starting point for the next discussion, and a ten-day deadline was fixed for tabling amendments to the draft. at the same time, president grasso asked the rapporteurs to get in touch with the committee on rules of the chamber in order to harmonize the projects of reform of the standing orders that were discussed in the two houses (march 12, 2014). yet, the process was soon blocked. on april 8 2014, a bill proposing an overarching reform of the italian constitution was submitted to the senate: the so called ‘renziboschi’ bill, named after its two main sponsors (prime minister renzi and the minister for constitutional reforms maria elena boschi). after this, the committee on rules of the senate was not convened for about three years. as mentioned above, the renzi-boschi attempt to reform the constitution eventually failed. this seemed to open again the possibility to revise the parliamentary rules, at least in the senate. in june 2017, six months after the constitutional referendum, president grasso gave a new boost to the process of internal reform of the italian upper house. in a public conference eloquently entitled ‘which limited reforms to the standing orders are still possible in the current legislative term?’ (rome, june 22 2017), grasso gave a speech enlisting a number of possible revisions to the internal rules of the senate (grasso 2017). when the committee on rules met for the first time after the constitutional referendum (july 11, 2017), grasso proposed the same list of revisions to the other members of the committee. this proposal was based on the draft discussed in the committee on rules three years before and overtly aimed at making parliamentary proceedings more efficient. quite interestingly, grasso’s list did not mention any change in the rules of bill assignment to the committees. the same day, grasso appointed a restricted working group (comitato ristretto), which would draft a reform proposal based on unanimous consensus among its members. this time, the working group included maurizio buccarella, a member of the anti-establishment five star movement (movimento 5 stelle, m5s), in addition to anna maria bernini (fi), calderoli (ln) and luigi zanda (pd). three months later, the draft was illustrated to the other members of the committee on rules (october 11, 2017). the project of reform introduced new rules for bill assignment, as bills were to be ‘normally’ assigned to committees in a drafting or legislating capacity (rather than in a reporting capacity). on november 14 2017, the reform proposal was finally adopted by the committee on rules and submitted to the floor of the senate (doc. ii n. 38). after being examined in the assembly, on december 20 2017 the reform was definitely approved by the senate. the proposal was largely supported, as just three senators abstained and five voted ‘no’ in the final vote on the floor. the reform was welcomed as an ‘unhoped-for miracle’ by life senator and former president of the republic giorgio napolitano (senato della repubblica 2017). at the same time, the president of the chamber laura boldrini bemoaned the lack of a similar reform in the lower house. in an official message, she pointed out that the same parties which approved the reform in the senate refused to do the same in the chamber (boldrini 2017). pedrazzani and zucchini 177 2.2. the contents of the reform according to the proposers, the 2017 reform of the rules of procedure – which would have been applied starting from legislature xviii – aimed at increasing the efficiency and speed of decision-making in the senate.4 as bernini stated in the final declaration of vote on the reform she gave on behalf of the fi party group, the new rules on bill assignment were meant to ‘speed up, make more efficient and simplify the activity of committees’. this is because, as stressed by doris lo moro (leu) in the same debate, when the media talk about lawmaking ‘it is very often said that everything languishes in the senate, everything is stopped in the senate’ (senato della repubblica 2017). overall, 66 articles were altered out of the 167 provisions that form the standing orders. the reform addressed three main aspects: the formation of parliamentary party groups, the role of permanent committees, and the rationalization of several steps of bill examination. as to the first aspect, the primary aim of the new rules was that of hindering the formation of new parliamentary groups during a legislative term. for example, new art. 14 establishes that each group shall comprise at least ten senators from a party or political movement, or a combination of parties and political movements, whose candidates ran for and were elected to the senate under the same party symbol. moreover, during the term, a new parliamentary group can only be established if it is the result of a merger of existing groups (art. 15). with regard to the third aspect above, the new rules curtailed speaking time on the floor during debates on legislation (art. 89). in addition, the new provisions granted two weeks a month, not overlapping with plenary business, for the work of standing and special committees (art. 53). furthermore, the rules governing voting in the plenary (art. 107) and question time (art. 151-bis) were made more similar to those operating in the chamber. the reform also increased the transparency of committees’ activities, since the broadcasting of committee sittings was made possible not only when committees act in a drafting or legislative capacity – as in the previous rules – but also when they act in a reporting capacity (art. 33).5 for the purposes of this article, the second aspect above – namely the role of permanent committees – is the most crucial one. the reform aimed at enhancing the role of standing committees in the lawmaking process. in this regard, the new art. 34 stipulates that, after being submitted to the senate, bills are ‘normally’ assigned to committees in a legislating or in a drafting capacity. this is a remarkable change, as according to the previous rules of the senate (and also to the rules still operating in the chamber) bills were normally sent to committees acting in a reporting capacity. the goal of this revision was that of charging the committees (endowed with the power to draft or even approve bills) with most of the lawmaking activities, thus making the parliamentary process 4 initially the proposers of the reform also aimed to reduce some discrepancies in the standing orders of the two parliamentary houses. however, the 2017 revision of the rules of procedure of the senate introduced some new rules (like those regarding bill assignment to committees and the formation of parliamentary groups) that are not present in the chamber (gianfrancesco 2018; giupponi 2018; lupo 2018). 5 note that broadcasting has to be requested by the committee and allowed by the president of the senate. as pointed out by fasone and lupo (2015), increasing the forms of public accessibility to the activity of committees can undermine their lawmaking capacity. in this regard, if compared to the previous situation in the senate, the 2017 reform may have weakened the committees’ ability to shape legislation when acting in their reporting capacity. we do not specifically address this issue in the present article. ineffective changes for hard times 178 more rapid and efficient. as in the pre-reform senate, however, certain ‘special’ types of bills can still be only assigned to the committees in their reporting capacity: bills amending the constitution, dealing with the electoral rules, converting law decrees, including delegation clauses, ratifying international treaties, and budget bills (art. 35 and 36). moreover, until the final vote in the senate, bills being examined by a committee in its legislating or drafting capacity can be re-assigned to a committee in a reporting capacity if requested by the government, one-tenth of the members of the senate, or one-fifth of the members of the committee (art. 35 and 36). 3. a promise of increased efficiency on the same day in which the reform was approved, the president of the senate grasso solemnly declared: ‘the floor has approved the modification of the senate rules, which has a profound effect on its efficiency and effectiveness and will allow us to respond more quickly to the needs of citizens’ (december 20 2017). in this article we focus on investigating the effects of the new rules regarding the assignment of the bills to the committees. in this regard, grasso’s words seem to resonate with the opinion of observers and even senate officials, according to whom the reform would allow a huge number of bills to be examined by committees in a drafting or legislating capacity, thus increasing the volume of approved bills (carboni and magalotti 2018). in both houses of the italian parliament, any legislative process begins with the bill being assigned to a legislative committee in order to be discussed. as mentioned above, the committee can act: a) in a reporting capacity (the bill proposed by the committee is introduced to the floor, which can amend it before final approval), b) in a drafting capacity (the bill proposed by the committee can only be approved or rejected by the floor), or c) in a legislating capacity (the committee can approve the bill without any subsequent step on the floor). both the legislating capacity and the drafting capacity are kept (and acquired) by the committees only if one-tenth of the house members, one-fifth of committee members and the government do not oppose (art. 72 of the constitution; art. 92 and 96 of the rules of procedure of the chamber; art. 35 and 36 of the rules of procedure of the senate). usually, and still now, in the chamber of deputies the bills are assigned to the committees in their reporting capacity. only when their nature (see above) and an almost unanimous consensus allow it, they are re-assigned to the same committee acting in a legislating or (much more rarely) in a drafting capacity. the same does not happen in the senate where, as we have already seen, the standing orders were changed at the end of legislature xvii. during the current legislature (xviii), in the senate bills are normally not sent to committees in their reporting capacity. all bills that are not associated with the budgetary process, do not ratify international treaties or convert decree laws and that do not include legislative delegations to the government or deal with electoral rules are assigned to a committee acting in a drafting or legislating capacity. from now on, we use the term ‘bill’ to refer only to the category of legislative proposal affected by the reform. our argument applies just to these bills, and not to the ‘special’ bills mentioned above (which can be assigned only to the reporting committee). did such a new rule really increase the senate’s decision-making efficiency as the president of the senate suggested? why should starting the legislative process with one pedrazzani and zucchini 179 of these two procedures – committee acting in a drafting or legislating capacity – make the process more efficient than in the past, when the starting point was the committee acting in a reporting capacity? in the next two sections we will try to figure out the rationale behind the reform. 3.1. the decision-making costs in order to answer the above questions, we first need to consider the advantages and disadvantages associated with the different procedures as well as the potential costs intrinsic to switching from one procedure to the other. on the one hand, when the committees act in a legislating or drafting capacity, the outcomes are more predictable. either the floor is not involved in the decision making (legislating capacity), or the floor can only accept or refuse, section by section, the bill proposed by the committee (drafting capacity). moreover, as near-unanimity is required to let the committees keep the prerogatives associated with these procedures, the policy options that can be approved are few in number, i.e. the bargaining set is small. the scarcity of winning alternatives and the absence or downsizing of the floor’s role can shorten the time necessary for the decision. on the other hand, if the bargaining set gets so small it becomes empty, no agreement can be reached about any alternative to the status quo. in summary, the approval of a law (the change of the status quo) is much less likely when committees act in a legislating or drafting capacity. when possible, however, it is easier to achieve it. on the contrary, when the committees act in a reporting capacity the bargaining set is wide – the agreement of just a majority of committee members (normally those who support the government) is sufficient to adopt a bill – but the final outcome is much less predictable, also because any final approval depends on the preferences of the floor. moreover, the floor’s schedule is crowded with the special bills that cannot be assigned to the committees acting in drafting or legislating capacity. overall, the decision making takes much longer. summing up, when committees act in a reporting capacity bill approval is on average more likely, but it is also more ‘costly’ to achieve it. we define as cr the cost in terms of required time to approve a bill in a chamber when the committee acts in a reporting capacity, as cd the same cost when the committee acts in a drafting capacity, and as cl the same cost when the committee acts in legislating capacity. then, in condition of incomplete information, we assume the following: cr > cd > cl (1) also switching from one procedure to another implies a prolongation of the decisionmaking process, which is different according to the starting procedure that the committee decides to abandon and the final procedure that the committee decides to adopt. such a delay can be long when the committee tries to stop acting in a reporting capacity to start acting in a drafting or legislating capacity. in this case, even when there is a better option than the status quo for all relevant players (the committee’s unanimity is needed in the senate to turn from a reporting to a drafting or legislating capacity), finding it in conditions of incomplete information takes time and has bargaining costs. on the contrary, the shift from a committee acting in drafting or legislating capacity to a committee acting in ineffective changes for hard times 180 reporting capacity is easy and fast, as a small minority is sufficient to impose it. we call crdl the time necessary for a committee to change from acting in a reporting capacity to acting in a drafting or legislating capacity, and cdlr the time necessary for the reverse change. based on the discussion above, we assume the following: crdl > cdlr > 0 (2) these costs are certainly not sufficient to assess which procedure is more convenient for the legislators and what the latter will choose to discuss and approve the bills. we also need to know which outcomes the legislators are likely to obtain given their ideal points and the position of the status quo (see below). turning back to the costs above, let us consider those bills examined by the committees acting in a legislating or drafting capacity. in the case of these bills, ceteris paribus, the senate after the 2017 reform should be more efficient than the senate prior to the reform. in the pre-reform senate, the bills were usually assigned to the committees acting in their reporting capacity. therefore, in the pre-reform senate for those bills examined by committees in a legislative or drafting capacity we should take into account not only the cost of the procedure itself (cl or cd), but also the cost of changing the procedure (crdl). for the same bills, in the post-reform senate only cl or cd has to be paid, being absent the cost of changing the procedure. a similar argument should give a small advantage in terms of efficiency to the senate before the reform when we consider those bills examined by the committees acting in a reporting capacity. for these bills, there were no costs for changing the procedure in the pre-reform senate since the normal procedure was that the committees acted in a reporting capacity. so, only cr had to be paid. the cost of changing the procedure (cdlr) affects, instead, the senate after the reform (in addition to cr), where bills are normally supposed to start with one of the other two procedures. these considerations suggest that an analytical comparison between the ‘legislative efficiency’ of the senate before the reform and that after the reform gives an ambivalent result. the overall effect of the reform will depend on the frequency of political circumstances that make it more attractive for the government parties’ members to choose the committees acting in their legislating or drafting capacity rather than the committees acting in their reporting capacity. the government parties’ members are the crucial ones as, in light of the literature, we assume that usually no legislative decision can be taken against the will of a government party (cox and mccubbins 2005). therefore, we need to turn to the effects of the different procedures in terms of policy outcomes for the government parties’ members. 3.2. a spatial analysis of the policy outcomes let us assume that a, b, c are the ideal points of three political actors. they are located along one policy dimension. b and c are the ideal points of the members of the government majority. a is the ideal point of the main opposition party. on the same policy dimension, sq is the position of the policy status quo. also the policy outcomes, that is the approved bills, are represented along the same dimension. eabc is the policy outcome when the committee acts in a drafting or legislating capacity, i.e., when the bill must be supported by all actors. ebc is the policy outcome when the committee acts pedrazzani and zucchini 181 in a reporting capacity, i.e., when the agreement of the government parties is sufficient to support the bill. the utility of a certain policy outcome for each political actor is given by the distance between its ideal point and the policy outcome. the smaller the distance, the greater the utility. for example, in figure 2a below, for actor c the utility deriving from the outcome when the committee acts in a legislating or drafting capacity is uc(eabc) = – | c – eabc |. we can distinguish three scenarios. in a first scenario, irrespective of the procedure with which a bill has been assigned to the committee, the bill is not in fact approved and sometimes it is not discussed either. the other two scenarios correspond to the procedures we have described above. scenario 1. when no procedure is de facto activated. no procedure is in fact activated if, even for just one of the actors required by the procedure, the utility is lower than that obtained by preserving the status quo sq (romer and rosenthal 1978; tsebelis 2002). in figure 1 the status quo will be maintained, as any agreement between the government parties b and c to change it is not possible. obviously, the procedure that requires the support of the opposition party fails as well. if we define w(sq) as the ‘winset’ of the status quo sq, then w(sq)bc = w(sq)abc = æ.6 figure 1. legislative actors and status quo when no procedure is activated (scenario 1). source: own elaboration scenario 2. when committee acts in legislating or drafting capacity. a necessary but non-sufficient condition to allow the committee acting in legislative or drafting capacity is that also opposition party a supports the policy change. it is not sufficient because also the other procedure (the reporting procedure) could be chosen. in this case w(sq)bc = w(sq)abc ! æ. even if the set of alternatives that can defeat the status quo is the same under both procedures (reporting or legislating/drafting), the outcome of the legislative game is likely to be different according to the selected procedure. when a committee acts in legislating or drafting capacity, the final outcome will be the closest one to the government party that is least distant from the opposition party. as illustrated in figure 2a, opposition party a somehow reinforces the bargaining power of government party b. when, instead, the committee acts in a reporting capacity, the bargain takes place only between the ruling parties, b and c, as in this case the required consensus is only inside the government majority. therefore, the final outcome is more likely to be closer to c than under the legislating/drafting procedure (ebc versus eabc). party c, i.e. the government party closest to sq, is the crucial actor. the committee will go on acting in a drafting (or legislating) capacity if – | c – eabc | – cd > – | c – ebc | – cr – cdlr (3) – | c – eabc | – cd > – | c – sq | (4) 6 the winset of the status quo is the set of points in the policy space that can beat the status quo according to the decision-making rule in place. ineffective changes for hard times 182 from c’s point of view, a committee acting in legislating or drafting capacity brings lower decision-making costs but a farther legislative outcome, while a committee acting in reporting capacity brings higher costs but a closer outcome. as in equation (1) we have assumed that cd < cr, inequality (3) is more likely to be true when the two policy outcomes, eabc and ebc, are similar. in this case, the low bargaining costs and uncertainty of the committees when they act in legislating or drafting capacity can largely compensate c for an outcome that is slightly worse than the outcome achieved under the reporting procedure. two circumstances can make the two policy outcomes similar to each other, thus making the adoption of the legislating/drafting procedure more likely: 1) if the possible policy change is marginal as in figure 2a, i.e., when the winset of the status quo is small; 2) if party b is particularly close to c (i.e., the government majority is cohesive) as in figure 2b. in the latter case, at worst the final outcome will not be farther for c than the ideal point of b even when the winset of sq is large. figure 2a. legislative actors and status quo when committee acts in legislating or drafting capacity (scenario 2a) source: own elaboration figure 2b. legislative actors and status quo when committee acts in legislating or drafting capacity (scenario 2b) source: own elaboration scenario 3. when committee acts in reporting capacity. according to the above discussion, when a policy change is almost unanimously preferred to the preservation of status quo, then the committee acts in reporting capacity if the change is not marginal and/or if the government majority is not very cohesive. the adoption of this procedure is de facto ‘compulsory’ also when the status quo is controversial, i.e., when the policy change wanted by the government parties is in the opposite direction to the change desired by the opposition party (figure 3a). the reporting procedure will be chosen also when both majority and opposition parties want a policy change in the same direction, but a new bill adopted under the legislating/drafting procedure would be very far from the ruling parties (figure 3b). pedrazzani and zucchini 183 figure 3a. legislative actors and status quo when committee acts in reporting capacity (scenario 3a) source: own elaboration figure 3b. legislative actors and status quo when committee acts in reporting capacity (scenario 3b) source: own elaboration the analysis of the consequences in terms of policy outcomes of the different procedures allows us to predict that the current senate should be more efficient in processing the ‘normal’ bills than the pre-reform senate if the possible policy changes are not only ‘uncontroversial’ but also smaller (scenario 2a), and/or if the government parties are also more homogenous (scenario 2b) than in the previous legislatures. in other terms, the post-reform senate should be more efficient (as it would resort more often to committees acting in legislating or drafting capacity) if the scenarios that are described in figures 2a and 2b are more likely now than in the past. even a rough knowledge of italian politics over the most recent years suggests that this is not the case. the internal homogeneity of the government majority increases the closer the ruling parties are in policy terms. as to the size of uncontroversial policy change, the scope of possible policy change grows with the distance in terms of policy positions between a government and the previous one. the status quo that the current government majority confronts and tries to change is largely the legacy of the government majorities that preceded it. the greater the difference between a government majority and the previous one in terms of policy positions, the less marginal (i.e. the greater) on average should be the policy change. an overview of the internal heterogeneity of government majorities and of the distance from the past government majorities in italy can be provided by the expert survey data collected by chapel hill in 2010, 2014 and 2019 (polk et al. 2017; bakker et al. 2015, 2020). party scores along the general left-right dimension are displayed in figure 4. looking at the graphs, we note that the ideological extension (or ‘range’) of the majorities that supported the letta, renzi and gentiloni cabinets during legislature xvii was lower than that of the governments of legislature xviii. the ideological distance that separates each government from the previous one also seems greater in legislature xviii as compared to legislature xvii.7 in particular, the distances between the conte ii and conte i cabinets, 7 identifying the joint policy position of the majority supporting a government is a hard task. we can expect the government position to be located somewhere between the two most extreme coalition parties. for ease ineffective changes for hard times 184 and between the conte i and gentiloni cabinets (legislature xviii), are greater than the distances between the gentiloni and renzi cabinets, between the renzi and letta cabinets, and between the letta and monti cabinets (legislature xvii). summing up, during legislature xviii neither of the circumstances that should favor the choice of the legislating/drafting procedure – hence making the senate more efficient – applies. therefore, we expect that the political circumstances push the senators during legislature xviii to approve (or to try to approve) bills by assigning them to committees acting in a reporting capacity. a procedure that in the current, post-reform senate is not the ‘natural’ one anymore and implies a change of the procedure and hence additional costs in terms of loss of time. in the next section we will try to assess if the implications of our very simple (and maybe simplistic) models are empirically confirmed. figure 4. positions of main political parties in the left-right dimension in legislatures xvi, xvii and xviii source: own elaboration 4. an empirical analysis to empirically evaluate the expectations deriving from our theoretical arguments, we collected data on the bills proposed and examined in the senate during legislature xviii (since it began on march 23, 2018, until december 31, 2019). measuring the legislative performance of the italian senate – and other representative chambers as well – is certainly not easy, as the notion of lawmaking powers has a complex and multifaceted nature (arter 2006). being aware that our evaluation is partial and rough in some way, here we offer an assessment of the legislative performance that is based on quantitative measures of productivity – i.e. the volume of bills examined under different procedures in a given time period. in so doing, we concentrate on exactly those aspects which have been especially emphasized by the proposers of the reforms and by most observers (see above). moreover, as we already mentioned, we focus on ‘normal’ bills – that is, those bills that can be assigned to different legislative procedures. in other words, we dropped from our of illustration, we suppose that the government position corresponds to the mid-range position between the most left-wing coalition party and the most right-wing coalition party (tsebelis and chang 2004). pedrazzani and zucchini 185 analysis the bills that can only be assigned to the committees in their reporting capacity: bills amending the constitution, electoral reform bills, bills converting law decrees, bills that include provisions delegating the government to act, bills ratifying international treaties, and budget bills. ‘normal’ bills were more than 82% of all bills that were presented during legislature xvii but only 23% of bills that became law. table 1 reports the distribution of all the bills submitted to the senate in the early period of legislature xviii (until the end of 2019), according to the stage of the legislative process they reached and the procedure of the committee’s assignment. table 1. distribution of ‘normal’ bills proposed in the senate, according to the procedure of committee’s assignment. legislature xviii reporting drafting legislating all procedures all the bills 120 10.4% 1021 88.8% 9 0.8% 1150 bills discussed at least once in committee 90 41.5% 118 54.4% 9 4.1% 217 bills already examined in committee 35 47.3% 35 47.3% 4 5.4% 74 approved bills 13 54.2% 8 0.0% 3 0.0% 24 source: own elaboration a preliminary glance at the data reveals that, from the beginning of legislature xviii to december 31, 2019, 120 bills that according to the new rules should have been sent to committees acting in drafting or legislating capacity, have in fact changed procedure. they were eventually assigned to committees acting in reporting capacity, and supposed to be examined under such procedure. these bills that changed procedure, even though they are only 10.4% of all the bills we consider, are more than 41% of bills that have been discussed at least once in the committee, more than 47% of bills for which discussion in the committee has been concluded, and 54.2% of bills that have already been approved in the senate. altogether, these data seem to suggest that, if the reform aimed at speeding up the approval of bills by letting them be considered in committees acting in drafting or legislating capacity, then it has failed so far. nevertheless, assessing the efficiency of the current senate is a demanding task and our conclusion above could be premature. a proper evaluation can only be given in comparative terms. to do this, however, one has to skip some methodological traps. on the one hand, a direct comparison with the senate of the previous legislature does not allow consideration of the general political circumstances that may have affected differently the number of bills found at different steps of the legislative process in the senate. furthermore, the sheer number of bills is in itself a questionable measure as bills are in some way packages of differing sizes and importance, and the average number and size of bills can differ from one legislature to another. in fact, a few major bills can point to a senate that is more effective and efficient than a senate that approves and/or discusses a large amount of fairly insignificant bills. on the other hand, a mere comparison with the chamber of deputies of the same legislature would keep us from considering some important institutional differences between the two chambers, such as, first and foremost, the lower number of legislators in the senate. we decided to combine these comparisons to minimize their drawbacks. to this purpose, we consider three different steps of a bill in the lawmaking process: 1) having been discussed at least once in the committee; 2) having completed examination in the ineffective changes for hard times 186 committee; 3) having been approved in the house where the bill was presented. firstly, we created – separately for legislature xviii until december 31 2019 and for legislature xvii (from its start on march 15 2013 to december 31 2014) – two indices of law ‘productivity’ for each of the three above-mentioned steps. one index is the ratio between the absolute number of bills proposed in the senate and the absolute number of bills proposed in the chamber of deputies (abs_index). the other index is the ratio between the percentage of bills in a given step over the total bills in the senate, and the same percentage in the chamber (per_index). these indices offer a measure of relative ‘productivity’ of the senate as compared to the chamber. results are reported in table 2. in particular, the upper part (a) of the table reports data on post-reform legislature xviii, while the central part (b) of the table displays data on pre-reform legislature xvii. we note, for instance, that during legislature xviii abs_index=0.388. this means that during the current legislature the bills approved in the senate were almost 39% of the bills approved in the chamber of deputies. also, per_index=0.548 implies that the percentage of approved bills over the whole amount of bills in the senate was almost 55% of the percentage of approved bills over the total amount of bills in the chamber. during legislature xvii, these scores were higher. the bills approved in the senate were roughly 50% of the bills approved in the chamber (abs_index=0.495). moreover, the share of approved bills in the senate was about 87% of the share of the approved bills in the chamber (per_index=0.872). in the lower part of table 2 (c), we compare the indices of law productivity across legislatures. in other words, we compare a measure of productivity of the senate with respect to the chamber during legislature xviii with the same measure calculated for legislature xvii. by doing so, we also control for different levels of law productivity between legislatures. if the senate’s productivity indices increase when shifting from prereform legislature xvii to post-reform legislature xviii, i.e., if the ratio between the indices for legislature xviii and the indices for legislature xvii is bigger than one, we can infer an increase in efficiency that is not affected by general political conditions and by the institutional differences between the two chambers. on the contrary, the results show us that the (post-reform) senate of legislature xviii is systematically less efficient than the (pre-reform) senate of legislature xvii, regardless of the steps in the decision-making process we take into consideration. the worst efficiency scores for the post-reform senate are the ones referring to the conclusion of work in the committees (0.710 and 0.574), and the best scores are those obtained considering the bills that have been discussed at least once in the committee (0.880 and 0.706). in the senate of legislature xviii, the bills that concluded their examination in the committee were only 45% of the bills that concluded their examination in the chamber. in the previous legislature such a percentage was around 64%. therefore, the main negative effect of the reform seems to take place during the discussion in the committee, long before bills are considered for approval on the floor.8 8 although the reform does not seem to have fulfilled the promise of more efficient decision making in the senate, political actors who can propose a bill appear to have believed in the increased efficiency of the senate. during the first 19 months of legislature xviii, the number of ‘normal’ bills submitted to the senate were 71% (1150/1627) of the normal bills presented in the chamber. during the first 19 months of legislature xvii, these were 57% (1212/2136) (see table 2). pedrazzani and zucchini 187 table 2. distribution of ‘normal’ bills proposed in the senate and in the chamber of deputies, according to the procedure of the committee’s assignment. legislatures xviii and xvii. indices of law productivity a) legislature xviii senate xviii (march 23, 2018-december 31, 2019) chamber xviii (march 23, 2018-december 31, 2019) ratio senate/chamber xviii reporting drafting legislating all procedures reporting drafting legislating all procedures abs_index per_index all the bills 120 1021 9 1150 1617 1 9 1627 discussed at least once in committee 90 118 9 217 315 0 0 315 0.689 0.975 already examined in committee 35 35 4 74 163 0 0 163 0.454 0.647 approved 13 8 3 24 59 0 3 62 0.388 0.548 b) legislature xvii senate xvii (march 15, 2013-december 31, 2014) chamber xvii (march 15, 2013-december 31, 2014) ratio senate/chamber xvii reporting drafting legislating all procedures reporting drafting legislating all procedures abs_index per_index all the bills 1195 0 17 1212 2104 0 32 2136 discussed at least once in committee 448 0 17 465 594 0 0 594 0.783 1.380 already examined in committee 224 0 17 241 377 0 0 377 0.639 1.127 approved 84 0 10 94 160 0 30 190 0.495 0.872 c) comparison xviii vs xvii abs_index xviii / abs_index xvii per_index xviii / per_index xvii discussed at least once in committee 0.880 0.706 already examined in committee 0.710 0.574 approved 0.782 0.628 source: own elaboration ineffective changes for hard times 188 5. conclusions the 2017 reform of the rules of procedure of the italian senate was celebrated as an unexpected ‘miracle’. the revision was not only extensive from a purely quantitative point of view, but also relevant in more substantial terms. indeed, the promoters of the reform presented it as a step towards a more efficient and rapid senate. in this article we concentrated on one key aspect of the reform: the changes made to the rules governing the assignment of bills to parliamentary committees. according to the new assignment rules introduced by the 2017 reform, bills are to be normally sent to committees acting in a drafting or legislating capacity, and not in a reporting capacity (as under the previous rules in the senate and the current rules in the chamber of deputies). our study offered a preliminary evaluation of the degree to which the new rules have so far improved the legislative efficiency of the senate. after summarizing the process leading to the 2017 reform as well as its main contents, we singled out the costs associated with the different assignment procedures and developed some theoretical expectations about the impact of the reform in terms of the senate’s decision-making efficiency. we hypothesized that, during post-reform legislature xviii, the political circumstances would lead the senators to resort to committees acting in a reporting capacity in order to approve bills – a procedure that has become more costly since the reform. empirical data on lawmaking processes in the senate showed that this indeed happened during the first part of legislature xviii. this implies that, if the new rules aimed at speeding the approval of bills through committees acting in drafting or legislating capacity, then they have failed so far. our analysis also revealed that, contrary to the intentions of the proposers of the reform, the legislative productivity of the senate has not yet improved. a cross-chamber comparison shows that the post-reform senate of legislature xviii has systematically lower levels of productivity than the pre-reform senate of legislature xvii. furthermore, the productivity ‘gap’ seems higher when bills are examined in the same committees, well before being considered for approval on the floor. using the preliminary evidence hitherto available, this article has then shown that the results hoped for by grasso and the supporters of the 2017 reform have not been achieved so far. of course, the legislative players in the italian senate probably need some time to learn how to make the most of the new rules. however, based on the theoretical arguments outlined in this article we can expect that the senate will increase its decision-making efficiency when the possible policy changes are uncontroversial and especially small, and when the governing coalition is particularly homogeneous in ideological terms. finally, although based on preliminary data, our analysis suggests some avenues for future research. for example, more extensive comparisons might be carried out using data on the entire legislature xviii, which would allow greater control over the time legislators need to adapt to the new rules. also, our aggregate analysis of law productivity might be complemented by an individual-level investigation of bills, where a number of characteristics of bills – such as their content and sponsor – would be properly taken into account. 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oxford university press. zucchini, francesco. 2008. ‘dividing parliament? italian bicameralism in the legislative process (1987-2006)’. south european society and politics 13(1):11–34. zucchini, francesco. 2013. la repubblica dei veti. un’analisi spaziale del mutamento legislativo in italia. milano: egea. zucchini, francesco and andrea pedrazzani. 2020. ‘government coalitions in italy: continuous changes and continuity in change’. forthcoming, in coalition governance in western europe, edited by h. bäck, t. bergman, and j. hellstrøm. oxford: oxford university press. microsoft word pdf_issue_14_2_mancosuladini.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 2, october 2019 © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 2, 114–128. contact author: moreno mancosu, university of turin. e-mail address: moreno.mancosu@unito.it the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega in the 2019 european elections: a multilevel approach moreno mancosu university of turin riccardo ladini university of milan abstract in italy, the lega obtained outstanding electoral success in the 2019 european elections, becoming the first party on the political spectrum. previous literature has argued that this performance can be attributed to the leadership of matteo salvini, who transformed the lega from an ethno-regionalist party into a national right-wing party (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). previous research has also argued that the recent geographical trajectories of the party’s success might be associated with the prevalence of a neo-fascist minority during the first republic (e.g. mancosu, 2015). however, the empirical evidence comes from aggregate official results and focuses only on some specific italian regions of the so-called ‘red-zone’. by employing multilevel models on survey data, this paper tests whether this expectation holds also at the individual level, and in a larger geographical area. the findings show that individual propensities to vote for the lega in 2019 are associated with the percentage of votes obtained more than forty years ago by the movimento sociale italiano in the municipality where the respondent lives, but only in central and southern italian regions, in which the lega was an irrelevant competitor before salvini’s leadership. these findings provide additional evidence concerning the ideological drivers of preferences for the lega. 1. introduction n italy, the most relevant outcome of the 2019 european elections was the outstanding consensus for the lega, which obtained more than 9 million votes, equal to 34% of valid votes. since its foundation about thirty years ago, the lega, for the first time, has become the most supported party on the political landscape at the national level. the result is even more stunning when considering the party’s strong ethno-regionalist background, rooted in the northern part of the country. we should also consider that the lega’s best performance at the national level before the leadership of matteo salvini, who became leader of the party in december 2013, was far lower than the most recent one – dating back to the 1996 national elections, when 3.8 million people voted for lega nord (about 10% of valid votes). until a few years ago, the electoral performance of the lega could be depicted by the metaphor of an expanding and contracting lung, always confined to the northern regions of the country (segatti and vezzoni, 2011). in political times characterized by i mancosu and ladini 115 the relative stability of the political system, the lega reduced its area of consensus and maintained some support only around its strongholds. in more unstable political periods (e.g. the 1992 and 1996 elections, characterized by significant political turmoil), support for the lega overcame its traditional boundaries by reaching some peripheral areas of its territorial basin, such as some provinces of emilia-romagna. in the last electoral cycle, pundits and academics have observed the increasing nationalization of the lega, which largely increased its consensus in the red area in the 2015 regional elections and, starting from the 2018 national elections, became a relevant political actor even in central and southern regions. this paper relies on the strand of literature that posits the relevance of mechanisms of behavioural path dependence to understanding social and political facts (e.g. diamanti, 2003; acharya et al., 2018). according to this literature, individual attitudes and behaviours are partially related to a self-reinforcing set of geographicallylocated behaviours and attitudes that persist over time. similarly to institutional path dependence (putnam et al., 1993), behavioural path dependence literature argues that attitudes are passed down through generations, by means of grass-roots learning mechanisms (in this respect, the role of primary socialization is crucial) and by local social structures (schools, churches, associations, etc.) that persist in the territory (sani, 1976; wittenberg, 2006; voigtländer and voth, 2012; acharya et al., 2018). as a result, we are able to trace a certain political culture – defined geographically – back to its roots by identifying the characteristics of the same geographical place several decades (or even centuries) before. scholars have stressed that the success of the lega is, among other things, related to the rapid change in the party agenda enacted by the new leader, matteo salvini, who aimed to transform what was originally an ethno-regionalist party into an extreme rightwing national one (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). in this regard, the lega started adopting a totally new set of claims and communication strategies, sometimes appealing to a narrative that resonates with that of the neo-fascist parties of the first republic (above all, the movimento sociale italiano, msi). according to previous studies (mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018), in regions in which the lega has never obtained a sufficient level of support because of its former ethno-regionalist structure, this new – more extreme and nationalist – rhetoric might have been particularly appealing for voters living in areas with a stronger neo-fascist political tradition. the present paper aims to test the patterns of geographical diffusion of the ‘new’ lega in central and southern italian regions by providing, among others, a contextual-level explanation of the success of salvini’s lega. we combine survey data at the individual level with official data at the contextual level to show that, in the centre-south of italy, individual propensities to vote for the lega during the 2019 election campaign are positively correlated with the electoral performance of the movimento sociale italiano (measured more than forty years ago) in the municipality where the respondents live. the paper is structured as follows: the next section focuses on the success of the lega in the 2019 european elections beyond its traditional borders, illustrates the shift in the communication strategy of the party, and describes the possible social mechanisms fostering the party’s diffusion trajectories. the third section explains data, variables and the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 116 models employed in the paper; the fourth section presents the results and the fifth draws some conclusions and suggests some limitations of the paper. 2. background 2.1. the lega beyond its borders previous studies have provided various explanations for the increased performance of the lega on the political spectrum and the overcoming of its traditional borders (mancosu, 2015; albertazzi et al., 2018; mancosu and ladini, 2018; passarelli and tuorto, 2018). nonetheless, these explanations agree that the success of the lega is largely dependent on the shift in the party’s rhetoric carried out by matteo salvini. since he took office, the new leader of the party has characterized his political action by transforming the lega from a somewhat traditional right-wing regionalist party (tarchi, 1998), into a national/nationalist right-wing party (albertazzi et al., 2018; passarelli and tuorto, 2018) radically based on anti-immigrant and anti-eu rhetoric. as outlined by passarelli and tuorto (2018, 90), although the lega started to move towards the right in the mid-1990s, the leadership of salvini ‘sped up’ the process of radicalization of the party. this strategy was intended to increase the potential electoral basin of the lega, with the realization that, among the italian population, anti-immigration attitudes are widespread (sniderman et al., 2002; vezzoni, 2018) and anti-eu attitudes have substantially increased in the last 20 years (see albertazzi, 2016; brunazzo and della sala, 2016; serricchio, 2018). moreover, the refugee crisis which led to the arrival of about 600,000 immigrants in italy from 2014 to 2017 contributed to making the voice of the lega louder on the immigration issue. in this respect, we should outline that the salience of this issue dramatically increased between 2013, when only 4% of italians considered it as the first or second italian problem, and 2018, when the percentage rose to 23% (vezzoni, 2018). by shifting its main enemy from rome to brussels (brunazzo and gilbert, 2017) and avoiding attacks against southern italians (largely present in the first incarnation of the party, lega nord), salvini’s lega has been successful in going beyond its traditional geographical boundaries. starting from the last election of the pre-salvini era – the 2013 national elections in which the share of votes for the lega was around 4% – the positive trend of party support has led the lega to largely increase its consensus at every election (obtaining 6% of valid votes in the 2014 european elections, 17% during the 2018 national elections, and 34% in the 2019 european elections). to appreciate the effectiveness of the lega’s strategy, table 1 compares the percentages of valid votes for the lega before and after the appointment of matteo salvini as leader of the party in two european elections (2019 and 2009 in which, incidentally, party performance was above the historical average up to that moment).1 1 the five areas considered refer to the istat geographical categorization, where the northwest is composed of valle d’aosta, liguria, piemonte and lombardia, northeast includes veneto, friuli, trentinoalto adige and emilia-romagna, centre includes toscana, marche, umbria and lazio, south includes abruzzo, molise, puglia, basilicata, campania, and calabria, and islands comprise sicily and sardegna. we decided not to employ the geopolitical categorization (galli, 1968), in order to keep separate emilia mancosu and ladini 117 table 1. voting percentages for the lega in 2009 and 2019 european elections in italy lega nord 2009 lega 2019 geographical area (pre-salvini) (post-salvini) delta north-west 19.4 40.7 110% north-east 19 41 116% centre 3 33.5 1017% south 0.6 23.5 3817% islands 0.4 22.4 5500% italy 10.2 34.3 236% in addition to the party’s growth in its strongholds (in which the lega doubled its strength in the northeast and northwest), the most stunning performance is the increase in support in places in which the party was substantially irrelevant 10 years ago (becoming 11 times larger in the centre, 39 times in the south and 56 times in the islands). we can thus say that the 2019 european elections consolidated the new geographical pattern which started at the beginning of salvini’s office. 2.2. a neo-fascist inheritance? why did this operation become so effective? the new era of the lega comes in a moment of crisis of the centre-right coalition, which began with the economic crisis of 2011. the progressive erosion of the image and political credibility of the main shareholder of the centre-right coalition, silvio berlusconi, and his personal party forza italia, combined with the corruption scandal that involved the former leader of lega nord, umberto bossi, in 2012, allowed new actors to exploit the potential of this political space. if, on the one hand, the opening of this political space has been crucial in the new success of the lega, on the other it is also important to understand what kind of claims and communication strategies filled this political gap. salvini’s communication, since the very beginning of his office, has been aggressive and mainly based on negative campaigning (bracciale and martella, 2017), aimed at targeting a certain number of enemies of his potential electoral constituency (immigrants, ngos, intellectuals, and everything that might recall the ‘left’ or the ‘outgroup’) and repeatedly attacking them on every medium at his disposal. the communication strategy enacted by the new leadership was also characterized by a certain ‘hidden’ openness to even more extreme positions, a form of scantily disguised sympathy towards more extreme right-wing parties and, in general, to the neofascist area. for instance, as noticed by de giorgi and tronconi (2018, 341), ‘while the use of violence by [...] extreme right groups was apparently condemned, [...] the league [...] often justified episodes of racism and xenophobia that took place during the course of 2017, placing the blame ultimately on the various governments in office over recent years and the decisions they took on immigration’. other examples can be traced back by employing the direct communication of its leader via social media, often characterized by romagna, where the lega was a relevant competitor even before salvini’s leadership (passarelli and tuorto, 2012, 2018), and the other regions belonging to the ‘red zone’, where the lega obtained a very low consensus in the pre-salvini period (see mancosu and ladini, 2018). the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 118 positive referencing to the public works done during the so-called ‘ventennio’ (the 19221943 period of fascist dictatorship, see rame, 2018). although this communication style could be interpreted as a form of tactical ‘dog-whistle politics’ (haney-lòpez, 2014), instead of a clear endorsement of the dictatorship, the subtle but insistent references to the fascist regime and its most important characters might have produced some effect on the resilient minority of italian voters that look with sympathy and nostalgia on the ventennio period as a ‘golden age’ of order, discipline and security (see castelli gattinara, 2018). this shift toward the right in the rhetoric of the party was also reflected in the profile of the voters of the lega. according to the itanes data, while in the mid-1990s, on average, voters of lega nord located themselves at the centre of the left-right (0-10) scale, their average values increased from 6.8 to 7.8 from 2001 to 2013, and to 8.2 in 2018 (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). in this respect, several studies have argued that the lega diffusion trajectories in the last 5 years might be partially explained by the more extremist and nationalist turn operated by salvini. in some of these studies (mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018), it is shown, by means of aggregate analyses, that places in which the performance of the ‘new’ lega was stronger are also those contexts in which the neo-fascist minority, measured by means of the support for the movimento sociale italiano (msi) in the ‘70s, was strong as well. as concerns the social mechanism that might explain this empirical evidence, we move in the wake of the strand of literature aimed at explaining political and electoral behaviour by means of patterns of ‘behavioural path dependence’ (acharya et al., 2018). analogously to path dependence in institutions (see, above all, putnam et al., 1993) this strand of literature argues that attitudes and behaviours become, in some way, self-reinforcing: once a path of development is embedded in the political culture of a certain geographical space, it becomes increasingly harder to erase. similarly to institutions like language, religion and rituals, attitudes are passed down from generation to generation, encouraged by families and mechanisms of primary socialization and by social structures, such as schools, churches, political and non-political institutions rooted in the territory (see acharya et al., 2018). many examples which suggest behavioural path dependence can be traced back in the literature: voigtländer and voth (2012) show that the nazi party’s support in 1933 elections was higher in places that had jewish pogroms during the fourteenth century (showing a persistence in behaviour of almost 500 years); wittenberg (2006), by analyzing voting behaviour in hungary before and after the communist period, shows that the performance of right-wing parties after communism was higher in areas in which right-wing parties had higher consensus during the pre-communist period. the social mechanism argued in these studies is somewhat similar to theories explaining the persistence over time of scattered zones of political influence in italy: areas with a strong communist or christian-democratic tradition during the first republic were usually characterized by a stronger activism of militants of the local majority party, as well as a stronger presence of associations connected to the party itself (bellucci and segatti, 2010). moreover, in these areas, it was more likely that the primary socialization, operated by the family of origin, was more able to convey a precise set of values compatible with the ideology of the dominant party. mancosu and ladini 119 in our case, the mechanisms argued here have a probabilistic component. given certain contextual conditions, a larger quota of the local electoral body will be more likely to accept a neo-fascist rhetoric if the characteristics of the context are exogenously more permeable to such rhetoric. what has been argued in the previous literature, thus, is that the shift of the communication operated by salvini could have contributed to triggering parts of the electoral body that were exogenously prone to accepting this type of rhetoric (and that one of the more prompt measures to identify the exogenous propensity to accept it is the prevalence of the neo-fascist right in a previous period). we need to outline that since support for the msi during the first republic was far lower than that for the democrazia cristiana and partito comunista italiano, its political tradition could be referred to as a ‘minority political tradition’ (mancosu and ladini, 2018). moving from the suggestion of sani (1976, 394), who argued that the ‘search for contextual forces shaping political attitudes should not be limited only to the identification of the major political tradition of the larger community’, our contribution aims at analysing how neo-fascist political traditions could be reflected in recent voting trajectories. the abovementioned empirical research on the topic presents at least two drawbacks: first, almost all the studies aiming to explain the new lega’s geographical trajectories of success with the scattered neo-fascist legacy of the context are mainly aggregate analyses, based on official electoral data at the municipality or provincial level, over a small part of the territory (mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018). this approach, which in addition does not take into account southern regions that saw a massive increase in support for the lega in 2019, keeps open concerns regarding the inference to the entire part of the country exposed to the party’s outbreak and exposes these studies to issues of ecological fallacy (robinson, 1950). in other words, just by looking at the aggregate, we do not have the ‘smoking gun’ of the effect of the context on individual attitudes and behaviours. 2.3. hypotheses the aim of this paper is twofold. first, we assess whether contextual characteristics are able to explain, by means of an aggregate measure, the variance of likelihood to vote for the lega explicitly at the individual level, net of several other individual-level controls. second, we extend previous analyses (focusing on a few regions) to the entire country, by looking in particular at central and southern regions, in which the lega was an (almost) irrelevant competitor before salvini’s leadership, and in which the increase of consensus has been more impressive in relative terms. these regions also made up the most important basin of the msi during the first republic (see ignazi, 1998), leading to a more precise test of our theoretical framework. in addition, while the diffusion of lega nord in northern regions took place in a period in which the party had ethno-regionalist connotations, the unprecedented diffusion of the lega beyond its strongholds coincided with the shift of the party to nationalistic and more radical right-wing positions. in this respect, we hypothesize that the effect of msi strength on individual support for the lega will be stronger in central and southern regions. the first hypothesis will thus read as follows: the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 120 h1. contextual levels of the neo-fascist minority are positively associated with individual propensities to vote for the lega in the 2019 european elections, especially in the centre-south. as an additional drawback, previous studies do not take into account the transformation of the extreme right-wing parties in the past decades. a correlation between the strength of the lega (either at the aggregate or individual level) in recent elections and the permeability of the context to the msi, per se, does not automatically lead to a corroboration of the mechanism depicted above. as stressed in the literature, indeed, the neofascist right has undergone several vicissitudes since the end of the first and the beginning of the second republic (see ignazi, 1998). in 1993, the msi leadership abandoned the ideological references to fascism (which clearly characterized the msi during the first republic), by dissolving the old party and founding alleanza nazionale, a more moderate party that aimed at qualifying itself as a potential governing party. the ideological shift, similar to the one that invested the centre-left parties in the same period, allowed this new party to receive 5 million votes at its first appearance in the 1994 elections, almost doubling the historical best performance of the msi (almost 3 million votes in 1972). however, the relationship between the two parties remained quite strong. for instance, the municipal-level correlation between the movimento sociale italiano in 1976 and alleanza nazionale in 2001 – two periods in which the voting percentage for the parties was about one percentage point higher than their average – is indeed equal to .54 (authors’ analysis). it is thus possible that the places in which the msi was strong became progressively less extreme, aided, in this process, by the decreasing extremism of the political entrepreneur which they referred to. the effect of the neo-fascist tradition on the lega must thus be discounted by the effect of a subsequent, and less extreme political entrepreneur that might have mitigated the original extreme ideological tenet of msi in the context. the second hypothesis will thus read as follows: h2. contextual levels of the neo-fascist minority in the centre-south are positively associated with individual propensities to vote for the lega in the 2019 european elections, irrespective of the contextual performance of alleanza nazionale during the second republic. 3. data and methods to test our hypotheses, we employed a survey carried out in italy before the 2019 european elections (from 13 march to 15 may, 2019). overall, 11,063 respondents from an opt-in panel of a private company (swg) were interviewed through the cawi (computer assisted web interviewing) mode. the survey contains questions referring to the socio-demographic, attitudinal, and behavioural characteristics of the respondents. in addition, the survey contains information on the municipality in which the respondents live. this piece of information is employed here to link the individual dataset with the election results extracted from the official database of the italian ministry of the interior. in particular, the voting percentages for the movimento sociale italiano in 19762 2 the distribution of the voting percentages for the msi in the 1976 national elections by geographical area are reported in appendix 1. to take into account possible bias due to the extreme values of the msi strength in some municipalities, we also attempted to fit the same models without these extreme values. results, available on request, are substantially equal to those presented in this article. mancosu and ladini 121 and alleanza nazionale in 2001 at the municipality level have been matched with every respondent declaring a non-missing municipality of residence. in this paper, we present four different models with the aim of providing consistent empirical evidence to back our hypotheses. the dependent variable is the individual propensity to vote for the lega, measured by means of a 0-10 scale in which the respondents express the likelihood of their voting for the party, with 0 meaning ‘0% likelihood’ and 10 meaning ‘100% likelihood’ (for more information on the measure see van der eijk et al., 2006). the first model, fitted only on respondents coming from the northern regions (northeast and northwest), explains the variation of the propensity to vote for the lega conditional to the level of support for the msi at the municipal level in 1976. the second model also includes the share of votes for alleanza nazionale at the municipal level as control variable. in this way, we are able to assess whether the propensities to vote for the lega are associated with the permeability to the neo-fascist tradition of the context in which people live, controlling for the level of the (more moderate) heir to this tradition in a subsequent election (alleanza nazionale). the same two models are fitted only on the respondents living in central and southern regions (third and fourth model)3. all the models also include a set of individual-level control variables: gender, age group (six categories: <25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and more), educational level (three categories: primary, secondary, and tertiary), perceived wealth (five categories: wealthy, living easily, living with difficulties, living with huge difficulties, poor), and left-right selfplacement on a 0-10 scale recoded in 6 categories (left: 0-1; centre-left: 2-3; centre: 4-6; centre-right: 7-8; right: 9-10; refused to locate).4 according to our hypotheses, we could expect that the coefficient of msi will be positive and significant in the centre-south of the country, net of control variables. to control for the possible inflation of standard errors because of the hierarchical structure of the data, we employ linear multilevel random-intercept regression models (snijders and boskers, 1999). this multilevel approach has some antecedents in the study of italian electoral behaviour aimed at analysing the role of territorial political traditions on vote choice (vezzoni, 2008). to further take into account the context at a lower level of specification, all the models are fitted with a fixed-effect control that indicates the istat geographical area to which the respondent belongs. 4. results table 2 shows the coefficients for the four multilevel regression models, fitted on respondents living in the northern (model 1 and 2) and central-southern (model 3 and 4) regions. 3 to stress the differences in voting behaviour for the league between north and centre-south we employed a separated model approach instead of estimating a single pooled model with an interaction between msi strength and a dichotomous north/centre-south variable. this choice is explained by both theoretical and methodological reasons: first, insofar as we deal with the geographically scattered support for the lega, subdividing north and centre-south signals that we are dealing with two different subnational contexts that should be treated in different ways (see passarelli and tuorto, 2012). second, by applying a two-model approach, we provide a more conservative interpretation of the effects that, in this way are estimated separately in the two subnational contexts (a pooled approach would indeed provide a weighted average of the control variables’ effects without taking into account geographical specificities). 4 all the question wordings can be found in appendix 2. the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 122 with regard to the control variables, although we can detect some differences between the models, results are in line with previous literature (passarelli and tuorto, 2018). all over the country, the propensities to vote for the lega are far higher among respondents with a low educational level, whose average value is more than one point higher than tertiary educated ones, both in northern and central-southern regions. table 2. multilevel linear regression models to study the propensity to vote for the lega model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 north only north only centre-south only centre-south only indep. variables lega ptv lega ptv lega ptv lega ptv msi municipal level (1976) -0.00 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) an municipal level (2001) -0.03 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) gender: female 0.33*** (0.09) 0.32*** (0.09) 0.26*** (0.09) 0.27*** (0.09) age: 25-34 (ref. <25) 0.04 (0.22) 0.03 (0.22) -0.22 (0.22) -0.22 (0.22) 35-44 0.25 (0.21) 0.25 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 45-54 0.57*** (0.21) 0.57*** (0.21) 0.22 (0.21) 0.22 (0.21) 55-64 0.02 (0.21) 0.02 (0.21) -0.03 (0.21) -0.03 (0.21) >64 -0.19 (0.20) -0.19 (0.20) -0.43** (0.20) -0.43** (0.20) education level: secondary (ref. primary) -0.23 (0.18) -0.23 (0.18) -0.58*** (0.18) -0.58*** (0.18) tertiary -1.09*** (0.19) -1.09*** (0.19) -1.39*** (0.19) -1.39*** (0.19) income: i can live easily (ref. i’m wealthy) -0.04 (0.34) -0.04 (0.34) -0.47 (0.36) -0.47 (0.36) i have difficulties 0.35 (0.35) 0.35 (0.35) -0.56 (0.36) -0.56 (0.36) i have huge difficulties 0.79** (0.37) 0.80** (0.37) -0.56 (0.38) -0.56 (0.38) i feel poor 0.65 (0.43) 0.65 (0.43) -0.07 (0.41) -0.07 (0.41) left-right s-p: centreright (ref. right) -1.07*** (0.19) -1.07*** (0.19) -0.86*** (0.20) -0.86*** (0.20) centre -3.56*** (0.22) -3.57*** (0.22) -2.28*** (0.22) -2.28*** (0.22) centre-left -6.30*** (0.18) -6.30*** (0.18) -5.01*** (0.18) -5.01*** (0.18) left -6.86*** (0.19) -6.86*** (0.19) -5.37*** (0.19) -5.37*** (0.19) not located -4.73*** (0.19) -4.74*** (0.19) -3.52*** (0.19) -3.52*** (0.19) constant 7.97*** (0.46) 8.15*** (0.49) 7.75*** (0.48) 7.84*** (0.55) level-2 variance 0.17** (0.08) 0.17** (0.08) 0.24*** (0.07) 0.24*** (0.07) level-1 variance 1.08*** (0.01) 1.08*** (0.01) 1.13*** (0.01) 1.13*** (0.01) observations 4,467 4,467 5,121 5,121 number of groups 1,053 1,053 922 922 notes: standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (the models contain fixed effect for the geographical area – coefficients not shown). when looking at gender, women present on average a propensity to vote for the lega which is 0.3 higher than men. concerning age groups, the analysis shows that, in the south, older voters (age > 64) have the lowest propensity to vote for the lega, in the north, mancosu and ladini 123 45-54 year old individuals are more likely to choose the lega than the youngest ones. as expected, individuals who locate themselves at the extreme right pole of the left-right scale had the highest propensity to vote for the lega in the 2019 european elections. in line with the argument on the radicalization of the lega, they are even significantly more supportive of the party compared to respondents locating themselves on the centreright. individual economic conditions seem to be associated with a preference for the lega only in the north, with people with difficulties having a higher propensity to vote for the party. figure 1. predicted propensities to vote for the lega according to the different levels of msi at the municipal level in 1976 (95% confidence intervals) – centre-south only, model 4 predictions our two substantively relevant independent variables are, as stressed above, the municipal-level strength of the msi in 1976, and the level of the less extreme heir to this party, alleanza nazionale, about twenty years before the 2019 elections. results seem to support our hypotheses. the association between the strength of the msi in the municipality and the propensity to vote for the lega in 2019 is positive and significant, but only in the south. in the north, the traditional stronghold of the party, we find no correlation between msi performance and individual support for the lega. this is further proof of the fact that the neo-fascist explanation of party trajectories can be an explanation only in the centre-south of the country. another relevant result is that this outcome is stable even when controlling for the municipal levels of alleanza nazionale, the less extreme heir to the msi, which turns out to be non-significant in explaining the variation in the propensity to vote for the lega.5 5 since the two variables might present issues of multicollinearity, we performed a variance inflation factor (vif) test on the model. in both north and centre-south models, the vif score of msi and an variables are around 2, a value that reassures us regarding the absence of multicollinearity issues (in general, a vif value over 5 or 10 starts to be worrisome; see hair et al., 2010). the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 124 an analysis of the magnitude of the effects is enlightening as to the relevance of the msi effect in shaping voters’ attitudes and behaviours. as figure 1 shows, if we select the central 90% of the distribution of our independent variable, the predicted propensity to vote for the lega (on a 0-10 scale) is equal to 2.8 when people live in a municipality in which the share of votes for the msi was around 2%. instead, when people exposed to areas which are more permeable to the neo-fascist minority (level of msi in 1976 equal to 14% on valid votes), their average propensity to vote is 0.8 points higher, equal to 3.6. 5. conclusion and discussion this paper aims to test the relevance of one possible explanation for the success of the lega in the 2019 european elections in italy, by focusing especially on central and southern regions where the consensus for the lega was irrelevant before matteo salvini’s leadership. to do so, we moved from the previous literature (see mancosu, 2015; mancosu and ladini, 2018) by looking at the persistence of the neo-fascist political tradition in the vote for the new lega. according to this view, one of the communication strategies of salvini started from the standpoint that support for the lega could expand by exploiting a potential national basin of extreme right-wing voters who were, if not contiguous, not reluctant to a classical set of neo-fascist claims (which include ventennio nostalgia, a supremacist view of the italian cultural and ethnic milieux, and a general preference for a ‘strong leader’ figure). some of the rhetoric in the communication strategy of the lega’s leader followed this general trend and progressively shifted its claims and political action to the extreme right of the political spectrum and to the centre-south as regards the geographical diffusion trajectories. previous research aimed at finding an association between the geographical scattering of the lega in the last 4-5 years and the contexts in which the extreme right minority was stronger, were mainly based on aggregate data – a strategy that does not allow us to clearly identify causal mechanisms. in this paper, we aimed to explain the electoral success of the lega in 2019 by explaining the individual variation of propensities to vote with levels of the neo-fascist minority in the first republic – measured by means of the municipal strength of the movimento sociale italiano. the mechanism hypothesized here can be identified with a form of behavioural path dependence (acharya et al., 2018) that argues that contexts more open to accepting a strong neo-fascist minority are those in which more extreme ideas can spread, even if more than forty years have passed. the analyses presented here provide empirical evidence towards our hypotheses, by showing a significant association between support for the msi and the propensity to vote for the new lega, but only in those areas where the lega was almost absent before salvini’s leadership. we think that our results can be relevant in showing the persistence of political attitudes over time. similarly to other cases of behavioural path dependence shown above, the attitudes of the neo-fascist minority at the local level which were present, and sometimes relevant, during the whole of the first republic, show up again with the exploits and communication shift of the new lega, after a period in which they have been hidden. these results must be evaluated by considering at least two caveats. the first one is that results do not show that ‘lega voters are neo-fascists’, nor that ‘neo-fascists massively vote for the lega’; rather, what we show here is that people in contexts in which a mancosu and ladini 125 neo-fascist minority were particularly present might have been socialized in a political context in which, among other things, shreds of the ideology were present. it is not necessary for people voting nowadays for the lega to accept the complete set of ideological tenets of neo-fascism; nor do they need to completely understand all the consequences of the ideological structure, which, by the way, has been historically extremely vague and foggy. in addition, the relationship between the msi’s prevalence and the propensity to vote for the lega allows us to explain only a part of the success of the party in the centresouth, which can also be accounted for by more recent trends, such as the immigration and economic crises (see albertazzi et al., 2018). finally, our results only indirectly argue that the trigger of the correlation that we see is the shift of salvini’s communication. although previous studies stressed that the correlation between the neo-fascist legacy and the trajectories of diffusion of the lega are related only after the advent of salvini as leader of the party, we do not present any evidence relating to this (crucial) point. future research should aim at better identifying the path dependence mechanism – by means, for instance, of panel data. references acharya, a., blackwell, m., & sen, m. 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(2006) crucibles of political loyalty: church institutions and electoral continuity in hungary. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. mancosu and ladini 127 appendixes appendix 1. voting percentages for the movimento sociale italiano in 1976 national elections geographical area msi 1976 northwest 3.8 northeast 3.4 centre 6.3 south 9.4 islands 10.1 italy 6.1 note: within the centre, in lazio – the only region of the macroarea not belonging to the so called ‘red zone’ – the voting percentage for the msi was equal to 9.5. appendix 2. question wording (authors’ translation) dependent variable propensity to vote for the lega: what is the likelihood that you will vote for the lega in the upcoming european elections? 1. not at all likely — 11. totally likely (variable rescaled on a 0-10 scale in the analyses) independent variables gender: you are... 1. male 2. female age: age class at 6 – pre-coded in the dataset. 1. <25 2. 25-34 3. 35-44 4. 45-54 5. 55-64 6. >64 education level – pre-coded in the dataset 1. primary 2. secondary 3. tertiary your income allows you to live... 1. i’m wealthy 2. i can live easily 3. i have difficulties the neo-fascist territorial legacy and the success of the lega 128 4. i have huge difficulties 5. i feel poor politically, you would locate yourself more on the... – pre-coded in the dataset 1. right 2. centre-right 3. centre 4. centre-left 5. left 6. i would not locate myself geographical area – pre-coded in the dataset 1. northwest 2. northeast 3. centre 4. south 5. islands microsoft word pdf_issue_16_1_vicentini_pritoni.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 1 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 1, 23–39. contact author: giulia vicentini, university of siena. e-mail address: giulia.vicentini19@gmail.com how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? giulia vicentini university of siena andrea pritoni university of turin abstract the purpose of this article is twofold: to explore the dynamics of party leadership change in italy, and to try to assess which (if any) characteristics of the leadership race (lr) to appoint (or re-appoint) the party leader, in combination with other conditions, could favour leadership re-selection in office at the end of the term, rather than a more or less forced early departure. to this end, we have taken into account about thirty lrs promoted by four italian political parties over the last three decades, relying on a methodology which is new in this field of research: qualitative comparative analysis. 1. introduction recent comparative article (vicentini and pritoni 2021) applied qualitative comparative analysis (qca) to assess whether the two separate moments in which party leaders are selected and de-selected may be connected. more specifically, the authors investigated which (if any) characteristics of the selection system – in combination with other conditions such as participation in government and party electoral support – could favour leadership re-selection in office. they concluded by indicating four different combinations of conditions and suggesting different paths for future research, including a qualitative in-depth analysis to explain deviant cases and better understand country and party peculiarities, as well as the specific idiosyncratic characteristics of some lrs. this explains the decision to complement that study by focusing on a single country during the same period (approximately the last thirty years). the choice to focus on the italian case is motivated by different reasons. it is well known that in the early 1990s the old party system collapsed, and a new majoritarian electoral law was introduced (cotta and verzichelli 2020). it created a new basis for the internal organization of italian political parties, which became more and more centred around the leaders. in this regard, the personalisation of political life (rahat and kenig 2020) and the presidentialisation of political parties (passarelli 2015) affected the process and visibility of leadership selection and leadership change. in fact, italian political parties are currently characterised by very different mechanisms of leadership selection, which are expected to produce different effects. it was no coincidence that we witnessed very solid leadership on the right side of the political spectrum (from berlusconi to salvini) and extremely fragile leaders on the centre-left side. a how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? 24 that said, as far as party selection is concerned, we take into account the same four parties analysed in the comparative study, as they cover the whole left-right continuum and they are the only parties that were present on the italian political scene for the entire thirty-year period under consideration. actually, during this period they all underwent various changes in names and/or in organizational structure, following merges with other parties and/or internal ideological revisions (cotta and verzichelli 2020). therefore, the huge variability over time in terms of organizational structure, electoral support, government participation and coalition potential (sartori 1970) clearly had a significant impact in terms of leadership dynamics, which guarantees variability in the dataset. these parties are: the mainstream centre-left party [democratic party of the left (pds) until 1998, thereafter democrats of the left (ds) and finally democratic party since 2007 (pd)]; the mainstream centre-right party up until a couple of years ago [forza italia (fi) up until 2008, thereafter people of freedom (pdl) and finally forza italia (fi) again since 2013]; a small leftist party that was an important coalition partner for about twenty years but has not been in parliament since 2008 [communist re-foundation (prc)], and a former regional right-wing populist party that has recently became the most voted italian party thanks to its ‘sovranist relocation’ [northern league (ln) /league (for salvini premier)].1 this contribution proceeds as follows: the next section introduces the theoretical framework, while section 3 is devoted to the calibration of both conditions and the outcome, and also offers the chance to describe the characteristics of the lrs promoted by the four parties under scrutiny over the last thirty years. section 4 briefly presents the dataset and the main dynamics of party leadership change in italy. section 5 applied qca to look at the different combinations of conditions which lead to the (possible) renewal of the party office vis-a-vis a more or less conflicting departure. finally, in the conclusions, the findings relating to the italian case are discussed in relation to the original comparative work (vicentini and pritoni 2021). 2. theoretical framework and hypotheses in their comparative study, vicentini and pritoni (2021) structured a novel theoretical framework by bringing together different strands of literature such as leadership selection, leadership survival, party change, etc. we refer to the same framework here, briefly recalling the main points and hypotheses to be taken into account for the successive qca analysis. while recent studies (scarrow et al. 2017) show a certain uniformity regarding the core architecture of party organization, they also found variation between countries and party families in terms of their internal processes, with particular regard to how internally democratic they are, especially in terms of leadership selection procedures. however, over the 1 as is well known, both pd and pdl came from the merging of, respectively, ds and fi with two other parties (the daisy and alleanza nazionale), coming from a distinct political tradition and presenting a different organizational structure which may be interesting to consider in terms of leadership dynamics.still, we prefer not to include those two parties in the analysis because of the need to have a balanced (though small) sample with only a mainstream centre-left and centre-right party vs. a smaller left-wing and right-wing populist/radical party. moreover, while pds/ds already existed in the 1990s before dissolving within pd, this is not the case for the daisy, so it would have created a further problem of temporal continuity. vicentini and pritoni 25 last few decades, the enhancement of intra-party democracy has often accompanied the growing personalisation of political life and presidentialisation of western political parties (poguntke and webb 2005; passarelli 2015; rahat and kenig 2020).this has entailed increased academic attention to the methods through which parties choose their leaders (scarrow 1999; leduc 2001; caul kittilson and scarrow 2006; kenig 2009; hazan and rahat 2010; cross and katz 2013; pilet and cross 2014; wauters 2014; cross and pilet 2015; keniget al. 2015; vicentini 2020). however, there have been considerably fewer studies focusing on how and why leadership tenures end (cross and blais 2012; gruber et al. 2015; ennser-jedenastik and schumacher 2015-2020). most of the few studies in the field suggest that leaders chosen by more inclusive methods face greater risks of de-selection (bueno de mesquitaet al. 2002; ennser-jedenastik and schumacher 2015; ennser-jedenastik and müller, 2015; schmacher and giger 2017; ennser-jedenastik and schumacher 2020). however, there are also scholars who suggest that a growing intra-party democracy will increase the legitimacy of the party leadership, securing greater organizational autonomy (mair 1994; sandri and pauwels 2011; ramiro 2016). accordingly, we do not have clear expectations concerning the direction of the relation, but still we assume that the size of the selectorate affects leadership re-selection (h1). furthermore, the degree of approval that party leaders receive from their selectorate – even in the case of ‘coronations’ of a single candidate (kenig 2008), i.e. with the absence of a formal opponent – is indicative of the extent to which they are in danger of being dismissed in the near future (ennser-jedenastik and muller2015). in turn, a contested lr (namely a race with more than one candidate running for the leadership) which is also competitive (as it ends with very close results between the first two candidates) is more likely to be divisive for the party, which may contribute to further enhancing internal factionalism (ware 1979; hazan and rahat 2010;wichowsky and niebler2010).thus, when lrs are very competitive, we assume that parties are very internally fragmented, and therefore the office of party leader is particularly at stake (h2a). similarly, even in the absence of an opponent, we expect a party leader selected or re-selected with a low approval rate to be less likely to be re-selected (h2b). that said, leaders who overcome the hurdle of the first mandate are expected to exert a stronger control over their own party, which means that they are more likely to survive in office in subsequent years (ennser-jedenastik and muller 2015). accordingly, we hypothesise more chances of re-selection in successive lrs for incumbent leaders (h3). however, a party leader cannot stay in office indefinitely without showing signs of ‘deterioration’ (vicentini and pritoni 2021). in fact, quantitative studies on leadership survival (andrews and jackman 2008; houriuchi et al. 2015) have demonstrated that younger party leaders tend to stay in office for a longer period compared to older colleagues. furthermore, previous research has found that electoral defeats and being stuck in opposition increase the probability of leader replacement (andrews and jackman 2008; ennser-jedenastik and müller 2015). however, losing and winning elections may have a completely different meaning for mainstream and challenger or niche parties. likewise, government participation is likely to be beneficial only for leaders of senior government parties, whereas the impact on leaders of challenger parties might go in the opposite direction (ennser-jedenastik and muller 2015). in fact, smaller (challenger) parties may have different party goals and tend to consider policy purity (or ideology) more important than how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? 26 winning votes or taking government office (harmel and janda 1994). accordingly, regardless of electoral performance, we assume that a leader of a big mainstream office-seeking governing party is less likely to be removed from his/her party office, notably if he/she is simultaneously the head of government (h4a), while we expect the contrary in the case of smaller parties (h4b). all these things considered, vicentini and pritoni (2021) identified five main conditions which are likely to affect the re-selection to office vis-a-vis de-selection/departure, both alone and in combination with each other: 1) whether there is an outgoing leader running for re-election (incumbency); 2) broad inclusiveness of the lr called to appoint the party leader; 3) a large victory (namely low competitiveness in contested lrs or high approval rates in coronations of a candidate); 4) participation in government during leadership tenure, and 5) party electoral support during tenure (whether the candidates run to become leader of either a big mainstream or small niche/challenger party). though being aware that there are a number of other potential conditions that may be considered (leader personality, institutional context, external events etc.), it is not worth including too many conditions in qca (schneider and wagemann 2012). this is particularly true if we only consider the italian case, which of course presents a much more reduced dataset with respect to the one employed for the original comparative study. either way, the focus on italy just allows us to better complement the qca findings with qualitative reflections concerning other specific factors that may have affected lrs as well as early terminations in office, especially in order to explain possible deviant cases. 3. calibration the first step in each fs-qca is the ‘calibration’ of sets (both the conditions and the outcome), which can be conducted directly or indirectly (ragin 2008, 85-105). this fundamental process, which should be as transparent as possible, (schneider and wagemann 2010, 403), allows us to investigate in detail the characteristics of the party leaders and lrs under scrutiny. we used the ‘indirect method’ – which requires the grouping of cases into set-membership scores on the basis of the individual researcher decision (schneider and wagemann 2012, 35) – for calibrating the outcome as well as all conditions, except for that of ‘big party’, for which we opted for the direct method. still, with respect to vicentini and pritoni’s (2021) comparative paper, a few conditions (i.e. inclusiveness, winning margin and party electoral size) have been slightly re-calibrated in order to better adapt to the italian context. 3.1. incumbency the operationalization of the first causal condition (incumbency) is easily explained: we assign ‘1’ when the outgoing party leader runs for re-appointment in office, against other candidates or in uncontested races. instead, ‘0’ is assigned to all lrs presenting new candidates, including people who have been party chairs years before. of course, in the case of contested races, it is not taken for granted that ‘incumbent’ party leaders will be reconfirmed in office. theoretically, this is not the case for single candidates either, as there might be a threshold to be reached (normally 50 per cent). yet, not reconfirming an incumbent leader in a coronation is very unlikely. vicentini and pritoni 27 3.2. lr inclusiveness according to the literature on candidate and leader selection, the main indicator to be taken into account to assess lr inclusiveness is the type (and size) of the selectorate, i.e. the group of people called on to choose the party leader. scholars usually consider six ‘pure’ types of selectorates, ranked from the most to the least inclusive (kenig 2009; pilet and cross 2014; spies and kaiser 2014, kenig et al. 2015): electorate (open primaries), membership (closed primaries), party delegates, party council, party parliamentary group or party top organs, and party leader. thus, we assign ‘1’ to open primary election, which allows all party sympathisers to choose the party chair. far fewer people – from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands, depending on party membership – are (potentially and actually) involved in closed primaries, which nonetheless represents a fully inclusive system of leadership selection (we thus assign a ‘0.6’ coefficient). instead, the most typical selectorate called to appoint the party leader in the european context, namely the delegates to the party congress, is coded with ‘0.4’, just below the inclusiveness threshold. not only do party delegates rarely surpass 1,000 people, but they are often required to approve a single candidate rather than choose between more competitors. then, ‘0.2’ is assigned when the appointment of the party leader is entrusted to the formal vote of the party top organs, normally made up of a few hundred people. finally, ‘0’ refers to uncontested races wherein the party leader is chosen (or reconfirmed) by informal negotiation within the party elite or he/she is self-proclaimed. 3.3. large victory the literature on primary elections and omov systems has estimated competitiveness in several different ways: through dichotomous (hacker 1975; bernstein 1977) or metrical variables (piereson and smith 1975; grau 1981), or by using only the results of the winner, of the two most voted candidates, or of all the competitors (atkeson 1998; kenig 2008). we opted for a simple ordinal scale: very competitive, somewhat competitive, barely competitive, not at all competitive. a similar criterion was applied for measuring the winning margin of a single candidate: we assume 80% approval as the threshold between a (somewhat or very) large victory for the newly elected or reappointed leader and a (somewhat or very) disappointing result which may indicate a certain level of internal opposition. accordingly we assigned ‘0’ to very competitive contested lrs (less than 10 percentage points between winner and second candidate) and coronations with approval rates lower than 70%; ‘0.33’ to somewhat competitive lrs (winning margin between 10 and 20%) and coronations with approval rates between 70 and 80%; ‘0.67’ to barely competitive lrs (winning margin between 20 and 30%) and coronations with approval rates between 80 and 90%; ‘1’ to not at all competitive lrs (more than 30 percentage points between a single intended winner and the second candidate) and coronations wherein the party leader is almost unanimously appointed (with an approval rate greater than 90% or by acclamation) or is automatically appointed with no formal vote. how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? 28 3.4. government participation as far as participation in government is concerned, we first distinguish between chairs whose party was mostly in government during the leadership tenure and chairs whose party was mostly in opposition during tenure. moreover, we also distinguish between party leaders who personally serve as heads of government (berlusconi, renzi, etc.) and party leaders who lead their governing party from the outside (or perhaps hold some other executive positions but not the ‘main’ one). keeping these two criteria together, we came up with a five-point scale: we assigned ‘1’when the party is in government during the leadership tenure and the party leader is also the head of government, while ‘0.8’ indicates that the party is the major party in government during the leadership tenure but its leader is not the head of government. ‘0.6’ is assigned when the party is more in government than in opposition during tenure or is in coalition as junior partner. ‘0.3’ is assigned when the party is mostly in opposition during the leadership tenure or at most provides external support to the government. finally; ‘0’ is assigned when the party remains in opposition for the entire leadership tenure. 3.5. party electoral support as anticipated above, for the last condition – namely party electoral support – we adopted the ‘direct method’ of calibration, taking into account the vote percentage in the closest general election in the course of the leadership tenure. accordingly, we looked at electoral results for the four political parties under scrutiny in the 30-year period considered, taking into account the proportional vote in the chamber of deputies. more precisely, considering the traditional fragmentation of the italian party system over the last 30 years (cotta and verzichelli 2020), we established a 15% threshold as the ‘point of maximum indifference’ between big and small parties. 15% indeed represents the average value of electoral support in our dataset, considering all the four parties over the last thirty years. consequently, we set a 25% threshold for identifying ‘full membership’ (in that all parties obtaining more than 25% of electoral votes are undoubtedly ‘big parties’), and a 5% threshold for identifying ‘full non-membership’ (in that all parties which cannot reach at least 5% of electoral votes are undoubtedly ‘small parties’). 3.6. leaders’ departure finally, we need to explain the calibration of the outcome. reappointment in office represents the most ‘positive’ outcome for a party leader, which we assume to be ‘qualitatively’ different from any kind of departure, voluntary or not. accordingly, we assigned ‘1’ to party leaders who were reappointed in office at the end of the tenure. the literature suggests that reasons for departure can be divided into five categories, ranging from the one showing the lowest level of conflict between the outgoing leader and his/her party to the highest level of conflict (cross and blais 2012; gruber et al. 2015). these are, respectively: force majeure, voluntary resignation, post-election resignation, resignation under pressure, formal removal. the first category refers to cases where the party leader dies or the party disappears. in this case we do not know what would have happened otherwise: maybe the party leader would have been re-selected in the subsequent lr, maybe not. accordingly, we assign ‘0.6’ to party leaders who leave vicentini and pritoni 29 their office because of force majeure, which is assumed to be the conceptual threshold between a positive and a negative outcome. thereafter we have three distinct types of resignation. the first, coded with ‘0.4’, is the truly voluntary resignation in which the leader autonomously decides to leave. this means that the leader could remain in office if he/she wanted to, but it may also hide some internal tensions. the second category encompasses what has been said previously concerning the relation between leadership survival and electoral failure. here we consider resignations that occur within one month of an election with ‘national value’, namely general and european elections. the third type (resignation under pressure) includes cases where there was a broad, organized movement calling on the incumbent to resign from the leadership (pilet and cross 2014), regardless of a negative electoral outcome, although the two things are often interlinked. yet we prefer to collapse these two categories into one (gruber et al. 2015), assigning it ‘0.2’. to conclude, the ‘formal removal’ category (coded with ‘0’) originally referred to a specific instrument through which a party top organ votes against the leader to remove him/her from office, which is typical of westminster systems. however, here we adopt this definition to refer to cases in which the outgoing leader is formally challenged and defeated by other contenders at the end of a (more or less defined) fixed term, for instance in a party congress. from this point of view, formal removal (or de-selection) is just the opposite of re-selection. 4. leadership selection and change in four italian parties our sample includes 33 lrs/coronations accounting for both the party leader’s first appointment in office and all the reappointments at the end of the term, for a total of 18 different party leaders. about half of the considered party leaders were not re-elected to office. among those who were successfully reappointed (eight), five completed three or more terms in office. this seems to confirm that once the hurdle of the first mandate is overcome, party leaders are more likely to be reappointed. as far as the reasons for departure are concerned, there are only a few cases of party leaders who came to an end because of force majeure (fassino) or formal removal (franceschini, martina), while ‘voluntary resignations’ and ‘post-election/under pressure resignations’ represent the most populated categories. that said, it is worth noting that ten out of 18 considered party leaders chaired the mainstream centre-left party in its various forms (pds, ds, pd). in this regard, the changing organizational structure and the progressive democratisation of leadership selection procedures did not help to solve the atavistic weakness of centre-left leaders. in the early nineties the pds used to select its chair by a formal vote of the party top organs, which was the typical system characterising its predecessor, the italian communist party (pci). in ten years, three different leaders ran the party from its foundation in 1991: occhetto, d’alema and veltroni. instead, the ds had only a single party chair (fassino), elected by the entire party membership for three consecutive terms. in april 2007, during the last ds congress, fassino was reconfirmed as ds chairman for a few months with the specific mandate to dissolve his own party in view of the forthcoming foundation of pd. how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? 30 in a context of growing personalisation and presidentialisation of italian politics (passarelli 2015), open primaries represented a foundational myth for pd and reflected the ‘thin ideology’ characterising the party’s overall organizational model, which was intended to merge two parties coming from completely different traditions: communist and catholic. in 2007, 3.5 million voters crowned veltroni as first chair of the newly born party. thereafter, this new system of leadership selection (accompanied by a preliminary vote by the party membership intended to reduce the number of candidates) was introduced in the party statute. since then, pd has resorted to open primaries to select its party chair four more times. in the last one (2019), voters were fewer than half compared to 2007, which shows a growing disaffection towards the instrument, going hand in hand with the pd erosion of electoral support. meanwhile, leadership volatility further increased: in march 2021, the party appointed its eighth leader since its foundation in 2007, following the unexpected and contentious resignation of nicola zingaretti, the umpteenth party chair forced to resign because of internal conflicts and/or disappointing electoral results. in fact, no pd leader has been able to conclude a four-years term in office and obtain reappointment, notwithstanding the large victories they all had, once elected, in their first term. this is true for the four leaders selected by open primaries (veltroni, bersani, renzi, zingaretti) but also for those elected by a much less inclusive selectorate (franceschini and martina),2 who then failed to be reappointed as they were both largely defeated in the subsequent open primaries. only matteo renzi was able to be re-appointed by winning open primaries in 2013 and 2017, but just after a period of interruption in which the party was temporary led by guglielmo epifani. still, renzi’s second term finished just one year later, following a severe electoral defeat in the 2018 general election. still, leadership volatility is not a ‘leftist’ characteristic. in fact, the prc had much more durable leaders compared to the pd. over the years, the party has not changed its practice of leadership selection: since its foundation in 1991 the choice is formally entrusted to party top organs, a system borrowed from the pci. from 1994 to 2008, the party alternated (troubled) times as a government coalition party with periods of external support and opposition, also facing some serious electoral defeats, but the leadership of bertinotti remained largely unchallenged. after bertinotti’s voluntary resignation, the party found another quite long-standing leader (ferrero) from 2008 to 2017 but progressively became an opposition force which was largely irrelevant on the national political scene, losing all its seats in parliament and its ‘coalition potential’. the trend did not seem to reverse with the recent change of leadership. moving to the other side of the political spectrum, leadership volatility is even lower. bossi’s leadership of the ln was undisputed from its foundation in 1989 till 2012. the party leader was formally elected as a single candidate by congress delegates, but 2 in the case of the early resignation of the previous leader, the appointment of the new party chair is not entrusted to open primaries but to the party national assembly, a body made up of about 1,000 persons, most of them selected during the previous party congress (in fact, this system may be compared to the vote of party delegates in terms of inclusiveness). actually, the pd statute also established that in the event that none of the candidates for secretary obtained 50% in the open primaries, the same national assembly had the right to choose the new party leader. however, this event has never occurred in practice and it was formally prevented after the statute’s amendment in 2019, as only the first two candidates (according to party members’ votes) qualified for the successive open primaries. vicentini and pritoni 31 differently from pd and prc, he/she did not serve for a fixed term. in fact, the ln did not hold any national congress to renew internal offices between 2002 and 2012. still, in 2012, the historical ln leader was forced to resign because of a scandal of the alleged appropriation of party funds for the private affairs of his family, although no pressure to leave apparently came from within his own party. since then, after the short leadership of maroni, the party radically changed its system of leadership selection, opting for closed primaries. under the new leadership of matteo salvini (since 2013), the league has progressively become the most voted italian party, reaching its peak in the 2019 european elections with 34% votes. still, the new party, renamed ‘league for salvini premier’, was still unable to see its leader as head of government, although it served as (junior) coalition partner (though keeping some opposition attitudes) from 2018 to 2019 and in the current draghi government. thus, we expect salvini as bound to keep his party office in the years to come, unless he suffers a resounding defeat in the next general election. in fact, the evidence pointed out by vicentini and pritoni’s (2021) comparative work seemed to suggest that leaders of big parties are more subject to the effect of electoral swings compared to leaders of small parties. this is because, in the case of small parties, there is predictably less internal competition to become party chair as the leader has fewer resources to distribute, for instance in terms of government offices. in any case, for both the league and the prc, the ‘radical’ political culture may contribute to explain the preference for a strong and durable ‘charismatic’ leadership. on the one hand, rightist forces tend to be more leadership-dominated (schumacher and giger 2017); on the other hand, parties coming from a communist tradition tend to disregard challenges to the dominant coalition (vicentini and pritoni 2021). still, leadership change does not seem to be an issue in the case of a personal party such as fi/pdl/fi, based on berlusconi’s charismatic leadership (calise 2015). in fact, the party founder is still formally the party chair after almost 30 years, notwithstanding his old age, judicial problems and recent huge electoral losses. it also implies the lack of formal leadership selection procedures at the national level, as berlusconi’s leadership is self-proclaimed. even in the (sporadic) cases when fi or pdl held a national congress (four in almost three decades), the reappointment of berlusconi was not submitted to a formal vote of the delegates, but simply to audience ‘acclamation’. in fact, italy has been defined as the country of ‘extreme selectorates’ (kenig 2009: 437): on the one hand, we have maximum inclusiveness with regard to the mechanism of selection of pd/centreleft leaders and candidates; on the other, a case of ‘self-enthroned’ leadership. 5. exploring the determinants of party leaders’ re-selection with qca now we return to fuzzy-set qca3 in order to move from the explorative and descriptive overview of party leadership change in italy presented above to more explicative reflections concerning the combination of conditions that might contribute to clarifying whether and how a party leader is reconfirmed in office or forced to resign. in qca terms, the four hypotheses presented in section 2 above can be addressed in terms of necessity and/or sufficiency: a scarcely or largely inclusive lr is necessary 3 we use the software fsqca 3.0 (ragin and davey 2017). how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? 32 and/or sufficient for the party leader to be re-selected (h1); a large victory when originally appointed is necessary and/or sufficient for the party leader to be re-selected (h2), incumbency is necessary and/or is sufficient for the party leader to be re-selected (h3); the combination of presence in government and large party electoral support is sufficient for the party leader to be re-selected (h4a); the combination of absence in government and limited party electoral support is sufficient for the party leader to be reselected (h4b). table 1. truth table incumb broadin largevic gov bigpar n outcome raw cons pri cons sym cons 1 1 1 1 1 4 (12%) 0 0.65 0.50 0.50 1 0 1 1 1 3 (21%) 1 0.84 0.79 0.79 1 0 1 1 0 3 (30%) 1 0.83 0.80 0.80 1 0 0 0 0 3 (39%) 0 0.73 0.64 0.74 0 1 1 0 1 3 (48%) 0 0.57 0.36 0.36 0 0 1 1 1 3 (57%) 1 0.88 0.82 0.86 1 0 1 0 0 2 (63%) 1 0.90 0.89 0.89 0 1 1 1 1 2 (69%) 0 0.49 0.13 0.15 0 0 1 0 0 2 (75%) 1 0.86 0.81 0.81 1 1 1 1 0 1 (78%) 1 0.84 0.79 0.79 1 0 1 0 1 1 (81%) 1 0.93 0.92 0.92 1 0 0 0 1 1 (84%) 0 0.60 0.45 0.45 0 1 1 0 0 1 (87%) 1 0.98 0.97 0.97 0 0 1 1 0 1 (90%) 0 0.62 0.41 0.41 0 0 1 0 1 1 (93%) 0 0.75 0.65 0.65 0 0 1 0 1 1 (97%) 1 0.84 0.62 0.62 0 0 0 0 0 1 (100%) 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 note: all other combinations of conditions are logical remainders. • pri: proportional reduction in consistency • sym: symmetrical consistency • theoretical assumptions (directional expectations) for intermediate solution: 1. outgoing leader running for re-election (incumbency) should contribute to the outcome when it is present; 2. no theoretical assumptions (directional expectations) for broad inclusiveness; 3. large victory should contribute to the outcome when it is present; 4. no theoretical assumptions (directional expectations) for presence in government; 5. no theoretical assumptions (directional expectations) for big party. • in bold all single truth table rows included in the ‘boolean minimisation process’. the analysis of necessary conditions for leader reappointment shows that no condition (or its non-occurrence) was necessary for the outcome (or for its non-occurrence)4. this is not even the case for sufficient conditions taken alone. yet, our analysis shows that five different combinations of conditions are sufficient for being reconfirmed as a party leader. more precisely, in qca, an empirical test of sufficiency set-relations between combinations of conditions and the outcome is conducted with a “truth table”. 4 all the consistency thresholds were lower than 0.9, which is the value above which empirical evidence supports the claim that a condition is necessary for the outcome (schneider and wagemann 2012, 278). vicentini and pritoni 33 specifically, the process proceeds as follows. i) we convert the data matrix into the abovementioned truth table. ii) single truth table rows are assessed for their consistency scores regarding whether they count as sufficient conditions for the result. finally, iii) if they count as sufficient conditions, they are included in the “boolean minimization process”; otherwise, they are not. see, on this, table 1 above. when logical remainders (i.e., combinations of conditions which are characterized by no empirical cases in the dataset at hand) exist, such as in this case, the solution formulas – complex, parsimonious and intermediate – are not interchangeable. in qca, solution formulas differ on the basis of assumptions on logical remainders. the complex solution does not include remainder rows when minimizing the consistent rows with cases. the parsimonious solution treats remainders as ‘don’t care’, stimulating outcome values to obtain parsimony. conversely, the intermediate solution evaluates the plausibility of remainders in accordance with the researcher’s simplifying assumptions based on theoretical or substantive empirical knowledge. in these cases – even though the most advanced methodological literature does not reach consensus on this issue (thiem 2016; thiem et al. 2015) – it is generally suggested that one should consider the intermediate solution to reduce the risk of drawing incorrect inferences about the automatic counterfactuals used in the parsimonious and complex solution (ragin 2008, 175; jano 2016, 15).5 that said, please see table 2 presenting solutions terms, consistency, coverage and cases covered of the intermediate solution, which is as follows: ~bigparty*~government*largevictory + bigparty*government*~broadinclusiveness + largevictory*~broadinclusiveness*incumbency + ~bigparty*largevictory*incumbency + ~bigparty*~government*~broadinclusiveness*~incumbency table 2. intermediate solution: solution terms. consistency. coverage and cases covered solution term raw coverage unique coverage consistency cases covered (membership > 0.5) ~bigparty* ~government *largevictory 0.342718 0.037379 0.863081 salvini1 (ln) (0.96,1) maroni (ln) (0.88, 0.4), bossi1 (ln) (0.7,1), bertinotti1 (prc) (0.67,1), ferrero2 (0.67,1) bigparty* government* ~broadinclusiveness 0.262621 0.084466 0.818457 epifani (pd) (0.8,0.4), veltroni1 (pds) (0.8,1), berlusconi1 (fi) (0.6,1), berlusconi2 (fi) (0.6,1), berlusconi3 (pdl) (0.6,1), d’alema (pds) (0.6,0.4), martina (pd) (0.6,0) 5 for the sake of transparency, as thiem (2016) suggests, we also present the parsimonious solution. how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? 34 largevictory* ~broadinclusiveness* incumbency 0.359709 0.072816 0.881094 berlusconi2 (fi) (1,1), berlusconi3 (pdl) (1,1), berlusconi4 (fi) (1,1), bertinotti2 (prc) (0.67,1), bertinotti3 (prc) (0.67,1), ferrero2 (prc) (0.67,1), martina (pd) (0.6,0), bossi1 (ln) (0.6,1), bossi2 (ln) (0.6,0.2) ~bigparty *largevictory *incumbency 0.251456 0.035922 0.836834 bossi2 (ln) (0.97,0.2), salvini2 (ln) (0.96,1), bossi1 (ln) (0.88,1), bertinotti2 (prc) (0.67,1), bertinotti3 (prc) (0.67,1), ferrero2 (prc) (0.67,1) ~bigparty* ~government* ~broadinclusiveness*~ incumbency 0.166990 0.045146 0.895833 ferrero1 (prc) (0.8,1), bertinotti1 (prc) (0.8,1), maroni (ln) (0.6,0.4) • intermediate solution coverage (proportion of membership explained by all paths identified): 0.689806 • intermediate solution consistency (‘how closely a perfect subset relation is approximated’) (ragin 2008, 44): 0.840828. • raw coverage: proportion of memberships in the outcome explained by a single path • unique coverage: ‘proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each individual solution term’ (ragin 2008, 86). • empirically contradictory cases are shown in bold. • complex solution: incumbency*~broadinclusiveness*largevictory + ~incumbency*~broadinclusiveness*~government*~bigparty + ~incumbency*largevictory*~government*~bigparty + ~incumbency*~broadinclusiveness*government*bigparty + incumbency*largevictory*~bigparty(coverage: 0.66; consistency: 0.85) • parsimonious solution: ~incumbency*~largevictory + broadinclusiveness*~bigparty + ~broadinclusiveness*government*bigparty + broadinclusiveness*~largevictory + ~largevictory*government + ~incumbency*~government*~bigparty + largevictory*~government*~bigparty + incumbency*broadinclusiveness*~government + incumbency*largevictory*~government + incumbency*~broadinclusiveness*largevictory + incumbency*government*~bigparty + incumbency*~broadinclusiveness*government (coverage: 0.74; consistency: 0.86) theoretically, the (intermediate) solution above means that re-selection in office is associated with five different combinations of conditions: first, leaders of small opposition parties who win the party office with a large victory are more likely to be re-selected. this solution term confirms theoretical expectations, as previous studies have shown that government participation is not beneficial for challenger or niche parties (vicentini and pritoni 2021). we only have a single deviant case here, namely a party leader who was not re-selected to office while presenting the abovementioned conditions: roberto maroni. yet this contradictory case is easily explained. maroni succeeded bossi as league chair after the latter’s forced resignation in 2012, and voluntary left the office one and a half years later, a few months after being elected president of the lombardy region. although there are no internal party rules establishing the formal incompatibility between the two offices, maroni declared he was leaving the position in order to work full-time for the region, where he governed in coalition with the other centre-right forces (which may have not appreciated a president widely considered to have a partisan point of view). thereafter, the new party leader, salvini, progressively started the vicentini and pritoni 35 national and ‘sovranist’ repositioning of the (northern) league, which would have been much harder if the party had remained in the hands of the lombardy president. secondly, re-selection to office seems to be more likely for big parties in government whose leaders have been selected by a non-inclusive selectorate. this might confirm the concerns of those scholars who suggested that inclusive procedures of selection are detrimental for leadership survival. still, the contrary is not confirmed either, as shown by the short leadership of the two contradictory cases of pd leaders epifani and martina, both selected by a scarcely inclusive selectorate (the party national assembly). in fact, their leadership was largely transitional (in view of the subsequent ‘real’ leadership selection by open primaries) and simply reflected the lack of valid alternative candidates and the necessity for a very fragmented party to show a certain unity in a delicate moment. as for the other deviant case, namely d’alema, his resignation as pds leader in 1998 may be explained with an argument similar to that made above with regard to maroni. d’alema was nominated prime minister, and although there was no formal incompatibility with his role of party chair, he preferred to leave in order to focus on the country’s government. in fact, the fragile balances to keep united the contentious centreleft coalition implied a complex mediation between the interest of the various parties, which was probably easier to pursue while not being a leader of one of the parties at stake. in this regard, party traditions and the political context are also to be taken into account, as some parties are more likely to keep separate party offices and (monocratic) institutional offices. thirdly, leadership re-selection is apparently favoured by the absence of inclusiveness counterbalanced by a large victory once re-elected as party leader (incumbency). this is also in line with theoretical expectations, as incumbent party leaders are much more likely to be reconfirmed in office by scarcely inclusive selectorates. it is no coincidence, because political parties tend to adopt more inclusive procedures of selection as a consequence of a leadership crisis or electoral defeats (cross and blais 2012), possibly when the course of a long-standing leader is over. furthermore, an incumbent leader is also quite likely to have a large victory once re-selected, unless he/she has started to show some signs of ‘deterioration’ because of age or the too-long administration of power within the party. yet this does not seem to be the case for berlusconi, as his leadership of fi is a structural feature linked to the ‘personal’ nature of the party (calise 2015). rather, ‘deterioration’ may have played a certain role in bossi’s resignation, which indeed appears as a deviant case. the fact that he was largely defeated by the young and still littleknown salvini in the 2013 primaries when he tried to win back his party office demonstrates that the grassroots had had enough of his 23-year leadership. as for the other deviant case, martina, what we said above holds true. fourth, an incumbent leader of a small party who wins a large victory once elected is also more likely to be re-selected at the end of his/her term. the interpretation here is similar to what we said about the previous solution term: incumbent leaders are more likely to have large victory once re-elected. moreover, leaders of small parties are likely to be less subjected to political contingencies. finally, the logical minimisation of the truth table shows that non-incumbent party leaders of small opposition parties elected through a scarcely inclusive lr have more chances of being reappointed to office. actually, this solution only explains two how and why do italian party leaders survive in office or come to an end? 36 empirical cases referring to the first appointment of then long-serving prc leaders, while maroni turns out to be a deviant case again, for the reasons already explained. 6. concluding remarks in this paper, we have employed qca in order to explore which (combinations of) conditions could favour the reappointment to office of italian party leaders. we identified five different combinations: large victory, once elected as party chair of a small opposition party; scarce inclusiveness of the lr to select the leader of a big governing party; large victory but scarce inclusiveness of the lr to select an incumbent leader; large victory once re-elected as (incumbent) chair of a small party; scarce inclusiveness of the lr intended to select a brand-new leader (non-incumbent) of a small opposition party. thus, the italian case presents few differences with respect to the findings shown by vicentini and pritoni (2021) in their recent four-country study. more precisely, starting from the same five conditions, they identified four solution terms: incumbency; small party electoral support and absence from government; absence from government counterbalanced by a large victory once elected as party leader, and inclusive procedure of selection and limited party electoral support. still, some evidence remains valid for both studies: leaders who have already served for one or more party mandates seem to be more likely to be reconfirmed in office. at the same time, being in opposition is not necessarily an obstructing condition for a leader’s reappointment, especially in the case of small parties and broad success in the previous lr. this latter condition is generally (but not always) a mirror of party unity and convinced support for a candidate with particular ‘leadership skills’. instead, the assumed legitimisation that may be associated with an inclusive process of selection does not guarantee re-selection. actually, with respect to the comparative study, the italian case seems to confirm that party leaders selected by very inclusive procedures (i.e. open primary elections) are more in danger of being dismissed. however, while it is undeniable that pd leaders are particularly unstable, it is arguable that it may be a consequence of open primaries. rather the recourse to open primaries to select the party chair (and the chief executive candidate) may also be considered as an attempt to compensate with popular legitimisation for the chronic weakness of centre-left leaders. furthermore, the italian case has to be interpreted considering the very peculiar nature of the (centre) right parties under scrutiny. if berlusconi’s party was undoubtedly a ‘personal party’ for at least two decades (calise 2015), bossi’s northern league was also close to that model, and it has clearly affected the dynamics of leadership selection and (the lack of) leadership change over the years. the progressive decline of berlusconi’s leadership, the new ascent of salvini’s league, the current and apparently irreversible political irrelevance of prc and the continuous re-positioning of pd (in terms of alliances and internal political balances) would suggest replicating the same study in the next few years in order to assess the magnitude of change. in any case, the present empirical analysis demonstrates the importance of focusing on the combined effects of different conditions to assess leadership re-selection and de-selection not only in a comparative perspective but also when dealing with a national case study. yet, it also suggests caution in making generalised inferences. accordingly, on the one hand, we are convinced that this novel methodological approach may inspire vicentini and pritoni 37 different paths for future research in the field of party leadership selection and leadership survival. on the other hand, our study is a reminder of the importance of qualitatively considering country and party specificities in order to really understand the drivers and dynamics of leadership change in the different contexts. references andrews j.t. and r.t. jackman (2008), ‘if winning isn’t everything, why do they keep score? consequences of electoral performance for party leaders’, british journal of political science, 38(4): 657–675 bueno de mesquita b., jd. morrow, rm. siverson (2002), ‘political institutions, policy choice and the survival of leader’, british 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(2014), ‘democratising party leadership selection in belgium: motivations and decision makers’, political studies, 62(1): 61-80 wichowsky a. and s.e. niebler (2010),’narrow victories and hard games: revisiting the primary divisiveness hypothesis’, american politics research, xxxviii: 1052–1071 microsoft word pdf_issue_14_1_pettrachin.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 1, march 2019 * the research from which these findings are derived was funded by the european research council for the project ‘prospects for international migration governance’ (fp7/2007-2013, erc grant agreement no. 340430) awarded to prof. andrew geddes. © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 1, 1-20. contact author: andrea pettrachin, migration policy centre, european university institute. e-mail address: andrea.pettrachin@eui.eu when asylum policies go local: the case of socially-useful works for asylum-seekers* andrea pettrachin migration policy centre, robert schuman centre for advanced studies, european university institute, florence department of politics, university of sheffield abstract the local sphere of asylum policy, during the refugee crisis, became a key area of intervention for local governments. the existing literature on the topic has largely neglected the role of political affiliation in local asylum policy-making and the implications for policy implementation of mayors’ subjective understandings and decisionmaking. this article aims to fill these gaps by focusing on the case of ‘socially useful works’ (suw) for asylumseekers, a local policy that was defined as the italian way to deal with the reception and integration of asylumseekers. the article first analyses the outputs of this policy, assessing which local governments developed suw policies, what types of measures were implemented and with what policy goals. second, by applying insights from weick’s sensemaking approach and relying on semi-structured interviews conducted in the veneto region, it develops an account that analyses how and why these measures were adopted. the analysis concludes, first, that mayors’ party affiliations are a strong predictor of how suw policies are (or are not) implemented. second, it shows that mayors are not mere passive implementers: they adapt state-level guidelines to their own aims in ways that powerfully shape policy implementation and its outcomes. third, the article shows how decisions about the implementation of suw policies are significantly influenced by the mayors’ diverse interpretations of the many anti-migrant protests against asylum-seekers, and by different identity processes, past experiences and social relations. 1. introduction sylum policies are an interesting case for investigating the role of mayors’ party affiliations in local policy-making and how mayors’ aims, motivations and understandings of social and political phenomena influence their decisions with regard to policy implementation. the local sphere of migration policy, indeed, became a key area of intervention for local governments during the refugee crisis. reception policies are managed primarily at national level but, during the crisis, mayors had to decide whether to cooperate with national authorities or actively fight against the creation of reception centres, and could decide to develop local integration policies for asylum-seekers (ambrosini, 2018). not only did the crisis increase the relevance of the local sphere of asylum policy, but this also became ‘an extremely contentious one’ (zapata-barrero et al. 2017). the sharp rise in a when asylum policies go local 2 asylum-seeker flows in most european countries has led to widespread anti-migrant protests and high levels of political contestation around asylum, which make mayors’ decisions in this field highly visible. while an increasing number of scholarly works have recently focused on local asylum policy-making (jorgensen, 2012; ambrosini, 2018), most of this literature, particularly in the italian context, neglects the role of mayors’ party affiliations in local policy-making and the implications for policy implementation of mayors’ aims, motivations and subjective understandings. this article aims to fill these gaps by focusing on both local policy outputs and decision-making processes and addressing the following questions. first, are mayors mere implementers of schemes decided at the national level or do they shape the policies they adopt in significant ways? and do mayors’ political affiliations have any influence or impact on asylum policy adoption and implementation? second, which elements shape mayors’ decisions to adopt (or not) local asylum policies and their policy goals? the article specifically focuses on ‘socially useful work’ projects for asylum-seekers (henceforth: suw projects/ suw policies), a key local asylum policy developed by mayors during the asylum crisis, entailing the voluntary involvement of asylum-seekers in unremunerated community service. the policy became one of the five key pillars of the agenda promoted by the interior minister marco minniti1 which led to the structural reform of the asylum system.2 the then chief of the department of civil liberties and immigration, mario morcone, defined them as ‘the italian way to deal with the reception of asylum-seekers’ (il corriere del veneto, 2016) and a key measure to facilitate their integration (il mattino, 2016). the article examines mayors’ decisions to adopt and implement these policies in the northern region of veneto, where suw projects were widely implemented during the asylum crisis. the article is articulated in three sections. it begins by explaining the analytical approach and methodology adopted. it then assesses policy outputs, analysing which local governments developed suw policies, the types of measures implemented and mayors’ policy goals. finally, it accounts for these differences in policy outputs through the analysis of the specificities of mayors’ decision-making approaches. the analysis shows, first, that mayors’ party affiliations are a strong predictor of how suw policies are (or are not) implemented. second, in line with well-established findings in the literature in public policy analysis (pressman and wildavsky, 1973), it argues that mayors are not mere passive implementers of state-level guidelines and rather adapt them to their aims, in ways that powerfully shape policy implementation. third, it shows that mayors’ decisions about how to implement suw policies are significantly influenced by their diverse interpretations of the causes of the many anti-migrant protests around them, and by different identity processes, past experiences and social relations. 1 source: https://openmigration.org/en/analyses/5-things-to-know-about-italys-plan-for-immigration/. 2 law decree 13/2017, then converted into law 46/2017. andrea pettrachin 3 2. analytical approach and rationale an increasing number of scholars have recently focused on local asylum policy-making, in italy and beyond, teasing out some key features of local governments’ responses to the asylum crisis and examining their consequences on localities (ambrosini, 2013; doomernik and glorius, 2016). these studies have described a variegated reality, in which local governments follow pragmatic or rights-based approaches in managing immigration or rather decide to adopt ‘policies of exclusion’ (jorgensen, 2012; steen, 2016; ambrosini, 2018; mcmahon, 2019). despite the increasing number of contributions in this field, at least two main gaps can be identified in such literature, which this article aims to address. on the one hand, while this literature has focused on the explanation of the variation and effects of local asylum policy, both the role of mayors’ political affiliations in local policy-making and their motivations and policy goals have been largely ignored. most of the literature, and contributions focusing on italy in particular, often tend to merely extrapolate assumptions about their nature from the observed decisions. mayors’ decisions are thus often assumed to be influenced by the mobilisation of local immigrant-supporting organizations or anti-migrant protests (filomeno, 2017), by conflicts with regional and national authorities (scholten and pennix, 2016), or by mayors’ ideological positions (ambrosini, 2018: 117). this is despite the fact that eminent scholarly works have demonstrated how decision-making is influenced by factors that are not necessarily evident in its outputs. on the other hand, those scholarly works that, outside the italian context, do focus on local actors and decision-making, tend to focus on issue framing in policy disputes (steen, 2016) and/or to move from rationalistic premises to assess actors’ choices (lidén and nyhlén, 2015). they thus assume that asylum policies ‘have an objective basis, in terms of quantifying local costs, the level of state subsidies and demographic effects on the community’ (steen, 2016: 466), and that actors’ choices are ‘constructed in the public discourse, and often with symbolic connotations’ (ibid.). these assumptions, legitimate in other contexts, seem inappropriate for studying asylum-related decision-making processes in situations of crisis, such as the one analysed in this article. as pointed out by a number of scholars (cohen et al., 1972; brunsson, 1985), indeed, in such situations decisions must be taken quickly and with scant information and tend to be powerfully influenced also by actors’ interpretations of the external environment, and not merely by rational or strategic considerations. this article, therefore, aims to complement this existing literature in two main respects. first, it aims to specifically investigate the role of party affiliation in asylum policy-making, with specific focus on the italian context. ambrosini (2018: 117) has questioned the existence of a clear-cut distinction in italy between centre-right administrations promoting anti-migrant policies and centre-left governments promoting inclusive policies. steen (2016) reached similar conclusions in the norwegian context. this article will investigate whether or not mayors affiliated with different parties in italy implemented suw policies and whether they did so in different ways. second, moving beyond the mere assessment of policy outputs, this article aims to account for such differences or lack of differences through the analysis of the specificities of mayors’ decision-making processes in situations of crisis. to investigate these processes, the paper adopts an actor-centred constructivist perspective (hay, 2012) which mainly draws concepts and ideas from weick’s sensemaking approach (1995). this when asylum policies go local 4 approach, rarely applied to political science (geddes and hadj-abdou, 2018), provides an alternative framework for analysing the social psychological processes through which individuals understand and assign meaning to unexpected events and act upon these understandings (helms mills et al., 2010: 182). importantly, it is particularly suited to examining decisions in situations of crisis (maitlis and christianson, 2014: 58), such as the one analysed, where local governments were suddenly asked by prefects to identify buildings to host increasing numbers of asylum-seekers, with scant information available and under the pressure of widespread protests against asylum-seekers. also, unlike cognitive approaches that merely focus on policy frames, the sensemaking approach connects thought and action and captures ‘the practical activities of real people engaged in concrete situations of social action’ (boden, 1994: 10). it indeed addresses both the two key questions that organizations and their members have to face in situations of crisis, related not only to cognition – ‘what is happening?’ – but also to action – ‘what should be done next?’ (mills et al., 2010: 183). weick’s ‘sensemaking framework’ (1995: 18), based on some interrelated ‘explanatory properties’, provides a method for analysing how individuals answer these two key questions. according to weick’s first property, sensemaking is ‘grounded on identity construction’ (ibid.): who individuals think they are as organizational actors in a certain context influences how they interpret events and act. secondly, weick states that sensemaking is focused on and by ‘cues’ that individuals extract from the environment in order to take decisions on the relevance and acceptability of information or explanations. these extracted cues are ‘seeds from which people develop a larger sense of what may be occurring’ (ibid.: 50), meaning that actors make choices by focusing on certain elements or events while ignoring others. according to weick’s third property, the opportunity for sensemaking, which is a comparative process, is provided by retrospection: individuals rely on familiar past experiences to interpret current events. in practical terms, this means that actors are more reluctant to project, forecast and plan solutions if these are ‘decoupled from reflective action and history’ (ibid.: 30). fourth, weick argues that sensemaking unfolds ‘in a social context of other actors’ and is contingent upon interactions with others (weick et al., 2005: 409). analysing how these properties influence mayors’ decisions provides in-depth insights into why and how mayors implemented suw policies and their policy goals. based on the first property, it is expected that mayors’ decisions are influenced by perceptions of their institutional role, but also by their identity of members of a party or by local identity processes. the second property suggests that mayors’ decisions are influenced by their perceptions of the effects of asylum-seeker reception in their municipalities. following the third property, past experiences in managing migration flows at the local level should help mayors and city officials deal with the present situation. in the absence of such previous definitions of the situation, asylum policies are expected to be mostly implemented in a very reactive way. finally, the last property suggests that mayors’ interactions with other actors in the asylum governance system – particularly if these actors are perceived as sharing similar perspectives on the issue – are expected to influence their interpretations and decisions. andrea pettrachin 5 3. case selection and methods veneto is an interesting ‘extreme case’ (gerring, 2006: 89) for analysing the research questions posed by this article and generating hypotheses on the implementation of asylum policies, for at least two reasons. first, the significant political variation within the region in 2017 (figure 1) allows us to formulate hypotheses about the role that party affiliation plays in shaping local asylum policymaking during the refugee crisis. veneto is one of the heartlands of the populist radical right lega nord (ln), which maintains a strong regionalist character in the region (zulianello, 2019: 83). yet the dominant position of the ln in the regional political system, in 2017, was contrasted by the centre-left partito democratico (pd), which controlled a significant number of municipalities, and by several independent mayors, not affiliated to any national party. these mayors are ‘fringe actors’, who, unlike the others, do not aspire to govern at the national level. figure 1. political affiliation of venetian mayors in 2017 source: http://www.comuniverso.it second, the high pressure from the asylum issue allows us to analyse decision-making in situations of crisis. veneto, in 2016-2017, was indeed characterised by a harsh political and institutional crisis around the reception of asylum-seekers. it experienced very high levels of political contestation around the issue, and the highest number of anti-migrant protests in italy (lunaria, 2017), often organized by ‘anti-migrant committees’ with no political affiliation. also, it was characterised by a very weak reception system, with a prevalence of emergency reception centres (cas)3 under the control of the prefecture, very few sprar4 centres (directly managed by local authorities), and a very unequal dispersal of asylum-seekers across the region (ministry of interior, 2017). the many anti-migrant protests, and pressure from anti-migrant groups, are expected to significantly influence mayors’ strategies. the very strong regional identity in the region is also expected to influence decisions, particularly those of right-wing mayors. 3 the acronym stands for: centri di accoglienza straordinaria, emergency reception centres. 4 the acronym stands for: sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati, system of protection for asylum-seekers and refugees. 97 71 23 3 51 31 18 2 413 400 11 2 4 2 2 0 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% total villages (< 15,000 inhabitants) towns (> 15,000 inhabitants) provincial capitals “centre-right” (ln, forza italia) “centre-left” (pd) independent (liste civiche) movimento cinque stelle when asylum policies go local 6 the article draws upon an extensive document analysis of policy documents and newspaper articles and 33 semi-structured interviews conducted in veneto in november 2017. the sample of interviewees includes 14 mayors and deputy mayors from municipalities that hosted reception centres; ten non-party actors directly involved in the implementation of suw policies (four civil servants, four representatives of service providers, two deputy prefects) and nine experts (four academics, three ngo representatives, two representatives of trade unions). the sample of mayors and deputy mayors (henceforth: mayors) includes three ln mayors, three pd mayors, and eight independent mayors. independent mayors have been grouped into three categories – ‘right-wing independent’, ‘centre-right independent’ and ‘centre-left independent’ – using, as criteria, the definition of actors themselves as such, past membership of a party, and the external support received by parties at local elections. interviewees were carefully chosen through a quota sampling strategy, in order to include, for each of the five groups, mayors from municipalities of different sizes (one provincial capital, one town and one village), in different provinces, and hosting different types of reception centres.5 section 3 uses insights from all interviews and the document analysis to assess which local governments developed suw policies, the types of measures implemented and mayors’ policy goals. section 4 uses insights from the 14 interviews with mayors to assess decision-making processes: following maitlis and christianson (2014: 62), weick’s ‘sensemaking framework’ has been used as a method of analysis, on the basis of which the 14 mayors were asked specific questions. in addition, social network analysis (sna) was applied to enhance the utility and value of weick’s framework, under the assumption that social processes also shape interpretations of events (geddes and taylor, 2016: 588).6 the analysis relies on data collected through structured questionnaires filled in by the interviewed mayors that implemented suw policies, investigating their interactions with other actors in the asylum governance system, and the degree of similarity or difference in their perspectives on asylum-related issues. 4. suw policies in veneto: the main policy outputs this section assesses which local governments developed suw policies, the types of measures implemented and mayors’ policy goals. the interview material and other sources7 reveal that mayors’ political affiliations are a strong predictor of whether local governments developed (or not) suw policies, unlike other variables (e.g. size of municipality, province, type of reception centre hosted). suw projects were implemented by local governments led by independent centre-left, independent centre-right and pd mayors (including the nine mayors interviewed with these political affiliations). only a few local governments led by ln mayors developed these policies, including one of the three municipalities analysed. most ln mayors opposed suw projects, arguing that they entailed a disproportional 5 no provincial capital was governed in 2017 by a ‘right-wing independent’ administration. the group of ‘right-wing independent’ mayors, therefore, only includes two interviewees. 6 for an overview of applications of sna to political phenomena see: wasserman and faust, 1994. 7 sources: il corriere del veneto, 2016; vvox, 2016; gjergji, 2017. andrea pettrachin 7 administrative burden for the municipality and/or that these activities should rather have been proposed to local unemployed citizens (vvox, 2017). the two independent right-wing mayors interviewed harshly criticised and opposed suw policies. table 1. key features of the suw policies implemented in the 14 municipalities analysed the analysis also provides information about the type of activities proposed to asylum-seekers and about mayors’ policy goals, showing that, in the selected municipalities, these are both strictly linked to mayors’ political affiliations. pd mayors decided to implement suw policies with the greatest enthusiasm: as one of them explains, ‘the decision was so rational that we cannot even speak of a decision-making process, everybody sustained this initiative’. all pd mayors interviewed agree that the main policy goals were twofold. the policies were implemented, first and foremost, to show the empathy of the local government for the local population, who were annoyed by seeing asylum-seekers loitering inside and outside the reception centres. as a pd mayor explains: when asylum policies go local 8 we cannot deny that the rationale was that of positioning ourselves on the side of our citizens, who were annoyed by seeing migrants doing nothing for the whole day. thus, we decided that these migrants had to give something back to the community that was hosting them (pd mayor). furthermore, suw policies, in the pd mayors’ view, can potentially contribute to reducing people’s fears of migrants, and re-orient the political debate on the reception of asylum-seekers: initially i was very sceptical (…) then i realised that these projects contributed to decreasing social tensions. as a councillor from the five star movement rightly told me, ‘if you see a person sweeping the street, you can’t be afraid of him’; you don’t see him as a potential enemy (pd deputy mayor). these goals clearly influence the type of work in which asylum-seekers are involved, which in pd-led municipalities only include low-skilled auxiliary jobs such as sweeping the streets, painting public buildings and maintaining parks and gardens. also, they have significant implications for policy implementation. first, as a city official explains, suw policies are developed in ways that make asylum-seekers’ work strongly visible to the locals: the local government decided to develop this policy in a period when the context was quite tense, with the aim of showing to the locals that these migrants were doing something useful for the community, which was the reason why we made them work in areas where they could be highly visible (city official). some pd-led local governments also organized public ceremonies during which the mayor delivered certificates to the asylum-seekers, proving their participation in suw projects (cervellin, 2016). second, these goals seem to influence the number of asylum-seekers involved in these projects and the choice of the actors involved in policy implementation: while others started developing these policies on a smaller scale, our mayor decided that we had to ‘go big’, doing something that could be visible to everybody. it didn’t make much sense to develop a project just for a dozen or so asylum-seekers; we had to do something important. so, he decided to involve the municipal company to implement these projects. and everybody praised him. (…) he was not the first one to develop this policy, but he systematised it and communicated it very well (pd deputy mayor). interestingly, the only ln mayor interviewed that decided to promote suw policies did so with similar goals, and with a similar emphasis on the impact of the policy on the local population. as he explains, the main goal of the policy was that of showing to the people that the local government was doing something to increase their security. the decisions of independent centre-left and independent centre-right mayors to develop suw policies, conversely, are driven by very different goals. all the independent centre-left mayors interviewed explain that their goal was to foster the integration of asylum-seekers in the local community and labour market: the rationale behind this decision was to try to help these migrants learn a job, and to actively promote their integration in our society, thus creating the conditions to avoid social marginalisation (independent centre-left mayor). andrea pettrachin 9 as another mayor puts it, ‘we wanted to make asylum-seekers feel part of the community where they are hosted’. this approach seems to influence the type of activities proposed to asylum-seekers, which in these municipalities also include work in public libraries, schools, canteens and nursing homes. centre-right independent mayors, finally, take a more ‘pragmatic approach’ and mostly explain that their decisions to develop suw policies were aimed at the provision of services to the local population that could not be provided otherwise. as one of these mayors explains: to be sincere with you, the main reason why we involved asylum-seekers in public utility works is because we had nobody that could perform those tasks. for instance, we involved them in the assistance of disabled children in the kindergarten, because no other local association was available. the main reason, therefore, is that we really need them (independent centre-right mayor). for this reason, two of these mayors suggest that the involvement of asylum-seekers in these projects should become compulsory – an idea publicly launched by the mayor of verona, flavio tosi.8 5. sensemaking processes this section aims to account for the differences in the implementation of suw policies identified so far through the analysis of the specificities of decision-making approaches. such analysis will thus provide crucial and in-depth insights into why and how mayors variously implemented suw policies, and why mayors with different political affiliations were moved by different policy goals. to do so, i apply weick’s ‘sensemaking framework’ (1995: 18) and, by investigating how weick’s four key properties of sensemaking influence mayors’ strategies and decisions, i examine how individuals develop understandings about the situation around them and act upon these understandings. the four properties are clearly interlinked but, for analytical and operational reasons, their impact on mayors’ decisions has been analysed separately. each of the following sections thus provides complementary insights and clarifies different aspects of mayors’ decision-making processes. identity processes identity construction ‘is at the root of sensemaking and influences the other properties of the sensemaking process’ (helms mills, 2003: 55). as weick points out (1995), individual identities have various dimensions and, indeed, the interview material reveals that mayors’ decisions are influenced by their institutional identity (who they think they are as institutional actors), their political identity (i.e. their party membership) and their sense of belonging to their state or region (cultural identity). the complex interaction between these dimensions helps to explain, first, the mayors’ standpoints on the reception of asylum-seekers and, second, why suw policies were developed in veneto and became so popular there. 8 see link online at: http://www.veronasera.it/politica/tosi-salvini-tweet-migranti-protesta-trattatodublino-5-gennaio-2017-.html. when asylum policies go local 10 awareness of their institutional role, the interviews reveal, leads pd mayors to moderate the traditionally pro-migrant positions of their party. as one of them explained, ‘being a mayor makes me more realistic, i’m more aware of the practical problems that migration flows pose and i can understand much better how people think’. another interviewee added: we must be welcoming towards asylum-seekers because this is the mission of a centre-left administration (…). [however] as local government we must confront reality and try to come up with responses. this doesn’t mean giving up our ideals, but adapting them to the situation (pd deputy mayor). their strong sense of belonging to the italian state, however, prevents pd mayors from opposing prefects’ decisions to allocate asylum-seekers to their municipalities. as a mayor explains: we are convinced that local authorities, being part of the italian state, should do their part and cooperate with national authorities so that the state can fulfil its duty to provide international protection to those who are entitled to it (pd mayor). most independent centre-left and independent centre-right mayors, conversely, describe their experience as local administrators as a learning process. they state that their institutional role put them in ‘a privileged point of observation’ and allowed them to meet experts and to better understand immigration dynamics. the three independent centre-right mayors interviewed, despite their initial scepticism about hosting asylumseekers in their municipality, ended up changing their preferences. as one of them explains, ‘my institutional role allowed me to get around mystifications and journalists’ fabrications. instead, the very strong sense of regional belonging (and ‘resentment’ towards the national political class) of ln mayors and, even more, independent right-wing mayors, leads them to harshly oppose the dispersal of asylum-seekers organized by national authorities. as an independent right-wing mayor explains: rome is trying by any means to destroy us (…). the only thing to do is reject the asylum-seekers, we must send them back to the sender. rome should burst. in a metaphorical sense of course. rome should keep all the immigrants, to really experience what it means. they should manage this problem there (independent right-wing mayor). the coordinator of a service provider reports that, during a meeting, an ln mayor motivated his decision to oppose the creation of a reception centre by stating: ‘i want to keep eating soppressa [a local type of sausage] as i have always done and drinking my own wine’. interestingly, however, two of the three ln mayors also explain that their institutional role moderated their initial, more radical, anti-migrant, positions: before being elected i had a more political and ideological approach to the issue. then, when you have to make decisions, the approach changes significantly. for instance, i was against the sprar system (…) but after analysing it in detail, i changed my mind. the decisions you make as a mayor, despite being partly influenced by political considerations, are more reasoned and thought out (ln mayor). andrea pettrachin 11 independent right-wing mayors, unlike ln mayors, explain that their institutional role did not influence their understandings and decisions. one of them states that, were he a private citizen, he would probably be the leader of an anti-migrant committee. another mayor explains that his opposition to the reception of asylum-seekers in his village started before he was elected and that his position has not changed since then. the very strong sense of regional identity in veneto also seems to explain why suw policies became so popular there. many mayors that do not oppose the reception of asylum-seekers, particularly pd mayors, indeed, agree that opposition to immigration in the region is largely grounded on identitarian concerns. as a pd mayor puts it, ‘the venetian identity is based on contrapositions against those who come from outside’, and venetians’ ‘industriousness’ and ‘aptitude for hard work’ are some of the elements upon which such contrapositions are built. the fact that most asylum-seekers are unemployed during asylum applications, as a deputy prefect interviewed puts it, ‘is not accepted in venetian culture’. making asylum-seekers work for the community, therefore, assumes, in the region, a specific symbolic value. understanding the effects of migration flows to analyse which events and cues influence mayors’ sensemaking processes, mayors were asked about their perceptions of the effects of asylum-seeker reception in their municipality. table 2 illustrates the findings of a frame analysis of actors’ responses, based on a typology of frames derived from the influential works of helbling (2014: 25) and benson and wood (2015). table 2. frame analysis of mayors’ responses to questions investigating their perception of the effects of the reception of asylum-seekers (in bold: mayors of provincial capitals) when asylum policies go local 12 as expected, the interview material reveals that, while describing the effects of asylum-seeker reception, most mayors focus on the many anti-migrant protests that have taken place in veneto. crucially, however, the five groups of mayors understand the causes of these protests in significantly different ways. mayors affiliated to both the ln and the pd describe anti-migrant protests and locals’ hostility towards asylum-seekers as an unavoidable reaction to the presence of asylum-seekers which makes locals feel insecure. as a pd mayor explains, locals are ‘hostile to migrants due to inherent fears of persons that are different from them’. as an ln mayor explains: the main effect has been a perception of insecurity among the citizens (…). people see the presence of these migrants as something that is imposed on them and that they don’t know how to face (…). and this perception of insecurity risks turning into xenophobia (ln mayor). independent mayors, instead, frame these protests and locals’ hostility as the outcome of specific events and dynamics. the two right-wing independent mayors, unlike ln mayors, adopt securitised frames and describe locals as ‘under threat’, because asylum-seekers commit crimes and represent a risk to public health: a spate of crimes has broken out; crimes are increasing, particularly those of a sexual nature (…). the asylum-seekers are causing abnormal social malaise. some of them went to the doctor and everybody ran out of the clinic, especially older people, and the doctor didn’t know which medical checks these migrants had done (independent right-wing mayor). independent centre-left and independent centre-right mayors, instead, explain that the main effect of the dispersal of asylum-seekers in veneto has been increased tension between local institutions, which has led to a very inefficient management of the reception of asylum-seekers and a high level of politicisation of the issue. the anti-migrant protests are mostly perceived by these mayors as the consequence of these institutional tensions, of the anti-migrant propaganda campaigns of the far-right, which received vast coverage in local media, and the unbalanced dispersal of asylum-seekers. these different understandings of the effects of asylum-seeker reception on public opinion and of the causes of the anti-migrant protests, have important implications for mayors’ decisions to develop (or not) suw policies and powerfully influence the type of measures implemented. they clearly explain why pd and ln mayors, particularly concerned about public reactions to asylum-seeker reception, have developed suw policies with the main goal of being seen to do something to address citizens’ perceptions of insecurity. it also explains why they want these activities to be highly visible. a pd deputy mayor explains that she had long suggested the idea to develop suw projects without being supported by the mayor, but that, at some point, the mayor suddenly changed his mind ‘when he perceived the rising social tension around asylum-seeker reception’. similar political and symbolic considerations influenced the only ln mayor to implement the policy. in the case of the two ln mayors that did not develop suw policies, a similar assessment of the problem did not lead to the same solutions. interestingly, both these mayors had to deal with a more limited number of asylum-seekers and did not perceive the citizens’ sense of insecurity as undermining their public support. andrea pettrachin 13 conversely, the conviction of independent centre-left and centre-right mayors that anti-migrant protests are a consequence of the inefficiencies of the reception system and of the lack of information about the issue, leads them to identify other policy solutions.9 all of them, indeed, unlike pd mayors, actively tried to combat people’s hostility through information campaigns or public events with experts. they have also taken a more proactive role in trying to better organize the regional reception system. as one of them explains, ‘what we did was to try to coordinate the reception system in our province, going beyond our formal competences’. public opinion, therefore, plays a minor role in these mayors’ decisions to develop suw projects: as an independent centre-right mayor puts it, ‘our decision had nothing to do with public opinion. i feel ashamed when i hear people around me saying that the solution is to have them clean the streets’. also, these understandings clearly explain why these mayors are much less concerned about the visibility of suw policies. finally, the analysis provides useful insights into why independent right-wing mayors so harshly oppose suw policies: being convinced that asylum-seekers represent a real threat to public security, they oppose any initiative that allows them to get closer to the citizens. the influence of past experiences the analysis of the retrospective element of sensemaking provides interesting insights into why local governments propose different types of activities for asylumseekers and why they do so with long-term or short-term policy goals. while replying to questions designed to grasp how they made sense of the refugee crisis, most mayors do not make any reference to past events. rather, they seem to perceive recent flows as an entirely new phenomenon, despite veneto having received significant migrant flows in the past three decades. in line with expectations, this absence of previous definitions of the situation leads to reluctance to make plans and projections. most mayors interviewed, indeed, describe asylum-seeking migration as an overwhelming phenomenon beyond their control and speak about the future in very anxious terms. many are concerned about the possibility that the asylum-seekers will settle in their municipality after the asylum procedure. this lack of planning and forecasting, at odds with the urgent need to provide solutions, suggests the potential for reactive tendencies in local asylum policy-making. most interviewed mayors, in fact, seem to have internalized the idea of being passive respondents rather than active shapers of asylum policies. as a pd mayor explains: we don’t have the instruments. problems arise, and no ideas about how to deal with them have been previously developed. i think we are dealing with a matter for which we were not prepared (…). we make urgent, emergency decisions (pd mayor). this helps to explain why most mayors implement suw policies in a reactive manner, as emergency measures and without any long-term planning. 9 the analysis does not allow us to assess the cause of these different perceptions. this might be due to the presence of strong inputs from the parties or mayors’ different aspirations to pursue a political career at the national level. when asylum policies go local 14 conversely, the availability of past experiences in the management of asylum or similar issues helps to explain why the three independent centre-left mayors (and one of the independent centre-right mayors) implemented suw policies with different policy goals. these four mayors, indeed, during the interview, refer to lessons from the past that helped them to make decisions during the asylum crisis. one of them explains that when the prefect suddenly decided to send 90 asylum-seekers to his village, the previous experience of his municipality within the sprar system helped him to manage the unexpected event: after 15 years of experience with the sprar system, we knew that this system and the diffused reception model worked: we had to recover that model and develop it further (independent centre-left mayor). importantly, these four mayors, unlike the others, are less afraid of the impact of asylum-seeking flows on their municipalities, and keener to make future projections and recommend innovative policy solutions: i think the most important thing is to understand that immigration is a structural phenomenon that will continue for the next 30-40 years. we have the social policy areas of disability, mental health, seniority, we have and will have the one of immigration. we must govern it through three-year programmes in a structural manner, building networks between municipalities, as we do in these other areas (independent centre-left mayor). interestingly, the availability of past experiences also seems to influence the implementation of suw policies. three of these mayors, indeed, explicitly mention that they initially replicated similar initiatives that had been implemented in previous years with asylum-seekers hosted in the sprar centres or with other groups of disadvantaged individuals. their tendency to project into the future helps to explain why they implement suw policies with more long-term policy goals. social network analysis figure 2 illustrates the findings of a social network analysis elaborated with the gephi software using data collected through structured questionnaires filled in by the ten interviewed mayors who implemented suw policies. the questionnaire investigates their interactions and discussions about asylum-related issues with other actors in the asylum governance system, the frequency of these interactions, and the degree of similarity or difference in actors’ perspectives on asylum-related issues.10 the four networks illustrate the connections of the different groups of mayors, with each node representing a category of actors with whom mayors discussed asylum-related issues. the size of the nodes and the weight of ties are proportional to the frequency of their interactions (the more frequent the exchange, the bigger the nodes). the colour of nodes depends on the degree of similarity of actors’ perspectives on asylum-related issues (red means significant similarity, yellow means significant difference). in order to facilitate the comparison, all political actors have been positioned in the upper-left corner in all 10 frequency is measured on a scale of 1-5 (occasionally; monthly; twice a month; weekly; daily). the degree of similarity of views is also measured on a scale of 1-5. andrea pettrachin 15 graphs; institutional actors in the upper-right corner; service providers, media and experts in the lower-right corner; and advocacy actors in the lower-left corner. figure 2. interactions of the three independent centre-left mayors with other actors in the asylum governance system. figure 3. interactions of the three pd mayors with other actors in the asylum governance system. the sna allows us to investigate weick’s fourth property of sensemaking, according to which sensemaking is contingent on interactions with other actors. it provides interesting information about those actors that, having frequent contacts with the mayors and sharing similar views on asylum-related issues, plausibly influence how suw policies are implemented. not surprisingly, all mayors have close interactions with the main actors involved in the organization of the reception system – the prefectures, and service providers – while the frequent discussions with other mayors help to explain when asylum policies go local 16 the quick diffusion of suw policies. the frequency of mayors’ interactions with other actors, instead, varies significantly, as does the degree of similarity of their views on asylum-related issues. independent centre-left mayors have close relationships with local pro-migrant ngos and other advocates of asylum-seeker reception, actors with whom they also share similar perspectives. this helps to explain why they adopt rights-based approaches while implementing suw policies and why migrant integration is their main policy goal. pd mayors, instead, have close relationships with the ministry of the interior and less frequent interactions with advocacy actors, which helps to explain why they develop suw policies in ways that seem more in line with national guidelines. figure 4. interactions of the three independent centre-right mayors with other actors in the asylum governance system. figure 5. interactions of the ln mayor that implemented suw policies with other actors in the asylum governance system. andrea pettrachin 17 independent centre-right mayors, compared to the other groups, seem to face less pressure from non-governmental actors and, rather, have close relationships with experts (e.g. researchers, experienced civil servants and practitioners). also, they do not share similar views on asylum-related issues with any of the actors with whom they interact (with the exception of the catholic church). these elements help to explain their more pragmatic policy approach, less influenced by external pressures. the close interactions of the only ln mayor to implement suw policies with journalists, finally, seems to be linked to his willingness to be seen as opposing the prefect’s decision to allocate asylum-seekers to his municipality. after he decided to implement suw policies, he also released several interviews on the issue to local newspapers, during which he explained that these policies were aimed at improving citizens’ security. 6. conclusions this article has examined policies for the involvement of asylum-seekers in socially useful works in fourteen municipalities in veneto, investigating how, why and with what goals this policy was developed. the main aim is to generate hypotheses for future research. the analysis leads to three main concluding remarks. first, the article has shown that only some of the selected local administrations implemented suw policies in veneto and that they involved asylum-seekers in different types of activities, from very low-skilled auxiliary jobs to more professionalising activities. importantly, it has also shown that mayors’ political affiliations (more than other variables) in the selected municipalities, is a strong predictor of their decisions to implement suw policies and of the type of measures implemented. to formulate proper generalisations, this finding should be tested in future research on a higher number of cases and in other regional and national contexts. second, the article has shown that mayors’ policy goals also vary significantly. mayors, therefore, do not passively implement the measures promoted by the national government. in doing so, they follow their own agenda and adapt national-level guidelines to their own aims in a way that powerfully shapes the policies developed and their outcomes. independent centre-left mayors develop suw policies with the aim of integrating migrants in the local community. independent centre-right mayors adopt more pragmatic approaches. pd and ln mayors develop suw policies with the main aim of being seen to do something to reduce citizens’ perceptions of insecurity. this finding is consistent with well-established findings in the literature on public policy analysis (pressman and wildavsky, 1973). third, the article sheds light on processes of meaning-production and decisionmaking, in order to understand how and why they decide to develop suw policies, why they implement different types of measures and why they do so with different policy goals. to do so, it has applied insights from weick’s sensemaking approach, which is particularly relevant to the study of decision-making processes in situations of crisis. the analysis has crucially shown that mayors are not ‘passive recipients of information, but active interpreters and rationalizers’ (mutz, 2007: 91). decisions about the implementation of suw policies are significantly influenced by mayors’ diverse understandings of the anti-migrant protests around them and interpretations of their causes, by different identity processes, and by their diverse past experiences and social relations. when asylum policies go local 18 the decisions of pd and ln mayors to implement suw policies are reactive responses to the protests and the perceived hostility of the local population towards migrants. such hostility is perceived to be increased by the sight of asylum-seekers loitering within reception centres, particularly unacceptable in the venetian society, where ‘industriousness’ and ‘aptitude for hard work’ are defining elements of a very strong sense of regional identity. making asylum-seekers work for the community, therefore, in these mayors’ eyes, is a policy that has the potential to meet locals’ approval and reduce their discontent. these understandings significantly influence the implementation of suw policies in these municipalities, which mostly involve very lowskilled jobs, highly visible to the local population. independent mayors, conversely, are much less influenced by public opinion. independent centre-left mayors’ decisions to develop suw policies in ways that are primarily aimed at fostering migrants’ integration seem to be significantly influenced and shaped by relevant past experiences of dealing with asylum-seeking migration and their close connections with pro-migrant ngos. the more pragmatic policy approach of independent centre-right mayors seems to be linked with the absence of pressure from both promigrant and public opinion. these findings complement and challenge the assumptions of the (scant) existing literature on local decision-making processes on asylum-related issues. it shows, indeed, that asylum policies, at least in situations of crisis, do not necessarily have ‘an objective basis’, in terms of quantifying local economic costs and benefits and demographic effects on the community, as shown by steen (2016: 466). it has also illustrated the potential of applying sensemaking approaches to understand local asylum policy-making processes, compared to cognitive approaches that more narrowly focus on policy frames analysis (lidén and nyhlén, 2015). following fiss and hirsh (2005: 31), while ‘framing focuses on whose meanings win out in symbolic contests’, applying sensemaking in this article has allowed us to ‘shift the focus to understanding why such frame contests come into being in the first place, and over which territory they are fought’. future research should move from these findings and further explore sensemaking processes in other contexts and policy fields. disclosure statement no potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. references ambrosini m. 2013. ‘we are against a 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17 issue 1 published in 2022 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 17, issue 1, 16–33. contact author: luca pinto e-mail address: luca.pinto@unibo.it party system change at the legislative level: evidence from the 18th italian legislature luca pinto university of bologna abstract party systems and party system change have long been one of the most studied topics within the comparative politics literature, yet most work in this field focuses on changes that occur between elections, neglecting the possibility that parties and party systems may reconfigure during the inter-election period. building on the studies on party system change, this paper aims to analyse how individual changes in party affiliation can aggregate into changes at the level of parliamentary party system in the 18th italian legislature. to achieve this goal, data on individual movements in the membership of parliamentary parties in the senate and the chamber of deputies are used to track the extent of legislative party system change over time, as indicated by changes in the number of relevant parties, their relative size and strength, and the bargaining power of parliamentary groups in the italian parliament. overall, our results show major changes in the main features of the italian parliamentary party system and the structure of competition in the 18th legislature, returning the image of a fluid, unstable and constantly moving system. 1. introduction olitical parties and party systems can be considered the pillars of democracy. on the one hand, according to the famous quotation of schattschneider (1942), parties are a necessary condition for the very existence of democracy. parties aggregate social interests and organise electoral competition; they guarantee the functioning of legislative assemblies, organising the agenda of parliaments and translating preferences into policies. finally, parties form governments, whose survival depends on their support. on the other hand, party systems largely characterise the quality and functioning of democracy (wolinetz 2006; casal bértoa 2017), as the number of individual parties and the way they interact and compete for electoral office and control of the government define voters’ alternative choices and influence patterns of coalition formation and the survival of cabinets (sartori 1976; mair 1997, 2001, 2006). given the strong relationship between parties, party systems and the functioning of democracy, a substantial body of work within political science has been concerned with understanding what conditions influence the democratic process, both in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness, identifying one of these conditions in party system institutionalisation (mainwaring and scully 1995; morlino 1998; mainwaring and torcal 2006; lindberg 2007; casal bértoa and mair 2012; casal bértoa and enyedi 2016; casal bértoa 2017; chiaramonte and emanuele 2017, 2019; emanuele and chiaramonte p pinto 17 2018). moving from sartori’s (1976, 44) classic definition of a party system as ‘the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition’, casal bértoa (2017, 407) defined party system institutionalisation as ‘the process by which the patterns of interaction among political parties become routine, predictable and stable over time’. according to this definition, institutionalisation is higher when parties compete in a structured and standardised way, thus reflecting a high level of ‘systemness’. on the contrary, party systems are under-institutionalised when the patterns of interactions between parties are not predictable, revealing therefore an ‘open’ structure of competition. in other words, it is only when voters become accustomed to a certain set of political alternatives that a system becomes structured, which also implies that votes are channelled through the party rather than through personalistic leadership (sartori 1994). in the absence of these conditions, there can be no structure in the party system. this line of reasoning also establishes a connection between institutionalisation and party system stability and change, identifying stability when there is a strong degree of institutionalisation and, conversely, change when there is a shift in the ‘prevailing structure of competition’ (mair 2006, 66). although there is a broad agreement among scholars in the general definition of party system change, there is less consensus on how to identify it. these differences arise from how party systems are defined in the first place (for a review see wolinetz 2006; enyedi and casal bértoa 2020). on the one hand, comparative scholars have built classifications and typologies of party systems (duverger 1954; blondel 1968; sartori 1976), developing criteria that have proven useful in categorising party systems ‘into distinct classes or types, such as two-party systems, systems of moderate pluralism, multiparty systems, or whatever’ (mair 2006, p. 63). according to this approach, changes imply moving from one discrete category to another. on the other hand, party systems can be summarised by a number of distinct empirical indicators that allow party system change to be tracked as a continuous process (wolinetz 2006). finally, mair (1997, 2001, 2006) emphasises the structure of competition for control of the executive as the key criterion for distinguishing party systems and therefore identifying party system change. despite different approaches to defining party systems and analysing their changes, most scholars agree that the main characteristics of party systems derive almost exclusively from electoral competition, thus ignoring that, between elections, party systems can change due to party mergers, splits and individual party switching of members of parliament (mps) (heller and mershon 2009).1 to balance the ‘bias in favour of an elections-dominant understanding of what parties and party systems are and do’ (mershon and shvetsova 2013, i), legislative party switching has recently become the subject of an expanding literature within political science. scholarship studying defections has mainly focused on the factors that drive legislators to change their party affiliation and on the interplay between mps’ ambitions and institutions (heller and mershon 2005, 2008; desposato 2006; mcmenamin and gwiazda 2011; pinto 2015; klein 2016, 2018, 2021; volpi 2019). at the same time, scholars have started to investigate the implications of party switching for parties (ceron and 1 focusing on the structure of competition for the executive, mair (2006) implicitly acknowledged the electoral bias of most work on party system change (see mershon and shvetsova 2013, 7-8 for a discussion). party system change at the legislative level 18 volpi 2021, 2022) and more generally for party systems and party system change between elections (mershon and shvetsova 2008, 2013, 2014). this paper is intended to fit into the latter line of research, analysing how individual changes in party affiliation can aggregate into changes at the level of the parliamentary party system. this contribution is therefore mainly empirical and aims to track the evolution of the italian parliamentary party system during the 18th legislature (2018-2022). this legislature is the product of the electoral success of two different populist parties the league and the m5s whose fortunes are linked to the multiple crises (political, economic and migratory) that have shaken italy (and europe) in recent years (caiani and padoan 2021). it is therefore a case worth studying through the lens of party switching, which is often perceived as a failure of democratic representation (heller and mershon 2009). to achieve this goal, data on individual movements in the membership of parliamentary parties in the senate and the chamber of deputies are used to trace the extent of legislative party system change over time, as indicated by changes in the number of relevant parliamentary groups, their relative size and strength, and the general structure of competition in the italian parliament. in addition, given the close relationship between stability, change and institutionalisation of party systems, this contribution also adapts two indices originally developed to measure the institutionalisation/de-institutionalisation of party systems in the electoral arena − the volatility and the degree of party system innovation (powell and tucker 2014; chiaramonte and emanuele 2017, 2019; emanuele and chiaramonte 2018) − to be applied in the legislative context. it should be emphasised that, by doing this, this paper does not intend to equate party system change and legislative party system change as two identical concepts. rather, the aim of this work is to provide more insights into the study of party system change by analysing one single dimension of this broader phenomenon, namely the evolution of legislative parties between elections as a consequence of party switching.2 hence, it cannot say anything about patterns of party competition as it is more commonly understood, i.e. outside parliament through electoral competition and parties’ supply-side strategies. overall, quantitative indicators show significant changes in the main features of the italian parliamentary party system and the structure of competition in the 18th legislature, returning the image of a fluid, unstable and constantly moving system. the argument and evidence presented in this paper are structured as follows. after this introduction, the next section offers a brief review of the main approaches to the study of party system and party system change. the third section provides evidence on inter-electoral change in legislative party membership in the italian parliament. in the fourth section, the main indicators to track the degree of parliamentary party system change are presented and their results are discussed, illustrating whether the changes identified by the quantitative indicators are also reflected in changes in the prevailing structure of competition in the lower and upper chambers. finally, the implications for the analysis of the italian case and more generally for a better understanding of party system change are discussed in the concluding section. 2 in the paper, legislative party and parliamentary group are used as synonyms, in the knowledge that the party in public office represents only one ‘face’ of the broader concept that is the party, together with the party on the ground and the party in central office (katz and mair 1993). pinto 19 2. party systems and party system change: a brief review starting with the seminal work of sartori (1976, 44), a party system has been conceptualised as the product of regular and recurring interactions among its constituent parties deriving from inter-party competition (see also wolinetz 2006, 52). the type and quality of these interactions depend on various features which account for the variance observed across different party systems. these features typically include: the number of relevant parties contesting elections and winning offices, their size and relative strength both in terms of votes and seats, the number and the content of the policy dimensions that shape the space of political competition and, finally, parties’ policy preferences and the distances that separate them on the most salient dimensions of competition. other features on which party systems may differ are related to the level of institutionalisation or deinstitutionalisation of the party system itself. this also implies considering the stability or instability of the patterns of parties’ electoral support and the entry of new parties into the competition (casal bértoa 2017; chiaramonte and emanuele 2017, 2019; emanuele and chiaramonte 2018). in order to grasp the differences between the various party systems, prominent scholars such as duverger (1954), blodel (1968) and sartori (1976) have combined one or more of the above characteristics to construct typologies. however, while these criteria have proved useful in classifying party systems into specific types, they prove rather ineffective in capturing changes in party systems over time (mair 2006, 63). on the other hand, a second approach to the study of party systems has completely avoided the issue of classification, instead using empirical indicators to summarise the main characteristics of party systems and show how they vary over time and space. in the panorama of the studies on party systems and party system change, mair (1997, 2001, 2006) stands out for challenging both those who resort to discrete categories to define party systems and those who use quantitative indicators to summarise the properties of such systems. according to mair, quantitative indicators only matter if they affect the structure of competition for control of the executive, which he considers the core of any party system and the only criterion for identifying party system change. more precisely, mair defines party competition for the executive in terms of three factors: the degree of alternation in office, the stability of government alternatives over time, and, finally, the extent to which access to government is open to new parties. the combination of these elements makes it possible to classify party systems as closed or open structures of competition for the executive and, consequently, to define party system change when there is a change in the prevailing structure of competition. building on these insights, in this paper we address the phenomenon of party system change by focusing on a specific dimension that has usually been ignored in the comparative literature, namely the evolution of legislative parties as a consequence of party switching. 3. party switching in the 18th legislature defined as an umbrella label for any registered change in party affiliation by elected politicians (heller and mershon 2009, 10), party switching encompasses different phenomena involving varying degrees of coordination between legislators: party party system change at the legislative level 20 mergers, splits and individual ‘jumps’ of mps from one party to another (ceron 2013; golder et al. 2022). building on the müller and strøm (1999) classification of political goals, a first strand of literature has shown that members of parliament (mps) may change party affiliation to secure re-election, obtain office benefits and influence policies (heller and mershon 2005, 2008; desposato 2006; mcmenamin and gwiazda 2011). a second strand of literature has focused instead on how the utility of promoting mps’ electoral, office and policy benefits can vary according to electoral institutions (klein 2016, 2018), the level of institutionalization of the party system (klein 2021), and parties’ ideology (volpi 2019). finally, a third strand of literature has concentrated more on the implications of party switching for sending and receiving parties (ceron and volpi 2021, 2022) and for party systems, party system change, and the structure of competition between elections (mershon and shvetsova 2008, 2013, 2014). more generally, the study of defections can provide insights into party system change and the dynamics of political competition in the inter-electoral period (laver and benoit 2003; laver 2005), also offering a new understanding of political parties as clusters of legislators rather than as unitary actors (benoit and giannetti 2009; ceron 2016). this work positions itself in this latter line of research, focusing not so much on the factors that drive individual party switching, but on the implications of defections for party system change between elections. although legislators are supposed to remain loyal to their party for the duration of the entire legislature, this is far from being completely true. comparative data show that party switching is quite a common phenomenon in legislatures around the world (see o’brien and shomer 2013; volpi 2019; klein 2021, for data on defections measured at the partylevel). these data show that both in western europe and in the younger democracies of central and eastern europe, the relevance of party switching varies greatly between countries, both in terms of the number of legislators involved and the number of parties affected by some defection. the main point that emerges when comparing the two groups of countries is certainly the greater recurrence of the phenomenon in central and eastern europe in the period following the collapse of the soviet bloc (sbabad and slomczynski 2004; mcmenamin and gwiazda 2011). in the group of western european countries, however, italy emerges as a deviant case due to the remarkable number of defections that have been registered in the last few years. given this uniqueness, the italian parliament has come to be one of the most studied cases within the empirical literature on party switching, especially since 1993, when the composition and labels of legislative parties became increasingly unstable following the passage from the so-called first to second republic (verzichelli 1996; heller and mershon 2005, 2008; giannetti, di virgilio and pinto 2012; russo, tronconi and verzichelli 2014; valbruzzi 2014; pinto 2015, 2021). our data confirm the trends registered by previous empirical research and update the analysis to the 18th italian legislature, also extending the investigation to the senate between 2018 and 2022.3 following the definition of party switching presented above, we 3 most of the studies on party switching in italy are focused on the chamber of deputies, probably in the belief that the senate repeats the patterns observed for the lower chamber. it should be noted, however, that a number of studies have registered a growing incongruence in the distribution of seats between the two assemblies (pedrazzani 2017; giannetti, pedrazzani e pinto 2020). moreover, the chamber of deputies and the senate differ according to the rules of procedures, in particular in relation to the norms regulating party switching and the formation of new parliamentary groups (pedrazzani and zucchini 2020). pinto 21 register as a defection event any recorded change in party affiliation on the part of mps, as reported in the open data of the chamber of deputies and senate.4 table 1 provides all the relevant information about party switching in the two chambers under examination, including the period of observation, the number of mps, the number of switching events, the number of unique switchers, the incidence of party switching in relation to the entire population of mps, and finally the percentage of defectors with respect to the total number of legislators. these last two figures are useful for comparing the switching behaviour in the lower and upper chambers, as the former comprises twice as many mps as the latter. table 1. summary data on party switching in the italian chamber of deputies and the senate (18th legislature) chamber senate start 2018-03-27 2018-03-27 stop 2022-02-09 2022-09-02 days 1620 1620 months 53 53 mps 660 334 switches 294 147 switchers 215 87 switches/mps (%) 44.54 44.01 switchers/mps (%) 32.57 26.04 notes: the number of mps includes all legislators who held a seat during the legislature including those who resigned or died and those who took over. for the senate, also life senators are included. both legislatures are still running with the end scheduled after the national elections on 25 september 2022. source: own elaboration on the open data of the chamber of deputies and the senate. table 1 shows that the absolute number of defections in the chamber is double that in the senate (294 vs. 147). however, taking into account that the lower house includes far more legislators than the upper chamber, the incidence of the phenomenon is more or less the same: 44.54 percent for the chamber of deputies and 44.01 percent for the senate. this result is quite surprising as the senate introduced a reform of the rules of procedures in 2017, with new regulations aimed at reducing the formation of new parliamentary groups during the legislature, which should also have had an impact on party switching. although a rigorous test to study the impact of these new rules on party switching is beyond the scope of this paper, data seem to suggest that this reform was ineffective. the main difference between the two assemblies is in the percentage of unique switchers, which is higher in the chamber. this means that in the senate, a 4 raw data on the movements between parliamentary groups can be retrieved from https://dati.camera.it/it/ and https://dati.senato.it/sito/home. these data record all the changes occurring in the composition of parliamentary groups in the two chambers starting from the first day of the legislature (27-3-18), without distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary defections. at the time of writing this paper, the legislature has not yet ended (general elections are scheduled for 25-9-22). for this reason, we have arbitrarily retrieved data up to 2-9-22. we cannot exclude further defections before the end of the legislature. https://dati.camera.it/it/ https://dati.camera.it/it/ https://dati.senato.it/sito/home party system change at the legislative level 22 smaller group of senators − about a quarter − are responsible for the total number of defections, changing party affiliation several times during the legislature. in the chamber, on the other hand, the phenomenon is more widespread, involving almost a third of mps. figure 1. alluvial plots of party switching in the chamber of deputies and the senate (18th legislature) notes: pd: democratic party; fi: go italy; league: league; fdi: brothers of italy; m5s: five star movement; iv: italy alive; mixed: mixed group; leu: free and equal; ci: cheer up italy; svp, uv: south tyrol peoples party, valdotanian union; maie-cd: associative movement of italians abroad-democratic centre; c.a.l.: constitution, environment, labour; ipf: together for the future. source: own elaboration on the open data of the chamber of deputies and the senate. a clearer picture of the dynamics of party switching in the 18th legislature is provided by figure 1, which employs alluvial plots to show switching flows during the legislature. this picture can be useful to get a first idea of how the occurrence of the pinto 23 phenomenon reshaped the parliamentary party system between 2018 and 2022. columns represents the distribution of legislators in the different parliamentary groups observed at a yearly base, starting from the first day of the legislature. flows show how mps regroup in parliamentary parties from year to year. thicker flows identify party splits, while thinner flows identify individual ‘jumps’. figure 1 identifies three common trends shared by both chambers. firstly, the first year of the legislature is characterised by a very low level of defections, which instead increases from the second year onwards. second, the size of the mixed group – which by definition is characterised by low levels of unity and party discipline and therefore can constitute a potential problem for the proper functioning of the assemblies – grows throughout the years. third, there is an increase in fragmentation due to the emergence of new parliamentary groups during the legislature. if we take the parliamentary party system in place at the beginning of the legislature as a reference point, figure 1 provides initial evidence of its evolution and, consequently, of a change in its structure. in the next section, we will investigate these changes in a more systematic way using a series of indicators to summarise them. 4. legislative party system change in the 18th legislature as mentioned above, one approach to the study of party systems relies on quantitative indicators to summarise the main characteristics of party systems and track changes in party systems over time. a second approach focuses more on changes in the structure of competition for control of the executive as an indicator of change in the party system. in this section, we first present and discuss the main indicators for tracking the degree of change in the parliamentary party system during the 18th parliamentary term. then, we will test whether the changes revealed by these indicators have an impact on the prevailing structure of the competition in the lower and upper chambers. 4.1. quantitative indicators of party system change as a first step in our analysis of parliamentary party system change, we rely on four indicators, most of them adapted from the literature on party systems and party system change in the electoral context: the effective number of parliamentary parties, withinterm seat volatility, the size of new parliamentary party groups, and, finally, the size of the mixed group. all the indicators are based on the relative strength of parliamentary parties. although important, the size of parties is only one of the criteria for studying party systems. other important aspects are the ideological preferences of parties and the number of salient dimensions of competition (wolinetz 2006). unfortunately, the main methodologies for studying parties’ policy preferences – the expert survey and the content analysis of parties’ manifestos (budge et al. 2001; benoit and laver 2006) − do not allow us to track the evolution of parties’ ideal points and salient dimensions during the legislative term.5 for this reason we exclude in our analysis any consideration related to the spatial structure of the space of competition.6 all indicators are measured on a daily 5 both expert surveys and the analysis of party manifestos calculate party policy positions at fixed points in time, which usually correspond to elections (see budge et al. 2001; benoit and laver 2006). 6 for an account of party system change in italy from the perspective of the spatial approach to elections and party competition, see giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto (2017, 2022). party system change at the legislative level 24 basis. this choice makes it possible to trace specific events that can be linked to the recorded changes. in addition, daily measurements can form the basis for further aggregations. a first indicator we use in our study concerns the number of competing parties in a system. counting the number of relevant parties has always been an issue debated in the literature on party systems and party system changes (blondel 1968; sartori 1976; siaroff 2000). a standard method for counting parties that avoids discretionary decisions is the laakso and taagepera (1979) index of effective number of parties. the index is measured by dividing one by the sum of the squares of proportions of votes (effective number of electoral parties, enep) or seats (effective number of parliamentary parties, enpp) won by each party competing in the system. given our focus on the evolution of the parliamentary party system, we use this latest version of the index, measuring the enpp per day, starting from the first day of the 18th legislature until the last one of the observation periods. a second indicator used in our analysis to track the changes in the party system over the inter-election period is a measure of volatility. the phenomenon of volatility is conceptually related to the stability or instability of voting behaviour patterns and is measured by averaging the vote shifts between parties in two successive elections (pedersen 1979).7 for the purpose of our study, we use a measure of within-term volatility which averages shifts in party seat shares from one day to the next (mershon and shvetsova 2013). volatility is the product of two different trends: the first one is when voters switch their vote between existing parties (type b volatility or ‘alternation’); the second one occurs when voters shift their vote from existing parties to new ones (type a volatility or ‘regeneration’) (powell and tucker 2014; chiaramonte and emanuele 2017, 2019). while these two types of volatility have different implications in electoral contexts, this distinction is less relevant in the legislative context, as both are indicators of instability in the structure of parliamentary party competition. for this reason, in the subsequent pages we focus our attention on total within-term volatility. finally, to complete our analysis of party system change between elections, we employ two further indicators. the first is a measure of the degree of 'newness' in the parliamentary party system and is calculated as the share of seats held by parliamentary groups that were formed after the first day of the legislature (emanuele and chiaramonte 2018). as the emergence of new parties can make inter-party competition increasingly unstable and unpredictable, party system innovation has often been used as an indicator of party system change (casal bértoa 2017). the second measure tracks the share of seats held by the mixed group. given the fundamental importance of party unity in legislative voting, the size of the mixed group, which is by definition heterogeneous and not very cohesive, increases unpredictability in parliamentary decision-making. both indicators capture relevant aspects of the changing structure of party competition in the legislature. the trends identified by the four measures of party system change in the chamber of deputies and the senate are illustrated by figures 2 and 3 respectively. 7 wolinetz (2006, 60) contests the use of volatility as an indicator of party system change or de-institutionalisation, as it measures ‘the ability of parties to build loyal followings and collectively structure the electorate’, which ‘are properties of parties, individually and collectively, rather than aspects of the party system’. despite this, volatility has been widely used to measure the regeneration and de-institutionalisation of party systems (mainwaring and scully 1995; chiaramonte and emanuele 2017, 2019). pinto 25 figure 2. indicators of party system change in the chamber of deputies (18th legislature) notes: in panel a, the y-axis measures the effective number of parliamentary parties; in panel b, the percentage of seats shifted between party groups from one day to the next; in panel c, the percentage of seats held by new parties formed during legislature; in panel d, the percentage of seats held by the mixed group. data refer to the chamber of deputies. source: own elaboration on the open data of the chamber of deputies and the senate. figures 2 and 3 show that in both the assemblies, the enpp almost doubles during the legislative term (panel a). on the first day of the legislature, the enpp was 4.39 in the house and 4.48 in the senate; on the last day of the observation period, these figures rose to 7.03 and 7.23 respectively. this is a relevant increase which, using siaroff’s classification (2000) of party systems, can be interpreted in substantial terms as a shift from a case of extreme multipartitism with two dominant players – the m5s and the league which together hold more than 50 percent of the seats – to a case of extreme multipartitism with a greater balance between parties, as the seats controlled by the m5s and the league fell to about 35 percent. the observed trends in the within-term volatility provide further evidence in favour of party system change in the 18th legislature (panel b). both figures show a fairly constant rate of volatility calculated on a daily basis, punctuated by more consistent peaks of over 8 percent in the case of the chamber and 4 percent for the senate. the average volatility each year is about 12 and 31 percent for the lower and the upper houses respectively, figures that analysists of volatility in the electoral context would consider high (chiaramonte and emanuele 2017). moving to our third indicator, party system innovation offers information about the regeneration of the parliamentary party system (panel c). in both the assemblies, the share of seats held by groups formed after the first day of the legislature increases over time, rising in the chamber from less than 4 percent to more than 15 at the end of the observation period. similarly, in the senate there is a shift from less than 2 to more than 12 percent. finally, comparably to what party system change at the legislative level 26 we observe for party system innovation, in both assemblies, the size and weight of the mixed group grow over time (panel d), exceeding 12 percent of the seats: on the last day of the observation period, the mixed group is the second largest group in the chamber and the fourth in the senate. figure 3. indicators of party system change in the senate (18th legislature) notes: in panel a, the y-axis measures the effective number of parliamentary parties; in panel b, the percentage of seats shifted between party groups from one day to the next one; in panel c, the percentage of seats held by new parties formed during legislature; in panel d, the percentage of seats held by the mixed group. data refer to the senate. source: own elaboration on the open data of the chamber of deputies and the senate. overall, the four indicators provide evidence in support of party system change during the 18th legislature. the data show that, after about a year of relative stability in the parliamentary party system, the environment started to become more dynamic, in particular from the second half of 2019, coinciding with the dissolution of the conte i government and the formation of the second cabinet led by giuseppe conte. 4.2. changes in the structure of competition as a second step in our analysis, we shift our attention to the three governments formed during the 18th legislature, to see whether the changes in the number of parties and the degree of party system innovation detected above had an impact on the competition for the executive. to this purpose, table 2 reports information on the composition of the governments, together with data on the extent of the support for governments during the confidence vote given by new parties and the mixed group. table 2. governments in the 18th legislature term members support pinto 27 conte i 2018-06-01 − 2019-08-20 (445 days) m5s-league 1.71 conte ii 2019-09-05 − 2021-01-26 (509 days) m5s-pd-leu-iv 13.70 draghi 2021-02-13 – 2022-07-21 (523 days) m5s-pd-leu-iv league-fi-ipf 15.63 notes: membership refers to parties with at least one minister or deputy minister at the time of the end of the government. ‘support’ reports data on the percentage of deputies belonging to new groups or to the mixed group who voted in favour of the government over the total votes of confidence in favour of the government. in bold the new groups formed during the legislature. acronyms: m5s: five star movement; league: league; pd: democratic party; leu: free and equal; iv: italy alive; fi: go italy; ipf: together for the future. source: data adapted from parlgov (döring, huber and manow 2022) and own elaboration on the open data of the chamber of deputies and the senate. table 2 shows that the two inter-electoral governments following the first cabinet led by conte are based either on a reshuffling of the original coalition, with the pd replacing the league as the main partner of the m5s in the conte ii government, or on the incorporation of additional parties into the pre-existing alliance, in particular the centre-right league and fi, in the executive headed by mario draghi. we observe, therefore, a high degree of alternation and instability in the government formula. moreover, both the conte ii and the draghi governments include new parliamentary parties created during the legislature, showing that the competition for the executive is open to brand new parliamentary groups. in particular, the second government headed by conte incorporates iv, a splinter of the pd.8 further information on the evolution of competition for the executive is provided by the last column of table 2, which shows the percentage of confidence votes given by new groups and the mixed group in support of the governments over the total number of favourable votes. while out of 350 votes in favour of the conte i government in the chamber of deputies, only six came from the mixed group or new parties (1.71 percent), in the conte ii and draghi governments this number rises considerably (13.70 and 15.63 percent respectively). considering that the mixed group includes independents and small party labels that do not reach the threshold necessary to form a parliamentary group, these figures indicate that an increasing share of support for the governments comes from components that are ideologically heterogeneous and poorly disciplined by definition. overall, this brief analysis configures the italian parliamentary party system of the 18th legislature as highly unstructured, with unpredictable patterns of competition. an alternative and more elegant way to summarise how the structure of the competition for the executive evolved during the 18th legislature is provided by figure 4, which shows the distribution of the shapley-shubik (1954) power index among the parliamentary parties in the chamber and the senate, calculated at the beginning of the legislature and then after each year. the shapley-shubik index is an index of bargaining expectations in an office-seeking coalition system as it measures the power of a given party in coalition bargaining, based on the probability that the party can turn a winning coalition 8 according to our coding also leu can be classified as a new parliamentary group since it was created in april 2018 only in the chamber of deputies. however, this group had existed since the beginning of the legislature as part of the mixed group. ipf instead can be considered a new party; however, it is very residual in terms of the period of the draghi cabinet covered. party system change at the legislative level 28 into a losing one (laver and benoit 2003, 217). thus, the more likely a party is to play a pivotal role in the government formation process, the more power it will have in coalition bargaining and the higher the power index will be. the index is computed on the basis of the seats controlled by each party and varies between 0 and 1. it can be interpreted as the proportion of all potential coalitions in which a party is pivotal. the sum of the powers of all parties is always equal to 1. figure 4. shapley-shubik power index in the chamber of deputies and the senate (18th legislature) notes: pd: democratic party; fi: go italy; league: league; fdi: brothers of italy; m5s: five star movement; iv: italy alive; mixed: mixed group; leu: free and equal; ci: cheer up italy; svp, uv: south tyrol peoples party, valdotanian union; maie-cd: associative movement of italians abroad-democratic centre; c.a.l.: constitution, environment, labour; ipf: together for the future. source: own elaboration on the open data of the chamber of deputies and the senate. figure 4 shows that at the beginning of the legislature, the m5s is the most ‘powerful’ actor in both the chamber and the senate. with a power index of 0.5, the m5s is pinto 29 expected to be decisive in half of all potential coalitions. the league, the pd and the fi, independently from the seats they control, have an index of 0.17, capturing their minor strategic importance in the competition for the executive. all other parliamentary groups are not relevant at all, having an index of 0. after the first year of the legislature, the balance of power between parties begins to change. starting from the second year, the strategic power of the m5s gradually diminishes, while that of the other groups – in particular the league – increases over time. at the end of the observation period, the league is the most decisive party in the chamber, with an index of 0.23. following numerous defections to the mixed group, the latter became the second most powerful actor (0.17). the m5s ranks only third along with the pd (0.16). in contrast, in the senate, the m5s is still the most powerful party (0.21), but with an index that is less than half of what it was at the start of the legislature. in conclusion, our analysis reveals that over the course of the legislature, the structure of the competition changed drastically, becoming more open and less predictable. 5. conclusions party systems and party system change have long been one of the most studied topics within the comparative politics literature, yet most work in this field focuses on changes that occur between elections, overlooking the possibility that parties and party systems may reconfigure during the inter-election period. this paper explores a specific dimension of the broader phenomenon of party system change, namely the evolution of legislative party system in the italian parliament between 2018 and 2022. the configuration of parliaments is usually considered rather stable: elections allocate seats and define the balance of power between parties until the next election. however, individual party switching can subtly alter this configuration, to the point of changing the bargaining power of parliamentary groups and support for government policy through parliamentary voting. according to the analysis presented in this paper, this is exactly what happened in italy during the 18th legislature. an impressive number of defections in both the chamber of deputies and the senate, despite the fact that the latter had implemented anti-defection rules, led to significant changes in the relative strength of parliamentary party groups and in the number of parties, followed by the entry of new political formations in parliamentary arena. these changes contributed to transforming the structure of competition in parliament, which proved to be open and unstable, with patterns of inter-party relations that can hardly be predictable. our findings have two major implications. the first challenges the value of elections as a mechanism for holding governments accountable and ensuring that citizens’ views and interests are adequately represented in the democratic process. it seems clear from our analysis that elections do not define the structure of party competition once and for all, but, if anything, they are only an intermediate step in a broader process in which the main actors – parties and individual legislators − continually review and adapt their position. the second implication concerns the functioning of parliaments. institutionalisation is usually associated with strong institutions. therefore, the instability and unpredictability of the structure of party competition detected for the italian parliament contribute to undermining its role vis-à-vis the government, further fuelling a crisis of political representation. party system change at the legislative level 30 more generally, this work shows that inter-electoral politics is important. future research should therefore extend the analysis to previous legislatures in order to verify whether the changes in the parliamentary party system noted for the 18th legislature are an isolated case or are instead the rule. secondly, although our analysis offers an original perspective on the topic of party system change, it is limited to the evolution of legislative party system in the parliamentary arena. as repeatedly emphasised above, this constitutes only one dimension of a broader phenomenon which is commonly understood through electoral competition. this is the reason why future research should better explore the link between party system change in the electoral and parliamentary contexts, in order to investigate whether the two are in any way related. in addition to being a study of only one legislative 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(2006). party systems and party system types. in r. s. katz & w. crotty (eds.), handbook of party politics. london: sage, 51–62. pdf_issue_14_3_marino_verzichelli italian political science, volume 14 issue 3, february 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 3, 217-228. contact author: bruno marino, university of bologna. e-mail address: bruno.marino3@unibo.it a paper in [the profession] series political science in italian universities: demand, supply, and vitality bruno marino university of bologna luca verzichelli university of siena abstract political science is widely considered to be an established academic discipline, even in a country like italy, where the penetration of empirical social science has been deeply constrained historically and culturally, and where there has been a clear predominance of other academic disciplines, including history and constitutional law. twenty years after the introduction of the so-called ‘bologna process’, and a few years after the implementation of the 2010 reform of the public higher education system, it is worth looking for a comprehensive description of the state of our academic discipline. this can be done by exploring some data about the role of political science within the italian university system. more in detail, three aspects of the current state of italian political science will be explored. firstly, the dynamics of the educational ‘demand’ for political science is here explored through an analysis of its presence in relevant bachelor’s and master’s degrees. this is even more interesting given the two dangers in the academic presence of political science: reiterated criticisms against the uselessness of social sciences, and the effects of at least two decades of anti-political sentiment, particularly diffused among younger cohorts of students. the second aspect tackled here is the capability of political science practitioners to respond to these challenges by presenting a credible set of academic subjects and increasing its visibility among students. third, we will discuss the overall reaction of the community of political scientists to these decisive challenges by looking at the magnitude and variance of academic recruitment in the political science academic community currently active in italy. the evidence presented in the article will offer some reasons for optimism, namely, the stability of the student population and the crystallisation of political science in the overall teaching supply. however, some critical elements are also evident: a persistent geographical imbalance in the spread of political science and difficulty in adapting to some new professional and inter-disciplinary courses. this will lead us to discuss, in the final part of the article, a grid of more specific and fine-tuned research questions on the future of political science in italy. 1. introduction ore than half a century has passed since the foundation of modern academic political science in italy by giovanni sartori with the fundamental support of norberto bobbio (morlino 1989; 1992; sartori 2004). italian political scientists can now count on a reasonable academic presence. they teach quite a large number of m [the profession] political science in italian universities 218 subjects and they ‘matter’ in several european and international professional associations, as well as in some relevant research networks at a global level. however, political scientists know that there is no reason to celebrate this period as the embodiment of an academic ‘institutionalization’. indeed, one can note the continuing relevance of long-term factors that determined a considerable delay in the development of the discipline in italy. these were, in particular, the long fascist regime in the twentieth century and the predominance of other disciplines, like history and constitutional law, at the core of the positivist normative vision of the italian intellectual elite. moreover, since the 1970s, the presence of professional political scientists in italy has always been rather irregular, with a relevant number operating in the northern and metropolitan universities, while a shortage of human resources has characterized the peripheral and southern areas. several reasons may explain the inertia of the process of stabilization of the discipline and its persisting weaknesses (capano and verzichelli 2016). at the same time, recent years have also brought about opportunities for some momentary phases of expansion. indeed, the long-term decline, dramatically impacted by the effects of the recent economic crisis, might have been somehow balanced by the rise of at least three relevant intervening processes: 1. the adjustments of the university curricula after the introduction of the so-called ‘bologna process’ in 1999. these new regulations may have determined interesting chances to consolidate the discipline in different programmes or, on the contrary, may have penalized political science in italy. 2. the reforms of the whole academic recruitment system, increasingly based on the principle of ‘matching funds’ and the capacity of a given discipline to support new positions by raising resources through international research projects. this is another relevant intervening factor, especially if one looks at the elements of flexibility and the increment of non-tenure-track positions introduced by a first university reform in 2005 and then formalized by the systemic law (n. 240/2010) on university governance. 3. finally, one may wonder if innovations in the system of public university funding could have had any effect on political science: the availability of some local and territorial resources, or the (still limited) ministerial bonuses provided during the last decade after the introduction of research quality assessments run by an independent agency (agenzia nazionale di valutazione del sistema universitario e della ricerca, anvur). these factors could potentially have a positive effect on a research-based, naturally internationalised, empirical social science, whose outcomes can also be transformed in ‘applied’ knowledge. hence, twenty years after the bologna process, and a few years after the implementation of a systemic reform of the whole public higher education system, it is worth looking for a comprehensive description of the state of this academic discipline. we will do this by providing a first analysis of fresh data on the current shape of italian political science collected by the società italiana di scienza politica (sisp) (italian political marino and verzichelli 219 science association).1 such data aim to provide a real-time analysis of the state of the discipline and allow us to explore, in a potentially novel way, different paths of italian political science. three research questions, in particular, are at the core of this explorative work. first, we aim to assess what can be defined as the rough ‘demand’ for political science, by looking at the dynamics of the flow of students within the bachelor’s and master’s degrees where political science is present. this is a potentially fruitful research question, in light of two dangers that emerged during a phase of crisis (from 2008 onwards) following a period of relative academic establishment of the discipline (19992008) (capano and tronconi 2005; capano and verzichelli 2008). these dangers would come from criticisms of the social sciences and their usefulness, and the spread of antipolitical sentiment, especially among younger cohorts of (potential) students. the potential effects of these challenges will be measured by looking at the trend of the overall number of students enrolled in classic political science degrees. secondly, we want to measure the capability of the ‘supply side’ of the italian political science academic market. the discipline may have responded to the multiple challenges that have emerged during the past decades by putting forward a modern and competitive set of subjects offered to students. the overall visibility of the ‘motherhouse’ discipline can somehow be assessed by looking at the recent evolution of the presence of political science subjects in some bachelor’s and master’s programmes offered in italian generalist universities. our third question has to do with the reaction of the whole community of italian political scientists to these decisive challenges. the vitality of political science in contemporary italian universities will be analysed by looking at the recruitment and the career-related variance within the political science community of untenured and tenuretrack academics. in the next section, we will approach the first two questions, while the third section will cover the problem of the vitality of italian political scientists. a short conclusive section will summarise our findings and present elements of reasonable optimism, as well as the persisting challenges, and will also refine a few questions about the future academic evolution of political science in italy. 2. political science in the italian university system: demand and supply as mentioned above, the first goal of this article is to assess the effective relevance of political science according to the magnitude of students selecting one of the dozens of political science related degrees activated in italian universities. a first rough indicator of the pool of students to be exposed to the discipline is the number of people enrolled in the degrees included in the ministerial class scienze politiche e relazioni internazionali (political sciences and international relations, code: l36), the only ba programme 1 the sisp project started in 2017 and has been collecting data on the presence of political scientists and political science subjects in the main italian university programmes. all the data presented in this article are based on three datasets subjects, teachers, students at the core of the project. a first version of the database is expected to be released in 2020. [the profession] political science in italian universities 220 imposing a minimum number of academic credits (credito formativo universitario, cfu) in political science in italian universities. more in detail, the percentage of all italian ba students who selected an l36 degree from 2013-2014 until 2017-2018 oscillated around 4% (a minimum of 3.98 in 2013-2014 and a maximum of 4.11 in 2016-2017). in absolute terms, the number of ba students enrolled in an l36 degree reached a peak of more than 38,000 people in 2017-2018. these numbers give us a measure of the potential exposition of students to political science but they do not assess the real ‘demand’ for this discipline, for the simple reason that a relevant percentage are likely not to know precisely what this discipline is before entering a university. a better idea of the real degree of attention paid to political science is the trend of students populating the whole ‘chain’ of ba and ma programmes where political science is typically offered. so, we have focused on the above-mentioned l36 ba class and two master’s classes: relazioni internazionali (international relations, code: lm52) and scienze della politica (political sciences, code: lm62). figure 1. evolution of students enrolled in political science degrees (l36, lm52, and lm62), italy (2013/2014-2017/2018) note: relevant degrees include data on students enrolled in the degrees belonging to the following ministerial classes: ‘l’, ‘lm’, ‘lm4 c.u.’, ‘lm85 bis’, ‘lm/snt1’, ‘lm/snt2’, ‘lm/snt3’, ‘lm/snt4’, ‘lmg/01’, ‘lmr/02’. as can be seen in figure 1, the students enrolled in l36, lm52, and lm62 ministerial classes2 represent a small yet stable percentage of the students enrolled in what we have called ‘relevant degrees’ (black line in figure 1). such relevant degrees correspond to the 2 roughly corresponding to the old four-year degree in political sciences offered to italian students before 1999. this is why we have considered l36, lm52, and lm62 degrees as the most typical programmes for the teaching of political science. 2. 4 2. 6 2. 8 3 3. 2 20 13 -20 14 20 14 -20 15 20 15 -20 16 20 16 -20 17 20 17 -20 18 % enrolled over relevant degrees' population % enrolled over total university population marino and verzichelli 221 entire academic path leading to a master’s degree in any subject, thus excluding, for instance, professional training programmes (e.g., nursery programmes). conversely, if one considers the entire italian university population, the situation is undoubtedly brighter for italian political science: the grey line of figure 1 shows an increase in the percentage of students enrolled in our three classes over the total population of italian universities. in other words, from this specific viewpoint, the demand for political science in italian universities has undergone a certain increment over time. also by looking at the absolute figures, the number of students enrolled in l36, lm52, and lm62 degrees grew from some 41,500 in 2013-2014 to more than 47,500 in 2017-2018. admittedly, this population remains limited, but these numbers do not point to a decline in political science, as the arguments for the ‘end of social sciences’ would suggest. in any event, we are writing about a thin minority of students. moreover, in absolute terms, in 2017-2018, while the l36 ba degrees enrolled more than 38,000 students, in the same year, the number of students enrolled in two master’s degrees – lm52 and lm62 – was just higher than 9,500. in relative terms, if we disaggregated figure 1’s data (black line) for ba and master’s degrees, the percentage of l36 students over the ‘relevant ba degrees’ population would be slightly more than 4% in 2017-2018, while the same percentage of lm52 and lm62 students over the ‘relevant master’s degrees’ population would be just above 1.5%. all in all, the demand for political science in italian universities is higher in ba degrees than in master’s degrees. is the picture we have just depicted any different if we disaggregate the data according to geographical areas? figure 2 below helps us to answer this question. figure 2. evolution of students enrolled in political science degrees (l36, lm52, and lm62) by geographical area and type of degree, italy (2013/2014-2017/2018) 10 20 30 40 50 20 13 -20 14 20 14 -20 15 20 15 -20 16 20 16 -20 17 20 17 -20 18 % enrolled in northern universites % enrolled in central universities % enrolled in southern universities l36 10 20 30 40 50 20 13 -20 14 20 14 -20 15 20 15 -20 16 20 16 -20 17 20 17 -20 18 % enrolled in northern universites % enrolled in central universities % enrolled in southern universities lm52 and lm62 [the profession] political science in italian universities 222 figure 2 tells us that the relative majority of political science students are enrolled in central italy.3 this is not surprising, considering that this category includes rome universities, which are among the biggest academic venues in italy. on the other hand, some northern universities (in particular, the university of milan and the university of bologna) are among the most populated ones. in some years, the students enrolled in the north for relevant master’s programmes (lm52 and lm62) surpass or equal those enrolled in central italy. a different picture is that of southern universities: in the mezzogiorno, there is a substantial decline in the proportion of political science students over time. such a decline is evident solely in this area of the country, and is particularly evident when analysing the right part of figure 2, which includes data for our two master’s degrees. all in all, the demand side does not seem to have dramatically changed over the past few years, with the noticeable exception of southern italy, which seems less and less attractive to political science students. this decline is even more relevant if we underline that the absolute number of students enrolled in these three degrees has actually increased over time. we have just analysed the demand side of political science in italy in the past few years. what about the position of political science on the ‘supply side’ of italian academic organisation? a first look at the presence of political science subjects in a broad set of italian academic programmes can give us a first rough answer to our second research question, related to the supply side of political science in italy. we have considered as a political science course all those courses labelled with the sps/04 scientific sector code (settore scientifico disciplinare). table 1. number of italian universities offering at least one political science (sps/04) course for each ministerial class, italy (2017-2018 and 2018-2019) ministerial class 2017-2018 2018-2019 ba degrees l36 37 37 other ba ministerial classes 60 58 total ba 97 95 master’s degrees lm52 and lm62 42 44 other master ministerial classes 81 85 total master 123 129 table 1 presents the situation, for the last two academic years, in terms of the number of universities offering at least one political science course (i.e., one sps/04 course) for each ministerial class. the overall number of universities in each class has certainly increased in comparison to the pioneering times between the foundation of the discipline and the late 1980s (morlino 1989). a little improvement is also visible when comparing these figures with those of the first decade of the twenty-first century (capano and verzichelli 2010). 3 northern italian universities include those located in piedmont, aosta valley, liguria, lombardy, trentino-alto adige, veneto, and emilia romagna; central italian universities include those in marche, tuscany, umbria, lazio, and sardinia; finally, southern italian universities include those in campania, abruzzo, molise, apulia, basilicata, calabria, and sicily. marino and verzichelli 223 however, the presence of political science in the academic teaching supply side still looks residual. above all, the discipline still looks too concentrated in the l36 class, while the other entry-level degrees show a somewhat limited presence in comparison to the former. although stable in the last couple of years, just a minority of ba degrees in public administration, communication, social work, and sociology, among others, (included in the row ‘other ba ministerial classes’) have offered a minimum of courses in political science. the situation looks a little more articulated if one analyses the master’s level, where some political science courses have been added, with a positive surplus for the 2018-2019 academic year. for instance, we have counted some political science courses in ministerial classes like territorial, urban, landscape and environmental planning (l21), geography (lm80), historical sciences (lm84), european studies (lm90), and in some hybrid programmes built by using the minimal requirements of two ministerial classes. for instance, sociology (l40) plus social studies (l39), administration and organisational sciences (l16) plus political sciences (l36), and so on. these data suggest two things. first, there is still a certain reluctance in conceiving political science as a ‘vital discipline’ to be anchored at the core of a comprehensive chain of studies. the very fact that, still now, there is no trace of political science in the ba classes of history, geography, and in the master’s class in pedagogy is a clear indication of the difficulty of political science being considered a credible option for many students. as a result, italian students may just meet political science in a myriad of master’s programmes in social sciences and humanities, without having had any background in the discipline in their earlier ba academic career. the second suggestion, to be better verified and discussed based on more consolidated evidence, is about the average role of political science within italian universities. only a handful of programmes in italy show a presence of political science courses, and only in those universities where a critical number of practising political scientists is active, typically in central and northern italy. in this very last regard, let us discuss some provisional data for the 2018-2019 academic year. in the l36 ba ministerial class, there are just 12 universities where political science related courses (again, those with an sps/04 scientific sector code) sum up to at least 36 academic credits4. out of these 12 universities, 9 are located in northern italy and 3 in central italy. then, moving to master’s degrees, in the lm52 class, political science courses sum up to at least 24 credits5 in 11 universities: 8 in northern italy, 2 in central italy and 1 in the southern part of the country. finally, concerning the lm62 class, 9 universities are offering political science courses for at least 24 credits: 3 for each italian macro-region (northern, central, and southern italy). 4 this sum includes all the political science courses offered in a specific university, regardless of the number of degrees present in that university. we have selected 36 credits as a cut-off point representing 20% of the credits required to obtain a ba degree. a caveat is necessary: while it is likely, especially in politicalscience-related ministerial classes, that more degrees lead to more political science courses, we contend it is useful to consider the aggregate number of courses offered to a specific population of students in a given university. 5 we have selected 24 as a cut-off point because it is equal to the 20% of credits needed to obtain a master’s degree. see also fn. 4 above. [the profession] political science in italian universities 224 hence, this preliminary analysis shows that the two features of the mere presence and relevance of political science in italy are today evident only in a selected group of universities, and almost all of them are located in the northern or the central area of the country. this means that the traditional marginality of political science is far from being overcome. as mentioned, the two historical steps of the 1999 reform imposing the ‘bologna process’ and the reform of 2010 represented two opportunities to include a broad and attractive set of political science subjects in a galaxy of programmes. however, the resilience of the old faculties (then transformed into broader ‘departments’ by the 2010 reform) has somehow prevented the transformation of several programmes (capano, turri and regini 2016) by introducing a number of non-compulsory political science courses (capano and verzichelli 2008). another reason for persisting weakness, however, may be attributed to the negligence of political scientists themselves: their typical attitude to ‘clone’ standard and repetitive academic profiles and research agendas may indeed work as a negative sign of evolution and an indicator of lack of eclecticism (capano and verzichelli 2016). 3. the vitality of italian political scientists let us now focus on the third research question discussed in the introduction. more in detail, can we say something about the vitality of the italian political science community? has there been any evolution in the composition of such a community over time? has the recent wave of recruitment changed something in the proportion of tenure-track or untenured scholars? to answer these questions, in this section, we focus on those scholars belonging to the sps/04 scientific sector. a first hint is given by the distribution of different academic positions within the italian political science community. table 2.1. distribution of academic positions within the italian political science community. absolute values and percentages, 2017-2019. post-doctoral research fellows included. 2017 2018 2019 assegnisti di ricerca (post-doctoral research fellows) n.a. 63 (21.9%) 59 (20.3%) rtd-a (non-tenure-track researchers) 17 (7.8%) 20 (7%) 21 (7.2%) rtd-b (tenure-track researchers) 11 (5%) 14 (4.9%) 27 (9.3%) ricercatori (old tenure-track assistant professors) 52 (23.7%) 48 (16.7%) 43 (14.8%) associato (confermato) (senior lecturers / associate professors) 88 (40.2%) 85 (29.6%) 85 (29.2%) ordinari (full professors) 50 (22.8%) 54 (18.8%) 54 (18.6%) straordinario td (temporary full professors) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.1%) 2 (0.7%) total 219 287 291 note: the category rtd-a includes all the non-tenure-track positions introduced in 2005 (law 230) and confirmed with the organic reform of 2010. a first element emerging from table 2.1 is the progressive increase in the numerical consistency of the political science community. nonetheless, this increase is mainly due to the presence of post-doctoral research fellows for 2018 and 2019. if we excluded this category, there would be a substantially less strong upward trend in the number of political science academics in italy. this is made evident by table 2.2, which reports the same marino and verzichelli 225 data as table 2.1 with the exception of post-doctoral research fellows, which are excluded from the calculus. table 2.2. distribution of academic positions within the italian political science community. absolute values and percentages, 2017-2019. post-doctoral research fellows excluded. 2017 2018 2019 rtd-a (non-tenure-track researchers) 17 (7.8%) 20 (8.9%) 21 (9.1%) rtd-b (tenure-track researchers) 11 (5%) 14 (6.2%) 27 (11.6%) ricercatori (old tenure-track assistant professors) 52 (23.7%) 48 (21.4%) 43 (18.5%) associato (confermato) (senior lecturers / associate professors) 88 (40.2%) 85 (37.9%) 85 (36.6%) ordinari (full professors) 50 (22.8%) 54 (24.1%) 54 (23.3%) straordinario td (temporary full professors) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.3%) 2 (0.9%) total 219 224 232 note: the category rtd-a includes all the non-tenure-track positions introduced in 2005 (law 230) and confirmed with the organic reform of 2010. a second element shown in table 2.1 is that, in 2019, 27.5% of academics do not have tenure-track positions (post-doctoral research fellows plus untenured researchers). although the lack of longitudinal data prevents us from presenting a comprehensive analysis of the presence of non-tenure-track scholars, it is quite clear that having temporary positions has become an important feature for a relevant percentage of the italian political science community. nonetheless, this can also signal the presence of some vitality in the discipline, given that as many as 60 post-doctoral research fellows, that is, scholars in the early stage of a prospective academic career, worked in italian universities in 2018 or 2019. third, and as a somewhat counterbalancing element, there is a growing presence of tenure-track researchers (rtd-b). incidentally, let us recall this category is made up of scholars with a lower average age than that of old tenure-track assistant professors or even associate/full professors. all in all, there has surely been an injection of fresh blood into the veins of the italian academic community in the past few years, possibly also due to the presence of political science in the excellence grants (progetti di eccellenza 20182022) provided to a few social science departments by the italian ministry of education and research. a further point of discussion is the geographical distribution of italian political science scholars. let us focus our attention on tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. table 3.1. geographical distribution of the italian political science community, absolute values and percentages, 2017-2019. post-doctoral research fellows included. 2017 2018 2019 northern italy 121 (55.2%) 155 (54%) 164 (56.4%) central italy 65 (29.7%) 92 (32.1%) 91 (31.3%) southern italy 33 (15.1%) 40 (13.9%) 36 (12.4%) total 219 287 291 [the profession] political science in italian universities 226 also in this case, a clear prevalence of northern and central universities is evident. let us again recall that 2018 and 2019 data include post-doctoral research fellows: if we excluded this category for these two years, the percentages would be slightly higher for northern and southern italy, even if the general picture would not change, as shown in table 3.2 below. table 3.2. geographical distribution of the italian political science community, absolute values and percentages, 2017-2019. post-doctoral research fellows excluded. 2017 2018 2019 northern italy 121 (55.2%) 125 (55.8%) 133 (57.3%) central italy 65 (29.7%) 66 (29.5%) 67 (28.9%) southern italy 33 (15.1%) 33 (14.7%) 32 (13.8%) total 219 224 232 is there, instead, any difference if we show the distribution of post-doctoral research fellows, rtd-a, and rtd-b? data from table 4 help us in addressing this task. to make figures comparable, we show data just for 2018 and 2019, given that no data on post-doctoral research fellows is available for 2017. table 4. geographical distribution of post-doctoral research fellows, rtd-a, and rtd-b, 2018 and 2019. 2018 2019 post-doc research fellows rtd-a (nontenure-track researchers) rtd-b (tenure-track researchers) total geographical area post-doc research fellows rtd-a (non-tenure-track researchers) rtd-b (tenure-track researchers) total geographical area northern italy 30 6 9 45 (46.4%) 31 8 18 57 (53.3%) central italy 26 11 3 40 (41.2%) 24 9 7 40 (37.4%) southern italy 7 3 2 12 (12.4%) 4 4 2 10 (9.3%) total 63 20 14 97 59 21 27 107 note: the category rtd-a includes all the non-tenure-track positions introduced in 2005 (law 230) and confirmed with the organic reform of 2010. table 4 tells us that a huge bulk of the younger cohorts of italian political scientists work in northern and central universities. two pieces of data are worth underlining: first, there is a certain balance between northern and central universities in 2018 which becomes a more pronounced imbalance towards the former in 2019. in other words, in 2019, italian universities operating in the north employed more than half of post-doctoral research fellows, rtd-a, and rtd-b. second, table 4 confirms the severe geographical imbalance between, on the one hand, northern and central universities and, on the other hand, southern ones, which, in 2019, employ less than 10% of earlystage political scientists. all in all, tables 3.1 and 3.2, along with table 4, tell us that there is a crystal-clear northern-central predominance in the places where the italian political science community operates. moreover, in 2019, northern universities alone employed more than marino and verzichelli 227 half of all italian political scientists and more than half of the ‘new generations’ of political science scholars. these data will be connected with those presented in the previous section, and unequivocally tell us that the lion’s share of political science in italy is that of northern and central italy. on the contrary, southern italian universities have a more peripheral position: a declining trend both concerning students enrolled in political science degrees and political science scholars is quite evident. 4. conclusions in this article, we have dealt with three research questions. the first related to the demand for political science in terms of students enrolled in relevant ba and master’s degrees. the second connected to the supply side of the discipline (i.e., the general presence of political science courses). finally, the third aims to investigate the vitality of political science concerning the number and the career status of italian political scientists. first of all, we have shown that, despite some apocalyptic predictions, in italy there is a stable demand for political science courses. in terms of rough figures, the number of students exposed to the discipline have increased over time. hence, the crisis does not seem to have led to a sharp decline in the demand for political science programmes. however, a problem of ‘critical mass’ remains, since the overall percentage of university students who have attended or are going to attend some political science courses remains quite limited. this might be connected to a persisting deficit of political science subjects in many programmes, especially at ba level, and to the long-term numerical weakness of the italian political science community. this brings us to the second point emerging from the analysis: the patent disequilibrium in the academic presence of political science in different italian macro-regions. in particular, we have stressed the persistence of a centre-north/south divide: with some remarkable exceptions (e.g., the university of catania, the university of naples ‘federico ii’), the presence of political scientists in southern italy is limited to isolated personalities who can guarantee just a ‘minimum offer’ in terms of teaching and training. as for the third point, our analysis of the recent development of the academic community reveals that a new generation of political science researchers has been recruited, notwithstanding the difficult financial period experienced by the discipline. as one could easily expect, there is a growing role of temporary positions. this can be read in two very different ways. one may argue, indeed, that the difficulty of political scientists to achieve a full professorship or at least a tenured position is evidence of the persistence of a limited institutionalisation (sartori 1986; freddi and giannetti 2007). on the other hand, the availability of a growing number of non-tenure-track positions might also be related to the availability of research grants from the european union or even from private institutions. this is just speculation to be empirically supported in more fine-grained research, but could point towards a sort of acknowledgement of italian political science as a source of ‘good research’. therefore, future research might empirically verify the thesis of an overall good outlook for a discipline that shows growing competitiveness, although suffering from a ‘critical mass’ problem in a number of departments and universities (verzichelli 2014). [the profession] political science in italian universities 228 all in all, the survival – and possibly the consolidation – of a discipline which is now strong, but certainly non-unitary and quite uneven, can be a realistic perspective only when its practitioners are able to extend their room for manoeuvre within the academy and society at large. this is the big challenge for the years to come: preserving the good quality of political science research and, at the same time, becoming more central in university programmes and within academic organisations. the strategies to be implemented to reach this goal will be, of course, discussed in more appropriate contexts. however, it seems clear that three elements will be crucial to assess the health of italian political science in the future: research eclecticism, a growing presence of the discipline in different inter-disciplinary and applied programmes, and an adequate diffusion of its subjects in all the relevant degrees in social sciences. references capano, g., m. regini and turri, m. (2016), changing governance in universities. italian higher education in comparative perspective, london: palgrave. capano, g. and tronconi, f. (2005). ‘political science in italian universities. peaceful survival?’ european political science, 4(2), pp. 151-163. capano, g. and verzichelli, l. (2008) ‘the presence of political science in the italian university curricula’, italian political science 2. https://italianpoliticalscience.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/2_5.pdf capano, g. and verzichelli, l. (2010) ‘good but not enough: recent developments of political science in italy’, european political science 9(1), pp. 102–116. capano, g. and verzichelli, l. (2016) ‘looking for eclecticism? structural and contextual factors underlying political science’s relevance gap: evidence from the italian case’, european political science 15, pp. 211-232. curini, l. (2008) ‘eight years of development: the italian academic community of political scientists within university and departments’, italian political science 2. https://italianpoliticalscience.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/2_1.pdf freddi, g. and giannetti, d. (2007) ‘the current state of political science in italy’, in h.d. klingemann (ed.) the state of political science in western europe, opladen: barbara butric publishers, pp. 255–274. morlino, l. (1989) ‘ancora un bilancio lamentevole?’, in l. morlino (ed.) scienza politica, torino: edizioni fondazione agnelli, pp. 5–52. morlino, l. (1992) ‘political science in italy: tradition and empiricism’, european journal of political research 20(2), pp. 341–358. sartori, g. (1986) ‘dove va la scienza politica’, in l. graziano (ed.) la scienza politica in italia. bilancio e prospettive, milano: franco angeli, pp. 98–116. sartori, g. (2004) ‘norberto bobbio e la scienza politica in italia’, rivista italiana di scienza politica 34(1), pp. 7-12, verzichelli, l. (2014) ‘signs of competitiveness? the presence of italian research in international political science journals’ italian political science 9(2), pp. 37-43. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_3_piattoni [tp].docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 3 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 3, 316–326. contact author: simona piattoni, university of trento. e-mail address: simona.piattoni@unitn.it a paper in [the profession] series italian political science today: has the profession changed in the last ten years? simona piattoni university of trento abstract this contribution analyzes the opportunities that the 2010 reform of higher education (gelmini reform) created for italian political scientists to form departments centered on the social sciences that would encourage greater experimentation with degree programs more attuned to the needs of a changing society and better able to chart the evolving nature of contemporary politics. it underscores the difficulty of making this transition, but also highlights the attempts formally made in this direction. it further analyzes the positive impact that the same reform has had on the internationalization and professionalization of the younger generations of political scientists. it also warns, however, against the promotion of an understanding of academic career that may induce them to detach themselves from other aspects of the profession that have to do with the management of university structures and the broad promotion of political science, nationally and internationally. 1. introduction n this brief contribution i will analyze how italian political science has adapted to the new opportunities that opened up following the university reform of 2010 (law 240/2010)1 and how it tackled the new challenges that derived from it. my contribution is based on my personal experience as coordinator of a degree program in international studies and on my exposure, in various capacities, to international experiences. it is therefore, to some extent, impressionistic in nature and based, if you will, upon privileged observations. my argument is that the new liberty that ensued from the cancellation of the old facoltà and the creation of the new dipartimenti resulted in a potentially greater variety of educational offers in political science, which has only in part been exploited but has nevertheless posed a dilemma to departments as to whether to retain their traditional multi-disciplinarity or rather specialize in one of the many sub-fields of political science. in other words, the new departments were placed before a choice: whether to simply 1 law 30 december 2010, n. 240 available is commonly referred to as the “gelmini law” from the name of the then ministry of university and research; available at: https://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/10240l.htm. i simona piattoni 317 change their status and retain the same disciplinary configuration as before or (try to) acquire a more distinctive political science profile or even pursue innovative crossfertilizations with other social science disciplines. i will suggest that some departments have pursued the latter strategy and that we begin to observe an interesting diversification of programs in political science. the same reform also introduced the centralized abilitazione scientifica nazionale, which replaced the old system of certification and promotion managed by the individual universities. this reform, too, has presented political science departments with interesting opportunities that may or may not be fully exploited. it has, on the one hand, caused an acceleration of careers in line with what happens abroad and in other disciplines and, on the other, created expectations of promotion (still dependent upon the availability of resources at the local level) that are bound to be disappointed and create frustration. as a consequence, the profession has somewhat changed, in part approaching international standards that bear the promise of a more dynamic academia, but in part still suffering from resource constraints that may choke this positive evolution. therefore, the overall picture is a mixed one, full of great promises but also fraught with dangers with which the newer generations of political scientists will have to deal. in the following sections, i will discuss whether italian political science has taken advantage of these opportunities by innovating at least in the academic organization of its degree programs (section 1); whether it has updated and streamlined the promotion and career progression of its members according to international standards (section 2); and, finally, whether it has taken measures to help upcoming scholars adapt to the many requirements of their future academic profession (section 3). section 4 will assess whether together these changes have induced a new awareness in the younger generations of what is required of them in order to compete in today’s academic world, but also of what is needed to carry forward the continuing upgrading of scientific standards in today’s academia. the final section will briefly recap the main insights. 2. the transformation of facoltà into dipartimenti: the quest for innovation in 2010 the so-called gelmini reform abolished the old facoltà that presided over the organization of teaching in universities, and created new dipartimenti, which differed from the old ones in that they now coordinated both research and teaching. the innovations introduced by this reform to the centralized and hierarchical “continental model” (regini 2020), were aimed at granting higher education institutions the flexibility to be more responsive to the needs of a changing society. departments were encouraged to organize the production and dissemination of knowledge so as to adapt their educational supply to quickly changing societal demands, in turn due to transformations in technologies, problems and orientations. many old facoltà di scienze politiche – in the plural, to indicate the many disciplines that, according to the traditional understanding of politics as little more than the application of constitutional rules and procedures, supposedly equipped students with the tools to understand politics – changed their names to emphasize other, until then underplayed features. several departments inserted “culture”, “communication” or “international studies” in their names and most of them more strongly signaled an underlying unity with the other social sciences as residing in their empirical and [the profession] italian political science today 318 applied nature, thus distancing the study of politics from that of mere formal norms and procedures. of the 52 university structures – mostly now called dipartimenti, but some still quaintly called facoltà or otherwise indicated as centri, istituti or scuole – that today host teachings in political science (sps/04),2 9 retain their original label “scienze politiche” and are characterized by a large prevalence of juridical studies; 27 are indicated as “scienze politiche e sociali” or “scienze sociali e politiche” or other similar locutions that stress the common roots of political science and the other social sciences (typically by adding “culture”, “communication”, “international studies” to the name); and 16 belong to departments and other types of structure that do not nominally relate to the social sciences but that still see the need to integrate their educational offer with teachings in political science (typically, departments of architecture, engineering, planning, and economics).3 the transformation from the previous situation is indicative of a new sensibility: the departments in which political science is most central are now those in which interactions between the social sciences are at least programmatically most intense. at the same time, the procedures for updating the degree programs through which knowledge is provided and certified still need to be approved by the ministry of higher education (miur, now mur), which significantly slows down and homogenizes the actual supply of new degree programs. in theory, departments could now pursue new developments in the social sciences deriving from relevant international dynamics, expanding communication technologies and the overabundant availability of data which in turn impact on the study of political behavior, political institutions and political methodology. thanks to their new freedom, departments could in theory emphasize their relative specialization and pursue interesting experiments in the hybridization of knowledge with other (social) sciences or they could rather carve a distinctive profile, specializing in communication studies, public opinion analysis or in the study of international political phenomena, just to give a few examples. this change in strategy, however, was initially hampered by the rush with which it was implemented and is still taking place slowly as disciplinary factions and corporatist interests make adaptation particularly viscous (giuliani, 2012).4 moreover, the curricular formats used by mur for the approval of new degree courses and the re-accreditation of existing ones, coupled with the existing classification of the disciplines (partially updated in 2016 through the introduction of new settori scientifico-disciplinari and the regrouping of existing ones), sometimes do not give sufficient latitude in experimenting with new course offers. one of the main innovations in the realm of the social sciences has lately been the creation of a degree program in data 2 whether taught by political scientists or others remains to be seen. 3 if economics, as i think would be most appropriate, is also counted among the social sciences, the number of departments that at least in their names acknowledge their common roots in the social sciences would be 31 while those that do not are reduced to 21, representing respectively 60% and 40% of all departments. own calculations on official mur data. 4 with regard to the university of milan, giuliani states: “symbolically it could have represented a laboratory for interdisciplinary research and teaching, and partly it even managed to fulfill this ambition, but as a matter of fact it was mostly a very complex organization with clear disciplinary factions and constituencies, which were the dominant actors in each decision regarding the distribution of resources” (giuliani 2012: 2). for a rounded assessment of the gelmini reform, attention should be placed not only on ba degree programs but also on ma degree programs. simona piattoni 319 sciences aimed at training scholars in mining and analyzing large pools of data. more frequently, however, despite their relative flexibility, ministerial formats are only blunt instruments of experimentation as they allow those disciplines that are already strongly rooted in existing degree programs to be largely present in many other curricula, thus limiting the room for innovation. the adaptation of knowledge to new political, social and technological developments has, therefore, been more difficult than was initially envisioned. 3. new career progression: changing expectations and increasing fragmentation of knowledge the second major innovation introduced by the gelmini reform was the introduction of a new mechanism of career progression. before the reform, scholars could progress in their career by applying for jobs in the higher category only when advertised locally by universities. this system gave rise to negotiations between universities aimed at giving the possibility to their most promising scholars to obtain, if not an immediate external promotion, at least the reasonable hope of soon being promoted internally. of the two statutory winners of the old concorsi, one would get the job while the other would acquire certification in the higher category (akin but not identical to today’s habilitation) that could then be used by other universities to offer her/him a promotion in that category. using an economic metaphor, we could say that, in addition to issuing an immediately cashable promotion, the system created a secondary market of promotions which could then be used to obtain a position in the higher category at other universities. both before and after the reform, mobility between universities was very limited,5 but what has significantly changed since then is that with the new system the number of habilitated scholars has significantly grown. still, only a few of them will be able to obtain a promotion at their current or at another university. this has created much frustration, but a second consequence also derived. the more open and frequent system of national habilitation (asn) – every four months it is possible to apply for habilitation in the higher category provided that certain criteria and productivity thresholds are cleared – has induced many more scholars, once marginal to the inter-university web of negotiations, to try and obtain habilitation, thus further inflating the ranks of the hopeful. the current one is certainly a more equitable and open system, given that many scholars who left academia to pursue other careers or went abroad to find a job at some foreign university wish to obtain italian habilitation in order to try and compete for a university position in italy. to some extent this has favored a greater circulation of scholars and the importation of scholars, italian and foreign, with interesting specializations, unusual career paths and significant language skills. it has also led to a certain homogenization of the italian system with career progression systems more frequently present abroad. in sum, it has led to the creation of a veritable international market of political scientists. 5 in fact, it might have been higher before the gelmini reform at least as far as internal mobility is concerned. what has increased since then has been international mobility, particularly through incentives for attracting to the italian university system international scholars and young italians who had decided to begin their careers abroad. this is, in itself, no small feat. [the profession] italian political science today 320 the combined effect of a greater circulation of scholars and greater ease in comparing scholarly achievements has gone hand in hand with a certain homogenization of evaluative standards in italy and abroad. italian academia, at least as far as political science is concerned, is increasingly aware of the standards that are prevalent abroad even if these are domestically still rather unpopular. two instances stand out. the first is the creeping use of bibliometric indicators (impact factor of the articles or journals in which they are published, h and g indices according to google scholar or publish or perish, number of publications in scopusor wos-ranked journals) to evaluate the scientific production of italian political scientists even if the use of these indicators is formally excluded by ministerial regulations. the second is the increasing acceptance of doctoral dissertations composed of three or four published (or accepted for publication) journal articles instead of the conventional monograph. this new practice is increasingly associated with the “modern”, structured type of doctoral program now prevalent as opposed to the “traditional” one based on the exclusive relationship between student and supervisor (ballarino et al 2021: 14). these practices have been adopted by some social science departments in italy – particularly in economics and increasingly also in sociology departments – while they are quickly becoming the rule abroad. a corollary of these practices is the increased relevance given to journal articles as opposed to book chapters and even edited or monographic volumes in the periodic assessment of the italian scientific political science production. the italian “research assessment exercise” (valutazione della qualità della ricerca, vqr) has adopted a system for ranking academic journals similar (though not identical) to scopus or wos, known as “classe a” or first-rate journals, which supposedly guarantee higher standards of impartiality and a blind review of the articles published therein. moreover, it is now inconceivable for an italian political scientist not to have earned a phd in political science at home or abroad and not to be a regular attendee and paper-giver at major international conferences.6 these developments were in their infancy ten years ago, when the reform was launched, and still only a hope two years later at the time of the roundtable, organized by ips among senior scholars representing six major italian universities where political science has a strong tradition, to assess the first consequences of the reform. at that time, pierangelo isernia illustrated the choice of the small but active group of political scientists of the then facoltà di scienze politiche at the university of siena to look for partners “whose methodological underpinnings were as homogeneous as possible (given the available options, of course) to ours. we did so for two reasons or, if you like, under a couple of working hypotheses” (isernia, 2012: 8). these “working hypotheses” reflected, first, a precise methodological and scientific orientation aimed at bringing political science closer to the other empirical social sciences and the desire to make the study of politics in siena attractive also for international students who would then need to compete in other academic systems. the second hypothesis was that, in the future, the results of the evaluation system for both teaching and research would “play a greater role in allocating resources, in influencing recruitment and in catalyzing projects and 6 for a comparative analysis of these research assessment exercises, see the special issue published in this journal in 2017 with contributions on the uk, france, the netherlands and italy (piattoni 2017, and the articles by flinders, andeweg, paradeise and checchi). simona piattoni 321 initiatives. any future department will actively compete in an environment in which … the results of the evaluation process will determine its growth” (isernia, 2012: 8-9). it seems to me that both hypotheses have been, against all odds and despite much resistance from many quarters, borne out by facts and that italian political science has managed to internationalize to a remarkable degree and become more competitive also thanks to the incentives inherent in the evaluation processes. the upshot of all this is that italian political scientists, particularly the younger ones, are now more internationally oriented and more “marketable”, but also more specialized than their elders. contrary to what was common an academic generation (or two) ago7 – that a good political scientist was supposed to be able to orientate him/herself in all sub-fields of political science and to never stick to just one research question for too long – today’s scholars are much more specialized, interact with smaller but more closely-knit communities of scholars pursuing similar research questions, and publish more in highly specialized peer-reviewed, high-impact factor journals. in other words, young political scientists are more “professional”, more specialized and more internationalized than the older generations, but also a lot narrower in their interests and knowledge of the discipline. a remarkable consequence follows. while a generation or two ago italian political science covered all aspects of the discipline with some degree of competence, it now suffers from remarkable gaps just as it is increasingly present in a few remarkable areas of specialization. it is as if the scientific study of politics in italy has fragmented into many different fields of expertise and research agendas and, while contributing to cover all areas of the discipline together with foreign political science communities through international networks, has ended up suffering from evident gaps domestically. in other words, the diagnosis of the state of political science offered by gabriel almond (1988) – that political scientists now sit at separate tables and are incapable of, or uninterested in, talking to one another – could be applied to italian political science as well, where a greater degree of specialization and internationalization has been acquired at the cost of a loss of general relevance and domestic debates. 4. future challenges: making political science more innovative, relevant and visible i would like to conclude this contribution by pointing to some new challenges that face italian political scientists today. we know that the three missions of higher education are teaching, researching and contributing to society. the first two are to some degree obvious, the third requires some elaboration. yet even the first two pose challenges to political scientists that are often undervalued and hence require a little discussion. teaching. it is normally presumed that, having earned a phd, political scientists should for that reason know how to communicate to students the knowledge they have so laboriously accumulated. as we all know this is far from true. all subjects present distinctive difficulties, and so does political science. i will here highlight those that i have personally found more challenging (and to which – i must confess – i am not yet sure to 7 there is nothing scientific in the following statement, but my impression is that a “generation of scholars” appears every 10 or so years. [the profession] italian political science today 322 have found a satisfactory answer). the first challenge connected with teaching regards being able to fine-tune the message to the audience. we sometimes take for granted that in our classrooms sit students eager to learn about our subject and who share our same enthusiasm for it. this is often not the case. students today often expect to acquire through higher education immediately marketable skills that they can deploy in an ever more competitive labor market. what specific skills does political science develop in students that can be immediately put to use out there? more simply, how can we arouse the interest of our students in the intricacies of political science, that require a mix of formal knowledge and passion for the unfolding of day-to-day events? political scientists obviously find politics exceedingly exciting and cultivate a nerdy interest in the minutest details of electoral systems, policy-making processes and institutional architectures, but they are sometimes surprisingly inept at sharing this interest with their students or at making them see how these abilities are assets that can be showcased to land good jobs. the rising field of (political) communication is one of the sub-fields of political science that promises to deliver such skills, and italian political scientists need to be ready to cultivate this field which is increasingly occupied by scholars coming from other disciplines. the second challenge stems from the fact that, while some of the main theories that characterize the study of politics remain fairly stable in time, the material to which they get applied constantly changes: no two elections, no two policy decisions, no two processes of democratization are the same. rarely is the extent to which teaching politics implies a constant effort at updating one’s knowledge fully appreciated. nothing ages more rapidly than an electoral result (particularly in italy)! political scientists may appear to simply describe the latest electoral result or the last reconfiguration in the party system, not too differently from other political commentators, and they must be better able to defend the scientificity of their profession and to communicate better the value added of their discipline. to make things worse, and this is the third challenge, italian political scientists, like most italian academics, are not required to learn how to teach (a certificate in education is not among the requirements for teaching at university level in italy) and are not required to adapt their teaching methods to evolving technologies. this has become painfully evident during the covid-19 pandemic, when most of us taught online as we would have taught in class, by delivering more or less well-crafted lectures that we hope were sufficiently clear and held the interest of the students. but even in normal times, the average lecturer hardly feels the need to innovate on his/her teaching technique other than perhaps sharing a picture or two or projecting a short video to bring a particular event to life. trying to innovate in one’s teaching techniques is a difficult, timeconsuming and uncertain enterprise that would greatly benefit if professional training sessions were offered to university lecturers as part of their continuing education. the kind of teaching assessment that is performed in italy hardly has an impact on the tools used by political scientists in their (virtual) classrooms and no specific reward (or penalty) is associated with their effort (or lack thereof) to innovate. what is still mostly measured in italy is simply the number of hours taught and a generic satisfaction on the part of the students, but hardly the in-depth look into teaching methods that is simona piattoni 323 performed elsewhere (e.g., the english teaching excellence framework, which, however, is still carried out on a voluntary basis). research. we all know that future academics are supposed to carry out research, which normally means more than just reading books and crafting nifty arguments. research in political science is mostly empirical and requires holding interviews, running surveys, collecting and analyzing documents, elaborating existing statistics, reconstructing policy processes, observing or participating in decision-making events, and much more. these activities are time-consuming and costly, and this is why political scientists (like other social scientists) spend long hours drafting research projects that, if funded, allow them to carry out research and bring money and notoriety to their universities, in turn allowing the latter to climb some notches in the international rankings. having won a competitive bid for research funds from some prestigious funding agency – particularly in the capacity of “principal investigator” (pi) – is now one of the criteria that contribute to defining the profile of an established political scientist. younger scholars are learning that research matters and that it matters even more than teaching. it is becoming almost easier for younger scholars to achieve this milestone (winning a competitive bid as pi) than it is for older ones, not least because the funds dedicated to young scholars have lately appropriately multiplied. the amount of funds raised by a political scientist is increasingly becoming one of the indicators according to which scholars are assessed by university departments. abroad, political scientists are hard pressed to bring a certain amount of funds to their university: indeed, some university positions give their occupants only a modest fixed salary, the understanding being that the complement to a standard university salary should be made up by funds won by the scholar in competitive bids. the piece-rate pay system is spreading quickly and, once again, i would not be surprised if it were to spread also to italian academia. contribution to society. the third mission of universities consists in giving back to society by disseminating widely the knowledge produced and by making sure that the research activities carried out therein are socially useful. this kind of activity is also useful in alerting the rest of the world that political science has indeed something valuable to offer and improving its (traditionally still low) standing among the social sciences. this has introduced a whole new aspect in the academic profession. in addition to being good teachers and successful researchers, academics must now contribute to society by disseminating relevant knowledge that has immediate practical applications. in itself, this quest has merits, as it forces academics to think hard about the social relevance of their research topics and to be able to present their findings in a manner accessible to the wider public. these goals, in themselves sacrosanct, have, however, the potential of diverting the attention of scholars from scientifically worthwhile (but in themselves dull) enterprises to topics that are more easily presented as useful and resonate more with the wider public. according to a recent study, academics, particularly those of the stem disciplines, don’t mind sharing their results; what is rather lacking is a sufficiently robust demand from society which has lately increased as a consequence of the covid-19 pandemic (regini, 2021: 22; perulli et al, 2018). basic research, which does not immediately lead to any applicable result but has the potential of opening up important avenues of study, may be discouraged. typically, methodological research – that is research that aims at refining existing methods and developing new ones – is [the profession] italian political science today 324 extremely difficult to communicate to the wider public and may be discouraged, while communication studies or opinion pools lend themselves more easily to being publicized to the wider public.8 political science may rather run the opposite risk: in an attempt to simplify the message and reach the wider public, political scientists may end up being mixed up with others who also “talk about politics” (and for that reason are called politologi, literally “those who talk about politics”), such as journalists or mass-media experts. these, although often more informed about current events and in certain cases also very knowledgeable with regard to the political scientific literature, on average use commonsensical arguments in their comments rather than the theories, models and knowledge developed by political science. the real danger here is to perpetuate a certain image of political scientists as not real “scientists”, but just as people who talk about things political. 5. the lingering challenges: governance, administration and service to the community the changes in the composition and quality of italian political scientists described above are certainly very promising but are also fraught with dangers for the continuing growth and consolidation of the discipline. let us summarize the achievements. first of all, it is by now taken for granted that italian political scientists should have earned a phd in political science or in a cognate social science with a clear specialization in the study of politics (a phd in political science is preferable). they should know the political science literature, broadly refer to its theoretical and analytical approaches, and use its methodological arsenal. they should have been trained to write, present and discuss their scientific works at national and international conferences and to disseminate their findings and reflections through national and international quality journals. they should demonstrate a certain continuity in the production of scientific works, slowing down possibly only during more intensive phases of data collection or in preparation of more complex scholarly products such as book manuscripts. they should command a number of methods, whether quantitative or qualitative, and be aware of the pros and cons of using the ones and the others. provided they clear all these requirements and show a pertinent record, with the important proviso that a sufficient number of positions in political science (and correlated funds) are available, they can legitimately aim at a steady progression of their careers. all good, then? in reality there are dangers inherent in this otherwise commendable mainstreaming of the profession that are worthy of mention. a career in political science, like that in many other disciplines in italy, requires also being available to carry out a number of activities that objectively distract from the three missions described above and that can be indicated as participating in the governance of university departments, contributing to the administration that makes the above three missions possible, and offering a service to the community (such as reviewing journal articles and other types of submissions, serving on the board of scientific journals, participating in evaluation committees, serving on the executive committees of scientific associations, etc.). young scholars, fresh 8 for a fuller assessment of the potentials and constraints of the third mission of universities, see compagnucci and spigarelli (2020). simona piattoni 325 out of a phd and perhaps enjoying the freedom afforded by a research grant, rightly worry about taking the first steps of their careers thinking that landing a position in a university department is the hardest part. in their minds, the uncertainties connected to their situation obviously outweigh the freedom of being able to shape one’s research agenda and dedicate oneself full-time to studying, doing research and writing. having interiorized the well-known injunction “publish or perish”, this is what they singlemindedly pursue. little do they know that those precarious years with little money and too much freedom may be the best of their lives! once they finally land a job in academia and clear the first hurdle to a stable position – in the current italian promotion system, when they become associate professors – their freedom and time begin to evaporate, and they are required to perform some of the many accessory activities (described above) that allow the system to function. unfortunately, some scholars never quite make the psychological transition and try to retain the best of both worlds: stability and freedom. this leads to situations in which departments are starved of people who are willing to help run them efficiently; evaluation committees (think of the various concorsi, but also of the vqr and the asn) are deprived of brilliant scholars who would rightfully contribute to keeping up the standards of the profession; scholarly journals do not find competent editors who can secure a stream of high-level scientific publications; and disciplinary associations and other governance structures cannot find worthy candidates to fill their executive positions. “service to the community” in various capacities is one of the hallmarks of an established scholar just as brilliant teaching, innovative research and captivating posts are. many colleagues eventually understand the importance of also carrying out these activities but, particularly among those who have experienced a long period of precariousness or who have begun their careers abroad, a certain reluctance in sharing the burdens of a system that they do not yet feel is their own can be noted. 6. conclusions italian political scientists have made momentous progress on many fronts, but particularly by upgrading upper tertiary education, mainstreaming career development and intensifying their presence in international scientific circles. a greater international mobility of italian scholars studying and working abroad and, vice versa, foreign scholars studying and working in italy can also be observed. these changes have been accompanied by a certain differentiation between (variously denominated) political science departments now trying to acquire a particular specialization and international standing in attractive research areas or in specific methodological approaches. a certain attempt at innovation and hybridization of political science with other social sciences is also observable, though perhaps not to the extent that seems to be required by the changing needs of current societies. more could be done in several areas: from the establishment of applied phd programs in collaboration with private firms and public agencies to the constant upgrading of teaching and disseminating techniques through more investment in continuing education and life-long learning arrangements. [the profession] italian political science today 326 references almond, gabriel (1988), “separate tables: schools and sects in political science”, ps: political science and politics, 21 (4): 828-842. ballarino, gabriele, alberto felice de toni and marino regini (2021), la riorganizzazione del dottorato di ricerca fra accademia e mercato. unimi 2040 discussion papers n. 4. doi: https://doi.org/10.13130/unimi2040.37 compagnucci, lorenzo and francesca spigarelli (2020), “the third mission of the university: a systematic literature review on potentials and constraints”, technological forecasting and social change, 161, december 2020. available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120284 giuliani, marco (2012), “political science in milan: three elements and four scenarios”, ips (special issue), 7 (1): 1-5. isernia, pierangelo (2012), “political science in siena: sentiments, rational calculations and windows of opportunity”, ips (special issue), 7 (1): 8-10. ips (2012), “political science in italy after the last university reform”, ips (special issue), 7 (1): 1-10. piattoni, simona ed (2017), “the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science”, ips (special issue), 12 (1): 1-54. regini, marino (2020), il futuro della governance universitaria. unimi 2040 discussion papers n. 1. doi: https://doi.org/10.13130/unimi2040.13 regini, marino, gaetano manfredi and gianfranco viesti (2020), scenari socio-economici del post-covid: quale impatto sull’università? unimi 2024 discussion papers n. 2. doi: https://doi.org/10.13130/unimi2040.21 microsoft word pdf_issue_15_1_hanausantini_132-143.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 1, may 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 1, 132-143. contact author: ruth hanau santini, university of naples ‘l’orientale’. e-mail address: hanausantinir@gmail.com italian post-2011 foreign policy in the mediterranean caught between status and fear: the case of libya ruth hanau santini university of naples ‘l’orientale’ abstract cold war and post-cold war italian foreign policy has been articulated by accommodating and harmonizing three sets of partnerships: atlanticism, europeanism and the mediterranean. following the 2011 arab uprisings, increasing fragmentation in the mena region, a more ambiguous us role and rising intra-eu divisions have constrained italian foreign policy in the region. by looking at the case study of post-2011 libya, the article, through historical process-tracing and in-depth interviews, illustrates how fear of abandonment by its us ally and of marginalization within the eu arena has characterized rome’s approach towards a key mediterranean energy and political partner. 1. introduction he mediterranean has historically been italy’s geographical backyard, encapsulating an idea, a dream of an african empire (varsori 2016), an arena, and an ensemble of policies where ambitious appetites could be displayed. recently, however, the mediterranean, far from being the natural locus for a search for status (felsen 2018), has become the graveyard of italian political and diplomatic efforts at power projection. the way in which italian foreign policy increasingly looks at the mediterranean region, however, is through the lenses of united states (us) policies and intra-european union (eu) dynamics. the article argues that, from 2011 onwards, italian foreign policy in the mediterranean has struggled to effectively navigate between three geographical and political dimensions, or circles — the atlantic, the european and the mediterranean — which until 2001 were balanced and substantially consistent among themselves (andreatta 2008). the article frames italian foreign policy towards the region within a broader framework, taking into account how post-2011 middle east and northern africa (mena) politics has become increasingly fragmented, and how this ongoing regional reconfiguration has exposed intra-european and us-european divergences. against this backdrop, the article investigates how italian post-2011 foreign policy has balanced the three circles around a key dossier: libya. the paper looks at italian libyan policy as an example of strategic weakness, resulting from the diminished consistency between italy’s atlanticism, europeanism and a strong mediterranean policy. the article identifies fear as a defining feature in post-2011 italian policy choices vis-à-vis libya. it does so by focusing on the emotional element of fear and the way in which it has become institutionalized and come to influence key foreign policy choices. secondly, it shows the extent to t ruth hanau santini 133 which the italian view of the southern mediterranean operates through the prism of american or european lenses and how this impacts italian policy. in order to do so, the paper analyzes a central case study, italian post-2011 libyan policy, methodologically through historical process-tracing, the analysis of secondary sources and in-depth interviews with italian foreign policy analysts and diplomats. 2. linking status and emotions in italian foreign policy in the words of leopoldo nuti, since the end of world war ii, italian foreign policy has been externally driven by the quest for status and recognition, while domestically, it has been instrumentally used as a tool to maintain shaky political equilibria (nuti 2011). as pointed out by ennio di nolfo (1990), this search for status and recognition was dependent on four interlocking variables: subordination (to the us), interdependence (with the north atlantic treaty organization, nato), integration (with the eu), and attempts at autonomy. the four constraints under bipolarity translated into three circles or dimensions, around which italian foreign policy was shaped in the cold war and early post-cold war period: atlanticism; europeanism and the mediterranean. as argued by andreatta, in the early postwwii period, italian governments managed cold war foreign policy constraints by keeping a careful balance between the atlantic alliance — embodied by nato —, europe — within the european community first and european union later—, and the mediterranean — with a projection mostly over the arab world and israel. nuti and di nolfo refer to status and prestige interchangeably and, without offering further analytical unpacking, seemingly point to the diplomatic dimension of a state’s power projection. in international relations theory, however, prestige is only one dimension of status: prestige depends on military victories and success in peace and war (onea 2014), while status refers to social rank and has a relational nature. recent scholarly work in the field has extensively delved into the notion of status and its role in foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis the outbreak of conflicts. this literature examines strategies of accommodation in rising powers’ status demands (paul 2016), status aspiration blockages (ward 2017), status discrepancies as causes of conflict (onea 2014), and major powers’ strategies for resisting status decline. status has been approached differently, according to the weight attributed to material or non-material aspects of power and identity-related dimensions. according to t.v. paul, larson and wohlforth (2014), status can be understood as “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, diplomatic clout)”. being a positional good, status revolves around what others believe about a state’s relative ranking. status has a clear link with social hierarchy, as it is recognized through voluntary deference from others. within an informal social hierarchy, status recognition points to the state’s position vis-à-vis other actors. in other words, status is not merely about becoming visible, but is also reckoned with in key foreign policy dossiers by the most significant foreign policy actors. others have focused on the less visible drivers of war, downplaying the role of material capabilities or factual elements of power ranking, choosing instead to focus on the existential dimensions of international politics. richard ned lebow has interpreted the search for status as the need by states to be esteemed, to be accorded a ranking among other states, and to be honored (ned lebow 2010). following a culturalist reading of international relations, italian post-2011 foreign policy in the mediterranean 134 ned lebow argues that the lack of such recognition is responsible for most international conflicts, as it ignites desire for revenge. status decline is particularly visible in cases where a country raises expectations about its military prowess and encounters a harsh military defeat, as was the case with mussolini’s italy, rapidly categorized as a ‘paper tiger’. onea considers it a case of status inconsistency, typical of ‘arrivistes’ powers which, at best, only excel in one dimension of power, and often not the military one (onea 2014: 134). the devastating experience of world war ii and the ways in which italian historical responsibilities have failed to be scrutinized in italian public discourse have hampered an honest assessment not only of racist behavior in italian domestic and foreign policy in the 1930s and early 1940s but it has tainted any public debate concerning national interests and the instruments to be used to pursue them. in postwar italy, public conversations about the atrocities committed by fascism, domestically as well as in europe and africa, were mostly swept under the carpet (judt 1992). in addition to this, the adoption of general amnesties for former members of the regime led to a postwar normalization of fascism and fascists in italian history and society. this, de facto, engendered a sense of mistrust in the country’s public selfrepresentation. in failing to address historical responsibilities linked to crimes committed against minorities domestically and against local populations in countries where italy ventured into colonial adventures, in the post-war era national discourse focused on the need to be internationally appreciated, acknowledged, and accepted (aresu and gori 2018: 61). the search for external recognition — premised on a fear of being undeserving — has influenced italian foreign policy in the three circles in which it operates, i.e. the atlantic circle, the european and the mediterranean, or middle eastern and north african one. more to the point, because of its wartime legacy and postwar alliances and unification projects, italy has, with few exceptions, sacrificed its autonomy vis-à-vis the mediterranean, subjugating its preferences to us and european interests or veto powers. italy has increasingly looked at the first two circles, atlanticism and europeanism, through the lenses of fear — of abandonment and of marginalization — and this has in turn impacted its policy in the third circle, torn as it is between the constraints provided by the two former circles and the search for strategic autonomy. the role of fear — fear of abandonment by the us in the postwar and post-cold war eras, and the fear of marginalization from european allies during and after the cold war — is an illuminating explanatory device if we grant emotions the ability to influence and shape behaviors and choices. in line with the works of neta crawford (2000; 2002) and brent steele (2008), emotions cannot be discarded as an ontological basis for state behavior. far from positing a cold, all-calculating state, neorealists and neoliberal scholars accept two important emotions, fear and hate, as drivers of state behavior (steele 2008: 16). as succinctly put by neta crawford, “emotions and beliefs structure the acquisition and organization of knowledge and the development of standard operating procedures and routines handling challenges” (2014: 547). specific emotions, in other words, rather than being posited in contrast with reason and rationality, should be understood as social forces which come to be internalized by policymakers and diplomats, cognitively driving their reading and perceptions of choices that can be made and decisions that are in the country’s best interest. emotions are embedded within specific cultural and social contexts and are interwoven with existing and prevailing ideas, interests and discourses (hutchison and bleiker 2014). emotions permeate contemporary understandings that underpin how politics, and foreign policy, operate in value-terms. ruth hanau santini 135 3. fear as an analytical element behind the first two circles of italian foreign policy these three circles — atlanticism, europeanism and the mediterranean — encapsulated italian national interest in a bipolar and unipolar world (garruccio 1982; andreatta 2008; brighi 2013). at least until the ascent of silvio berlusconi in 2001, these circles balanced and reinforced each other (andreatta 2008). from then and until 2006, the italian government unequivocally aligned with the us and prioritized atlanticism over the other two circles. this was made painfully clear by the 2003 us military intervention against iraq. in a way, some scholars argue, when rome adhered to bush’s coalition of the willing, spearheaded by the united states this represented a shift from being, as was the case during the cold war, merely a ‘security consumer’ to becoming and acting like a ‘security producer’ or security provider (croci and valigi 2013). however, this decision contributed to weakening international multilateralism, as it occurred without united nations security council authorization and was, as later reluctantly admitted by the then un secretary general annan, in explicit violation of the un charter (the guardian 2004). siding with the us on a polarized issue also reverberated within europe, where two opposing camps were created according to who intervened in iraq (united kingdom, italy, spain, poland) and those who remained critical of the intervention (france and germany in primis). this drove a wedge within the eu and dealt a blow to eu foreign policy that took time to heal. others have framed this phase of italian foreign policy as one where a clash materialized between traditional internationalist approaches and the re-nationalization of foreign policy (quaglia 2007: 144). under unipolarity, two facets occur: a vast reduction in constraints on the unipole, and the continuation of alliances from previous eras, albeit with less bargaining power for minor allies as there are no alternative great powers and the “systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions” (monteiro 2011/2012: 24). what this has meant in practice for italian foreign policy is that rome has sided even more assertively with washington in most middle east and north african dossiers. the beginning of the end of the unipolar moment came with the 2003 iraq war, which polarized european allies and fragmented eu foreign policy consensus. since then, fear of us abandonment, a classic risk or pathology in alliances (snyder 1984), has accounted for much of italian subservience to washington even in key hotspots such as 2011 libya. it could therefore be argued that the first circle was perceived through fear. fear of being left behind and of being considered the weak link in the alliance is the key reason behind the choice made by italy to prioritize us preferences over european ones and the identification of national interests with automatism in looking first and foremost across the atlantic. andreatta recalls the cases of albania in 1993 and 1997 and the crisis in the former yugoslavia, where italy was initially excluded from the contact group (ibid). another kind of fear dominated the second european circle in the eyes of italian policymakers during and after the cold war: fear of marginalization within the eu. in the last decade, this has been coupled with a fear of neglect, as rome has felt left alone in dealing with southern mediterranean challenges. these feelings developed into a perception of either being or at least being treated as a second-class citizen among eu powers, or what a diplomat has dubbed the ‘violetta syndrome’, the verdi character who is desperate to be loved back by her lover and never stops asking for reassurances (aresu italian post-2011 foreign policy in the mediterranean 136 and gori 2018: 60). this motivated much of italian foreign policy in eu circles (cladi and webber 2011), especially vis-à-vis the perceived motor of european integration, the franco-german engine. as in the previous circle, fear — here of being a second-class european power — changes what we look for, what we see and the way we think (crawford, 2014). it affects how we filter and organize knowledge and can contribute to cognitive dissonance by leading us to discount alternative information. in the words of a senior diplomat, the franco-german condominium was particularly hard to swallow for italy as it basically denied italy’s aspiration to be a ‘regional power’ (aresu and gori 2018: 66). this is arguably a reformulation of what varsori asserted about italian cold war status expectations of being recognized as a ‘middle power’, aware of its subordination but searching status parity with other middle powers (varsori 1998). the eu circle changed in its dynamics and in the eyes of the beholder, i.e. italy, with the emergence of a directoire in charge of negotiations with the islamic republic of iran in the second half of the 2000s. this was even more apparent after the 2008 financial crisis, with decisions increasingly taken between berlin, paris and, to a lesser degree, london, and then somewhat superimposed on remaining partners (aresu and gori 2018: 67). for italy, the fear of neglect by the eu in the migration portfolio was deeply felt with the deterioration of the situation in the southern mediterranean and in sub-saharan countries. the assumption that the combination of revolts, deteriorating economic conditions and climate shocks would trigger new migratory waves towards europe, and southern europe in particular, was a motivating factor in italian policymakers’ appeals to the european commission and council for joint policies, especially throughout 2015 and since then. the lack of a european consensus over migratory policies and the difficulties in changing the dublin regulation meant that legal provisions envisioned for non-emergency phases of migratory flows proved to be highly inadequate in 2014-2017 and italy bore the brunt of the rigidity of other european member states. between 2013 and 2017, over 650,000 migrants reached italian shores, a fourth of which in 2016 alone (rome med 2017: 26). the italian interior minister, marco minniti, appealed to the other member states for help in 2017: only germany seemed to listen, accepting a small number of asylum seekers and pushing the eu to assist italy in maintaining refugee camps in libya (longo 2017). on the italian political landscape, the migratory crisis represented the short circuit between the second and the third circle, the mediterranean. in 2017, 90% of migrants came from libya (ibid). the 2003 dublin regulation foresees the criteria of attributing to the first country of arrival the duty to process asylum requests. already in 2008, the european parliament acknowledged that the system “in the absence of harmonization will continue to be unfair both to asylum seekers and to certain member states” (united nations high commissioner for refugees, unhcr). this was echoed by the european commission, which proposed amendments, endorsed by the european parliament, which remained on paper for a decade. after several years of painful negotiations, the regulation was eventually ‘temporarily’ modified at the la valletta summit in september 2019, theoretically sharing the burden across european states vis-à-vis migratory flows. this, however, was done outside existing eu treaties and inter-governmentally, at an informal meeting of interior ministers in malta (carrera and cortinovis 2019). in the case of italy, both the delayed ruth hanau santini 137 timing of the acceptance of solidarity and the lack of implementation of the decision were the nails in the coffin in terms of perception of neglect, verging on abandonment, by europe. the latest testing ground of the second circle for italy is the 2020 covid-19 related crisis. the devastating impact of covid-19 diffusion in early 2020 wreaked havoc, not just in terms of sustainability of the health system but also of the skyrocketing level of the country’s debt and its entering into recession because of the impact of the lockdown adopted to contain the pandemic. demands for a coronabond or the mutualization of public debt encountered resistance from a coalition including germany, the netherlands and austria. while many parallel the ongoing health and economic crisis in italy, and potentially also spain and france, to the one experienced a decade ago after the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, the demands and supply shocks experienced, with varying degrees, by most european countries present a different set of challenges, requiring qualitatively new policy responses both at the national and supranational level. 4. the mediterranean, between a dysfunctional eu second circle and an increasingly reluctant first us circle as aptly illustrated in the previous paragraph, with the exemplary case of the handling of migratory pressures from the southern mediterranean on southern europe, the expanded mediterranean increasingly represents a plethora of security challenges. more than that, it encapsulates all interlocking threats identified in 2003 by the european union in its first strategic document. eu diplomacy identified five pressing challenges to the security of the continent in the european security strategy: regional conflicts, terrorism, wmd, organized crime, state failure (european union 2003). in it, a preferred and endorsed policy approach which should have informed eu policies in a consistent way was depicted as ‘effective multilateralism’. there the idea was to act, whenever possible, under the aegis of legitimate international organizations, in primis the united nations, in a forceful way. since then, however, both the nature of the international system and european politics have significantly changed. internationally, the unipolar moment (monteiro 2014) has faded away while, at the eu level, qualitatively new phenomena have included the rise of nationalist and eurosceptic political parties and governments across the union and the loss of one of its core members with brexit. the eu has also faced spillovers from external shocks, ranging from terrorist attacks on its soil to unprecedented migratory flows. the combination of these elements has transformed the proactive and optimist outlook of the early 2000s into an increasingly torn and inward-looking europe. the changing landscape was aptly epitomized in 2016 by a new strategic document, the global strategy where, rather than focusing on the kinds of threats the continent faces, or the specific kind of multilateralism to be endorsed and sustained to face them, two notions are spelled out: principled pragmatism and resilience. coupled together, they signaled a less ambitious agenda, the abandonment of transformative ideals (juncos 2017) and the adoption of a post-liberal foreign policy attitude (european union 2016). the eugs also embodies european fears, articulated in the fear of losing identity and the european way of life in the section dedicated to the ‘security of our union’. this materialized in december 2019 in the post of the european commission’s vice president in italian post-2011 foreign policy in the mediterranean 138 charge of the portfolio ‘promoting our european way of life’, problematically linked to migration and security management. paradoxically, this has sat quite well with italian foreign policy in the mediterranean, which, far from being driven by transformative goals, aims at navigating increasingly complex challenges, rising geopolitical competition and ensuring that italian economic and energy interests are safeguarded (barberini 2020). in other words, fear of losing out from what was acquired in the past, the status quo ante, becomes the justification for policies aimed at protecting values and interests vis-à-vis external challenges threatening core principles and values. this is a full reversal of the european security strategy transformative ethos, less so for italian foreign policy guiding principles, which, as demonstrated in the case of libya, are articulated with the core goal of preserving and losing as little as possible rather than rethinking, relaunching, revising, and transforming the country’s approach to the dossier. 5. italian libya policy and the short circuit of the three circles in the words of a senior italian diplomat in charge of mena affairs at the italian ministry of foreign affairs (mfa), four drivers explain italian foreign policy in north africa and towards libya in particular: energy needs, responding to migratory challenges, countering terrorist threats and the search for status (interview, rome, february 2020). the libyan dossier epitomizes all of them. italian-libyan relations have been marred by the legacy of italian colonialism (1912-1943), which only with the 2008 treaty on friendship, partnership and cooperation signed between libyan ruler muammar qaddafi and italian prime minister silvio berlusconi solved all libyan claims related to colonialism, especially economic ones. italy committed to pay 5 billion dollars’ worth of reparations over the course of two decades in exchange for sustained cooperation on migration (croci and valigi 2013). rudely but honestly, the agreement was dubbed by berlusconi as enabling ‘more oil, fewer migrants’ (paoletti 2010). italian libyan policy, it is widely held, has been a bipartisan one, as no notable difference could be detected in the different center-left and center-right governments since the 1990s. after 42 years in power, muammar qaddafi was ousted after an initially peaceful nation-wide protest movement, militarized after brutal repression by the regime, coupled with aerial bombing by nato forces between march and november 2011. italy joined operation odyssey dawn-unified protector on march 19, 2011 after the no-fly zone had been approved by the united nations security council resolution 1973, profiting from the abstention of china and russia (and among the non-permanent members of the united nations security council, unsc, germany, india and brazil). italian center-right foreign minister franco frattini pushed for a nato mission rather than an ad hoc coalition. the reason might reside in the fear that a non-nato operation would be led by a small directoire (croci and valigi 2013), italy being antithetic to such foreign policy practice out of fear of being marginalized. even then, however, rome displayed reluctance to contribute troops on the ground to aid nato’s efforts. it did however, with the ‘cirene’ mission from 2011, albeit in a limited fashion, engage in military and security cooperation with libyan forces, training them to patrol borders and in maritime security. in may 2012, the two sides — the italian government and the libyan transitional government headed by ali zeidan — signed a memorandum of understanding ruth hanau santini 139 (mou) which officially sealed this bilateral security cooperation, mostly aimed at avoiding losing what had been secured since 2008 in political and economic terms (iai 2014). between late 2011 and the june elections in 2014, libya seemed to be on track for a domestic-led transition. in july 2012, assisted by the un support mission to libya (unsmil), the country held peaceful and democratic elections. what the first libyan democratic elections produced were formally democratic institutions (a parliament and a government) which, however, resembled an empty shell more than functioning bodies. the aftermath and the period up to the june 2014 elections already pointed to an existing and increasing divisiveness among libyan political forces. fractures revolved around the secular-islamist cleavage, interlocking with personal and local exclusionary political dynamics. the 2014 elections, however, proved to be the nail in the coffin of the country’s democratic trajectory. islamist political parties lost the vote but failed to accept the electoral results, did not recognize the legitimacy of the new legislative body, and refused to hand over power. as the dispute over the 2014 elections results triggered a widespread clash and a relapse into violence was materializing, the international community committed to a negotiated settlement and the establishment of a new governing authority. such efforts eventually led to the shirkat political agreement in december 2015. the agreement, however, failed to tackle the most controversial issues, including security arrangements (droz vincent 2018). while the un-recognized authority, the government of national accord (gna) was established in tripoli and was led by fayez al-serraj, the islamist forces, refusing to hand over power, maintained control over the house of representatives (hor) in the eastern part of the country and appointed khalifa haftar as field marshal libyan national army (lna), a mixture of military units and tribal or localbased armed groups mostly supported by egypt and the united arab emirates. from late 2014 and throughout 2015, haftar and the lna took control over cyrenaica, libya’s eastern region, and expanded south, controlling most of fezzan by 2018 (lacher 2019). the proliferation of domestic and external actors further complicated the political dynamics between the two polities. low-intensity violence characterized the period until april 2019, when, a few days before the national conference set up by the un envoy to libya, ghassan salamé, general haftar moved his forces towards tripoli and started staging an attack that has been ongoing ever since. the attempt by military means to take control of the entire country, attempted again in april 2020, failed to succeed. while officially the european union, which has played virtually no role in the libyan crisis, recognizes and supports the un-sponsored tripoli government, since early 2015, france has been supporting general haftar with military advisers and special forces (a fact which became impossible to deny once two french military advisors were killed in a helicopter crash near benghazi in july 2016) (harchaoui 2017). this occurred under the watch and patronage of french foreign minister jean-yves le drian, who served as defense minister under president hollande (2012-2017) and who shares french president macron’s view of libya through the prism of combating terrorism, political islam and serving french national interests. in this context it should be noted how, paris, especially since its 2013 intervention in mali, which france considers a success, looks at north africa through the prism of the sahel, and does so from a securitized perspective where countering terrorism and limiting the spread of islamists are its italian post-2011 foreign policy in the mediterranean 140 driving goals. in july 2017, president macron organized a meeting at la celle-saintcloud, which served its purpose, i.e. legitimizing haftar in the eyes of the international community. besides this aspect, the political value of the meeting between haftar and serraj was null as they did not sign the final communiqué. the french diplomatic initiative did not go unnoticed and it ruffled a few feathers in rome, as french activism was perceived as a way to bypass italy (falchi 2017). again, italy — this time reasonably so — feared marginalization by a european power in what italy perceives its backyard, because of colonial ties and energy relations, eni being in libya since the late 1950s. in order to take back control of diplomatic initiatives in libya, italy went back to its first circle and in september 2018, prime minister conte visited the united states and obtained what was interpreted as a green light from the trump administration to relaunch the mediation process. shortly afterwards, in november 2018, rome organized the palermo conference, considered an important milestone in italian diplomatic activity. according to a senior diplomat, though, it was the perceived success of the conference that created a false sense of security in the italian government which led conte to sit on his laurels (interview, rome, february 2020). as previously mentioned, a few months later, in april 2019, general haftar launched a surprise large-scale attack against tripoli, something which caught italy and europe unprepared (wehrey and lacher 2019). the fear of abandonment came into play when rome realized that the us, despite being one of the few external powers able to leverage enough incentives and threat of sticks (sanctions) to bring both sides to the table, would be unlikely to engage more in the conflict. this reverberated in rome in particular after the only italian hospital in libya was almost hit by haftar forces in a bombing against misurata in july 2019. italy maintains there a military hospital with 300 servicemen and considers it a crucial logistical base. within the void determined by scarce us action, in september 2019, russian mercenaries arrived in support of haftar in southern tripoli. while russia had been stepping up its efforts in libya since 2015, this was unprecedented in scale, as russia provided the lna with anti-tank missiles, laser-guided artillery and support through paramilitary forces, the wagner group (wehrey and harchaoui 2020). italy had renounced any kind of military activity on the ground, from 2011 onwards, thereby also limiting its appeal to serraj who, by mid-2019, accepted an aid offer from turkish president erdo!an and in november 2019 signed an mou with turkey. italy had lost valuable time due to domestic reasons. between late spring 2019 and the summer, the lega-5star movement had crumbled and a political crisis erupted, culminating in a government reshuffling, and substituting the lega with the center-left democratic party. if the former foreign minister in 2018-2019, moavero milanesi, had been barely visible on the libyan dossier, the new foreign minister from the 5star movement, luigi di maio, had no international or diplomatic experience and little appetite for foreign policy. he only grasped the importance of the libyan dossier for italian domestic and foreign policy on the occasion of the rome mediterranean dialogues, which took place in late november 2019 and saw the participation of most arab foreign ministers. unfortunately, despite renewed interest in libya, the successive diplomatic initiative was a fiasco. in january 2020, prime minister conte tried to arrange a meeting in rome between the two libyan leaders, serraj and haftar, offending the former and falling short of creating a viable track two diplomatic channel with the latter. shortly ruth hanau santini 141 afterwards, on january 19, 2020, germany took the lead and set up the berlin conference, whose main output was the adoption of an arms embargo. italy’s fear of marginalization was then substantiated. the wound, however, was partially self-inflicted. as a consequence of the berlin conference, a new naval military operation, irini, replacing the previous operation sophia, was launched on may 4, 2020. serraj, however, complained that this mission would mostly facilitate haftar forces, whose refurbishment from the united arab emirates (uae) arrived by air or by land from egypt, while turkish military support to tripoli would be the one most likely to be intercepted by irini. while italy supports the military naval mission, it is left with few arrows to spare and has become mostly an observer of the complex interlocking domestic developments in libya, impacting also on italian politics, from migratory flows to energy cooperation to political relations. this section intended to show how italian libyan policy has become hostage of the first two circles and italian fears of abandonment or of marginalization by europe — and france in particular — on the libyan dossier have become a self-fulfilling prophecy, leaving italy an invisible player in the heavily populated libyan theatre. 6. conclusions by analytically unpacking the three circles and the first two in particular, this short paper has attempted to illustrate how, identifying the emotional dimension of each circle, post-2011 italian foreign policy in a key mediterranean dossier like the libyan one, has been characterized by strategic weakness. this resulted from increasing challenges in having the two circles — atlanticism and europeanism — converge in the mediterranean, which, rather than providing increased room for maneuver for italian foreign policy, has been read through the lenses of fear of abandonment by the us and fear of marginalization within the eu. the article has offered a reading premised on the identification of a key emotional dimension accounting for italian foreign policy relations with the us and within europe and has tried to illuminate how the emotional backbone of these relations is premised on the element of fear, be it of abandonment or marginalization. through historical process tracing, secondary sources and in-depth interviews with italian foreign policy analysts and diplomats, the article has provided a series of empirical illustrations from the libyan post-2011 period in order to testify to the self-sabotage of italian foreign policy in its third circle due to excessive weight placed on external constraints attributed to the us or the eu or other european powers. with regard to the former, a sense of subordination has led italy to postpone actions and launch initiatives, uncertain of a clear us mandate, only to be left alone to deal with its own diplomatic fallouts. with regard to the latter, libya, in european terms, has become a battlefront for status rivalry between italy and france, where the two european powers, while formally supporting the same side, the un-backed tripoli gna, are rivals on the ground as france has increasingly supported haftar and the lna. the failure of the january rome meeting and the berlin conference, where most of the issues agreed by the parties were particularly welcomed by paris, only reinforces this point. the irini naval military mission, while on paper aiming at implementing those decisions and the arms embargo, might end up reinforcing the side france has been not so silently supporting for the past italian post-2011 foreign policy in the mediterranean 142 five years, also with covert operations, while italy 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cayrol 1991; de vreese, lauf, and peter, 2006a). yet, it is also the case that this model is evolving (schmitt 2005; hobolt and wittrock 2011; galpin and trenz 2018; roncarolo 2011). certainly, after the great recession, the eu gained considerable salience within domestic debate for imposing austerity measures and (not) managing the migration issue (hutter and kriesi 2019). in the same period, several national parties – both europhile and eurosceptic – have stressed the relevance of the eu within national political debates (meijers 2017). in this context, the news media have become increasingly relevant not only as a source of information but also as an active player in the game of (de)legitimation of the eu. a european versus domestic politics 74 in this regard, a well-established branch of literature has found that the news coverage of european union (eu) politics plays a crucial role in connecting european citizens with institutions and in raising public awareness of eu politics. banducci and semetko (2003) found that eu news coverage affects turnout in european elections, while other scholars have shown a correlation between citizens’ support for future european integration and the features of news coverage on the eu (e.g. maier & rittberger, 2008; vliegenthart et al., 2008). eu news coverage also contributes to enhancing the process of europeanizing national public spheres (e.g. fossum & schlesinger, 2007) and strengthening the legitimacy of the eu institutions (e.g. trenz, 2008). a second strand of scholars focus more specifically on the negative media coverage of eu-related issues and on their effects on citizens’ attitudes towards the eu. one consistent finding, regarding journalism and news values in general, is that bad news is more newsworthy than good news (soroka, 2014). this also applies to politics at both national and supranational level. in this perspective, the news media can play an active role in amplifying or restraining eu contestation (statham & trenz, 2013). galpin and trenz (2018), comparing news media coverage in the uk and germany, found that the uk news demonstrates a strong negative bias towards eu polity, whereas in germany ep debates focus more strongly on eu politics and policies and show a positive bias towards eu polity. other scholars, looking at the effects of this type of coverage, have analysed the tone of eu news and found that exposure to negative evaluations of the eu leads citizens to be more supportive of eurosceptic parties (de vreese 2004; van spanje & de vreese 2014). this article examines mainstream media coverage of the 2019 eu elections, adopting the case of italy as an illustration. these elections were the first test for the populist government led by the 5 star movement and the league. both these parties are clearly not europhile but rather, albeit with some differences, eurosceptic. the 5 star movement has in the past adopted a pretty ambiguous approach by raising criticism against the eu but keeping their distance from the eurosceptic parties once in brussels (franzosi et al. 2015). on the contrary, the league – especially under the leadership of matteo salvini – shifted towards hard euroscepticism, moving the traditional cleavage (and divide) from rome to brussels, blaming eu institutions for the bad economic situation (albertazzi et al., 2018). as a consequence, eu elections have acquired greater importance than in the past. this article aims to understand to what extent european issues and actors are referred to in a negative tone within the news coverage of the 2019 ep election campaign. it allows a thorough understanding of the role of the mainstream media in the (de)legitimation of the eu in a country affected by several controversies with the eu (among others, migration issues and public debt containment) and led by two eurosceptic parties. for a long time, italy was considered a europhile country (huysseune, 2010; conti & memoli, 2010, 2013). since 2014, the situation has radically changed. while eurosceptic parties did not reach 20% in 2009, they exceeded 50% of the votes in 20141. italy further 1 in the 2009 ep elections, the eurosceptic parties were the northern league (ln) and the radical left (sel). in 2014, besides ln and sel (renamed the ‘tsipras list’ for the occasion), a further three parties openly joined the eurosceptic side. on the right, berlusconi’s forza italia (fi, go italy) ran a campaign under the slogan ‘more italy in europe, less europe in italy’. in the same area, fratelli d’italia (fdi, brothers of italy), a berlusconi ally, campaigned close to the eurosceptic positions of marine le pen. finally, the most voted eurosceptic party in the 2014 elections was the movimento cinque stelle (m5s, five star movement), whose campaign was based on the request for a referendum on the euro and a refusal of seddone, bobba and roncarolo 75 evolved toward an eu-critical positioning in 2019 when lega, m5s and fdi won almost 58% of the votes cast. in this situation, where the two mainstream parties, forza italia (fi, go italy) and partito democratico (pd, democratic party), are marginalized, and no proeuropean voices are heard in the public debate, it is relevant to investigate the role of the italian media system in counterposing or fostering the anti-eu narrative. in the light of the above, the article shows how the main italian newscasts and newspapers used a negative tone to cover domestic and european actors and themes, by investigating different patterns of europeanization (koopmans and erbe 2004). in the section below, we discuss how literature has addressed this issue and, on this basis, we present our research questions. in section 2, we outline the research design, while in section 3 we examine the coverage of the 2019 ep election campaign in italy. our findings suggest that tv and daily press present different patterns of negativity. newspapers, in particular, appear more prone to using a negative tone when featuring politics. as concerns the dualism between eu and domestic politics, europe still benefits from a europhile media coverage if compared with domestic politics, and this applies to both press and tv. conversely, when the distinction between eu and domestic politics is viewed through the lens of political actors, we observe a radical difference between tv and press. eu political actors are indeed more likely to be covered negatively on tv newscasts than in newspapers. further differences can be identified when taking into account the dimensions of europeanization, results suggesting that when the media cover the interaction between eu and domestic politics there are higher chances of negative coverage. there is one exception: when italian political actors approach eu institutions or eu representatives, tv newscasts tend to be less negative 2. eu coverage on mainstream media in the past two decades, several scholars have focused their studies on media coverage of the eu. analyses of media coverage of european politics have answered questions about the europeanization of national public spheres (e.g. fossum & schlesinger, 2007) and contributed to our understanding of the democratic legitimacy of the eu institutions (e.g. trenz, 2008, savini, 2019). findings show that irregular and limited news coverage could unfavourably influence public citizens' awareness of the eu and especially the relationship between the representatives and the represented (shephard, 1997). regular coverage, on the contrary, would enhance opportunities for citizens to take note of eu activities and foster trust in european institutions (norris, 2000; nardis, 2015). the development of the european public sphere is challenging journalism cultures and practices; despite country-based differences the eu has indeed become a common issue for journalists (kunelius 2008). in this respect, pfetsch et al. (2008), for example, found that the press plays a crucial role in the europeanization of national public spheres, and in particular some countries seem to share similar approaches when dealing with eu issues as a consequence of a similar degree of involvement in the eu integration project (i.e. the press of france, germany, italy, the netherlands and spain share a similar point of view on eu issues when compared with the uk or switzerland). besides the functional the restrictive policies imposed by the eu (e.g. the inclusion of the fiscal compact and balanced budget principle in the italian constitution). european versus domestic politics 76 relationship with the eu, press coverage is affected also by the organizational infrastructure and the editorial policies setting the allocation of resources for eu newsgathering, and by the journalistic culture as well. similarly, cornia et al. (2008) suggest that a european journalistic culture is developing, but the domestic perspective still prevails and national relevance remains the core criterion for news selection. similar results are found by preston (2009), underlining that eu issues are still largely addressed and covered through domestic interpretative schemes. news about the eu is not traditionally widespread in mainstream media and some differences can be found between media types. while quality newspapers usually tend to cover european affairs (trenz, 2004; machill, beiler & fischer, 2006), eu news on television has been limited, irregular, and mainly focused on domestic issues or actors (e.g. de vreese, peter & semetko, 2001; peter & de vreese, 2004; meyer, 2005; boomgaarden et al., 2010). starting from 2008, the economic and euro crises began to change this approach to covering the eu (e.g. kleinen-von königslöw, 2012). at the same time, another series of issues, including humanitarian intervention, common defence, immigration policy and terrorism, are becoming more transnational, potentially contributing to the europeanization of national public spheres (e.g. koopmans, 2004; de vreese & kandyla, 2009; kantner, 2011). scholars have mainly addressed the study of european union news coverage by taking into account several dimensions, such as the visibility of eu news (e.g. boomgaarden et al., 2010), the degree of europeanization (or domestication) (e.g. koopmans, 2007; mcquail & bergsma, 1983; peter & de vreese 2004), the tone of the news regarding european integration, and the framing of eu affairs (e.g. de vreese et al., 2006). as clearly illustrated in several studies by boomgaarden, de vreese, and colleagues (boomgaarden et al., 2010; boomgaarden et al., 2013; schuck & de vreese, 2011), the visibility of the eu in the news is relevant, since it provides citizens with 'information about the issues at stake and cues them about the importance of european parliament elections' (boomgaarden et al., 2013: 611). in the light of the second-order elections thesis (reif & schmitt, 1980; schmitt, 2005), the europeanness of the news, namely the extent to which eu news is (or is not) domestified (boomgaarden et al., 2013; boomgaarden & de vreese, 2016), has been assessed through different dimensions. europeanization has been defined as a vertical or horizontal process: vertical europeanization ‘consists of communicative linkages between the national and the european level’, and horizontal europeanization ‘consists of communicative linkages between different member states’ (koopmans & erbe, 2004: 101). by using both of these dimensions, schuck & de vreese (2011: 289) showed that newspapers are still more important as agents of europeanization than television news; the quality press and public television are more european in focus than their commercial counterparts. mainly focusing on the vertical dimension, boomgaarden et al. (2013: 623–624) examined the prominence of eu actors in news coverage and found that when there is increasing elite conflict, there is less of a european focus in the news. this also applies to negativity among the political elites: the more negative, the less european (or vice versa). in light of the above, we investigate whether and to what extent the coverage of european politics and actors differentiates from the coverage of domestic politics and actors. we focus in particular on the negativity dimension, which is a recurrent element in the seddone, bobba and roncarolo 77 coverage of politics in general (lengauer et al. 2011). no study has so far focused specifically on the negative media coverage of european politics. therefore, we do not have clear expectations but have structured our analysis around four different research questions. a preliminary question concerns possible differences between newscasts and newspapers in the coverage of politics, in general. as mentioned above, we know that some differences emerge in terms of visibility but, to our knowledge, there are no studies that account for systemic differences between the two media regarding negativity. we therefore wondered: rq1: does the level of negativity vary between tv and newspapers? on the basis of this preliminary rq, we developed a further set of queries aimed to better clarify the main drivers of negativity within the two media types. the aim is thus to compare the negative tones of tv and the press by focusing on the distinction between domestic and eu politics at different levels. indeed, we found expectations that domestic politics is more relevant (in terms of visibility and space) than european politics, but there are no clear indications as to the patterns that a negative tone follows when covering the former or the latter. similar findings concern political actors: domestic actors are more salient within national public debates, but no clear expectations are found regarding media negativity. in this regard, our questions read as follow: rq2: does the level of negativity differ when european or domestic politics are covered? rq3: does the level of negativity differ when european or domestic political actors are covered? finally, literature shows that the europeanization of public debates involves the coverage of different dimensions of the european integration process. our last question, therefore, wonders whether there are different probabilities of negative coverage being associated with vertical and horizontal europeanization: rq4: does the level of negativity differ according to different ways to cover european politics? 3. methods 3.1 sample this study investigates the italian media coverage of the 2019 ep elections. our research questions are addressed by mean of a dataset including all news items focusing on political issues published or broadcast by the main italian press and tv media outlets during the seven weeks before the ep elections (7 april–24 may 2019). the unit of analysis was the news story and it was studied through a human content analysis carried out by three supervised coders. the data collection comprehends five newspapers and five tv newscasts that were selected according to two different criteria: the readership/audience and the outlet’s political leaning2. therefore, among the most widespread italian 2 the outlets’ political leanings were identified by referring to individual media diet and voting behaviour in the 2018 general elections by relying on itanes 2018 survey data (itanes, 2018; roncarolo and mancini, 2018). european versus domestic politics 78 newspapers, we considered corriere della sera and la stampa as less-politically-oriented/neutral outlets, while il giornale and la repubblica were included as representatives of, respectively, rightand left-wing views. finally, il fatto quotidiano was covered by our analysis since its political leaning appears closer to the movimento 5 stelle. as regards tv, the evening editions of the following newscasts were examined: tg1, tg2, tg3, tg5 and la7 news. also in this case, tg1 and la7 news were selected as less-politically-oriented/neutral newscasts, while the others account for different political areas. more precisely, tg2 was considered because it most reflects the government’s political views, while tg3 and tg5 were included in our study for their traditional closeness to, respectively, the centre-left and centre-right positions. for newspapers, all political news items published on the first page and recalled in internal pages were coded, while news items focusing on eu-related issues were all included in the data collection, regardless of their position within the newspaper. as regards tv, all political news items broadcast were coded. the final dataset includes 5,816 news items; in detail: 1,873 tv news items and 3,943 press news items. 3.2. variables3 general tone of the story: negative tone. our dependent variable (dv) accounts for the negative tone of media coverage. following lengauer et al. (2011), indicators of negative tone were found in those news items containing elements referring to (i.e.) crisis, disaster, negative outlook, conflict, defeat, fiasco the dv was derived from a categorical one, which according to the coding procedure aimed to distinguish between news items providing a negative, positive, balanced or neutral tone. then, for the sake of simplicity, it was recoded to isolate the news items showing negative tones against all the other news items framed by positive, neutral or balanced tones. media type and outlets. the first research question (rq1), exploring the negative bias in press and tv coverage, was addressed by means of a dichotomous variable (iv1) distinguishing between news items reported by press (=1) and news items broadcast by tv newscasts (=0). furthermore, we also investigated possible differences in the likelihood of negative tone among the outlets analysed. indeed, according to the criteria adopted for selecting the outlets, we could rely on a sample reflecting different political leanings. this allowed us to clarify whether there were ideological elements underpinning the outlet patterns of covering political issues. we investigate this dimension through a set of dummy variables identifying each of the ten media outlets analysed (ivs2). eu politics vs domestic politics. according to rq2, within a general climate of opinion characterized by citizens’ increasing criticism of the european integration project, we aim to assess if italian media outlets contributed to this climate of opinion by covering european-related issues and political actors in a negative way, or whether eu politics still benefits from europhile coverage (bobba and seddone, 2018). with this purpose in mind, we classified the news stories according to two main categories: those dealing with domestic politics and those referring to european politics. we intended this latter 3 coding instructions are reported in appendix. seddone, bobba and roncarolo 79 dimension as all the references to eu institutions, eu policies or eu political actors. in addition, when the story was devoted to issues relating to other eu member states it was also identified as european politics. conversely, all the stories covering the italian political debate or italian political actors were categorized as domestic politics. we derived, then, a dichotomous variable scoring 1 if news stories focused on european politics and coded as 0 when domestic politics was addressed within the news item (iv3). political actors. rq3 examines the impact of political actors’ visibility on negative bias within media coverage. the presence of political actors within the news story was detected by mean of a categorical variable accounting for the main italian political leaders as well as any possible reference to eu or foreign political actor in news items. for each news item, coders were asked to register up to five political actors. these data were then recoded into a set of five different dummy variables (ivs4) indicating, respectively, whether the story presented references to: berlusconi, di maio, salvini, zingaretti or eu political actors. europeanization. the fourth research question (rq4) addresses the dimension of europeanization. it is meant as a process of reciprocal connections between the eu political space and the domestic one. the contribution of koopmans and erbe (2004) appears fundamental. in particular, their theoretical framework identifies two dynamics of interactions between the national and the eu public spheres: vertical and horizontal. vertical europeanization is intended as the communicative linkages between the national and european political space. the bottom-up variant refers to the case of national actors directly addressing european institutions, european political actors or referring to eu policy issues. the top-down variant of vertical europeanization follows the inverse flow, i.e., the case of european actors addressing national actors, or intervening in domestic political debate by emphasizing common european issues and interests. horizontal europeanization, instead, pertains to the connections between the public spheres of eu members states. the weak variant of horizontal europeanization occurs when national media coverage reports issues related to the national political space of other eu member states. the strong variant of horizontal europeanization concerns instead direct communicative linkages between two member states’ political spaces. it could take place, for example, when politicians of a given country directly approach political actors of another eu member state. empirically, the vertical europeanization dimension was covered by two dummy variables detecting whether the news item provides reference, respectively, to topdown and bottom-up vertical europeanization (ivs5). similarly, two dummy variables identified the news items referring, respectively, to strong and weak horizontal europeanization (ivs6). 3.3. models the research questions leading our study were addressed by mean of four logit models, testing the likelihood of a negative tone in media coverage (dv). according to rq1, in order to detect differences between media types, we ran separated models for press and tv. model 1 and model 2 include as independent variables (a) the set of media outlets reporting the news story, (b) the dummy variable testing the reference to eu contents european versus domestic politics 80 (institutions, policy issues or political actors), and finally (c) the dichotomous variable accounting for the reference to eu political actors. models 3 and 4 extend this analysis by introducing the set of dummy variables identifying references to berlusconi, di maio, salvini, and zingaretti along with the dichotomous variable referring to the presence of eu political actors. in addition, these two models also include the dimension of europeanization, by testing the dummy variables detecting bottom-up vertical europeanization, top-down vertical europeanization, weak horizontal europeanization and strong horizontal europeanization. again, the two models distinguish between tv and press media. table 1 shows descriptives of variables included in the two models. table 1. descriptives of the variables variable obs. mean std. dev. min max type of media (press vs tv) 5816 0.68 0.47 0 1 corriere della sera 5816 0.14 0.34 0 1 la repubblica 5816 0.12 0.33 0 1 la stampa 5816 0.13 0.34 0 1 il giornale 5816 0.14 0.35 0 1 il fatto quotidiano 5816 0.15 0.36 0 1 tg1 5816 0.07 0.25 0 1 tg2 5816 0.08 0.27 0 1 tg3 5816 0.07 0.26 0 1 tg5 5816 0.05 0.22 0 1 tg la7 news 5816 0.05 0.22 0 1 reference to eu or foreign political actors 5816 0.20 0.40 0 1 reference to berlusconi 5816 0.08 0.27 0 1 reference to di maio 5816 0.23 0.42 0 1 reference to salvini 5816 0.37 0.48 0 1 reference to zingaretti 5816 0.08 0.28 0 1 eu news stories 5816 0.46 0.50 0 1 bottom-up vertical europeanization 2103 0.52 0.50 0 1 top-down vertical europeanization 2103 0.14 0.35 0 1 weak horizontal europeanization 2689 0.31 0.46 0 1 strong horizontal europeanization 2689 0.15 0.36 0 1 4. results we introduce our findings by providing some descriptive analyses illustrating the patterns of negative tone within our sample. precisely, table 2 shows the proportion of negative tone among the media outlets included in this study4. first of all, we observe that italian media coverage of the ep election campaign presents high levels of negative tone, especially if compared with 2014 media coverage of the ep elections (roncarolo 2019; bobba and seddone 2018). in total, 39.4% of the news stories analysed present elements of negative tone. this applies generally to all media outlets analysed, but it should be noted that negativity varies according to media type. indeed, newspapers present a 4 table 1a reported in the appendix provides details about the distribution of negative, positive and neutral tone. in general, among italian media outlets a neutral/balanced tone prevails when addressing politics and related issues. however, there are some significant differences. in particular, as concerns media outlets like il giornale and tg5 – both owned by berlusconi – the portion of neutral/balanced tone is quite low when compared with other outlets, while a negative frame prevails for depicting politics. in addition, it should be noted that a positive tone is actually extremely marginal for all the media outlets included in this study. seddone, bobba and roncarolo 81 higher quota of news stories using a negative tone (42.8%) while tv outlets seem to be less inclined to cover political issues negatively; nevertheless, the portion of negativity remains pretty high since it concerns more than one third of tv news items. further differences emerge among outlets composing our sample. as concerns the press, news items characterized by a negative tone range from 34.3% for corriere della sera to 56.8% for il giornale while the other press outlets register portions of negative news items close to 40%. regarding tv, instead, tg1 has the lowest quota of news stories framed in a negative tone (24.4%), while tg5 seems to be the outlet that covers politics with greater negativity: almost one out of two news stories is depicted in a negative tone. table 2. negative tone in media and single outlets news item (n total) negative news item (n) negative news item (%) daily press 3,943 1,687 42.8 corriere della sera 787 270 34.3 la repubblica 706 291 41.2 la stampa 773 300 38.8 il giornale 808 459 56.8 il fatto quotidiano 869 367 42.2 newscast 1,873 609 32.5 tg1 393 96 24.4 tg2 451 157 34.8 tg3 431 124 28.8 tg5 305 145 47.5 la7 news 293 87 29.7 total 5,816 2,296 39.5 table 3 details the negativity of media coverage when the news story presents references to political actors5. we can see from these figures that, in general, when news items include eu or foreign political actors, the portion of negative tone is lower than media coverage focusing on italian political leaders. only one news story out of three is negative when referring to eu or foreign politicians. conversely, negativity increases when the media cover italian political actors. the percentage of negative news items ranges from 38.6% when silvio berlusconi is covered to 51.3% of negative tone when the story presents references to nicola zingaretti. interestingly, the share of negativity referring to luigi di maio and matteo salvini is quite similar for the two leading exponents of the coalition government (resp. 45.5% and 42.5%). table 3. negative tone and political actors news item (n total) negative news item (n) negative news item (%) berlusconi 453 175 38.6 di maio 1,333 606 45.5 salvini 2,161 918 42.5 zingaretti 483 248 51.3 eu-foreign political actors 1,141 366 32 5 table 2a in the appendix provides details about the general tone for political leaders. data show that with the sole exception of nicola zingaretti, the negative tone prevails for all political leaders – including the eu/foreign political actors. the positive frame is also in this case extremely marginal, ranging from 2.9% for zingaretti and 7.8% for eu/foreign political actors. european versus domestic politics 82 table 4 shows instead the patterns of negative tone among news items focusing on the eu. data suggest that media coverage tends to be more negative when addressing issues relating to domestic politics. this seems to confirm the idea of a europhile attitude among italian media outlets. the political debate among domestic politics catalyses the negativity of italian media outlets where almost one out of two news stories presents a negative tone (46.6). conversely, the percentage of negative news items decreases when the eu is covered (31.24%). however, taking into account the modalities of europeanization, data indicate some differences. indeed, as regards horizontal europeanization, the portion of negative news items is pretty similar: about 30% for both strong or weak variants. on the contrary, things appear slightly different when considering vertical europeanization. while one third of the stories presenting bottom-up elements are framed within a negative tone, as regards the top-down variant the tone of the coverage appears far more negative (37%). table 4. negative tone and european vs domestic politics news item (n total) negative news item (n) negative news item (%) news items with references to domestic politics 3,127 1,456 46.6 news items with references to european politics 2,689 840 31.2 bottom-up vertical europeanization 1,243 369 29.7 top-down vertical europeanization 303 113 37.3 weak horizontal europeanization 837 246 29.4 strong horizontal europeanization 398 124 31.1 total 5,816 2,296 39.5 although these are preliminary results, some interpretative cues can already be drawn. in the first instance, even within a negative media coverage context, europe and its political actors seem to benefit from a benevolent media attitude. if domestic politics is covered more frequently with negative tones and frame elements, when dealing with issues relating to the eu the media moderate the negative tones. furthermore, it is possible to identify a substantial difference between press and tv. the newspapers analysed are all characterized by prominent negativity, assuming much higher proportions than tv outlets. however, when figures are observed in more detail, some dynamics emerge clearly. the european theme is, in fact, treated in different ways by the italian media. in particular, when the eu institutions directly approach the domestic political space, meaning they intervene in the national political debate by raising european interests, values or rules, the media show less indulgence and the share of negative news items grows more significant. these bivariate analyses have to be integrated by multivariate analyses testing these dimensions and measuring their contribution to negative bias in media coverage during the last ep election campaign in italy. taken all together, indeed, these elements of media coverage have a different effect on the probability of negative media coverage. when we look at the models presented in table 5, these patterns appear clearer. models 1 and 2, indeed, confirm the evidence that has already emerged from descriptive analyses. as regards the press (model 1), where the corriere della sera is the reference category, all media outlets present positive and significant coefficients, meaning that they are all associated with a higher likelihood of negative media coverage. seddone, bobba and roncarolo 83 table 5. drivers of negative tone on press and tv coverage variables model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 press negative tone tv negative tone press negative tone tv negative tone press (ref. cat. corriere della sera) la repubblica 1.376*** 1.520** (0.151) (0.277) la stampa 1.259** 1.267 (0.135) (0.230) il giornale 2.465*** 2.464*** (0.260) (0.438) il fatto quotidiano 1.262** 1.481** (0.131) (0.277) tv (ref. cat. tg1) tg2 1.692*** 2.878*** (0.262) (0.914) tg3 1.350* 1.429 (0.217) (0.480) tg5 2.926*** 4.758*** (0.486) (1.603) la 7 news 1.353* 1.367 (0.237) (0.495) eu/foreign political actor 0.701*** 2.052*** 0.598*** 1.775** (0.0702) (0.288) (0.0879) (0.420) berlusconi 0.438*** 2.072*** (0.0881) (0.573) di maio 1.528*** 1.088 (0.228) (0.301) salvini 1.185 1.380 (0.162) (0.338) zingaretti 0.541*** 5.057*** (0.120) (1.225) eu politics 0.513*** 0.552*** (0.0393) (0.0636) bottom-up vertical europeanization 0.865 0.468*** (0.103) (0.0976) top-down vertical europeanization 1.417** 1.830** (0.224) (0.554) weak horizontal europeanization 0.952 2.509*** (0.184) (0.848) strong horizontal europeanization 1.333* 0.780 (0.223) (0.250) constant 0.769*** 0.349*** 0.369*** 0.103*** (0.0633) (0.0438) (0.0596) (0.0328) observations 3,943 1,873 1,472 631 notes: se in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 on the contrary, news items focusing on eu-related issues are less likely to be framed within a negative tone, and the same applies for news stories referring to eu or foreign political actors. when we move to observe these patterns on tv (model 2) something changes. here we used tg1 as the reference category. even in this case, odds rations associated with tv newscasts are all positive and significant, signalling that their news items increase the likelihood of a negative tone in media coverage. in addition, eueuropean versus domestic politics 84 related issues are, also in this case, less likely to be covered in a negative tone. however, when it comes to assess whether the eu political actors act as drivers of a negative tone in media coverage, the coefficients are positive. indeed, compared to the press, tv newscasts are more likely to frame negatively stories referring to eu politicians. models 3 and 4 enlarge this analysis by including two elements: the different variants of europeanization illustrated above and the differentiated contribution of italian political leaders. model 3 focuses on the press. in this case, we observe that media outlets still maintain their effect in increasing the likelihood of negative coverage, with the sole exception of la stampa. on the other hand, if we consider model 4, the tv outlets show different patterns. only tg2 and tg5 are associated with positive and significant odds ratios which are far higher than in model 2, confirming they are drivers of negativity. in general, it is worth noting that elements of political parallelism could be identified if taking into account coefficients from the two media outlets owned by berlusconi (hallin and mancini, 2004; mancini, 2008). we found, indeed that they are both characterized by a far higher likelihood of increasing negativity coverage during the election campaign. this is a result of the position taken by these outlets, which basically acted as the opposition to the government (and the former ally, salvini, in particular) while attacking the left-wing parties as well. differences between press and tv remain prominent even when considering the dimension of political actors. while within press coverage the presence of eu or foreign political actors reduces the chances of negative coverage, tv shows the opposite result. in this case, news items are more likely to be framed by negative elements. italian political actors are also differentiated. as regards the press, berlusconi, indeed, is associated with significant coefficients proving a lower probability of negativity. the same applies to zingaretti. only di maio, according to our findings, boosts the likelihood of a negative tone in media coverage. again, the picture changes with model 4, focusing on the tv sample. regardless of whether they are domestic or eu, all political actors are more likely to increase the likelihood of a negative tone. only di maio and salvini disconfirm this pattern, with no significant odds ratio. these patterns could appear as counterintuitive. indeed, given the eurosceptic claims from both m5s and league, one could have expected that the visibility of the two leaders contributed to increasing the likelihood of a negative tone in media coverage. however, according to some previous research, the italian media tend to mitigate negativity driven by eurosceptic political leaders by counterbalancing the negative frame relating to their positions with a neutral or even positive frame on the eu that results in a more balanced general tone. furthermore, these coefficients appear quite coherent with bivariate analyses (see figure 1a in appendix) showing that on tv both salvini and di maio present a lower degree of negative tone compared with other leaders. finally, distinguishing between variants of europeanization, we found interesting results. while in models 1 and 2, eu-related issues were found less likely to be covered in a negative tone, the introduction of variables relating to the four variants of europeanization determines substantial differences between the two media. within the press subsample, only top-down vertical europeanization and strong horizontal europeanization are found to be significant and positively associated with the dv. conversely, as pertains to tv, a negative tone is more likely when stories refer to top-down vertical seddone, bobba and roncarolo 85 europeanization and strong horizontal europeanization. on the other hand, when national political actors approach eu-related issues, the likelihood of a negative tone decreases. 5. conclusions our study aimed to investigate the drivers of negativity within italian media coverage during the 2019 ep election campaign. italy offers a privileged angle for addressing this issue. on the one hand, italian politics is going through a shift in climate of opinion on the eu. the country was traditionally considered europhile, but the success of populist parties – now in government – criticising the eu integration process and endorsing nationalist views, indicate that eurosceptic views are becoming prominent among italian parties. on the other hand, the media have usually held a supportive attitude towards the eu. indeed, while media coverage of politics is in general characterized by a negative tone, where the elements of conflict and negativity prevail, the eu institutions and political actors have traditionally benefited from a less negative tone in the media. in other words, the media have often acted as moderators of criticism towards the eu by tempering their usual tendency to negativity in covering political issues. our study relied on an original dataset derived from a human content analysis carried out on news items reported by five newspapers and five tv newscasts during the five weeks preceding the ep elections. our results contribute to a better understanding of the processes of development of the european public sphere, and we identify some interesting patterns concerning the italian case. however, we are aware of some limitations. first of all, we should underline that our data may present some weaknesses due to the news item selection. indeed, as concerns the press, the sample includes all news items focusing on the eu regardless of their position within the outlet (front page and internal pages), while news items focusing on domestic politics were included in the sample only when reported on the first page. on the contrary, as regards tv coverage, we took into account all political news items broadcast. on the one hand, this choice may entail a problem of comparability between press and tv; on the other hand, our data may suffer from overrepresentation of eu visibility in the press. for future studies, this issue will be addressed by re-defining the research design and including, for the press, all political news. nonetheless, given that the purpose of the article was to clarify the dynamics of negativity in media coverage and the relationship with europeanization patterns, the data provided still offer an interesting report on the dynamics of europeanization during the 2019 european election campaign in italy. secondly, we acknowledge that some results could be further strengthened if we included in our research design a qualitative dimension addressing the peculiarities of journalistic cultures characterizing the single outlets included in our analysis. this would allow us to differentiate outlets according to their editorial policy and organizational structure as pertains to the eu, since literature found these elements to be relevant to understanding the dynamics of the europeanization of public debate. given the peculiarities of the italian media system, we organized our research questions by addressing in particular whether press and tv may be characterized by different patterns of negativity within their coverage during the election campaign. in this regard, we observed that newspapers tended more to add a negative tone to political news stories, european versus domestic politics 86 while portions of negativity within tv appeared more limited. furthermore, we also identified diverse attitudes among the outlets included in our study. these differences could be understood by taking into account the parallelism characterizing the italian media system. indeed, we found the higher quota of negative news items within the coverage provided by il giornale and tg5, which are both owned by the berlusconi family. as a result of the crisis within the party, the poor results obtained in the 2018 general elections and the marginal role played within the centre-right area, the two media outlets engaged in a very negative and critical coverage, attacking both the left opposition and the coalition in government in an attempt to mobilize forza italia supporters. on the contrary, media outlets such as corriere della sera and tg1 confirm their more neutral approach to covering politics. the distinction between press and tv was explored also with regard to the other research questions leading this study. we investigated whether and to what extent the distinction between eu and domestic politics may affect the negative media bias. two main considerations emerge from our study. first of all, without much surprise, we observed that eu politics benefits from a lower likelihood of negative coverage compared to domestic politics. in other words, the national italian political debate catalyses media negativity, and this applies to both press and tv. however, when we move to the dimension of political actors, the picture is more nuanced, showing net differences between newspapers and tv newscasts. in this case, indeed, the press confirms its moderation in the use of a negative tone when covering eu political actors, while on tv the dynamic is reversed, meaning that politicians from eu institutions or from other eu member states are more likely to be covered in a negative tone. secondly, as concerns europeanization, we observed that the interplay between eu and italian politics is more likely to be framed in a negative tone when eu political actors intervene directly within the italian political debate by raising european interests (i.e. threatening sanctions in the event of disregarding eu treaties or agreements). more interestingly, when the bottom-up vertical europeanization variant is addressed within media coverage, tv media are less likely to adopt a negative tone. in other words, when italian politics addresses eu politics, tv tends to change its approach. this is not found within the press sample of news stories. also as regards horizontal europeanization, press and tv are differentiated, the strong variant being significant only within the press and the weak one significant only within tv. all things considered, it seems that while the press have adopted a negative attitude towards politics, expressing criticism towards domestic politics rather than 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(2008). news coverage and support for european integration, 1990–2006. international journal of public opinion research, 20(4), pp. 415–439. seddone, bobba and roncarolo 91 appendix: codebook general tone of the story what is the overall tone of the news item? does the report convey primarily a positive, negative, balanced or neutral impression of politics, political records, conditions or views? 1 = predominantly negative tone 2 = predominantly positive tone 3 = balanced/ambivalent 0 = neutral/not applicable instructions: indications of a negative tone are when the story is framed as political failure, fiasco, disaster, crisis, frustration, collapse, flop, denial, rejection, neglect, default, deterioration, resignation, scepticism, threats, cynicism, defeatism or disappointment. indications of a positive tone are depictions of political success, problem solutions, achievement, improvement, advance, prosperity, accomplishment, enthusiasm, hope, benefit, gain, sustainability, gratification or accomplishment. if a report does not reflect indications of a negative or positive tone, then it should be coded as ‘neutral’. eu and domestic politics does the news item contain relevant references to europe (eu or any other eu country/political actor apart from italy)? 1= yes, reference to eu (in general or single institution) 2= yes, reference to other eu country/political actor 0= no reference to europe instructions: europe is meant as a single institution, as eu issues, as eu policies as well as other eu countries. please note that code 2 should be applied only in residual cases, namely only other eu country references and not eu institutions. any reference to brexit should be coded as 1. any reference to eu parliamentary elections should be coded as 1. vertical europeanization: bottom up does the news item include references to national actors addressing eu actors or making claims on eu issues/policies (general or specific)? 0= no 1 = yes 999= na instructions: eu issues and policies should be addressed from a european perspective. for example, references to the eu election campaign or alliances at domestic level are not to be considered as an eu issue. on the contrary, when the discussion focuses on alliances within the eu parliament it should be considered as an eu issue. euro-crisis, schengen, lisbon treaty are to be considered as eu issues. vertical europeanization: top down does the news item include references to eu actors intervening in the domestic debate of any eu country in the name of common european/eu interests? european versus domestic politics 92 0= no 1 = yes 999= na instructions: for example, code 1 to be applied for news items where, for example, draghi/junker/tajani (or eu commissioners) intervene on greek debt crisis. horizontal europeanization: weak does the news item cover the political debate in another country? 0= no 1 = yes 999= na instructions: code 1 to be applied for news items focusing on other eu member states and their issues (i.e. brexit, gilets jaunes…) horizontal europeanization: strong does the news item cover one political actor (from any eu country) speaking about issues or with actors related to another eu country? 0= no 1 = yes 999= na instruction: code 1 to be applied when an actor from a member state addresses or refers to actors or issues related to another member state or even participating in public debates in another country (i.e. merkel commenting on gilets jaunes; di maio speaking about brexit, orban commenting on italian government) microsoft word pdf_issue_12_2.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 2, september 2017 * this text describes briefly the main points of my on-going research on italian mps elected abroad: reconstruction of italian deputation profile and the kind of representation enjoyed by italian migrants. © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 2, p. 38-42. parties and party systems in pietro grilli di cortona’s research antonino castaldo university of lisbon luca germano roma tre university, rome arties and party systems, intended as key democratic institutions, represented a central subject in pietro grilli di cortona’s research. his focus on these topics has been rich, innovative and continuous during all his career. his approach to the study of political parties and party systems has always been comparative, with a great relevance given to their historical evolution and the connections with the cleavages structures present in european societies. although pietro’s contribution to the study of parties and party systems has mainly been framed within a more general research stream on the processes of democratization, he has also given a broader contribution to the explanation of the transformations currently affecting the main european countries. in this brief note we will try to trace the key features and steps of pietro’s work in this field. in da uno a molti. democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in europa orientale [from one to many. democratization and rebirth of parties in eastern europe] (grilli 1997), pietro focuses on the rebirth of democracy and multi-party politics in central and eastern european countries. the book’s aim is twofold: on the one hand, to retrace the shift from a monoparty to a multiparty system during the transition occurred from 1989 to the first half of the 1990s; on the other, to identify all the causal factors affecting each analyzed case’s (bulgaria, czechoslovakia – czech republic and slovakia since 1993 – poland, romania and hungary) own evolution and development. after describing the specific transitions from communism to democracy with regard to each selected case, the focus is then shifted to a thorough analysis on how each party system has been changing accordingly. the main explaining factors for the variance that can be observed across the national cases taken into account are identified with the cleavages inherent the party system’s birth/rebirth and with the different ways in which the democratic transition has taken place. the indepth analysis regarding the historical roots of the conflicts that had generated the party alignments as they appeared before the spread of communism makes it possible to analyze them and their main features, and to outline continuities and discontinuities between the former party systems and the ones originating from communism. three degrees of p in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 39 continuity/discontinuity are thus delineated, respectively related to the party families, to the cleavage systems and to the single parties. pietro’s analysis shows that, whereas a certain degree of continuity may be found with respect to party families, relevant discontinuities are to be traced as for the single party units and, above all, for the cleavages. particularly, his findings on the changes affecting cleavages are worth mentioning, since, according to pietro’s analysis, eastern european countries present a new and different cleavage structure. the first sociopolitical conflict, crucial during the democratic transitions, is related to the struggles between innovators and democracy supporters on the one hand, and conservatives only moderately inclined toward the democratic transition, on the other. the second cleavage, which gains more relevance after the transition, is related to the conflict between “libertarians” pro-market and “authoritarians” anti-market. finally, the last cleavage that became relevant in eastern europe is centred on the conflicts among nationalities, since consistent ethnic minorities are present in almost all eastern european countries. with regard to the cleavages originally elaborated by rokkan, in his analysis pietro demonstrates that the class cleavage disappears, being only in part incorporated by the pro/antimarket conflict. moreover, the urban/rural and state/church cleavages have been decisively weakened by the consequences of fifty years of communism, being to some extent relevant only in a few cases. the focus on the eastern european countries, to which pietro devoted a constant attention during all his career, led him to focus on the subject of nationalism which, as mentioned above, represented one of the most interesting phenomena emerging from the previous research. in stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in europa [states, nations and nationalisms in europe] (grilli 2003), he focuses on the phenomenon of nationalism in both western and eastern european countries, devoting a special attention to the nationalist parties and their impact on party systems. according to pietro, there are four possible types of relationship between nationalism and political parties. the first is indifference: the nationalist cleavage is not dominant and does not lead to the formation of a nationalist party; in fact, the party system is structured by other cleavages. secondly, confluencerepresents the case where the nationalist cleavage is more relevant, though still insufficient to favour the emergence of a nationalist party; parties originating from different cleavages incorporate the nationalist issue in their own political programmes. thirdly, there can be a sectionalisation, that is the development of a party system at the sub-national instead of the state level, as it happened in the belgian case where a duplication of the party system in the francophone and flemish regions occurred. finally, the presence of a nationalist party generated directly by the ethno-territorial cleavage constitutes a case of direct expression. in this last scenario, pietro identifies three types of nationalist parties: a) ethnonationalist parties, representing the interests of an ethnic (or ethno-linguistic) group which can be either dispersed in the state territory or concentrated in one specific region and whose members share a common identity (history, religion, language); b) regionalist parties which represent the interests of a specific region, where the sense of belonging to a territory is more relevant than any other ethnic tie; c) populist and xenophobic parties, whose key issue is a high degree of intolerance towards immigrants, external groups and any other national minorities. with regard to the last type, pietro clarifies that it is not castaldo and germano, parties and party systems in pietro grilli di cortona’s research 40 always possible to consider populist parties as true nationalist parties. in terms of impact on party systems, pietro identifies the cases where nationalist parties are concentrated in a specific region as the ones with more chances to become relevant at the systemic level. there can be a situation, which pietro calls hegemony, where a single nationalist party is able to monopolize the vote of the entire ethnic group: in this case, there will be a clear distinction between the party system at the state and local levels. a second situation, defined fragmentation, refers to cases where more than one nationalist party tries to represent the interests of the dominant ethnic group in a specific region: as in the previous case, there will be a party system at the local level clearly distinct from the one at the state level, but in this case the competition among nationalist parties will weaken the chances to reach their goals. finally, in the third situation, nationalist parties may represent a minority in the region, limiting the differences between party systems at the local and national levels. pietro’s interest towards parties and party systems has focused on the italian case as well. in his book il cambiamento politico in italia [the political change in italy] (grilli 2007), focused on the two big transitions affecting the italian democratic experience (the first of genus, from fascism to democracy, the second of species, from the first to the so called ‘second republic’), he provides for key arguments on the role of parties and of party systems in the change and transformation of the italian political system, keeping an eye on the compared dimension. moving from evidence already emerged from previous studies on the italian case (morlino 1998, 2006), pietro identifies parties as the main causal link between the first and the second transition. formerly, they are the main structures of the democratic consolidation following the first transition, but then, by expanding their role in the society, they get to “occupy” social and economic sectors and thus limit the role of other collective actors. parties’ intrusiveness, associated to the decision-making deficit which was due to the lack of political turnover and to an irresponsible competition (sartori 1982), contributes to a generalized crisis, that will last all over the first republic (cotta and isernia 1996). nonetheless, it is in the very party system that the new transition towards the second republic is going to take its roots. according to pietro, the electoral earthquake and the party system’s break-up, occurring after the mid 1990s’ crisis (cotta 1996) are the most notable outcomes of an ongoing transformation and the key explaining variables for a transition for a brand new political system, different from the previous one but whose results, however, are still hard to be clearly identified. pietro selects parties and party systems as one of the key dimensions also within his compared research on the role of the legacy in european countries’ processes of democratization, published in the book, co-edited with orazio lanza, tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia [between old and new regime. the weight of the past in democracy building] (grilli and lanza 2011). it is in the very parties that such legacies may have a stronger impact. in particular, the attention is focused on former ruling parties or “successor” parties and their fate after the democratic transition: do they survive? if so, what is their degree of capacity of adaptation? how much relevance are they able to obtain? the analysis of some of the most relevant european cases show a consistent variance of outcomes (grilli 2011a; 2011b). for example, in the german case the former ruling party disappears after world in memoriam: pietro grilli di cortona 41 war ii due to the strategies implemented by both the occupying forces and the national democratic elite. pietro underlines also that successor parties may hand down legacies even if they disappear or become marginal at the systemic level: in the italian case, for instance, the mass party model introduced by the national fascist party is adopted by the main italian political parties after the transition. in post-communist countries, the former ruling parties survive the transition and became relevant actors of the new regime. according to pietro, the survival and success of the ruling party after the regime change is largely due to its capacity to maintain and exploit the resources controlled before the transition. in this regard, the more continuous and peaceful was the transition the more the former ruling parties have been able to keep direct control over the crucial resources. former ruling parties may constitute both positive and negative legacies for successor democracies. pietro underlines how these outcomes are largely influenced by the strength of former ruling parties before the transition and the degree of genuineness of their conversion to democracy after the regime change. hence, former ruling parties are more likely to represent a negative legacy for successor democracies when they have not entirely rejected the communist ideology or become nationalist parties (slovakia, romania). in cases like poland the former ruling party’s genuine conversion to democracy represented a positive legacy for the democratic consolidation. nonetheless, as said before, pietro’s interest towards parties and party systems is not only framed within the broader research area of democratization: an in-depth review of the various changes affecting them in the european experience can be read in the book, coedited with gianfranco pasquino, partiti e sistemi di partito nelle democrazie europee(grilli and pasquino 2007). here pietro draws the conclusions of a comparative research on the state and evolution of parties and party systems in eight countries representative of central (great britain, france, germany), southern (spain, portugal), northern (sweden) and eastern europe (poland, russia). for instance, according to pietro, despite the many signs of crisis the thesis of a party decline cannot be confirmed; on the contrary, political parties remain crucial players of every democratic regime, yet with changing roles and functions. moreover, the thesis of a strong connection between political parties and social cleavages seems to be confirmed: while they may emerge also thanks to the role played by political entrepreneurs, their institutionalization and survival in the long run need an anchoring with interests and groups coming from civil societies. with regard to party systems, a different evolution between “old” and “new” systems can be detected. in the former, a “de-freezing” process led bipolar systems to be increasingly threatened by third poles in united kingdom, france and germany around antiimmigration and anti-europe issues, as well as localist and regionalist tendencies, also present in spain. in the latter, the tendency until the first part of 2000s was the opposite, with systems consolidating centripetal, bipolar tendencies, with a decreasing ideological polarization (portugal, spain, poland). hence, empirical evidence supports the thesis of a decreasing relevance of sartori’s polarized pluralism (sartori 1976; 1982), while the moderate pluralism type became widespread. however, the former type did not become useless at all. according to pietro, polarized pluralism may return to be a diffuse type of party system in europe if the degree of ideological polarization and the support for anti-system castaldo and germano, parties and party systems in pietro grilli di cortona’s research 42 parties raise again, a prophecy confirmed by recent developments in most of the european countries and even more so outside europe. the frame so far depicted inevitably sketches only a partial and incomplete outline of the rich and various legacy that every work by pietro represents to political science, made of a lucid analysis and of an objective capacity to easily interpret and explain phenomena of no simplicity at all. his untimely death not only deprived us of a careful and generous maestro, but first and foremost of a dear friend we will miss, now and forever. references cotta m. (1996), la crisi del governo di partito all’italiana, in cotta m. e isernia p. (eds.), il gigante dai piedi d’argilla. la crisi del sistema partitocratico in italia, bologna, il mulino, pp. 11-52. cotta m. and p. isernia (eds) (1996), il gigante dai piedi d’argilla. la crisi del sistema partitocratico in italia, bologna, il mulino. grilli di cortona p. (1997), da uno a molti. democratizzazione e rinascita dei partiti in europa orientale, bologna, il mulino. grilli di cortona p. (2003) stati, nazioni e nazionalismi in europa, bologna, il mulino. grilli di cortona p. (2007). il cambiamento politico in italia, roma, carocci. grilli di cortona p. (2011a), il passato che non passa. il ruolo delle eredità nelle democratizzazioni, in grilli di cortona p. and o. lanza (eds), pp. 11-40. grilli di cortona p. (2011b), conclusioni. eredità e democratizzazioni in prospettiva comparata, in grilli di cortona p. and o. lanza (eds), pp. 289-322. grilli di cortona p. and g. pasquino (2007), partiti e sistemi di partito nelle democrazie europee, bologna, il mulino. grilli di cortona p. and o. lanza (eds) (2011), tra vecchio e nuovo regime. il peso del passato nella costruzione della democrazia, bologna, il mulino. morlino l. (1998), democracy between consolidation and crisis. parties, groups and citizens in southern europe, oxford, oxford university press. morlino l. (2006), le tre fasi dei partiti italiani, in morlino l. e tarchi m. (eds), partiti e caso italiano, bologna, il mulino, pp.105-144. sartori g. (1976), parties and party systems. a framework for analisys, cambridge, cambridge university press. sartori g. (1982), teoria dei partiti e caso italiano, milano, sugarco. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_2_demicheli.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 2, september 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 2, 191–208. contact author: chiara de micheli, university of sassari. e-mail address: cdemicheli@uniss.it the italian xviii legislature: populism, law-making and procedures chiara de micheli university of sassari abstract the study explores the adjustment of the italian parliamentary system to the change of balance between political parties. the results of several aspects of the breakdown of the march 2018 parliamentary elections are examined in the use of certain law-making mechanisms such as laws, decrees, delegations, votes of confidence and decentralised procedures, analysed as a dependent variable. an interpretation of the characteristics of the legislative process is then proposed on the basis of elements of continuity and change in three independent variables: parliament fragmentation, governability and electoral volatility. the case study is the xviii legislature, focusing on the first year of activity of the government-parliament subsystem. 1. introduction he centrality that representative institutions still hold in the italian political system is core to the relevance of this study in order to further explore the adjustment of the parliamentary system to the change of balance between political parties. here, the results of several aspects of the breakdown of the march 2018 parliamentary elections will be examined with the intention of observing the transformations they provoked within the government-parliament subsystem. the use of certain law-making mechanisms such as laws, decrees, delegations, votes of confidence and decentralised procedures will be analysed as a dependent variable. therefore, an interpretation of the characteristics of the legislative process is proposed on the basis of elements of continuity and change of three independent variables: parliament fragmentation, governability and electoral volatility. the case-study will be the xviii legislature, focusing on the first year of activity of the government-parliament subsystem. the aim of the article is twofold: to expand the literature on legislative efficiency and on the role of law-making procedures in the recent evolution of the italian political system and to give a contribution on the topic of the supposed decline of parliament along with the decline of traditional political parties in contemporary democracies, with an in-depth study of the italian case. the paper is structured as follows. the second section explores the new political context following the 4 march 2018 political elections; in the third section the theoretical foundations and the hypothesis of the study are discussed; the fourth section illustrates the methodological proposal for the empirical analysis of the case-study; the fifth and sixth sections are dedicated to the empirical analysis of the independent and dependent variables respectively; in the seventh section some preliminary findings are discussed while the eighth section concludes. t the italian xviii legislature 192 2. the new political context following the 4 march 2018 elections the 4 march 2018 political elections furthered the erosion of the electoral force of the two coalitions that had opposed and alternated in government since 1994.1 consequently, the relationship between the poles changed radically [pedrazzani 2018], clarifying and consolidating the premonitory signs which had already emerged in the results of the 2013 election. parallel to this, the electoral results promoted the abandonment of old, ideological identities and the strengthening of those parties that had sprung up from new schisms. m5s and lega, sharing a growing anti-european credo, became the two principal political forces. such political party formations, which are both defined as populist2 with anti-elite and anti-pluralist3 traits (the lega also flaunts a high degree of sovereignism), no longer appear classifiable as left or right wing. according to several observers [chiaramonti and emanuele 2017; 2019] m5s and lega (whose ideological spectrum seems less ambiguous nowadays than in the past) are broadly defined expressions of a recent central/peripheral fracture. the south of the peninsula, which identifies with the movement, and the peripheral and provincial areas of the central north (consensus assured for lega) as well as the outskirts of the big cities, are in opposition to a symbolic centre where the dominant liberal, urban and secular elite live. the 2018 elections, which took place under the new electoral law 165/2017, appeared to explicitly question the liberal-democratic model of democracy [baldini 2014; 2017; moschella 2019]. the crisis of the majoritarian model is also displayed in other polyarchies (great britain, france and germany)4 where anti-system parties have emerged, or sometimes re-emerged, and dismantled traditional political party systems. compared with traditional party formations, the ‘new’ parties are reputed by the electorate to be more capable of satisfying their expectations of obtaining solutions to widespread inefficiency and zero or slow growth, as well as integration and globalisation issues. at the same time, the populist movements maintain that problems caused by a financial crisis, inequality, political neo-liberalism, globalism, and austerity failure are produced by the ill-governance of the elites and can be resolved in simple and self-evident ways by the true representatives of the public alone. such movements classify themselves 1 the italian political system can be illustrated by using the model of polarised pluralism from 1948 to 1992 and polarised bipolarism from 1994 to 2013. 2 reference is made to the contribution of bartolini [2018, 52] who gives insight into the connotations of the concept of populism by proposing the following definition: ‘a movement of political actions/reactions that principally refers to the people, presented in homogeneous terms, to which some kind of specific and desirable positive values are added which are in contrast with the entities that vary radically according to the context’. 3 according to muller, the main characteristic of populist parties is that they present themselves simultaneously as anti-elite (at odds with the dominating elite from whom they want to distinguish themselves) and anti-pluralist forces (because they consider themselves the only groups to represent the true interests of the people) [muller 2017]. these kinds of characteristics, with diverse intensity and coherency, have symbolised lega (from 1989 until 2017 lega nord) since its beginning. to the two criteria of anti-elitism and anti-pluralism, ronsanvallon [2020] adds an instrumental element specifically to these political formations: indiscriminate solicitation of public opinion expressed (also virtually) through voting polls and street demonstrations. 4 for an in-depth study on the origin and consolidation of the populist parties in the european polyarchies please refer to the detailed volume by grabow and hartleb [2013] and the subsequent work by kriesi and pappas [2015], mudde [2004]. chiara de micheli 193 as the sole legitimate representatives of society: all the others are illegitimate and pursue sectoral interests on behalf of different groups. moreover, the populists show complete faith in public opinion and contempt for any intermediation or pluralist expression of democracy. this loss of authority, to which the parties unable to represent voters’ request for change were subjected, is examined in detail by schadee, segatti and vezzoni in their book. this crisis resulted in the emergence of political groups with no underlying organisation or structured ideological framework. the principle at the basis of their political offer is: ‘we can do without politics’; everything can be immediately decided at first hand without useless negotiating and intermediation between groups. governing is easy for the populist type of party because the policies to be formulated are self-evident, the solution is undisputed and only one, and the existence of inevitable conflicts of interest or necessary compromises is not acknowledged [schadee, segatti and vezzoni 2019]. the new (m5s) and modernised (lega) political movements used corruption and insecurity as a means of substituting the old political class (not without fault) and the ‘traditional’ political parties indicated as the main cause of the intense inefficiency of the system. these political movements transmit the image of a ‘disintermediation democracy’ and, in any case, symbolically deny confrontation between any acting aggregators of different political and social issues, increasingly discrediting the parliamentary institution, symbol of the representation and composition of a wide range of demands/interests.5 from this context, a legislative assembly without a clear majority, struggling to establish an executive, emerged from the national consultations of 4 march 2018 [valbruzzi and vignati 2018]. the process of forming the cabinet was long, and negotiations were needed because the politicians had not agreed on the name of the candidate for the role of president of the council6 who, following the mandate of the head of state, initiates contact with the political forces in order to define the programme. instead, after the polls, m5s and lega started with the programme (called ‘contract for the government of change’) and then started looking for the name of a candidate, deciding on a technical presence [valbruzzi 2018; pedrazzani 2018]. in this way, a lega-five star movement executive was formed [giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto 2018], replaced in less than a year by a pd-m5s coalition with the distinctive feature of maintaining the same head of government. 3. theory and hypothesis our intention is to examine the legislative efficiency of the italian government-parliament sub-system during the first year of the xviii legislature by identifying the continuity/discontinuity of its functioning compared to previous legislatures. in fact, it is possible to isolate several original features of the legislative assembly as a consequence of the 4 march 2018 elections. such characteristics regard parliament in the input phase, namely in the more or less fragmented representation of the political forces in the two 5 for the relationship between democracy, popular vote, majority rule and populism refer to the contribution by william riker [1982]. 6 in the majoritarian system legislatures such agreements occurred with an explicit pre-election pact. yet, in this election, the m5s only presented themselves at the elections whereas lega was already part of the centre-right alliance. the italian xviii legislature 194 chambers (parliament fragmentation); in the conversion phase, or rather in the capacity of a more or less stable majority to support a government (parliament governability), and in the output phase, that is, in the various ways that parliament acts in its legislative capacity. our hypothesis, already subject to empirical tests in previous works [de micheli and fragnelli 2016; 2019], is that parliament fragmentation and governability constitute two fundamental independent variables able to influence the characteristics of parliamentary law-making. more precisely, the hypothesis states that behind the use of the different law-making procedures is the strategic behaviour of the government, which goes beyond the motivations that inspired the legislators when they designed these procedures. strategic behaviour refers to the use of procedures which are different from the ordinary one, and which, according to the constitution, were designed with particular situations, e.g., urgency, in mind. nevertheless, these different procedures may sometimes allow the government to resolve a conflict with parliament, due to the weakness of the majority, which may be suffering for various reasons, the most important being low governability, i.e., the low efficiency of the government, and high fragmentation, i.e., the extent to which the seats of parliament are divided among several parties, each of them with similar percentages. furthermore, the independent variable of electoral volatility is introduced in order to understand how it intervenes and to what degree it influences the relationship between the other independent variables and the dependent variable. electoral volatility refers to the number of voters who change their vote between elections. we can hypothesise that high electoral volatility tends to produce two interrelated effects on the government-parliament subsystem. one effect (supply-push strategy) concerns the party positioning of representatives, that is their tendency to form new parliamentary groups capable of supporting and making visible an innovative political offer, which can be attractive to the volatile voters. this dynamic, in turn, tends to increase parliamentary fragmentation and to decrease governability. the other effect (demand-pool strategy) tends to occur on the decision-making strategies of the political player formed by the government and its majority. in a context of high electoral volatility, it is in fact conceivable that the incumbents try to improve their decision-making efficiency in order to follow the political demands of volatile voters, to gain the trust of the electorate and to balance the effects of increasing parliamentary fragmentation and decreasing governability. more particularly, we can hypothesise that, in high electoral volatility conditions, the legislator is more likely to enact very vague acts, showing to the volatile voter that the government is doing something while most of the implementing decisions (which are decisive for the impact of the measure) lag behind. 4. methods albeit referring to the detailed analysis of previous contributions [de micheli 2014; de micheli and fragnelli 2016] for their methodological considerations, our study proceeds along the operative phase through the use of indexes capable of summarising the complexity of the analysed variables in order to measure the effective transformation prompted by electoral change. chiara de micheli 195 as mentioned above, the study takes into account three independent variables: parliament fragmentation, governability and electoral volatility. five indexes will be specifically considered. two of these are expressed in degree of fragmentation of the elected assembly, i.e., not only the number of parties, groups, or official factions inside the representative arena, but also their weight in terms of seats7 (it is considered useful, for deeper insight into this variable, to apply the index not only to the whole parliament, counting all the groups present in the representative assembly, but also to the parliamentary majority, counting the groups it is made up of and therefore defining the degree of cohesion). other two indexes refer to the degree of parliament governability, i.e., to the greater or lesser capability of the party to establish a strong government in terms of decisional efficiency.8 the last index refers to electoral volatility. this index displays the combined percentage of voters who have changed vote from one election to another and can be distinguished by ‘inter-block’ or ‘external-block’ volatility where the former concept indicates the voters who switch within the same policy sector area.9 the dependent variable consisting of law-making of the first year of the xviii legislature will then be analysed (the widest sense of the word law is intended, i.e., the production of binding rules by the government-parliament sub-system, whether they are primary or secondary acts). in this regard, besides the ordinary procedure, different 7 in order to analyse the factions, i.e., the fragmentation of the parties in the government and the party system on the whole, the rae index [1971] will be used. the rae index evaluates parliament fragmentation, that is to say, the higher the number of political formations, the higher the value of the index. it is defined in: !"# = 1 − '(!" !∈$ where n = {1, ..., n} is the set of the parties and si is the percentage of the party seats iîn. 8 the operationalised definition by migheli and ortona [2009] will be used, according to which governability is a measure of the transaction costs a government has to face when making a decision. governability principally depends on two parameters: the number of parties that form the majority of the government and the total number of seats these parties hold. more specifically, governability is inversely correlated to the number of political formations (counting the cost of reaching an agreement) and directly connected to the number of seats which make up the majority itself (weighing up the different consequences of absenteeism and/or defectionism). the first index of governability g1, considers the number m of the critical parties, i.e., those parties whose withdrawal can damage the majority, and the number f of the number of seats of the majority. the parameter m is considered more important than f so f element, gf, is lexicographically added to m-element, gm. more precisely, given that gm = 1/m then the formula for g1 is as follows, where t is the total number of seats in parliament: )1 = )* + ), = 1* + 1. + 1 *(* + 1).(, − 1 2)/ 1 2 in order to understand the importance of the number of seats in a majority coalition more exactly we must use a second index of governability in which the sum of the percentage of the majority seats divided by the number p of the parties in the majority is taken into account. this operationalisation comes from migheli and ortona (2009) whose proposals suggest that in evaluating governability the following index is used: )2 = ,/14 4 4,. ∝ where pf is the total number of factions in the parties in the majority and aî[0,1] is a parameter that represents how ‘monolithic’ the parties are. 9 measuring electoral volatility is found to be easy and undisputed both at the level of single parties and that of the party system. in general, this measurement is labelled as ‘net electoral change’ or ‘aggregated’ between one election and the subsequent election (bartolini 1986). the italian xviii legislature 196 decisional methods used by the politicians in the government-parliament subsystem will be discussed. among the legislative procedures established by the italian constitution, those most applied are the following. the ordinary procedure (art.72, c.1) can be used to approve all types of bill but for some you need a special quorum. in the ordinary procedure the government does not play any special role: it can propose a bill like any member. then, a committee (called ‘referral commission’), often integrated with an executive’s representative as observer, discusses and amends it. eventually, the floor examines the bill and votes it article by article and in full. the decentralized procedure (art.72, c.2) allows that the legislative process (final approval included) takes place only in a committee, called ‘legislative’ or ‘deliberative committee’, if there is consensus among political actors. the bill, otherwise, may return to the plenary session if requested by 1/5 of the members of the committee, 1/10 of the floor, or by the government. the decentralized procedure cannot be used to convert decrees, to legislate constitutional amendments, electoral rules or budgetary norms, to ratify international treaties, or to approve delegating laws. the decree law procedure (art. 77, c.2) enables the executive to issue a decree in ‘extraordinary cases of necessity and urgency’. the executive’s decree becomes law immediately and remains in effect for sixty days without any parliamentary approval. if, after this period, parliament has not ‘converted’ the decree into a perfect law, then the previous status quo is re-established. the delegating law (art. 76 and art. 77, c.1) is approved by the ordinary procedure. this type of bill has at least a section delegating to the executive the power to promulgate the legislative decrees according to some general framework voted for in the delegating law, and within a limited period of time. the legislative decree, approved by the council of ministers, is sent to the president of the republic, at least 20 days before the deadline required by the delegating law, so that the president can check it and, if necessary, send it back to the chambers. each delegating law can contain a variable number of ‘delegations’, and de facto, they give the last word to the government. another legislative procedure, which has become more and more frequent over the years, is the maxi-amendment that compacts extended regulatory measures into a single article or amendment of an ordinary law, or a conversion law of a decree law. frequently, when considered strategically appropriate, the government asks for the parliament’s vote of confidence on the maxi-amendment. it is worth mentioning that in a parliamentary system the government remains in office for as long as it enjoys the confidence of the parliamentary majority, whose existence, in italy, can be verified at any time. this case study is descriptive and interpretative in nature. as a consequence, the following sections will illustrate descriptive trends in the independent and dependent variables, respectively. 5. descriptive trends in fragmentation, governability and volatility the xviii legislature presents a high degree of fragmentation compared to the previous one (fig.1). it is also worth remembering that the italian parliament is more fragmented than the representative assemblies of many other european democracies, namely great chiara de micheli 197 britain, france and spain [de micheli and fragnelli, 2019] and the average degree of governability is lower (fig.1).10 during the last twenty years, successive reforms were meant to change the behaviour of politicians for the purpose of making government coalitions less conflictual, discouraging any party’s strategy aimed at gaining excessive visibility and maintaining veto power.11 however, for the most part, in order to make the reforms work, they have to represent the final stage of a shared process of change, sustained by almost all the political forces, as occurred in the first republic for the renewal of the parliamentary regulations of 1971. on the contrary, the political parties supporting the views of the of the second republic appear more confused, controversial and changeable. after long negotiations, the eighteenth republican parliament produced its first government led by giuseppe conte. this government was unstable, partly because of poor control over the parliamentary majority (it is considered an oversized coalition government with two crucial parties reflecting the values of the average g1 and g2 in the republican context, fig.1). moreover, as regards the distance of position between the two parties, at that time the m5s were ambiguous and unstable.12 contrasts and long negotiations arose even for the nomination of the president of the chamber13 and the 10 the variables were operationalized as follows: 1. range: independent variables governability: gov.1: below or equal to 0.3: low; more than 0.3 and up to 0.6: medium; over 0.6: high. gov.2: below or equal to 0.1: low; more than 0.1 and up to 0.2: medium; over 0.2: high. fragmentation of the chamber of deputies: between 0.5 and 0.75: medium; over 0.75: high. the degree ‘low fragmentation’ has not been used because, given the oscillation of the rae index between 0 and 1, the rate of our parliament always exceeded 0.5. 2. range: dependent variable commissions: fewer than 20% of the laws produced with decentralised procedure -; between 20% and 50% -; between 50% and 75% +; over 75% ++. laws converting the decree laws: fewer than 10% produced -; between 10% and 20% +; over 20% ++. it must be underlined how this analysis grid underestimates recourse to the decree, because here each decree law is counted only when it is converted into law. in this way the relevant phenomenon of reiteration is excluded. delegated laws: fewer than 1% -; between 1% and 5% +; more than 5% ++. confidence: monthly average of the times that a vote of confidence is used for legislative measures, up to 0.1 -; from 0.1 to 0.5 +; more than 0.5 ++. 11 due to the large number of majoritarian reforms and reform proposals during the last twenty years [de micheli and verzichelli, 2004; ceccanti, 2013], the list would be too long to enumerate and describe for the aims of this article. among the most relevant adopted reforms, we can mention at the electoral level, the law 270/2005 introducing a proportional system with closed lists and a majority bonus to the party or coalition obtaining the highest number of votes; as far as the parliamentary rules are concerned, we can recall the 2017 reform of the senate, which adds a political requirement, other than a numerical one, to establish a parliamentary group. 12 the short duration of the conte i government and its substitution with an apparently more stable conte ii could indicate greater steadfastness and placement more to the left in the political arena for the m5s. the differences (and commonalities) between the m5s and the lega are investigated more in depth by carlotti and gianfreda [2018]. 13 from the xiv to the xvii legislature, the president of the chamber was normally a leader from a party in the coalition, not the same as the president of the council (up until then chosen by the coalition through a pre-election agreement). the italian xviii legislature 198 designation of each collective organism. the marked territorial coverage of this executive makes the discontinuity more notable as there is an evident southernisation of the m5s whereas the lega’s stronghold is in the north (more evident compared to the successive executive conte ii). figure 1. fragmentation and governability of chamber of deputies i-xviii legislature (1948–2018) source: compiled by the author, based on data of the chamber of deputies (https://www.camera.it) and presidency of the council of ministers (https://www.governo.it) electoral volatility has gained significance in light of its increase over the past three legislatures14 (fig. 2). the extensive repositioning of the voters, measured by the high degree of volatility displayed in the march 2018 elections, rewarded a new, innovative political formation (m5s) and/or a modernised one (lega). however, this did not result in a reduction of the number of groups present in parliament. conversely, although it changed in this election,15 the method of selection used by the political class of the second republic had created a direct link between politicians and voters. the mixed majority system, which involved single name lists, weakened the obligation between voter and party that had already been impaired by the radical crisis within the parties and the decline of ideologies. this made the voters look for imminent and direct representatives of their specific interests (appreciated and emphasised by opinion polls and especially social media) up to the point of doubting a pillar of liberal-democratic representation like the ‘imperative mandate ban’. 14 the increase in electoral volatility also affected other european countries, such as germany and the united kingdom, both nationally and locally [emanuele 2015]. 15 electoral law 195 from 2017 was used for the first time. chiara de micheli 199 figure 2. volatility per italian legislature source: chiaramonte and emanuele [2019] strategical position change inside the representative assembly was increasingly more frequent by politicians looking for urgent consensus, as was blatantly displayed in the previous legislature (xvii) with the highest mobility of the elected in the republican era. in the preceding parliament, over 35% of the elected had changed their position in the chamber and almost 50% in the senate. such levels of switching16 during the elections provoked a distortion of the political framework which resulted in a change of the power relations between the political groups. besides passing from one group to another, we also witnessed the creation of new identities and the establishment of new parliamentary groups: in every part of the assembly (including the mixed group) out of 11 groups present in 2013, only 4 in the chamber and 3 in the senate maintained the same denomination in the eighteenth republican parliament [curreri 2017]. therefore, the xviii legislature is an interesting case for examining the consequences brought about by the different re-positioning of politicians and voters, both in terms of seats and in terms of strategies pursued in the process of law-making. 6. law-making activity and procedures the conditions for changing the characteristics of the legislative function in the parliament of the xviii legislature were initially expressed with the proposal of the party leaders of the parliamentary majority to exemplify a clear-cut discontinuity with respect to the recent past. in quantitative terms, the historical trend has been a constant decrease in the number of laws passed by the italian parliament. starting with almost forty laws a month in the first republic, there is a drop to roughly three laws a month issued by the xviii legislature (the lowest average along with that of the xv legislature). frequent use of legislative delegation continues (shared with the previous legislature, the letta and renzi governments) but the number of legislative decrees issued overall has risen. in this first year of legislature the government capitalised on the use of 16 switching can be considered the degeneration of parliamentary mobility; it is due to personal reasons linked to career prospects, expectations of connections or even economic gain [curreri 2017] the italian xviii legislature 200 this procedure, using it, first of all, to announce extensive reforms [marchetti 2019] and obtain consensus and immediate support (the previous paragraphs underline the importance gained by immediacy with the advent of the populist parties) despite the uncertainty which comes with an effective and/or complete implementation of this type of procedure. conversely, the parliament derived an advantage from the fact of not assuming direct and visible responsibility in sensitive areas but maintaining a minimum of formal control over delegated policies. there is also a preference to resort to delegations in order to discipline certain crucial sectors when the majority coalition is in particular difficulty. in accordance with the delegated law, the risk of having an implementation or a partial or incompatible implementation, as we have pointed out, is compensated by the publicity the politicians receive from the enactment of the decision. the delegation is a medium which can be subject to the needs of urgent policies.17 from a quantitative point of view, the relationship of the legislative delegations compared with decree-laws shifts in favour of the former, while the quantitative relationship of the bills compared with decree-laws grows in favour of the latter (fig. 3). in the xviii legislature the decree-law signals discontinuity not from a quantitative point of view but in the way it is used. the decree-law (previously the main means of legislative output at primary level in the second republic, fig. 3) affirms a political willingness that should be collective but, in fact, in this legislature is increasingly more often attributable to individual ministers and/or leaders.18 such an adaptive manner of use seems congenial to the type of government fragmentation that presents two parties with two distinct policy areas in which they are orientated to maintain almost exclusive control. furthermore, the decree-law press conference sometimes becomes a means of political announcement of the contents which have not, or not yet, been shared19 as is also inferred by the long delay between the moment of deliberation in the council of ministers and the publication of the same decree in the official gazzette (decree-law 32/219 was published 28 days after the council of ministers meeting on 20 march)20 [razza and bartolucci, 2019]. such a delay is in ulterior contrast with the urgency of the instrument: increasingly, the decree-laws are neither urgent nor necessary and not even appropriate (lacking the requirement of instantaneous application in accordance with art.15 l.400/1988) and barely presented with diligence to the chamber. a progressively high number of the decree-laws have become manifesto laws – empty containers, only externally justified by short excerpts announced by the media, who are often aware of the draft before the competent offices. 17 we will not go into detail here about the critical notations on the excess of delegations and its executive self-empowerment, but in any case, please refer to [marchetti 2016]. 18 a lack of ministerial collaboration in issuing decree laws started to manifest itself in the preceding legislature but in the conte i government it became routine and a governmental resource [marchetti 2019]. 19 by way of example, the budget bill, whose regulatory contents were anticipated in a brief press conference, was only submitted to parliament many days after the council of ministers. 20 the important new element of the wider distance between the two occasions, the deliberation and publication during the xviii legislature, is thoroughly presented in the table of all the decrees created by razza and bartolucci [2019]. moreover, we recall the increasingly common practice of ‘fuori sacco’ decrees, or rather, decrees not included in the council of ministers’ items of the day because the accord is finalised only a few minutes before the same council starts. chiara de micheli 201 the most relevant choices made by the conte i government were all passed through use of the emergency decree (decrees for workers, safety, citizenship income and unblocking building sites)21 [di cosimo 2019], even though the government-parliament subsystem can achieve the approval of draft legislation in a relatively short time following the customary procedure [ibrido 2019; gazzaretti 2013]. the tendency to use the decree is even more detached from any evaluation of the time frame of the decision, as the aim is for the implementation of the new policies to make an immediate impact on public opinion. in fact, it is not to be forgotten that a rapid decision is synonymous with a good decision and is a metaphor for good government. however, it is not so much the actual speed of approval that determines the choice of a procedure but the certainty of its approval and, above all, its greater media impact. it seems that in recent years the emergency regulation has been performed primarily through the issue of civil protection ordinances: from 2009 the relationship between the use of this procedure and the decree-law has always been clearly in favour of the former and even more distinctly since 2016.22 when faced with a disastrous event, decreelaws are less frequent and slower to take action while ordinances are ready and presented more often [arcuri 2019]. due to this more frequent use, several dysfunctions have arisen like the case of the omnibus ordinances (multi-sectoral laws) or the paradox of decree-laws that act notwithstanding ordinances by derogation, as well as the standardisation of emergency, i.e., the transformation of the same ordinance from an extraordinary instrument to an ordinary one in order to adjust recurring situations. the constitutional court recognised an intrinsic mutation of the emergency decree with sentence 244/2016 during the preceding legislature. this ruling affirms that, from a material point of view, heterogeneousness is compensated by a substantial ‘objective uniformity’. the use of decree-laws. is confirmed to be useful when the levels of intergovernmental rivalry and the autonomy of government departments are high. it is a way of working similar to northon’s baronial model [2011], according to which ministers are like feudal lords who hold the power to make political decisions on their ‘territory’, and either clash or make alliances with other barons in order to achieve their own goals. in this first year of the xviii legislature other innovations were consolidated: notably, more frequent appeals to the provision ‘subject to agreements’, which allows the adoption of a regulation even when it has not been formulated in detail. in other words, the politicians involved achieve political sharing (which is the objective of the council of ministers’ resolutions), yet they reserve the detailed draft for a later date which is then specified by the competent offices. consequently, there is a post-council meeting where negotiations23 are continued. in fact, with this clause, the government reserves the right to modify the text. the time from the approval of the decree-laws by the council of ministers to their publication in the official gazzette is prolonged. thus, such procedure is not noted for the transparency and certainty of its contents but for the distorted political value that is firmly underlined by the participation of the president of the republic. 21 these are decree-laws that usually derive from various emergencies condensed into a sort of key word used like a journalistic slogan, conveniently utilised in terms of public opinion [lupo 2019] to demonstrate the immediate acceptance of the government’s legislation and maintain/gain consensus. 22 we recall that up until 2012 (decree -law n.59) the ordering power was entrusted to the president of the council of the ministers and then to the head of the civil protection department. 23 the first time this clause was mentioned was by the monti government (23 march 2012). the italian xviii legislature 202 president mattarella revealed an abuse of ‘approvals subject to agreements’, commenting on the procedure chosen by the conte ii executive for the so-called ‘growth’ decree even before this kind of procedure was also used for the substantial ‘building site unblocking’ decree. after the withdrawal of the requirements of article 77, this legislature affirms the de-specialisation of the now legitimate decree-laws to be considered as the ordinary instrument for pursuing political goals alongside deputations (and legislative decrees). the first conte government used this instrument in a casual manner in order to implement the programme, overcoming the profound contrasts between the two majority groups, and, principally, to publicise political activity. instead, this legislature issued the first ordinary law well after 149 days from its constitution,24 the vote of confidence after 75 days and another three months were needed to constitute the commissions.25 rather than proceeding with an ordinary programme of activities of their own initiative, the first cabinet led by conte chose to gather the various emergencies at hand and, at the appropriate time, incorporate them together in a decree-law possibly ‘subject to agreement’ (approvazioni salvo intese) and/or omnibus. in this way, the executive obtains a more immediate and visible implementation of the programme as regards forcing the attention of the majority towards placing their vote of confidence. in the xviii legislature the use of the decree-law is not as it was in the preceding decades i.e., similar to a fast lane, consequent to a more autonomous functioning of the department, with ministers lobbying for a high degree of control over their own area of policy unlike before [laver and shepsle 1996]. a more decentralised decisional process than in the past takes shape. the m5s-lega alliance was formed to enable these parties to implement the policies that had brought them ample, but perhaps unforeseen, success:26 namely, it was indispensable for the five star movement to incorporate the concession of the citizenship income with the proposals on immigration and public order by the lega.27 in recent years, a high level of volatility (fig. 3) predominantly conditioned party attitude inside the coalition to make the implementation (and/or the perception of the implementation) of certain policies more prominent in order to maintain and win votes. 24 in addition to being quantitatively scarce, the ordinary laws are also reduced from the point of view of content if you count the number of letters [legislation committee, 2019]. 25 in fact, the difficulty in coming to an agreement is also evident by the laboriousness of the obligations relative to the setting up of the bodies (indicator of the ease with which the majority politicians establish any kind of accord). diversely from what happened in the previous assemblies, in the xviii legislature it is unusual for the policy-making process to be quicker than the process that leads to the nominations in the different organisms [di porto and piana 2009]. 26 according to downs [1957] the position of policy is merely instrumental: political parties are exclusively interested in governmental power but in order to obtain it they have to generate positive utility in the electorate by means of the issuance of public policies (or even through the communication of their issue). the positions of the political parties mutually affect the various dimensions (positions and politics). 27 for an in-depth analysis of the legislative activity of lega (nord) and ms5 in their parliamentary beginnings see de giorgi and dias [2018]. chiara de micheli 203 figure 3. average per month of norms source: compiled by the author, based on data of the chamber of deputies (https://www.camera.it) the advent of a majoritarian system heightened the trends of governments in the nineties and afterwards to reduce parliamentary confrontation to a minimum. the autonomy of the cabinets in the chamber, which could be presumed to be a contingent factor, was institutionally claimed in the name of the direct relationship that would be established between the voters and the chosen executive, expressed in the winning coalition. it is no longer like this in the xviii legislature because a coalition agreement never existed from the beginning. this kind of agreement promotes the governance of the coalition by being useful for the party leaders when they find themselves forced to seek the approval of their party members for a controversial decision, but most of all, to the benchmark voters who will be more inclined to accept concessions from coalition partners, if these arise from a compromise stipulating a preceding pact28 [strom, muller and bergman 2008; pedersen and christiansen 2012]. the government agreement signed by two political forces at the moment of the constitution of the executive does not seem to have the same force as one legitimated by the actual voters.29 therefore, governing and law-making is crucial for the lega and m5s for the coalition and its endeavour for control is extended in the convoluted form of the cogent regulations issued: ‘thousand extensions’ decrees, omnibus, the application of votes of confidence, delegations and remedial delegations. all these procedural contrivances are not only for shortening the time of the legislative procedure but mainly to impose measures on parliament. the first test for the government is precisely the use of the question of the vote of confidence for the sole article of the draft law of the ‘thousand extensions’ decree law conversion, and for the autonomous and separate ministers to continue functioning through the frequent use of 28 it is worth remembering that preand post-agreements can involve policies, rules and distribution of positions [pedersen and flemming 2012]. 29 generally, the major conflict in parliamentary systems does not arise from the opposition between the two arenas – government and parliament – [king 1976], but between the parties, or factions, with diverging objectives that choose to converge on certain goals that are not individually achievable, hence, form a coalition [vercesi 2012; hubner 1996]. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii legislature conversion law budgetary norm delegating law ordinary law legislative decree d.l. confiance the italian xviii legislature 204 legislative delegation. the absence of coalition agreements makes the relationship between parties more difficult in the legislative process. in the xviii legislation, the law has lost its value as a point of equilibrium between the will of the people and the expression of the rule of law in the most tangible manner. it is balanced ‘between the means with which it expresses the political will of the majority and instrument – once virtually exclusive – for the protection and implementation of the constitutional rights’ [lupo 2019, 253]. the populist tendencies of the governing forces tend to consider the regulatory measures as expressions of only the will of the people, virtually direct and instantaneous implementation not so much of the will of the representatives who are called to establish acceptable points of agreement on a case-by-case basis, but rather that of the same represented. as a consequence, in the formulation of a policy or a law, the populist legislator tries to manipulate the consensus of those represented, not only by satisfying their interests but, most of all, by going along with their responses and desires collected from surveys and social media. as lupo [2019, 253] clearly stresses this point ‘in contemporary democracies, due to the growing populist influences, the law tends to get too close to popular will and in this way [the law] becomes the pure and bare expression […] of the same represented. consequently, the contents of the law reflect non only the interests or the demands of the represented but also and above all their immediate reactions, their desires and moods, as they are accurately and promptly captured, not without unavoidable and sometimes drastic simplifications, by surveys and social media, and as they are declined and exploited by the populist leaders’. therefore, the provisions issued are increasingly more subject to specifications, reformulations, extensions, cancellations and more frequently in response to the voters’ reactions than for necessary corrections.30 furthermore, for the most part this legislation is constituted by measures of eclectic content, usually extensions and various emergencies (for instance the conversion laws for the above stated decrees): from the little laws (micro-sectoral laws) of the first republic to the omnibus laws. instead, the delegating law is increasingly used to provide complex measures and reforms, seeking through this regulatory tool the fusion between government and parliament, which becomes increasingly weaker with the passing of legislatures. 7. preliminary findings based on the empirical evidence of the case study and given the descriptive and interpretative nature of the analysis, some preliminary (theoretically relevant) findings can be argued. this first year of the xviii legislature appears to have completely capsized the characteristic traits of the italian republican parliament. the distance between the parliament of ‘transformation’ [polsby 1975], and ‘settlement centre’ or ‘compensation room’ [sartori, 1963] and the system has never been so great. however, if this distancing can be physiological and functional to profound political change, both national and 30 one of the consequences highlighted by lupo [2019] is the phenomenon of the precariousness of the law since the content is uncertain. chiara de micheli 205 international, which has occurred in recent years, on the other hand, the assembly seems to be heading towards the expropriation of its function of mediation and settlement. the fluidity of the party system caused substantial instability in the parliamentary set-up due to runaway political fragmentation accentuated by a high degree of switching. discontinuity did not occur in the dysfunctions of the legislative process, as announced by the leaders of the m5s (luigi di maio) of the lega (matteo salvini) and by the neo-president of the chamber (roberto fico). indeed, recourse was made to all the dubious procedures used up until then. consequently, starting from the hypothesis validated by the preceding comparative analysis [de micheli and fragnelli 2016] which, added to the increase in parliamentary fragmentation and decrease in governability, carrying out the normal governmental functions becomes progressively more complex and influences the course of the lawmaking process (besides all the other functions that require widespread agreement like nominations and the constitution of commissions), the high level of volatility has changed certain features even more. the higher propensity level of the voters to switch their preferences from one party to another can be considered an independent variable that modifies the use of the available tools to the policy makers so as to exploit visibility and publicity as much as possible. if, with time, the different degrees of fragmentation and governability have affected the abandonment of ordinary legislation and decentralised approval in favour of decrees, delegations and provisions protected through votes of confidence, the high volatility rate of the voters has motivated the use of these instruments in such a way that they have become more flexible, modifiable and easier in promoting their contents. the case-study gives empirical support to the hypothesis that, due to high electoral volatility, the governmental actors tend to follow the political demands of volatile voters, showing a high degree of decision-making efficiency, even resorting to procedural tools to make the implementation (and/or the perception of the implementation) of certain policies more prominent. 8. conclusions this paper has analysed the characteristics of the legislative process in the first year of the italian xviii legislature on the basis of elements of continuity and change of three independent variables: parliament fragmentation, governability and electoral volatility. descriptive trends of the independent variables and of their impact on law-making activities and procedures have confirmed that high parliamentary fragmentation and low governability tend to influence the law-making characteristics of the parliamentgovernment subsystem, drastically reducing ordinary legislation and decentralised approval in favour of decree-laws, delegating-laws and legislation protected through votes of confidence. moreover, high electoral volatility has modified the use of these regulatory tools and procedures in order to make them more flexible, changeable and promotable in their contents, making it easier for policy makers to follow the political demands of volatile voters and to show them a high degree of decision-making efficiency. these empirical and theoretical findings, although preliminary and based on a descriptive analysis of a case-study, enrich the literature on the role of law-making the italian xviii legislature 206 procedures in the recent evolution of the italian political system. they also offer promising arguments to frame, with further empirical investigations, the topic of the supposed decline of italian parliament along with the decline of the traditional political parties. references arcuri, alberto 2019. ‘il governo delle emergenze: i rapporti tra decreti-legge e ordinanze di protezione civile dal terremoto de l’aquila al crollo del ponte 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genetica del decretolegge’. osservatorio sulle fonti. 22(2). p. 1-25 riker, william h. liberalism against populism: a confrontation between the theory of democracy and the theory of social choice. san francisco: w.h. freeman, 1982. ronsanvallon, pierre. 2020. le siecle du populisme. histoire, théorie, critique. paris, edition du seuil. sartori giovanni. 1963. dove va il parlamento? in il parlamento italiano 1946-1963. edited by somogyi, stefano, luigi lotti, alberto predieri and giovanni sartori. napoli: esi. strøm, kaare, wolfgang c. müller and. torbjörn bergman. eds. 2008. cabinets and coalition bargaining: the democractic life cycle in western europe. oxford: oxford university press. schadee hans m., paolo segatti and cristiano vezzoni. 2019. l’apocalisse della democrazia italiana. bologna: il mulino. valbruzzi, marco. 2018. ‘when populists meet technocrats. the italian innovation in government’. in il vicolo cieco. le elezioni del 4 marzo 2018, edited by valbruzzi, marco and rinaldo vignati. bologna: il mulino valbruzzi, marco and rinaldo vignati, eds. 2018. il vicolo cieco. le elezioni del 4 marzo 2018. bologna: il mulino. vercesi, michelangelo. 2012. ‘governi e decisioni difficili: la gestione dei conflitti interpartitici nelle coalizioni italiane’. paper presented at the xxvi annual congress of the italian political science association (sisp). roma: università roma tre. italian political science, volume 17 issue 1 published in 2022 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 17, issue 1, 75–89. contact author: marcello natili, university of milan e-mail address: marcello.natili@unimi.it the italian welfare reform trajectory in turbulent times. income support, family and pension policy during the xviii parliamentary term igor guardiancich university of padua ilaria madama university of milan marcello natili university of milan abstract absolutely exceptional in many respects, the xviii parliamentary term represented a peculiar terrain for welfare reform. on the one side, over the past five years, three highly heterogeneous governments have alternated in power, supported by different coalitions, each the result of demanding negotiations and alliances between parties, within a moving political landscape. on the other side, the legislature has been heavily affected by the unprecedented challenges posed by the covid-19 health emergency and its harsh social and economic consequences. despite the complexity of the scenario and the internal frictions experienced by the three short-lived cabinets, since 2018 important reforms have been enacted in key welfare sectors, marking in some cases a break with the previous institutional legacy. the paper aims to critically examine the trajectory of welfare reforms during the last parliamentary term, shedding light on how they have been shaped through time by a combination of external turbulences and political constraints. adopting a historical institutionalist approach, the analysis focuses on the transformations which have occurred in key social policy areas – anti-poverty policy and income support, family policy and pensions – in order to examine the major innovations and shifts occurring under the three cabinets, featuring such diverse electoral bases and ideological stances. 1. introduction bsolutely exceptional in many respects, the xviii parliamentary term represented a peculiar terrain for welfare reforms. the five-year legislature witnessed the alternation in power of three heterogeneous governments, supported by different coalitions that formed after demanding negotiations between political parties in a rapidly changing environment, affected since 2020 by the dramatic covid-19 health emergency and its socioeconomic consequences. despite such unprecedented challenges and the frequent internal frictions, the three cabinets managed to pass important reforms in key welfare areas, marking at times a substantial break with the previous institutional legacy. a the italian welfare reform trajectory in turbulent times 76 against this backdrop, the paper critically examines the trajectory of welfare reforms during the last parliamentary term, shedding light on how they have been shaped through time by a combination of external turbulences and unlikely political constraints, from the naissance of the ‘yellow-green coalition government’, the populist alliance between the lega (l) and movimento 5 stelle (m5s), through the yellow-red coalition, led by m5s and the partito democratico (pd), to the multi-coloured technocratled unity government headed by mario draghi, supported by all the parties but for fratelli d’italia (fdi). in order to examine major innovations and possible shifts occurring under the three cabinets that featured very diverse electoral bases and ideological stances, the article employs a historical-institutionalist approach, focusing on the transformations taking place in key social policy areas – namely anti-poverty policy and income support, family policy and pensions.1 in so doing, the article contributes to the scholarly debate about the recalibration of the italian welfare state, asking how far these reforms have helped to move the country beyond a partially frozen landscape (cf. palier and martin, 2007), long characterized by distinctive functional and distributive distortions (ferrera, 2019; ferrera and hemerijck 2003; jessoula and locatelli 2009). remarkably, functional distortions arise from deeply-rooted imbalances in the internal allocation of social spending, biased in favour of the elderly. comparatively, a broader share of resources has traditionally been absorbed to protect against longevity and survivorship risks, i.e., through the pension system; whereas other welfare functions – such as catering for the family and children and insuring against unemployment, social exclusion and poverty – have been rather neglected. furthermore, cash transfers largely prevail, towering over the modest efforts in the provision of in-kind social services. besides, the distributive distortion intersects the functional one, and refers to the gaps in the protection granted (in terms of coverage, requirements to access benefits and their generosity) across occupational categories and social groups, which have resulted in segmentation between insiders, who enjoy high protection against a wide range of risks, and outsiders (jessoula, graziano, madama, 2010). these include individuals only weakly tied to the formal labour market, such as atypical employees, the long-term unemployed, and those employed in the informal sector, only marginally or poorly protected. drawing on well-established historical-institutionalist theoretical frameworks, we develop different expectations regarding the trajectories of the three policy fields. according to classical works on welfare state retrenchment, or, better on the possibility to reform social policy in the ‘age of permanent austerity’ characterised by public budget constraints, pierson (1998) posits that mature (mostly, insurance-based) welfare state areas will elicit greater resistance by beneficiaries and the involved interest groups compared to underdeveloped ones. in a similar vein, bonoli (2012) argues that decisionmaking strategies involving affordable credit claiming can be fruitfully applied to policy fields that cost comparatively less, compared to encompassing social insurance benefits, and that do not cater to established constituencies. considering the distributional 1 the selection of policy fields was driven by the importance attributed to these sectors by the recalibration framework (ferrera and hemerijck 2003). for this reason, we do not include here policy changes occurring in the field of healthcare which, nonetheless, in recent decades has been subject to major cuts made even more evident during the recent pandemic crisis (guillèn et al. 2022). guardiancich, madama and natili 77 conflicts highlighted above, it becomes clear how pensions, which traditionally absorbed the vast majority of italian social policy resources, have a limited potential to be either retrenched or significantly expanded as institutional change may occur only ‘at the margin’ (myles and pierson 2001), vis-à-vis social assistance and family policies. the latter display totally different political and institutional dynamics, being both less costly and long neglected areas throughout the history of the italian welfare state development. hence, we maintain that path-departure is more likely to happen in the latter two domains and is much less probable for insurance against old age. the article is structured as follows. sections 2, 3 and 4 outline the reforms that have occurred in three main policy fields: section 2 focuses on labour market reforms and anti-poverty policies, section 3 deals with the main novelties in the area of family policy and work-family balance, section 4 provides an overview of the changes in pension policy. section 5 concludes by discussing the overall trajectory of reforms in light of their possible contribution to the recalibration of the italian welfare model along the functional and distributive axes. 2. labour market and anti-poverty policies in the aftermath of the march 2018 general election, the italian labour market displayed distinctive features: very low work intensity, due to a comparatively limited number of good quality permanent jobs available and low levels of female and youth labour-force participation, stagnating wages, and a high incidence of informal and precarious employment (ferrera, 2022; tassinari, 2022). in the previous legislature, a three-decade trajectory of labour market de-regulation culminated in the adoption of the so-called jobs act, which combined the relaxation of dismissal for workers on open-ended contracts with the expansion of unemployment benefits, targeting in particular labour market outsiders (picot and tassinari, 2017; sacchi, 2019). this did not result, however, in a significant boost of employment nor in reduced labour market segmentation (giuliani and madama, 2023), which actually remained pervasive since new types of low quality ‘cheap’ atypical contracts spread and the social condition of many solo-self-employed people critically deteriorated. such labour market features, along with the peculiarity of the italian welfare system, contributed to the dramatic rise of poverty and social exclusion in italy in the postgreat recession decade (gori, 2017; madama et al., 2014; saraceno et al., 2020). according to the italian national statistics office, in 2006, in the pre-crisis scenario, the absolute poverty rate was 2.9 per cent; it almost tripled in the following years, reaching 8.4 per cent in 2018, corresponding to more than 5 million people. to respond to this alarming social trend, in 2017 the centre-left gentiloni government introduced an antipoverty programme, the inclusion income (reddito d’inclusione, rei), finally overcoming the most visible comparative weakness of the italian social protection system, that is, the absence of a national minimum income scheme (jessoula and natili, 2020). some features of rei made the programme peculiar in comparative perspective: indeed, it was one of the least generous and inclusive minimum income schemes in europe (natili, 2020). due to severe budgetary constraints, only a limited number of poor individuals could receive this benefit, which was also very meagre – equal to eur 187.5, i.e., just 23.7 per cent of the relative poverty line, for single member households. furthermore, strict the italian welfare reform trajectory in turbulent times 78 duration limits, constraints on beneficiaries’ discretion in the use of the monetary component as well as a pervasive sanctioning system led experts to question the effectiveness of rei in actually ‘empowering’ the poor (granaglia, 2018). against such a backdrop, the yellow-green conte i government (m5s-l) promised to change the direction of labour market and income protection reforms. in the contract for the government of change, signed by the m5s and the lega, it is stated that “particular attention will be paid to combating precariousness, caused also by the ‘jobs act’, in order to build more stable labour relations and allow families a more serene planning of their future.” the same document also identifies the introduction of a new minimum income scheme called ‘citizenship income’ (reddito di cittadinanza, rdc) as a priority of the new government’s action. this was not surprising, considering that the m5s was the coalition leader (in light of the higher share of parliamentary seats vis-à-vis the lega) and strengthening minimum income protection was the pièce de résistance in m5s’s programmatic agenda. thus, a few months after the establishment of the conte i government, law decree no 4/2019 introduced the citizenship income, replacing rei from april 2019. although the name recalls the idea of a universal unconditional basic income, the italian rdc is a minimum income scheme – a monetary benefit targeting poor households conditional on participation in job-search activities – not so different from those already introduced in all other eu-28 member states. compared to rei, rdc is endowed with greater budgetary resources, it is more generous, inclusive, and with less strict duration limits. in 2020, resources allocated to rdc amounted to 0.43 per cent of gdp, and coverage was relatively broad in comparative terms, around 5.1 per cent of the total population (jessoula et al., 2021). relevantly, the new rdc maintained the uniform national standards for the provision of integrated social services for the poor introduced with the previous inclusion income,2 while also investing additional resources for active labour market policies (almps). despite these unquestionable merits, scholars have highlighted some of rdc’s shortcomings (gallo and raitano, 2019; gori, 2020; natili et al., 2022). in order to reach an agreement with the lega (jessoula and natili, 2020; landini, 2021), eligibility conditions for immigrants were significantly tightened: indeed, the ten-year residence requirement and the obligation to provide detailed certificates about their wealth in the countries of origin exclude many poor immigrants from rdc provision. second, a very strong workfare activation profile was introduced, a feature that contrasts with italy’s persistently limited labour demand, especially in southern regions. finally, in order to increase the number of beneficiaries without expanding costs, the government introduced an equivalence scale for computing the rdc amount that favours single member households, whereas it is detrimental for large families, thus providing relatively fewer resources to poor children (saraceno, 2019). 2 at the same time, it is important to underline that some of the innovations that followed the introduction of the citizenship income are detrimental to the provision of integrated services to the poor (gori, 2019). indeed, the rei had envisaged that social services had to manage access to the measure and define the type of inclusion path (‘simple’ or ‘complex’; devoted to ‘social’ or ‘labour’ inclusion). conversely, with the new citizenship income, local social services are no longer the ‘single point of access’ and local social workers no longer carry out pre-assessment in order to design a household-specific social and/or labour inclusion path. moreover, there are no adequate coordination methods between municipalities and pes, and effective guidance allowing families to orient themselves in the local ‘social system’ is lacking, generating a ‘fragmented’ social inclusion system (gori, 2019). guardiancich, madama and natili 79 along with the introduction of the rdc, the yellow-green government adopted a reform of employment-protection legislation (epl) sponsored by m5s, the ‘dignity decree’, which reduced the maximum number of renewals allowed for temporary contracts and marginally increased monetary compensation in cases of unfair dismissal for open-ended contracts (bulfone and tassinari, 2022). overall, these welfare reforms constituted significant changes compared to the social and labour market policies promoted in the previous decades. while the citizenship income finally put an end to italian exceptionalism, as a fully-fledged minimum income scheme with no budgetary constraints eventually institutionalized minimum income protection in italy (jessoula and natili 2020), the introduction of the dignity decree (partially) interrupted a three-decade-long trajectory of labour market deregulation. the coalition government of the m5s and the lega was short-lived. frictions between the two parties led to the formation of a new government coalition between the m5s and the pd, in charge from september 2019 until january 2021. the labour market and social policies of this government were dramatically affected by the covid-19 pandemic. the government’s response relied, on the one hand, on existing social protection schemes – the main unemployment protection scheme naspi (nuova prestazione di assicurazione sociale per l’impiego), the citizenship income and especially the short time work compensation scheme cig (cassa integrazione guadagni). on the other hand, several measures were introduced (and often extended) by a series of government decrees aimed at cushioning the social impact of the crisis by providing protection to workers against income shortfalls resulting from protracted lockdowns. overall, the most consistent interventions concerned employment retention and were characterised by heavy reliance on short-time work schemes to protect firms and employees. the emergency packages also introduced new income support benefits for workers not otherwise covered: workers in a continuous and coordinated collaboration agreement (the most common form of bogus self-employment in italy), the self-employed, seasonal workers, and workers in the entertainment industry. although they included many groups of non-standard workers, these ad hoc provisions were not particularly generous and maintained the typical fragmentation and complexity of the italian system (jessoula et al., 2021). furthermore, a few groups of workers were excluded from these emergency measures: some categories of seasonal and intermittent workers, unemployed people who were no longer eligible for unemployment benefits before the emergency, poor migrants and informal workers. the need to protect these households in need could have been met either by expanding the rdc through the relaxation of the conditions for entitlement, or by introducing a new means-tested benefit. the government preferred the second option, and in the so-called ‘decreto rilancio’ (decree no. 34/2020 of 19 may) introduced the emergency income (reddito di emergenza, rem), a less generous, residual and temporary safety net for poor households who could not access the rdc (natili et al., 2022a). to contain the dramatic rise of material needs, the government and the regions launched emergency initiatives aimed at temporarily addressing the economic difficulties of poor tenants, thus avoiding the risk of eviction, without, however, solving any of the multiple structural problems of housing policies in italy (jessoula et al., 2021). the italian welfare reform trajectory in turbulent times 80 in a nutshell, the italian government reacted to the covid-19 crisis by expanding its income-maintenance protection schemes. at the same time, it returned to its traditional model, prioritising well-established insider-biased policies, such as short-term work, while granting a patchier response and delays in guaranteeing economic support to the outsiders (natili et al., 2022b). moreover, with the exception of iscro (indennità straordinaria di continuità reddituale e operativa), the extraordinary allowance aimed at guaranteeing income and operational continuity to a small category of the self-employed, introduced as a pilot scheme for three years (2021-2023), all other measures were short-term. overall, and differently from other countries such as spain, during the covid-19 pandemic the italian government did not introduce structural measures, so that the main weaknesses in labour and social policy remained in place. mounting tensions between the centrist italia viva (iv) and the m5s over the allocation of next generation eu funds led to the resignation of the conte ii government and the formation of a coalition government led by mario draghi (guidi and moschella, 2021; domorenok and guardiancich, 2022). the new government finalised the drafting of the italian national resilience and recovery plan (nrrp), officially handed over to the european commission in april 2021. in line with the social investment paradigm promoted by eu institutions (ferrera, 2017), the plan focuses on financing childcare, almps and social services, and reducing the traditional cash-transfer bias that characterises the italian welfare system (madama, 2010). overall, while investing in several underfinanced social policy areas, there is continuity in the supply-side approach to labour market policies, in that the plan focuses on activating and training workers rather than creating jobs or reducing labour market fragmentation (tassinari, 2022). in other words, the nrrp does not address some of the longstanding structural weaknesses mentioned above: low work intensity, low wages, labour market segmentation and little protection for those with a weaker labour market attachment. indeed, some proposals to tackle these issues, like the minimum wage or the reform of a short-time work compensation scheme in a universal direction (with the aim of covering atypical workers), were not included in the final version of the nrrp (mirò et al., 2022). beyond the drafting of the italian nrrp, the draghi government intervened in the anti-poverty field with the budget law for 2022 (law no. 234/2021). indeed, in march 2021, the minister of labour, orlando, announced that the bureaucratic mechanisms of the rdc would be assessed and revised. to this end, a committee composed of experts chaired by sociologist chiara saraceno was set up, which by october 2021 came up with ten policy proposals on how to improve the design of rdc in order to make it more equitable and effective, in particular by relaxing its access requirements (for migrants especially), supporting families with children and encouraging employment through tax breaks (saraceno et al., 2021). the draghi government, however, decided to tread a different path, thereby ignoring the main issues highlighted by the saraceno committee (gori 2021). the main changes to the rdc, then, included stricter conditionality for beneficiaries and meagre links to almps, with the aim of reducing the disincentives to job search. in other words, in line with a neo-liberal approach to anti-poverty benefits, ‘negative activation’ prevailed. guardiancich, madama and natili 81 3. family policies the xviii legislature marked important transformations in the sphere of family policies too, interrupting a long cycle of substantial institutional and political inertia. notably, the major innovations were passed during the second part of the legislature, under the lead of the yellow-red coalition (the conte ii government), and under the technocrat-led unity government headed by mario draghi. changes concerned all the three core areas of family policy, namely: childcare services, thanks to the investment planned within the framework of the nrrp and the setting of national thresholds in minimum levels of service provision; parental leave, through the further extension of the compulsory paternity leave, in line with the requirements envisaged by the 2019 eu directive on work-life balance (directive (eu) 2019/1158); and, remarkably, child allowances, with the introduction of the single universal allowance (assegno unico e universale, auu). as regards childcare services, the most important intervention came late in the parliamentary term and corresponds to the investments passed under the draghi government in the context of the italian nrpp. as highlighted in section 2, the third government of the parliamentary term revised and finalized the drafting of the nrrp, submitted in april 2021, boosting a social investment-oriented plan, thereby prioritizing childcare, almps and social services. more in depth, the nrrp targeted approximately 4.6 billion euros to the extension of childcare facilities for children aged 0-6, as one of its flagships, with an expected growth of 228,000 childcare places by 2026. coherently with these objectives, the budget law for 2022 allocated resources – as part of the national strategy to increase levels of service provision – with the aim of reaching an overall coverage of at least 33 per cent of the 0-3 population for each municipality or territorial area by 2027. funds are to be distributed on the basis of a strict monitoring system and starting from municipalities with lower coverage rates (less than 28.88 per cent). further, resources are planned to grow from 120 million in 2022 up to 1,100 million annually starting from 2027 (175 million in 2023, 230 million in 2024, 300 million in 2025, 450 million in 2026 and 1,100 million from 2027 onwards). starting from a coverage rate stuck at 26 per cent at the national level – yet with very large variations, from 9.3 per cent in the campania region to 38.6 per cent in the lazio region – such an investment is meant to imply an increase in access to childcare facilities for children aged 0-3 from the current 312,000 places in either public or private services, to 454,000 (minzyuk and stradiotto, 2022). turning to cash transfers, the most important reform, the auu, was framed under the conte ii government but approved under the cabinet led by draghi, as part of the socalled family act. the latter was a broader package of measures aimed at reorganizing the system of family and work-life balance policies, representing one of the flagship measures sponsored by matteo renzi’s iv party, and championed by elena bonetti, family minister both under the conte ii and the draghi government (therefore from september 2019 to october 2022).3 through the delegation law of april 2021 (law no. 46/2022), the government was in fact required to adopt, within 12 months, one or more 3 the family act was passed in the form of a delegation law in april 2022 (law no. 32/2022). its concrete implementation will depend, therefore, on subsequent implementation laws, except for the auu, which followed a different path, via a dedicated law anticipating its entry into force. the italian welfare reform trajectory in turbulent times 82 legislative decrees ‘aimed at reorganising, simplifying and strengthening’ child allowances. the implementing act was passed a few months later, in december 2021. the main goal of the auu is to simplify and rationalize the plethora of existing measures to support the costs of raising children, overcoming some of the disparities that have long characterized the italian model. the new scheme has in fact replaced various benefits including birth or adoption bonuses, child allowances, birth allowances (baby bonus) and tax deductions, setting a unified allowance, which covers from the 7th month of pregnancy up to the age of 21 (under certain conditions) and without age limits for disabled children.4 the monthly amount ranges from a maximum of 175 euros per child for low-income families up to a minimum of 50 euros per underage child for those on higher incomes. in addition, top-ups are foreseen for families with more than three children or having children with disabilities, for young mothers and in the event that both parents are employed. totalling about 18 billion per year (mef, 2022), of which 6.8 billion comes from additional fiscal resources, the new auu concerned about 7.2 million families, with 77 per cent of the children covered by the reform expected to benefit from a net increase in transfers, 672 euros on average, with a significant progressiveness in favour of low-income families (upb, 2022). thanks to its design – in particular universal coverage, type of financing, and the generosity of the benefits combined with the different progressiveness of the amounts and top up – the new scheme overcomes, in fact, some of the distributive disparities and coverage gaps of the previous model, based on two main programmes, namely the household allowances and tax deductions for dependent children (upb, 2022). the former was in fact a categorial measure, targeting employees only and incometested,5 whereas tax deductions de facto excluded families in situations of major need, i.e., those with a yearly income of less than 8,000 euros, as they fell within the no-tax area. finally, and differently from the intervention on the two other areas of family policy, the extension of paternity leave can be seen as part of an incremental process, beginning in 2012 with the labour market reform enacted by the monti government (law no. 92/2022). more precisely, the reform introduced for the years 2013-2015 a compulsory pilot leave (of one day) and an optional leave alternative to the maternity leave (of two days) for employed fathers in the private sector, during the first five months of the child’s life. in 2015, the compulsory paternity leave was then extended by increasing its duration to two days; and then further increased to four days for 2017-2018, augmented to five days in 2019, then seven days in 2020. the budget law for 2021 (law no. 178/2020) further increased the number to 10, while the budget law for the year 2022 (law no. 234/2021) stabilized the leave, which therefore lost its experimental character. how far are these measures affecting the italian traditional model of family policies, that has long remained, echoing naldini and saraceno (2008), far from structural reforms? the overview offered above shows that during the xviii legislature, albeit with considerable delay compared to other european countries, family policies in italy experienced, partly at least, the transition from a frozen landscape to structural reforms (cf. 4 the previous system is maintained for dependent relatives aged over 21, including tax deductions for dependent children. 5 more precisely to households with an income coming for at least 70 per cent from wages (or pensions of previous wage earners) and funded via social contributions. guardiancich, madama and natili 83 palier and martin, 2007). a neat expansion occurred in the funds devoted to family policies, affecting both coverage and benefit generosity, enriched through significant innovations. in this novel scenario, the reform of child allowances is undoubtedly the most far-reaching intervention, not only for the additional resources made available, but above all for its path-shifting scope with respect to the pre-existing policy structure in terms of distributive outcomes (madama and mercuri, 2022; naldini and saraceno, 2022). besides this, the investments in childcare facilities may in the medium term counterbalance the deeply-rooted cash-transfer bias. lastly, on the side of parental leave, the extension of paternity leave to ten days, although possibly relevant from a cultural standpoint, is more a kind of symbolic top-up, unable to offset gender disparities in the fruition of care leaves. in sum, even though comparative social spending data still fails to capture recent changes, the yellow-red coalition and the technocrat-led unity government shaped reforms aimed at strengthening long-neglected welfare functions in the field of family policy, and social groups – including in particular underage children, over 1.4 million of whom lived in absolute poverty in 2021, i.e., one out of seven – and which, not surprisingly, were more dramatically affected by the great recession and by the covid-19 pandemic. whether these reforms will also offset the alarming and long-lasting decline in fertility rates while supporting employment, especially for women, which are currently two of the major challenges the country has to cope with, needs a longer time horizon to be appreciated. 4. pensions with regard to old-age pensions, the xviii parliamentary term continued treading the ‘new path’ inaugurated by the previous centre-left governments, especially the ones led by matteo renzi and paolo gentiloni, aimed at tackling two main challenges befalling the italian retirement system. first, as a result of previous reform rounds during and immediately after the sovereign debt crisis (2009-11), the pensionable age and early retirement contributory requirements have risen rapidly and significantly. this has generated problems of retirement duration and difficulties arising from the interplay between expected longer working lives, the insufficient absorption capacity of labour markets for older workers and the chronic underdevelopment of social services, often filled through domestic care carried out by retired women. second, despite italy being the second highest pension spender in the eu, its retirement system only limitedly shields pensioners against the risk of poverty in old age, resulting in an uneven distribution of pension incomes, increasing pension inequality and a marked gender gap. thus, jessoula and raitano (2019) consider this ‘new path’ a reaction against previous cost containment measures, consisting of ‘measures aimed at relaxing the eligibility requirements for (early) retirement with measures designed to support low-income pensioners.’ fundamentally the interventions during the xviii parliamentary turn boiled down to two: i) the di maio-salvini reform in 2019 (law decree no. 4/2019), and ii) the minor adjustments introduced by mario draghi’s budget law of 2022 (law no. 234/21). the italian welfare reform trajectory in turbulent times 84 the former consisted of two innovations: the ‘citizenship’ and the ‘quota 100’ pensions.6 the citizenship pension (pensione di cittadinanza) was introduced by the m5s as a complement to the new minimum income scheme (the already-mentioned rdc), with which it shares several features and flaws. the anti-poverty measure is a means-tested benefit for people aged 67 and above who have resided in italy for at least 10 years and who earn less than eur 9,360 in annual equivalised income. the individual monthly benefit was eur 630, plus eur 150 for housing. more important for the pensions section is the early retirement ‘quota 100’, which drew criticism from the european commission, contributed to a spike in the spread between italian and german bond yields, was later revised by the draghi government, but, at the same time, helped salvini’s lega to its best electoral result during the ep elections in 2019. ‘quota 100’ was a pilot measure lasting three years (2019-21), available to private and public sector employees starting from, respectively, april and august 2019. people aged at least 62 and having 38 years of contributions7 were allowed to retire before reaching both the legislated pensionable age and the contributory period for early retirement. pension payments begin three months after the criteria are met (six months for public employees). unlike the standard pensionable age, the ‘quota 100’ requirement is not linked to changes in life expectancy. the early retirement scheme does not involve a reduction in benefits or require occupational hardship criteria to be met. a minimal disincentive is the prohibition of earning additional income from work worth eur 5,000 per year or more – implying the re-emergence of a social insurance principle in fashion between 1980-2000, i.e., the attempt to restrain early retirement by means of introducing incentives and disincentives (jessoula, 2009). public employees get a (small) additional perk: severance payments continue to be made in accordance with the seniority requisites of pre-existing legislation, as if the retiree were still employed. ‘quota 100’ legislation fulfilled one of the electoral promises that were inserted in the lega’s 2018 electoral manifesto, whose main aim, among others, was to partly cancel the begrudged 2011 fornero pension reform, which eliminated several early exit options. ‘quota 100’ was designed by lega deputy labour minister claudio durigon, previously deputy general secretary of the right-wing trade union ugl (unione generale del lavoro). the union had entered a close alliance with the lega in 2018, thus providing some labour support to a party often siding with business organisations. apart from this input, the policy’s adoption was not done in concert with social partners. as detailed by brambilla and gazzoli (2020) both the initial cost and take-up were lower than those predicted by the parliamentary budgetary office. whereas alfonso and bulfone (2019: 248) described potential claimants as ‘male workers from northern regions like lombardy, veneto, piedmont and emilia-romagna who started working early 6 other measures not dealt with in this article were: i) the suspension, until 2027, of the automatic linkage of the contributory years for early retirement to changes in life expectancy, fixed at 42 years 10 months for men and 41 years and 10 months for women; ii) confirmation of the ‘woman’s option’ pension, which allows early retirement for women who choose a purely notional defined contributions (ndc) pension calculation formula; iii) extension of the ‘social ape’ (anticipo pensionistico) pension. the latter two were extended through the budget law for 2022 until the end of 2022. 7 given the stipulation of two minimum thresholds, this is not a ‘quota’ in the sense of a share whose value can be obtained using diverse combinations of age and seniority. it is just a name given to the sum of two minimum thresholds. guardiancich, madama and natili 85 with a stable contract’, actual claimants were concentrated among public sector employees in the southern regions. as with many other social policy measures of the yellowgreen conte i government, this measure favoured male over female workers (meardi and guardiancich, 2022). the lega almost doubled its vote at the 2019 ep elections and, unsurprisingly, its rise in popularity was primarily in the south and among public employees (ipsos, 2019). without entering into excessive detail, the reversal of the fornero pension reforms attracted the ire of the european commission, which, rather laconically, included among its country-specific recommendations for 2019 and 2020, which have to be fulfilled within the subsequent nrrp drafted in 2021, the need to fully implement past pension reforms (domorenok and guardiancich, 2022). additionally, the huge budget overruns, partly imputable to ‘quota 100’ and the citizenship pension, led to a rise in sovereign bond yields, as predicted by the theory (see guardiancich and guidi, 2022). in order to partially backtrack, the budget law of 2022 under premier mario draghi, replaced ‘quota 100’ with ‘quota 102’, a slightly more restrictive early exit option, which allows retirement to workers who fulfil combined contributory (38 years) and age (64 years) requirements. ‘quota 102’ was in force until the end of 2022. if it keeps being renewed alongside the other derogation to the fornero pension reforms it may generate additional pension spending worth 0.23 per cent of italian gdp annually until the year 2034 (ragioneria generale dello stato, 2022: 83). 5. conclusions and discussion in this article, we analysed the policy trajectory of the italian welfare state during the turbulent xviii parliamentary term, through a careful investigation of social policy reforms in three crucial policy fields: family, pensions, labour market and anti-poverty policies. although in some respects one may argue that in the course of the legislature labour and income support policies turned to more traditional tracks, the legislature brought about the introduction of a minimum income scheme (the rdc), finally overcoming one of the main weaknesses of the italian welfare state, the lack of a safety net guaranteeing income protection to all poor (italian) individuals. equally relevant, a neat expansion occurred in another traditionally neglected policy field, family policy, in particular through the introduction of the single universal allowance. further, with the launch of the italian national recovery and resilience plan and the setting of essential levels of provisions, significant investments were made in social – and in particular childcare – services, which should allow reaching, in the medium term, a coverage rate closer to the european average. as expected, less incisive reforms were adopted in pensions and labour market fields. as to the latter, the italian labour market is still heavily affected by low employment levels, stagnating wages, and the high incidence of atypical work. in the pension field, reinstated early exit options have been criticized by european institutions for being contrary to the efforts to modernize and slim down the italian retirement system. overall, the analysis of welfare developments in the three major policy fields during the xviii parliamentary term thus shows a rather mixed picture, where highly exceptional contextual conditions and political configurations made it possible to adopt reforms resting on heterogenous ideological and normative bases. against such a backdrop, three main considerations can be made. first, after a decade mainly characterized the italian welfare reform trajectory in turbulent times 86 by retrenchment, during the latter legislature expansion occurred in all three social policy areas considered here. however, and second, in terms of distributive profiles and outcomes, the reforms had very different implications. if in the field of pensions, ‘quota 100’ strengthened the traditional approach to welfare, prioritizing pensions by means of wellestablished insider-biased policies, in the areas of family and anti-poverty policies, instead, the auu and, most notably, the rdc, have a clearly redistributive impact in favour of disadvantaged groups, and strengthen the protection of social risks (related to the family situation, to poverty and social exclusion) that have been long neglected. this is despite the fact that the de facto exclusion of most poor migrants from the main anti-poverty policy creates a ‘new’ group institutionally excluded from the italian social protection architecture. in this respect, it is interesting to note that rdc and ‘quota 100’ were the two flagship initiatives of the yellow-green coalition, targeting almost opposite electoral constituencies, being almost a perfect school case of logrolling. third, and finally, as regards functional recalibration, looking at spending commitments, it is possible to point out how the investment in pensions, although targeting a restricted social clientele, could count on an overall allocation of over eur 30 billion in the 2019-2022 period, comparable to the outlays estimated for rdc and the additional resources allocated to auu. the net impact of the recalibration across welfare functions is therefore limited. in sum, from a theoretical point of view, our historical-institutionalist conjectures are by and large vindicated. path-departing reforms, largely conforming to bonoli’s (2012) affordable credit claiming, have been enacted in less costly and institutionalized policy fields, where there was the potential to expand social protection onto previously neglected (and politically weak or dispersed) constituencies (the poor, families, etc.). yet, quite surprisingly, italian governments pursued ‘affordable credit claiming’ strategies also in the retirement field, through the marginal (and catering to specific constituencies) expansion of pension rights. as expected, the potential to either further retrench or embark on a comprehensive reform path in the pension field was radically reduced, on the one hand, by deeply entrenched interests and constituencies and, on the other hand, due to budgetary and external political constraints. one may argue that to the surprise of many, despite heterogeneous and unstable political configurations with assorted majorities and short-lived governments and lacking an overarching reform plan, welfare reforms during the xviii parliamentary term broadly contributed to a recalibration of the italian welfare state in both functional and distributive terms, thanks to the adoption of structural reforms in the anti-poverty field and in family policy, and the increase in expenditure in services (in childcare, active labour 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(2020), ‘sovereignism’ and the challenge of welfare reform. pensions and social assistance between innovation, continuity and reversions to the past. contemporary italian politics 12(2): 258–273. tassinari, a. (2022). labour market policy in italy’s recovery and resilience plan. same old or a new departure?, contemporary italian politics, 14:4, 441 457, doi: 10.1080/23248823.2022.2127647. upb ufficio parlamentare di bilancio (2022), l’assegno unico universale: effetti distributivi e interazione con la riforma dell’irpef, focus tematico n° 3, 31 marzo 2022. http://www.welforum.it/ microsoft word pdf_issue_16_2_mancosu_etal.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 2 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 2, 122–136. contact author: moreno mancosu, university of turin and collegio carlo alberto, turin. e-mail address: moreno.mancosu@unito.it “in conspiracies we trust”: interpersonal/institutional trust and beliefs in conspiracy theories during the covid-19 pandemic moreno mancosu university of turin collegio carlo alberto, turin antonella seddone university of turin giuliano bobba university of turin collegio carlo alberto, turin federico vegetti university of turin abstract academic research has shown that believing in conspiracy theories is common in contemporary democracies and that believing in such theories is particularly common in moments of crisis (such as wars, terrorist attacks, or pandemics). scholars have attempted to understand the psychological and attitudinal elements that trigger conspiracism among the citizenry, finding that both interpersonal and institutional trust negatively correlate with conspiracism. if, however, it is straightforward to expect that people who present low levels of institutional trust might present high levels of conspiracism (due to the consistency of the narratives that drive the two attitudes), no research has so far investigated the mechanism behind the relationship between interpersonal trust and beliefs in conspiracy theories. using survey data collected in italy at the beginning of june 2020, after the first pandemic wave in the country, the present contribution aims to identify a plausible socio-psychological mechanism that triggers this latter association. using fixed-effect regression models, we show negative associations between institutional/interpersonal trust and conspiracism – with the former coefficient being bigger than the latter. we also show that pandemic stress, measured as one’s perceived likelihood of being infected by the new coronavirus, moderates both associations. in particular, at higher levels of pandemic stress, the correlation between interpersonal trust and conspiracy is larger, while the opposite is true for the relationship with institutional trust. this is consistent with theories that see conspiracism as a simple explanation of a complex world, namely, a tool that people (especially low-interpersonal-trust individuals) employ to reduce stress and anxiety produced by an uncertain situation. 1. introduction n recent years, scholarly and public opinion interest in conspiracy theory beliefs has grown. conspiracy theories, in their most basic definition, are explanations of social facts by means of “secret arrangement[s] between a small group of actors to usurp political or economic power, violate established rights, hide vital secrets or illicitly cause i mancosu, seddone, bobba and vegetti 123 widespread harm” (uscinski et al. 2016, p. 58). the growing interest in the determinants of conspiracism might be explained in two ways. first, the diffusion of conspiracist beliefs seems in contrast to the spread of higher education, scientific knowledge, and the relative ease with which rigorous and reliable information can be accessed by the general public. rather than explanations of social facts put forward by experts, people seem to be more fascinated by alternative epistemologies, which are usually consistent with their previous beliefs (plencner, 2014). partially related to this first argument, the increased diffusion of conspiracy theories also seems to be associated with the support of populist parties (mancosu et al., 2017; castanho silva et al., 2017), which have recently made heavy use of conspiratorial language. the academic literature has shown that conspiracy theories emerge during crises, such as wars (olmsted, 2019; byford and billig, 2001) or terrorist attacks (kreis, 2020); i.e., moments in which the feelings of threat and panic are at their peak in the citizenry (oleksy et al., 2021). unsurprisingly, thus, the covid-19 pandemic crisis has crucially contributed to the emergence of a large number of theories related to the origins of the virus and the possible benefits that evil and powerful conspirators might obtain by lockdown measures, the circulation of the virus, or vaccination campaigns (miller, 2020; oleksy et al., 2021, vezzoni et al., 2021). these positions can lead to negative consequences, such as vaccine hesitancy (hornsey et al., 2020) or scarce compliance with public health measures (constantinou et al., 2021). scholars have made relevant efforts to understand the psychological and attitudinal elements that trigger conspiracism among the citizenry, focusing, among other elements, on the relevance that trust in institutions might have on the likelihood of accepting conspiracy theories. it should not surprise, indeed, that people holding scarce trust in political institutions are more fascinated by theories that place in an extremely negative light these same institutions, deemed as plotting conspiracies to the detriment of regular citizens. much less investigated is the connection between interpersonal trust and conspiracism. although some research has been dedicated to this latter relationship, showing a negative correlation between the two concepts (goertzel, 1994; abalakina-paap et al., 1999), the mechanism that should drive this empirical evidence is far from being assessed. the aim of this contribution is twofold. first, we aim to systematically compare the strength of the relationship between interpersonal/institutional trust and conspiracism. second, we aim to identify a socio-psychological mechanism that is able to explain the under-theorized correlation between interpersonal trust and conspiracism. we will argue that the relationship between conspiracism and horizontal trust might be due to the cognitive and social tools that interpersonal trust guarantees. we rely on socio-psychological theories that see interpersonal trust as an indicator of the extent to which people can deal with complexity and can solve cognitive and social problems through a trustworthy network. when an individual lacks social/interpersonal trust, it means that they are alone in solving those problems and dealing with complex, stressful situations. believing in conspiracy theories is, after all, very similar to producing simple answers to complex problems. this leads us to hypothesize that, at lower levels of social trust, we will witness a higher likelihood of relying on coping mechanisms that produce higher levels of conspiracist ideation. this mechanism can be further refined by exploiting the covid-19 pandemic, which has unevenly increased levels of stress and uncertainty in the population. on the one hand, if the in conspiracies we trust 124 mechanism we are hypothesizing is correct, at heightened levels of stress and uncertainty (produced by the covid-19 crisis) we will see stronger associations between conspiracism and interpersonal trust. on the other hand, we will not see the same picture with regard to the association between institutional trust and conspiracism, which is mainly due to a narrative consistency between the two concepts. we test our hypotheses by means of survey data collected in italy at the beginning of june 2020, after the first pandemic wave in the country. using fixed-effects regression models, we show the negative associations between institutional/interpersonal trust and conspiracism – with the former being about 4.5 times bigger than the latter. in addition, we show that pandemic stress, measured as one’s perceived likelihood of being infected by the new coronavirus, moderates both associations. in particular, at higher levels of pandemic stress, the correlation between interpersonal trust and conspiracy is greater, while the opposite is true for the relationship with institutional trust. the paper is designed as follows. section 2 aims to outline the argument, define the basic concepts that we will take into account, and clarify the hypotheses. section 3 presents the data and methods employed to test our expectations. section 4 will present the results of the regression analyses, and section 5 will draw some conclusions on the results and present the limitations of the research. 2. background 2.1 conspiracies theories and people who believe them academic research has shown that believing in conspiracy theories is common in contemporary democracies. according to oliver and wood (2014), about 50% of americans believe in at least one conspiracy theory among those most widespread in the us. the percentage of believers is similar in other samples collected in other countries (see, as regards italy, mancosu et al., 2017). as a matter of fact, conspiracism seems not to be a marginal phenomenon. the academic literature has tried to identify the factors that explain the individual likelihood of endorsing these theories. in particular, it is possible to identify two research lines. the first relies on psychological and psychopathological studies, which argue that believing in conspiracies is a more or less severe form of mental disease (darwin et al., 2011; barron et al., 2014). conspiracism seems to be related to a paranoid style of thinking, a psychological condition in which an individual “sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he feels himself to be living as directed […] against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate does not affect himself alone but millions of others.” (hofstadter, 1956, p. 4). in addition, people believing in conspiracy theories are more likely to show manichean attitudes of the social and political environment in which they live, depicting a society in which a few conspirators are identified with evil and millions of individuals with good. moreover, social psychology literature finds that conspiracism is correlated with lower levels of selfesteem, agreeableness, high levels of powerlessness, and authoritarianism (abalakina et al., 1999; swami et al., 2011). a second line of research, on the other hand, investigates conspiracy beliefs by employing a socio-political perspective, aimed at finding associations between conspiracism and other attitudinal or socio-demographic variables (oliver and wood, 2014; van proojien, mancosu, seddone, bobba and vegetti 125 2017; mancosu and vegetti, 2020). for instance, it is shown that education is negatively related to conspiracism, with more educated people being more likely to engage in rational thinking, to avoid an obscure interpretation of facts, and to be less likely to present the need for closure attitudes (oliver and wood, 2014, van proojien, 2017, mancosu et al., 2017). the literature also shows positive correlations between conspiracism and religiosity (see oliver and wood, 2014; mancosu et al., 2017; ladini, 2021), and political engagement (jolley and douglas, 2014). as regards the relationship between electoral attitudes and conspiracism, the literature shows different patterns, diversified by the national contexts in which the empirical evidence is collected. in the us, generic conspiracy theories (i.e., theories that do not see a major role in the conspiracy of a democrat/republican) seem not to asymmetrically affect liberal/conservative citizens (oliver and woods, 2014). on the other hand, rightand left-wing extremists seem to believe more in conspiracy theories in the netherlands (see van prooijen et al., 2015). italy is characterized by a strong left-right cleavage, with extreme right-wing people believing significantly more even in generic theories (mancosu et al., 2021). previous research has also dealt with the relationship between different forms of trust and conspiracy theory beliefs. 2.2 interpersonal, institutional trust, and conspiracism overall, the investigation of interpersonal and institutional trust, as well as their consequences, is extremely prolific in sociology and political science. trust in institutions (also known as “vertical trust” or “trust in authorities”) is generally labeled as the level of confidence that one has in political institutions (such as the government, the police, the parliament of one’s country, etc., see yang, 2006; twenge et al., 2014). similarly, interpersonal trust is the level of trust that people have in others during their everyday activities. on the other hand, the horizontal trust concept is usually connected to the concept of social capital (hooghe & stolle, 2003; prakash & selle, 2004; putnam, 2002), which conceptualizes the levels to which one is embedded in interpersonal networking activities, knows other people in one’s community and is willing to trust them. although apparently similar (after all, both deal with the act of trusting), in the literature the two concepts present enormous differences, both in terms of the mechanism explaining the determinants of different levels of interpersonal/institutional trust, and in terms of their theorized consequences. when dealing with institutional trust, for instance, scholars tend to explain different degrees of it by means of one’s position in society (campbell, 2004), or the characteristics of the political/institutional system to which individuals are exposed. for instance, political contexts in which people witness low levels of accountability of the political systems are those in which a lack of trust in those suboptimal institutions is more likely (e.g. edlund and lindh, 2013, hakhverdian and mayne, 2012, welch et al., 2005). on the other hand, asymmetries in the levels of horizontal trust are more likely to be explained by micro-sociological or psychological elements, such as the intensity of relationships in formal/informal groups (li et al., 2005), or the degree of structuredness and clarity of the social norms in one’s environment (welch et al., 2005). especially regarding this latter construct, it is easy to imagine that in a social environment in which the individual can efficiently predict the actions of other individuals surrounding them, the level of social trust will be higher. as far as the consequences of different social and in conspiracies we trust 126 institutional levels are concerned, it is possible to say that, if institutional trust is more a matter of the opinions of people about the political and social system in which they live, interpersonal trust tackles one’s everyday social life. the literature stresses that interpersonal and institutional trust presents strong (and negative) associations with conspiracism. for instance, einstein and glick (2015) show that high levels of conspiracism are correlated with low levels of trust in institutions. the same relationship is shown by mari and colleagues (2021). the socialpsychological literature presents similar results concerning the relationship between interpersonal trust and believing in conspiracy theories. evidence of this association can be found in goertzel (1994), as well as in abalakina-paap and colleagues (1999). however, in this latter case, the relationship is always presented as plain empirical evidence, rarely associated with an explanatory mechanism. 2.3 trust and conspiracism: what about the mechanisms? the explanation of the relationship between different types of trust and conspiracism is the main aim of the paper. as regards institutional trust, the mechanism that drives the relationship is pretty straightforward. if people, for a variety of reasons, tend to trust less in institutions, it means that they believe that these are at best inefficient, and at worst flawed (hakhverdian and mayne, 2012; mari et al., 2021). if political and economic institutions are perceived in this way, it becomes easier to believe that a corrupt elite, not attentive to the public interest, might plot in secret to the detriment of the large majority of the unaware population (for a more in-depth analysis of the consistency of distrust and conspiracist narratives, see jamison et al., 2020). as shown above, previous literature has shown a negative relationship between conspiracism and institutional trust, and we have no elements to believe that the pandemic would undermine this association. our first hypothesis will thus read as follows: h1. at lower levels of institutional trust, the level of conspiracism increases much less clear is the mechanism that drives the relationship between social trust and conspiracism – as stressed above, previous literature, mainly based on correlational analyses in social psychology, did not provide a social mechanism that can provide a compelling theoretical explanation of the association between the two concepts. in order to provide an attempt to solve this puzzle, we must start with defining conspiracism in a slightly different way. for citizens who believe in these theories, conspiracism has been defined as a simple explanation to a complex problem (see marchlewska et al., 2018). believing in conspiracy theories shifts the responsibility of dramatic events or unequal distributions of resources to a super-powerful, unrecognizable, and unbeatable group of people – the conspirators (marchlewska et al., 2018; uscinski, 2018). we also stressed in the previous paragraph that low levels of interpersonal trust are related to anomy – i.e., social structures in which social norms are undermined or almost absent (see welch, 2005; falcone and castelfranchi, 2001). as stressed in previous studies, people with low interpersonal trust are alone in coping with complexity – namely, they have to cognitively deal with complex issues in (almost) complete solitude. this interpretation is compatible with the evidence brought by grace and schill (1984), who show that people presenting high levels of social trust are more likely mancosu, seddone, bobba and vegetti 127 to cope with situations of stress better than people with low levels (see also wang et al., 2020). it is thus easier for those people to rely on simple explanations of social and political facts to cope with complexity. hypothesis 2 will thus read as follows. h2. at lower levels of interpersonal trust the level of conspiracism increases 2.4 the role of uncertainty and the covid-19 crisis in italy the covid-19 crisis in italy, especially during and after the so-called first wave (between march and july 2020), provides a unique occasion to test this mechanism. the coronavirus pandemic hit italy before other countries and, especially during the first wave of the pandemic, in a particularly strong way (with an excess death rate – as of 15 june 2020 – of more than 34,345 units, see blangiardo et al., 2020). the first wave, with the strong lockdown measures taken to prevent the spread of the virus, produced dramatic changes in italians’ everyday lives. for our interests, this wave of the pandemic presents two relevant characteristics. first of all, it enhanced stress and uncertainty in the population from the economic, social, and existential points of view. the pandemic, in addition to producing a disastrous economic crisis, reduced the network of social relationships of a large quota of the population, forced to stay at home because of the lockdown measures. the second element of interest is the variance of those stress levels in the population. since the beginning of the pandemic, it was clear that some subjects (the elderly, people with pre-existing pathologies) were more likely to be seriously endangered by the virus. also, italy has seen a very uneven distribution of the prevalence of infected people (and consequently, different death tolls), with outbreaks in some provinces of northern italy. for these reasons, the measured levels of stress and the perceptions of existential threat during and after the pandemic were largely different among italians. in this contribution, we will employ the perception of the threat of the covid-19 pandemic (the so-called pandemic stress, see kujawa et al., 2020) as a moderator to better understand the relationships between interpersonal/institutional trust and conspiracism. perceiving high levels of pandemic stress brings, inevitably, a burden of anxiety and uncertainty that people must cope with. if what we argued in h2 is true, i.e., that the relationship between interpersonal trust and conspiracism is driven by a form of anxiety reduction, in which people cope with uncertainty by relying on simple, manichean theories that explain almost everything with simple arguments, it is plausible to infer that this same relationship should be stronger in subjects that experience more of this type of anxiety. in other words, we expect that, if the mechanism we are theorizing is correct, covid-related stress will moderate the relationship between interpersonal trust and conspiracism. hypothesis 3 thus reads as follows: h3. the negative relationship between interpersonal trust and conspiracism will be stronger among people experiencing more pandemic stress. on the other hand, we have stressed that trust in institutions is only marginally associated with the levels of anxiety that one experiences, and it is mainly a matter of opinion, which deals more with the consistency of conspiracist narratives with respect to anxiety management. institutional trust is mainly based on perceived perceptions of in conspiracies we trust 128 institutional performance, or political partisanship, but the literature so far has not provided any possible theoretical link between institutional trust, conspiracism, and uncertainty/pandemic stress. in this case, we might expect that the moderation effect would be absent, because of the very fact that the two mechanisms that drive people’s reactions are different. we do not see any reason why pandemic stress is expected to moderate the relationship between institutional trust and conspiracism. our h4 will thus read as follows: h4. the negative relationship between institutional trust and conspiracism will not be moderated by pandemic stress. 3. data and methods our hypotheses are tested through an online survey of the over-18 italian population (n=2,267). data collection is managed by the italian polling company swg. the sample is drawn from a pool of 60,000 panelists. respondents are randomly drawn from this pool, with the sampling procedure stratified by a set of socio-demographic indicators (gender, age, and area of residence). the questionnaire was administered after the first pandemic wave (more specifically, between june 26 and july 3, 2020). our dependent variable is the result of a scale asking our respondents to evaluate the likelihood of four conspiracy theories about the nature and diffusion of covid-19 that were particularly widespread in july 2020. more specifically, we asked them to evaluate – from 0 (meaning “not plausible at all”) to 10 (meaning “completely plausible”) – the following statements: the new coronavirus has been created to breed fear and impose mass vaccinations covid-19 was created in a chinese lab and escaped, causing the pandemic1 new 5g antennas harm the immune system and makes the diffusion of covid-19 easier the covid-19 emergency and lockdown measures have been a rehearsal for a dictatorship the four items, although covering largely different aspects of the conspiracy theories about the pandemic, present an extremely satisfactory internal consistency (cronbach’s alpha = 0.92). we can thus argue that they tackle a concept that might be very similar to that of conspiracist ideation (bruder et al., 2013). after summing the four items, we rescaled them to obtain a 0-10 scale, in which 0 is equal to 0 “evaluating every conspiracy theory as not plausible at all” and 10 means “evaluating every conspiracy theory as totally plausible”. the main independent variables are represented by two scales tackling interpersonal and institutional trust. the first scale, which covers interpersonal trust, is composed of two items, asking people to evaluate, on a 1-4 scale from 1 (“no trust at all”) to 4 (“a lot of trust”) how much they trust 1) their colleagues/coworkers and 2) friends and acquaintances. the second scale measures trust in political and public institutions, asking them to evaluate, on the same 4-point scale outlined above, their trust in the 1 we are aware of the fact that the “leak” hypothesis is now more plausible, being evaluated as a possible origin of the new coronavirus also by official sources. still, in july 2020 this was definitely a conspiracy theory. mancosu, seddone, bobba and vegetti 129 following institutions: the president of the republic, the italian parliament, italian law enforcement, the president of the respondent’s region, the mayor of respondent’s city, the government, and the national healthcare system. both the scales provide a more than sufficient internal consistency (respectively, the cronbach alphas of the two scales are equal to .83 and .86). to make them comparable in the models that test our hypotheses, and to provide positive coefficients in the models, after summing the items, we rescaled them to a 0-1 scale, inverted the polarity of the scale, and produced two distrust scales, in which 0 means “no distrust at all in any item” and 1 means “complete distrust in all items”. this will help the readability of predictions/average marginal effects in the following paragraph. it must be noted that the first-order correlation between the two types of trust is not particularly high (r=.40). we can thus conclude that the two concepts, as stressed repeatedly in the literature (see spadaro et al., 2020, kim et al., 2020), tackle two different concepts. we stressed above the importance of the moderator of the effect, the individual level of pandemic stress. since we do not have a measure in our questionnaire that tackles this concept exactly, we rely on a proxy of the concept, namely, the perceived likelihood of getting infected in the future by the new coronavirus (a 0-10 scale going from 0 “impossible” to 10 “sure”). the question was asked of those who did not get infected with covid-19 (in our sample, we had 29 people who declared they had been infected and we thus expunged them from the analysis). in this case, at higher levels of perceived likelihood of being infected, we are assuming that feelings of anxiety and pandemic stress will increase.2 to control for possible composition effects, we added to our models several confounders, namely gender, age (continuous), educational level (subdivided in “primary”, “secondary” and “tertiary”), and vote intentions (subdivided in “majority”, “rightwing opposition”, “other parties/abstention”).3 3.1 models we stressed above that the pandemic hit the country in very different ways. it is thus important to take into account that different subnational pandemic situations might alter the correlation of our attitudes. the hypotheses will thus be tested using two fixedeffect linear regression models, with the level-2 variable being the region of residence of the respondents. the first model, aimed at testing h1 and h2, in addition to the control variables, fits the coefficients for the two types of trust. the second fits two two-way interactions between the two types of trust separately and the perceived likelihood of getting infected by covid-19. this latter model will test h3 and h4. 4. results table 1 reports the coefficients for the two models presented above. 2 of course, this choice, similarly to the working employed for the trust scale, is a suboptimal solution. this drawback of the empirical design will be dealt with in the last section of the paper. 3 see appendix 1 for descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the models. in conspiracies we trust 130 table 1. two fixed-effect models to study conspiracism model 1 model 2 independent variables coef. s.e. coef. s.e. institutional distrust 3.018*** (0.371) 6.558*** (0.814) interpersonal distrust 0.670** (0.310) -0.640 (0.711) likelihood of getting covid-19 0.0452 (0.0305) 0.338*** (0.0795) instit. distrust * getting covid-19 -0.742*** (0.152) interp. distrust * getting covid-19 0.274** (0.138) gender: female (ref. male) 0.613*** (0.124) 0.596*** (0.124) age -0.004 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) vote: government (ref. others) 0.152 (0.152) 0.166 (0.151) vote: right-wing opposition 1.303*** (0.166) 1.260*** (0.165) education lvl: secondary (ref. primary) -0.858*** (0.226) -0.806*** (0.225) education lvl: tertiary -1.360*** (0.232) -1.336*** (0.230) constant 1.099*** (0.415) -0.396 (0.554) observations 1,668 1,668 number of lvl-2 units 20 20 lvl-2 variance 2.489 2.474 note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 as it is possible to see in model 1, both vertical and horizontal distrust variables correlate positively with conspiracism, as correctly predicted in h1 and h2. since the two variables are rescaled in the same way, it is also possible to investigate the magnitude of these two effects. as we can note, the difference between the coefficients of vertical and horizontal distrust is important, with the institutional distrust coefficient being about 4.5 times greater than that of interpersonal distrust (a three-point coefficient for the institutional trust variable and a 0.7 coefficient for the interpersonal trust variable). although few studies in the literature have investigated the relevance of the differences between interpersonal and institutional trust in explaining conspiracism, the corroboration of h1 and h2 does not come as a surprise. the interaction terms, presented in model 2, show a more interesting pattern. we argued in h3 that, if the relationship between different types of trust and conspiracism is actually driven by different mechanisms (fear and anxiety on one hand, narrative consistency on the other), the moderation effect of perceived stress caused by the covid-19 crisis should impact interpersonal trust in a very precise way, namely, increasing the effect of distrust at increasing levels of pandemic stress. on the other hand, in h4 the sign of the moderating effect of stress was expected not to be significant. as is possible to see from table 1 (model 2), the interaction terms between pandemic stress and the two variables present opposite signs. in other words, the more a person is persuaded that he/she will get covid-19, the greater the correlation between interpersonal distrust and conspiracism. similarly, at increasing levels of our pandemic stress variable, we see a decreasing correlation between institutional distrust and conspiracism. figure 1 shows these two relationships graphically. mancosu, seddone, bobba and vegetti 131 figure 1. average marginal effects of the coefficient of institutional and interpersonal distrust on conspiracism, by perceived likelihood of getting covid-19 source: own elaboration. as is possible to see from the left panel of figure 1, the average marginal effects show also the magnitude of the two opposed moderation effects. we can see that the ame of interpersonal distrust is non-significant at low levels of perceived likelihood of getting infected (and it becomes significant when the perceived likelihood is higher than 5). on the other hand, we can see the opposite figure for institutional distrust (right panel of figure 1). here, at high levels of pandemic stress, we have non-significant marginal effects of interpersonal distrust. summarizing, we can say that h3 is corroborated, while the empirical test of h4 reveals unexpected evidence that must be carefully taken into account. although we expected that the moderation of pandemic stress would not have been significant, we realize that the effect is significant, and goes in the opposite direction with respect to the effect that moderates the correlation between interpersonal trust and conspiracism. this moderation effect is particularly large, with people with low levels of pandemic stress presenting a strong and positive association between institutional trust and conspiracism, and citizens presenting high levels of pandemic stress presenting a non-significant correlation between institutional trust and conspiracism. this result challenges our h4 and calls for possible alternative explanations of the relationship between trust (and, in particular, institutional trust) and conspiracism during the pandemic. 5. discussion believing in conspiracy theories is usually seen as being related to one’s levels of trust. lower levels of institutional trust might make people more likely to believe in plots orchestrated by powerful and evil elites. at the same time, even if the mechanism is not in conspiracies we trust 132 explicitly posited, the literature found a negative association between interpersonal trust and believing in conspiracy theories (goertzel, 1994; abalakina-paap et al., 1999). the present contribution aimed to systematically compare the effects that different types of trust might have on conspiracism. in addition, the paper aimed to understand the mechanisms underlying the relationship between conspiracism and interpersonal/institutional trust, by exploiting, as a moderator variable, the role of pandemic stress after the first covid-19 wave. we argued that people with low levels of interpersonal trust are more likely to employ conspiracy theories as coping mechanisms to deal with complexity, especially when presenting high levels of pandemic stress. believing in such theories, thus, might be a way of reducing the stress related to uncertain situations (grace and schill, 1984; wang et al., 2020). on the other hand, people with high levels of interpersonal trust are more equipped to deal with uncertainty and thus are less likely to be forced to rely on these simple explanations of reality. at the same time, we expected that the moderating effect of pandemic stress would not be significant as regards the correlation between institutional trust and our dependent variable. surprisingly, we found that the moderation effect in this latter case is opposite with respect to the former type of trust. this is particularly interesting since it might suggest that a situation of pandemic distress leads to a reduction in the correlation between believing in conspiracies and trust in institutions. the relationship between institutional trust and conspiracism seems to be affordable only if one feels relatively safe with respect to the pandemic. being afraid of the possible consequences of the pandemic, on the other hand, reduces the correlation between trust and conspiracism. this latter result might be explainable as some form of side effect of high levels of fear of the pandemic, which, as we know from previous literature, increases the average level of institutional trust (kritzinger et al., 2021). as a result, if institutional trust increases also for generally conspiracist people, this might lead to the weaker correlations that we see in the results. the study presents several limitations, both as concerns the data employed and the design. concerning the former, we have seen that the variables employed to measure both interpersonal trust and pandemic stress are non-standard variables that are usually employed in the literature. in particular, interpersonal trust and pandemic stress are generally measured in different ways. also, because of data limitations, several socioeconomic variables (such as economic vulnerability and income losses, which might represent relevant indicators fostering respondents’ feeling of anxiety) were kept out of our analyses. future research will aim to test whether those relationships hold with standard variables, as well as with more confounders. the second limitation relates to the non-causal design employed. the results present correlational evidence, and the causal mechanisms argued are corroborated only in an indirect way. in other words, we do not have the “smoking gun” that our argument is correct. notwithstanding these issues, we think that these results shed light on the connections between two fundamental concepts employed in social science and a new, interesting element of public opinion that is becoming extremely relevant in contemporary societies. mancosu, seddone, bobba and vegetti 133 acknowledgement data collection has been financed by collegio carlo alberto (turin) and the department of cultures, politics, and society (university of turin). references abalakina-paap, m., 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(2021). where does the coronavirus come from? on the mechanisms underlying the endorsement of conspiracy theories on the origin of sars-cov-2. italian political science review/rivista italiana di scienza politica, 1-15. wang, h., xia, q., xiong, z., li, z., xiang, w., yuan, y., ... & li, z. (2020). the psychological distress and coping styles in the early stages of the 2019 coronavirus disease (covid-19) epidemic in the general mainland chinese population: a web-based survey. plos one, 15(5). welch, m. r., rivera, r. e., conway, b. p., yonkoski, j., lupton, p. m., & giancola, r. (2005). determinants and consequences of social trust. sociological inquiry, 75(4), 453-473. yang, k. (2006). trust and citizen involvement decisions: trust in citizens, trust in institutions, and propensity to trust. administration & society, 38(5), 573-595. in conspiracies we trust 136 appendix descriptive statistics: variable min max s.d. mean conspiracism scale 0 10 2.72 2.55 institutional distrust 0 1 .20 .52 interpersonal distrust 0 1 .22 .39 likelihood of getting covid-19 0 10 2.06 4.64 gender: female (ref. male) 1 2 .50 1.47 age 18 90 15.73 48.80 vote: others 0 1 .48 .37 vote: government 0 1 .48 .38 vote: right-wing opposition 0 1 .43 .25 education lvl: primary 0 1 .30 .10 education lvl: secondary 0 1 .50 .52 education lvl: tertiary 0 1 .49 .38 microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_i.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. i. an introductory note from former ips co-editors: stefania panebianco university of catania francesco zucchini university of milan t is with great pleasure that we welcome the new format of italian political science (ips) as an open-access, peer-reviewed, quarterly journal. it is, in some way, the journal's third life. ips was launched in 2007 by maurizio cotta with giliberto capano as a professional digital journal whose mission was to foster debate on problems relating to the development of political science in italy and abroad. for the first time, the italian political science community had access to an electronic tool, entirely written in english, to engage in the international debate. in 2013, ips was relaunched with a new editorial team, a new website, a new format and a section including book reviews. as a professional journal, ips was faced with such challenges as the internationalization of teaching (first and foremost of phd programmes), the evaluation of research, and the reform of academic programmes. while the sisp journal ‘rivista italiana di scienza politica’ was changing into ‘italian political science review’, ips was conceived primarily as a forum to debate on traditional and emerging research issues or new teaching instruments. a number of interviews with the founding fathers of political science in italy and with italian political scientists in relevant international roles aimed at fostering the circulation of ideas, in combination with short but more structured articles. special issues were devoted to specific new or neglected sub-fields of the discipline. ips has now turned into an open-access scientific journal with a broader scope. this is a new, exciting adventure. by fostering the understanding of political phenomena through the lenses of political science, ips opens to a wider politically-minded public without losing scientific rigour. this new phase, aimed at further strengthening italian political science in italy and abroad, kicks off with a timely first issue focusing on the 2018 italian general election. we believe that such a strong beginning will be upheld in forthcoming issues. good luck to the co-editors and to the new editorial team. i pdf_issue_14_3_pilati_perra italian political science, volume 14 issue 3, february 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 3, 167-187. contact author: katia pilati, university of trento. e-mail address: katia.pilati@unitn.it trade unions and labour conflicts: social movement and radical political unionism in france and italy katia pilati university of trento sabrina perra university of cagliari abstract this article explores differences in labour conflicts in italy and france by focusing on the characteristics of the most prominent structures of worker mobilization: trade unions. despite several similarities between the french and italian industrial relations systems, and despite the fact that trade union density in italy is more than three times greater than it is in france, france is one of the few european countries in which the average strike volume increased after the great recession. protests in france also peaked in the pre-crisis period, while italy did not show any wave of contention. we contend that the nature and level of labour conflicts observed in the two countries in the last two decades depend on alliances between trade unions and other social groups and organizations sustaining worker mobilization, specifically, social movement organizations. in particular, we argue that labour conflicts are related to the characteristics of social movement unionism. evidence from cases studies in france and italy suggests that the role of trade unions and their alliances has been different in the two countries. confederal trade unions in france have been able to engage in social movement unionism within broader coalitions involving other social categories and social movement organizations. in contrast, in italy, these dynamics have mostly involved small rank-and-file unions and self-organized workers’ groups engaged in radical political unionism. this has resulted in different levels of mobilization associated with social movement unionism and radical political unionism, given the greater capacity of confederal trade unions in building nationally coordinated and sustained collective actions. 1. introduction oday, trade unions have serious difficulties in developing common and coordinated national and european strategies of revitalization in order to come out of the stagnation resulting in declining membership and worker mobilization. since the nineties, governments have attempted to obtain social stability by co-opting these intermediate groups, which have historically challenged them through strikes, the most commonly used form of collective action in the labour field. in particular, in many countries, governments have promoted processes of trade union institutionalization. in this way, many unions have become bureaucratic organizations relying on institutional power resources, thus limiting efforts devoted to the mobilization of workers. t trade unions and labour conflicts 168 despite similar policy changes, evidence has shown highly heterogeneous levels and forms of labour conflicts in european countries since the beginning of the 2000s. in most european countries strikes have declined in the last two decades but, in a few cases, they have increased (vandaele 2016: 279-280). differences have been further exacerbated during anti-austerity protests. since 2008, economic and labour-related claims have prevailed over political and cultural claims, but this has mostly occurred in southern europe (rüdig and karyotis 2014; portos garcía 2016; kriesi et al. forthcoming). in this framework, italy and france represent two cases in point of some of the differences in labour conflicts that have emerged in europe in the last two decades. france is indeed one of the few countries in which the average strike volume increased after 2005, as compared to the previous two decades, reaching, between 2005 and 2014, an average strike volume three times higher than that of italy (vandaele 2016: 280).1 in addition, protests in france peaked in the pre-crisis period, while italy only experienced a series of intermittent crisis-related mobilizations without showing any wave of contention, as had occurred in greece, portugal and spain (kriesi et al. forthcoming). such differences emerged despite france and italy sharing many similarities in their industrial relations systems and trade union models. furthermore, this occurred despite the fact that the density of trade unions in france remains one of the weakest in europe, at around 8 percent throughout the 2000s, compared to more than 30 percent in italy, suggesting an apparently greater support from italian trade unions for worker mobilization. these data therefore underline the ambiguous relationship between union density and mobilization. this article aims to examine factors which are likely to affect the differences in labour conflicts between france and italy. it contends that the nature and level of labour conflicts depend, inter alia, on alliances between trade unions and other social categories and organizations sustaining worker mobilization, particularly social movement organizations. in other words, we argue that labour conflicts are related to the characteristics of social movement unionism, as referred to by industrial relations scholars in order to explain these dynamics (baccaro et al. 2003). to explore such a hypothesis, our empirical study draws on existing evidence in the two cases. in france, case studies suggest the crucial role of the main confederations, like confédération général du travail (cgt), in acting together with other actors to mobilize workers in protests such as strikes, demonstrations and occupations. in general, in france, confederal trade unions have a good connection to the social movement sector, even if some scholars argue that mobilization has remained fragmented since 2011 (ancelovici 2011; béroud and yon 2012; tapia and turner 2013; béroud 2018). in contrast, in the last two decades, italy has often witnessed a lack of alliance building by the three major confederations – confederazione generale italiana del lavoro (cgil), confederazione italiana sindacati dei lavoratori (cisl) and unione italiana del lavoro (uil) – in processes of worker mobilization. workers have often relied on self-organized 1 empirically, strikes have a multi-dimensional character, reflected by three main indicators: the number of strikes, the number of workers going on strike and the number of days not worked due to industrial action. according to vandaele (2016: 279), the latter, i.e., the number of working days lost through strikes per worker per year, referred to as strike volume, is considered the most reliable indicator for cross-national and historical comparisons. although lockouts should in principle be separated from strike actions, most data on industrial action do not make a distinction between those two types of industrial action. pilati and perra 169 and informal groups or on grassroots, independent, small rank-and-file trade unions (cillo and pradella 2018; 2019; chesta et al. 2019; caruso et al. 2019; see also mattoni 2016 on temporary workers).2 2. the repertoire of labour conflicts: strikes and beyond labour conflicts refer to instances of workers’ collective actions or collective actions whose claims refer to labour. they identify the various forms of opposition that the workforce, or other actors on its behalf, carry out against the worsening of labour conditions in the workplace, and of workers’ rights in relation to employment standards, retirement and social security (roscigno and hodson 2004). historically, strikes have been the main form of labour conflict; however, labour conflicts have not been restricted to them. indeed, they include street protests, sit-ins, assemblies, more institutional acts such as forms of consultations, and more disruptive actions such as squatting. these forms of action represent specific instances of contentious politics. whether or not they identify, as a whole, as a labour movement is an empirical question. indeed, labour movements are specific forms of collective action dynamics and are associated with sustained contentious interactions between challengers and authorities, a shared class consciousness and a variety of actors and organizations which support, engage in or organize various types of labour-related collective actions and events (tilly and tarrow 2015; diani 2018). strikes, the main form of labour conflict since the 1980s and 1990s, have progressively decreased in most european countries, despite differences across countries (brandl and traxler 2010; baccaro and howell 2011). while the great recession has worsened conditions in many workplaces and often diminished workers’ rights due to austerity measures adopted by many european countries in order to face the crisis, strikes have continued to decline even during the last decade. a comparison of strike volume before and after 2008, the year in which the great recession started, shows that the daysnot-worked rates have only increased in a limited number of countries in the past decade. compared with the pre-2008 period, the average days-not-worked rate after the great recession only rose in belgium, france, germany and luxembourg (vandaele 2016: 279280).3 data from the european commission reporting the distribution of strike volume across european countries further confirms that, after 2008, strike volume declined steadily in absolute terms in almost all countries. the only countries in which strike volume sharply increased in the first four years of the crisis, between 2008 and 2012, are denmark, ireland and france (european commission, directorate-general for employment, social affairs and inclusion unit b.1, 2015: 37). strikes have undergone several other changes in the last decades. on the one hand, they have become more defensive than offensive, thus differing in many ways from the labour movements of the second half of last century (ancelovici 2011; baccaro and howell 2 as culpepper and regan (2014) underline, from the middle of the 1990s onwards, radical organizations such as cobas (comitati di base) have used their shop-floor power to arrange wage-settings at the local level. cgil often contested these agreements using a binding vote of union members in order to reaffirm its own legitimacy. 3 vandaele (2016: 280) suggests being cautious when discussing data on strikes after the recession. indeed, the author argues that the number of countries covered by strike data and its reliability have fallen since 2008, especially in southern european countries. trade unions and labour conflicts 170 2011). calhoun (2012) argues that modern workers seem to be reformists rather than radicals. they tend to compete in the capitalist arena for distributional advantage. however, they do not aim to challenge the mode of production, nor propose a new economic and social order. on the other hand, empirical evidence has shown that strikes have been increasingly addressed to governments rather than to employers. indeed, general and political strikes increased during the great recession, especially in the period 2010–2013 and in southern european countries such as greece (rüdig and karyotis 2014; kelly 2015: 11; vandaele 2016). as already mentioned, labour conflicts are not only manifested through strikes. prompted by struggles against neo-liberal policies developed at the beginning of the millennium and exacerbated by the great recession, claims over economic issues, including labour-related claims, have been expressed in a variety of actions, beyond strikes (ancelovici 2011; flesher fominaya 2014; della porta 2015; andretta, bosi and della porta 2016; giugni and grasso 2015). during anti-austerity protests, demonstrations proved to be the major form of collective action next to strikes (for southern europe see rüdig and karyotis 2014; portos garcía 2016; andretta 2018). during such protests, workers have often been incorporated in broader coalitions against neo-liberal policies or austerity measures, claiming against the demise of social benefits and the retrenchment of welfare states, against the regulation of immigration to europe, and against financial regulations and spreading inequalities (tapia and turner 2013; della porta 2015). under such circumstances, workers have mobilized around cross-cutting issues such as social exclusion or various types of rights such as housing or migrants’ rights and claims by traditional working classes, the ‘insiders’, have overlapped with claims by ‘outsiders’ such as atypical workers, the unemployed, students, youth, and migrants.4 occupations, as well as more disruptive forms of action, by means of violent or dangerous actions such as ‘boss-napping’ in france at the goodyear tyre factory, where workers held their managers hostage in a protest against the plant closure in 2012, have also been used to claim labour rights or better working conditions (baccaro 2010). 3. interpreting changes in labour conflicts several hypotheses have been put forward to account for changes in labour conflicts, more specifically for declining strikes. one reason for the declining strikes is related to longterm shifts in the labour force composition. as regards the occupational sector, scholars have observed a steady trend towards further de-industrialization of employment, namely shrinking manufacturing employment, with a corresponding decrease in the days-not-worked rate in industry in most countries (vandaele 2016: 284). from the 1980s onwards, labour conflicts have moved from the industrial sectors to public services. indeed, shifts in the employment composition, namely the “tertiarisation of industrial conflict” (bordogna and cella 2002) assume that strikes in the services sector are 4 the opposition between insiders and outsiders is defined as dualization (emmenegger et al. 2012). it implies that policies differentiate rights, entitlements and services for different groups of recipients. while the position of insiders has remained more or less constant, the position of outsiders has greatly deteriorated. scholars distinguish between process of dualization, output (institutional dualism) and outcome of the policies (divide). see davidsson and naczyk (2009) for a review of the literature. pilati and perra 171 escalating, while historically strike-prone unionized sectors have structurally declined over time (vandaele 2016: 284). another factor associated with the generally decreasing number of days-not-worked rates before the recession relates to the fact that, since the 1990s, in southern european countries, industrial conflict has been solved via ‘social pacts’.5 until the mid-1990s, italian trade unions represented an integral part of the policy-making process and a major counterpart of the government in the negotiations regarding several reforms. afterwards, unions reduced this role, although they maintained their ability to mobilize social protest and the possibility to veto a decision during negotiations (regalia and regini 2018). industrial relations scholars have further delved into the role of the characteristics of the industrial relations system to explain declining industrial action. moving in a neoliberal direction over the past 30 years has meant, inter-alia, a dualization of the economic system, in particular of the labour market opposing insiders to outsiders, a progressive flexibilization of workers’ labour conditions, and a process of decentralization of collective bargaining from the national to the second-level-firm or company-bargaining levels (silver 2003; baccaro and howell 2011; emmenegger et al. 2012; regan 2017). austerity structural reforms imposed by the new european economic governance have further increased the process of decentralization and the flexibility of the labour market, reducing multi-employer bargaining systems, the process of institutionalization of many industrial relations practices and delegitimized unions as political subjects (leonardi and pedersini 2018; leonardi 2018)6. decentralization and company bargaining have increased in many european countries including, since the 1980s, both italy and france. governments have encouraged enterprise bargaining instead of sectoral or national collective bargaining and have removed the monopoly of unions in bargaining working conditions and wage setting.7 while there is 80-90 percent of collective bargaining coverage in both countries, many sectoral agreements only include what is prescribed by law, and workplace settlement disregards the sectoral framework. consequently, the problem is often how company agreement can derogate collective bargaining (the national collective agreement and the sectoral agreement) and what the arrangements for companies should be where no union representative exists. these changes imply that labour disputes are likely to be smaller and with relatively fewer workers involved, given the downward 5 since the great recession, the process of involving labour in social pacts has been interrupted. national governments, regardless of partisanship, have mostly rejected a process of negotiated adjustment of reform initiatives that involved unions (culpepper and regan 2014; armingeon and baccaro 2012). 6 the progressive introduction of bilateralism can be considered the most evident example of the process of institutionalization. 7 in this framework, france is the most prominent case of state-guided coordination (culpepper 2006) as demonstrated by the high politicized level of wage setting, including coordinated second level bargaining. in this country there is a dual system of industrial relations. in large industrial firms and in the public sector, where trade unions maintain their presence, it is possible to observe the traditional exchange between working time flexibility for job security (long term contract). in small firms and low skilled sectors – public and private – without union representations, working conditions have deteriorated and flexibility is increasing (palier and thelen 2010). trade unions and labour conflicts 172 scale-shift of bargaining to the firm level. in contrast, where bargaining takes place at higher levels, relatively more workers are involved but conflicts may be fewer.8 more recently, gentile and tarrow (2009) have drawn on the literature on social movements, namely on the concept of political opportunity structure (pos) which defines the institutional setting shaping opportunities for collective actions to explain changes in labour conflicts. the pos regards both the most stable dimensions of the institutional system, like the legislative frame, and more contingent dimensions such as the type of electoral system and the stability of elites’ alignments or elites’ alliances (cf. kriesi et al. 1995). according to the main hypothesis driven by such theory, an open pos is expected to provide more opportunities for protest mobilization. gentile and tarrow (2009) have interpreted differences in labour conflicts, namely between labour and rights-based claims, by referring to the different degree of legal-institutionalized recognition of labour rights across countries. according to the authors, in corporatist settings the specific legalinstitutionalized setting is associated with more opportunities for workers to mobilize along labour issues. this also characterizes a labour repertoire of industrial action, whereby workers tend to coordinate through trade unions and frame their demands in terms of the expansion or violation of their labour rights. in contrast, where labour rights are severely curtailed, as in neoliberal regimes, opportunities for workers to mobilize along labour issues shrink, leading to a closing pos and to a shift towards a citizens’ rights-oriented repertoire. in this case, claims and grievances tend to be framed in terms of civil rights; workers will build alliances with social movements, not just unions, and they will resort to civil legal institutions for protection. this has been observed in the case of the us labour movement (milkman and voss 2004). nonetheless, in recent decades, neoliberal policies have definitely touched all european countries, especially through decentralization, as mentioned, thus affecting countries with a corporatist regime too (gumbrell-mccormick and hyman 2013). the aforementioned scholars, in an attempt to account for changes in labour conflicts, argue that the broad macro-level context has significant consequences for labour conflicts through shifts in employment composition, or through changes in the legal-institutionalized recognition of labour rights, or else through policies aiming, inter-alia, to decentralize collective bargaining. these factors, as discussed, tend to affect many european countries, including france and italy. therefore, they cannot fully account for the specific differences observed between france and italy. in the following paragraphs, we therefore turn to examine factors associated with the meso-level, considering, in particular, intermediate mobilizing structures such as trade unions. scholars have indeed argued that differences in labour conflicts may also depend on trade union characteristics, such as the level of unity or disunity of trade unions, the capacity of trade unions to shape government responses to socio-economic trends and periodic economic crises, and the involvement of trade unions in government decisions about public spending cuts (gumbrell-mccormick and hyman 2013; bieling and lux 2014; grote and wagemann 2018). below we specifically discuss the alliances built by 8according to vandaele (2016) the associations between level of bargaining and strike characteristics are, however, weak and he advocates further analysis considering other economic and political variables. pilati and perra 173 trade unions with other sectors of civil society, specifically, with social movement organizations, smos, and the ways they may affect labour conflicts. 4. trade unions, alliances, and labour conflicts: a hypothesis historically, the major actors coordinating industrial conflicts have been trade unions (leonardi 2018).9 trade unions are active as both economic and political actors in activities spanning from collective bargaining, work-place regulation and the provision of services to their members, to claims-making, aggregating workers’ interests against capital in relation to demands concerning salaries or work-place conditions, among others (baccaro et al. 2003; olivier 2011). as political actors, trade unions have played a major role in mobilizing the necessary resources for the coordination, organization and the management of strikes, the most notable and traditional form of industrial conflict in europe (shorter and tilly 1974; crouch and pizzorno 1978). despite notable differences across european countries, today traditional trade unions have largely lost their primary role in mobilizing workers. as mentioned, a process of regulation of the labour market has led to progressive depoliticization and to a bureaucratization of labour disputes, leading trade unions to become more dependent on their institutionalized roles in current welfare states (ebbinghaus and visser 1999). the institutionalization of trade unions has meant, inter-alia, a progressive specialization of their organizational functions, the adoption of a more conventional repertoire of actions such as negotiation rather than protest, the centralization of decisions, and the moderation of the objectives which often evolve around organizational survival rather than broader social and political changes. by becoming more institutionalized – also in countries usually considered confrontational such as france and italy – trade unions have therefore been involved in negotiations and consultation on policy making related to labour or pension laws (ebbinghaus and visser 1999; ebbinghaus 2002; brandl and traxler 2010; baccaro and howell 2011). under such circumstances, workers have, consequently, progressively perceived trade unions as institutional actors rather than as allies against institutions themselves and this has been aggravated by the growing incapacity of trade unions to organize workplace mobilization against the new organization and delocalization of production, technological innovation, shifts in the composition of employment and the flexibilization of labour contracts. under such circumstances, trade unions have been facing a crisis of their representative power vis à vis workers. this has had substantial consequences for membership, which has steadily declined since the 2000s in most european countries (visser 2016b in regalia and regini 2018: 69).10 9 concerning the relationship between union membership growth and strike action cf. edwards and mccarthy 2004; fantasia 1988; kelly 1998; barling et al. 1992; clark 2009; visser 2002). 10 italy is, together with norway, the only advanced economy in which the union density rate has increased during the crisis, shifting from 33.9 per cent in 2008 to 37.3 per cent in 2013 (visser 2016b in regalia and regini 2018: 69). trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (oecd labour force statistics). density is calculated using survey data, wherever possible, and administrative data adjusted for non-active and self-employed members otherwise (visser 2016b). trade unions and labour conflicts 174 trade unions have looked for strategies of revitalization to come out of this situation (bernaciak et al. 2014). industrial relations scholars have shown that trade unions in countries such as the us, great britain and france have followed peculiar strategies of revitalization by extending solidarity with other organizations and community networks, and promoting social movement unionism (baccaro et al. 2003; le queux and sainsaulieu 2010; tapia and turner 2013). alliances are processes through which groups exchange various types of resources in pursuit of a common goal, and are of the utmost importance when actors cannot afford to pursue their goals in total autonomy (van dyke and mccammon 2010). through social movement unionism, trade unions have been able to capture new claims by workers, including those by ‘outsiders’ such as claims related to temporary jobs, claims related to rising unemployment or civil rightsbased claims (ancelovici 2011; tapia and alberti 2019). these cases of revitalization are usually portrayed as being opposed to those instances where traditional trade unions, in contrast, have not been able to rely on alliances with other organizations and social categories, remaining anchored to their institutional role and closed to mainstream parties (simoni 2013; ceron and negri 2017). in italy, for instance, established trade unions have been absent in many labour conflicts, and have mostly continued to protect the ‘insiders’, while the ‘outsiders’ have been often mobilized by independent, small rank-and-file and more radical trade unions. scholars have referred to these dynamics as radical political unionism (cf. cillo and pradella 2019 for the italian case).11 both social movement unionism and radical political unionism have meant the reappearance, next to trade unions, of several other actors active in mobilizing workers such as smos, ngos, workers’ self-organized groups, grassroots informal groups and a multiplicity of networks evolving in open public spaces, such as the street, square, parks and virtual space. however, the type of trade unions involved in social movement unionism and in radical political unionism and the role of confederal trade unions and small rank-and-file unions differs. we contend that such differences are likely to sustain different types of labour conflicts and forms of protest. labour conflicts can indeed span from short term, contingent, local-level single actions – such as those which may evolve around single firm-level issues – to more sustained interactions spanning several years. we advance that the presence of confederal trade unions in dynamics of social movement unionism is more likely to be associated with sustained long-term actions, and actions with a national scope. confederal trade unions have indeed the necessary organizational resources, a more established structure, and chapters diffused throughout the national territory sustaining such actions, something that small rank-and-file trade unions or the presence of online networks do not always possess. in contrast, we expect that radical political unionism – dominated by fragmentation between confederal and independent small rank-and-file trade unions, and the prevalence of the latter – is likely to be associated with more contingent and sub-national or local-level actions. indeed, fragmentation among trade unions, such as that which occurred in italy, is more likely to be associated with the competition between organizations and the polarization of the organizational field. through fragmentation, actors become more and more autonomous 11 radical political unionism has been discussed with reference to france and britain as well (cf. connolly and darlington 2012). pilati and perra 175 from one another, draw on different sources of support, and focus on diverging goals and tactics, or diverging interests. these dynamics are all the more likely to prevent shared interests and constrain the construction of broad collective identities which support wide-ranging, sustained and long-term collective actions. we try to explore this hypothesis better by investigating the relationship between the type of alliances and the nature of labour conflicts in the french and italian cases. 5. the empirical study 5.1. france and italy compared: case selection to empirically explore the aforementioned hypothesis, we focus on france and italy. in selecting these countries, we followed the comparative method of the ‘most similar system design’, in particular, a paired controlled comparison. this method implies the intentional selection of observations that resemble each other in every respect but one to control for possible effects of omitted variables (king, keohane, and verba, 1994: 205). our cases, france and italy, indeed share several characteristics. first, the two countries have historically shown a strong class cleavage and a stronger labour movement compared to other european countries. the two countries have long been considered similar in terms of the characteristics of their strikes, featuring high rates of days not worked and classified as belonging to ‘the strike front’ (bordogna and cella 2002; vandaele 2016: 282). despite this however, the italian labour movement has been characterized as being weakly institutionalized and severely fragmented (cella 1989). workers’ interests have mainly been represented by trade unions and left-wing parties in italy, while in france labour movements have been stronger and trade unions have been more able to establish long-term alliances with smos. indeed, in italy the reciprocal defiance of trade unions and smos and their incapacity to build long-term alliances goes back to the seventies, when trade unions distanced themselves from the social movement sector, particularly when a few organizations turned to political violence. second, france and italy share the same trade union model, historically characterized by highly politicized industrial relations, a contentious and conflictual model within a latin cluster in which france, italy and spain are aggregated together (meardi 2004; gumbrell-mccormick and hyman 2013; pedersini 2014; visser 2016a). in both cases, in the last three decades, this model has experienced a process of institutionalization, with a moderate level of involvement of trade unions in government socio-economic policies and claims which are dealt with through state regulation. third, the two countries witnessed rising rates of unemployment and worsening levels of living conditions among workers after the 2008 crisis. italy and france are among the 10 countries with the highest unemployment rates, especially of young people, with a subsequent massive build-up of debt, in italy in particular (bieling and lux 2014). 5.2 labour conflicts in france and italy despite sharing the aforementioned characteristics, the two countries have shown quite divergent patterns in labour conflicts in the last two decades. france is one of the few countries where the number of days not worked due to strikes has increased in the last two decades (vandaele 2016: 279-280). as regards the period between 2000 and 2009, trade unions and labour conflicts 176 the average days not worked due to industrial actions in france were 127 per 1,000 employees (and the figure remained approximately the same between 2010 and 2017) while there were only 88 in italy (etui 2019; see also vandaele 2016). in turn, italy showed higher levels of general strikes than france between 2000 and 2009 (etui 2019: 2). in 2010, a further peak resulted mainly from the ‘national days of action’ against pension reforms in france (ancelovici 2011), after which the days-not-worked average declined to a level lower than before the recession.12 however, between 2008 and 2012, on average, over 150 working days were lost due to strikes per 1000 employees per year in france, and only around 25 in italy, leading to an italian strike volume six times lower than the french strike volume.13 likewise, a study on protests during the great recession shows that most protests in france occurred in the pre-crisis period, which spanned from 2005 to 2006. in contrast, italy experienced a series of intermittent crisis-related mobilizations without showing any wave of contention which emerged in other southern countries such as greece, spain and portugal (zamponi 2012; kriesi et al. forthcoming). this trend appears even more striking for italy, given that anti-austerity protests overlapped with political disaffection in a strong political crisis, with europeans’ trust in government dramatically declining in most southern countries since the onset of the crisis. political outcomes in these countries have, nevertheless, mainly resulted in the reconfiguration of the party system, rather than in a clear-cut resurgence of protests (hutter, kriesi and vidal 2018). in this framework, the repertoire of labour conflicts has also changed significantly in both countries. in france, “strikes are getting more scattered, impromptu, and shorter, and significantly, there is a rise in individual manifestations of conflict” (le queux and sainsaulieu, 2010: 507). labour struggles in the pre-crisis period involving immigrants in france started in 2006 and later developed in the sans papiers movement of 2008–2010, resulting in strikes integrated by occupations (barron et al. 2016; béroud 2018). the great recession further widened the repertoire of labour conflicts. in 2010, “the national days of action that punctuated the months of demonstrations were a combination of protests and strikes coordinated at the national level” (ancelovici 2011). furthermore, “in june 2010, workers spent day and night occupying part of place de la bastille; in the following autumn, they occupied the cité nationale de l’histoire de l’immigration, a new institution settled in the former museum of colonies.” (barron et al. 2016: 642). cgt leaders called “the main camp at bastille – not a strike, not in a company – the ‘picket of the pickets’” (ibidem). likewise, the 2016 movement against the el khomri law, or the ‘loi travail’, that took place from march to july 2016 – the strongest and longest social protest under a left-wing government during the fifth republic and president hollande’s five-year term (2012–2017) – included not only strikes that lasted several days in different sectors, but a predominance of ‘days of action’ and demonstrations across the country (béroud 2018). the 2016 protests were referred to as the nuit débout (‘up all night’), and involved the occupation of public spaces in a series of cities, beginning with the place de la république in paris. more recently, in december 2019, the public sector strikes involved rail workers, bus drivers, teachers, hospital staff, and 12 while the days-not-worked rate during the hollande presidency (further) declined, at least until 2013, no later data are available (vandaele 2016). 13 this needs to be taken with caution as in the italian case data is only available up to 2009. pilati and perra 177 students who walked out protesting the proposed reforms of the country’s generous pension system. more than 800,000 people across the country took to the streets, in one of the biggest strikes in france in decades. last year in paris, labour union marchers were joined by yellow vest protesters, who posed a significant challenge to president emmanuel macron’s agenda. people on strike were asking the government to back down on planned reforms to the pension system in an attempt to unify the system, which currently has specific rules for some occupations. likewise, the italian repertoire of labour conflicts has also changed in the last decade. as regards anti-austerity protests, between 2009 and 2014, 33 percent of actions were strikes and 23 percent demonstrations (andretta 2018). similar findings are reported by a study specifically tackling labour conflicts in italy after 2008 (pilati, frazzetta, and perra unpublished manuscript). this study shows that strikes were the most common form of action during the first period of the crisis (2008-2010), representing around 24 percent of all forms of labour conflicts. next to strikes, sit-ins and public demonstrations were the major forms of labour conflicts during those years, representing, respectively, around 19 and 15 percent of all actions observed. furthermore, from 2008 to 2010 strikes declined from approximately 28 to 20 percent, while from 2008 to 2010 squatting increased to nearly 10 percent. below, we aim to discuss how dynamics of social movement unionism in france, and of radical political unionism in italy, may have affected the aforementioned dynamics of labour conflicts in the two countries. 5.3 social movement unionism in france if we approach the explanation of labour activism in france by drawing on theories related to resource mobilization and the role of trade unions as major actors mobilizing resources in the labour field, the picture is quite puzzling. in france, the density of trade unions remains low compared to other countries. throughout the 2000s unionization in france remained around 8 percent. specifically, the density in 2018 was 8.8 percent in france and 34.4 percent in italy, despite the latter largely accounting for affiliations by workers with a typical contract, the ‘insiders’, and by pensioners who receive various types of services from trade unions (oecd 2020). indeed, “french trade unions are often considered an ‘atypical’ case when it comes to international comparisons due to their small number of members and their strong dependence on the state (particularly for their funding), but also, and paradoxically to the first two points, because of their ability to instigate very strong collective mobilization” (béroud 2018: 180). previous research points to two other characteristics of trade unions: trade union unity as well as trade union alliances with other organizations and societal groups (cf. ancelovici 2011). as regards trade union unity, the so-called 2010 ‘national days of action’ were indeed organized by an alliance of all french labour confederations, namely the cgt, the cfdt, fo, the cftc, the cgc, unsa, the fsu, and solidaires. such an alliance, called ‘intersyndicale’, was not unprecedented, but it had never held together over such an extended period (ancelovici 2011). alliances that trade unions built in france affected their strong collective mobilization: despite the 2010 french reform concerned with retirement and unemployment insurances, worker mobilization gradually extended to youth, who had initially organized their own rallies, independent of those of the trade unions. according trade unions and labour conflicts 178 to several youth organizations, 70,000 youths (high school and university students) participated in the national day of action on 19 october 2010 (ancelovici 2011: 123). crosssectional and national-wide initiatives in which trade unions allied with other social movement organizations, youth-led or immigrant-led initiatives also include the cgtled ‘sans papiers’ campaign, which started in 2006, as well as the nuit débout movement, in which french trade unions played a determining role in the opposition to the el khomri law (also called the ‘loi travail’) in spring 2016 (tapia and turner 2013; barron et al. 2016; béroud 2018). following this, some scholars have contended that traditional trade unions in france have engendered dynamics of social movement unionism by privileging coalition-building with other organizations and constituencies, including not only workers with a variety of contracts, but also students and immigrants (tapia and alberti 2019).14 the evolution of the protests by undocumented migrant workers which started in 2006 exemplifies this process (barren et al. 2016). the strike, which began in 2006 in chilly-mazarin, near paris, involved immigrant workers in an industrial laundry service; a second major strike then took place at a buffalo grill restaurant in june 2007 and a third strike was organized at la grande armée restaurant near the champs-elysées, with the support of several cgt branches. all three initiatives were initially supported by the local branch of cgt, which workers knew from media and community networks. due to their limited resources, the local cgt branches had, however, contacted and involved the main branch of the cgt in paris and eventually involved the national branch when strikes became diffused in 2008. eventually, the multi-site movement was followed by negotiations between the cgt and the government over regularization criteria (barron et al. 2016: 639).15 these campaigns were successful due to the union attempts to involve migrant workers, thanks to the intersection of demands for liberation and equality (tapia and alberti 2019: 117). claims had been related to mobility rights, the freedom of movement through regularization, as well as to labour rights, in an attempt to achieve equal treatment among all workers in the workplace (tapia and turner 2013; tapia and alberti 2019). collective action frames were, therefore, resonating both with traditional workers’ claims and with claims by new categories of workers such as migrant workers. likewise, with respect to the 2016 protests known as the nuit débout, beroud (2018: 181) highlights that “a number of the organizers of nuit débout wanted to create a space where their struggles could converge and to help the unions to strengthen their position of power in relation to the government. for them, it was less about rejecting trade unions than about pointing out their weaknesses in relation to the difficulties they have in reaching a whole section of the 14 vandaele (2016: 283) nonetheless contends that “due to divisions between unions, a revival of social movement unionism has hardly resulted in revitalizing the main characteristics of france’s industrial relations system so far”. 15 of course, the participation of cgt in undocumented workers’ strikes did not come without conflict as when “on 2 may 2008, members of the ‘coordination 75’ of sans-papier collectives (csp 75) occupied the bourse du travail, a communal labor building housing the paris branch of the cgt, which by then was the most active labor union section in the strikes […] criticizing what they believed to be the union’s new role as an unavoidable intermediary of regularization” (barron et al. 2016: 640). conflicts peaked when “on 24 june 2009, after facing 14 months of occupation at the bourse du travail, the cgt proceeded to forcibly evacuate its premises, with the assistance of anti-riot police outside the building” (ibidem). pilati and perra 179 workforce, including occasional workers, and offering them an adapted framework of representation.” 5.4 radical political unionism in italy according to a recent study, trade unions in italy staged 52 percent of the anti-austerity protests. 34 percent were organized by the largest confederations, mostly cgil in 2009 and 2010, and 20 percent by radical grassroots trade unions (andretta 2018). during these protests confederal trade unions were not, however, able to ally with other actors in building strong coalitions, hampering the development of cooperative relations and of social movement dynamics, and facilitating the growth of independent unions. several case studies on strikes that have emerged since the great recession confirm that many of them were backed by independent trade unions and self-organized groups, at times in alliance with other constituencies, involving dynamics of radical political unionism (cillo and pradella 2019). strikes which occurred in the logistics sector from 2008 onwards mainly concerned immigrant workers from north africa and asia (cillo and pradella 2018). in this case, conflicts began in 2008 in one logistics centre of the bennet supermarket chain in origgio (milan), and then spread to the main logistics hubs in the central north of italy. as well as self-organized workers’ groups, these struggles were mostly supported by independent small rank-and-file unions like slai cobas and adl cobas and were supported by left-wing militants and social centres from milan (cillo and pradella 2018: 77). a first national strike of the logistics sector was organized on 22 march 2013, blocking the sector in the north of italy, rome and naples, and then two other national strikes followed. as well as strikes, workers organized pickets which went on for several months, blocking commodity flows from the warehouse to supermarkets in northern italy. issues claimed were initially focused on working conditions but then included broader and political issues, such as the repeal of the ‘bossi-fini’ law (ibidem). workers eventually managed to achieve better working conditions in the cooperatives of the main logistics hubs but, at the same time, induced harsh repressive measures by the state and the companies. the same authors report experiences of strikes across the fiat-chrysler automobiles (fca) plants in southern italy which erupted in 2015 (cillo and pradella 2019). this time strikes started when workers at fca went on strike against increasingly worsening working conditions such as those related to delays which were “often offset by forcing employees to work during rest periods, refusing permission to use the toilets, and not stopping the assembly line in case of accidents” (cillo and pradella 2019: 463). strikes were called in january 2015 and then repeatedly called in the following months and years – in may and november 2015, in april and july 2016, in january and october 2017 and in march 2018 – involving workers from different fca plants in southern italy, melfi, termoli, and cassino and atessa. strikes also transnationalized to include solidarity with workers on strike at the fca plant in serbia. even in this case, strikes were organized thanks to the support of sicobas and, to a lesser extent, adlcobas and usb. fragmentation among trade unions was clear in this case, as independent trade unions pushed for going on strike in clear opposition to traditional trade unions even to the most militant branch, the fiom-cgil (federation of metallurgical employees and trade unions and labour conflicts 180 workers), which precipitated into a crisis as many shop stewards preferred to join independent unions (cillo and pradella 2019: 459). another case study examined the emergence of ‘rider unions’, self-organized collectives of food delivery riders working for online platforms (chesta et al. 2019: 821). the first of these workers’ strikes took place in turin in october 2016 and involved a group of riders employed by the food delivery company foodora. this action was then followed by deliveroo employees in milan who organized a strike in july 2017, and then workers grouped under the label riders union bologna went on strikes in november 2017. in all such cases, riders were claiming better working conditions, either rejecting the transition from an hourly pay system to a payment-by-delivery system, as had occurred in turin, or refusing to risk their health by riding on the icy streets, as had occurred in bologna. in all such instances riders were self-organized. the support for their claims came, again, not from confederal trade unions but from youth associations and social centres, due to the presence of students with previous experiences of activism among workers (chesta et al. 2019: 822). these case studies show the absence of engagement by confederal trade unions and the dominant role of small rank-and-file and independent trade unions, as well as their fragmentation. italy has indeed experienced isolated trade unions since the 1990s, with marked differences and competition between the three traditional union confederations, with cgil showing a more conflictual approach than the other two, cisl and uil. this situation has been further exacerbated by the distance between confederal trade unions and independent trade unions. the latter, often in competition with confederal trade unions, have, since the 1990s, increasingly focused on atypical workers who have been looking to have their concerns represented at a political level (see mattoni 2016 on temporary workers). when traditional trade unions met instances by atypical workers, whose claims in italy were often backed by self-organized workers’ groups and independent trade unions, they were pushed by other sectors of society, as was the case with the emergence of nidil, the cgil trade union sector representing atypical workers. nidil was initially rooted in the autonomous organization of professional occasional freelancers (murgia and selmi 2011: 171). however, rather than collaborating with the latter, cgil preferred to create a specific internal representation. the aim was to provide protection for under protected workers, also through collective bargaining. cgil defined a national committee for professional self-employed individuals, in order to extend labour rights and welfare protection to all workers. this initiative aimed to revitalize cgil and it was part of the strategies to organize young and atypical employees, ‘knowledge workers’ and immigrants (pirro and pugliese 2015; leonardi 2018). in the last decade, confederal trade unions have nonetheless supported campaigns against xenophobia, exploitation of migrants and the abuses associated with low-cost services in urban transport, in some airline transport as in the case of ryanair, as well as in the area of home-delivered food. there has been strong mobilization against the overexploitation of migrant workers in agriculture by providing assistance in rights and contracts. in october 2016, through the support of traditional trade unions, immigrant workers obtained the approval of a law, the 2016 law 199, that punishes illicit labour intermediation and forced labour and slavery (leonardi 2018). despite this, confederal trade unions have lost much of their appeal amongst workers. as mentioned, this has pilati and perra 181 been linked to processes of decentralization of bargaining and of co-optation of trade unions by political parties.16 the negative effects of these processes on trade unions were multiple and included not only the lowering bargaining power of trade unions, but also a crisis of their representation and their de-legitimation among workers. this has contributed to competition between parties and trade unions for consent and the exit of trade unions from labour–capital conflict (streeck 2009; cella 2012; crouch 2012a; 2012b). in this regard, traditional trade unions in italy seem to be caught in the middle of two processes of delegitimization. first, italian confederal trade unions are progressively losing their legitimacy in the industrial relations system as they are often not a legitimated counterpart for the national government in the definition of major reforms. while trade unions have the possibility to veto a decision, and they have been involved in the discussions on reforms such as those on retirement or on the labour market (see pritoni and sacchi 2019) governments do not necessarily include their claims when finalizing and implementing reforms. with regard to the 2011 fornero law, for instance, this occurred with reference to the ‘esodati’.17 scholars have indeed underlined that, during the great recession, the government not only excluded trade unions from the process of adjustment, but eviscerated tripartite social partnership arrangements (culpepper and regan 2014; benassi and vlandas 2016). despite this, trade unions, most notably cgil-fiom, are still maintaining a set of power resources in defence of collective bargaining. recently, leonardi (2018) observed that for italian unions, progressive decentralization is manageable due to their comparatively strong membership and their representative power at the plant level. second, trade unions have progressively lost their legitimation in the eyes of workers. indeed, unions are today organizations founded both on notions of collectivism and on individual identities and interests. these need to be continuously negotiated for trade unions to encompass all forms of exclusion due to gender, job insecurity and international migration that produce deep fractures between the workforce. in italy, one of the main channels used to increase union density has been the transformation of the membership basis. while this has been traditionally based on collective ideational motivations, more recently membership has shifted its focus on individual instrumental attitudes. in this perspective, trade unions have aimed to increase their membership by managing services of welfare provisions which offer organizational and financial resources. however, members have become clients rather than activists. 16 particularly, the architecture of italian industrial relations has changed since 1993 (baccaro and howell 2011). the 1993 interconfederal protocol attributed a central role to decentralized bargaining as it provided unions with a ‘right to access’ the enterprise-level bargaining that was previously unavailable. however, as discussed by baccaro and howell (2011) confindustria, the employers’ association, became “increasingly disenchanted with tripartite negotiations and, on the eve of national elections in 2001, struck a strategic alliance with the center-right coalition, […] criticized concertation as an empty rite that blocked much-needed structural reform […]” 17 the ‘esodati’ are those workers who had agreed to stop working at the time of the 2011 fornero reform, but who could not earn a pension under the new retirement age and contribution age rules, thus finding themselves unemployed and without pension rights for a number of years. trade unions and labour conflicts 182 5. conclusions the aim of this article was to explore differences in labour conflicts in italy and france by focusing on the characteristics of the most prominent structures of worker mobilization in labour conflicts: trade unions. italy and france have indeed witnessed similar changes in labour conflicts. however, the level of strike volume after 2008 increased in france but not in italy. in addition, anti-austerity protests in france started to emerge in the pre-crisis period while italy experienced a series of intermittent crisis-related mobilizations without showing any wave of contention. under this framework, both in france and italy, trade unions have shown strategies of alliance building. however, evidence suggests that the alliances built by trade unions have been different in the two counties. in particular, confederal trade unions in france have been able to engage in social movement unionism within coalitions involving other social categories and smos. on the one hand, this may have occurred because of low french trade union density rates. on the other hand, confederal trade unions in france have been more open to smos. through social movement unionism, confederal trade unions in france have enlarged their frames from a closely bound focus on workers and their conditions – including those related to salary, layoffs, restructuring and redundancies – to a focus on broader rights including equality and basic rights such as, for instance, mobility or housing rights. the participation of confederal trade unions in alliances has implied nationallevel and long-term actions. as discussed, france witnessed an increasing average strike volume after 2005, as compared to the previous two decades, and the cases studies discussed, such as in the case of the sans papiers movement or of the nuit débout protests, show important long-term, sustained interactions involving a variety of actors. in contrast, alliances between trade unions and smos in italy have mostly involved small rank-and-file unions and self-organized workers’ groups engaged in radical political unionism. confederal trade unions have remained more marginal in such alliances. these dynamics have been associated with a lower level of strikes in italy than in france, and with a decreasing number of strikes after 2005. however, single case studies such as strikes at fca suggest that further evidence is required to better assess the role of independent small rank-and-file trade unions in shaping long term and sustained labour conflicts. differently from what we could have expected given the presence of small rankand-file trade unions – which, according to our hypothesis, are more likely to be associated with local levels, and short-term actions – the fca strikes started in 2005 and then spread to 2016 and 2017 across many northern italian regions. independent small rankand-file trade unions may therefore, at times, be able to replace the role of confederal trade unions. the conditions for them to do so need, however, to be better assessed. finally, regardless of which dynamics prevail – social movement unionism or radical political unionism – trade unions face the problem concerning the relationship between their identities as collective actors and workers’ interests in the capitalist arena. this entails a paradox. unions are in fact strongly advocated to criticize the capitalist mode of production. this implies a regulation of the labour market, particularly during economic crises, to support the rights of workers and to improve their working conditions. however, during the last crisis, the critique of capitalism was not at the core of public and political debates. trade unions appeared weak in opposing governments’ pilati and perra 183 attempts to reform the labour market rules. the consequence was limited popular support for trade union initiatives. workers and unions therefore appeared divided in their efforts to defend jobs in the context of the industrial crisis, of the restructuring of industrial sectors and of increasing social inequalities. unions are clearly organizations founded on notions of collectivism, but this risks colliding with workers’ individual identities whose interests cannot all be associated with class belonging. therefore, 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(2012). ‘why don’t italians occupy?’ hypotheses on a failed mobilisation’, social movement studies, 11:3-4, 416-426, doi: 10.1080/14742837.2012.708833 microsoft word pdf_issue_16_2_bello.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 2 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 2, 58–73. contact author: valeria bello, ramón llull university, barcelona. e-mail address: valeriab3@blanquerna.url.edu the spiral of prejudice and the securitization of migration: the complexity of small changes in italian migration networked governance valeria bello ramón llull university, barcelona abstract the post-cold war world has witnessed increased migratory movements. in many countries, prejudice has entailed negative developments in dealing with the phenomenon, spawning a series of insecurities and resulting in more irregularities that do not benefit either migrants or the established population. italy is a crucial case study of how even the very definition of migration can be connected to discriminatory policies, such as the one based on the citizenship principle of jus sanguinis. a document analysis of how migration policies have evolved in the country and a process-tracing analysis of the role played by different actors in the governance of migration in italy examine the complexity of small changes in the securitization of migration. the latter, due to its variety of components, can be referred to as a networked governance. although it is true that the linkage between migration and insecurities in italy did not suddenly happen in a single act, the idea that changes across governments have not mattered would be entirely misleading. some of the policies enacted by different governments have actually entailed discriminatory practices, generating a spiralling of the securitization of migration and its related migration-crime nexus. the analysis illustrates that even small changes in migration policies attempting to remove prejudice from the equation can encompass crucial differences for the entire migration governance. finally, it illustrates that a turning point in reducing insecurities would depend on the adoption of jus culturae, which can actually reduce the creation of irregular migration and insecurities. 1. introduction ollowing the end of the cold war, the world has witnessed an increase in migratory movements. in many countries, prejudice has entailed negative developments in dealing with the phenomenon, spawning a series of insecurities and resulting in more irregularities that do not benefit either migrants or the established population. however, when it comes to analysing migration related phenomena, the dimension of security and insecurities has outclassed all others in recent decades, so much so that we have also seen the emergence of an entire new branch of studies: the securitization of migration. the latter serves the purpose of accounting for the shift in contemplation of the entire process, which has moved from the social, economic and political domains to mainly one of security, and the consequences of such a transformation. an inherent outcome of this outlook change is the increasing tendency to criminalize the act of human mobility across borders (huysmans 2006; huysmans and squire 2010; panebianco 2021) and to govern it in exceptional ways (bello 2021; salter 2008). a large number of analyses have illustrated that similar measures exist everywhere in the world, and not only in the f valeria bello 59 west, and have grown mainly since the end of the cold war (bello 2020; bigo 2002; huysmans 2006; salter 2008). while these conservative tendencies have increased, welcoming movements, solidarities and progressive politics have also flourished, as the literature has recently highlighted (crepaz 2020; della porta 2018; della porta and steinhilper 2021; mitchell and sparke 2018). similar countermoves have been interpreted in terms of either desecuritization or countersecuritization (balzacq 2010; strizel and chang 2015; vuori 2010). the difference between these two approaches is especially useful in considering the effects they encompass: while desecuritization has the final aim of moving migration governance back into the social, economic or political domain to which it initially pertained, countersecuritization results in the spiralling of the phenomenon and the creation of more confrontational situations (balzacq 2010; bourbeau and vuori 2015). if the concept of countersecuritization certainly explains a key component that enables us to suitably understand how the securitization of migration escalates, it also considers that all accelerations need to start from a growing hostility between two parts. however, other theories (maguire 2015) have explained that the securitization of migration is self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing and it does not always need an equally powerful opponent to speed up its dynamics (bello 2020a). the securitization of migration has the power to self-accomplish its own initial prejudice: by declaring something as a threat -the speech-act that ontologically identifies the referent object “migration” a danger (buzan and waever 2009; waever 1993)and regulating it as such through policies (panebianco 2020), it enables practices (léonard and kaunert 2020b) creating a climax of emergency that finally normalizes its treatment in exceptional ways (salter 2008). the spiralling of the securitization of migration is not only due to the confrontation of two different groups with contrasting interests (vuori 2010). what bigo called the ‘governmentality of the unease’ (bigo 2002) is not only responding to the interests and mentalities of certain categories such as security professionals. all the actors called to govern or manage migration can enact a securitization of the field if their cognitions are prejudicials (bello 2020a). if the actors who intervene to regulate human mobility are prejudicial towards migrants and migration, they will create a spiralling progression, which will further criminalize human mobility, propagate hostilities and socially construct it as a threat. as a consequence, prejudice truly matters on how migration is governed and becomes a crucial dynamic in the spiralling of securitization of migration and a crucial part of its way of configuring migration as a threat. by considering the italian securitization of migration as a spiralling progression, such an analysis also speaks to those studies that have considered that migration policies in italy have not completely transformed along with the changing of governments (strazzari and grandi 2019; zotti and fassi 2020) but that the relation has been far more complex, mainly between 2002 and 2019. although migration is a matter which is regulated through national policies, its development indeed depends on a variety of actors, external and internal to the country politics; thus it is more correct to speak of a migration networked governance rather than a migration policy, in line with how a networked governance has been previously defined (bee and bello 2009). an analysis of italian migration policies will look for elements pertaining to the spiralling effect of prejudice in the securitization of migration and will explain the outcomes the spiral of prejudice and the securitization of migration 60 in the italian networked governance of human mobility. the study aims to apply the theoretical framework of the spiral of prejudice (bello 2017; bello 2020a) and will show that the only way to disentangle the migration-crime nexus is to operate at its root causes, mainly by removing prejudicial cognitions intervening in any of the steps that constitute the regulation of international human mobility in italy. the current work will consider the role of prejudice in the securitization of migration to prove the complexity of small changes and variations in italian migration governance. hence, the article first elucidates the link between discriminations and the very categorization of migration to subsequently understand, in the second section, the usefulness of such a framework in analysing the securitization of migration and the complexity of small changes in italian migration networked governance. such a study can illustrate how, in a migration networked governance, nuanced variations in policies (top-down moves) are intrinsically connected with important transformations in practices (horizontal moves) and narratives1 (bottom-up moves). paraphrasing this, the goal of this examination is to highlight the role of small changes in migration governance in the securitization of migration and its related migration-crime nexus through both horizontal and vertical countermoves. in particular, the migration-crime nexus is a socially constructed connection between criminality and human mobility that political actors establish through speech acts, policies or practices (huysmans 2006). by simply coupling migration and crime, or migration and security in speeches or policies, and by treating migrants as criminals in practices, politically relevant actors are able to depict migrants as criminals in the eyes of the general population. the article shows how such a connection was established through a networked governance of migration in italy from 2002 onwards. it concludes the discussion by identifying the most relevant divergences within all italian migration policies, from the initial turco-napolitano law and the following consolidation act (testo unico) of the discipline of immigration and the regulations of the condition of the foreigner of 1998 to the current law 18 december 2020, which consolidates lamorgese’s decree. 2. prejudice and the categorization of migration: jus sanguinis, jus soli and jus culturae2 a vast literature on prejudice has long existed in social and political science (allport 1954; pettigrew and meertens 1995; dovidio 2001) and in its breadth has helped to discern several ways through which the phenomenon impacts everyday political and social life. to make a broad excursus3, it is usually understood as a set of learnt negative attitudes or dispositions that a person can manifest towards others (allport 1954), that are based on antipathies that precede actual experience (pettigrew 1980) and can be associated with specific political 1 there are several different types of narrative that are relevant to analyse in the field, from grand narratives to meta-narratives to micro narratives (see for example suganami 1999; oppermann and spencer 2018). in this text, when referring to narratives, they are analysed as bottom-up moves reflecting the literature of securitization of migration. 2 after this article was already submitted to the journal, there were crucial developments in the italian parliament on the topic, with a discussion about the approval of jus scholae, which is substantially very similar to the jus culturae discussed here. 3 it is impossible to do justice to the entirety of the relevant literature on prejudice, and this article only aims to apply the concept to the political analysis of how its spiralling in italy has impacted the governance of migration. valeria bello 61 conservative behaviours (adorno et al. 1950). it can be expressed in covert or more blatant ways (pettigrew and meertens 1995) and can also represent a collective phenomenon that then historically develops in institutional forms of discrimination (dovidio 2001). if as an individual disposition it can feed political extremism, understanding prejudice in its collective dimension helps disentangle how it mixes with policies in certain foundational ways. historically it has been linked with the development of extremist politics and the collapse of the nineteenth-century international system (polanyi 1944), an intellectual operation that has contributed to explaining ‘why prejudice is a global security threat’ (bello 2017). because it obviously refers to the discrimination of alterities, migrants are intrinsically amongst the most affected by the phenomenon. taking a step further, it would be possible to even claim that migration itself as a label is both ontologically and epistemologically an effect of prejudice. the term ‘international migration’ is an act of socio-political engineering, a category invented to identify and consequently regulate a human action that relates to some basic human need, such as the choice of establishing a residence and possible movement somewhere else. in order to track its complexity, it could be useful to first despoil it of all the social constructions introduced by the political organization of life, to then consider the complexity of migration ontological entanglement with discriminatory securitizing moves. if tracked down to basic and constitutive elements, indeed one could ponder that persons have three main strategies at disposal regarding their residence: establishing it in a place that they consider safe and, possibly, to their liking; adapting their residence to new conditions if necessary; and changing it when the place proves to be no longer safe or to their liking. this moving of residency is identified with the term ‘international migration’ when the relative movement happens to cross another human socio-political invention: national borders. in such a light, the ‘international migration’ category is ontologically related to the creation of foundational boundaries ensuring control over the simple natural course of life on the planet. still, in this simplified description, it already becomes clear that the category of migration exists only as a consequence of the intentions to control who accesses certain privileges on a national basis. in fact, even if it is normally taken for granted that, when dealing with international migration, scholars, stakeholders and policymakers are considering the very human phenomenon of crossing physical borders, such an accepted fact is not entirely true. international migration does not always relate to the physical crossing of borders, but it does always encompass, instead, a form of human discrimination (bello 2017). due to human regulations and cognitive perceptions, the category of international migration goes far beyond the physical act of crossing borders. a clear example of a similar circumstance is that today it is practically impossible to establish a single definition which is valid for all cases everywhere. the same international organization for migration had to add a note to its web page ‘who is a migrant?’ to clarify that ‘[a]t the international level, no universally accepted definition for “migrant” exists’4. the status of being a migrant does not only depend on the physical act of, and the reasons for, crossing international borders. in certain countries, like italy, one can be a migrant also without crossing international borders. a similar situation happens in all those countries where citizenship is based on jus sanguinis rather than on jus soli. persons born in italy of foreign parents will be considered migrants even if they have never crossed any international borders in their entire life. as a consequence, the category 4 see iom webpage ‘who is a migrant’ available at https://www.iom.int/node/102743 the spiral of prejudice and the securitization of migration 62 of migration extends beyond those persons who have crossed international borders to establish their life somewhere else from their place of origin or citizenship, if they have ever had one5 in the first place. in these countries, the institutional incorporation of persons who have never crossed international borders into the category of international migration stretches what is a physical event, ‘the crossing of international borders’, already ontologically constructed through the invention of the nation to discriminate who possesses certain rights, into an entirely subjective, epistemological, matter. it depends on both how the state and its apparatus understand ‘who people are’, and how the society perceives and socially (and cognitively) constructs them, rather than ‘what they actually do’. in countries where jus soli applies, all those born there will be considered citizens. however, persons who were born of foreign parents in countries where jus sanguinis is the element that guarantees access to the ‘body of the nation’, will be considered migrants in such places, as happens in italy. in a similar contingency, persons who have never crossed the borders of the state where they were born, can also become ‘irregular migrants’ once they reach the age of majority, when their visa no longer depends on the family status. for example, visas cannot be granted if the person is unemployed and no longer attends the education system. this case is a very concerning situation for over one million minors in italy. however, it is to be noted that, yearly, a number of these come of age and are no longer counted among italian minors without citizenship. therefore, the number of those affected by this policy is constantly underestimated. for many years now, a political battle has been fought to guarantee what in italy is known as jus culturae. differently from the jus soli, jus culturae intends to connect citizenship not so much to the fact of being born in the country but to the fact of being educated in the culture of the country. such a criteria would solve the situation not only of those minors who were born in the country (as the jus soli would do) but also of those who arrived in the country at a later age. to make a clear example from real-life, jus culturae would avoid the possibility of two sisters born of foreign parents, one having arrived in italy at the age of two and the other born in the country, having different citizenships and different rights. however, despite the changes in governments, and a serious attempt to modify the citizenship law between 2015 and 2017, parliament has been very resistant to addressing the current unequal treatment of italians without citizenship, due to a tense political climate which the elections of 2018 made evident. as a result, in italy, and in many other countries where jus sanguinis applies, the phenomenon of migration is not only a real, physical situation entailing the crossing of borders. it is also evidently an institutional category that the state uses to differentiate between human beings; it discriminates unequally against those who come to reside in the country at a later stage and against those born and residing within its territory. in such countries, as in italy, hence, migration is a discriminatory category per se, which denies the enjoyment of certain rights to some persons, and it is not only a definition that describes the crossing of borders: its usage extends far beyond this physical action. for the state itself, the extension of the category of migration would stop here. however, from a socio-political point of view, it can be stretched further through specific perceptions, as people can perceive certain persons to be migrants even if they are not 5 the case of ‘statelessness’ indeed complicates further the definition of the problem. valeria bello 63 migrants at all but are actually citizens of the state, with their italian nationality stated on their passport. such an occurrence can depend upon physical or cultural discriminatory elements. citizens who represent a minority in a state can be cognitively placed in the ‘migration’ vessel by the vast majority of the population. a similar cognition explains why, if asked how numerous migrants are in the country, many would have an exaggerated idea of the state of affairs (bello 2017; blangiardo and ortensi 2020; diamanti 2019). this first discussion of the very definition of migration sets out the reasons for which discriminatory acts seep into the core of all those elements that constitute the governance of migration and develop it into an excessively debatable political issue. an awareness of such prejudices, which are evidently at some of the roots of the means used to regulate human mobility, does not necessarily help disentangle the problem. specific political interpretations actually prosper on discriminations and on marking differences and borders rather than fighting them. there are political beliefs that evidently question the idea that there exist universal human rights and that all persons are entitled to the same rights of a life with dignity. it is of course the case of far-right and sometimes populist parties (geddes and petracchin 2020), which, when they do not completely neglect human equality, position the applicability of these rights in specific territories as they come to be determined by national boundaries. in other words, far-right and populist organizations and movements, in the best of cases, would argue that migrants are entitled to certain rights (for example a life with dignity) within their homelands but not in other countries (ambrosini 2020). this has been a typical discourse in salvini’s lega, with the well-known slogan ‘salviamoli a casa loro’ (zotti and fassi 2020). nonetheless, even leaving aside the case of extremist political movements and organizations, at the basis of the very idea of who composes the body of the nation there may be more prejudiced or more inclusive approaches (bello 2017), which are reflected in the point in case of jus sanguinis versus jus soli citizenship laws, and all the mixture of law principles through which countries fall into mid-range positions. some scholars have suggested that exclusionary politics is at the core of the formation of nation states (wimmer 2002). since the state has been defined as monopolist in the power realm by a variety of actors, and mainly as a consequence of globalization (castles and davidson 2000), migration has become an increasingly politicized matter of state and a core part of party politics and campaigns. igniting the nucleus of the identitarian machine of us versus them, migration is ‘weaponized’ (greenhill 2010) and ‘securitized’ (huysmans 2006) and normally dealt with through exceptional measures (salter 2008). if the political and instrumental use of migrants as weapons was already a well-known fact in international relations, the securitization of migration has instead emerged since the end of the cold war (bigo 2002; huysmans and squire 2010), and the exception has been normalized particularly in our post-9/11 world (salter 2008). italy in this sense is not any different from other countries and the changes of governments have not, according to some (strazzari and grandi 2019; zotti and fassi 2020), entailed particularly different politics. however, the relevance that prejudice plays in the governance of migration – understanding ‘governance’ as a process that leads to decisionmaking through the contributions of several different types of actors, including both state and non-state actors – is crucial in differentiating how the process can accelerate and create the spiral of prejudice and the securitization of migration 64 a negative framework. however, the same can happen in the opposite direction to positively govern the phenomenon of migration. specific cognitions (bello 2020) can be at the very core of small changes in migration policies that can either intensify the migration-crime nexus or its deconstruction. an analysis of italian migration policies shows how even slightly different changes in migration policies, and more generally in a country’s migration governance, can encompass crucial differences for the security of both migrants and the general population. in particular, prejudice can represent a key demarcating line in a country’s governance of migration which, if not avoided, can contribute to generating a realm of insecurity that reinforces its own initial discriminatory elements and a securitizing migration-crime nexus. prejudice can thus entail a spiralling of the securitization of migration, which does not benefit any non-violent part of the process but only strengthens aggressive politics. both state and non-state actors feel called on to defend their positions, creating more fences and borders, through policies (huysmans 2006), practices (léonard and kaunert 2020), and an array of discursive strategies (bello 2020a), from speech acts to narratives. this work claims that small changes in italian migration policies can crucially affect more general italian migration governance, which happens not only to be exercised through top-down directives, but also through practices and narratives (bello 2020b; panebianco 2020; léonard and kaunert 2020b), which heighten the initial effects of migration policies. 3. the methodological description of how to analyse a networked governance of migration and the spiralling of prejudice when it enters the gears of the institutional and governmental machine, prejudice can entail a spiralling progression that further boosts stereotypes and engenders new discriminatory attitudes, which end up spreading across societies and self-fulfilling negative expectations (bello 2020a). that this spiral of prejudice takes place in italy has been proved both in the analysis of the narratives that originate from the bad management of reception centres (bello 2020b), and from the accentuation of exceptional measures that recent italian governments have taken through law decrees, namely salvini’s security decrees in late 2018 and early 2019, which contributed to creating further situations of insecurity (bello 2021). these decrees have evidently resulted in a series of inhumane practices, but they have also generated reactions from a part of civil society, who reacted strongly to the decisions to close ports to rescued migrants in the mediterranean sea (panebianco 2021). such studies all relate to how the way migration is governed in italy can be framed in a broader scenario, too often creating practices that condemn migrants to vulnerabilities (fontana 2021). likewise, it has been emphasized how such politics has not happened in a vacuum but builds on already existing international trends (strazzari and grandi 2019). others have instead illustrated the growing interconnection between international and domestic management of migration across different governments (zotti and fassi 2020). this study employs a document analysis of all the migration policies and policy reports issued from 1998 to 2020, so from the turco-napolitano law of 1998 to the most recent law 173 of 18 december 2020. it includes, therefore, an examination of 22 policy documents (see annex 1) in order to identify relevant changes. for each of the changes introduced in the policies, a consideration of their effects on the networked governance valeria bello 65 of migration is taken into account through the method of process tracing. ‘process-tracing might be used to test whether the residual differences between two similar cases were causal or spurious in producing a difference in these cases’ outcomes’ (george and bennet: 6-7). process-tracing is very helpful in identifying causal inference (checkel and bennet 2012). particularly, it is valid in considering causal process observations (cpos), and in validating hypotheses in multi-method research, such as this one that involves document analysis and outcomes of observed changes in terms of practices. checkel and bennet (2012) particularly stress that process-tracing can help identify the causal observation of the independent variables (the effect of changes in policies) and assess the effects on the dependent variable, which in our case is the changes in practices. process tracing is used in this study’s multi-method research in an interpretivist perspective. ‘in an interpretivist perspective, process tracing allows the researcher to look for the ways in which this link manifests itself and the context in which it happens. the focus is not only on what happened, but also on how it happened’ (vennesson 2008: 233). therefore, process tracing is valid in considering the outcomes that small policy changes have had for other actors involved in the process, to account for the effects on the networked governance of migration. indeed, although the competences for overseeing migration issues lie within the national policy framework, those concerning asylum are strongly dependent on the common settings established by eu regulations, even if their actual implementation is decided by the countries (léonard and kaunert 2020a). without entering into the specificities of why demarcating a line between the two categories – migration and asylum – in real case scenarios is often impossible, as discussed at length in a different study (bello 2017), the overcrossing of political responsibilities can often be used as a shield to escape criticism, but also to create opportunities for policy venues and venue shopping, which refer to the abilities and strategies that private actors use to influence the decision-making subdivisions of political institutions (léonard and kaunert 2020a). evidently, such an intricate process further complicates – and obscures – all the nodes in the network of actors that intervene in the field. indeed, if on the one hand the decisions are taken by political public actors at the european (asylum) and national levels (migration), these are then implemented by other actors. in italy crucial roles are played by the prefectures, which are administrative offices that oversee the implementations of migration policies in provinces, and by managers of reception centres, whose activities strongly influence how migration is perceived in local areas (bello 2020b). such a situation resembles the networked governance model previously identified for the european public sphere (bee and bello 2009), a model that accounts for the intervention of actors at the horizontal level that implement and influence decisions, in addition to those who play a role at the different hierarchical levels (european, national and subnational levels). when it comes to migration networked governance, the eu is the supranational hierarchical level, the ministry of the interior is the national level and the prefectures play a role at the subnational level. however, horizontally, at all of these levels (european, national and subnational or local), organized interest lobbyists, civil society, and managers of reception centres all exercise an influence on how migration is governed. the spiral of prejudice and the securitization of migration 66 the relevance that these different actors play in the networked governance of migration is also proven by the very fact that, after the notorious term served by matteo salvini in the conte i government, the ministry of the interior passed to someone who had been exercising the role of prefect since 2003, luciana lamorgese, and since 2017 in the very relevant context of the city of milan. recently, it has been advanced that precisely such an appointment of a technocrat as minister of the interior was intended to reduce the politicization of the issue (zotti and fassi 2020), as also the national newspaper il corriere della sera reported on 4 september 2019 (corriere della sera 2019). spawning a series of stereotyping narratives, which contributed to the migrationcrime nexus to a greater extent, negative storytelling can be referred to as one of the main means of what in the literature is known as securitization from below (bello 2020b; ejdus and rečević 2021). however, other changes in italian migration policies have instead definitely affected governance in a different direction. such shifts, actually, do not happen only towards a securitizing direction, entailing a negative framework for the management of migration, with the further creation of insecurities. the spiralling process can assume different directions, and small changes can also bring about crucial positive dynamics. 4. the prejudicial spiralling of securitization in italian migration policies and the relevance of small changes the incipit of the securitization of migration in italy and its related migration-crime nexus started with the bossi-fini law in 2002 (law 189/2002). law 189, strongly promoted by gianfranco fini, leader of the far-right party alleanza nazionale (national alliance), and supported by umberto bossi, leader of la lega nord (the northern league, which has now changed its name to simply the league to project itself at a national and not only at subnational level), introduced for the first time in italy the criminalization of those who had travelled irregularly to italy. it indeed entailed prison custody for those who were caught arriving in italy without the proper documentation. this was evidently in contrast with the geneva convention, of which italy is signatory. the geneva convention establishes that a person who declares they are looking for shelter for reasons of discriminations and risks to their own life in their country of origin, has the right to individual case treatment and, consequently, until the case is not solved by the state, cannot be considered an irregular migrant. in addition to this, law 189/2002 also limited the social protection that was initially guaranteed by the turco napolitano law, and only accepted humanitarian protection, applied only for serious and exceptional personal safety reasons. as a consequence of the exclusion of social protection many more migrants who had travelled without the proper documentation could be considered irregular migrants and detained, enlarging the numbers of irregular migration in italy because those previously considered refugees would become irregular migrants. indeed, the law was declared illegitimate by the constitutional court (corte costituzionale), with sentence no. 222 of 15 july 2004. despite this, the law evidently worsened with the so-called berlusconi security package in 2009, which protracted the custody of migrants in prison-like conditions to a maximum of 18 months, whereas in the bossi-fini law, custody could be protracted for a maximum of 90 days. therefore, the bossi-fini law and the berlusconi security valeria bello 67 package, rather than providing security for the country, created a migration-crime nexus in italy, and the growing necessity for persons to hide and travel in even more concealed ways, thus substantially providing big profits for criminal organizations and human traffickers and smugglers. in the literature, some authors have highlighted that the 2003 eu security strategy did not consider migration as a threat (ceccorulli and lucarelli 2017), and others that it actually did so but not in direct ways, rather only as ‘an absent presence’ (squire 2015). whatever the uptake on this, it is possible to consider the italian creation of a migration-crime nexus as one of the first of its type. if the bossi-fini law and the berlusconi security decree were responsible for the migration-crime nexus in italy and the growing insecurity in the country, with the next governments things did not always improve. in 2015, renzi’s reception decree unpacked a series of institutional problematic practices, although mainly in order to respond to the pressures coming from the european union as a whole and some eu member states in particular. such requests were mainly due to the need to manage the exceptional peak in arrivals. although migration is regulated through national policies, its development depends, indeed, on a variety of actors, external and internal to the country politics (bello 2017; léonard and kaunert 2020a; strazzari and grandi 2020); it is thus more correct to speak of a migration networked governance rather than a migration policy (bee and bello 2015). the most important consequence that renzi’s reception decree had was on the practices it allowed in reception centres (bello 2021). indeed, renzi, with the aim of increasing room in reception centres for migrants, made it possible to convert any forprofit businesses that included allocation services (b&b apartments, hotel, small farms, etc.) into an extraordinary reception centre (cas). before renzi’s reception decree, according to the turco napolitano law and the consolidated act, the establishment of reception centres was limited to organizations which could prove adherence to an entire set of criteria. such requisites slowed down the selection process of the state, but guaranteed that these places would all include the needed best practices to deal with migrants and refugees. indeed, before the bossi-fini law and berlusconi’s and renzi’s respective decrees, and thanks to the turco napolitano law and the consolidated act of 1998, italy was able to develop an excellent network of receptions centres (sprars), as these were already constructed on the basis of wellpondered limitations and practices evinced from other european countries which became net immigrant recipients long before italy. therefore, the creation of cas centres jeopardized the excellent settings of the italian system of reception created by the turco napolitano law and the consolidated act. the idea was to use these extraordinary reception centres only for the peak of arrivals. nonetheless, the cas extraordinary reception centres became the rule and not the exception in the system, hosting the vast majority of migrants (italian chambers of deputies, 2019b). the evident mistake in renzi’s decision was to consider that he could increase rooms in the reception system using a cheap measure. instead of increasing human resources in the state apparatus to deal with the growing exigencies of the receptions system, and providing more funds for the centres already experienced in dealing with integration, renzi’s reception decree lowered the standards of the italian reception centres. however, it was only in late 2018 and early 2019, with salvini’s decrees, that the situation deteriorated, producing important insecurities, as a consequence of his evident the spiral of prejudice and the securitization of migration 68 prejudicial approach towards migrants and diversity more generally. the problem of salvini’s decrees was not only the closure of ports to those boats which had rescued persons seeking refuge but, most crucially, also the decision to cut funds for sprars and to suspend the integration services for those whose refugee status was already recognized. such a decision entailed very negative practices: many refugees with their status already recognized (and so not individuals in irregular situations) were obliged to leave sprar centres and were left to wander the streets. entire families became homeless after the closure of some important sprars. a decision of this sort evidently created a lot of insecurities for both those refugees left unprotected all of a sudden and for citizens, who had to witness an increase in squatting in their districts (bello 2021; la repubblica 14 june 2019). insecurity in the field of migration has willingly been used as a seed in an attempt to generate an electoral yield for the party la lega (the league). however, the political strategy has not been so advantageous to la lega itself as it was for its direct competitor, the even more far-right italian politician, giorgia meloni. it has actually polarized the debate to an extent that has only created more resonance for the even more extremist far-right politics of fratelli d’italia, which is now, according to opinion polls, the most popular italian party, with over 20% of the vote share (demos 2021). when she took charge, luciana lamorgese gradually removed all those elements that have entailed the creation of a nexus between migration, insecurities and crime. in october 2020, she issued a new decree which encompassed migration and other domestic issues, thus strategically removing it from the ‘security domain’ where first bossi and fini, then berlusconi and then salvini had placed it. the decree was then converted into law by parliament on 18 december 2020 (law 18 december 2020 n. 173). in addition to this, the website of the ministry of the interior now refers only to the consolidation act (testo unico) of the discipline of immigration and the regulations of the condition of the foreigner of 1998, which followed the turco napolitano law in 1998, and to gentiloni’s inter-ministerial decree of 21 july 2017. therefore, it does not make any reference to any of the decrees that were previously identified as problematic for the positive development of migration, particularly because they included discriminatory elements (bello 2021). to consider that these political decisions played a minor role is very misleading, because they can be key to stopping the migration-crime nexus and the scapegoating of refugees and migrants by part of unscrupulous far-right leaders. the consequences in practices and attitudes are already visible: demos’ data show that prejudice diminished from 46% in september 2017 to 27% in september 2021 and the favourable position towards receiving immigrants in italy has also importantly increased (demos 2021). indicative of how the general feeling of italians has depended also on the policy decisions is the fact that in 2015 and 2016, 72% and 73% of those interviewed were favourable to jus soli. this went down to 59% in 2017 and has now returned to a very high level: 75% of those responding to the surveys. 5. conclusions: the complexity of small changes in italian migration governance an analysis of the spiralling effect of prejudice in italian migration policy and the networked governance of migration shows that the only way to disentangle the migrationvaleria bello 69 crime nexus is to operate at its root causes by ensuring that discriminatory cognitions do not intervene in any of the steps that constitute the regulation of human mobility. as this paper has shown through a document analysis of policies and a process-tracing analysis, the politicization and consequent criminalization of migration in the country have happened through the role of an array of actors, both internal to the state and external to it, acting at different levels (supranational, national and subnational) in dealing with migration. although it is true that in the past it was possible to discern that the link between migration and insecurities in italy did not suddenly happen in a single act, the idea that changes across governments have not mattered would be entirely misleading. an attentive analysis of italian migration policies and their consequences for practices in the broader governance of human mobility in the country, illustrates that small changes have had a huge impact on daily life and the creation or the dissolution of social tensions. for this reason, it is claimed that in italy it is possible to identify a networked governance of migration, which connects the development of policies with certain practices in reception centre management and the development of prejudicial ideas that spread through narratives, thus heightening and reinforcing the process of securitization. such a networked governance of migration has contributed to spiralling prejudicial dynamics and thus reinforcing the migration-crime nexus, for which the analysis presented in the previous section was able to identify an increasing securitization of migration for the years 2002-2018 in italy. some of these policies have actually entailed discriminatory practices that have generated a spiralling of the securitization of migration and its related migration-crime nexus. the aggravation of the nexus between migration and crime has been in crescendo in italian migration policies, being orchestrated initially through the bossi-fini law, escalating through berlusconi‘s security decree, being mismanaged through renzi’s reception decree, and finally spiralling as a consequence of the intended securitizing moves of salvini’s two security decrees. as a consequence, the spiralling of prejudice in italy has had its exaltation in the populistic rule of the domain enacted by matteo salvini when he was minister of the interior during the conti i government. such a twist was particularly achieved through a series of acts serving the purpose of generating more insecurities for both migrants and the rest of the population and self-fulfilling the ‘threat of migration’. salvini’s security decrees were therefore an unscrupulous means to contributing to insecurities for everyone in order to capitalize this in a general feeling of unease that would boost votes for the league party, which made the scapegoating of migrants the core of its campaign. however, if the aim was to politically profit from such aversion in terms of votes, salvini miscalculated its effects, which were much more beneficial to the most extremist farright party, fratelli d’italia, which has evidently gained political power, than for la lega. the consequences of this technique of governing the issue were crucial in the development of more hostile attitudes in the general population. as elucidated through the process-tracing analysis and the document analysis presented in this article, the conte ii government appointed a prefect, luciana lamorgese, and not a political leader as minister of the interior, possibly to counteract such political use of the migration issue. this appointment was then renewed in mario draghi’s government. the dismantling of the migration-crime nexus by luciana lamorgese through the decree then adopted by law 173 of 18 december 2020 is already playing an important the spiral of prejudice and the securitization of migration 70 role in the entire governance of migration in italy, as shown by its effects 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(2008) ‘case study and process tracing: theories and practices’. in della porta, d. and keating, m., eds (2008) approaches and methodologies in the social sciences. a pluralist perspective, cambridge, cambridge university press: 223-239. vuori, j. 2010. ‘religion bites: falungong, securitization/ desecuritization in the people’s republic of china.’ in balzacq, t. eds. securitization theory. how security problems emerge and dissolve. london and new york: routledge. waever, o. 1993. ‘securitization and desecuritization.’ in ronnie d. lipschutz, ed. on security. new york: columbia univeristy press. valeria bello 73 wimmer, a. 2002. nationalistic exclusion and ethnic conflict: shadows of modernity. cambridge university press: cambridge. zotti, a. and fassi, e. 2020. ‘immigration and foreign policy: italy’s domestic-international linkage in the management of mass human movements.’ in italian political science, 15(1): 96-116. italian documents analyzed: • italian constitutional court, sentence 15/07/2004 n° 222 https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionschedapronuncia.do?param_ecli=ecli:it:cost:2004:351 • italian chamber of deputies (2019a) ‘i centri di permanenza per i rimpatri’ study of the chamber 27 june 2019. online at: <https://temi.camera.it/leg18/post/cpr.html> (retrieved on 20 july 2019). • italian chamber of deputies (2019b) diritto di asilo e accoglienza dei migranti sul territorio. 5 march 2019. online at: < https://www.camera.it/temiap/documentazione/temi/pdf/1105104.pdf> (retrieved 20 july 2019). • italian ministry of interior (2019) cruscotto statistico giornaliero. 22 july 2019. online at: <http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione.dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/cruscotto_statistico_giornaliero_22-07-2019.pdf> (retrieved 20 july 2019). • italian ministry of interior, et al. (2016) ‘rapporto italiano sulla protezione internazionale’, digitalia lab, rome, italy. • law 18 december 2020 n. 173 • law 563/1995 • law 40/1998 • law 189/2002 • law 47/2017 • law-decree 13/2017 • law-decree 113/2018 • law-decree 53/2019 • legislative decree 541/1995 • legislative decree 286/1998 • legislative decree 140/2005 • legislative decree 25/2008 • legislative decree 11/2009 • legislative decree 129/2011 • legislative decree 142/2015 • national guarantee of the rights of detained persons (2018) recommendations 2016-2018. norme e normalità standard per la privazione della libertà delle persone migranti. • senate of the italian republic (2017) rapporto sui centri di identificazione ed espulsione. january 2017 extraordinary commission for the protection and promotion of human rights. online. <https://www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/file/cie%20rapporto%20aggiornato%20(2%20gennaio%202017).pdf> (accessible on 20 july 2019). italian political science, volume 17 issue 1 published in 2022 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 17, issue 1, 105–120. contact author: roberto di quirico, university of cagliari, cagliari e-mail address: diquirico@unica.it economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi roberto di quirico university of cagliari abstract two main aims characterized the 2018-2022 italian economic policy. the first was reforming the whole economic system to stop the so-called ‘italian decline’ that eroded the competitiveness and growth of the italian economy for decades. the second was recovering from an impressive sequence of crises (the eurozone crisis, the covid-19 pandemic and later the consequences of war in ukraine) that endangered the italian economic system and the sustainability of the italian public debt. this paper analyses the crucial steps in the reform strategies and recovery policies carried out by the three governments that led italy from 2018 to 2022, particularly emphasizing the oscillating relationship between the three italian governments and the european union. to this end, particular attention will be devoted to the conte governments’ economic reform proposals and the subsequent recovery strategies. these proposals will be drawn from some crucial documents: the government contract for the first conte government, the colao plan, and the first draft of the italian recovery and resilience plan (pnrr) prepared during the last days of the second conte government. these documents will be compared with the piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza approved under the draghi government. the paper will also discuss the role of the eu in addressing italian economic and recovery policies. 1. introduction uring the italian xviii legislature, three different governments were in charge. each of these governments had to face a dramatic challenge coming from outside the italian system. the first conte government (conte i), created by the movimento 5 stelle (m5s) and the lega, governed italy from june 2018 to september 2019 and faced the consequences of the early 2010s eurozone crisis and the never-solved problems caused to the italian economy and society by the so-called italian decline.1 the second conte government (conte ii), now based on the partnership of the m5s with the partito democratico (pd) and some minor parties, desperately fought against the covid19 pandemic that hit in italy in early 2020. when the conte ii government collapsed in january 2021, a new government was formed under the leadership of the former governor of the european central bank, mario draghi. it included all the parties in the italian parliament, except for fratelli d’italia and comunisti italiani. the draghi government continued to face the impact of the pandemic until the war in ukraine challenged the international political and economic order, imposing on it new policies and economic strategies. 1 on the italian decline issue and its explanation, see simoni (2020). d economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 106 all three governments planned and tried to implement economic recovery policies. however, there were two kinds of recovery policies on their agenda inspired by two different recovery strategies. the first was a long-term recovery policy that aimed to address the italian economy’s structural problems by redefining the nature of italian involvement in the economic and monetary union. the second was a short-term recovery policy devoted to restarting the italian economy after the pandemic. while the conte i government mainly aimed to address the problem of the italian decline and the impact of the 2010s crisis with a long-term recovery policy, the conte ii government mainly worked on recovery from the damages of the pandemic. the draghi government had to adapt the two kinds of recovery policies to a new and confusing international context, while facing the consequences of the covid-19 pandemic and using the opportunities offered by eu financial support. the relationship between the italian government and the eu changed from 2018 to 2022 according to the attitude and objectives of the government in charge and its economic and recovery policies. during the conte i government, particularly in its first months in power, the eu was the primary target of criticism, as it was presented as an obstacle to the implementation of the populist economic programme of the government. after the start of the pandemic crisis, however, the european union became a reference for defining a recovery strategy and inspiring economic reforms. the eu mobilized considerable economic resources, and ambitious plans for economic recovery were launched. thus, the interaction of domestic and european activities and multilevel cooperation became crucial for italian recovery, notwithstanding the controversial attitude of some of the main parties in power towards european integration and eu economic governance. this article analyses the crucial steps in the economic recovery policies carried out by the three governments that led italy from 2018 to 2022, particularly emphasizing the oscillating relationship between the governments and the european union. to this end, particular attention will be devoted to the conte governments’ economic proposals and the subsequent recovery strategies. they were described in three crucial documents: the contratto di governo, the colao plan, and the first draft of the italian recovery and resilience plan (pnrr) prepared during the last days of the second conte government. these documents will be compared with the pnrr approved under the draghi government, also considering the new needs that emerged due to the war in ukraine and the downsizing of economic transactions with russia. of course, these documents do not include all the aims nor do they disclose all the three governments’ ambitions. other objectives had been proposed in crucial documents and electoral programmes.2 however, the stringent needs imposed by the pandemic and the urgency in preparing, submitting and implementing the pnrr defined the priorities. also, the sequence of the documents illustrates clearly the evolution of the recovery policies carried out by the three governments in charge during the legislature, which meant moving from longterm and very ambitious plans for long-term recovery to a more focussed and less 2 an example comes from draghi’s declaration to parliament on 17 february 2021, in which many longterm objectives and reforms are mentioned. however, among these issues, only those included in the pnrr were carried out during the short period of draghi’s stay in power. see senato della repubblica (2021). di quirico 107 ambitious shortand mid-term objectives of the pnrr. this move is the core of the process-tracing exercise proposed in this article. 2. challenging the eu. the first conte government and the failure of the populist economic policy the roots of the early proposal of economic reforms of the first conte government are to be found in the debate that started in the 1990s about the reasons for the so-called italian economic decline. after 2008 and particularly in the early 2010s, this debate became more confrontational due to the dramatic impact of the eurozone crisis and the austerity policies implemented to prevent the dissolution of the economic and monetary union (emu). also, the debate moved from academic and political milieus to the level of ordinary citizens and dramatically impacted electoral results, favouring the rise of populist parties in italy, which proposed economic recovery strategies based on radical economic ideas and a fierce anti-eu attitude.3 the two main italian populist parties – the m5s and the lega – won the 2018 elections and created the conte i government. when in power, they tried to implement their economic ideas and policy proposals, but soon clashed with a much more complex reality than they had expected. explaining the reasons for the italian decline or analysing the impact of the eurozone crisis on the italian economy is not among the aims of this essay. the explanations floated at the time profoundly influenced the ‘populist economic theory’, which inspired the economic recovery policy of the first conte government and some economic policy choices during the conte ii government. therefore, it is crucial to understand the genesis of particular policy choices and political behaviours that influenced the attitudes of parties in power towards recovery strategies. populists drew from the debate on the italian decline some elements that addressed their political programmes toward anti-europeanism and the rejection of monetary integration and the euro.4 inspired by the theories of a few thinkers and the re-elaboration of scientific literature, a kind of ‘populist economic theory’ emerged, explaining italian decline and the persisting crisis as a consequence of european integration and the boundaries of the emu and its rules (di quirico 2021a). thus, the economic policy proposals advanced by the populists challenged the views adopted by the eu and suggested the dismantling of many constraints, primarily the euro. consequently, the rejection of the emu implied the rejection of austerity policies derived from the emu governance framework and the limits to public debt.5 in other words, the ‘populist economic theory’ suggested a return to the ‘golden age of the 1980s’ and the economic model of that time.6 3 among these ideas there are marginal and contested monetary and economic theories such as chartism, economic sovereignism, and misleading interpretations of italian economic history. 4 the term ‘anti-european/anti-europeanism’ is preferred to the traditional term ‘euroscepticism’ because the latter is a definition adopted in the past to define actors and concepts that opposed further integration. today this term is inadequate to define parties, actors and concepts that reject the eu and integration as a whole and propose its dissolution. 5 one of the main targets of populists and anti-euro activists was the debt-break rule (principio del pareggio di bilancio) inserted in the italian constitution during the eurozone crisis (constitutional law n. 1/2012). the rule limits the government’s power to deviate from the budget balance to specific cases such as deep economic depression, financial crisis, and natural disasters. see sottilotta, (2020). 6 populists insisted on the crucial role of state intervention in the economy, salary indexing, and deficit spending budget policies such as those adopted in italy during the late 1970s and 1980. see bagnai (2012). economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 108 the m5s and the lega elaborated these proposals differently in their political programmes. the m5s emphasized the anti-austerity proposals and paid attention to social issues such as poverty and unemployment. at the same time, the lega recovered antieuropeanism and the rejection of the euro from its 1990s programmes, proposing italexit as the primary solution for the economic crisis (di quirico 2021b; ivaldi, lanzone woods, 2017; garcia lupato and tronconi 2016; franzosi, marone and salvati 2015; huysseune 2010). this partial convergence in economic proposals then facilitated the two parties’ alliance after the elections. meanwhile, the main obstacle to implementing their economic recovery programme came from the dramatic divergence of their economic policy proposals from the eu norms and the unavoidable clash that consequentially followed between the italian government and the eu institutions. initially, negotiations between the m5s and the lega were complicated by the two parties’ different political backgrounds and policy aims. they finally created a government and introduced a new instrument for defining a joint political programme. the contratto per il governo del cambiamento (contract for the government of change) was an agreement which described the aims and the rationale of the activities to be realized by their coalition when in government. it included some specific innovations such as the reddito di cittadinanza, quota 100, and the flat tax that became the flagship measures of the conte i government.7 there were other specific reform proposals, such as the introduction of a ministry for tourism, an increase in police officers, and some administrative reforms to accelerate and simplify investments, tax collection, and infrastructure building. the contract was a mix of the most important policy proposals by the parties now allied in the government. among the three flagship measures, the reddito di cittadinanza was the core of the m5s’s social policy proposals,8 while the flat tax was the core of the lega fiscal policy. quota 100 was coherent with both the m5s and the lega criticism of the fornero pension system reform,9 which delayed the retirement of many workers. however, the mixed nature of the document is strident in the field of economic policy, where the ecologist approach of the m5s and the anti-european approach of the lega merged.10 the contract sections regarding the economic issues and, in particular, the recovery strategies to be implemented, adopted the logic of the eu green deal,11 and made the circular economy, decarbonization and renewable energy sources the core of 7 the ‘reddito di cittadinanza’ (citizens’ income) is a subsidy to working-age citizens with a low income. instead, the ‘pensione di cittadinanza’ (citizens’ pension) aims to support the elderly and poor. both subsidies increase the total incomes of the beneficiaries to €780 per month. the ‘quota 100’ regards the pension system and aims to allow workers retirement if the sum of their age and the years of paid contributions reach 100 (e.g. 62 year-old workers who paid social security contributions for 38 years). finally, the flat tax is a fiscal regime based on two fixed tax rates (15% and 20%). see giugliano (2019), monaco (2022, 10 and 12-13). 8 in the contract (p. 29), there is a reference to the ‘salario minimo’ (minimum salary) to establish a minimum threshold for workers’ wages. this became an important issue for social policy in the conte ii and draghi governments. 9 the fornero pension reform (riforma fornero) was introduced in december 2011 by the minister elsa fornero as part of the law 214/ 2011 (the so-called decreto salva italia) adopted by the monti government. 10 the m5s was born as an ecologist movement which focused on 5 main policy issues (one for each of the five stars in its name). these issues were public water, environment, sustainable mobility, growth, and connectivity. 11 on the eu green deal, see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/ . https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/ di quirico 109 the transformation projects for the italian economy and industrial growth (pp. 10-11). meanwhile, contestation of the eu rules and proposals for a drastic change in multilevel governance and the distribution of powers between the member states and the eu were meant to gain the fiscal and operative latitude the government needed to support the recovery of traditional italian economic sectors such as agriculture and export-oriented industries. fiscal and budgetary policies were the core matters in the contract. implementing the green transition to make the italian economy more competitive, reducing raw material and energy imports, and innovating productions in new and technologically advanced sectors, which are other expensive aims of the contract, needed money and state support. lowering taxes and supporting infrastructure building also needed to be financed. thus, the crucial problem of the conte i economic and recovery plans was the impossibility of reconciling the long-term recovery policy with a necessarily constrained fiscal policy, particularly the fiscal policy required by the emu governance and the stability and growth pact. this contrast is particularly strident in the field of public debt reduction. with regard to this issue, the contract (p. 17) explicitly rejected austerity measures and stated that debt reduction had to come from gdp growth. in practice, the contract implied expansive economic and fiscal policies based on subsidies (reddito di cittadinanza), fiscal incentives for the energetic requalification of public and private buildings and the support of firms involved in the circular economy, tax cuts (flat tax and ‘friendly’ collection of fiscal credits), compensations for savers and shareholders damaged by the crisis and bankruptcy of some italian banks, and public investments in infrastructures to be financed mainly with new public debt.12 these policies were unfortunately irreconcilable with emu rules. the only possibility to change this situation depicted in the contract would have entailed ‘further discussion of the eu treaties and the european-level rules’ (p. 17). in the meantime, pressures have to be exerted to induce the european commission to exclude the expenditure on public investments from the deficit calculation. so, in the contract, anti-europeanism and de-integration were the fundamental strategies to gain operative space to finance long-term recovery. this also emerged in sector-specific strategies. in the agriculture and fishery section, the contract proposed revising eu policies and empowering member states and parliaments to approve external trade agreements (p. 9). besides, the contract proposed the further discussion of eu rules for the fishery sector and the basel rules on micro-enterprise rating to access banks’ credit (p. 15). finally, the influence exercised by the eu on italian fiscal and budgetary policy and its constraints would have to be diminished by abolishing the eu safeguard clauses which impose raising the vat rates and other taxes in the event of non-fulfilment of deficit flexibility rules negotiated by the previous italian governments.13 12 the contract identifies some specific sources for funding the programme. among them, there are savings obtained from waste costs reduction, an ambiguous and poorly defined ‘management of the debt’, and ‘a limited recourse to the deficit’ (p. 17). savings and resources from the first two sources are not quantified and probably largely inadequate to the programme’s financial need. 13 the safeguard clauses (regole di salvaguardia) were introduced during the last berlusconi government in 2011 (law decree 98/2011) to obtain eu approval of the italian budget. these clauses had been applied economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 110 the anti-eu nature of the contract and the conte i recovery strategy also emerge in the section dedicated specifically to the eu (pp. 53-55). the key aims here are reforming the eu economic governance framework and disempowering those supranational decision-makers with no democratic legitimization in favour of empowering the european parliament. a critical attitude also emerges about some eu economic governance elements, such as the fiscal compact and the constitutionalization of the debt brake, the stability and growth pact and the european stability mechanism (esm)14. however, to understand the fundamental attitudes of the conte i government toward the eu, it is helpful to consider the section about the eu in a previous draft of the contract dated may 14 (huffington post 2018). in this draft, there is an explicit reference to reforming the eu treaties and introducing procedures to permit member states to exit or permanently opt out of the emu (p. 35). the same document considers the possibility of freezing or writing off part of the italian debt in bonds in the ecb’s hands (p. 38). the contract’s final version then reformulated these statements toward less ambitious and disruptive proposals. however, the extreme anti-eu and anti-euro attitude of at least part of the government coalition and the influence of ‘populist economic theory’ survived inside the conte i government. they sometimes re-emerged in the conte ii government, influencing its economic and european policy choices. when the conte i government initiated its work, the contradictions of its recovery and budgetary policies emerged as well as the contradictory attitudes of the government towards the eu. the problem was financing the expensive reforms programme while converging toward an economic model promoted by the eu. the solution adopted by conte i was an ‘outflanking and blackmailing’ strategy based on the possibility of italexit, which could damage and destabilize the whole eu economy.15 the aim was to obtain at least broad flexibility regarding deficit and public debt reduction. a ‘budget war’ between the italian government and the eu resulted in the abandonment of the anti-euro strategy and acceptance by the conte government of the eu rules.16 consequently, the lack of funds and the budget constraints made the contract plans for economic recovery unattainable, jeopardizing some flagship policies. this situation and the subsequent competition on the distribution of funds between the flagship measures undermined the government alliance well before salvini’s attempt to change the balance of power in the coalition drove the alliance to a stalemate and caused the government to fall. under the monti government (law decree 201/2011) and renewed in various forms by subsequent italian governments. the clauses were abrogated in 2020 (law decree 34/2020). 14 the european stability mechanism (esm) is a financial institution created in 2012 by the eurozone member states. its main function is mobilizing financial resources to support emu member states in financial distress. those states that ask for esm aid are subject to stringent conditionality on their budget and fiscal policies. see gocaj and meunier (2013); howarth and spendzharova (2019). 15 the opposition of president mattarella to the appointment of the italexit strategist savona as minister of economic affairs did not completely curb the possibility of italy leaving the emu. other episodes such as the mini-bot issue, suggest that members of the government coalition continued to support italexit plans. also, the possibility of an italian default because of a sovereign bonds crisis remained an option and could have caused italy’s abandonment of the emu. see di quirico (2021b). 16 about these events and the dismissing of the italexit strategy, see fabbrini and zgaga (2019), marzinotto (2020), di quirico (2021b), and monaco (2022). di quirico 111 3. begging the eu. the second conte government and the pandemic crisis prime minister conte resigned on august 20, 2019, due to the withdrawal of the lega from the alliance. the risk of a landslide electoral victory for the lega induced the m5s and some parties from the centre-left to agree on a new government pact. the conte ii cabinet entered office on september 5, 2019. a few months later, the covid-19 pandemic overwhelmed italy and caused a dramatic economic downfall. recovering from the pandemic’s economic impact added to the previous need for recovery from the eurozone crisis and decades of economic decline, changing the nature of the italian recovery policy. this situation required a new and ambitious policy and a solution to the budget and financial constraints that had made the conte i recovery policy unachievable. the pandemic emergency generated a u-turn in italy’s eu policy. the eu became the only institution capable of supporting the italian economy in resisting the impact of the pandemic and lockdown, and this required a change in attitude on the part of the government. however, such a drastic turnaournd of mind was unacceptable for parties and supporters who had spent years criticizing the invasiveness of eu economic governance and contesting the legitimacy of supranational actors. the most evident case regards the m5s and the european stability mechanism. echoes of former anti-europeanism emerged in december 2019 when a reform of the esm had to be approved in the italian parliament, but it was not (marzinotto 2020, 5-7). further opposition mounted when the eu proposed to use a reformed esm to fund healthcare costs that had skyrocketed due to the pandemic. the conte ii government rejected the possibility of using such a financial instrument due to the conditionality and constraints the esm funding could impose, mainly because they had abhorred these limitations for years in their political programmes (bastasin 2021). however, the need to fund the post-pandemic economic emergency and recovery could not be ignored. soon after the onset of the pandemic, the eu had tried to tackle the emergency. however, the measures implemented were fragmented and addressed specific problems (e.g., the scarcity of sanitary products and masks) or keeping the emu financial framework stable, notwithstanding the suspension of the stability and growth pact (sgp). the main risk, in this respect, was a collapse of the bond market for the countries hardest hit by the pandemic. the ecb countered this risk by creating in march 2020 the pandemic emergency purchase programme (pepp), an instrument funded with 750 (later augmented to 1,850) billion euros to buy assets on the secondary market.17 flexibility in eu rules and funds from the eu budget were also used to address the pandemic emergency. in addition, the eu established the support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (sure), a temporary instrument to support member states’ efforts to preserve employment.18 the eu also recognized the impossibility of keeping in force many constraints imposed by eu economic governance in ordinary times, particularly those imposed by the stability and growth pact, and suspended it on 23 march 2020. 17 the fund was increased to 1,850 billion euros between june and december 2020. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html. 18 the sure establishment was proposed on 2 april 2020. however, it was activated only in late september 2020. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-financial-assistance/sure_it. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-financial-assistance/sure_it economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 112 while addressing the pandemic’s immediate consequences, these measures were insufficient to support post-pandemic economic recovery. this applied particularly to countries like italy and other southern european member states that still had not recovered from the previous eurozone crisis. on 17 march 2020, conte himself urged eu partners to issue joint debt (the so-called coronabonds) to tackle the financial needs of recovery. a few days later, conte and other eu member states leaders sent a letter supporting the coronabonds issue to the president of the european council, charles michel. the negotiation for a european recovery policy, specifically for funding it and issuing coronabonds, was painful and generated harsh contrasts between groups of member states. some member countries were sceptical about the convenience of subsidies and jointly issued debt in favour of the southern european debtor states. echoes of the 2010s debate about common debt issues (the so-called eurobonds) re-emerged.19 conte’s pressures for direct eu financial support for the italian recovery became vehement, and tension emerged with the german chancellor merkel.20 the debate and negotiations that followed finally led to the creation of the next generation eu programme (ngeu) in july 2020.21 the ngeu required italy to prepare a national plan (later called piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza or pnrr) to identify the specific activities to fund. these activities would have to lead italy towards a general recovery which also included recovery from previous weakness and, in the italian government’s eyes, recovery from the thirty-year economic decline. italy obtained almost 200 billion euros for funding its recovery plans. the main problem was then defining these plans in detail. in april 2020, when italy was still under a regime of maximum lockdown, the government established a committee led by the international manager vittorio colao to define a pandemic exit and recovery strategy for the italian economy after lockdown. this committee produced a document dubbed the ‘colao plan’. this plan represents a link between the recovery strategy formulated in the contract and the subsequent pnrr adopted by the draghi government. the colao plan was admittedly less ambitious than the contract or the pnrr. it aimed to advance proposals realizable within twelve months and did not consider most of the italian economy’s long-term problems that curbed its competitiveness and public debt sustainability. thus, in the colao plan, there was no space for institutional reform proposals or innovative strategies to challenge the italian decline. instead, most proposals aimed to relaunch economic activities and growth in the early post-pandemic years. the long-term perspective emerges only in the core proposals for economic and industrial recovery because they share the same aims of the eu (digitalization and the 19 about eurobonds and the italian pressures for their creation, see european commission (2011), reuters (2011). 20 in an interview with the german newspaper sueddeutsche zeitung, conte openly criticised merkel. he had already done the same a few days before in another interview with the german ard tv channel. rumours surfaced that merkel had accused conte of being childish in his pretention to obtain all he asked. finally, conte remained isolated in proposing coronabonds, which were dismissed as a solution for recovery. see (bastasin 2021). 21 in official documents, references to the need to establish a recovery fund have circulated since april 2020. see council of the eu (2020). di quirico 113 transition to a green and circular economy). also, infrastructures have a central role in that plan, despite the fact that only some of them are new projects. the most surprising characteristic of the colao plan is the scarce attention devoted to the financial coverage of the proposals. some references regard private capital and incentives for attracting it or public-private partnerships in financing industrial innovation and infrastructures. however, it lacks an explicit budget to identify the sources for funding investments, subsidies and incentives. the colao plan was probably prepared with the idea that the eu recovery funds would arrive soon to feed its expensive proposals. arguably, the return of colao as a minister in the draghi cabinet suggests his proposals were not just the personal consideration of an insulated group of experts. 4. pleasing the eu. the pnrr from conte ii to draghi government the success of conte in securing funds in the framework of the ngeu plan urged the definition of an italian plan for recovery to organize funding activities that fitted with the requirements and the guidelines established by the eu. this turned out to be a very challenging task. collecting and coordinating coherent proposals from the different italian administrations was complicated. however, it was still more difficult to reconcile the different requests for funds and power distribution in the pnrr from the parties in the conte ii cabinet. finally, the conte ii government collapsed, handing the power to mario draghi, who led the country until september 2022. the ngeu immediately appeared as a historical opportunity for italy because it solved the crucial problem that made the contract economic strategy unfeasible: lack of funds and budgetary flexibility. in the meantime, such an option provoked bitter political conflicts in the government over the distribution of funds and the power to manage them because of the electoral and clientelist opportunities generated by the pnrr. preparing the pnrr was also tricky because of the short time at the government’s disposal to define a complex strategy for solving structural problems and overcoming the backwardness problems accumulated by italy in the previous decades. theoretically, the colao plan was a blueprint for the pnrr, whose preparation was facilitated by the eu framework to address innovation and industrial transformation milestones. green and circular economies and digitalization are at the core of this framework, while gender balance is a general criterion to consider. also, the eu guidelines impose the dedication of a share of funds to the green economy transition. thus, the budget structure was, in part, predetermined. the passage from conte ii to the draghi government is also the story of the pnrr preparation and implementation. therefore, an analysis of the different drafts (the one presented at the end of conte ii and the final version sent to brussels by draghi) helps to understand the progress towards an italian recovery strategy initially destined to shape the country’s future for years, and later made partially obsolete by the consequences of war in ukraine. the first step in preparing the pnrr was defining the strategic vision. in june 2020, the conference progettiamo il rilancio (planning the relaunch) was organized in economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 114 rome with different stakeholders affected by pnrr aims.22 thus, when in september 2020 the eu published the guidelines for writing the pnrr, the colao plan and the results of conference debates contributed to defining the priorities to pursue. the eu policies and their priorities also addressed the recovery strategy depicted in the pnrr. in mid-october 2020, the italian parliament issued an act for the government (atto d’indirizzo) to identify the contents of the pnrr, and on 7 december 2020, a first draft of the pnrr was presented in the italian council of ministers for discussion. a new draft (here called conte pnrr), to be used for debating with parliament and stakeholders in view of submitting the final draft to brussels, was approved by the council of ministers on 12 january 2021, and presented in the italian parliament on january 15. two weeks later, after the withdrawal of matteo renzi’s new italia viva party from the government, prime minister conte resigned. during the discussion of the plan, tensions emerged between the m5s and renzi’s party, eventually causing conte’s resignation. renzi accused conte of supporting a pnrr draft that concentrated too much power in his hands. however, the real reasons for this crisis did not lie with the pnrr. indeed, a comparison of the conte and draghi pnrr versions demonstrates that the differences are minimal and that, in the case of pnrr governance, the draghi pnrr concentrated more power in the government’s hands than the conte pnrr (guidi and moschella 2021, 422). when, on 13 february 2021, mario draghi’s government took office, preparing the pnrr was the most important and urgent mission for the new executive. however, the vast parliamentary majority that supported the government granted draghi an almost free hand to adjust the pnrr (here called pnrr draghi) and submit it to brussels, despite the fact that some critical points that had emerged in pnrr conte and been criticized by the eu commission had not been solved.23 the draghi pnrr was submitted to brussels on 30 april 2021, and approved on 13 july 2021. the italian recovery strategy then entirely concentrated on the pnrr and on obtaining the eu funds. the needs of the pnrr permeated italian politics as a whole. accomplishing the missions and respecting the roadmap indicated by the eu commission for realizing reforms and implementing the pnrr became the core of italian economic policy. draghi became the deus ex machina of italian politics and the most (maybe the only) point of reference for the eu institutions in guaranteeing italian credibility and compliance with the agreements. when russia invaded ukraine in february 2022, draghi was the most authoritative among european leaders and adopted a firm position against russia, despite the risks for the italian and european economies from the impact of sanctions and the russian reaction in terms of gas supply cuts. when these consequences became evident to italian voters, and some reforms carried out to fulfil the eu requests and implement the pnrr were relaxed or openly opposed by some majority parties, draghi resigned. 22 an alternative translation could be planning economic revitalisation due to the specific aims of the debate. 23 these problems mainly regarded quantitative estimates of the impact the pnrr could have in the different sectors it affects. di quirico 115 5. the strategies for italian recovery and the pnrr: comparing the plans the conte ii and the draghi pnrrs are very similar, despite the fact that the draghi pnrr dedicated more attention than conte to the reform issue. however, it must be kept in mind that the conte pnrr was a preliminary draft of the final pnrr version prepared by the draghi government. thus, it was to be expected that the final version would be more detailed and pay more attention to those topics that the commission was keener on. the similarities between the two pnrrs also emerge from comparing the funds’ distribution (table 1). differences are minimal, apart from a transfer from the budget item green revolution to the item education and research, and a redistribution of funds internal to the item green revolution from the sub-item energy efficiency and building requalification to the sub-item energy transition and sustainable local mobility. this redistribution is coherent with the transition from the conte government, which implemented a subsidy policy to finance the energy efficiency of buildings, to the draghi government, which acknowledged the criticism against those norms regarding abuses and problematic implementation. on the other hand, it is interesting to note some crucial differences between the draghi and conte pnrrs and the colao plan. while the colao plan shares the centrality of green transition and digitalization issues with the pnrr plans, it also pays attention to the banking sector and credit problems and the fragmentation of italian firms, which need instruments and funds for recapitalization and support for export. also, the colao plan considers the need to support italian firms in taking advantage of post-pandemic reshoring opportunities that could be important for reorganizing the italian industrial system and increasing jobs.24 finally, the colao plan explicitly describes essential strategic criteria not revealed in the later pnrrs. despite the fact that the logic of the colao plan and that of the pnrr are similar and mainly based on investment for shortand mid-term recovery and stimulating internal demand, the rationale for these investments is deeply influenced by specific internal problems that could limit the effectiveness of the pnrr in supporting mid-and-long-term growth. the colao plan refers explicitly to infrastructures at the end of their lifecycle that need rebuilding. in reality, many infrastructures had been depleted by lack of maintenance and excessive usage because of predatory activities by private concessionaires and the corruption of controlling officers. 25 many of these infrastructures are included in the pnrr. other funds had been devoted to repairing school buildings and coastal infrastructures depleted by decades of neglect. thus, part of the pnrr funds will not generate growth 24 reshoring regards a return to the homeland of national industries and production formerly moved offshore to countries which offer opportunities to save taxes or pay lower wages. the pandemic shows how offshoring could create fragile supply chains and hinder the production of firms which use components produced abroad. the supply side problems also emerged in sanitary and other strategic supplies. the convenience of supporting and funding reshoring then became evident also for governments. 25 the morandi bridge collapse is italy’s primary and dramatic example of an infrastructural crisis. after this tragedy, many infrastructures were discovered to be at risk, but there was no space in the italian public budget for a national plan for infrastructural rebuilding. also, morandi’s case nudged the conte i government towards a punitive policy against private concessionaires, threatening to revoke concessions without compensation. however, the conte i government had no time to carry this proposal to its conclusion. the fall of the conte ii government seemed to be in conjunction with a turning point in the concessions issue. economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 116 returns; they will just avoid the collapse of bridges and roads and allow us to keep today’s infrastructures working. repairing existing infrastructures will not change the italian economy, offering new opportunities and creating new industrial sectors as new and modern infrastructures can. thus, only that part of the pnrr funds devoted to new infrastructures can improve italian industrial competitiveness and generate the gdp growth required to repay ngeu loans. this means that the pnrr’s effectiveness in counteracting italian decline by acting as a long-term recovery plan is limited. many criticisms emerged after the approval and the initial steps for implementing the pnrr. the excessive fragmentation noted in the conte pnrr (guidi and moschella 2021, 408) was not solved by the draghi pnrr. the problem of implementation planning detected by the conte pnrr critics (baratta 2021) emerged during the early implementation phase (viesti 2022). also, the poor involvement of italian regions (profeti e baldi 2021) in pnrr definition reduced their role to competitors for funds. failure to assign a coordination role to the regions, and the dramatic limits of the administrative capability of municipalities, will probably be a major problem in the next steps of pnrr implementation. the relevance of the pnrr as a recovery policy is evident in its short-term recovery potential. instead, its ability to tackle italian economic decline is more doubtful. investments will inject liquidity into the italian economic system and will favour post-pandemic recovery in those sectors affected by the plan. it will probably help relaunch the economy through the infrastructural expenditures, acting as a driving force, and support new startups with subsidies and, less certainly, with a reorganization of taxes and bureaucratic dues. however, some other crucial problems remain poorly considered or wholly unaddressed. the pnrr assigns a relevant role to advanced training and research to support industrial renewal and long-term growth. however, no appropriate reforms are planned for the university nor has the creation of an efficient link between universities and industries been defined. the aim of attracting phd holders and skilled technicians to the public administration is bound to fail due to the unattractiveness of the jobs offered. this puts at risk the full implementation of the plan, also considering the short time provided for its implementation (2026). thus, while expenses could support the post-pandemic recovery anyway, the risk is that long-term recovery will be undermined by the likely partial failure of pnrr implementation. on the other hand, some crucial measures for solving the italian decline problem are not eligible for pnrr funds. the reorganization of the financial and banking sector, a general institutional reform, and all of the problems of italy’s re-insertion into the emu governance framework when the sgp is re-activated remain unsolved and unaffected by a recovery policy based on the pnrr. the impact of the war in ukraine could dramatically change the effectiveness of the pnrr, creating shortage-based inflation, the closure of export markets, and turbulence in european macroeconomic and financial dynamics. the first effects of war inflation have already emerged to hinder the allocation of pnrr funds because of rising costs that have made signing contracts problematic. on the other hand, the turn towards green energy is unavoidable today due to the suspension of economic relations with the eu’s leading energy supplier. this could help to avoid the obsolescence of pnrr strategies. di quirico 117 table 1. comparison between the budget of the pnrr as defined by the conte ii and draghi governments nominal values (billions of euros) % conte draghi balance conte draghi balance digitalization, innovation, competitiveness and culture 46.3 50.07 3.77 20.68 21.29 0.62 digitization, innovation and security in public administration 11.75 10.95 -0.80 5.25 4.66 -0.59 digitization, innovation and competitiveness of the production system 26.55 30.98 4.43 11.86 13.18 1.32 tourism and culture 4.0 8.00 8.13 0.13 3.57 3.46 -0.12 green revolution and ecological transition 69.8 69.96 0.16 31.17 29.75 -1.42 green business and circular economy 7.00 6.97 -0.03 3.13 2.96 -0.16 energy transition and sustainable local mobility 18.22 25.36 7.14 8.14 10.79 2.65 energy efficiency and building requalification 29.55 22.26 -7.29 13.20 9.47 -3.73 protection and enhancement of land and water resources 15.03 15.37 0.34 6.71 6.54 -0.18 infrastructure for sustainability mobility 31.98 31.46 -0.52 14.28 13.38 -0.90 high-speed railway and road maintenance 28.30 27.97 -0.33 12.64 11.90 -0.74 intermodality and integrated logistics 3.68 3.49 -0.19 1.64 1.48 -0.16 education and research 28.49 33.81 5.32 12.72 14.38 1.66 skills enhancement and study support 16.72 20.89 4.17 7.47 8.88 1.42 from research to business 11.77 12.92 1.15 5.26 5.49 0.24 inclusion and cohesion 27.63 29.62 1.99 12.34 12.60 0.26 employment policies 12.62 12.63 0.01 5.64 5.37 -0.26 social infrastructure, families, communities and the voluntary sector 10.83 12.58 1.75 4.84 5.35 0.51 special geographical cohesion measures 4.18 4.41 0.23 1.87 1.88 0.01 healthcare 19.72 20.22 0.50 8.81 8.60 -0.21 community-based care and telemedicine 7.90 9.00 1.10 3.53 3.83 0.30 innovation, research and digitization of healthcare 11.82 11.22 -0.60 5.28 4.77 -0.51 total 223.92 235.14 11.22 100.00 100.00 0.00 sources: camera dei deputati, proposta di piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza presentata dal presidente del consiglio dei ministri, january 15 2021, (pnrr conte), p. 22; piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza #next generation italia, final version (pnrr draghi). p. 22. economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 118 6. conclusions during the xviii italian legislature, three different governments alternated in power. each of them proposed recovery policies that combined in different ways solutions proposed to solve the crucial short-term and long-term problems of the italian economy. the main differences between these recovery policies regarded the nature of the problems and the role of the eu in solving them. the conte i recovery policy mainly targeted long-term economic decline and the competitiveness gap that italy had accumulated in previous decades. instead, the conte ii and the draghi governments mainly focused on the pandemic’s consequences and the need for post-pandemic recovery, leaving aside some structural problems previously addressed in the colao plan and the populist economic programmes. the first conte government combined a european-like plan in the industrial policy field centred on a green and circular economy and an anti-eu attitude that contemplated exiting the emu and abandoning the euro, at least as last-resort option. the core of the conte i recovery policy failed because of its inconsistency, budget narrowness, and the impossibility of mobilizing additional financial resources over the limits imposed by the eu. when the pandemic made the italian situation desperate, the ngeu allowed the italian government to fund part of the previous recovery policy, privileging those items that fitted eu requirements. however, the long-term objectives of the conte i government had to be redefined and restricted to be coherent with the pnrr. thus, under the draghi government, the pnrr became the primary (if not the only) plan for recovery and attention was concentrated entirely on its implementation, while other crucial weaknesses of the italian economic system remained unchallenged. in particular, the italian position in the emu governance framework when the stability and growth pact is reactivated remains problematic. defining a long-term recovery strategy for italy remains crucial for tackling italian economic decline and the impact of the eurozone crisis and the pandemic on the italian economy. the limits of the pnrr in this field – its implementation problems, the lack of political projects in tackling the political and institutional ineffectiveness of the country, and the economic and electoral consequences of the war in ukraine – suggest that the mission will be particularly challenging. references bagnai, a. 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(2022), the rise of anti-establishment and far-right forces in italy: neoliberalisation in a new guise?, in competition & change, 0(0), pp. 1–20. piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza #next generation italia, versione finale (pnrr draghi). profeti, s. and b. baldi (2021), le regioni italiane e il pnrr: la (vana) ricerca di canali d’accesso all’agenda, in rivista italiana di politiche pubbliche, 3, pp. 431-458. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/09/report-on-the-comprehensive-economic-policy-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic/ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/04/09/report-on-the-comprehensive-economic-policy-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic/ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/memo_11_820 https://bit.ly/2k3bcmx economic reform strategies and recovery policies in italy from conte to draghi 120 reuters (2011), italy calls for euro bonds, uk backs fiscal union, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/13/us-eurozone-idusl6e7jd0 2l20110813 (consulted, 19 january 2023). servizio studi del senato della repubblica and servizio studi della camera dei deputati (2021), il piano di ripresa e resilienza. schede di lettura, roma. senato della repubblica (2021), legislatura 18ª aula resoconto stenografico della seduta n. 298 del 17/02/2021, https://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=res aula&leg=18&id=1208137&part=doc_dc-ressten_rs-gentit_cdpdcdmecd (consulted 8 december 2022). simoni, m. 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(2022), riuscirà il pnrr a rilanciare l’italia?, in il mulino, 2, https://www.rivistailmulino.it/a/riuscir-il-pnrr-a-rilanciare-l-italia (consulted 8 december 2022). http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/13/us-eurozone-idusl6e7jd0%202l20110813 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/13/us-eurozone-idusl6e7jd0%202l20110813 https://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=resaula&leg=18&id=1208137&part=doc_dc-ressten_rs-gentit_cdpdcdmecd https://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=resaula&leg=18&id=1208137&part=doc_dc-ressten_rs-gentit_cdpdcdmecd microsoft word pdf_issue_12_1.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 1, june 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 1, pp. 1–3. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science simona piattoni president of the italian political science association university of trento t the 2016 sisp annual meeting, in milano, we held a roundtable on the topic of research assessment in comparative perspective. leading european scholars, both expert of evaluation and with significant experience at the helm of their respective national associations, took part in this roundtable: prof. matthew flinders, chair of the executive committee of the political studies association (psa); prof. rudy andeweg, chair of the executive committee of the european consortium for political research (ecpr) and former chair of the dutch political science association; prof. catherine paradeise, professor emerita upem-lisis (laboratoire interdisciplinaire sciences innovations sociétés) and expert of academic evaluation; and prof. daniele checchi, member of the group expert evaluator in economics (gev-13) for the research quality evaluation (vqr) 2004-2010. they were asked to share their experience with research assessment in their countries and to contribute their points of view to the discussion of the impact of research assessment in the social sciences, and particularly in political science. as organizer of the roundtable, i asked them to comment on and report their experience on the following aspects of research assessment: 1. have research assessment exercises in your country been met with enthusiasm and collaboration or with suspicion and resistance? what were the arguments pro and against? 2. which aspects have been pinpointed as being particularly problematic: the use of quantitative indicators (such as single product/journal impact factor); the pressure towards internationalization (often coinciding with ‘publishing in english’); debatable rankings of publishers’ prestige, etc.? 3. what impact have these exercises had on the academic profession in political science? have they prompted a higher rate of international submissions? have they improved overall production rates? have they encouraged publications of journal articles as opposed to monographs? 4. what impact have these exercises had on the academic profession in political science? have they prompted a higher rate of international submissions? have they improved overall production rates? have they encouraged publications of journal articles as opposed to monographs? a piattoni, the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 2 5. which aspects have been reformed/improved from one round to the next? have the problems encountered in early rounds been amended in successive rounds? the context for such an analysis is the fact that several european countries – uk, sweden, spain, norway, netherlands, italy, ireland, hungary, germany, france, finland and belgium – conduct by now periodic research assessment exercises. in particular, the italian university system has already conducted three such rounds of assessment, according to particularly formalized procedures. we therefore thought that the time had come for a collective reflection on the pros and cons of such exercises and on the potential repercussions that they may have on the academic profession and the discipline of political science, as the very idea of assessing scientific production was met with considerable resistance and skepticism in many countries, italy included. some are opposed in principle to the idea of assessing scholarly products as if they were just any other product, implicitly rejecting both the logic of accountability (how are public or private/public funds spent) and the logic of monitoring. others have misgivings about the specific way in which this assessment is carried out, and in particular about the construction of (increasingly) indicators-driven excellence rankings of departments, scholars and disciplines. a handful doubt that such assessment has any consequence at all (while it does have a small financial impact on the distribution of funds from the ministry of education, which departments can use to expand their teaching staff), while many object to the mostly undesired consequences that these exercises have on the development of the academic profession. the controversy is particularly intense in the social sciences and humanities, therefore also in political science, areas in which the so-called bibliometric indicators are more difficult to apply and assessment must therefore remain mostly qualitative. the articles that follow are the much elaborated and refined texts of the interventions presented at the roundtable. the article by flinders sketches the long history of british research assessment and warns against the subtle and paradoxical effects of the potential excesses of a productivity-driven assessment of academic activity. the articles by andeweg and paradeise show how other european countries tailor research assessment to the specific needs and particularities of the national organization of academic and research institutions. and finally, the article by checchi provides abundant data on the italian experience with the vqr (valutazione della qualità della ricerca), allowing the readers to draw their own conclusions. in thanking again the participants for their generous contribution of time, knowledge and ideas, i would like to draw attention to a few common themes that emerge from these articles: 1. the managerial logic that inspired these assessment exercises, particularly in the uk but also in other european countries, was mostly implemented over the heads of the academic profession as a way of curtailing what were perceived to be outdated privileges; the academic profession has been mostly sidelined in the elaboration and implementation of these procedures and has shown either skepticism and resistance or indifference to the idea of assessing scholarly production; this is particularly shocking in the case of political science, as political scientists have been marginalized in one of their putative fields of expertise – the politics of academic policy-making; the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 3 2. assessment of research products tends to increasingly rely on quantitative indicators and rankings of journals and publishing houses – an aspect which is contested also, e.g., in france and in italy – in a mimetic attempt to emulate the hard sciences; such indicators increasingly acquire a life of their own, being often used as summary indicators for the scientific worth of departments and scholars; 3. research assessment exercises introduce a number of potential distortive elements: a) peer-reviewed journal articles tend to be assessed better than edited volumes and monographs, regardless of their real value; b) joint works tend to be preferred over single-authored works, inducing the artificial inflation of multiauthor products; c) all other things being equal, works in english attract greater readership and gain higher impact factors than works in national languages, which affects particularly academic communities which do not use english as their first language; d) research assessment rankings of departments and scholars induce ‘gaming strategies’ that create further distortions (strategic hiring, discouragement of teaching, creation of two-tier academic milieus) that do not necessarily secure better scholarship; d) the advantages of creating a culture of assessment, peer-review and accountability may be more than offset by the costs, in terms of time and money, of the assessment exercise itself; 4. the impact of research assessment on departmental funding is highly uneven across europe – small but meaningful in italy and france, inexistent in the netherlands (where cuts and increases in funding follow a different logic) and indirect in the uk (through the effect that rankings have on the attractiveness of departments for scholars and students is remarkable) – while the impact on the nature and pressures of being in academia are momentous (described in one of the contributions as ‘going mad’); the relevance of political science for society may have paradoxically suffered from this attempt to make it more socially accountable, as the energy and attention of scholars has been in part diverted from the pursuit of interesting, cross-disciplinary research questions to the production of formally more polished and marketable works; 5. subsequent reforms of the exercise have, in certain cases, tried to correct some of the perceived distortions by adding, e.g., teaching assessment or by correcting the number and selection of works to be assessed, but these corrections run the risk of introducing new distortions of their own. in conclusion, while research assessment throughout europe addresses the issues of transparency, comparability and accountability in the academic world, it also carries challenges of its own that affect particularly the social sciences and the humanities. italian political science is neither alone nor unique in experiencing some difficulties in having its production being assessed through such methods, yet it would be difficult to argue that the assessment should cease and that the academic world should deprive itself of this instrument of self-evaluation and accountability towards society. the one overarching lesson that we may perhaps draw from this comparative analysis is that political scientists need to pay greater attention to academic politics and policy, and should attempt to play a more proactive role in defining the standards and goals of academia. microsoft word ev_179_fittipaldi.docx italian political science, volume x issue x published in 2023 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume x, issue x, x–x. contact author: fortunato musella e-mail address: fortunato.musella@unina.it duration and durability of italian ministers: an old paradox revisited raffaella fittipaldi university of naples federico ii fortunato musella university of naples federico ii abstract the italian paradox of ‘stable instability’ characterized the first republic, with a very short duration of governments but with a stable ministerial class. during the last twenty years we note a ‘partial’ growing of governmental duration, but what about the stability of ministers along with the crisis of party government? this question calls for an empirical investigation in search of a more precise understanding. first, this article will focus on the concepts of the duration and durability of italian ministers, as a premise for further comparative analysis. second, it will investigate the italian ministerial elite in order to examine the decreasing role of political parties in stabilizing the political class. finally, we will focus our attention on the instability of the italian party system as one of the main explanations of (the lack of) governmental durability. this leads to the conclusion that, leaving aside the rhetoric of stronger italian executives, italy has been experiencing a period of greater instability. 1. introduction table instability: this is the traditional image associated with the italian republic during its first fifty years, as a result of a peculiar mix of very short government duration and the firm grip of political parties over political institutions (cappadocia 1972). in comparative perspective, the first italian republic was characterized by the highest rate of cabinet turnover in western europe (müller and strøm 2000). conversely, although the average life of a government was less than a year, the christian democratic party remained in power during the whole period, giving rise to rather stable and stagnant (certainly not innovative, as specified in the section on this point) governmental formulas. partitocracy led to the lengthy careers of a restricted number of people in the higher echelons of government: more in particular, the composition and recruitment of ministers and junior ministers (sottosegretari) showed a remarkable degree of permanence and ministerial partisanship (calise and mannheimer 1982; calise 1984). the super-elite were so stable that ‘about one hundred ministers remained in office for more than five years, being part of numerous governments. in particular, two of them for a quarter of a century (emilio colombo and giulio andreotti) and one for twenty years (paolo emilio taviani)’ (cassese 2022, vii, our translation). what about the (apparent) paradox of italian stable instability after the advent of the so-called second republic? this question calls for empirical investigation in search of a more precise understanding. although we have registered a clear departure from the s duration and durability of italian ministers 2 short duration of the italian executives of the past, so leaving aside the ‘governi balneari’1 that symbolized an epoch, executive life has increased but still falls short of expectations. the average duration of governments over the last twenty years is about 690 days, while most of the 50s and 60s governments did not even reach the 100-day threshold – or barely touched it. eleven governments, however, alternated from 2000 to 2021, with eight different presidents of the council, and only three of them lasted more than a thousand days (table 1). moreover, as the christian democrats’ one-party dominance was eroded, and the italian party system radically changed, relevant consequences may be noted for the stability of the political class, with the occurrence of less ‘partified’ and durable ministerial career paths (pritoni 2012; bergman et al. 2015). this has raised the suspicion that the italian republic has been experiencing – since the 1992 election, which may be considered the last one of the first republic (bull and newell 1993) – a period of greater instability. table 1. italian governments and ministers (2000-2021) government government’s duration (days) number of ministers amato ii 412 25 berlusconi ii 1,412 28 berlusconi iii 389 25 prodi ii 720 26 berlusconi iv 1,287 22 monti 528 19 letta 299 22 renzi 1,024 21 gentiloni 536 19 conte i 460 19 conte ii 527 22 source: own elaboration on the italian government’ official website. government duration might be combined with its durability. the stability of a government of a given political class (in this case ministerial) depends, indeed, on many factors. if duration is an objective and factual measure, taking into consideration the starting date and the end of the executive mandate, durability captures the relationship between the actual data and other intervening variables/factors (lijphart 1984). to ride the italian paradox of ‘stable instability’ that characterized the first republic, with a very short duration of governments but with a stable political class, what has happened to the duration and durability of the italian executives in recent decades, if we look at this from the angle of the duration of their ministers in office? and what are the main factors leading to, or limiting current governmental and ministerial stability? 1 ‘seaside government’, an italian expression which indicates a care-taker executive which lasts for the restricted time of the summer holidays. fittipaldi and musella 3 this article will be divided into three parts: first it will analyse the concepts of duration and durability by taking into account recent ps literature; second, it will focus on the italian ministerial class in the last twenty years, to capture indicators of its permanence and underline dominant career paths, along with the decreasing role of political parties in stabilizing the political class. finally, the instability of the italian party system will be considered as one of the main explanations of (the lack of) governmental and ministerial durability. the main thesis of the article is that the crisis of party government and the weaker control of party organizations over ministerial selection in the post-1994 years, as well as a greater level of party alternation in government, have brought about the increasing instability of the ministerial class. this has determined the shift from the wellnoted system of ‘stable instability’ (i.e., unstable cabinets and a stable political elite) to a system of ‘unstable stability’ (longer – though not sufficiently so – cabinets, but frequent ministerial turnover). 2. duration and durability of government and ministers: starting from the concepts government stability comes from both duration and durability. the distinction between the two concepts emerged in the political science literature in the early 1970s, to explain how some democratic regimes may acquire a high level of stability with executives that do not last for a long time (laver 2003). indeed, while the duration of a government, or that of a minister’s office, consists in the observation of the time which elapses between the beginning and the end of the mandate, research on the durability of governments and ministers seeks to identify explanatory factors that impact the term of office. therefore, duration is the essential starting point for our analysis, whereas durability is an analytical deepening into what factors may allow for government stability or instability. as a matter of fact, “‘ministerial stability’ is a generic term encompassing both ministerial duration and durability” (fischer, dowding, and dumont 2012, 507). starting from the concept of duration, although it constitutes an essentially empirical concept, which coincides with the time spent in office by a single minister, its operationalization may not be immediate. studies on the topic have essentially followed two paths. some scholars consider the ministerial mandate to be continuous through various governments (blondel 1985; shevchenko 2005), others view ministerial tenure as the length of time a minister serves in a given cabinet (berlinski, dewan, dowding 2007; berlinski, dewan, dowding 2012). in the first case, the duration of the ministerial mandate coincides with the time that occurs between the first ministerial appointment in a government and the end of his last ministerial mandate. thus, for example, minister dario franceschini, who held a ministerial position (changing portfolio once) from 2013 to 2021 by crossing four governments, is considered to have been in charge for about eight years. in the second case, however, the minister’s duration officially ends with the end of a single mandate. accordingly, in the event of the minister being appointed again in a different government, this counts as another office. this could be borrowed from research on cabinet stability, where the end of a cabinet is assumed to be a point of discontinuity both for the government as collective body and single ministers. in addition, we could point out that while the first type of measurement takes the minister’s point of view, looking at the total days spent in office by each individual, the second type of measurement of ministerial tenure adopts duration and durability of italian ministers 4 the point of view of the government, noting the days in office of each individual for individual governments or by types of government. apart from the chosen ‘counting rule’ to measure the length of ministerial office, the mean of the duration in office (in days and/or in years) is generally seen as an accurate index of ministerial longevity. as table 1 above shows, if we compare the average duration of the italian governments from 2000 to 2021 with the duration of ministerial offices in the same period, clear differences between the two measures may be observed. if we use the first measurement of duration, based on the total stay in office by individual ministers,2 ministerial duration is longer than that of the government, as ministers are more stable than the governments that host them. moreover, the two values show a (still unsatisfactory) increase in governmental duration compared with the first republic: indeed, the average of 690 days for executives is double that of past executives, which was 315 days on average (vassallo 2005; pritoni 2012, 228). yet, if one refers to the second type of measurement of ministerial stay in office,3 the current political scenario moves sharply away from the first republic, when ‘there was a strong stability of the ruling class’ (cassese 2022, vi; frognier 1991). figure 1. average duration of ministers and governments (2000-2021) notes: * total time spent in office by ministers; ** time in office of ministers per cabinet source: own elaboration on the basis of official government website and musella, fittipaldi and rullo, monocratic government dataset: personalisation of leaders and masses, appendix of musella (2022). indeed, an increase in the average duration of governments compared to the past is offset by a shorter tenure of the ministerial elite compared to the past. it is sufficient to note that the average value of ministerial duration in single cabinets, that is about 640 days, is much lower than that of the first republic: ‘the degree of stability of the rulers was enormously greater than that of the individual governments’, so that in the first republican thirty years ‘152 ministers, one third of the total, enclosed two thirds of the 2 in this case, the unit of analysis is the individual minister. we therefore aggregate all the days that the given minister has spent in government in a ministerial post, over and above the duration of the individual cabinets in which he or she has participated. 3 in this case, as mentioned above, the point of view is that of the executive and taken into account are the days each minister spends in office for each government or type of government. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 days total m inis ter ial duration* minis terial dur ation per cabinet** gov ernment duration fittipaldi and musella 5 presences in their hands; 1331 government posts as minister and/or junior ministers’ (calise 1997, 360-361, our translations). thus, by adopting the second measure of duration, the last phase of republican history seems to result in greater ministerial instability. using these different types of measurement, we approach the concept of durability. hence, we can argue that the concept of durability refers to the tentative explanatory models about the relationship between executive or ministerial duration and their causes. following, therefore, a wide tradition of studies on the subject (laver and schofield 1990; warwick 1994; lupia and strøm 1995), in this article we will look at the factors of change related to parties and party systems as the main unit of analysis of government and ministerial durability. various personal and political elements can determine the beginning and end of a ministerial mandate. in this way, several classes of explanatory factors have been identified in the political science literature as having an impact on ministerial time in office: 1) sociodemographic, 2) political and 3) institutional factors. as regards the first of these, the personal characteristics of the ministers such as gender, age, education, sexual and/or financial scandal and state of health are variables at the basis of many empirical studies on ministerial durability (fischer, dowding, and dumont 2012). as regards the second, party affiliation, career paths, policy disagreement or criticism, (bad) ministerial performance, forms the research design of other studies on the subject (berlinski, dewan, dowding 2007; müller-rommel, kroeber and vercesi 2020). finally, among the last group, elements related to the government in which the ministers are in office, such as institutional framework or nature of coalition are key factors for those studies based on the analysis of structural characteristics and on (critical) events (warwick 1979; strøm 1985; browne frendreis and gleiber 1984). although the political science literature has proposed several reasons to explain the degree of government durability (taylor and herman 1971; laver and shepsle 1996; andeweg 2000; smith 2004; dewan and dowding 2005; dowding and dumont 2009; fittipaldi and rullo forthcoming), there are no clear and unambiguous effects, however, between each of such variables and the duration of the ministers and governments in office (huber and martinez-gallardo 2008; back et al. 2009; bucur 2017; berlinski, dewan and dowding 2007; bakema 1991). nevertheless, the recent radical transformations of parties and party systems constitute key elements for understanding how governments change – and how long they last. as the literature on the topic confirms, in our day, the loss of salience of the traditional lines of socio-political conflict shakes up the established and mainstream party systems (panebianco 1988; diamond and gunther 2001; van biezen and poguntke 2014). the number of parties has been growing in almost all western countries4 and the left-right axis which traditionally organized the dynamic of politics is less and less salient, thus opening a window of opportunity for the emergence of new political actors (ignazi 1996). the result is that, in accordance with the thesis of the decline of political parties (‘departitization’), we have fragile – and changing – majorities in cabinets and 4 in the last decade, historical cases of two party systems, such as the british and spanish, do not resist the test of the vote (musella 2018). see also: rodon and hierro (2016) for the spanish case and lynch (2007) for uk. for a recent comparative view, see chiaramonte and emanuele (2022). duration and durability of italian ministers 6 considerably fragmented and fractionalized assemblies with a remarkable number of party switchers and independents (sartori 1976; bardi 2004; musella 2018; 2022). it’s been a long way from the parteienstaat doctrine (mortati 1972; elia 2009) based on the idea that parties could provide legitimation for the democratic state. indeed, if during the phase of the first republic, the parties controlled both the processes of government formation and cabinet decision-making, having a considerable hold on society, in the subsequent period they have been undermined by other political actors. more precisely, as the gap between society and parties has widened, with dissatisfaction becoming the main political outcome (morlino and tarchi 1996), the pre-eminence of the president of the republic and of the prime minister outlines a political scenario of residual party government (fabbrini 1996; calise 2015; musella 2022). the reduction in the party affiliation of ministers and the change in ministerial career patterns is one of the main evident results that will be analysed in the following paragraph. 3. the instability of political parties when schattschneider (1942) claimed that democracy was impossible without parties, by referring to both the function of representation of such political intermediate bodies and their role in government, he made a statement which is still valid today. indeed, although much time has passed since similar considerations were made, parties continue to be crucial actors in contemporary political systems (morlino and tarchi 2006). however, since the second half of the last century the crisis of political parties is an accomplished fact, so that while some observers still recognize their indisputable position, for other aspects one may suspect that the party is over (mair 2013). on the one hand, the main indicators on the presence of political parties in society present decreasing values: party membership seems to belong to the past, with party affiliates generally getting older, and voting not in accordance with the traditional socioeconomic and sociocultural cleavages that stabilized the parties in the second half of the twentieth century. especially in the last few years, the instability of party systems seems a common feature in several contemporary democracies: from the united kingdom to spain, and including italy, party systems suffered the shock of the so-called great recession (emanuele and marino 2018; hutter and kriesi 2019; fittipaldi 2021), as the economic and financial crisis gave release to both a consistent loss of consensus to mainstream parties and the spread of radical and populist parties. on the other hand, as regards systems of government, while democratic political systems have appeared as party governments, today political leaders have acquired greater centrality on the political scene (musella 2018; musella 2022). the result of such interrelated trends was very clear in the field of ministerial selection. with reference to the italian case, indeed, from the birth of the italian republic to the second half of the ‘70s, party control was almost total, only tempered by the territorial linkages of the local (notable) politicians (calise and mannheimer 1982; 1986). nevertheless, over time, the decline of party politics impacted the recruitment and career patterns of the political elites. indeed, the spread of the personalization trend over time, along with the emergence of technocratic governments during periods of political or economic crisis, provided fittipaldi and musella 7 more innovative paths for entering the executive. this is a fact that catches the eye when observing the following table, where it can be noticed that over the last two decades, a good number of ministers have not had a party background, coming from academia or business instead. although the party grip on ministerial selection remains crucial, and the ranks of government are still largely occupied by professional political personnel, with party affiliation and a traditional cursus honorum (blondel and thiébault 1991; cotta and verzichelli 2007), the increasing number of cases of ‘non-partisan ministers’ marks the political change from the past (verzichelli and cotta 2018). in our country this trend was inaugurated by the rise of ‘non-partisan or non-political prime ministers’ (mancini 1997; pasquino and valbruzzi 2012; costa pinto and tavares de almeida 2018; musella 2018), with silvio berlusconi being a clear case on the international scene. during the last twenty years this phenomenon has spread from the apex of government to the entire ministerial elite. consequently, although italy has been a paradigmatic case of party government, with a tight and remarkable party and parliamentary control of the process of ministerial recruitment,5 our data highlights less linear and predictable ministerial careers. table 2. occupation of ministers before their mandate field of work ministers (n) ministers (%) institutional 20 8% business 23 9% political party 66 27% military 3 1% media 13 5% academia 61 25% judicial 32 13% medical 9 4% other 21 8% total 248 100% source: musella, fittipaldi and rullo, monocratic government dataset: personalisation of leaders and masses, appendix of musella (2022). the progressive relevance of innovative recruiting channels for the ministerial class establishes the development of a ‘genetically outsider political elite’, i.e., one that is formed outside that party-parliamentary circuit which has traditionally been recognized as the main one in italy and in other european countries (dogan 1979; calise and mannheimer 1982; winter 1991; verzichelli 2016). the relevance of experts, such as academics (25 percent) or businessmen (9 percent), demonstrates the declining role of political parties in their basic and more crucial function, which is the selection of the political class (neumann 1956; marsh 1988), as can be seen in table 3. moreover, this fact 5 in the face of low government stability, the notable continuity of the political class was ensured precisely by the penetration of the parties both in society and at all levels of government. see: verzichelli and cotta 2000. on italian party government see also (pasquino 1987). duration and durability of italian ministers 8 is supported by the percentage of ministers with no previous parliamentary experience: 38% of the ministerial elite of the last twenty years did not come from the parliamentary benches. our data confirms, indeed, that 94 out of 248 ministers between 2000 and 2021 became ministers without first having been members of parliament, thus subverting a classic route to the executive.6 a lower level of parliamentary extraction of ministers, indeed, confirms the lesser partyness of the ministerial elite. as an evident symptom of the erosion of italian-style party government, this point also helps us to understand the growing ministerial instability in our country. by adopting the second measure of duration, based on the ministerial time in office per government, the duration rate of the ministers with no previous parliamentary experience appears much lower if compared with that of ministers who have had previous experience in the national parliament. indeed, the former group has served in office for 140 days less than the latter one. this data tells us that a ministerial class coming from a party-parliamentary circuit is more durable and therefore more stable. from a different point of view, the rise of non-partisan ministers has also resulted from a more general crisis of contemporary democracies. as on the one hand the postmaterialist wind (inglehart 1977) has been driving the birth of new political subjects who are unconventional from the point of view of political organization, repertoire of action, and/or issues, on the other hand ‘the withdrawal of the elites’ from the realm of civil society towards the realm of government (mair 2013) has served to offset the loss of weight in society of political parties (cotta and verzichelli 1996). indeed, on the side of government composition, the reduction in party weight brings to light the existence of a growing number of ministers not strictly belonging to a party organization and the diminished control of political parties over the selection of ministers. finally, to have a more concise representation of such trends, one may also use the index of party governmentness7 as a measure to outline the level of partisanship of the ministerial elite. although a high degree of ministerial class partisanship has been noted in the past, a different scenario is emerging today. indeed, in the last twenty years, 15 percent of ministers have lacked party affiliation, leaving behind the model of the politician with a typical pure party background. we must also note that ministers who have a party affiliation last, on average, 180 days more in office than those who are independent and, therefore, without party affiliation. hence, the ministerial duration per cabinet is on average longer for partisan ministers. this leads us to think that we are leaving the ‘golden age’ of party government, when parties exercised full control over the executive appointments and stability of the political elite reached its highest values (cotta and verzichelli 2002). 6 musella, fittipaldi and rullo, monocratic government dataset: personalisation of leaders and masses, appendix of musella (2022). 7 the index of party governmentness is borrowed from the katz’ concept of party governmentness (1986) and is calculated as the ratio between the number of partisan ministers and the total number of ministers who serve in office per single government (pasquino and valbruzzi 2012). for example, in a cabinet with all partisan ministers the value of the index is 1; instead in a cabinet with all non-partisan ministers the value of the index is 0. fittipaldi and musella 9 table 3. index of party governmentness cabinet index of party governmentness amato ii 0.96 berlusconi ii 0.93 berlusconi iii 0.96 prodi ii 0.96 berlusconi iv 1.00 monti 0.00 letta 0.86 renzi 1.00 gentiloni 1.00 conte i 0.68 conte ii 0.86 source: musella, fittipaldi and rullo, monocratic government dataset: personalisation of leaders and masses, appendix of musella (2022). in more recent times, moving from the tendency of more independent minsters, a different feature of italian politics has also emerged: the formation of non-partisan governments, matched with technocratic cabinets in periods of political and economic crisis, and the rise of a grand coalition government. in the technocratic cabinet led by mario monti (mcdonnell and valbruzzi 2014) the value of the party governmentness index is 0 while in the conte i government it is lower than in other cabinets, as more than 30% of ministers do not belong to any party. looking at the executives in the last two decades, the letta government and the conte ii government show a relevant rate of non-partisan ministers as well, with a percentage of 14%. at the same time, some differences might be noted in terms of the presence of non-partisan ministers between the ‘political’ cabinets (centre-right – berlusconi cabinets, and centre-left – amato, prodi, letta, gentiloni, and renzi cabinets) and those that are ‘technocratic’ (monti) and ‘techno-personalized’(conte i and ii).8 as a matter of fact, the latter tend to appoint more independents, so emphasizing the differences between party-based cabinets and technical ones. table 4. partisanship rate of ministers per type of government source: musella, fittipaldi and rullo, monocratic government dataset: personalisation of leaders and masses, appendix of musella (2022). 8 we use the label ‘techno-personalized government’ borrowing it from valbruzzi (2019). we mainly refer to the relevance of the prime minister, understood (prior to the most recent position within the m5s) as a technical and independent premier until 2021, and to the presence of two highly personalized party leaders. the label also aims to emphasise the relevant influence of non-political experts or authorities over party politicians and partisan institutions in the decision-making process and in the cabinet in general (see the composition of the government and the reference to valbruzzi 2019 for more details). type of government independents n (%) party affiliated n (%) total n (%) centre-left 6 (5%) 107 (95%) 113 (100%) centre-right 3(4%) 72 (96%) 75 (100%) technocratic 19 (100%) 0 (0%) 19 (100%) techno-personalised 9 (22%) 32 (78%) 41 (100%) total 37 (15%) 211 (85%) 248 (100%) duration and durability of italian ministers 10 especially in technocratic experiences, party politics seems gradually to have been replaced by the politics of depoliticization. this leads to an “enlargement of the ‘pool of ministerables’ and […] confirming the hypothesis of a declining role of the typical career politicians described in the past decades” (verzichelli and cotta 2018, 93). consequently, italian party government appears as a feature that belongs more to the past than to the present and the future of the country. our findings shed light on the relevance of the link between the party-parliamentary circuit and the duration and durability of the ministerial elite. the instability of governments in the past was, in fact, balanced by a high rate of duration in office of the ministers who contributed to delineating a stable political class. today, the italian paradox no longer holds, and the greater stability of the government is now ‘balanced’ by a greater instability of the political-ministerial class. in the next paragraph, we will look at the same phenomenon from another analytical perspective. 4. the innovative governments government refers, strictly speaking, to the executive body in a given political system. it is a crucial institutional actor in all regimes, in some way reinvented by contemporary regimes, which gradually expanded its borders and competences (musella 2021). therefore, given the progressive expansion of the role of the executive, it comes as no surprise that: ‘the making and breaking of governments is one of the most basic of all political processes. political competition is typically structured as a choice between governments, and it thus hardly surprising that government formation is of perennial fascination to political scientists’ (laver 1998, 1). in this line of thinking, italy is an interesting political laboratory. during the so-called first republic, our country showed a considerable political stalemate in terms of government formation (curini and pinto 2013), reproducing government formulas that were not very, or not at all new. if we define as ‘innovative governments’ those whose formation is new in the combination of its components, that is, when the coalition of government has never been realized before (valbruzzi 2019), italy exhibits a change only at the end of the first republic. indeed, as we noted above, despite the short duration of the governments of this first republican phase, instability in italy was blunted by the permanence in office of the ministerial elite who, in fact, did not undergo much change or turnover. more precisely, despite the instability that characterized the ‘golden age’ of the italian-style party government, the ‘cooperation at the elite level’ (pasquino 197; calise 1987),9 on the one hand, highlights the tendency and the tradition of political compromise within italian governments and, on the other, it points to a kind of political inertia that has often brought an advantage to the incumbents, whether parties and/or individuals, already in office. as is clear, in the partitocratic era, the prominent role of the democrazia cristiana (dc, christian democracy) was a strong element of political continuity in italy (curini and pinto 2013). in the light of the so-called conventio ad excludendum, another constant was the exclusion from the government of other parties, i.e., those which were ‘anti-system’,10 and especially, for a long time, the partito comunista italiano (pci, 9 for an analysis of the italian party system as a case of polarized pluralism and the patterns of elite cooperation see: bogaards (2005). 10 see sartori (1976 and 1982) for an overview of the italian party system and the anti-system parties. fittipaldi and musella 11 italian communist party). consequently, cabinet formation reached one of the lowest turnover rates of any parliamentary democracy (strøm 1990). from another angle, the static nature of government formation and composition can be understood as the search for stability, overcoming the obstacle of the short duration of the cabinets. figure 2. number of innovative governments per legislature (1948-2022) source: own elaboration of parlgov dataset, parlgov.org. indeed, as our data highlight, the italian first republic is characterized by a low degree of innovative governments: only about a quarter of the governments in the first eleven legislatures (1948-1994), in fact, can be defined as such. the relations between political parties were characterized – and determined – by a considerable ideological polarization (‘k-factor’)11 and such a division could not allow for a real alternation of government. this paved the way for a ‘blocked democracy’ (fabbrini 2009). in the so-called second republic, data show an increasing government innovativeness (figure 2). in the new socio-political scenario, more competition between coalitions is noted and government formation strictly connected to the electoral results of single political leaders (musella 2019; 2020; barbieri and verzichelli 2003). it is reasonable to think that the higher the rate of government innovativeness, the greater the instability of the ministerial elite, as a consequence of greater party turnover. indeed, looking again at the substantive aspect of the executive, namely its ministerial components, by reducing the stability of political parties over time, ministerial careers become shorter. indeed, other channels of access to ministerial ranks have become more relevant and the weight of the party-parliamentary backgrounds is reduced. and this appears very clear when there are periods of greater alternation of government, as occurs in the second republic. 11 k-factor comes from the russian word ‘kommunizm’, that is communism used for the first time in an editorial of corriere della sera of 30 march 1979 by alberto ronchey just to explain the lack of turnover of governmental political forces in the first fifty years of republican italy. see calise (2006) for an analysis of the so-called ‘k’ factor in italian politics. 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii duration and durability of italian ministers 12 figure 3. average duration of ministers per single governments (2000-2021) source: own elaboration of the italian government’s official website. therefore, if previously the rank of minister was the final step in a complex, linear and long career in political institutions (calise 1987),12 since the nineties italian ministers have stayed less time in office. on average, the ministers who stayed in office longer were those belonging to the berlusconi ii and iv governments (about three years) and those in renzi’s government (about two years). the prodi government, which ranks fourth, is the last to come close to the two-year threshold for the average duration of the ministerial class. the rest of the cabinets’ ministers, in fact, are closer to the year mark. the party-political situation helps us even if we use another angle for our analysis (warwick 1992). centre-right governments report higher rates of ministerial duration than centre-left, technocratic and techno-personalized governments. table 5. average duration of ministers per government type ministerial duration per government ministers in centre-left government ministers in centre-right government ministers in technocratic government ministers in techno-personalized government days 547.45 901.26 510.58 480.39 years 1.50 2.47 1.40 1.32 source: own elaboration on the basis of musella, fittipaldi and rullo, monocratic government dataset: personalisation of leaders and masses, appendix of musella (2022). moreover, since it is the technocratic and techno-personalized cabinets that have the lowest rate of partisanship, our analysis is clearly in line with other recent studies on the topic (see: costa pinto and tavares de almeida 2018), by underlining that the mean duration of non-partisan ministers, i.e. the ministerial duration per government, is always lower than that of ministers who are affiliated to parties. 12 an articulate reflection on the ‘self-reproduction’ of the party bureaucracy and its leadership is found in cassese (1974). 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 ave rage durat io n (days) amat o ii berluscon i ii berluscon i iii prodi berluscon i iv mo nti let ta re nzi ge ntiloni con te i con te ii fittipaldi and musella 13 finally, our data, on the one hand, emphasize the ‘constituent role of the parties in relation to democratic institutions’ (calise 1987, 221, our translation) and, on the other hand, they testify to the deconstruction of the party system and the progressively less crucial role of party actors in terms of incubators – producers and selectors – of the ruling class. 5. concluding remarks the italian political landscape of recent years is closer to the image of an unstable stability than to the topical paradox, italian par excellence, of stable instability. our article has highlighted some political duration trends of the italian ministerial elite and executives. after clarifying the conceptual differences between duration and durability, we note that the latter has been declining over the last twenty years. indeed, while during the italian first republic government duration was balanced by the stability of the italian executive political class, as the duration of governments seems to be (partially) growing during the second republic, the stability of the ministerial class is decreasing. norberto bobbio was right when he pointed out that partitocracy was the main feature of the italian political system. with the change of the partitocratic world, our political system has changed its nature as well. political parties are no longer the only incubators of the ministerial elites, with experts, academics and businessmen gaining, indeed, political terrain. this has been pretty evident in several variables we have considered in our analysis: the decreasing rate of partyness of the ministerial class, the growing destructuration of the party system, the increasing rate of government innovativeness. hence, the processes of elite recruitment and government formation have become less partydriven. furthermore, without any majoritarian reform project of our institutions, it also results in a more unstable republic. references andeweg rb (2000) ministers as double agents? the delegation process between cabinet and ministers. european journal of political research 37, 377-395. back h, persson t, vernby k and wockelberg h (2009) swedish cabinet ministers in the postwar era. in dowding k and dumont p (eds.), the 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government survival in western european parliamentary democracies. comparative political studies 25, 332-361. warwick p (1994) government survival in parliamentary democracies. cambridge: cambridge univ pr. winter ld (1991) parliamentary and party pathways to the cabinet. in blondel j and thiébault jl the profession of government minister in western europe. new york st: martins press, pp. 44-69. italian political science, volume 17 issue 1 published in 2022 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 17, issue 1, 34–54. contact author: nicola maggini, university of milan e-mail address: nicola.maggini@unimi.it the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times nicola maggini university of milan cristiano vezzoni university of milan abstract the polls on the voting intentions of italians during the covid-19 pandemic revealed substantial stability of electoral orientations in the first phase of the pandemic, while they detected a certain fluidity after the birth of the draghi government, specifically with a decline of the league and m5s and the growth of brothers of italy (fdi). the results of the 2022 general election confirmed those trends with a clear-cut victory of the (centre-) right coalition, this time led by meloni’s brothers of italy. in the meantime, the opponents experienced a poor electoral performance, and an even more deceiving result in terms of seats. all these upheavals have led many pundits to speculate about what would have been the results if the opponents to the right-wing coalition would have succeeded in building a coalition to achieve a higher level of competitiveness in the first-past-the-post electoral districts. but, beyond considerations based on vote intentions or electoral results, to what extent are these speculations consistent with the actual space of electoral competition among main italian parties? in other words, on which areas of the electoral space does the competition unfold and how did those areas evolve? this article answers these questions using original survey data from the response covid-19 project. in particular, through the scale analysis of a set of propensity-to-vote (ptv) measures, we investigate the configuration of the electoral competition space in the aftermath of 2022 general election and how (and if) this configuration changes over three distinct phases of the pandemic: during the first wave (spring-summer 2020), during the third wave (spring 2021) and during the fourth wave (autumn-winter 2021). results show that regardless of the period analysed, party competition occurs mainly within the right, whose party electorates strongly overlap, whereas more barriers exist among party electorates of the opposite camp. 1. introduction o any observer of the italian political debate, the attention journalists, politicians and pundits pay to election polls is manifest, with a special focus on the estimates coming from the aggregation of the answers to the question on vote intention. despite the notable limitations of such predictive exercises, nowadays broadly recognised in literature (sturgis et al. 2018), their popularity in the public debate is paramount, not only before an election but also after it and during the whole electoral cycle. if predicting the share of votes of the parties is thus problematic, there is something that is even more arduous if not altogether impossible to achieve by means of vote intention questions. in fact, relying only on them does not allow us to derive direct information on party competition. t maggini and vezzoni 35 the scope of this article is firstly to illustrate the main limitations of vote intentions as an instrument for describing both proportion of votes and party competition. secondly, we will discuss an alternative to vote intention that supplies a broader reach, especially as far as the description of the political space of competition is concerned. we refer to propensity to vote (ptv) measures, illustrating their conceptual significance and how they work. finally, we use ptv to reconstruct the space of competition in the last two years, from the beginning of the pandemic crisis to the general election of 2022. the sections of the article follow this scheme closely, with the addition, after the conceptual discussion of ptvs, of a brief presentation of the data that we use. 2. vote intentions and their limitations in studying electoral competition the primary use of vote intentions within the framework of electoral polls is to generate a prediction of a forthcoming election. however, in recent years, their use became widespread during the whole course of the electoral cycle. it is now customary to have weekly polls and to follow their trend over time. gathering multiple polls and offering an average for comparison over time also in periods not close to an election has become common practice.1 the attitudes towards this instrument are nonetheless ambivalent. their limitations are, in principle, acknowledged, but in facts they are commented on ‘as if’ they would depict the state of the matter about the preferences of the voters, often having real consequences on the decisions of political actors. nowadays, a great deal is known about the shortcoming of electoral forecasts based on polls, especially when far from elections (sturgis et al. 2018). it is nonetheless useful to briefly review the main limitations that affect specifically the vote intention question. the first problem is that a large portion of respondents, generally exceeding a third, do not answer the question, either because they do not know or because they do not want to express their preference. this points to a clear problem of coverage, made more severe by the fact that refusing to express one’s vote intention is often not independent of the respondent’s political profile. in fact, respondents giving a valid answer are more politically interested and engaged than those refusing to answer such a question. and this can significantly bias the estimates. problems concerning both coverage and measurement error are not the only ones affecting the instrument. there is also a more profound problem connected with it. the main limitation is in fact conceptual. the question gives the interviewee the possibility to choose only one party from a list, while it supplies no information about the attitudes of the respondent towards all other non-selected parties. one could hold that the information we want to know is about the party to be voted for, and thus that is what we ask. if we constrain ourselves to this use, we can hold that the instrument supplies a valid measurement of what it purports to measure (kelley 1927, quoted in borsboom 2005, p. 150). it is, though, fair to recognize that such a question does not allow anything to be said about the preferences concerning parties other 1 the main example in europe, collecting polls in multiple countries, is poll of polls produced by the online outlet politico.eu (https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/). the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 36 than the one selected, and therefore on the competition that exists between parties and the contestable nature of portions of the electorate.2 this limitation is often forgotten and many arguments on the possible electoral gains and losses of parties are in fact derived from the comparison of mere marginal distributions of the vote intention question. in the face of these shortcomings and holding that understanding party competition is a relevant objective, the question is: does a viable alternative to vote intention exist? the answer is, in our opinion, positive. 3. the alternative to vote intentions: propensity to vote for four decades now, political scientists developed a tool for studying voters’ preferences that is referred to as propensity to vote for a party, and denoted by the acronym ptv (van der eijk and franklin 1996; van der eijk et al. 2006). ptvs are measured by asking the respondents how likely they are to vote for a party in the future, on a scale from ‘not at all likely’ to ‘very likely’. crucially, all major parties are tested, supplying a measure of the dyadic relation, in terms of probability to vote, that exists between them and each respondent. propensities to vote are regularly asked in the questionnaire of the european election study (ees) which supplies the standard formulation of the question: “we have a number of parties in [country] each of which would like to get your vote. how probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties? please answer on a scale where 0 means ‘not at all probable’ and 10 means ‘very probable’ (schmitt et al. 2022). the concept of propensity to vote is not particularly complex to imagine. indeed, it corresponds to the evaluation that a voter gives of a party, in terms of willingness to vote for it in an undefined future. economists would indicate it as the utility of the various voting options, which is made explicit and observable precisely through the answers to the question. if the concept is simple to grasp, its conceptual implications are quite profound in terms of representation of the electoral choice process. in fact, considering the utility of the various choice options in the voting function means making clear the fact that the voting choice takes place in two steps. in the first step, the available options are considered, and a specific utility is attributed to each one (propensity to vote); in the second step, a translation rule is applied which leads from the utilities, considered together and compared, to a choice of a preferred option that is, in our case, vote intention. figure 1 clearly represents this process. 2 to fully understand this limitation, it is enough to refer to an example in market research. assume that we want to study the pasta market. by asking only which brand of pasta a potential buyer would like to buy (purchasing intention), we would only know their preference for the pasta they choose, and nothing about all the other brands not chosen. it is clear that for an operator in the pasta sector this information would be rather poor and insufficient for designing a market strategy aimed at acquiring new customers, because no information on effective competition between brands would be available. maggini and vezzoni 37 figure 1. a two-stage model of electoral choice source: van der eijk et al. 2006, p. 428. these propensities to vote, therefore, represent the immediate antecedents of the choice to vote, and summarize both individual considerations and the images of a party which lead a voter to be more inclined to choose one rather than another. there is something more to the ptvs, a characteristic that clearly distinguishes them from voting intentions and on which their inventors insist. voting propensities are not ipsative. the adjective ‘ipsative’ indicates a forced choice, where by choosing one option you give up the others, such as when you have to choose a party on the ballot paper. ptvs allow a probability to vote greater than zero to be expressed for several parties. in this way, it is possible to detect if a voter is available to more than one party and, therefore, to study the potential competition between these parties (for the linkage between electoral availability and political competition, see bartolini 2000). what is the typical distribution of the propensity to vote for a specific party? first, the majority of respondents usually indicate values equal to zero, expressing a total closure towards the party at stake. the other respondents are then distributed over the scale with increasing values, signalling a higher openness of considering the party as a vote option. thus, the typical distribution of a ptv is skewed to right, with the modal value at zero. when considering the joint distribution of ptv for more parties, we can obtain different profiles for our respondents. one can express a high score only for one party, supposedly being certain of her choice and not exposed to competition, while another can indicate two or more high ptvs. those respondents who assign high and equal or similar scores to two or more parties are voters who are potentially open to different options and, therefore, open to competition between parties (bartolini 2000). on the one hand, ptvs are a straightforward instrument to detect the potential electorate of a party, namely those who express high scores for that party. on the other hand, they are an effective tool to study the structure of the electoral competition, and its evolution over time, precisely because they supply non-ipsative information for several parties. there is a final attractive characteristic of ptvs with respect to voting intention: being a less directive question formulated in a non-ipsative way, it receives far fewer refusals and ‘don’t know’ answers from the interviewees, allowing analyses to be the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 38 elaborated on almost the entirety of the sample (for an italian example, see vezzoni 2014). since their ideation in the 1980s, ptvs have proven to be very successful. first and foremost, they became a major tool to study electoral behaviour in comparative perspective (van der eijk and franklin 1996). in the american context, the combined use of ptvs for the democratic and republican parties provides a better measure of party identification than the traditional questions developed more than 50 years ago by the michigan school (campbell et al. 1960, paparo, de sio and brady 2020). finally, in the italian context, ptvs have been extensively used to reconstruct the party space of competition, the location of the voters in such a space, and to investigate the left-right dimension without the need to explicitly use the measure that refers to the spatial dimension of the competition (schadee, segatti and vezzoni 2019). 4. research questions and data in this article, we provide an empirical analysis of ptvs in the italian context, describing their distribution at the time of the 2022 general election, and propose an application to study the electoral space of competition based on a multidimensional analysis3 of their joint distributions spanning from 2020 to 2022, a time span dramatically marked by the covid-19 pandemic. in this context, the electoral outcome of the 2022 general election, with the clear-cut victory of the (centre-)right coalition led by giorgia meloni’s brothers of italy, has led many pundits to speculate about what would have been the results if the opponents to the right-wing coalition had succeeded in building a coalition to achieve a higher level of competitiveness in the first-past-the-post electoral districts (the so-called majoritarian part of the electoral law). but to what extent are these speculations consistent with the actual space of electoral competition among main italian parties? in other words, in which areas of the electoral space does the competition unfold and how did these areas evolve since the outbreak of the pandemic? the analysis of party competition over the two years preceding the general election is functional to understanding whether its configuration in 2022 is contingent on the electoral campaign dynamics or rather it has more long-lasting roots. to answer these questions, we use data coming from the response covid-19 study, which covers the period 2020-2022 with four waves of data collection on the adult italian population (vezzoni et al. 2020, biolcati et al. 2021, vezzoni et al. 2022). the study is intended to investigate the social, political and economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic on italian citizens. the study counts over 30,000 interviews over five waves, part of them collected with a panel design. the samples come from a commercial online community of an italian research institute (swg), and are collected respecting the quotas for gender, age and geographical area of residence. specifically, we use here the data coming from waves 1 (spring 2020), 3 (spring 2021), 4 (autumn-winter 2021) and 5 (autumn 2022), counting respectively 15,673, 3 as we will clarify in the next section, the multidimensional analysis is constrained to two dimensions. we are aware that this choice can have some limitations and an alternative solution based on three dimensions could be employed. nonetheless, the addition of a further dimension to the classical twodimensional solution would accommodate for residual segments of the electorate that are in any case marginal and of ambiguous meaning (e.g., voters giving high scores to all parties). maggini and vezzoni 39 9,222, 3,032 and 4,768 interviews.4 we applied post-stratification weights based on the cross-classification of gender, area of residence, age group, level of education and (for wave 5 only) voting behaviour. in our research, the ptvs were asked for all those parties that reached the 3 per cent electoral threshold:5 brothers of italy (fratelli d’italia, fdi), the league (lega), go italy (forza italia, fi), action-italy alive (azione-italia viva, azione-iv), democratic party (partito democratico, pd), green europe-italian left (europa verde-sinistra italiana, verdi-si), five star movement (movimento 5 stelle, m5s). table 1 shows the distribution of the ptvs for the parties, divided into four groups and further distinguishing between those available and not available to a given party, with the threshold set at the value of 6. table 1. distribution of the propensity to vote for the main italian parties in 2022 (percentages, n = 4768) propensity to vote general election 2022 not available to the party available to the party % outcome for the party don’t know 0 1 to 5 6 to 10 total on valid votes on total voters fdi 9 43 16 32 100 25.9 15.9 lega 8 49 21 22 100 8.8 5.4 fi 8 50 23 19 100 8.1 5.0 azione-iv 9 51 27 13 100 7.8 4.8 pd 9 44 25 22 100 19 11.6 verdi-si 10 50 26 14 100 3.6 2.2 m5s 8 47 24 21 100 15.4 9.4 source: response covid-19. observing the table, it is possible to detect some of the characteristics of the ptvs discussed above. first of all, it clearly emerges that the majority of respondents give a valid answer to the question and less than 10% adopt the ‘i don’t know’ option. as expected, zero (complete unwillingness to vote for the party) is the modal value, i.e., the category receiving the most responses, for all parties. with increasing values, readiness to vote for the party increases as well. where to place the cut-point between what we consider low and high values of ptv is an arbitrary matter. in the italian context, it makes sense to indicate 6 as the cut-point, in line with the well-known scale of school marks, 6 being the lowest pass mark. thus, values between 1 and 5 can still be considered low. values from 6 upwards are compatible with a potential willingness to vote for the party. fdi is clearly the party that attracts the largest number of potential voters, almost one third 4 in wave 5 the panel component (84.9 per cent of interviews) was integrated with new interviews to maintain the representativeness of the sample according to the aforementioned quotas. 5 as regards the allocation of pr seats, national thresholds of 3 per cent apply to single party list votes. according to this criterion, we excluded the respondents who voted for +europe, which in the 2022 election reached 2.8 per cent. we acknowledge that +europa, though small, is a relevant option for voters, especially when considering the area of potential support for the pd. unfortunately, it is not only a matter of an arbitrary decision to cut parties below 3 per cent but also of available data, as the ptv for +europa was asked for only in one wave. however, the conclusions drawn in the paper do not change, including one party below the threshold. the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 40 of the sample (32%). pd, lega and m5s follow with slightly more than one fifth (or 20%) of the sample. lower portions of the sample are available to fi, verdi-si and azione-iv (below 15%). it should be noted that the percentages are expressed on the total sample n. thus, for each party, that portion largely exceeds the percentage of votes received in the 2022 election computed on the total number of potential voters, thus including abstention, white ballot and invalid votes, as shown in the last column of table 1. figure 2 highlights this aspect, comparing the percentage of respondents in the sample that are available to a party (ptv ≥ 6, solid bars) and the actual percentage of votes received in the 2022 elections (computed on the whole electorate). this comparison suggests that the success of a party is not only a function of the size of its potential electorate, i.e. those open to voting for it, but also of the ability of the party to translate that availability into votes. it is clear that the distance between potential voters and actual votes varies largely from party to party. fdi, pd and m5s seem to be more effective in getting the votes of their potential electorate, while the other parties express poorer performances. the central focus to understanding these differences is on the translation rules from utilities to actual votes (see figure 1) and, at the end of the day, on competition between parties that share (at least partially) the same potential electorate. once more, ptvs show their usefulness for studying electoral competition in full strength. in the following paragraph, we will show an innovative method to consider jointly all the ptvs for the main parties and study in this way the whole electoral space of competition. figure 2. percentage of available voters (ptv≥6) in the sample (n=4867) and percentage of votes received in the 2022 election (low chamber) on all voters (n ca. 46*106) for each of the main italian parties source: response covid-19. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 fdi pd lega m5s fi left-green azione % ptv>=6 (on all respondents) % votes (on the total voters) maggini and vezzoni 41 5. the configuration of the political space after the 2022 italian general election in the previous section we discussed how ptvs provide an effective tool to study the political competition space. in fact, it is precisely by analysing the ptvs for the main italian parties that we can fully answer the previous research questions, going beyond arguments built on the marginal distributions of voting intentions which represent a mere snapshot of the balance of power between parties. the analysis of the ptvs allows us to understand the level of electoral uncertainty and to make counter-factual reasoning about how difficult (or easy) it would have been for voters to vote differently from how they actually did. at an aggregate level, this result supplies an indication of the potential for electoral volatility (van der eijk and elkink 2017). this is a particularly relevant topic in light of the great electoral volatility that has characterized italy and europe in recent years (emanuele, chiaramonte and soare 2018), as seen in the last political and eu parliament elections. in this regard, the 2022 general election marks for italy the third highly-volatile election in a row, signalling the unprecedented instability experienced by the italian party system over the past 15 years (chiaramonte et al. 2023). the space of the italian electoral competition in 2022 can be described with the diagram shown in figure 3 (a so-called venn diagram).6 the size of the circles is an estimate of the size of each party’s potential electorate (ptv equal to or greater than 6).7 the larger the share of respondents that gave a ptv of at least 6 for a party, the larger its circumference. the overlapping areas between the circles represent the share of potential voters ‘in common’ between two or more parties (i.e., those voters who express a ptv equal to or greater than 6 for the parties in question). it is worth repeating that this is not an estimate of the vote, but an estimate of the propensity to vote and therefore an estimate of the electoral potential of each party, namely its attractiveness. if we look at the electoral potential of the main italian parties after the 2022 italian general election (data collected in november 2022), we immediately notice that fdi has clearly the biggest electoral potential, followed by pd and m5s, while more limited is the electoral potential of lega, of fi and, especially, of azione-iv. 6 these diagrams were drawn based on the results of a constrained multidimensional scaling (mds) analysis applying the algorithm developed by ben frederickson in javascript (https://github.com/benfred/venn.js) and implemented in stata. constrained mds improves the classic mds layout in being aware of subsets and disjoint circles/relationships and this is particularly suitable when there are more than 3 circles. there are several alternatives to the constrained mds to handle joint distributions of ptv, among which multiple correspondence analysis. nonetheless, once decided for the space constraints (e.g. two dimension solutions), the results are comparable. moreover, the option selected here, integrating the results with venn diagrams, conveys a clear idea of the relative size of the electoral potential of a party and its overlapping with the electorates of other parties, which was the scope of the article. 7 of course, we could have chosen a different cut-point between what we consider low and high values of ptv. in appendix a we reproduced the political space shown in figure 3, but with different cut-points for high ptv: at 5 (figure a1), at 7 (figure a2) and at 8 (figure a3). as expected, the diagrams show that when we lower the cut-point, the overlapping areas (voters available to more than one party) increase, whereas these areas decrease (thus voters available to only one party increase) if we raise the cut-point. in particular, it should be noticed that results for ptvs≥8 approximate those for voting choices. we believe that the cut-point we have chosen (ptv≥6) offers an adequate solution for our purposes, also for the reasons outlined in the previous section. https://github.com/benfred/venn.js the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 42 figure 3. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥6), november 2022 source: response covid-19. this overall picture is consistent with the outcome of the election, which saw the unprecedented success of the radical-right fdi, led by giorgia meloni (who would become the first female prime minister in italian history). fdi, indeed, moved from 4.4 per cent of the votes in 2018 to 26 per cent in 2022. this incredible rise came at the expense primarily of fdi’s main allies, lega and fi, which lost millions of votes compared to the previous election (chiaramonte et al. 2023). overall, the centre-right coalition sharply won the other line-ups, i.e., the centre-left coalition led by the pd, the m5s and the new centrist subject azione-iv. a great deal of speculation has been produced about what would have been the results if the opponents to the right-wing coalition had succeeded in building a coalition to achieve a higher level of competitiveness in the first-past-thepost electoral districts and, therefore, a better result in terms of seats. nevertheless, this argument relies on the assumption that voters in this area were ready to vote for a coalition that included parties like pd, m5s and azione-iv, which had clearly distinct platforms and strategies. in this regard, figure 3 is particularly useful for a twofold reason. on the one hand, it shows that there is a strong overlap of the potential electorates of the centre-right parties, as can be seen from the large overlapping areas between the circles of fdi, lega and fi (i.e., respondents who show a ptv ≥6 for two or three parties of the centre-right coalition). this means that an overwhelming majority of right-wing voters are open to moving from one party to another of the centre-right coalition, rewarding especially the biggest party (fdi), which has also a significant share of ‘uncontestable’ voters who do not consider the possibility of voting for another party (contrary to fi and lega). on the other hand, pd, azione-iv and m5s do not share the same potential electorate. although there is a significant share of voters who are open to voting for both the pd and m5s, even greater is the share of voters who consider the possibility of voting only for the pd or only for the m5s. the same occurs as regards the relationship between pd and azione-iv (although the loyal voters of the latter are far maggini and vezzoni 43 fewer, considering also that this party is much smaller than pd). furthermore, azioneiv is located on the opposite side of the political space compared to the m5s, sharing few potential voters with the party led by giuseppe conte, while sharing a significant amount of potential voters with centre-right parties. in this regard, azione-iv can be considered a sort of ‘bridge’ between pd and centre-right parties, consistently with its centrist nature. a similar role is played by verdi-si, but in this case the ‘bridge’ is between m5s and pd. this is consistent with the fact that verdi-si ran allied with pd at the 2022 election, while advocating the need to include the m5s in the alliance. however, verdi-si seems to have no reserve of loyal voters: practically all its potential voters consider the possibility of voting also for pd or for m5s (or for both). to sum up, the configuration of the political space based on the ptvs confirms for the electorate what we witnessed at the level of the party elites during the 2022 electoral campaign and afterwards: there is substantial unity on the right, whereas there are many more distinctions in the opposite camp. where does this configuration of the electoral competition space come from? is it only the result of the recent events that marked the 2022 general election and the birth of meloni’s government or does it have deeper roots? to answer this question, in the next section we will analyse the evolution of the party competition space between 2020 and 2021, a time span marked by the pandemic of covid-19. 6. the configuration of the political space during the pandemic since the beginning of 2020, italy has been hit by an intertwining of social, economic and political changes with few precedents in republican history. in march 2020 the covid-19 pandemic exploded in italy. in addition to the health emergency and related economic difficulties, the country faced a significant reconfiguration of the political framework. a year after the outbreak of the pandemic, a political crisis concerning the management of the funds of the european economic recovery programme – the next generation eu – decreed the end of the conte ii government, which had led the country since the spread of covid-19. in february 2021 the so-called ‘yellow-red’ government, built on the alliance between the m5s, the pd, iv and leu (liberi e uguali, free and equal), was replaced by a national unity executive headed by former president of the european central bank mario draghi and supported by all the main political forces present in parliament, with the exception of the fdi. 6.1. national patterns between spring 2020 and spring 2021 if we look at the electoral potential of the main italian parties during the first wave of the covid-19 pandemic (spring-summer 2020, see figure 4), we immediately notice that pd, lega and fdi, followed closely by m5s, have the biggest electoral potential, while that of fi is much more limited. we have to recall that this period was initially marked by a decision of the conte ii cabinet to impose a strict national lockdown to contain the spread of covid-19. after may 2021, the government gradually reopened economic and social activities, thus ending lockdown, while maintaining mandatory face masks, social distancing and isolation measures. this stance was criticized by the right-wing opposition parties, especially fdi and lega, who suggested more emphasis on the economy. the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 44 looking at figure 4, the other fact that immediately catches the eye is the strong overlap of the potential electorates of the centre-right parties, as can be seen from the large overlapping area between the circle of lega and that of fdi. in particular, the share of potential voters in common with lega and fdi (i.e. those who show a ptv ≥6 for both parties) is greater than the share of salvini’s and meloni’s parties voters who do not seriously consider the possibility of voting for both parties. the same applies to forza italia, with the difference that the latter appears at the centre of the intersections of all potential electorates, showing the vulnerability of the party, competing not only with its centre-right allies, but also (partially) with the pd and the m5s. lega and fdi instead show a smaller electoral overlap area with the pd, while the overlap area with the m5s is greater (similar to that between fi and the m5s). in the latter case, it should be noted that unlike in the past (emanuele and paparo 2018), among the centre-right parties it is no longer lega that shows the greatest overlap with m5s, but fdi. figure 4. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥6), spring-summer 2020 source: response covid-19. after a year of pandemic, the picture we have just described is substantially confirmed if we look at the same data for the spring of 2021 (figure 5) when the nationalalliance cabinet led by draghi had recently replaced the conte ii cabinet, the country was facing a further pandemic wave and the anti-covid-19 vaccination campaign had started. the analysis of the italian political space confirms that on the right there is a compact bloc: conservative voters are open to shifting from one party to the other without major problems, with the major potential electorates shown by lega and fdi. again, a significant share of voters shows high ptvs for both the m5s and the fdi, whose antiestablishment rhetoric resembles that originally characterizing m5s. berlusconi’s party is confirmed as the most central in the political space, but also as the most vulnerable maggini and vezzoni 45 because it is subject to multiple competitive pressures: almost all of its potential voters seriously consider the possibility of voting for another party. on the other side, the pd led by enrico letta, like that previously led by nicola zingaretti, is confirmed as the most peripheral within this political space, even if once again it shares a consistent share of voters with the m5s and, to a lesser extent, with the centreright parties (in particular fi). the isolation of the pd had already been captured by other analyses that previously relied on venn diagrams (emanuele and paparo 2018), although the overlap between potential voters of the pd and m5s has increased over time, probably because of their common experience in both the conte ii and draghi cabinets. finally, the m5s is confirmed to be more vulnerable than the pd, but more crosscutting and attractive also to non-left voters, as we said earlier. figure 5. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥6), spring 2021 source: response covid-19. 6.2. national patterns in autumn-winter 2021 during the fourth pandemic wave and after the municipal elections held in october 2021, we carried out a further wave of our survey from november 2021 to december 2021 (see figure 6). we can see some elements of novelty compared to previous survey waves. the electoral potential of the m5s has reduced and, at the same time, it is less cross-cutting: indeed, the area of competition between m5s and centre-right parties is smaller. conversely, the pd is less isolated in this political competition space. during the years of the pandemic the readiness of right-wing voters to change electoral preferences has benefited meloni’s party, whose position of ‘coherent’ opposition has increased its attractiveness. the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 46 figure 6. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥6), autumn-winter 2021 source: response covid-19. another novelty compared to the previous waves is that in the questionnaire we asked for the ptvs also for the smaller parties. in particular, we asked for the ptv for the italian left-progressive democratic movement (sinistra italiana-movimento democratico progressista, si-mdp),8 for italy alive (italia viva, iv) and for action (azione). the question was put randomly to one third of respondents for each party. figure 7 shows the potential electorates of italian parties, including the minor ones. in general, the potential electorates of si-mdp, azione and iv are much smaller than those of the major parties. furthermore, the three parties are located in different areas of the political space. the si-mdp electoral constituency is a sort of trait d’union between that of the pd and that of the m5s. this is in line with the favourable attitude shown by the leadership of si-mdp as regards the electoral alliance between centre-left parties and m5s, which then collapsed after the crisis of draghi’s government triggered (among others) by the leader of m5s, giuseppe conte. conversely, both azione and iv are more central in the political space: they compete with all parties, in particular with the pd and fi. that said, it should be noticed that the circles representing the potential electorates of iv and azione are both included in the circle of the pd. this means that their main area of electoral competition, indeed, was with the centre-left party led by letta. this is not totally surprising given that the leader of iv, matteo renzi, was a former prime minister and leader of the pd, whereas the leader of azione, carlo calenda, was a former pd member of the european parliament. 8 at the time mdp and si were together in the wake of the joint electoral list created at the 2018 general election (leu). for the 2022 general election, mdp-article 1 decided to present its candidates within the list of the pd, while si created a joint list with the greens. similarly, azione and iv created a joint list. maggini and vezzoni 47 figure 7. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥6) including some minor parties, autumn-winter 2021 source: response covid-19. so far, we have analysed the configuration of the space of electoral competition at the national level. however, we know that in italy territorial differences have always mattered in explaining the electoral results. therefore, for sake of completeness, we repeated the analysis using both the 2021 spring data and the 2021 autumn-winter data, disaggregated into three geopolitical zones: north, former red belt, south and islands (see figure b1 and figure b2, respectively, in appendix b). in a nutshell, the configuration of the electoral competition space at the macro-area level does not differ much from that previously observed at the national level (figure 6).9 7. concluding remarks focusing on public opinion, this article has examined italians’ actual electoral preferences, which are the most immediate antecedents of the vote choice. in this regard, we have clarified – on a conceptual and empirical level – the distinction between two instruments to detect political attitudes: propensities to vote and the traditional voting intentions. on the basis of the configuration of the propensities to vote, it has been possible to reconstruct the configuration of the overlapping areas between the potential electorates of the main italian parties, which in turn represent the space of electoral competition. the latter was analysed after the 2022 general election and in the two previous years to understand whether italians’ political attitudes towards the main parties have changed during the pandemic. in conclusion, this analysis has pointed out some results that can be useful for interpreting the dynamics of party competition at the time of covid-19. the first is that in the 9 the actual difference across areas is that, as expected, the size of the potential electorate of the main italian parties varies according to the zone considered, but to a different degree. especially, the m5s shows a much smaller potential electorate in the north than in the south (with the electorate in the former red belt in an intermediate position), confirming the ‘southernization’ of the party that has taken place since the general election of 2018. furthermore, the south is the area where there is more competition (consistently with the area’s high electoral volatility during the so-called second republic). compared to the past (with the remarkable exception of the 2018 general election, see cataldi and emanuele 2019), the novelty is that the former red belt, once an absolutely non-competitive area from an electoral standpoint, now is more similar to the south than to the north. in the latter, the predominance of the centreright is clear and the possible voting shifts across the left-right divide, in particular between the pd and the centre-right parties, are minimal. the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 48 electorate there was a significant willingness to change vote choice. this depends not so much on the fact that individual voting propensities radically changed over time, as on the fact that there were multiple availabilities: significant segments of the electorate were effectively contestable between multiple parties. in particular, within the centreright area, there was a large share of voters open to moving from one party to another. currently, it is the party led by giorgia meloni that is exploiting this greater openness to vote switching within the centre-right area, as shown also by the results of the general election held on 25 september 2022. undoubtedly, the decline recorded by the lega and fi at the ballot box is explained by the strong competition exercised on the right by fdi, which exploited its role as the (almost) only parliamentary opposition during the past legislature (2018-2022). this role probably allowed fdi to leverage also the malaise caused by a year of pandemic among specific sections of the population, in particular those most affected by the restrictive measures imposed by the two governments (conte ii and draghi) to face the pandemic waves. and among the most affected categories are undoubtedly the self-employed, the traditional constituency of the centre-right parties. as we saw in a previous analysis (ladini and maggini 2021), lega voters were more lukewarm than those of the pd towards the draghi government, probably being more in line with the anti-establishment position taken by fdi. similarly, forza italia has been subject to much competition, not only on the right (fdi), but also in the centre (azione-iv). on the other side of the political space, the common experience of being in government during the pandemic seems to have made the potential electorates of the pd and m5s more compatible than in the past. however, the overlap is much less than that found in the centre-right. furthermore, the pd on the one hand appears to be the party with the greatest share of ‘loyal’ voters, who do not consider voting for other parties; on the other hand, it appears also as the most peripheral party in the space of political competition, although this isolation decreased after the municipal elections of october 2021. hence, the pd on the one hand has a reserve of loyal voters that allows it to be resilient even in the event of adversity; on the other hand, it has to compete for significant shares of votes with both the m5s and azione-iv. furthermore, the pd shows low attractiveness to centre-right electorates. in general, the left-right dimension in its symbolic meaning (schadee, segatti and vezzoni 2019) still seems to strongly limit the voting movements between areas of the opposite political colour. compared to the pd, the m5s and especially azione-iv appear to be more attractive to right-wing voters. for the m5s, however, the electoral attractiveness cross-cutting left and right boundaries has significantly diminished compared to the past. furthermore, this competitive profile means that the m5s is also more sensitive to electoral volatility, with the risk of losing voters in different directions. this occurred mainly towards abstention and, partially, towards fdi in the last general election (chiaramonte et al. 2023). electoral volatility could affect even more azione-iv, which has a much smaller potential electorate (and fewer ‘loyal’ voters) compared to both the pd and the m5s. finally, the m5s potential electorate has significantly reduced compared to the great success of the 2018 general election, especially in the north, which accentuates its ‘southern’ electoral profile in line with the territorial pattern actually observed in the last general election. before the electoral campaign for the 2022 general election there was a certain debate on a possible alliance between pd and m5s, which then failed when letta refused to maggini and vezzoni 49 forgive conte for having triggered the crisis in the draghi government. in the light of our data, an alliance between the two parties would not have been unreasonable, even if it would have been less organic and feasible than the alliance in the centre-right, given that there are significant shares of voters of both m5s and pd who rank the (possible) ally poorly. and the latter point is not something contingent, related to the events that marked the fall of the draghi cabinet and the latest electoral campaign. as shown by our analysis, this aspect characterised both the electorates throughout the entire period marked by the covid-19 pandemic, when both parties were together in government. an eventual alliance including azione-iv appears even more difficult, given the low compatibility between the m5s electorate and the azione-iv electorate. in other words, as of today, strong reasons for division between the main opposition parties persist, which had prevented these parties from running in the same coalition at the 2022 general election. conversely, the governing coalition can rely on a rather homogenous electoral bloc: right-wing voters are open to switching their vote from one party to another within the coalition. this time they awarded an astonishing result to the previous junior partner fdi, while assuring victory to the overall coalition. this sort of interchangeability across centre-right electorates shows both the existence of a (almost) single right-wing electorate and a high level of competitiveness within the centre-right coalition. as for the first aspect, it is significant that a single right-wing electorate existed throughout the 2020-2021 time span we analysed, regardless of the fact that the reference parties were together in opposition (conte ii government) or divided (draghi government). the unity of the rightwing electoral bloc seems to have deep roots: after all, the format of the coalition has more or less been the same since 1994, although party labels have changed over time as well as the balance of power within the coalition (with a clear right-wing turn) and the coalition’s leaders (first berlusconi, then salvini, now meloni). however, the high level of competitiveness within the centre-right coalition can be a powerful factor of instability in the relations between the coalition parties and therefore in 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(1996), choosing europe? the european electorate and national politics in the face of union, ann arbor (mich.): the university of michigan press van der eijk, c. van der brug, w., kroh, m. and franklin, m. (2006). ‘rethinking the dependent variable in voting behaviour: on the measurement and analysis of electoral utilities’, electoral studies, 25: 424–47. vezzoni c. (2014), ‘italian national election survey 2013: a further step in a consolidating tradition’, rivista italiana di scienza politica, 1: 81-108, https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/ 10.1426/76399. https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1424/100292 https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2022.2160088 https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.25 https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2018/12/21/centralita-della-lega-e-isolamento-del-pd-il-nuovo-spazio-politico-italiano-2/ https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2018/12/21/centralita-della-lega-e-isolamento-del-pd-il-nuovo-spazio-politico-italiano-2/ https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2019.102092 https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13846 https://doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12329 https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1426/76399 https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1426/76399 maggini and vezzoni 51 vezzoni, c., ladini, r., molteni, f., dotti sani, g. m., biolcati, f., chiesi, a., maraffi, m., guglielmi, s., pedrazzani, a. and segatti, p. (2020), ‘investigating the social, economic and political consequences of covid-19: a rolling cross-section approach. survey research methods’, 14(2): 187-194. https://doi.org/10.18148/srm/2020.v14i2.7745. https://doi.org/10.18148/srm/2020.v14i2.7745 the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 52 appendix a. figure a1. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥5), november 2022 source: response covid-19. figure a2. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥7), november 2022 source: response covid-19. fdi fi m5s lega azioneiv verdisi pd m5s pd azioneiv fdi fi lega verdisi maggini and vezzoni 53 figure a3. venn diagram of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥8), november 2022 source: response covid-19. fdi m5s fi verdisi lega azioneiv pd the italian space of electoral competition in pandemic times 54 appendix b. figure b1. venn diagrams of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥6) by geopolitical zone, spring 2021 source: response covid-19. figure b2. venn diagrams of the potential electorates of the main italian parties (ptv≥6) by geopolitical zone, autumn-winter 2021 source: response covid-19. italian political science, volume 17 issue 1 published in 2022 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 17, issue 1, 90–104. contact author: fabrizio di mascio, university of turin, turin e-mail address: fabrizio.dimascio@gmail.com administrative reform under mutating populism in office: insights from italy (2018-2022) fabrizio di mascio university of turin alessandro natalini lumsa university, rome stefania profeti university of bologna abstract this paper tracks the dynamics of administrative reform across two areas (civil service, simplification) in italy, focusing on the xviii parliamentary term, characterized by the presence of populist parties in three different coalition governments (conte i, conte ii, draghi). the alternation in power between different governments occurred in a context marked by the shift of the eu economic governance from a logic of conditionality to a logic of solidarity in the wake of the covid-19 pandemic. after a decade of eu-led austerity, the shift of eu economic governance was expected to support and enable administrative reform at the national level. our findings reveal that the structural lack of time induced the draghi government to focus administrative reforms on a limited number of domains to produce quick and relevant results. this selective approach focusing on capacity building was an improvement in patterns of administrative reform if compared with what happened under the conte i and ii governments, which displayed a marked chasm between the level of talk and the level of action. this was due partly to populist parties not having pursued a distinctive agenda in matters of administrative reform despite their bold words, and partly to eu fiscal constraints. 1. introduction niquely in europe, italy witnessed five coalition governments dominated by populist parties in the period 2000–2021 (berlusconi ii, berlusconi iii, berlusconi iv, conte i, conte ii). the grand coalition government chaired by mario draghi (2021-2022), former president of the european central bank, also encompassed three populist parties in its parliamentary majority (forza italia, or ‘go italy’, fi; lega nord or ‘northern league’, ln; the movimento cinque stelle, ‘five star movement’, fsm). the only party in opposition during the reign of mario draghi’s government, the post-fascist populist party fratelli d’italia, or ‘brothers of italy’, fdi, followed the pattern typical of the italian party system in which new populist actors react to the success of their fellow populist parties that enter coalition government (verbeek and zaslove 2016). u di mascio, natalini and profeti 91 against this background, the xviii parliamentary term (2018-2022) offers an extraordinary research window for scholars interested in the behaviour of populist parties when in government, and their impact on the making of administrative reforms. first, this parliamentary term was marked by considerable instability, with three successive government formations (conte i, conte ii and draghi governments) and three different ministers for public administration (bongiorno, dadone, brunetta), who were the expression of three different populist parties (ln, fsm and fi, respectively). second, in two out of the three governments (conte ii and draghi), the presence of populists was balanced by the presence of mainstream parties (e.g. the democratic party, pd; +europa; liberi e uguali, leu, and other parliamentary groups created during the term) and technicians in key cabinet positions (in the case of the draghi government, both the prime minister’s office and the ministry of economy and finance), with whom they had to come to terms. finally, the context in which the xviii parliamentary term unfolded was studded with extraordinary circumstances that were at once a challenge and an opportunity for the italian pa (and for those in government, too). on the one hand, the management of the pandemic emergency due to the sars-cov2 virus (for which the italian populist parties expressed diametrically opposed positions, cf. russo and valbruzzi 2022) and the consequent need to launch a credible recovery plan are particularly complex tasks for a country with reduced administrative capacity like italy; on the other hand, the gradual shift at the european level from austerity to a solidarity-oriented approach paved the way for breaking with a long season of budget cuts, thereby opening a window for reforms that addressed some of the underlying problems of pa dysfunctions, such as staff shortages and the progressive ageing of civil servants (ongaro, di mascio and natalini 2022). based on these premises, in this article we aim to track the strategies for administrative reform pursued by the three consecutive governments during the xviii parliamentary term in order to answer the following research questions: rq1. during the xviii parliamentary term, given the succession of governments and the changing contextual conditions, did the salience of administrative reforms change as part of the government agenda? rq2. with representatives of different populist forces taking over the leadership of the ministry for public administration in three cabinets that differed markedly with respect to their composition, did the impact of populist parties on administrative reforms change during the xviii parliamentary term? in order to answer these questions, an analytically grounded account for each of the cabinets during the 18th parliamentary term is provided. actions taken by the pa ministers were traced by looking at three dimensions that are key to grasping the relationship between populist parties and public administration: a) the type of interventions proposed, b) the kind of rhetoric used and c) the attitude towards bureaucracy (see section 2). empirically, the focus was on administrative simplification and civil service reform, two policy priorities that rank high on the agendas of the italian populist parties (di mascio, natalini and ongaro 2021). data were collected using source triangulation so as to ensure the validity of findings: the review of official documents (e.g., primary and secondary legislation) was coupled with the analysis of institutional monitoring reports and ministerial hearings recounted in the national press, as well as with a number of administrative reform under mutating populism in office 92 interviews with key informants that brought to light issues that could not be deduced from the documentary analysis. more specifically, between december 2021 and may 2022, ten open interviews were carried out with ministerial advisors and senior civil servants of the civil service department. the article is structured as follows: section 2 offers a brief review of the literature on the relationship between populist parties and public administration, while section 3 illustrates the state of the art of administrative reforms in italy. section 4 presents the results of the empirical research, analysed for the three governments in office during the xviii parliamentary term. finally, section 5 discusses the findings in the light of the research questions outlined above and conjectures about future developments. 2. literature review on populism and public administration over the past few decades, populist politicians have steadily increased their support, entering government in many democracies. public administration reform projects inspired by the new public management paradigm that offered to measure performance objectively but failed to do so, that proposed to listen to the people but often did not, and that advocated policy driven by evidence but often failed to deliver, have fed cynicism about mainstream governing practices later exploited by populism (stoker 2021). populist politicians often joined the call for a ‘post-npm’ approach to the public service aimed at attenuating the negative consequences of new public management like increased fragmentation of governance or inadequate political control of civil servants (reiter and klenk 2019). given that policymaking relies to a great extent on bureaucracy, an emerging research agenda explores the implications of populism for governance (rockman 2019; bauer et al. 2021; caiani and graziano 2022). theoretically, this stream of the literature revolves around two perspectives, exceptionalism and normality, that describe the effect of including populists in government (askim, karlsen and kolltveit 2022). many populist parties that enter government have a history of expressing dissatisfaction with civil servants, who are seen as part of the corrupt establishment. according to the exceptionalism perspective, there is a strong incentive to continue the opposition role while in government to reassure core voters that the party has not sold out to the establishment. this is expected to imply an increasing level of patronage, with populist politicians appointing as many loyalists as possible in government, complemented by centralization of decision-making and reduction of accountability. conversely, the normality perspective assumes that executive politicians from a populist party behave like those of any other party in government. first, populist parties vary in their outlook on public administration, and their views on the state are likely to differ, and upon entering government these differences will eventually come to the fore. populist parties that call for more efficient governance, in particular those with a technocratic bent, need to ensure that experienced civil servants provide advice if they want to have any chance of implementing policies. second, although at the heart of the populist rhetoric lies the idea that bureaucracy is part of the corrupt establishment, populists in government have often displayed a lack of interest in reforming bureaucracy, which is seen as a technical issue that their core voters do not perceive as salient (peters and pierre 2019). third, most populist parties entering government have done so as di mascio, natalini and profeti 93 coalitions with mainstream parties. tight interactions with mainstream coalition partners that are needed to search for compromise between different policy options may have sobering effects on populist parties in government. finally, populist parties’ room to manoeuver may be limited by a robust administrative order, which comes with legacies and path dependencies that constrain the administrative choices available. this may prevent populists in government from undertaking strategies like ‘capturing’ or ‘dismantling’ bureaucracies that go far beyond ordinary measures of enhancing political steering capacities (bauer and becker 2020). as acknowledged above, when populists enter government this may not result in an overhaul of bureaucracy; it rather depends on their conduct in office. politicians in general have three general choices after entering government: sidelining, empowering, or using bureaucracy (peters and pierre 2019). the first scenario is that of the marginalization of bureaucracy whose top officials are sidelined, leaving room for outsiders linked to populist parties to obtain positions in the nodal ganglions of the public sector. upon being included for the first time in the executive government, populist parties can be incentivized to rely on the advice and the networks of institutional relations provided by senior civil servants. however, they often prefer instead to trace a clear dividing line with the old ruling class, of which the top administrative officials are an important part. this scenario can take place in several ways. first, sidelining can be more or less intrusive. depending on the institutional context, the power of appointment may in fact be subject to rules, even constitutional ones, that safeguard merit or in any case make problematic the replacement of even a few top executives or entire ranks of public officials using trust-based criteria. secondly, depending on the various types of populism, the style of appointments can be very different. in some cases, appointments may concern technically qualified individuals who, due to their skills, can take root in the ranks of civil service. in particular, this is the case where populist rhetoric focuses on the stereotype of lazy and incompetent bureaucrats that the new governing parties replace with skilled and virtuous individuals. in other cases, populists can even appoint poorly qualified people to the top echelons of administrations in order to be able to count on the personal and/or political loyalty of those who must lead the process of change within hostile offices where the power of the old ruling class is entrenched. in the second scenario, the populist parties in government assign more powers to the bureaucracy. once in office, populist parties may actually want to implement their policy priorities. in this scenario, it is important for populists in government to gain the consent of the bureaucracies within a tight schedule in order to be able to launch the new public policies expected by citizens as soon as possible. in this perspective, public managers, especially if they are inclined to maintain a neutral but supportive position with regard to the democratically invested political leadership, can be useful allies for populist parties. this can lead to a strengthening of the bureaucracy with the aim of enabling it to perform its task in the best possible way. one variant of the empowering scenario is that populist leaders coming into office will not be interested in governing or that they will focus only on a few policy domains such as immigration and leave much of the rest of government unattended to. the absence of effective leadership and direction from the top may enable some form of ‘bureaucratic government’ to appear, in direct contradiction to the rhetoric of populist parties that denigrates bureaucracy. administrative reform under mutating populism in office 94 in the third scenario, the populist parties in government use the bureaucracy they inherited from their predecessors. this scenario can take place due to the cynicism or incapacity of the ruling populists. in the former case, the anti-statalism that characterizes populism is nothing more than a rhetorical device to stir up protests and gain the consent of dissatisfied citizens. once in power, especially in countries with authoritarian tendencies, the logic of the past is reproduced (only with a different interpreter at the head of power). the same effect of leaving the role of bureaucracy unaltered can be brought about by the incapacity and inexperience of populist actors. in this case, populist leaders who neither have the necessary knowledge about administrative procedures nor know an adequate number of potential appointees who can help them design and implement new public policies end up using the people they find in public offices. 3. mutating populism and public administration in italy italy is a case of ‘mutating populism’ where diverse populist parties emerged as different incarnations of a consolidated anti-establishment ethos (bobba and mcdonnell 2015; verbeek and zaslove 2016). the success of populist parties is in part traceable to certain long-term determinants of political dissatisfaction characterizing modern italy (morlino and tarchi 1996). the poor delivery of public services resulting from traits typical of southern european bureaucracies— clientelistic patterns of personnel recruitment, formalism and legalism complemented by informal shadow governance structures, uneven distribution of resources, organizational fragment and insufficient mechanisms for policy coordination — is one of the key factors of chronic dissatisfaction with political parties and elites (sotiropoulos 2004). a key feature of the italian bureaucracy is the lack of an administrative elite: until the early 1990s the italian administrative elite constituted an elderly ‘ossified world’ displaying extremely rare horizontal and vertical mobility, and was dominated by the legalistic outlook of personnel coming almost exclusively from the underdeveloped south. this low level of professionalism allowed the higher civil service to form a pact with politicians of reciprocal self-restraint: public managers renounced an autonomous proactive role in processes of policy making, while politicians refrained from interfering in the management of career advancements based on age and length of service (cassese 1999). the lack of integration between political and administrative elites made governments reluctant to ‘use’ the established bureaucracy. the general approach to the bureaucracy has been to ‘sideline’ it, meaning that governments filled ministerial cabinets with hundreds of loyal party officials, setting up a parallel advisory structure. ministerial cabinets were a substitute for the ordinary bureaucracies and exercised executive tasks, thus also blurring the lines of accountability between politics and the administration. given the legalism of the administrative system, professional corps (e.g., council of state, court of accounts, state attorney), whose staff are all trained in law, constituted the privileged recruitment pool, yielding heads of cabinets who provided ministers with advice about the legal aspects of the policy-making process (di mascio and natalini 2016). since public sector organizations were often utilized by political parties to cultivate their clienteles, no government was able or willing to undertake administrative reforms until the early 1990s when the abrupt collapse of the italian party system opened a di mascio, natalini and profeti 95 window of opportunity for administrative modernization. policy entrepreneurs like the ministers of public administration cassese in 1993 and bassanini in 1996-1998 exploited the political crisis to deliver long-awaited administrative reforms. the success of italian policy entrepreneurs has depended heavily on their ability to repackage the internationally widespread new public management (npm) doctrines as technical and bipartisan, drawing on their a priori expertise on the conditions and problems of public administration in italy (mele and ongaro 2014). policy entrepreneurs also exploited the intensification of the european integration process to strengthen their capacity to act in relation to a major problem of structural adjustment like the quality of public services, by weakening the position of opponents of administrative reforms (natalini 2010). administrative reforms aimed to radically change the organization and functioning of all areas of public administration. the reform of the higher civil service was meant to be the point of departure for long-term administrative modernization, as reformers conceived it as the trigger for further reform in the other domains of civil service. the traditional subordination of senior civil servants to ministers was eliminated, meaning that managers were in charge of making decisions about the utilization of resources for achieving the objectives set by the political principals, and new specialized advisory bodies were introduced to appraise their results. however, a significant percentage of reform initiatives launched in the 1990s suffered from an ‘implementation gap’ (ongaro and valotti 2008), originating from the high level of political instability that determined a lack of political incentives to implement reforms. the new specialized bodies did not produce the directives, targets and indicators that should have oriented the performance evaluation of public managers, as politicians displayed a keen reluctance to cease meddling with administrative management. since the confirmation of incumbent public managers did not become subject to thorough appraisal of results, the temporary nature of managerial positions was exploited by political elites to maintain control over administrative elites. the implementation gap of administrative reforms contributed to the persistent deficit of economic competitiveness, which has kept budgetary pressures intense. as a consequence, a repertoire of across-the-board cuts has been progressively entrenched as it proved to be effective in containing government spending in the aftermath of the 1992 currency crisis that forced the italian lira out of the european monetary system. acrossthe-board cuts were enacted as a response to the austerity imposed by the eurozone governance on the italian budget in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial meltdown (di mascio, natalini and stolfi 2013). the austerity imposed by the eurozone governance on the italian budget has been a major target of populist campaigning, which has fed into the perception of the euro as a painful constraint afflicting the stagnating economy (ongaro, di mascio and natalini 2022). while eurosceptic rhetoric has been a unifying feature, populist parties differed on the emphasis that should be given to different areas of administrative reform. centreright populist parties shared the call for a deregulatory approach, which was complemented by different reform targets: fi prioritized civil service reform in an effort to increase productivity and reward merit by curbing the influence of trade unions over public employment regulation, the ln focused on the structure of government, with a view to devolving competences and resources to regional governments (in line with its administrative reform under mutating populism in office 96 history as the regionalist party of the north). the fsm endorsed a more statist approach to public policy, alongside an emphasis on transparency and anticorruption as key topics of its broader approach to legality via the implementation of digital tools. the following empirical analysis highlights that, once in power, populist parties encountered turbulence within cabinets originating from the incoherence of policy positions. 4. empirical section 4.1. conte i government the most noticeable element in the conte i government was the abandonment of npm recipes in favour of interventions perceived as simpler and more direct. unlike previous administrative reform efforts, the new rules governing public sector employment did not represent the core of the measures in matters of personnel. dissatisfaction with the complexity of npm, in doctrine and practices, was epitomized by the emphasis on ‘concrete’ actions for raising the productivity of public employment displayed by the minister for public administration giulia bongiorno, a prominent criminal lawyer who was elected senator among the ranks of the ln. in particular, a ‘unit for concreteness’ was introduced at the ministry for public administration, which was supposed to ensure the implementation of the measures envisaged in a three-year plan of ‘concrete actions’. this plan, to be adopted by ministerial decree, was supposed to verify the correct application of the provisions on the organization and functioning of the administrations as well as to ensure the improvement of their efficiency, with an indication of the timeframe for the implementation of corrective actions. to do this, the unit for concreteness, with 53 staff members, was supposed to carry out inspections and visits in order to monitor the state of implementation of the provisions by the administrations, identifying the methods of organization and management of human resources according to criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and economy. non-compliance with the corrective measures indicated by the nucleus following its inspection should have been a source of managerial or disciplinary responsibility and should have led to the inclusion of the non-compliant administration in a list published on the website of the department of public administration. these provisions were never implemented, also due to the short duration of the conte i government. however, even if these measures had actually been introduced, they could at best have allowed the incumbent government to show itself as a champion of public virtue and efficiency with respect to individual cases that ended up in the media spotlight. the small size of the structure and the manifest inadequacy of the powers conferred on this nucleus would in fact have made it impracticable to monitor an even minimally significant percentage of the thousands of units that compose the fragmented italian administrative system. in keeping with the fight against absenteeism that marked previous governments led by silvio berlusconi, the conte i government also introduced biometric detection tools and cameras to monitor access of public employees to the workplace (law no. 56/2019). this measure provoked harsh reactions from trade unions in the public sector and in particular in the school sector as it was claimed that the measure violated di mascio, natalini and profeti 97 employee privacy and was an unjustified form of criminalization of bureaucracy. in fact, this measure was also never implemented. as regards simplification policies, on 26 february 2019, minister bongiorno called a meeting to define the ‘simplification pact for the three-year period 2019-21’. the meeting was attended by around one hundred representatives of public administrations and with the plan to also involve business associations, citizens and professional categories. the final approval of the pact came on 25 july 2019 in the unified conference. in line with the simplification agendas pioneered by previous governments, the pact for simplification contained a programme of new simplification measures, with the identification of timeframes, targets and responsibilities. this programme identified four priority areas of intervention: the electronic business dossier, the business information portal, the simplification of controls, and the standardisation of forms. in the field of public infrastructure construction, the traditional instrument of simplification has been the introduction of extraordinary commissioners to whom the specific regulations have assigned more or less broad powers to accelerate the implementation of procedures, or to derogate from the regulations in force, including environmental and landscape issues. the commissioner, however, has often lacked the skills and resources to solve the problems of planning works. in fact, the frequent recourse to this remedy (which by its very nature should have been extraordinary) contributed to the lack of concentration of effort on increasing the efficiency of ordinary administration, for example by increasing their powers. in an attempt to accelerate procurement procedures for the realization of public works, decree law no. 32/2019 (sblocca cantieri) curbed the regulatory powers of the italian anticorruption authority (anac). this provision was pushed by the ln with the declared objective of deregulating and boosting growth, even though the higher corruption risks resulting from this change, highlighted by the president of the anac raffaele cantone before his resignation in the summer of 2019, were in stark contrast with the fsm’s call for further delegation of powers to the anac. the fsm had also campaigned for a significant reduction of senior civil servants’ salaries, but this issue was removed from its agenda when it entered government. 4.2. conte ii government the new minister for public administration, fabiana dadone, a lawyer elected to the chamber of deputies among the ranks of the fsm, shared with her predecessor the reluctance to launch ambitious reforms that aimed to radically change the organization and the functioning of the public sector. unlike her predecessor, however, the new minister downplayed the fight against absenteeism in favour of interventions aimed at boosting the digital transformation of the public sector. in particular, the new minister put emphasis on the diffusion of ‘agile working’ — a species of remote working that had been introduced by law n. 81/2017 across italian public administrations for the purpose of facilitating work and family balance, on the one hand, and enhancing environmental sustainability, on the other. agile working is primarily characterized by the absence of place and time constraints and also by an organization by phases, cycles and objectives agreed between the worker and employer with a view to increase productivity. it differs from ‘telework’, administrative reform under mutating populism in office 98 which is defined as working remotely from a fixed work station with equipment provided by the employer and involving the same working hours and conditions as in the office. after the introduction of law n. 81/2017, public administrations were expected to identify the activities that can be carried out through agile working and establish annual implementation objectives on a voluntary basis. however, the limited number of public administrations that had trialled agile working before the outburst of the covid-19 pandemic limited themselves to compliance with the law, without any review of the organizational models or revision of the performance evaluation system that was needed to measure results rather than hours worked. the covid-19 crisis and the consequent policies implemented by the conte ii government to allow remote work as a substitute means of carrying out public services caused an explosion in ‘agile working’. however, the latter was implemented as an emergency measure without the features required by the legislation like individual agreements between workers and administrations and the adoption of an internal organizational plan. in an attempt to transform agile working from provisional measure to being commonplace for public administrations, the conte ii government introduced in 2021 the three-year ‘organizational plan for agile work’ (pola) as a section of the performance plan that requires public administrations to identify objectives, targets and indicators for the progressive application of agile working. the introduction of the plans was meant to supersede the emergency regulation which allowed the public sector to use agile working without collective and individual agreement and with simplified regulation. from 30 april 2021, the new regime was expected to overcome the provision of agile working as a common working pattern for the public sector and the minimum mandatory share of 50% of employed staff in favour of greater discretion in the use of agile working on the basis of the specific needs of each public administration. however, despite the minister’s rhetoric about the radical transformation of public administration unleashed by the diffusion of agile working, the voluntary nature of the plans and the absence of enforcement limited the effective spread of this form of remote working across public bodies. as regards administrative simplification, the presence of a minister elected to the ranks of the fsm marked some change in the rhetoric behind reform measures. on the one hand, administrative simplification, besides being a tool to relaunch the country’s economy, was framed as an opportunity to ‘build a new relationship of trust between administration and citizens’1 primarily through completing the path towards full digital transition. several online consultations of citizens and stakeholders were launched by the department of civil service (dfp) between the end of 2019 and mid-2020 to map critical issues and priorities for action, albeit with little success in terms of participation (only 103 respondents including citizens and companies) (dfp 2020). on the other hand, in line with fsm’s manifesto, simplification cannot coincide with unbridled deregulation that would undermine transparency.2 in this regard, an ad hoc commission was set up, composed of 17 experts tasked with proposing solutions for simplification that were compatible with rules on the prevention of corruption. however, proposals from this commission did not turn into any legislative initiative. 1 hearing of minister dadone by the parliamentary simplification commission, 13 january 2021. 2 ibid. di mascio, natalini and profeti 99 when tested against the facts, however, the actions taken by the conte ii government show less discontinuity than declared: the demands for procedural simplification from the various administrations (local ones in particular) during the pandemic, and the need to get public works back on track to relaunch the economy after the emergency, led to a renewed focus on temporary deregulation, which was not too dissimilar to the ‘sblocca cantieri’ decree.3 indeed, besides introducing some measures to facilitate citizens’ access to all pa digital services, in july 2020 the so-called simplification decree (dl 76/2020, later converted into law 120/2020) introduced again some relaxations on public contracts and constructions, with an extension of the use of direct entrusting and simplified procedures without a call for tenders. with regard to long-term actions, the same decree provided for the launch of the 2020-2023 simplification agenda, a blueprint document that was to define a road map with clear objectives and timeframes. in continuity with the past, the agenda (approved by the unified conference on 23 november 2020) resulted from a concerted process led by the technical table for simplification already set up in 2015, made up of representatives of the dfp, the conference of the regions, anci and upi. some targeted actions were envisaged such as the simplification and re-engineering of procedures, the standardization of digital forms, the elimination of unnecessary burdens, the measurement of the actual length of administrative proceedings, as well as the implementation of the ‘once only’ principle, whereby the administration does not ask citizens and enterprises for the information and data it already has. the anticipated demise of the conte ii government on 13 february 2021 blocked the agenda roadmap, which was later taken over — albeit with some modifications — by the draghi government. however, the concrete feasibility of the proposed interventions within the cabinet’s lifespan was questionable in any case, given the persisting separation between the fields of administrative modernization and digital innovation (both in terms of planning and implementation responsibilities) and the lack of digital skills across the public sector, both typical traits of the italian case (natalini 2022). 4.3. draghi government the national recovery and resilience plan (nrpp) elaborated by the draghi government differed substantially from the draft that had been elaborated by the conte ii government in the emphasis placed on administrative reforms. administrative modernization was identified by the draghi government as a key area for structural reform, affecting horizontally all missions in the nrpp funded by the eu to sustain economic recovery. however, concern for the quick implementation of measures in the early stage of nrpp implementation led the draghi government to downplay post-pandemic recovery as an opportunity for sweeping change. in keeping with the previous cabinets, the draghi government pursued incremental targeted measures primarily aimed at (re)building the capacity of the pa after austerity cutbacks. indeed, the strategy of breaking away from the all-embracing (and for that reason non-implementable) administrative reforms of the 1990s was explicitly asserted by the new minister for 3 ‘i lavori pubblici tra covid e decreto semplificazione’, lavoce.info, 3 august 2020. administrative reform under mutating populism in office 100 public administration,4 renato brunetta, elected within the ranks of fi having previously served in the same role under the berlusconi iv government (2008-2011). during his former mandate, brunetta had distinguished himself by a very adversarial approach to trade unions, launching a package of managerial-inspired reforms focused on increasing the individual productivity of civil servants (epitomised as ‘slackers’) and severely reducing the scope of collective bargaining (di mascio, natalini and ongaro 2021). instead, under the draghi government, with a broader and more composite majority and in view of the conspicuous resources made available by the nrrp, his approach somewhat followed in continuity with the two previous cabinets, moving away from the npm’s tenets and shifting the spotlight from individual performance to the capability of structures and to human capital. this trend was particularly noticeable in recruitment: on the one hand, the first steps of the new government in the field focused on fast-track (let’s say emergency) measures such as the unblocking of recruitment and the hiring of temporary staff, at once necessary for the implementation of the nrrp and easier to realise as they were welcomed by all stakeholders (di mascio, natalini and profeti 2022); on the other hand, the draghi government marked a return to concertation with the public-sector trade unions: negotiations for renewal of contracts for 2019-2021 began with the ‘pact for innovation in the civil service and for social cohesion’ signed at palazzo chigi on 10 march 2021 by the government and the main trade union confederations, the final agreement being reached between aran and trade unions on 9 may 2022. in addition to providing for salary increases and the acknowledgement of retrospective pay, the agreement incorporated some regulatory innovations introduced as part of the mission of ‘digitalization, innovation and security in the p.a.’ of the nrrp, such as a new four-area personnel classification system, the strengthening and reorganization of the training system, an extended protection for vulnerable workers and, last but not least, the regulation of agile working after the pandemic emergency. it was precisely agile working (or, more generally, remote working) which was the thorniest issue in the relations between minister brunetta, who — unlike his predecessor — showed himself to be inwardly hostile to generalized remote work, and the trade unions, who instead continued to call for greater recourse to agile working given the flare-up of infections. the very harsh media clash, in which the minister dusted off the old rhetoric on slackers depicting workers ‘locked up at home, with their smartphones on their milk bottles, pretending to do remote work’,5 and called for a return to 100 per cent presence from 15 october 2021, does not, however, fully match the facts. indeed, in the same time span (late 2021-early 2022) the government agreed with unions on some guidelines for the ordinary use of agile work in the pa that provided for its activation on an individual and voluntary basis, with staff rotation and to the maximum extent of 49%, just as aran signed an agreement, again with the unions, for agile work in the collective agreement for the civil service sector. very little or anything, though, has yet been done to enable conditions to make agile working more productive, be they technological, organizational or training-related: the implementing regulation of the piao (integrated activity and organization plan), i.e. the document that according to decree law 80/2021 would incorporate and replace a whole series of compulsory acts for public 4 ‘pa, brunetta: no grandi riforme ma strappi innovativi’, la stampa, 7 march 2022. 5 ‘smart working, brunetta: ‘basta far finta di lavorare’. ira sindacati’, adnkronos, 4 february 2022. di mascio, natalini and profeti 101 administrations including polas, was only approved at the end of june 2022 (less than a month before draghi’s resignation), and single administrations are still moving ahead in short order. as regards administrative simplification, instead, the measures proposed by brunetta were in full continuity with the simplification agenda 2020-23, envisaging the completion of a national catalogue of 600 simplified and standardized procedures by mid-2026, and the achievement of the full interoperability of desks and platforms so as to ensure compliance with the once-only principle. the only relevant change is that, thanks to the financial resources made available by the nrrp, streamlining initiatives were now complemented by ad hoc technical assistance to the public administrations involved in the implementation of the nrrp, in particular the local ones. strong continuity with past government is also recorded on the governance side: the creation of an ad hoc unit for the rationalization and improvement of regulation at the presidency of the council of ministers to serve the purposes of the nrrp did not challenge the dfp’s guidance in the simplification domain, and the pivotal role of the technical table as a venue for concertation with local governments and stakeholders (di mascio, natalini and profeti 2022). 5. discussion and conclusions this paper has investigated the impact of populist actors in government on the italian public service during the xviii parliamentary term and has highlighted some traits marking their influence over administrative reforms as well as some features of italian populist parties. first, the salience of administrative reforms as part of the government agenda has steadily increased after the formation of the draghi cabinet within the frame of the new eu governance for post-pandemic recovery. however, the emphasis on the success of administrative reforms as an enabling factor for the implementation of the nrpp has implied only an incremental restructuring of policy-making patterns during the xviii parliamentary term. administrative reforms undertaken by the draghi government can be qualified as loosely interconnected and piecemeal rather than as a set of interventions coalescing around npm doctrines, and this marks a departure from the course of action pursued by the governments in office in the 1990s. the shift from a pattern of comprehensive administrative reforms targeting every area of the public sector to a pattern of selective administrative reforms targeting only specific areas was already underway in italy where populist parties in government shared a lack of concern for long-term administrative modernization. whereas the emphasis of concrete actions by populist actors was due to their broader lack of expertise and their reluctance to apply complex theories like the npm, the course of action pursued by the draghi government seemed to reflect and incorporate some stock-tacking from previous reform exercises whose implementation gap had brought discredit to the prospect of long-term administrative modernization. second, the succession of three governments in the same parliamentary term has further enhanced the reactive nature of reform sequencing in italy, meaning that the administrative reform trajectory is marked by reversals that make reform issues more or less salient. given the different reform priorities endorsed by populist parties with regard to the reform of public employment, this area has been marked by intense reactive administrative reform under mutating populism in office 102 sequencing as highlighted by the reversals that marked the trajectory of policies aimed at curbing absenteeism (from the conte i to the conte ii government) and promoting the shift to agile working (from the conte ii to the draghi government). conversely, populist parties shared a focus on a deregulatory approach and this has made the area of administrative simplification less exposed to reform reversals. in light of the enduring demand for populism in the italian electoral market, it is likely that reactive sequencing will persist after the xviii legislature, thus decreasing the chance that the incremental interventions launched by the draghi government will eventually embed in a coherent cumulative reform trajectory. third, our analysis highlighted that populists in government talked more than they acted, a finding much in line with what happens in other countries where the rhetoric about administrative modernization has not been matched with consistent action (peters and pierre 2019). the decoupling of talk and action on the issue of administrative reform has been greatly enhanced by the mutating character of italian populism, in a context marked by the fragmentation of the party system. as highlighted by the inconsistency exhibited by brunetta in his relationships with the trade unions, populist actors are extremely fluid on the recipes to be proposed for the modernization of the italian public administration, supporting tactical conveniences of the specific political phase. fourth, the italian bureaucracy has not been radically reshaped by populist parties in government and this finding resonates with the normality perspective reviewed in section two. the xviii parliamentary term was marked by a lack of any significant reform effort in two key areas that are typically targeted by populist parties in government that aim to ‘dismantle’ or ‘capture’ the state, namely the appointment of senior civil servants and the reorganization of the state apparatus (bauer and becker 2020). in particular, our empirical analysis has found no trace of reform in the area of the senior civil service. this has implied that populist parties in government recruited top officials for ministerial cabinets from the professional corps at the core of the italian state, in continuity with practices that date back decades. the established pattern of a bargain between political power and job security has also been reproduced: higher civil servants have been ‘sidelined’, meaning that they have been deprived of an autonomous role in policymaking, while politicians have refrained from practising a major turnover in top posts. on the one hand, the reproduction of this bargain was due to the inability of populist parties in government to recruit technically qualified outsiders. on the other hand, seemingly of equal importance was the lack of any overt reaction of top italian civil servants in a country like italy where public managers are used to serve different political masters in the context of well-entrenched distrustful politico-administrative relationships. finally, our empirical analysis highlighted that the shift in eu governance had significant consequences for the dynamics of administrative reforms in italy. it may be conjectured that administrative reforms after the xviii parliamentary term will be shaped by the dynamics of the two-level game at the eu member states interface. this means that the eu will have to find the right balance between sticking to the original timetable for the implementation of agreed-upon investments and reforms, on the one hand, and being flexible towards the latest developments, including the formation of a new government in italy. it also implies that administrative reforms will be shaped by the reaction of populist parties in government to the strategies pursued by eu-level policymakers. di mascio, natalini and profeti 103 references askim, j., karlsen, r. and kolltveit, k. 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(2022). “the impact of the pandemic on the italian party system. the draghi government and the ‘new’ polarization”, contemporary italian politics, 14(2), 172-190. sotiropoulos, d. (2004). ‘southern european public bureaucracies in comparative perspective.’ west european politics, 27(4), 405-422. stoker, g. (2021). ‘public administration: how to respond to populism and democratic backsliding.’ in m. w. bauer, b. g. peters, j. pierre, k. yesilkagit and s. becker (eds.), democratic backsliding and public administration (pp. 246-266). cambridge: cambridge university press. verbeek, b. and zaslove, a. (2016). ‘italy: a case of mutating populism?’ democratization, 23(2), 304-323. abstract this paper tracks the dynamics of administrative reform across two areas (civil service, simplification) in italy, focusing on the xviii parliamentary term, characterized by the presence of populist parties in three different coalition governments (conte i, conte ii, draghi). the alternation in power between different governments occurred in a context marked by the shift of the eu economic governance from a logic of conditionality to a logic of solidarity in the wake of the covid-19 pandemic. after a decade of eu-led austerity, the shift of eu economic governance was expected to support and enable administrative reform at the national level. our findings reveal that the structural lack of time induced the draghi government to focus administrative reforms on a limited number of domains to produce quick and relevant results. this selective approach focusing on capacity building was an improvement in patterns of administrative reform if compared with what happened under the conte i and ii governments, which displayed a marked chasm between the level of talk and the level of action. this was due partly to populist parties not having pursued a distinctive agenda in matters of administrative reform despite their bold words, and partly to eu fiscal constraints. 1. introduction 2. literature review on populism and public administration 3. mutating populism and public administration in italy 4. empirical section 4.1. conte i government 4.2. conte ii government 4.3. draghi government 5. discussion and conclusions references microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, p. iv-ix. focus on: gender and politics: research, practice and education. moving beyond the obvious claudia padovani university of padua giovanna vignelli università della calabria guest editors he 2015 congress of the italian political science society (sisp) hosted a temporary section, titled gender, politics, and policies.1 this was organized to mark the 20th anniversary since the united nations fourth world conference on women, held in beijing in 1995 and where the international community made commitments to gender equality objectives in a number of critical areas, including education, research, and knowledge. panels in that temporary section provided a space to discuss the (dis)connects between european developments in gender-focused political science, italian local experiences in teaching politics with a gender perspective, and the realities of our research practices. as convenors of those panels, we felt it was important to keep that space open, and possibly to expand it, in order to share and discuss—in a comparative and transdisciplinary perspective—a number of concerns about the role, relevance, and visibility of gender-sensitive approaches to the study of politics and international relations. thus, in june 2016 the center for gender studies at the university of padua invited european political scientists and colleagues from different italian institutions and disciplinary fields to a conversation that is now reproduced in this themed issue of italian political science. on that occasion, decades of work to “engender” political science as a discipline, through research approaches, objects, and methods, were acknowledged. it is worth mentioning that within the american political science association (apsa), where a women’s caucus2 has existed since 1969, a 2004 report titled “women’s advancement in political science” solicited a debate on under-representation of women in the profession and its consequences; as well as on the possible means to overcome inequalities 1 the section programme is accessible at: http://www.sisp.it/convegno2015/?pagename=cms&name= sessiontracks&trackname=genere-politica-politiche. 2 online at: https://womenscaucusforpoliticalscience.org. t gender and politics v in the discipline, through measures such as monitoring, mentoring, and creating networks for collaboration. this debate that was revived in 2013, when maliniak, powers and walter published in international organization an article titled “the gender citation gap in international relations” showing that women are systematically cited less than men. the international political science association (ipsa) witnessed the constitution of a study group on sex roles and politics as early as 1976, which later became research committee n.19 on gender politics and policy.3 in that context, a collection called gender and politics: the state of the discipline, has recently been edited by jane h. bayes (2012),4 providing a review of a field that is emerging globally. it highlights the major themes that characterize scholarly works carried out across the world: the nexus between the creation of knowledge about gender and global hierarchies of political, economic and linguistic power; the exclusion of women from democratic political institutions; the diffused and productive critique to mainstream concepts, theories and discourses, as gender biased; and the political significance of social relationship and hierarchies that are not considered to be “public” or related to the state by mainstream political scientists. the european consortium for political research (ecpr) also established the standing group on women and politics back in 1985. the group then evolved into a gender and politics section5 which since 2009 has organized well-attended biannual european conferences on politics and gender6 (ecpg). in this context, scientific symposia have recently addressed different aspects of the nexus between gender and political science; contributions that are now available in two themed issues of the journal european political science. in 2015, a special issue of eps titled “women in european political science”, edited by stephen bates and heather savigny, explored how women and men are represented in the discipline, and positioned institutionally, in spain, finland, germany, and the united kingdom. the cases show the ways in which institutional structures and recruitment mechanisms may serve to disadvantage women; while issues of under-representation emerge (women at senior level in the discipline stands at 7% in spain, 8% in finland, and 28% in germany), alongside unofficial gendered division of labor (through small circles and informal networks), gendered symbols and interactions, and the well-known “leaky pipeline” effect throughout (female scholars’) carrier paths. a 2016 second themed issue of eps focused on “gender in european political science education”. there, scholars from austria, germany, the netherlands, spain, and the united kingdom offer an overview of gender in political science education, addressing questions related to how the consolidation of gender studies as an interdisciplinary field may affect political science curricula. editors mugge, evans, and engeli state that “gender is virtually absent from much of the political science curricula”; in their view, gender and political science courses suffer from issues of supply (rather than demand), such as the persistent under-representation of women academics within political science, as well as tight budget constraints. at the same time, they indicate why a gender-sensitive 3 online at: https://www.ipsa.org/research-committees/rclist/rc19. 4 the volume is published within the ipsa series “the world of political science” edited by michael stein and john trent, barbara budrich publishers. 5 online at: https://ecpr.eu/standinggroups/standinggrouphome.aspx?id=8. 6 online at: http://www.ecpg.eu. padovani and vignelli, ips interviews stefano sacchi vi approach to teaching politics is necessary: on the one side politics is about power and power is always gendered; on the other, embedding gender in the core of political science education may positively affect gender equality in the profession and politics. as we can see, the reflection is ongoing across europe and beyond. yet the italian political science community has not been attentive to these debates; and, we argue, most of the above issues have seldom been addressed in our professional circles. as our community is increasingly inhabited by a diverse constituency of emerging female and male scholars, we suggest it is time for an open discussion on the potential of promoting and supporting gender-aware approaches to political science research and education in the country. as a starting point, it can be pointed out that in italy a gender perspective is increasingly present in the social sciences—in sociology, economics, linguistics, psychology, and literature—and there is a growing debate also within the “hard sciences”. among scholars and academics there has been a long-standing discussion concerning both the need to mainstream a gender perspective across different disciplines and curricula, and the challenges accompanying attempts to institutionalize women’s and gender studies in academia, given the specific constraints of italian universities’ institutional frameworks (saraceno, 2010; pravadelli, 2010; magaraggia and leone, 2010). in the last few decades, many individual scholars have successfully introduced a focus on women and/or gender in their teaching subjects and research, while a growing number of seminars have contributed to increasing the visibility to, and recognition of, gender approaches and methods. it has thus been recognized that putting gender into the research agenda offers new ways of understanding social, cultural, political processes, and structures through which societies are organized. it has also become clear that gender studies demand an understanding of power relations, and thus of politics, within and beyond government. in other words, gender has emerged as a fundamental aspect of the organization of power: an aspect that is unambiguously political. a deeper engagement of italian political science with gender studies seems urgent first of all on the grounds of an evident delay in acknowledging and taking advantage of the innovation brought by national and international scholarship in this area of research and knowledge. notwithstanding the problems in dealing with the structure and organization of academic power (saraceno 1995), there have been developments in theoretical and practiceoriented bodies of knowledge that critically question the accepted paradigms and categories of particular disciplines and promote the affirmation of gender issues in society at large; while new theoretical models and interpretive tools have often emerged from productive dialogs across disciplines. gender perspectives, in fact, have always aimed at crossing disciplinary boundaries and challenging subject compartmentalization. disciplinary intersections, although potentially productive in terms of generating alternative ways of explaining and acting upon social relations and inequalities, are not simple nor without tensions. this is partly the case also with the present collection, where diverse voices have been invited to contribute to a better understanding of the nexus between gender and politics, by “moving beyond the obvious.” the obvious conceived as the persistence of gender inequalities, in society and in the discipline; as well as the obvious of a (still prevailing) narrow understandings based on the conviction that “counting women”—in politics, and in political science—would be an adequate gender and politics vii measure to redress such inequalities. finally, “the obvious” of too easy identification of “gender” with “women”, and of thinking of “gender and politics” as a research object of concern to a specific category of scholars, that of female political scientists. in their foreword to this collection, kantola and lombardo outline the contributions that gender lenses to the study of politics and power relations have made to political science over the past 20 years, in relation to concepts, research questions, and analytical approaches; in redefining “the political” as well as the nexus between theory and praxis, while indicating persisting challenges towards mainstreaming gender in the discipline. sara de jong provides an overview of recently published literature in the u.s., u.k. and australia on the state of gender in political science; while self-reflectively and critically articulating the tension between the progress made, through building networks of academic collaboration and designing courses, and persisting gender biases and blindness. adopting a national perspective, catherine achin contributes a storytelling of french political science in relation to (the institutionalization of) gender studies as summarized in the introduction of the dictionnaire genre & science politique. concepts, objets, problèmes, which she edited with laurence bereni (2013), where 40 entries unlash the contribution of a gender perspective to the discipline, in terms of knowledge, findings, innovative research and new tools. it has also been argued that “the fact of being excluded from the mainstream has made gender studies of politics particularly open to inclusion and diversity” (kantola and lombardo, this issue), both in building bridges between political science approaches, and in opening spaces of dialog across disciplines. this is reflected in the present collection where inter-disciplinarity is widely referred to as a necessary condition to support change; and where, alongside contributions from political scientists, other disciplinary perspectives show “the potential strength of methodological pluralism” (siim 2004: 98). in that vein, barbara poggio, building on the experience of the center for interdisciplinary gender studies at the university of trento, recalls the steps toward institutionalizing gender studies in the italian academic context; and focuses on networking and partnerships as strategic practices to that end. lorenza perini composes a lively storytelling of her teaching experience in the course titled gender policies at the university of padova; while, from a sociological perspective, carmen leccardi speaks directly of/to the younger generation, addressing issues of young women expression, reflexivity, and subjectivity in their connection to “the political” and to an (increasingly adverse) social world in contemporary fragmented and “nomadic” experiences. the conversation continues with a contribution by isabelle chabot, former president of the società italiana delle storiche (sis). by sharing fragments of the history and experience of the sis, chabot provides a concrete review on what it has taken to “engender” a discipline like the study of history over the past three decades, including through an interdisciplinary approach to issues such as leadership and power. finally, a challenging contribution by political philosopher flavia monceri invites readers to reconsider the very assumptions of gender studies, starting from a direct question of “who is entitled to perform that kind of research and for whom?” and forcing us to move beyond stereotypical “obvious” that affect research as much as the social world. differences in languages and styles among these contributions are evident, and yet a number of common concerns emerge from these writings: a strong focus on the “how to” padovani and vignelli, ips interviews stefano sacchi viii of gender studies, with emphasis on the methods and approaches adopted in research and educational practices; a shared understanding of the centrality of education and training (including formal and informal) as tools for transformation; and a recurrent reference to networking and fostering interdisciplinary and multi-vocal exchanges. in particular, the building of alliances and networking practices among scholars, academic centers, and research groups is seen as an effective strategy to sustain ongoing efforts in fostering gender in the study of politics, thanks to reciprocal support and legitimation. in this sense, professional associations are seen by all contributors as a strong element for women’s further advancements in political science; in creating opportunities, combat sexism, and address masculine assumptions of the discipline. we would like to see this “strong element” activated across our scholarly community. we hope this issue of ips may contribute to bringing closer, and making visible, the variety of gender-aware contributions that have enriched the discipline over the past years and the potential for new knowledge and intellectual exchanges in the future. this, adhering to the idea that gender-aware and feminist analyses, conceived as “an approach that challenges some of the concepts, models, and methods developed within political science, (are) of importance for the whole discipline, and not just for feminists” (allwood 2005). references akhtar, p., p. fawcett, t. legrand, d. marsh and c. taylor (2005). ‘women in the political science profession’, psa news 16, 1(1), p. 28. apsa (2004). ‘a report on the apsa workshop on the advancement of women in academic political science in the united states’. accessible at: http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ed495970.pdf. bates, s. and savigny, h. 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(1997). reinventing political science: a feminist approach. halifax: fernwood. waylen, g., celis, k., kantola, j. and s. l weldon (2013). the oxford handbook of gender and politics. oxford: oxford university press. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_4.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. 51–62. * contact author: giuliano bobba, university of turin. e-mail address: giuliano.bobba@unito.it the likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 italian general election giuliano bobba franca roncarolo university of turin abstract this article focuses on the controlled communication that the main italian political leaders – silvio berlusconi, luigi di maio, pietro grasso, giorgia meloni, matteo renzi, matteo salvini – published on their facebook profiles during a period of four weeks before election day. taking the 2018 italian general election campaign as an illustration, this article aims to clarify whether and to what extent populist communication on facebook differs from non-populist communication in terms of volume and likes received. facebook was selected as the source, since digital politics and social media are becoming increasingly relevant for both political parties and citizens. the article shows that, in general, messages containing populist claims get more ‘likes’ compared to non-populist messages. however, only messages containing references to immigrants – namely complete and excluding populism – appear to be significantly correlated with the number of likes. 1. introduction he 2018 general election was thematised as a clash between antithetical conceptions of politics. it was structured around a series of antithetical dimensions: new against old politics, people against the elites, responsible against irresponsible candidates, and honest ones against the unacceptable. the election campaign – involving a divided centre-left, a compact centre-right, and the 5 star movement (m5s) – was defined by all kinds of journalists and commentators as the ugliest ever, centred on fake news, insults and false promises.1 it also reached high levels of conflict between the incumbent matteo renzi, leader of the partito democratico (democratic party, pd) and the two most active competitors: luigi di maio, political leader of the m5s, and matteo salvini, leader of the lega nord (northern league, ln). the election results returned a deeply changed political balance, in which, despite the fact that forming a government remains a big issue, winners and losers are clear. undoubtedly to be counted among the winners is the m5s, whose result certifies both the growing attraction of its proposals and a deep discontent with the performance of traditional parties. the growth of the right, that the polls had recorded both in terms of voting intentions and increasing hostility towards migrants (demos & pi 2018), has rewarded 1 ‘elezioni 2018, la campagna più brutta della storia. anche i talk show ridotti a monologhi’, il fatto quotidiano, 19 february 2018; ‘una campagna elettorale ferma a 70 anni fa’, il giornale, 11 february 2018; enrico mentana: ‘questa è la più brutta campagna elettorale’, l’aria che tira, 2 march 2018. t bobba and roncarolo, the likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 italian general election 52 the ln at the expense of more moderate allies, such as forza italia (go italy, fi) and more radical ones, such as fratelli d’italia (brothers of italy, fdi). finally, the decline of renzi and pd approval attests that the former mayor of florence failed not only to convince italians during his term but also to mobilize his electorate during the election campaign (emanuele 2018). within this big picture, this article aims to study an aspect which has been poorly empirically analysed so far, namely the use of a populist style of communication by political leaders on social media. as is well known, social media have changed the way politicians communicate with and relate to their constituencies during election campaigns and routine periods alike. in particular, it has been observed that they provide a powerful tool for populists to mobilise their followers, in addition to the traditional channels of political communication and mainstream media (kriesi 2014: 367). if, in the 1990s, populist parties obtained visibility thanks mainly to tabloid media coverage (mazzoleni 2003), the advent and widespread diffusion of social media platforms (such as twitter and facebook) among citizens has now provided them with a way to communicate directly and more spontaneously with their audience (bartlett 2014). despite the growing importance of social media, few studies have examined the features of online populist communication and addressed the question of how to assess the success of online posts (bobba 2018; ernst et al. 2017). this study focused on the controlled communication that the main leaders published on their facebook profiles during a period of four weeks before the election day. the material collected was analysed for content to assess the presence of populist elements. facebook was selected as the source, since digital politics and social media are becoming increasingly relevant for both political parties and citizens: in 2017, italy had 73% of internet penetration and 34,000,000 (56.1%) facebook users (digital in italia 2018). the structure of the article is as follows: in the next section, the key elements of populist discourse are discussed. the second section presents the research questions and methodology, while the third presents the results. the article shows that not all messages containing populist claims get more ‘likes’ compared to non-populist messages. though populist posts against elites or immigrants are the largest ones, only messages containing references to this second issue – namely complete and excluding populism – are significantly correlated with the number of likes. 2. the key elements of populism populism is a contentious concept. generally, scholars agree on a minimal definition. populist discourse relies on the juxtaposition of a ‘good people’ with a series of ‘bad elites’. moreover, in the case of right-wing populists, the people’s values, their identities and rights are considered to be endangered not only by the elites but also by the action of a series of ‘others’ that would receive preferential treatment by the elites (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2015; kriesi 2014; mudde 2007, 2014; taggart 2000; canovan 1999). the key elements of populist discourse are thus ‘the people’, ‘the elites’ and ‘the others’. usually, populists in western democracies present themselves as the ‘real’ democrats, the only ones able to denounce what went wrong, who is to blame, and what is to be done to reverse the situation (betz and johnson 2004: 323). in their storytelling, who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 53 democracy should reflect the will of the people, but it has been usurped and exploited by the ‘elites’. the elites and ‘others’ (namely non-elites who are also considered as not part of ‘the people’) are held responsible for the difficult situation in which the people find themselves. ‘the people’ must express their voice and power through the populist leader and party. populism is centred on the idea of ‘the pure people’ (mudde 2004: 544), a homogeneous and virtuous community, a place where, as zygmunt bauman (2001: 12) observes, ‘it is crystal-clear who is ‘‘one of us’’ and who is not, there is no muddle and no cause for confusion’. the people are – or should be – united and sovereign. potential divisions are caused by political, intellectual and media elites (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2008: 5-6; taggart 2000: 92). for populists, politics is therefore a direct and non-mediated expression of the general will of the people (mudde 2004: 544). populism relies on a ‘manichean outlook’ that combines the positive valorisation of the people with the denigration of their enemies, namely the elites and the ‘others’ (panizza 2005: 16-17). the elites are generally accused of being incompetent and selfinterested when not actually conspiring against the people and seeking to undermine democracy. they comprise political, media, financial, judicial and intellectual elites. the identity of ‘the others’ is country dependent but, for right-wing populists in europe, it usually includes out-groups such as immigrants, homosexuals, roma communities and other specific social categories that are held not to be ‘of the people’. empirical evidence has also revealed that populist parties have been favoured by the proliferation of social media, and especially by the effective use that populist actors have made of these new platforms. this has made populist messages central to the public debate as well as in the daily life of ordinary citizens (engesser et al. 2016; aalberg et al. 2016). moreover, candidates use populist style not only as a form of communication but also as a mobilization resource to effectively reach their constituencies (roncarolo 2017). as regards our case study, it is worth noting that italy has experienced innovative and durable forms of populism compared to other european countries in the last few decades. it has been defined, among others, as the ‘promised land’ (tarchi 2015), an ‘enduring market’ (bobba and mcdonnell 2015) and a ‘breeding ground’ for populism (bobba and legnante 2016). the emergence of the ln in the late 1980s and the unexpected performance of silvio berlusconi at the head of forza italia (fi, ‘go italy’) in the early 1990s were the first stages of the recent history of populism in italy. since 2012, also fdi has reached the right-wing populist field. finally, the success of the movimento 5 stelle (m5s, ‘five star movement’) since 2013 has expanded the varieties of populism (caiani and graziano 2016) to include non-right-wing parties. some scholars, have also described the italian situation as characterized by the presence of an ‘endemic populism’ that overflows from strictly populist precincts into the general political discourse (bracciale and mazzoleni 2018). 3. research questions and methods in the last few years, the role of the web in explaining the success of populist parties and movements has been stressed by the literature addressing the study of the new wave of populism in europe (bartlett 2014; kriesi 2014). recent research has also showed empirically that social media are highly compatible with populist communication (bobba bobba and roncarolo, the likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 italian general election 54 2018; ernst et al. 2017). the underlying concept of these interpretations is that populists can reach a broader range of citizens through social media and thereby are able to increase support for issues that were not so popular previously. as such, a first research question is: rq1: do leaders of populist parties get more likes than leaders of non-populist parties in their fb communication? in addition, moving from populist as the source of communication to the presence of populist contents within a message, a second intertwined question is: rq2: do populist messages get more likes than non-populist messages on fb? finally, considering that populist posts could stress and combine different aspects related to the key elements of populism – the people, elites, others – the last question is: rq3: which types of populist message get more likes on fb? to tackle these questions, a quantitative content analysis was conducted of the messages posted by the main italian leaders – silvio berlusconi, luigi di maio, pietro grasso, giorgia meloni, matteo renzi, matteo salvini – on their official facebook accounts. all messages posted on these accounts – except for shares, links, images or event announcements without any text – were gathered and analysed for the last four weeks of the election campaign (31 january – 3 march 2018). in total, the sample consisted of 1,459 posts. as regards our cases we made our selection and classification relying both on the literature and on empirical evidences of the 2017 chapel hill expert survey (ches, see polk et al. 2017). in the literature, ln is considered as a classical example of radical right populism (betz 2018) or ethno-regionalist populist party (spektorowski, 2003). fi has been defined as neoliberal populist (mudde 2007: 47). m5s, though harder to classify due to its eclectic mix of rightand left-wing policies, presents a populist ideological profile in terms of opposition between the people and the elites (fabbrini and lazar 2013). research focused on fdi as a populist party is scarce so far. however, when studying the italian political context, some scholars have included it in the populist field (castelli gattinara 2017; mazzoleni and bracciale 2018). as regards ches data, in 2018 for the first time the survey also includes two questions related to the core definition of populism: people-centrism2 and anti-elitism3. three out of six parties are clearly considered populist by the experts interviewed: ln, 2 ‘some political parties take the position that “the people” should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. at the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the most important political decisions. where do the parties fall on this dimension?’ chapel hill expert survey 2017 codebook: www.chesdata.eu. 3 ‘next, we would like you to think about the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for a party. how important was the anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric to the parties in their public stance?’ chapel hill expert survey 2017 codebook: www.chesdata.eu. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 55 m5s, and fdi4. on the other side, pd and movimento democratico e progressista (the major party of the left-wing electoral cartel, liberi e uguali, included in the survey) scored a low level of populism. finally, forza italia shows an intermediate result. combining these two sources of data, we therefore considered as non-populist parties pd and leu, and as populist parties the other four: ln, m5s, fdi, and fi. for this latter party we are aware that something is probably changing in terms of populist attitudes of the party. still, we preferred to be conservative by considering fi a populist party. two coders content-analysed the messages to assess which posts were or were not populist, by the presence of the three key elements of populist discourse outlined previously: ‘elites’, ‘the people’ and ‘the others’. an intercoder reliability test was conducted on a subsample of 150 posts (10 per cent of the entire sample) and yielded satisfactory results (krippendorff’s alpha, ka >0.67). in particular, in the category ‘the people’ (ka 0.87), we placed references to the ‘common man’, italian identities, christian tradition, made in italy, etc. the category ‘elites’ (ka 0.81) contains criticism of blame attribution to politicians, banks, the media, the judicial system, the eu, etc. finally, in the category ‘others’ (ka 0.85) was coded criticism of or blame attribution to immigrants, roma communities, muslims, homosexuals and welfare recipients. relying on the idea that on social media ‘populism manifested itself in a fragmented form’ and that this fragmentation ‘could be an empirical expression of populism’s ‘‘thin’’ nature and ‘‘inherent incompleteness’’’ (engesser et al. 2017: 1121-1122), all the posts containing at least one reference to the aforementioned key elements have been considered as an expression of populism. following the typology of populist discourse by jagers and walgrave (2007), the three key elements were then combined in order to identify different types of populist messages: complete populism: posts containing references to all three key elements; empty populism: posts containing only references to ‘the people’; excluding populism: posts containing references to ‘the others’ and posts �containing references to ‘the people’ and ‘the others’; anti-elitist populism: posts containing references to ‘the elites and posts containing references to ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’; contentious populism: posts containing references to ‘the elites’ and ‘the others’. complete and empty populism are operationalized as in jagers and walgrave: in the first case, each post including all the key elements together were coded, while in the second one, those posts referring only to ‘the people’ were coded. as regards excluding and anti-elitist populism, besides considering the references to ‘the elites’ and ‘the others’ in a given post, the combination of these with ‘the people’ is also taken into account. finally, contentious populism is a combination that highlights the aggressive and contentious nature of messages that are at the same time against both ‘the elites’ and ‘the others’. a typical example consists in the blaming of immigrants by attributing 4 the average score of people-centrism and anti-elitism items (1-10scale) is 9,88 for the m5s, 7.84 for the ln, 6.65 for fdi, 3.68 for fi, 2,61 for pd, and 2,14 for movimento democratico e progressista, the major party of the left-wing electoral cartel, leu, included in the survey. bobba and roncarolo, the likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 italian general election 56 responsibility to some kind of elite, such as politics, international finance, or the media. since it is a combination of ‘the elites’ and ‘the others’, only right-wing populists could publish this type of claim. 4. findings table 1 shows the number of posts published by leaders of populist and non-populist parties as well as the number of likes they received. as mentioned, berlusconi, di maio, meloni, and salvini have been considered as leaders of populist parties, while grasso and renzi as leaders of non-populist parties. these data allow us to provide an initial response to rq1. leaders of populist parties appear more active and their posts more liked: on average, populists publish 4.5 times more posts than non-populists, while they receive about 1,000 likes more for each post. looking deeper into the data, berlusconi stands out for being the least active and popular, while salvini published more posts (around 15 per day), and di maio received more likes (9,446). among non-populist leaders, on the one hand, grasso appears to be little focused on social media for the election campaign, while on the other hand, renzi – whose favourite medium is twitter – gets a considerable amount of likes when compared to di maio and salvini. the figure of the pd leader shows that likeability is dependent on several factors linked not only to the content, but also to the type of message (text, video, image, etc.), to the source that publishes a post, and to the frames and/or emotions the post contains. nonetheless, populist contents, in this particular age, are certainly among those elements capable of increasing the communication success of a party/leader on social media. table 1. activity and likeability of leaders of populist and non-populist parties on fb n likes (mean) median fb fans (n) leaders of populist parties (mean) 327 6,252 4,197 berlusconi 136 2,826 1,740 1,061,607 di maio 329 9,446 5,595 1,621,552 meloni 362 3,828 1,972 834,740 salvini 482 8,909 6,672 2,213,012 leaders of non-populist parties (mean) 75 5,376 3,874 grasso 55 3,507 2,864 144,080 renzi 95 7,244 4,667 1,124,102 total 1,459 6,890 4,159 as regards the populist content of the message, figure 1 and table 2 show that populist postings received more likes than non-populist ones almost continuously during the campaign. the general trend highlights three peaks linked to the particular success of three individual posts. on 6 february, salvini published a video containing his speech to the european parliament against the eu on the subject of immigration, achieving 74,000 likes. di maio is instead the author of the other two posts that move the average of likes upwards. the first one was posted on 13 february and concerns the so-called who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 57 ‘reimbursement scandal’ involving the m5s (130,297). m5s requires its mps to donate a part of their salary to a fund which helps small enterprises. however, some mps have made only fake bank transfers instead of actually donating money. di maio in this post promises to expel from the party all those who have not been honest. the second very popular message was posted on 2 march. it contains an appeal to vote, namely a letter entitled ‘despite everything, we will change italy’ that achieved 107,612 likes. figure 1. trend of populist and non-populist messages in the last four weeks before election day (average number of likes) table 2 shows the relevance of populist contents within the leaders’ fb communication. the data allow us to clearly identify two groups. on the one hand, salvini, meloni and di maio show a relevant percentage of populist messages (between 20.1% of the m5s leader and 30.1% of the fdi leader). on the other hand, renzi, grasso and (contrary to the literature) berlusconi, show percentages no higher than 11.6%. not surprisingly, the messages of populist parties leaders also achieve a greater number of likes when compared with their respective non-populist messages as well as with the messages of nonpopulist party leaders. table 2. activity and likeability of leaders of populist and non-populist parties on fb non-populist % (n) likes (mean) std. dev. min max median berlusconi 91.9 (125) 2,812 3,333 373 21,920 1,633 di maio 79.9 (263) 9,085 12,267 733 118,806 5,779 grasso 92.7 (51) 3,603 2,955 272 15,959 2,929 meloni 69.9 (253) 3,815 6,634 147 79,719 2,026 renzi 88.4 (84) 7,139 7,277 724 32,039 4,636 salvini 77.6 (374) 8,583 7,859 407 73,702 6,493 total 78.8 (1,150) 6,695 8,706 147 118,806 4,068 bobba and roncarolo, the likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 italian general election 58 populist % (n) likes (mean) std. dev. min max median berlusconi 8.1 (11) 2,986 2,098 532 8,772 2,508 di maio 20.1 (66) 10,881 20,711 909 130,297 4,732 grasso 7.3 (4) 2,286 1,704 1,240 4,814 1,545 meloni 30.1 (109) 3,858 6,025 360 41,299 1,857 renzi 11.6 (11) 8,044 6,784 2,318 21,405 5,531 salvini 22.4 (108) 10,038 9,346 1,397 74,060 7,435 total 21.2 (309) 7,616 12,073 360 130,297 4,451 turning to the type of populist message, table 3 shows that the more frequent type is excluding populism (101 posts), closely followed by anti-elitist (92). on the contrary, complete (15) and contentious populism (32) are the least frequent types. in terms of likes received, complete populism, though the least frequent type, obtained the highest level of likes (11,223), while its opposite, empty populism, the lowest level (5,209). table 3. types of populism published by the main italian political leaders on fb % (n) likes (mean) std. dev. min max median non populist 1,150 6,695 8,706 147 118,806 4,068 populist 309 8,132 10,398 360 130,297 4,451 empty 72 5,326 6,001 533 30,233 3,494 complete 15 11,223 11,915 1,088 47,810 7,601 excluding 98 8,447 14,409 532 130,297 5,280 anti-elitist 92 7,874 14,326 360 107,612 3,754 contentious 32 7,787 5,339 494 23,742 6,733 table 4. types of populism published by salvini, di maio, and renzi on fb salvini di maio renzi avg likes median n avg likes median n avg likes median n non populist 8,583 6,493 374 9,085 5,779 263 7,139 4,636 84 populist 10,038 7,435 108 10,881 4,732 66 8,044 5,531 11 empty 7,891 5,315 22 8,070 4,127 11 6,749 4,605 9 complete 16,602 12,503 8 0 0 excluding 10,172 8,286 38 13,303 4,185 16 0 anti-elitist 10,072 5,560 20 10,681 5,448 39 13,873 13,873 2 contentious 9,486 8,797 20 0 0 who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 59 the likeability of the most popular leaders – salvini, di maio, and renzi – seems to be differently linked to populism. table 4 clearly shows that all these leaders improved their results when they published populist posts: on average more than a thousand likes for renzi, about 1,500 for salvini and almost 1,800 for di maio. still, the populist content of these posts differs greatly. on the one hand, as mentioned, renzi makes little use of populist rhetoric and when he does so, he mainly posts appeals to the people (9 posts out of 11). these are the types of claim defined by jagers and walgrave (2007) as empty populism typical of all parties’ election campaigning. the last two messages in the sample contain instead anti-elitist claims that refer to a manichean view of politics. what is striking about these few populist posts is that the empty populism ones receive few likes (on average 6,749), while antielitist ones double the result (13,873). on the other hand, salvini and di maio – besides being among those who post more populist contents – are the two leaders that benefited more in term of likes from this type of communication. salvini especially gets likes in response to complete, anti-elitist and excluding populism, while only these last two types are relevant in the communication of di maio. as in the case of renzi, here again a similar pattern is found, suggesting that heated and contentious communication probably produces more engagement with users on facebook. table 5. users engagement with different types of populist posts on facebook b se empty populism -1,053.34 1,114.41 complete populism 4,991.26* 2,385.84 excluding populism 2,037.57* 973.67 anti-elitist populism 746.21 999.58 contentious populism 1,082.75 1,653.45 salvini 1,309.47 1,033.54 di maio 1.965.21• 1,071.78 meloni -3,844.76*** 1,063.95 berlusconi -4,524.66*** 1,223.72 grasso -3,842.29* 1,550.10 renzi (omitted) (constant) 7,328.05*** 943.90 n = 1459 r2 = 0.085 note ols regressions. dependent variable: likes count. entries are non-standardized b-coefficients and standard errors ***p <0.001, **p <0.01, *p <0.05 •p <0.1 a thorough look at the different types of populism through an ordinary least square (ols) regression model (table 5) offers some evidence of this suggestion. three main features stand out. first, complete populism – although the least frequent type – significantly affects the number of likes: messages containing references to the people, elites, and the others together gained around 5,000 'likes' compared to other messages. second, also a simple reference to immigrants, minorities, welfare recipients – namely excluding populism – contributes to the explanation of likeability, even though it appears to be less relevant in terms of magnitude of the correlation coefficient compared to complete populism. third, bobba and roncarolo, the likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 italian general election 60 all the other types of populism – empty, contentious, and anti-elitist – are not significantly correlated with the likeability of a given post, meaning that the amount of likes they receive is independent from populism. in addition, as regards the leaders, di maio is the only one who is significantly and positively correlated to the number of likes: a post published by the leader of the m5s received around 2,000 likes more than renzi (reference category) regardless of its – populist or not-populist – content. 5. conclusions a recent strand of research has highlighted social media as being a fertile ground for populist actors (engesser et al. 2017). taking the 2018 italian general election campaign as an illustration, this article follows this line, aiming to clarify whether and to what extent populist communication on facebook differs from non-populist communication in terms of volume and likeability. our findings confirm the existence of different patterns of communication. indeed, we find evidence that posts containing populist claims get more likes than non-populist ones on facebook. however, not all populist messages were equally popular over the period analysed. in our sample only complete and excluding populist messages boost the number of likes of a given post. this means that right-wing and m5s leaders put great emphasis on ‘the other’ and that these messages were also the most popular among their fans on fb. on the contrary, anti-elitism – though relevant in terms of size – does not impact on the likeability of leaders’ communication. in the light of the data presented, an element clearly emerges: in the 2018 italian general elections the debate was polarized between leaders and parties using populist communication and leaders and parties that did not use it. this was particularly evident on social media but, more in general, this division structured the entire campaign, influencing both media coverage and the action of all political actors. the adoption by ln, m5s and fdi of populism as a communicative macro-frame pursued a twofold objective. on the one hand, it was used to mobilize the electorate by exalting the opposition us vs. them, the people threatened in its integrity, its values and its wealth by the immigrants and the outgoing political class (led by renzi). on the other hand, it allowed a simplification of the political debate by interpreting everything through a manichean division between right and wrong, good and bad, honest and corrupt, new and old. the success of this rhetoric and contents imposed on the other parties their agenda and rhythm. this found both the centre-left (pd and leu), and fi not entirely ready to implement effective countermeasures. the result was an election campaign sparsely articulated in terms of content, but strongly connoted in terms of the use of populist communication that had a polarizing effect on the entire political-media system. references aalberg, t., esser, f., reinemann, c., strömbäck, j., and de 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(2017) populism and social media: how politicians spread a fragmented ideology. information, communication & society 20(8): 1109–1126.� ernst, n., engesser, s., büchel, f., blassnig, s., and esser, f. (2017) extreme parties and populism: an analysis of facebook and twitter across six countries. information, communication & society, advance online publication 29 may, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2017.1329333. fabbrini, s., and lazar, m. (2013). ‘still a difficult democracy? italy between populist challenges and institutional weakness’. contemporary italian politics 5(2): 106-112. jagers, j., and s. walgrave (2007) populism as political communication style: an empirical study of political parties’ discourse in belgium. european journal of political research 46(3): 319–345. kriesi, h. (2014) the populist challenge. west european politics 37 (2): 361-378. mazzoleni, g. (2003) the media and the growth of neo-populism in contemporary democracies. in the media and neo-populism: a contemporary comparative analysis, edited by g. mazzoleni, j. stewart and b. horsfield. westport, ct: praeger, pp. 1-20. mazzoleni, g. and bracciale, r. (2018) socially mediated populism: the communicative strategies of political leaders on facebook. palgrave communications, 4(50), doi:10.1057/s41599-018-0104-x mudde, c. (2004) the populist zeitgeist. government & opposition 39(4): 541–563.� bobba and roncarolo, the likeability of populism on social media in the 2018 italian general election 62 mudde, c. (2007) populist radical right parties in europe. cambridge: cambridge university press. mudde, c. (2014) fighting the system? populist radical right parties and party system change. party politics 20(2): 217–222. panizza, f. (ed.) (2005) populism and the mirror of democracy. london: verso. polk, j., rovny, j., bakker, r., edwards, e., hooghe, l., jolly, s., koedam, j., kostelka, f., marks, g., schumacher, g., steenbergen, m., vachudova, m., and zilovic, m. (2017) ‘explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in europe with the 2014 chapel hill expert survey data’. research & politics (januarymarch): 1-9. roncarolo, f. (2017) ‘media politics and populism as a mobilization resource’. in holtzbacha, c and mazzoleni, o. (eds.) political populism. a handbook. baden baden: nomos. spektorowski, a. (2003) ‘ethnoregionalism: the intellectual new right and the lega nord’, the global review of ethnopolitics, 2(3): 55-70. taggart, p. (2000) populism. buckingham: open university press.� tarchi, m. (2015) italy: the promised land of populism? contemporary italian politics 7(3): 273–285. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 15–18. networking and partnership as strategic practices for gender studies in academia: the case of the university of trento barbara poggio university of trento ender as a concept entered the italian political debate in the late 1970s. as in many other european countries and the united states, theoretical reflections on gender first emerged outside academia and were closely linked to political activism by women on issues such as abortion and divorce. the debate then moved from women’s studies to gender studies. it thus no longer focused solely on women and women’s rights, but also encompassed broader aspects of gender relations and the intersection between gender and other identity categories such as race, ethnicity and sexual identity. only in the late 1980s did gender studies begin their fight to become a discipline fully acknowledged by italian academic institutions. as saraceno (2010) states, there was a debate among women feminist academics on how better to achieve institutionalization within academia: by introducing specific women and gender studies curricula, or by attempting to mainstream women and gender perspective in existing courses and curricula. given the institutional rigidity of the italian university system, feminist scholars opted for a mainstream solution. they introduced a focus on women, and later on gender, in their regular teaching subjects. they offered students seminars, initiatives, and events in addition to normal curricula, and eventually established gender research centers. the first such center opened in 1991 at the university of torino. this was the cirsde (women and gender studies interdisciplinary centre) whose founders came from many academic fields: both humanities like sociology, psychology, history, political science, literature, economics, foreign languages, and “hard” sciences like biology, law, medicine, and chemistry. thereafter, several research centers and programs were founded, and today there are around 20 research centers at universities across italy. the centre for interdisciplinary gender studies at the university of trento the centre for interdisciplinary gender studies (csg) of the university of trento belongs to this tradition. on the one hand, it aims to transform social reality and promote equal rights for women and girls; on the other, it works to develop critical and interdisciplinary theoretical approaches to gender relations. csg was formally established in 2008 by a group of scholars and researchers from different faculties and departments. its aim g poggio, networking and partnership as strategic practices 16 was to give formal recognition to an existing active collaboration among gender scholars in multiple fields. cooperation among scholars in these fields had been informally in existence for several years, and their collaboration was strengthened by the joint effort to establish an interdisciplinary specialist program, “gender policies in the labour market”. this collaboration was based from the outset on the conviction that studying gender needs a composite approach, the adoption of multiple perspectives, and the ability to consider the complexity of cultural, social, and structural factors that come into play in the social construction of gender. of necessity, therefore, gender studies must draw on varied knowledge bases—sociological, legal, economic, political, psychological, narrative, and philosophical—in an interdisciplinary perspective. a second cornerstone of csg is recognition of the importance of collaboration between university and community. for this reason, the centre is open to external members, including individuals as well as public and private institutions concerned in any way with gender issues. the ultimate goal of the centre is, in fact, to create a multidisciplinary laboratory in which interaction between the university and society can become a stimulus for reflection, debate, and social change. in order to achieve its goals, csg undertakes initiatives in three realms: teaching and training, conferences and seminars, and research and action. the first set of activities is aimed at promoting a gender-sensitive culture through graduate and postgraduate programs and courses, as well as continuing education on different issues (in particular gender policies in the labour market, gender and politics, gender and education, gender and law, gender and interculture). a second group of activities includes conferences and seminars on a variety of topics usually connected with key issues in the italian debate on gender and feminism and addressed both to students and a wider audience. moreover, every two years the csg organizes a national conference to deal with a specific issue, always from a gender perspective (topics that have been addressed: gender and precariousness; gender and power; gender, knowledge and science). the third area is that of research and action. we are involved in research projects at national and international level, focused on such diverse issues as gender policies within organizations, gender pay gap, gender implications of precariousness, fatherhood, gender and education. several of the activities carried out have been based on interdisciplinary collaborations with other national and international scholars and research centers. the garcia project currently the centre is engaged in a european project, garcia (gendering the academy and research: combating career instability and asymmetries)1 concerned with the implementation of actions in european universities and research centers to promote a gender culture and combat gender stereotypes and discriminations. particular attention is paid to the early stages of academic and scientific careers: the main targets are researchers with non-tenured positions and people who have left the university after their phd or a temporary position (murgia, poggio 2015). to this end, we have constructed a partnership consisting of seven european universities2 and research centers representing different eu countries. by involving both stem and ssh disciplines, the aim of transforming academia and research into a more gender gender and politics 17 equal environment may be extended to all disciplines by adopting the best systemic organizational approaches. macro, meso, and micro level analyses are followed through the implementation of gender action plans, which are mainly directed to: gender regimes; gender equality in management and decision-making; awareness raising on gendered practices; everyday working conditions; recruitment and selection processes; and the “leaky pipeline” phenomenon. the role of coordinator of the garcia project has enabled us to become part of a network of “sister projects” (i.e., the structural change projects funded under the fp7 from 2010 to 2013) engaged in encouraging and supporting mutual learning dynamics, the purpose being to integrate the efforts that each project is making toward gender equality in scientific organizations. moreover, in order to disseminate the results of our project, we have organized several streams in different national and international conferences and scientific networks (for example, the gender summit, gender work and organization, the international sociological association, the european group for organizational studies, and the society for advancement of socio-economics). this has created a solid international network. building partnerships and networking in the last part of this short contribution i would like to focus specifically on the issue of partnership building and networking, because they are critical dimensions for the survival and development of gender studies in academia, and in particular for research centers working on these topics. there are various reasons for this importance. first of all, i must mention the interdisciplinary vocation of many of these centers, which makes it vital for them to have and to create opportunities to interact and to relate with other scholars, other disciplines, other perspectives. another important point is that these centers do not usually have a very easy life within universities, where gender issues are not considered a priority, and sometimes are even dismissed as “non-scientific”. it is therefore important for gender issues to gain legitimacy through relationships with other universities and similar organizations, as well as with other institutions, both public and private. in the case of our center, being chosen as an honorary member of the us sociologists for women in society network or coordinating an important international project are examples of ways to obtain internal recognition within the university. moreover, networking can be useful in order to act as pressure groups linked through meta-organizations, such as the gender-dedicated sections of disciplinary associations (for instance, the gender studies section of the italian sociological association) or the european network of women scientists (epws) (antonucci 2013), and therefore able to lobby national and supranational bodies. networking is also necessary to establish close relations with local stakeholders, in our case, the provincial ministry for equal opportunities and equality bodies, trade unions, and other public institutions. networking at the local level makes it possible on the one hand to obtain additional authority, and on the other, to affect local policies, experimenting with innovative measures. in our case this has happened through both innovative work-life balance initiatives in public organizations and gender-sensitive education in schools. poggio, networking and partnership as strategic practices 18 finally, it is also important to build and consolidate a network within the university. in our case this has been done at institutional level by establishing contacts with all representative groups and categories of the university and identifying delegates within each department. the outcome is a group of motivated and proactive people who can collect in a widespread manner the needs and requirements of individual departments and disseminate the actions and policies enabled. networking is certainly a very fatiguing and delicate work. it requires a constant activity of relationship and connection; but at the same time it is a necessary condition for legitimizing and supporting change. references antonucci, m.c. (2013) “promotional or public interest group? the advocacy and lobbying activity for gender equality in science and research by the european platform of women scientists, in s. avveduto, l. pisacane (eds) portrait of a lady. women in science: participation issues and perspectives in a globalized research system, gangemi, roma, pp. 91-95. murgia, a., poggio, b. (2015) “il progetto garcia – università e ricerca in ottica di genere: superare le asimmetrie e l’instabilità lavorativa”, in s. avveduto, m.l. paciello, t. arrigoni, c. mangia, l. martinelli (eds) scienza, genere e società. prospettive di genere in una società che si evolve, cnr-irpps: e-publishing, pp. 247-252. saraceno, c. (2010) “women and gender studies in italy: lack of institutionalization or a different kind of institutionalization?” european journal of women’s studies 17 (6): 269-274. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_0.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. 1–7. contact author: vincenzo emanuele, luiss guido carli university, rome. e-mail address: vemanuele@luiss.it introduction to the special issue: ‘who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election’ vincenzo emanuele luiss guido carli university, rome italian centre for electoral studies (cise) guest special issue editor an unprecedented election ive years after the ‘electoral earthquake’ of 2013 (chiaramonte and de sio 2014), when the rise of the largest genuinely new political party that had ever appeared in western europe led to the collapse of the bipolar pattern of party competition that had characterized the so-called second republic (bordignon and ceccarini 2013; maggini 2014; chiaramonte and emanuele 2014), italian politics has been shaken by another turbulent election. indeed, the election held on 4 march of 2018, while showing a substantial continuity in the tripolar competition pattern that emerged in 2013, has produced a radical shift in the balance of power among the three poles of the italian party system, thus leading to at least five unprecedented results. first, the centre-right coalition came first with 37% of the vote share but falling short of an overall majority by 50 seats. here, berlusconi’s party is no longer the dominant actor of the coalition, as the new populist and nationalist lega (the league) led by matteo salvini (tarchi 2018) received more than 17% of the vote share, thus managing to overtake forza italia (go italy, fi) for the first time since 1994. second, the incumbent partito democratico (democratic party, pd) fell to 18.7%, its lowest result ever, and the centre-left coalition came only third with less than 23% of the votes. from a longitudinal perspective, the election was a disaster for the italian left: if we consider the entire left bloc, including also the two leftist lists of liberi e uguali (free and equal, leu) and potere al popolo (power to the people), it received just 27.4% and less than 9 million votes, the lowest result since the foundation of the republic. just to make a comparison, in 2006, this bloc was twice as large with 19 million votes. more generally, today the italian left is the second weakest in western europe, just after france (emanuele 2018a). third, under the new leadership of luigi di maio, the movimento cinque stelle (five star movement, m5s) became the most voted party with 32.7% of the vote share, thus managing to achieve a sort of record. indeed, all the previous cases of a successful electoral debut – such as forza italia in 1994, the spanish podemos in 2015, the portuguese democratic renewal party in 1985 or the dutch pim fortuyn list in 2002 – suffered an electoral setback in the subsequent election (emanuele and marino f emanuele, introduction to the special issue 2 2018). in this regard, not only did the five star movement manage not to lose votes, but it also increased its vote share by almost seven percentage points compared to 2013. deeply intertwined with the previous points are the fourth and fifth unprecedented events that resulted from the 2018 election. in recent years, scholars working on electoral dynamics in the european context have started to consider the ‘great recession’ that hit europe after 2008 as a sort of new ‘critical juncture for the structuration of national party systems’ (kriesi 2017; hooghe and marks 2018). specifically, the impact of the economic and sovereign debt crisis systematically led to the defeat of incumbent governments led by mainstream parties (hérnandez and kriesi 2016); the rise of new antiestablishment challengers (bosco and verney 2012; emanuele and chiaramonte 2016; hobolt and tilley 2016); increasing electoral instability with patterns of party system deinstitutionalization (chiaramonte and emanuele 2017; 2018) and, especially in southern europe, high risks of government instability (bosco and verney 2016). not only does the italian election of 2018 fit perfectly into this path, but it is also the first time that antiestablishment forces (i.e., m5s and lega), considered together, have won the overall majority of votes and seats. moreover, and this brings us to the last point which is an absolute innovation in comparative perspective, after about three months of complex negotiations, the m5s and the lega have eventually come to an agreement and have formed a new coalition government, thus putting the traditional mainstream parties (i.e., the pd and forza italia) out of power. such an outcome will inevitably produce a deep change in the italian political system, opening a transition whose final point of arrival is still difficult to predict. why this special issue for all the above-mentioned reasons the italian election of 2018 is a remarkable novelty not only for our national politics but also in comparative perspective. a usual and, in some way, unavoidable problem of the scientific community is that its production (books, journal articles) requires a great deal of time and the findings they deliver scarcely tap into the ongoing political debate. consequently, the latter is dominated by journalists and non-academic commentators whose analyses generally convey superficial messages, without grasping the underlying dynamics of the political processes. here is the rationale of this special issue. in a nutshell, it aims to provide the scholarly community with a suitable and timely tool to feed the scientific discussion about this election. it delivers cutting-edge analyses with original and, to a certain extent, unexpected findings, and will become an unmissable starting point for scholars aiming at developing further investigations on the same topics. the special issue consists of six research articles, analysing the election and its outcomes from different perspectives and covering different topics: from the new electoral system to the electoral campaign and the use of media; from candidate selection and characteristics to the electoral results and the new parliamentary class. notwithstanding the different approaches, all the articles share a predominantly empirical focus: they all present original data with the purpose of providing a fresh, descriptive (but theorygrounded) account of what happened on 4 march. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 3 content and findings of the special issue to begin with, the article by alessandro chiaramonte and roberto d’alimonte focuses on the features of the new mixed-member electoral system introduced at the end of the past legislature, the so-called rosatellum. this contribution is, to the best of my knowledge, the first scientific analysis of the new italian electoral law and its effects after its first application. the article first highlights the political reasons behind the approval of the law – the fourth electoral reform in italy in the last 25 years – then reviews the characteristics of the new system and the incentives and constraints it provides to voters and parties. specifically, it focuses on the effects of the new rules on the election outcome, by testing whether the rosatellum acted more as a proportional or a majoritarian system. in this regard, chiaramonte and d’alimonte find mixed results. indeed, the building of pre-electoral coalitions witnesses the clear effect on parties’ strategic coordination with the purpose of winning seats in single-member districts. however, this majoritarian logic had only a limited impact on voters’ behaviour, as the impossibility of a split-ticket vote, the lack of information about candidates and their competitiveness and the large size of the districts led voters to vote for their preferred party instead of casting a strategic vote. finally, the article assesses the level of disproportionality of the new electoral system. overall, the distortion in the translation of votes into seats has been limited, making the rosatellum closer to proportional systems than to majoritarian ones. interestingly though, the authors find that this limited disproportionality is the result of the sharp geographical pattern of voting: the electoral system has produced relevant disproportionality both in the north (in favour of the centre-right) and in the south (in favour of the m5s). therefore, the system has produced a remarkable majoritarian effect, but such disproportionality at the national level has been cancelled out by these contrasting geographical patterns. the features of the new electoral system have influenced the coalition building process and all the choices related to the electoral supply, from the number of party lists to the use of multiple candidacies, up to the traits of candidates, with particular regard to their gender (given the gender-quota rules provided by the electoral law). in this respect, the article by andrea pedrazzani, luca pinto and paolo segatti investigates the characteristics of the italian candidates running for a seat in the chamber of deputies in 2018 and compares them with those who have stood for office from 1976 onwards. the results show that the electoral system has played a role in balancing the population of the italian would-be deputies in terms of gender and, thanks to the re-introduction of a plurality quota, has reduced the overall number of lists and candidates. nevertheless, the number of those who run for office without any reasonable possibility of obtaining a parliamentary seat is still very high in comparative perspective. according to the authors, this finding is interesting as it testifies to the fact that there are still many who aspire to become part of the political elite in spite of the negative climate towards politics and politicians’ privileges well rooted in italian society and widely exploited by the media. moreover, this finding suggests also that simplistic rationalistic accounts based on the analysis of institutionally-determined benefits and costs cannot fully account for the propensity of italian citizens to enter the electoral arena. furthermore, other features of the candidates display some novelties compared to the past, albeit not necessarily related to the electoral system change. first, due to a mix of factors, among which the decision emanuele, introduction to the special issue 4 of the m5s to limit the renovation of their ruling class and rely on a cohort of experienced parliamentarians, the turnover rate of candidates was lower than in 2013, with 20% of candidates having participated in at least one election in the past. second, the number of multiple candidacies was more limited than in the elections held under the calderoli law and was used as a ‘parachute’ to secure the election of some prominent (but not so popular) politicians. beyond the role played by the electoral system and the characteristics of the candidates, the electoral campaign was decisive in boosting the political messages of parties and leaders. it was a short campaign, characterized by the scarcity of resources available for parties, due to the abolition of the electoral refunds approved in 2013. for such reasons, as cristopher cepernich and roberta bracciale argue in their article, social media have acquired greater importance compared to the past. thus, they refer to it as a ‘hybrid campaign’, characterised by the intersection between traditional media (tv, radio, press) and new digital media (internet). their article analyses and measures the communication strategy of the main italian leaders and political parties on twitter (conceivable as the platform of intra-élite relationships) and facebook (the platform of extra-élite relationships) through the use of a large amount of data and indicators concerning the social media activity of parties and leaders. the shift from a more traditional media system to a hybrid one seems to have favoured some parties more than others. in particular, the league and its leader matteo salvini seem to have benefitted from their massive use of social media: according to the data shown by cepernich and bracciale, the lega has been the most productive and skilled political actor, namely the best in the broadcasting of its (top-down) messages and the most competent in using different features of the social media platform. this general result is indirectly confirmed by the analysis performed by giuliano bobba and franca roncarolo, who focus on the comparison between populist and nonpopulist communication on facebook. by relying on the bulk of literature on populism and starting from the theory-grounded expectation that populist actors have been favoured through proliferation on social media, the authors test whether populist messages and, more generally, populist leaders, tend to have more success than non-populist ones on facebook. they find not only that posts containing populist claims get more likes than non-populist ones, but that this is particularly true for those messages including references to immigrants, namely what bobba and roncarolo define as ‘complete and excluding populism’. moreover, this polarization between parties and leaders employing populist messages (lega, but also the m5s and fratelli d’italia) and actors employing non-populist messages (pd, leu and, to a lesser extent, forza italia) has affected the entire political-media system. populist parties and leaders have used their messages for mobilizing the electorate and allowing simplification of the political debate to we (the people) vs. them (the outgoing, corrupt, pd-led political class). non-populist parties were not ready to implement the effective countermeasures. this innovative and polarizing campaign, of course, is likely to have affected the outcome of the election and the success of the two populist anti-establishment parties (i.e., the m5s and the lega). in this regard, the article by aldo paparo, besides the indispensable analysis and interpretation of the electoral results – including the study of the geographical patterns of competition in single-member districts – provides an investigation into the who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 5 underlying dynamics of the vote. in particular, paparo focuses on survey data to detect the socio-demographic characteristics of the four major parties’ electorate. the m5s is confirmed as the most socially cross-cutting party, having become very strong even among public-sector employees, a former stronghold of the pd, which is instead significantly overrepresented only among the elderly and retired people. consistent with expectations, the league is particularly strong among the self-employed and blue-collars while, quite surprisingly, forza italia is the second most-voted party among the unemployed, after the m5s. through the use of original ecological analyses of the transition matrices in 11 italian cities, paparo then looks at the electoral shifts between 2013 and 2018. in a context of relevant voters’ electoral mobility (confirmed in the aggregate by the very high level of electoral volatility, see emanuele 2018b), two main phenomena emerge. between 2013 and 2018 there were substantial movements of voters from the centre-left to the m5s, who, in turn, lost relevant portions of its voters to the league. finally, besides the electoral results and voting patterns, another important outcome of the election took place at parliamentary level, with the election of a renewed parliamentary class. in this respect, eugenio salvati and michelangelo vercesi analyse the legislative turnover – conceived as the percentage of new mps out of total membership, compared to the previous legislature – in the italian parliament and its determinants. they adopt a longitudinal perspective, by focusing on the general elections held since 1994 and disentangle their analysis across the main italian parties. empirical evidence shows that legislative turnover has been very high in 2018, with roughly two-thirds of new mps compared to the previous legislature. moreover, the turnover has involved all parties, irrespective of their electoral performance. as far as the determinants of legislative turnover are concerned, they find that the prominent legislative turnover recorded in 2018 – comparable to that in other two turbulent elections, namely in 1994 and 2013 – is not fully accounted for by those factors that are traditionally highlighted by the literature on the topic (i.e., systemic factors), such as high electoral volatility, the emergence of new parties, or the presence of new electoral rules. conversely, the main explanatory factors of the 2018 election have to be sought at intraparty level. salvati and vercesi find that how parties work and organize, selection criteria, and leadership styles seem to influence the degree of renewal in the party’s parliamentary class. between 2013 and 2018 all the main parties excepting forza italia changed their party leader and allowed for a strengthening of leaders’ control over nominations: therefore, the high turnover could be explained by the leaders’ will to form reliable parliamentary groups in the chamber of deputies. what are the prospects for the italian political system? to sum up, the articles of this special issue highlight many interesting results regarding the evolution of the italian political system after the general election of 2018. these pieces of research will stimulate further investigation along a number of different lines, from political communication to voting behaviour up to the study of the institutional framework. however, we are aware that the main findings included in the articles of this special issue are unable to provide the final word on the ultimate direction the italian political system will take in the near future. this is because, given the persistent state of electoral fluidity and ‘party system de-institutionalization’ (chiaramonte and emanuele, introduction to the special issue 6 emanuele 2017; 2018), italian politics and, more specifically, parties, leaders and the interactions between them, can change or evolve in unexpected directions in a relatively short period. at the time of writing, it appears that this process of change may lead in one of two alternative directions: either a consolidation of the tripolar party system that has emerged since 2013 or the start of a new bipolar phase in italian politics. even though the final result of this process of change is still very unclear, it is likely that it will be affected by two different, albeit interrelated factors. the first change is a possible new electoral reform, which may soon be placed on the political agenda. while a more proportional new electoral system might favour the consolidation of the existing tripolar configuration, a shift towards a majoritarian system may lead to a new bipolar setting. the second driver of change is linked to the consequences of the new government formed by the m5s and the lega. such a coalition agreement has brought to power the two main anti-establishment parties and has put the two mainstream parties, the pd and forza italia, together in opposition for the first time since 1994. if this new schema lasts beyond the time of this government, expanding to the local level or becoming a structural pattern of competition also in subsequent elections, it is clear that it will reshape the italian party system in a completely new direction, creating a novel bipolar phase based on the ‘globalization cleavage’ (kriesi et al. 2012; hooghe and marks 2018). references bordignon, f. and ceccarini, l. (2013), ‘five stars and a cricket. beppe grillo shakes italian politics’, south european politics and society, 18(4): 427-449. bosco, a. and verney, s. (2012) ‘electoral epidemic: the political cost of the economic crisis in southern europe, 2010–11’, south european society and politics, 17(2): 129–154. bosco, a. and verney, s. (2016) ‘from electoral epidemic to government epidemic: the next level of the crisis in southern europe’, south european society and politics, 21(4): 383-406. chiaramonte, a. and l. de sio (eds) (2014), terremoto elettorale. le elezioni politiche del 2013, bologna: il mulino. chiaramonte, a. and emanuele, v. (2014) ‘bipolarismo addio? il sistema partitico tra cambiamento e de-istituzionalizzazione’, in terremoto elettorale. le elezioni politiche del 2013, in a. chiaramonte and l. de sio (eds.), bologna, il mulino, pp. 233-262. chiaramonte, a. and emanuele v. (2017) ‘party system volatility, regeneration and de-institutionalization in western europe (1945-2015)’, party politics, vol. 23(4): 376-388. chiaramonte, a. and emanuele, v. (2018), ‘towards turbulent times: measuring and explaining party system (de-) institutionalization in western europe (1945–2015)’, italian political science review, doi: 10.1017/ipo.2017.27. emanuele, v. (2018a), ‘il peggior risultato di sempre della sinistra italiana, la seconda più debole d’europa’, italian centre for electoral studies, 5 march 2018 https://cise.luiss.it/cise/ 2018/03/05/il-peggior-risultato-di-sempre-della-sinistra-italiana/. emanuele, v. (2018b) ‘dataset of electoral volatility and its internal components in western europe (1945-2015)’, cise, new data release 2 may 2018, http://cise.luiss.it/cise/dataset-ofelectoral-volatility-and-its-internal-components-in-western-europe-1945-2015/. emanuele, v. and chiaramonte, a. (2016) ‘a growing impact of new parties: myth or reality? party system innovation in western europe after 1945’, party politics, doi:10.1177/1354068816678887. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 7 emanuele, v. and marino, b. (2018), ‘the eu nightmare comes to life: italian populist forces above 50%’, who governs, 7 march 2018, https://whogoverns.eu/the-eu-nightmarecomes-to-life-italian-populist-forces-above-50/. hernández, e. and kriesi, h. (2016), ‘the electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in europe’, european journal of political research, 55: 203–24. hobolt, s. b., and tilley, j. (2016), ‘fleeing the centre: the rise of challenger parties in the aftermath of the euro crisis’, west european politics, 39(5): 971-991. hooghe, l., and marks, g. (2018), ‘cleavage theory meets europe’s crises: lipset, rokkan, and the transnational cleavage’, journal of european public policy, 25(1): 109-135. kriesi, h., grande, e., dolezal, m., helbling, m., höglinger, d., hutter, s., & wüest, b. (2012), political conflict in western europe, cambridge: cambridge university press. kriesi, h. (2017), ‘the great recession: a critical juncture for the structuration of european party systems?’, paper presented at the itanes seminar, university of siena, 13 november 2017. maggini, n. (2014), ‘understanding the electoral rise of the five star movement in italy’, czech journal of political science, 21: 37-59. tarchi, m. (2018) ‘voters without a party: the ‘long decade’ of the italian centre-right and its uncertain future’, south european society and politics, 23(1): 147–162. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_3_pansardi_pinto.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 3 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 3, 241–256. contact author: pamela pansardi, university of pavia. e-mail address: pamela.pansardi@unipv.it candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy pamela pansardi university of pavia luca pinto university of bologna abstract political parties play the most prominent role in shaping the gender composition of parliaments. through political recruitment, parties might act in such ways as to promote or hinder gender equality in terms of women’s chances of accessing parliamentary seats. while external factors, such as the electoral system and the presence of legislated gender quotas, have been widely studied as affecting parties’ attitudes towards gender equality, candidate selection procedures are one of the most important, although still understudied, features internal to party organisation that have an impact on women’s representation. by taking the italian 2013 elections as a case study, our empirical analysis shows that inclusive selection methods, such as open primaries, increase female candidates’ chances of getting elected in comparison to other, more exclusive methods, such as selection by party leadership. 1. introduction he claim for an equal representation of women in political institutions in italy has entered the debate quite forcefully in the last few decades. yet, as witnessed by the recent composition of the draghi government (13th february 2021), which includes only eight female ministers out of a total of twenty-three, gender balance in representation is far from constituting a well-established feature of italian politics. the prominent role of political parties in the promotion or hindering of gender equality in political representation is widely recognized (kittilson 2006; norris and lovenduski 1995). since candidate selection procedures, list ordering and safe-seat placement are in the hands of political parties, party gatekeeping (norris and lovenduski 1995; kunovich and paxton 2005; pansardi and vercesi 2017) is frequently called into question as one of the main explaining factors of the reproduction of gender differences in political representation. parties’ electoral strategies are generally understood as shaped by a set of external and internal constraints that have an independent effect on gender equality in representation. however, while external factors, such as the characteristics of the electoral system and the presence of legislated gender quotas, have been widely studied as affecting parties’ attitudes towards gender equality in representation, parties' internal factors, such as intra-party dynamics and candidate selection methods, are a far less studied topic (kittilson 2006; gauja and cross 2015). t candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 242 candidate selection procedures are one of the most important features of party organisation that have an impact on women’s representation. according to the seminal work of rahat and hazan (2001), parties can opt for a fully inclusive candidate selection process, which may involve participation and voting by party members at the local level, or even be open to the entire national electorate, as in the case of open primary elections. on the other hand, parties can give party leaders and elites a good deal of discretionary power, adopting highly centralized procedures for selecting candidates and compiling and ordering lists. however, there is contrasting evidence in the literature about the impact of inclusive versus exclusive candidate selection procedures on women’s representation. in this article, we are interested in ascertaining whether different candidate selection procedures affect female candidates’ chances of getting elected, taking the 2013 italian election as a case study. the electoral system in place in 2013 consisted in a proportional system with majority bonus and was characterized by blocked electoral lists for each of the 26 multi-member constituencies in the lower chamber, with the order of candidates decided by each party before the elections. the main reason for selecting this case lies in the fact that 2013 showed an unprecedented and unreplicated variety of methods of candidate selection, led by the adoption of largely inclusive selection procedures by three of the main competing parties, the democratic party (pd), left, ecology and freedom (sel) and the five star movement (m5s) (lanzone and rombi 2014; seddone and venturino 2013; sandri, seddone and venturino 2015). with almost all parties returning to centralized selection procedures in the 2018 election, the 2013 election is a unique case worth investigating. by relying on original data from the 2013 italian candidates survey (di virgilio et al. 2015; di virgilio and segatti 2016), we empirically study whether selection procedures have different effects on male and female candidates’ electoral vulnerability − i.e., uncertainty about their election prospects − and consequently on their chances to be elected. in particular, unlike previous studies which found mixed evidence of the effect of inclusive versus exclusive candidate selection methods on women’s representation by studying the share of female candidates in party lists (matland and studlar 1996; kittilson 2006; aldrich 2020; pruysers and cross 2016), we shift our unit of analysis to individual candidates, linking candidate selection procedures to subjective and objective measures of vulnerability to electoral defeat. accordingly, by studying the impact of party choices on list or district placement (rahat, hazan and katz 2008; guaja and cross 2015), we provide a more fine-grained analysis of the effect of candidate selection methods on women’s representation. the article is organized as follows. in the next section, we present our theoretical framework and introduce our hypotheses about the effect of candidate selection procedures on the electoral vulnerability of female candidates. in the second section, we introduce our case study, which focuses on the examination of the effects of selection procedures on candidates’ electoral vulnerability in multi-member districts in the 2013 italian general election. in the third section, we introduce our data operationalization and methods and in the fourth we present and discuss our empirical findings. lastly, we conclude by assessing our results in the light of our main theoretical assumptions. pansardi and pinto 243 2. political party gatekeeping and candidate selection women’s under-representation in national parliaments is frequently explained, in international literature, by looking at two different, though intertwined, aspects. on the one hand, since candidate selection procedures, list ordering and safe-seat placement are in the hands of political parties, gendered party gatekeeping (norris and lovenduski 1995; kunovich and paxton 2005) is frequently called into question as one of the main explaining factors of the reproduction of gender differences in political representation. party gatekeeping refers to the ‘barriers of entrance’ placed by long-term party members (kittilson 2006), who detain most of the party’s political resources, against groups of newcomers − such as aspiring female politicians − who might threaten their privileged position within the party and/or their parliamentary seat. on the other hand, voters might show unfavourable attitudes towards female candidates (sanbonmatsu 2002; pansardi and pinto 2020), accordingly affecting women’s descriptive representation both directly and indirectly: directly, by penalizing female candidates vis-a-vis male candidates at the ballot; indirectly, by influencing parties’ candidate selection strategies and negatively affecting the promotion of female candidates. intra-party dynamics, however, such as candidates’ selection methods, might have an independent effect on women's representation. while the literature agrees on assuming an effect of candidate selection procedures on women’s representation, no agreement is to be found on the direction of the effect. rahat, hazan and katz (2008) suggest the negative effect of more inclusive selection methods − such as open primaries − on gender balance in representation. this is so because open primary elections may suffer from gender-biased voting as much as general elections. moreover, the electorate choices in primary elections might be influenced by the effect of incumbency and candidate visibility and reputation as much as in national elections, thus negatively affecting possible female newcomers. on the other hand, centralized selection by the party leadership might positively affect women’s representation, because party leaders might choose to endorse gender equality either as a genuinely recognized political value (kittilson 2006) or as an electoral strategy (matland and studlar 1996). between the two sides of the continuum, selection by party members − at the local or central level − is, according to rahat, hazan and katz (2008), the candidate selection method that might have the most negative effect on women’s representation. it is so because local and central party members are those whose privileges and power resources − and, potentially, whose parliamentary seats − are those most directly threatened by groups of newcomers such as aspiring female politicians (kittilson 2006; pruysers and cross 2016). however, recent literature (luhiste 2015; aldrich 2020) has effectively problematized the link between the exclusivity of the selection method and the promotion of gender balance in parliament. according to aldrich (2020), more exclusive selectorates would be more effective in promoting women’s representation only if there were an actual commitment to gender equality on the part of the party central elites. the results of previous studies on the role of selection procedures on women’s representation are thus not conclusive: if party leadership is committed to a gender equality strategy, an exclusive selection process might be more effective as primary elections may replicate gender biased choices observed in the electorate (rahat, hazan and katz 2008). on the contrary, candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 244 inclusive selection procedures can be more helpful in promoting women’s representation in the event that party leadership is less favourable towards gender balance than voters at large or party members (kittilson 2006; matland and studlar 1996). accordingly, we present two alternative hypotheses: h1a. the more exclusive the party selectorate, the less vulnerable female candidates are to electoral defeat; h1b. the more exclusive the party selectorate, the greater the vulnerability of female candidates to electoral defeat. 3. the italian 2013 election as a case study in order to test whether women candidates are favoured or penalised by different selection procedures, we choose to focus on the 2013 italian general election instead of the most recent one (2018). there are three reasons for this choice. first, there is almost no variance between candidate selection procedures in the 2018 election: most parties centralised the selection of candidacies both in single-member and multi-member districts, often ‘parachuting’ key candidates into safer districts, even in the absence of any link with the local constituency. the only party adopting an open selection procedure was the m5s, but only for candidates in the proportional tier. on the contrary, as mentioned in the introduction, in 2013 we observed, for the first time, a huge variation in selection procedures across parties according to the selectorates’ inclusiveness/exclusiveness dimension: from voters at large to party leadership. accordingly, the 2013 election is a unicum in terms of the variety of candidate selection methods used by parties and is thus the best test for assessing their effects on women's representation. secondly, the introduction of gender quotas in the 2018 election forced parties to increase the share of women in their lists and to alternate women and men in terms of list placement (donà 2018; regalia and legnante 2018; sampugnaro and montemagno 2020), mitigating, therefore, between-party differences in terms of the promotion of women candidates and making this case less suitable for our kind of study. thirdly, we have no individual level candidate data for the 2018 elections, while for 2013 we can take advantage of the data included in the italian candidates survey (ics). the ics collected original survey data with the aim of gaining new insights into the role of political elites, and specifically candidates in the italian general elections held in february 2013 (di virgilio et al. 2015; di virgilio and segatti 2016). focusing on the relationships between candidates, parties and voters, the ics covers several topics, including the candidate selection process.1 in particular, the ics directly asked candidates who made the decision about their nomination and at what level the decision was made. the replies to these questions allow us to operationalise the two main dimensions of the selection process identified by rahat and hazan (2001) and can be helpful in mapping selection procedures – which are often informal and occur in a non-standardised way − across parties and candidates. the ics includes answers from a representative selection 1 the ics is part of the comparative candidates survey project, a cross national elite survey, which combines an internationally agreed core questionnaire and a locally adapted set of questions that try to capture the specifics of the national political and electoral systems. pansardi and pinto 245 of 672 candidates from the main political parties.2 accordingly, by relying on original data from the 2013 ics, we empirically study whether selection procedures have different effects on male and female candidates’ electoral vulnerability, and consequently on their chances of being elected. 4. data and methods parties’ candidate selection procedures constitute the main independent variable of our study. rahat and hazan (2001) provided a typology of candidate selection procedure based on two dimensions: the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of selectorates and the level of nomination. the first dimension varies from a pole coinciding with the entire electorate to that of a restricted élite. the second dimension varies depending on whether the selection of candidates is entrusted to a national body or to decentralised, regional or local bodies. based on these two main characteristics of the selection process, we produced a sixpoint selection index for each candidate by combining survey responses to two questions in the ics. firstly, in order to measure the exclusivity of the selectorate, each candidate was asked who made the decision for her/his nomination, coding the answers in four ways: voters at large; party members; an assembly of delegates of my party; party leadership. secondly, in order to identify the degree of centralisation of the selection process, each potential representative was asked at what level the decision about her/his nomination was made. the answers were then classified according to two categories: local or national level. bridging together candidates’ individual responses to both questions, we created a six-point index of selection, in which the lowest level was ascribed to candidates selected with the most inclusive and decentralized selection mechanism: selection by voters at large at the local level. the next category depicts an internal procedure in which candidates were selected by party members at local level. the next two categories represent more informal selection processes in which candidates were selected by party elites either at the local or the national level. finally, the last two categories describe selection procedures ruled by party leaders with or without local incentives (see table 1).3 table 1. selection index value category 1 voters at local level 2 party members at local level 3 party delegates at local level 4 party delegates at national level 5 party leadership at local level 6 party leadership at national level note: the selection index combines the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the selectorate and the level at which the nomination was made. 2 for a discussion about response rates and the representativeness of the selection of candidates see di virgilio et al. (2015). 3 see shomer (2009) for a similar index applied to the case of israel. candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 246 it is worth noting that higher values of the selection index are related not only to different candidate selection procedures, but also to different incentives to cultivate a personal versus party reputation (carey and shugart 1995). when the party leadership has the final say in all the stages from recruitment to final selection, candidates’ re-election depends exclusively on party decisions. conversely, in open primaries, candidates are directly responsible for their final selection and thus re-election. figure 1 shows the distribution of the selection index computed by combining the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of selectorates and the level of nomination measured at the candidate’s level across the parties included in our analysis. the recruitment of candidates in the italian political system has long been concentrated in the hands of a few leaders, albeit with some differences in the degree of decentralisation of the selection process between the various parties. as mentioned above, the 2013 elections, however, contributed to breaking this pattern, since the m5s, the pd and sel organised a mechanism for the selection of potential representatives based on primary elections with very different characteristics in terms of both selectorate inclusivity and the degree of decentralisation of the selection process (regalia and valbruzzi 2016; sandri, seddone and venturino 2015; venturino and seddone 2017).4 with respect to the first aspect, the m5s primaries were characterised by a greater degree of exclusivity than those of the pd and sel, limiting the vote only to party members. as a matter of fact, the m5s restricted the possibility of participating in the vote for the choice of candidates to those registered on the party’s website before 2012 (just over 30,000 people). on the contrary, pd and sel opted for a more inclusive strategy, extending participation to voters at large. more precisely, the pd and sel allowed not only registered members to vote, but also all those who had participated in the november 2012 primaries to choose the leader of the centre-left coalition (a pool of more than three million people). as regards the degree of decentralisation of the selection process, in all three parties the candidates were chosen at the local level, with a more or less marked involvement of the national leadership. in the m5s, candidate lists were proposed at the local level, but they required the final approval of the leader beppe grillo. national leadership had the authority to not validate the lists if they did not meet the very strict party requirements regarding eligibility to stand as a candidate. according to m5s' eligibility requirements, candidates were chosen from among party members who were at least 25 years old, had no legal debts, and who were resident in the constituency in which they competed. finally, candidacy was only open to those who had previously run without being elected in the local or regional elections in which the m5s competed between 2008 and 2012. sel and pd opted instead for provincial lists with less stringent candidacy requirements. however, the national party leadership of the two parties reserved the right to nominate one candidate for every ten outside the mechanism of the primaries.5 finally, there are differences between the three parties as regards the type of ballot used for the primaries that can be relevant for our analysis. the pd and sel ensured 4 the svp – a minor regional party – also organized a primary election in the context of the 2013 election (see seddone and venturino 2017 for more information). 5 the candidates indicated by the national leadership were placed in safe positions, so much so that only 67% and 51% of those elected to the chamber of deputies by pd and sel respectively were actually selected through the primaries (pinto and pedrazzani 2015). pansardi and pinto 247 gender balance by using a legal provision that allowed voters to express two preferences, one for a male and one for a female candidate. the m5s allowed up to three preferences without any formal provision on gender balance. the other parties included in our analysis opted instead for more informal procedures characterised by a high level of centralization and direct involvement of the party leadership in candidate selection. figure 1. candidates’ selection procedures across parties (2013) party acronyms: cd (centro democratico, democratic centre); fdi (fratelli d’italia, brothers of italy); pdl (popolo della libertà; people of freedom); ln (lega nord, northern league); m5s (movimento 5 stelle, five star movement); pd (partito demoratico, democratic party); riv (rivoluzione civile; civil revolution); sc (scelta civica, civic choice); sel (sinistra, ecologia e libertà, left, ecology and freedom); svp (südtiroler volkspartei, south tyrol peoples party); udc (unione di centro, union of the centre). source: own elaboration. in this study, we use the selection index described above in combination with candidate gender as our main independent variables in order to investigate whether women candidates are advantaged or disadvantaged by exclusive versus inclusive selection mechanisms. unlike previous studies (kittilson 2006; pruysers and cross 2016; aldrich 2020), in this article we do not investigate the effect of candidate selection procedures by relating it to the share of female candidates, but we explore parties’ electoral strategies and potential gatekeeping more closely by looking at actual candidates' chances of getting elected in terms of electoral vulnerability: i.e., in terms of the impact of party choices on list or district placement. while a candidate’s own perception of her chances of getting elected can constitute a proxy of her actual chances, in this study we include both subjective and objective measures of electoral vulnerability. in particular, to assess women’s chances of getting candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 248 elected, we follow rahat, hazan and katz (2008) and, together with a measure based on the ics data, we include a measure based on list position and seat safety. by assuming a stronger commitment to gender equality by those parties that place women in higher positions on the electoral list and in districts where they expect a larger share of votes, we are able to directly relate the party candidate selection procedure with their party gatekeeping strategy. given the nature of the electoral system used in the 2013 election − a bonus-adjusted proportional system with closed lists – we accordingly use as dependent variables two measures of electoral vulnerability (andré, depauw and martin 2015). our first measure concerns subjective electoral vulnerability and is based on ics data with regard to candidates’ expectations about their chances of winning the election. in particular, candidates were asked to rate their uncertainty about their election prospects on a scale ranging from (1) ‘i thought i could not lose’ to (5) ‘i thought i could not win’. higher values on this question correspond, therefore, to a greater perception of vulnerability. although the perception of precariousness is strongly associated with actual measures of vulnerability, we also include in our analysis an objective electoral vulnerability indicator which reflects several features that can shape candidates’ likelihood of being elected: list position, district magnitude and the seats won by parties in each district.6 higher values of the objective indicator correspond to greater vulnerability. the relationship between gender and selection on the one hand, and vulnerability on the other hand, is evaluated taking into account several covariates that are assumed to affect the latter. the use of survey data often allows a fine-grained operationalisation of the control variables. at the individual level, we first include a categorical variable associated to candidates’ political experience. combining questions related to prospective legislators’ previous experience in elected institutions at the national or local level, we created a typology in which candidates are classified according to four categories: no political experience, experience only at the local level, experience both at the local and national level, or finally experience at the national level exclusively (pinto and verzichelli 2016). second, we include a four-point index measuring candidates’ level of education (1 = middle school, 2 = high school, 3 = university degree, 4 = master or phd). third, we add a variable measuring candidates’ age in number of years. fourth, we compute a four-point index of localness according to whether a candidate is: neither born nor located in the district (1), born but not located in the district (2), not born but located in the district (3), born and located in the district (4) (marangoni and tronconi 2011). the higher the value of the index, the greater should be candidates’ local bonds. finally, we include a covariate measured at the district level controlling for the log-transformed value of district magnitude (carey and shugart 1995). table 2 reports descriptive statistics by parties of the variables described above. we do not directly incorporate party dummies, but we control for party differences and potential unobserved factors by computing random intercepts at the party level. 6 in order to compute electoral vulnerability in closed list proportional systems, we use the following formula: 𝐿 𝑀(𝑆 + 1)⁄ , where l is the candidate list position, s is the seats won by the party to which the potential legislator belongs, and m is the district magnitude. we add a one to the denominator in order to take into account those parties included in the ics which did not win any seat (pinto 2016). for a further discussion about the computation of electoral vulnerability in plurality and proportional systems with open or closed lists see andré, depauw and martin (2015). pansardi and pinto 249 table 2. descriptive statistics by parties. % of female among respondents sub./obj. vulnerability selection (mean) career (mode) education (mean) age (median) localness (mean) cd 14 4.25/0.26 3.66 no exp. 2.69 52 3.39 fdi 19 4.21/0.28 3.94 local politicians 2.68 45 3.84 pdl 21 3.86/0.12 3.62 local politicians 2.70 47 3.73 ln 28 4.10/0.12 3.52 local politicians 2.44 45 3.90 m5s 13 3.72/0.11 2.00 no exp. 2.54 38 3.77 pd 45 3.17/0.04 1.20 local politicians 2.81 50 3.57 riv 40 4.31/0.35 4.05 no exp. 2.76 52 3.49 sc 16 3.91/0.14 4.19 no exp. 2.81 50 3.57 sel 39 4.28/0.13 0.72 local politicians 2.67 50 3.67 svp 0 4.33/0.10 2.00 local politicians 3.00 48 4.00 udc 33 3.94/.22 4.00 local politicians 2.89 52 3.64 tot. 28 3.81/0.14 2.58 no exp. 2.70 47 3.65 source: own elaboration. 5. findings we perform our analysis using two multi-level models to account for the hierarchical structure of the data (i.e., candidates are clustered across different parties; for more details on the use of multilevel analysis, see rabe-hesketh and skrondal 2012). figure 2 presents the results of the multilevel models in a graphical way (see the appendix for regression tables). the left panel uses as a dependent variable the measure of subjective vulnerability; the right panel uses instead the objective measure of electoral vulnerability. the graph should be interpreted as follows: dots represent regression coefficient, while segments refer to 95 percent cis. when cis cross the zero-line, the covariates’ impact is not statistically significant. by contrast, when they are located on the right (left) of the origin, variables positively (negatively) influence candidates’ precariousness. in order to test whether or not women are penalised according to different selection procedures, we include in the models the interaction between gender and the selection index. as figure 2 shows that the interaction is statistically significant in both models, however, in order to assess its substantive impact we rely on graphical interpretation as suggested by brambor, clark and golder (2006). the dots in figure 3 represent the contrast between genders, i.e. the difference between the average value of vulnerability predicted for men and women, plotted against each value of the selection index. the segments represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. when the confidence intervals are both below or above the horizontal zero-line the difference is statistically significant. women candidates are more vulnerable than male colleagues when dots are above the candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 250 origin; on the contrary, female prospective legislators are less precarious than male candidates when dots are below the zero-line. both the panels in figure 3 highlight that, other things being equal, women are significantly more vulnerable than men when candidates are selected either by party elites or the party leader at the national or local level (selection index = 4, 5, 6). substantially, these results support h1b, meaning that female potential legislators are located in more vulnerable positions in party lists than men when they are selected by a more exclusive selectorate. figure 2. assessing electoral vulnerability under different candidates’ selection procedures (2013) note: multi-level linear regression models. constant term and inter-party variance components are not reported. n = 658/663. omitted baseline category for political experience: no-experience. segments represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. source: own elaboration. while our results clearly indicate that exclusive selection procedures are associated with greater vulnerability of female potential legislators, they are less robust with regard to the impact of inclusive selection practices. the right panel of figure 3, which uses the measure of objective vulnerability, shows indeed that female candidates are favoured in comparison to men when selection is made with open primaries (selection index = 1).7 this result, however, is no more statistically significant when the measure of subjective vulnerability is used (left panel). notwithstanding, our analysis shows that candidate 7 these results should also be read in the context of the parties that promoted open selection procedures. as mentioned above, the pd and sel guaranteed gender balance employing a ‘double gender preference’. in the m5s primaries, on the other hand, all candidates with no political experience took part, thus negating any resource-based advantage for experienced male candidates. pansardi and pinto 251 selection procedures matter and are not completely neutral in relation to the promotion of women candidates.8 figure 3. contrast of electoral vulnerability between genders under different candidate selection procedures note: contrasts are computed holding constant the values of the other variables. source: own elaboration. among the control variables, as figure 2 shows, only a few covariates are strongly significant. other things being equal, experienced candidates are on average less vulnerable than prospective legislators without experience (the reference category). conversely, electoral precariousness is on average higher among candidates with stronger local bonds in the district. this result is in contrast with previous findings in the literature, as shugart, valdini and suominen (2005), in their comparative analysis of six european established democracies, showed that, contingent upon electoral rules, having been born in one’s district helps to win mandates. however, the same literature also underlines the importance of having gathered political experiences in district level electoral offices. our models, indeed, show that candidates with local experience are less vulnerable than those without experience. finally, both models emphasise that higher district magnitude implies, on average, a lower level of candidate vulnerability. 5. conclusions our study shows that different candidate selection procedures have different effects on female and male candidates’ electoral vulnerability. in particular, in contrast with rahat, hazan and katz (2008), our findings show that for female candidates selected by party leadership the chances of being elected are significantly worse than those of their male counterparts. by contrast, our work on the 2013 elections confirms the findings of 8 as suggested by berry, golder and milton (2012), we also test the other side of the interaction, i.e., the marginal impact of selection across genders. results confirm that as we move towards more centralized selection procedures, women’s vulnerability significantly increases, while men’s precariousness decreases. candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 252 other descriptive studies (regalia and valbruzzi 2016; venturino and seddone 2017) and shows that, for candidates selected by open primaries, women have a better chance of being elected than men. accordingly, evidence suggests that the selection procedure has an effect on parties’ electoral strategy that is different for male and female candidates. women candidates selected with exclusive methods are subject to party gatekeeping and are penalized in terms of list placement, thus affecting their chances of gaining a seat in parliament. the opposite is true in the case of women candidates selected with inclusive methods. not only does the negative effect of gender on list placement disappear in the case of female candidates selected by open primaries, but women candidates are promoted in comparison to their male counterparts. in this case, party gatekeeping is replaced by a gender positive bias, since parties exploit the primary-winning candidates’ visibility, reputation and personal resources gained through competition in primary elections by placing them in higher list positions. although our analysis takes into account unobserved party-related factors by estimating random intercepts at the party level, it is worth noting that two of the parties which adopted more inclusive selection procedures in the 2013 elections (pd and sel) belong to the centre-left and left of the political spectrum, which is generally associated with a more positive cultural and ideological attitude towards gender equality in representation (caul 1999; kittilson 2006; reynolds 1999; rule 1987). moreover, these two parties promoted gender balance in their primaries by allowing voters to vote for two candidates of different genders, and were the only ones to include statutory gender quotas for their participation in the 2013 elections. it is worth mentioning that these quotas only prescribed that no gender should appear on the lists for more than the 40% of times. accordingly, they had no direct effect on female candidates’ list placement in winnable list positions, and thus had no impact on reducing candidates’ electoral vulnerability. however, it is certainly an expression of a stronger commitment towards gender equality by the party leadership of these parties vis-a-vis their competitors. the elements reported above might affect female candidates’ electoral vulnerability and potentially interact with the effect of the selection procedures for pd and sel. however, this is not the case for the m5s, whose positioning on the left-right continuum is rather ambiguous and never included mechanisms such as quotas for the promotion of female candidates. the m5s is actually the party which, overall, greatly contributed to the femininization of the 2013 legislature by attesting a rate of 34.3% female mps − opposed to a mere 15.3% of female candidates on the electoral lists (pansardi and pedrazzani 2019). as a result of the online consultation for candidate selection (lanzone and rombi 2014), m5s members selected only a minority of female candidates, and yet, the majority of those selected were placed in winning position on the electoral lists. accordingly, while we can assume that for pd and sel ideological factors interact with candidate selection procedures in the promotion of female candidates, the selection procedure alone seems to be able to explain the strong positive results of the m5s in terms of women’s representation. overall, while international literature provides mixed evidence (aldrich 2020; gauja and cross 2015; luhiste 2015; pruysers and cross 2016; rahat, hazan and katz 2008) about the relation between selection procedures and women's representation, our pansardi and pinto 253 results are quite straightforward and show that more inclusive procedures grant women better chances of election. to offer more ground to attest the positive effect of inclusive selection methods on women’s representation further studies are needed, in particular, studies that go beyond the single national cases until now produced and offer a comparative perspective on this topic. while studies of this type are complicated by the paucity of cases in which inclusive procedures, such as open primaries, are used to select prospective parliamentary candidates − in particular, in proportional electoral systems − an assessment of the impact of selection methods on women’s representation can offer a further reason to students of party organization and gender politics to argue for more intra-party democracy. references aldrich, a.s. 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(2018). the new italian electoral system and its effects on strategic coordination and disproportionality. italian political science 13(1): 8–18. de lucia, f. and paparo, a. (2019). l’offerta elettorale tra regole nuove e conflitti vecchi e nuovi, in a. chiaramonte and l. de sio (eds), il voto del cambiamento. le elezioni politiche del 2018. bologna: il mulino, pp. 13−60. di virgilio, a. and segatti, p. (eds) (2016). la rappresentanza politica in italia. bologna: il mulino. di virgilio, a., giannetti, d., pedrazzani, a. and pinto, l. (2015). candidates in 2013 italian general election: evidence from the italian candidate survey. italian political science review/rivista italiana di scienza politica 45(3): 317–342. donà, a. (2018). eppur si muove. the tortuous adoption and implementation of gender quotas in conservative italy, in lépinard, é., & rubio-marín, r. (eds.) (2018). transforming gender citizenship: the irresistible rise of gender quotas in europe. cambridge university press, pp. 186-215. gauja, a. and cross, w. (2015). the influence of party candidate selection methods on candidate diversity. representation 51(3): 287-298. herrnson, p. s., lay, j. c. and stokes, a. k. (2003). women running “as women”: candidate gender, campaign issues, and voter-targeting strategies. journal of politics 65(1): 244– 255. candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 254 kittilson, m.c. (2006). challenging parties, changing parliaments: women and elected office in contemporary western europe. columbus: the ohio state university press. kunovich, s. and paxton, p. (2005). pathways to power: the role of political parties in women’s national political representation. american journal of sociology 111(2): 505552. lanzone, m. e. and rombi, s. 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(2018). nuovo sistema elettorale e scelta dei candidati: cosa è cambiato?, in m. valbruzzi and r. vignati (eds), il vicolo cieco. le elezioni del 4 marzo. bologna: il mulino, pp. 99–126. pansardi and pinto 255 pruysers, s., and cross, w. (2016). candidate selection in canada: local autonomy, centralization, and competing democratic norms. american behavioral scientist 60(7): 781-798. rabe-hesketh, s. and skrondal, a. (2012). multilevel and longitudinal modeling using stata, third edit.. college station, tx: stata press. rahat, g. and hazan, r. y. (2001). candidate selection methods: an analytical framework. party politics 7(3): 297–322. rahat, g., hazan, r. y. and katz, r. s. (2008). democracy and political parties: on the uneasy relationships between participation, competition and representation. party politics 14(6): 663–683. regalia, m. and legnante g. (2018). legge elettorale e rappresentanza di genere. 2018 annual conference of the italian political science association, turin, university of turin. regalia, m. and valbruzzi, m. (2016). with or without parliamentary primaries? some evidence from the italian laboratory. contemporary italian politics 8(1): 42–61. reynolds, a. (1999). women in the legislature and executives of the world: knocking at the highest glass ceiling. world politics 51(4): 547–72. rule, w. (1987). electoral systems, contextual factors and women’s opportunity for election to parliament in twenty-three democracies. western political quarterly 40(3): 477–98. sampugnaro, r. and montemagno, f. (2020) women and the italian general election of 2018: selection, constraints and resources in the definition of candidate profiles. contemporary italian politics 12:3, 329-349. sanbonmatsu, k. (2002). gender stereotypes and vote choice. american journal of political science 46(1): 20-34. sandri, g., seddone, a. and venturino, f. (2015). party primaries in comparative perspective. london: routledge. seddone a., and venturino f. (2013) bringing voters back in leader selection: the open primaries of the italian democratic party. modern italy, 18(3): 303-318. shomer, y. (2009). candidate selection procedures, seniority, and vote-seeking behavior. comparative political studies 42(7): 945–970. shugart, m. s., valdini, m. e. and suominen, k. (2005). looking for locals: voter information demands and personal vote-earning attributes of legislators under proportional representation. american journal of political science 49(2): 437–449. venturino, f. and seddone, a. (2017). winds of change: how primaries brought renewal to the italian parliament. quaderni dell'osservatorio elettorale, 78(2): 13–41. candidate selection procedures and women’s representation in italy 256 appendix table a1. assessing electoral vulnerability under different candidate selection procedures (2013) (1) (2) subjective vulnerability objective vulnerability female -0.214 -0.052* (0.203) (0.020) selection -0.109** -0.001 (0.039) (0.004) female x selection 0.133** 0.017** (0.051) (0.005) local politicians only -0.105 -0.035** (0.112) (0.011) national mps with local exp. -1.344** -0.085** (0.188) (0.019) national mps only -0.630* -0.083** (0.282) (0.028) education 0.017 -0.004 (0.060) (0.006) age 0.006 0.001 (0.004) (0.001) localness 0.235** 0.011+ (0.065) (0.007) district magnitude (ln) -0.166* -0.201** (0.080) (0.008) constant 3.834** 0.788** (0.546) (0.059) sd (party) 0.354*** 0.082*** (0.098) (0.021) sd (residual) 1.118*** 0.111*** (0.031) (0.004) aic 2060.059 -967.958 bic 2118.418 -909.500 n 658 663 note: multi-level regression models. omitted baseline category for political experience: no-experience. standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 microsoft word pdf_issue_12_1.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 1, june 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 1, pp. 29–35. two decades of political science research assessment: the dutch experience rudy b. andeweg leiden university a high level of acceptance today, there is a general acceptance of, or at least resignation about, dutch research assessments, whether in political science or in other disciplines. research assessment exercises started in the netherlands in 1993, and are held every six years. to a large extent, research assessments are a non-issue. in comparison to the experience of political scientists in many other countries, this may seem surprising, but several factors help account for this counter-intuitively high level of satisfaction. the single most important factor underlying the acceptance undoubtedly is the simple fact that the role of the government in organizing, administering and supervising the assessments is marginal. a recent report by an independent think tank concluded that nowhere in europe is the involvement of the government or other state actors as minimal as it is in the netherlands (van drooge et al. 2013). the universities alone are responsible for the assessments. the standard evaluation protocol (sep), which outlines the aims and procedures of the research assessments, has been developed by the dutch association of universities (vsnu) together with the dutch science foundation (nwo) and the royal academy of sciences (knaw), organizations that are beyond the direct control of the government. the introduction to the latest edition of the standard evaluation protocol (2014) mentions that it was presented to the minister of education, but merely out of politeness. neither the minister nor her civil servants had been involved in setting the evaluation criteria, and even the obligation to send a copy of each completed assessment exercise to the education minister has been dropped several years ago. the universities define the research units that are to be subjected to an assessment exercise; each university decides whether its research units will be assessed in a standalone exercise, or whether they will be part of a nation-wide comparative assessment of research in that particular discipline. the most recent political science research review (verdun et al 2014), for example, did not include the department of political science at radboud university nijmegen, because that university had opted for a stand-alone assessment of its political science research programme. the universities decide on the composition of the peer review committee that will conduct the assessment, as long as it is an international committee and its members have no conflict of interest with any of the departments, and often the university executives will delegate the search for committee andeweg, two decades of political science research assessment 30 members to representatives of the departments concerned. the universities also provide logistic and administrative support to the assessment committees, and through the dutch association of universities they have set up an independent agency qanu (quality assessment of netherlands’ universities) which specializes in offering such support. it is fair to conclude that the dutch research assessments are free from governmental interference. a second reason for the general acceptance of the research assessments is that they hardly have any direct consequences for the scholars whose work is evaluated. to some extent this is related to the lack of government interference. the government could still use the reports, which are made public, to shape its funding decisions, but it does not. even the universities do not attach direct consequences to the assessment outcomes. doing so would contravene the twin aims of the assessment exercises: accountability for the use of taxpayer money, and improvement of the research units involved. these aims are explicitly stated by the universities themselves, which limits their ability to punish a research unit for poor assessment results by reducing funding or closing down departments. the only direct consequence that i have been able to find is for the accreditation of research master programmes. in the netherlands, master programmes in all but a few disciplines are one year programmes. ministerial permission is required for the start of a two-year research master catering to selected talented students, primarily potential phd candidates. the minister bases such decisions on the recommendation of (re-)accreditation panels, and one of the criteria used is having obtained high scores in the most recent research assessment exercise. there are more indirect consequences. departments take the research assessments very seriously because they affect their reputation. getting a bad evaluation, or even a good evaluation that is significantly below the evaluations of other departments in the same discipline, has a negative effect on the department’s reputation, which is feared to weaken a department’s potential to recruit good phd candidates and faculty, and to weaken its potential to receive research grants from the science foundation. still, it would seem that the absence of direct sanctions helps explain the relative satisfaction. in the netherlands, there is a parallel scheme for the assessment of teaching quality, and there seems to be more concern about the nature and aims of those reviews. in any given six-year cycle, most departments will be evaluated twice, once on the quality of their research, and once on the quality of their teaching. although the teaching quality assessments are also organized by the universities themselves, the reports are used by the minister of education and her inspectorate. in 1994-1995, such an assessment report was used by the inspectorate and the minister to threaten to withdraw the accreditation of the bachelor programme in political science at radboud university nijmegen – a threat that was lifted only after the university promised major reforms. moreover, the outcomes of the teaching quality assessments are used by others, including commercial publishers, who draw up rankings of bachelor programmes to aid prospective students in choosing which university to go to. as the funding of universities, and of departments within universities, is largely determined by student numbers, a poor teaching quality assessment may have immediate effects on the intake of students, and thus on the funding, of departments. so the immediate consequences of the teaching quality assessments are much more important than those of the research quality assessments. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 31 criticisms the fact that research assessments are hardly controversial in dutch academia does not mean that there are no criticisms of aspects of the assessment exercises. some of the criticisms have led to adaptations in the regularly updated standard evaluation protocol, but on others the process has been less responsive. administrative burden a major complaint refers to the administrative burden. for each assessment, a department has to hand in a self-evaluation report. such a report should contain quantitative information on the research input and output, conforming to very specific standardized criteria. occasionally this requires collecting new data or transforming existing data to meet the standard evaluation protocol’s criteria – for example when a university employs different definitions of peer-reviewed/non-peer-reviewed publications, or national/international publications for its internal use. in addition, the self-evaluation report should contain a qualitative reflection by the department of its own research policy, publication strategy, etc. this should be presented in the form of a swot (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, and often prompts lengthy deliberation on finding the right balance between being honest and being strategic: being very honest makes it easy for the assessment committee to expose the department’s weaknesses; being too strategic may prompt the committee to distrust the self-evaluation and to dig deeper itself. an often used strategy to deal with this dilemma is to be quite honest about the department’s weaknesses, but to start reforms to address these weaknesses just before the committee arrives for its site visit. the site visit itself is disruptive for a department, but it is brief. more work awaits the department after the assessment report has been published, as most university administrations will request a follow-up report from the department to show what will be done with the committee’s recommendations. moreover, most universities fear the effects of a negative assessment on their reputation, and require departments to organize a midterm assessment themselves in order to be able to address any vulnerabilities before the real assessment takes place. although this is less burdensome than the real research assessment, it still requires compiling a selfevaluation document and discussing it with an external assessor, usually a trusted colleague from a university outside of the country. given the fact that assessments of research and teaching quality follow quite similar procedures, most departments have to write two self-evaluations, two follow up reports, and organize two midterm assessments in any given six-year cycle. nothing has been done to alleviate this administrative burden. the improvement/accountability dilemma as mentioned above, the stated aims of the dutch research assessments are accountability and improvement. these aims are not contested, but in practice they are difficult to reconcile. in terms of accountability it is necessary that the assessment reports are given wide publicity, and include the evaluations of all research units in a given discipline. this makes it easy for the interested taxpayers to see what was done with their money. but such public and comparative reports may lead to posturing by departments rather than to frank swot analyses in their self-evaluation reports. such reticent self-evaluations will hamper andeweg, two decades of political science research assessment 32 assessment committees in identifying weaknesses and developing useful suggestions for improvement. since 2003, universities are allowed to organize stand-alone research assessments, and an example of such an assessment exercise in political science was mentioned above. even if such non-comparative assessments are made public, they do not attract the same amount of attention that the comparative reports attract. it could well be argued that stand-alone reports are preferable in terms of searching for improvement of research quality as there is less need for a department to act strategically. however, this comes at a cost in terms of accountability. moreover, withdrawing from the national and comparative research assessment exercise is generally interpreted as an admission of weakness by one’s colleagues. nevertheless, the number of stand-alone research assessments has increased considerably. across all disciplines 222 research assessments have taken place between 1994 and 2012, 136 of which were confined to just one university or research unit (van drooge 2013: 7). in political science, with the exception mentioned, comparative assessment exercises are still the norm. one size fits all? originally, the assessment protocols made no allowance for differences between disciplines. the assessment criteria were largely based on what was customary in the technical and natural sciences. research assessments were not alone in having this bias towards a publication culture that favours journal articles over books, english-language over dutch-language publications, and multi-authored over single-authored publications. this bias has had a marked impact on the publication culture within political science. gradually, however, the protocols allow for greater variety and fine-tuning to the needs of the discipline being evaluated. in the most recent political science research assessment, for example, it was decided to use bibliometric data from google scholar rather than web of science, as the first has a better coverage of political science publications than the latter. a recent report of the royal netherlands academy of arts and sciences advocates to find a balance between uniform assessment criteria and taking into account the variety within the social sciences, by adopting a simple 2×3 table of assessment categories, and leaving it to each discipline to fill those categories with indicators that are relevant to that discipline (bensing et al. 2013). it is too early to say whether this recommendation will be implemented and assessment criteria will be furthered tailored to the publication culture and the specific needs of political science and the other social sciences. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 33 the problem of proxies research quality is a largely subjective concept for which no clear and generally accepted indicators are available. as a consequence, all indicators that are used in assessment exercises are proxies, and usually proxies of a quantitative nature: the number of publications, citation scores, the amount of external research funding, etc. there is increasing dissatisfaction with such quantitative criteria that almost by definition imply that ‘more is better’. the concern is that it will lead to strategic behavior: mutually adding colleagues as coauthors so that all members of the department have more publications. in at least one dutch political science department it has become the rule that the phd supervisor is automatically listed as a coauthor of all publications of the phd candidate. this led the most recent assessment committee to conclude that ‘there are questions for each of these institutes about whether phd candidates in their programmes should publish together with their supervisors (and if so whether those publications should form part of their dissertation work)’ (verdun et al. 2013: 13). here too there has been some responsiveness to those concerns. research units are asked to list what it considers its five best publications over the past six years, and assessment committees are expected to read them, although it is not always clear from the report that the committee actually did so. of the four quality indicators used so far: (scientific quality, scientific productivity, societal relevance, and viability), the most quantitative indicator – productivity – has been dropped, and research integrity has been added. outcome inflation? although the research units that are assessed do not complain, it is perceived by policy-makers as a problem that the average scores that are used to summarize a department’s research quality have gone up over the years, leaving very little variation between the research units that have been assessed. so far, the scores have been expressed on a scale of 1 to 5. on the indicator of quality, for example, the average score went up from 3.65 in the first assessment cycle in the 1990s to 4.39 in the most recent 2009-2015 cycle (van drooge 2013: 10). cynics might surmise that this increase is correlated to the increase in standalone assessments, but a comparison between the average scores used in comparative and in stand-alone assessments shows that this is not the case. in the most recent political science research assessment (verdun et al. 2014) the variation in scores across departments is indeed small: in response to what is perceived as ‘score inflation’, the scale has been redefined several times. from 1=poor, 2=unsatisfactory, 3=average, 4=good and 5=excellent, to 1=unsatisfactory, 2=satisfactory, 3=good, 4= very good and 5=excellent. in the next round the scale will be reversed and range from 4=unsatisfactory, 3=good, 2=very good, to 1= andeweg, two decades of political science research assessment 34 world leading. it is hoped that such changes will also produce more variation in the scores awarded to various research units. however, it is not clear whether the higher and more homogeneous scores indeed reflect score inflation. after all, it is one of the explicit aims of the research assessments to help improve the research quality at dutch universities. if, after over twenty years of research quality assessments, quality would not have improved, this would not reflect well on the utility of the whole exercise. similarly, as the room for improvement was greater for departments that started out with relatively low scores, it should not come as a surprise that there is less variation two decades later. impact as they hardly have any direct consequences, it is not possible to measure the impact of the research assessments. moreover, the introduction of research assessments in the early 1990s was but one element in the general professionalization of political science in the netherlands. this professionalization was not only imposed from above by research assessments, by reducing the income that universities receive from the state directly, making them more independent on the competition for external research funding, etc., but it has also been initiated from below, by political scientists who sought to maintain or strengthen their reputation in an increasingly international environment. a recent overview of the development of dutch political science is entitled ‘from politicization to professionalization’ (andeweg & vis 2015), and describes how professionalization has also been a reaction to political scientists growing tired of the ideological conflicts that plagued some of their departments (the two universities in amsterdam and nijmegen university in particular) from the 1960s to the 1980s. in that light, the undoubtedly positive outcome of professionalization and internationalization can only in part be attributed to the research assessments. the other side of the coin is that the downside of professionalization and internationalization can also be blamed only partially on the research assessments. one of these negative side effects is the shift in the publication culture towards co-authored englishlanguage articles in peer-reviewed journals. there are no intrinsic reasons for this shift from books to journals and for the increase in the average number of coauthors. it has less to do with increasing quality than with succumbing to the temptation to measure research quality by readily available bibliometric indicators. we have allowed ourselves to be taken hostage by a commercial firm: thomson reuters and its social science citation index! the trend to publish more internationally, i.e. in english, does not have only negative consequences. after all, an english language publication is accessible to a much wider readership than a publication in dutch, which brings a higher level of scrutiny and debate. this can only have beneficial consequences in terms of research quality. however, the shift in publishing from dutch to english, and the higher threshold to readers because of the more sophisticated methodology used, has also meant that political science plays a significantly less prominent role in public debate in the netherlands: science for science, rather than science for society. in the media, we see that historians and constitutional lawyers increasingly replace political scientists when journalists need expertise to explain current events. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 35 the changes that already have been made to the standard evaluation protocol, and the further changes that have been advocated, can be seen as efforts to address the negative effects of professionalization and internationalization: less emphasis on productivity and more attention to research integrity may help stop some of the strategic publishing choices that have emerged, and more attention to societal relevance may induce political scientists to invest in contributing to the domestic public debate by – also – writing in dutch and for a wider public. we shall see: the next assessment of research quality in political science is scheduled for 2019. references andeweg, r.b. and b. vis (eds) (2015), van politisering naar professionalisering; politicologie in nederland, oudewater: nkwp, 126 pp. bensing, j. , r. andeweg, ph. franses, b. meyer, c. prins, k. schuyt (2013), towards a framework for the quality assessment of social science research, amsterdam: royal netherlands academy of arts and sciences, 43 pp. standard evaluation protocol 2015-2021; protocol for research assessments in the netherlands (2014) association of universities in the netherlands (vsnu), royal netherlands academy of arts and sciences (knaw), netherlands organization for scientific research (nwo), 32 pp. van drooge, l., s. de jong, m. faber and d. westerheijden (2013), twintig jaar onderzoeksevaluatie; feiten & cijfers, rathenau instituut (www.rathenau.nl), 19 pp. verdun, a., d. farrell, o. gabriel, c. hay, h. heinelt, k.e. jørgensen, m. kenny (2014), research review political science 2007-2012, utrecht: qanu, 69 pp. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_2_memoli_dipastena.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 2 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 2, 137–156. contact author: vincenzo memoli, university of catania. e-mail address: memoli@unict.it migrants, religion, and politics: an imperfect combination. the strange case of italians in times of migration vincenzo memoli university of catania maria pina di pastena university of molise abstract how do italians perceive immigrants? over the last twenty years, the issue of immigration has become increasingly relevant. with the intensification of landings, the issues connected to immigration have become elements of conflict and confrontation both in civil society and in politics. among the various determinants that explain attitudes towards immigration, religion appears to play a very important role in orienting public opinion. using some information collected by the european values survey (2012; 2016-2018) and adopting different regression models, it emerges that among catholics, a closed attitude towards immigrants prevails. nevertheless, something seems to have changed over time because when the religious practice of catholics intensifies, the anti-immigrant sentiment declines. a contraction of anti-immigrant sentiment is found also when practising catholics vote for a populist party. 1. introduction he issue of immigration, as hollifield (1997) argued at the end of the last millennium, is seen to be of great importance in many countries and occupies a central role in the agenda of the governments of eu member states (scheepers et al. 2002). since 2015, when massive flows of immigrants arrived in europe by crossing the mediterranean sea, public concern has increased, and immigration has become one of the two most important issues facing the eu (welsch and kuhling 2017). although immigration has been a central issue in many national elections, facilitating the rise of nationalist parties which gained support from those who saw immigrants as one of the principal problems in their country (harteveld 2017), voters remain misinformed about the issue (blinder 2015). even today, many citizens believe that the number of immigrants is higher than in reality and the fracture between reality and perception of migratory phenomena appears to have widened over the years. among italians, in 2018 the difference between the perceived and true share of immigrants was equal to 16 percentage points (26% perceived and 10% true; see alesina et al. 2018), while in 2019 the gap increased by another 5 percentage points (31 perceived and 9% true; ipsos 2019). t migrants, religion, and politics 138 the anti-immigrant attitude taking root among european countries is not new. more than a decade ago, reed (2006) showed that western democracies were becoming increasingly inhospitable and that voters were not convinced by government choices based on humanitarian principles. since then, few governments have tried to attenuate popular prejudice against immigrants, while the political class has tended to be reluctant toward reception measures. this is evident in countries such as denmark, finland, hungary, and slovenia, which have restricted their immigration policies, as well as in some host countries, where immigrants are seen as a problem for national culture (semyonov et al. 2008). only countries with more inclusive integration policies, such as sweden, have a lower perception of ethnic threat (see callens and meuleman 2017). religion is known to be a long-standing factor in politics and its impact on social and political processes has grown lately, especially where rigid migration policies have closed borders even to those fleeing conflicts (hatton 2011). in the last two decades, when the influx of immigrants and the complex social and political consequences thereof have been affecting europe’s ‘cultural, religious and humanist inheritance’ (the economist 2019), studies on the influence of religion have increased numerically. religions have many points in common, with charity, benevolence, and a long tradition of love for humanity shared by the islamic (rahaei 2012; elmadmad 2008), christian (groody 2009), and jewish (schulman and barkouki-winter 2000) religions, and the defence of refugees and those seeking asylum is at the basis of the principles that characterise both catholics and lutherans (see handlin 1951). in europe, churches provide the social structure to support ethnic communities, promoting the structural assimilation of immigrants and their children, showing a broad competence in interreligious dialogue, and easing the religious and cultural tensions surrounding immigrants in europe (see permoser et al. 2010). however, the debate continues as to whether religion is a source of intolerance and exclusion (brewer et al. 2010), a means to achieving peace and unity (little 2007) or a two-sided janus (appleby 1999). how does religious belief affect anti-immigrant sentiment in italy? immigration is not a stable phenomenon, and it changes over time. studies examining the connection between religion and sentiment towards immigrants adopt different measures of religiosity and use them separately to test specific hypotheses. in this study, we investigate the attitudes of those who practise religion, because religious practice is something that could favour the capacity to address social problems and concerns (fagan 2006), such as that of immigration. to this end, we use religious membership and aggregate different measures of religiosity (attendance at mass, prayer, and grade of religiosity) in a single dimension. although these religious measures are not exhaustive, the synthesis of religious involvement at the individual level and the religious community to which one belongs are factors that allow us to look more precisely at how religiosity, even in an age of secularisation, causes different attitudes towards immigrants among italian citizens. in recent years, the rhetoric of populist parties, especially in italy, has made the relationship between the public and immigrants more fragile. an example is given by the lega which, in the last national administrative elections, exploited religion and its contents (see gnagni 2018; re 2019), and tried to win over the catholic electorate. in this work, distinguishing practising catholics from non-practising catholics, we will shed memoli and di pastena 139 light also on the effects that populist ideology, expressed through the vote, produces on the perception that catholics have of immigrants. the paper is organised as follows. the next two sections will highlight theoretical aspects relating to both the european immigration process and religion which define the hypotheses. subsequently, in section three, we define the research methods adopted, the dependent and independent variables, and describe the phenomenon analysed. in the fourth section, we show the principal results and the final, fifth, section presents our conclusions. 2. theory and hypotheses 2.1. immigrants and europe immigration has transformed europe’s southern borders into a death trap (fargues 2015). in 2015, over one million people arrived in europe by crossing the mediterranean sea, compared with 250,000 in 2014 and 60,000 in 2013. this increase appears clear in italy especially with respect to asylum seekers. specifically, as reported by fiore and ialongo (2018), in southern europe between 2014 and 2017, the total number of migrants was 1,766,186, peaking at just over one million in 2015 alone. in italy, in the same period, 624,747 migrants arrived. although these arrivals made up only about 1% of the italian population of 59 million, the perception of the threat of immigrants has increased in the country, also in terms of insecurity (see steiner et al. 2013). over time, the perception of insecurity has turned into distrust and lack of social cohesion because migrants are often forced to rely on the informal economy to cope with daily survival. it is no coincidence that where there have been more arrivals and more refugee assistance, the resident population has appeared more hostile and more inclined to support a restrictive, asylum-centred approach (hangartner et al. 2019). in these contexts, immigrants are still seen as a burden, and represent a problem for the culture of the host country (semyonov et al. 2008). the predominant theoretical framework used by scholars to explain the relations between citizens and immigrants falls into the category of threat theories. according to the intergroup threat theory (stephan, ybarra and rios 2016), negative attitudes towards outlying groups are a defensive reaction to the threat of competition. in this perspective, perceived threats from outgroups can be categorized into realistic threats (referring to resources or wellbeing) and symbolic threats (values, culture). although an individual’s perception of the immigrant is shaped by the social context in which he or she lives, for some scholars whose explanations rely on economic motivations, the defensive attitudes on the part of the internal group are a reaction to a real threat related to immigration (gorodzeisky and semyonov 2009; hainmueller and hiscox 2010). as the number of immigrants (external group) increases, competition for scarce economic resources also increases, giving rise to concern in the internal group for their own interests (see blalock 1967). furthermore, competition and fears tend to increase when there are sudden changes (newman and velez 2014), such as the intensification of an economic or migration crisis. for other scholars, who instead adopt an explanatory identity key, concerns towards immigrants have a symbolic matrix. for them, the perception of immigrants is connected to cultural threats, that is to the norms, beliefs and values of the group which may be at risk (see sides and citrin 2007). although the economic and migrants, religion, and politics 140 cultural aspects of immigration are both correlated to attitudes towards immigrants (ruedin 2020), studies that took into account both measures found that perceived cultural threats largely outperform measures of material and economic threat (schmuck and matthes 2017; vallejo-martin et al. 2021; davidov and meuleman 2012; semyonov et al. 2004) and they dwarf the effects of economic threat measures (see ha 2008; sniderman et al. 2004; sides and citrin 2007). considering that in italy almost 90% of the population claim to belong to the catholic faith (vezzoni and biolcati 2015) and that in italy catholicism is a specific religion and cultural expression of the core national heritage (ferrari and ferrari 2010), in this paper we adopt cultural threats as a measure of anti-immigration sentiment. 2.2. hypotheses religion can be defined as an institutionalised system-based set of beliefs and practices relating to the supernatural realm and personal belief. it is an important source of social identity (ben-nun bloom et al. 2015) and social world (saroglou 2013) as well as an instrument of aggregation of people in moral communities (graham and haidt 2010). however, this is not always the case, especially when we compare the behaviour of religious people of the catholic faith with those belonging to other religions. catholics, as well as protestants, compared to those who profess other religions, tend to score higher in the different dimensions of nationalism and ethnic exclusion (coenders and scheepers 2003). at least in italy, this attitude is also found to be valid towards foreigners of catholic faith. ambrosini and bonizzoni (2021, 828), analysing the christian migrant churches in italy, claim that ‘for catholic immigrants, the establishment of new communities involves a negotiation with local catholic hierarchies, a sometimes-complex process and not without resistance’. although the catholic church in italy has ‘evolved as a religion of a predominantly solidaristic, tolerant and inclusive character’ (maraffi and vignati 2019, 349), it does not always appear so benevolent even when the proponents are catholic foreigners. by shaping social and political attitudes, religion tends to delineate those who are part of the group, distinguishing them from others (geertz 1993), thus feeding low levels of tolerance towards those outside the group (grant and brown 1995), a phenomenon that may enhance anti-immigration attitudes (creighton and jamal 2015). in past research, christians appear more in favour of the ethnic exclusion of legal immigrants than non-believers and non-christians (scheepers et al. 2002) and are more likely to express concerns about immigration (storm 2018). seventy years ago, adorno and colleagues (1950) in their study on the authoritarian personality, reflected on the idea that subjects with some religious affiliations are more prejudiced than those without affiliation. when analysing religious anti-semitism in 28 countries, tausch (2018), notes that together with some other religions, such as hindu, muslim and buddhist, catholicism seems to be characterized by anti-semitic attitudes. while analysing the catholic church, kertzer (2014) shows how it represented jews as an existential threat in the eyes of european catholics. this peculiarity is certainly not new and it is likely affected by a not-so-distant past when some catholic circles were permeable to anti-semitic and racial prejudices (valbosquet 2018). finally, considering that for catholics migrants could memoli and di pastena 141 represent a perfect target for their fears, we hypothesise that catholics have a more negative attitude towards immigrants (h1). like religious membership, participation in religious activities is relevant in explaining anti-immigrant sentiments. participation in religious services ‘consists in elevating the importance of [some] values in the decision-making process of the members of the [congregation]’ (djupe and calfano 2013, 644). it indirectly recalls the concept of ‘moral communities’ (ruiter and de graaf 2006), according to which a higher average attendance of religious services indicates greater exposure to religious culture and a greater probability of including religious people in one’s social network. however, being part of a congregation or a large religious network does not always imply a propensity to open up to others with confidence. when analysing the united kingdom, paterson (2018, 26–27) observes that “the messages of the elite to which those of high religiosity are exposed (in terms of ecclesial presences) could act as a bulwark against potential intolerances that induce the effects of the religious affiliation (‘membership’)”. in the same vein, knoll (2009) suggests that taking part in religious activities increases empathy or induces universal values and, thus, leads to supporting immigration. conversely, by analysing forty-four countries, doebler (2014) found that religious practice and religious affiliation have less impact than citizens’ predispositions against immigrants and muslims, while mcdaniel et al. (2011) found that attendance at religious services is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes on cultural grounds, but it has no effect in relation to economic motivations. at this point, given that the theoretical positions on the link between religious practice and attitude towards immigrants appear to be opposed, we generate the alternative hypothesis that practising believers show more positive attitudes towards immigrants (h2). furthermore, considering that being religious is very different from being religious and actively participating in religious services, it is possible to hypothesize that among catholics, the intensification of religious activism has a positive effect on their perception of immigrants (h3). closely connected to the relationship between religion and immigration is politics. in the past few decades, the increase in populist parties in numerous european countries has made the relationship between the public and immigrants increasingly fragile: relying on topics also linked to religion (marzouki et al. 2016), they have further exacerbated the vision that the public has of immigrants. the lega party in italy does not seem to want to be outdone (see ozzano 2021). since its inception, the league has tried to capitalize on the lines of national identity based on traditions by combining them with migration and security issues. at the same time, it has identified the main enemy in the illegal muslim immigrant who threatens italy’s ethnic-cultural and religious homogeneity and europe’s christian character (see martino and papastathis 2016, 115). with the intensification of the landings on the italian coast, the league has further shifted its rhetoric towards catholic religious symbols. on several occasions, speeches have made references to the virgin mary, without hesitating to attack the positions of the pope on the immigration theme (see gnagni 2018; re 2019). the use of religious symbols during the rallies of the league has not escaped the church, which has lamented their exploitation for the sole purpose of enchanting voters, who are morally attracted to those symbols. although the league has strong ties with the conservative wing of the catholic world, it is possible to hypothesize that the league’s populist rhetoric could affect the migrants, religion, and politics 142 anti-immigrant sentiment of non-practising catholics who, sharing the programmatic contents of the league party and voting for it, could perceive immigrants negatively (h4a). on the contrary, the anti-immigrant attitude should contract among those who, despite voting for lega, are practising catholics because they are probably affected by the principles of benevolence and love expressed by the catholic church (h4b). 3. methods, dependent and independent variables the hypotheses discussed in the previous section have been tested through three european social survey datasets round 6 (2012), 8 (2016), and round 9 (2018). the dependent variable is represented by the item in the survey that reads as follows ‘and, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’, with response options running from ‘cultural life undermined’ (0) to ‘cultural life enriched’ (10).1 the main independent variables of our research are represented by four items. the first item refers to membership of a religious congregation, 2 while the second one is an additive index3 – the frequency of attendance of religious services,4 praying,5 and the overall grade of religiosity6 – that synthetises religious practices and personal religiosity level (see driezen, verschraegen, clycq 2020). these two variables allow us to test the first three hypotheses. to test the last two hypotheses (h4a and h4b) we have created two new variables. the first one has been obtained by aggregating religious membership (only catholics) with a religious activism index,7 while the second one is represented by a dichotomous variable (0=other parties, 1=lega) that synthesizes the vote expressed by the respondents to the last national administrative election.8 1 for interpretative convenience we have inverted the order of the modality so that (0) cultural life enriched, (10) cultural life undermined. 2the question runs as follows: have you ever considered yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination? – which one? we have recoded the variable as follow: (0) no one, (1) protestants, eastern orthodox, other christian denomination, jews, islamic, eastern religions, other non-christian religions, (2) catholics. ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 3 the index ranges from 0 (low level) to 14 (high level); its reliability, measured through cronbach's alpha, is equal to 0,853. 4 the question runs as follows: apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays? for interpretative convenience we have inverted the order of the modality in the following way: (0) never, (1) less often, (2) only on special holy days, (3) at least once a month (4) once a week, (5) more than once a week, (6) every day. ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 5 the question runs as follows: apart from when you are at religious services, how often, if at all, do you pray? for interpretative convenience we have inverted the order of the modality in the following way: (0) never, (1) less often, (2) only on special holy days, (3) at least once a month (4) once a week, (5) more than once a week, (6) every day. ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 6 the question runs as follows: regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are? the variable runs from (0) not at all religious, (10) very religious. ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 7 the new variable (catholic activism) runs as follows: (0) no religious, (1) no practising catholic, and (2) practising catholic. 8 the question runs as follows: which party did you vote for in that election (last country’s national election)? memoli and di pastena 143 the hypotheses reported above were tested, controlling their effects for a set of variables commonly used in the literature, including gender, age, education (see van der brug and harteveld 2021), ideology,9 insecurity,10 social trust11 (see di mauro and memoli 2021), the area in which the respondent lives,12 and time.13 the analyses were carried out using linear regression models. in this respect, many studies have examined the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiments and some individual and structural factors. to explore the impact of these factors on anti-immigration sentiments we adopt rounds 6 (2012), 8 (2016) and 9 (2018) of the european social survey. from 2012 to 2018, anti-immigrant attitudes expressed by italians increased, with an inverted u trend. the highest peak is in 2016, when the landings on the italian coasts were numerous, and overcrowding of the infrastructures of the national reception system was consistent. in 2018, the fears of the public towards immigrants decline, albeit to levels far higher than those of 2012. (figure 1). over time, anti-immigrant sentiment seems to have subsided among those who believe in other religions and participate in religious activities. among catholics and the non-religious, anti-immigrant sentiment does not fade after the migration wave. figure 1. anti-immigrant sentiment and religion source: own elaboration on european social survey (2012, 2016, 2018). 9 the question runs as follows: in politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right? we have recoded the variable in the following way: (0) centre (values 4-6), (1) left (values 0-3), (2) right (7-10). ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 10 the question runs as follows: how safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this area after dark? do – or would – you feel... the variable has been recoded as follow (0) very safe+safe, (1) unsafe+very unsafe. ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 11 the question runs as follows: using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted. the variable is coded as follow: (0) no trust, (10) trust. ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 12 the question runs as follows: which phrase on this card best describes the area where you live? we have recoded the variable in the following way: (0) a farm or home in countryside, (1) a country village, (2) a town or a small city, (3) the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, (4) a big city. ‘do not know’ answers have been coded as missing values. 13 the descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in appendix, table a. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 anti immigration sentiment religious index no-religious other religions roman catholic religious membership 2012 2016 2018 migrants, religion, and politics 144 the shock suffered by public opinion with the increase in landings (2016) seems to persist also in 2018. this trend characterizes both the non-religious and those belonging to the roman catholic faith, while those who profess other religions seem to perceive immigrants positively. the anti-immigration sentiment level is high among those who take part in religious activities. nevertheless, the negative perception of immigrants expressed by this specific group towards foreigners remains high even when, in 2018, the landings on the coasts of the bel paese decline. on connecting the anti-immigrant sentiment with some socio-demographic indicators, while we find, as stated in previous research (see eger et al. 2021; gorodzeisky and semyonov 2018), clear distinctions between the age groups of the interviewees (figure 2a), we do not find differences in terms of gender. the youngest (18-24 years) appear more likely to welcome immigrants than other age groups, probably because they have had the opportunity to know and accept the cultural traits of different models. on the contrary, the elderly (65+) tend to be less benevolent towards immigrants. the evaluation expressed by the elderly could be dictated by a sense of insecurity generated by the presence of immigrants. figure 2a. anti-immigrant sentiment and socio demographic aspects source: own elaboration on european social survey (2012, 2016, 2018) as was expected, ideology plays a decisive role in defining the anti-immigrant attitude of respondents. among italians, the attitude of the 'centrists' is less intense than those who place themselves on the right side of the scale. this trend appears to persist over time, even when arrivals on the italian coasts have reduced in number. even if the less educated appear more reluctant towards immigrants, it is among those with a medium-high qualification (advanced vocational) that anti-immigrant sentiment intensifies over time. this attitude could probably be dictated by uncertainties regarding the future, by the weaknesses of the labour market, which has never been particularly prosperous, and by the presence of immigrants. finally, fears related to immigrants are also found among those who live in a ‘farm or country house’, where social relations are consolidated over time, and the arrival of foreigners can be perceived as a threat (figure 2b). comparing the rural area (farm or country house) with the urban area (a big city), negative attitudes towards immigrants decline in the latter. however, this result must be considered with caution, since immigration attitudes are also related to other aspects, 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 man woman 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ left centre right gender age ideological self-placement 2012 2016 2018 memoli and di pastena 145 such as the demographic characteristics of geographic areas (maxwell 2019) and to the socio-cultural and socioeconomic changes that characterize these areas (huijsmans et al. 2021), which are not considered in this article. figure 2b. anti-immigrant sentiment and socio demographic aspects source: own elaboration on european social survey (2012, 2016, 2018). 4. results and discussion following the hypotheses reported above, the effects of religion on anti-immigrant sentiments were estimated using the ess waves of 2012, 2016 and 2018. as hypothesized, not all those who are religious perceive immigrants positively. in 2012 (table 1, model 1), catholics express a negative perception of immigrants (beta = 0.085; h1 confirmed). this result is certainly not new. as known, cultural outgroups pose a symbolic cultural threat to dominant groups (fetzer 2000). the negative attitude expressed by catholics towards immigrants may have been conditioned, at least in part, by the migrations dictated by the ‘arab spring’, which in 2011 generated a short but intense shock within italian society (see labanca 2012). contrary to what we assumed, religious activism correlates positively with the dependent variable, and it is not statistically significant (h2 not confirmed), while those characterized by a sense of insecurity (beta = 0.124), and those on the right of the political 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 le s s th a n lo w e r se c on da ry -l o w er se co n d ar y lo w er -u pp er t ie r up p er s ec o nd ar y ad va n ce d v o ca ti on al lo w er -h ig h er t e rt ia ry e du ca tio n o th er fa rm o r ho m e in c o un tr ys id e co un tr y vi lla ge to w n o r sm al l ci ty su b ur b s o r o ut sk ir ts o f bi g c it y a bi g c it y geographic area 2012 2016 2018 migrants, religion, and politics 146 space (beta = 0.078) have a negative perception of immigrants. compared to men, women, who trust others more, are more trustful of immigrants. the same can be said about those who are between 45 and 54 years old. in 2016 (model 2), the empirical results are very similar to those found previously. catholics continue to perceive immigrants negatively, but with greater intensity than in 2012. the intensification of the phenomenon appears connected with the high numbers of landings on the coasts of the bel paese, which have probably strengthened a negative perception of immigrants among the public. young people appear to perceive immigrants negatively (beta = 0.073) to a lesser extent than those on the right of the political space (beta = 0.194) and those who perceive a sense of general insecurity (beta = 0.113). women appear more sensitive to immigrants in the same way as those who express trust in others in general. if 2016 is recorded as the year of the peak of landings on the italian coast and of a net overcrowding of the national reception system infrastructures, in 2018 the immigration numbers changed (see ministry of the interior and unhcr), but not public perception. in 2017, with the ‘minniti decrees’ and the italy-libya memorandum, between the then prime minister paolo gentiloni and the libyan leader fayez al serraj, migratory flows to italy were reduced by a third compared to the previous year. in 2018, even if the migration trend towards the coasts of southern italy tended to thin further (-80% compared to 2017), catholics did not seem to notice a change: their perception of immigrants remained negative (model 3). on the contrary, members of other religions are more sensitive to foreigners (beta = -0.097). the role played by social trust was confirmed, but among italians the overall negative perception of immigrants remained unchanged. the anti-immigrant sentiment, which cuts across different age groups and different levels of education, mainly characterizes the elderly (55+; beta = 0.120) and the less educated (lower secondary school children; professional upper secondary school). a similar trend is found among those who place themselves on the right side of the political space and live in a town or small city. in general, looking at the entire 2012-2018 period (model 4), the differences between catholics and non-catholics emerge more clearly and highlight the differences inherent in each religious confession. as previously anticipated, taking part in religious activities appears as a two-faced janus since it can be beneficial (see knoll 2009) or deleterious (doebler 2014) for the relationships that exist between ‘us’ and ‘them’. religious activism, although not statistically significant, appears to nourish the negative perception of immigrants. when the level of catholic religious activities increases, their negative perception of immigrants contracts, while the opposite is found when instead we look at those who belong to other religions (figure 3). nevertheless, the negative attitudes of catholics towards immigrants appear to hold (h3 confirmed). an opposite scenario is found among those who profess other religions, who appear more open towards immigrants. however, with the intensification of religious activism, their attitude tends to contract in terms of intensity. part of the results relating to catholics are in line with the study conducted by landini and colleagues (2021, 401) which, analysing only 2018 and 2019 through diversified data sources, argue that ‘irregular and non-practicing catholics exhibit the most negative attitudes toward immigration. in contrast, non-religious people namely those who memoli and di pastena 147 neither attend religious services nor describe themselves as catholics show the most positive attitudes toward immigration’. despite some differences from the work realised by landini et al (2021),14 our results confirm how religious membership and religious activism are two key dimensions for understanding the anti-immigrant attitude in italy, both for catholics and for those who belong to other religions. table 1. religion and religiosity model 1 (2016) model 2 (2016) model 3 (2018) model 4 (2012-2018) beta std. err. beta std. err. beta std. err. beta std. err. religious membership (no religion) other religions 0.050 0.545 -0.000 0.396 -0.097**** 0.355 -0.117** 0.719 roman catholic 0.085* 0.304 0.114**** 0.183 0.059** 0.162 0.136**** 0.185 religious index 0.012 0.034 -0.038 0.022 -0.038 0.018 0.003 0.022 religious membership (no religious) other religions* religious index 0.083* 0.069 roman catholic* religious index -0.079* 0.027 social trust -0.301**** 0.041 -0.246**** 0.029 -0.218**** 0.025 -0.242**** 0.017 insecurity perception 0.124**** 0.222 0.114 0.147 0.055** 0.128 0.087**** 0.088 sex (male) -0.102*** 0.193 -0.052** 0.136 -0.003 0.114 -0.039*** 0.080 age (18-24) 25-34 -0.072 0.370 0.073** 0.275 0.085*** 0.247 0.049** 0.164 35-44 -0.063 0.350 0.056 0.271 0.089*** 0.233 0.047** 0.158 45-54 -0.101** 0.342 0.057 0.259 0.087*** 0.223 0.038* 0.152 55-64 -0.053 0.360 0.013 0.271 0.060* 0.224 0.020 0.156 65+ 0.061 0.353 0.021 0.271 0.120*** 0.217 0.046* 0.154 education (other) less than lower secondarylower secondary -0.116 1.448 0.358 2.547 0.354* 1.071 0.231 0.822 lower-upper tier upper secondary -0.242 1.438 0.276 2.549 0.268 1.072 0.142 0.822 advanced vocational -0.119 1.527 0.013 2.614 0.135* 1.104 0.042 0.851 lower-higher tertiary education -0.266 1.440 0.147 2.553 0.047 1.077 0.008 0.825 left-right scale placement (centre) left -0.123*** 0.224 -0.077*** 0.163 -0.143**** 0.143 -0.112**** 0.097 right 0.078** 0.236 0.194**** 0.156 0.173**** 0.131 0.166**** 0.092 geographic area (farm or home in countryside) country village 0.004 0.457 -0.028 0.353 -0.069 0.308 -0.040 0.207 town or small city -0.012 0.472 -0.015 0.356 -0.101* 0.311 -0.046 0.210 suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.011 0.618 -0.021 0.430 -0.052 0.368 -0.031 0.254 a big city -0.077 0.526 -0.046 0.393 -0.064 0.336 -0.060** 0.229 14 in this study, both dependent and independent variables are different and differently operationalized from those used in our work. migrants, religion, and politics 148 time (2012) 2018 0.163**** 0.112 2019 0.137**** 0.110 constant 7.467**** 1.595 4.458* 2.593 4.700**** 1.112 0.453**** 0.864 r_square 0.256 0.204 0.233 0.231 adjust r_square 0.234 0.193 0.224 0.226 f (sig.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 n. observ. 716 1,530 1,842 4,088 note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. source: own elaboration on european social survey (2012-2018). figure 3. the marginal effects on the anti-immigration sentiments of religious membership as religious index change 90% cis source: own elaboration on european social survey (2012-2018). in table 2, we analyse the relationship between practicing catholics / non-practicing catholics and their vote expressed for the league in the last administrative elections of 2018. as expected, the non-practising catholics who voted for the league appear to perceive immigrants negatively. even if the sign of the relationship is as expected, the effect is statistically insignificant (h4a partially confirmed). as for practising catholics, we found that although they voted for the league, they still tend to look at immigrants with greater benevolence and love, as probably taught by the catholic church (beta=0.160; h4b confirmed). in the last national administrative elections, salvini tried to consolidate his electoral consensus by leveraging the catholic electorate. however, the result was not particularly relevant, as evidenced by the electoral results obtained by his party (see ipsos 2018). ‘fetishist sovereignty’ has certainly made its way into the catholic world, -3 -2 -1 0 1 e ffe ct s on l in ea r p re di ct io n r el ig io n m em be rs hi p 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 religious index other religion roman catholic memoli and di pastena 149 gathering the vote of those who weekly participate in religious services (15.7%; see ipsos 2018). nevertheless, it does not seem to have affected their catholic principles, as they continue to express strong sentiments of benevolence and solidarity towards immigrants (fig. 4). by checking the empirical results through a series of indicators, we find that less-educated individuals (less than lower secondary/lower secondary; advanced vocational) reveal an undoubted closure towards immigrants. a more positive perception towards immigrants, on the other hand, is found among those who tend to trust others (beta = -0.263). table 2. religion and politics beta std. err. catholic activism (non religious) non-practising catholics -0.000 0.742 practising catholics 0.062** 0.189 vote for league (no) 0.370**** 0.403 catholic membership activism *vote for league non-practising catholics * vote 0.036 1.892 practising catholics * vote -0.160** 0.446 social trust -0.263**** 0.031 insecurity perception 0.038 0.164 sex (male) -0.019 0.141 age (18-24) 25-34 -0.005 0.327 35-44 0.003 0.318 45-54 -0.001 0.308 55-64 -0.051 0.307 65+ -0.039 0.302 education (other) less than lower secondary/lower secondary 0.530 1.720 lower-upper tier upper secondary 0.466 1.718 advanced vocational 0.260 1.742 lower-higher tertiary education 0.223 1.722 geographic area (farm or home in countryside) country village -0.024 0.353 town or small city -0.063 0.356 suburbs or outskirts of big city -0.003 0.430 a big city 0.014 0.393 constant 3.988 1.746 r_square 0.213 adjust r_square 0.199 f (sig.) 0.000 n. observ. 1,216 note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001 source: own elaboration on european social survey (2018). migrants, religion, and politics 150 figure 4. the marginal effects on the anti-immigration sentiments of religious membership as vote change 90% source: own elaboration on european social survey (2018). 5. conclusions since the early years of the new millennium, italy has experienced a high level of immigration. with a fluctuating trend, landings on the coast of southern italy have intensified over time. this increase in foreigners in the last twenty years has exacerbated the attitude of italians (see molteni 2020) who, overestimating the actual numbers involved, often see immigrants as a problem. religion exerts distinct and even contrasting effects on immigration attitudes in italy, playing a determining role in the cultural separation between ‘we’ and ‘them’. it shapes social and political attitudes, exacerbating the differences between those who are part of the majority group and those who are not. catholics tend to have a negative perception of immigrants and perceive them as a problem for their culture in general. this attitude is also found among italian catholics. one explanation could lie in the various migratory waves that have begun to worry the public since the early years of the last two decades. on the contrary, a positive attitude towards foreigners is found among those who profess another religion. participation in religious activities (mass and prayer) and recognising oneself in catholicism also appear relevant in explaining anti-immigrant sentiment, especially when connected to religious membership. according to wuthnow (2002), religious activism tends to generate and feed bridging social capital, through which it is possible, as putnam (2000) has pointed out, to generate wider reciprocity. we find a similar trend among italians: as religious activism increases, catholics appear more inclined to express a positive opinion towards immigrants. nevertheless, their perception of immigrants remains negative. -2 0 2 4 e ffe ct s on l in ea r p re di ct io n c at ho lic a ct iv is m 0 1 party voted non-practicing catholic practicing catholic memoli and di pastena 151 in the last twenty years, an increase in support for populist parties in italy has made the italian case very important (see vercesi 2021), as confirmed by the results of the last administrative (2018) and european (2019) elections. the cultural populism that distinguishes the league (see caiani and carvalho 2021) has influenced catholic voters but does not seem to have been particularly incisive for a portion of them. non-practising catholics who voted for the lega in the last national administrative elections appear characterized by a negative perception of immigrants. practising catholics, on the contrary, appear more inclined to accept immigrants. it would have been interesting to consider how the church and the catholic elite have contributed to the formation of the attitudes of the faithful towards immigrants and the consequent choice of vote. the data in our possession are limited and do not allow this level of detail. future research could shed light on larger temporal dynamics, taking into account these factors and expanding the number of cases. acknowledgements the authors wish to thank the journal editors, the anonymous reviewers and fabio franchino for their valuable comments. funding this research has been conducted with the contribution of the university of catania ‘piano della ricerca 2016/2018’ and ‘piano di incentivi per la ricerca di ateneo 2020/2022’. references adorno, t.w., frenkel-brunswik, e., levinson, d. j., & sanford, r. n. 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(2002). religious involvement and status-bridging social capital. journal for the scientific study of religion, 41(4), 669-684. migrants, religion, and politics 156 appendix table a. descriptive statistics mean / % std. dev. min max anti-immigration sentiment 5.255 2.82 0 10 religion membership no religious 23.4 other religions 5.8 roman catholic 70.8 religious index 7.979 3.920 0 14 catholic activism no religious 23.4 non-practising catholics 5.8 practising catholics 70.8 vote for league no 87.2 yes 12.8 social trust 4.698 2.378 0 10 insecurity perception safe 68.3 unsafe 31.7 gender male 48.1 female 51.9 age 18-24 9.9 25-34 13.1 35-44 15.7 45-54 19.0 55-64 16.3 65+ 26.0 education other 0.3 less than lower secondary/lower secondary 43.6 lower-upper tier upper secondary 38.9 advanced vocational 2.6 lower-higher tertiary education 13.6 left-right scale placement left 29.8 centre 30.9 right 39.3 geographic area farm or home in countryside 3.7 country village 44.1 town or small city 34.5 suburbs or outskirts of big city 5.9 a big city 11.8 time 2012 15.2 2018 41.5 2019 43.3 source: european social survey round 8 (2016) and round 9 (2018). microsoft word pdf_issue_16_2_landini_100-121.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 2 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 2, 100–121. contact author: irene landini, university of trento e-mail address: irene.landini1@gmail.com beyond welfare chauvinism? populist radical right parties’ social policies and the exclusion of migrants from national welfare in italy irene landini university of trento abstract the present article contributes to the advancement of the understanding of the social policies of populist radical right parties (prrps) by focusing on the case of italy during the conte i government (june 2018-september 2019). by taking the italian prrp, the league, as an example, it investigates the ideological and rhetorical frames exploited by prrps to promote and legitimize cuts in welfare generosity toward migrants when they hold governmental positions. the specific welfare benefit under observation is the 2019 means-tested citizenship income (reddito di cittadinanza, rdc). the article relies on the theoretical framework by abs (2021), showing that prrps exploit two different frames to promote restrictive social measures against migrants during national elections and in their manifestos, i.e., the welfare chauvinism (wc) and the welfare producerism (wp) frames. the article assesses whether, and to what extent, prrps transpose these frames into their governmental action. furthermore, it also examines which of these frames ruling prrps are most likely to exploit. the findings show that, when in a ruling position, the league supports exclusive solidarity (i.e., the exclusion of tcns from access to rdc) by exploiting the very same ideological and rhetorical frames exploited during the electoral campaign, i.e., both the wc and wp. it does not try to frame welfare cutbacks in more morally and politically acceptable terms in light of western european democratic standards. this article confirms that prrps tend to de-emphasize social issues in their discourses and hold a clear-cut position only with regard to migrants’ entitlement to the benefit, adopting a clear nativist approach. moreover, the analysis points out that the overused concept of welfare chauvinism is not fully adequate to illustrate the prrps’ social policy formula. 1. introduction he present article contributes to the advancement of the understanding of the social policies of populist radical right parties (prrps henceforth) by focusing on the case of italy during the conte i government (june 2018-september 2019). over the past 15 years, welfare state research has focused more and more on the “multidimensionality” (rovny 2013; abs et al., 2021) of prrps’ welfare preferences. the concept of multidimensionality refers to the fact that prrps may have different preferences with regard to two distinct dimensions of welfare politics. these are: 1) the level of generosity (spending effort, amount of social benefits and resources) the welfare state should pursue and 2) the recalibration of welfare expenditure, i.e., which social policy domain should be financed and which should not (investing in human skills or substitute income). this work is mainly interested in the first dimension. namely, it considers prrps’ t irene landini 101 preferences about whether welfare generosity should be extended to a specific group, i.e., migrants. more precisely, the article investigates how prrps promote and legitimize cuts in welfare generosity toward migrants when they hold governmental positions. when asking how, the article refers to the ideological and rhetorical frames exploited by prrps, i.e., the social construction of migrants’ deservingness and un-deservingness of their host country’s national welfare. the article builds on former research about prrps and social policies. in particular, it refers to a recent contribution by abs (abs et al., 2021) which argues that three interrelated frames inform the welfare agenda of prrps, especially during national elections. namely, these parties advocate for social closure on the basis of the deservingness criterion of identity (welfare chauvinism), on the criteria of control, attitude and reciprocity (welfare producerism), and on an antagonism between the people and the establishment (welfare populism). this latter frame is not relevant to the article’s purposes, since it does not deal with the topic of migrants’ entitlement and disentitlement to national welfare.1 thus, it is not considered by the article’s analysis. conversely, the welfare chauvinism (wc) and the welfare producerism (wp) frames are relevant since prrps exploit these in their electoral manifestos in order to promote and legitimize restrictive social measures (cutting welfare benefits or even excluding from them) against some groups in society, among which, migrants.2 nevertheless, this study deals primarily with prrps’ electoral strategies. however, the fact that they rely on these frames in their electoral manifestos does not automatically imply that they transpose one or both frames (wp, wc) into their governmental action. for example, they may eventually abandon the identity-based wc frame, since it openly clashes with the “sense of duty and moral responsibility” (mair 2014, p.587) arising from parties’ governmental positions (cfr, paragraph 2). against this backdrop, the present article addresses the following research question: rq. do prrps exploit the ideological frames underlying their welfare agenda (wc, wp) to promote migrants’ disentitlement to national welfare when they hold governmental positions? and if so, which of these frames are they most likely to exploit? italy is a relevant example since, during the conte i government, the league (one of the government coalition members and commonly classified as a prrp) pushed for the introduction of some restrictive measures targeting non-eu migrants within the framework of the newly approved citizenship income (reddito di cittadinanza, rdc hereafter), a means-tested minimum income scheme introduced in 2019 as a replacement of the previous minimum income scheme, the reddito di inclusione (jessoula and natili, 2020). theoretically speaking, this work makes a twofold contribution. first, it assesses whether and to what extent the theoretical framework by abs (2021), distinguishing between wc and wp, can be a useful tool to understand prrps’ governmental action, 1 welfare populism pertains to the attribution of blame to elites for the sub-optimal implementation of welfare arrangements 2 it is important to remember that native citizens are not exempted from this logic. in several cases, prrps exploit welfare producerism also in regard to natives who do not fulfill the deservingness criteria of control, attitude and reciprocity. in this article, i only consider welfare producerism to the extent it is applied to migrants. beyond welfare chauvinism? 102 beyond their electoral strategies. moreover, the analysis identifies which of these frames ruling prrps are most likely to exploit. secondly, the article complements former research specifically focused on the league’s imprint on italian welfare policy. a recent study has shown that the party’s input was visible in specific areas like pensions and family social policies (meardi and guardiancich, 2022), but it has not yet investigated its influence on the anti-poverty policy. another contribution has argued instead that the league accepted the introduction of the rdc in exchange for tightened eligibility conditions for non-eu migrants (jessoula and natili, 2020). however, this work does not go deeper in examining how exactly the league promoted the introduction of these restrictive measures, i.e., the ideological and rhetorical frames it exploits. the article is organized as follows. to begin with, i illustrate the most relevant contributions in the literature about prrps and social policy. secondly, i illustrate the article’s hypotheses and methodological approach. thereafter, i carry out the analysis of the selected case-study. to conclude, i move to illustrate the article’s main findings and implications against the backdrop of the literature about prrps and social policies. 2. prrps and social policy 2.1. from the new winning formula to a more multifaceted scenario historically, radical right parties have tended to promote a specific type of “winning formula” (kitschelt, 1995), made up of the combination of neoliberal views on economic issues – free trade and minimal state intervention in economy – and authoritarian views on sociocultural issues – law and order, morality and authority, national way of life and opposition to immigration, with special attention to muslim immigration. some scholars have argued that since the mid-1990s, several prrps have started revising their electoral agendas and have made a real “programmatic shift” (kitschelt and mcgann 1997, p.115). namely, they have started to pay increased attention to welfare state issues and policies for welfare redistribution, positioning themselves very close to left-wing socio-democratic parties, which traditionally own this issue (kitschelt and mcgann, 1997). hence, for some of them, the new winning formula (nwf) is a combination of conservative and authoritarian stances on cultural and (relatively) left-wing positions on socio-economic issues; i.e., they support expansionary welfare proposals (ibid). however, in the wake of a growing academic interest in rrps’ economic and welfare stances in the last decades, scholars have challenged the nwf argument as well. some of the most recent studies have shown that, against the expectations of the nwf, rrps do not adopt a clear position on the socio-economic dimension in their political agenda. conversely, they engage in position-blurring by deliberately avoiding precise social and economic placement (rovny 2013; rovny and polk 2020). namely, they either de-emphasize social issues altogether or present “vague, contradictory, or ambiguous positions” (rovny 2013). finally, some additional contributions have argued that rrps’ welfare state stances are to be seen in light of the multidimensionality of the political conflict about welfare politics (enggist and pingerra 2021; rathgeb 2021; busemayer et al., 2021). such conflict is defined as multidimensional since it hinges on two main dimensions. the first one concerns the level of generosity the welfare state should pursue, i.e., the spending effort irene landini 103 (amount of social benefits and resources) to be made. the second dimension concerns the recalibration of welfare expenditure, i.e., which social policy domain should be financed, and which should not (investing in human skills or substitute income). in such a scenario, political parties can adopt different preferences in regard to both dimensions. prrps typically present blurry or moderate stances on the first dimension, whilst they express clear preferences and provide unambiguous, clearly discernible stances on the second. namely, they explicitly support consumptive policies (such as pensions) while cutting social rights for the unemployed and opposing a progressive welfare recalibration that would cover the new social risks of non-standard workers – typically women, the young and the low-skilled (enggist and pingerra 2021; rathgeb 2021; busemayer et al., 2021). as enggist and pingerra point out, these features “do not come out of nowhere” (enggist and pingerra 2021, p.119) but they correspond to the attitudes and preferences of prrps voters, as busemayer has shown (busemayer et al., 2021). this work is focused on the first dimension, i.e., the level of generosity of welfare policies. scholars agree that, while prrps tend overall to de-emphasize this aspect, they only present clear social policy positions with regard to a nativist, exclusionary stance towards immigrants. this is commonly defined as “welfare chauvinism” (ennser-jedenastik 2018, 2020; otjes et al. 2018; schumacher and van kersbergen 2016). in simple terms, rrps explicitly aim to reduce the national spending effort made for migrants, by limiting their access to national welfare benefits and programs. by contrast, they argue that these should be reserved to national citizens (and, some times, permanent residents).3 most of this research is focused on prrps’ electoral manifestos and welfare agenda when they are in political opposition. in recent times, several prrps obtained electoral gains, and thus managed to increase their bargaining power in the policy-making process (afonso, 2015). this occurred, for example, in denmark (agersnap et al., 2019; careja et al., 2016; jorgensen and thomsen 2016), austria (pelinka 2002; kriesi et al., 2014; ennserjedenastik 2020) and the netherlands (chueri, 2019). as a result, scholars have started examining if this increased power is also leading to alterations in social policies in a welfare chauvinistic direction. the overall assessment so far seems to provide a positive answer. studies on prrps by akkerman and de lange (2012) and, most recently, chueri (2019) have shown that the role of prrps, as members of government coalitions, in the adoption of restrictive social policies affecting migrants, cannot be ignored (akkerman and de lange 2012; chueri 2019). moreover, careja (2016) distinguishes between direct and indirect welfare chauvinism in policy reforms and frameworks in the danish social and labor market-related policies. they have been promoted by the danish people’s party (dpp), one of the most successful prrps in europe (careja et al. 2016). the former explicitly limits access to welfare for migrants. the latter instead envisages cutbacks or limitations directed to larger target groups, but where migrants are over-represented among benefit claimants (ibid). careja shows that most of the chauvinist laws promoted by the dpp between 2001 and 2011 contain measures which indirectly target some migrant groups (at least in the danish case). in addition, the party promoted several instances of direct chauvinist welfare policy reforms, although these are still a minority compared to the indirect ones (careja, 2016). 3 as this research highlights, it is sometimes unclear whether prrps refer to national citizenship, ethnicity, or residence as the identity criterion for accessing social benefits and services beyond welfare chauvinism? 104 2.2. welfare chauvinism and welfare producerism a recent contribution by rathgeb (2021) highlights that both prrps’4 preferences for consumption policies and for welfare chauvinism (in manifestos and as government partners) fit into a broader producerism ideology. he argues that hard-working and taxpaying “makers” (employees, employers, constituting the core male workforce) need to be liberated from the economic burden imposed by self-serving “takers” (immigrants, “corrupt elite”). more precisely, this model distinguishes between “takers from above” and “takers from below”. the former are the corrupt elites and the “party cartels” among mainstream parties and organized interests, who abuse tax money for corrupt practices at the expense of national workers. the latter are immigrants (especially those from outside the eu) who are portrayed as abusers and “lazy free riders” (p.642): i.e., they exploit national public welfare without contributing to it. according to this view, the prrps’ preference for consumptive policies (such as pensions) is justified as necessary to protect the social rights of the core male workforce. moreover (and most relevant to our purpose) restrictive proposals and policy reforms against migrants (the “takers form below”) are justified and legitimized precisely to avoid such (supposed) welfare abuses by migrants. according to the makers-takers framework, therefore, migrants’ exclusion is primarily based on their economic (lack of) contributions, not so much on their citizenship or residency status. in simple terms, the line between wc and wp is fairly blurred. on the contrary, abs argues that welfare chauvinism is not part of a broader policy of producerism, but wp and wc are rather two distinct frames informing the prrps’ welfare agenda – especially during national elections (abs et al., 2021). his work builds on the so-called deservingness logic (van oorschot 2000, 2006). such a logic deems different population subgroups worthy or unworthy of receiving social help from the welfare state (welfare benefits) to different extents according to five criteria of deservingness: control, attitude, reciprocity, identity, need (usually referred to by the acronym carin). the first deservingness criterion is control. it looks at whether and to what extent the situation of need of benefit claimants is beyond their control and/or to what extent they can be held responsible for such a situation. the guiding logic is that the less control, the more they are deserving. the second criterion is attitude. it is focused on claimants’ behaviors which have to comply with socially accepted “good morals” (for example they should not cheat on their need status to obtain social support and, once obtained, they should show they are grateful for it). the more they are compliant, the more they are deserving. the third criterion, reciprocity, looks instead at the degree of reciprocation by the benefit claimants. this is generally intended in economic and monetary terms. it primarily looks at the extent to which welfare claimants have contributed to the host society group in the past, i.e., before making their claims for social benefits. past contributions are typically measured by looking at one’s previous working activity and/or taxes paid and/or insurance contributions into the system (the “earned” support) (van oorschot 2000, 2006). 4 his analysis is especially focused on the case of the prrp fpo in austria. irene landini 105 the fourth criterion is identity, addressing the (extent of) proximity and distance of benefit claimants to/from the perceived ethno-majoritarian group in society. from survey research, it emerges that this criterion is usually conceived in terms of either formal citizenship status or ethnic-based identity (and sometimes both). the closer to “us” in terms of citizenship, residence (i.e., the acquisition of formal citizenship or permanent residency) or ethno-cultural characteristics, the more deserving. finally, the need criterion simply looks at claimants’ actual condition of need, generally measured through low income and earnings. the greater the level of need, the more they are deserving (van oorschot 2000, 2006). both the wc and the wp frames point back to the deservingness logic; they differ exactly in terms of the deservingness criteria on which they are based. wc is based on the identity criterion, opposing national citizens and/or residents against non-citizen migrants in access to national welfare (in line with the previous definition of welfare chauvinism). conversely, wp is based on the principles of reciprocity, control and attitudes (a mix or only just one of these). through an analysis of electoral parties’ manifestos of four different prrps (among which is the league), abs shows that exclusionary social policy reforms against migrants in prrp manifestos are usually based on both wp and wc, as two distinct strategies. namely, migrants are excluded both because they are not formal citizens (or residents) and because of their supposed dishonest behaviors, unwillingness to search for a job and lack of economic contributions to the system (abs et al., 2021). 3. hypotheses this article shifts the focus from prrps’ electoral strategies to their governmental action. when in government, prrps (like their mainstream counterparts) are subject to responsibility constraints. responsibility requires parties to act “from a sense of duty and moral responsibility” (mair 2014, p.587), i.e., within the bounds of accepted practices and following known legal and procedural rules and conventions. these can be, for example, those laid down in the constitution, or in treaties of international organizations to which a country belongs (mair 2014). accordingly, restrictive social reforms excluding or limiting migrants’ access to national welfare are clearly at odds with prrps’ responsibility function. namely, they explicitly challenge fundamental western democratic rules, and notably the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and ethnicity. indeed, this is embedded in both national constitutions and article 21 of the eu charter of fundamental rights. nevertheless, the aforementioned studies on prrps’ governmental action with regard to migrants and welfare have shown that they are usually indifferent to responsibility constraints.5 namely, they continue to advocate for exclusionary social reforms targeting immigrants, either directly or indirectly (careja et al., 2016). in several cases, they even manage to implement these reforms (careja et al., 2016; akkerman and de lange 2012; chueri 2019). building on this, the article is interested in understanding how (i.e., the rhetorical and ideological frames by which) ruling prrps legitimize and 5 to be sure, they are indifferent to such constraints in other policy fields as well (akkerman and de lange 2012). beyond welfare chauvinism? 106 promote these welfare restrictions, with respect to national and european public opinion and democratic institutions. as mentioned in the introduction, i investigate whether the theoretical framework by abs (2021), distinguishing between the wc and wp frames, can be a useful tool for understanding prrps’ governmental action too. i argue that three views are possible. the first view argues that, once in government, prrps are not likely to use either one of the two frames used during elections – neither wp nor wc. this view is based on two factors. firstly, both frames already emerge very clearly in the political manifestos of almost all prrps, especially during electoral campaign (abs et al., 2021). accordingly, national and eu public opinion and institutions in most cases already know very well to what extent wc and wp inform prrp social policy agendas. secondly, we have just mentioned that ruling prrps are typically indifferent towards the duties and moral responsibility characterizing governmental parties (mair 2014; akkerman and de lange 2012; chueri 2019). based on this, they may not feel the need to further explain and legitimize their exclusionary view towards migrants, which they already did in their manifestos. building on these considerations, i derive my first hypothesis: h1: when holding a governmental position, prrps do not exploit the ideological frames underlying their welfare agenda (wc, wp) to promote migrants’ disentitlement. the second and third views claim instead that ruling prrps do exploit these ideological frames, consistently with their social policy agenda during elections. however, the second view argues that they only exploit the wp frame, i.e., promoting migrants’ exclusion based on the reciprocity, attitude and control deservingness criteria. as seen, these criteria differentiate solidarity according to what one has done or can do for society, the types of behaviors adopted and the extent to which one can be blamed for one’s neediness respectively. since they do not point back to citizenship and/or ethnicity, one may argue that none of these criteria explicitly clash with the democratic anti-discrimination principle (although they finally lead to migrants’ exclusion from welfare benefits). thus, when relying on them, prrps may argue that restrictive reforms are not even really discriminatory, but they are rather a way to protect hard-working national citizens (in rathgeb’s words, the “makers”, 2021) from welfare and economic abuses by free riders, lazy migrants (the “takers form below”, cfr. rathgeb 2021). moreover, this frame does not apply to migrants exclusively. conversely, prrps use it also to limit welfare access for native citizens who get welfare benefits without making any contributions, do not make efforts to look for a job and/or behave in an improper way (cheating on their incomes or not showing gratefulness for the social help received). in light of this, while far from being unquestioned, this frame may eventually make restrictive social policies against migrants overall more morally and political acceptable, in light of considerations of economic and social necessity and fairness. by contrast, the wc frame, based on the identity criterion of deservingness, prompts an explicit nativist differentiation of solidarity, excluding migrants only because of their citizenship and/or residence status. this is explicitly and unequivocally at odds with the democratic anti-discrimination principle. in addition, given its focus on national identity, this frame cannot apply to native citizens, but it only refers to non-citizens migrants. based on these considerations, i build my second hypothesis: irene landini 107 h2: when holding a governmental position, prrps prefer to exploit the wp frame (rather than wc) to promote restrictive social policy measures against immigrants. nevertheless, prrps may also apply a third, different reasoning. given their typical indifference to “duty and moral responsibility” (mair 2014, p.587) as governing parties (akkerman and de lange 2012; chueri 2019), they may choose to employ the identity criterion of deservingness, i.e., the wc frame, irrespective of rules of moral and political acceptability. the wc and the wp frame are not mutually exclusive. prrps may exploit both or just one of them to promote restrictive social measures against migrants, as they do during national electoral campaigns. the third and last hypothesis therefore claims that: h3: when holding a governmental position, prrps rely on the wc and the wp frames (both or just one of them) to promote restrictive social policy measures against immigrants. 4. methodology and data 4.1. italy as a case-study i test my hypotheses in a specific case-study, i.e., italy, during the conte i government. it was the 65th cabinet of the italian republic, supported by a coalition composed of the left-wing populist party movimento cinque stelle, five stars movement (ms5) and the prrp, the league (previously northern league). a few months after its establishment, this government introduced the rdc scheme, one of the warhorses of the m5s. the league pushed for the introduction within it of some restrictive measures targeting a specific category of migrants, i.e., those from outside the eu, also defined as third-country nationals, tcns (jessoula and natili, 2020). more precisely, the party put forward an amendment to article 2.1. of the decree law (establishing the beneficiaries of the rdc and the entitlement rules). the amendment imposed a temporary ban to access to the rdc for non-eu migrants, until they fulfill 2 additional requirements (beyond isee6 certification): 1) showing evidence of 10 years’ uninterrupted residency in italy (rather than 5 years, as before) and 2) presenting, as a proof of their income status, a certification attesting to the absence of movable property and real estate abroad, in their home countries. this certification does not substitute the isee, but constitutes an additional requirement for extra-eu migrants only. both 1 and 2 were embedded in the final law and precisely in art. 2. in light of the above, this case provides an ideal setting for studying how prrps frame and promote restrictive measures against migrants. indeed, i argue that this case provides leverage for the generalization of the results to other countries and prrps. namely, in spite of some specific peculiarities, the league is a good representative of the prrp family in (western) europe. previous studies have pointed out that the league’s ideological profile with regard to social policy and the migration-welfare nexus is very 6 isee (indicatore situazione economica equivalente, indicator of the equivalent economic condition) is the certification showing the actual economic condition of families (based on earnings, wealth and properties). beyond welfare chauvinism? 108 similar to that of other prrps across europe. that is, like other prrps, it claimed for welfare restrictions for migrants during past electoral campaigns, relying on both the wc and the wp ideological frames (abs et al., 2021). moreover, the league is a member of the europe of nations and freedom group in the european parliament, alongside the french rassemblement national, the belgian vlaams belang, the dutch partij voor de vrijheid, and the austrian fpo. given all the above, there are reasons to believe that the league’s governmental action is not so different from that of other prrps. 4.2. the italian context: an overall summary and differences from previous research italy was originally the only southern-european country included within esping-andersen’s sample of countries and it was assigned to the conservative-corporativist cluster (ferrera, 2010). with the conceptualization of a fourth welfare regime, the southern or mediterranean welfare state regime (ferrera 1996, 2010), italy is typically considered a member of the new cluster, together with spain, portugal, and greece (ferrera 1996, 2010; sciortino 2004). like other southern european countries, italy has an overall lower social expenditure and a much larger expenditure for pensions (both old age and survivor), as a percentage of gross domestic product (gdp), than the eu average (ferrera 1996, 2010). in addition, the italian welfare system traditionally makes very limited use of meanstested benefits and programs – less than half the european average (ibid). this is paired to the significant role of the compulsory social insurance program in providing social provisions (ferrera 1996, 2010; sciortino 2004; natili 2018; jessoula and natili 2020). however, these traditional mechanisms have recently begun to be brought into question. social assistance minimum income protection schemes have acquired a new importance, at both citizens’ and politicians’ level (natili 2018; jessoula and natili 2020). this has marked the end of “italian exceptionalism” (jessoula and natili, 2020). since 2017, two welfare schemes have been approved. the first one is the inclusion income, reddito di inclusione sociale, approved in 2017 by the center-left gentiloni government. it was designed as an in-cash means-tested monetary benefit conditional on claimants’ income, aiming at promoting active inclusion through individualized plans and service provision. however, due to severe budgetary constraints, it was one of the least financed, generous and inclusive minimum income schemes in europe and only a limited number of poor individuals could receive it (jessoula and natili, 2020). the second is the rdc. like its antecedent, it is an in-cash, means-tested type of program, based on applicants’ income and especially the family income. only families whose income is below a given threshold can apply and legitimately obtain the benefit. accordingly, applicants have to present isee certification. the rdc was initially drafted as a decree-law (num.4/28 january 2019) and then turned into final law (num. 26 of 28 march 2019) between february and march 2019. it dealt with two major topics: the introduction of the new minimum income scheme, the ci, and a new pension reform (quota 100), overhauling the former 2011 fornero pension scheme. quota 100 consisted of an early retirement scheme for people aged at least 62 and having contributed for at least 38 years (the quota refers to the sum of the two minimum thresholds). jessoula and natili (2020) highlight that the league accepted the irene landini 109 introduction of the rdc in exchange for the tightened eligibility conditions for non-eu migrants as well as the approval of the reform pension. the latter, indeed, was designed by lega deputy labor minister durigon and it matches the league’s (and prrps’ overall) emphasis on old age and retirement and the defense of generous state pensions for people who have contributed all their lives. beyond the study by jessoula and natili, some other scholars have dealt with the most recent italian social policy reforms and the league’s role in them (giannetti at al, 2020; meardi and guardiancich 2022). these studies have argued that the league influenced the policy priorities of the government more than the m5s did, being able to “reap the fruits of governing” (giannetti at al, 2020, p.15) thanks to its increasing popularity over time. they claim that the league’s input was more visible in the specific areas of pensions and family social policies than in that of the rdc, with the exception of the introduction of the restrictive measures toward migrants (meardi and guardiancich, 2022), being thus in line with what jessoula and natili say (2020). however, these previous studies have touched the topic of the rdc, and especially the restrictive measures by the league, only marginally, without going deeper into an examination of how, exactly, the league promoted the introduction of these measures. by contrast, the present article specifically addresses this topic, delving into the league’s rhetorical and ideological discourse so as to better clarify its social policy formula and notably how it frames the migrant-welfare nexus. 4.3. method and data as for the specific method used, i test the hypotheses by means of an in-depth qualitative content analysis of the speeches made by politicians and deputies of the league. i select those speeches where they discuss and illustrate their views of the rdc and notably the restrictive measures against non-eu migrants put forward by the league. the specific text’s passages under examination are those where they speak in support of such measures and explain their reasons for doing this. by focusing on them, i examine the specific rhetorical and ideological frames politicians use to legitimize these restrictive measures and whether they exploit such frames as expected in the article. with regard to the types of speeches selected, i focus on official speeches first (on the topic of rdc and in particular the restrictive measures by the league), made by matteo salvini, the federal secretary of the league since 2013 and minister of the interior during the conte i government, through the league’s primary communication channels: declarations on social networks, interviews in tv or newspapers. it goes without saying that salvini is continually active on social networks and television, and he made several relevant speeches. this analysis is focused on those speeches he made in the period he was minister of the interior (june 2018-september 2019), both before starting the negotiations with the m5s for the introduction of the rdc and during negotiations. given its role in the government, we can presumably expect that in this period salvini speaks in behalf and highlights the ideological view of the league as a governing party. all the relevant speeches were collected by a key word search on salvini’s official webpage, lega per salvini premier, where all the most important declarations by the politician and the events he takes part in are uploaded. i have manually transcribed his oral speeches (e.g., on tv) in written form. secondly, i focus on parliamentary speeches (by salvini or other beyond welfare chauvinism? 110 deputies of the league) held at the italian chamber of deputies and senate, during which the decree-law was translated into final law. these took place between february and march 2019. i focus merely on the debates where the design and approval of the rdc is discussed, while neglecting those which touch on other topics (especially the pension reform). from a preliminary analysis, it emerges that the rdc issue is discussed during the chamber’s 145th and 146th sessions (20 and 21 march respectively). i took the written transcripts of these debates from the official website of the italian chamber of deputies.7 parliamentary speeches are a more valid exploratory tool to examine the frames employed by politicians than social policies and laws (keskinen, 2016). the latter are indeed usually very vague, putting forward general rules and norms, without clearly specifying the logic and justifications behind them. on the contrary, during parliamentary debates, politicians often have to provide longer and more well-developed explanations for their policy preferences, also to respond to the criticism of the opposition (ibid). moreover, given the continuous confrontation and the need for articulating quick counterarguments, parliamentary speeches are generally more dynamic, also envisaging the re-formulation of politicians’ arguments and frames. thus, they are likely to offer wider material for investigating the ideological and rhetorical frames employed, eventually also capturing different facets of them. the article explores the relevant frames in politicians’ speeches by assigning to the text passages in set 1 a number of “categories” (or “codes”), i.e., several conceptual labels that foster the understanding of the data (ibid). five main categories are used: four of them correspond to the deservingness criteria underlying the wc and wp frames: identity (wc), control, attitude and reciprocity (wp). the last one is an additional residual category, (“others”), corresponding to other criteria and frames not conceptualized in the literature, which may eventually emerge from the analysis. by assigning to the relevant text passages one or more of these categories, i extract from politicians’ speeches the specific deservingness criteria and corresponding frames they use to legitimize the chauvinist welfare measures targeting the rdc. a more detailed illustration of the types of categories, coding frame and procedure is provided in appendix a. to make the reading smoother, in the analysis i only quote some short sections and specific words from the passages analyzed, as examples of the frames exploited by politicians. i present a more detailed overview of politicians’ speeches in appendix b. in order to improve the efficiency of the research, i rely on maxqda, an advanced piece of software for qualitative data analysis, to code the qualitative data and analyze them (kuckartz, 2019). 5. analysis overall, both salvini and other deputies of the league deliberately avoid taking a clear position on the topic of the rdc. every time journalists or other deputies ask for their views, they tend to answer in a vague way, saying that this question should rather be put to the deputies of the m5s. they hold a clear-cut position only with regard to migrants’ entitlement to the benefit, adopting an explicit nativist view, which emerges clearly in the amendment they put forward to the original rdc law text. this finding is in line 7 see: https://www.camera.it/leg18/1. irene landini 111 with previous studies about prrps, showing that they tend to de-emphasize social issues and, in particular, present blurry stances on the first dimension of welfare (i.e., the level of generosity of welfare policies) with the only exception of nativist stances against migrants (rovny 2013; rovny and polk 2020; rathgeb 2021). a more thorough review of the data selected reveals that salvini addresses the specific topic of migrants’ entitlement/disentitlement to the rdc in two cases only (at least, during the period under analysis). the first time is during an interview conducted in september 2018 by journalists of la repubblica,8 an italian daily general-interest newspaper. the interview does not specifically deal with the topic of migrants’ entitlement/disentitlement to the rdc, but the journalist also asks him about his position (and that of the league) in that regard. on this occasion, salvini clearly states that such a measure should be reserved exclusively to italian citizens. he justifies and promotes such a view by relying on both the wc and the wp frames, thus complying with h3. he declares that the league is working on an amendment introducing restrictions for non-italian citizens. the party wants the introduction of these restrictions, he says, in order not to “give away money for free” to migrants who “are not italian citizens” (i.e., the wc frame) and “wander the country without working or making any effort to get employment” (wp). from this speech, it emerges that national citizenship is the main identity criterion informing the wc frame. thus, migrants9 are considered as less deserving of social support through the rdc (and therefore they should not get access to it) because formally they are not italian citizens. as for the wp frame, this is articulated around the deservingness criterion of control. the reference to migrants “wandering around” and their unwillingness to search for a job reminds us of such a criterion. the second time matteo salvini directly and explicitly deals with this topic is when he is invited on the italian tv broadcast non è l’arena, in february 2019. 10 in this case, he relies mainly on the wp frame to promote the restrictive measures. at the time, the amendment to article 2.1 (temporarily banning migrants’ access to the rdc) had already been presented and the approval of the final version of the rdc was under discussion. when asked how the league managed to compromise with the m5s on the subject of the rdc, he answered that it was possible thanks to the introduction of some “controls” within the text of the d-l. these aim to prevent both nationals and migrants (tcns) from cheating the system by making false declarations about their income and residence to obtain the rdc. he then adds that that many of these cheaters are migrants. in this case, wp against non-eu migrants hinges especially on one of the three deservingness criteria, i.e., attitude. that is, politicians argue that migrants should be temporarily banned from the rdc because they are fundamentally dishonest people, ready to cheat in order to obtain more economic advantages for themselves, at the expense of italian people living in extreme poverty. however, the wp frame is exploited also against national citizens, in that salvini explicitly states that also many italian citizens tend to adopt these dishonest behaviors. during the parliamentary debates preceding the approval of the final law envisaging both the rdc scheme and quota 100, matteo salvini does not directly address the topic 8 i found the relevant video on the facebook webpage lega-salvini premier. 9 here, he refers generically to “immigrants” without specifying any groups (ex., eu, not eu). 10 i found the relevant video on the facebook webpage lega-salvini premier. beyond welfare chauvinism? 112 of migrants’ entitlement to the rdc. he rather leaves the floor to other deputies who promote the restrictive measures by relying, again, on both the wc and wp frames (h3). with regard to the wc frame, it remains somewhat unclear whether politicians of the league refer to national citizenship or residence as the main identity criterion for accessing the rdc. since they introduce the 10 years-residence requirements, one may expect that residence is the criterion used. on the other hand, during the parliamentary sessions analyzed, they explicitly state that the government (and the league in particular) aims at defending the (social and economic) interests of italian citizens against those of non citizens “coming from the other side of the world” (20 march, column 145, pos. 198). accordingly, the measures put forward by the league aim exactly to favor citizens over non citizens in access to the rdc. besides this explicit statement, all through the sessions, the deputies of the league repeatedly stress that both the quota 100 and the rdc are measures in support of italian citizens, to meet the needs of that part of the italian population (people who used to be employed or self-employed but lost their jobs and currently live below the line of economic and social poverty). these statements seem to suggest that national citizenship is the main identity criterion for the entitlement or disentitlement of migrants, more than (or to a larger extent than) residence. that is, migrants are considered as less deserving of social support through the rdc because formally they are not italian citizens. “with the two measures that we, the league, have introduced […] we want to make sure, we are sure, that this benefit [i.e., the citizenship income] will go primarily to italian citizens and not to immigrants! our government was elected by italian citizens and it pursues the interests of italian citizens, not those of nonitalian citizens coming from the other side of the world”. (deputy edoardo ziello, the league, 20 march, c.145, pos. 198). as far as the wp frame is concerned, it especially hinges on the attitude criterion of deservingness (similar to what is observed in the speech by salvini on tv). once again, migrants are blamed for their (supposed) dishonest and usurping behaviors (in italian, they are called furbetti). more specifically, politicians argue that, in the previous years, most migrants declared less property and income than they actually had, in order to be entitled to the former minimum income schemes (21 march, c.146, pos. 1072). this way, migrants took away several social and economic resources, that may otherwise have been spent to improve the welfare services for italians living below the poverty line (ibid). some of them even left italy to spend the money received abroad, in their home country (20 march, c.145, pos. 200). in the politicians’ view, this phenomenon was especially made possible by the fact that administrative controls by frontline social workers were too light in previous years, and were therefore unable to assess the real estate and income situation of people claiming the benefit (ibid). in light of this, the league politicians argue that the new restrictive measures are necessary in order to ensure that italian citizens will be given priority in the allocation of the new rdc measure, contrary to what occurred for the rei (20 march, c.145, pos. 200). accordingly, the 10-year requirement is intended to make it a longer and more difficult procedure for migrants to apply for the rdc. in the politicians’ view, this should discourage them from applying, finally ensuring that more resources are left for italian citizens. furthermore, the second requirement (the additional certification from migrants) aims irene landini 113 at preventing migrants from doing the same for the rdc as well. by asking migrants to present additional certification, the government will be able to strengthen control over migrants and make it more difficult to declare less property, earnings, and income than they actually have (21 march, c.146, pos. 1072). as a result, this second measure will prevent and reduce the possibility of cheating at the expense of italians. in simple terms, this may be a strategy “to cut the problem out at its root” (20 march, c.145, pos. 200). “because, mr. president, that was what happened with the previous minimum income scheme: the majority of migrants who took the inclusion income played dumb and did not declare all their real properties, in order to get the benefit. some of them even went to spend it in their country of origin rather than here in italy! this situation was also likely to create economic damage to our country and a fiscal loss for our citizens who lost a lot of resources we wish the government could rather have spent to help them. we, on the other hand, said: more barriers to the access to benefits for migrants, to cut the problem out at its root and prevent cheating practices, so as to make sure that more resources are left for italians”. (deputy edoardo ziello, the league, 20 march, c.145, pos. 200). “it is required, for those who present an isee declaration, given that there are patrimonial requirements to be respected, that the embassy of the state of origin certifies that the foreigner who applies to obtain the citizenship income, is not cheating us, is not trying to fool us again, as happened with the inclusion income, for which many foreigners did not declare all their actual properties and real estate and stole money from italians citizens”. (deputy riccardo molinari, the league, 21 march, c.146, pos. 1072). from the speeches analyzed, it seems that the league11 mobilize the wc and wp frames to promote non-eu migrants’ exclusion. namely, non-eu migrants are to be temporary banned from the new rdc both because they are not italian citizens (i.e., the identity criterion) and because they violate some good morals by cheating on their properties and incomes (i.e., the attitude criterion). based on this, we can conclude that the league’s ideological and rhetorical frames (wc and wp) reflect the party’ s welfare agenda during elections. 6. discussion and conclusions the present article has applied the theoretical and analytical framework by abs (abs et al., 2021) to prrps’ governmental action. it has investigated whether prrps transpose the ideological and rhetorical frames underlying their welfare agenda during elections (wc, wp) into governmental action. in addition, it has examined which of these frames ruling prrps are most likely to be exploited. to answer these questions, the analysis has tested three different views. the first states that ruling prrps do not exploit any of these frames. the second view claims instead that they only exploit the wp frame. indeed, it may eventually make restrictive social policies against migrants overall more morally and politically acceptable in light of the rules of moral and political acceptability within 11 in the person of its leader and minister of the interior matteo salvini but also some other deputies defending the amendments during the parliamentary sessions. beyond welfare chauvinism? 114 western democracies, especially the nondiscrimination principle. conversely, the third view argues that prrps may choose to exploit also the identity criterion of deservingness, i.e., the wc frame (either together with the wp frame or not), coherently with their electoral rhetoric and irrespective of rules of moral and political acceptability. the analysis has focused in particular on the case of the league and the introduction of the rdc during the conte i government (2018-2019). the results bring empirical evidence to the third hypothesis. that is, when in a ruling position, the league supports exclusive solidarity (i.e., the exclusion of tcns from access to rdc) by exploiting the very same ideological and rhetorical frames exploited during the electoral campaign (differently from what is expected in h1). moreover, the party relies on both the wc and wp (h3); it does not try to frame welfare cutbacks in more morally and politically acceptable terms in light of western european democratic standards (in contrast to h2). as previously mentioned, some studies on the league and its imprint on italian social policy already exist. in particular, the work by meardi and guardiancich (2022) has shown that the party’s input was visible in some specific areas like pensions and family social policies. in addition, jessoula and natili (2020) have showed that the introduction of the restrictive measures towards tcns within the rdc was the result of a compromise between the league and the m5s; namely, the league accepted the introduction of the rdc only in exchange for these measures. however, none of these studies has examined how exactly the league promoted the introduction of these restrictive measures, i.e., the ideological and rhetorical frames exploited. by delving into this specific aspect, this work therefore complements former research on the italian case. beyond the specificities of the italian case, the article relies on this case to contribute to the advancement of the understanding of prrps’ social policies. as argued in 4.1., the findings observed for the league can be quite extensively generalized to other prrps across european countries too. when examined from a wider perspective, these findings have two major theoretical implications in the literature about prrps and social policies. first, they confirm some trends already highlighted by some previous studies (rovny 2013; rovny and polk 2020; rathgeb 2021; enggist and pingerra). except for some cases, salvini and other deputies of the league tend to de-emphasize social issues and specifically the rdc, in their official and parliamentary speeches. they hold a clearcut position only with regard to migrants’ entitlement to the benefit, adopting a clear nativist approach, emerging in the amendment they put forward to the original rdc law text (ibid). secondly, by showing that the league exploits both wc and wp, the article’s findings point out that the overused concept of welfare chauvinism is not fully adequate to illustrate the prrps’ social policy formula, in particular with regard to migrants. while the identity criterion (formal citizens, residence and eventually ethno-cultural characteristics) remains undisputedly a key element of prrps’ social policy reforms and rhetoric targeting migrants, it is complemented by other deservingness criteria looking at migrants’ behaviors, attitudes and willingness to (economically) integrate in the host country. in light of this, this work aligns to some previous studies (abs et al., 2021; rathgeb 2021; enggist and pingerra 2021) in saying that research on prrps must go beyond the welfare chauvinism concept to better understand these parties’ social policy formula. irene landini 115 i am aware of the limitations of the present study. the analysis has voluntarily neglected some factors that may have an impact on prrps’ action in the social policy field. among others, countries’ specificities may matter. for example, as suggested by abs (abs et al., 2020), the different types of national welfare regimes may moderate the emphasis of prrps (also when in office) on particular deservingness criteria to be applied to migrants (and possibly also to national citizens). another factor may be the different types of policy areas, i.e., whether prrps promote and implement social reforms in the means tested (like the rdc), or rather universal policy field. future research can incorporate the present findings to further investigate these matters, including new countires in the analysis and adequately comparing them. finally, this study has focused exclusively on the first dimension of the political conflict about welfare politics, i.e., about the level of generosity of national welfare expenditure (enggist and pingerra 2021; rathgeb 2021; busemayer et al., 2021). by contrast, it has not considered the second dimension, namely the recalibration of welfare expenditure (which social policy domain should be given priority). while both dimensions are undoubtedly relevant in the italian political panorama, i decided to focus especially on the first one for two reasons. firstly, the topic of tcns’ disentitlement to the rdc acquired great relevance and visibility during the period under observation, by both politicians and public opinion, including ngos, legal groups and associations, etc. accordingly, i argue that a deeper analysis of how the league promoted disentitlement was necessary to shed light on this whole matter. secondly, focusing on a single specific dimension has allowed me to carry out a deeper and more detailed analysis. further studies can complement the present analysis, by delving into the debate around the recalibration of welfare expenditure in italy (second dimension). references abs, k. et al. 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(2018) ‘explaining different trajectories of minimum income schemes: groups, parties and political exchange in italy and spain’, journal of european social policy, 28(2), pp. 116–129. rathgeb, p. (2021) ‘makers against takers: the socio-economic ideology and policy of the austrian freedom party’, west european politics, 44(3), pp. 635–660. doi:10.1080/01402382.2020.1720400. rovny, j. and polk, j. (2020) ‘still blurry? economic salience, position and voting for radical right parties in western europe’, european journal of political research, 59(2), pp. 248– 268. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12356. schreier, m. (2014) ‘qualitative content analysis’, in: flick, u. the sage handbook of qualitative data analysis, london: sage, pp. 170-183 schumacher, g., and van kersbergen, k. (2016) ‘do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism of populist parties?’, party politics, 22(3), pp. 300–312. doi: 10.1177/1354068814549345. sciortino, g. (2004) ‘immigration in a mediterranean welfare state: the italian experience in comparative perspective’, journal of comparative policy analysis: research and practice, 6(2), pp. 111–129. irene landini 117 parliamentary debates analyzed: session no. 145, 20 march 2019, available at: https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idseduta=0145&tipo=stenografico#sed0145.stenografico.tit00030 session no. 146, 21 march 2019, available at: https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idseduta=0146&tipo=stenografico#sed0146.stenografico.tit00020 beyond welfare chauvinism? 118 appendix a. the coding procedure and coding frame qualitative content analysis is a more appropriate method for testing the article’s hypotheses than its counterpart, quantitative content analysis (keskinen, 2016). the quantitative method counts words and occurrences within the texts. conversely, the qualitative one systematically examines themes and patterns and the overall sentiments within the selected texts. thus, it is suitable to the article’s research question since it allows for an in-depth and systematic examination of politicians’ rhetoric with regard to migrants, namely the ideological and rhetorical frames they use to legitimate and promote migrants’ exclusion from the rdc. furthermore, qualitative content analysis allows the researcher to simultaneously capture both politicians’ explicit and implicit references to the ideological and rhetorical frames under investigation (schreier, 2014). indeed, it may sometimes be the case that politicians do not explicitly refer to any of the existing frames, but they rather develop the discourses in such a way that they point back to one or both of them, or eventually to additional and still unexplored frames. by contrast, a purely quantitative analysis of the texts fails to capture these latent meanings since it only focuses on the explicit meanings (ibid). the article extracts the relevant frames from the texts’ passages under examination by relying on a number of “categories” (or “codes”), i.e., several conceptual labels that foster an understanding of the data (ibid). empirically speaking, categories are “those aspects of the material about which researchers would like more information” (schreier, 2014, p. 75), namely the deservingness criteria (and the corresponding frames, either wc or wp or both) in this article. categories can be created before or while analyzing the content (kuckartz, 2019). ex ante categories are called deductive because they originate from previous knowledge of the researcher, from the research question or from the existing literature. they are concepts that exist and have been formulated before reading the text and independently of it (kuckartz, 2019). in vivo categories are created from the text itself, during the analysis: they are inductive (ibid). this work deals with deductive categories, built starting from the literature. they correspond to the specific deservingness/undeservingness criteria highlighted in the relevant literature: identity, control, attitude, reciprocity. by assigning the relevant text passages (i.e., those in which politicians speak in support of the restrictive measures introduced in the rdc and explain their reason for doing so) one or more of these categories, i extract from politicians’ speeches the specific deservingness criteria and corresponding frames they use to legitimate the welfare chauvinist measures targeting the rdc. based on abs’ (abs et al., 2021) analytical framework i know that when the identity category applies then the wc frame is at play. instead, when the other three categories/criteria apply (one or even all), then politicians are using the wp frame. in line with the traditional qualitative content analysis, each category is marked by one or several indicators. these are words, sentences, and broader considerations in the texts which enable me to immediately recognize the category at play (schreier 2014; kuckartz 2019). here below, i show a summary scheme of the article’s coding system. irene landini 119 • identity ○ indicators: words related to the identity semantic sphere (“citizens”, “residents”, “italians” and “not italians” and/or other similar ones); reasoning and considerations that explicitly give formal citizens (or residents) priority over non-citizen migrants in access to the rdc; • control ○ indicators: words related to the control semantic sphere (“control”, “held responsible”, and/or other similar ones); reasoning and considerations that blame non-eu migrants for their own situation of need and low-income (for example, because they are unwilling to actively look for a job so to increase their income); • attitude ○ indicators: words related to the attitude semantic sphere (“ungrateful”, “dishonest”, and/or other similar ones); reasoning and considerations that portray non-eu migrants as ungrateful and/or dishonest or in some other negative manner (from a moral and behavioral point of view); • reciprocity ○ indicators: words related to the reciprocity semantic sphere (“contribute”, “awarding”, “actively engaging”, and/or other similar ones); reasoning and considerations that stress that non-eu migrants have not contributed enough to the italian social and economic growth through their past working activities. relying on well-defined indicators is useful for making clear where one code ends and another one begins. in fact, each category is applied to one or more sentences and textual passages only when words and discourses are consistent with that category’s indicators. this in turn allows for the assessment of which deservingness criteria are used to justify the restrictive measures targeting the new rdc and whether these criteria correspond to those hypothesized in the article. besides, indicators are useful for applying the same categories to all the material in a consistent manner, i.e., always applying the same category when the same indicator is observed. the consistency of the coding frame increases, in turn, the reliability and replication of the overall analysis. in order to improve the efficiency of the research, i rely on maxqda, an advanced piece of software for qualitative data analysis, to code the qualitative data and analyze them (kuckartz, 2019). beyond welfare chauvinism? 120 appendix b. text excerpts analyzed12 speeches by matteo salvini (ministry of the interior, the league), posted on the official facebook webpage lega-salvini premier: when asked about the rdc: “so, are you asking me what i think about the citizenship income? the citizenship income is a measure promoted by our coalition partner, the m5s. […] the league is working on an amendment to reserve such schemes to italian citizens only. i will accept the citizenship income, as long as it is a measure to help italian citizens. the league does not want to give away money for free to those people who are not italian citizens, wander the country without working or making any effort to get employment in italy”. (interview by la repubblica, september 2018) “we agree on this measure, but we are negotiating to introduce more controls (the ones proposed by the league). luigi [i.e., the ministry of labor luigi di maio] and i will discuss this point further in the next few weeks. the league does not want to undermine the efforts made to support 5 million italians living under the poverty line, so we are trying to find a compromise between helping people in need and avoiding cheating by dishonest people and abusers. […] all those people who declare false properties and lower incomes just to obtain entitlement to the citizenship income, if caught, have to go to prison – no ifs, not buts! i refer especially to migrants from outside the eu. i know that many of them are behaving this way and i want to stop them! (tv interview during the tv broadcast non è l’arena, february 2019) parliamentary speeches speeches by deputy edoardo ziello (the league) during the 45th parliamentary session of the chamber of deputies, on 20 march 2019: “i move now to talk about the citizenship income. it is clear that we, as a party, had not thought of introducing a citizenship income during the election campaign for the general election of 4 march. however, we have always said one thing, namely that the 5 million poor italians who are in our country because of the wrong and wicked policies of the democratic party, these italians were and are a priority for us” (20 march, column 145, pos. 193-194). “citizenship income is not a purely poverty-alleviation, welfare measure, it is also and above all a measure that is linked to reintegration into the labor market. with this measure, we guarantee that all the beneficiaries of the citizenship income will be people who are totally obliged to follow a path, who will not sit on their sofa and live merely on the money received, as some deputies of the democratic party do” (20 march, column 145, pos. 195-197). 12 translation from italian by the author. irene landini 121 “this new law represents a new pact for social inclusion. surely, thanks to this pact for social inclusion, a lot of italian citizens will be included in a path of inclusion that will also guarantee them the right to return to be or feel protagonists of their community […]. then, with the two measures that we, the league, have introduced, namely residence for ten years for all non-eu citizens and the additional certification attesting to the absence of property abroad, we want to make sure, we are sure that this benefit [i.e., the citizenship income] will go primarily to italian citizens and not to immigrants! our government was elected by italian citizens, and it purses the interests of italian citizens, not those of people coming from the other side of the world. […] because, mr. president, that was what happened with the previous minimum income scheme: the majority of migrants who took the inclusion income played dumb and did not declare all their real properties, in order to get the benefit. some of them even went to spend it in their country of origin rather than here in italy! this situation was also likely to create economic damage to our country and a fiscal loss for our citizens who lost a lot of resources we wish the government could have rather spent to help them. we, on the other hand, said: more barriers to access to benefits for migrants, to cut the problem out at its root and prevent the cheating practices, so as to make sure that more resources are left for italians” (20 march, column 45, pos. 198). speeches by deputy riccardo molinari (the league) during the 46th parliamentary session of the chamber of deputies, on the 21 march 2019: “a few months ago, the league and the five stars movement, alone against everyone, against all the opposition, against all the national and international commentators, engaged in a tug-of-war with the european commission. this occurred because the commission had a clear objective regarding our financial law: not to make us apply these two social measures, the citizenship income and the revision of the fornero pension system. because the idea of brussels was that the wrong recipes, which have led our country to have one third of italian families at risk of poverty and 5 million living under the poverty line, those recipes should not be questioned. therefore, this government and this majority are a government and a majority that are subversive with respect to those dogmas. namely, we are demonstrating that, if you want to do battle for italian citizens, if you want to do battle for social justice, nothing can hold: italian citizens are right when they vote well and when they have leaders who do the things they promise. well, these two measures are measures which, as i was saying, respond to the demand for social rights and social protection and meet the needs of a significant part of the italian population, which is the part that has become poorer in recent years” (21 march, column 146, pos. 1068). “the measures we proposed are to be seen as a way to make the citizenship income even more effective. it is required, for those who present an isee declaration, given that there are patrimonial requirements to be respected, that the embassy of the state of origin certifies that the foreigner, who applies to obtain the citizenship income, is not cheating us, is not trying to fool us again, as happened with the inclusion income, for which many foreigners did not declare all their actual properties and real estates and stole money from italians citizens” (21 march, column 146, pos. 1072). microsoft word pdf_issue_12_1.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 1, june 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 1, pp. 46–54. the italian research assessment exercises daniele checchi university of milan the italian experience italian universities have so far experienced three assessment exercises (2001-3, 2004-10 and 2011-14), which are described in details in table 1. the fiscal law approved in december 2016 dictates that from now onwards the reference periods will be quinquennial, reducing the discretionary power so far exercised by the ministry of education in designing the exercise. table 1. the three research assessment exercises after an initial trial-and-error approach, the second and third exercises have been rather similar, thus consolidating a standard of evaluation, whose principles are the following: • each assessment is intended to evaluate groups (universities, research agencies, down to departments and institutes) and not individuals (individual assessments are revealed to each researcher, but not to heads of departments, deans or chancellors); the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 47 • the assessment considers a fixed number of products per capita/year, which should capture the best production: as such, it is closer to a monitoring exercise than to a quality assessment, revealing the excellences in a given research field; • using current standards (1/2 product per year per university professor – currently around 52,000 – and 1 product per researcher working in a research agency – currently around 10,000) implies approximately 35,000 products per year; over a 5year interval it sums up to 175,000 products, making some sort of automatic (bibliometric) assessment unavoidable; • the process has been managed by groups of experts, defined according to predefined research areas (since italian professors are pigeon-holed into 371 research fields, then grouped into 14 research areas, known as aree cun). each group was composed by a variable number of experts (from 20 to 60, depending on the expected number of products – the experts were selected by anvur from list of applicants according to their publication records and their area of expertise). in turn, these experts relied onto 14,500 external peer reviewers, working in domestic and foreign institutions; • in the last two exercises, the evaluating agency (anvur) requested to the experts a preassigned distribution of journals, according to the world distribution of impact. as a consequence, the top list of journals should correspond to the best 10% of the world production; nevertheless, more than 30% of the submitted products to the last exercise ended up in this category (because the exercise considers only the best products); • depending on the research area, two assessment procedures have been followed: – bibliometric assessment consisted of combining the ranking of the journal according to the impact factor and the citations obtained by a specific article – articles in highly ranked journal with limited citations and/or highly quoted articles published in low ranked journals were peer reviewed; – peer review assessment consisted of a product being separately assigned to two experts, who independently selected an external peer reviewer; once the reviews were returned, a consensus report was drafted by the experts. in case of significant disagreement, a third reviewer was introduced, and the final assessment has to be approved by coordinator of the group of experts. in both cases the submission to experts were non-blind, and the evaluators may have formed their opinion looking at the place of publication, in what has been called as “informed peer review”. 2. the impact of the research assessment the evaluation of the product is normalised according to the means in each research area, leading to an indicator which combines quality and quantity assessment of a research field in a university.1 this indicator counts for three-fourths of the funds allocation, and is then 1 from a technical point of view, the indicator consists of the share of scores attained by a single university/department over the total scores achieved at the national level by all institutions. that share is then applied to the distribution of funds. if a university/department performs above the average, it will obtain a funding share which exceeds the corresponding share computed on the personnel heads. paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 48 complemented with other indicators (phds, foreign students, external funding) in order to achieve the summary indicator to be applied to a funding scheme for universities. the most recent exercise lead to the distribution of ¼ of total funding to public universities in italy (1.4 billions of euro for 2016). approximately 15% of total funding relies on the proper evaluation of research products.2 as such italy belongs to evaluation-based systems (with the uk, australia, new zealand), to be contrasted with indicator-based systems (norway, denmark, czech republic). however, the 5-year interval is long enough to call for alternative methods of evaluation in the intermediate years. in addition, the results of the evaluation have trickled-down, directly or indirectly, to many other dimensions of the life of university departments. many universities have used the scores obtained by their departments in the internal allocation of funds and promotions; the current accreditation of phd programs is based on the research assessment of the teaching staff; newspapers articles have widely disseminated the results of the research assessment with reference to local universities, in order to drive the choices of students and their families. even if they are formally independent, the process of selecting new academics has been significantly influenced by the research assessment exercises. selection in hard science research fields makes large use of bibliometric methods, while in soft science journal rankings have been adopted. though i would not dare claiming that the introduction of assessment exercises has raised the standards of hiring in most disciplines, as a matter of fact in the most recent vqr the average score of newly hired/promoted researchers is higher than the average of permanent members (the indicator called iras2). this implies that new entrants in the academia have introjected the assessment approach in shaping the way in which they publish their research outputs. while the vqr asks for the assessment of “originality, relevance, exposure to international debate”, what is more perceivable (and perceived) is the internationalisation of the domestic production. publishing in a foreign language (notably in english) has become the dominant strategy in several fields. as a consequence, many italian journals which used to publish in italian opted for the english language. a related issue is the multiplication of the number of papers via the diffusion of co-authorship. since the vqr rules allow for the same product being submitted by more than one author (as long as they belong to different research entities), many authors have followed a strategy of risk diversification, by developing joint research projects in the expectation that at least one of them would obtain publication in a highly ranked journal. 3. the recent vqr (2011-14) the most recent research assessment exercise ended in february 2017, with the official presentation of global report on the italian research activity accompanied by specific reports for each research areas and for the social impact activity. 96 universities participated to the exercise, together with 12 pro’s (public research organisations) and 26 other institutions on a voluntary basis. the distribution of 118,036 products received for evalua 2 to be honest, the impact on funding is less dramatic in the short run, because of high persistence on historical values: each university cannot receive ±2% of what it has received the previous year, thus strongly attenuating whatever result could obtain from the research assessment. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 49 tion is reported in table 2, where one can easily detect few regularities. compliance rates vary across research areas, oscillating between 90% and 97%.3 journal articles represent the dominant submission for hard sciences (reaching 98% in biology and medicine), while collected papers (edited volumes) prevail in the social sciences and humanities. books have almost not been submitted in bibliometric areas, while they represent one fourth of all submissions in some non-bibliometric areas. the residual category [including musical compositions, designs, projects (architecture), performances, exhibitions, arts objects, databases and software] account for a small fraction of the total output submitted to the assessment. this does not produce a representative snapshot of the research activity of universities (pros have similar composition), because the limit imposed to two products per researcher. rather it allows monitoring of what can be considered as relevant scientific productivity of the entire research community.4 table 2. distribution of products by research area and type of output – italy vqr 2011-14 the assessment of each product was conducted according to three criteria: 1. originality, to be intended as the degree according to which the publication is able to introduce a new way of thinking about the object of the research; 2. methodological accuracy, to be intended as the degree according to which the publication adopts an appropriate methodology and is able to present its results to peers; 3. actual or potential impact, to be intended as the level of influence – current or potential – that the research exerts on the relevant scientific community. 3 it is important to recall that a protest organised in some universities led a fraction of university professors to refuse to submit their required output. however, in the first vqr, the submission rate for universities was 95.09% of the expected output, while it went down to 933.82 during the second one. 4 the rules prevented the submission of textbooks, working papers and self-publications. paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 50 each publication was attributed a quality profile: • excellent (weight 1) if it falls in the top decile of the world distribution of publications in the research area; • good (weight 0.7) if it falls in the 70-90% segment of the distribution; • fair (weight 0.4) if it falls in the 50-70% segment of the international distribution; • acceptable (weight 0.1) if it falls in the 20-50% segment of the distribution; • limited (weight 0) if it belongs to the 0-20% lowest segment of the distribution; • impossible to evaluate (weight 0) was assigned to missing publications or publications that were impossible to evaluate. as one can easily expect, any evaluation of a product following the above-mentioned criteria contains some degree of arbitrariness. one can initially consider the language of publication as a proxy for the exposure to the international debate. an inspection to table 3 seems to suggest that what are considered as bibliometric sectors (in light grey) are largely open to the international debate. from this perspective, the research area 13 (economics and statistics) could be considered equally open to internationalisation. these areas have mostly relied on automatic assignment of products to the evaluation categories, using the principle that journal with high impact factors are generally speaking more selective in acceptance, and therefore impose higher standards of quality. this principle is complemented with the use of papers’ citations, which should capture the relevance of the contents for the scientific debate. the evaluation in non-bibliometric areas relied on peer review (with the exception of the research area 13, which adopted a ranking of the journals based on the impact factors). if the replacement of an algorithm with human reviewers may be welcome in terms of adherence to the suggested evaluation principles, it introduces the problem of potential disagreement among the reviewers, which is likely to motivate the lower fraction of “excellent” and “good” evaluation recorded in the non-bibliometric areas (see table 4). table 3. language of the products submitted to vqr 2011-14 the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 51 table 4. distribution of products by research area and received evaluation – vqr 2011-14 4. the receipt of the research assessment exercises in the academic community these exercises have generated enthusiasm and collaboration as well as suspicion and resistance. a large fraction of academics definitively cooperated with the exercise, organising the submission within each department and accepting to review the product. a smaller fraction opposed it, on the arguments that these exercises were misleading the italian research towards irrelevant topics, were promoting harmful competition among research agencies and were destroying the weakest segment of the academia (very often located in southern universities).5 my impression is that the main argument against the research assessment exercise runs as follows: “the assessment legitimizes budget cuts, especially against southern universities. if we want to save the equal opportunity in accessing universities, we should oppose any assessment which associate funding and results”. this argument has some plausibility, especially when looking at figure 1, which shows the trends in state funding to italian universities in nominal and real (i.e. deflated by the price variation) terms. remember that the first exercise with impact on funding was launched in 2011, when the decline in resources became more pronounced. although the actual impact was not disruptive (due to safeguard clauses – see above), the linkage of resources to assessment opened the risk of “poverty traps”: a poorly performing university received fewer resources and was therefore less likely to improve its performance in the next round of assessment. budget cuts curtailed hiring possibilities, which were only later released in 5 perhaps the most representative instances of this aversion towards evaluation performed by anvur can be traced in the following websites (unfortunately, all in italian): www.roars.it (usually covering topics related to assessment methods); http://www.flcgil.it/universita/ (the website of the main union of university workers); http://firmiamodimissionianvur.org/ (more than 2,000 researchers signed a petition asking for the dismissal of the board of anvur, the evaluation agency). paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 52 correlation with performance. thus poorly performing universities were supposedly prevented from hiring better researchers in order to revert their rank position. figure 1. total public revenues accrued to italian public universities (2000=100) despite its simplicity, this line of argument is substantially flawed. during the first decade of the present century, the hiring procedures of italian universities were reformed, moving from a format of centralised competition to one of local competitions. each department was left almost free to hire or promote whoever they deemed worthy to be hired. the first exercise (vtr) did not provide a clear picture of the average performance, because it was designed to assess excellence within each university, without considering who wrote what. the second exercise (vqr 2004-10) for the first time revealed that a nonnegligible fraction of researchers was unable to submit any research product at all. the third exercise (vqr 2011-14) provided evidence of some convergence of universities towards the mean, thanks to the change in the grading procedure (missing submissions were no longer penalised with a negative grade) but also to the injection of new resources that made possible to all universities the hiring of new scholars. 5. open issues for future assessment exercises in the immediate aftermath of the publication of the results of the third exercise, several suggestions have emerged in the press as well as in official forums. some of them were mainly technical, some other more philosophical. in the following i will review them in brief. the first concerns the potential bias contained in the evaluation. given existing rules, co-authored papers to be submitted to foreign journals have the highest probability to receive a high grade. this implicitly “delegates” to foreign editors (and publishers) the choice of what is to be considered relevant for the international debates. topics that are outside the mainstream, or that are simply concerned with national debates, are likely to appear at best in local journals, which then receive lower evaluation even by referees. still, most of italian journals do not yet have standard double blind reviewing procedures, inducing the suspicion that the quality of their articles may be lower. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 53 the absence of domestic databases on publications and citations makes it impossible to introduce a dual layer system, where articles and books in italian could gain more visibility. the use of peer reviewers is not a panacea, for various reasons. especially in the social sciences, where the ideological content of the arguments is important, the judgment of the reviewer may be biased by strategical concerns (by attributing a lower score to an author, one may be tempted to alter the competition among different schools of thought). in addition, peer review of papers that have already undergone a real blind review process represent in inherent contradiction: suppose that the final reviewer spots an evident error; who has to be blamed, the author, the journal referees, or the editor of the journal? finally, the peer review is expensive. consider the following back of the envelope calculation: in the most recent exercise 52,060 products (corresponding to 44.1% of total production) underwent a double review; each reviewer received 30 euro per review, leading to a total cost above 3 million euro, which is a cost that cannot be frequently afforded. the second aspect concerns the different publication strategies of different research communities. on average applied physics scholars publish more than 30 papers per year, because the number of co-authors can easily exceed one hundred. the corresponding figure for a theorist in mathematics may not reach one paper per year. to partially account for these differences the scores are normalised by research area, but this does not reduce the evident advantage of sectors where the scholar may select their best production from a larger set of papers. a related issue deals with the weighing of different products. the most recent exercise introduced for the first time a different weighing for books vis a vis journal articles: under specific request of the author, a book could have been considered as equivalent to two articles, thus satisfying the requirement of submission. but the principle could be extended to other categories of products, because an article collected in a book is probably subject to less scrutiny than an article in a journal. articles and/or books could be weighed by the number of co-authors. and so on. a further issue that has been raised deals with the boundaries of research areas. so far the assessment exercises have considered aggregation of research fields (settori scientifico-disciplinari) under which academics have been hired to teach. this does not have any correspondence to other classification criteria (like erc) and tend to penalise crossdisciplinary research. in principle, nothing prevents redesigning of the evaluation areas, but this interferes with the academic careers, which represents the strongest incentive to publish (at least for academics). thus, a net separation between research assessment and promotion criteria would be required before addressing this problem. a final point deals with the potential trade-off between teaching and research. the assessment is conducted without any reference to the resources available/invested in research, including the time absorbed by teaching. most universities in peripheral areas lament the excess burden of teaching created by the chronic lack of staff. from an intuitive point of view, a proper assessment should correct for differences in the starting conditions. otherwise stressing research results as unique measure for scholars’ quality is detrimental to the effectiveness of teaching, because scholars will devote their best energies to article writing. there are possible solutions to avoid this trade-off: if each academic could choose over a menu of different combinations of teaching loads and commitment to publications, we could observe a possible sorting of scholars according to their preferences paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 54 and abilities. this would require a revision of the procedure of assessment, because scholars should then be weighed or converted into full-time equivalents. overall, the unsolved issue for the italian research assessment exercises seems to be whether the results should be interpreted as monitoring the system (in order to ensure accountability vis-à-vis the tax-payers) or rather a research quality assessment (intended to promote excellence). the ministry of education oscillates among these two interpretations, which however lead to alternative policy suggestions. according to the former perspective, uniformity of performance is a goal, and the weakest universities should be sustained in order to grant a common standard of tertiary education across the country. according to the latter, the best universities/departments should obtain even greater resources, given their good evaluations obtained in the assessment. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_6.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. 82–94. * this article is the result of work conducted fully in common. however, eugenio salvati specifically worked on sections 2 and 5, while michelangelo vercesi specifically worked on sections 3 and 4. the introduction is a joint effort. we are grateful to two anonymous reviewers of italian political science for their valuable comments and suggestions. contact author: michelangelo vercesi, leuphana university of lüneburg. e-mail address: michelangelo.vercesi@leuphana.de party organizations and legislative turnover: signals of an unstable parliamentary class? eugenio salvati university of pavia michelangelo vercesi leuphana university of lüneburg abstract parliamentary turnover is an important question in political science due to its connection to salient topics like elite circulation and parliamentary roles, legislature institutionalization, executive-legislative relations, and the quality of the policy-making process. in this article we contribute to the debate by focusing on the italian case from a longitudinal perspective. the 2018 general election was conducive to a relatively high level of turnover. this level is roughly equivalent to two previous electoral rounds. however, the empirical evidence shows that the conditions usually thought to account for another two exceptional elections seem not to apply to 2018. after introducing the literature on legislative turnover and arguing that this topic is worth tackling, we stress the usefulness of the italian case for comparative research and we provide a picture of our case study, presenting the theoretical puzzle and research questions. subsequently we tackle this issue, claiming that the usual explanations fit only partially with our case. in particular, we argue that neglected intra-party factors can be a viable explanatory alternative. the article ends with a brief discussion of the findings. 1. introduction arliamentary turnover is an important question in political science due to its connection to salient topics like elite circulation and parliamentary roles, legislature institutionalization, executive-legislative relations, and the quality of the policymaking process. despite its importance, it is a relatively underdeveloped research field. starting from the two influential works by polsby (1968) and rosenthal (1974), the great bulk of studies on turnover have focused on single cases (moncrief et al. 1998; samuels 2000; manow 2007; kerby and blidook 2011); only rarely have they attempted to engage with cross-country analyses (matland and studlar 2004; kuklys 2013; gouglas et al. 2017). the main exception is the stream of studies on subnational parliaments. following the us tradition, these works have provided within-country comparisons (squire 1998; moncrief et al. 2004; heinsohn and freitag 2012; heinsohn 2014). in this article we contribute to the debate by focusing on the italian case from a longitudinal perspective. the 2018 general election was conducive to a relatively high level of turnover. this level is roughly equivalent to two previous electoral rounds, with rates ‘definitely deviant for a context of democratic continuity’ (verzichelli 2009: 61). p who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 83 however, the empirical evidence shows that the conditions usually thought to account for another two exceptional elections seem not to apply to 2018. this suggests that we should look for further explanatory factors. after introducing the literature on legislative turnover and arguing that this topic is worth tackling, we stress the usefulness of the italian case for comparative research and we provide a picture of our case study, presenting the theoretical puzzle and research questions. subsequently we tackle this issue, claiming that the usual explanations fit only partially with our case. in particular, we argue that neglected intra-party factors can be a viable explanatory alternative. the article ends with a brief discussion of the findings. 2. legislative turnover: definition and determinants parliamentary turnover is linked to two facets of the life of legislatures: institutionalization and professionalization. polsby (1968) has defined the turnover rate as the central element that can help measure the degree of institutionalization achieved by a parliament. according to him, long legislative careers and low turnover rates play a central role in the strengthening of a legislature. this is why a stable group of incumbents within legislatures is fundamental to structure and routinizing organizational behaviours. moreover, they promote specialization and differentiation, which are considered crucial features of efficient legislature. professionalization refers to a condition in which mps can conceive of their parliamentary activity as their main occupation. professionalization can be measured by three indicators: the mps’ remuneration and benefits, length of legislative sessions, and availability of resources (staff, working spaces, funds, etc.) (squire 1988, 1992, 1998). often, subnational legislatures are less professionalized, being thus inherently much more exposed to high turnover rates (squire 1992; moncrief et al. 2004; heinsohn and freitag 2012; heinsohn 2014). following matland and studlar (2004: 92), legislative turnover can be defined as the proportion of membership that changes from one election to the next. a new legislature is composed of re-elected mps, incoming mps elected for the first time and former mps who come back after an interruption (francois and grossman 2015; salvati 2016a). legislative turnover defines the level of renewal or continuity of parliamentary elites and membership stability within an institution (squire 1998). additionally, it indirectly tells us something about the criteria that parties follow to select their personnel and/or party gate-keeping strength. studies on parliamentary turnover can be gathered into two groups: the micro-level approach looks at individual motivations for exiting, while the macro-level approach takes institutional factors into account. francois and grossman (2015) have suggested three levels for studying turnover: the legislature (macro-level), the parliamentary party (meso-level), and, finally, the individual (microlevel). according to the two scholars, micro and macro levels are not per se adequate for studying turnover. indeed, only the party level could account for party strategies, party elites’ circulation, and party selection processes. all in all, a concomitant consideration of both party and legislative factors seems to be the most fruitful approach. salvati and vercesi, party organizations and legislative turnover 84 the nature of the exit of mps from parliament can be either voluntary or involuntary. voluntary exits stem from individual choices, determined by cost/benefit analyses of running for office (squire 1988; hall and van houweling 1995; matland and studlar 2004; kerby and bildook 2011). on the other hand, an involuntary exit may be due to party gate-keeping or failure to get re-elected (somit et al. 1994; moncrief 1998; matland and studlar 2004). the most important source of involuntary turnover is electoral volatility, that is, the degree of change in voting behaviour between elections (matland and studlar 2004; moncrief et al. 2004; manow 2007; heinshon 2014): higher volatility increases the likelihood of higher turnover and substantial changes of parliamentary seats (rosenthal 1974; matland and studlar 2004). overall, we can expect to find higher turnover rates when there is institutional instability, parties and party systems characterized by lower institutionalization, and high electoral volatility (matthews 1984; gouglas and maddens 2017). a second determinant of involuntary turnover is the electoral system: proportional systems tend to increase turnover, while majoritarian and double-list systems are conducive to higher re-election rates (mutland and stadlar 2004; manow 2007; heinsohn and freitag 2012). in majoritarian systems, candidates rely on their status and resources; in contrast, in closed party lists in proportional environments, candidates depend more on parties’ decisions (heinsohn and freitag 2012; francois and grossman 2015). parties take a step back in their gate-keeping activity in majoritarian systems because they ‘fear the loss of what is perhaps a personal vote’ (matland and studlar 2004: 101). party selection prior to the campaigning phase has proved to be a major factor in explaining the entry of newcomers into parliament (gouglas and maddens 2017). however, it remains a neglected aspect of turnover research. frequently, turnover is affected by the inability of incumbents to obtain re-nomination (moncrief 1998; swain et al. 2000; marino and martocchia diodati 2017). re-nomination can fail due to resignations, party deselection (more frequent in pr systems), and death (gouglas and maddens 2017). in addition to the electoral system, heinshon (2014) has listed four further variables that can affect turnover rates: 1. length of the legislative term: the more frequent the elections, the lower the turnover rate; 2. level of professionalization: mps are less likely to abandon the legislature when benefits are greater and the institutional context is professionalized (squire 1988; hibbing 1999; kerby and blidook 2011; gouglas et al. 2017); 3. degree of institutionalization: the stronger and more influential the legislature, the less likely it is that mps will leave voluntarily (sisson 1973; hall and van houweling 1995; hibbing 1999; matland and studlar 2004; salvati 2016a); 4. legislature size: lower numbers of seats have a negative effect on turnover. overall, the literature tells us that legislative turnover calls for a continuous research effort, due to the complexity produced by the interaction between variables at both the institutional and individual levels. furthermore, it is extremely interesting to consider turnover in relation to the institutionalization of parties and to party system stability. from this viewpoint, high turnover can be interpreted as an indicator of structural de-institutionalization (huntington 1968). who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 85 3. the italian case between stability and deep transformations italy has proved to be an interesting case study for the analysis of legislative turnover in a twofold sense. on the one hand, it is possible to observe significant variations over time in the structural conditions that are likely to affect turnover ratios. this allows us to make longitudinal comparisons within the same context of democratic continuity, thus keeping fixed the possible effect of intervening regime and cross-country idiosyncratic factors. on the other hand, the relevance of the italian case ensues from the empirical mixture of stability and quick renewals which has characterized the parliamentary class over the years. as noticed by verzichelli (2009: 60), this research topic has great potential, especially when it comes to investigating political change in italy from the 1990s. we operationalize legislative turnover simply as the percentage of new mps out of the total membership, compared to the previous legislature (matland and studlar 2004; gouglas et al. 2017). we do not distinguish between newcomers and those who re-enter after a ‘break’. finally, we decided to focus only on the first parliamentary chamber. this choice is the most beneficial strategy from a comparative perspective, for reasons of lower comparability between second chambers due to their deep inter-chamber differences (e.g., vercesi 2017). in this regard, it is worth noting that, however, the low share of passing between the two parliamentary branches in italian history (usually ranging between 4% and 8% of the total number of mps) does not appear to be a potential significant source of bias (verzichelli 2009: 61). circumscribing the focus to the republican period only, we notice that – from the first general election in 1948 to 2013 – italy has shown relatively high levels of turnover compared to other western european countries. however, there has been a general increase especially from 1994 onwards (gouglas et al. 2017). before 2018, the turnover rate of the chamber of deputies surpassed the indicative threshold of 50% only in three circumstances: in 1948, 1994, and 2013 (verzichelli 2009: 53). excluding the exceptional case of the 1948 election, held to substitute the then constitutional assembly with the new democratic parliament, we easily find – mutatis mutandis – important similarities between the two remaining periods. the general election of 1994 was the first held with a new electoral system since 1953 and marked the final breakdown of the former party system (bartolini and d’alimonte 1996); this ground-breaking phase was subsequently followed by the new stabilization of the parliamentary class (verzichelli 2006). in 2013, the party system underwent a new earthquake, due to the pressing entry of the five star movement (m5s) in parliament and the consequent shift from bipolarism to tripolar party competition (d’alimonte 2013). both electoral rounds were characterized by significant voter realignment and high electoral volatility. in table 1, we present descriptive statistics on electoral turnout, volatility and legislative turnover since 1994, including 2018 for comparative purposes. information about the mean age of the elected and the number of ‘new parties’ in parliament is also included. to exclude minor changes, we consider as new parties only those that were not in the previous parliament with a parliamentary group and reached at least 5% of votes. however, we do not count those lists resulting from the merger of former parties. electoral volatility is calculated following in the footsteps of pedersen (1979) and chiaramonte and emanuele (2015). with regard to the 2018 general election, an interesting puzzle stems from our picture. the percentage of legislative turnover is as high as the one of the two critical salvati and vercesi, party organizations and legislative turnover 86 passages which established the birth of the so-called ‘second republic’ in 1994 and its end in 2013 (almagisti et al. 2014). the 2018 turnover equals the ratio of 66% of 2013 and it is only one percentage point below that of 1994. the mean age of mps can be a further indicator of turnover. indeed, the more people that get re-elected, the greater is the likelihood of older deputies. in this regard, the data are striking: in 2018 the age reaches its historical minimum, that is, 44 years.1 however, we observe a concomitant significant decrease in overall electoral volatility, compared to the previous election. in 1996, the downfall of volatility appeared together with the stabilization of a new parliamentary class compared to 1994: between 1994 and 1996, the legislative turnover moved from 67 to 44 percent. moreover, the two peaks of legislative turnover in 1994 and 2013 are coincident with the entry of three and two, respectively, new major parties in the legislative arena. nothing similar has happened in 2018: all the largest parties had already run the previous electoral campaign. this would lead us to argue that volatility has not involved new party actors. table 1. electoral turnout, volatility, and turnover in the italian chamber of deputies, 1994-2018 election turnout (%) total volatility (%) legislative turnover (%) mean age new parties 1994 86.3 39.3 66.8 47.1 3 1996 82.9 12.3 43.5 48.1 0 2001 81.4 20.4 41.9 50.4 0 2006 83.6 8.2 42.3 52.2 0 2008 80.5 11.3 40.8 50.8 0 2013 75.2 36.7 65.5 45.7 2 2018 72.9 26.7 65.9 44.3 0 note: data for 2018 volatility are drawn from the ‘new data release (may 2, 2018)’ of emanuele (2015). the parties people of freedom (popolo della libertà – pdl) for 2013 and go italy! (forza italia – fi) for 2018 have been counted as the same party (e.g., vercesi 2015). the same applies when a party has changed its label. sources: data from the archives on the italian parliamentary class of circap (university of siena) presented in verzichelli (2006, 2009) and cotta and verzichelli (2016: 78), emanuele (2015), openpolis (2018: 9), and own update based on data from the website of the italian ministry of the interior (www.interno.gov.it). we have touched upon the fact that electoral volatility and party system changes are major factors when it comes to explaining legislative turnover (gouglas et al. 2017). overall, our data on the italian chamber of deputies from 1994 and 2018 confirm this tendency. the positive pearson correlational value between the two measures is indeed 0.91 (p< 0.01); if we exclude 2018, it even rises to 0.95 (p< 0.01). overall, the 2018 general election appears to be a deviant case. if it cannot be explained by electoral volatility as straightforwardly as previous rounds, what accounts more for the prominent legislative turnover of 2018? are there any factors that hold for 2018 and that distinguish this election from previous ones in terms of elected candidates? 1 it is worth remembering that the minimum age to be elected for the italian first chamber is 25. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 87 4. legislative turnover in the 2018 italian general election: what role for parties? recent changes in legislative turnover rates in italy have been theoretically associated with a couple of conditions: the emergence of new parties, voters’ realignments, changing electoral rules, the decline of mass-based parties, and the change of the multi-level state structure which provides career opportunities to ambitious politicians at other levels of government (lanza and piazza 2002; verzichelli 2006; cotta and verzichelli 2016: 78, 177; grimaldi and vercesi 2018). we have seen that the first two conditions are not fully convincing when accounting for the high level of 2018. the fourth and fifth, in turn, can perhaps explain differences between the pre-1994 period and subsequent increases, but they cannot explain oscillations from one election to the next (e.g., verzichelli 2010). the electoral system, too, does not account for all the variations between subsequent legislative terms. moreover, it is worth pointing out that similar turnover rates in italy in 1994, 2013, and 2018 were reached under three different electoral laws. in contrast, the significant decrease in 1996 occurred with the same mixed system of 1994 in force. in 2018, candidates were elected through a new system that allocates a minority part via single member districts and the majority of votes proportionally to closed party lists, on which the same candidate can be placed for more than one district. however, no splitvote was allowed. except for the majority premium, the rule applied in 2013 resembled this logic to some extent (chiaramonte 2015). if we discard the usual explanatory arguments, we need to look for alternatives. we have seen that political parties remain an intriguing option in this respect. regression analyses have found no evidence of an impact of ideological positions (gouglas et al. 2017: 18). according to gouglas and maddens (2017), selection is often more important than election as a drive behind new entries into parliament. with regard to italy, the impact of political parties seems visible in the higher percentages of non-rerunning outgoing mps after 1994, associated with higher turnover rates (verzichelli 2009: 54). gouglas et al. (2017: 20-21) have mentioned the possible effect of intra-party rules. in particular, they have suggested analysing turnover at the party level and looking at factors such as quotas and candidate selection methods. what they do not directly mention is the impact that strong leaderships can have. scholarship on italian political parties has underlined the flourishing of personalist/personal parties after the breakdown of the ‘first republic’ (pasquino 2014; musella 2015). these parties have become increasingly dependent on their own leaders in terms of functioning and party strategies. to one extreme, leaders of these parties use party organizations as vehicles for their own success, undermining the notion of party as a composite and autonomous organization (blondel and thiébault 2010; vercesi 2015; musella 2018). it has been claimed that even the democratic party – traditionally based on cadres and a thicker organization – has recently moved in this direction (salvati 2016b). here, we posit that large renewals of parliamentary elites can be the result of a specific way of organizing parties. in particular, we argue that leader-centred parties boost turnover, because in these parties ‘loyalty to the leader is the basis on which asymmetrical power relationships are established […]. a key indicator of this would be the authority to make unilateral decisions on nominations’ (kostadinova and levitt 2014). thus, our salvati and vercesi, party organizations and legislative turnover 88 expectation is that legislative turnover in 2018 in italy has ensued from a substantial convergence of political parties towards a personalist model, larger than in the past. before entering into an overall comparison, we first check if in 2018 turnover affected some parties more than others. moreover, we gauge whether the renewal of mps is proportional to the gains of votes for parties with better electoral performances. this allows us to observe if there was a cross-party trend and to pinpoint possible parties where selection was more important than election to reshape parliamentary groups (table 2). table 2. variation in votes, turnover, and candidate renewal by party in 2018 (chamber of deputies) party votes 2013 (%) votes 2018 (%) variation in votes (%) 2013-2018 turnover (%) new candidates (%) m5s 25.6 32.7 +7.1 72.3 75.0 (85.8) pd 25.4 18.7 -6.7 34.5 54.3 (57.5) league 4.1 17.4 +13.3 87.8 92.7 fi 21.6 14.0 -7.6 64.7 76.1 fdi 2.0 4.4 +2.4 85.2 94.7 centreright 27.6 37.0 +9.4 79.2 75.4 (only smd) leu 3.4 +3.4 21.4 84.8 (91.9) note: calculations based on proportional votes to party lists, national territory (aosta valley excluded). fdi: fratellid’italia, brothers of italy; fi: forza italia, go italy!;leu: liberi e uguali, free and equal; m5s:movimento 5 stelle, five star movement; pd: partito democratico, democratic party. only parties with parliamentary representation in 2018 are included. for simplicity’s sake, the counting of new candidates is based on a stricter criterion, compared to that used to calculate turnover. we indicate the percentage of candidates without previous parliamentary experience in plurinominal lists. values between brackets refer to single member districts. in the latter case, the pd ran in coalition with other minor parties. sources: openpolis (2018), istituto cattaneo (2018a), italian ministry of the interior’s website (www.interno.gov.it), and own updates. data show that parties have promoted high levels of turnover, irrespective of their electoral performances. if we look at the ‘new candidates’ placed on party lists, we see that a significant majority had not had previous parliamentary experience. however, the net difference between new candidates and turnover confirms what previous research has shown: often, new candidacies occupied lower positions on the party lists, thus decreasing the likelihood of election (istituto cattaneo 2018a). in this respect, the cases of the pd and leu are clear-cut examples. however, it is interesting to note that the pd was affected by a renewal of 35% of its mps, although it lost 7% of its votes. in this regard, a caveat must be addressed. as we have said, the electoral law used in 2013 provided for a majority premium, which granted about 55% of seats in the first chamber to the coalition or list with more votes (chiaramonte 2015). in particular, this overrepresented the democratic party (pd) and the electoral coalition it had led which won the election with less than 1% of votes, compared to the centre-right coalition; the m5s, in turn, ranked third, about 4 percentage points below the winning coalition. the move towards lower disproportionality could be seen as a possible drive behind the high turnover of some parties other than the pd. for example, the m5s has more than doubled its number of seats in 2018 subsequent to an increase of only 7% of votes, thus being confronted with the need to allocate a proportionally higher percentage of new seats. on the other hand, the loss of who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 89 the majority bonus together with the decrease in votes should have reduced the pd’s room for manoeuvre to change representatives beyond its parliamentary elite. however, we observe indications of high turnover in this party as well. all in all, thus, our numbers suggest that the trend towards the renewal of the parliamentary class involved all parties, albeit with different gradients. to answer our questions, we compare a few central characteristics of parties in 2013 and 2018, so that we can see any changes within the same organizations. for control purposes, we double-checked our findings with similar information about parties in 1994 and 1996. according to classic explanations, after a round of adjustment, new stabilization should have come. this was true in 1996, but not in 2018. by conducting the comparison by pairs of elections, we should be able to see if there are clues that party factors actually could play a role. if the degree of variation between 1994-1996 and 20132018 is similar, then we should reject our conjecture. a first rough indicator of party change is the change of leadership from one election to the next. parties can become more personalized by modifying the actual functioning, but substantial moves are more likely if there is a new leader. in addition, we present a few proxies of party personalism and leader’s strength over nomination. they refer to leadership powers and intra-party democracy (poguntke et al. 2016). building on sandri et al. (2013), we look at the selectorate’s inclusiveness of leadership contests: we argue that inclusive methods can lead to more personalized leaderships (plebiscitary effect); however, if there is no election and the leader holds the position ‘by right’, this probably further increases his or her strength within the party. another important aspect is the possibility and the likelihood of being able to remove the leader from his or her office: stronger personal leaderships are hard to remove. moreover, we need to focus on the leader’s actual control over nominations. we also refer to hazan and rahat (2010: 35) to distinguish between inclusive and exclusive candidate selection methods: once more, moving from party circles to broader selectorates would foster personalization, but turnover should be even more likely when the single leader decides on his or her own. finally, we claim that more inclusive candidacy (hazan and rahat 2010: 20) favours turnover. we provide the overview of party changes in table 3. for clarity’s sake, we limit our focus only to the four largest parties in parliament in 1996 and 2018, so that we can exclude parties with residual impact on turnover. changes in party organizations are marked in italics in the table. findings support our expectations. while from 1994 to 1996 no substantial changes occurred (except for the change of party leader in the pds), between 2013 and 2018 three out of the four main italian parties moved in the expected direction. methods of leader selection moved towards higher inclusivity. on the other hand, leaders increased their control over the party. moreover, unlike in 2013, in 2018 all leaders had a final say on nominations, often raising complaints among excluded party cadres, former mps nominated in the lower positions of party lists, and underrepresented party minorities. fi did not experience substantial changes in its organizational arrangements, but this indicates nothing but the confirmation of berlusconi’s role of absolute party dominus. fi’s lists were formed with the aim of opening lists to civil society and specifically to a new wave of mps recruited from berlusconi’s enterprises (as previously happened in 1994): this renewal was pursued together with confirmation of the most loyal party salvati and vercesi, party organizations and legislative turnover 90 members.2 even in a personal party such as fi, this method has been conducive to tensions with excluded candidates and penalized incumbents.3 the impact on turnover has been amplified by the poor electoral performance of fi, which suffered from an intracoalitional competition with salvini’s league, which was able to attract many former fi voters (istituto cattaneo 2018b). table 3. party features, 1994-1996 and 2013-2018 1994 1996 pds fi an ln pds fi an ln leadership change no no no yes no no no leader’s selectorate party convent. party council party convent. party convent. party convent. party council party convent. party convent. leader’s deselection no no no no no no no no control over nominations very low very high low high very low very high low high candidate selection party council single leader party council party council party council single leader party council party council candidacy citizens citizens citizens citizens citizens citizens citizens citizens 2013 2018 m5s pd ln pdl m5s pd league fi leadership change yes yes no partial yes yes no leader’s selectorate single leader voters party convent. party convent. members / single leader voters members party convent. leader’s deselection no party congress no no no party congress no no control over nominations very high moderate high very high very high very high very high very high candidate selection members members/ single leader party elite single leader members / single leader single leader single leader single leader candidacy members + requirements citizens citizens citizens citizens citizens citizens citizens note: see table 1. pds: partito democratico della sinistra, democratic party of the left; an: alleanza nazionale, national alliance; ln: lega nord, northern league. party convent. stands for party convention. sources: sandri et al. (2013); pasquino (2014: 561), vercesi (2015), and own elaboration and updates based on party statutes. the nomination process proved to be less complicated for the league, where salvini and his deputy secretary giorgetti had total control of lists. such centralization was facilitated by the transformation of the league from regional to national party.4 2 see: https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2018/01/30/elezioni-berlusconi-schiera-indagati-e-fedelissimile-liste-cambiate-nella-notte-de-girolamo-litiga-con-carfagna/4126607/ (first access: 10 may 2018). 3 see: http://www.napolitoday.it/politica/forza-italia-liste-candidati-degirolamo-laboccetta.html (first access: 10 may 2018). 4 see: https://www.ilfoglio.it/politica/2018/01/24/news/lega-matteo-salvini-candidati-collegi-uninominali-sud-174968/ (first access: 11 may 2018); http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/bongiornobagnai-tutti-i-candidati-lega-1488411.html (first access: 10 may 2018). who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 91 pd’s path was more tortuous: for the first time, the definition of party lists was centralized in the hands of the party leadership (i.e., renzi and his inner circle). the internal opposition was almost deleted from party lists (or, however, from the most secure positions), in order to guarantee the formation of parliamentary groups loyal to the party leader.5 finally, the only party that in the 2013 election requested some specific requirements for candidacy – the m5s – not only followed in other parties’ footsteps by opening candidacy to all citizens (thus enhancing the possibility of the renewal of the parliamentary class), but it also gave to the central party leadership (i.e., di maio and grillo) the opportunity to personally select the candidates collocated in the top positions of the closed party lists.6 5. discussion and conclusion we have seen that the 2018 italian election has not caused an earthquake in the format of the party system. thus, party system deinstitutionalization cannot be a viable explanation for turnover rates. beyond electoral volatility and party performances, data show that it is fruitful to investigate intra-party factors and selection procedures to improve our knowledge about turnover determinants. albeit with different nuances, the empirical evidence points in the direction of the strengthening of leaders’ control over nominations. overall, this seems to highlight a certain systemic transformation of selection criteria within parties for the 2018 election. how parties work and organize, selection criteria, and leadership styles seem to influence the degree of renewal in the parties’ rank-and-file. considering that all the four main parties have shown significant centralization (with the partial exception of the m5s with regard to selection), it seems that the combination of highly personalized leaderships and a strong control over nominations is a valuable clue (among others) to solve the turnover enigma. with the exception of fi, all the main parties moved, where possible, towards more inclusive leadership selection methods between 2013 and 2018: this kind of legitimation can account for the enforcement of more leader-centred forms of candidate selection. it is fundamental to remember that three out of four of the main parties changed leadership after 2013 (the m5s defined its own leadership); the high turnover could be explained by the leaders’ will to form reliable parliamentary groups in the chamber of deputies. to conclude, we can argue that a large part of the turnover is likely to be determined by what occurs before the elections and that the new frontier of turnover studies should probably be found in the analysis of intra-party organizational factors (leadership, organization size, party territorial dimension, party role in institutions, etc.), party 5 see: https://www.panorama.it/news/politica/le-liste-del-pd-annunciano-una-nuova-scissione/ (first access: 9 may 2018); and also: http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2018/01/27/news/pd_trattativa_a_oltranza_nella_notte_per_le_liste_renzi_non_ci_sara_condivisione_totale_-187372869/ (first access: 9 may 2018). 6 see: https://www.panorama.it/news/politica/nuove-regole-per-il-movimento-5-stelle-addio-agli-incendiari/ (first access: 10 may 2018). salvati and vercesi, party organizations and legislative turnover 92 electoral performances, and nomination of party candidates (gouglas and maddens 2017; gouglas et al. 2017). it is worth bearing in mind that these three aspects are strictly intertwined. this means that there is a reciprocal influence behind the shaping of the empirical effects. references almagisti, m., l. lanzalaco and l. verzichelli (eds.) 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(2010). vivere di politica. come (non) cambiano le carriere politiche in italia. bologna: il mulino. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_1_zotti_fassi_96-113.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 1, may 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 1, 96-113. contact author: antonio zotti, università cattolica, milan. e-mail address: antonio.zotti@unicatt.it immigration and foreign policy: italy’s domestic-international linkage in the management of mass human movements antonio zotti università cattolica di milano enrico fassi università cattolica di milano abstract especially since the outbreak of the 2014-2015 so-called ‘migration crisis’, immigration policy has come to be frequently regarded as part of italy’s foreign policy. although the management of inbound population movements clearly comprises a relevant external dimension, the relations between immigration and foreign policy are less plain than might appear at first sight. based on this assumption, the paper examines the domestic-international nexus in italy’s immigration policy, the association of the latter with foreign policy, and how this process is connected to italy’s participation in the migration and asylum policy system of the european union (eu). in particular, the article examines the role played by interior ministers in bridging the domestic-international divide typical of this policy area, as well as how the country’s participation in the eu migration policy system has backed up this process. 1. the politicising issue of migration in italy’s political and public discourse t least since 2013, international mass immigration has become a major issue in italy’s political and public debate (carvalho 2014). although it is not the first time that the entry and stay of foreigners in the country has ranked so high among national concerns, the breakout of the so-called ‘refugee’ or ‘migration crisis’ has certainly contributed to putting the issue in the spotlight of italian policy and politics (geddes and petracchin 2020). underlying this heightened attention are not only crude facts, such as the unprecedented number of arrivals during the most critical months of the crisis,1 the steady increase in size of the foreign component of the country’s population, (slightly more than one every ten residents), and the estimated number of irregular immigrants (i.e. with no valid permit) – roughly 9 percent of the 6.222 million foreigners living in italy 1 around 170,000 and 150,000 in 2014 and 2015 respectively, according to the figures provided by the italian ministry of the interior and the international organisation for migration (2018). a zotti and fassi 97 (blangiardo and ortensi 2020).2 the impact of perceptions and social discursive construction on this trend is evidenced by the social alarm generated by the presence of immigrants, groundlessly associated with an increase in crime rates (bove et al. 2019) and grossly overestimated, with the number of immigrants residing in the country being perceived as amounting to as much as 25 percent of the population (eurobarometer 2018). in fact, social discourses have construed migration in several different ways. foreigners who (try to) move to and stay in italy have been represented as the target of compassion and pity or rejection and fear, the subject of integration policies or users of public resources and, to a significantly lesser degree, as active partners of their own inclusion in italian society (cava et al. 2018; musarò and parmiggianini 2017). to a significant extent, the inflow of migrants into italy has been represented as a threat to national security, e.g., linking foreigners moving to the country with the risk of terrorist attacks (galantino 2020), and/or a menace for italian identity and national values, e.g., criticising the commitment to save migrants with an ‘islamic pedigree’, especially while disregarding christians persecuted in remote countries, as an act against italy and western civilisation as a whole (ceccorulli 2019). alternatively, the media, politicians, and an array of social actors have also discursively construed migration as a way to cope with the ‘demographic gap’ generated by italy’s distinctive low low population growth (saraceno 2020), the only source of manpower for jobs largely shunned by italian workers (cordini and ranci 2017) or as a ‘historical phenomenon’ in which vulnerable people actively push themselves to manage their own lives against the strongly oppressive conditions of global and local injustice structures, and successfully settle in italy’s socio-economic texture (musarò and parmiggianini 2017). in italy, as in most european countries, the outbreak of the ‘migration crisis’ not only heightened public attention to the phenomenon, but also sparked a flare of negative outlooks on – if not flat-out scaremongering about – international human movement (berry et al. 2015). in fact, migration has remained a priority even in periods when other issues ranked higher among the population’s and policy-makers’ concerns (biassoni and pasini 2014). reportedly, over the last five years or so, the italian media and (party) politics have presented migrations for the most part through a ‘permanent crisis’ narrative framework (osservatorio di pavia 2017). this trend has been fuelling sentiments of insecurity, suspect and social fragmentation among italian citizens, aggravated by an increasingly weak correlation between the actual number of arrivals and the diffusion of these gloomy views, but also accompanied by a distinctive process of ‘accustomisation’ to the emergency climate (diamanti 2019). this worried-cum-jaded attitude is in fact ambivalent, as it changes depending on the degree to which immigrants are regarded as a structural component of italian society. accordingly, italians have proved relatively benevolent with regard to the already settled migrated population, but very apprehensive towards new migratory waves, feared to trigger again the welfare and domestic security problems experienced during previous dramatic increases in the inflow of foreign nationals (cesareo 2020). yet, compared to previous experiences, the latest immigration wave hitting the italian borders stands out not only for its sheer magnitude and its prominence in the public 2 migration data portal. italy, data available at https://migrationdataportal.org/data?i=stock_abs_&t =2019&cm49=380. immigration and foreign policy 98 and political debate. a unique feature of the 2015 crisis is that the issue has been widely framed as a component of the country’s foreign policy, even though its domestic reverberation was the predominant concern in the eyes of the public and the policy makers, and the (political and administrative) responsibility of the issue remained largely with the ministry of the interior. between the end of world war ii and the seventies, (im)migration policy had already been a foreign policy matter in europe, as reconstruction and economic expansion led to a mutually beneficial interdependence between most of western europe and the rest of the world (especially north africa and the middle east), regulated through more or less formal international arrangements. notably, italy participated in this economic complementarity mostly within the framework of the ‘guestworker model’ (castels 2006), an exclusionist immigration policy that functioned mostly as a labour-provider, based on bilateral recruitment agreements, designed to fill in low-qualification vacancies for a prearranged time-span. clearly, the vanishing of the economic circumstances did not put an end to international human movement as such, as forced and unforced migrants continued to move within and across europe’s boundaries, and the single market’s advancements allowed for increased mobility. yet, by and by, the issue of international migration became largely confined within the realm of domestic policy, attended to as a matter of internal order (and european community/union policy) rather than an instance of international affairs. as a mostly low-politics issue throughout europe, the issue of migration underwent a process of depoliticisation: that is, the ebbing of public debates signalling demands for policy change with regards to a certain question (birkland 1997). if polarisation assumes that parties react to these public debates by emphasising existing divergences on the topic, and/or coming up with new migration-related political cleavages, with some of them challenging the status quo and further polarising the debate, de-polarisation postulates a process which is the exact opposite (downs 1972). until the nineties, de-politicisation was particularly evident in italy, as the country was only relatively affected by economic immigration, and positioned at the margins of the politically charged question of asylum seekers from socialist countries (see below). the immigration waves generated by the collapse of socialist regimes and later the eastern enlargement of the eu, as well as the growing inflow of refugees and asylum seekers from politically unstable and economically less developed regions in africa and asia, periodically increased public attention and political conflict in italy, similarly to the rest of europe. that being so, the politicisation triggered by the 2015 ‘crisis’ may be regarded as the latest instance of a well-established trend. yet, besides the unprecedented magnitude of the human flows and of their salience in public and political discourses, the degree to which the issue has been framed in foreign policy terms stands out as a distinguishing feature worth further investigation. hence, the paper examines this re-activation of the domestic-international nexus, in order to see whether and how the mentioned process of politicisation of the migration issue fuelled by the 2015 ‘crisis’ has affected its association with italy’s foreign policy. the following section of the article looks into the reasons why and the extent to which the ‘external’ or ‘international’ dimension of italian immigration policy has been the object of analytical conceptualisation and policy practices. section three deals with the general terms of the conceptualisation and practice of immigration as a genuine foreign policy problem, and the changes undergone by some crucial distinctions underlying them zotti and fassi 99 (oltman and renson 2017). in the fourth section, the recent transformation of italy’s immigration policy into an instance of foreign policy is examined. we point out the role played by interior ministers in bridging the domestic-international divide typical of this policy area through the externalisation and securitisation of the issue, implemented via political discourses and practices, at a national level and within the migration and asylum policy system of the european union (eu) (iai 2018; cetin 2015). a few concluding remarks will sum up the article’s argument and results, with a few mentions of the present situation. 2. the external dimension of italy’s immigration policy remarking that the immigration policy of a country such as italy has a potentially relevant external dimension may sound like a platitude at a time when the former has come to be commonly regarded by policy-makers, public opinion and (foreign) policy analysts as a crucial part of the country’s foreign policy, especially through the conceptual bridge offered by the notion of ‘global issues’ (camera dei deputati 2018; dipsoc/laps and iai 2017; di filippo and palm 2017). in fact, the italian political elite paid little-to-no attention to migration until the fall of the berlin wall. before this, the international human movement was only opposed by radical right-wing forces and the issue was virtually absent from the electoral contest. it was only in the 1990s that italian governments intensified their foreign policy initiatives in order to facilitate the regular entry and stay of foreign workers from selected categories of countries, and to reverse the traditional trend of low-skilled immigration directed towards italy (dottori and poletti 2014). the wave of albanians who, in 1991, turned up on apulia’s coastline triggered a response by the italian authorities which included the dispatch of a thousand unarmed soldiers in the country. this event not only ushered in a steady intensification of irregular immigration and sparked off public and political debates, but also served as a case where international human movement triggered a complex foreign policy action (perlmutter 1998). the 1990s also marked the start of italy’s commitment to strengthen collaboration on migration with third countries – as evidenced by an almost continuous, albeit frequently troubled, diplomatic relationship with libya. after the 9/11 attacks, discourses about immigration focused on questions about identity and religion, albeit with a strong security connotation that had a bearing on the foreign policy conduct of the country, such as italy’s participation in the international military campaign launched by the united states government to tackle sunni islamist fundamentalist armed groups (zotti and parsi, forthcoming). however, it was the so-called ‘migration crisis’ of 2014-15 – which, as regards italy, peaked in 2016, when about 180,000 people sailing from north africa reached the country’s coast – and the sudden increase in the salience of the issue that put back in the spotlight the supposedly crucial nexus between italy’s migration and foreign policies. the centre-left coalition governments in office at the height of the crisis – matteo renzi’s (2014–2016) and paolo gentiloni’s (2016–2018) – had to manage an unprecedented humanitarian crisis triggered by a dramatic rise in the number of ship wreckages and deaths at sea along the sicily-bound central mediterranean route. in fact, in terms of security policy, already in 2013 italy had increased the resources made available for coastal patrols by launching the search-and-rescue operation mare nostrum. the year-long operation immigration and foreign policy 100 brought to safety at least 150,000 migrants, but was ended on 31 october 2014 owing to italian frustrations with the inadequate commitment of eu institutions and the other member states to share the burden of crisis management (cusumano 2019). italy’s irritation was justified ex post by the much more limited scope of the frontex-conducted operation triton that replaced mare nostrum, as the former was only designed to control the union’s external borders. this was in line with the duties of the eu agency and the schengen countries’ unwillingness to share the responsibility of a mission operating in proximity of north africa’s coastline. moreover, throughout the crisis, and even after the number of arrivals dropped in 2017, the italian government engaged in an increasingly contentious relationship with non-governmental organisations (ngos) participating in the management of the emergency through their search-and-rescue operations. despite the crucial contribution provided by organisations such as migrant offshore aid station, médecins sans frontières and sea watch in preventing more tragedies at sea, the italian governments acquiesced to the notion that ngos served as a (more or less conscious) pull factor in migration and as enablers of smuggling and trafficking. accordingly, italian authorities put their efforts into imposing limitations on non-governmental migrant rescuing, most notably through a code of conduct to be signed by maritime ngos engaged in search-and-rescue missions. the gentiloni cabinet – especially through the action of interior minister marco minniti – also launched negotiations with president fayez alsarraj of libya in a new agreement on the repatriation of irregular immigrants leaving for europe from the country’s shores. this foreign policy action was complementary to the reopening of italy’s identification and expulsion centres, which resulted in a significant increase in the repatriation of irregulars. the minniti-led ‘foreign immigration policy’ of the gentiloni cabinet also included the 2017 meetings with the interior ministers of niger, chad and libya in order to build migration centres in north africa to cut off the migration flow along the central mediterranean route. the attempts of centre-left governments to respond ‘assertively’ to the migration crisis can be held to evidence a sort of contagion effect by part of the centre-right political platform. yet, although during the crisis both centre-right and centre-left representatives did change their negative views of the effects of immigration – especially as concerns repercussions on the national economy – the literature has identified no evident sign of a general culture-based shift towards the rejection of immigrants (di mauro and verzichelli 2019; urso 2018). if that is so, the ‘continuity of external immigration policy’ (strazzari and grandi 2019) after the handover to the conte i cabinet – the ‘first populist government of western europe’ (laboriously) formed after the 2018 general election, supported by league (lega) and the five star movement (movimento 5 stelle m5s) (garzia 2018) – cannot be traced back to a dramatic change in the ideological orientations of italy’s political actors, but to structural aspects which will be examined in section four. for the moment, it is worth pointing out the inconsistency between, on the one hand, the substantial continuity of the conte i cabinet’s international dimension of immigration policy with those of previous governments’ – as regards, for instance, restrictions on searchand-rescue activities at sea, and a higher-profile role for the interior minister in issues that had once fallen within the remit of the foreign affairs ministry (strazzari and grandi 2019) – and, on the other hand, the emphasis with which the new executive zotti and fassi 101 presented itself as the ‘government of change’, declaredly aimed at disrupting the entrenched patterns of mainstream italian politics and policies. especially in the domestic sphere, the government did forcefully argue for and, to some extent, actually launch even more severe immigration policy measures, blending together issues of national identity, public order and anti-terrorist measures (helbling and meierrieks 2020). this is clearly the case with the so-called ‘security decree’ and the ‘follow-up security decree’ (decreto sicurezza and decreto sicurezza bis) both represented as aiming to increase italians’ security through a restrictive reform of italian policies, in compliance with an emergency approach, embraced despite the drop of arrivals to pre-2014 levels. the adoption processes of the decrees also served as highly effective focal points of the national, and to some extent european, public debate. among the changes brought about by these secondary legislative measures are the reform of the status-determination process and the reception of asylum-seekers (with the replacement of humanitarian protection with time-limited special permits unconvertable into residence permits). moreover, the decrees radically redesigned the reception system by granting to beneficiaries of international protection access only to the reception structures directly managed by local councils, formerly known as the much-praised system for the protection of asylum seekers, and refugees – sprar. tougher sanctions were also levied on ngo ships seeking to bring into italy migrants rescued in the mediterranean. the latter measure, in particular, created the conditions for the government – namely in the person of the deputy head of government, interior minister, and league leader matteo salvini – to put more effectively into practice its antagonistic stance towards ngos, as evidenced by the june 2019 incident with the sea watch 3 vessel.3 the government would eventually pursue a fully-fledged strategy aimed at denying entry to italian ports to vessels involved in search-and-rescue operations (including commercial ships and even the italian coast guard unit diciotti) (de vittor 2018). a string of incidents with ngos dominated the political and public debate on migration, and were cunningly played out by matteo salvini, who used his prominent official position as a platform from which to conduct what seemed like a permanent election campaign around the issue (newell 2020). on this account, key members of the cabinet and a number of politicians, pundits and parts of the media kept on referring to migrants as ‘clandestine’, which simply refutes and abridges the difference between forced and unforced immigration (see below), e.g., ‘the free ride is over (la pacchia è finita) for clandestine immigrants’ (adnkronos 2018). in fact, the league and the m5s respective anti-immigration stances rested on only partially overlapping ideological premises and have been incorporated in different political strategies in different policy arenas (carlotti and gianfreda 2020). while the league’s opposition to immigration is based on xenophobic, nativist, welfare-chauvinist or nationalistic arguments, that of the m5s is more 3 on 12 june 2019, sea-watch 3 rescued 53 migrants off the libyan coast. the ship’s captain, carola rackete, refused to disembark the rescued migrants in tripoli, arguing that this could not be considered a ‘safe harbour’, and instead moved towards lampedusa, considered the closest safe one. two days later, on the basis of the first version of the follow-up security decree, interior minister matteo salvini issued an administrative decree that banned sea-watch 3 from entering italian waters. after a two-week standoff with the italian authorities, on 29 june, rackete decided to dock in lampedusa, in defiance of salvini’s ban, arguing that the rescued migrants were exhausted. after disembarkation, rackete was arrested for having broken the blockade. she was released a few days later. immigration and foreign policy 102 instrumental to a general denunciation of the mismanagement of the res publica by mainstream parties, and the elite’s alleged collusion with organized crime (bulli and soare 2018). moreover, the m5s position on immigration was also characterised, like the league’s, by a string of recriminations against the eu’s inaction and lack of solidarity. nonetheless, the league’s aggressive rhetoric on the topic also gave voice to sentiments quite widespread among m5s voters and some representatives, despite the latter party’s more nuanced official position (mosca and tronconi 2019). by more or less explicitly subscribing to simplistic formulas such as ‘let’s help them at home’ (aiutiamoli a casa loro), the m5s not only reinforced the numerous clichés on which the italian public debate on migration was so largely built (ambrosini 2020), but also undermined its declared support for the international regime of refugee protection, which provides for the assessment of asylum seeker status after their arrival in a safe haven. the idea is to limit – if not circumvent – the country’s duty to deal with asylum requests as formulated in the geneva convention by presenting a foreign policy intervention designed to eliminate humanitarian migration’s root causes as a more effective and just policy option. that being so, a closer look into the relations between foreign policy (as a practice and an object of analysis) on the one hand, and the different ‘kinds’ of migrants on which this policy area is premised, on the other, seems in order. 3. categories of international human movement and the immigration/foreign policy gap this sketchy overview may appear to be evidence enough to substantiate the currently common assumption that immigration has become, thus and simply, part of italy’s foreign policy. at a closer look, though, one can see that the inclusion of a country’s immigration policy within the fold of foreign policy needs at least to be qualified. as argued by oltman and renshon (2018), the instruments of foreign policy analysis have rarely been used to examine immigration policy. the point does not merely signal a blind spot in scholarly work; in fact it can be assumed that the theoretical instruments though which the phenomenon is approached may well have been playing an effective role in shaping and perpetuating (and possibly generating) the pressing policy problems posed by international human movements (scholten 2018; mayblin 2017; singleton 2015). ordinarily, analytical perspectives place themselves on either side of the domesticinternational divide. on the one hand are the approaches focused on domestic politics: that is, those designed, among others, to meet the demands of the national economy for foreign labour and to integrate migrants into society. these research programmes are largely grounded in the methods and assumptions of political economy, and focus on the ‘pull’ or demand factors that incentivise and regulate migration to a receiving country. this methodological orientation is warranted by the fact that, to this day, immigration remains a matter of individual state policy, and that the sweeping institutionalisation process undergone by international politics over the last seventy years has never included any explicit multilateral mechanisms for cooperation over the labour movement. on the other hand are those theoretical perspectives that concentrate on international relations, especially international norms regarding the treatment of migrants – with an emphasis on asylum seekers and refugees – with an international protection regime of forced migration that is comparatively more formally developed. these approaches focus on ‘push’ factors zotti and fassi 103 that drive people from their homelands, and concentrate on displaced populace, human rights norms, and institutions and cooperation between states. this conspicuous separation in the body of work on immigration is reflected in the analytical and practical distinction between ‘refugees’ and ‘economic migrants’. while commonly accepted by practitioners as well as scholars, and fixed in international law by documents such as the 1951 refugee convention, the difference between forced and unforced migrants is by and large the result of states’ contingent economic and political interests, and is grounded in the structure of the international system that emerged in the aftermath of world war ii. at the time, countries found it convenient to differentiate between, on the one hand, foreign workers needed to sustain their post-war reconstruction and industrial development, and on the other, people fleeing from hostile regimes, mostly to re-join their homeland after the dramatic redrawing of national borders and regimechanges experienced by european countries since the 1940s. throughout the cold war, each of the contending camps maintained a vested interest in welcoming asylum-seekers claiming to be persecuted by their countries’ political regimes. depriving them of human capital and undermining their credibility, both with their own public and with the international community, amounted to scoring points in their economic and ideological competition with the opposing party. however, for all its resilience, each arm of the expedient two-fold notion of migration has been put under pressure by a number of factors. as it turned out, (economic) migration was not simply the same as imported labour – apart from the case of ‘guestworker systems’ – as it came with the costly supplements of family unification and the difficult task of singling out the highly-skilled foreigners sought by increasingly advanced economic systems. at the same time, with the end of the ideological confrontation between liberal-democracies and socialist regimes, the intake of asylum-seekers lost much of its strategic purpose as well as of its economic appeal. the growing humanitarian immigration flows directed towards western countries were no longer made up prevalently of qualified defectors, but rather destitute people from developing countries. since the outbreak of the 2015 migration crisis, italy, together with most european countries, has been contributing to the gradual erosion of the practical and conceptual backgrounds of the (economic) migrant/refugee distinction. in doing so it has been affecting the conception of immigration policy as a component of its foreign policy. the substitution, via the security decree, of humanitarian permits with special permits is a telling case. according to the league, the measure was grounded in the ‘excessively wide margins for extensive interpretation’ left by the old permits. admittedly the weaker but also more flexible form of legal protection for refugees in italy was the one most commonly granted to asylum-seekers until 2017, giving recipients the right to work and access to basic services (geddes and petracchin 2020; ambrosini 2019). the change, though, may not only undermine the conditions of forced immigrants, but it also effectively denies a practice that has allowed italy to comply with the international regime of refugee protection (and the eu’s directions on the issue) despite italy-specific conditions such as the infamous slowness and backlog cases of the country’s judiciary system. questioning the basic legal premises and the established practices of the international protection regime ‘pushes’ the protection issue out of the ‘protected’ domain of international law into that of the more contingency-prone one of international politics. the magnitude of these immigration and foreign policy 104 increasingly overt reservations about the rationale of the regime might become even more consequent depending on the degree to which the league might succeed in creating a consistent enough coordination among eurosceptic eu member states, possibly in connections with extra-european forces interested in undermining the integration process (bulli and soare 2018; makarychev and terry 2020). ironically, the ‘artificial’ distinction between forced and unforced immigration has been traditionally questioned, pointing out that humanitarian discourses and policy practices aimed at protecting refugees from harm actually end up preventing them from securing an economic livelihood independent of humanitarian assistance (long 2013). conversely, anti-immigration forces in italy – policy-makers and the media – have been playing on, and at the same contesting, the distinction, especially by introducing a number of indefinite categories, making headway towards the notion of ‘illegal immigrant’ (greblo 2017). typical arguments defying the migrant/refugee differentiation are those based on the image of the illegitimate/false asylum seeker, deriving from the spontaneous and/or deliberate exaggeration of valid information – e.g. by italian police and judicial authorities – about proven or suspected cases of baseless applications (benzoni 2019). the aim is to diffuse the notion that all people fleeing from persecution are by default potential freeloaders on the international protection system and the receiving country’s resources (bontempelli 2016). on the other hand, the idea of ‘helping migrants in their own home countries’, a notion prominent in the public debate since the time of the renzi government, is premised on the idea that immigration is a pathological symptom whose rootcauses have to be extirpated (ambrosini 2020). accordingly, finding durable solutions for immigrants is out of the question, as the emergency framework for forced migration is also projected on human movement triggered by the explicit desire to move and settle in a different country, with the prospect of starting a family, or reuniting with members thereof who have already emigrated. this is consistent with the emphasis put on the link between migration and development, whose mutual relations have been extensively explored. admittedly, the resources and the political commitment assigned by the italian government to development aid – alone and within the framework of the eu international cooperation and development policy – have hardly ever been up to the task of actually ‘helping them at home’. moreover, the politicisation of this link deliberately overlooks the evidence that, for the most part, the development of poor countries is generally associated with an increase rather than a decrease in emigration, and that international aid is unlikely to have any effect on flows of ‘irregular’ migrants coming from countries that are either at war or oppressed by regimes persecuting their populations, although development and international partnership with countries of emigration can indeed improve the management of the flows generating from them (caselli 2019). none of these handicaps, however, is particularly significant to the extent that the actual political goal of immigration policy consists in virtually eliminating immigration, drying out the transnational dimension of the phenomenon. the more the inter-national dimension of immigration policy is emphasised, the more integration policy issues can be made solely dependent on national economic demands and identity politics, and the object of extremely strict regulation, if not of mere political contention. zotti and fassi 105 4. the emerging foreign policy processes of italy’s immigration policy: the role of interior ministers determining whether the international-domestic nexus has shifted to the point where immigration policy is now to be examined through the lenses of foreign policy analysis – see hudson (2005) – is beyond the scope of this article. while the challenging question is better shelved for future inquiry, paying closer attention to the link between microand macro-factors, the focus on decision-makers and the interplay between material and ideational factors (as foreign policy analysis does) may offer some interesting insights into our object of study. this is all the truer in light of the strain placed, in recent years, on the material conditions, conceptual distinctions and policy practices that migration policy has been resting on. focusing on the process through which the international dimension of italy’s immigration policy has been designed and conducted, one of the most outstanding aspects appears to be the increasingly high-profile role of interior ministers who, as far as migration is concerned, have been acting as some of the most prominent ‘rivals’ of foreign affairs ministers in the country’s decision making process (hill 2016). this trend climaxed during matteo salvini’s stint at the helm of the government department, and appears to be tightly intertwined with the politicisation process of the issue of immigration. the league leader’s pre-eminence in the cabinet may be regarded as an effect of the extraordinary political circumstances that emerged from the 2018 general elections. the interior minister’s ascendancy can also be seen as just another effect of the ‘polycrisis’ that had been affecting the eu for the previous ten years, the wave of anti-establishment sentiments that had already arisen in a number of general and local elections across the continent, wreaking havoc on italy and leading to a relatively unprecedented tri-polar party system, and the impasse of the customary government formation procedures (garzia 2018; ceccarini and bordignon 2018). the ‘unnatural’ agreement between the m5s and the league – based on a declared aspiration to abandon failed conventional paths in order to improve/transform the country (giannetti et al. 2018) – was complemented by the inclusion in the cabinet of ‘independent’ ministers, including foreign affairs minister enzo moavero milanesi and, under certain aspects, prime minister giuseppe conte himself (at the time a politically unknown law professor, albeit seen as ideologically close to the m5s). salvini’s politicisation of the immigration issue and its cunning use of the media not only soon made him a figure widely known to the european press and a prominent exponent of the circle of eurosceptic politicians gearing themselves up in view of the imminent european parliament election, but also led to his area of activity expanding well beyond the traditional remit of his department, at the expense of a somewhat compliant foreign affairs minister. yet, as pointed out by strazzari and grandi (2019), the trend of the growing role of the interior minister in the external dimension of migration policies had already become apparent with the previous government, as the figure of marco minniti had already gathered significant responsibilities in the areas of intelligence and security while in office. the regulation on migrant flows achieved by minniti proved highly successful in terms of the reduction in migrant landings on italian shores, although it was his successor who reaped the fruits of these measures, presented as the result of salvini’s repressive actions in government (fabbrini and zgaga 2019). immigration and foreign policy 106 nevertheless, the high-level profiles gained by minniti and salvini in this sui generis component of italy’s foreign policy – as mentioned, one made possible by the structural transformation of immigration policy – seem to have distinct reasons. as for marco minniti, besides his famous (or infamous, depending on the points of view) connections with intelligence services and police forces, other powerful rivals of traditional foreign policymakers, according to hill (2016), one may argue that his contribution to the transformation of the role of the interior minister into national foreign policy making hinged primarily on his (successful) intention to act on behalf not only of italy, but of the entire eu. in line with the renzi cabinet, though with a less swashbuckling attitude, gentiloni’s government tried to forge alliances with eu member states such as france, germany and spain, as well as with mediterranean countries with problems similar to italy, rather than with the eurosceptic countries of eastern europe (fabbrini and zgaga 2019). the person in charge of pursuing this strategy in the migration and asylum policy domain was marco minniti, whose approach was largely praised among allied governments and the eu institutions, and equally criticised by the united nations, ngos and left-wing leaders due to the questionable effects of his policies in terms of protecting migrants’ human rights (paravicini 2017). italy’s approach became not only a model for other member states, but the de facto solution to the migration problem of the entire union. this is evidenced by the endorsement received by the council of the union on july 2017 after the signature of an anti-smuggling memorandum with the libyan government, the subsequent peace deal he brokered between tribes of the fezzan region, and the relaunch of the libyan coastguard to prevent migrants’ boats from leaving the country. the former minister’s enduring reputation within eu policy-making circles is confirmed by his much talkedabout candidacy as eu special envoy to libya. minniti’s ‘desert diplomacy’ in libya was perfectly consistent with, and deeply embedded in, the more general externalisation of migration and asylum policy pursued by the eu since the issuing of its global approach to migration in 2005, and its revised version in 2011 – the global approach to migration and mobility. in this perspective, externalization seems to be rather ingrained within the management of migration by the eu. resembling concentric circles (parkes 2017), migration management begins with the schengen area, in which free movement is counterbalanced by increased border surveillance and deterrence, reaches the eu’s external border with frontline member states carrying the responsibility for search and rescue and asylum processing, with countries in the european neighbourhood being increasingly involved, and extends to third countries – as far as central asia and the horn of africa – via the policy of externalisation of border control and migration management (triandafyllidou and dimitriadi 2014). in a nutshell, the transformation undergone by the relations between migration and foreign policy under the gentiloni cabinet can be regarded as perfectly in line with italy’s traditional goal of being put on a par with member states such as germany and france, and in a more central position in the eu decision-making process – and in doing so, trying to manage, and possibly defuse, the increasing politicisation of the issue. on the other hand, matteo salvini’s role in the inclusion of immigration as a foreign policy component, while not independent from the eu policy framework, seems to rest on yet another traditional feature of italian foreign policy. elaborating on furlong (2014), it may be argued that salvini’s prominence is a remarkable case of the re-emergence of a ‘normalisation zotti and fassi 107 trend’ of this policy area; that is, the assimilation of foreign policy making with the rest of national public policy. the interaction of foreign and internal politics in italy before the international and domestic political upheaval triggered by the end of the cold war was usually understood to be dominated by the so-called vincolo esterno (‘external constraint’). owing to the country’s geopolitical position, the presence of a sizeable communist party effectively prevented from taking ministerial office and the propensity of potential allies and powerful opposition parties to use foreign policy issues for shortterm political advantage, the range of foreign policy choices available to the governing parties was limited, the quality and openness of debate low, and the country’s orientation in international affairs directly tied to coalition choices. before the 1990s, dominant parties and actors played a gate-keeping role in foreign policy, determining the entry and exit of the foreign affairs minister to substantive and partisan policy arenas – i.e., respectively, those aimed at pursuing the interest of the country as a whole, and those of one or more factions and their clients. hence, due to the figure’s lack of ‘political dividends’ to carry out their own partisan policy, foreign affairs ministers in italy have almost always been outliers as regards not only the setting and implementation of foreign policy but also the definition of this policy area’s effective boundaries. this feature of italian foreign policy making has in fact never really disappeared, but was restrained by the post-1994 bipolar structure of the party system, which limited political bargaining within the boundaries of each coalition. the exceptional conditions that emerged from the post2018 general election re-emphasised the gate-keeping role of dominant parties, providing more leeway for political bargaining in cabinet politics, before and after the executive’s formation. it comes as no surprise that the unprecedented salience of the migration issue, the changes in the conceptual and material structure of the latter together with the policy practices linked to them – combined with the politicisation of the migratory problem successfully carried out by the league – made the senior position of interior minister all the more appealing to matteo salvini, as it could be used as a political springboard, unlike the ‘hammock post’ offered by the foreign affairs ministry. what is more singular, though, is that the regained gate-keeping role of an assertive (and experienced) party such as the league and of a personality like salvini, who had successfully personalised the political process, presenting himself as the ‘strongman’ able to tackle italian society’s migrationrelated demands for security, allowed the extension of his ministry’s remit to virtually the entire external dimension of immigration policy. this is not to say that salvini’s ‘immigration policy as foreign policy’ is independent of the european dimension. the eu has indeed offered a specific context – a fertile ground one might say – in which salvini’s discourses and policies on migration, otherwise likely to be regarded as ‘extreme’ and ‘unacceptable’, could be relatively ‘normalized’. this phenomenon, rather counterintuitive given the values the eu is usually associated with, seems especially evident in the peculiar area of migration represented by ‘migrant smuggling’. in particular, during the migration crisis, migrant smuggling rapidly gained relevance in the eu’s agenda (perkowski and squire 2018), as laid out in a series of policy documents adopted in fast succession between 2015 and 2016 (fassi 2020). overall, the measures elaborated by the eu to contrast migrant smuggling, from eunavformed sophia to the strengthening of frontex and europol’s mandate, convey the notion of a serious security threat – closely compatible with matteo salvini’s agenda and rhetoric immigration and foreign policy 108 against i trafficanti di uomini (‘people traffickers/smugglers’) – and one that demands ‘a powerful demonstration of the eu’s determination to act’ (european commission 2015: 3). significantly, observers have used the expressions ‘eu’s war against smuggling’ (albahari 2018) to describe this policy and narrative stance. in this view, the eu discourse on human smuggling echoes the ‘security narrative’ that the literature has identified more generally in relation to migration (ceccorulli and lucarelli 2017), and seems to bear strong linkages with the ‘threat/risk narrative’ that has been recognized as one of the main strands in eu external relations (nitou 2013). shifting the focus on smuggling, away from the much more sensitive issue of migrant rescue and reception, makes it more likely that the eu and its member states find an agreement around a (normative) lower common denominator (fassi 2020). in addition, the proposed solution is increasingly based on the recourse to an externalization logic that shifts the material and normative burden towards third countries, reinforcing the already existing dynamics we have observed in the case of italy. 5. conclusions the somewhat unexpected termination of the ‘unnatural’ league-m5s (quasi-)coalition has seemingly put a stop to the high profile of interior minister as regards the external dimension of italy’s foreign policy. nevertheless, the choice of a ‘technocrat’ such as maria lamorgese – a long-standing civil servant, former prefect and member of the council of state4 – might also be regarded as confirmation of the significance of the rise of italy’s migration policy to the status of ‘high politics’, at least to the extent the appointment serves as a break from the increasing politicisation of the policy issue and the prominence lately acquired by the heads of the ministry of the interior. as the article has tried to show, the transformation of the external dimension of migration policy into an indeed crucial component of the country’s immigration policy is deeply, if problematically, intertwined with the complicated – to the point of incoherent – inner working of the eu migration policy system and the union as a political system at large. on the one hand, marco minniti, a left-wing minister who tried to snatch the right’s monopoly of security issues, succeeded to a significant extent in turning his ‘philosophy’ – according to which ‘security is freedom because it is quite clear that there cannot be an idea of security if individual freedom is not guaranteed just as there is no real freedom if the safety of everyday life is not guaranteed’ (gargiulo 2018) – into that of the eu. in so doing he became the champion, as much praised as contested, of the externalisation of the latter’s migration and asylum policy. on the other hand, much of matteo salvini’s political fortunes are the outcome of the politicisation not only of migration issues, but of eu political processes. this is evidenced by the position that eurosceptic stances have gained in the league’s political platform and the importance acknowledged to intra-eu alliances with likeminded parties. at the same time, one can see that, although as interior minister he remained quite aloof from eu ordinary policy making, he found a significant consonance – albeit somewhat distorted to his own political ends – with some trademark migration policy measures and strategies of the union. these were based on the criminalisation and 4 a legal-administrative consultative body ensuring the legality of public administration. zotti and fassi 109 securitisation of migration that inform such a big part of eu policy in this domain, and part of an even wider trend (böhmelt and bove 2019). it remains, therefore, to be seen if italy will be able to hold such a prominent position in european and mediterranean ‘circles’ of 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(forthcoming). patterns of uncertainty: security and quality of democracy in italy. in l. weinberg, & e. francis (eds.), routledge handbook of democracy and security, london: routledge. pdf_issue_14_3_visconti_pellegata italian political science, volume 14 issue 3, february 2020 * this essay is part of the research project titled ‘reconciling economic and social europe: the role of values, ideas and politics’, funded by an advanced grant of the european research council (grant no. 340534, p.i. maurizio ferrera). © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 3, 188-205. contact author: francesco visconti, university of milan. e-mail address: francesco.visconti@unimi.it representation in hard times: party-voter distance on support for social europe in italy* francesco visconti university of milan alessandro pellegata university of milan abstract political representation is a fundamental virtue of contemporary democracies. the policy preferences of politicians should converge to some extent with those of voters. in the last twenty years, and in particular in the aftermath of the multiple crises the european union (eu) has recently experienced, the integration process has become an increasingly polarizing issue for both voters and political representatives. while the existing literature has investigated party-voter distance on diffuse support for the eu, this article focuses on preferences for eulevel policies aiming to strengthen european solidarity. we argue that although italian voters and their political representatives tend to diverge on their general support for the eu, they are closer over their willingness to share the burden across eu member states of the multiple crises italy has recently experienced. employing original mass and elite survey data collected between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2018 in the framework of the resceu project, our empirical findings show that both mps and their voters strongly support european solidarity, though they also detect differences across parties. the most important implication of this study is that the mounting euroscepticism of italian voters is not an outright rejection of the eu but a call for the eu’s proactive role in protecting weaker countries and peoples. 1. introduction n representative democracies the decisions made by policy-makers should, to some degree, mirror the preferences of their voters (downs 1957). the present article looks at collective representation (wlezien and soroka 2016) by comparing the (general and specific) attitudes towards the european union (eu) of italian citizens with those of their parliamentary representatives. while most of the extant literature analyses the gap between masses and elites in their diffuse support for the eu (dolny and babos 2015; mattila and raunio 2006; 2012; mcevoy 2012; thomassen and schmitt 1999), our study takes a less travelled road by focusing also on the differences in how the demand side and the supply side of the chain of representation evaluate the policy-making role played by eu institutions (see sanders and toka 2013 or muller et al. 2012). more precisely, we investigate party-voter issue proximity on preferences for policies aiming to foster european i visconti and pellegata 189 solidarity, an issue that in the aftermath of the euro crisis has become highly salient and contentious in several eu member states. in the last two decades, a broad literature has discussed how eu integration and other macro-level phenomena such as globalisation and massive migration have contributed to reshaping party competition in several european countries by generating a new political divide that deals with the opening of national borders and cross cuts the traditional left-right dimension (kriesi 2008; 2012; hooghe and marks 2018; otjes and katsanidou 2017). considering its increasing policy-making role during the euro and the refugee crises, the eu has further polarised the attitudes of both voters and political elites. what is increasingly debated are the policy initiatives and measures that the eu has adopted (or should adopt) to face the negative externalities of the multiple crises it has experienced and to avoid future predicaments: in other words, policies fostering solidarity across eu member states as well as european citizens. financial help to states facing severe economic difficulties, the harmonisation of welfare policies to guarantee a high standard of social security to all europeans in need, and the redistribution of extra-eu migrants and asylum seekers among eu member states are all items on the agenda of political parties that campaign on these issues to gain electoral consensus. however, while several recent studies investigate the determinants of public support for european solidarity (baute et al. 2019; ciornei and recchi 2017; ferrera and pellegata 2018; gerhards et al. 2019), we have significantly less knowledge about the attitudes expressed by political elites (see conti 2018 for an exception). to the best of our knowledge, moreover, no study expressly compares voter and party preferences on this highly contentious topic. italy represents an interesting case to study party-voter distance on the topic of european solidarity. it was badly hit by the economic recession, it implemented a series of fiscal austerity measures and structural reforms to keep its public debt under control, and it is one of the first landing places for migrants coming from the african continent. on the political side, italy has shown a dramatic decrease in popular support for the eu and trust in its institutions and, at the same time, a significant increase in electoral consent for eurosceptic parties, though with different nuances, such as the five star movement (m5s), the league (l) and brothers of italy (fdi). thus, do voter and party preferences tend to converge or diverge on the issues of european integration and solidarity? are there differences across parties in how close political representatives are to their voters? we expect to find a significant divergence between italian voters and elites on a general evaluation of the benefits of the eu project with the former being more sceptical than the latter. however, we expect to find more convergence on support for policies strengthening solidarity in the eu. given italy’s exposure to the crises, both voters and their representatives demand eu-policy intervention to correct economic and social imbalances among eu member states that the recent challenges experienced by the eu have exacerbated. we provide answers to these research questions by employing original public opinion and political elite survey data collected between the end of 2016 and the beginning of 2018 within the framework of the resceu (reconciling economic and social europe: values, ideas and politics) research project conducted at the university of milan in the 2014-2019 period. while exploratory in nature due to the limitations of the data, we believe that the present study provides useful contributions to the literature on both eu representation in hard times 190 support and representation in italy. regarding the former, by comparing party-voter distance not only on the general view of the eu but also on its policy role, we shed light on the nature of euroscepticism in italy. concerning the latter, we provide important insights on how the integration-demarcation dimension is contributing to restructure the preferences of political actors in the italian party system. 2. background and expectations 2.1. italy and the crises the multiple crises that the eu has experienced in the last decade have contributed to exacerbate the line of tension over the integration process and to generate a new conflict constellation within the eu (armingeon and ceka 2014; ferrera 2017). the bailout of the greek economy in exchange for severe austerity measures, merkel’s decision to allow more than one million asylum seekers into germany and the outcome of the brexit referendum as well as other critical junctures became salient political issues for national governments and affected the everyday life of european citizens. however, the consequences of the multifaceted european crisis were unevenly distributed across eu member states. italy, as well as other weak economies of the eurozone periphery, was strongly affected by the detrimental consequences of the global economic downturn and the sovereign debt crisis. since 2009, the main macro-economic indicators have abruptly deteriorated. the sharp decline in gdp caused the italian economy to enter recession and in 2012 – the peak of the sovereign debt crisis – italian public debt rose to 126.16 per cent of gdp – a figure considerably higher not only than the average value of the eurozone, but also than the average value of southern european member states (pedrazzani et al. 2018). even though italy, differently from greece, ireland, portugal and spain, did not formally sign a bailout agreement with the ‘troika’ (eu commission, european central bank and international monetary fund), the country committed itself to an ‘implicit conditionality’ programme that implied fiscal austerity measures and structural (labour market and pensions) reforms (moschella 2017; sacchi 2015). the economic downturn and the policies implemented by the technocratic monti government (2011-2013) had relevant negative social consequences (natili 2019). unemployment rose from 6.1 per cent of the labour force in 2007 to 13.1 per cent in 2014 and the scenario was even more alarming concerning youth unemployment, which rose from 20.4 per cent in 2007 to a remarkable 42.7 per cent in 2014. poverty rose as well: the share of households living in absolute poverty increased from 4.7 per cent in 2009 to 7.9 per cent in 2013 (istat 2019a). the deterioration of the objective indicators was paralleled by mounting public concern about the situation of the national economy, with a peak of negative evaluations – over 92 per cent of italian citizens – in 20121. besides the economic crisis, italy is facing other important challenges deriving from increasing migration flows into the country. given its geographic position, in the aftermath of the arab spring, italy became one of the countries of first landing for migrants and asylum seekers coming from the african continent. immigration contributed to 1 see eurobarometer data on italian citizens’ evaluation of their national economy: http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/chart/index . visconti and pellegata 191 change the composition of italian society. while in the early 2000s foreign-born residents were around 1.5 million, at the beginning of 2018 they were around 5 million, about 8.5% of the total population (istat 2019b). this mutated social landscape contributed to affect the italians’ attitude towards immigration. a series of ipsos surveys highlight that italian citizens tend to overestimate the real number of immigrants living in their country.2 in the weeks before the 2018 national elections, 62 per cent of respondents who participated in the pastel survey believed that italy had already hosted too many immigrants and 43 per cent of them believed that foreigners represent a threat to italian culture.3 the consequences of these multiple challenges on party system configuration and electoral competition dynamics are manifest for the observers of italian politics. indeed, the 2013 and 2018 general elections caused a political earthquake (chiaramonte et al. 2018; emanuele 2018; schadee et al.2019). in line with a pattern emerging also in other eu member states badly hit by the economic crisis (hutter et al. 2018), the last two election rounds marked a significant increase in votes for eurosceptic parties at the expense of the mainstream parties – the democratic party (pd) and go italy (fi) – that had rotated in government since the mid-1990s. in 2013 m5s – a populist and anti-elite party – obtained 25.6 per cent of the vote, which is the best result ever obtained by a newcomer party in national elections in europe. after five years in opposition, in 2018 m5s managed to again increase their vote share (32.7 per cent) becoming the pivot in the parliament and the major party in the two different government coalitions it has experienced so far. the 2018 elections also marked a victory for the league – a right-wing eurosceptic party renovated under matteo salvini’s leadership – which quadrupled its vote share (17.4%) compared with the 2013 elections (4.1%). 2.2. diffuse and policy support for the eu during the crisis against this background, a number of recent studies depict how the average level of public support for the eu among italian citizens – traditionally among the highest across eu member states from the 70s to the 90s – sharply decreased after the crises that invested europe in the last decade (olmastroni and pellegata 2018; conti et al. 2020; serricchio 2018). the deterioration in the level of support for the eu is striking whichever dimension we consider: polity identification, trust in eu institutions, benefit from eu membership or the deepening of the integration process (olmastroni and pellegata 2018; conti et al. 2020). a similar trend is detected in all southern eu member states, while in northern and continental countries the average support for the eu remained high also during the crisis (20112016). the literature argues that economic concerns and perceived threats to national identity are the main drivers of euroscepticism (bellucci 2014; conti and memoli 2015). in hard times, individuals blame the eu because they consider it responsible for the worsening of both their personal and their country’s economic conditions. while a broad literature has investigated trends of public support for the eu, we know incredibly less about political elites’ preferences on this increasingly contentious issue. figure 1 compares the attitudes of italian voters and their representatives in the chamber of deputies towards the eu. data on voters are taken from the eurobarometer 2 see the ipsos ‘perils of perceptions’ project (https://perils.ipsos.com/). 3 participated platform for the study of italian elections 2018, a project of the department of social and political sciences of the university of milan and ipsos italia. resceu project sample. representation in hard times 192 88.1 (october 2017) while data on national representatives come from the resceu elite survey conducted between 2017 and 20184. the column chart displays the share of voters and political representatives who believe that italy has benefited or has not benefited from eu membership. we chose this question to compare mass and elite support for the eu for two main reasons. first, this is one of the most commonly used survey items in the literature on eu support. by tapping the utilitarian calculation with which individuals evaluate their country’s membership in the eu, this is particularly suitable for measuring how italians’ judgement of the eu has changed during the crisis. second, this is one of the few survey items for which data are available at both mass and political elite level. figure 1. diffuse support for the eu among italian masses and elites. note: ‘taking everything into consideration, would you say that [country] has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the european union? 1) it has benefited; 2) it has not benefited.’ not surprisingly, in late 2017, 46.2 per cent of italian respondents believed that their country had not benefited from being a member of the eu. this percentage is one of the highest among the 28 eu member states and it reflects a pattern common to other southern eu member states, such as cyprus (49.7 per cent) and greece (45.9 per cent). however, citizens of other countries that have been badly hit by the euro crisis such as portugal (14.2 per cent) and spain (20.4 per cent) tend to evaluate much more positively their country’s membership in the eu. on average, instead, italian political representatives are much more satisfied than their electorate with italy’s membership in the eu. 73.7 per cent of the mps interviewed believe that italy has benefited from being a member of the eu, while only 26.3 per cent express a negative view about the eu. although the support for the eu expressed by italian political elites has also worsened in the last decade, even after the crisis an overwhelming majority of mps tend to express a positive evaluation of italy’s membership in the eu.5 more than 30 points separate italian mps from their voters, with the former being more supportive of the eu 4 detailed information about the survey is reported in the next section. 5 data taken from the intune elite survey show that the share of mps who believe that italy has not benefited from being a member of the eu was 4.1 per cent in 2007 and 2.6 per cent in 2009 (best et al. 2012). 40.2 73.7 46.2 26.3 13.6 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 voters mps sh ar e of r es po nd en ts benefited not benefited don't know visconti and pellegata 193 than the latter. this result confirms that the eu can still be considered an elite-driven project (haller 2008). the masses’ permissive consensus that allowed a deepening and a widening of the integration process for more than three decades after the treaty of maastricht (1992) turned into an explicit dissensus that started to constrain the work of the eu institutions (hooghe and marks 2009; müller et al. 2012; sanders et al. 2012; conti 2014). opposition to the integration process became explicit especially in those countries badly hit by the multiple crises experienced by the eu. in these countries citizens voiced criticism of the role played by the eu institutions during the crisis and eurosceptic parties entered the government. however, if we turn to analyse support for specific policies that can be implemented by the eu institutions to challenge the most contentious and detrimental aspects of the different european crises, we expect to find closer views between italian citizens and their representatives in parliament. we start from the assumption that, since italy found itself in the eye of the storm of simultaneous crises, the relevance of the utilitarian calculation over the role of the eu increases both for public opinion and among political elites. given that the eu is a supranational project built with the aim of providing solutions to large-scale problems, such as the economic recession and the humanitarian crisis related to massive migration flows, in a socio-tropic perspective italian masses and elites should be more supportive of eu-level policies aiming to strengthen solidarity across eu member states by sharing among them the burden of the crises. in an apparently paradoxical scenario, while italian citizens are more negative than their official representatives when expressing a general judgment of the eu as a polity project, they share preferences closer to those of the elite for policies that can help italy, as well as the other countries in difficulties, to face the detrimental consequences of the crises. recent studies have investigated which factors contribute to explain mass and elite support for burden sharing and solidarity measures across eu member states and for delegating policy initiative to the eu (basile and olmastroni 2019; conti et al. 2020). the degree of exposure to the crisis at both the country and individual levels correlate significantly with support for european solidarity. the present study, instead of assessing mass and elite correlates of support for a more proactive role of the eu, remains interested in the existence of representation gaps between voters and parties over eu-level policies strengthening european solidarity. in doing so we mainly focus on differences across parties. we are firstly interested in comparing the level of party-voter distance between mainstream and challenger parties. following the definition provided by hobolt and tilley (2016), challenger parties are not necessarily new but are those parties that have ‘sought to reshape the political landscape by putting new issues on the agenda’ (hobolt and tilley 2016, 974). in the following analyses we consider the m5s and the l as two challenger parties given the issueentrepreneurship role they played in the recent developments in italian politics. they have been able to mobilise the electorate on new issues like european integration and immigration, by breaking the previous consensus.6 challenger parties should also not have 6 the 2017 chapel hill expert survey (polk et al. 2017) considers the l and the m5s as the two parties among those investigated with the lowest values in overall orientation towards european integration (variable goes from 1 ‘strongly opposes’ to 7 ‘strongly in favour’). party scores are: l 1.5; fi 4.714; m5s 2.643; pd 6.5; si 4.5; mdp 5.363. representation in hard times 194 had previous government experience. while this was true for the m5s at the time the two surveys were conducted, this is not the case for the l who held important government positions in all governments led by silvio berlusconi. still, the new leadership of matteo salvini has given a new and distinct characterisation to the party, and thus we consider it a challenger.7 due to their role as issue entrepreneurs, we expect challenger parties to reduce the gap with their voters, as well as with the median italian voter, compared to mainstream parties (pd and fi) that have registered major electoral setbacks. 3. defining and measuring european solidarity the concept of solidarity refers to individuals’ agreement to share resources with others by personal contribution through taxation and redistribution organised by the state (gelissen, 2000; stjernø, 2009). it is a definition grounded in the very notion of nation state, and historically solidarity has been institutionalised through the development of national welfare states. since the 1980s, the successive waves of european integration have put under stress nation-based welfare systems. this was primarily due to the tension between the ‘logic of closure’ upon which nation-based welfare states developed and the ‘logic of openness’ of eu integration, represented by the completion of the internal market and then by the institutionalisation of the monetary union. this tension threatening the social sovereignty of eu member states has forced institutions and citizens to reframe the concept of solidarity in european terms (ferrera 2017). in the eu wide context, solidarity has been (re-)defined as the individual willingness to share risks across the eu (ciornei and recchi 2017:470). sangiovanni (2013) differentiates between two dimensions of european solidarity: member state and transnational solidarity. the former refers to risk sharing across eu member states. the latter entails the sharing of obligations among eu citizens (see also ciornei and recchi 2017; baute et al. 2019). here we consider both these dimensions of european solidarity. the following analyses draw on two surveys conducted within the resceu project. the first is a public opinion survey carried out in the autumn of 2016 that evaluates citizens’ preferences on eu solidarity. it includes 1,320 italian respondents interviewed through the cawi method and sampled around age, education, and area of residence. the second is an elite survey conducted on national members of parliament (mps) between 2017 and 2018. it includes 87 italian mps of the lower chamber (camera dei deputati) elected in 2013, of whom 76 answered all relevant eu solidarity items. in both surveys we identified five items designed to measure italian citizens’ and mps’ support for policy programmes introducing cross-national and trans-national forms of european solidarity. table a1 in the appendix lists these five items along with their response categories. the first question asks respondents whether they are in favour of or against the introduction of common european bonds. while undoubtedly a technical issue, so-called eurobonds became a salient topic after the euro crisis in the italian debate. think for instance about the m5s manifesto prepared for the 2014 european parliament elections that explicitly mentioned the introduction of eurobonds as one of 7 brothers of italy can also be considered a challenger party, but due to the low number of mps of this party that took part in the elite survey we could not consider them in our analyses. visconti and pellegata 195 their seven key proposals (della porta et al.2017). the second question asks respondents to indicate whether they are in favour of or against the introduction of a common eu fund compensating national governments and local communities for the costs related to immigration from other eu member states. in the last five years in italy as well as in other countries both intra and extra eu immigration have become a more salient topic of political debate on which right-wing populist parties have capitalised. the third eu solidarity item measures respondents’ preferences on the institution of common eu social insurance schemes (such as healthcare, unemployment or pensions) covering intra-eu migrant workers. this question captures preferences over forms of trans-national solidarity, and preferences over one of the cardinal achievements of the eu: free movement. the fourth question asks citizens and mps whether or not they agree with the introduction of an eu budget large enough to provide substantial financial help to member states facing a sudden rise in unemployment rates, which remains among the top concerns in the minds of italian citizens. the fifth and final question asks citizens and mps whether they agree that in the case of a severe financial crisis in a given member state, the eu should make sure that no citizen remains without means of subsistence (food, shelter, essential medicines etc.). this item depicts a social crisis triggered by severe economic turmoil, a scenario similar to what happened in greece during the euro crisis. responses were given using 4-point likert scales (1 strongly disagree/against, 2 somewhat disagree/against, 3 somewhat agree/in favour, 4 strongly agree/in favour), where lower values mean anti-solidarity preferences, and higher values prosolidarity views.8 in the next section we gauge the congruence between italian voters and party representatives both on the single dimensions, as well as on a comprehensive measure of eu solidarity. this consists of an additive index based on the summation of respondents’ answers on the five solidarity items presented above. the index has then been rescaled to vary between ‘0 anti-eu solidarity’ and ’10 pro-eu solidarity’. the internal consistency of this index is ensured by a factor analysis run on polychoric correlations separately for the elites and the mass datasets, confirming that these items are captured by only one underlying dimension.9 to investigate the congruence between italian mps and their electorate, we have matched them based on the party group of the mp at the moment of the interview, and on the future vote intention of citizens. to ensure consistency we included in our analyses only parties for whom more than three mps and at least ten voters have been interviewed. table a2 in the appendix lists the political parties with the number of voters and mps considered in the analysis: sinistra italiana + movimento democratico e progressista (si+mdp), partito democratico (pd), movimento 5 stelle (m5s), forza italia (fi), and lega (l). 8 employing short answers scales to survey questions protects against the risk of excessive influence of outliers. this is a way to make findings relatively more robust given the difficulties of collecting elite data and the relatively small number of observations that does not allow us to conduct more sophisticate tests. 9 table a3 in the appendix displays results obtained from factor analysis. the correlation between the additive index of eu solidarity and the factor extracted from the factor analysis is of 0.995 for mps and 0.993 for citizens. representation in hard times 196 4. assessing party-voter differences here we are interested in comparing italian public opinion and political elites on the european solidarity issue. to this end we look at two dyads: issue congruence between citizens and mps, and between voters and parties. firstly, we compare the average levels of support for european solidarity expressed by our samples of italian citizens and political representatives, irrespective of their different political orientations and partisan affiliations. with this analysis we aim to detect whether political elites are also more supportive of policies fostering european solidarity than citizens, as they are for the eu in general. then we turn to compare the distance in support for european solidarity between major italian parties and their voters to assess whether there are differences between mainstream and challenger parties. rather than focusing on the individual representative, we scrutinise party-level representation because the electoral system in place at the time of the elite survey emphasised the central role of parties in the chain of representation. the ‘calderoli electoral law’ was indeed a proportional representation system with a majority prize for the plurality party/coalition, large districts and blocked lists in which the voter could not express any preference vote. while directly comparing distributions within two groups is a viable approach (golder and stramski 2010; lupu et al. 2017) we follow the classic representation literature that resorts to measures of central tendency like the mean and the median (huber and powell 1994; müller et al. 2012) to evaluate absolute congruence. table 1 reports summary statistics for the additive eu solidarity index and each of its five components for the italian masses and elites in the aggregate. they show that on average, both the italian public and elites favour a very high level of eu solidarity. on average, italian citizens share an eu solidarity score of 7.35 on a scale from 0 to 10. at the same time, mps are even closer to the pro-eu solidarity pole, with an average value of 8.33. looking at each solidarity item separately, we note that the interpolated median10 is always closer to the pro-solidarity pole of the measurement scale for both groups with only slight mass-elite differences. italian political elites are a bit more pro-eu solidarity than the average italian citizen on all policies but one – preferences for an eu budget large enough to provide financial help to mss in case of a sudden rise in unemployment. in this case, no relevant difference between the two groups emerges. the introduction of eurobonds is the solidarity policy towards which both the public and elites are relatively more sceptical. instead, the one receiving the broadest support is the policy programme ensuring the eu will guarantee to all its citizens that no one is left behind in the aftermath of an economic crisis. the two european solidarity policies relating to the free movement of european citizens, the fund compensating for the costs of managing intra-eu migration and the institutionalisation of a supra-national social insurance, are instead the two proposals with the relatively most significant discrepancy between masses and elites. at the aggregate level, we find support for our expectation of observing closer views between italian citizens and their representatives when it comes to specific eu level policy programmes fostering solidarity, rather than when looking at diffuse support. 10 when dealing with ordinal variables with a limited number of responses, comparing simple medians may not be informative: two distributions with equal median may be heavily weighted above or below the median. the interpolated median provides an alternative measure of centre which takes into account the percentage of the data strictly below or strictly above the median. it gives a measure within the upper and lower bound of the median, in the direction that the data is more heavily weighted. visconti and pellegata 197 table 1. summary statistics for eu solidarity index and its five components. eu solidarity index mean standard error median st. dev. n elite 8.33 0.154 8.67 1.34 76 mass 7.35 0.043 7.33 1.56 1295 introduction of eurobonds mean standard error interpolated median st. dev. n elite 3.37 0.086 3.36 0.75 76 mass 2.86 0.02 2.94 0.85 1295 eu fund to compensate for immigration costs mean standard error interpolated median st. dev. n elite 3.55 0.076 3.70 0.66 76 mass 3.19 0.022 3.25 0.80 1295 eu social insurance covering intra-eu migrants mean standard error interpolated median st. dev. n elite 3.47 0.081 3.58 0.70 76 mass 3.01 0.022 3.07 0.80 1295 eu should provide financial help to mss in case of sudden rise in unemployment mean standard error interpolated median st. dev. n elite 3.34 0.078 3.44 0.69 76 mass 3.39 0.018 3.46 0.66 1295 eu should ensure subsistence in case of financial crisis mean standard error interpolated median st. dev. n elite 3.76 0.049 3.85 0.42 76 mass 3.57 0.017 3.70 0.63 1295 of course, aggregate level differences can hinder variation at a lower level of analysis. the next figures present data disaggregated by party, portraying the median position of parties (blue dots), of their voters (red triangles), and the median position of all italian citizens interviewed in the mass survey (dotted line) on all measures of eu solidarity. figure 2 portrays the median on the eu solidarity index for the five parties meeting the conditions described in the previous section and listed from left to right on the vertical axis: si+mdp, pd, m5s, fi, l.11 the horizontal axis records instead the median on the eu solidarity additive index for both party members and for citizens who would vote for these parties. four insights emerge from the figure. first, there is more between-party variation in support of european solidarity among political elites than among voters. while median supporters of parties tend to be closer to the median citizen, the median representatives of the same parties, though they tend to be more pro-solidarity than the median citizen, present more differences. second, while in the aggregate the elites were more pro 11 the left-right positioning of italian parties is based on the 2017 chapel hill expert flash survey (polk et al. 2017) available at https://www.chesdata.eu/1999-2014-chapel-hill-expert-survey-ches-trend-file1.the position of the parties on the lrgen variable measuring parties’ ideology – where 0 means ‘extreme left’ and 10 ‘extreme right’ – is the following: si 1.36; mdp 2.23; pd 3.8; m5s 5.2; fi 6.533; l 8.26. representation in hard times 198 european solidarity than the masses, this is not always true when we look at each party separately. the aggregate level result holds for si+mdp, pd, and l. the two parties located closer to the left pole of the ideological axis are those with the largest distance between elites and masses (for both parties, voters and mps shared the same median position). solidarity policies are the preferred terrain of battle for left-wing parties, issues that therefore they tend to emphasise more in their political activities. the same also holds for the league of matteo salvini. interestingly, l voters are the only group whose median lies below the overall median of italian citizens. third, mps of the l, together with the m5s representatives, are the least supportive of european solidarity. nevertheless, compared to the left-wing mps, they are closer both to the l median voter and to the median citizen. finally, fi and m5s show perfect congruence between national mps and their voters. voters of berlusconi’s party present the same median score on the solidarity index as the left-wing voters (pd and si+mdp). however, fi mps are less prone to supporting pro-solidarity policies than their left-wing counterparts. the perfect congruence of the position of m5s representatives not only with their electoral base but also with the median italian citizen on the issue of eu solidarity is probably related to their electoral success in the general elections of 8 march. it falls in line with the pivotal role played by the m5s in the italian political system since the 2013 elections figure 2. medians for voters and elites on the eu solidarity index. looking at the additive index may hinder differences on the specific policy proposals considered. while the underlying structure of preferences on the five issues is similar, it is not exactly the same and there is some independent variation across the five eu solidarity policies. therefore, figures 3 and 4 show the interpolated medians on each of the five components of european solidarity. the first figure depicts the three items measuring preferences over the introduction of forms of cross-national ● ● ● ● ●si+mdp pd m5s fi lega 5 6 7 8 9 10 median pa rt y ● elite voters eu solidarity · · · country median visconti and pellegata 199 solidarity, while the second looks at the transnational forms of eu solidarity. first, we find that there is greater congruence on issues related to poverty and unemployment, two problems that the economic crisis has exacerbated since 2009. both parties’ and voters’ preferences on these issues are very close to the pro-eu-solidarity extreme. therefore, regardless of the polity-level euroscepticism characterising italian citizens, it emerges that a solution to these problems lies at the supra-national level through further integration in the minds not only of mps but also of voters. second, we find lower congruence when we look at support for the introduction of eurobonds to pool risks related to public debt. this is a complex issue to be understood and processed by citizens, and across parties they tend to align close to the overall country median. third, the two policies related to freedom of movement are the ones with more variation across parties in terms of congruence. figure 3. interpolated medians for voters and elites on cross-national components of eu solidarity. ● ● ● ● ●si+mdp pd m5s fi lega strongly disagree 2 3 strongly agree interpolated median pa rt y ● elite voters eurobonds · · · country interpolated median ● ● ● ● ●si+mdp pd m5s fi lega strongly disagree 2 3 strongly agree interpolated median pa rt y ● elite voters eu fund compensating for immigration's costs · · · country interpolated median ● ● ● ● ●si+mdp pd m5s fi lega strongly disagree 2 3 strongly agree interpolated median pa rt y ● elite voters eu financial help to face unemployment · · · country interpolated median representation in hard times 200 concerning the first policy, the introduction of an eu fund compensating member states for immigration costs, we find a low level of congruence for all parties but si+mdp, which perfectly match their voters, and the m5s. as regards this policy, of particular interest is the distance between the interpolated median of mps of the l and their voters, which is the most extreme distance between elites and voters found in our data. l’s voters are only moderately in favour of more integration policies in the field of immigration, and less so than the median citizen. instead, their representatives hold a very favourable opinion about the introduction of this programme. this result could hint at the outright rejection of immigration on behalf of voters, notwithstanding refunds for its management. on the second policy item related to free movement, the introduction of a social insurance scheme covering workers moving from one eu member state to another, our data suggest an association between the interpolated median position of mps and the leftright positioning of their party: the more a party locates itself on the left, the more it supports such a form of transnational solidarity. still, parties located on the left of the ideological spectrum are those less congruent with their voters. even if m5s representatives are less in favour of eu solidarity policies than left-wing parties (apart from the item on subsistence in case of a severe crisis), they tend to be very much attuned to their voters and the general citizenry. figure 4. interpolated medians for voters and elites on transnational components of eu solidarity these results suggest the m5s has been able to catalyse the priorities and preferences of italian citizens on the fight against poverty and unemployment, and the need for new welfare instruments which are much better than its competitors. these issues have been central in the m5s policy agenda and key to its electoral success. instead, these results somewhat contradict the official m5s rhetoric of a party that wants a return to the principles of solidarity and community in the eu (della porta et al.2017). when compared to the other parties included in our analysis, their mps, as well as their voters, present positions that are either less pro-eu solidarity or not significantly different from other parties. ● ● ● ● ●si+mdp pd m5s fi lega strongly disagree 2 3 strongly agree interpolated median pa rt y ● elite voters eu should provide means of subsistence · · · country interpolated median ● ● ● ● ●si+mdp pd m5s fi lega strongly disagree 2 3 strongly agree interpolated median pa rt y ● elite voters eu social insurance · · · country interpolated median visconti and pellegata 201 5. concluding remarks this article investigated party-voter distance on support for policies strengthening the social dimension of europe in italy. in the aftermath of the multiple crises that the eu has experienced in the last decade, solidarity and redistribution of resources across eu member states and citizens have become salient and highly contentious issues among both political elites and citizens. while italian voters are much more sceptical than their representatives about the benefit brought by their country’s membership in the eu, they are much closer to them when it comes to supporting policies strengthening european solidarity. in a country such as italy, badly hit by the euro crisis and by the negative externalities of fiscal austerity, both public opinion and political elites blame eu institutions for being unable to face the unevenly distributed challenges coming from the crisis and ask for policies aiming to redistribute resources and correct imbalances across eu member states. by means of a public opinion and elite survey under the framework of the resceu project, we analysed the italian mass-elite gap on support for policies fostering european solidarity, focusing on differences across parties. we found a high level of congruence between mass and elite preferences towards pro-solidarity policies. left-wing parties (pd and si+mdp) are the most supportive of european solidarity. for these parties as well as for the league we detected a certain amount of divergence between mps and their voters, with the former tending to be more pro-eu solidarity than the latter. our analysis revealed instead a perfect match-up of the m5s mps’ preferences and those of both their voters and the italian median citizen. voters of the league show they are the most eurosceptic, while m5s party representatives show on overage a lower level of support for pro-eu solidarity policies, even when they were part of their official electoral manifesto as in the case of eurobonds. these findings seem to corroborate works on the issue-entrepreneurial role of challenger parties and their ability to better represent the median citizen (hobolt and tilley 2016). while exploratory in nature, our study suggests two relevant and interrelated implications. first, our findings show that, though salient, eu-related issues do not seem to contribute to reshaping political competition in italy. although we detected few cross-partisan differences, voters and mps have preferences in favour of policies that can contribute to sharing the burden of the multiple crises italy is experiencing with other eu member states by redistributing risks, resources and responsibilities. second, this study sheds light on the nature of the euroscepticism that is increasingly characterizing large sectors of italian public opinion as well as important parties. it is plausible that italians are sceptical about the eu institutions for being unable, or unwilling, to implement policies that can help those member states that, more than others, are facing the challenges provided by the multiple crises that recently invested europe. however, both italian voters and their political representatives do not consider the eu a project deemed to fail but, on the contrary, they ask for a proactive role of the eu in protecting 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(2016). public opinion and public policy. in oxford research encyclopedia of politics. visconti and pellegata 205 appendix table a1. descriptive statistics of the dependent variable's components. question wording response categories thinking about the european union over the next 10 years, can you indicate whether you are in favour or against the following: item 1 the introduction of common european bonds (aka eurobonds). 1strongly against; 2somewhat against; 3somewhat in favour; 4strongly in favour item 2 the introduction of a common eu fund compensating national governments and local communities for the costs related to immigration from other eu member states. item 3 the introduction of common eu social insurance schemes (such as healthcare, unemployment or pensions) that cover intra-eu migrant workers. eu member states have decided that their economic and social policies should be brought closer together. please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: item 4 the eu should equip itself with a budget large enough to provide substantial financial help to member states facing a sudden rise in unemployment rates. 1strongly disagree; 2somewhat disagree; 3somewhat agree; 4strongly agree item 5 in the case of a very severe financial crisis in a given member state, the eu should make sure that no citizen of that state remains without means of subsistence (food, shelter, essential medicines etc...). table a2. number of mps and voters for each party considered. party number of mps number of voters si+mdp 9 21 pd 39 235 m5s 13 305 fi 7 51 lega 4 99 total 72 711 table a3. results from factor analyses on elites and masses items. elites masses variables factor loadings uniqueness factor loadings uniqueness eurobonds 0.580 0.586 0.371 0.810 financial help 0.334 0.612 0.575 0.504 subsistence 0.411 0.597 0.583 0.489 immigration 0.738 0.442 0.679 0.473 insurance 0.756 0.400 0.605 0.506 eigenvalues 1.733 1.636 note: factor analyses based on polychoric correlations. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 * lorenza perini is adjunct professor at the university of padova. she has been teaching the course gender policies and welfare state in the european union since 2010, first in italian (with prof. alisa del re) and then, since 2013, in english. the course is offered within the master’s degree in european studies. the course she teaches is attended by an average of 20-30 students from all over the world. © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 19–23. teaching in a gender perspective lorenza perini* university of padua the gender perspective as an opportunity for change gender policies, the subject i teach at the university of padua, is not a very common topic in italian academia for at least three reasons. the first is that in our country there is little recognition of the category of ‘gender’ from the perspectives of both political science and political history (stabili, 2015). the second is that this reception – or ‘cultural translation’ – is, in most cases, distorted, as it tends to be superimposed on the biological category of female sex. therefore, as a category of analysis, the gender perspective appears to be greatly weakened. today, while normally taken into account when discussing topics such as violence or migration, on other issues there is a persisting mistrust of gender as a category of political analysis and, unfortunately, there is no revolution underway to change this way of thinking. there is also a third, more practical reason, which is that ‘gender’ is not a real subject to teach, but it is rather a perspective, a point of view, a cross-cutting category (scott, 1986). teaching in/with a gender perspective is therefore more like using a particular type of glasses to look around and see things differently. through the lens of gender students are asked to take a deeper look at life around them, at the society they are living in and – possiblyreconsider some of their own beliefs and understandings. taking ‘gender’ into account as a category of analysis, they are asked for example to re-think their research interests for their final dissertation. the aim is to make them aware of the differences – “through a gender perspective i see this, without this perspective i see that”and aware of the fact that, in a high percentage of the cases, the gap between ‘this’ and ‘that’ is an issue of gender discrimination. in this scenario one of the main goals of courses like gender policies is to highlight that there are differences in the outcomes of policy-making that simply derive from gender differences and these should be considered and taken into account. as stated in the introduction to this themed issue, it has been recognized that putting gender into the research agenda offers new ways of understanding social, cultural and political processes and structures through which societies and the relationships between sexes that substantiate them are organized. the gender perspective is therefore a critical look that makes clear and emphasizes differences between sexes not in the biological sense, but in how women and men participate and take part in the making of everyday ‘facts’, how they are affected by the political choices of national as well as local governperini, teaching in a gender perspective 20 ment, and this has nothing to do with the ‘point of view of women’ or with ‘gender as women’s stuff’, as it is usually interpreted in our culture.1 since there are no specific and institutionalized degree courses dedicated to gender in the italian academic system, students who decide to attend a class like gender policiesmay come from very different backgrounds, such as human rights or political science; many of them also from economics, science, medicine, urban planning, or law. in this particular case, the class i teach is attended not only by italian students but by a lot of foreign students coming from all over the world – from europe to north and south america, from africa to balkan and asian countries. this ‘attraction’ is very positive in my opinion, and is certainly due to the fact that, since 2013, at the university of padua a number of courses in the field of political science – including gender policies – have been offered in english. like in the past, when the course was held in italian, the main objective is to introduce students to the very basic concepts in the approach to gender studies, but what has changed in the last three years is the territorial perspective. a much broader approach is now necessary, taking into account the different experiences of the students. in class, we start discussing basic concepts like the meaning of sex, gender, gendering, gender system (patriarchy), power, homophobia – in terms of effectiveness of policies at international, national and local levels. we introduce concepts like heteronormativity, we address the importance of gender awareness in decision-making and we discuss the implications if a non-discrimination perspective were to be taken into account in the implementation of policies, especially in the urban context (‘engendering the city’). we also reflect on the role of the european community which, despite the resistance of local institutions, in the last ten years has strongly pushed for gender issues to be mainstreamed in all fields of research and aspects of life in academic environments. in order to increase the personal sensitivity of the students in a non-prescriptive way, the lessons are not organized as traditional lectures. the presence of foreign students is a great opportunity to use different sources and methods, which has led me to review the structure of the course, framing each lesson as a sort of interactive workshop, where it is easier to discuss, to share knowledge and exchange views depending on the interests and the personal sensibility of the participants, without imposing my personal orientation. at the end of the course i ask all the students to prepare not only a term paper but also ‘a lesson’ for the rest of the class on the topic they have been most interested in. to foster the students’ curiosity, during the lessons guest lecturers are often invited to present their books and papers; specific seminars on ‘how to write a good final dissertation’ with the support of librarians from the faculty and experts on digital resources are organized and, during the course, students have the chance to attend seminars and activities organized by the university center for gender studies – cirsg – on topics of their interest. the opportunity to teach in english allows us to go beyond english as a means of communication and refer broadly to the international environment in which the issues we deal with have emerged. at the end of this third year of teaching in english i recognize that 1 an example that shows how simple it can be to misunderstand what gender really means: “women in the labor market” is completely different from studying “the labor market from a gender perspective”. although both take women into account, only the second considers the interaction of the sexes and the different perspectives from which women and men are affected by the policies and the rules of the labor market. this may seem to be a minor difference, but it is not; there is, indeed, a considerable cultural and political distance between the two. gender and politics 21 i made a great effort in renewing the contents of the course as a consequence of the language change: switching to english means switching to another way of thinking, of organizing topics within the lessons and the type of lessons themselves. this different perspective is very useful when talking about gender: the center is represented by the students, who are women and men, by their unique and different stories, their backgrounds, their experiences that the new pair of gender glasses have made richer, deeper and more productive. the challenge proved to be a great opportunity for the course to become a real multicultural space for discussion, sharing experiences, listening to different voices and, most of all, for fruitful mutual learning. when the students are not (only) academic this type of educational perspective, very fruitful in academic courses does not exhaust its potential with a mark or with a final dissertation. ‘gender glasses’ are very useful also outside university, to analyze the challenges emerging from each specific local context and the dimension of life-long-learning that accompanies women and men at any stage of their life, in their working dimension, as well as in the social and political commitments they decide to undertake, up to the decisions they may take in their private life. it was in this perspective of offering learning opportunities on ‘gender policies and equal opportunities’ to people outside academia that, in 2004, the italian government, decided to fund a national project entitled ‘women, politics and institutions’. the ultimate aim was to help create cultural and educational conditions in order to increase the participation and presence of women in political life, both at national and local level, in elected assemblies, in councils and consultative committees, where women are typically absent (forcina, 2003). involving the ministry for equal opportunities and a number of universities, the project included 100 hours of training a year, directed both to undergraduate students and to people outside the academia with a strong interest in gender issues. there was no tuition fee and there were two tests, one mid-term and one at the end of the course, with a final grade and a certificate of attendance. the aim of the project was to raise awareness of the importance of women and men participating together in the public sphere and in political life, both at national and local level, in elected assemblies, in councils and consultative committees, where women are usually under represented (folke-richne, 2014). this was driven by the belief that it is “mostly the cultural factors that prevent a broader participation of women in politics and in all decision-making bodies” (asti et al. 2008). focusing on the formal structure of national politics, on the knowledge of how decisional arenas work and leaving the analysis of local dynamics to the universities involved (especially to the scientific coordinators responsible for the implementation of the project, one for each university, chosen for their specific skills, personal experiences and some of them for their long-feminist militancy), it was possible, in part, to go beyond the stereotype of a clear role division between sexes – the institutions with their rituals, occult mechanisms and male tested schemes on the one side and the social and reproductive roles of women on the other. considering the ‘institutional box’ together with its political content of practices was the new and decisive element. inserting the point of view of gender equality in an apparently neutral scenario was certainly a difficult task of mainstreaming, but a harbinger of good results, giving the participants an idea of ‘politics’ from all possible points of view: as a path toward the conquest of rights for women and perini, teaching in a gender perspective 22 men that differs both in achievements and in chronology; as a growing difficulty in maintaining these achievements; as a real impossibility to access certain spheres of political power for no other reasons than sex. this course was a platform of awareness and recognition in short, offering not mere acquisition of theoretical knowledge, but an active ‘tool’ to propose and suggest, allowing participants to identify the crucial issues of how to enter and remain in the political arena, to understand how to propose changes to the access mechanisms and to find a position given the skills acquired. fourteen thousand applications arrived for the first two editions (2004 – 2006) and about seven thousand participants took part in the project, involving 44 universities across italy. the experience continued with these high numbers until 2012, organized with the formula of co-participation (and co-financing) of universities and the ministry. then, in 2013, the government funding stopped and the organizational and financial burden ended up on the shoulders of the universities, who were able to carry on one or two more editions of the project, in collaboration with local institutions in some cases with the help of a sponsor. a negative implication of this is that the government has clearly lost interest in this type of initiative; but a positive one is that this type of course still exists today in many universities under various and different labels – as postgraduate training, or as professional development, continuing to create bridges from academia to the territory and to promote knowledge sharing. as carmen leccardi, coordinator of the project at the university of milano-bicocca since the very beginning, stated: “these courses are the only time when the university actually opens to the territory, fulfilling in this a vital function” (leccardi, 2012). the formula of the project, mixing students and people interested in the topic of gender equality2 has clearly shown that the desire for gender-aware knowledge, aimed at acting in the public sphere, is very strong. second, it has contributed to educating a generation of young women who look to politics as an opportunity to express their personality and skills, and as a career option. from the point of view of the results achieved by the students, because the course took place in the universities and involved a lot of academics, it has put in place an important mechanism of recognition of the knowledge acquired. it was not just a course ‘sponsored’ by the academic institution, or hosted in a university classroom. it was a project entirely organized within the universities. the importance of this recognition of authority is twofold, because on the one hand it has connected the university to its territory, placing it at the center of an osmotic circulation of knowledge and skills. secondly, it has encouraged the participants to get passionate about its contents, asking for further information, additional classes, advanced courses, as well as requesting academic spaces where they can hold meetings and self-managed seminars, beyond the margins of the course itself. it was a chance to re-create a positive imagery around academic knowledge, no longer seen as separate from the practice of everyday life, but in dialogue, towards the concept of a university open to training throughout the course of life (lifelong learning), which is the foundation of a modern and european conception of academic places. 2 in the first edition (2004-2005) the course was delivered only to women. then the subsequent editions were open to the participation of both men and women. gender and politics 23 gender perspective as ‘expert knowledge’ in policy making it is a fact that after the seventies many occasions of ‘speech’ for women in italy simply closed. for a long time, their participation in the political life of the country took place underground. the place to present themselves in the decision-making public arena was missing, due to political circumstances, to the ‘resilience’ of a patriarchal society, and also due to the fact that part of the feminist movement was (and still is) hesitant if not reluctant about a real participation and involvement of women in the institutions (del re, 2008). today the situation has partly changed: the place does exist, women want to participate, and yet what prevents them from doing so is mostly the burden of the care activities that is today (as it was thirty years ago) mostly on their shoulders, without any real chance to share it with men. a burden that holds them back a centimeter, just one centimeter, but decisive. discriminating. the issue of the crisis of the forms of citizenship and of the political representation of leadership is the focus of the current political debate and compels us to rethink the past as well as the present and maybe also to redesign the forecasts for the future. for this purpose, a gender perspective in policy making could be a key of great help to interpret and solve many problematic issues. it is about taking responsibility and having the courage to reformulate certain categories of values: the gender perspective should be considered as ‘expert knowledge’ to be taken seriously into account inside and outside academia. recognizing the importance of the presence and the action of women in the public sphere – not just in terms of numbers, but in terms of thoughts, opinions, expertise – is a matter of justice: this is the type of ‘cultural work’ that academic institutions should provide to students and to the whole society, and it is what a democracy should adopt as a target priority to achieve. references asti a., fantone l., giuliani g., perini l., una ricerca sul progetto formativo donne politica e istituzioni, inchiesta, 160 (oct. 2008), p. 56-62. del re a. (2008), gli studi di genere e i loro luoghi: ricerca, diffusione e formazione, inchiesta, 160 (oct. 2008), p. 3-10. folke o., richne j. (2014), the glass ceiling in politics: formalization and empirical tests research institute for industrial economics, sweden, working paper. forcina m. (2003), una cittadinanza di altro genere. discorso su un’idea politica e la sua storia, milano, francoangeli. leccardi c. (2012), donne politica istituzioni: la politica di genere all’università, interview with assunta sarlo, available online at: http://www.elle.it/magazine/donne-politicaistituzioni-cultura-di-genere-universita. scott w.j. (1986), gender: a useful category of historical analysis, the american historical review vol. 91, no. 5 (dec., 1986), pp. 1053-1075. stabili m.r. (2015), il genere come categoria analitica nella storiografia politica italiana, ricerche di storia politica, 1/2015. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_1.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. 8–18. * contact author: alessandro chiaramonte, university of florence. e-mail address: alessandro.chiaramonte@unifi.it the new italian electoral system and its effects on strategic coordination and disproportionality alessandro chiaramonte university of florence roberto d’alimonte school of government luiss guido carli university, rome abstract on 26 october 2017, the italian parliament approved a new electoral system nicknamed rosatellum after ettore rosato, head of the partito democratico’s (pd, democratic party) parliamentary group in the chamber, who was the first proponent of the law. the new electoral system is the fourth since 1993. it is a mixed system, like the others, and it applies to both the chamber and the senate. roughly two thirds of the seats are assigned with a proportional formula in multi-member districts. the remaining seats are assigned in single-member districts with plurality rule. the impact of the new electoral system in terms of party representation has been more proportional than majoritarian. no party or coalition won an absolute majority of seats. however, if we look at its overall performance the picture is mixed. after all, the smds are a potent tool and they have made the difference in terms of voting behaviour and pattern of competition. two pre-electoral coalitions have been formed, the centre-left and the centre-right, which presented themselves, along with m5s, as potential government alternatives. the agreements made among their members acted as a constraint on possible post-electoral alliances making difficult to form a government. this is one of the main reasons of the long stalemate. introduction: why this electoral system? n 26 october 2017 the italian parliament approved a new electoral system nicknamed rosatellum after ettore rosato, head of the partito democratico’s (pd, democratic party) parliamentary group in the chamber, who was the first proponent of the law. the law passed with 76% votes in favour in the chamber and 77% in the senate1. it was supported by all the main parties with the exception of the movimento 5 stelle (m5s, five star movement). the new electoral system is the fourth since 1993. the first was introduced with the mattarella law and was a mixed system based on a combination of 75% plurality rule in single-member districts (smds) and 25% proportional (pr) seats (d'alimonte and chiaramonte 1995; giannetti and grofman, 2009; katz 2001). it applied to both branches 1 these percentages are based on votes cast. in the chamber the votes were 307 in favour, 90 against, 9 abstentions. in the senate there were 214 in favour, 61 against, 2 abstentions. pd, forza italia (fi, go italy), lega nord (ln, northern league), alleanza popolare (ap, people’s alliance), alleanza liberalpopolare-autonomie (ala, liberal-popular alliance-autonomies) voted in favour. m5s, movimento democratico progressista (mdp), democratic progressive movement), sinistra italiana (si, italian left) voted against. o who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 9 of parliament. the second was introduced in 2005 with the calderoli law (d'alimonte 2007; di virgilio 2007; pasquino 2007; renwick, hanretty and hine 2009). it was also a mixed system, but the mix was different. all the seats were assigned with a pr formula, but the party or the coalition with a plurality of votes at the national level (chamber) or at the regional level (senate) would get a majority prize. in the chamber the prize was majority-assuring. with this system the prize replaced the smds as the majority component of the mix. the third system, nicknamed italicum, was introduced in 2015 during the renzi government and in connection with constitutional reform. it was another mixed electoral system. as in the calderoli system, all the seats were assigned with a pr formula, but the party (not the coalitions) with at least 40% of the votes would get a majority prize, allowing it to obtain 54% of the seats. if, however, no party won 40% of the votes, the two parties with the most votes would face a run-off, the winner obtaining 54% of the seats. the losers would split the remaining 46% proportionally, based on first round results. the italicum applied only to the chamber. the fourth, discussed here, is also a mixed electoral system, but it is not the end of the story2. in addition to these ‘parliamentary’ electoral reforms there have been two other reforms dictated by the constitutional court. the first was introduced in january 2014 with ruling no. 1/2014 and it modified the calderoli law. the main changes were the abolition of the majority prize and the introduction of the preference vote. the original calderoli law provided for the majority prize to be assigned with no minimum percentage of votes received by the winner. in the 2013 elections the centre-left coalition won the prize with only 29% of the votes. this outcome reinforced the opposition to this electoral system on constitutional grounds, as the potential disproportionality was deemed excessive. following this logic, the court abolished the prize. in doing so, it basically transformed the existing mixed electoral system into a proportional one. with the same ruling it deemed unconstitutional another provision of the system, that is, the closed list of candidates, which according to the court, included too many candidates. the third ‘parliamentary’ electoral reform mentioned above, the italicum, was a response to this decision by the court. it was, however, approved only for the election of the chamber of deputies, the reason being the connection with the renzi-boschi constitutional reform which was to have changed the composition and functions of the senate. the decision to introduce a new electoral system for the chamber left in place the electoral system of the senate introduced by the constitutional court with ruling no. 1/2014. this created a peculiar situation whereby the two branches of parliament would be elected by two radically different voting systems: the system for the chamber was two-round and majority-assuring, whereas the system of the senate was single-round and proportional. the second electoral reform dictated by the constitutional court was introduced in january 2017 with ruling no. 35/2017. this second decision was made after the rejection of the constitutional reform in the referendum held on 4 december 20163. in this case the court deemed unconstitutional the run-off provided for by the italicum. what was 2 for a comprehensive analysis of (at least some of) the main italian electoral reforms since 1993 and their effects on the party system see baldini (2011) and chiaramonte (2015). 3 on the 2016 constitutional referendum and the reasons leading to the rejection of the renzi-boschi constitutional reform see bordignon and ceccarini (2017) and pasquino and valbruzzi (2017). chiaramonte and d’alimonte, the new italian electoral system and its effects 10 left after the ruling of the court was still a mixed system but no longer majority-assuring. if a party obtained 40% of the votes it would be given a prize, allowing it to have 54% of the seats in the chamber, but if nobody reached the 40% threshold all the seats would be assigned proportionally. this system would apply only to the chamber. the senate would still be elected with the proportional system introduced by the court with its 2014 ruling. this is the background to the fourth and last (for the time being) ‘parliamentary’ electoral reform. after the second intervention of the court, the status quo was based on two electoral systems, both designed by the judges. the system for the chamber included a majority prize and a 3% threshold for winning seats. the system for the senate was a proportional system without a majority prize and an 8% threshold. added to this heterogeneity we must mention the fact that the two chambers are elected by two different electoral bodies, as voters in the 18-24 age group vote for the chamber but not for the senate. given the fact that italy’s bicameral system assigns exactly the same powers to both branches of parliament, this could be a serious problem. in light of these anomalies one can understand the concern of many observers, and particularly the president of the republic, that voting with these different systems might produce confusion, and possibly different outcomes. these concerns led to several attempts to change the status quo. the one that came close to being successful before the final decision was reached on the present system was based on the german model. the proposal was approved in the committee for constitutional affairs in the chamber with the support of all the major parties, including the m5s, but it was defeated once it reached the floor. the subsequent attempt was the rosato law. 1. the new rules of the electoral game with the new electoral system, the differences between the chamber and the senate have disappeared. the two systems have finally been harmonized as their main features are basically the same. both systems are mixed with roughly one third of the seats allocated in smds with plurality rule and two thirds by a proportional formula. district structure. the allocation of seats, both in the chamber and in the senate, occurs according to a three-tier system. the first tier is made up of smds, of which there are 232 in the chamber and 116 in the senate. the second tier involves the election of the remaining candidates in multi-member districts (mmds). excluding those who are elected in a separate constituency by italian residents abroad (12 in the chamber and 6 in the senate), 386 deputies and 193 senators are elected by pr in mmds. there are 63 of these districts in the case of the chamber and 33 for the senate. the number of seats per district ranges between 3 and 8 in the chamber and 2 and 8 in the senate. the last tier is represented by the 28 constituencies of the chamber and the 20 regions of the senate. list and candidates. smds candidates, party lists and coalitions are the actors who participate in an interdependent game. smds candidates cannot run alone. they have to be affiliated to a single party list, as happened in the 2018 elections for all the m5s candidates, or to a coalition formed by different parties, as in the case of the centre-right and centre-left. each coalition can be associated with just one smd candidate and vice versa, but each member of the coalition has its own list of pr candidates. these pr lists are connected to the mmds discussed above. they are closed lists, i.e., no preference votes are permitted. for both branches of parliament, the number of candidates in the list cannot who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 11 be less than half of the number of seats assigned in the mmd and cannot be more than the total. however, regardless of the number of seats in any mmd, the number of candidates in each party list cannot be less than two or more than four. table 1. constituencies, smds, mmds, pr seats and total seats (chamber of deputies and senate) chamber of deputies senate constituency sm ds mm ds pr seats total seats constituency sm ds mm ds pr seats total seats piedmont 1 9 2 14 23 piedmont 8 2 14 22 piedmont 2 8 2 14 22 lombardy 1 15 4 25 40 lombardy 18 5 31 49 lombardy 2 8 2 14 22 lombardy 3 8 2 15 23 lombardy 4 6 2 11 17 veneto 1 8 2 12 20 veneto 9 2 15 24 veneto 2 11 3 19 30 trentino-alto adige 6 1 5 11 trentino-alto adige 6 1 1 7 friuli-venezia giulia 5 1 8 13 friuli-venezia giulia 2 1 5 7 liguria 6 2 10 16 liguria 3 1 5 8 emilia romagna 17 4 28 45 emilia romagna 8 2 14 22 tuscany 14 4 24 38 tuscany 7 2 11 18 umbria 3 1 6 9 umbria 2 1 5 7 marche 6 2 10 16 marche 3 1 5 8 lazio 1 14 3 24 38 lazio 10 3 18 28 lazio 2 7 2 13 20 abruzzo 5 2 9 14 abruzzo 2 1 5 7 molise 2 1 1 3 molise 1 1 1 2 campania 1 12 3 20 32 campania 11 3 18 29 campania 2 10 3 18 28 apulia 16 4 26 42 apulia 8 2 12 20 basilicata 2 1 4 6 basilicata 1 1 6 7 calabria 8 2 12 20 calabria 4 1 6 10 sicily 1 9 3 16 25 sicily 9 2 16 25 sicily 2 10 3 17 27 sardinia 6 2 11 17 sardinia 3 1 5 8 aosta valley 1 1 aosta valley 1 1 abroad europe 5 5 abroad europe 2 2 abroad north america 4 4 abroad north america 2 2 abroad south america 2 2 abroad south america 1 1 abroad rest of world 1 1 abroad rest of world 1 1 total 232 63 398 630 116 33 199 315 chiaramonte and d’alimonte, the new italian electoral system and its effects 12 no candidate can run in more than one smd, but an smd candidate, as well as any pr list candidate, can run in up to five mmds. these multi-candidacies are the preserve of the most influential party members. they serve a double purpose. on the one hand they give visibility to the list and might attract votes on the basis of the popularity of the candidates. on the other hand, they offer some privileged candidates more chances to be elected. as happened in the last elections, a number of these candidates lost in their smd, but were ‘saved’ by the pr list in which they were included. the candidate winning the seat in more than one mmd is elected in the mmd where her list received the lowest share of votes of the total votes cast. each list has to field candidates in at least two thirds of the mmds in any given constituency and must file candidates in all the smds in any given mmd. a complex set of gender provisions are included4. in the pr lists in mmds, candidates of different genders have to be placed in alternate order. in the chamber single lists or coalitions cannot field more than 60% of candidates of the same sex in the smds. the percentage applies at the national level. as to the mmds, the first place on the list cannot be assigned to candidates of the same sex in more than 60% of the districts5. also, in this case the limit applies at the national level. all of these provisions apply at the regional level for the senate. voting structure. a great deal of attention has been given to ballot structure and to voting procedures. the ballot is designed in such a way as to provide voters with readily available information. each smd candidate is listed with his/her name next to the party or coalitions of parties that support him/her. on the ballot, voters can read not only the name of the smd candidate but also the names of all the pr candidates of each party running in the mmd which includes the given smd. voting choices are limited. one of the most controversial elements of this electoral system was the choice between fused vote and split vote. the former eventually prevailed. voters cannot vote for an smd candidate and for a party list not affiliated to her. they have the following options: 1. they can vote just for the smd. all of these votes are transferred pro quota to the parties affiliated to smd candidates on the basis of the pr votes they get in the relative mmd. 2.they can vote for a party list. in this case their vote is automatically assigned also to the smd candidate affiliated to the same list. 3. they can vote for an smd candidate and for one of the lists affiliated to her. as mentioned above, voters cannot modify the order in which pr candidates are placed in the mmd lists. it is a ‘take it or leave it’ choice. whether they like it or not, with one vote they get the entire package. formulas and thresholds. plurality is the rule for winning smds. in a tripolar context, as it exists in italy today, this means that most seats can be won with less than 50% of the votes. in the march elections this was the case in 188 smds out of a total of 232 (81%) in the chamber. the largest remainder hare quota is the method for the allocation of the pr seats. the procedure is top down. for the chamber the distribution of the seats among parties is done first at the national level. the second step involves the 28 constituencies. 4 in the 2018 election these gender provisions proved to be effective, in that a record number of women were elected (34%). 5 this provision may be (partially) circumvented by strategically placing the same female candidate as list head in multiple constituencies in order to promote the election of different male candidates following in the list. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 13 the last step takes place at the level of the mmds. for the senate the procedure is the same, but the first step is at the regional level. thresholds of representation play an important role. they apply to both single parties and coalitions. in the case of single parties, the threshold is 3% of the valid votes calculated at the national level. this threshold does not apply to parties representing ethnic minorities. for these parties a threshold is set at 20% in their region. in addition, only for the senate, any party can gain pr seats if it gets 20% of the votes at the regional level. in the case of coalitions, the picture is more complex. coalitions as such participate in the allocation of pr seats only if they get at least 10% of the votes at the national level and if they include a party with not less than 3%. if these conditions are met, then the coalition can count on the votes received by all of its members which obtain at least 1% at the national level. however, only the parties in the coalition which have at least 3% of the votes can obtain a proportional share of the pr seats assigned to the coalition. this set of thresholds creates a situation by which the votes of party members of the coalition getting between 1% and 3% contribute to the total votes of the coalition for the benefit of the parties that have more than 3%6. 2. how disproportional the new electoral system has been the introduction of this new electoral system raised the question of whether it could have produced a winner in terms of an absolute majority of seats in favour of one of the main competitors. the widespread and largely misleading expectation in the public discourse was that this outcome could have materialized if either the centre-right coalition, the centre-left coalition or the m5s had gained at least 40% of the votes. actually, to be precise, this would have happened only if any one of these three competitors had put together 40% of the pr seats and 70% of the plurality seats. as it happened, none of them came close to the target. in terms of pr seats, the centre-right was not too far off, with 39.1% in the chamber and 39.9% in the senate. but it fell way short in terms of smd seats, as it won only 47.8% in the chamber and 50% in the senate. the conclusion is that the electoral system did not generate the kind of disproportionality that would have been required for a majority winner. as we can see from figure 1, at the systemic level the degree of disproportionality in the 2018 election – as measured through the gallagher (1991; 1992) index – is, with one exception, significantly lower than that of the elections of the second republic and very similar to that of the elections of the first republic. more specifically, comparing the level of disproportionality of this election with that of the elections held under the pure pr electoral system in place during the first republic, we do not see a significant difference, in spite of the fact that with the electoral system used today one third of the seats are attributed to smds under the plurality rule. moving from the systemic level to the level of individual actors, the picture is slightly different. table 2 shows the share of votes and that of plurality and total seats for each of the main competitors (both for the chamber and the senate). if we look at the 6 in other words, if any party gets less than 1% of the votes, its votes cannot be used by the other members of the coalition who have more than 3%. these votes are effectively wasted, just like those of single parties who get less than 3%, as regards the allocation of pr seats. not so for the allocation of smds seats because they are automatically transferred to the candidates in the smds. chiaramonte and d’alimonte, the new italian electoral system and its effects 14 plurality side, the level of overand under-representation is indeed significant. in the case of the centre-right we are talking about 11 percentage points (pp.) in the chamber, and even more in the senate. in the case of the m5s it is about 7 pp. in the chamber and 6 in the senate. as to the centre-left, under-representation is 11pp. in both branches. however, taking into account the pr seats, the general picture shows a level of overall disproportionality which is relatively modest. figure 1. level of disproportionality (lsq, gallagher index) in the italian elections of the chamber of deputies between 1948 and 2018 after all, this result should not be considered as surprising as it was perceived by the general public. there are three reasons that explain it. the first has to do with the nature of the electoral system, given the asymmetry between the share of pr seats and that of plurality seats. the second reason is that the share of wasted votes was quite low. as mentioned above, these are the votes cast for party lists running alone and receiving less than 3% nationwide and also for parties which are members of coalitions but get less than 1% of the votes. the sum of these votes turned out to be about 5% both in the chamber and in the senate. such a low percentage has made a small difference in terms of over/underrepresentation for the parties above the threshold. the third reason is a sort of paradox. this election has shown a clearly distinct territorial pattern of disproportionality. in the north of the country 87% of the smd seats in the chamber were won by the centreright. in the south 83% of them were won instead by the m5s. in other words, the large disproportionality in favour of the centre-right in the north was almost entirely cancelled out by the large disproportionality in favour of the m5s in the south (see table 3), and vice versa. the loser in this game was the third main actor, i.e. the centre-left coalition, which used to be dominant in the four regions of the so-called ‘red belt’ of the country. this is no longer true, as this coalition won only 40% of the smd seats here. a mediocre performance in this area, combined with its abysmal performance in the north and in the south, left this coalition with a significant under-representation at the national level. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 15 table 2. overand under-representation of the main political actors (chamber of deputies and senate) coalitions/parties % votes % plurality seats % total seats dis-representation (a) (b) (c) (b) (a) (c) (a) chamber centre-right 37.0 47.8 42.1 +10.8 +5.1 m5s 32.7 40.1 36.0 +7.4 +3.3 centre-left 22.9 12.1 19.4 -10.8 -3.5 senate centre-right 37.5 50.0 43.5 +12.5 +6.0 m5s 32.2 37.9 35.6 +5.7 +3.4 centre-left 23.0 12.1 19.0 -10.9 -4.0 table 3. overand under-representation of the main political actors in each of the three geo-political areas of italy (chamber of deputies) coalitions/parties % votes % plurality seats % total seats dis-representation (a) (b) (c) (b) (a) (c) (a) north centre-right 44.2 86.8 62.6 +42.6 +18.4 m5s 23.7 4.4 16.8 -19.3 -6.9 centre-left 24.8 8.8 18.9 -16.0 -5.9 'red belt' centre-right 33.0 47.5 39.8 +14.5 +6.8 m5s 27.7 12.5 23.1 -15.2 -4.6 centre-left 30.6 40.0 35.2 +9.4 +4.6 south centre-right 31.8 12.9 25.7 -18.9 -6.1 m5s 43.4 83.2 59.2 +39.8 +15.8 centre-left 17.6 4.0 12.1 -13.6 -5.5 chiaramonte and d’alimonte, the new italian electoral system and its effects 16 3. a proportional system after all? not really the preceding analysis has shown that the impact of the new electoral system in terms of party representation tends to be more proportional than majoritarian. however, if we look at its overall performance the picture is mixed. after all, the smds are a potent tool and they have made a difference in terms of voting behaviour and pattern of competition. voters and parties have been affected by them, the latter more than the former, as parties have adapted better to the incentives of the new system. this has to do with strategic coordination (cox 1997). the clear evidence of strategic coordination by parties has been the building of pre-electoral coalitions. italy already experienced this type of coordination between 1994 and 2001 when the mattarella law was in place. the techniques for implementing this strategy were developed in that period. they included the selection of common coalition candidates, the ranking of smds in terms of electoral risk, and the proportional distribution of the common candidates among coalition members. these techniques were used with an electoral system that allocated three quarters of the seats by plurality rule in smds. they have been used again today with a system where the plurality rule applies to only one third of the seats. in other words, the smaller number of smds have still turned out to be a sufficient institutional incentive for parties to coordinate strategically. from the point of view of voters' behaviour, the impact of the smds has been more limited. on the one hand, a number of factors made it difficult for voters to vote strategically. the first was the lack of information on the candidates and on their relative competitiveness. the large size of the districts, particularly those for the senate, did not help7. the second, and most relevant, factor is the fused vote8. as we already explained, voters cannot vote for an smd candidate and for an unaffiliated party list. this feature constrains voters' behaviour. from a purely majoritarian perspective, a strategic calculation would lead voters not to vote for their preferred smd candidate who happens not to be competitive, but for the better liked candidate among those perceived as having a chance to win. this 'majoritarian' logic does not apply to our case, precisely because voting for an smd candidate and voting for a party list are not separate. in other words, in order to vote for their most preferred party list, voters might have to forego casting a strategic vote in their smd, the more so since the share of pr seats is twice that of smd seats. smds have had another kind of impact on the performance of the electoral system. it has to do with the nature of the pre-electoral coalitions and with their impact on the process of government formation. the point is that these coalitions have shaped the pattern of competition in a majoritarian fashion. that is to say that voters have cast their vote not only for a party, as they would do in a purely proportional arena, but also for a coalition since they perceived the two coalitions and the m5s as viable alternatives for government. party leaders themselves have fostered this perception, by emphasizing in their campaign the possibility that the coalitions or the m5s could have gained an absolute majority of the seats, being able, therefore, to form a cabinet. this expectation per se might have affected voters’ behaviour, giving them a reason to defect from parties 7 the average population of each smd was about 250,000 in the chamber and 500,000 in the senate. 8 by definition, a fused vote generates an effect of 'contamination' between the majoritarian and proportional logics. on the contamination effects in mixed electoral systems see chiaramonte (2005) and ferrara, herron and nishikawa (2005). who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 17 with no chance of winning at the national level. at this stage this is just a hypothesis. we will need data to check it, but it is a plausible hypothesis. last but not least, the existence of pre-electoral coalitions had a further effect which goes beyond the actual vote. the fact that parties presented them as potential government alternatives and that voters perceived them as such has consequences on the process of government formation. in a purely proportional context, after the vote parties are free to pursue whatever coalitional strategy suits their pursuit of office and policy. post-electoral coalitions are rarely conditioned by pre-electoral agreements. in the italian system it is not so. the agreements made for electoral purposes act, to a certain extent, as a constraint on possible post-electoral alliances aimed at forming a government. voters expect parties to abide by their promise to stay together after the vote. in the realm of democratic regimes accountability is not always taken into consideration by party leaders and in italy even less so. nevertheless, it is potentially risky not to respond to voters’ expectations. the cost associated with this risk does enter into strategic calculations by parties. this is precisely one of the reasons for the stalemate which characterized italian politics immediately after the march election. references baldini, g. (2011), the different trajectories of italian electoral reforms, in ‘west european politics’, vol. 34, n. 3, pp. 644−663. ceccarini, l. and bordignon, f. (2017), referendum on renzi: the 2016 vote on the italian constitutional revision, in ‘south european society and politics’, vol. 22, n. 3, pp. 281-302. chiaramonte, a. (2005), tra maggioritario e proporzionale. l’universo dei sistemi elettorali misti, bologna, il mulino. chiaramonte, a. (2015), the unfinished story of electoral reforms in italy, in ‘contemporary italian politics’, vol. 7, n. 1, pp. 10-26. cox, g.w. (1997), making votes count: strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems, cambridge, cambridge university press. d’alimonte, r. (2007), il nuovo sistema elettorale. dal collegio uninominale al premio di maggioranza, in r. d’alimonte and a. chiaramonte (eds.), proporzionale ma non solo. le elezioni politiche del 2006, bologna, il mulino, pp. 51-88. d’alimonte, r. and chiaramonte, a. [1995], il nuovo sistema elettorale italiano: le opportunità e le scelte, in s. bartolini and r. d'alimonte (eds.), maggioritario ma non troppo. le elezioni politiche del 1994, bologna, il mulino, pp. 37-81. di virgilio, a. (2007), la riforma elettorale della casa delle libertà alla prova del voto, in ‘polis’, vol. 21, pp. 119-146. ferrara, f.e., herron, s. and nishikawa, m. (2005), mixed electoral systems: contamination and its consequences, new york, palgrave macmillan. gallagher, m. (1991), proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems, in ‘electoral studies’, vol. 10, n. 1, pp. 33−51. gallagher, m. (1992), comparing proportional representation electoral systems: quotas, thresholds, paradoxes, and majorities, in ‘british journal of political science’, vol. 22, pp. 469-496. chiaramonte and d’alimonte, the new italian electoral system and its effects 18 giannetti, d. and grofman, b. (eds.) (2011), a natural experiment on electoral law reform: evaluating the long run consequences of 1990s electoral reform in italy and japan, new york, springer. katz, r.s. (2001), reforming the italian electoral law, 1993, in m. shugart and m. wattemberg (eds.), mixed-member electoral systems. the best of both worlds?, oxford, oxford university press, pp. 96−122. pasquino, g. [2007], tricks and treats: the 2005 italian electoral law and its consequences, in ‘south european society and politics’, vol. 12, pp. 79-93. pasquino, g. and valbruzzi, m. (2017), italy says no: the 2016 constitutional referendum and its consequences, in ‘journal of modern italian studies’, vol. 22, n. 2, pp. 145-162. renwick, a., hanretty, c. and hine, d. (2009), partisan self-interest and electoral reform: the new italian electoral law of 2005, in ‘electoral studies’ vol. 28, n. 3, pp. 437−447. italian political science, volume 17 issue 1 published in 2022 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 17, issue 1, 1–15. contact author: simona piattoni, university of trento e-mail address: simona.piattoni@unitn.it beyond italian exceptionalism? the ‘critical’ eighteenth legislature simona piattoni guest editor, university of trento marco valbruzzi guest editor, university of naples federico ii abstract italy’s eighteenth legislative term stands out as particularly idiosyncratic throughout italian history. over the course of this term, three governments with varying political orientations came into power, relying on parliamentary votes that shifted between the right, left, and centre. in this article, we aim to highlight these peculiarities and explore whether they indicate a further complexification of italy’s already intricate governmental history, or if they instead reflect issues that are prevalent in most western democracies. in addition to briefly presenting the articles included in the special issue, in the last section the article will attempt to take stock of the eighteenth legislature, analyzing its legacy for the italian political system and trying to identify those factors that are bound to characterize italian politics in the future as well. 1. introduction taly’s eighteenth republican legislative term could rightfully be considered the most eccentric of a series of rather peculiar italian republican legislatures. three governments of rather different political orientation succeeded each other, finding their legitimation in parliamentary votes that fluctuated from right to left to center. in this introduction, we highlight some of these oddities and discuss whether they signal a further complexification of the already rather complex governmental history of the country, or rather reveal problems that are common to most western democracies. we further wonder whether, as is often the case, the most extreme manifestation of an event occurs when the causes underlying it are already on the wane, and we therefore must expect a ‘normalization’ of italian politics from now on. italy is known in the literature for having had a record number of governments succeeding one another during its republican phase, from 1948 onward (cotta and verzichelli 2007; pasquino 2019). up to six different governments were formed and voted down during the second, fifth and seventh legislatures, marking the zenith of the exceptional governmental instability of what is commonly denoted as the ‘first italian republic’ (1948-1992) (though see mershon 2002 for an interesting contrast between high governmental instability and surprising continuity in governmental personnel). the ‘second italian republic’ (from 1993 onward, though it is debated whether we had i beyond italian exceptionalism? 2 already entered a third and perhaps even a fourth republican period, see tebaldi 2022) was instead marked by relatively greater governmental stability, with an average of fewer than three governments per legislature, but by an increasing diversity in government composition and greater innovativeness in the way government majorities were formed and held together. in addition to the fourth ‘technical government’ led by mario draghi (after those led by carlo azeglio ciampi, lamberto dini and mario monti during the eleventh, twelfth and sixteenth legislative terms), in the eighteenth term we witnessed the alternation in government of majorities of rather different (if not opposite) orientations, the first two led by the same prime minister (conte i and conte ii governments), who was, to some extent, at least initially, also a non-politician! the alternation between political and technocratic governments has characterized the italian political system since the early 1990s, when two significant changes occurred: the ‘political earthquake’ brought about by the clean hands investigations (gilbert 1995) and the decision, at maastricht, to create a common currency and, therefore, the need for italy to commit to fiscal stabilization. the decision to progressively disentangle monetary decisions from the needs of the italian government to finance its debt had been made well before maastricht (the famous ‘divorce’ of the bank of italy from the treasury occurred in 1982 and became a reference case study, epstein and schor 1986) but after maastricht what had initially been a recalibration of public debt seniority and a mild check on public deficits became an absolute imperative. the ‘external constraint’ – which was supposed to force italian authorities down a virtuous fiscal path (ferrera and gualmini 1999) – dates from this period. it is this imperative that has motivated the periodic formation of technocrat-led governments capable of imposing much needed but much dreaded sacrifices onto an electorate on whose support they did not depend. in this special issue we ask ourselves whether the peculiarity of italian politics further accelerated during the eighteenth legislature, reaching unprecedented levels even by italian standards or rather the long search for governmental stability has been so affected by the exceptional circumstances that have characterized the last thirty years – particularly the euro and covid crises, not to mention the migration and the ukrainian war crises – that even the apparent ‘normalization’ of italian politics, with different majorities alternating in government between the twelfth and seventeenth legislatures, has been once more postponed and high-jacked. we further wonder whether the long-coveted ‘normalization’ of italian politics is now on the horizon. we contend that the unique developments of italian politics during the eighteenth legislature reveal tensions and problems that are in fact common to many european and non-european democracies during these turbulent times, and expose the difficulties of these democracies to govern in times of heightened interdependence. 2. the long quest for governmental stability perhaps the most distinctive trait of post-war italian politics is the accentuated instability of its governmental majorities. remedying such instability has been the goal of many electoral reforms and the object of endless expert debates, particularly after the demise of the so-called ‘first italian republic’ (d’alimonte 2005; ceccanti and vassallo 2004). governmental instability was initially attributed to the extreme polarization of italian piattoni and valbruzzi 3 politics, which forced governments to be formed by litigious coalitions under the fractious leadership of christian democracy (dc) – a predicament that was described by giovanni sartori as ‘polarized pluralism’ (sartori 1976). these traits pre-empted the formation of alternative coalitions, a situation dubbed by giorgio galli ‘imperfect bipartyism’ (galli 1966). according to both, the italian political system appeared immune to the process of normalization that characterized other political systems and that allowed elsewhere a peaceful alternation in government between coalitions of different colorations. only france and finland appeared as polarized and as resistant to normalization, according to sartori (1982). situated at the centre of a party system traversed by centrifugal forces, christian democracy (dc) was at the same time the headstone of many italian governments and the cause of their inner brittleness. unchallenged by alternative coalitions, christian democracy’s internal factions could freely vie for governmental jobs and other plum positions, thus lending extreme instability to governmental majorities often identical to one another in all but the minutest compositional details (venditti 1981). as is known, this situation became increasingly untenable, and was the cause of lavish disbursements of public funds to keep this or that political clientele happy (lapalombara 1964; pritoni 2017). from the 1980s onward, christian democracy was increasingly challenged by new formations: the rejuvenated and modernized italian socialist party (psi) under the leadership of bettino craxi, the various ethno-regionalist parties that later federated into the lega nord (ln) (diamanti 1996; biorcio 2010), and an italian communist party (pci) that managed to wean itself from the tutelage of the soviet union and to attract increasing numbers of young voters because of its capacity to govern well at the regional and municipal levels. the breaking point came, at the beginning of the 1990s, with the ‘clean hands’ investigations that caused the almost complete disappearance of the historical post-war parties, dc and psi (cafagna 2012), the troubled transformation of the pci into partito democratico della sinistra (pds) (ignazi 1992), then democratici di sinistra (ds) and finally partito democratico (pd), the re-foundation of the old neo-fascist party, movimento sociale italiano (msi), into a post-fascist party called alleanza nazionale (an) (ignazi 2023), and the emergence of a brand-new party, berlusconi’s forza italia (fi) (ignazi 2014). these – fi, an, lega nord and pds – were the main parties that characterized the ‘second italian republic’ between 1993 and 2013. during this period, italy experienced a certain process of bipolarization, but the brittleness of italian governments was far from over. rather patchy and litigious coalitions managed to alternate in government, without, however, stabilizing the italian political system (verzichelli and cotta 2000; pasquino and valbruzzi 2011). so, just when all political novelties seemed to have been exhausted, two new developments marked the further evolution of the italian political system: the emergence of a populist movement – the five star movement (fsm) – under the dual leadership and inspiration of comedian beppe grillo and computer guru gianroberto casaleggio (campus et al. 2021; tronconi 2015; corbetta 2018), and the renaming of the post-fascist party an as fratelli d’italia (fdi) (vassallo and vignati 2023). a further development was the attempt of the lega nord to extend its leadership beyond its northern strongholds and the consequent shedding of its label of the geographical qualifier, becoming now simply the lega (albertazzi et al. 2018). beyond italian exceptionalism? 4 handmaidens of these party system transformations were a series of electoral reforms, each inspired by the attempt to make the formation of governmental coalitions more immediately dependent on electoral results and, therefore, hopefully more stable (bartolini and d’alimonte 1995; d’alimonte and fusaro 2008). the two camps or poles (the ‘people of liberties’ on the center-right and the ‘popular democrats’ on the center-left) made timid attempts to legitimize each other and thus ease the normalization of italian democracy between roughly 1993 and 2013, without much success (ieraci 2013). a series of crises stalled this process and revealed the precariousness of this attempt. the increasing frequency with which, between 1993 and 2022, political governments were replaced by ‘technocratic governments’ (mcdonnell and valbruzzi 2014) is testimony to the difficulty of electing ‘responsive and responsible’ governments (mair 2013) in a context of heightened interdependence and during increasingly turbulent times. it is probably the perception of the italian electorate that, no matter how hard political parties tried to establish the appearance of a responsive party or coalition government, contextual circumstances and previous international agreements limited their space for manoeuver, which sealed the period of bipolarism. this outcome was most certainly the effect of the financial turbulence unleashed by the us subprime crisis (2007-08), which in turn triggered an international financial crisis and eventually the euro crisis (2009-2015) that particularly enveloped the more exposed economies – greece, ireland, spain, portugal, cyprus and italy – of the eurozone (morlino and raniolo 2017). the austerity measures enforced by the ecb and the european council from 2010 cut deep into the flesh of a country like italy that had already made a sustained effort, since 1992, to reduce its public debt and thus become eligible to adopt the euro from its inception. the perception among italian voters that their economic sovereignty was severely limited by commitments made in the past (the maastricht criteria) and even more by commitments imposed by the other partners during the crisis (suffice to mention the fiscal compact that italy had to underwrite in 2012 and the strengthening of stability and growth pact rules in 2011 and 2013) fostered growing criticism, and sometimes veritable skepticism, vis-à-vis the process of european integration (cotta and isernia 2021). these perceptions were compounded by the migrant crisis that erupted in 2014, caused by the growing inflow of illegal immigrants from northern africa and by the feeling of being left alone to face this new emergency by outdated dublin accords that no other member state had a real interest in revising. perceptions of reduced economic sovereignty and of inexistent or reluctant solidarity between member states (basile et al. 2021) ultimately fanned the winds of populism that grew in italy as well as in many other countries. it would be hard to find a european (and non-european) country in which populist or nationalist parties did not achieve substantial electoral successes in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, managing to conquer governmental power at the regional level (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2015; pappas 2019; zulianello 2019). disillusioned by many rounds of electoral reforms (1993, 2001, 2005) that had not managed to stabilize the political system and had not given back that ‘control’ that had supposedly escaped them since the creation of the euro, italian voters have been perhaps more disposed than other piattoni and valbruzzi 5 national electorates to give credit to new formations and to shift their support from one party or coalition to another. the frustration may have been further intensified by the awareness that other, more structural problems of the italian political system did not seem to find any durable solution. among these, the prolonged weakness of the italian economy (notermans and piattoni 2020), the enfeeblement of the italian public health system due to painful and repeated cuts to welfare provisions that further exacerbated existing inequalities (franzini and raitano 2018), and the neverresolved issue of a bureaucracy apparently incapable of overseeing the speedy and efficient use of public resources to promote growth and territorial cohesion (di mascio and natalini 2018; polverari and piattoni 2022). 3. the exceptional eighteenth legislature: the apex of italian exceptionalism? the developments described above came to a head during the eighteenth legislature and are well documented by the articles of this special issue. all share a common longitudinal comparative perspective, although the authors were free to focus on the aspects that they felt were more relevant. as much as the last legislature was indeed exceptional in several respects, it is nevertheless the result of some long-term factors that have characterized italian political development. the comparative diachronic perspective here adopted allows us to analyze the structural factors that have conditioned the evolution of the italian political system, in conjunction with some more contingent elements, such as exogenous shocks and the different crises of various kinds, that have recently hit italy (along with other countries). from this analytical perspective, the article by luca pinto, which is devoted to the analysis of (frequent and increasing) party switching in the last legislature, shows how the highly unstructured or fluid nature of the italian party system ended up conditioning not only the relations between parties and voters at election times, but also the parliamentary dynamics themselves (pinto, 2022). indeed, the period between two elections has itself become a powerful generator of party fragmentation and systemic deinstitutionalization, with micro-parties, often of a personalistic nature (calise 2010), arising from within the legislative assembly and then seeking electoral support – a phenomenon that distorts electoral responsiveness and obfuscates the mechanism of democratic accountability. what is more, the phenomenon of party switching and the related creation of new parties of exclusively parliamentary origin directly affect the recurring fluctuations of the electoral market observed on the demand side. this means that supply-induced fragmentation (generated from within the legislative arena) has an impact on the level of electoral volatility, thus creating a downward spiral of party system deconsolidation. however, beyond the enduring deinstitutionalization of the party system [chiaramonte and emanuele 2021], another long-term element observed in the eighteenth legislature was the willingness of voters to change their political preferences and behaviors. in this respect, nicola maggini and cristiano vezzoni (2022) note the presence of what they term in their article ‘multiple availabilities’ on the demand side of the electoral market. voters are willing to change their political choices in relatively short periods of time – all the more so, given that during a relatively short timeframe there have been at least three major crises, from the great recession to the covid-19 beyond italian exceptionalism? 6 pandemic, to the recent international crisis triggered by the russian invasion of ukraine, capable of changing the structure of italian voters’ preferences. however, in the face of the great fluidity of the italian electoral and party landscape, the analysis conducted by maggini and vezzoni reveals the existence of another long-term factor in the italian political system, namely, the greater cohesion or overlap of the centerright electorate compared to the more divided center-left electorate. this is a feature that was further reinforced during the course of the eighteenth legislature and that led, in the 2022 parliamentary elections, to the emergence of that ‘asymmetric bipolarism’ (vassallo and verzichelli 2023) – or ‘imperfect bipolarism’ to echo an older expression already mentioned (galli 1967) – that is neatly unbalanced in favor of the center-right coalition. the exceptionalism of the eighteenth legislature is even more pronounced if one interprets this phase as a synthesis of the political events of the entire ‘second italian republic’ inaugurated in 1993. on the one hand, as highlighted above, the crumbling of the party system and the level of electoral volatility have been taken to extremes. on the other hand, what was once, especially during the first republican phase, party government ‘italian-style’ (lapalombara 1987) has been gradually replaced by governments led by populist forces or technocratic figures. indeed, the last cabinets supported by traditional mass-based parties in the early 1990s were followed, in 1993, by the technocratic government led by carlo azeglio ciampi, and in the following decades, at different intervals, governments led by or composed largely of populist leaders were followed by other technocratic governments (such as the one headed by mario monti between 2011 and 2013). this kind of atypical alternation between populism and technocracy (which, in mair’s terms, we could describe as fluctuation between phases of ‘irresponsible responsiveness’ and ‘unresponsive responsibility’) found its ultimate synthesis precisely in the eighteenth legislature. this began with a government composed for the first time entirely of populist parties (valbruzzi 2018) and ended with a cabinet led by the emblem of all european technocrats, former ecb president mario draghi (garzia and karremans 2021). despite these pendulum swings between populism and technocracy, the three governments formed during the eighteenth legislature showed some trends in the formation of cabinets and the choice of individual ministers similar to past decades. in particular, as andrea pedrazzani and michelangelo vercesi’s (2022) analysis regarding the patterns of reselection and promotion of ministers shows, more than individual factors (such as gender) or structural factors (such as the prestige of the ministerial office or the party size), what counts in the composition of the ministerial team is the previous political experience of the would-be rulers. this confirms a long-standing trend in the italian political system, namely that of ‘decentralized personalization’ within cabinets, where greater weight is carried by individual ministers with their respective personal political followings than by other more objective features. it is worth stressing that this is a form of decentralized personalization which, as balmas et al. (2014, 37) note, may go hand in hand with that form of ‘centralized personalization’, also commonly known as ‘presidentialization’ (poguntke and webb 2005), that has steadily characterized italian politics and its executives for more than three decades. piattoni and valbruzzi 7 if we now move from the level of politics to the level of policies, we once again observe signs of innovation introduced by the three governments of the eighteenth legislature, which, however, had to come to terms with some structural features of the italian political system. this description applies in particular to the reforms introduced in the italian welfare state, analyzed in great detail by igor guardiancich, ilaria madama and marcello natili (2022). the article investigates the extent to which the social policies adopted by the governments of the eighteenth legislature represent a substantial break with the previous institutional legacy, also in light of a rapidly changing socio-economic context, affected since 2020 by the dramatic covid-19 health emergency and its consequences. in the face of what the authors describe as a ‘frozen landscape’ (guardiancich et al. 2023, 76), with a welfare state long characterized by distinctive functional and distributive distortions, some new measures were introduced between 2018 and 2022 that can indeed be interpreted as ‘path-departing reforms’. we refer especially to those reforms enacted in less costly and institutionalized policy fields, where there was the potential to expand social protection onto previously neglected (and politically weak or dispersed) constituencies (the poor, families, etc.). among these were anti-poverty measures (starting with the reddito di cittadinanza), which finally overcame one of the main weaknesses of the italian welfare state, that is, the lack of a safety net guaranteeing income protection to all poor (italian) individuals, and some pro-family policies, such as the introduction of the single universal allowance and some significant investments in other childcare services. however, alongside these policy innovations that involved a recalibration of the italian welfare state and reduced some historical distortions, in other areas – such as pensions and the labor market – path-dependency ended up prevailing, through the introduction of reforms that strengthened the traditional italian approach to welfare, prioritizing pensions by means of well-established insider-biased policies (as in the case of quota 100). it is important to note that many of the reforms introduced in the social welfare sector have occurred primarily in the wake of, or as a response to, exogenous factors, such as the pandemic outbreak, that opened unexpected windows of opportunity for changing the status quo. however, while these external shocks triggered a reform process in some areas of welfare, the same cannot be said for the modernization of italy’s public administration. as fabrizio di mascio, alessandro natalini and stefania profeti show in their article, beyond the populist rhetoric about the need for radical changes in the structure of public administration, the two governments led by giuseppe conte were characterized by a substantial ‘decoupling of talk and action on the issue of administrative reform’ (di mascio et al. 2022, 102). this means that once they came to government, populist parties quickly adapted to the previous situation, leaving the overall structure of the bureaucratic apparatus unchanged, without ‘any significant reform efforts in two key areas that are typically targeted by populist parties in government that aim to “dismantle” or “capture” the state, namely the appointment of senior civil servants and the reorganization of the state apparatus’ (di mascio et al. 2022, 102). italian public administration thus confirmed its traditional, decades-long resistance to change despite the many efforts to remedy its well-known ‘backwardness’ (fabbrini 2013, 428) and the need for its modernization. what is even more significant beyond italian exceptionalism? 8 is that the veto power of the italian public administration remained basically intact even after the arrival of the draghi government and the acceptance of the absolute priority, so strongly emphasized by the new supranational governance, to implement some badly needed ‘structural reforms’ (among them also the overhaul of legal procedures with the aim of shortening the length of civil litigation) before the funds of the national recovery and resilience plan (nrrp) could be released. although the salience of administrative reforms as an enabling factor for the implementation of the nrrp did indeed grow in the latter part of the legislature, the policies adopted ‘can be qualified as loosely interconnected and piecemeal’ (di mascio et al. 2022, 101) rather than as a set of consistent interventions capable of profoundly transforming the structure and functioning of the italian public administration. finally, the last factor that is now structural to italian politics is an increasing integration with the supranational political arena, represented by the european union (eu). long considered by both experts and politicians as an ‘external constraint’ (dyson and featherstone 2007) capable of conditioning public policies in italy and pushing the country in the direction of greater ‘responsibility’ in the area of fiscal policies, after the covid-19 pandemic and in response to the subsequent economic crisis, the eu has progressively loosened its austerity measures putting in place ‘interventionist’ public policies and economic support for the countries severely affected by the crisis. this ‘new social europe’, no longer viewed as an ‘austere stepmother’ but rather as a ‘caring mother’, caught the italian governments of the eighteenth legislature off guard, starting with those composed mostly of populist parties. it is precisely the changed relationships between the eu’s supranational institutions and the italian governments of the eighteenth legislature that are the focus of the article by roberto di quirico (2022). in particular, he highlights the policy u-turn of the conte i government, which began on vaguely euroskeptic positions and then gradually became absorbed by the mechanisms and constraints of european governance. in the reconstruction provided by di quirico, the three cabinets formed during the eighteenth legislative term depict the three stages of gradual rapprochement between the two decision-making arenas, i.e. the national and the supranational: from the ‘challenging the eu’ approach adopted by the first conte government, through the intermediate stage of ‘begging the eu’ by the second conte government amid the pandemic, and then ended with the ‘pleasing the eu’ stage with the government led by mario draghi, created to foster a more effective implementation of the nrrp. this historical reconstruction reveals at least two noteworthy aspects. first, despite the anti-system and anti-establishment charge of the populist actors, la force tranquille of the eu’s supranational institutions has shown itself capable of absorbing internally the challenges coming from some member states and progressively including them in the complex, accommodating governance of the eu. second, european institutions can no longer be viewed, somewhat narrowly, simply as an ‘external constraint’ on national political systems. the eu should increasingly be seen and studied, particularly in light of the effects of the pandemic and then the russian attack on ukraine, as an essential component of a sui generis multilevel political system capable of conditioning both the political dynamics and policy choices of individual member states. as far as italy is concerned, this complex multilevel governance emerged profoundly changed during the piattoni and valbruzzi 9 course of the eighteenth legislature: above and beyond the changes of government triggered by general elections, the national executives formed in the future will inevitably have come to terms with this. 4. where is the italian political system going? the legacy of the eighteenth legislature what is ultimately the political and institutional legacy of the eighteenth legislature? or at least what lessons can be learned for the present and future of the italian political system? in our view, there are at least four lessons that are worth bearing in mind. the first lesson is that the italian political system, despite its continued deinstitutionalization (or perhaps because of it), is still capable of absorbing both internal and external challenges. regarding the domestic challenges, italian liberal democracy has indeed managed to integrate in the system some political parties that entered the scene with a strong anti-systemic connotation and upholding ideals – such as binding online direct consultation with party members or the introduction of the imperative mandate for members of parliament1 – that are at odds with the principles of representative democracy. in the italian case, unlike in many other european political systems, populist parties did not limit themselves to gaining representation in the legislative assemblies, but impetuously crossed the ‘threshold of executive power’ (rokkan 1970), conquering and dominating governmental offices. nevertheless, the institutions of representative democracy, on the one hand, have facilitated the reduction of political polarization produced by the breakthrough of populism and, on the other hand, have enabled the transformation of anti-system political actors into stable (and essentially loyal) components of the political system. all this happened in the space of not even a decade, moreover in an international context characterized by profound upheavals. as for the external challenges to which italian democracy has been exposed, they have been numerous, unforeseen, of different kinds (economic, health, diplomatic, etc.) and requiring timely reactions by political institutions. we refer not only to the longterm consequences of the great recession, but especially to the health emergency due to the spread of covid-19, the subsequent economic difficulties that emerged in international markets, and, finally, the war that broke out in the heart of europe between russia and ukraine, again with significant socio-economic consequences for italy. many analysts, pundits and scholars feared that democracies, starting with the most fragile and least consolidated ones, might weaken to the point of collapse (levitsky and ziblatt 2018; mounk and foa 2016; bartels 2023). instead, as far as the italian case is concerned, despite various forms of protest and some signs of disaffection toward institutions and political actors, the political system has been able to react promptly, avoiding or limiting some possible excesses (such as, for example, the expansion of powers for the head of the government during a prolonged state of emergency). thus, despite obvious difficulties, 1 this was, at least, the original ambition. the actual use of this instrument revealed strong manipulative behavior on the part of the party leaders, with the dominance of top-down over bottom-up, inclusive processes of decision-making. this eventually led to the emergence of that form of plebiscitarian ‘reactive democracy’ (gerbaudo 2021) in which members were simply called upon to ratify decisions already made by leadership. beyond italian exceptionalism? 10 italian democracy, with its fluid party system, still passed the stress test of a literally ‘critical legislature’. the second lesson is institutional in nature and concerns, precisely, the functioning and quality of italian political institutions. despite a constitutional framework constantly under criticism, with an institutional transition that opened in the early 1990s and that no one seems able, or willing, to conclude, the italian political system nevertheless seems to have found its own way of functioning, through mechanisms and safety valves of internal self-regulation. as discussed above, italy is the only country in western europe that, after the demise of its mass-based parties, gave birth to a strange form of alternation between populisms and technocratic governments – that is, of cycles of varying duration in which total electoral responsiveness was followed by phases of complete institutional responsibility, a bit like a dog chasing its own tail (bickerton and invernizzi accetti 2021). if in the first republican phase it was the mass bureaucratic parties that ensured some sort of balance between responsiveness and responsibility, in the next phase the balance was produced only in cyclical form: populist waves created the conditions for the arrival of technocrats without direct electoral legitimacy who, in turn, fueled forms of protest against the establishment. from this perspective, the events and cabinets of the eighteenth legislature have been the epitome of this new, all-italian, cyclical balance between phases of irresponsible responsiveness and unresponsive responsibility: during the eighteenth legislature, in particular, from a government born ventilating the specter of an ‘italexit’, italy ended up with a cabinet led by a pro-european technocrat supported, albeit unwillingly, also by populist parties. it should be added, moreover, that the italian political system has also been able to rely, as a rebalancing mechanism, on the flexibility granted by its parliamentary regime and, in particular, by the figure of the head of state, often described by jurists as ‘the most enigmatic and elusive among the public offices provided for in the constitution’ (paladin 1986, 165). to a significant extent, the cabinet instability that continues to characterize the italian political system has been counterbalanced by the figure of the president of the republic, a factor of institutional stability and continuity. it is not by chance that, during the last legislature, we witnessed the reiteration of what in 2013 (with the re-election of giorgio napolitano) was considered an absolute exception. indeed, the re-election of sergio mattarella to the presidency of the republic in 2022, in the face of a possible political stalemate, confirms the growing centrality of the head of state in the italian institutional setting, transforming a neutral political figure into a political actor who is increasingly vested with formal and informal political powers to guarantee the stability of the political system. in addition to the role of the head of state as a balancing factor, the eighteenth legislature also showed the growing relevance of the european union, including for domestic policy decision-making – the third lesson that we can draw from our analysis. after years of growing criticism of, and opposition to, supranational institutions, characterized by a shift from the initial ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’ (hooghe and marks 2009) toward the increasingly complex workings of european governance, the italian political system seems to have come to terms with the importance and centrality of the european anchoring, especially as a factor of institutional and democratic piattoni and valbruzzi 11 stability. the eu has enabled italy to include in its complex multilevel decision-making process even those actors – such as the lega and fsm – that had initially placed themselves in an openly euroskeptic position, transforming an opposition of principle to the eu polity into a critique of eu policies. the italian political system’s ability to absorb challenges arising from the international context was further aided by transformations in the eu’s own approach to economic policy. in contrast to the 2009 sovereign debt crisis, which was tackled by european institutions with policies of fiscal and social austerity, the approach shown in the aftermath of the pandemic emergency and the war in ukraine was the opposite. on these occasions, the eu showed a willingness to create and share its own resources, finance investments, and even absorb debts incurred during the pandemic with innovative instruments. from this point of view, therefore, after the eighteenth legislature italy's anchoring to the european union is even firmer, and whatever government may come in the future, including a government dominated by ‘sovereigntist or ‘neo-nationalist’ rhetoric, it will not be able to question this link. finally, the fourth and last lesson we can draw from such a ‘critical legislature’ concerns the long-lasting debate over the institutional transition that began in the italian political system at the dawn of the 1990s in an attempt to transform a consociational democracy based on proportional representation into a westminster-style, adversarial model of democratic government based on a quasi-majoritarian electoral system. a season of attempts at ‘major reforms’ (grandi riforme), that is, systemic interventions in the political regime and the distribution of powers between the central government and the regions, came definitely to an end during the eighteenth legislature. the only institutional reform that was approved during the period was the reduction (by one-third) of the number of parliamentarians of both chambers. this reform, as it was later realized, served more to give rhetorical answers to the anti-political sentiments of italian society than to effectively improve the performance of the italian political system. thus, any hypothesis of comprehensive reform of the italian institutional setting, capable of bringing the italian transition to a conclusion, is now scarcely credible. at most, as observed at the opening of the current nineteenth legislature, sectoral or limited institutional reforms may be explored, with a piecemeal approach and with low or no level of systematicity. this is the case, for instance, of reforms granting ‘differentiated autonomy’ to the regions or bestowing greater powers on the executive or the head of government/state.2 in any case, these reforms, however daring, will meet fierce opposition from all those that have come to appreciate the balancing effect of a political system that is held together by many checks and balances. although some of these reforms might constitute a breakthrough in the long italian institutional transition, they might not lead to desirable conclusions, not least because, as the events of the eighteenth legislature have well 2 naturally, it is still too early to evaluate the proposals for reforming the form of government put forward by the current executive led by giorgia meloni. however, both presidentialism and the so-called ‘elective premiership’ model (adopted only by israel in the late 1990s and then quickly abandoned) do not seem to be able to solve the problems of the italian political system, which concern political parties much more than political institutions. moreover, both 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(2019). “varieties of populist parties and party systems in europe: from stateof-the-art to the application of a novel classification scheme to 66 parties in 33 countries”, government and opposition, 55 (2): 327-347. abstract italy’s eighteenth legislative term stands out as particularly idiosyncratic throughout italian history. over the course of this term, three governments with varying political orientations came into power, relying on parliamentary votes that shifted between the right, left, and centre. in this article, we aim to highlight these peculiarities and explore whether they indicate a further complexification of italy’s already intricate governmental history, or if they instead reflect issues that are prevalent in most western democracies. in addition to briefly presenting the articles included in the special issue, in the last section the article will attempt to take stock of the eighteenth legislature, analyzing its legacy for the italian political system and trying to identify those factors that are bound to characterize italian politics in the future as well. 1. introduction 2. the long quest for governmental stability 3. the exceptional eighteenth legislature: the apex ofitalian exceptionalism? 4. where is the italian political system going?the legacy of the eighteenth legislature references microsoft word ev_181_maritato.docx italian political science, volume x issue x published in 2023 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume x, issue x, x–x. contact author: chiara maritato e-mail address: chiara.maritato@unito.it diaspora governance in times of covid-19: the case of the turkish diyanet in italy chiara maritato university of turin gül ince-beqo university of urbino abstract since the covid-19 emergency broke out, turkish state institutions have become crucial in governing diaspora communities facing lockdown measures and forced separation from their homeland. being the first european country strongly affected by covid-19, where massive lockdown measures were put in place, italy is a relevant case to analyze. retracing the scope and scale of the online activities organized during the covid-19 pandemic, this paper investigates how the turkish state supported the turkey-originated population living in italy. the analysis draws on interviews with diyanet religious officers sent from ankara to serve the diyanet’s branches (ditib) in different italian cities and with the religious attaché employed in the turkish consulate in milan who supervises them. the interviews have been corroborated by a vast collection of visual materials including brochures, videos and posters published on the youtube channel and the official facebook pages of the ditib cultural centers in italy. our data show that, during the covid-19 pandemic, online seminars enabled turkey’s connection with the diaspora to be strengthened, using the emergency situation as a starting point for enhancing family programs and fostering muslim-turkish belonging in all aspects of life. 1. introduction he presidency of religious affairs (diyanet i̇şleri başkanlığı, hereinafter diyanet) is one of the longest-running turkish state agencies operating abroad. the institution, founded in 1924, established a department for international relations in 1985, one year after the “turkish-islamic union for religious affairs” (ditib) opened its branch in germany. over the past decades, imams and preachers have been attached to the diyanet mosques in sweden, france, denmark, austria and the netherlands to provide religious services and carry out socio-cultural activities for the adults and young generations of turkey-originated muslim communities. while the diyanet rapidly turned into a transnational actor and a key diaspora institution (sunier and landman 2014; çitak 2013; allievi and nielsen 2003), it has also contributed to the turkish state’s double strategy of both “maintenance” (amiraux 2002) – strengthening the link with “its” diaspora – and control of religious and political opposition activities abroad (yükleyen 2011). during two decades of justice and development party (adalet ve kalkınma partisi, akp) rule, the turkish government’s diaspora policy and diyanet’s international mission have been closely intertwined. this transformation mirrored a larger reincorporation of sunni islam into the official state ideology, as well as the renewed presence of religion as a public affair by means of a complete reorganization of the diyanet, whose budget and t diaspora governance in times of covid-19 2 responsibilities have expanded (yener-roderburg 2020; öztürk 2016; maritato 2018a; lord 2018). the number of diyanet cadres (imams, preachers and religious officers) sent abroad has increased and their competences have been redefined, including a uniformization of the tasks and competences. in 2019, according to the diyanet’s official statistics, 1931 of its religious officers were serving abroad for either a long period (up to 5 years) or a short one (up to 2 years). these religious services are under the supervision of turkish embassies and consulates, where the religious attachés (din ataşesi) are charged with coordinating the activities carried out in the country’s mosques. since the early 2000s, concomitant with the increase in women employed in the diyanet workforce, women preachers have also been included among the contingent to serve turkish muslim communities abroad with the intention of reaching families and young generations. scholars have recently investigated the forms and meanings of the activities conducted in diyanet mosques located in germany (carol and hofheinz 2022; öcal and gökarıksel 2022), sweden (maritato 2018b), austria (maritato 2021, çitak 2013), france (çitak 2010; bruce 2012; akgönül 2018) and denmark (öztürk and sözeri 2018) and emphasized the continuities and changes in turkey’s art of governing its diaspora. against this backdrop, italy has hitherto been understudied, for two main reasons. the first lies in the peripheral position of the country in turkish labor migration trajectories. the second is the relatively small numbers of turkey-originated communities settled in the country (officially 21,000)1 if compared to other migrant communities. however, the turkish-islamic union for religious affairs opened a branch in italy (ditib italya) in 2013 and, like the other ditib union in european countries, the italian one has recently expanded its activities. at present, cultural centers have been established in five northern italian cities: milan, como, modena, imperia, and venice. the ditib coordinates and supervises these local branches, whose objectives include the promotion of the socio-cultural activities of turkish communities in italy, the management of the places where the communities meet and the organization of activities such as italian and turkish language courses, social events on the occasion of religious feasts and national celebrations, and activities for young generations, women and families such as the offices for family counseling. this engagement has also occurred within the framework of a redefinition of consulate services showing proximity and availability vis-à-vis migrants’ associations. such an “empathetic” approach (öktem 2014) has characterized the akp’s populistic narrative of the state serving the people and establishing an “equal” relationship between officers and citizens. with the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic in february 2020, the attempt of the turkish state institutions to be close to the people became crucial in governing diaspora communities facing lockdown measures and forced separation from the homeland. as italy was among the first countries where massive lockdown measures were put in place, the ditib coordinated all the local branches to provide online activities to support the turkeyoriginated population living in italy. it is thus an interesting case study from which to investigate how state-sponsored diaspora institutions contribute to governing the diaspora. the paper draws on qualitative research on how covid-19 has affected the activities of state-related diaspora organizations. it stems from the following questions: how have the lockdowns measures in italy affected the diyanet association’s activities towards the 1 istat, as of 31 december 2021. maritato and ince-beqo 3 turkish diaspora? and what does this say about the ongoing transformation of turkey’s diaspora governance? it contends that while most activities provided by the ditib branches were online, the state institution assumed a new proximity with the diasporic communities, providing both religious and moral support in an unprecedented situation. the paper is organized as follows: the first section illustrates the theoretical framework focusing on the role of religious institutions in diaspora governance. the second provides a focus on the akp’s understanding of diaspora policy and how it has evolved to reach citizens living abroad. subsequently, attention will be paid to the italian context and the research methodology. the analysis is then divided into three subsections which examine how, during covid-19 pandemic, the ditib associations in italy (i) referred to islamic principles to provide moral support to the communities while re-organizing activities aimed at reaching people at home, (ii) conducted online seminars which grew in scope and scale to include as many people as possible during severe lockdown measures and (iii) maintain and reinforce the communities’ link and sense of belonging to turkey. the examination of such an attempt to establish a new proximity with the diaspora communities casts light on a broader transformation of turkey’s diaspora governance. 2. the contribution of transnational religious actors and institutions in diaspora governance: theoretical premises since the 1990s, a vast literature has emphasized the increasing visibility of diasporas in global politics. scholars’ attention has been mainly devoted to investigating the contribution of states in building and governing their “domestic abroad” (varadarajan 2010). this has mainly occurred via ad hoc institutions, policies, and bureaucratic apparatuses through which nation-states maintain political, economic, and identity ties with their respective communities abroad (gamlen 2014). the role of the state in shaping, manipulating, and building identities is a continuous process that transcends the borders of the state and creates new political actors, such as the diasporic and kin communities. diasporas as subjects of an expanded, territorially diffused nation have also been analyzed to stress how these new constituencies affect international relations and are strategically employed to propagate states’ images and reputations (korkut 2016). a stream of literature has examined the policies and instruments through which diasporas are governed and how they shape boundaries of belonging (ragazzi 2009; délano and gamlen 2014; alonso and mylonas 2019; lafleur and yener-roderburg 2022). in this vein, the study of governmentality and its transnationalization contributes to diaspora studies, casting light on the ways states resort to a symbolic control of transnational space and a discursive control of imaginative space given the impossibility of directing physical discipline (collyer and king 2014:194-9). besides institutions and policies, states resort to “creative forms” and “symbolic instruments” to manage their citizens abroad, preserve their national loyalty, and, if possible, extract resources from them (fitzgerald 2008:34-5). against this backdrop, transnational religious actors and institutions have been examined to reflect on socio-political structures within which individuals “belong” to communities or are excluded therefrom. the role of imams and priests sent to diaspora communities has expanded and diversified the literature on diaspora governance beyond the research on more “classical” diasporic actors such as workers’ associations, political, diaspora governance in times of covid-19 4 economic, and financial elites (fitzgerald 2008; adamson 2012; bruce 2019; maritato 2021). religion has been investigated for its contribution to foreign policy and international relations as well as the religious actors’ local response to international issues such as the refugee crisis and migration (haynes 2001; warner and walker 2011; jacoby et al. 2019). a perspective which considers the activities conducted by religious officers within diaspora communities is not only able to inform about the multifaceted aspect of diaspora governance, it also drives attention to the meanings, symbols, rituals, and morals constituting pastoral power, a governmentality technique that foucault describes as the art of governing men (foucault 2009:165). some scholars have analyzed religious actors’ practices in diaspora communities, referring to pastoral power to emphasize care and control as it pertains to the state’s interest in building loyal and enduring relations with emigrants while spreading the government’s discourse abroad (i.e., catholic priests sent to serve mexican immigrants in the usa, (fitzgerald 2008) or imams and preachers sent from the turkish presidency of religious affairs in austria (maritato 2021). proximity and universality qualify pastoral power as a form of ruling which needs to establish close relations with people to be exerted. scholarship has recently analyzed how digital diaspora allows issues of spatiality and belonging to be reframed, arguing that, through their digitally networked activities, migrants reinforce their geographical identity rather than becoming more deterritorialized (van den bosch and nell 2006; ponzanesi 2020). relying on the literature on long-distance nationalism, scholars emphasize how nationalist conservative parties influence their diasporic citizens by enhancing forms of connectivity with the homeland (anderson 1991). the paper is situated at the intersection of these literatures and examines how the religious officers’ online activities conducted during covid contributed to offering care and guidance while reinforcing online transnationalism (trandafoiu 2013; ponzanesi 2020). the analysis of how state-led diaspora institutions functioned at micro-levels during the pandemic might thus enrich the literature on diaspora studies and transnational religious actors operating in a (digital) diasporic context. 3. turkey’s art of governing diaspora under the akp since the early 2000s, the ruling justice and development party (adalet ve kalkınma partisi, akp) has been engaged in renewed activism towards turkey-originated diasporas. the literature which has analyzed the akp diaspora policies emphasizes two peculiarities that mark a discontinuity in relation to turkey’s long-lasting interest in “its” communities abroad. the first aspect focuses on governmentality and considers the instruments through which the turkish state aims to reach and govern the diaspora. the activities of agencies, government-organized non-governmental organizations (gongos) as well as ad hoc institutions and bureaucratic apparatuses have recently expanded in scope and scale. new and well-established diaspora institutions operationalized their international mission at cultural, economic, social, and political levels. as scholars have underlined, these institutions are situated at the blurred boundary between diaspora and foreign policy (mencutek and baser 2018; maritato et al. 2021; yabanci 2021). this is the case of the presidency for turks abroad and related communities (yurtdışı türkler ve akraba topluluklar başkanlığı, ytb) founded in 2010 with the aim of building social, cultural and maritato and ince-beqo 5 economic relations with kin and co-ethnic communities, (former) citizens abroad and foreign students and to propagate an ethnic-religious conception of nationhood. the ytb is the only agency committed to the implementation of diaspora policies, education programs, networking and funding schemes for diaspora organizations. since the 1990s, the turkish cooperation and coordination agency (türk i̇şbirliği ve koordinasyon i̇daresi başkanlığı, ti̇ka) is also actively engaged abroad and today runs projects in balkan countries, the middle east and africa. moreover, in 2007 the yunus emre cultural institutes were established to promote turkish language and culture and, since 2016, the maarif foundation provides educational services abroad while fostering turkey’s cultural diplomacy. the proliferation of state institutions and para-public agencies also reflected a change in turkey’s art of ruling the diaspora. scholars underline a discontinuity characterizing the akp diaspora policies vis-à-vis the previous ones as it pertains to the relationship with the migrants’ associations and the empathetic approach combining care and control employed while serving the communities abroad (öktem 2014:7; maritato 2020). the second aspect that qualifies the akp interest in building and governing diaspora is related to the prominence of islam and islamic identity in akp’s thematic conceptualization of diaspora. the literature has underlined how in the past two decades a “new diaspora policy” has been shaped in religious-nationalist terms and how institutions and policies have been aimed at strengthening emigrants’ ties with the homeland and widening turkey’s conceptions of citizenship, belonging and identity (aksel 2014; mencutek and baser 2019). the intent to reinforce the link with the diaspora has also included new measures like the 2009 blue-card system, which granted more rights to emigrants and their foreign-born children, and the external voting rights since the 2014 presidential elections. in this attempt to shape the diaspora’s boundaries of belonging, the diyanet’s associations abroad have emerged as crucial institutions in propagating and fostering a religious-nationalist identity within the diaspora. although the diyanet has a long-established presence in europe dating back to the 1980s, in the past two decades, the number of imams and preachers serving abroad has expanded (öztürk and sözeri 2018; bruce 2020). related to this, the budget of the institution has increased to the point where religious services have been transformed into permanent pastoral care aimed at guiding turkish muslim communities living abroad (maritato 2021). the strategies of the turkish state in creating and representing turkey’s image abroad through state religious apparatuses have been analyzed in different european contexts, in some cases from a comparative perspective ( çitak 2018; öztürk and sözeri 2018) while in others with a special focus on the role of women preachers (maritato 2018). projects and series of seminars such as “family schools” have been organized by religious officers employed in diyanet branches in european countries with regard to women’s role within the family, children’s education, marriage, and divorce. such attention to future generations in the diasporic context also resonates with the akp’s discourse on the strengthening of the traditional turkish family and the attempt to forge a pious generation (lüküslü 2016; maritato 2015; kocamaner 2019). family and religious consultation bureaus are currently operative in many diyanet branches abroad and the counseling services related to diaspora governance in times of covid-19 6 the family, parenthood, and childcare contribute to redefine the role of religious officers as professional civil servants at the service of the community. the activities organized by the diyanet abroad also go beyond routine religious services, training and guidance sessions in mosques and include turkish language courses and social events like trips and picnics for children and teenagers, iftar dinners and culinary kermesses. by virtue of protocols signed with the ministries and state agencies of host countries, diyanet officers abroad regularly visit elderly people at home, in hospitals and in prisons, and provide counseling services and moral support. in this vein, religion and nationalism intertwine in the construction of a pro-active sense of belonging and of a mobilized and politicized immigrant self. however, in the aftermath of the post 2016 attempted coup, diaspora policies and institutions have been shaped by authoritarian extraterritorial practices (glasius 2018) aimed at dichotomizing the conduct of a population abroad by dividing it into the “good” pro-akp and the “bad” emigrants. moreover, the fact that religious officers work under the supervision of religious attachés employed at embassies and consulates raises a debate on the spaces for the maneuvering of political opposition. recently, cases of imams accused of controlling and reporting the activities of the gülen movement outside turkey2 contributed to the recalibration of the relationship between european countries and the diyanet as the main actor of turkish islam which combines both mechanisms of caring and control. 4. research context and methodology within the framework of turkey’s current reinvigoration of its diaspora policy, the article analyzes the activities organized for turkish immigrants attending mosques run by diyanet in italy (ditib italya) with particular focus on the lockdown period due to the covid-19 pandemic (february 2020 april 2022). italy is an important case for two main reasons: first, it was the first european country to be severely affected by covid19 and secondly, it has become a destination country for flows from turkey only due to changes in european/italian migration policies. as it concerns the covid-19 crisis in italy, a recent and expanding literature examines the impact of covid-19 on different italian sectors (auriemma and iannaccone, 2020; minello, 2021; scavarda, 2020). in this vein, some scholars have focused on the relationship between the covid-19 crisis and religious resources to assess how religiosity has been experienced during the pandemic (molteni et al., 2021). in line with what was previously examined, we contend that covid-related policies implemented by italian authorities had an important impact on diaspora communities living in italy as it pertains to their perceived health and psychosocial security. in this respect, the exceptionality of covid-19 provides a significant perspective from which to observe not only how the turkish state operates in accompanying its citizens abroad, but also how turkish communities living in italy turned to turkish state authorities and institutions, especially during lockdown measures which forced the closure of community centers and places of worship in italy. 2 please see: https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-imam-spy-affair-in-germany-extends-across-europe/a37590672. maritato and ince-beqo 7 the turkey-originated diaspora in italy has been understudied mostly because migration from turkey to italy has a short history and an irregular character compared to other european countries that have regulated flows through bilateral agreements since the 1960s (purkis and güngör, 2015; purkis, 2019; ince-beqo, 2019). the first flows started right at the end of the 1980s, in a period in which italy became a destination country and started to officially address migratory phenomena. on turkey’s side, the end of the 1980s reflected not only the negative consequences of neoliberal policies and the economic crisis, but also the growing socio-political tensions in the entire region (purkis, 2019). other research (ince-beqo and ambrosini, 2022; schuster, 2005; sirkeci, 2006) also showed that italy was rarely seen as a country of settlement for migrants and asylum seekers from turkey; rather, it was considered a transitional place where they could settle temporarily, with the intention of later moving to northern european countries. currently, the resident population from turkey in italy is about 21,000, with no clear count of immigrants without turkish passports. more than half of this population reside in italy’s three most industrialized regions: piedmont, emilia-romagna, and lombardy. moreover, it is worth also mentioning that by combining the typical characteristics of unskilled labor migration and asylum seeker flows with those of students and highly skilled labor, italy and particularly large cities such as milan and turin have recently become an important destination for students and highly-skilled migrants from turkey.3 within the framework of the ditib association in italy, between 2017 and 2022 we conducted six interviews with two attachés employed at the turkish consulate in milan (one in 2017 and one in 2022) and with two women preachers employed in venice and imperia local branches and two with milan and como associations. between 2020 and 2022, this was combined with the analysis of brochures, videos and posters published on the youtube channel and the facebook official pages4 of the five ditib cultural centers in italy: milan, imperia, como, modena, and venice with the aim of retracing the scope and scale of the online activities organized during the covid-19 pandemic. as online activities increased, we also considered videos posted on the facebook pages in the period between 2020-2022. to grasp continuities and changes with the covid-19 period, the article also benefits from previous fieldwork on ditib in italy conducted in 2017. this included interviews with the former ditib attaché in milan, one women preacher working in milan and in the como camerlata religious center, and the head of the diyanet’s women section in como. the article is also based on diyanet publications and yearly reports of the activities conducted abroad. this is the case of the book “the islam’s view on epidemic disease” (i̇slamın salgın hastalıklara bakışı) published in 2020 by the diyanet press as well as all the online brochures and documents about diaspora projects and publications of the local branches in italy. 3 samuk-carignani, rosina & ince-beqo, forthcoming. 4 the facebook pages of the ditib italya (https://www.facebook.com/ditibitalya) and all the local branches: ditib como, ditib imperia (https://www.facebook.com/ditib-italia-imperia-camisi102263606505293), (https://www.facebook.com/ditib-italia-imperia-camisi-102263606505293), ditib venice (https://www.facebook.com/ditib-venezia-1903624493252894), ditib milano (https://www.facebook.com/diyanetcamiimilano), ditib modena (https://www.facebook.com/ulu.camii.modena). diaspora governance in times of covid-19 8 5. data analysis: turkey’s strategies to reach citizens during covid-19 pandemic 5.1. “we don’t want to die here”. islamic principles under lockdown measures with the outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic, the italian health system was massively under stress due to the high number of infected cases and the lack of therapies. as the death numbers were exponentially increasing all over the country, severe lockdown measures were implemented. from the beginning of march 2020, italy was defined as a “red zone” and the movement of the population was restricted except for necessity, work and health issues. in an attempt to contain the spread of the pandemic, non-essential shops and businesses were closed and public and educational services were provided online. these repeated containment measures transformed the relationship between domestic and public space, contributing to a complete redefinition of the space of “home”. for families this meant combining working from home with child and elderly care and the supervision of children’s schooling programs. in this vein, religious places were also forced to close (figure 1) and online activities increased to cope with the various requests for moral support. the unprecedented situation of a pandemic and the forced atomization of lives had a huge impact on family ties which were forced to be put on standby and carried on from afar. figure 1. announcement in turkish and italian about the closure of the cultural center in milan translation: until april 3, 2020, we are closed due to coronavirus. note: friday prayer will not be held. the lockdown measures in italy and the travel restrictions worldwide also had a strong impact on turkish diaspora communities which experienced a forced cut-off from families and relatives living abroad. the ditib branches in italy were engaged in untangling the italian government’s regulations for turkish communities and convincing the diaspora to “stay at home”. as the religious attaché affirms, as soon as the mobility restrictions and travel ban were reinforced, a sense of distance from relatives in turkey spread the fear of isolation and a huge panic within the communities. in this context, despite strict instructions not to move, many turkish immigrants tried to return to turkey by their own means because there was so much information circulating, often untrue, about how they would be treated if they were to die in italy after contracting the virus. in particular, the spread of fake news about the cremation of bodies who had died maritato and ince-beqo 9 from covid-19 led to a number of requests to return to turkey despite the travel restrictions: “our people were so afraid of the cremation of their bodies, that they were calling us at all times or ask if it was possible for turkey to organize for the return of the immigrants even with helicopters” (ditib venice branch). “they absolutely did not want to die here because they did not know how their bodies would be treated” (religious attaché). in the management of this panic situation, diyanet’s branches encouraged diaspora communities to follow italian authorities’ dispositions while spreading a religious discourse on the pandemic. this occurred through the constant reference to the sunnah and a specific saying (hadith)5 attributed to the prophet mohammed on how to behave in case of a possible pandemic. it suggests that muslims should not leave the place where they are located and should isolate themselves in case of infectious diseases to safeguard both individual and community health.6 diyanet’s branches abroad emphasized the presence of the turkish state alongside its citizens by reinforcing the meaning of this hadith. “we constantly repeated what our hadith suggested (...). we supported our citizens in every way, reminded them that our state was with them and would never let their bodies be cremated” (religious attaché). with the aim of providing a religious explanation for the pandemic, the diyanet published a document entitled “islam’s view on epidemic diseases” (diyanet i̇şleri başkanlığı 2020). alyanak has recently analyzed how this publication emphasizes that the pandemic was not caused by a virus alone, but by humans due to their own moral failures (alyanak 2021:168). as the imams and preachers operate on the italian territory under the coordination of the religious attaché in the turkish consulate in milan, the ditib was receiving requests for moral and spiritual support as well as the assurance that the (turkish) state was not abandoning them. this occurred via a number of activities that were implemented to reach, and provide support to, as many people as possible while controlling that the quarantine restrictions were implemented among turkeyoriginating communities. ditib officers used the diplomatic car of the turkish consulate to reach people during lockdown measures. as reported by the attaché, such support had a strong symbolic value: “overall, they (citizens) understood that they are never alone and that we (as a state) were with them (...) in addition to food aid, we (financially) supported our citizens who were unable to work or who lost jobs, during the lockdown”. people reached by the ditib officers needed moral and psychological support, but also foodstuffs and basic necessities. as the attaché affirms: “we delivered more than 500 food aids not only in the city of milan, but also up to 450 km away. in fact, we did not 5 hadiths are believed to be the words of the prophet, memorized by his followers, and written in the first or second century of the islamic calendar, see burton (2022) for more information. 6 the hadith mentioned in turkish is the following: “hz. peygamber, bir yerde veba çıktığını duyanların oraya gitmemelerini, bulundukları beldede ortaya çıktığı takdirde oradan ayrılmamalarını söylemiştir” (buhârî, “ṭıb”, 30; müslim, “selâm”, 92-100; buhârî, “hıyel”, 13). diaspora governance in times of covid-19 10 leave our citizens alone”. this support epitomizes a change in the direction of the way services are provided by the ditib, as the head of religious activities conducted in italy, the attaché underlines: “during the covid pandemic we delivered our help to the people” as it was the institution that reached the communities, not the contrary. while reaching people at home during the covid pandemic, the ditib officers could also build on the previously established practices of visiting people in hospitals and at home as part of a way to reinforce the link with the diaspora (maritato 2019). these practices, which combine individual care and proximity, are in line with what has been described as turkish officers’ “more empathetic” approach towards diaspora communities (öktem 2014). however, they were greatly amplified during the covid pandemic. the lockdown experience paved the way for the blossoming of online activities which broadened the scope and scale of diyanet’s local branches. while the broadening of activities allowed those who did not regularly attend the mosques to be reached, the diyanet as a religious and diplomatic representative was a reinvigorated presence of the turkish state in the lives of the citizens living abroad. it was indeed an opportunity to emphasise that “the state is with you in this very difficult moment”. 5.2. the introduction of online activities: transforming strategies and changing diasporas the lockdown measures were a watershed moment for the organization of online religious activities in all the italian branches. after the closure of the prayer rooms and cultural centers, and religious seminars for young people, women and families turned online, and this entailed a change in the scope and scale of the events, as well as the audience and the invited speakers who could also join virtually from outside italy. moreover, the online meetings allowed the participation of those people who were not usually attending because of working hours and distance from home. the religious attaché affirms that before religious seminars and social activities were conducted online, reaching both adults and children in big cities like milan was not always an easy task. “men working in kebab shops are outside home from 7am to 10 pm and could neither come to nor drive children to the ditib center. it was also hard to make groups of students. [...] however, once the activities were conducted online, the number of students increased a lot. while about 10 people were attending the meetings in presence, we now reached 200 people online”. the changes concerned not only the audience but also the very nature of the meetings as is reported by religious officers: “our activities were not exclusively religious before covid, (our mosques) were a meeting place for turks. we would meet around what unites us: religion, culture, turkish culture... sometimes we would just meet to eat together. in particular, women who attend the mosque are housewives, they are always at home, and in this place, they could unwind little bit (…) on the other hand, however, not everyone could easily come to the mosque: for those who did not have a car or driver’s license it was difficult. they obviously had opportunities to follow more activities than before. during lockdown we were thus able to talk to other people and it was very meaningful for them”. (venice branch) maritato and ince-beqo 11 while those programs such as language classes, religious courses and qur’an reading directed towards women, families and young people were conducted on-line, not only the numbers but also the geographic provenance of the audience enlarged. this entailed an important change in the city-based (often neighborhood-based) dimension, characterizing diaspora associations like the ditib in which members usually know each other. the online meetings organized by the ditib officers working in italian branches were also welcoming people from abroad as in the case of the seminar titled “daily life expected from a muslim” in which the religious advisor in washington intervened, who operates within the framework of diyanet america (figure 2). the online seminars were either attended or organized by people from germany, us, new zealand, and turkey, allowing for an expansion of the communities beyond the city borders. figure 2. poster of a webinar on family, ‘daily life expected from a muslim’ the extension of immigrant communities’ physical boundaries7 created a transnational virtual space in which representatives of diyanet and of other diasporic communities could participate. before the covid pandemic, the limited economic resources and the relatively small-size communities did not allow the italian branch of the ditib to invite to italy religious officers and speakers from abroad. however, the online seminars forged an international and transnational digital diasporic space which in italy affected the turkey-originated diaspora’s perception of living in a peripheral diasporic context (ince-beqo, 2021). on the facebook pages of the local ditib branches all the information concerning the online seminars is posted regularly and the recorded videos of the meetings are available. online seminars that hosted high-level religious officials employed at diyanet’s headquarters in ankara were highly effective tools in making citizens feel the presence of the turkish state. this is the case of the seminar titled “marriage and family life” organized by the ditib milan branch whose invited speaker was the head preacher of the diyanet in ankara (figure 3). in a similar fashion, the seminar 7 see ince-beqo (2021) for how this digital diasporic space has transformed the migration experience of turkish muslim women in italy. diaspora governance in times of covid-19 12 titled “family: love, compassion and mercy” hosted the president of the diyanet and his wife (figure 4) while the ditib venice and imperia branches organized an online conference titled “being mothers and fathers, raising children” hosting diyanet’s head of the department of family and religious guidance (figure 5). figure 3. poster of a webinar on family, ‘to be ready for eternal life’ figure 4-5. posters of webinars on family relations (‘family: love, compassion and mercy’) and parenthood (‘being mother and father, raising children’), with the participation of the ditib president and his wife the online seminars allowed the diyanet to conduct activities despite the closure of mosques and religious centers worldwide and thus to strengthen turkey’s link to the diaspora also during covid. from the vast number of online sessions organized between 2020 and 2022, it is clear that the emergency situation was used as a starting point to maritato and ince-beqo 13 enhance programs on family and foster muslim-turkish belonging in different spheres of daily life. not only were family life and routines indeed subverted by lockdown measures, but also the forced cohabitation caused tensions and new challenges. as part of a project implemented by the presidency of turks abroad and related communities (ytb) a turkish psychologist living in austria offered phone counseling to immigrants in different italian cities. “in some cases, different generations live in the same house. living with mothers-in-law for some was already burdensome: with the lockdown it was even more difficult. sessions with the psychologist were of great help, particularly for the women” (ditib venice branch). the online religious sessions not only affected the audience and the distribution of the content provided, but they also expanded the psychological support to women who otherwise were not used to consulting psychologists. however, the combination of spiritual guidance and psychological support also contributed to enhancing that blurred relationship between religious counseling and psychological support which characterizes diyanet’s mission to diffuse morality within society (yazıcı 2012; mutluer 2018; kocamaner 2019). the covid-19 pandemic has thus accelerated practices which were already in place. 5.3. religion as a resource to strengthen ethnic-national belonging all our interlocutors affirm that during covid there was an increase in the request for religious and moral support among turkey-originated muslim communities in italy. in the interviews, they report that even people who are not very religious approached the ditib personnel to ask for advice and to find a sense of community within the diaspora. for turkey-originated communities in italy, the sense of isolation during the covid pandemic led to a quest for both a community to belong to and moral support. it is important to consider that all over europe local ditib branches receive religious officers from turkey but are also independent in terms of the funding of new mosques and cultural centers which rely on members’ donations. the sense of community belonging is thus built also via the financial contribution to the local branch activities. however, as many of our interlocutors confirmed, the peculiar context of italy as a country of transition rather than a final destination negatively affected donation. this is particularly true for the building of new places of worship, which, as was confirmed by the attaché, do not receive financial aid from the turkish state and exclusively rely on member donations. as the pandemic provoked an economic crisis, mostly hitting some sectors such as constructions and food service and distribution in which turkish immigrants work most, the accomplishment of the mosque construction in italy has been delayed by the decline of donations and the covid lockdown measures. however, religious personnel managed to refer to islamic principles and turkishness as a national and ethnic culture to reinforce a sense of community also during the pandemic. scholars have underlined how the activities organized by diyanet associations abroad are imbued with religious and nationalistic references (maritato 2021; öcal and gökarıksel 2022). by virtue of the institution’s mission to protect national solidarity and integrity (article 136 of turkish constitution), religious officers abroad commemorate national holidays and religious celebrations which span from the first world war diaspora governance in times of covid-19 14 battle of gallipoli and turkey’s 1919-1922 independence war to the birth of the prophet mohammed and the ramadan month. during a farewell program for ditib como religious officials whose six-year abroad mission had come to end, this aspect was confirmed. the two-hour program, attended by about 500 people, was also streamed online on facebook. it began with the national anthem with the projection of ataturk’s photo on the big screen and was followed by one student’s qur’an reading (figure 6). in an attempt to summarize the years she served the community in como, the head of the ditib women’s section clarifies how her duty was at the intersection of islam and state. “(...) we have tried to fulfill this duty conferred on us by our state by working day and night, to convey love for the ezan [call to prayer], the flag, the state and the nation, and to keep our national and spiritual values alive. we tried to be close to our brothers and sisters living in como and switzerland on good and bad days”. figure 6. farewell program to religious officers in ditib como the event, attended by the attaché, was also an occasion to present all the activities organized by the como association in the past six years, stressing the covid-related challenges, and to emphasize how they were in continuity with turkey’s long-lasting engagement vis-à-vis diaspora communities in europe. in this view, the turkish state’s aim to not forget its citizens abroad and to preserve their belonging to the “islamic civilization” (islam medeniyeti) was operationalized through the building of mosques and cultural centers and the sending of religious officers from turkey to europe. in ditib officers’ speeches this notion of islamic civilization is intertwined with national culture as an essential component of religion. this aspect is crucial in a migratory context considering that the ditib is representing the turkish sunni interpretation of islam, as the attaché affirms: “different (ethnic) communities interpret islam differently; we have our own interpretation. in a religious organization the cultural aspect is crucial, it is much more crucial than we imagine” the focus on turkish islam qualifies ditib activities as made by and for the turkey originated diaspora. it also allows us to cast light on how the diaspora is governed in times maritato and ince-beqo 15 of emergency and how the relationship between home states and emigrant communities are continuously shaped. recently, some scholars have contended that the covid-19 pandemic marked a return of the states and their notions of sovereignty, protection and control (gerbaudo 2021). in the case of turkey, rather than a return of the state, the pandemic accelerated ongoing dynamics at the base of a transformed diaspora governance. 6. conclusions one of the first european countries strongly affected by covid-19, italy immediately ordered the closure of all places of worship. this closure, along with many other anticovid measures strictly enforced from march to june 2020, created great economic and psychological hardship for a segment of turkish immigrants for whom religious places offer not only religious functions but also social solidarity. in this context, diyanet’s officers who were sent from turkey to serve the communities in italy had to adopt new strategies to continue to reach out to citizens. however, under the lockdown measures they seized the opportunity of online resources to expand their audience and present themselves as essential actors to cope with this unprecedented situation. this narrative is thus built on the representation of religious services and moral support provided during the covid-19 pandemic as important as those offered by secular institutions to strengthen the link between turkey and its communities abroad. in this article, we analyzed the way the lockdowns measures in italy affected the diyanet association’s activities towards the turkish diaspora. we also looked at how this change can give insight into the ongoing transformation of turkey's diaspora governance. our findings showed that covid-19 enhanced forms of digital diaspora governance. the online activities strengthened the link with turkey and reduced the sense of isolation and marginalization of the turkey-originated diaspora in italy, boosting their sense of belonging to a larger online community in which distance from the homeland is shortened. we also argue that the pandemic has expanded the boundaries, though virtual, of diyanet's presence in the daily lives of immigrants. in fact, the initial food aid and economic support for those who lost jobs due to the total lockdown was later followed by virtual meetings and, in some cases, online psychological sessions. what we found is that the online seminars proposed by diyanet were much more than relational or moral support. sharing a space, though virtual, with diyanet representatives from turkey for the participants was very meaningful because they “felt the concrete presence of turkey next to them.” this was the case of a number of seminars organized by the italian local ditib associations which hosted high level religious officers employed in the diyanet ankara head office. at a time of crisis and panic, this involvement reinforced the approach taken particularly by akp's diaspora management based on care and proximity. nevertheless, the relationship between the state representatives and citizens has been simultaneously horizontal and vertical. while on the one hand the care and proximity approach was pursued, on the other hand the authoritative and protective presence of the state through religious functions in daily life was continuously introduced. accordingly, diyanet’s religious officers allowed the “empathetic angle” to reinforce the link with the diaspora communities and to shape an ethno-religious identity in which islam and turkishness are defined in essentialist terms. in this attempt, the diyanet’s services during the covid-19 pandemic reflected a contentious diaspora governance in times of covid-19 16 situation marked by divisions within the turkish diaspora communities between proakp associations, political opponents, secularists and members of religious communities like the gülen movement, whose activities abroad are persecuted as terrorism by the turkish government. while different political and religious associations carried out their own activities during the pandemic, the state nature of the diyanet also involved political purposes both to present itself as an official interlocutor acting in compliance with italian regulations, and to support citizens abroad with transnational bureaucratic apparatus. references adamson, f. 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(2011). localizing islam in europe: turkish islamic communities in germany and the netherlands. syracuse university press. http://dergipark.gov.tr/iusiyasal/issue/24500/259673 http://dergipark.gov.tr/iusiyasal/issue/24500/259673 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366538620_like_falling_leaves_the_migration_of_the_highly_skilled_from_turkey_to_italy https://www.researchgate.net/publication/366538620_like_falling_leaves_the_migration_of_the_highly_skilled_from_turkey_to_italy microsoft word pdf_issue_15_1_dossi_60-76.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 1, may 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 1, 60-76. contact author: simone dossi, university of milan. e-mail address: simone.dossi@unimi.it italy-china relations and the belt and road initiative. the need for a long-term vision simone dossi university of milan abstract during chinese president xi jinping's visit in march 2019, italy and china signed the memorandum of understanding on the belt and road initiative (bri). as italy was the first g7 country to formally join the bri, the memorandum caused alarm in the united states and europe. the paper explains why italy and china, apparently so distant from both a political and an economic point of view, opted for cooperation under the bri. it concludes that, in order to seize the opportunities provided by the bri and reduce the associated risks, italy needs a longterm vision for the future of its relations with china, and a more structured and permanent public debate on its china policy. 1. introduction n 23 march 2019, during chinese president xi jinping’s visit to rome, italy and china signed the memorandum of understanding on cooperation within the framework of the silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road initiative (governo della repubblica italiana e governo della repubblica popolare cinese 2019). the document aimed to promote bilateral cooperation in six areas: (1) policy dialogue; (2) transport, logistics and infrastructure; (3) unimpeded trade and investment; (4) financial cooperation; (5) people-to-people connectivity and (6) green development cooperation. although legally non-binding (as expressly stated in the text), the memorandum was politically the most significant among the several documents signed during president xi’s visit to italy. with the memorandum, italy became the first g7 country to formally join the belt and road initiative (bri), the pillar of china’s increasingly ambitious foreign policy under its current leadership. also, the timing of the signature was particularly sensitive, as it overlapped with a european council that was to discuss a common approach to china by the european union (eu) (casarini 2019). for these reasons, the decision to sign the memorandum alarmed italy’s partners. in washington, national security council spokesman garrett marquis cautioned on 9 march that the bri is a chinese ‘infrastructure vanity project’, while the council’s official account on twitter warned that ‘italy is a major global economy and a great investment destination. endorsing bri lends legitimacy to china’s predatory approach to investment and will bring no benefits to the italian people’ (giuffrida 2019; us national security council 2019). in strasbourg, eu commission vice president jyrki katainen issued a reminder on 12 march that bri loans are no ‘free lunches’ and warned o simone dossi 61 that ‘all the member states, and also belt and road operators, must comply with our regulations and rules’ (von der burchard 2019). the comments were made at the presentation of the joint communication on eu-china relations issued by the commission and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy (2019), which for the first time presented beijing not just as a ‘cooperation’ and ‘negotiating partner’, but also as an ‘economic competitor’ and a ‘strategic rival’. for both political and economic reasons, italy and china could appear to be unlikely partners under the bri. first, as a nato, eu and g7 member, italy is considered as unequivocally located within the us-centred network of western alliances. rome’s official support for beijing’s foreign policy initiative seemed, then, incoherent with italy’s traditional foreign policy alignments, especially at a time when us-china relations were rapidly deteriorating and washington was mobilizing an increasingly assertive rhetoric against the bri as a ‘debt trap’ reportedly used by beijing to secure strategic advantages (bolton 2018; pence 2018; brautigam 2019). second, since the 1990s and even more so after china’s accession to the world trade organization in 2001, italy has been exposed to fierce chinese competition in the manufacturing sector. compared to other european countries, italy has been more exposed to such competition due to the significant similarities in the structure of the two economies, as both italy and china rely heavily on manufacturing and specialize in the same industrial sectors (prodi 2014; andornino 2015a). from an economic point of view, the two countries seemed, then, destined to compete in third markets rather than to cooperate under the bri. the aim of this article is to explain why italy and china, apparently so distant from both a political and an economic point of view, opted for cooperation under the bri and signed the ad hoc memorandum in 2019. in order to do this, we will focus on the considerations that, in each of the two countries, led to the identification of the other as a key partner and the bri as a fruitful platform for cooperation. the article is organized in four sections. the first introduces the bri as part of china’s foreign policy and analyses some aspects of the initiative that are particularly significant for italy-china relations. the second and third sections investigate, respectively, chinese views of italy’s role in the bri and italy’s reactions to the chinese initiative. finally, the conclusions identify the lack of a long-term vision as the main challenge that italy needs to address if it wants to seize the opportunities presented by the bri, while reducing the associated risks. 2. the belt and road initiative as china’s first foreign policy initiative with global ambitions, the bri is subject to intense scrutiny by policy analysts and scholars. in the west, the debate on the bri has increasingly focused on its implications for the us-led liberal international order. on the one hand, some see the bri as an indicator of china’s changing attitude towards the existing international order, with a shift from a reformist to a revisionist agenda (for example nicolas 2016; rolland 2017; brunnermeier et al. 2018; nordin and weissmann 2018). on the other hand, others place the bri within the context of china’s traditional reformist agenda and see it as a more proactive attempt by beijing to reform the liberal international order from inside, in line with china’s long-term efforts to ‘change the world from second place’ (breslin 2016; see also leverett and wu 2016; jones 2020). while reviewing the rapidly expanding corpus of literature on the bri is beyond the scope italy-china relations and the belt and road initiative 62 of this article, this section will focus on four aspects of the bri that are particularly relevant for italy-china relations. the first aspect is the timing of the initiative and its progress. the land and maritime components of the project were announced by xi in september and october 2013, in two carefully choreographed speeches at kazakhstan's nazarbayev university and the indonesian parliament respectively (xi 2013a, 2013b). in march 2015, the project was then detailed in the vision and actions on jointly building the silk road economic belt and the 21st century maritime silk road issued by the national development and reform commission, the ministry of foreign affairs and the ministry of commerce. then presented as an ‘initiative’ (changyi, 倡议), the project identified five ‘cooperation priorities’: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and peopleto-people ties (guojia fazhan gaige weiyuanhui et al. 2015). two years later, in may 2017, the first belt and road forum for international cooperation was convened in beijing and concluded with a final joint communiqué issued by 29 heads of state and government (waijiao bu 2019). in october the same year, the 19th national congress of the chinese communist party (ccp) introduced a reference to the bri in the general programme of the party constitution (xinhua she 2017). in april 2019, the second belt and road forum for international cooperation was convened in beijing, with the leaders roundtable attended this time by 37 heads of state and government (waijiao bu 2019). the second aspect that is worth noting here is that the bri is conceived in beijing not just as a blueprint for economic cooperation, but as a political initiative with long-term strategic goals. in fact, the bri was originally conceived as china’s strategic response to the increasingly complicated international situation faced by the country in 2010-11, in the context of the obama administration’s ‘pivot to asia’. the intuition behind the bri is attributed to influential ir scholar wang jisi, who in 2012 called for a comprehensive readjustment of china’s strategy: “in a situation where the tectonic plates of the world’s geoeconomy and geopolitics are shifting, there is a need for new reflections on a geostrategic ‘rebalancing’ [diyuan zhanlüe ‘zai pingheng’, 地缘战略 ‘再平衡’] that is comprehensive and combines land and sea power” (wang 2012). in proposing this, wang was building on an academic debate that had been going on in china since the 1990s, with scholars discussing ‘sea power’ (haiquan, 海权) and ‘land power’ (luquan, 陆权) as two alternative paths for china’s rise (dossi 2018). amid growing competition with the us in maritime east asia, wang recommended a ‘march west’ (xi jin, ⻄进) strategy integrating the two paths and reorienting china’s rise toward eurasia. this proposal provided the intellectual background for the bri, which was then formulated by the chinese foreign policy decision-makers as a quintessentially geopolitical initiative; that is, an initiative aimed at reshaping international space based on the preferences of a rising china. this is particularly clear in the 2015 vision and actions, which not only enumerates the principles, goals and priorities of the initiative, but also illustrates china’s perspective on the reorganization of the eurasian space in the twenty-first century. as such, the bri is much more than an economic cooperation project: it is a ‘space and order shaping’ endeavour that aims to reshape international order by reshaping international space (caffarena and gabusi 2019). the third aspect is the flexible and pragmatic nature of the bri. like other chinese policy initiatives, the bri does not work as a detailed plan, but rather as a general simone dossi 63 framework that leaves considerable room for manoeuvre in its implementation. from this point of view, the bri fits perfectly into the analytical framework of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’, the theoretical model that explains policy outcomes in china as the result of the interactions between decisions made at the centre and the ‘self-interested, short-term and parochial calculations’ of the several institutional actors involved in the implementation process (mertha and brødsgaard 2017, p. 3; for the classic formulation see lieberthal and oksenberg 1988, pp. 135-168). in the case of the bri, while the centre provides overall directives, provincial and local authorities, as well as state-owned enterprises (soes) and private companies, are encouraged to contribute by developing their own initiatives within the broader bri framework. each of the several actors involved in implementation pushes for its own priorities, often by reframing its pre-existing projects so that they conform to the new bri discourse. while the initiative is strategic in its ambitions, the picture is thus much less clear when we move from the level of the general design to the level of implementation, so that it is often difficult to say whether individual bri projects respond to the strategic directives from the centre or to the relatively uncoordinated agendas of the several actors involved. in turn, this leads to considerable flexibility in the boundaries of the initiative, with bottom-up pressures resulting in adjustments and expansions. finally, a fourth element that should be taken into account is that, five years after the publication of vision and actions, the bri seems to be currently under review in beijing. according to chinese scholars (author’s interviews, beijing, november and december 2019), several bri projects face resistance from local populations due to the ‘free riding’ attitude of china’s partners, who value the bri as a source of investment but are not willing to mobilize their political resources in support of the projects. also, interviewed scholars complained that many bri projects are promoted by the chinese government out of political considerations and without adequate assessment of their profitability, potentially resulting in huge losses for the chinese investors, especially in the cases of projects in politically unstable countries. finally, interviewed scholars were aware that the strategic ambitions of the initiative resulted in a backlash from the united states, eventually contributing to the deterioration of china-us bilateral relations and complicating the external environment of china’s foreign policy in east asia and beyond. according to the interviewed scholars, these concerns have now triggered a review process of the bri, whose implementation is going to become less ‘impressionistic’ and more focused on details, i.e. more prudent and centred on china’s own interests. 3. chinese views of italy in the bri italy’s place in the bri is related to the peculiar position that beijing awards to the country as a bridge between two regional contexts of particular significance for china’s interests: europe and the mediterranean region. beijing sees italy first and foremost as a european country and, more specifically, as a member of the eu: its italy policy is then part of the broader policy toward the eu and europe as a whole. from an economic point of view, brussels is a key interlocutor for beijing, as the eu remains china’s largest trading partner (general administration of customs of the people’s republic of china 2020). from a political point of view, however, china’s attitude toward the eu has changed significantly over the past two decades. in the 1990s and 2000s, beijing had great expectations about the role italy-china relations and the belt and road initiative 64 of the eu in the context of a perceived ‘multipolarization’ of the international system (casarini 2009, pp. 82-86). since the eurozone crisis, however, beijing’s confidence in the eu as a political interlocutor has declined dramatically, leading to a shift in its approach to the continent: rather than investing in political relations with the eu, beijing has continued to look at the eu as an economic partner, but has increasingly looked either at individual european states (especially the so-called ‘big three’: france, germany and the united kingdom) or at regional subgroupings for the development of political ties (casarini 2015; feng and huang 2015). most notably, beijing has consolidated its relations with central and eastern europe through the 16+1 framework (17+1 since 2019, following the inclusion of greece), which not coincidentally involves both members and non-members of the eu (szczudlik-tatar 2015; vangeli 2017). as the case of the 17+1 framework shows, beijing is increasingly leveraging on divisions between european states to advance its agenda for china-europe relations. as a ‘southern european’ (nan ou, 南欧) country, italy is also part of the mediterranean region, conceived in beijing as the intersection between southern europe, north africa (bei fei, 北非) and west asia (xi ya, ⻄亚) (andornino 2015c; fardella 2014b; 2015; 2018; fardella and ghiselli 2017). traditionally far from china’s sphere of interests, the mediterranean region has gained importance for beijing since the beginning of the new century. as shown by chinamed data, chinese imports from and exports to north africa and the middle east have increased since 2001. in the same period, chinese investments in the two regions have also grown, together with the number of chinese contract workers deployed there (chinamed 2020). the mediterranean sea has become increasingly busy as both a destination and a transit for shipping from and to china (deandreis 2016; panaro and ferrara 2018). this is reflected in chinese investments in port infrastructures in the region, with the acquisition of a majority stake in the piraeus port authority by cosco shipping in 2016 as well as significant chinese investments in other ports on the southern shores of the mediterranean (luo 2018). since 2011, political instability in north africa and the middle east has created concerns regarding the security of chinese investments and workers in the region. in early 2011 china had to evacuate over 35,000 chinese nationals from libya, with a second evacuation operation being organized in 2015 from yemen (dossi 2015; ghiselli 2018). for beijing, the region thus gained importance also from the point of view of security, resulting in the establishment of china’s first military base abroad in djibouti in summer 2017 (ghiselli 2017). in their interactions with italian counterparts, chinese officials tend to emphasize the role that italy plays in these two regions and the tradition of friendly relations between the chinese and italian peoples dating back to ancient times. as noted by the former ambassador to the people’s republic of china (prc) alberto bradanini (2018), however, such positive comments are largely rhetorical and do not reflect the real perception that chinese officials have of italy and its role in europe and the mediterranean region. a more effective way of investigating chinese perceptions of italy is, then, to look at what chinese scholars write about italy and what courses of action they recommend to the chinese decision-makers. a particularly interesting perspective is the one provided by scholars who work at government-affiliated research institutions and write for their official journals. in this respect, a first set of indications regarding the role assigned to italy can be inferred from purely bibliometric data. if we consider, for example, simone dossi 65 dangdai shijie (当代世界, contemporary world), the journal of the international liaison department of the ccp central committee, only 38 articles whose title includes the word ‘italy’ (yidali, 意⼤利) have been published since 1994, compared to the 63, 77 and 99 whose titles include the words ‘england’ (yingguo, 英国), ‘france’ (faguo, 法国) and ‘germany’ (deguo, 德国) respectively. the perception of italy that emerges from the limited number of articles that have been published in this and other journals is that of a country in an increasingly difficult position from both an economic and a political point of view. chinese analysts emphasize the negative impact of the economic and financial crisis on italy’s political position in the eu (cao 2016; dong 2018; shen 2017; sun 2018; sun 2019b; zhong 2016). a second issue that is mentioned as a source of weakness is the migrant crisis, which is viewed at least partly as the result of a foreign policy failure, as italy did not manage to prevent western military intervention in libya (zhong 2016). against this complicated background, chinese analysts expressed optimistic views when matteo renzi’s government was formed in 2014. the discontinuity that renzi’s leadership seemed to introduce in italian domestic politics and his more vocal approach to foreign policy were seen as potentially contributing to an italian comeback in the eu (sun 2017; zhong 2016). as recalled by bradanini (2018), these positive attitudes toward the new government were common among chinese officials, and they were reflected in the considerable attention that renzi’s visit to beijing in june 2014 received in the chinese media (dossi 2014). yet these expectations were eventually disappointed when renzi resigned after defeat in the 2016 constitutional referendum, whose results came as a shock to chinese analysts (cao and li 2017; sun 2017). since the 2016 referendum, chinese analysts have mostly looked at italian politics through the lenses of ‘populism’ (mincuizhuyi, ⺠粹主义) (cao 2018; dong 2018; li 2018; shen 2017; wang 2017). the 2018 general election was seen as the triumph of ‘anti-system and extremist parties’ (fan jianzhi zhengdang he jiduan zhengdang, 反建制政党和极端 政党) (sun 2018, p. 42; see also dong 2018). according to sun yanhong, associate researcher at the institute of european studies of the chinese academy of social sciences and secretary of the chinese association of italian studies, the rise of the five star movement and of the league was due to four main reasons: the persisting economic difficulties of the country, the ongoing migrant crisis, the growing euroscepticism of italian public opinion, and the innovative use of social media by the two parties. the performance of the conte i government was assessed negatively by sun, as the new government failed to achieve its two main goals in the eu, i.e. the end of austerity and a shift in migration policies (sun 2019a). these negative views of the italian political situation were amplified by the 2019 government crisis, seen in china as a further demonstration of the traditional political instability of the country (cao 2019). instability reportedly continues to characterize italian politics under the conte ii government formed in september 2019, as the new majority is seen as extremely weak and the league is expected to make a comeback at the next general elections if not earlier (ibid.; sun 2019d). despite this grim picture of italy’s political and economic conditions, chinese analysts tend to be more positive when it comes to italy’s place in the bri. on the one hand, rome has much to gain from its participation in the bri. first, italy enjoys the italy-china relations and the belt and road initiative 66 ‘geographic advantage’ (diyuan youshi, 地缘优势) of its location at the centre of the mediterranean sea, where it plays the role of a natural ‘hub connecting mainland europe, north africa and west asia’ (zhao and zhang 2019, p. 27; see also liu 2018). as such, italy is ideally located to become the western terminal of the bri: despite china’s investments in the piraeus port, the fact that the ports of northern italy are much closer to continental europe makes them a natural destination for chinese investments in infrastructures under the bri (sun 2019b; 2019c). second, italy has a sizeable economic presence in central and eastern europe, north africa and central asia, regions where china has growing interests too. this creates the conditions for fruitful cooperation in third countries: for example, italian banks unicredit and intesa sanpaolo are expected to be involved in the financing of chinese infrastructure projects in the region (sun 2019b). on the other hand, italy has much to offer to the bri and to chinese companies willing to invest in the country. as the second manufacturing power in the eu and an ‘industrial and technological power’ (ibid.), italy is an interesting destination for chinese investments. at the same time, due to its difficult economic situation, the huge size of its public debt, and the challenges posed to its exports by us protectionist policies, italy is better disposed toward chinese investments than other eu countries. as noted by zhao xianjin and zhang xiaoting (2019) from shanghai university, foreign investors are not exposed to any specific restrictions, and benefit from the same treatment as local companies. from this point of view, what makes italy particularly attractive for china in the context of the bri is its peculiar mix of strengths and weaknesses. as a developed country, italy has an industrial base and technological know-how that most of china’s bri partners do not possess; as a country in endemic economic crisis, on the other hand, italy is better disposed toward chinese investments than the european ‘big three’. at the same time, however, zhao and zhang also warn of the ‘risks’ (fengxian, ⻛险) that chinese investors face in italy. first, one of the main problems is limited access to credit by financial institutions: chinese companies investing in italy need to know that they will have to rely on their own capitals. second, italy’s labour law creates significant restrictions in the management of personnel: ‘particularly in some areas, italian labour policies offer excessive protection [guodu de baohu, 过度的保护] [sic] to workers’ (ibid., p. 28). third, as an eu member state, italy is exposed to the changing climate toward chinese investments that is now occurring at the european level, with the introduction of more stringent mechanisms to screen foreign investments in strategic areas. fourth, rather than being complementary, the chinese and italian economies are largely in competition: chinese companies investing in the country or exporting there should, then, expect fierce resistance from italian companies and public opinion as a whole. based on these risks, zhao and zhang make specific recommendations to chinese companies and authorities. first, china should strengthen its ‘top-level planning’ and consolidate ‘guidance and oversight’ over chinese companies, providing them with adequate support in risk assessment and compensation policies. second, chinese companies should diversify their ‘mode of investment’ in italy, complementing mergers and acquisitions with the establishment of joint ventures, and they should identify innovative sources of financing. finally, chinese investors should learn more about the local context, manage appropriately cultural differences, labour disputes and environmental issues, and invest in ‘social responsibility’ (shehui zeren, 社会责任). simone dossi 67 4. italian views of china and the bri for italy, china has never been a foreign policy priority. as argued by carlo m. santoro (1991) at the end of the cold war, the foreign policy of italy as a ‘middle power’ is traditionally focused on the regional system composed of the euro-atlantic, balkan, middle eastern and north african subsystems. three decades later, this regional focus continues to characterise italy’s foreign policy, although in a context that has been altered dramatically by the crisis of the eu and by instability in the middle east and north africa (mammarella and cacace 2013, pp. 290-316; diodato and niglia 2019; isernia and longo, eds. 2019; for a critique of the ‘middle power’ model, see romero 2016). while certainly not a priority, however, china has been the recurrent target of italian ambitions, driven by a mix of economic and political motivations. on the one hand, sectors of the business community have been attracted by the economic opportunities offered by china, although such attraction has often been based on a rather limited understanding of the real conditions of the chinese market. on the other hand, the italian government has periodically looked at its china policy as a tool to demonstrate italy’s international status. at different stages of italian history, relations with china thus assumed a symbolic meaning that went beyond the bilateral relationship in itself (samarani and de giorgi 2011, pp. 18-32; samarani 2008, pp. 118-19; samarani 2014; fardella 2014a; olla brundu 2004). while this traditional mix of economic and political elements persists, since the 1990s the economic rise of china has introduced a major discontinuity by dramatically altering the structure of bilateral relations. exposed to fierce competition in the manufacturing sector, italy now runs a large deficit in its trade with china, while italian companies compete with chinese ones in third markets (prodi 2014; andornino 2015a). in addition, since the euro crisis, italy has looked to china as a source of capital for its economy, in the context of high levels of public debt and a reduction in credit supply (andornino 2014). in italy’s calculations, china is thus no longer just a ‘land of opportunity’, but also a manufacturing competitor and a potential source of investments: accordingly, reducing the trade deficit and attracting chinese investments have become key goals of italy’s china policy. it is in this context that italy has increasingly focused on economic cooperation as a key dimension of the ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (partenariato strategico globale; quanmian zhanlüe huoban guanxi, 全⾯战略伙伴关系) established with china in 2004. in june 2014, during prime minister matteo renzi’s visit to beijing, the two sides signed the 2014-2016 action plan for economic cooperation between italy and china and a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in five major areas: environmental protection and energy, agricultural products and processing, food security, urbanization, medicine and health, and aviation (andornino 2015b). between 2014 and 2015, important chinese investments in italy were finalized. in 2014, chinese soes shanghai electric and state grid corporation of china acquired respectively a 40 percent stake in ansaldo energia and a 35 percent stake in cdp reti, which in turn manages holdings in snam (construction and integrated management of natural gas infrastructure) and terna (electricity transmission grid) (andornino 2015b; 2016). the people’s bank of china bought stakes in eight major italian companies (enel, eni, prysmian, fca, telecom italia, generali, mediobanca, saipem), while chinese soe chemchina acquired italy-china relations and the belt and road initiative 68 pirelli, with the involvement of the silk road fund, the investment vehicle launched by the chinese government in december 2014 to support bri projects (fatiguso 2015). coherently with this focus on economic cooperation, italy showed interest in the bri and china’s related initiatives at a rather early stage. the goal was to rebalance bilateral trade by obtaining greater access to the chinese market, while at the same time attracting chinese investments that would help italy’s economic recovery. in 2015, italy was one of seventeen eu member states to join the asian infrastructure investment bank (aiib) as a founding member (gabusi 2019). in the following years, italy expressed its high-level support for the bri during bilateral meetings, as stated in the joint communiqués of the seventh and eighth meetings of the italy-china governmental committee in 2016 and 2017 respectively (ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale della repubblica italiana e ministro degli affari esteri della repubblica popolare cinese 2016, 2017). also, the bri figured prominently in two speeches delivered by italian president sergio mattarella (2017a, 2017b) during his visit to china in february 2017. in particular, in his lectio magistralis at fudan university, mattarella referred to the bri as a ‘new, important direction in relations between our continents’ and confirmed that italy would ‘participate with conviction in this ambitious project’ (mattarella 2017b). in may 2017, prime minister paolo gentiloni attended the belt and road forum for international cooperation in beijing, the only head of government from a g7 country to do so (casarini 2019). begun in 2014-15 under the centre-left governments, italy’s march toward the bri accelerated dramatically under the ‘yellow-green’ conte i government formed in june 2018. interactions with china were immediately intensified, most notably with separate visits to china by minister of economy and finance giovanni tria and undersecretary of state at the ministry of economic development giuseppe geraci in the summer of 2018 and then by deputy prime minister and minister of economic development luigi di maio in september and again in november (santevecchi 2018a; 2018b; 2018c). in january 2019, at the ninth meeting of the italy-china governmental committee, foreign ministers enzo moavero milanesi and wang yi declared the two countries’ “interest in joint collaborations within the ‘belt and road’ initiative” and announced the imminent visit to italy by chinese president xi jinping (ministro degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale della repubblica italiana e ministro degli affari esteri della repubblica popolare cinese 2019). when it was revealed that the agenda of xi’s visit included the signing ceremony of a bri memorandum, italy’s china policy became the subject of heated debate. the domestic context was provided by the tense political situation of spring 2019, with endemic conflict between majority and opposition, as well as growing contradictions within the majority itself. the prospected memorandum opened a new front in this unstable political situation, with a foreign policy debate apparently centred on two alternative strategies: a new pro-china strategy advanced by the government versus the traditional strategy centred on italy’s alignment with the us and the eu. negative comments from washington and brussels, amplified by the italian mainstream media, further reinforced the polarized nature of the debate. under the surface, however, the situation was far more complicated. on the one hand, the decision to sign the memorandum by the conte i government was not the manifestation of a comprehensive strategy, but rather simone dossi 69 the outcome of a contingent mix of factors. on the other hand, those who contested the memorandum from the opposition camp did so for different reasons and with different views of italy’s relations with china. two main factors contributed to the conte i government’s decision to sign the memorandum: uncoordinated initiatives by some members of the government and infighting in a coalition with highly heterogeneous views of foreign policy. first, the government included members with considerable experience and connections in china: minister tria, who had studied in china in the late 1970s, and undersecretary geraci, who had been teaching in chinese universities for a decade. geraci, in particular, was extremely vocal in supporting closer relations with china and italy’s involvement in the bri. just before his appointment, he had written a controversial piece on italy-china relations for the blog of five star movement leader beppe grillo, where china was uncritically presented as a model for italy in several fields (including the management of public security) (geraci 2018). once in power, geraci assumed a highly visible role in italy’s china policy, for example by establishing at the ministry of economic development a working group of china experts tasked with promoting relations with china – the so-called ‘task force cina’. second, some sectors of the majority – especially in the five star movement – identified closer relations with china as crucial for a more proactive foreign policy, as opposed to the alleged subservience of the centre-left governments to the us, the eu institutions, germany and france. the memorandum thus assumed a symbolic value that went far beyond italy-china relations. this can be seen in the arguments presented by the five star movement in support of the memorandum in the parliamentary debates. the mp santi cappellani, for example, cautioned against ‘submission [servilismo] to the north atlantic treaty allies’ and expressed his ‘admiration’ for a government that ‘finally dares to sign a memorandum in the interest of the country and its citizens, thus rediscovering the geopolitical tradition that transformed italy into the great nation that it used to be and that we should return to being’ (camera dei deputati 2019, p. 37). while advocated by some sectors of the majority, however, closer relations with china were resisted by others, most notably in the league, as reflected once again in the parliamentary debates. although never contesting the memorandum in itself, league members of parliament insisted on italy’s traditional alliances and called for reciprocity in trade and investment under the bri. mp giulio centemero, for example, declared that ‘we are and we will always be loyal to our alliance with the united states as a pillar [of italy’s foreign policy]’ and called for greater scrutiny of the bri’s implications for italy’s infrastructures, communications and networks as ‘sectors that impact on national security’ (camera dei deputati 2019, p. 21). similarly, senator paolo formentini called on minister moavero milanesi to protect communications infrastructures and networks as ‘strategic national interests that are not on sale’: ‘we say yes to trade, but trade stops when a national interest is at stake – a national interest that our historical ally, the united states, urged us to protect’ (senato della repubblica 2019). in the opposition camp, the memorandum was criticised by most political forces (with the notable exception of the small liberi e uguali party) but for different reasons. on the one hand, centre-right party forza italia and right-wing party fratelli d’italia were opposed not just to the memorandum, but to the bri as a whole as a major economic italy-china relations and the belt and road initiative 70 and political threat. according to forza italia mp deborah bergamini, the government was ‘closing ports to migrants but opening our country to an invasion of chinese products’ (camera dei deputati 2019, p. 51) and threatening italy’s membership of the ‘western bloc’ by transforming the country from ‘nato’s aircraft carrier’ into a ‘dock for the biggest infrastructure tentacle that the world has even known’ (ibid., pp. 18, 51). on the other hand, the democratic party – despite its rhetoric against the memorandum – did not criticise the bri as such but rather the memorandum as a tool, which it considered to be a unilateral political concession made by the conte i government to china. according to mp ivan scalfarotto, who had served as undersecretary at the ministry of economic development in the renzi and gentiloni governments, the memorandum was ‘the achievement of a praiseworthy goal in the worst possible way’, because ‘agreements with china and work with china have to be done, but without selling out [the country]’ (ibid., pp. 54-55). in conclusion, the conte i government’s decision to sign the memorandum was not the manifestation of a new comprehensive strategy; similarly, the ‘great debate’ on china triggered by the memorandum was not a truly strategic debate centred on clearly defined alternative options. the whole issue of the memorandum was rather a by-product of italy’s contingent domestic political situation in spring 2019. on the one hand, substantial divergences within the ‘yellow-green’ majority left room for uncoordinated foreign policy initiatives; on the other hand, endemic conflict between the majority and the centre-left opposition contributed to a highly polarized debate that failed to recognize long-term elements of continuity in italy’s china policy. by the end of summer 2019, however, the domestic political context had changed dramatically, with the collapse of the conte i government and the establishment of a new conte cabinet, whose majority also included the democratic party that had vehemently opposed the memorandum. just a few months after the signing ceremony, the political conditions that had led to the memorandum had largely disappeared. 5. conclusions. the need for a long-term vision for both political and economic reasons, italy and china might seem to be unlikely partners under the bri. as we have shown, however, several considerations led rome and beijing to identify each other as important partners and the bri as a key platform for bilateral cooperation. on the one hand, china values italy’s position as a bridge between different regions involved in the bri and sees the country as an interesting destination for investments, due to both italy’s strengths and weaknesses. on the other hand, italy soon identified the bri as an opportunity for gaining greater access to the chinese market and for attracting chinese investments into the country. while in line with italy’s long march toward the bri, however, the conte i government’s decision to sign the memorandum in 2019 was the product of a contingent political context that has since changed significantly. this leaves open the question of the prospects for the memorandum and the implications for the future of italy-china relations. as a non-binding document, the memorandum does not produce immediate returns for the two parties, but rather provides a framework for the negotiation of specific and legally binding documents in the areas that it covers. yet it would be wrong to conclude that the memorandum is merely simone dossi 71 symbolic. for beijing, it is a demonstration of italy’s political support for the bri as china’s most ambitious foreign policy initiative and, more broadly, a demonstration of italy’s political support for china’s proactive role in international politics. such support was taken very seriously in beijing, especially at a time when the bri was increasingly contested elsewhere. from china’s point of view, the memorandum thus brings relations with italy to a new level and creates the conditions for a qualitative leap forward in bilateral cooperation. in fact, beijing has repeatedly signalled this positive attitude to rome, for example by reserving special treatment to foreign minister di maio when he visited shanghai in november 2019 for the second china international import expo (santevecchi 2019). the ball is, then, in italy’s court. rome has to decide what it wants to achieve through the memorandum, a decision that is now considerably complicated by the growing tensions between washington and beijing. but a decision has to be made, and it has to be made rapidly, as the bri itself is under review in beijing. as mentioned above, there is the perception among chinese scholars that the bri will be adjusted, with a stronger emphasis on china’s own priorities. if italian policy-makers are not focused enough, the whole issue of italy’s participation in the bri might, then, transform into just another missed opportunity for the country. in this respect, the real risk for italy’s engagement in the bri is the lack of a long-term vision, which is also the main lesson from the 2019 debate and a striking element of asymmetry between italy and china. the bri is underpinned by a clear vision of china’s future place in the world: it is a quintessentially strategic initiative that was articulated in beijing as a response to an increasingly complicated international context and based on a long-term vision for china’s rise. on the contrary, italy’s approach to china and the bri seems to be still largely reactive: what is missing is a long-term vision for the future of italy’s relations with a rising power that is going to exercise growing influence – both in economic and political terms – in europe and in the mediterranean region. the lack of a long-term vision is in turn related to the poor conditions of the italian public debate on china. in a country where foreign policy is rarely the subject of public debate, relations with china are no exception. it is notable that chinese investments in strategic sectors of the italian economy under the renzi government took place in the absence of any public discussion. in this respect, the debate around the bri memorandum, with all its limits, was a useful step forward. for a couple of weeks, italy’s china policy was at the centre of discussions among policy-makers, with the involvement of both branches of parliament. while much of the pathos was merely instrumental to domestic agendas, this nonetheless ensured media coverage of the issue, which created a rare window of opportunity for scholars and experts, who were invited to share their views on china, the bri and the state of italy-china relations. unfortunately, in the turbulent political situation of spring 2019, the attention of the media declined rapidly, and italy’s china policy soon returned to be the specialized field of a small community of foreign policy experts and decision-makers. yet, if italy wants to seize the opportunities that participation in the bri might offer and reduce the associated risks, a more structured and permanent debate on china and italy-china 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(xiuzheng’an)’ da jizhe wen”, renmin ribao, 29 october 2017, p. 5. zhao, xianjin, and zhang xiaoting (2019), “‘yi dai yi lu’ changyi xia zhongguo yu yidali jingmao hezuo de jiyu yu tiaozhan”, duiwai jingmao shiwu, no. 2019/06, pp. 26-28. zhong, zhun (2016), ‘yidali waijiao zhengce ji qi zai oumeng zhong de xin juese. zhengdan zhengzhi de fenxi shijiao’, ouzhou yanjiu, no. 2016/4, pp. 117-130. italian political science, volume 17 issue 1 published in 2022 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 17, issue 1, 55–74. contact author: michelangelo vercesi e-mail address: michelangelo.vercesi@fsch.unl.pt ministerial comebacks: explaining reselection and promotion of cabinet members in italy andrea pedrazzani university of milan michelangelo vercesi nova university lisbon abstract three cabinets (conte i, conte ii, and draghi) entered office during the 18th legislative term in italy. in spite of the significant ideological differences between them, no full alternation of parties in government occurred. the largest party in parliament – the five star movement – participated in all three cabinets, while the league and the democratic party took part in two of them (the league in the conte i and draghi, the democratic party in the conte ii and draghi); other minor parties entered the conte ii and draghi as well. did party continuity lead to ministerial stability? this article puts the 18th legislative term in perspective, through a longitudinal comparison of all italian partisan cabinets from 1994 to 2022 (15 cabinets). in particular, it aims to account for continuity and changes within the italian ministerial elite across different cabinets, also controlling for the gendered aspect of cabinet reselections and promotions. it answers the following questions. what makes ministerial reselection likely? do political and personal background count in being reappointed and promoted? based on original data, the analysis shows that remarkable previous political experience, age, and time matter. in contrast, the type of portfolio held in cabinet and gender do not have a significant impact. in this context, the 18th legislative term appears in line with the general pattern, but it distances itself from other terms defined by party continuity across multiple cabinets. the article contributes to the debates about personnel turnover, representation, and policymakers’ stability in democratic cabinets. 1. introduction olitical executives in parliamentary democracies are collective institutions made up of a prime minister (pm) and a number of senior ministers. some of these ministers stay in office longer than others. moreover, some cabinet members serve in multiple cabinets, while some serve just in one. this article deals with ministerial reselection across cabinets in italy. one of the key concerns of the comparative literature on ministerial careers in parliamentary systems has been the explanation of ministerial selection and deselection, with scholars focusing on both structural constraints and actors’ strategies (e.g., amorim neto and strøm 2006; dowding and dumont 2009, 2015). in this context, it has been observed that a person’s social and political background, as well as gender, affects the likelihood of their becoming a minister (e.g., blondel and thiébault 1991; krook and p ministerial comebacks 56 o’brien 2012; hallerberg and wehner 2018). at the same time, strong prime ministers tend to dismiss cabinet members to reduce agency loss (indriðason and kam 2008), to tackle ministerial scandals (berlinski et al. 2012), or to boost government popularity (miwa 2018). the common denominator of this literature is that it concentrates on ministerial selection and deselection as discrete events or as parts of broader cabinet reshuffles within one cabinet (helms and vercesi 2022). what the relevant studies miss is to account for what fosters the reselection of a given minister in a new cabinet, even after a period out of office. as blondel (1980: 196) observed already in 1980, many executive members stay ‘close to the corridors of power after their downfall from high office, hoping to return to the […] position later’. reselection is more infrequent than ‘one-shot selections’ and, therefore, it needs to be studied as a phenomenon in itself, driven by specific political logics. admittedly, studies of elite circulation in democracy refer to this topic indirectly (verzichelli 2018). yet, there is a scholarship paucity about the individual-based determinants of ministerial returns (see fleming 2021). this is surprising in light, on the one hand, of the important role that personal background and previous experience play in the definition of political career paths (müller-rommel et al. 2020) and, on the other hand, of the impact of ministerial profiles on political representation and government performance. for example, female ministers increase women’s empowerment and cabinet stability (barnes and taylor-robinson 2018; franceschet et al. 2017; krauss and kroeber 2021), while social policy may depend on the partisanship and the gender of a minister (atchison and down 2009; alexiadou 2015, 2020). this article is an attempt to fill the literature gap, by comparing the personnel makeup of the three italian cabinets of the 18th legislative term (2018-2022) to the previous ministerial teams (from 1994). the aim is to detect the factors that foster (or undermine) the continuity of the ministerial elite as well as ministerial promotions through government changes, when parties come back to power; the investigation pays attention to the possible gendered facet of these phenomena. the driving research questions are the following. what explains the multiple appointments of ministers from the same party to different cabinets? which individual characteristics make a minister more likely to return and to be promoted? the 18th legislative term is put into perspective because of its particular configuration. compared to previous terms, this was characterized by the partial alternation in government of the three largest parties in parliament across three cabinets: the first cabinet leaning to the ideological right, the second to the left, and the third supported by all major parties in parliament. the three cabinets – conte i, conte ii, and draghi – were supported by different types of multiparty coalitions. while the five star movement (movimento 5 stelle, m5s) was in office in all three cabinets, the league (lega) was in office in the first and third and the democratic party (partito democratico, pd) in the latest two. in relation to other terms, the 18th legislative term allows an investigation into whether general explaining factors are time-dependent or if they also hold within one single legislative term, with large parties coming and going from the cabinet. the italian case is particularly suitable to answer the research questions. indeed, italy is a parliamentary democracy with frequent cabinet turnover. since the breakdown of the first republican party system in the early 1990s, the country has been pedrazzani and vercesi 57 characterized by the frequent alternation of parties in government and party system changes (zucchini and pedrazzani 2021); this phase has led to large ministerial turnover and diversity in the ministers’ background (verzichelli 2009; musella et al. 2022).1 the focus on the 1994-2022 period (made up of seven legislative terms) allows investigating ministerial reappointments between both consecutive and non-consecutive cabinets. in the next section, we present the theoretical framework and infer four hypotheses, based on the extant literature. subsequently, we describe our case study and the most relevant aspects of our interest. the fourth section introduces the dataset and tests the expectations. the final section provides a discussion and suggests research outlooks. overall, the work contributes to knowledge of the selection patterns of top politicians in contemporary democracies and has implications for the debates about personnel turnover, representation, and policy-makers’ stability in democratic cabinets. 2. party delegation, ministerial background and reselection in this article, we assume that ministers are ambitious politicians (schlesinger 1966) interested in surviving in office and trying to avoid steps back down their career ladder. as stressed by blondel (1991: 153), a ministerial position in parliamentary democracies is usually the ‘apex of a political career and indeed a career tout court […]. to cease being a minister is thus a form of decline’. save, for example, for rare cases of promotion to a top executive regional office or to outstanding positions within supranational organizations, most ministers should be interested in being reappointed after leaving the cabinet. moreover, they would probably prefer to be reappointed to prestigious ministerial portfolios, if not as prime ministers.2 ministers’ chances of getting the job are subordinate to the preferences of those who pick them. although the prime minister is formally in charge of their selection, the true selectors (i.e., the principals) of the ministers (i.e., the agents) in coalition governments are their respective parties, embodied by party leaders (andeweg 2000).3 these leaders are the ultimate selectors of their own party representatives in the cabinet (bäck and carroll 2020), whereas the prime minister has greater autonomy in selecting non-partisan ministers (costa pinto et al. 2018).4 in this context, (the prospect of) reselection is one of the most potentially incisive instruments that party leaders have to induce a minister to behave according to the party agenda, even after being appointed (andeweg 2000: 389). 1 higher ministerial stability characterized the first decades of the republic (see calise and mannheimer 1982). 2 we do not consider voluntary retirements. however, they are mostly dependent on the age of the outgoing minister and we control for this in the empirical analysis. 3 party leaders will have to accommodate the requests of internal party factions in making their choices. 4 one should notice that, as long as party organizations are strong, political parties have – through their leaders – full control of ministerial selection. in contrast, the number of non-partisan technocrats increases when parties lose their grasp on society and electoral volatility is high (e.g., emanuele et al. 2022; helms 2022). the logic of technocratic appointments, however, does not coincide with the logic of partisan appointments. factors such as commitment to policy change and international credibility, rather than party reliability, are of major importance (e.g., alexiadou and gunaydin 2019; alexiadou et al. 2021). moreover, the reappointments of non-partisan technocratic ministers are empirically exceptional events (improta 2022). for our article’s purposes, we thus develop our hypotheses referring only to partisan ministers. ministerial comebacks 58 overall, party leaders want to avoid agency loss (lupia 2003) and, for this reason, they try very carefully to select loyal agents who will act according to their preferences once in office. these leaders screen in advance the pool of ministerial candidates, by using their individual characteristics as proxies of party reliability. the most straightforward indicator of party reliability is a minister’s previous service in the party and within political institutions, because it provides information about their behavior and compliance with the party agenda. this especially holds when the political position at issue has been held for a relatively long period of time (e.g., samuels and shugart 2010; kaltenegger 2022; kaltenegger and ennser-jedenastik 2022; müller-rommel et al. 2022). reselection is a particular form of selection (verge and astudillo 2019) and, just as the set of reselected ministers is a smaller subset of those selected at least once, the set of promoted cabinet members is a subset of those reselected (figure 1). therefore, reselection and promotion need to be investigated as distinguished phenomena, although they are strictly related to selection (and one another). figure 1. set relation between the groups of selected, reselected, and promoted cabinet ministers source: own elaboration. the same factors that favor the selection of a minister may have an impact on her or his reselection and promotion, but this conclusion cannot be taken for granted. more specifically, it is plausible that to be reselected is more demanding than being selected and that to be promoted is more difficult than being simply reselected. due to the quantitatively poor literature on ministerial reselections, we use the existing empirical literature to develop our expectations inductively. building upon our theoretical considerations, we argue that political experience matters when it comes to being reselected.5 in this regard, astudillo (2015) shows that a 5 as some scholars have shown, political experience also determines political performance in the cabinet (grotz et al. 2021), which, in turn, may affect reselection. other factors might theoretically count, such as territorial origin and kinship. however, we exclude them, since they either have little effect within the pedrazzani and vercesi 59 politician’s anchoring in their own party is usually an important condition to be at least considered for reselection in top executive positions. more specifically, claveria and verge’s (2015) comparison of post-ministerial careers in 23 democracies finds that political seniority is a significant drive behind ministerial reselection. at the same time, louwerse and van vonno (2022) observe that party leaders value parliamentary activism when it comes to assessing the performance of their own representatives. and an mp, to be active in parliament, needs to stay in office for a sufficient amount of time. these findings are in line with the results of martocchia diodati and verzichelli (2017), who observe that extensive parliamentary experience and the occupation of a top party office boost one’s probability of becoming minister in italy.6 moreover, verge and astudillo (2019) remind us that holding the party leadership is a key resource to be included in subsequent cabinets. therefore, our first hypothesis is that: h1a: previous long parliamentary careers increase the likelihood of being reselected by one’s own party in a new cabinet; h1b: the previous occupation of a leadership position within the party increases the likelihood of being reselected by one’s own party in a new cabinet. martocchia diodati and verzichelli (2017) also suggest that the core members of the executive are more frequently selected for higher offices in subsequent cabinets. on a similar note, studies on ministerial durability detect a positive relation between the occupation of a prestigious ministerial portfolio and survival in office (hubert and martinez-gallardo 2008; hansen et al. 2013; bright et al 2015). these observations fit with the general argument that those in office enjoy an ‘incumbency advantage’ related to future selections (golden and picci 2015). based on these findings, our second hypothesis is that: h2: those who have held a prestigious ministerial portfolio in a previous government are more likely to be reselected by their own party in a new cabinet. that said, there are plenty of studies showing that cabinets are gendered institutions, in that women meet less favorable career conditions than men. although the number of women in government has sensibly grown in the most recent years in several countries and many cabinets apply a ‘parity norm’ (beckwith and franceschet 2022), women are still underrepresented and stay in office for shorter periods than their male counterparts (fischer et al. 2012; claveria 2014; bright et al. 2015). interestingly enough, cabinets are often subject to what scherpereel et al. (2018) have called the ‘see-saw effect’. this means that substantial increases in the presence of women in one cabinet are normally followed by ‘backsliding’ trends in the following one. some studies suggest that this effect is likely to hold also among cabinets that are not consecutive. for example, verge and astudillo (2019: 733) find that party seniority matters only for men when it comes to returning to public office. moreover, o’brien (2015) observes that women are more likely than men to leave top political office once their party has suffered poor electoral performance. italian political system for the period under investigation or have become of minor importance over time (e.g., smith 2018: 40; tronconi and verzichelli 2021). 6 in italy, ministers may be also parliamentarians, but they do not have to be. ministerial comebacks 60 coherently, we expect that: h3: women are less likely than men to be reselected by their own party in a new cabinet. finally, it has been observed that, once entering government for the first time, it takes longer for women to reach higher prestigious positions than men (kroeber and hüffelmann 2021; curtin et al. 2022). the existence of such gendered patterns of careers within cabinets leads to our fourth hypothesis: h4: women are less likely than men to be promoted to more prestigious posts when reselected by their own party to serve in a new cabinet. before testing these hypotheses, we elaborate on the party attributes and ministerial composition of italian cabinets from 1994 to 2022. 3. cabinets and coalitions in italy, 1994-2022 italy has had a long track record of cabinets since the end of the second world war. according to official counting rules, the meloni executive (the cabinet which is in office at the time of writing) is the 68th government of the italian republic. although based on various coalitional formulas, all cabinets formed during the so-called ‘first republic’ were centered upon christian democracy (democrazia cristiana, dc), which was a pivotal party in the party system (verzichelli and cotta 2000). after the breakdown of the traditional party system in the early 1990s and the shift to a ‘second republic’, italy has been characterized by instability in the party system and the frequent alternation of parties in government (zucchini and pedrazzani 2021). for about two decades since 1994, center-right and center-left coalitions competed at elections and alternated in power. in particular, the center-right cabinet headed by silvio berlusconi in 1994 was the first italian government to not include the dc. this government was made up of berlusconi’s go italy (forza italia, fi), the post-fascist national alliance (alleanza nazionale, an), the regional/separatist northern league (lega nord, ln) and an ex-dc conservative segment. after lamberto dini’s technocratic cabinet (1995-1996) and new elections, the 13th legislative term (1996-2001) featured four center-left coalition cabinets. these cabinets included the main party of the left – the democratic party of the left (partito democratico della sinistra, pds), then relabeled left democrats (democratici di sinistra, ds) – and the center-left heir of the dc – the italian popular party (partito popolare italiano, ppi), which later on became the daisy (la margherita) – together with several minor parties (communists, greens, etc.). center-right parties came back to power in the 14th legislative term (2001-2006), with two consecutive executives led again by berlusconi, while a center-left cabinet was formed in the 15th term (2006-2008). during the life of this cabinet, which relied upon a very large and extremely heterogeneous coalition, the ds and the daisy merged into the pd. a new center-right coalition government with berlusconi as pm took office after the 2008 elections, including the people of freedom (popolo della libertà, pdl) – a party resulting from the merger between fi and an – as well as the ln and the movement for the autonomies (movimento per le autonomie, mpa), the latter being a moderate party with an electoral base in southern italy. in november 2011, the berlusconi iv cabinet was replaced by a technocratic government headed by mario monti. pedrazzani and vercesi 61 the inconclusive results of the elections held in february 2013 seemed to mark the ‘end of bipolarism’ and brought about the formation of a ‘grand coalition’ (letta cabinet), which was initially supported by the pd, pdl, monti’s civic choice (scelta civica, sc) and the christian democrats of the union of the center (unione di centro, udc) (chiaramonte and emanuele 2014; di virgilio et al. 2015; pasquino and valbruzzi 2015). in november 2013 the pdl withdrew its support from the cabinet and relabeled itself fi, while a pdl segment remained loyal to the executive after naming itself new centerright (nuovo centrodestra, ncd). during the same legislative term, two other cabinets – very similar to each other – were formed in 2014 and 2016, featuring matteo renzi and paolo gentiloni as pms (respectively) and including the pd as well as the ncd and other minor centrist parties. the elections of march 2018 were once again the beginning of a turbulent phase (chiaramonte et al. 2018). no party or pre-electoral coalition obtained an absolute majority of parliamentary seats, the anti-establishment m5s turned out to be the most voted party in italy (winning as much as one-third of the popular vote), and the league surpassed for the first time its traditional coalition partner fi. after a long bargaining process, a new cabinet was sworn in in june 2018, with the m5s and the league as coalition partners and giuseppe conte as pm (giannetti et al. 2018, 2022; valbruzzi 2018). the so-called ‘yellow-green’ cabinet lasted for 15 months only, as a government crisis triggered by the league prompted the m5s to join the pd and the left-wing free and equal (liberi e uguali, leu) into a new coalition government – conte ii cabinet – in september 2019 (conti et al. 2020). following tensions within the coalition, the conte ii cabinet was replaced in february 2021 by a sort of ‘national unity’ executive which was headed by mario draghi and involved all the main italian parties except for giorgia meloni’s brothers of italy (fratelli d’italia, fdi). draghi’s resignation in july 2022 led to early elections two months later. most cabinets during the 1994–2022 period relied upon legislative coalitions that were rather fragmented and quarrelsome. it can be said, however, that center-right executives were less fragmented in terms of the number of coalition members and enjoyed more stable parliamentary support if compared to center-left ones (conti and marangoni 2015). as we will show below, this does not imply that center-left cabinets were less stable in terms of ministerial personnel. a particularly relevant trait of italian executives during the second republic regards their size and ministerial structure: after reaching their maximum size in the 1987-1992 legislative term, italian cabinets have gradually become smaller in terms of both the number of ministries and the overall number of ministerial departments. this has been especially true since 2001, when a single ministry of economy and finance was created, and a number of other ministries were merged (zucchini and pedrazzani 2021). as to patterns of portfolio allocation, since the end of the second world war the distribution of ministerial posts has largely followed a proportionality norm (gamson’s law) among coalition parties. in this regard, it should be noted that, during the second republic, the degree of proportionality was particularly high for those cabinets sworn in immediately after the elections and lower for those formed later during the legislative term (cotta and marangoni 2015). ministerial comebacks 62 a further peculiarity of the cabinets of the second republic concerns non-partisan ministers, who were rather exceptional during the previous period. after the appointment of a technocrat-led cabinet (mcdonnell and valbruzzi 2014) in 1993 (ciampi), the number of non-partisan ministers increased throughout the second republic. not only did two fully technocratic executives (dini and monti) take office, but also the partisan cabinets have often featured a number of non-partisan figures appointed to some key ministries – above all to the ministry of finance. moreover, a non-partisan policy expert has been appointed to ministries such as justice, labor, and health several times. other important portfolios – for instance, the interior, defense, and foreign affairs – have instead been assigned usually to high-ranking and long-tenured party members (verzichelli and cotta 2018). finally, non-partisan appointees are rarely found in ministerial posts without a portfolio, as the latter are often created to increase the spoils to be distributed to the government parties. 4. empirical analysis 4.1. data and operationalization of variables to test the hypotheses put forward in section 2, we built a dataset including all the partisan cabinets that were formed in italy during the 1994-2022 period. our data allow us to analyze patterns of ministerial reselection in the 18th legislative term (2018-2022) and to compare them to what can be observed during the previous six terms (1994-1996, 19962001, 2001-2006, 2006-2008, 2008-2013, 2013-2018). on the whole, we include all the 15 partisan cabinets that took office throughout the italian ‘second republic’.7 the aim of this article is to understand what types of ministers – in terms of political experience, previous ministerial appointments and personal traits such as gender – are more likely to be reselected by their own party when the party comes back to power. to do this, a comparison is needed between the ministerial team of a given governmental party and the ministerial team of the same party in the next cabinet it participates in. supposing that party x participates in government a and, some years later, enters government b (where a and b are either two consecutive or two non-consecutive cabinets), reselection occurs when a minister from party x appears in government a as well as in government b.8 for instance, roberto castelli, a member of the northern league who was minister of justice in the berlusconi ii cabinet (2001-2005), was appointed to exactly the same portfolio in the next government his party participated in (berlusconi iii, 2005-2006). similarly, pier luigi bersani – minister of transport and navigation in the amato ii cabinet (2000-2001) was reselected to serve as minister of economic development when his party (left democrats – democratici di sinistra, ds) came back to power 7 we follow the official counting of italian governments, according to which there is a new cabinet whenever a new ministerial team is sworn in before the head of state. we do not consider the two fully nonpartisan cabinets headed by dini (1995) and monti (2011). 8 our analysis is based on comparing pairs of cabinets. hence, if party x participates in governments a, b and c and a minister from party x holds a portfolio in all three governments, we count an instance of reselection in the a-b pair and another instance of reselection in the b-c pair. for reasons of empirical tractability, in this article we do not consider multiple (re)appointments of the same minister. to control for the possibility that the same individual appears more than once in the dataset, in our regression analysis we cluster standard errors on the minister’s name (see below). pedrazzani and vercesi 63 in may 2006 (prodi ii cabinet) after staying in the opposition for the entire 2001-2006 legislative term. danilo toninelli, who was minister of infrastructure and transport in the conte i cabinet (2018-2019), was instead not reselected as minister when his own party – the m5s – broke with the league and formed a new government (conte ii, 20192021) together with the pd and leu. our dataset then includes the ministerial teams of those governing parties that came back to power during the 1994-2022 period.9 as we investigate ministerial reappointment at the individual level, the unit of analysis in the data is the individual minister. the total number of observations is 308. the main dependent variable in our analysis indicates whether a minister is reselected in the next government their party takes part in. in particular, the dummy variable reselected equals 1 if a minister of cabinet a is reappointed in the next cabinet (b) where the minister’s party appears (whether governments a and b are consecutive or not).10 conversely, this variable is 0 if a minister is not reselected by the party when this enters a new cabinet. on average, throughout the 1994-2022 period, more than one-third of italian ministers (37% – that is, 115 out of 308) were reselected by their own party and appointed to a cabinet post the next time the party entered government. the standard deviation around the overall mean of 0.37 is 0.48, indicating a huge variation. to explore such variation, in figures 2 and 3 we show how the dependent variable is distributed across legislative terms and cabinets, and across parties, respectively. figure 2. patterns of ministerial reselection in italy, 1994-2022, by legislative term and cabinet source: own elaboration. 9 some italian parties came back to office with a different name or after a party merger. for instance, fi and an came back to government in 2008 after merging into the pdl. 10 prime ministers are included. moreover, we consider all types of ministerial appointments – that is, both with portfolio and without portfolios. 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 conte ii conte i gentiloni renzi letta berlusconi iv prodi ii berlusconi iii berlusconi ii amato ii d'alema ii d'alema i prodi i berlusconi i (by legislative term and cabinet) proportion of ministers re-selected by their party in a new cabinet ministerial comebacks 64 figure 2 displays the average proportion of ministers reselected by their party in a new cabinet for the different cabinets covered in this study. the graph reveals that the ministerial personnel of some governments was largely reselected by the parties in the new governments they formed afterwards. this is the case of the two executives headed by massimo d’alema (formed in 1998 and 1999), the berlusconi ii cabinet (2001) and the renzi cabinet (2014). each of these cabinets was followed by a very similar cabinet during the same legislative term, with the new cabinet resembling the previous one not only in terms of party composition, but also in terms of ministerial personnel. indeed, the governing parties of these four cabinets reselected as ministers more than 60% (on average) of their ministerial team. in contrast, ministerial reselection was very limited (much less than 10%) in the case of the parties that were members of three cabinets: prodi ii (2006), berlusconi iv (2008) and gentiloni (2016). for example, if we consider the gentiloni cabinet we note that the pm and 12 ministers belonged to the pd. of these 13 pd members, only dario franceschini obtained a cabinet position when the pd came back to power in 2019 (conte ii cabinet).11 in terms of ministerial reselection, the cabinets of the 18th legislature are in between the two ‘extremes’ and closer to the overall mean. with regard to the conte i executive, just one-fourth of the ministers were reappointed by their own party in the governments that followed. in particular, the m5s reselected three of its nine-person team when entering the conte ii cabinet: giuseppe conte (who remained pm), luigi di maio (who went from being deputy pm, minister of economic development and minister of labor and social policies to being minister of foreign affairs) and alfonso bonafede (who remained minister of justice). the league reselected only one of its ministers when coming back to power in the draghi government: erika stefani, who was minister of regional affairs and autonomies under conte i and minister of disabilities under draghi. moreover, the minister of environment sergio costa – a non-partisan figure at the time of the formation of the conte i cabinet – was reappointed to the same position in the conte ii cabinet. as for the conte ii cabinet, we note that 41% of its ministerial personnel received a cabinet post in the draghi executive. more precisely, three of the nine ministers who belonged to the pd at the time of the formation of the conte ii cabinet were reselected in the draghi cabinet: dario franceschini, lorenzo guerini and elena bonetti.12 similarly, the m5s reappointed four of its ten ministers: luigi di maio, stefano patuanelli, fabiana dadone and federico d’incà. in addition, the only minister from leu (roberto speranza) was reappointed to the health portfolio in the draghi government. finally, the independent luciana lamorgese was minister of interior in both the conte ii and the draghi cabinet. these figures seem to indicate that, in a legislature characterized by different types of government coalitions and partial alternation in government of the three largest parties, ministerial reselection took place only to a limited extent. the m5s, the league and the pd reappointed only a few of their outgoing ministers in the next governments they participated in, presumably as a way to signal discontinuity with the prior government and to present a ministerial team that was more 11 franceschini was given the same ministership (culture and tourism) in the two cabinets. quite interestingly, franceschini was reselected three times by the pd, as he served as minister of culture in the renzi, gentiloni, conte ii and draghi cabinets. 12 elena bonetti actually left the pd a couple of weeks after the formation of the conte ii cabinet, when a pd faction broke with the party to become italy alive (italia viva, iv). pedrazzani and vercesi 65 compatible with the ‘new’ coalition partners. this pattern is especially visible in the case of the m5s, which took part in all three cabinets of the 18th legislature and reappointed less than half of its ministers when turning from the conte i to the conte ii executive and from the conte ii to the draghi executive. figure 3. patterns of ministerial reselection in italy, 1994-2022, by party source: own elaboration. figure 3 reports the average proportion of ministers reselected by their party in a new cabinet, for the different italian parties that were government members in the 19942022 period. although there does not seem to be a clear pattern in terms of party size, we can note that two small parties are the most prone to reselecting their ministers: the radicals (rad), which were members of the prodi ii cabinet and reselected emma bonino in the letta cabinet, and leu, which appointed roberto speranza in the conte ii cabinet and again in the draghi cabinet. in contrast, two large parties such as pd and pdl reselected their ministers only to a limited extent. quite interestingly, the main predecessor of the pd in the 1990s – the pds, which then became ds – used to reselect its ministers much more often than the pd. similarly, the two parties which merged into the pdl – fi and an – reselected their ministers more than the pdl. let us also note that two minor parties such as the italian social democrats (socialisti democratici italiani, sdi) and sc did not reselect their ministerial personnel across the cabinets they participated in (d’alema i, amato ii and prodi ii for the former, and letta and renzi for the latter). as to the other parties, we observe that the m5s and the (northern) league display a reselection record that is not far from the overall mean: 37% and 30%, respectively. after such a descriptive account of the dependent variable, we now turn to the operationalization of the other variables included in our analysis. with regard to the independent variables, h1a and h1b posit that ministers are more likely to be reselected by their own party in a new cabinet if they have sat in parliament for a long time and if 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 rad leu dem pds/ds ri ncd ppi fdv udr/udeur pdci fi an m5s ccd/udc ln indep pd pdl sdi sc (by party) proportion of ministers re-selected by their party in a new cabinet ministerial comebacks 66 they have been party leader in the past, respectively. to test h1a we counted the number of legislative terms that a minister spent in parliament (sitting in the chamber of deputies or in the senate) before being appointed as a minister for the first time. the resulting variable is called parliamentary experience. as for h1b, we created a dummy variable named party leader, whose value is 1 when a minister was leader of the party in the past, and 0 otherwise.13 according to h2, those who have previously held a prestigious ministerial portfolio are more likely to be reappointed by their own party in a new cabinet. to test this hypothesis, we classified ministerial portfolios according to their importance and identified five top positions: prime ministership, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of interior, ministry of economy, and ministry of labor.14 the resulting variable – the dummy prestigious portfolio – equals 1 if a minister holds one of the top five cabinet positions in government a. the last two hypotheses we formulated deal with women’s chances of being reselected and promoted to more prestigious cabinet positions. to empirically evaluate h3, according to which female ministers are less likely than their male colleagues to be reselected by the own party in a new cabinet, we created a dummy called woman (1 for female ministers, and 0 for male ministers). testing h4 requires the creation of a second dependent variable. according to this hypothesis, female ministers are less likely than males to be promoted to more prestigious posts when they are reselected by their own party to serve in a new cabinet. to operationalize promotion, we created a dummy variable coded as 1 when a minister holds a non-top portfolio (see above) in cabinet a and is reselected to hold a top portfolio in the next cabinet (b) where the minister’s party appears. this variable, which we call promoted, is equal to 0 in all other situations. in the analysis, we controlled for a set of factors – at the individual, party, and cabinet level – that can influence patterns of ministerial reselection. at the individual level, we introduced age, which corresponds to the minister’s age at the time when their party enters a new cabinet. at the party level, we took into account the fact that, all else being equal, the reselection of any minister can be particularly hard if the party controls a small number of cabinet portfolios when entering a new cabinet. we hence included party share, measuring the share of cabinet posts controlled by the minister’s party in the new government. finally, at the cabinet level we accounted for the fact that a minister’s reappointment becomes less and less likely to occur the longer the time between government a and government b. in particular, we incorporated the variable time between, which counts the number of years between the starting year of the cabinet where the minister appears and the starting year of the next cabinet where the minister’s party appears. descriptive statistics for all the variables are provided in table 1. 13 we attribute 1 even if the party was different from the current one. 14 when more than one portfolio deals with the economy (e.g., ministry of treasury and ministry of finance), we consider all these portfolios among the top portfolios. the classification of prestige portfolio is based on bergman et al. (2021). pedrazzani and vercesi 67 table 1. descriptive statistics variables mean sd min max n dependent variables: reselected 0.37 0.48 0 1 308 promoted 0.02 0.14 0 1 308 independent variables: parliamentary experience 1.73 1.82 0 10 308 party leader 0.12 0.33 0 1 308 prestigious portfolio 0.24 0.43 0 1 308 woman 0.20 0.40 0 1 308 control variables: age 56.58 10.49 33 83 308 party share 0.29 0.19 0 0.68 308 time between 3.32 2.33 1 10 308 source: own elaboration. 4.2. analysis and results turning from a descriptive analysis to an explanatory one, we now present the multivariate logistic regression models that we used to test the hypotheses discussed in section 2. in particular, we ran two logistic regression models. one with reselected as dependent variable, which allows us to test h1a, h1b, h2 and h3 (model 1). and one with promoted as dependent variable, allowing us to test h4 (model 2). while model 1 uses all the observations in our dataset, model 2 uses a subsample of the data (that is, only those ministers who are reselected in the next cabinet where their party participates). in both models, standard errors are clustered on the minister’s name. coefficients are reported in table 2. note that coefficients are expressed as odds ratios, where the odd is defined as the probability that an event – in our case, reselection or promotion of a minister – will occur, divided by the probability that the event will not occur. the odds ratio compares two odds, computed at different covariate values. in the table, the odds ratios indicate how the probability of reselection (or promotion) changes for a one-unit change in the independent variable of interest. starting from model 1, it can be noted that our first two hypotheses are supported by the data on italian cabinets in the 1994-2022 period. in particular, a minister’s probability of being reselected by their own party to serve as minister in a new cabinet increases if the minister has a long parliamentary career (h1a) and if they have been leader of the party in the past (h1b). more precisely, an odds ratio of 1.162 on parliamentary experience indicates that each additional legislative term spent in parliament before a first ministerial appointment increases a minister’s chance of being reselected by their own party in a new cabinet by 16%. at the same time, having served as party leader in the past ministerial comebacks 68 more than doubles a minister’s chance of being reselected in a new government the next time the party comes back to power.15 table 2. determinants of ministers’ reselection and promotion in italy, 1994-2022. model 1 (reselection) model 2 (promotion) parliamentary experience 1.150 * 2.295 ** (0.086) (0.936) party leader 2.249 ** 2.203 (0.905) (1.879) prestigious portfolio 1.332 (0.472) woman 0.891 0.318 (0.305) (0.417) age 0.960 *** 0.936 (0.012) (0.088) party share 0.898 2.409 (0.693) (8.800) time between 0.749 *** 1.673 (0.050) (0.584) constant 9.835 *** 0.031 (6.809) (0.090) number of observations 308 115 log pseudolikelihood -181.72 -16.31 notes: logistic regression models with standard errors clustered on ministers’ name. table entries are odds ratios, with standard errors in parentheses. statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. source: own elaboration. our analysis does not lend support to h2 and h3, as the coefficients on prestigious portfolio and woman in model 1 do not reach standard levels of statistical significance. this implies that the probability of being reappointed as minister in a new cabinet does not depend on the prestige of the portfolio held or on the minister’s gender. with regard to h4, the logistic regression of model 2 focuses on those ministers that have been reselected by their own party to serve in a new cabinet and tests whether women are less likely than men to be promoted to more prestigious posts. the coefficient on woman is not statistically significant, indicating that women are not less likely than men to be promoted to more prestigious posts when reselected in a new cabinet. as for the control variables we included, age and time between are found to be statistically significant. more specifically, ministers become less and less likely to be reselected when they get older: a minister’s chance of being reappointed by their party in a new cabinet decreases by roughly 4% for every year that passes. moreover, 15 in analyses we do not report here, we checked if chances of reappointment are higher for those cabinet members who are also leader of their own party at the moment of their possible reselection as ministers. results show that this is not the case, implying that what increases the likelihood of reselection is more a politician’s career within the party than current status as party leader. we must note that incumbent ministers who are also party leaders at the time of their possible reappointment are very few. pedrazzani and vercesi 69 unsurprisingly, reselection chances decrease as time passes between the moment when a minister is in office and the moment when they can be reappointed by their own party in a future cabinet: all else being equal, each additional year reduces reselection changes by 25%. in contrast, the share of cabinet posts controlled by the minister’s party in the new government (party share) does not seem to affect ministers’ reselection chances. 5. discussion and conclusion in this article, we investigated the extent to which italian political parties tend to reselect the same ministers across different political executives. moreover, we tried to detect what makes some ministers more likely than others to be selected by their respective party heads in more than one cabinet. from a theoretical viewpoint, we adopted a principal-agent perspective, arguing that some personal characteristics are particularly important in determining the outcome. first, we hypothesized that remarkable political experiences within the parliament and the party as well as previous cabinet experience in a prestigious ministerial portfolio increase one’s chances to be reselected. second, we expected women – due to the gendered character of political careers and executive institutions – to be less likely than men to be reappointed and promoted to more prestigious cabinet positions. we tested these conjectures on all italian partisan cabinets from 1994 to 2022. the results do not support our arguments for the linkages between gender, portfolio prestige, and reselection or promotion. at the same time, we found that – similarly to what happens with first selections – political experience is a key criterion that party principals take into consideration when it comes to choosing the ministerial team. an experienced minister is, in fact, someone who has already had the opportunity to demonstrate reliability and loyalty towards the party; moreover, the minister will be likely to have acquired enough skills to perform in office. interestingly enough, the seat share of the party within a coalition does not have a significant impact on reselection, while age and time between two cabinets have a negative effect. the lack of significant effect of the portfolio prestige on our main dependent variable may actually be an indicator that party principals value party reliability per se, irrespective of the type of previous cabinet post. in other words, they use a minister’s prior experience within the parliament and in the party to assess their adherence to the party agenda and to have a proxy of future behavior. in a nutshell, a minister can be a reliable party agent either in a prestigious or in a less prestigious portfolio. the rejection of the two gender-related hypotheses, in turn, would suggest that the major existing obstacles to gender parity within cabinets emerge before breaking the ‘glass ceiling’; in this phase, party gate-keeping may be particularly effective in limiting access to positions from where one can prove to be ‘fit for the job’. with regard to the reselection patterns, the 18th legislative term is a particular case, in that it includes three cabinets characterized by partial party alternation yet with significant ideological heterogeneity. compared to other terms where the same parties came back to power immediately after the fall of the previous executive, the 18th term shows lower levels of ministerial continuity. a possible explanatory factor is the relative high variation in the coalition partners’ policy positions from one cabinet to another. in this regard, bäck and carroll (2020: 330-331) have pointed out that the choice of a ministerial comebacks 70 minister may be dependent not only on intra-party factors, but also on how coalition partners evaluate a portfolio, and whether or not they like the political profiles in the ally’s pool of candidates. therefore, the same party – say, the m5s – in different cabinets may have had to change its ministers depending on the ideological orientation of the partners, in order to find a general agreement on portfolio allocation. future research could extend the focus of the analysis and provide cross-country comparisons. besides providing more generalizable findings, this would allow assessment of the possible conditional effect of country-specific institutional variables. moreover, scholars could introduce further individual-based variables, whose impact seems plausible. for example, other types of political experiences at sub-national and supranational level could be taken into account. future studies would also greatly benefit from introducing sturdy operationalizations of ministerial performance in office and from consequent analyses of how this performance affects a minister’s career outlooks. acknowledgements the authors thank the anonymous reviewers for their most valuable comments. references alexiadou d (2015) ideologues, partisans, and loyalists: cabinet ministers and social welfare reform in parliamentary 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cambridge: cambridge university press. scherpereel ja, adams m and jacob s (2018) ratchets and see-saws: divergent institutional patterns in women’s political representation. socius 4: 1-13. doi: 10.1177/2378023117735271. schlesinger ja (1966) ambition and politics. political careers in the united states. chicago: rand mcnally and company. smith dm and martin s (2017) political dynasties and the selection of cabinet ministers. legislative studies quarterly 42(1): 131-165. doi: 10.1111/lsq.12146. tronconi f and verzichelli l (2021). the territorial representativeness of italian ministerial elites: from the regional ‘parity norm’ to the rise of technocrats. nationalities papers 1-18. doi: 10.1017/nps.2021.56. valbruzzi m (2018) when populists meet technocrats. the italian innovation in government formation. journal of modern italian studies 23(4): 460-480. doi: 10.1080/1354571x.2018.1500216. verge t and astudillo j (2019) the gender politics of executive candidate selection and reselection. european journal of political research 58(2): 720-740. doi: 10.1111/14756765.12312. verzichelli l (2009) italy. the difficult road towards a more effective process of ministerial selection. in: dowding k and dumont p (eds) the selection of ministers in europe. hiring and firing. london: routledge, pp. 79-100. verzichelli l (2018) elite circulation and stability. in: best h and highley j (eds) the palgrave handbook of political elites. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, pp. 573-591. verzichelli luca and cotta m (2000) italy: from ‘constrained’ coalitions to alternating governments? in müller w c and strøm k (eds) coalition governments in western europe. oxford: oxford university press, pp. 433-497. verzichelli l and cotta m (2018) shades of technocracy: the variable use of non-partisan ministers in italy. in costa pinto a, cotta m and tavares de almeida p (eds) technocratic ministers and political leadership in european democracies. cham: palgrave macmillan, pp. 77-110. zucchini f and pedrazzani a (2021) italy: continuous change and continuity in change. in bergman t, bäck h and hellström j (eds) coalition governance in western europe. oxford: oxford university press, pp. 396-447. microsoft word pdf_issue_12_1.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 1, june 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 1, pp. 55–63. book reviews section edited by carla monteleone and stefania panebianco manuela caiani and simona guerra (eds.), euroscepticism, democracy and the media. communicating europe, contesting europe (palgrave macmillan, 2017). 284 pp., £52.99 (e-book), isbn: 9781137596437 weakening financial and economic equilibrium, rising political relevance of the immigration issue, the resonating anti-eu rhetoric of populist parties, and more recently the outcome of the uk referendum shed light on the ‘crises’ that hit european democracies and, specifically, european union institutions from different angles. as a result, at the national level discontent towards european integration foments political conflict while gaining more and more salience. within this context, old (i.e. newspapers) and new tools of communication (i.e. websites and social networks) bridge political actors’ positions towards the eu and shape the public debate over the eu legitimacy. this book, edited by manuela caiani and simona guerra, offers an in-depth evaluation of the multi-layered concept of euroscepticism considering citizens’ changing attitudes (both pro and con) towards eu politics and the role played by traditional and digital media in framing eu polity, politics, and policies. the allencompassing approach adopted in this book, as stated in the introduction, aims to investigate political parties’ and civil society’s contingent and qualified or outright and unqualified contestation of the european democracy. the volume consists of 12 original contributions covering the existing literature on euroscepticism, democracy, and the media. these contributions analyse the extent to which mass media portray the eu in the political and public debate of different member states, such as the uk, france, italy, denmark, greece, poland, germany, spain, and the netherlands. the book is organised in three parts. in the first section, the authors review the current academic debate on the themes and offer new theoretical suggestions. the second part focuses on the role played by traditional media in shaping and fuelling the so-called ‘spiral of euroscepticism’ in comparison to online platforms, such as the internet and social networks. the third part analyses the extent to which new media channel eurosceptic political conflict to civil society. in the introduction, manuela caiani and simona guerra provide a well-articulated review of studies on euroscepticism and the impact that media can ips, volume 12, issue 1 56 have in influencing public opinions and attitudes. contestation towards the eu may occur differently across ‘actors, tactics, and forms’. there is no unique definition of euroscepticism, rather, it is a nuanced phenomenon that originates from domestic political conflict. although scholars tend to focus mainly on party-based euroscepticism, citizens’ emotions play a crucial role in affecting the process of eu integration, as the result of the brexit referendum demonstrated (simona guerra, chapter two). under these theoretical premises, media can be seen as an obstacleor a facilitator to eu integration and european democracy. however, the dividing line cannot be reduced to a mere dichotomy between new and old means of communication. media do not represent only an important political channel to inform and shape public opinions. they can, in fact, be dynamic actors in negatively framing the eu, and their bias produces direct effects in terms of public discontent (galpin and trenz chapter three). significant events, such as the eurozone crisis, increased the degree of euroscepticism that has also become mainstream in quality newspaper (bijsmans, chapter four). on the demand side, in the emblematic cases of the uk and the netherlands, evidence has also shown that newspaper readership is related to the common perception of journalists’ political bias on the left-right spectrum, as well as to the position they adopt in favour or against the eu (leruth, kutiyski, krouwel and startin, chapter five). intensity in the use of news or social media also affects public preferences towards the eu. new media tend to capture more attention from young people while emphasising euroscepticism, while traditional media tend to frame the eu in positive terms. consequently, media framing effects can be seen in citizens’ eurosceptic or supportive attitudes towards the eu (conti and memoli, chapter six). similarly, despite context-related differences, voters’ news diets and party preferences relate to their positions towards the eu. again, social media represent the main facilitators of eu discontent (mosca and quaranta, chapter seven). the internet in particular is the arena where extreme-right’s anti-eu rhetoric spreads cross-nationally while fuelling political discontent (pavan and caiani, chapter eight). twitter networks show a clear distinction between europhile and eurosceptic camps. social network analysis highlights that europhile networks interact more transnationally than eurosceptic ones (heft, wittwer, pfetschnineth, chapter nine). in contrast to ‘hard’ euroscepticism, the austerity policies’ effect produces a ‘soft’ eu discontent. this can be seen in the claims of movement parties such as syriza and podemosthat support the idea of ‘another europe’ rather than being completely against it (della porta, kouki, fernández, chapter ten). moreover, technologies may be used to develop a new model of citizenship and political representation that transcends national borders. a long-term and sophisticated eu ‘u-government’ model would be shaped by a mixed reality technology (fanoulis and peña-ríos, chapter eleven). as further argued in the conclusion, moving beyond eurosceptic parties’ strategies is an essential starting point to better understanding the different shades in which eu discontent manifests itself (chapter twelve). empirical evidence shows a nuanced euroscepticism and provides substantive arguments for further investigating this highly-contested phenomenon through a bottom-up approach. book reviews 57 finally, in so-called “times of crisis” this book outlines the state of the art on the theoretical and empirical implications that sit behind different eurosceptic labels. a positive connotation of eu contestation is adopted and, often, shared as a dominant frame across countries and actors like citizens, social or political movements, and the extreme right. the book proposes new and interesting stimuli to the study of dissent towards the process of european integration. it also highlights the doublesided role media play as agents and arena for political conflict. by so doing, it represents a valuable starting point for further studies on european politics and political communication. ornella urso, scuola normale superiore, pisa * * * paolo chiocchetti, the radical left party family in western europe, 1989-2015 (london, new york: routledge, 2017). 244 pp., £88.00 (hardback), isbn: 9781138656185 the book is based on an analysis of quantitative data, historical records and public statements that characterized the parties of the radical left in seventeen countries in western europe, from 1989 to 2015. the analysis of the individual parties follows four lines of research: the electoral strength, organizational characteristics and the political strategy. the strength of the parties is measured both in absolute terms and in the systemic context, with the number of votes, of members, of parliamentary seats won and the members’ ability to influence the government, in particular the ability to increase public expenditure in terms of the gdp. the book proposes a “new holistic approach” to conceptualizing and analyzing the party family of the radical left and is developed along three dimensions: the family of radical parties, the individual parties, and the most important fields of investigation. the family party is characterized as opposed to the dominant tradition of social democracy. according to the author, firstly relating the specific identity of the radical left in terms of class clearly distinguishes it from other family parties, maintaining at the same time its internal pluralism; as well as enabling its changes in space and time to be understood whilst maintaining a cognitive compass. in the first chapter the author outlines the theoretical and methodology framework of the book. chiocchetti defines the new european left as the family which responds to the class and communist left, which is separate and distinct from the dominant tradition of social democracy; and acknowledges its constitutive pluralism and historicity. the second chapter reconstructs the parable of the radical left in europe from 1914 to 1988. it originated as a radically anti-capitalistic branch of labor socialism: it was divided between the defense of the soviet model and “real existing” socialism and the acceptance of a reformist model centered on the ips, volume 12, issue 1 58 redistribution of wealth and the expansion of welfare. the third chapter reconstructs the panorama of the radical left in western europe after the historic breakup in 1989, until 2015. in fact 2015 represented the turning point in the history of the radical left, which in three countries gained exceptional electoral success (45.0% in greece with syriza, 25.8 % in spain with podemos and 21.5% in portugal with be and pcp – p. 66). instead, in the three major countries of the eurozone (italy, france, germany) its electoral proposal did not meet in the same way with the favors of the electorate, who preferred other center and right policies. chapters 4 to 6 deal with three special cases of the development of the european left in germany (“a success story”), italy (“history of failure”), and france (failure or success?”). the final chapter attempts a comprehensive reading of the political trajectory of the left in western europe after 1989 (“filling the vacuum?”). the disappearance of the soviet union and the profound crisis of the years 19891993 almost led to the disappearance of the revolutionary left of the communist matrix, to the dispersion of their members and voters. the new revolutionary left that emerged from its ashes has highly diversified characteristics, although it is mostly composed of long-standing militants of the communist movements, trotskyists, maoists and of the socialist left. some legacy of the 20th century communism continues within it but only a small minority cultivates this legacy as the basis of a political project. the vast majority tried to amalgamate very different politicalcultural references: marxism, keynesian, anarchism, social democracy, libertarian left, radical democracy, environmentalism and populism, trying to create a “modern” political organization, which is pluralistic, inclusive and hostile to neoliberalism. the political project is vague and shaky, evoking an idea of transition toward a distant socialist society, towards an anti-capitalism system defined now as communism, now as democratic socialism; a society that affirms the primacy of man over profit. in fact, the political identity of the radical left is undefined, ideology has little to do with political daily choices. it tries to stay focused on the representation of the interests of the working classes, the defense of the welfare state, and the promotion of the values of the libertarian left. engaged in the tradition of the communist left and revolutionary socialism, the radical left in contemporary europe had moved by the 1990s toward a new ideological identity centered on antiliberalism and has thus claimed to be the authentic heir of both historical communist organizations, both of the socialist tradition and of the libertarian left. the radical left appears today as the product of three distinct elements: the decline of the historic tradition of communism and of the socialist left; the adoption of the founding themes that characterized the social democrats and the ecologist left in the 1970s and early 1980s; and finally it is the product of a new anti-neoliberal reflection. the radical left must contend with three challenges and many contradictions: coherence between an antiliberist position and unity of the center-left; between anti-neoliberist and anticapitalist; and between loyalty to the tradition and the requirements posed by the economic and social transformations. consequently, there are difficulties in relations with the other left-wing parties (social democrats book reviews 59 and environmental movements), the ideological oscillations, the organizational weakness and the continuous oscillations between fragmentation and regrouping. according to chiocchetti, the great recession of 2007-2008 offered new and great opportunities to the radical left in europe but, at the same time, it highlighted its limitations. the non-homogeneous electoral successes of the radical left are a barometer of widespread rebellion in many areas of european society against the dominant neo-liberalism, but certainly they are not the only barometer. the successes of the new radical european left are the fruit of anti-austerity mobilisation however, it has not gained success everywhere or been seen as an alternative to existing coalitions of center-right governments or as a partner for the governments of the center left. radical left, neo-communist left, revolutionary left? or just left? the question that arises after reading this thorough research concerns precisely the politicalideological boundaries of the study. and perhaps the answer is that however you translate this “radical” nature, it is still difficult to speak of a “family party”, of a radical left family in western europe after 1989: though the author actually believes this is possible. i believe that what chiocchetti’s careful and very detailed reconstruction does is to highlights the great differentiation among partisan subjects who would like to be grouped into a single family. the non-homogeneity between parties who share the same anti-liberal orientation is very strong and, above all, does not tend to decrease over time, as demonstrated by the evolution of the parties of this shaky radical left in the period following the end of chiocchetti’s research (2015) until today. carlo baccetti, university of florence * * * stefania panebianco (ed.), sulle onde del mediterraneo. cambiamenti globali e risposte alla crisi migratoria (milan, italy: egea, 2016). 230 pp., €24.30 (paperback), isbn: 9788823845275 in 2016, over 180,000 migrants crossed the mediterranean in the attempt to reach italy. after the march 2016 deal between the european union and turkey, the central mediterranean migratory route, heading from the western coast of libya towards sicily, has become the largest avenue of irregular migrations to europe. the death toll – amounting to around 4,500 estimated casualties in 2016 only – has turned the mediterranean into the theatre of a complex humanitarian emergency. in spite of the policy-relevance of migrations across the mediterranean and its salience in the public discourse, academic research on the subject has lagged behind. to be sure, existing scholarship has shed light on different aspects of the phenomenon, such as the securitization of migrations, eu and non-governmental organisations’ law enforcement and search and rescue (sar) operations, and pubips, volume 12, issue 1 60 lic opinions’ (mis-)perceptions of migrations to europe. there is, however, hardly any research seeking to bring together all these different dimensions in order to provide a truly comprehensive overview of the so-called migration crisis. the absence of such an overarching analysis is regrettable, as all the issues mentioned above are tightly intertwined and can hardly be investigated in isolation. decisionmakers’ policies are informed by public opinions’ perceptions, but also shaped by social norms, and international law and institutions. consequently, an in-depth explanation of the migration crisis requires a thorough examination of the material, institutional, and ideational factors affecting foreign and domestic policy decisionmaking processes. sulle onde del mediterraneo. cambiamenti globali e risposte alle crisi migratorie (on the waves of the mediterranean. global changes and responses to migratory crises) – edited by stefania panebianco – is the first attempt to provide such a comprehensive analysis. based on an impressive amount of empirical research conducted at the university of catania within the framework of the research project ‘fir 14’, the volume systematically examines the nature, drivers, and implications of the italian response to the latest surge in maritime migrations by analysing the phenomenon in each of its most relevant aspects. fulvio attina’s introduction places the present crisis within the framework of the academic scholarship on migrations and eu migration policies, a subject examined more in-depth in francesca longo’s and rosa rossi’s chapters. longo’s chapter examines the evolution of eu asylum and migration policies, arguing that eu policies are no longer capable of addressing large-scale migratory flows. most notably, the dublin regulations – which oblige refugees to embark in a dangerous journey and apply for asylum in the country of first entry – should be reconsidered to both guarantee a better protection of refugees and ensure fairer burden sharing across eu member states. rossi’s chapter broadens the perspective to other international organisations, presenting elite survey data of italian elite perceptions of international organisations’ response to the crisis. the contribution by luigi caranti goes beyond a legalistic understanding of the obligations enshrined by european and international law by examining the moral underpinning of the duty to rescue and provide for refugees and economic migrants alike. the chapters by stefania panebianco and daniela irrera then turn to the operational aspects of the migratory crisis offshore libya, examining sar and law enforcement operations. panebianco’s contribution focuses on state-led migrant rescuing, and most notably the italian navy operation mare nostrum, launched in october 2013. in spite of being capable of rescuing over 150,000 migrants, mare nostrum was discontinued after one year due to italy’s frustration over the lack of burden sharing and other european states’ criticism that the operation was a pull factor on migration. as argued by panebianco, while mare nostrum did not become a template for future eu operations, it at least succeeded in putting maritime migrations at the centre of the eu policy agenda. the eu maritime operations that followed mare nostrum, triton and eunavfor med do not have sar as their primary mandate. consequently, a number of non-governmental organisations started to conduct their own migrant rescuing operations to try and fill the gap left book reviews 61 by the end of mare nostrum. daniela irrera’s chapter focuses on the nongovernmental provision of sar, providing data that illustrate ngos’ contribution to mitigating migrants’ loss of life. the chapters by simona gozzo, fulvio attina’ and rossana sampugnaro rely on a large amount of survey data to look at how existing italian and european policies are perceived by elite and public opinion alike, thereby providing an ideal conclusion to the volume. as epitomized by this short summary, the volume edited by panebianco examines italy’s perceptions of and response to the migration crisis in a truly comprehensive and multidisciplinary fashion, combining the use of survey data, the in-depth examination of existing policies and the legal frameworks they are embedded in, as well as legal normative perspectives on the responsibility to rescue and welcome migrants. sulle onde del mediterraneo is not only an important reading for scholars of international relations, comparative politics, political theory, and international and european law alike. thanks to its empirical richness, comprehensiveness and clarity, the collection also provides a useful compass for the wider community of informed readers seeking to navigate a public debate that often provides more heat than light on such a complex subject. in spite of its merits, panebianco’s volume cannot – nor does it seek to – provide a conclusive examination of the subject, suffering from the inevitable limitations associated with the timeliness and complexity of the issue it investigates. given the ongoing nature of the migration crisis, examining the phenomenon is like shooting at a moving target. this leaves ample room for further research looking at very recent developments such as the growing role of and mounting criticism against ngo sar operations. likewise, the in-depth, empirically rich examination of the italian case provided by the volume can only occur at the price of renouncing a larger comparative analysis. contrasting the policy responses to migrations across the central and eastern mediterranean routes would allow future research to better investigate the role played by public opinion and european and international law, norms and institutions in shaping policy responses to migration crises in europe and worldwide. eugenio cusumano, leiden university * * * gianluca passarelli (ed.), the presidentialization of political parties. organizations, institutions and leaders (london, united kingdom: palgrave macmillan, 2017). 300 pp., $39.99 (paperback), isbn: 9781349577675 this volume is an important contribution to the field of comparative political institutions because it focuses on the growing role of party leaders who assume a relevant institutional power in many advanced democracies. the notion of “presiips, volume 12, issue 1 62 dentialization” is at the core of the volume’s theoretical framework. however, in contrast to other pieces of empirical research emphasizing the impact of institutional changes on the development of party structures, the volume endeavors to explore the phenomenon of the increasing importance of party leadership independently from the evolution of the institutional setting. this is, as noted by the editor in the introduction, the “missing link” in the study of presidentialization. more precisely, passarelli aims to explain the varying intensities of “party presidentialization” one can observe by comparing certain countries using a simplified framework built on two separate dimensions: institutional presidentialization and party genetic presidentialization. first, this volume is a very interesting contribution to our understanding of the changing role of party (and institutional) leaders in many contemporary democracies because it emphasizes the complicated relationship between historical party transformations and macro-institutional (or constitutional) changes. to solve this puzzle, passarelli proposes a systematic analysis of the multifold dynamics of the process of party presidentialization), which should be in conflict with the “natural” attitudes of any european parliamentary democracy (dominated by collegial executives controlled by legislative bodies). supposedly, it is very likely that a pure presidential form of democracy has been established in those systems. the structure of the volume confirms that such dynamics are, in the real world, much more compound and mutable, corroborating the arguments presented at the end of the comprehensive review on the literature on presidentialization and party personalization provided by passarelli in his introduction. this ambitious proposition can be somehow tested by a large country-by-country comparison. for this reason, the rest of the volume, shaped on the idea of an extensive research strategy, includes eleven chapters devoted to different cases of parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential systems, thus covering a significant variety of political systems and democratic experiences. further, other examples of “institutional presidentialization” are covered in the first part of the volume, where the systems in chile, the united states, and brazil and the peculiar “semi-presidential” case of the french fifth republic are included. the cases of parliamentary democracies (or “premier-parliamentary democracies” like those recently developed in central-eastern europe) included in the second part of the volume are also rather different from each other. for example, poland and ukraine represent the family of “newcomers,” while a good sample of the western political systems from the uk to australia and from germany to japan and italy covers an evident variability including the typical “westminster” and “power-sharing” examples of democracy. such a research strategy proves very useful in unveiling the complicated set of factors determining a great deal of variance in party presidentialization. the study of a relatively neglected case such as chile (chapter 2) shows, for instance, how the impact of party organizations has been rather malleable since the end of the pinochet regime. on the other hand, some parliamentary democracies show that despite their stable rates of democratic performance and practices, their overall rates of presidentialization (or “missing presidentialization”) have changed considerably book reviews 63 over time. the presence of specific institutional devices and the emergence of hierarchical party organizational cultures, for instance, have determined high levels of personalization in germany (chapter 10) and, to some extent, in the uk (chapter 8). conversely, the expectation of crucial “majoritarian turns” connected to the emergences of strong leadership and the consolidation of personalized styles of electoral campaigns did not come true in typical power-sharing democracies, such as italy (chapter 12). this is due to the persistence of several institutional and partisan characteristics. in other words, following the theoretical framework used by passarelli, personalization cannot be a surrogate for the absence of institutional presidentialization. we have no space here to cover the myriad of findings included in all the empirical chapters of this rich yet extremely harmonized collection of studies. we can simply say that the deep complexity of party presidentialization emerges in all the diachronic analyses included in the volume. this brings the reader to the conclusion that different factors must be considered to understand the comparative evolution of the phenomenon. among them, historical path dependencies and the different developments of the constitutional settings—including the actual powers of the legislatures, the various steering capabilities of the executives, and, not least, the electoral regimes—are revealed as crucial variables. however, historical transformations of party organizations can make the difference, especially when they are originated by the peculiar visions of strong, long-standing leaders. the editor’s final chapter provides the volume with a precious element of comparative assessment. according to passarelli, many of the empirical findings provided in the country chapters support the idea that the typical approach based on the role of institutional setting on the transformation of party leadership should be somehow completed considering the findings of a more comprehensive comparison of the evolution of party genetic presidentialization. this is the main message the reader receives from this volume, which seems to pave the way to a new generation of studies based on the idea of a mutual interactive influence between the macro-institutional framework and the historical evolution of the most significant and long-standing political organizations at the core of democratic competition. as always happens to any new path-breaking piece of research, the highest, most provocative point becomes the weakest (at least in terms of empirical robustness), and the most debatable argument surfaces at the end. in this case, the map portraying the dynamics of party presidentialization in the 11 political systems covered by the volume (p. 257) looks impressionistic and, as admitted by the same author, rather vague, especially if one looks to the relative distance between the measures of the party genetic presidentialization dimension. however, the implications discussed by passarelli are fascinating. the phenomena of presidentialization and party leader personalization must be discussed in their continuous interactions under an adequate comparative research framework. by providing important evidence for such a basic but not irrelevant proposition, this volume thus proves to be an important text for scholars concerned with the future of party politics and the perspectives of political leadership within the democratic sphere. luca verzichelli, university of siena microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, p. iii-v. focus on: outside academia: political science as a profession manuela moschella stefania panebianco francesco zucchini editorial board of italian political science t is not uncommon to hear descriptions of the academic profession as an activity that takes place in an ivory tower. academics, so the argument runs, are too focused on scientific work, and not sufficiently willing to share and engage with wider audiences. this could be the case for political science, which in italy seems to be confined to academia. but this is not exactly true. this ips issue takes this criticism head on by going outside the ‘ivory tower’ to explore political scientists’ roles as managers, experts, consultants or public officials. we have reached out to a number of scholars and practitioners who actively participate in the political and social world we study, either because they have public roles in it, or private careers. specifically, we asked ips contributors to comment on two broad themes that pertain to the relationship between political science and the ‘world out there’. the first theme is the distinctive contributions that political scientists can make in public debate and political processes but also the reverse, i.e. the additional value of experiences as public official or consultant to academic work. what emerges from the interviews and contributions in this issue is a generally positive assessment of the public role of political scientists. on the one hand, our contributors largely agree that the mindset (and education) of political scientists provide us with the ability to foster a more informed public debate and more efficient policy solutions. “academic engagement can shape the terms of public discourse, providing information, and analytical models” (cacciotto). according to the ips contributors, this ability stems from our holistic and complex understanding of how the political sphere works, our knowledge of its rules and processes, and our capacity to be flexible and adaptable. on the other hand, “political experience provides political scientists with enormous knowledge about the objects they study” (gualmini). in general, “academics and practitioners complement and improve each other in their respective endeavours and, together, they do a better job” (settembri). the second major theme our contributors were invited to comment on is the question of the ‘relevance’ of our discipline when compared to others such as law and economics. in this respect, there is substantial variation in the contributions that follow. in general, virtually all the authors seem to agree that political scientists should reach out more regularly. at the same time, however, there is no consensus on whether such public outreach is the i iv key to increased relevance, in terms of obtaining a hearing in public and political debates. what emerges from the contributions is a widespread belief that political scientists are somehow marginalized in public debates and political decisions in our country, especially when compared to lawyers and economists: “we find ourselves operating in a cultural tradition that attributes to lawyers pride of place in the management of ‘cosa pubblica’.” (ventura); “economists have an advantage compared to political scientists: they simplify reality and give clear messages to policy-makers and stakeholders. political scientists tend, by contrast, to make things complex and to give articulated and complex answers (natali). this also applies in the eu institutions, though to a lesser extent. nevertheless, “ for political scientists it is maybe easier than for academics with other backgrounds (for example anthropology, linguistics or psychology) to pursue policy advice as well” (liberatore). furthermore, it seems as if political scientists are reluctant to be vociferous in areas that clearly fall within the scope of their expertise, such as the area of public policy. given this state of affairs, “getting our hands dirty” does not automatically translate into increased relevance. in addition to these broad themes, ips contributors also discuss the risks that derive from going outside the ivory tower. one author finds that “by becoming a decision-maker (e.g., by engaging directly in politics or public administration), the scholar tends to lose social recognition as a source of independent knowledge, and therefore s/he loses an important power resource” (martinelli). even for those who are much more positively oriented towards the direct intervention of scholars in decision-making processes, there are dangers: “you are doing things that you, as a scholar, do not approve of, even if you understand the meaning and sometimes the utility in the political game (…) an anchorage to a value system must be present” (sacchi). of course, these risks are not confined to political scientists, but apply to all disciplines that move beyond their scientific circles. at any rate, in reflecting on the implications of public engagement for political scientists, the ips contributors remind us all of the conflicting logics of academic research and policymaking. whereas the former is much more long-term in orientation, and largely free of constraints, the latter is more short-term, and decisional constrains are part of a larger machine (whether this be domestic (parliamentary) decision-making or the bureaucratic politics of an eu institution). furthermore, the sources of authority are significantly different, as authority in academia is largely the result of scientific reputation, whereas in the ‘real world’ it largely depends on problem-solving ability. reconciling the two logics is possible but also extremely complicated: “it is a fragile balance between different priorities and ways of looking at politics” (natali). finally, it is interesting to note that several of our contributors make suggestions for the (re)organization of our undergraduate and graduate degree courses. in particular, there is general agreement on the need for more practical knowledge, for more “testimonies” from policy-makers but also for broader knowledge (martinelli). “in today’s world, any political science curriculum should include activities, based on active pedagogy, that stimulate the problem-solving skills of students such as simulations, group projects, international exchanges and workshops with practitioners (marchi). these suggestions tie in with the major issues discussed above; namely, the idea that political scientists’ distinctive contribution to public life consists precisely in a mindset that is able to grasp complexity in the political and social world. suggestions that we should tilt towards more v generalized knowledge and transversal skills, however, clash with the principle of specialization which has inspired much of the evolution of our discipline over the past two/three decades. whether to pursue one path or another, or how to combine them, provides further food for thought. these issues – as highlighted by ips contributors – represent a concern for all of us. microsoft word pdf_issue_15_2_cavalieri_150-172.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 2, september 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 2, 150-172. contact author: alice cavalieri, university of siena. e-mail address: alice.cavalieri@unisi.it responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament. public budgeting in italy in the time of techno-populism alice cavalieri university of siena abstract institutional frictions ruling the public budget narrow a government’s possibilities to implement its electoral stances and policy preferences. at the same time, parties increasingly move around between the choice to be responsive and the need to be responsible. these have become major challenges in italy, particularly after the 2018 elections and in the era of techno-populism, when many parties took office while advertising themselves as expert problem-solvers and the only ones able to give a voice to popular demands. measuring the allocation of expenditure and budget changes in italy during the xviii legislative term, the paper studies the trade-off between responsibility and responsiveness and populism where budget policy is concerned. it also sheds light on the balance of power between the executive and the legislative, investigating how the first and second conte governments steered and exploited the budgetary process to protect their spending preferences. introduction he political earthquake of the 2018 national elections, a consequence of sharp critiques of representative democracy and of a profound process of party system deconstruction, has invested italian politics. while the key players of this period are not brand new in the italian political arena, their characteristics have changed substantially during recent legislatures. an overview of the xviii legislative term is as follows. after weary post-electoral negotiations, the five star movement (m5s) and the league formed a coalition government sealed by the so-called ‘contract for the government of change’, characterized by striking anti-elite rhetoric. in fifteen months of government, they had to balance their promissory agenda as quarrels emerged because of divergent policy preferences, which exacerbated latent tensions and eventually led to the government’s fall.1 employing a strategy to avoid new elections, the m5s and the democratic party (pd) agreed on a joint platform to form a new cabinet (supported by minor parties such as italia viva2 and liberi e uguali, leu) headed again by giuseppe conte. 1 the government’s breakdown followed the outstanding success of the league at the 2019 european elections, which overturned the balance of power between the government partners (see appendix, figure a1), after which salvini called new elections. 2 italia viva was formed following a scission within the pd which occurred a few days after the inauguration of the conte ii government. since that moment, the party has supported the government. t alice cavalieri 151 much has already been written about the innovations and characteristics of the two cabinets delivered (so far) during the current legislative term, and in particular about the former one (among others giannetti et al. 2020; marangoni and verzichelli 2019; de giorgi and dias 2018). despite these valuable works, we still lack studies that analyze how the two cabinets managed the budget policy.3 indeed, as soon as they took power, both cabinets had to cope with one of, if not the most important policy appointment and contentious moment of the year, namely the discussion and approval of the budget law. because of its characteristics, the budget constitutes a privileged instrument for analyzing the government’s policy priorities. an investigation into how much funding one program receives compared to others reveals how important that policy is for the government. in this sense, the budget is an essential element of political representation, because ‘it is primarily on spending choices that the voters’ consensus joins or dissolves’ (luciani 2019: 48). however, multi-annual spending commitments, european economic parameters, along with the need to interact with coalition partners and opposition, restrain individual parties from achieving their spending targets. for these reasons, the budget seems to be the litmus test for understanding how governments balance the long-term needs of citizens and country (responsibility) and the short-term demands of voters (responsiveness) (bardi et al. 2014). resting on scholarships about populism and techno-populism, this paper studies the budget policy of the first and second conte governments, and aims to assess the performance of techno-populist parties in government and how they balance responsiveness and responsibility during the budgetary process. findings show that the conte i government emphasized responsiveness and was able to implement the targets of the ‘contract’, while the conte ii one acted more responsibly to the detriment of its policy goals. the ongoing crisis of parliamentary decision-making, evident here from the ability of both governments to suffocate parliamentary debate, and the limelight on the budget during the discussion and approval phases, allows techno-populists to exploit this venue to continue stressing their adversarial image. the paper is divided as follows: section 1 reviews the main threads of research on populism, techno-populism, and budget policy; section 2 explains the research strategy, presenting a few insights into the 2019 and 2020 budgets; section 3 analyses the budgetary process during the conte i and ii governments; the last section discusses the main evidence. 1. theoretical framework 1.1. the italian xviii legislative term: all the colours of techno-populism representative democracy has been in dire straits for a few years now. many transformations, such as the mediatization of political communication, globalization, and multilevel governance have put a strain on party government, exacerbating the struggle between responsiveness to public opinion and responsibility to domestic and international systemic constraints (mair 2011). challenges to representative democracy have taken root mainly from two angles, namely populism and technocracy. populist parties 3 scholars have either investigated only the budget of the conte i government (codogno and merler 2019) or focused on how the conte i and ii governments dealt specifically with the problem of public debt (marzinotto 2020). responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 152 have enhanced their role in the national politics of several countries, gaining ruling positions after successful electoral results. perceiving political parties as no longer being able to give voice to people’s needs and fostering the idea that politics must reflect the volonté générale of the people, populist parties appeal for a closer link between citizens and decision-makers (kriesi 2014). on the other hand, the technocratic critique blames political parties’ search for short-term consensus, which obstructs responsibility. it asks for more power for experts who do not fulfil a mandate but, in contrast, ‘claim to act in the best interest of society’ (caramani 2017: 63). their common monolithic view of the community, divided between (good) citizens and (corrupt) elites (mudde 2004) (populism) and between right and wrong (caramani 2017) (technocracy), make them appear as ‘mirror images of each other’ (müller 2014: 28). these characteristics fuse together within a new party family of ‘techno-populism’ (bickerton and accetti 2018). the italian xviii legislative term, begun in march 2018 after a round of voting that reshuffled italian politics, accommodates all of these political innovations, with populists and techno-populists alongside mainstream parties. it is also the first legislature to give rise to the first fully-fledged populist government in italy and in western europe (d’alimonte 2019). this transformation accompanies a broad crisis of democratic legitimacy (bickerton and accetti 2018) and parliamentary processes (ferrajoli 2017), a consequence of the discrediting of political parties and decentralized decision-making (lupo 2019). it is no coincidence that the non-partisan and technocratic profile of ministers – especially of the minister of economy (moe) who fulfils an extremely complex and burdensome role (hallerberg and wehner 2020) – has increased over time (verzichelli and cotta 2018). conte himself is a non-party political actor with a strong ‘technocratic profile’ (marangoni and verzichelli 2019).4 he firstly presided over a government composed of the techno-populist m5s (bickerton and accetti 2018) and the radical-right league (passarelli and tuorto 2018). its fate remained uncertain for most of the time because of the two parties’ opposite policy views – especially on economic and immigration policy (basile and borri 2018; gianfreda and carlotti 2018) – and because of the tensions between the two deputy prime ministers di maio and salvini. in a little over a year, they loudly advertised their attitudes, starting from the inaugural speech of the cabinet, when the prime minister himself defined the incoming government as populist (cited in basile and borri 2018). in fact, the whole conte i government may be defined as techno-populist. after all, while the m5s already epitomizes this label, there is a growing tendency of far-right parties to move into techno-populist stances (bickerton and accetti 2018). indeed, the league presents the party as a problem-solver and eschews any political compromise and ideological confrontation, in line with the technocratic conception of politics (meynaud 1964; fischer 1990) expressed by techno-populism (caramani 2017; bickerton and accetti 2018). it was precisely the hyper-competitive strategy of the leaders of the two parties (marangoni and verzichelli 2019) that caused the breakdown of the government and the 4 besides the technocratic connotation of the prime minister, shared by the conte i and conte ii governments, the two diverge in their degree of ‘technocracy’. as highlighted by valbruzzi (2018), the former displays the highest percentage of technocrats among the members of the cabinet, compared to all the italian partisan governments (excluding the technocratic governments led by ciampi, dini and monti). the share of technocrats decreased with the conte ii government, as a consequence also of the higher number of coalition partners who demanded control of some ministries. alice cavalieri 153 appointment of conte ii. differently from the previous cabinet, the latter matches together the techno-populist traits of the m5s and the center-left mainstream attitude of the pd. it has shown the m5s abandoning its harsh criticism of its new ally and a gradual shift towards a pro-european attitude (di quirico 2020). all things considered, both cabinets of the xviii legislative term are unusual in italian republican history, blending populist claims with technocratic attitudes (conte i) and the same two with mainstream parties’ stances (conte ii). evidently, the anti-establishment trait of the m5s and league makes their participation in government considerably difficult, because of the risk of ‘‘normalising’ their image’ and adopting the much-criticized behavior of the elite from which they strive to be different (tronconi 2018: 172). ultimately, maximalist populist pledges seem to be a political strategy mostly suitable for opposition parties to increase their appeal and consensus, while being hardly attainable for incumbent parties. this paper considers the context just presented and aims to study how the conte i and ii governments steered the budgetary process, in order to figure out the consequences of techno and populist participation in government where the budget policy is concerned. before going in depth into the analysis, the next section elucidates on the fundamental role of budget policy and the main dynamics it is subject to. 1.2. the italian budget policy between constraints and attempted reforms the annual appointment with the budget law is always one of the most discussed and contentious moments of the year and of the government’s life. no government emerges from the budgetary process perfectly unscathed, and the implementation of policy preferences through the annual allocation of resources is increasingly challenging. this is because the budget conceals a crucial contradiction: while it is intended to contribute to continuity and change, flexibility and rigidity, it is impossible to succeed in all these mutually exclusive aspects (wildavsky 1978). some of them prevail and, unsurprisingly, this causes tensions and dissatisfaction. despite this aspect, the quantification of collective political decisions through the budget – a result of the adaptation of political actors’ choices to the domestic institutional setting, incoming information, and the external environment – is essentially the ‘lifeblood of the government’ (wildavsky 1992: 595). however, because of its extreme complexity it does not necessarily give rise to innovative single policies. the strict rules that govern public budgeting and the high transaction and information costs (buchanan and tullock 1962), make it the most constrained policy venue (jones et al. 2003). therein, the strength of frictions that must be overcome to give rise to policy modifications rises considerably (jones and baumgartner 2005). the allocation of expenditure is therefore locked into an incremental pattern of tiny modifications which marginally depart from past choices. basically, the legislator decides how to allocate financial resources by adjusting the previous year’s expenditure, either by slightly enlarging or reducing funds. this dynamic becomes stronger because of the hurdle, for parties, of driving public policies according to their ideological preferences,5 and restrictions placed by multi-annual spending commitments and by european economic and fiscal requirements. 5 different threads of research have uncovered the lack of a direct effect of partisan ideology on deficits (de haan and sturm 1994; borrelli and royed 1995) and the crucial role of incoming information and external shocks on budget changes (epp et al. 2014; breunig 2011). responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 154 noticeably, responsiveness is no longer the main government’s concern and needs to be counterbalanced with the request for responsibility from multilevel governance (mair 2011), which on some occasions has pushed governments to prefer the latter over the former at heavy electoral expense (bellucci et al. 2012). in the italian case, the broad power of parliament over the budget has for a long time bridled the executive’s steering capability in controlling public finance. nevertheless, a gradual reforming process, begun more effectively during the nineties, seems to have determined the conditions for an appropriate institutional design, achieving the purpose of strengthening the role of pivotal actors, such as the government and the moe (di mascio et al. 2017). there is evidence of a clear-cut path in the long-term transformation of the budgetary process that aimed to ease an overblown budgetary cycle, improving its effectiveness and providing both the formulation phase and the parliamentary session with adequate timing and clear rules about the institutional role of each actor. in this regard, the 3-year time span of fiscal and economic policy objectives (in force since 1988) is intended to overcome the decision-makers’ short-sightedness and to foster larger changes, while zero-based budgeting (zbb) (effectively in force since 2016) detaches the executive from previous spending decisions, granting ampler leeway for the allocation of funds. 2. method and research strategy comparative policy studies partially solved the small-n problem (too many variables and too few cases) by improving methodological sophistication and employing cross-countries pooled time-series data (beck and katz 1995). a wealth of quantitative studies on budget rest on the punctuated equilibrium theory (jones and baumgartner 2005), which explains the pattern of stability and change, analyzing the distribution of budget modifications (among others breunig 2011; breunig and jones 2011; jones et al. 2003). concurrently, many researches have emphasized the usefulness of carrying out small-n analysis (brady and collier 2010; king et al. 1994). in this regard, the neo-institutionalist approach compares case studies attempting to unravel the complexity of interacting factors in joint decision-making processes (scharpf 1988). specifically, the interactionoriented model conceives actors and their interplay as causes of the type of policy response, while institutions are considered as remote causes molding actors’ decisions (scharpf 1997). because the purpose of this study is to describe techno-populist parties’ behavior and degree of responsiveness when coping with the budget, a mere quantitative study would inevitably blur the comprehension of dynamics in place. as recommended by recent works on policy and budget transformations (walgrave and varone 2008; john and bevan 2012), mixed-method strategies would substantially improve knowledge on the occurrence and characteristics of changes. adopting this strategy, i compare the 2019 and 2020 manovra6 through a detailed description of the role of actors and their interactions during the budgetary process and a quantitative analysis of the allocation of 6 the term ‘manovra finanziaria’ identifies the annual financial package composed of the budget bill and additional corrective measures introduced through bills and urgent decrees. i use the official name of the budget, meaning that the 2019 budget was introduced and approved in 2018 (the same for the 2020 one and for those displayed in table 1 and table a-2). alice cavalieri 155 expenditure across budget categories. the case selection strategy is driven by a twofold rationale. first, whereas other italian parties that governed in past years have been considered populists, the characteristics of those ruling in the present legislative term are profoundly different.7 at the same time, the divergent ideological placement and composition of the two governments, which however have been headed by the same prime minister, make the comparison extremely interesting. then, from a methodological point of view, by keeping the legislative term homogeneous, the challenge cast by the difficulty of managing the complex array of causal constellations is easily prevented because the two budgets already represent a subset of cases that allow certain contingent factors to be held constant. this makes it easier to single out the influence of certain conditions with a higher degree of confidence. quantitatively, two different sources can be used to study italian budget policy, namely the budget bill (where the government draws its actual spending intentions, later submitted to parliament) and the budget law (approved by the chambers at the end of the year after the parliamentary session). using these documents, different types of comparison are possible, depending on the point in time and the document considered (figure 1). figure 1. types of analysis between budget documents source: own elaboration here, i am interested in seeing whether spending choices are transformed according to the government in charge. the variation between the law(t-1) and the bill(t) (d), which displays how much the government relies on the spending decisions of the previous budget law when drawing the new year’s bill, fulfils this task.8 because the budget is barely changeable and partisan preferences are unlikely to be translated into spending decisions, investigating how the government tries to adjust the budget bill uncovers the attempt to pursue new policy goals. if the government is still in office, one may find a long 7 while also berlusconi’s personal parties have been labeled ‘liberal-populist’ (mudde 2004), the ideological platform of his parties better approaches those of the ‘mainstream european center-right’ (verbeek and zaslove 2015; ruzza and fella 2011). additionally, in terms of party competition, berlusconi’s parties have generally played the role of the functional equivalent of the mainstream right in the italian political system (castelli gattinara and froio forthcoming). 8 differently from the comparison of two consecutive budget laws, this allows us to clearly highlight the government’s intentions in relation to the status quo (interpreted as the budget law approved the year before), and the distance in policy preferences between parties that succeeded in government. responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 156 term budget plan or, in contrast, if a new government writes the bill one would expect a substantial shift in the position of the status quo (zucchini 2011), due to the parties’ attempt to be responsive towards the electorate. however, annual adjustments are affected also by the economic and fiscal conditions of the state and are not necessarily a function of deliberative choices. the comparison between the budget bill and the budget law of the same year (a) overcomes this issue, and allows the decisions on budget adjustments that result from the current legislation to be unraveled.9 this type of modification enlightens us as to the leeway of parliament in altering the spending proposals of the executive or, in contrast, about the ability of the executive to exploit the rules of procedure in order to preserve the budget from substantial changes. as demonstrated by pedrazzani and zucchini (2013), a crucial factor affecting the degree of adjustment of governmental legislation by parliament is precisely the distance between preferences of the cabinet and those of the parliamentary majority.10 it is also informative about the role of other actors who might intervene during the budgetary process, such as the european union. to carry out these different types of analysis, i rely on official budget documents from the minister of economy and finance (mef) and make use of spending objectives classified according to the internationally adopted cofog scheme, which splits public spending into ten macro-economic functions (i level) and sixty-five micro ones (ii level) (see appendix, table a-1). these data allow the allocation of expenditure to be measured and compared across single policy domains. to place the two budgets in analysis within a broader framework of italian budget policy over the past twenty years, i use an index of transformativeness which measures the variation in the allocation of expenditure across budget domains between the bill and the law (cavalieri et al. 2018). more precisely, i firstly calculate the proportion of each budget item of the bill on the total expenditure of the bill itself,11 then the proportion of the same budget item of the law on the total expenditure of the law. next, i compute the difference between proportions for each spending item and calculate the percentage change score. this gives a sense of how much each of them moves away from the original document. i then square these values and sum them together to obtain a yearly value, later divided for the total number of spending domains.12 technically, it is possible to express the index with the following formula: !"#$% '( )*+",('*-+)./$"$,, = ∑ 234%!(#)5 − 34%!(#%&)57 ' 10 where: 34%!(#)5 is the proportion of expenditure for the budget function . at time ); 34%!(#%&)5 is the proportion of expenditure for the budget function . at time ) − 1. 9 this avoids potential errors due to different interpretations of the coding scheme used for categorizing expenditure. 10 while the authors demonstrated that bills pertaining to many policy dimensions and complex subjects emerge extensively altered from the parliamentary debate, they excluded budget laws from the study precisely because of the radically different parliamentary dynamics that shape the final legislation. 11 using the proportion of expenditure on the total, i control for size and focus only on the budget composition. 12 here i compute the index using macro-categories to be coherent with the analysis in section 3 that is only based on those categories. however, it is also possible to use the micro-categories and divide for their total number, namely 65 (see appendix, table a-2). alice cavalieri 157 the index has a twofold merit. on the one hand, using squared values, it prevents negative modifications from resetting positive ones, thus really considering the degree of change of each annual manovra. on the other hand, it allows us to assess the transformative nature of the budget, focusing on the dispersion of changes, and considers widespread adjustments across several categories as having a non-transformative nature.13 years of interest show in both cases extremely low values, despite some differences (table 1). table 1. index of transformativeness between budget bill and budget law (1999–2020) year law(t-1)/bill(t) (d) bill(t)/law(t) (a) year law(t-1)/bill(t) (d) bill(t)/ law(t) (a) 1999 0.0493 2010 0.8499 0.0675 2000 0.9258 0.7184 2011 0.9640 0.0259 2001 0.3225 1.1039 2012 0.4384 0.2135 2002 15.4752 0.2031 2013 0.2428 0.3457 2003 0.2285 1.1234 2014 0.7120 0.0983 2004 0.7928 0.0709 2015 2.6552 0.3020 2005 0.0839 0.2354 2016 0.3424 0.1063 2006 0.4927 0.2297 2017 0.0888 0.0006 2007 33.9030 28.6182 2018 0.0239 0.0016 2008 0.2814 0.1514 2019 0.7236 0.0007 2009 6.7153 0.0088 2020 0.1568 0.0016 source: own elaboration with regard to the first column, the degree of transformativeness of the budget for 2019 is quite high compared to that for 2020, meaning that the conte i government aimed to considerably modify the distribution of expenditure allocated by the previous government. is this the effect of the cabinet composition and the attempt of the m5s and league to be responsive to their electorate? instead, the conte ii government relied a great deal on the previous year’s budget. is the lower value a consequence of the containment put in place by a mainstream ally that balanced m5s attitudes towards higher responsibility? considering the level of transformativeness between the bill(t) and law(t), in 2018 the parliament left almost unchanged the allocation of expenditure foreseen by 13 other indexes can be used to measure the difference between the bill and the law, such as the duncan dissimilarity index (duncan and duncan 1955) and the measure of budget distance developed by tsebelis and chang (2004). the former is a measure of dissimilarity between two distributions, whereas the latter assesses the change in the structure of the budget, represented as the distance between points in an ndimensional euclidean space (tsebelis and chang 2004: 454). despite the diffusion and reliability of these measures, here i stick with the index of transformativeness already used in a previous study to estimate the divergence between the budget bill and the budget law in the italian case (cavalieri et al. 2018). it appears more intuitive and accounts also for the number of budget categories. to increase the reader’s confidence in the index, i evaluate the distance between documents using also the other two measures (see appendix, table a-2). correlation matrixes in table a-3(a) and table a-3(b) confirm reliability on the index of transformativeness, which correlates almost perfectly with both the duncan dissimilarity index and the index of budget distance. responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 158 the conte i government, while it intervened more during the 2019 budgetary session. however, the degree of transformativeness is still very low and in line with an ongoing trend that displays the reduced impact of parliamentary debate on the bill. while these values already give a cursory insight into how the two cabinets managed the budget, they do not provide information about the favorite policies the two executives aimed to implement. how can we explain these, though small, differences? was there a substantial dissimilarity in the management of the budgetary process between the two cabinets and – if this is the case – what are the determining factors? the qualitative analysis aims to answer these questions. the study of each manovra is assisted by two plots, which appreciate both the weight of each budget authorization on total spending and the percentage change in spending from the two points in time considered. on the one hand, i first calculate the proportion of each spending domain in the bill and in the law on the total expenditure of the corresponding document, then i compute the difference between the two. in this way i get the changed relative importance of each budget category, as expressed by the following formula: :! = 3(%!(#)) − 3(%!(#%&)) on the other hand, i compute the percentage change between the expenditure for each domain in the bill and the expenditure for the same in the law, stated as follows: =! = 4%!(#)5 − 4%!(#%&)5 4%!(#%&)5 where: %!(#) is the total amount of expenditure for the budget function . at time ); %!(#%&) is the total amount of expenditure for the budget function . at time ) − 1. overall, considering the characteristics of the budgetary session – a battleground where the government draws the budget bill and tries to avoid substantial modifications from the interference of other actors (e.g. the european commission and parliament) – the study of the budget offers a unique way to evaluate how political parties balance responsiveness and responsibility, as well as the implications, in term of policy performance, following the techno-populist takeover. 3. analysis 3.1. 2019: a face-saving fight to death with the ‘external enemy’ the conte i government had its first significant test a very few months after taking office with a number of electoral pledges that, put together, seemed hardly attainable. on the one hand, the economic and fiscal proposals of the government partners were crisply in contrast. for instance, in their electoral programs, the league advertised the introduction of a flat tax (a bottom-up redistribution), while the m5s leant toward the ‘citizenship income’ (a top-down redistribution) (codogno and merler 2019). on the other, the socalled ‘quota 100’ (the new early-retirement option pledged by the league) and other expansionary measures unveiled the impossibility of complying with the european alice cavalieri 159 requirements that italy had previously committed itself to. ultimately, chasing the implementation of their favorite policies, the cabinet decided to disregard the mediumterm objectives (mtos), modifying the original accounts foreseen in the document of economy and finance and setting deficit levels to 2.4 (2019), 2.1 (2020), and 1.8 (2021) percent of gdp. by doing so, italy clashed with eu institutions, depicted as the real enemy of national sovereignty and harshly criticized by both parties (basile and borri 2018). its negative aura was further supported following the european commissioners’ disapproval of the italian budget plan and their threat to open the infringement procedure for excessive debt, recognizing ‘a deviation of the budget from the stability plan to an extent never seen before’ (commission 2018a). the fierce confrontation between the majority and the eu continued with: a letter in which the commission asked the government to modify the budget, a renewed request to revise the expected accounts observing ‘a particularly serious non-compliance’ with the recommendation received in july, and a steadfast persistency on the italian side, which considered the level of deficit to be ‘an insurmountable limit’ (mef 2018). in this regard, the budget bill submitted to parliament left the spending programs almost unaltered compared to the previous year, with few exceptions. the government’s intention was to substantially increase the expenditure for ‘social protection’ (about 14 billion), which includes funds both for the citizenship income and for the pension scheme (figure 2, d).14 figure 2. budget changes across spending functions, 2019 manovra source: own elaboration 14 at length: the micro spending functions, part of ‘social protection,’ that grew the most were ‘old age’ and ‘unemployment’, which were expected to gain more than 7 billion (+12.53 percent) and about 8 billion (+65.74 percent) respectively. −0.35 1.04 3.43 −6.89 −6.75 10.2 2.14 7.08 2.62 11.89social protection education recreation & culture health housing & amenities envir. protection economic affairs public order defence general administr. −2 −1 0 1 2 percentage points 2018 law − 2019 bill (d) −0.15 0.1 0.13 0.39 0.07 0 1.14 0.14 0.19 0.06social protection education recreation & culture health housing & amenities envir. protection economic affairs public order defence general administr. −2 −1 0 1 2 percentage points 2019 bill − law (a) responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 160 with the alarming growth of the spread, which reached 336 points (the highest level since 2013), the european commission rejected the italian budget plan and opened the procedure ‘for excessive deficit related to the violation of the debt parameter’ (commission 2018b). these circumstances – along with criticism from the ufficio parlamentare di bilancio for failure to fulfil previous budget objectives and the president of the republic’s request for a fertile dialogue with supranational institutions – mitigated the government’s attitude. correcting the financial previsions, the government made the withdrawal of the infringement procedure possible. it agreed to cut the expected spending for the next three years of 10.25 (2019), 12 (2020), and 16 (2021) billion, setting the deficit at 2.04 percent and thereby decreasing the level of debt. at the same time, it resorted to safety clauses to cover the costs of the citizenship income and the earlyretirement scheme. yet, despite this about-face, the majority stressed the fact that ‘italy never moved back from the priorities chosen by voters in the march 4 polls’,15 as affirmed by the prime minister, in an attempt to advertise the public image of a government that did not surrender to european ‘diktat’. during the parliamentary session, the situation became even more troublesome and its management raised several doubts about legitimacy.16 precisely, the government resorted to a first maxi-amendment to introduce the new responsibilities agreed at supranational level. once the document was sent to the chamber, the government kept on working on the bill at the committee, making other changes to the text already presented to the senate and impeding the beginning of the discussion. it then resorted to a second maxi-amendment protected by the confidence vote. when back at the chamber, with the risk of the provisional budget approaching, the v committee conceded during a night session to pass the text to the house without discussing or voting on 350 amendments (as already happened in the senate). the majority keynote speaker renounced the chance to describe the text in order to speed up the process, while the executive asked again for a confidence vote on a third maxi-amendment.17 from a normative perspective, not only did parliament not have time to discuss the budget, but also the government used the confidence vote each time on a document that none of the parliamentary bodies had previously examined and which differed substantially from those analyzed and voted on earlier (bergonzini 2019). how did this translate in terms of policy decisions? the indiscernible variation between the bill and law (figure 1, a) explains unequivocally that the management of the parliamentary session allowed the government to carry out its far-reaching policy choices. in fact, the feverish budgetary process saw the government coercing parliament into approving the final, brand new maxi-amendment protected by the confidence vote without even discussing it. the tiny shifts are therefore attributable to a change made by the government itself (rather than by parliament) while the budget bill was underway. even the 15 available online at: https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2018-12-19/conte-mai-arretrato-e-maiceduto-contenuti-manovra-113342.shtml?uuid=aezh9m2g. 16 the manovra for 2019 saw to the suppression of the usual parliamentary procedure regulated by art. 72 of the constitution (cavino 2019). the government not only set extremely scant timing for the parliamentary examination of the bill in the first place, but it eventually skipped the examination itself for the sake of time. moreover, the vote on a different text from the one issued by the committee violated the lodo pera-morando (bergonzini 2014: 82-86), a parliamentary procedure which forbids the government to add a confidence vote on a text that the committee has not previously scrutinized. 17 in the extreme disorder of this period, fi and other minor parties left the work at the v committee before the vote, while the pd asked the chamber, unsuccessfully, to examine and discuss the contents of the bill. alice cavalieri 161 confrontation with european institutions did not alter the spending allocation but concerned only the growth and deficit levels for subsequent years. although the executive transferred further details to a specific decree preserving only the framework legislation (codogno and merler 2019), it was able to safeguard its spending targets and to translate two of its most important electoral stances into actual policies. all in all, the government stood out for its ability to ‘obtain the necessary resources to […] confirm its fundamental measures’ without ‘blindly accepting european obligations’.18 as proudly affirmed by an mp of the m5s, the majority ‘delivered a popular manovra to brussels, […] written by the people for the people’ and it ‘lays claim to sound and constructive populism’.19 3.2. 2020: ruling the process to repress infighting and keep itself alive similarly to the conte i government, the new majority installed after the summer of 2019 had, almost immediately, to cope with the most important policy decision of the year, with the burden of 23 billion in vat increase inherited by the previous government and a higher public debt cost caused by the rising spread after fifteen months of a eurosceptic stance. in this context, trying to boost economic growth while ensuring balanced public accounts and a proactive participation in the european community (nadef 2019), the government asked the european commission for more flexibility. after a threefold letter exchange which aimed to appease the eu and the financial markets,20 the government decided to partially forego the european suggestion to make further progress to ensure compliance with the stability and growth pact parameters. it stood firm on its initial intention so as not to reduce the expenditure for the recentlyimplemented quota 100 and citizenship income.21 keeping these expenditures meant avoiding any other substantial change. this is evident from figure 2, d where a clear pattern of continuity with the previous budget law emerges. the government did not dramatically alter the allocation of expenditure across spending domains and the weight of budget categories over the total budget was not considerably modified, except for a growth of 10 billion for the category ‘general administration’ (4.62 percent). the most relevant measure of the 2020 budget was the assignment of about two thirds of the entire fiscal package to repeal the safety clauses. 23 billion was earmarked to avoid the vat tax hike through the rise of the deficit to 2.2 percent of the gdp (from 1.4 percent). other measures concerned the reduction of the tax wedge of labor, investments in childcare facilities, along with additional financial and human resources for education and healthcare, and actions to combat fraud and reduce the tax gap (mef 2019). overall, these decisions and that of not ‘resorting to the easier choice of implementing linear cuts 18 camera, ass. res. sten. sed. 30/12/2018 (silvestri). 19 ibidem. 20 initially, the budgetary plan did not convince the european commissioners, who sent a letter to ask for clarifications regarding the request of flexibility (commission 2019a). after the moe gualtieri explained its use for unusual events such as ‘hydrogeological and seismic-risk mitigation, infrastructure repair and upgrade’ (mef 2019), a second letter from the eu followed, where the commission acknowledged the ‘risk of significant deviation from the required adjustment towards the mtos for 2019 and 2020’ and from the debt reduction benchmarks (commission 2019b). 21 in a letter to the commission, the moe explained that repeatedly changing the early-retirement rules would be damaging and that the number of people who applied for the entitlement was substantially below the initial projections (mef 2019). responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 162 to gain funds to the detriment of public services’ were the first steps in a long-term spending review.22 figure 3. budget changes across spending functions, 2020 manovra source: own elaboration as regards the process, after discussion at the v committee, the government presented to the senate a maxi-amendment protected by the confidence vote. opposition parties sharply criticized the majority for avoiding the discussion of several amendments, because of the choice to completely modify the text using the maxi-amendment, made necessary because of the approaching december 31 deadline caused by coalition disputes.23 incidentally, the quarrels within the cabinet already started in early december, when the italia viva group left the work at the committee after the presentation of several sub-amendments to the maxi-amendment to block the introduction of new taxes. the confrontation both within the majority and with the opposition affected the whole budgetary process, but the executive fought off the charges, affirming that the committee scrutinized at length the text without excluding opposition parties from the debate, guaranteeing the possibility to amend the document.24 nevertheless, the longlasting custom to achieve approval of the budget just before the end of the year discouraged any real parliamentary debate (de giorgi and verzichelli 2008), allowing the government to pass the budget law – a new modified maxi-amendment of 313 pages and 958 clauses – without any change to the bill (figure 2, a) and also to the text approved by 22 available online at: https://www.partitodemocratico.it/economia-e-lavoro/gualtieri-ledisuguaglianze-il-nemico-da-battere/. 23 senato, ass. res. sten. sed. 13/12/2019 (perosino) and also senato, ass. res. sten. sed. 16/12/2019 (rivolta). 24 senato, ass. res. sten. sed. 16/12/2019 (manca). 4.62 8.34 2.4 1.28 82.36 −14.9 −1.66 −3.62 −0.21 −0.38social protection education recreation & culture health housing & amenities envir. protection economic affairs public order defence general administr. −2 −1 0 1 2 percentage points 2019 law − 2020 bill (d) 0.27 −0.1 0.14 −0.91 4.18 0.92 0.42 0.4 0.11 0.06social protection education recreation & culture health housing & amenities envir. protection economic affairs public order defence general administr. −2 −1 0 1 2 percentage points 2020 bill − law (a) alice cavalieri 163 the senate. precisely, during the second reading at the chamber, the majority added the confidence vote on the same document approved at the senate, preventing the usual third reading and obstructing the amending process. in doing this, the symmetrical bicameralism acted de facto as a monocameral parliament.25 once again, the government managed to steer the budgetary process and to implement the spending choices drawn up in the bill which, however, responded to a completely different logic from the previous year. as the keynote speaker maintained, ‘the government was formed in an unexpected context, but with a very focused reason: to take on the responsibility to rule the country. the responsibility to govern with untidy public accounts, the responsibility to defuse a 27 billion danger. […] a responsibility that somebody else did not take on and unloaded onto others, and that the government accepted to avoid all the false promises becoming a high price that italian citizens would pay’.26 4. discussion and conclusions by assessing budget politics during the xviii italian legislative term, the paper analyzes the 2019 and 2020 manovre, carried out by the first and second conte governments. using a mixed-method strategy to describe the management of the budget policy and process, the work refers to two different scholarships which investigate the balance of power in parliamentary democracies and the impact of populist parties in government. first, measuring the distance between the budget bill(t) and the budget law(t), it contributes to the study of the relationship between the executive and the parliament in italy. what emerges is the established ability of the government to steer the budgetary process and to safeguard the intentions drawn in the bill. apparently, the centrality of the parliament and the mps’ moral hazard (verzichelli 1999) which characterized economic policy during the first republic were replaced by the executive’s more incisive role (di mascio et al. 2017). nevertheless, at this point the budgetary process resembles merely a battlefield where the government increases the politicization of the decisionmaking process to succeed at protecting its spending targets. this it does by exploiting one of the three cornerstones that regulate the management of the budgetary process, namely the december 31 deadline for the approval of the law,27 and it is encouraged by a reinforced top-down approach and the implementation of the zbb. this stood out in both budgets considered, although to a different extent and because of different reasons. in 2018, the m5s and the league inflated the conflict against the eu, mounting a strategic – rather than programmatic – polarization to contribute to the popular imagination of (still) fighting parties that do not surrender to the ‘usual’ political dynamics. 25 see di cosimo, available online at: http://www.lacostituzione.info/index.php/2019/12/27/approvazione-del-bilancio-cambiano-le-maggioranze-ma-non-le-procedure/. also, a member of the government during the parliamentary debate affirmed that the parliament was acting in an ‘alternated monocameral regime, because either the chamber of deputies or the senate on their own, alternately, oversee the measures’ (senato, ass. res. sten. sed. 13/12/2019, collina). 26 camera, ass. res. sten. sed. 22/12/2019 (pagano). 27 the other two pillars are the prohibition of deliberation during the budgetary session on other measures of a financial nature and the safeguarding of the substantive law’s contents attached to the budget. pleading the deadline, the government justifies the violation of the other two norms, a custom that is considered to be the actual cause of the lack of adhesion to the general regulations of the budgetary process (goretti and rizzuto 2010). responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 164 in 2019, instead, the conflict was inside the coalition, which needed to bargain between the popular stances of the m5s and the more responsible attitudes of the pd. while the incentives for the two governments were very different – in the first case the executive aimed to sharpen its ideological profile whereas in the second it tried to keep itself alive – both of them suffocated the parliamentary session for their purposes. this is confirmed by the extremely low values of the index of transformativeness between the budget bill(t) and the budget law(t) and by the negligible differences displayed in figure 1, a and figure 2, a. this evidence adds information to previous research on the impact of the legislative process on governmental legislation in italy. as is implied by the qualitative analysis, adjustments to the bill (although extremely small) ensue almost exclusively from the bargain within the government or between the government and european institutions. even in the case of the budget, the parliament is an arena at the executive’s disposal to change the approach if needed where the opposition parties’ role is insignificant, as already revealed by pedrazzani and zucchini (2013). however, the deprivation of the parliament’s functions during the budgetary process is not a new story in italy (bergonzini 2014). that said, although the conte i government pushed the alienation of the parliament to an extent never experienced before (bergonzini 2019), the crisis of parliamentary decision-making is sustained equally by governments with higher and lower populist stances. second, calculating the difference between the budget law(t-1) and the budget bill(t), the paper enters the wide debate on the trade-off between responsiveness and responsibility and populism. acknowledging the league’s intransigence for debate and disagreement, and its boasting about being a rational problem-solver – in line with the trend of far-right parties to adopt techno-populist stances (bickerton and accetti 2018) – it seems that the italian political spectrum is by now marked by the division between fully-fledged techno-populism and blended techno-populism, whereby a mainstream party enters a coalition with a techno-populist one. what are the implications of these parties’ participation in government in terms of policy performance? a major challenge for populism is to cope with governing tasks while retaining its distinctive traits and not succumbing to the burden of responsibility. in this respect, the conte i government was successful. it managed to do it by purposefully raising the conflict against the ‘external enemy’ while advertising its capability to keep promises and its independence from responsibility, feeding its populist rhetoric, and then obstructing parliamentary debate. despite the achievement, it is clear that the ‘the burden of responsiveness leads parties to adopt less responsible behaviors’ (bardi et al. 2014: 245). as a matter of fact, the considerable budget changes put in place by the m5s and the league were all at the expense of the conte ii government, which had to take charge of all the monetary and reputational debts of techno-populists in government. instead, the inclusion of the pd in the government moved the executive’s inclination towards higher responsibility, reducing their pretension as problem-solvers and fostering the dialogue both within the coalition partners and with the eu which, however, did not allow the government to chase specific policy goals. overall, the paper shows that techno-populist parties keep on stressing their adversarial image and their maximalist pledges even when in government. however, this alice cavalieri 165 may be due to the importance of the budget – continuously in the limelight for about four months each year – which, although rather difficult to modify, can be easily exploited by parties to spotlight their own image. further research on different policy venues is needed to understand whether techno-populist parties are always able to retain their distinctive traits once in office. concurrently, comparative studies on the budget policy considering countries where techno and populist parties are in government would help to understand whether responsibility is doomed to surrender to responsiveness, with potential backlashes on national accounts. acknowledgements a preliminary draft of this article was presented at the workshop titled ‘il parlamento del cambiamento? la xviii legislatura alla prova dei dati’ (rome, 13 june 2019), organized by the sisp standing group on ‘government, parliament and representation’. the author is grateful to the organizers and all participants for the discussion. i also thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. references bardi, luciano, stefano bartolini, and alexander h. trechsel. 2014. “responsive and responsible? the 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https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it) table a-1. categorization of national public expenditure in italy (1998–2019) i and ii level cofog (1998–2018) 1 general administration 6 housing and community amenities 1.1 finance, revenues 6.1 housing development 1.2 international aids 6.2 territory arrangement 1.3 general services 6.3 water supply 1.4 basic research 6.4 street lighting 1.5 r&d on general administration 6.5 r&d on housing and community amenities 1.6 public services 6.6 housing (not otherwise classified) 1.7 debt 1.8 money transfer 2 defense 7 health 2.1 military defense 7.1 health devices 2.2 civic defense 7.2 non-hospital services 2.3 foreign military aids 7.3 hospital services 2.4 r&d on defense 7.4 public health 2.5 defense (not otherwise classified) 7.5 r&d on health 7.6 health (not otherwise classified) 4.08 25.55 25.42 6.16 21.16 40.82 17.35 32.68 18.76 34.33 17.07 22.69 0 10 20 30 40 2013 2014 (ep) 2018 2019 (ep) year of elections s ha re o f v ot e league m5s pd responsiveness, responsibility and the role of parliament 170 3 public order and safety 8 recreation, culture and religion 3.1 police 8.1 leisure activities 3.2 firefighting 8.2 culture activities 3.3 courthouses 8.3 publishing, television 3.4 prisons 8.4 religious services 3.5 r&d on public order and safety 8.5 r&d on recreation, culture and religion 3.6 public order (not otherwise classified) 8.6 culture, religion (not otherwise classified) 4 economic affairs 9 education 4.1 commerce, labor 9.1 preschool, primary education 4.2 agriculture, fishing, hunting 9.2 – secondary education 4.3 fuels, energy 9.3 post-secondary education 4.4 manufacturing, mining, building 9.4 higher education 4.5 transports 9.5 education (other) 4.6 communication 9.6 additional services 4.7 other sectors 9.7 r&d on education 4.8 r&d on economic affairs 9.8 education (not otherwise classified) 4.9 economic affairs (not otherwise classified) 5 environmental protection 10 social protection 5.1 waste treatment 10.1 illness, handicap 5.2 wastewater 10.2 old age 5.3 pollution control 10.3 survivors 5.4 environmental protection 10.4 family 5.5 r&d on environmental protection 10.5 unemployment 5.6 environmental protection (not otherwise classified) 10.6 residences 10.7 social exclusion 10.8 r&d on social protection 10.9 social protection (not otherwise classified) source: la nuova classificazione del bilancio dello stato e la traduzione in italiano della cofog, s. carobene – istat, dipartimento di contabilità nazionale, n. 13/1999 (available online: https://www.istat.it/it/files//2011/01/cofog.pdf) alice cavalieri 171 table a-2. indexes to calculate the difference between the budget bill and the budget law macro categories micro categories law(t-1)/bill(t) (d) bill(t)/ law(t) (a) law(t-1)/bill(t) (d) bill(t)/ law(t) (a) year budget distance duncan index budget distance duncan index transformativ budget distance duncan index transformativ budget distance duncan index 1999 0.0070 0.0096 0.0125 0.0090 0.0182 2000 0.0304 0.0353 0.0268 0.0290 0.2442 0.0398 0.0612 0.1079 0.0264 0.0369 2001 0.0179 0.0223 0.0332 0.0300 0.1387 0.0300 0.0527 0.1901 0.0351 0.0371 2002 0.1243 0.1061 0.0142 0.0140 2.4605 0.1264 0.1615 0.2106 0.0370 0.0360 2003 0.0151 0.0164 0.0335 0.0337 0.0494 0.0179 0.0309 0.4412 0.0535 0.0825 2004 0.0281 0.0275 0.0084 0.0101 1.3688 0.0943 0.1200 2.9645 0.1388 0.1344 2005 0.0091 0.0100 0.0153 0.0140 0.0416 0.0164 0.0299 0.0411 0.0163 0.0229 2006 0.0221 0.0217 0.0151 0.0149 0.2603 0.0411 0.0504 0.0473 0.0175 0.0239 2007 0.1841 0.1589 0.1691 0.1480 0.7183 0.0683 0.1099 0.1474 0.0309 0.0564 2008 0.0167 0.0158 0.0123 0.0150 0.1676 0.0330 0.0448 0.0764 0.0222 0.0330 2009 0.0819 0.0796 0.0029 0.0028 2.8468 0.1360 0.1701 0.0106 0.0083 0.0101 2010 0.0291 0.0286 0.0082 0.0075 0.1576 0.0320 0.0524 0.0037 0.0049 0.0092 2011 0.0310 0.0380 0.0050 0.0051 5.7937 0.1940 0.2143 0.0055 0.0060 0.0102 2012 0.0209 0.0211 0.0146 0.0153 0.0815 0.0230 0.0295 0.0197 0.0113 0.0184 2013 0.0155 0.0168 0.0185 0.0171 0.1037 0.0259 0.0380 0.0487 0.0177 0.0239 2014 0.0266 0.0273 0.0099 0.0104 0.1507 0.0312 0.0381 0.0175 0.0106 0.0174 2015 0.0515 0.0455 0.0173 0.0163 0.4199 0.0522 0.0604 0.0407 0.0162 0.0252 2016 0.0185 0.0181 0.0103 0.0110 0.7889 0.0716 0.0749 0.0218 0.0119 0.0190 2017 0.0094 0.0097 0.0008 0.0007 0.0468 0.0174 0.0271 0.0001 0.0007 0.0009 2018 0.0048 0.0056 0.0013 0.0012 0.0169 0.0104 0.0207 0.0002 0.0011 0.0017 2019 0.0269 0.0232 0.0008 0.0007 0.0978 0.0252 0.0420 0.0001 0.0008 0.0012 2020 0.0125 0.0132 0.0012 0.0011 0.0775 0.0224 0.0350 0.0002 0.0011 0.0018 notes: the index of transformativeness for macro-categories is in table 1 (section 2) source: own elaboration ips, volume 11, issue 1 172 table a-3(a). correlation matrix between indexes (macro and micro categories) law(t-1)/bill(t) (d) macro categories duncan dissimilarity index budget distance duncan dissimilarity index budget distance 1.00*** index of transformativeness 0.95*** 0.97*** micro categories duncan dissimilarity index budget distance duncan dissimilarity index budget distance 0.99*** index of transformativeness 0.94*** 0.96*** notes: statistical significance with p-value 0.05 (*), 0.01 (**), 0.001 (***) source: own elaboration table a-3(b). correlation matrix between indexes (macro and micro categories) bill(t)/ law(t) (a) macro categories duncan dissimilarity index budget distance duncan dissimilarity index budget distance 1.00*** index of transformativeness 0.97*** 0.97*** micro categories duncan dissimilarity index budget distance duncan dissimilarity index budget distance 0.97*** index of transformativeness 0.86*** 0.95*** notes: statistical significance with p-value 0.05 (*), 0.01 (**), 0.001 (***) source: own elaboration microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 31–35. the association of italian women historians and the promotion of gender culture in italy isabelle chabot società italiana delle storiche he società italiana delle storiche (sis, italian association of women historians)1 was founded in 1989. its aim was to promote women’s and gender history through research, teaching and the conservation of documents and source materials. over more than 25 years, the association has worked to highlight women’s experience and subjectivity through research and to further enrich the legacy of knowledge that has stemmed from women’s and gender history: it is already a well-recognized and acknowledged player in academia and not only in the field of the history and politics of women. the sis is an association of professional historians, but also a women’s association that is very active in the dissemination of a gender culture that has its roots in history. two sis conferences, organized on very current issues, should, we believe, be read in an historical perspective: a recent one on “violence against women in an historical perspective”,2 and one on “women, citizenship, and religion in the history of the mediterranean,” held in rome in november 2016.3 this paper aims to present, very briefly, two of the sis’s main activities in the dissemination of a gender culture: the summer school and the training courses. history and politics of women: the sis summer school right from its beginnings the sis has privileged the relationship between research and training. in 1990, the sis summer school (scuola estiva) was founded, in partnership with the university of siena; since then the school has taken place annually at the certosa di pontignano, during two weeks at the end of august-beginning of september. the sis wanted its school to be open to a wide group of women from very different backgrounds: students and academics, but also school teachers, librarians and archivists, workers in public administration, women involved in trade unions, political parties, and cultural organizations focused on equal opportunities between men and women, etc. the scuola estiva aimed to offer training both in women’s and gender history and in gender culture 1 online at this address: http://www.societadellestoriche.it. 2 la violenza contro le donne in una prospettiva storica. contesti, linguaggi, politiche del diritto (secc. xvi–xxi), rome 27–28 november 2015; the proceedings of the conference will be published by viella editrice in rome. 3 donne, cittadinanza e religione nella storia del mediterraneo, rome 4–5 november 2016. t chabot, the association of italian women historians and the promotion of gender culture in italy 32 and politics. across the years, the sis summer school has proved to be an innovative and successful format of interdisciplinary training that interweaves the skills of historians, philosophers, sociologists, jurists, etc. in 2003 the scuola estivamoved to fiesole, near florence, and is now open to male participants. starting from a historical perspective open to the contemporaneity, and the changes at work in the world of women, some of the last editions of the scuola estiva dealt with specific themes, including: the challenge of feminism to the movements of the seventies (2004); women in the monotheistic religions: faith, politics, freedom (2006); the construction of motherhood: history, science, feminist reflection (2013); disobedience: gender, power, resistance (2014).4 the 2016 edition of the sis summer school took place from 31 october to 2 november and focused on the very current issue of procreation and motherhood, between history and biotechnology. training for leadership starting in 2010, the sis has also undertaken a wide-ranging educational program, initiating a fruitful collaboration with local administrations, first of all with the toscana region and the province of florence (department for equal opportunities), continuing with the cities of narni and rome, in the lazio region, and with the veneto region (provinces of venice and padua). the implementation of a new and innovative law (16/2009) of the toscana region on “gender citizenship-equal opportunities between men and women”5 gave sis the opportunity to improve its own original style of training, combining a conceptual approach of high scientific level with a solid professional training facility. from spring 2010, in order to implement the law, the toscana region considered – among other initiatives – funding projects proposed by associations whose statutes provide for “the dissemination and implementation of the principle of equal opportunities between men and women; or the promotion and enhancement of the status of women; or help to protect in court in case of violation of rights” (art. 6). selection and funds were to be managed by the departments for equal opportunities of the nine toscana provinces. between 2010 and 2014, four sis projects were selected by the province of florence, the first three being fully funded.6 in these years, the thematic areas of the sis training courses were: gender stereotypes (language and images);7 relationship between women and work (work-life balance; leadership);8 leadership: work and politics.9 4 see the programmes of all the editions from 1990, online at this address: http://www.so cietadellestoriche.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=105&itemid=117&limitstart=0. 5 regione toscana, legge regionale 2 aprile 2009, n. 16 ‘cittadinanza di genere’. 6 in 2014, the project was ‘financed but not funded’ due to dire lack of funds (only four years after the enactment of the law 16/2009). 7 2010 – fuori dal senso comune. corso di formazione per combattere gli stereotipi all’origine delle discriminazioni di genere (dicembre 2009–marzo 2010) (out of common sense. training course to fight against stereotypes at the origin of gender discrimination). project by isabelle chabot and anna scattigno. more information available online at this address: http://www.societadellestoriche.it/index. php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=245&itemid=303. 8 2011 – sebben che siamo donne… corso di formazione per promuovere la parità nel mondo del lavoro (febbraio–maggio 2011) (although we are women… training course to promote equality in the workplace). project by isabelle chabot, elena martini, alessandra pescarolo, anna scattigno. gender and politics 33 women’s leadership emerged rapidly as a crucial issue, so we decided to devote the third course to it. but leadership is also an open concept, not reducible to a single definition, and it did not seem to be an easy subject to handle in a training course. to begin to circumscribe our object and better tackle the related issues, we decided together with the assessora sonia spacchini, to organize seven meetings between may and june 2012 in seven different places, across the territory of the province of florence.10 the aim of these public debates was to stimulate a collective reflection, gather ideas, needs, aspirations, and experiences of leadership both in politics and work. we involved several local administrators (mayors, assessori, city councilors, etc.) because local government seemed to us a strategic field, where interesting forms of female leadership had developed in recent years. we asked for their help to involve workers, entrepreneurs, and women active in the organizations in the area. participation in these debates was large and active, and contributed to raising many issues and to highlighting some keywords (summarized in a report).11 examples of themes that emerged during these public discussions are as follows: • power: the different attitudes of men and women with respect to power; exercising power with others (but not over the others); women gaining power not for themselves but to generate changes in the social, economic, political order and to transform gender relations (an issue addressed by anna loretoni in the opening conference);12 • leadership models: is there a different leadership model from the male pattern? is there a necessity to build a leadership in which even men can recognize themselves?13 • participation and representation of women: the urgent need to increase this, both in the political parties and in organizations, in order to affirm a women’s leadership; 9 2013 – leadership femminile: diciamo sì al cambiamento. corso di formazione per promuovere e valorizzare le competenze di leadership femminile nelle organizzazioni, nella politica e nel mondo del lavoro (marzo–giugno 2013) (female leadership: say yes to change. training course to promote and enhance women’s leadership skills in organizations, in politics and in the workplace). project by isabelle chabot, elena martini, and anna scattigno. more information online: http://www.societadellestoriche.it/index .php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=242&itemid=300. see also, 2014 – esercizi di leadership (al femminile) (female) leadership exercises. project by isabelle chabot and anna scattigno (not funded). 10 the 2012 ‘tour’, and the following training course on female leadership (spring 2013) were a very exciting experience that we quickly gathered in a ‘quaderno di formazione’, a digital training notebook entitled la leadership che fa la differenza. esperienze femminili. quaderno di formazione, anna scattigno (ed.), with isabelle chabot, barbara imbergamo, elena martini, francesca maria casini, vanessa moi (november 2013). the book can be downloaded for free from this address: http://www.societadellestoriche.it/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=494&itemid=293. 11 see the report of the seven debates: a. scattigno, una discussione a più voci attorno alla leadership, in la leadership che fa la differenza, cit., pp. 12–19. 12 anna loretoni, la leadership femminile tra empowerment e gendermainstreaming, in la leadership che fa la differenza, cit., pp. 21–24. 13 see the report of the lectures: maria cristina bombelli, esercizi di leadership, in la leadership che fa la differenza, cit., pp. 35–36. chabot, the association of italian women historians and the promotion of gender culture in italy 34 • laws: to remove discrimination, promote equality (much was said on “quotas”, with differing opinions);14 • education and training: to fight against stereotypes; to empower women; • empowerment: develop and strengthen the skills and abilities of women; • courage: train women to take a step forward; • value: recognize the value of women, recognize valuable women; awareness, self-confidence, self-esteem (issues elaborated upon by carmen leccardi in her lecture);15 • visibility: communication, the need to train in public speaking. this somehow unusual public “brainstorming” was invaluable when structuring the training course (march–june 2013): many of these issues were raised at the opening conference (20 march 2013) through lectures (open to the public) that provided a theoretical framework to the course. further elaboration on the concept took place within two following workshops: one on leadership and politics, a second one on leadership and work(only open to 60 selected participants). the training course was free of charge and open to a wide range of the public, female and male, coming from the province of florence. participants, mostly women, came from different backgrounds and had different expectations: students and school teachers; unemployed and managers; public administration staff; operators of the centers for employment; operators in the sectors of training, human resources within the institutions and the organizations; representatives of the equal opportunity committees (comitati pari opportunità) within public institutions and organizations; and women who were politically active (political parties, trade unions, movements). the first two meetings of the workshops16 aimed to form a critical consciousness through participatory discussions, with the aim to: a) conceptualize women’s leadership and reach to shared definitions (conceptual map); and b) draw a map of the skills and qualities of women leaders. the starting point of the reflection was: is it possible to recognize and promote a “feminine” leadership, with its own style and special features, and then different from a “masculine” one? or is it more useful to build and promote new “good practices” of a participatory leadership, not precisely characterized by gender, which could be shared by men and women? although there was no unanimity on this important point, the participants were nevertheless all convinced that greater access of women to positions of command would be the bearer of changes, both in politics and in organizations. and it was stressed that the economic marginalization and discrimination of women are related to the problem of participation and representation. in the second stage of this discussion, we aimed to outline a woman leader profile, developing a map of skills and qualities that could be played out in politics as in work 14 see the report of the lectures: alisa del re, le donne nei governi locali, in la leadership che fa la differenza, cit., pp. 39–40. 15 see the report of the lectures: carmen leccardi, tra generazioni: soggettività femminili in mutamenti, in la leadership che fa la differenza, cit., pp. 37–38. 16 see the report of the two workshops: 1) leadership e politica, in la leadership che fa la differenza, cit., pp. 41–60; 2) leadership e lavoro, ibid., pp. 61–77. gender and politics 35 contexts. this map was divided into three areas: knowledge (what knowledge i need to give content to my leadership?); skills (what know-how is useful to express my leadership?); and personal qualities (what ways of being can sustain and make efficient my leadership?). the discussion drew a distinction between, on the one hand the knowledge and skills that are acquired through education and training and improved with experience, on the other hand qualities and talents that are part of one’s own personality. in general, the participants placed less emphasis on knowledge with respect to knowing how to do and knowing how to be. moving from these maps, participants had then to identify women leaders in the world, not only politicians, and discuss their profiles. the third workshop, “leadership and politics”, was an empirical test: a) to acquire methods and tools useful to the development of skills and capabilities emerged as central to a participative leadership (narrative, active listening, group building management, and public speaking); and b) to simulate a strategy to support the election campaign of a woman in the local elections. in the workshop “leadership and work”, learning was rooted in individual work experience, with the narrative of leadership skills, successes and failures, conflicts. this phase ended with the drawing-up of a self-assessment questionnaire then administered to all members of the group. in subsequent meetings, participants met two women at a different stage of a political career—a young candidate for mayor (group 1) and a regional councilor (group 2)—and had to draw up a grid of questions before interviewing them.17 in another workshop, a researcher was invited to present and discuss a study conducted in 30 companies in lombardia on the role and responsibilities of women and young people in times of crisis. a conclusive seminar allowed the different groups to share their experience and findings. since its founding in 1989, the sis has placed at the core of its activities training and transmission of knowledge, even beyond the university, as a tool for the transformation of social reality and enhancement of the female subjectivity. the gender training was designed as a positive action that would allow women to acquire tools, to analyze, and deconstruct stereotypes and mechanism of exclusion, to promote women’s work and leadership. references scattigno, a. (2013) (a cura di) la leadership che fa la differenza. quaderno di formazione. “leadership femminile: diciamo sì al cambiamento” corso di formazione organizzato da assessorato alle pari opportunità della provincia di firenze. società italiana delle storiche. progetto realizzato con il finanziamento della regione toscana (lr. 16/2009 cittadinanza di genere). 17 see the report of the interviews to brenda barnini and daniela lastri in la leadership che fa la differenza, cit., pp. 52–60. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_3_crulli_196-219.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 3 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 3, 196–219. contact author: mirko crulli, university of pisa e-mail address: crullimirko@gmail.com scientists versus the people: science, anti-science and counter-science in italian populist communication, before and during the pandemic mirko crulli university of pisa abstract this paper fits into the complex debate on the relation between pandemic and populism, shedding light on one aspect that has not yet been sufficiently investigated: the renewed antagonism between common sense and scientific knowledge in populist communication. how has the way populist actors speak of expert knowledge and scientists changed since the outbreak of the coronavirus? has the pandemic fostered an extension of the ‘elite’ concept in populist rhetoric, allowing populist forces to identify scientists as the new central antagonist of ‘the people’? the research attempts to answer these questions through a content analysis of populist tweets (n=1533). we focus on a relevant case study, italy, which makes it possible to distinguish between different ‘types’ of populist parties, in terms of both ideology and strategical ‘constraints’. findings show that a radical right ‘science-related populism’ has emerged as a backlash against scientists’ massive intervention in the political sphere. 1. introduction ince the very beginning of the covid-19 pandemic, scholars have questioned the possible implications of the health and socio-economic crisis for populist forces. in europe, the debate has focused above all on trying to understand whether the coronavirus and all that derived from it may represent an electoral ‘enemy’ or ‘ally’ of populist radical right parties (mudde, 2007), of which there has been an overwhelming rise over the last two decades. such attention to the relationship between the pandemic crisis and populism is not surprising, since there is a strong historical correlation between crisis and populism. more precisely, although crises are not a necessary prerequisite of populism, the latter has often been interpreted as a derivative of crises (hubé and bobba, 2021: 2–8). indeed, many authoritative studies of comparative politics and political sociology on the transformations of political conflict, drawing on cleavage theory (lipset and rokkan, 1967), trace the roots of populism, and its strengthening, to ‘critical junctures’ that often coincide with crises, such as the transition from materialistic and industrial societies to post-materialistic and post-industrial societies, the intensification of globalization, and the great recession (bornschier, 2010; de wilde et al., 2019; hooghe and marks, 2018; kriesi et al., 2006; norris and inglehart, 2019). it is also clear that what we still have to emerge from is s mirko crulli 197 not only an unprecedented health crisis but also a devastating socio-economic and political crisis, which ‘adds to and exacerbates the dynamics of existing crises’ in europe (alteri et al., 2021: 8). interpretations of the state of health of populism after the coronavirus have been disparate. alongside reports and collective volumes containing studies on various national cases (bar-on and molas, 2020; hubé and bobba, 2021; katsambekis and stavrakakis, 2020), a few interventions of a more general nature have maintained a cautious position (mudde, 2020; wondreys and mudde, 2020), while many have used tones that seem too definitive at present. some have predicted that populist radical right parties will be ‘the profiteers’ of the pandemic in the long run (burni, 2020). others have described them as its ‘victims’ (betz, 2020; english, 2020) or its ‘significant losers’ (samaras, 2020). and still others have foreseen that populism will emerge from covid as a ‘peripheral and almost negligible’ ideology (bufacchi, 2020), or have claimed that the coronavirus crisis may have given way to ‘a post-populist phase’ (gerbaudo, 2021: 25). this paper fits into this complex debate on the relation between pandemic and populism. however, the research question is not whether the pandemic has strengthened or weakened populism. indeed, a significant bulk of works have already been dedicated to this topic, and, beyond this, i believe that a reflection with true heuristic value on the electoral consequences of the coronavirus crisis for populist parties should be postponed at least to the effective conclusion of the crisis. therefore, this contribution aims to shed light on one aspect that, although present in the public debate, has not yet been adequately investigated: the renewed tension between common sense and scientific knowledge in populist communication following the pandemic. how has the way populist actors speak of expert knowledge, of women and men of science, changed? did the pandemic offer a ‘window of opportunity’ for the extension of the ‘elite’ concept in populist rhetoric, allowing populist leaders and parties to identify mainstream experts and scientists as the new core antagonist of ‘the people’? these are the basic questions guiding the research, which is structured as follows. the next section illustrates the theoretical framework. i clarify what is meant by ‘populism’ (or rather, what definition of populism is adhered to here) and in what sense the outbreak of the coronavirus could have favored an extension of the ‘elite’ concept in populist rhetoric and the emergence of a new ‘variant’ of ‘science-related populism’ (mede et al., 2021; mede and schäfer, 2020). then, i try to empirically answer the research questions, through a content analysis of populist communication on twitter, by selecting a single relevant case study: italy. the bipolarism that structured the italian party system of the 2000s was indeed upset in the post-great recession period by the rise of several populist parties, with different characteristics. first, there was the sudden electoral success of the ‘polyvalent’ (pirro, 2018) or ‘eclectic’ (mosca and tronconi, 2019) populism of the five star movement (m5s). then, from 2018 onwards, came the strengthening of populist radical right parties – the league, transformed into a nationalist and populist party by matteo salvini (albertazzi et al., 2018), and giorgia meloni’s brothers of italy (fdi), whose surge reconfigured the balance of power inside the right-wing alliance (albertazzi et al., 2021). moreover, during two years of pandemic crisis, two cabinets – the ‘conte ii’ and the ‘draghi’ cabinets – have alternated, and these have been supported by different populist parties. in short, the italian case is particularly interesting and apt scientists versus the people 198 because it enables us to examine science-related communication by populist forces both of different ‘types’ and with different ‘constraints’, one having been in government (m5s), one in opposition (fdi) and one first in opposition and then in government (lega) throughout the pandemic crisis. 2. a ‘new’ antagonist of the people and a new populist ‘variant’ although populism remains one of the most debated concepts in socio-political literature, the definition of populism that has garnered the greatest consensus in recent years is that provided by cas mudde’s ‘ideational approach’ (mudde, 2004, 2017). according to this definition, populism is ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people’ (mudde, 2004: 543). as mudde himself pointed out (mudde, 2017: 29), many scholars usually associated with other interpretations of populism – for instance, those who depict it as a ‘discourse’ (laclau, 2005) or a ‘political style’ (moffitt and tormey, 2014) – nonetheless consider populism a phenomenon related to the dichotomous ideas of ‘people’ and ‘elite’. therefore, it is a common acknowledgement that the two key concepts on which populism is based are those of ‘people’ – virtuous and holder of the truth – and of ‘elite’ – bearer of falsehoods and selfish interests. with this in mind, the thesis advanced here is that the outbreak of the pandemic created at least the potential for the extension of the ‘elite’ concept. due to the new centrality of science in the public arena, and to the enormous and unprecedented exposure of scientists in the media, also virologists, immunologists, epidemiologists, and all sorts of scientists could fully enter ‘the elite’ which is targeted by populist actors. in other words, after the coronavirus, the enemies of the people in the manichean view of populism may no longer be only traditional parties, non-majoritarian institutions, the european union, and non-natives, but also women and men of science, who have assisted european governments in outlining their policy strategies. to be clear, populists’ aversion to expert knowledge is not new (alteri et al., 2021: 12; caramani, 2017). a typical populist feature is indeed trusting the ‘common sense’ of the people and at the same time distrusting the ‘specific knowledge’ presumably supported by the elites and considered to be disconnected from real, practical and ordinary everyday life (moffitt and tormey, 2014). this connection between ‘anti-intellectualism’ – or in any case distrust of intellectuals and knowledge-based institutions, such as universities – and populism has already been highlighted by empirical research (merkley, 2020; saarinen et al., 2020). nonetheless, the pandemic has inevitably increased the penetration of technical and scientific knowledge into the political sphere, forcing the ruling elites to rely more than ever (albeit not without tension) on technical-scientific recommendations. as a backlash, the pandemic may also have exposed scientists more than ever to populist ‘attacks’ (brubaker, 2020: 2–7; eberl et al., 2021), providing a window of opportunity for the full inclusion of scientists in the despised elite. in fact, during the pandemic there have been several signs that populist rhetoric is drawing renewed vigor from the attack on scientists. to name just one from the case study of this research, italy, even a few days after joining mario draghi’s coalition government, the leader of the lega, matteo salvini, criticized the main advisor of the ministry of health, asked to change the scientists of the technical scientific committee mirko crulli 199 (cts), and declared: ‘we can no longer stand “experts” who sow fear and uncertainties’ (la repubblica, 2021b). therefore, it is no coincidence that some authors have begun to speak of a new ‘variant’ of populism, labelled as ‘science-related populism’, and conceptualized as ‘a set of ideas suggesting a fundamental conflict between an allegedly virtuous people and an allegedly immoral academic elite over who should be in charge of science-related decision-making and over what is deemed “true knowledge”’ (mede et al., 2021: 274).1 this new populist variant would not primarily advocate a rejection of scientific knowledge per se, but rather a contestation of the decision-making sovereignty of established science, aiming to replace it with the legitimate ‘science-related decision-making sovereignty and truth-speaking sovereignty’ of the people (mede and schäfer, 2020: 484). in this sense, ‘science-related populism’ is something more than pure and simple anti-intellectualism,2 since what characterizes the former is considering ‘the people’ to be just and superior not only in moral terms (such as in the ‘classic’ populist weltanschauung) but also in epistemological terms. and in fact, on more than one occasion during the pandemic, the message of several populist parties and politicians seems to have been: ‘let’s replace “their scientists” – those of the establishment – with “our counter-scientists” – those of the people’ (on the use of ‘counterknowledge’, namely, ‘proposing politically charged alternative knowledge authorities in the stead of established ones’, by the populist radical right see ylä-anttila, 2018). to mention a telling event, the league senator roberta ferrero organized the ‘first world conference on early treatments for covid 19’ in september 2021, hosted by the italian senate. the association promoting the event has argued that the covid disease is easily treatable at home and has called for the use of alternative therapies, which have been strongly criticized by the official scientific community. however, the league senator did not present the conference as an event of protest against science and medicine. rather, she defended the initiative by stating: ‘international doctors with long curriculums spoke. is it no longer possible to speak, or express scientific theses in this country?’ (la repubblica, 2021a). it is thus evident that the attempt, supported by other important league exponents, was to give a voice to ‘counter-scientists’ as opposed to the mainstream ones. through the following content analysis of the italian populist tweets, we will proceed to gauge whether this ‘science-related populism’ has risen (on the supply side of politics) and whether the hypothesized extension of the ‘elite’ concept in populist communication has occurred. 3. research design to choose the populist actors on which the research is based, i resorted to the poppa (populism and political parties) expert survey, conducted by meijers and zaslove (2021). the poppa expert survey builds on the ideational approach to populism but, 1 an apparently similar concept, introduced before covid-19, is that of ‘medical populism’, defined as ‘a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit “the people” against “the establishment”’ (lasco and curato, 2019). however, such ‘medical populism’ is conceived of as a particular type of response to health emergencies, rather than as a ‘variant’ of populist ideology. unlike ‘science-related populism’, therefore, it is a contingent phenomenon to health crises, and not a ‘set of ideas’ that can be present even outside a crisis, or, in any case, persist once a crisis is over. 2 definable as ‘a generalized suspicion and mistrust of intellectuals and experts of whatever kind’ (merkley, 2020: 26). scientists versus the people 200 instead of relying on a dichotomous understanding of parties’ populism (parties are either-or-not populist), it conceives of populism as a multi-dimensional and continuous property, and thus it measures populism as an interval index ranging from 0 to 10. this is particularly apt and useful when judging contentious cases of populism. for instance, as regards italy, the literature has been rather unanimous in labelling la lega and the movimento 5 stelle (m5s) as ‘populist’, whereas the cases of fratelli d’italia (fdi) and forza italia (fi) have been more contested3. therefore, i selected only the parties whose score on the populism index based on poppa data is higher than 6. these are the m5s (9.46), the league (8.6) and fdi (7.44). i excluded forza italia because its score is 5.56: almost equidistant from the two extremes of the poppa populism scale. this choice is further justified by considering that in recent years forza italia has ‘sub-contracted populism and euroscepticism’ to its allies on the radical right (the league and fdi) and, especially during the pandemic, it has ‘reinvented itself as a moderate and pro-eu party’ (albertazzi et al., 2021: 12; 2). the analysis is based on a collection of tweets posted by the official accounts of the selected parties and their leaders: matteo salvini (lega), giorgia meloni (fdi), beppe grillo and luigi di maio (m5s). two different m5s exponents are considered, because the leadership of this party is not as clearly ‘monocratic’ as in the two populist radical right parties. throughout the course of the pandemic crisis, di maio has been the most important exponent of the movement in public office4, whereas grillo holds the role of ‘guarantor’. therefore, considering both di maio and grillo, we can distinguish between the communication of the leader within the institutions and that of the external ‘guarantor’, possibly freer to keep the original anti-establishment vocation. i use twitter as a data source for the analysis of science-related populist communication for several reasons. first, discussions on relevant public issues, such as the covid19 crisis, take place on twitter almost concurrently with real events (boccia artieri et al., 2021). secondly, recent studies have reiterated that ‘the features of this platform are now widely recognized as a key arena for political communication’ (albertazzi et al., 2021: 4). thirdly, previous research has also claimed that due to its structural characteristics (e.g., the character limit), twitter is ‘perfect for the embodiment of populism’ (bracciale and martella, 2017: 3). the time span covers from 1 january 2019 to 31 december 2021. the investigation, therefore, comprises the whole pre-covid year (2019) and almost two years of pandemic crisis, which we can consider open from 30 january 2020, the date of the first confirmed infections from covid-19 in italy. the period of the pandemic crisis is divided according to two criteria: (1) the alternation between the conte ii government (until 12 february 2021) and the draghi government; (2) the distinction between different pandemic phases. the entire time frame is therefore divided as follows: 1) pre-covid year: from 1 january 2019 to 29 january 2020. 3 to mention just one example, employing text-analytic methods to measure the level of populism in italian parties’ press releases (from the period of the 17th italian parliament), decadri and boussalis (2020: 8–10) found a rather moderate level of populism for berlusconi’s party and even more so for fdi 4 giuseppe conte became the political leader of the m5s only in august 2021. mirko crulli 201 2) 1st wave: from 30 january to 8 october 2020 (the day on which the use of medical masks became mandatory, as a first measure against the advent of the second wave). 3) 2nd wave and end of the conte ii cabinet: from 9 october 2020 to 12 february 2021. 4) beginning of the draghi cabinet and 3rd wave: from 13 february to 21 june 2021 (the day the curfew was lifted). 5) end of the 3rd wave, mass vaccinations, omicron variant: from 22 june to 31 december 2021. through this periodization, it will be possible to examine how and how much the way of speaking about expert knowledge, science and scientists by italian populists changed between preand post-covid periods, as well as through the different pandemic phases. the research hypotheses are that, since the outbreak of the pandemic crisis, there has been – in the tweets of italian populist actors an increase in: (h1) negative references to mainstream science, experts and scientists; (h2) direct attacks on mainstream experts and scientists; (h3) references to mainstream scientific knowledge, experts and scientists as illegitimate, enemies, or ‘others’ than ‘the people’; (h4) references to ‘counter-sciences/counter-knowledge’5 or ‘counter-scientists/experts’ of ‘the people’ as opposed to those of the establishment. the first two hypotheses concern the level of anti-intellectualism and anti-scientism more generally, while the third and fourth hypotheses concern more specifically the extent to which mainstream science and scientists have been portrayed as part of the elite, and the extent to which the communicative elements of ‘science-related populism’ have recurred. a fifth hypothesis is needed to differentiate between populist forces in opposition and in government. indeed, it is likely that the latter, having to face the crisis, were more bound to present the technicians and scientists close to the establishment in a more positive way: (h5) hypotheses 1-4 find more confirmation for populist actors in opposition than for those in government. finally, the paper also aims to verify whether the tweets containing elements of anti-intellectualism, anti-scientism and ‘science-related populism’ have been more successful than those containing more neutral references to science. this is crucial for the broader public sphere debate because, since the very beginning of the pandemic, claims that emerged from the digital world have resulted in grassroots ‘anti-hygienic’ anti-lockdown protests in the streets (ariza, 2020; vieten, 2020). thus, there are compelling reasons to assume that the consensus apparently accumulated by populists in social media through anti-science or counter-science rhetoric does not remain confined to the screens. (h6) (h6) elements of anti-intellectualism/anti-scientism and ‘science-related populism’ increase the number of likes of a given tweet. 5 potentially endorsed also by experts with a consolidated scientific profile. scientists versus the people 202 through the twitter api, all the tweets by the parties and leaders mentioned above in the selected time frame and containing keywords related to science and expert knowledge were downloaded (see appendix a). after a preprocessing phase aimed at removing the tweets that even containing the keywords were not really focused on expert knowledge, science and scientists, the dataset comprised 1,533 tweets. table 1. science-related tweets per account and period: total n (1st row) and n per month (2nd row) lega salvini fdi meloni m5s di maio grillo total/ mean pre-covid year 18 25 29 10 55 1 61 199 1.37 1.90 2.21 0.76 4.19 0.08 4.64 2.16 1st wave 260 95 116 15 33 8 11 538 30.83 11.26 13.75 1.78 3.91 0.95 1.30 9.11 2nd wave and end of conte ii cabinet 118 32 63 5 2 3 2 225 27.87 7.56 14.88 1.18 0.47 0.71 0.47 7.59 draghi cabinet and 3rd wave 167 27 193 13 4 3 1 408 38.84 6.28 44.88 3.02 0.93 0.70 0.23 13.55 3rd wave end, vaccinations, omicron 38 3 99 12 7 2 2 163 5.91 0.47 15.39 1.87 1.09 0.31 0.31 3.62 total 601 182 500 55 101 17 77 1,533 16.45 4.98 13.69 1.51 2.76 0.47 2.11 5.99 pre-covid 18 25 29 10 55 1 61 199 1.37 1.90 2.21 0.76 4.19 0.08 4.64 2.16 post-covid 583 157 471 45 46 16 16 1,334 24.91 6.71 20.13 1.92 1.97 0.68 0.68 8.14 source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. all these tweets were coded manually,6 to verify whether: (h1) the reference to mainstream science and/or mainstream experts/scientists was negative (-1), neutral (0) or positive (+1);7 (h2) there was a direct attack on mainstream experts/scientists (0=no; 1=yes); (h3) there was a reference to mainstream scientific knowledge and/or mainstream experts/scientists as illegitimate, enemies, or ‘others’ than ‘the people’ (0=no; 1=yes); (h4) there was a reference to ‘counter-sciences/counter-knowledge’ or ‘counterscientists/experts’ of ‘the people’ as preferable to those of the establishment (0=no; 1=yes). 6 about 10% of each account’s tweets were coded by both the author and another scholar to ensure intercoder reliability (krippendorff and hayes, 2007). the krippendorff’s α was: 0.86 for h1; 0.91 for h2; 0.80 for h3; 0.98 for h4. these are satisfactory values, which justified the coding of the rest of the tweets by the author alone. 7 whenever a tweet contained only references to ‘counter-sciences’ or ‘counter-experts/scientists’, and not also references to mainstream science and/or experts, the reference to the latter was considered neutral. mirko crulli 203 the data derived from the manual coding of the tweets were then analyzed through descriptive statistics and regression models. table 2. examples of the different elements examined in the tweets (translation from italian to english by the author) h1 negative reference to mainstream science and/or experts/scientists fake news on the coronavirus? let’s start with those of ‘experts’ and scientific committees. lega, 16/04/20 h2 direct attack on mainstream experts/scientists from #tv to the #redcarpet… but never in the laboratory and at work🙄 #burioni #venice #virologist. fdi, 01/09/21 h3 reference to mainstream scientific knowledge and/or experts/scientists as illegitimate, enemies, ‘others’ ++ stop the presence on tv of virologists that terrorize the italian people++ lega, 18/02/21 h4 reference to ‘counter-sciences/counterknowledge’ or ‘counter-scientists/experts’ of ‘the people’ results are supporting him: come on prof. de donno, the doctor of the people💪🇮🇹❤👨⚕ lega, 13/05/20 source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. before moving on to the results, it is interesting to outline which areas of science the collected populist tweets referred to, so as to contextualize ‘what science is to populists’. i classified each tweet as belonging to one of the following areas: ‘medicine & health’; ‘economics’; ‘social sciences & humanities’; ‘engineering and ict’; ‘energy, ecology & environment’; ‘physics & astronomy’; ‘generic reference to science/expertise’. then, i calculated the percentage of tweets that referred to each area, in the entire period, in the pre-covid period and in the post-covid period (see appendix 1b). over the entire period, most of the tweets made reference to ‘medicine & health’ (61%), followed by ‘generic references to science/expertise’ (27%), while the tweets that dealt with other areas of science were just 12%. however, the outbreak of covid-19 was a watershed, as the situation was very different in the pre-pandemic year. the major component was ‘generic references to science/expertise’ (38%); compared to other areas, ‘medicine & health’ was the one with the most references (20%), but the gap with other fields was much narrower (‘energy, ecology & environment’ at 14%; ‘economics’ at 12%). predictably, then, science-related populist tweets have mostly been centered on ‘medicine & health’ (67%) since the advent of coronavirus. i also checked if some of the tweets referred to non-italian science/experts, and it turned out that this was the case for less than 6% of the total tweets. therefore, almost all science-related tweets by italian populist actors concerned the italian context. 4. findings considering that for many months since the outbreak of covid-19 the virus has been almost the only relevant issue in the public debate – in italy as elsewhere – it would have been reasonable to expect an increase in the volume of tweets concerning science from any political party and leader. but it was not so. the first significant result of this research is indeed that the monthly number of tweets concerning expert knowledge and science published by the m5s and grillo has been significantly lower during the pandemic crisis than in the pre-covid year. furthermore, as regards di maio, the tweets per scientists versus the people 204 month relating to these issues were close to zero both in the pre-pandemic and during the pandemic. in the pre-covid period, the m5s’s science-related tweets were more than those of the two populist radical right parties. since the advent of coronavirus, it has evidently been the opposite. therefore, it seems that expert knowledge and science in times of pandemic have been a quantitatively relevant theme in the social communication of populists on the radical right only. assuming that the number of tweets on a specific topic is a measure of salience and that salience can be strategically manipulated by parties for electoral purposes, one possible conclusion is that the m5s has had no interest in politicizing science. after all, it is plausible that the m5s, being constantly in government, has preferred to ‘remove from the spotlight’, or at least not politicize, the problematic management of the health crisis and of the public role of science. figure 1. science-related tweets per populist parties and leaders source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. of the 17 tweets posted by di maio and 77 posted by grillo throughout the time span, none contained elements of anti-intellectualism, anti-scientism, or ‘science-related populism’. this finding is also noteworthy and in some ways surprising, since the old endorsement of some anti-science positions, and in particular ‘no-vax’ positions, by many m5s exponents and by grillo himself is well known. the pandemic could have provided grillo especially, freed from institutional constraints, with the opportunity to repoliticize the debate on science and vaccines in a populist key. but evidently the intention has been the opposite: not to dally with the anti-science electorate, or in any case with those who are close to ‘counter-science’ narratives. the party account as well has not published any tweet with negative references to science, attacks on experts/scientists, or elements of ‘science-related populism’ during the pandemic crisis. the vast majority of tweets by the m5s (70.71%), di maio (87.50%) and grillo (77.63%) contained lega salvini fdi meloni m5s di maio grillo pre-covid 1.37 1.90 2.21 0.76 4.19 0.08 4.64 post-covid 24.91 6.71 20.13 1.92 1.97 0.68 0.68 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 n p er m on th mirko crulli 205 positive references to science and/or mainstream experts/scientists8. only 2 out of the 101 m5s tweets included negative references to the experts (h1) and presented the latter as part of the ‘elite’ (h3) but both were from the pre-covid year. during the pandemic, instead, the party’s twitter communication has appeared to be aimed at combating fake news and ‘counter-knowledge’. for example, seven times during the 1st wave the m5s account published the following tweet: ‘beware of fake news on #coronavirus. here are the hoaxes refuted by the experts of the ministry of health and of the higher institute of health’. hypotheses 1-4 are therefore to be rejected as regards the m5s and its leaders. as for the populist radical right, it should first be noted that more than 80% of the tweets of both salvini (148/182) and meloni (45/55) were retweeted by the official accounts of the respective party; thus, they are already comprised in the sample of tweets of the league and fdi (25% of the tweets from the account of the league are retweets from salvini, while 9% of the tweets from the account of fdi are retweets from meloni). for this reason, we will focus here on the two parties only (the disaggregated analysis of science-related tweets published by the two party leaders, salvini and meloni, is summarized by figures 2a-5a in appendix b). for both parties, the first consideration is that the monthly number of tweets relating to expert knowledge and science has surged enormously during the pandemic crisis (+1,718% for the league and +811% for fdi). so, although these themes were not absent from the social communication of these parties, certainly (and predictably) the outbreak of the pandemic has made them much more central. figure 2. analysis of science-related tweets published by the league source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. the content analysis of the tweets of both the league and fdi amply supports hypotheses 1-4. starting with salvini’s party, the presence of all elements of anti 8 however, it must be acknowledged that the official accounts of the m5s and of the two leaders are probably not sufficiently representative of the variety of positions within the m5s. for instance, it is telling that some of the more active ‘no-vax’ mps, such as sara cunial or gianluigi paragone, were elected through the m5s lists in 2018 (both cited mps were later expelled from the party). negative references to mainstream science/experts/scientists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scientists as illegitimate/enemies/others references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid 0.76 0.30 0.69 0.08 post-covid 7.22 3.16 5.17 10.73 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 n p er m on th scientists versus the people 206 intellectualism, anti-scientism and ‘science-related populism’ has significantly increased in the post-covid period. but, among these, the league has above all made use of references to ‘counter-sciences/counter-knowledge’ and ‘counter-scientists’. many league tweets sponsored the use of hydroxychloroquine as an effective therapy for covid-19, despite the contrary opinion of aifa (agenzia italiana del farmaco) and who. this therapy, in the words of professor cavanna (one of the experts portrayed as ‘people’s scientists’) reported by the accounts of both the lega and salvini, has only two ‘major flaws’: ‘it costs very little, and trump likes it’. especially during the 1st and 2nd covid wave, the league conducted an incessant campaign in support of professor de donno,9 presented as the doctor ‘of the people’ or ‘of the poor’, being the promoter of the other therapy (in addition to hydroxychloroquine) considered by the league to be effective and ‘democratic’: the hyperimmune plasma. the superiority of these ‘scientists of the people’ compared to alleged ‘bribed’ scientists, who go on tv with conflicts of interest, has also been stressed by the league. giuseppe de donno, the pioneer of plasma therapy: [‘if everything remains in the hands of bribed scientists, we won’t get anywhere’ (...) ‘i have no conflicts of interest, i wish it were the same for scientists who go on tv’] (lega, 20/05/2020) we must thank prof. giuseppe de donno and his colleagues, who from the beginning, in the general skepticism or, worse, with the open hostility of some ‘television scientists’, believed in it with humility and passion (lega, 03/06/2020) honor and merit to the great prof. de donno 👏 [‘my treatment is democratic. for this, they stand against me. plasma therapy is cheap, it works great, and it doesn’t make billions. and i’m a country doctor, not a big pharma shareholder’] (lega, 15/06/2020) although prof. de donno had obtained the approval for his experimentation of hyperimmune plasma transfusions at the university of pavia, this was still a therapy in an experimental phase, considered controversial by most of the scientific community, and finally judged not suitable for treating covid by official medicine. ultimately, as can be seen from the tweets cited above, supporting these therapies with such motivations was equivalent to supporting the replacement of official science with a ‘counter-science’ of the people. after the surge registered in the early pandemic phase, the monthly number of negative references to science, direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists, references to the latter as part of the adverse elite and references to ‘counter-science/scientists’ by the league remained high for the duration of the health crisis. the monthly number continued to be high after the league’s entry into the draghi government, whereas it has drastically dropped in the most recent period, that of mass vaccinations. therefore, it is 9 90 of the 260 1st wave tweets retrieved from the league account (35%) included references to de donno. mirko crulli 207 possible that, as we approach the exit from the toughest emergency phase, the use of these communicative elements in the league tweets will return to pre-pandemic levels. figure 3. analysis of science-related tweets published by the league per period source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. elements of anti-intellectualism, anti-scientism and ‘science-related populism’ in the fdi’s tweets have been more frequent since the outbreak of the pandemic. however, meloni’s party made less use of references to ‘counter-sciences’ and ‘counter-experts’ and more of references to the other three elements investigated. therefore, despite having both adopted largely populist science-related communication, the two italian radical right parties seem to have followed partially different communication strategies. figure 4. analysis of science-related tweets published by fdi source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. negative references to mainstream science/experts/scientists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scientists as illegitimate/enemies/others references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid year 0.76 0.30 0.69 0.08 1st wave 6.52 3.68 6.28 17.55 2nd wave & end of conte ii cabinet 11.81 3.54 6.14 11.57 draghi cabinet & 3rd wave 13.72 5.81 9.53 9.77 end of 3rd wave, vaccinations, omicron 0.78 0.47 0.16 1.87 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 n p er m on th negative references to mainstream science/experts/scientists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scientists as illegitimate/enemies/others references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid 0.91 0.30 0.69 0.46 post-covid 10.26 6.71 6.32 1.15 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 n p er m on th scientists versus the people 208 fdi’s negative references to science and scientists, direct attacks on experts/scientists and references to the latter as illegitimate, enemies, or ‘others’ climbed during the first months of the draghi cabinet, coinciding with the 3rd wave of the virus in italy. figure 5. analysis of science-related tweets published by fdi per period source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. many attacks were against the members of the technical scientific committee and the experts of the task forces that have backed both governments in the management of the health emergency. these technicians and scientists have repeatedly been blamed for making decisions ‘without any scientific basis’, aimed at implementing ‘control mechanisms’ over the people or even a ‘health dictatorship’. in some tweets, they were also accused of being part of a ‘new caste’. other #experts for a #government of incompetents! this is the new #caste (fdi, 29/06/2020) stop to #health dictatorship. stop to impositions without scientific explanations. (fdi, 22/04/2021) the latest cts farce: masks in the restaurant between courses. mask up and mask down (...): the last frontier of fools who bully italy without any scientific basis to support their vexatious measures (fdi, 28/05/2021) i believe the drift taken by the management of the epidemic is crazy: from scientists i expect medical solutions such as home care and protocols, not mechanisms for controlling the life of each individual. citizens’ freedom is sacred, inviolable and binding (fdi, 07/06/2021) negative references to mainstream science/experts/scientists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science or experts/scientists as illegitimate/enemies/others references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid year 0.91 0.30 0.69 0.46 1st wave 3.68 2.73 4.62 1.42 2nd wave & end of conte ii cabinet 8.50 4.02 6.85 0.47 draghi cabinet & 3rd wave 29.07 20.70 12.56 1.40 end of 3rd wave, vaccinations, omicron 7.46 4.35 4.04 1.09 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 n p er m on th mirko crulli 209 however, the data of the fourth sub-period are strongly influenced by the fact that after the insults addressed to giorgia meloni by professor gozzini of the university of siena (22 february 2021), the attacks by fdi – or rather the ‘counter-attacks’ in the party’s view – against gozzini himself, other university professors and the academic world as a whole, multiplied. to sum up, hypotheses 1-4 are largely confirmed for the parties of the populist radical right, whereas they must be rejected for the m5s. hypothesis 5 finds a first validation from the comparison between these political forces. indeed, the m5s, which managed the pandemic emergency for the entire observed period, has not employed anti-science or counter-science rhetoric. but we still have to judge whether their entry into the draghi government represented a watershed in the science-related communication of the league. expectations are confirmed: the league made less use of all four types of tweets after becoming a governing party (sub-periods 4+5). above all, its references to ‘countersciences’ have fallen by nearly 70%. figure 6. analysis of science-related tweets published by the league: comparison between the conte ii and the draghi cabinets source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. the last step of the research (h6) consisted in verifying whether the presence of the elements of anti-intellectualism/anti-scientism and ‘science-related populism’ increased the popularity of the tweets published by populist parties (n=1202). ‘popularity’ is here operationalized in terms of likes. a simple comparison of the averages of likes received by the different types of tweets provides an initial confirmation of h6. above all, the percentage difference between the average likes of tweets that feature references to ‘counter-science’ or ‘counter-experts’ and those that do not contain this element is remarkable (73%), beyond being statistically significant. negative references to mainstream science/experts/scientists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scientists as illegitimate/enemies/others references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts conte ii 8.29 3.63 6.24 15.55 draghi 5.96 2.61 3.91 5.03 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 n p er m on th scientists versus the people 210 table 3. average popularity of the different types of tweets t-test (h0: diff=0) likes count avg. difference t ha: diff>0 p-value reference to mainstream science and/or experts/scientists: pos. 166.97 57.39% 2.91 0.00*** neg. 262.79 direct attack on mainstream experts/scientists: no 247.78 8.73% 0.53 0.3 yes 269.42 reference to mainstream scientific knowledge and/or experts/scientists as illegitimate, enemies, ‘others’: no 231.34 37.3% 2.21 0.01** yes 317.64 reference to ‘counter-sciences/counter-knowledge’ or ‘counter-scientists/experts’ of ‘the people’: no 214.92 72.93% 4.21 0.00*** yes 371.66 notes: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. to test this last hypothesis more appropriately, we apply two multiple linear regression (mlr) models, in which the dependent variable is the number of likes of the tweets. in the first model, the independent variables are the four categorical variables obtained through the manual coding of the tweets. considering only statistically significant results, it emerges that the tweets in which mainstream science and experts were presented as ‘elite’ (h3) and the tweets in which there was a reference to ‘counter-science’ or ‘counter-experts’ (h4) were almost twice as successful as those that did not contain these elements. however, the goodness of this model is scarce. table 4. popularity of science-related tweets by populist parties: explanatory models 1st model 2nd model likes count (y) b se b se h1 reference positive neutral 47.08 40.7 58.12** 28.62 negative -36.14 55.49 31.38 39.07 h2 direct attack on mainstream experts/scientists (no/yes) 57.75 44.82 87.1*** 31.53 h3 reference to mainstream scientific knowledge and/or experts/scientists as illegitimate, enemies, ‘others’ (no/yes) 133.61*** 43.52 32.16 30.74 h4 reference to ‘counter-sciences/counter-knowledge’ or ‘counter-scientists/experts’ of ‘the people’ (no/yes) 154.92*** 35.47 11.45 25.28 contr retweet from the leader (no/yes) 956.82*** 27.36 _cons 163.57*** 32.18 32.43 22.94 adjusted r2 0.03 0.52 notes: *** p<0.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1 source: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. thus, the second model includes a fifth dichotomous variable that assumes a value of 1 when the tweet is actually a retweet from the party leader (and therefore the author is salvini for the league, meloni for fdi, di maio or grillo for the m5s), and a value of 0 in all other cases (original tweet or retweet from other accounts). indeed, previous research has already shown that populist posts originating from the party leader are more successful (bobba, 2019). by adding this variable, the goodness of the model increases considerably and the party leader as the source of the tweet becomes the decidedly more important variable for the success of the message. therefore, these two regression models provide only partial support for hypothesis 6. mirko crulli 211 5. conclusions in this paper, i have dealt with a specific aspect of the intricate relation between pandemic and populism, namely how and how much the populists’ way of speaking about expert knowledge, science and scientists has changed following the coronavirus. in particular, i investigated whether the pandemic has favored an extension of the ‘elite’ concept in populist communication, allowing populist forces to target scientists as a new central antagonist of ‘the people’, and whether a ‘science-related populism’ (mede et al., 2021; mede and schäfer, 2020) has established itself as a backlash against scientists’ massive irruption into the political sphere. the empirical analysis focused on italian populist actors, whose preand post-covid tweets were examined. italy was chosen as a single relevant case study because here there are populist parties of different ‘types’ and which had different ‘constraints’ during the pandemic crisis, meaning that some were in government and others in opposition. the research questions may have appeared trivial to those who believed that, before covid-19, science was an irrelevant topic in the italian political debate. but, on the contrary, already during the previous decade science had become a profoundly politicized issue; so much so that the country was considered ‘a strategic case to understand the development, dissemination, and use of public epistemologies’ (brandmayr, 2021: 50). for instance, the political debate on vaccines was very heated in the years preceding the pandemic. in this respect, a clash between populist parties and mainstream parties had already taken shape: the former against compulsory vaccination (and in some cases close to ‘no-vax’ stances); the latter open to the hypothesis of compulsory vaccination (and definitely ‘pro-vax’) (brandmayr, 2021). given this already important level of politicization of science in italy, it was not to be taken for granted that the pandemic would further increase the extent to which populist actors resort to anti-science and counter-science narratives. and indeed, this was not the case for the ‘neither left nor right’ populist party – the five star movement. firstly, the monthly number of m5s tweets concerning expert knowledge and scientists has decreased considerably during the pandemic crisis (fig. 1). secondly, and above all, the m5s has not posted any negative references to science, nor attacks on experts/scientists or contents of ‘science-related populism’. instead, the m5s references to science have been mostly positive and characterized by ‘institutional’ tones, arguably due to the fact that the m5s has been constantly in government throughout the pandemic, managing the health emergency during two consecutive cabinets. the results of the content analysis of the tweets of the two populist radical right parties are totally different. this reminds us once again that not all populisms are the same. the recurrence of all the elements of anti-intellectualism, anti-scientism and ‘sciencerelated populism’ considered here has radically increased in the tweets of the league and fdi since the outbreak of the pandemic (figg. 2; 4). nevertheless, the two parties seem to have implemented different communication strategies. the league has made greater use of references to ‘counter-sciences’ or to scientists presented as alternative and preferable to those of the establishment – a much less frequent element in fdi’s communication. meloni’s party has mainly employed negative references and direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists, who have also been portrayed as a ‘new caste’. scientists versus the people 212 ultimately, the idea that the pandemic represented a window of opportunity for the inclusion of mainstream scientists among the enemies of ‘the people’ and for the emergence of a ‘science-related populism’ holds, but only for populists on the radical right. nonetheless, we must pay attention to two other factors that make this conclusion more nuanced. the first factor is related to whether or not the party belonged to the government coalition. indeed, during the draghi government, of which the league is a member, the recurrence of anti-science and counter-science rhetoric in the league’s tweets has diminished (fig. 6). the second factor is related to ‘the cycle of issue attention’. the use of elements of anti-intellectualism, anti-scientism and ‘science-related populism’ in the league’s tweets has sharply declined in the last few months analyzed here, those marked by the mass vaccination campaign (fig. 3). this supports the interpretation that anti-science and counter-science have not taken real root in the league but were just a temporary rhetorical device resorted to for electoral goals during the peak of public attention towards the virus. this would lead to assuming that, with the end of the most critical emergency phase, these elements are going to disappear from the social communication of the populist radical right. however, the results relating to fdi do not point to this interpretation, since its negative references to science and its direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists have been more frequent during the vaccination period than they were during the 1st covid wave (fig. 5). finally, on one hand, tweets dealing with anti-science or counter-science have on average been more successful than those featuring more neutral references to science (tab. 3). on the other hand, there is only tepid evidence that the presence of elements of anti-intellectualism/anti-scientism and ‘science-related populism’ increased the popularity of tweets from populist parties (tab. 4). in fact, even more than the content of the science-related tweets, what really determined the success of a tweet was the fact that the party leader (rather than the party itself or another account) was the author. this can be interpreted as a sign of the increasing trend in the ‘personalization’ of politics favored by new technologies, in line with previous research which has already found that populist posts originating from the party leader are more popular (bobba, 2019). two years after the outbreak of the pandemic in italy, the continued media overexposure of scientists seems to have fostered the emergence of a conflict not only between the populist radical right and mainstream scientists, but also between politics and science more generally. proof of this was the approval by the italian government of an o.d.g. (ordine del giorno) dated 22 september 2021 which requested that virologists, immunologists and infectious disease specialists appear in the media only with prior authorization from the structure where they work. whether this clash, as well as the more explicit one between the populist radical right and mainstream science, will be reabsorbed with the disappearance of the virus or, on the contrary, will contribute to a higher politicization of science even in the post-pandemic era and to a strengthening of the alignment between political and epistemological positions is something we still have to understand. nonetheless, some sociologists believe that ‘a crisis in the relationship between science, politics and society’ is already underway in liberal democracies (alteri et al., 2021: 9). future studies may also investigate further the implications of the populist right’s winking at anti-science and counter-science positions, not only in italy but throughout europe. a fruitful line of research could be to explore whether and how far mirko crulli 213 populists’ anti-science and counter-science rhetoric has pushed grassroots protests (against lockdowns, anti-contagion measures or compulsory vaccines) that have spread to all european countries. references albertazzi d, giovannini a and seddone a (2018) ‘no regionalism please, we are leghisti !’ the transformation of the italian lega nord under the leadership of matteo salvini. regional and federal studies 28(5): 645–671. doi: 10.1080/13597566.2018.1512977. albertazzi d, bonansinga d and zulianello m (2021) the right-wing alliance at the time of the covid-19 pandemic: all change? contemporary italian politics. routledge. doi: 10.1080/23248823.2021.1916857. alteri l, parks l, raffini l, et al. 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dott.ssa; virolog-o/a/i/he; immunolog-o/a/i/he; infettivolog-o/a/i/he; epidemiolog-o/a/i/he; burioni; accademic-o/a; professor-e/i; professoress-a/e; prof.; prof.ssa; professoron-e/i; espert-o/a/i/e; ricercator-e/i; ricercatric-e/i. ‘burioni’ is the only proper name included in the research as, to the best of my knowledge, burioni is the only scientist who was really involved in the italian political debate before covid-19 (brandmayr, 2021). pre-processing the initial pre-processing phase aimed to remove tweets that, while containing the keywords, were not really inherent to expert knowledge, science and scientists. the result was a dataset of 1,533 tweets (1,202 from parties and the remainder from leaders). the rest of the pre-processing phase was necessary for ensuring a correct manual coding of the tweets. this second phase involved the following operations: • whenever it was necessary to read the title of the newspaper article or web page linked to the tweet to understand the meaning of the tweet, this title was added in square brackets to the text; • whenever it was necessary to read the content of the image published with the tweet to understand the meaning of the tweet, this content was added in square brackets to the text; • whenever a tweet ended with a truncated sentence due to the character limit, linking to a facebook or instagram post for the full text, that post was retrieved and considered in place of the tweet. mirko crulli 217 appendix b. figures and tables figure 1a. areas of science referred to by the collected populist tweets economics, 4.83% energy, ecology & environment, 2.54% engineering and ict, 1.11% social sciences & humanities, 1.96% medicine & health, 61.06% physics & astronomy, 1.17% generic reference to science/experts, 27.33% 1a.1 whole period (2019-2021), n=1,533 economics 12.06% energy, ecology & environment 14.07% engineering and ict 7.54% social sciences & humanities 5.03% medicine & health 20.10% physics & astronomy 3.52% generic reference to science/experts 37.69% 1a.2 pre-covid, n=199 economics 3.75% energy, ecology & environment 0.82% engineering and ict 0.15% social sciences & humanities 1.50% medicine & health 67.17% physics & astronomy 0.82% generic reference to science/experts 25.79% 1a.3 post-covid, n=1,334 scientists versus the people 218 figure 2a. analysis of science-related tweets published by matteo salvini figure 3a. analysis of science-related tweets published by matteo salvini per period figure 4a. analysis of science-related tweets published by giorgia meloni negative references to mainstream science/experts/scientists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scientists as illegitimate/enemies/others references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid 1.45 0.46 1.37 0.00 post-covid 1.67 0.51 1.54 3.25 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 n p er m on th negative references to mainstream science/experts/scien tists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scien tists as illegitimate/enemies/o thers references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid year 1.45 0.46 1.37 0.00 1st wave 2.02 0.83 2.13 6.88 2nd wave & end of conte ii cabinet 2.83 0.47 1.89 3.31 draghi cabinet & 3rd wave 2.09 0.70 2.09 0.70 end of 3rd wave, vaccinations, omicron 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.16 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 n p er m on th negative references to mainstream science/experts/scientists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scientists as illegitimate/enemies/others references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid 0.38 0.15 0.23 0.08 post-covid 0.81 0.47 0.77 0.51 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 n p er m on th mirko crulli 219 figure 5a. analysis of science-related tweets published by giorgia meloni per period source for all appendix graphs: author’s elaboration on data retrieved via the twitter api. negative references to mainstream science/experts/scie ntists direct attacks on mainstream experts/scientists mainstream science/experts/scie ntists as illegitimate/enemies/o thers references to countersciences/counterscientists/experts pre-covid year 0.38 0.15 0.23 0.08 1st wave 0.59 0.47 0.95 0.59 2nd wave & end of conte ii cabinet 0.47 0.24 0.47 0.24 draghi cabinet & 3rd wave 1.86 0.93 1.16 0.70 end of 3rd wave, vaccinations, omicron 0.62 0.31 0.47 0.47 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 n p er m on th microsoft word pdf_issue_15_1_natalizia_morini_42-59.docx italian political science, volume 15 issue 1, may 2020 © 2020 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 15, issue 1, 42-59. contact author: gabriele natalizia, sapienza university of rome. e-mail address: gabriele.natalizia@uniroma1.it sleeping with the enemy: the not-so-constant italian stance towards russia gabriele natalizia sapienza university of rome mara morini university of genoa abstract a taken-for-granted assumption within the italian foreign affairs community argues that the relationship between rome and moscow follows a generally cooperative attitude, fostered by strong cultural, economic and political ties. this narrative misses a significant part of the tale, which is at odds with the idea that the good relations with russia are a ‘constant feature’ of italy’s foreign policy. indeed, competitive interaction has frequently emerged, as a number of events in the last decade confirm. to challenge conventional wisdom, the article aims to provide a more nuanced interpretation of the investigated relationship. focusing on the outcomes of global structural changes on italian foreign policy, it posits that rome is more prone to a cooperative stance towards moscow whenever the international order proves stable. by contrast, its interests gradually diverge from those of its alleged ‘natural’ partner as the international order becomes increasingly unstable. this hypothesis is tested by an in-depth analysis of italy’s posture towards russia amidst the crisis of the international liberal order (2008-on). furthermore, the recurrence of a similar dynamic is verified through a diachronic comparison with two other international orders in crisis, i.e. that of the interwar period (1936-1941) and that of the cold war (1979-1985). 1. introduction anctions against russia happened out of the blue for italy in 2014, and only after much resistance did italy align with the choice of its eu partners (coticchia and davidson, 2019). the sanctions triggered harsh criticism from the main national trade associations (confartigianato, 2018; coldiretti, 2018; confindustria, 2018) and all italian governments have evaluated them to be particularly burdensome for the country (parsi, 2016). although mostly confined to parliamentary debate, the significance of italy’s participation in nato’s enhanced forward presence (efp) was downplayed by the renzi government in 2016 (arnese and rossi, 2016) but raised protests from the opposition (de feudis, 2016). moreover, some creeping tensions in the field of security, energy and eu integration are widening the gap between the interests of rome and those of moscow, having remained on the sidelines of the public debate. recently, medical supplies provided by the russian military in italy in the wake of the covid-19 emergency have raised a vibrant debate. the so-called from russia with love operation has been accused s natalizia and morini 43 of being putin’s trap for the italian government, which would be part of a broader strategy aimed at urging italy to request the lifting of eu sanctions against russia (iacoboni, 2020; razov, 2020). nevertheless, conventional wisdom diffused among italian foreign policy (ifp) scholars, experts and practitioners is that italy’s stance towards russia tends to be cooperative and focused on the pursuit of shared goals, without being influenced by political turnover. also, growing russian aggressiveness – which is a substantial part of its revisionist challenge to the liberal order (white house, 2017) – is not perceived as a threat to italy, either by political elites or by public opinion (olmastroni, 2017). the supposed enduring friendly ties between the two powers have been explained through both domestic and external variables based on the asymmetry of international status, the lack of shared borders and the positive effects of long-term factors such as mutual cultural fascination and economic exchanges. however, this narrative misses a significant part of the tale, which is at odds with the idea that the good offices with moscow represent a ‘constant feature’ of the ifp. as a matter of fact, competitive interaction has cyclically emerged as a number of events from the last decade confirm. the article aims to challenge a deeply-rooted belief about the italian posture towards russia and provide a more nuanced theoretical framework. therefore, it posits that intervening changes at the structural level trigger a competitive turn in this relationship. accordingly, it diachronically compares rome’s stance towards moscow across three different periods equally marked by the crisis of the international order. in particular, it brings out the competitive downturn between the two countries in the current crisis of the liberal order1 and verifies the occurrence of a similar dynamic during those crises of the interwar period (1936-1941)2 and of the cold war (1979-1985).3 the in-depth analysis is based both on primary (strategic documents, international treaties and agreements, governmental websites) and secondary sources (scientific literature, policy reports, newspapers). 2. the ‘russia factor’ in italian foreign policy undoubtedly, political, cultural and economic ties between italy and russia are rooted in past centuries and trace back to long before the birth of a unitary state in the peninsula – as a vast historical literature confirms (berti, 1957). as a result, this topic has mostly been explored by historians, although only a few of them have taken into consideration the post-cold war era (nuti, 2011; bettanin, 2012). instead, it has generally remained underinvestigated in the literature on international relations (ir). in this field of research, few works have paid specific attention to italy’s stance on russia while others have analysed it in a wider effort to understand the ifp. instead, their relationship has frequently been the subject of policy reports. 1 the 2007-2008 crisis has been conventionally identified as the turning point for the liberal order (parsi, 2018). 2 the international order shaped at the paris conference definitively fell into crisis between the italian aggression against ethiopia and the turn of the war in europe on a global scale in 1941 (morgenthau, 1948). 3 the bipolar order definitively fell into crisis between the war in afghanistan and the appointment of mikhail gorbachev as general secretary of the communist party of the soviet union (gaidar, 2017). sleeping with the enemy 44 this being said, five major interpretative strands emerge in the literature. a first strand explains italy’s policy towards russia as linked to the quest for a new role within the euro-atlantic community after 1989-1991, as clearly pointed out by caffarena and gabusi (2017). according to them, rome’s goal was to emerge as a mediator with former cold war enemies such as russia and libya within a changing international environment. collina (2008) claims that italy undertook the pragmatic mission of acting as a bridge between russia and the eu and nato (‘bridge approach’) due to italy’s needs in the energy sector and russia’s opportunity to be gradually accepted in the western concern. coralluzzo (2006), for his part, interpreted italy’s mediator role with russia as the result of the shift from its traditional ‘obsession for visibility’ to a new ‘obsession with mediation’, even when such a role is not requested by the states involved. besides, a second strand in the literature emphasizes the weight of political leaders and party preferences on italy’s stance towards russia. in the light of this, romano (2009), giacomello and colleagues (2009), as well as carbone and coralluzzo (2011), agree that this objective was pursued by silvio berlusconi, in particular through his ‘personal diplomacy’ strategy, based on the scenario of the future integration of russia into the eu.4 more broadly, diodato and niglia (2019) write that berlusconi attempted to put the country in the position of the ‘honest broker’ in order to reconnect russia and the west, establishing friendly relations with vladimir putin that were maintained even when berlusconi was not in office.5 ferrari and pejrano (2011), together with brighi (2013), illustrate that berlusconi’s appetite for a special relationship with putin was also pursued to bolster his image at home. this choice requested immaterial costs such as defending the kremlin from charges of human rights violations in chechnya, and being subjected to the accusation of being russia’s ‘trojan horse’ in europe after the russo-georgian war (carbone, 2008). coticchia and davidson (2019), for their part, shift the focus on matteo renzi, explaining that the conciliatory stance of his cabinet with russia was finely tuned to maximize the prime minister’s chances of winning the next election. mikhelidze (2019), finally, points to a recent reconsideration of russia as a pillar in ifp due to a political-cultural environment open to putin’s geopolitical narratives and to the rise to power of populist and antieu parties such as the five star movement and the league in 2018. the third group of explanations highlight economic and/or cultural reasons. accordingly, giusti (2009) considers rome’s search for a strategic partnership with moscow to be motivated by its russian gas supply dependence and increasing economic exchanges. similarly, carbone (2009) as well as brighi and giugni (2016) maintain that all italian governments have invested in bilateral ties with moscow, especially in the oil and gas sector. lastly, de maio and fattibene (2016) posit that the lack of historical wounds and conflicting interests in strategic areas encourage rome to implement a two-track strategy. this approach is based on both the simultaneous maintenance of its euro-atlantic commitments and on the search for a partnership with moscow in the energy market. 4 differently, centre-left governments have been sceptical about russia’s membership in the eu (romano, 2009). 5 nonetheless, his efforts resulted ephemeral because germany established privileged relations with the kremlin in the years of his ii-iii cabinets (2001-2006). natalizia and morini 45 among those studies particularly devoted to the strategic factor, romano (1994) does not believe in a sincere partnership between italy and russia and interprets their interaction as a mutual attempt to exploit the counterpart with the aim of achieving material advantages. they can mimic an alliance to deter other powers from their intentions or to increase their perceived power, as they did for the first time with the racconigi bargain (1909). later, croci (2005) argues that italy’s interest in undermining the gradual re-balancing of nato’s centre of gravity eastward matched that of russia at the turn of the millennium. if the former wanted to avoid the weakening of the southern flank of the alliance, the latter aimed at thwarting the gradual ‘encirclement’ of western powers. similarly, siddi (2019) maintains that italy’s middle power approach shows its commitment in favour of a détente in russia-west relations and its need for the kremlin’s cooperation in contrasting the new security challenges in the mediterranean basin. finally, another group of works more explicitly represent italy’s search for a partnership with russia as a ‘constant’ of its foreign policy following a multiplicity of factors. arbatova (2011) argues that the investigated relationship is marked by a close intertwining of cultural, political and economic contacts shared since the eighteenth century. indeed, the collapse of the soviet regime opened up new opportunities for the development of foreign trade and fostered political cooperation on major international issues, leading to the emergence of a ‘privileged partnership’. later, giusti (2017) confirmed the idea of a privileged relationship between the two countries rooted in history. to her, rome’s cooperative posture towards moscow has been further relaunched in the wake of four integrated narratives, namely the need to strengthen a lucrative relationship, the italian diplomatic goal of becoming russia’s gateway to the west, the european strategic interest in avoiding ‘closing the door’ to russia, and the tendentially positive feelings of our elite and public opinion towards moscow. de maio and sartori (2018), for their part, state that, after 1991, the political turnover at palazzo chigi did not generate significant variations in the italian ambition to include russia in the wider european ‘family’. on the contrary, italy continues to try involving russia in all negotiation tables and strengthening bilateral relations, while respecting the duties connected to its euro-atlantic membership. finally, alcaro (2013) assesses that cultural infatuation, economic interests and political parentage played a fundamental role in consolidating rome’s closeness to moscow. interestingly, the author makes the point that short-term gains push italy towards russia, while long-term advantages bring italy on side with the us on crucial issues but, unfortunately, he does not address the argument. 3. neither too much good nor too much harm the rhapsodic nature of the debate on italy-russia relations has favoured the consolidation of rhetoric about their alleged special relationship. the first analysed strand highlights that italy’s stance towards russia was primarily based on tactical considerations that lie outside bilateral relations with the counterpart. instead, the strand that interprets it through domestic political variables has the advantage of incorporating the preferences and policies implemented by italian leaders towards russia. however, both of these explanations generally focus their attention on the post-cold war era, without exploring the possibility of the existence of abiding trends in the relations between the two powers over the decades. sleeping with the enemy 46 consciously or not, the other three strands of the literature treat italy’s cooperative stance towards russia as a sort of ‘constant’ (or ‘permanent’) feature of its foreign policy. this concept refers to long-term behaviours fostered by cultural accumulation, factual experiences, or geography and absorbed by the collective imagination of a country (santoro, 1991; isernia and longo, 2017). nevertheless, the third group overemphasizes the weight of economy upon foreign policy, without considering that trade tends to ‘follow the flag’, especially during periods of crisis. the fourth, for its part, does not seem to be aware that some constant russian interests – such as having influence in the balkans and the access to warm seas6 (kotkin, 2016) – can persuade it to invade that circle of ‘geographic proximity’ where italy cannot afford to keep a low profile (andreatta, 2001). instead, the last strand idealizes the italyrussia relationship, defining it as ‘a rare case where the definition of close traditional ties is not an exaggeration or a tribute to diplomatic etiquette’ (arbatova, 2011, 5). this interpretation misses the fact that significant tensions between the peninsula and russia have emerged over the centuries, since before italian unification7, as denounced by some historians (petracchi, 1993; bettanin, 2012). in the light of this article, what appears most important is that the above-mentioned works underestimate the impact of structural factors on rome’s posture towards moscow. except for romano (1994), the last three strands of explanation bring out several instances of proof of cooperation between the two powers, accepting uncritically that italy would be constantly looking for a partnership with russia. hence, they do not contemplate the possibility that some recurring interests might be subverted by the unforeseen and eroded by the inexorable flux of time (wight, 1970). furthermore, it must be noted that most of the literature here discussed seems to be generally committed to analysing italy’s preferences and policies towards russia within a stable international environment. this implies that the level of ‘day-to-day decisions’ prevails, rather than in ‘moments of great crisis’, when the criterion of state affairs becomes more problematic (watson, 1959, 43-44). therefore, the article investigates how a structural factor such as the intervening instability of the international order influences relations between states. ‘international order’ means ‘a set of commonly accepted rules that define the limits of permissible action and a balance of power that enforces restraint where rules break down’ (kissinger, 2014, 9). as a result, it is based on the interaction between a normative dimension and a distributive one (clementi, 2011). ‘instability’ is not understood only by a ‘negative’ perspective, according to which the order is stable because it is peaceful (waltz, 1964) or ‘no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system’ (gilpin, 1981, 10). conversely, unstable is every international order suffering from a lack of acceptance by most of the major powers (kissinger, 1957), a low degree of predictability (schweller 2016), and uncertain durability (andreatta, 1997). thus, instability pertains to ‘any state of affairs that […] would continue to change until reaching some limit or breakdown point of the system’ (deutsch and singer, 1964, 391). 6 italy has always been concerned that the black sea could become a ‘russian lake’ and about the presence of the russian fleet in the mediterranean sea (petracchi, 1993). 7 such as the sizable participation of italians in the french invasion of russia (1812), the leading role of the czarist empire in the holy alliance as guarantor of the status quo derived from the congress of vienna (1814-1815) or the kingdom of sardinia’s contribution to the crimean war (1853-1856). natalizia and morini 47 by adopting the logic of power transition theory, the crisis represents the peak of growing instability, when power hierarchies and principles of legitimacy on which the order is based are openly put under strain by revisionist states (colombo, 2014). this phase is marked by the so-called ‘interaction changes’ intended as ‘modifications in the political, economic, and other interactions or processes among the actors in an international system’ (gilpin, 1981, 43). in the meantime, states are called upon to make crucial decisions that will shape the global outcome of the crisis, such as their future rank within the next order (colombo, 2014). indeed, interaction changes frequently result from states’ efforts ‘to accelerate or forestall more fundamental changes in an international system and may presage such changes’ (gilpin, 1981, 43).8 consequently, the mounting struggle for power is very likely to constitute an influential structural constraint on states – such as italy (santoro, 1991) – which are generally classified as middle powers. for most of them, the presence of a stable international order brings increasing opportunities and greater freedom of choice. this strategic context enables some middle powers to take initiatives of their own in regard to the core relationship of international politics, or it allows the playing of crucial roles in regional politics. by contrast, intensified competition between major powers, combined with an increasing polarization of resources, significantly narrows the range of middle powers’ actions (holbraad, 1984). their limited but still substantial power has a twofold implication. on the one side, median states recurrently seek external support from a major power and tend to align with it even if their interests partially diverge. on the other hand, major powers bid for their support (wight, 2002) and must take their behaviour into account in their key decisions (handel, 1990). therefore, middle-sized states tend to side with the conservative power/s or with the revisionist one/s to defend or revise the international order (organski, 1967). choosing allies depends on intervening variables, such as a higher compatibility of strategic interests, pre-existing alliances and ideological affinity (valigi, 2017). although the article is not aimed at denying the influence exerted by domestic, tactical or strategic factors on italian foreign policy, it proposes a structural explanation of italy’s stance towards russia. it posits that rome seems to be more prone to a cooperative stance towards moscow whenever the international order proves stable and exercises looser constraints over states. conversely, a condition of growing international instability reveals escalating tensions between the two powers. therefore, this work pursues a twofold goal: on the one hand, to challenge the taken-for-granted assumption about italy’s constant cooperative stance towards russia and, on the other, to provide a more nuanced interpretation of the italian posture towards its alleged ‘natural’ partner (table 1). this is neither to say that italy and russia have turned into absolute enemies in the past, nor that they will become so in the future. in fact, as constantino nigra disclosed in a letter to pasquale stanislao mancini in 1881,9 they could do ‘neither too much good nor too much harm’ (chabod, 1962, 620). rather, it serves to highlight how rome’s interests gradually diverge from those of the counterpart when international uncertainty increases. 8 in light of the periodization of the article, the systemic changes occurred respectively in 1941-1945 and 1985-1991. conversely, we cannot speak of a systemic change that has taken shape within the contemporary international order. 9 at the time, they were respectively the italian ambassador in russia (1876-1882) and the minister of foreign affairs (1881-1885). sleeping with the enemy 48 table 1. a century of italy-russia relations (1920-2020) period italy’s policies towards russia cooperation within a stable international environment turning points competition within an unstable international environment the interwar order (1920-1941) recognition of the bolshevik government (1921); agreement on fiat activities in the ussr (1931); italo-soviet pact (1933) japan and germany withdraw from lon (1933); italian aggression against ethiopia (1935-1936) military and diplomatic skirmishes during the spanish civil war (1936-1939); adhesion to the anti-comintern pact (1937); italian expeditionary corps in russia (1941) the cold war order (1949-1985) joint communiqué on italy’s pow (1959); pci cooperative posture with moscow (1949-1977); dc cooperative posture with moscow to diversify the ifp (1953-1979) soviet-afghan war’s outbreak (1979); acceleration of the us-ussr strategic rivalry (1981) participation in the boycott of moscow summer olympics (1980); denounce of ussr’s violation of italian territorial waters (1982); missiles installation at the comiso airport (1983) the liberal order (1991-2020) treaty of friendship and cooperation (1994); nato-russia council established in rome (2002); memorandum on the south stream (2007) increasing competition among the us and the revisionist powers since the financial crisis (2007-2008) and world recession (2009) adhesion to the sanctions against russia (2014); participation to the efp (2016); support to the nato membership of montenegro (2017) and macedonia (2020) 4. looking for a modus vivendi? the international order of the interwar period emerged amidst the beginning of the paris conference in january 1919 and the entry into force of the treaty of versailles in january 1920. it was marked by multipolarity and the absence of clear leadership, because the united kingdom was lacking in terms of capacity and the united states was not willing to take the lead (taliaferro et al., 2012). although the trotskyist project of the ‘permanent revolution’ expired in 1922, the soviet union was relegated to the sidelines of international diplomacy until 1934, when it joined the league of nations (lon) as a permanent member of the council (carr, 1969). this choice was justified by the kremlin’s objective to consolidate ‘socialism in a single country’, which implied the need to be progressively integrated into the international order (ulam, 1974). although maintaining a moderate ideological controversy, fascist italy established a modus vivendi with the ussr. after the de facto recognition of the bolshevik government in 1921, the progressive instauration of the fascist regime did not thwart a rapprochement between the two countries. at the outset of its pragmatic foreign policy, italy was the third state to recognize the ussr de jure in 1924 (petracchi, 1993). later, italy’s approach towards the soviet union was driven by its willingness to foster economic and diplomatic natalizia and morini 49 cooperation. in 1931, a credit agreement was signed between the two governments and fiat started its industrial activities in the ussr. moreover, both rome and moscow found a common interest in publicly promoting the image of a cooperative attitude between two ‘anti-capitalistic’ countries (bettanin, 2012). the italian cooperative stance towards the ussr reached its peak with the pact of friendship, neutrality and non-aggression in 1933 (petracchi, 1993).10 its signature overlapped with adolf hitler’s rise to power, which was viewed with concern not only by moscow, but also by rome due to the nazi party’s claim to unite the german people by including the austrian and italy’s south tyrolean populations (mammarella and cacace, 2006). shortly thereafter, rome contributed to the definitive destabilization of the interwar order that was already experiencing the first japanese and german revisionist policies (taliaferro et al., 2012).11 in fact, its aggression against ethiopia in 1935-1936 constituted a violation of the principle of territorial integrity (art. 10) of the lon covenant (league of nations, 1919), proved the ineffectiveness of the collective security principle (art. 16) and, more generally, undermined the legitimacy of the post-war equilibrium (morgenthau, 1948). as a result, italy progressively aligned with germany. this choice was fostered by the nazis’ neuordnung project, which contemplated rome’s sphere of influence over the mediterranean basin and by the ideological affinity of the two countries (nolte, 1988). the occupation of ethiopia was fiercely opposed by moscow because it clashed with its commitment to defend the lon after 1934, its new willingness to strengthen its relationship with london and its leadership role of the ‘popular fronts’ (strang, 2013). in the meantime, it gradually backed italy to align with germany. galeazzo ciano12 signed the rome-berlin axis in 1936 and joined the anti-comintern pact in 1937. these choices clashed directly with the maintenance of a cooperative posture towards the ussr. the first proof of this political shift belongs to the spanish civil war, when the two powers found themselves on opposing sides (mammarella and cacace, 2006). moreover, their relationship did not improve in the following years. in 1937, moscow accused rome of the sinking of some soviet ships plying the mediterranean by covert submarine and air attacks and, as a response, it expelled italian peasants from the soviet caucasus and closed all the italian consulates in the ussr (petracchi, 1993). in 1938, commercial relations plummeted to almost nothing13 (issraelyan and kutakov, 1967). although italy intensified its alliance with the third reich,14 mussolini perceived the molotov-ribbentrop pact (1939) negatively for a twofold reason. on the one hand, he considered it a threat to italy’s ambition to play the role of mediator between the two powers. on the other hand, the italian dictator was convinced that the pact might be extended to south eastern europe, undermining his ambitions in the region. rome’s reaction was not long in coming. it encouraged the romanian government to take a firm 10 the italo-soviet pact was considered to be complementary to the four-power pact, signed by italy, uk, france and germany in the same year (melograni, 1965). 11 japan invaded manchuria in 1931 and together with germany withdrew from the league of nations in 1933. 12 he was the italian minister of foreign affairs (1936-1943) and mussolini’s son-in-law. 13 italy’s exports to the soviet union dropped from 9 million lire in 1937 to 1 million lire in 1938, and its imports from 105 to 7 million lire. 14 the following steps were the pact of steel (1939) and the tripartite pact (1940). sleeping with the enemy 50 line on bessarabia, promising assistance in the event of an attack, and hosted in venice a meeting with the hungarian foreign affairs minister to contemplate the future of the balkans (pons and romano, 2000). after the beginning of the winter war,15 palazzo venezia fostered an anti-soviet media campaign and supplied helsinki with weapons (petracchi, 1993). the evolution of the war in europe triggered a change in the nazi plan towards the ussr. at the beginning of june 1941, mussolini offered hitler an army corps and created the italian expeditionary corps in russia, which joined operation barbarossa (issraelyan and kutakov, 1967). in his diary, ciano (1996, 895) remembered that ‘the idea of a war against russia is in itself popular, inasmuch as the date of the fall of bolshevism would be counted among the most important in civilization’. however, he immediately noticed that this choice lacked an ‘undeniable’ and ‘convincing’ reason, with the exception of berlin’s military calculation. 5. an atlantic loyalty combined with friendship with the ussr? the cold war order gradually took shape between the wartime conferences16 and the soviet union’s achievement of nuclear parity in 1949 (gaddis, 2005). as a result, it was characterized by a strong balance of power in the military dimension and, at the same time, by the united states hegemony in the economic one (kindleberger, 1996). the usussr strategic competition not only marked the security dynamics at the global level, but had a pervasive impact also on the regional and local ones (aron, 1962). each superpower took the leadership of a given institutionalized system of alliances – the so-called ‘blocs’ – within which it imposed constraints on the foreign policy of the states that belonged to it (colombo, 2010). in the light of this perimeter, italy recognized its subordinate role to the us but, in the meantime, it exploited its strategic weight to obtain a certain degree of autonomy (nuti, 2011). in particular, it was able to maintain a relationship with the soviet union, mainly in order to enhance its position with western partners (bagnato, 2003). the post-war relations between rome and moscow were definitively normalized with stalin’s death in 1953, italy’s admission to the united nations in 1955 and the joint communiqué on the issue of italian war prisoners in 1959 (bettanin, 2012). from then on, italy showed political nonchalance in developing commercial relations with the ussr, as proved by the economic agreements signed by eni and finsider in 1960 and by the agreement reached by fiat for the construction of a car-assembling plant in the soviet city of tolyatti17 in 1965 (bagnato 2003). furthermore, rome’s cooperative attitude towards the soviet union was favoured, on the one hand, by the deeply rooted political relations of the italian communist party (pci) with moscow and, on the other hand, by the will of christian democracy-led governments to diversify the ifp from that of the western allies on non-crucial issues (bettanin, 2012). during the détente (1969-1979), italy’s international posture was further inspired by both an absolute atlantic loyalty and 15 it was fought by the ussr and finland between november 1939 and march 1940. 16 among them, the conferences of terranova (1941), tehran (1943), dumbarton oaks (1944), san francisco (1945), yalta (1945), potsdam (1945). 17 called after the secretary of the italian communist party palmiro togliatti. natalizia and morini 51 the quest for a friendly relationship with the ussr. the good relations between the two powers culminated with the 1969 deal between eni and the ussr ministry of foreign trade for a twenty-year russian natural gas supply to the amount of 6 billion cubic meters per annum.18 however, the outbreak of the soviet-afghan war in 1979, together with a sharp increase in the strategic rivalry between the us and the ussr enhanced by the arrival of ronald reagan in 1981 and the soviet economic decline in the eighties, undermined the bipolar order (gaidar, 2017). this led to the beginning of a new period of intense awakening of tensions and conflicts around the world (halliday, 1989). italy had been deeply integrated into the structures of the western alliance since 1949 and its loyalty to the united states was never a matter of question. therefore, its stance towards the ussr was not insensitive to this change. as evidence of this, jimmy carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 moscow summer olympics gained the official support of the italian government, which did not allow athletes serving in its military corps to attend the games.19 furthermore, the so-called ‘second’ cold war allowed italy to resume its international prestige. from 1979, the italian government clarified its willingness to host the new nato missiles to the great surprise of its allies. it took the lead very early during the negotiations for the deployment of new weapon systems aimed at contrasting the continuing military build-up of the warsaw pact countries. in fact, the increasing capability of the latter in nuclear systems threatened western europe through the deployment of the soviet ss-20 missiles. furthermore, this choice was confirmed by the craxi government, which allowed the installation of the pershing and cruise missiles at the comiso military airport in 1983, raising violent protests from the kremlin (nuti, 2011). moreover, the new posture of the italian government towards the kremlin became clear when a nuclear-powered soviet submarine was detected by the italian submarine leonardo da vinci in the gulf of taranto in 1982. hence, the italian defence minister lelio lagorio called the ussr ambassador to denounce this violation of italian territorial waters (lagorio, 2005). in the same year, italy participated in the multinational force in lebanon with the italcon mission. therefore, a major italian force composed of 2,300 troopers of the folgore brigade and bersaglieri regiments was deployed abroad for the first time since the end of wwii (nuti, 2011). although this choice was not explicitly directed against the ussr, it contributed to reaffirm italy’s special relations with the us, as well as its willingness to play a more decisive role in an area in which moscow was traditionally engaged (lagorio, 2005). finally, the ‘second’ cold war restricted any room for political manoeuvre also for the pci. as secretary, enrico berlinguer had already brought out the creeping frictions with moscow that existed since the prague spring by opting for the historic compromise with christian democracy in 1976 and by launching the ‘eurocommunism’ project in 1977. although the pci sided with moscow in the euromissile crisis, the soviet-afghan war and the 1981 military coup in poland increased once more its distance from the 18 moscow was granted a loan of usd 200 million for the procurement of pipelines and equipment for the gas industry from italian companies (gazprom, 2009). 19 the others participated under a neutral flag with the olympic anthem played at each ceremony. sleeping with the enemy 52 eastern bloc. therefore, berlinguer affirmed that the october revolution had exhausted its driving force and that he felt safer being within the atlantic pact (gozzini, 2017). 6. such a ‘privileged’ relationship? the liberal international order that stemmed from the fall of the berlin wall and the collapse of the ussr is generally considered to be unipolar and hegemonic, being based both on the power preponderance and on the leadership of the us (deudney and ikenberry, 1999). although downgraded in the international hierarchy of power and prestige, the russian federation maintained a significant role after the intervening systemic change. its persistent strength, whose main indicators were military capacity (especially nuclear), geopolitical weight and natural resources, made it the equal of any great power other than the us and an enduring potential threat to the european continent. therefore, it remained a top priority for washington and for its allies (task force on russia and us national interests 2011), among which rome was prominent. the intervening changes in the international environment, made a low-profile foreign policy style no longer sustainable (isernia and longo, 2017; monteleone, 2019). among other policies, italy outlined the political project to act as a ‘bridge’ (collina, 2008) between russia and the west. the post-cold war relationship between the two countries was officially launched with the 1994 treaty of friendship and cooperation (camera dei deputati, 1995). subsequently, italy fostered a gradual integration of russia in the euro-atlantic community, as confirmed by its sponsorship of moscow’s inclusion in the contact group on the balkan wars. however, it is generally agreed upon that the most important success of the italian approach towards russia was reached with the 2002 nato summit in rome. in fact, silvio berlusconi played a major role in the launch of the nato-russia council (ncr) (nato, 2002) and of the so-called ‘pratica di mare spirit’.20 it paved the way for a new age of cooperation and for italy’s upgrade to a pivotal diplomatic role (diodato and niglia, 2019). in 2006, romano prodi pushed ahead with negotiations to build another pipeline network that would directly link italy with russia, bypassing the transit countries. as a result, eni and gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding for the construction of the south stream pipeline in 2007 (eni, 2007). finally, italy moderated us pressures for ukraine and georgia to be given membership action plans at the nato summit in bucharest (nato, 2008), in order to avoid such a step increasing friction with russia (gallis, 2008).21 in the light of these events, the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the following world recession represented a watershed for the shift of the liberal order towards instability (colombo, 2014), as confirmed by the growing competition between its main guarantor, the united states, with some revisionist powers, including russia (white house, 2017). in the wake of this event, rome’s posture towards moscow did not suddenly turn into a competitive one. mario monti renewed support for the south stream project and signed new economic agreements during his visit to moscow in 2012 (russian government, 20 the summit was held in the pratica di mare air base. 21 russia harshly denounced the dangers of the us-led international order at the 2007 munich security conference, while the us began negotiating the deployment of a missile defence shield in poland and czech republic and recognized kosovo’s declaration of independence (natalizia and valigi, 2020). natalizia and morini 53 2012). similarly, enrico letta was the sole eu leader to participate in the opening of the russian winter olympic games in sochi when the 2014 ukrainian revolution was ongoing (letta, 2014). however, italy’s membership both in nato and in the eu and the definitive authoritarian turn of the russian regime since 2012 (freedom house, 2013) have limited rome’s room for maneuver with moscow. as a result, italy accepted the launch of the european monitoring mission in georgia after the 2008 georgian-russian war, supported the launch of the european eastern partnership in 2009, and adhered to almost all of the eu initiatives under the project (mikhelidze, 2017).22 furthermore, matteo renzi’s cabinet did not recognize the legitimacy of crimea’s status referendum, but condemned russia for the annexation of the ukrainian region and agreed on suspending its participation in the g8 and on the eu sanctions against it (coticchia and davidson, 2019). all these policies were implemented to contrast the kremlin’s growing aggressiveness and to thwart the definitive restoration of its influence over its ‘near abroad’ (stefanachi, 2018). afterwards, rome’s choices pointed to its firm alignment to the western field, the secondary nature of its relationship with the supposed ‘privileged’ partner and the decline of the ‘bridge approach’. in the light of russia’s counter-sanctions, which negatively affected the italian exportations of agri-foods, machinery and mechanical equipment (giumelli, 2018; morini, 2020), as well as its decision to abandon the south stream project,23 differently from the nord stream 2 project with germany, rome’s stance towards moscow has undergone a gradual structural revision including in the energy sector. as a result, eni has improved its diversification strategy aimed at making italy more independent from the russian gas supply. in particular, its efforts turned to the exploration of offshore reserves in the eastern mediterranean area, where it made a world class supergiant gas discovery at its zohr prospect in the deep waters of egypt in 2015 (eni, 2015). in the meantime, rome’s interests progressively diverged from those of moscow in an increasing number of strategic issues. in the balkans, italy was among the main sponsors of growing eu cooperation with albania, montenegro, north macedonia and serbia, in order to strengthen its traditional influence in the adriatic-ionian region (maeci, 2017; 2018). in the same vein, it fostered the recent nato membership of montenegro and north macedonia.24 russia, for its part, silently opposed the first integration not only to avoid losing its economic influence in the region, but also because it considers this process as parallel to that of acceding to nato (iiss, 2019). moreover, italy confirmed its commitment to securing nato’s eastern flank, by sending 140 soldiers to latvia. the alliance’s enhanced forward presence in poland and the baltics was promptly accused by the kremlin of constructing ‘new lines of division in europe, instead of deep, solid relations as good neighbours’ (de feudis, 2016). finally, the most important case of emerging contrasts between the two countries concerns libya. here, rome has fiercely supported the internationally recognized government of tripoli and the ‘one libya’ solution, just as it has tried to maintain a central role in the crisis by countering the interference of actors from outside the central mediterranean, such as russia 22 among them, the visa liberalization for georgia, moldova and ukraine. 23 however, the kremlin explored a new southern route to europe via turkey (reed and kanter, 2014). 24 respectively obtained in 2017 and 2020. sleeping with the enemy 54 and turkey (maeci, 2019). by contrast, moscow openly supports tobruk, it has favoured the entry of the russian mercenaries in the libyan theatre of crisis alongside the warlord khalifa haftar, and it is, de facto, backing the option of splitting the country, therefore guaranteeing the strengthening of its position in the mediterranean basin (biagini, 2020). 7. conclusions the main goal of this article was to challenge a taken-for-granted belief about the ifp, such as rome’s alleged constant cooperative posture towards moscow. therefore, it investigates a century of relations between these powers, providing both theoretical and empirical insights. the study of the italian stance towards russia underlines the weight of the structural factor on states’ foreign policy in the long term. it proves that a certain kind of cooperation can take place between states belonging to different systems of alliance, distinguished by some conflicting strategic interests or marked by deep ideological differences in the presence of international stability. by contrast, it shows that the occurrence of a gradual shift in the global distribution of power and prestige and the consequential increase in international competition usually reverses this tide. furthermore, the investigation of the ifp in 1936-1941, 1979-1985 and 2008-2020 appears useful also to improve ir knowledge of middle powers’ behaviour. it confirms their inclination, as in the case of italy, to align with a major ally, such as the third reich or the us, in the face of a global crisis and to assume a competitive posture against the states – the ussr or the russian federation – belonging to the opposite side. at the same time, the diachronic comparison confirms that, when there is stable international order, they seemed to be more prone to cooperate with the counterpart. the in-depth analysis shows that during the first part of the interwar period, italy was among the first states to recognize the soviet government and to establish friendly relations with it, culminating in the italo-soviet pact. similarly, rome developed economic relations with moscow during the fifties and the sixties, reaching a peak with the 1969 deal for the shipment of soviet gas to italy. finally, it presented itself as a ‘bridge’ between the west and the russian federation in the post-cold war, playing a fundamental role in the establishment of the nato-russia council. conversely, the diachronic comparison proves that instability of the international order calls into question the common belief about italy’s constant cooperative attitude towards russia. after 1936, rome’s gradual alignment with berlin fostered a competitive turn. it was not surprising that the molotov-ribbentrop pact further worsened this shift because it posed a threat to its role as mediator and its interests in the balkans. similarly, at the turn of the eighties, italy exploited the evolution of the international scenario to relaunch its prestige, particularly by playing a major role in the ‘euromissile crisis’. finally, an increasing number of rome’s policies have clashed with moscow’s interests during the last decade. in particular, palazzo chigi aligned itself with western powers regarding the 2014 sanctions, favoured the integration of the balkans into the euro-atlantic security system and countered the russian proxy in the libyan theatre of crisis. to conclude, we are aware of not having included in the present study another interesting case, namely that of the declining phase of european equilibrium before the natalizia and morini 55 great war. we opted for this solution because at the end of the crisis rome entered the conflict on the same side as petrograd, and this choice could be partially distortive. in a nutshell, it must be remembered that the secret racconigi bargain was immediately tempered by a new austro-italian agreement on the interpretation of article 7 of the triple alliance, that rome’s interest was thwarting both the austrian and the russian influence in the balkans at the beginning of the century and, finally, that its vital interest in fiume and dalmatia was considered unacceptable by the then russian foreign affairs minister sergey sazonov (vigezzi, 1966; biagini, 1983). references alcaro, r. 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(1966). l’italia di fronte alla prima guerra mondiale. milano: ricciardi editore. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 7–9. political scientists as consultants and advisors: david natali david natali is an associate professor at the university of bologna at forlì. he holds a phd in political science from the european university institute of florence (eui, 2002). the specific focus of his research is the comparative analysis of pensions, the eu coordination of social protection and social inclusion policy, the lisbon strategy and the europe 2020 strategy. he is also working on social concertation and social dialog in broader terms, across europe. he has been involved in several european integrated projects and networks of excellence financed through the 6th and 7th framework programmes (including neujobs, newgov, intune, recwowe). he coordinated several research projects on pensions and the eu social dimension and the comparative analysis of pension reforms. ips: can you briefly describe your typical tasks and working day? are you happy in your current job? academic life is complex and in fact consists of many different activities. rather than in an ivory tower, scholars are increasingly involved in many respects in political life. applied research is one of these respects, as well as the collaboration with policymakers at different levels. while teaching and research are the main part of my daily life, i am involved in the reflection group on eu governance of the italian presidency of the council (headed by the secretary of state for european affairs, sandro gozi). on top of that, i am involved in the european social policy network (espn), the set of experts of social policy that support the european commission in monitoring and assessing welfare reforms across the eu and in other projects supported by eu stakeholders. ips: is your job the result of a tenaciously pursued project, or rather of an opportunity you seized? had you planned this type of career whilst you were studying because you were attracted by it, or rather is it the result of a later choice? did studying political science matter? my professional life has been quite peculiar. after my phd at the european university institute of florence, i left italy and worked in brussels for an independent research institute. i thus left academic institutions to be fully involved in the network of policy analysts based in brussels. i worked for the european social observatory in a project financed by the belgian government in the field of pensions to analyze the first results of the new eu mode of coordination in the area: the open method of coordination. at that time, i lived through a big shift: from an academic expert on comparative politics, i turned to comparative policy analysis and i started approaching eu integration studies. the methodological, analytical and theoretical background i got during the phd program was crucial in my decision to start working in new fields and through different analytical if not disciplinary ips interviews david natali 8 lenses. even after my return to academia, i have continued trying to find a shared ground between more academic research on one hand, and applied research on other. ips: people you work with often have a different educational background to you. what are the competing academic backgrounds in your working environment? do you perceive you have an advantage or disadvantage vis-à-vis these colleagues? what does such advantage or disadvantage consist of? those who are involved in policymaking have very different backgrounds. between analysts, for instance, economists have a leading role. to some extent they have monopolized the activity of knowledge-diffusion. they have an advantage compared to political scientists: they simplify reality and give clear messages to policymakers and stakeholders. political scientists tend, by contrast, to make things complex and to give articulated and complex answers. ips: is there anything not written in textbooks that you have learned thanks to your work experience, and that you would recommend should be taught to politics and policy students? policymaking is not a purely rational activity. many factors that shape the way policymakers interpret problems and solutions are imponderable and do not reflect a “synoptic rationality.” that said, i have found my own background—policy analysis, policy studies, etc.—extremely useful and able to provide the right analytical toolkit to understand politics. ips: can you identify who has an academic background similar to yours on the basis of their approach to problem setting and problem solving? or rather do you think that other differences or similarities (e.g., personality, political orientation, other peculiarities) matter more than academic background? as stressed above, a key cleavage is between economists on the one hand and the other social scientists on the other. the latter tend to share similar methods and analytical frameworks. but personal profiles are extremely important too. analysts tend to show different styles and attitudes irrespective of their scientific background. ips: how would you re-organize (if needed) courses in political science (including its sub-disciplines) in order to structure a curriculum that could naturally lead to activities as the policy advisor? political studies have experienced a huge transformation in recent years. the academic track—with doctoral studies followed by fellowships, and more stable contracts—is increasingly “contaminated” with more policy-oriented research for policy-makers and/or stakeholders. this is a promising aspect that needs to be cultivated with an on-going dialog between universities and institutions involved in the policymaking process. recent attempts to open academic institutions with seminars, roundtables, internships and joint research projects with non-academic institutions are very promising in that sense. at the same time, some risks are evident: academic research risks passively accepting the policy-makers’ agenda both in terms of topics and analytical and theoretical frameworks. political scientists as consultants and advisors 9 ips: should political science scholars “get their hands dirty,” i.e., intervene more in politics and policy making, so that they gain in relevance? as far as your activity domain is concerned, is it possible to distinguish easily between technical knowledge on the one hand, and political values and policy preferences on the other? some dialog—if not interference between politics, policymaking and political studies—has always been evident. if we look back at the origin of political studies, for instance, it is clear that the dialog with policymakers enriches scientific knowledge. this is potentially beneficial for the two sides: for the analysts this allows for an immediate feedback to their theories and frameworks, while for policymakers and practitioners, political scientists, it allows for a sense of reality. but this is a fragile balance between different priorities and ways to look at politics. ips: for a political science scholar who wants to be active and produce an impact on policy making, is it easier to do it by studying the policy process or rather by being fully part of the process as decision maker? o be honest, i think all political scientists aspire to being somehow involved in politics and policymaking. first, this is the result of intellectual curiosity. they want to be close to the political life to improve their own knowledge of political dynamics. yet different scholars may have different ambitions: some may want to prescribe some decisions or courses of policies, while others feel the risk of being involved in what they study. ips: what is the added value of the political science scholar to the job of policy practitioner? policymakers and stakeholders tend to focus on the short term: they need solutions to address major problems. they need these solutions to be consistent with their own interests and ideological backgrounds. but they do not have time for an in depth analysis of both problems and solutions and the link between the two, so they need scholars and experts to shed light both on problems and solutions with a longer-term view. ips: and, vice versa, how is the profession of policy practitioner improving the academic work? academics tend to be concentrated on theories and analytical concepts and grids. they often risk being at the margin of political and social life, in an ivory tower. they thus need to have a dialog with those who live the day-by-day political and socio-economic dynamics. it is crucial to have a feedback about theories and analytical framework and to have direct access to empirical information. ips: what are the disadvantages of mixing up theoretical knowledge and “practice”? the major risk is to be trapped in a purely ideological discourse set by practitioners and to lack the necessary autonomy to analyze the evidence of politics with a sound method. what is more, the world of politics and that of science are partly inconsistent. i refer to the different approaches they follow, for instance in terms of time frame. the time perspective of scholars is long and slow. they need time for in depth analyses. by contrast, policymaking is rapid and need fast solutions. it is thus hard to strike a deal between these two different time frames. sometimes the analyst basically cannot provide the knowledge policymakers demand and should thus resist from giving inaccurate inputs. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 6–10. beyond good news and bad news: narrating gender in political science sara de jong open university hinking and writing about gender in political science conjures up two affective states. on the one hand, there is the joy coming from the tangible vibrancy that is often generated when feminist political scholars meet. the seminar on ‘gender and politics: research, practice and education: moving beyond the obvious’, organised in june 2016 at the university of padova, is a case in point. on the other hand, other situations and encounters leave one in a rather gloomy mood. in what follows, i will try to show that these two apparently competing moods are illustrative for the narrative about state of gender in the discipline of politics and that we need to unpack this when we want to ‘move beyond the obvious’, the slogan that the padova organisers used for their event. as a dutch national, mostly trained in the uk academic context but working until recently in austria, i am an outsider to the italian national academic context. as co-chair of atgender, the european association for gender research, education and documentation, and in other capacities, i am engaged in intellectual and social conversations with italian scholars in and outside of italy. i have learned from these conversations that gender theories and approaches are less institutionally embedded in italian academia compared to some other countries and that this has led some italian feminist scholars to look across borders to learn lessons from feminist allies abroad. this neither implies that feminist political science scholars in other countries are not struggling nor that italian feminist political science simply needs to ‘catch up’. the rich academic and activist work of italian feminist scholars, the ambivalences about the institutionalisation of feminist perspectives, and the struggles of feminist political science scholars in the hegemonic academic centres belie that judgement. in the next section, i will offer a quick survey of recently published literature in the us and the uk on the state of gender in the discipline of politics to map these struggles. narrating gender in politics: some good and some bad news an obvious entry point is the 2015 oxford handbook of gender and politics edited by georgina waylen, karen celis, johanna kantola, and s. laurel weldon. in the rich introduction to the handbook, celis, kantola, waylen and weldon recognise that the discipline of politics now encompasses a wider research remit and broader understanding of politics than traditionally was the case. however, they also soberly remark that ‘despite the vibrancy of the gender and politics scholarship shown in this handbook and a long history of gender activism, gender is still ignored in much academic political science’ (2015: 2-3). t gender and politics 7 they stress that the positive developments that can be witnessed, for instance in the increasing number of female political science scholars, are only tiny steps on a much longer road to a ‘gender equitable’ discipline (2015: 6). this pessimistic tone, amidst some positive observations, is echoed by elizabeth evans and fran amery (2016) who mapped the uk landscape of politics and gender higher education. in their tellingly article called ‘gender and politics in the uk: banished to the sidelines’ they observe that the teaching of gender is still seen as marginal to the discipline of politics, or worse perhaps, as a ‘luxury’ (2016: 1; cf. bonjour, mügge and roggeband 2016 for a similar observation for the dutch teaching landscape). the results of their survey of undergraduate courses of politics in the uk show that less than one-third of 91 institutions offer a module on gender and politics and that none of these are compulsory. combined with the fact that no uk university offers a gender or women’s studies undergraduate degree (evans and amery 2016), this challenges the idea that uk would be ‘ahead’ compared to other academic contexts. while the authors add some positive notes on the work done by feminist scholars in organising themselves, liaising with other associations and pressuring institutions for change and suggest that the multiple global crises have encouraged students’ interest in nonmainstream critical perspectives, their general outlook is rather bleak. while some concerns might be shared across different disciplines, smith and lee (2015) find political science particular reluctant to gendering the discipline: ‘what we have discovered is a sharp discrepancy between how issues of gender, sexuality and the body are treated in political science compared with the social sciences and humanities more broadly … the absence, in particular, of serious consideration of queer theory is notable and appears to place political science in something of an intellectual silo’ (smith and lee 2015: 50; 59). to understand the specific gender blindness and underrepresentation in the discipline of politics, celis, kantola, waylen and weldon (2015) suggest that these echo the gendered nature of politics in the world ‘out there’. evans and amery (2016) add to this picture by drawing a link between the political and economic context of conservatism and austerity and the precariousness of staff teaching gender and politics modules. the importance of looking at the relation between the world of politics and the discipline of politics is also underlined in recent work of karen beckwith (2014) who suggests drawing on effective political strategies to change the discipline. for efforts towards gendered change in the discipline and world of politics to be successful, it is crucial to work collectively and to find allies, as well as to have key figures in positions of authority who can push political agendas. in a related vein, carol mershon and denise walsh, editors of a 2016 dialogue section on ‘diversity in the discipline: why it matters and how to get it’, collected contributions from feminist political science scholars who turn the analytical lenses they usually employ to study politics in the world, such as attitude survey data and intersectional approaches, to research the discipline of politics. their suggestions for developing different strategic interventions are presented alongside an equally condemning diagnosis of the ‘stubborn reality’ of ‘slow progress both in diversifying political science faculty at all ranks and in redressing bias in the discipline’, where despite many efforts ‘political science remains largely the domain of white men’ (mershon and walsh 2016: 1). no doubt many of us can add our own stories and anecdotes about gendering the discipline of politics that resonate with and illustrate some of the research findings presented above. the school of politics and ir at a uk university that enabled my own development de jong, narrating gender in political science 8 as a feminist political scholar, was at the time an institution with no female professor. recently, i had to explain once more to one of the many male professors, a mentor and friend who i value very much, why i considered it problematic that the single activity organised to enhance informal contact between phd students and staff was a weekly game of football. so what do we do with these stories as well as the more substantial findings from the research presented above? moving beyond the obvious what many of the accounts about gender in the discipline of politics share can be summed up in the idiom ‘i have some good news and some bad news’. the good news is a story of progress and of achievement. it is a narrative which rightfully acknowledges the hard work of feminist scholars who have made a difference to the discipline, for example by building networks of support, designing courses that expose the gendered dynamics of politics, and pushing for appointments of female scholars. the bad news part takes stock of the current state of the discipline, in particular the disappointing gender bias, often hidden as gender blindness. the good and bad news components combine in a narrative that describes that we came some way, but we are not there yet. since the bad news unfortunately tends to overshadow the good news, feminist scholars in political science heavily invest in understanding the gendered and sexist mechanisms in the discipline in order to make effective proposals for change. that means that the stories about the road we have travelled (the good news) and the observations that we are not there yet (the bad news) are generally concluded with recommendations on ‘how we can get there’. there are good reasons for the narrative of gender in political science to take the tripartite form of ‘recognising progress/seeing that we are not quite there yet/proposing how to get there eventually’. pragmatically, we hope it has the function of encouraging further action. affectively, we need something uplifting to end a gloomy story. it is also a recognisable academic genre as well as a common genre for social movement analysis. it is a tempting format that my presentation at the university of padova, which formed the basis for this article, also adhered to. i alluded to some positive news, then referred to evidence to demonstrate how much work still needs to be done and finally felt compelled to offer some directions for change. without challenging the content of these subtle, well-researched and well-told accounts, i propose to have a closer look at the recurrent structure of this narrative. celis, kantola, waylen and weldon explicitly address the force of standard narratives in their introduction to the oxford handbook of gender and politics (2015: 4): our starting point is to recognize the big changes that have taken place both in politics as practice and political science as a discipline over the last century. we do not adhere to a standard metanarrative […] of a uniformly patriarchal world that began to be transformed when feminism (depicted as originating in the west in the 1960s) spread to the rest of the world. clare hemmings’ (2011) work on feminist narratives, which has forcefully demonstrated that stories matter, presents an even a more complex challenge. writing about feminist historiography, she asked: ‘how does this story about the 1970s come to be told and accepted?’ and (…) ‘why do i want to tell this story, and in telling it, what kind of subject do i become?’ (2005: 119). applying these questions to our reflections on the stories gender and politics 9 about gendering and queering political science, we can ask ourselves what our investment is in the narrative where we recount our successes before lamenting the current state of gender in politics. or, why do we feel that we have to tell the story in this way? what are the pressures making us sandwich our critique by first recognising progress and ending with positive and proactive proposals? or, what emotional labour are we performing here? how much space is there to revel in resignation, or make our anger a productive force, refusing to provide a set of recommendations to the mainstream of political science? i also propose to stand still by the temporal and spatial elements implied in the three components of our story: ‘this is how far we have come’/’we are still not there yet’/’this is how we could get further’. where, or rather what is the ‘there’ where we want to go? the narrative focus on the lack of progress and the pressure to provide recommendations might inhibit us from further developing our vision of what our aims are in the first place. it might also smooth over important differences among feminist and queer political scholars that are worth discussing. the 2015 european conference on gender and politics in sweden, prompted jonathan dean to write a thought-provoking blog post reflecting some of the critical discussions that had taken place at the side-lines of the conference. under the title ‘feminising politics, politicising gender’, he distinguished between scholars predominantly concerned with (formal) political representation of women, in the tradition of plenary speaker joni lovenduski, and scholars whose broader interpretation of politics as always already gendered, leads them to extent this remit. this intervention complicates the narrative of gain, disappointment and projections into the future and raises important questions about the directions of our efforts. finally, with reference to a recent experience, i want to pick up on the contrast between mainstream political science on the one hand, and feminist and queer political research on the other. about a year after joni lovenduski’s keynote at the ecpg was described by jonathan dean and other conference participants as representing a traditional approach to gendering political science, a similar intervention by lovenduski at the 2016 15th dutch and flemish political science association conference marked her as the first female (let alone feminist) keynote speaker in the history of the association. moreover, in this context she stood out as a radical, progressive speaker. this anecdote helps to unpack a further layer to the common narrative to recognise that the progress documented in many commentaries, has mostly been about building a gender and politics subfield within the discipline of politics with its own conferences, networks and journals. much of the sense of discontent arises from the limited imprint on political science as a general discipline. while we might have hoped for a more straightforward connection between the achievements of the subfield and influencing the mainstream of political science, much of the evidence suggests that this is not the case. with every evaluation of the state of gender and politics we write (and often repeat) a particular story, and that story has certain effects. therefore, we need to take a critical look at the evolving master narrative and consider our investments in it. moreover, when we can liberate ourselves from providing the compulsory positive vision and roadmap for change to cushion our critique, this might open new avenues for thought and action. in this vein, this contribution has refused to end with a set of recommendations on how to integrate gender in political science, instead offering some suggestions on how to ‘move beyond the obvious’. de jong, narrating gender in political science 10 acknowledgements i would like to thank claudia padovani and giovanna vingelli for organising the ‘gender and politics: research, practice and education: moving beyond the obvious’ seminar at the university of padova and for inviting me to this thought-provoking event. this article has also benefitted from a conversation about gender in the italian academy with sabrina marchetti, university of venice. references beckwith, k. (2015) ‘state, academy, discipline: regendering political science’, ps: political science & politics, 48(3), 445-449. bonjour, s., l.m. mügge and c. roggeband (2016) politicologie 2.0: gender in het kerncurriculum, tijdschrift voor genderstudies, 19(2): 141-164. celis, k. j. kantola, g. waylen, and s. laurel weldon (2015) ‘introduction: gender and politics: a gendered world, a gendered discipline’ in: oxford handbooks online (eds. g. waylen, k. celis, j. kantola and s. laurel weldon). oxford: oxford university press, pp. 1-31. dean, jonathan (2015) ‘feminising politics, politicising gender’, psa women and politics blog, june 17, 2015 evans, e. and f. amery (2016) gender and politics in the uk: banished to the sidelines, european political science, doi:10.1057/eps.2015.79 hemmings, c. (2005) ‘telling feminist stories’, feminist theory, 6(2): 115-139. mershon, c. and d. walsh (2016) ‘diversity in political science: why it matter and how to get it’, politics, groups and identities, 4(3): 462-466. smith, n. j and d. lee (2015) ‘what is queer about political science?’, bjpir, 17(1): 49–63. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 1–5. gender and politics studies within european political science: contributions and challenges johanna kantola university of helsinki emanuela lombardo universidad complutense de madrid 1. introduction gender and politics has become a vibrant subdiscipline of political science over the past twenty years. to reflect this, political science associations organise conferences and panels on gender and politics, books, journals, specialized book series and journal special issues are published, and courses are taught at universities (mügge, evans and engeli 2016; ackerly and mügge 2016). however, the contributions of gender and politics to political science remain to be fully recognized. in this foreword, we draw on our recent work to outline these contributions and the challenges that feminist analyses still face within political science (see kantola and lombardo 2017; 2017a; and 2017b). 2. feminist contributions to political science gender and politics has made three main contributions to politics studies: first, it has inspired the rethinking of political questions and concepts from gender lenses; second, it has provided a variety of different analytical approaches to analyze politics; third, it has expanded the boundaries of ‘the political’; and fourth, it has strengthened the link between theory and praxis. with respect to the first contribution, brooke ackerly and jacqui true (2011: 63) suggest that ‘gender analysis opens up a whole landscape of new research questions as well as giving us tools to rethink old research questions’ of power, institutions, agency, and democracy. second, feminist political analyses are extremely diversified. in our new book gender and political analysis, we show how they range from a women approach (investigating the representation of women in political institutions), to a gender approach (exploring gender-biased structures and practices within institutions), a deconstructing gender approach (analyzing the construction of gender in political discourses and its effects on people), an intersectional approach (studying the interaction of gender with other inequalities), and a post-deconstruction of gender approach (such as new materialist studies on the impact of matter on the politics of gender and the cultural politics of emotions) (see kantola and lombardo 2017). each approach captures aspects of political reality that othkantola and lombardo, gender politics studies within european political science 2 er perspectives may have overlooked, and jointly they shed light on dimensions of power and inequalities that gender blind political studies tend to neglect. third, gender analyses have expanded the boundaries of ‘the political’ to include gender relations and issues formerly considered private. as the famous feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ shows, power relations are not abstract but rather embodied in gender subjects. two main consequences for conceptualising ‘the political’ follow from this: the first is that power relations and values are considered gendered, because they reproduce gender norms and biases against women; the second is that gender analyses consider issues formerly defined as personal – or that are still de facto marginalised in politics in spite of their inclusion in existing legislation – such as sexual violence or childcare, as highly political. fourth, gender and politics research is especially apt to connect theory and praxis, something that politics as a discipline especially needs in current times of crisis and conflicts (see kantola and lombardo 2017a). equality theory is engaged with real world problems questioning gender power hierarchies and suggesting ways to put equality into everyday practice. gender and politics tends to be conducted through feminist theory and lenses. this normative component, on the one hand, has made it vulnerable to critiques of being ideological in the eyes of mainstream political science. on the other hand, the normative side of the feminist analysis of politics adds to its strength to explain, understand, and change relations of domination that take place in existing societies (kantola and lombardo 2017; mügge, evans and engeli 2016; ackerly and mügge 2016). the contribution of gender and politics studies to the field of political science and international relations has nowadays partially been recognized so that liza mügge, elizabeth evans and isabelle engeli (2016: 2) argue that ‘gender scholarship is gradually becoming part of mainstream political science, while retaining its distinct identity’. indicators of this are the fact that gender and politics publications are increasingly present in political science journals that do not specialise on gender, at the same time that new gender-specialised political science book series are created; and gender and politics research is now embedded in national and international political science associations such as ecpr and ipsa. 3. challenges for gender and politics studies despite the key contributions and the significant expansion of scholarship gender and politics studies still face challenges within the discipline. dominant approaches in political science affect the recognition of gender studies in the field and influence the emergence and marginalization of particular gender approaches to politics, such as deconstructivist and new materialist ones (kantola and lombardo 2017b). teaching of gender is still marginalised or inexistent in most political science departments, including uk and us (foster et al 2013: 13; mügge, evans and engeli 2016: 2). in their study of citational practices in political science, titled ‘what’s queer about political science’, nicola smith and donna lee (2015: 50) argue that: ‘far from being the broad and inclusive discipline it purports to be in modern textbooks, today’s political science is consciously marginalising issues of gender and sexuality and hardly doing justice to the political analysis of social relations that queer theorists have been successfully doing for quite some time.’ gender and politics 3 the marginalisation of gender approaches in political science, despite their recent gradual integration in the discipline, argue celis et al (2013) still exists because men are overrepresented in the field, and because the discipline reproduces androcentric biases. concerning the first point, ‘women are underrepresented at virtually every level of the discipline, from graduate school to apsa leadership, and they continue to face genderrelated obstacles in their professional lives. moreover, women and politics scholarship remains somewhat marginalized in the discipline’ (tolleson-rinehart and carroll 2006: 512). in the european context, drude dahlerup (2010) relates the progressive institutionalization of gender and politics within the ecpr, through the creation of a standing group and a specialized conference on politics and gender. and at the same time she reports ‘resistance and even anger’ on the part of ‘male oligarchs’ in the ecpr as gender studies developed and women demanded more leadership positions in the organization, because according to dahlerup (2010: 91-92) this ‘represented an attack on the fundamental selfperception of academia as being free from any bias and being strictly based on merit as its selection criteria. the university seems to be the last institution in society to recognize that gender is a structuring factor in all institutions, even in academia.’ feminist scholars make similar diagnoses on the lack of integration of gender in political science for contexts as different as the uk, the netherlands, germany, austria, spain, or finland (evans and amery 2016; bonjour, mügge and roggeband 2016; abels 2016; sauer 2016; alonso and lombardo 2016; kantola 2015). feminist political theorists and epistemologists have shown that knowledge and science have been constructed on the basis of androcentric biases that have privileged the questions, issues, and methods relevant to hegemonic men (harding 1991; hekman 1990). political science is not an exception in this respect. the theory of political science has been developed within a line of thinking that, from aristotle to machiavelli, locke and the contractualists, has justified the right of men to rule over women and public affairs and the subordinate position of women and their association with the private domestic sphere. although feminist scholars have exposed and challenged the gender stereotypes present in male-dominated classics of political science (pateman 1995; shanley and pateman 1991), ‘the notion of a separation of the public and private spheres persists today’ (celis et al 2013: 7), with the symbolic association of women with the private and men with the public sphere of politics. the very concepts of politics, power, citizenship, or the state have been conceptualised in androcentric ways, reflecting the experience, interests, and values of embodied dominant male subjects (lister 1998; brown 1988; pateman 1988). ‘these ideas have again affected what has been deemed suitable subject matter for the academic discipline of politics’ (celis et al 2013: 7). the experience of being excluded from the mainstream has made gender studies of politics particularly open to inclusion and diversity, so to challenge marginalisations and build bridges between different approaches in political science. according to birte siim (2004: 97), gender and politics approaches have adopted a ‘methodological pluralism’ that has challenged the ‘methodological split in political science between different schools, for example between “rationalists” and “social constructivists”’. siim recognizes the existence of a dialogue within feminist political research between empirical studies, comparative context-aware analyses, and discourse analysis inspired by poststructuralism (2004: 97). she traces the emergence of interdisciplinary ‘conversations’ in kantola and lombardo, gender politics studies within european political science 4 feminist political research between ‘political theorists, gender theorists and comparativists, as well as between neo-institutionalists and social constructivists’ that did not generate methodological splits but rather ‘productive tensions between different positions’ (2004: 98). these dialogues have contributed to build an agenda around three main elements: ‘the contested and constructed nature of key concepts; the principle of diversity and differences among women’, and ‘the inter-relation between discourse, agency and institutions’ (siim 2004: 99). in this way, feminist political research has shown political science the ‘potential strength of methodological pluralism’ (siim 2004: 98). gender and politics studies are characterized by a huge variety of approaches (kantola and lombardo 2017 and 2017b). the value and contribution of gender approaches to political science lies precisely in their diversity, because each of them is able to capture aspects of political reality that another perspective had overlooked. it is therefore tremendously important that the contributions of gender and politics to political science receive wider academic recognition within the discipline, so that scholars may enjoy the benefits of a more complete range of analytical approaches for understanding, explaining, and transforming the political. references abels, gabriele (2016) ‘the gender gap in political science education in germany’ european political science 15(3): 322-331 doi:10.1057/eps.2015.80. ackerly brooke and liza mügge (2016) ‘teacher symposium: mainstreaming gender in the teaching and learning of politics. introduction’ ps: political science & politics 49(3): 1-5. doi:10.1017/s1049096516000949 ackerly, brooke and jacqui true (2011) doing feminist research in political & social science (basingstoke and new york: palgrave macmillan). alonso, alba and emanuela lombardo (2016) ‘ending ghettoization? mainstreaming gender in spanish political science education’ european political science 15(3): 292-302 doi:10.1057/eps.2015.77. bonjour, saskia, liza mügge, and conny roggeband (2016) ‘lost in the mainstream? gender in dutch political science education’ european political science 15(3): 303-313 doi:10.1057/eps.2015.78. brown, wendy (1988) manhood and politics a feminist reading in political theory (new jersey: rownham and littlefield). celis karen, johanna kantola, georgina waylen and laurel weldon (2013) introduction . in: waylen, g celis k kantola j and weldon l (eds) the oxford handbook on gender and politics. oxford: oxford university press, pp. 1-26. dahlerup, drude (2010) ‘the development of gender and politics as a new research field within the framework of the ecpr’ european political science 9, 85–98. evans, elizabeth and fran amery (2016) ‘gender and politics in the uk: banished to the sidelines’, european political science doi:10.1057/eps.2015.79. foster, emma, peter kerr, anthony hopkins, christopher byrne, and linda ahall (2013) ‘the personal is not political: at least in the uk’s top politics and ir departments’, the british journal of politics & international relations, 15 (4), 566–585. harding, sandra (1991) whose science? whose knowledge? thinking from women’s lives (ithaca: cornell university press). gender and politics 5 hekman, susan (1990) gender and knowledge: elements of a postmodern feminism (cambridge: polity press). kantola, johanna (2015) ‘political science as a gendered discipline in finland’ european political science 14(2): 79–86. kantola, johanna and emanuela lombardo (2017) gender and political analysis. basingstoke: palgrave. kantola, johanna and emanuela lombardo eds (2017a) gender and the economic crisis: politics, institutions and intersectionality. basingstoke: palgrave. kantola, johanna and emanuela lombardo (2017b) ‘feminist political analysis: exploring hegemonies, silences and novelties’, in feminist theory, forthcoming. lister, ruth (1998) citizenship: feminist perspectives (basingstoke: palgrave). mügge, liza, elizabeth evans and isabelle engeli (2016) ‘introduction: gender in european political science education – taking stock and future directions’, european political science 15(3): 281-291 doi:10.1057/eps.2015.72. pateman, carole (1995) the disorder of women: democracy, feminism, and political theory (stanford: stanford university press). pateman, carole (1988) ‘the patriarchal welfare state’ in amy gutman (ed.) democracy and the welfare state (princeton: princeton university press), 231–260. sauer, birgit (2016) ‘austrian exceptionalism? insights from a huge department in a small country’ european political science 15(3): 332-342 doi:10.1057/eps.2015.81. shanley, mary lyndon and carole pateman (1991) feminist interpretations and political theory (cambridge: polity press). siim, birte (2004) ‘towards a contextual and gender sensitive european political science?’ european political science 3(2) spring 2004, 97-101 smith, nicola and donna lee (2015) ‘what’s queer about political science?’ british journal of politics and international relations 17 (1), 49–63. tolleson-rinehart, sue, and susan j. carroll (2006) ‘“far from ideal:” the gender politics of political science’ american political science review 100(4), 507-513. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_3.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. 36–50. contact authors: roberta bracciale, university of pisa, roberta.bracciale@unipi.it cristopher cepernich, university of turin, cristopher.cepernich@unito.it hybrid 2018 campaigning: the social media habits of italian political leaders and parties roberta bracciale university of pisa cristopher cepernich university of turin abstract the electoral communication flows produced by leaders, parties, and the main candidates are the result of hybrid media logics and this is due to the environment in which they develop, and to the communicative strategies used. these strategies are generated by the intersection of traditional media logics (tv, radio, press) with digital media logics (internet). this article investigates the social media communication habits of the main italian leaders and political parties on twitter and facebook. to understand how the hybrid campaign developed in the italian context, specific indicators were identified to operationalize social media habits related to: (a) communicative strategy, based on the productivity of the account (broadcast) and on its degree of interactivity (conversational), (b) skillfulness, regarding the capability to use different features of the social media platform; and (c) engagement, related to the capacity of the account to involve the audience. results show that a more skillful use of the platforms, combined with a conversational communication strategy, produce more engaging messages regardless the specific political actor (leader or party). finally, the outcomes show a significant strengthening of hybrid media campaigning during the last italian general elections on 4 march 2018. 1. hybrid campaigning he political campaign during the last italian general elections on 4 march 2018 shows a significant consolidation of hybrid media campaigning. the electoral communication flows produced by leaders, parties and the main candidates are the result of hybrid media logics, because such is the environment in which they are structured. in fact, according to chadwick’s definition, a hybrid communicative strategy is generated in the integration – but we could better say in the intersection – of traditional media logics (tv, radio, press) with digital media logics (internet). a hybrid communication system, therefore, ‘is built upon interactions among older and newer media logic – where logics are defined as technologies, genres, norms, behaviours, and organizational forms – in the reflexively connected fields of media and politics’ (chadwick 2013: 4). in this perspective, the old/new media dichotomy is nowadays impractical both in the professional practices of communication and in those of research. the elements at the root of contemporary electoral campaigns are found by focusing attention on ‘the flux, in-betweenness, the interstitial, and the liminal’ (ibidem). recently, wells et al. have demonstrated that ‘trump’s efforts to court media attention, through staged events, unscheduled interactions, and social media activity, were largely successful’ (2016: 675). there are different relevant cases of communicative t who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 37 hybridization also during the latest electoral campaigns such as the ‘live’ facebook streaming of public events. in this regard, the electoral rally has become a fundamental element of the electoral narrative. sociological studies on the performance of politics have shown that the performative action of leader becomes a generative factor of media narratives. it functions both as an internal bond within the communities of supporters and militants, and as a unifying collective representation of a wider segment of voters: ‘[...] the struggle for power becomes theatrical. candidates work to present compelling performances of civil competence to citizen audiences at a remove not only geographically but also emotionally and morally. it is the success of these performances that determinate how whites, blacks, jews, catholics, and women distribute their precious votes, and the opinions of these supposedly demographic groups shift significantly in response to coding, narrative, tone, metaphor, setting, and performance in the course of campaign time’ (alexander 2010: 9). as a second significant case of communicative hybridization in the electoral context, live tweeting during tv talk shows is a feature that enhances the direct interaction between politicians and the public through second screen vision. in fact, a growing number of citizens comment on live tv programmes as they are being transmitted, simultaneously using more than one screen, such as a smartphone or a tablet. this produces a collective re-framing of the mainstream information flow, especially when live tweeting performances are used. it is the viewertariat public ‘which we define as viewers who use online publishing platforms and social tools to interpret, publicly comment on, and debate a television broadcast while they are watching it’ (anstead and o’loughlin 2011: 441). the hybrid campaign is correlated to the penetration of digital technologies in the field of politics, as social networks are the hub of any hybrid campaign (wells et al. 2016). they work as the primary connection factor between media and real space (stromer-galley 2014). different strategic set-ups of the hybrid campaign give shape to equally different social media habits: that is, different functional uses of social networks in the economy of the hybrid campaign. for this reason, the digital set-up of the hybrid campaign is the subject of this research. the literature, albeit in a fragmented way, shows a qualitative leap in different levels of the electoral campaign model, especially if contrasted to the ‘postmodern’ model (andretta and bracciale 2017). on a first level, the digital communication system has definitively reinforced the primacy of the network logic in electoral campaigns, defined on the criteria of the spreadability of the content and the connectivity between people. this network logic operates in everyday life through personal media, social network sites (facebook, instagram and pinterest), microblogging platforms (twitter, tumblr), and messaging apps (whatsapp, telegram, snapchat). on a second level, the communicative style of political actors is increasingly personalized (bentivegna 2015). symmetrically, this determines the personalization of messages with an increasing use of targeting and microtargeting techniques. we have seen them work with instruments such as google adwords and facebook adv, which efficiently profile people’s interests. on a third level, the media that form the basis of the hybrid campaign are now those typical of the disintermediation process, taking place through the efficient integration of channels. among the dynamics at the base of bracciale and cepernich, hybrid 2018 campaigning 38 this we can find: (a) the spreadability of contents, or virality, an essential feature to increase the volume of circulation of online messages, their visibility and, when possible, to inform the media agenda; (b) direct and immediate contact with citizens and voters, and (c) the re-acquisition of interpersonal communication into the campaign structure, focusing on the reactivation of ‘molecular leaders’ as a hub of informal communication in the most personal daily environment of each citizen-elector (cepernich 2017). thus, politicians return to participate in public events and to talk in the squares in the form of rallies. these are typical forms of pre-media election campaigns which feed the voracious social network circuits with ever-fresh content and support for the construction of the media agenda. on a fourth level, the network-logic infrastructure is active in all phases of the campaign. in this scenario, the main factor of the digital campaign is the mobilization capacity of all relational networks available to the individual and to the collective political actors. the networked campaign is developed by giving the offline mobilization an online organization. in fact, individual willingness to mobilize is positively influenced by the quality of the structural connections, determined especially by the use of technological platforms. networking is a powerful factor in the activation of behaviour. the influencer, especially when his or her actions are linked to the real social sphere, and not only to the technologically mediated one, becomes the most effective testimonial, bringing into the interactive situation a capital of trust often unavailable to the political figure. finally, on a fifth level, the political campaigns during the digital age face the great challenge of engaging and participating in an increasingly apathetic and fickle electorate that tends towards emotional and sometimes reactive voting behaviour. the post-medial logic of the network, which states as fact the direct involvement of individuals and the revitalization of individual microcosms, and online and offline communities, involves the empowerment of individuals. in this sense, the hybrid campaign is post-medial and implies the recovery of the ‘human factor’ of communication as a relational factor. the hybrid campaign structure takes places at the intersection of three main dimensions of the campaign process: real space, internet and television. all these were clearly present in barack obama’s campaign for the 2008 us primary (chadwick 2013: 139). to illustrate the hybridization of electoral communication in italy, we can consider the metamorphosis affecting some traditional propaganda material such as commercials, leaflets and posters. this is a consequence of an irreversible digital switch. seizing the opportunities arising for disintermediation, propaganda communication has found in the information bubbles of social networks a very fertile ground for the mobilization of voters (cepernich 2017; novelli 2018). a first example of this is the tv adv historically strangled in italy by the par condicio law on equal conditions for political communication, which actually inhibits its circulation on national tv circuits. this has found new life in non-places (augé 1995), such as large railway stations in major urban areas, and in digital ecosystems with a high rate of partisanism and emotionalization (brader 2006; cepernich and novelli 2018). a second example is the old flyer, now reproduced on timelines in the form of promotional postcards and infographics with an extensive use of numbers that certify an inevitably partial representation of the reality. a third and final example is the electoral manifesto which has disappeared from city walls, a sort of substitution effect of the physical territory with the digital one. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 39 unexpectedly, the use of manifestos – above all the invasive 6x3 format – is no longer customary, with the exception of leaders or parties with significant starting deficits in brand awareness. this is the case, for example, of pietro grasso (liberi e uguali), the new face of the leadership of a debuting party, and giorgia meloni (fratelli d’italia), a well-known leader but at the head of a small political force in a coalition overwhelmed by exuberant political and media personalities such as silvio berlusconi (forza italia) and matteo salvini (lega). berlusconi also rediscovered the 6x31 manifestos, although on a drastically minor scale compared to the past, in the urgency of rebranding himself as a public figure, no less important than his party. they have found on facebook, twitter and instagram a more effective communication channel. the acquired centrality of social networks is explained by the availability in those arenas of increasingly large and, at the same time, active publics who support the political leaders’ communication, but also because of the possibility of new strategies of message profiling at very low costs compared to traditional advertising forms. two important scenario conditions supported the digitalization upgrade of campaigning during the italian election. firstly, this was the first low-budget campaign in italian politics, due to the abolition of electoral refunds to parties2. secondly, the reduced time available for campaigning, which was concentrated within a period of just two months, forced the protagonists to make huge efforts in order to optimize the scarce available resources. in fact, efforts were focused almost exclusively in february. for these reasons, social media became the key production and dissemination channels for disintermediate propaganda and the main nodes of hybrid campaigning: twitter with more intra-elite dynamics, facebook more extra-elite. following these preliminary assumptions, this research investigates the social media communication habits of the main italian leaders and political parties on twitter and facebook. the leaders’ communication habits cannot be explained independently from those of their parties, and vice versa. in a strategic perspective, the leaders’ communication is strictly interdependent with that of their parties. based on their respective structural features, staff often assign different and integrated functions to each social media. for example, twitter is more inclined towards media-oriented communication, and facebook to a public-oriented one. the increasing personalization of the communicative style produces differentiation in the strategic use of the channels, not the replacement of one with the other. in the first part of this work, specific indicators are identified to operationalize social media habits on twitter and facebook (bracciale and martella 2016). later, the first outcomes of the monitoring activities conducted by policom.online3 on the strategic use of social networks in electoral communication by political actors are presented in a descriptive form. finally, we try to underline similarities and differences in the approaches to the 2018 election campaign strategies on social network sites. 1 the extensive use of the 6x3 format electoral manifesto was introduced by berlusconi in the 2001 general election campaign in response to the par condicio law (n. 28 of 2000), known as the law on equal conditions of political communication in an election context, which limited the broadcasting of television commercials to very limited spaces, in fact, by blocking it. 2 electoral refunds were abolished by decree-law no 149 of 28 december 2013, signed by the former prime minister, enrico letta. 3 see link: http://www.policom.online. bracciale and cepernich, hybrid 2018 campaigning 40 2. measuring social media habits in order to translate this conceptual background into an empirical analysis and to understand how the hybrid campaign was developed in the italian context, we have used as proxy the social media habits of both leaders and their parties. specifically, we have identified three dimensions of the social media use habits that fit with the logic of the digital environment outlined above: the communicative strategies adopted by both leaders and political parties; the skills that they need to best seize the specific social media affordances, and their capacity to engage their audiences. the outlined hybrid campaign attributes are not mutually exclusive in relation to a specific dimension of social media habits as there could be different motivations behind each communicative action. for instance, the spreadability of a content can be related to the communicative strategies adopted by the accounts and at the same time can depend on its capacity to engage citizens. personalization, due to the disintermediated context in which political actors can interact directly with followers, can be disclosed by the possibility of both being able to communicate directly to the public and the capacity to address someone by the use of mentions or tagging a specific user. to summarize, the social media habit dimensions are related to (a) communicative strategies: (i) broadcast, based on the productivity of the account, and (ii) conversational, based on the degree of interactivity in the platform; (b) skilfulness: regarding the ability to use different features of the social media platform, and (c) engagement: regarding the capacity of the account to involve the audience. the social media habits have been operationalized based on these dimensions, identifying specific indicators for both facebook and twitter. although the specific affordances of both platforms may differ, in the case of public facebook pages we can find many similarities to twitter profiles if we consider the structure of the social networks they configure. in fact, relationships on both twitter and facebook pages are asymmetric – unlike private facebook profiles where friendship is mutual. indeed, a user can follow a twitter account or a facebook page without being followed, i.e. without the relationship becoming bidirectional. in this scenario, the two social network sites and their habits become more correctly comparable. this analysis considers the facebook pages and twitter accounts of the main italian political leaders and their parties: silvio berlusconi and forza italia; emma bonino and +europa (+europe); luigi di maio and movimento 5 stelle (five stars movement); pietro grasso and liberi e uguali (free and equal); giorgia meloni and fratelli d’italia (brothers of italy); matteo renzi and partito democratico (democratic party); matteo salvini and lega – salvini premier (league salvini premier). the timelines of the leaders and parties were downloaded4 through twitter rest api and facebook graph api, from 2 january 2018 to 3 march 2018. in total we collected 7,673 tweets and 8,940 posts. the indicators were operationalized both with metadata gathering by twitter and facebook apis and with some text parsing tools using the r software. 4 see link: http://www.policom.online. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 41 2.1. social media habits dimensions 2.1.a. communicative strategies political actors still use social network sites mainly for broadcasting messages, following a top-down communication model. the pursued strategy of maximizing the visibility of both the leader and the party in the public debate has three main goals: 1. to promote the leader’s or party’s image through (re)branding activities and self-promotion actions; 2. to influence media coverage through the over-production of self-generated content then made available to journalists and taking advantage of the rapidity and voracity of the digital information system, due to media hybridization; 3. to foster direct communication with the audience and voters. in the light of the foregoing, the first communication strategy that should be considered is productivity, namely each account flow and coverage capacity. indeed, according to the broadcast communication rule, the greater the communication flow, the greater will be the available potential of visibility. table 1 shows the specific indicator used for the analysis. table 1. communicative strategies: broadcast (productivity indicators) twitter indicators facebook indicators 1. frequency: daily average of produced tweets during the analysed time period. 1. frequency: daily average of produced posts during the analysed time period. table 2. communicative strategies: conversational (interactivity indicators) twitter indicators facebook indicators 1. mentions done: percentage of tweets with a mention out of the total number of produced tweets during the time period considered 2. replies done: percentage of replies out of the total number of produced tweets during the time period considered 3. retweets done: percentage of retweets out of the total number of produced tweets during the time period considered 1. tags done: percentage of posts with a tag out of the total number of produced posts during the time period considered 2. comments done: percentage of replies to comments out of the total number of produced posts during the time period considered [percentage of comments made by the account to its posts] the analysis considers another important strategy, the conversational one. this is pursued through the interaction practices supported by the leaders’ and parties’ twitter accounts and facebook pages. as shown in table 2, the degree of interaction is measured by the propensity to mention, reply, and especially on twitter, to retweet. while retweets could be seen as a simple act of resharing content generated by others, they offer the opportunity to engage new users in a discussion thread, contributing to creating ‘a bracciale and cepernich, hybrid 2018 campaigning 42 conversational ecology in which conversations are composed of a public interplay of voices that give rise to an emotional sense of shared conversational context’ (boyd, golder and lotan 2010: 1). this indicates a greater inclination towards dialogue and including other users in the communication flow. therefore, if at a first level a tag mostly measures the propensity of the political actor to directly interact with another political actor or an influencer in any respect, the number of comments made is an indicator, instead, of the tendency to interact with users. this allows the candidate’s style to be positioned according to the broadcast vs conversational polarization. it should be pointed out, however, that often the interactivity strategies are functional to, and not an alternative for, the predominantly broadcast use of the social network during electoral campaigns. indeed, historically speaking, the politicians’ recourse to web-based interactions has mainly aimed to build a shareholders’ interaction rather than a real one with users. in other words, the goal has been to create ‘an illusion of face-to face relationship’ (stromer-galley 2014: 91), because of both a widespread distrust towards the process outcome, and the objective difficulty of operatively managing a large-scale real interaction with users in an efficient and effective way. 2.1.b. skilfulness skilfulness reflects the degree of the politicians’ communication expertise in managing the structure flow on twitter and facebook. certainly, the communication format is an element of major importance for effective communication. it is the outcome of the organization of contents, the style through which they are expressed, the emphasis and relevance given to certain elements, and the communicative grammar of the medium (altheide and snow 1979). in other words, skilfulness measures the complexity degree of the communicative syntax. the following table (table 3) specifies the indicators which measure the skilfulness strategy, such as the resort to hashtags and hyperlinks, explaining the characteristics of each platform. table 3. skilfulness indicators twitter indicators facebook indicators 1. hashtags: percentage of tweets with a hashtag out of the total of tweets produced during the time period considered 2. links: percentage of tweets with a link out of the total of tweets produced during the time period considered (over 280k) 3. photos: percentage of tweets with an image out of the total of tweets produced during the time period considered. 1. hashtags: percentage of posts with a hashtag out of the total number produced during the time period considered (ad hoc publics) 2. links: percentage of posts with a link out of the total number produced during the time period considered 3. photos: percentage of posts with an image out of the total number produced during the time period considered 4. videos: percentage of posts with a video out of the total number produced during the time period considered who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 43 hashtags on twitter, as a matter of fact, offer different functions. they emphasize a particular content, making it searchable on the information flow of the platform (bruns and burgess 2012). they can also set the agenda on specific arguments (small 2011), allowing political actors to monitor and manage the communication flow indexed by a ‘#’, an efficient tool for audience enlargement (segerberg and bennett 2011). lastly, hashtags enable the creation of ad hoc communities (bruns and burgess 2012), overcoming the limit of one’s own network of followers. on facebook, instead, hashtags play a marginal role, even if they technically offer, especially on public pages, almost the same functions as those on twitter, such as thematization, post searchability in the information flow, and cross-networking, among other functions. verifying their use is one of the aims of the monitoring activities, as it would represent a significant case of hybridization between the two most important social platforms. the use of hyperlinks, on the other hand, makes the flow structure even more complex. they allow users to exceed the 180-characters limit (240 nowadays) (boyd, golder and lotan 2010), to share existing content (zhao and rosson 2009), and to complete the message with additional text. furthermore, photo and video contribute to increasing audience engagement and interactions, thus giving the content more visibility due to the algorithm that hierarchizes the timeline news (wang 2016). 2.1.c. engagement engagement is undoubtedly the most interesting analytical dimension in the digital campaigning context. this is determined according to its potential for activating online supporters, as necessary as they are difficult to obtain, in fact, especially for parties (greffet and wojcik 2017; lilleker 2016). the strategic use of online engagement represents the first step towards hybrid campaigning as the activation of online supporters is a key condition for offline activation. this network building is fundamental for hybrid electoral campaigns, which are based on the ‘creation, cultivation, and maintenance of ties with supporters that staffers could mobilize for collective social and symbolic action’ (kreiss 2012:10). for example, retweets (on twitter) and shares (on facebook) enhance the political actors’ capacity to reach a secondary audience. indeed, this process allows a specific account or page to communicate with a public beyond its number of followers (primary audience). this is crucial for the diffusion of the political message, and consistent with studies which have analysed the relationship between the number of followers and influence on political attitudes and behaviour (bond et al. 2012; cha et al. 2010; zhang et al. 2009). hence, the retweet and share rates are necessary for measuring the overall efficacy of the communication strategies (tab. 4). moreover, the ability of a facebook page to prompt comments and interactions in general is a key element in increasing content visibility, apart from the number of fans. in fact, the facebook news feed gives visibility to those posts that have comments from a user on a friend’s5 timeline. 5 see link: https://www.facebook.com/help/327131014036297/. bracciale and cepernich, hybrid 2018 campaigning 44 table 4. engagement indicators twitter indicators facebook indicators 1. retweets received: average of received retweets out of the total number of produced posts during the time period considered. 2. likes received: average of received favourites out of the total number of produced posts during the time period considered. 1. comments received: average of comments received out of the total number of produced posts during the time period considered 2. likes received: average of likes received out of the total number of produced posts during the time period considered 3. shares received: average of shares received out of the total number of produced posts during the time period considered 3. twitter habits during 2018 campaign all the main italian political leaders and their parties had active accounts on twitter, which were opened before the 2018 general elections. the two new political formations – liberi e uguali and +europa – are obvious exceptions, as both opened their profiles at the end of 2017. these 2018 general elections also marked the debut of silvio berlusconi’s official twitter account. the late landing could be the reason for the low number of followers of the latest arrivals. this was probably remedied by the enhancing of productivity (using a broadcast strategy) during the campaign. the broadcast strategy managed by political actors on twitter was verified through two indicators: the average of the original tweets produced, and the average of the total activity given by the sum of tweets, retweets and replies. the first is a measure of the strategic investment in communication built ad hoc for its followers; the second is an indicator of the ‘coverage’ of the online presence. except for matteo salvini and silvio berlusconi, higher frequencies and higher activities seem to be part of the strategic communicative style of parties, while the leaders show lower levels of productivity. regarding the interactivity dimension (conversational strategy), fringe parties and their leaders seem to be more inclined to involve other users in the discussion. this is the case of pietro grasso, liberi e uguali, emma bonino, and più europa, as well as forza italia. with respect to replies, these are generally very few in number, with the exception of two of the centre-right parties: lega salvini premier (32.3%) and forza italia (65.8%). the fi data appears particularly interesting, because it prefigures the use of tactics that are significantly different from the others. this aspect needs further investigation. finally, the movimento 5 stelle and the partito democratico are the parties most inclined to act on their strategy on twitter through the practice of retweeting content produced by other accounts. in relation to skilfulness, defined as a dimension of reinforcement in the construction of the message through a more informed use of platform features, the data shows that about three fourths of the posts by giorgia meloni, silvio berlusconi, matteo salvini, matteo renzi and +europa contain at least one hashtag. more than 50% of tweets by the who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 45 movimento 5 stelle, luigi di maio, fratelli d’italia and lega salvini premier contain a hyperlink. this practice of adding a link to an external web page is usually employed to exceed the textual limits imposed by the platform6. furthermore, it represents an opportunity for self-promotion, driving traffic into other platforms (for example from twitter to facebook and vice versa) or advertising participation in tv programmes, radio, newspaper interviews, etc. giorgia meloni, movimento 5 stelle, partito democratico and fratelli d’italia included a photo in more than half of their posts, usually portraying the leader participating in a television broadcast or speaking with ordinary people during a rally. the last analytical dimension considered in this research is the engagement capability of twitter users. this competence is mainly expressed through retweet (rt) and likes (favourites) that each tweet on the profile obtained through its strategic game. the political actors who most effectively created engagement were luigi di maio, with over 500 rt for each tweet; followed by matteo renzi, with over 370 rt and the movimento 5 stelle with over 230 rt. compared to the number of likes, the positions in the table of renzi and di maio are reversed: over 1,300 favourites for the former and 1,150 for the latter. table 5. twitter habits of italian political leaders and parties from 02.01.2018 to 03.03.2018. productivity (broadcast) interactivity (conversational) skilfulness engagement account frequency v.% mentions v.% reply v.% rt v.% # v.% url v.% photo mean rt mean likes silvio berlusconi 19.0 21.5 1.1 1.6 81.5 4.5 45.5 33.5 88.4 emma bonino 2.9 85.8 1.3 53.1 68.9 29.0 5.5 80.5 255.8 luigi di maio 1.6 24.5 0.0 52.2 27.6 77.6 33.7 543.4 1152.3 pietro grasso 1.4 53.3 2.3 47.4 39.1 47.8 47.8 175.8 498.4 giorgia meloni 3.0 30.0 5.6 13.4 75.5 19.0 61.5 179.6 596.4 matteo renzi 2.7 7.8 0.9 22.1 91.6 44.0 28.3 374.2 1302.9 matteo salvini 18.8 24.4 1.1 3.2 81.8 24.3 46.2 128.2 435.2 forza italia 0.8 98.9 65.8 33.5 54.3 11.3 13.1 16.3 1.1 più europa 6.7 71.5 1.1 2.3 97.2 20.1 47.4 38.3 104.4 m5s 2.2 38.3 0.2 72.4 51.8 59.6 67.4 236.5 424.5 liberi e uguali 9.1 58.3 1.6 58.2 44.7 34.0 44.9 36.0 75.3 fratelli d’italia 13.0 5.8 0.1 5.0 7.1 92.9 94.8 7.9 18.6 pd 4.6 48.5 0.3 82.0 38.4 46.5 75.4 113.6 230.6 lega 36.4 32.3 32.3 0.0 9.3 98.8 0.0 7.0 14.0 total 21.7 42.9 8.1 31.9 54.9 43.5 43.7 140.8 371.3 4. facebook habits during 2018 election the facebook pages of italian parties and leaders have a rather heterogeneous number of fans. in general, the leaders’ pages have larger audiences than those of the parties, with the exception of forza italia which has close to two million likes preceded only by matteo salvini who has exceeded the threshold of two million fans. 6 at the beginning the textual limitation imposed by the platform was 140 characters, today 280. bracciale and cepernich, hybrid 2018 campaigning 46 the analytical dimension of productivity (broadcast strategy) is characterized by the high frequency of the lega salvini premier party with around 60 posts per day. the other parties published fewer than 16 posts per day. among the leaders, however, the most active in terms of frequency were salvini, di maio and meloni with an activity rate of over 10 posts per day. interactivity (conversational strategy) is a characteristic feature of pietro grasso’s communication strategy. in almost 60% of his posts there was at least one mention and his response rate to comments was 72%. with regard to platform use skills (skilfulness), the syntax of posts is a good indicator of the heterogeneity of formats that is presented to the public. matteo salvini and +europa use hashtags in about half of their posts. hashtags are a typical twitter format which, due to the effects of hybridization between platforms, has been imported into facebook, albeit with little success. fratelli d’italia uses at least one hyperlink in over 80% of their posts. this is a much more intensive use of this syntax than its competitors. in fact, the league, which uses the second largest number of hyperlinks, includes links in just 30% of its posts. the use of images is quite widespread among the political actors’ facebook pages. more than half of the posts of +europa, silvio berlusconi, forza italia, partito democratico, lega salvini premier and liberi e uguali contain at least one. the recourse to use images (photos, but also infographics and postcards) is a significant indicator of technical expertise, because images offer a better chance of engaging the audience than just using written text. the use of videos is also quite widespread: matteo salvini, movimento 5 stelle and forza italia publish them in over 40% of their posts. table 6. facebook habits of italian political leaders and parties from 02.01.2018 to 03.03.2018 productivity (broadcast) interactivity (conversational) skilfulness engagement page name frequency v.% mention v.% reply v.% # v.% url v.% photo v.% video mean comments mean likes mean share silvio berlusconi 3.3 55.6 0.0 12.7 3.1 62.2 34.7 1213.8 3738.6 648.3 emma bonino 2.0 34.4 0.0 7.2 25.4 47.5 21.3 25.9 267.2 32.0 luigi di maio 11.2 23.9 4.9 5.4 28.8 31.1 36.9 1545.2 7513.2 4062.8 pietro grasso 1.4 59.3 72.0 1.1 17.3 39.5 22.2 30.4 3493.8 772.5 giorgia meloni 8.7 7.1 19.6 35.2 14.5 39.2 32.1 117.3 3901.5 954.0 matteo renzi 2.5 7.9 20.0 28.4 7.2 28.3 38.8 639.3 8470.7 1530.4 matteo salvini 11.8 1.1 1.2 55.5 16.9 31.2 46.6 527.5 8571.2 2208.9 forza italia 6.4 2.6 33.3 2.5 2.3 55.8 41.4 22.7 633.6 206.1 più europa 3.8 42.4 11.6 45.2 7.4 63.8 24.0 70.3 1700.3 308.3 m 5 stelle 15.6 20.7 0.1 4.4 32.5 23.9 43.2 199.4 2354.1 1697.9 liberi e uguali 3.8 23.0 24.2 2.6 20.7 49.6 25.7 236.8 435.5 216.6 fratelli d’italia 12.0 1.0 0.0 4.6 82.9 7.8 9.2 151.8 374.5 68.9 pd 6.7 47.1 61.0 11.3 16.1 54.6 25.4 2596.8 1380.5 587.5 lega 58.8 0.4 0.1 37.8 37.6 49.7 12.5 1812.1 240.2 68.4 total 10.6 23.3 17.7 18.1 22.3 41.7 29.6 656.4 3078.8 954. 5 who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 47 finally, we also consider the last analytical dimension of engagement for facebook. the element of personalization seems to play a key role in the number of likes collected: matteo salvini, matteo renzi and luigi di maio get an average of around 8,000 likes for each post. other leaders also show a favourable engagement performance. overall, giorgia meloni, silvio berlusconi and pietro grasso have discreet success with over 3,500 likes per post. the only real exception is emma bonino, whose facebook management reaches just 250 likes for each post. as to the average of shares, the situation changes substantially. in addition to di maio and salvini, the movimento 5 stelle appears able to generate an important sharing activity from fans in the community. 5. conclusion what communicative habits can we then highlight for the political leaders and their parties on facebook and twitter? first of all, we must remark on the prevalence of the broadcast strategy, especially used by centre-right political actors, in line with previous research on the relationship between politics and innovation technologies. lega is the political actor with the strongest focus on broadcast strategy, both on twitter and facebook. of particular interest is how the parties’ daily mean of production is significantly higher than that of the political leaders. the only exception is silvio berlusconi’s twitter account which is more active than that of his party forza italia, whose index of productivity is quite low. this suggests a precise functional differentiation between the use of the channels by parties and leaders. the adoption of a broadcast communicative model by political actors highlights the adhesion of a specific cultural form which is characterized by a one-way, centralized communication flow. the adoption of this model implies the reluctance of the political actor, more or less consciously, to establish a direct relationship with citizens and voters in sharp contrast to the social and conversational nature that distinguishes social media. in any case, there is no direct correlation between flow capacity and public engagement. for example, on twitter, luigi di maio is the least productive leader (daily mean 1.6), but he obtains better results with the number of retweets and likes he receives (tweets mean 543.4 rt and 1,152.3 likes). in this regard, numerous studies have shown the importance of the number of retweets collected by the account, as this directly influences the political actor’s ability to reach a secondary audience to which he/she would otherwise not have any access (vaccari and valeriani 2015). as for the parties, data on engagement capability seems to show a scenario in which the smaller parties try to manage the account to reduce the communication gap with the larger parties (gibson and mcallister 2015). however, this strategy seems to generate negative effects. the data shows a normalization of the online presence that reproduces the existing offline gaps in terms of popularity (margolis and resnick 2000). indeed, a communicative model which is mainly broadcast is characterized by a low response rate to users’ comments. in this respect, this electoral campaign on facebook confirms what has already been observed by different studies regarding the use of social media by political actors: it is a sort of bullhorn simply aimed at self-promotion (graham et al. 2013). bracciale and cepernich, hybrid 2018 campaigning 48 on the contrary, the adoption of a conversation communicative model, besides using the potentialities of the medium, conveys a greater predisposition towards dialogue and an effort to regain a direct relationship with voting citizens (bentivegna 2015). this last is directly related to the nature of the platforms. conversational strategies are pursued less on facebook than on twitter. a confirmation of this seems to be a shared abandonment of the interactive use of facebook (the platform of extra-élite relationships), as opposed to twitter (the platform of intra-élite relationships). the analysis shows a disposition, by the centre-right and the movimento 5 stelle political actors, to adopt a more conversational and interactive strategy, which is a historically rooted characteristic of these actors. furthermore, a tendency emerges towards a more coherent use of the platforms by some of the parties, namely pd and liberi e uguali, and their leaders. for example, pietro grasso and liberi e uguali show a significant capacity for interaction on facebook the movimento 5 stelle practices an interactive strategy more on twitter than on facebook. this results in increased interactivity in the elitarian communicative twitter flow, a platform mostly oriented to the diffusion of political opinions (stieglitz and dang xuan 2013) and characterized by a strong tendency towards polarization (enli and skogerbø 2013). as a matter of fact, facebook is a more generalist social network. the radically interactive twitter strategy of forza italia should be highlighted. regarding facebook, the strategies seem to be more balanced between broadcast and interactive. nonetheless, the functional diversification between leaders’ and parties’ channels does not seem to be significant. on average, skilfulness is higher in the channels of the parties rather than in those of the leaders, especially on twitter. in general, fratelli d’italia is the party that presents more articulated grammar, principally on twitter because of the use of photos (present in 95% of tweets) and links (present in 93% of tweets). following this party, movimento 5 stelle and +europa, renzi and pd, are the ones that more systematically use the complex potentials of the platform. for example, +europa and pd resort more to hashtags and lega more to links. skilfulness on facebook in mainly linked to the use of photos and links. in the posts by lega, which present the highest levels of skilfulness among the political actors considered for this study, pictures are present in 42% of its posts. in the posts by +europa, these elements are present in 64% of the total number of posts. however, consideration should be given to the use of hashtags on facebook, usually intense but reductive. these are present in almost half of salvini’s posts, in 45% of the ones by +europa, 35% of the posts produced by meloni, and 28% by renzi. this means that the use of hashtags on facebook is spreading, probably because they are useful to define the priority of a particular issue. this represents, evidently, a substantial trace of hybridization between the main social platforms for electoral communication. finally, we monitored the political actors’ engagement capacity, which directly affects the opportunities to spread the content of the message beyond their circle of followers on facebook and twitter. in general, we have observed that a more skilful use of the platforms, combined with a conversational communication strategy, seems to produce more engaging outcomes for the message of both the political leaders and parties. this last is notably true for the leaders’ profiles and pages which tend to be more who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 49 engaging than those of the parties. our monitoring corroborates a leader-centrism effect of communication on social media, specifically as it regards this fundamental dimension of electoral communication. thus, luigi di maio and matteo renzi are the most engaging political leaders on twitter, followed by meloni, grasso, and salvini. below the average we then find bonino and berlusconi. on facebook, di maio confirms his primacy over salvini, who prefers generating engagement on the more generalist extra-élite relationship platform. lastly, renzi presents an above-average engagement capacity on facebook, while bonino’s engagement is much more about content. around the average we find the rest of the political leaders: meloni, berlusconi, and grasso. regarding the political parties, the only one with an engagement capacity above the average is the movimento 5 stelle, both on twitter and facebook. in conclusion, this monitoring aimed to provide a picture, as complete as possible, of the social media habits of political leaders and their parties during the 2018 italian general elections. this is only the first interpretative step of a wider research programme on the hubs of the hybrid campaign, which aims to explain the most recent developments in the italian political context. references alexander, j. 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(2009), how and why people twitter: the role that micro-blogging plays in informal communication at work, in ‘ingroup ‘09 proceedings of the acm 2009 international conference on supporting group work’, 243-252. microsoft word ev_185_amadio_angelucci.docx italian political science, volume x issue x * both authors contributed equally to this paper. published in 2023 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume x, issue x, x–x. contact author: davide angelucci, luiss guido carli university, rome e-mail address: dangelucci@luiss.it disconnected? public opinion, economic elites, and political parties during the migration crisis maria giulia amadio viceré* european university institute, florence davide angelucci* luiss guido carli university, rome abstract this article analyses whether european political parties were responsive to the policy preferences of citizens and economic elites over immigration during the migration crisis. to do so, it derives hypotheses from the scholarly literature on party responsiveness and tests them on survey data collected in 2016 and 2017 from among voters, political parties, and economic elites in 10 different eu member states. contrary to the widespread belief about the crisis of contemporary representative democracies, the article shows that political parties’ positions on immigration changed consistently with changes in public opinion. on the contrary, the article finds no significant relation between the positions of economic elites and those of political parties. these empirical results are particularly relevant for the study of democratic representation, as they challenge the widespread assumption about the crisis of contemporary representative democracies. 1. introduction his article addresses the state of democratic representation in europe with specific regard to political parties’ representation of public opinion positions during the migration crisis.1 democratic representation is defined as the ability of political elites to aggregate and represent, within democratic institutions, interests that are diffused in societies (dahl, 1973). this function is mainly carried out by political parties, which traditionally aggregate societal interests and formally express them through elected representatives in national parliaments. nonetheless, globalization and its implications for domestic decision-making have catalysed the tension between responsible and responsive political parties (mair, 2009; 2013). not only are states now embedded in complex networks of interdependence at the international level, but the strengthening of ties with other states and international actors prompts political parties to behave responsibly. against this backdrop, to respect countries’ external commitments, political parties 1 the article conceptualizes the migration crisis in a broad manner. on one hand, it considers both refugees and migrants arriving in europe in the period considered. on the other, it conceives this crisis period as the ensemble of the years during which there was a significant increase in the influx of migrants and refugees to europe (i.e., 2014-2017). t disconnected? 2 have often gone against the preferences of their domestic electorates (bardi et al., 2014, p. 237). by increasingly interpreting their roles as responsible elites, it has been argued, political parties (particularly mainstream ones) have favoured the alienation of voters. the latter, in turn, have grown increasingly frustrated by parties’ lack of responsiveness to their policy preferences (brady et al., 2019). existing scholarship claims that such a phenomenon is particularly relevant in the european union (eu). it is a widespread opinion that during the multiple crises that occurred within and around europe in the 2010s, the eu underwent a generalized crisis of political representation (kaldor and selchow, 2013). while at the domestic level this crisis led to a ‘strain of representation’ (rohrschneider and whitefield, 2012), at the eu level it raised concerns about the democratic accountability of the eu responses to the challenges it had to face (fabbrini, 2014). indeed, the widespread criticism that current political parties are disconnected from their voters (rasmussen, 2019) undermined the argument according to which, since national governments represent citizens’ preferences, member states, by controlling the eu decision-making system, inherently make its decisions accountable (moravcsik, 2002). certainly, political parties’ responsiveness is a well-known issue in the scholarly literature (for a review see beyer and hanni, 2018). nonetheless, this issue has only rarely been examined in the context of the recent crises the eu has faced. to address this research gap, the article examines one of the recent eu crises, namely the migration crisis. in particular, it aims to answer the following questions: were political parties responsive? and, if so, to whom? to answer these questions, the article examines the association between the positions of political parties and those of citizens on the issue of immigration from 2016 to 2017 in 10 different eu member states, namely: czech republic, france, germany, great britain, greece, italy, netherlands, portugal, poland, and spain. on the one hand, the timeframe considered allows us to delve into the national divisions on immigration, and the ensuing formation of conflicting positions between member states over the managing of the migration crisis at eu level. significantly, focusing on this time frame allows us to measure political parties’ political representation of voters on immigration during the implementation of the 2015 eu temporary relocation scheme (council of the eu, 2015a; 2015b), and hence in a period when immigration returned to the centre of political debate across europe. on the other hand, examining these member states in a comparative research design allows us to achieve stronger confirmation of our analytical claims. our analysis is based on a combination of survey data collected by the euengage project (cotta et al. 2021) among voters and economic elites, with data from the chapel hill expert survey (ches) (jolly et al. 2022) dataset on political parties’ policy positions. at the same time, our article considers not only the relation between public opinion and political parties, but also the one between political parties and economic elites. with few exceptions (e.g., conti et al. 2021), the extant scholarly literature has largely neglected such a relationship. given the relevance of this aspect, scholars’ lack of attention is surprising. as a matter of fact, economic elites may express positions on policy issues that differ from those of public opinion. overall, our results bring into question the widespread assumption that contemporary representative democracies are in crisis. in fact, the empirical analysis demonstrates that political parties aligned their preferences over immigration with those of their amadio viceré and angelucci 3 citizens, rather than with those of their national economic elites. while doing so, political parties adopted increasingly restrictive policy positions towards migrations flows. notably, the analysis shows that their preferences in this regard were associated with the public’s perception of immigration as a threat. the remainder of the article is structured as follows. first, we place the migration crisis within the context of the scholarly debate on the crisis of democratic representation and discuss its relevance for our analysis. second, we outline our analytical framework. third, we provide an overview of our research design, our data sources, and research strategy. fourth, we present and discuss the empirical results of the analysis carried out. fifth, and finally, we draw conclusions from our study. 2. policy representation and the migration crisis has the representative capacity of parties decreased? and, if so, why? these are key questions in the scholarly debate on democratic representation and, more generally, on the state of representative democracy (andeweg, 2019; mair, 1995; 2011; schmitter, 2001). political parties can secure democratic representation in different ways. nonetheless, the existing scholarship on representation and on the quality of representative democracy claims that the tension between responsible and responsive forms of representation has thrown contemporary representative democracies into crisis (mair, 2009; lefkofridi and nezi, 2020). indeed, the distinction between responsive and responsible elites necessarily implies two different understandings of representation. responsiveness consists of the ability of political parties to collect and represent citizens’ policy preferences consistently. it refers to the connection between public opinion preferences for policy change (or changes in opinions) and changes in policies (or changes in parties’ policy positions) (beyer and hanni, 2018). as such, responsiveness is a relevant goal for democratic governments (erikson, 2013). responsibility, in turn, refers to the willingness of representatives to abide with accepted norms, procedural rules, and conventions, such as the ones set by international treaties and institutions (lefkofridi and nezi, 2020, p. 335). by acting as responsive elites, representatives generally follow the short-term orientations and preferences of their constituencies, be they common citizens or economic elites. in these cases, the representation of societal interests within democratic decision-making institutions is substantially based on the reflections of such preferences and their variations. by acting as responsible elites, in turn, representatives carry out their activities based on a relationship of trust with voters, epitomized by their electoral mandate. even though voters subsequently evaluate their performances, in these situations political parties act as interpreters of society’s general interest without being directly constrained by the voters’ preferences (mair, 2009). the migration crisis can be considered as the epitome of what has been called the responsive versus responsibility dilemma (lefkofridi and nezi, 2020). although to different extents, most eu member states experienced unexpected waves of migration because of the difficult political transition occurring in the middle eastern and northern african region following the 2010-2011 arab uprisings. while eu responses to the migration crisis were characterised by inefficiencies and stalemates, the pre-eminence of intergovernmental practices in such responses fuelled mistrust between member states, as well as between some national governments and the eu institutions (amadio viceré, disconnected? 4 2019). as the migratory pressure on the european continent augmented, the constraints imposed by international law as well as by eu policy frameworks reduced the decisionmaking space for domestic political parties (moravcsik and schimmelfennig, 2019). meanwhile, political parties had to deal with a public opinion that was less and less keen to accept such rules. in fact, as the migratory flows towards europe augmented, public opinion throughout the continent increasingly supported restrictive policies against immigration (debomy and tripier, 2017). crucially, such policy preferences were often in contradiction with the constraints imposed by international law as well as by agreements within the eu institutional framework. against this backdrop, immigration became highly politicized across europe, turning into a key issue of political competition in many countries (grande et al., 2019). it became a winning issue especially for radical-right parties, as well as for those parties which were previously on the edge of political competition. by spearheading voters opposing immigration, the latter managed to reshape the political landscape of many european countries. eventually, the success of radical-right parties in this regard also pushed mainstream parties, which generally adopt less critical positions on immigration, to gradually adopt tougher positions towards migration flows (abou-chadi and krause, 2018; urso, 2018; van spanje, 2010). all this notwithstanding, the relationship between the policy preferences of political parties and the orientation of public opinion on immigration has received scant attention so far. while existing studies on these matters focus on inter-party relations, they overlook the demand side of politics. in other words, they neglect the role of public opinion and other societal actors in the formation of political parties’ policy preferences regarding immigration. certainly, there are studies that examine the link between public opinion and political parties on immigration (angelucci et al., 2020), but they adopt a cross-sectional and static design (i.e., they focus on congruence). by doing so, such studies neglect the evolution of the relationship between the demand side of politics (i.e., demands coming from the bottom) and the supply side (i.e., responses from the top). hence, they do not consider the dynamic dimension of political parties’ responsiveness. of course, we are aware that in practice the connection between voters and parties may not always unfold in the same direction. for instance, studies on public opinion have demonstrated that parties may not only respond to voters’ positions but also shape their views (steenbergen et al., 2007), including on immigration (vrânceanu and lachat, 2021). while acknowledging the complexities of the relationship between parties and voters, in this article we specifically focus on the association between citizens’ and economic elites’ positions with those of political parties. 3. the analytical framework 3.1. responsive to whom? ever since the publication of dahl’s seminal work on polyarchy (1971), the capacity of politicians and political parties to respond consistently to the demands of public opinion is considered a key feature of representative democracies (thomassen, 1994; katz, 1997; powell, 2000). it should therefore come as no surprise that the scientific scholarship focuses extensively on the study of representation and, more specifically, on the link amadio viceré and angelucci 5 between political parties and voters in terms of their policy preferences and issue priorities. in this context, scholars have generally either focused on congruence or on responsiveness. while both congruence and responsiveness can be considered forms of representation (lax and phillips, 2012), they hint at two distinct phenomena. congruence is a static measurement, insofar as it relates to the correspondence of mass public preferences with those of political elites at a given point in time. it has been traditionally employed to determine the left-right ideological proximity between voters and political elites (miller and stokes, 1963). comparisons between the ideological positions of mass publics and political elites at one point in time, have recurrently shown fairly robust levels of congruence. such comparisons indicate that voters and parties would substantially align themselves along the left-right scale (miller et al., 1999). when it comes to congruence on specific issues, however, results tend to be much more uncertain. angelucci et al. (2020) show, for instance, that there has been a consistent gap between voters’ and parties’ positions on the process of european integration, with elites being systematically more europhile than citizens in different policy areas. similarly, by examining the relationship between elites and voters on immigration policy, brady et al. (2020) provides clear evidence of wide gaps between voters and parties. responsiveness, instead, is a dynamic concept. rather than focusing on the static correspondences between political parties’ positions and those of voters, it looks at the ‘correlation between prior public opinion and policy outputs’. at the same time, it examines whether ‘changes in public opinion lead changes in policy in the same direction’ (or changes in policy positions of representatives) (beyer and hanni, 2018, p.18). based on this definition, we conceive responsiveness as being not only in terms of policy outputs, but also in terms of the capacity of parties to shift their policy positions consistently with changes occurring in public opinion. examining the dynamic responsiveness of political parties, therefore, necessarily requires a focus on their adaptation to the stimuli coming from voters, as well as from other political and societal actors, such as economic elites and interest groups. looking at the relationship between voters and parties, assuming the rationality of parties, one would expect the latter to adapt their positions to shifts in the policy positions of their voters (stimson et al., 1995). indeed, acting in line with voters’ preferences can increase political parties’ chances of re-election. the underlying mechanism would be a punishment-reward one: political parties would respond to public opinion to avoid the potential negative consequences stemming from their lack of responsiveness at the elections. in this respect, empirical evidence has reported high levels of responsiveness both in the us and in europe (page and shapiro, 1983; stimson, 1991; stimson et al., 1995; brettschneider, 1996; hakhverdian, 2012). however, in addition to citizens, other political actors may influence political parties’ policy positions (klüver and pickup, 2019). a growing body of scientific research has shown that there is a significant variation in the degree of responsiveness of political parties towards different subgroups or organised interests (druckman and jacobs, 2011; gilens and page, 2014; jacobs and page, 2005). for example, examining policy positions over the eu, sanders and toka (2012) found that political parties are more responsive to economic interest groups than to public opinion at large. along similar lines, klüver and disconnected? 6 pickup (2019) showed that the role of interest groups is decisive in structuring elites’ responsiveness to public opinion on a number of issue areas. after all, this is not surprising. while it is reasonable to expect political parties to be rationally responsive to public opinion for fear of electoral consequences, it is also reasonable to expect political parties to respond to economic elites and interest groups. significantly, political parties may respond to such groups even if they have positions which differ from those of the party’s electorate. in fact, in exchange for political influence, interest groups might provide economic resources to support party campaigns, electoral support, and information when elections are being held (giger and klüver, 2016; hall and deardorff, 2006; klüver and pickup, 2019). bearing all this in mind, it is reasonable to assume that, depending on the incentives in place, political parties may rationally respond either to their voters or to economic elites. in this article, we posit that the characteristics of the issue at stake determine to whom political parties choose to be responsive. in particular, we argue that party responsiveness to voters is conditioned by the extent to which an issue is contentious and/or salient in the public debate. according to costello et al. (2020), when an issue is highly salient, parties have the incentive to fill potential issue gaps between themselves and their electorates. as a matter of fact, salient issues are highly visible in public debates and easily recognizable by voters, who are likely to make their electoral choices based on parties’ offers on these issues (or lack thereof). in other words, when issues are key for political competitions, the punishment-reward mechanism is likely to be activated. on the contrary, when issues are out of the public opinion’s radar, parties are less likely to be evaluated on them. consequently, they retain a wider room for manoeuvre. on these occasions, parties have greater possibilities to adopt policy positions which differ from their own electorate’s preferences and accommodate interests expressed by economic elites. it is relevant to point out that this argument resonates with the liberal intergovernmentalist understanding of the formation of member states’ preferences in the eu context (moravcsik, 1997). according to this theory, political elite goals are expected to vary according to changing pressure from national economic elites. powerful interest groups may even capture government institutions and use them for pursuing their specific objectives, hence determining a bias of the political representation in their favour (moravcsik, 1997). nonetheless, when policy issues have significant implications for eu citizens’ lives, they generate more diffused patterns of societal interests (hix, 2018). on these occasions, national governments are likely to be tightly constrained by mass publics. as far as immigration is concerned, it is relevant to stress that this issue has become increasingly salient over the last decade. immigration has in fact turned into a source of political contestation both in the eu and within member states (van der brug et al., 2015), to the point that it is currently considered the most prominent electoral issue of recent times (green-pedersen and otjes, 2019). considering all of this, we expect political parties to be more responsive to common citizens’ positions on immigration than to those of economic elites. 3.2. responsive to what? at this stage, our analytical framework provides some useful assumptions about the formation of political parties’ preferences. it predicts which societal interests – be they the amadio viceré and angelucci 7 electorate’s interests or those of economic elites – are more likely to be represented under certain circumstances. however, our framework does not explain the stimuli to which political parties are likely to respond. in other words, it does not tell us what changes are necessary, in public opinion positions and those of the economic elites, for the positions of parties to vary on a given issue. in this article, we posit that public opinion’s perceptions about immigration might have an impact on the variations of policy preferences about immigration among political parties. we base this argument on two different strands of literature. first, there are studies suggesting that public opinion policy preferences about immigration are, among other factors, dependent on the perception of threat related to migration flows (basile and olmastroni, 2020; mclaren, 2003; mclaren and johnson, 2007). in essence, the more threatening migration flows are perceived to be, the more favourable are likely to be the public opinion positions towards more restrictive policies on immigration. second, a well-established literature on the effects of public opinion orientations on political elites’ foreign policy preferences shows that such preferences become more supportive of tougher and restrictive policies towards an external enemy or danger, if public opinion perceives such an enemy or danger to be particularly threatening (cohen, 1979; holsti, 1996; hurwitz and peffley, 1990; peffley and hurwitz, 1992). combining the analytical argument about the public opinion’s perception of immigration as a threat and the argument about political parties’ responsiveness to public opinion’s threat perceptions, we can reconstruct the mechanism that urges political parties to be responsive to public opinion in this issue area. by conceptualizing immigration as an external threat, it is plausible to argue that the connection between political parties and public opinion on immigration can be found in the relationship between voters’ threat perception and the policy responses of the politicians. in other words, if political parties were responsive to public opinion positions on immigration, any shift in their policy preferences would derive from changes in public opinion’s threat perception of immigration. all in all, considering the arguments outlined so far, we expect that: 1) political parties will be responsive to the preferences of public opinion on immigration rather than to those of economic elites; and 2) political parties will adopt increasingly restrictive policy positions on immigration in response to increases in the public opinion’s perception of immigration as a threat. 4. data and methods 4.1. the research design the literature on policy congruence has often assessed the quality of representation by comparing the positions of political parties with those of public opinion on the same issue. this assessment is typically conducted through a correlation analysis or through a comparison of the average positions of politicians and public opinion on given issues.2 the rationale behind these empirical methods is simple: the greater the correlation, the greater the level of congruence. however, it is important to note that these empirical 2 for a discussion of different strategies to measure congruence see wlezien (2016). disconnected? 8 analyses are generally carried out at a single point in time. as a corollary, they do not fully succeed in evaluating the elites’ actual level of response to changes in the positions of public opinion (simonovits et al., 2019). the changes occurring over time in the positions of political parties in relation to changes in the positions of the public masses (i.e., responsiveness) are relatively less explored. this may be because there are technical constraints deriving from the operational complexities of studying representation. the main problem in analyses of the relationship between masses and parties is that they are observations belonging to groups that are distinct and separate. to overcome this problem, these groups can be compared at a macro level, measuring the positions of both public opinion and parties at the country level. an alternative solution is to create a bridge for comparability by measuring the positions of political elites, public opinion, and economic elites at a meso level, namely that of political parties. such a bridge would allow a comparison carried out in terms of party electorates and party positions. at first sight, adopting such an approach would leave two questions open, namely: who should the parties respond to? would they respond to their constituencies or to voters at large? crucially, however, positive answers to such questions are not mutually exclusive. on the contrary, recent studies clearly show how political parties act to maximize support outside their own electoral bases without jeopardizing their traditional electoral bases (de sio and weber, 2014). bearing all this in mind, in this article we decided to focus on the meso level of political parties. therefore, we will first map the evolution over time of the perception of immigration as a threat by different parties’ electorates, both for public opinion and economic elites. then, we will match these variations with the changes in the policy positions of the respective political parties. this approach has a clear advantage over a macro-level approach. of course, the latter remains relevant from a descriptive point of view. nonetheless, a party-level approach allows us to expand the number of observations in our analysis, and hence to have a more robust assessment of party responsiveness. in essence, rather than focusing on the overall differences at country level, we devote our attention to the multiplicity of parties that compete in the existing party system in each of the countries considered. 4.2. the data our analyses are based on two data sources: the euengage mass and economic elite panel (2016 and 2017) (cotta et al. 2021), and the chapel hill expert survey (ches), 2014 and 2017 (jolly et al. 2022). the euengage dataset includes 11,638 respondents (mass sample) and 1,271 businesspeople (economic elite sample) in 10 european countries, who were interviewed for the first time in 2016 and subsequently re-interviewed in 2017.3 after removing the speeders,4 the mass panel consists of 10,928 observations, while the 3 it is relevant to note that, in addition to the mass and businesspeople surveys, the euengage dataset includes an elite survey which was conducted among politicians in the same 10 eu member states in 2016 and 2017. elite surveys and expert surveys are often used to estimate party positions (ecker et al. 2022). still, we chose to use the ches expert survey rather than the elite survey to maximize the number of observations. in fact, since elite surveys suffer from low response rates, they are often marred by a limited capacity to capture the positions of a large number of parties. 4 in particular, we removed those people answering in less than 50% of median time in each country in (at least) one of the two waves. amadio viceré and angelucci 9 economic elite sample consists of 1,203 observations. this dataset is an optimal source for testing our hypotheses for a series of reasons. first, the time frame of the survey is particularly interesting, given that the two waves were collected during the implementation of the 2015 eu temporary emergency relocation scheme, which set mandatory relocating obligations for eu member states. crucially, during this period the migration crisis returned at the centre of the political debate, both in the eu and domestic level. second, the dataset’s panel structure allows us to map real changes occurring within the public and businesspeople samples about immigration. finally, the dataset provides the opportunity to test our hypotheses in 10 european countries. not only do these countries represent different geographical areas, but they also differ considerably in terms of history, tradition, political culture, economy, and society. in particular, earlier studies have demonstrated that, in these countries, the public opinion and political elites’ preferences regarding immigration were determined by: their different contextual factors (i.e., level of exposure to the crisis), their different predispositions towards migrants and the eu, and by their identity and ideological orientations (basile and olmastroni, 2020). furthermore, while in some of these countries there were elections between the first and the second wave (i.e., czech republic, france, germany, netherlands, spain), in the others there were no elections in the period considered. this variance will not only make our findings more robust, but it will also allow us to decrease the possibility of detecting changes of perceptions in the electorates generated by the specific electoral dynamics of individual countries. the ches dataset, in turn, estimates the parties’ positions on a wide range of issues, including policy preferences over immigration in more than 30 countries. these countries include the 10 countries covered by the euengage dataset. the 2014-2017 datasets, especially, allow us to specifically analyse changes in policy preferences that happened in this period. in our understanding, responsiveness derives from the consistency between change in the position of voters and change in the position of parties on immigration. put simply, if political parties changed their positions on immigration consistently with changes on immigration among their electorates, then they would be responsive to their constituencies. therefore, our dependent variable consists of the change of party positions on immigration, measured by the ches data. specifically, it is the difference between the position of the parties on immigration in 2017 and the position of the same parties in 2014. to measure the position of parties in the two waves, we considered a variable ranging from 0 (i.e., party fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration) to 10 (i.e., party fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration). we standardized both variables so that they could range from 0 to 1 in both waves. then, we calculated the difference between the two waves. this yielded a variable ranging from -1 (i.e., parties have changed towards a more open position towards immigration) to +1 (i.e., parties have adopted a tougher position in immigration). our key independent variable is the change in the perceptions of immigration as a threat by public opinion and economic elites. here, we rely on the euengage datasets of 2016 and of 2017 and, especially, on an item asking the respondents to express how threatened they felt by immigration. the variable ranges from 1 (i.e., do not feel threatened) to 4 (i.e., feel threatened). in each wave, we averaged respondents’ positions as sorted by the party they intended to vote for in general elections. we did so for public opinion and disconnected? 10 businesspeople separately to measure the threat perceived by each of these two groups (again, by political party). in the two waves, the variables were standardized to range from 0 (i.e., do not feel threatened) to 1 (i.e., feel threatened). then, we calculated the change in threat perception for each electorate as the difference between the perception of threat in 2017 and in 2016. once again, this yielded a variable ranging from -1 (i.e., the electorate has become less threatened) to +1 (i.e., the electorate has become more threatened). after having calculated parties’ and electorates’ scores, we matched them in a unique dataset, consisting of an overall number of 57 party/electorate observations in 10 countries (i.e., the parties for which we have data in the mass survey, the businesspeople survey, and the ches dataset). in addition to changes in threat perceptions among public opinion and economic elites, we also included as a series of other control variables: the electoral strength of the party, measured as the difference in votes share of the party in the two last general elections available in the dataset, the left-right ideological position of the party,5 and its position in government/opposition. we constructed this last variable to account for the variation in government positions of parties between 2014 and 2017. in particular, we constructed a categorical variable which differentiates between: a) parties that were in government in 2014 and remained in government in 2017; b) parties that were in government in 2014, but then moved to opposition in 2017; c) parties that were in opposition in 2014 and then moved to government in 2017; and d) parties that were in opposition in 2014 and remained in opposition in 2017. lastly, we included a dummy variable to distinguish between countries where elections were held between 2016 and 2017 (i.e., the years when the two euengage waves were collected) and countries where there were no elections in the same period. 5. results according to our expectations, when it comes to highly politicized and contentious issues, political parties should be more likely to adopt policy positions in line with public opinion preferences. given the highly politicized nature of immigration during the migration crisis, we expect political parties’ policy preferences to correspond to those of public opinion. to test these expectations, we set up a series of regression analyses to understand whether or not political parties were responsive to their voters on the immigration issue between 2016 and 2017. as discussed above, our dependent variable is the change in the policy preferences of political parties on immigration, while our key independent variables are the variations in perception of immigration as a threat by common citizens and businesspeople. concerning the details of our empirical analysis, we estimated five linear regression models, including a random intercept to account for country variations. in each model, we let the intercept vary across country. by doing so, we were able to account not only for the variance of the dependent variable that is explained at the individual level (i.e., electorate/party combinations), but also at the country level. through this modelling 5 the left-right ideological position of political parties is calculated as the average score between left-right positions as measured in 2014 and 2017 in the ches dataset (lrgen item). in both cases, the left-right ideological position was measured on a 0-10 scale, where 0=left and 10=right. amadio viceré and angelucci 11 strategy, we could estimate the effects of threat perception among citizens and businesspeople, net of contextual factors linked to cross-countries differences. the results of our analyses are reported in table 1. in the first place, we assessed to what extent our dependent variable is explained either at country or individual level. to this end, we ran an empty model, without predictors (model 1). the random parameters at the bottom of the table show that the variance of the dependent variable is mostly explained at the individual level, that is to say at the level of the electorate-party combination. at the same time, the random parameters show that the variance at the country level is relatively small. this is reassuring. in fact, this result indicates that there is not much variation in the dependent variable due to contextual factors. therefore, variations in party responsiveness may be found in the relation between parties and voters. the latter include, of course, both common citizens and businesspeople. table 1. random intercept linear regressions. dependent variable: party positions’ change on immigration. model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 δ immigration threat (citizens) 0.260* 0.233* 0.366** (0.107) (0.111) (0.134) δ immigration threat 0.0951 0.0601 0.0511 (businesspeople) (0.0641) (0.0647) (0.0658) electoral strength of the party 0.0011 (0.00228) position in government: party always in opposition baseline party moved to government 0.0452 (0.0421) party moved to opposition -0.0709 (0.0560) party remained in government 0.0233 (0.0360) left/right position of party -0.0105 (0.00663) election in 2016-2017 0.0211 (0.0376) intercept 0.0222 0.0754* 0.0226 0.0702* 0.137* (0.0256) (0.0317) (0.0244) (0.0317) (0.0595) random parameters country level variance 0.068 0.058 0.063 0.055 0.0393 (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) individual level variance 0.102 0.099 0.101 0.099 0.095 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) n 57 57 57 57 57 aic -79.79 -83.29 -79.93 -82.13 -77.59 bic -73.66 -75.11 -71.76 -71.92 -55.12 notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses. as for the more substantial findings of our models, we assessed the association between the threat perception of common citizens (model 2) and businesspeople (model 3) and variations in party positions across 2016 and 2017. these bivariate regression analyses confirmed our expectations. we found a significant and positive effect of threat disconnected? 12 perception variations among common citizens on party position variations. indeed, our results show that with any unitary increase in the threat perception of citizens, there was an increase in party preferences for tougher policy measures (b=0.260; p<0.05). we found the same positive effect for the relation between changes in the threat perceptions of businesspeople and changes in party positions. in this case as well, political parties seemed to react to the mood of economic elites consistently. nevertheless, it is important to note that the coefficient of threat perception does not reach the conventional threshold of statistical significance. in model 4, we included the two variables together (i.e., threat perceptions of both citizens and businesspeople). by doing so, we further confirmed the significant positive effect of threat perception of public opinion on political parties and the insignificant effect of threat perception of businesspeople on political parties. these results provide some support for our expectations: when it comes to highly politicized issues, such as immigration, political parties adapt their policy preferences to perceptions that are mostly diffused within the public opinion, rather than to those of economic elites. finally, in model 5, in addition to our two key independent variables, we plug into our regression analyses a set of control variables, namely: the electoral strength of the party, the position in government-opposition of the party, its ideological position (i.e., left-right ideological dimension), as well as a dummy variable distinguishing countries where elections were held between 2016 and 2017, and countries where there were no elections in the same period. the robustness and the strength of the effect of threat perception of common citizens on party position changes are not wiped out by the inclusion of these control variables. this result confirms once again the solidity of the relation between citizens’ threat perceptions and political parties’ reactions. overall, this suggests that parties were actually responsive to public opinion’s perceptions on immigration during the migration crisis. finally, while we did not advance specific hypotheses on the relations between the other predictors we included as control variables and party position variations between 2016 and 2017, it is relevant to note that none of these variables reached conventional thresholds of statistical significance. the different status of the political parties considered, namely whether they were in the government or in opposition, did not produce any effect on the changes of their positions. this result is somewhat surprising. indeed, it would have been reasonable to expect that, compared to parties in opposition, governing parties would have had more constraints on changes in their positions, given their institutional roles. at the same time, right-wing parties were not more likely to move towards tougher positions on immigration than left-wing parties. this result is in line, however, with the assumption that left-wing parties too have often adopted more restrictive positions towards immigration as a reaction to the surge of radical right parties (bale et al. 2010). lastly, neither the electoral strength of parties nor the presence of an election produced an effect on the variation of parties’ positions on immigration. 6. discussion and conclusions by examining the association between the positions of political parties, economic elites, and public opinion on immigration across europe during a crucial period of the migration crisis, we were able to confirm the expectations stemming from the analytical framework amadio viceré and angelucci 13 we elaborated. the article demonstrates that political parties aligned their policy preferences on immigration, which is a highly salient issue, in accordance with citizens’ preferences rather than with economic elites’ preferences. in particular, our results suggest that parties reacted significantly to the stimuli provided by public opinion on the issue of immigration, shifting their policy positions consistently with changes occurring among citizens. certainly, our results do not allow us to reach clear-cut and definitive conclusions about ‘who followed whom’ in the period considered. in this sense, our study should be considered as exploratory research on party-public opinion dynamics. as the scholarly literature shows, the connection between citizens and political parties may take different causal directions (e.g., steenbergen et al., 2007): if it is true that parties’ positions can be influenced by public opinion, it is also true that parties, by cueing citizens, are in fact able to influence their opinions (e.g., carsey and layman, 2006; lenz, 2012; leeper and slothuus, 2014; slothuus and bisgaard, 2021). nonetheless, these results have important implications for those who study democratic representation. previous studies demonstrated that public opinion and political parties do not differ much in terms of their policy positions on several issues, including immigration (angelucci et al., 2020). in our article, we demonstrated that these positions were not only similar, but also that they changed consistently over time. of course, the limited geographical and temporal span covered by this study does not allow us to simply generalise our findings. nonetheless, this result is interesting in itself: if parties shift their positions consistently with citizens’ positions, is democratic representation in trouble, as many argue? indeed, one may reasonably conclude that our results disconfirm the widespread belief that contemporary representative democracies are experiencing a crisis; or rather that they indicate that the causes of such a crisis should be searched for elsewhere. further research, for example, should investigate the patterns of political representation on issues which are different from immigration. indeed, one could also argue that the lack of connection between political parties’ positions and the economic elites’ positions on this issue is due to the different relevance that this issue has for different societal groups. in this sense, immigration might not be salient enough for economic elites to push them to mobilize their resources to influence the policy preferences of political parties. recent research in the us, analysing responsiveness on a broad set of issues, has produced different results compared to ours, showing that ‘the majority does not rule’, whereas powerful economic and business elites do have a strong influence on policy making (gilens and page, 2014, p. 576). these seemingly contradictory results suggest that the political representation of different societal groups might in fact be conditional on a number of factors, including the nature and the salience of the issue at stake. from a more general point of view, to understand thoroughly the dynamics of political representation and identify ‘who rules’, future research will have to explore these factors further. acknowledgements the authors would like to thank the luiss italian centre for electoral studies (cise), especially professor lorenzo de sio, for organizing the seminar that inspired this article. disconnected? 14 the authors would also like to thank the journal editors and the anonymous reviewers for 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(2016) public opinion and policy representation: on conceptualization, measurement, and interpretation. policy studies journal 45 (4): 561-582. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_3_criscitiello_179-195.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 3 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 3, 179–195. contact author: annarita criscitiello, university of naples federico ii e-mail address: annarita.criscitiello@unina.it the italian premiership after berlusconi: a limited legacy annarita criscitiello university of naples federico ii abstract almost 30 years after the foundation of his own personal party, forza italia, and after having been the longestserving prime minister of the republic, silvio berlusconi is without doubt ‘the most presidential’ of all italian prime ministers. this article addresses the seven executives that followed the crisis of silvio berlusconi’s last government in 2011. in particular, it focuses on the management of the presidency of the council through the use of prime ministerial decrees (dpcms) and then explains this process with two important dimensions inherited from the process of the personalization and presidentialization of politics: party leadership and populist discursive strategy. in the concluding remarks we will try to take stock of various aspects of berlusconi’s legacy and the ways in which it was managed by his successors. 1. introduction: managing a presidential legacy lmost 30 years after the foundation of his own personal party, forza italia, and after having been the longest-serving prime minister of the republic, leading four governments for a total of 3,340 days (most of which were during the 2001-2006 legislature), silvio berlusconi is without doubt ‘the most presidential’ of all italian prime ministers. he became the head of government for the first time in 1994, in the midst of major transformations in the italian political system. in this period, long-term external factors, such as the fall of communism and the european integration process, led to the redefinition of the italian party system and the emergence of a broader role for the executive and its leader. internal factors, beginning with the inexorable crisis of the historical parties and the resulting wave of anti-politics, have been even more disruptive, giving rise to the so-called second republic (garzia 2009). with an unchanged constitution, this republic, in which personal power increasingly takes hold (and gains strength), marks the long but final farewell to the ‘century of parties’. indeed, throughout the 1990s, the process of the personalization of politics attacked the two collective bodies of the state – parties and parliament – from within, with the force of a ‘virus’ (calise 2016). this process gave the executive branch the opportunity to play a key role in changing the political landscape in relation to the functioning of institutions. indeed, the slow but inexorable process of the centralization of government accelerated with the collapse of the old parties (cotta, verzichelli 2020). thus, the president of the council of ministers more frequently manages to step out of the shadow of the principle of executive collegiality, demonstrating a a the italian premiership after berlusconi 180 ‘presidential twist’ in the italian parliamentary republic and creating a new logic of government. in other words, the prime minister has more autonomy for manoeuvre in the three areas of action that the italian constitution gives him: the choice of ministers, the control of the government agenda and political direction (criscitiello 2019). this autonomy obviously differs in intensity and duration according to the prime minister in question (verzichelli and marangoni 2019), also because we are still dealing with a premier caught in a difficult balance between the wider spaces of governmental autonomy and the control of parliament, who often also finds himself in a difficult relationship with his own coalition. hence the process of the presidentialization of politics, analysed in comparative political research since the beginning of the 2000s (poguntke and webb 2005; musella and webb 2015; elgie and passarelli 2019), also arrived in italy. it was berlusconi who first took advantage of this slippage towards the personalization of politics, taking up the position of protagonist in the three most important arenas of power: executive activity, party leadership and communicativeelectoral strategies. in the italian political system, after a 20-year bipolar phase that rewarded (and legitimized) the leader of the winning coalition with the position of prime minister, the arenas of party leadership and communicative-electoral strategies now suffer from an extremely fragmented party system and an increasingly volatile and demotivated electorate, while in the arena of executive activity the process of personalization, just as in all contemporary democracies, has meant that the governments formed in italy in the new millennium have exhibited a clear monocratic tendency1 both in terms of organization and in decision-making processes (musella 2022). this article addresses the seven executives that followed the crisis of silvio berlusconi’s last government in 2011. in particular, it focuses on the management of the presidency of the council through the use of prime ministerial decrees (dpcms) and then explains this process with two important dimensions inherited from the process of the personalization and presidentialization of politics: party leadership and populist discursive strategy. the article is organized into three sections which mirror the three previously identified arenas of ‘presidential legacy’.2 section 1 focuses on the arena of executive activity, namely the organizational machinery of the prime minister’s office, in the seven governments after berlusconi. since the 1980s, italy has tried to make up for its historical delay in providing the prime minister with an office and prerogatives in line with the trends that had long been 1 by ‘monocratic tendency’ we mean the outcome of three combined phenomena: i) the creation of a direct relationship between the political leader and citizens, to which mediatisation contributes; ii) an expansion of the powers and control of political leaders over party and government activities, with the strengthening of the prerogatives of the heads of government and the proliferation of decision-making and operational structures reporting directly to chief executives; iii) a re-articulation of the relationship between the public and private sectors, particularly evident in the increasingly frequent cases of the ‘revolving doors’ between public roles and private appointments. for a more in-depth analysis see: musella 2019 and 2022. 2 when using the concept of political legacy, we refer to policy achievements or other tangible changes associated with a politician that endure after they leave office (fong et al. 2019). for an interesting multidimensional approach to conceptualizing and operationalizing political legacies, see farrall, hay and gray (2020). annarita criscitiello 181 consolidated in the other main western democracies. a lengthy incremental reform process that culminated in law 400 of 1988 tried to turn the prime minister’s office into the government’s operational hub. this happened both at the organizational level, with its progressive expansion of qualified staff and supporting apparatuses, and at the legislative level, thanks to the extensive recourse to prime ministerial decrees (dpcms) (aa.vv. 2020; criscitiello 2019). section 2 examines the arena of party leadership. during the 1990s, berlusconi was the first to create a personal party, a new type of party organization in which personalization, professionalization and centralization represented the keys to success (calise 2010), leading him to three general election victories. yet, three decades after the birth of forza italia, this aspect of berlusconi’s legacy has failed to survive for two main reasons. firstly, his personalization and ownership of the party have been so absolute that they are difficult to replicate, especially at a time of the ‘personalistic atomization’ of the new italian party system (musella 2014). secondly, the fact that three out of six of the prime ministers, in the decade between 2011-2021, were non-partisan chief executives, is also an indicator of the failure of berlusconi’s legacy to survive. section 3 is devoted to the arena of communicative-electoral strategies in order to understand whether the prime ministers who followed berlusconi have used his populist strategy in presidential communication, in the sense of an occupation of the media space that takes full advantage of the prerogatives of the institutional role, also through the use of populist rhetoric (campus 2010; ventura 2019). the decade under examination was in fact characterized by an important process of populist leaderization that affected all contemporary democracies. the crisis of representation and legitimacy experienced by the political parties (ignazi 2017) favoured the spread of populist rhetoric (bobba and mcdonnell 2016). finally, in the concluding remarks we will try to take stock of various aspects of berlusconi’s legacy and the ways in which it was managed by his successors. to paraphrase one of ivor crewe’s research questions (1988) on margaret thatcher’s legacy in british politics, we could ask: have italian executives become berlusconite? 2. the executive arena and the administrative presidency the term ‘administrative presidency’ refers to the organizational structures of the office of the italian prime minister: the presidency of the council of ministers. this office has a complicated history in terms of its formation and institutionalization (cassese et al. 2022). just like the role of the head of government, the prime minister’s office and staff are not clearly defined in the constitution. the organizational developments of this office have therefore been characterized by belated reforms (law no. 400 arrived in 1988, 40 years after the constitution was adopted) and slow developments (criscitiello 2019; cotta and marangoni 2015). however, as the history of the berlusconi governments demonstrates, the transformations of the presidency toward its greater autonomy and organizational optimization have gone hand in hand with the challenging task of strengthening the role of the premier. these incremental transformations occurred thanks to the prime minister’s power to act autonomously through administrative acts (mainly prime ministerial decrees: dpcms), which have enabled him to strengthen staff and policy structures according to his needs. through the use of dpcms, not only the italian premiership after berlusconi 182 policy structures, but also the inter-institutional bodies that allow the executive to coordinate the different levels of government, have been strengthened, including the departments for parliamentary relations, local government relations and european union policies. in particular, during the legislature in which he was continuously in government (2001-2006), berlusconi gave the prime minister’s office a personal imprint (poli 2022), with a series of interventions that culminated in the dpcm of 23 july 2002. the most significant changes that were made concerned the simplification of institutional communication, particularly administrative language; the streamlining and computerization of certain structures; and, most significantly, an increased reliance on external consultants. this prime ministerial decree remained the benchmark for the organization of the administrative presidency for the next 20 years. the professional media skills of the prime minister and his advisors also affected the institutional communication sector. the government’s own website was streamlined and made more accessible, and the web team at palazzo chigi was incorporated into the prime minister’s press office. with a reorganization of the prime-ministerial apparatus that focused above all on coordinating staff structures, simplifying communication, streamlining purely managerial structures and strengthening policy structures through recourse to experts, berlusconi and his staff exploited all of the resources that had been made available to the administrative presidency over a quarter of a century. however, as we shall see, precisely because it was obtained through ad hoc regulatory measures such as dpcms, this strengthening of the prime minister’s office would not be accompanied by its institutionalization. we will analyse these autonomous powers by the chief executives who have succeeded berlusconi, focusing on the use of dpcms. we have constructed a data set including all of the dpcms that can be found in the section of the italian government’s website dedicated to documents on the organization of the prime minister’s office. from these dpcms, we have selected – and put into a special category – those that contain measures relevant to the activity of the prime minister and his staff, leaving out those that concern the ordinary bureaucratic activity of the governmental machine. from the point of view of berlusconi’s organizational legacy, the premier who handled the administrative presidency with most prime ministerial flair was the technocrat mario monti, who succeeded him in november 2011. he took advantage of all the government’s regulatory tools to tackle one of the most dramatic periods of economic crisis in the history of the republic. through the use of dpcms, he personally managed organizational changes in his office and in those of the ministries, incorporating them into his spending review policies. there is no doubt that his urgent public containment measures were a real watershed in the organization of the presidency (fiorentino 2022). all the premiers that have succeeded monti have been obliged to deal with the changes he implemented. as can be seen in figure 1, monti used the dpcm instrument four times to reorganize the presidency and each time made significant changes. furthermore, the decrees that reorganized the ministries meant the chief executive had greater room for manoeuvre: they streamlined bureaucratic procedures, creating simpler approval processes; and gave him the power to request the opinion of the council of state (or not, as happened in annarita criscitiello 183 most cases) and to decide on the termination of previous regulations, including those adopted by the president of the republic. amongst these, the most significant decrees were the dpcms of 21 june and 1 october 2012, which reorganized the general structures of the main departments and gave a detailed definition of their responsibilities. they aimed to improve the work of the secretary general and thus the coordination of all of the prime minister’s staff offices, as well as providing technical and methodological support and monitoring for the main structures of the presidency. and they were always accompanied by a reminder to exercise spending restraint. thus, for the first time in the history of the prime minister’s office, the executive machinery was significantly overhauled through economic rationalization, in line with the spending review policies that were the principal objectives of his government. so, despite being the head of a technocratic-led government, or perhaps precisely because he was (lupo 2015), monti managed to become a political premier also thanks to the tools of the administrative presidency. it is particularly interesting to note that the part of the 2012 dpcm that referred to the power of the prime minister to organize ministries was defined as ‘temporary’, when it has in fact been extended several times by successive prime ministers, thus giving it a significant organizational legacy. figure 1. the dpcm of the reorganization of the presidency of the council of ministers (2011-2021) note: * only the first year of government was considered. source: www.governo.it; own elaboration from rules and regulations of the presidency of the council of ministers. the next cabinet, led by enrico letta, was formed after the 2013 elections and lasted only 300 days. at the time of his appointment letta had already had various experiences in centre-left governments and was therefore very familiar with the executive machine. as we can see from figure 1, he used the organizational dpcm 19 times. in proportion to the number of months he spent in government, letta was the prime minister who made most frequent use of dpcms. most concerned only routine appointments and commissions, but four contained measures to limit the expenditure of the presidency and to set 17 10 34 18 15 17 12 4 19 40 16 14 17 3 4 4 7 7 9 10 3 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 mario monti enrico letta matteo renzi paolo gentiloni giuseppe conte i giuseppe conte ii mario draghi* months in o ffice total dpcms about general organization of presidency of council dpcms relevant to premier and his staff http://www.governo.it/ the italian premiership after berlusconi 184 up executive support structures with specific objectives, such as for the study and analysis of institutional reforms (a key theme of letta’s government programme), for the simplification and improvement of regulation, and for the implementation of the digital agenda. however, he faced a challenging situation on the party-political front. this was due, on the one hand, to the complications of the first italian ‘grand coalition’, including the centre-left and berlusconi’s party and, on the other, to the fact that his own party, the democratic party (pd), was grappling with yet another leadership crisis. in february 2014, the secretary of the pd, matteo renzi, brought down the letta government, becoming italy’s youngest prime minister ever. he would go on to head the longest-lasting government after berlusconi’s. when he became the head of government he was also the secretary of his party, holding both positions from 2014 to 2016. he presented himself as a young party outsider, distant from the old pd establishment. a formidable communicator, he played all the cards of the personalization of politics right from the start, with an authoritative style of decision making, the complete opposite of his predecessor, letta. but how did he manage the organizational legacy of the administrative presidency? as we can see from figure 1, he used 40 dpcms. although only seven of these concerned significant transformations within his own office and staff, these measures strengthened the role of some key offices. the most important of these included: the transfer of a unit dealing with public-private partnerships from the ministry of the economy to the economic department of the presidency, the reorganization and strengthening of the department for european policies, and the increase in managerial positions and their remuneration. in addition to renzi’s decrees, it is also worth noting the strong input of the secretary general of the presidency and the minister for constitutional reforms and parliamentary relations, who had a very active role in 19 administrative acts. this far exceeded the input of undersecretaries and ministers without portfolio in previous governments. as a result, an organizational and coordinational dynamism in the presidency’s policy structures was produced, which in the case of the minister for constitutional reforms, maria elena boschi, included a close collaboration with the prime minister that would lead to a constitutional reform signed by both (d’alimonte and mammarella 2022). more generally, due to the characteristics of renzi’s leadership, the prime minister’s ‘political direction of government’, provided for in the constitution, was more monocratic than collegial in style. in the first months of the renzi government, providing (and communicating) clear political guidance to the executive became a key government goal. however, as we shall see in the following sections, the administrative presidency was not the only (or even the most significant) berlusconian legacy of renzi’s premiership. after renzi’s resignation, due to the failure of the december 2016 constitutional referendum, his foreign minister paolo gentiloni became prime minister, leaving the former team of ministers essentially unchanged, with 12 out of 18 ministers remaining the same. he had long experience as a parliamentarian of the pd and had twice been a minister. as chief executive he had a completely different style of government from that of his predecessor, being mainly committed to acting as a mediator for his majority: he was almost a ‘first republic head’ of the executive (calise and musella 2022). gentiloni governed for about a year and a half, leading the country until the end of the legislature that ended with annarita criscitiello 185 the elections of 4 march 2018. he instigated 16 dpcms, seven of which made significant changes to the organization of the presidency’s policy structures, such as the strengthening of the legislative office and of the core of experts supporting the prime minister in implementing the government’s economic programme. the 2018 national elections completely changed the face of the italian political system, bringing about the victory of the populist movimento 5 stelle (m5s) and its forming a government with another populist party. the lawyer and university professor giuseppe conte was appointed to lead the new cabinet, acting as the guarantor of the ‘government contract’ signed by the two deputy premiers, matteo salvini, leader of the lega and luigi di maio, leader of the m5s. we will later explore the implications of his being a non-partisan on the one hand and a populist on the other. for now we will focus on whether, and how, conte used the tools of the administrative presidency in his first experience of government. figure 1 reminds us that the first conte government lasted 461 days and used organizational dpcms no fewer than 14 times, nine of which concerned interventions relevant to the management of the presidency. in the meantime, there was a reorganization of many of the offices in which ministers without portfolio engaged in direct collaboration with, and reported to, the presidency, from the office for parliamentary relations (which would be renamed ‘parliamentary relations and direct democracy’, in order to underline the populist imprint of the executive) to the departments for public administration and european policies. the pay and staff numbers of the undersecretary to the presidency were revised, differing from those laid out in monti’s 2012 decree. a new department responsible for digital transformation was also established. most significantly, six months after the birth of his government, a dpcm instigated the so-called ‘cabina di regia’ (a core task-force) which was known as ‘strategia italia’, and was tasked with coordinating and controlling the implementation of public works both at the centre and at the regional level. it was formed of the prime minister, the undersecretary, the ministers of economic affairs, and other relevant sectors. after the governmental crisis triggered by the leader of the lega, matteo salvini, in the summer of 2019, giuseppe conte was again appointed prime minister. this time at the head of a centre-left coalition, which saw the m5s allied with the pd, conte frequently used the instrument of the dpcm as an urgent administrative act. more generally, the use of regulatory power by the executive –which had remained constant over the previous twenty years – considerably increased both in terms of frequency and intensity during the management of the covid-19 pandemic, veering off in a decidedly monocratic political direction. the numerous decree-laws that were issued were inextricably linked to the extensive use of dpcms, and thus to the power of the prime minister personally to manage a significant portion of government decisions. the immediate applicability of a state of emergency and the dramatic nature of the situation provided the backdrop for a series of dpcms which, during the pandemic, allowed the implementation of important steps decided directly by the prime minister that in fact escaped the scrutiny of parliament and the president of the republic (criscitiello 2020; rullo 2021).3 3 dpcms (decrees of the president of the council of ministers) are administrative acts and, therefore, unlike laws are not submitted to parliament and the president of the republic for approval. precisely because of this, their sheer number during the pandemic stage caused much controversy over the legitimacy of decisions made by the chief executive. the italian premiership after berlusconi 186 in addition to the numerical variable of the decrees, we should consider the contextual variable – particularly important in the period of the pandemic — concerning the declaration of a state of emergency, which was then extended three times. while the decrees and the dpcms used to manage the pandemic are unsurprising, the dpcms that were issued during the state of emergency to change the organizational structure of the presidency were less foreseeable. we will now go on to discuss them. of the 17 measures, ten concerned relevant organizational aspects of the prime minister’s office. a group of experts were added to the department for digital transformation, and later integrated within it; an office was set up for people with disabilities; economic incentives were given to the evaluation unit and the managers of the economic department; and a post-earthquake coordination task-force named ‘casa italia’, was set up within palazzo chigi at the instigation of conte. thus, an organizational structure for the management of post-earthquake emergencies in central italy was centralized under the control of the prime minister, implementing shared guidelines and road maps that were the same for all actors. these were all evidence of the growing and unexpected ability of conte and his staff to manage the organizational resources of the presidency. his activism, along with the ‘monocratic government’ of the pandemic (musella 2022) and the attempt to bring the governance structure of the next generation eu (ngeu) plan to palazzo chigi, led to the aggressive return of the parties to the policy-making arena. they also resulted in the governmental crisis of january 2021 (criscitiello 2021). on 13 february 2021, mario draghi, former governor of the bank of italy and former president of the european central bank, became the 67th president of the italian council of ministers. he was a technocratic prime minister at the head of a six-party ‘grand coalition’. in the first year of government he signed three dpcms on the organization of the presidency. the first prime ministerial decree established a task force of 70 experts in technological innovation and the digitization of public administration, the second concerned the regulation of the inter-ministerial committee on ecological transition, and the third strengthened the role of the government programme office in monitoring the national ngeu plan. together these decrees reconfigured the administrative presidency in light both of the management of the emergency due to the pandemic and of the national recovery and resilience plan (nrrp). 3. the party leadership arena: premiers without parties italy is a parliamentary republic and a party government par excellence, which in the last twenty years has become increasingly presidential. berlusconi and his personal party played a decisive role in this lengthy process (calise 2010). the personalization, professionalization and centralization of the party were vital resources that berlusconi tried to merge with a monocratic executive institution: the presidency of the council of ministers. at the same time, the process of the personalization of politics has undergone significant changes over time that have further distorted parties’ organizational dynamics. while forza italia can undoubtedly be seen to have provided the model for italian political parties for about twenty years, recent transformations testify to the crisis of the personal party, caused by a combination of the leaderization of political parties and their internal fragmentation. annarita criscitiello 187 it is the huge significance of berlusconi’s control over his party in the process of the presidentialization of government and thus the development (and crisis) of the personal party that led us to investigate whether and how his successors dealt with the party arena. as this process is still ongoing, it has not yet been sufficiently analysed in all of its implications. as we saw in the first part of this article, there have been seven governments and six prime ministers in italy in the last ten years. of these, half (monti, conte and draghi) were ‘prime ministers without parties’, and the other three (letta, renzi and gentiloni) were representatives of the pd. this decade of governments has seen an interesting as well as problematic technocratic trend (table 1): a non-partisan beginning with mario monti, a political middle – with three prime ministers belonging to the majority party – followed by the non-partisan premiership of giuseppe conte and ending with the technocrat-led executive of mario draghi (d’alimonte and mammarella 2022; garzia and karremans 2021). table 1. partisan and non-partisan prime ministers (2011-2021) prime minister pm’s party mario monti non-partisan enrico letta democratic party matteo renzi democratic party paolo gentiloni democratic party giuseppe conte i non-partisan giuseppe conte ii non-partisan mario draghi non-partisan as summarized in table 1, the first prime minister after the berlusconi era, mario monti, was a technocrat without a party. he was the head of the third technocrat-led government in the italian republic, after carlo azeglio ciampi, former governor of the bank of italy, in 1993, and lamberto dini, former director of the bank of italy, in 1995. giuseppe conte had also never belonged to a party when he was put forward by the m5s as chief executive, coming instead – as he himself loved to stress – ‘from civil society’. among the prime ministers with a party, letta and gentiloni had the same political background and had many traits in common in their respective roles. letta was deputy secretary of the party and had been an mp and a minister several times. gentiloni had been elected as an mp for five terms and was a minister twice. the third prime minister with a party affiliation was renzi, who was very different from the other two. when he became the head of government, he was also the secretary of his party, which is rare in italy. renzi’s pd was a ‘personalized’ party, rather than a personal party, a new and weaker type of personal party that emerged in the second decade of the 2000s. while berlusconi’s personal party was primarily characterized by the highly centralized management of the entire life of the party, the so-called partito democratico of renzi (pdr, as coined by ilvo diamanti, 2014) was a personalized party which renzi tried to use to the italian premiership after berlusconi 188 serve himself, his ideas and his reform project, but without having any real monopoly over the party organization (fabbrini and lazar 2016). excessive personalization in relation to an issue as important as constitutional reform meant that renzi neglected – and therefore weakened – the governance sphere, leading to his resignation in december 2016. the next non-partisan premier, giuseppe conte, did not have any political experience. he came from the university, having no party of his own and no charismatic appeal, but despite having to manage coalitions containing parties on the opposite sides of the left-right divide, was able to stay in the saddle and to emerge as a potential political leader during the crisis of his first government in 2019. he was a non-partisan prime minister who, thanks to his handling of the pandemic during his second term in office, managed to acquire an enormous popular following around his performance as premier, being rated positively by over 60% of italians (natale, 2021; bull 2021). however, his experience reminds us of the weakness of the ‘divided premier’ (musella 2012), balanced between strengthening the instruments of independent action (presidentialism) and the difficult task of controlling his majority (parliamentarism), all the more so in the case of conte, who was not a leader of a political party. in february 2021, after the crisis of the second conte government, another non-partisan premier arrived at palazzo chigi. this was the third time that italy had been given a technocratic prime minister ‘to save the day’. the first time was following the tangentopoli crisis, with carlo azeglio ciampi, former governor of the bank of italy; then, as we have seen, following the global economic crisis of 2008, with mario monti, and finally, during the crisis of the covid-19 pandemic, with mario draghi. these crises were all characterized by the same two trends, which are themselves closely linked: the decline of parties and the emergence of a monocratic executive. it is no surprise that after their experiences in government the various prime ministers felt the need for their own parties. after his resignation, monti contested the 2013 elections with his own ‘personal party’, scelta civica, which gained 8.3 per cent of the vote. letta gave up his role as an mp to devote himself to studying and teaching at sciences po in paris, but in march 2021, seven years later, agreed to become secretary of the pd. renzi, after failing in his attempt to complete the process of personalization (and control) of the pd, founded his personal party, italia viva, in september 2018, which took 45 deputies from the pd. conte, who was in sympathy with the outlook of the m5s from the start, became its ‘political leader’ at the end of his second government. to date, gentiloni is the only ex-premier who has not attempted to climb the ladder of his party’s leadership. and draghi? it is too early to tell. 4. the communicative-electoral arena: a populist discursive strategy transformations in society, the effects of the 2008 economic crisis and now the crisis of the pandemic have been addressed without the mediation of political parties, continuing a process of disintermediation that, although it began a long time ago, has recently been moving at breakneck speed. the personalization of politics and the individualization of society have gone hand in hand (calise and musella 2019; urbinati 2019), thus redefining the characteristics and language of leadership. annarita criscitiello 189 which prime ministers have inherited berlusconi’s populist discursive strategy? there is no doubt that berlusconi’s telepopulism (taguieff 2006) and rhetoric changed political communication in the country forever (bordignon 2014). the use of direct, simple, comprehensible and captivating language; identifying with the interlocutor; the opposition to politics as a profession; the us-them dichotomy, and the constant appeal to the majority of italians, have all become indispensable tools for the prime minister (campus 2010; ventura 2019). almost thirty years after he took power, berlusconism has become one of the forms taken by contemporary populism (pasquino 2010; orsina 2013). the impact of the timeframe is crucial for a discursive legacy that ‘may stretch over two or more generations of politicians’ (farrall et al. 2020, p. 21). his populist strategy worked its way into other premiers’ discourses. even monti, who was known for his reserved and staid communication style as a university professor, created a more popular self-image once he became prime minister. and he did this through the medium of television, unexpectedly succeeding in moving from a select and restricted audience to a more general macro-audience (calise 2016). his government was set up as a response to one of the most difficult economic and financial crises of the post-war period, and therefore he had to pursue what he himself defined as policies of ‘tears and blood’. in order to do this, from the beginning of his term he focused the government’s political agenda on the country’s serious economic and financial problems, with a programme that was limited in time and content. he used a very personal style of communication in his public appearances, for example foregoing prerecorded videos in favour of long, calm interviews, explaining the decisions taken in detail, almost in a didactic manner. finally, he adopted (and imposed on his government) a public image of sobriety and seriousness, thus marking a significant break with his predecessor (bosco and mcdonnel 2012). as we have seen, the first three governments of the new legislature were led by three premiers belonging to the pd. letta and gentiloni in many respects followed an old style of premiership, starting from a propensity for mediation and the absence of an effective communication strategy. there was no populism in their political discourse, nor in their governing approach: in fact, they were both anti-populist. it may be useful to remember here that paolo gentiloni’s book on his experience in government is entitled la sfida impopulista (the (un)populist challenge), in some ways anticipating the challenge to the pro-europeans posed by the populist-sovereignists that would emerge shortly afterwards, in the 2018 elections. matteo renzi could be considered to be the true heir of berlusconi’s populism.
already when he was the mayor of florence, renzi had made himself known for his populist call for the ‘scrapping’ of the old pd elite (castaldo and verzichelli 2020). once he became premier, he put berlusconi’s populist lesson to good use. in fact, renzi’s communication strategy relied on a direct relationship between the leader and the electorate, daily signalling his distance and difference from his opponents. he also nurtured his popularity by exercising constant control over the government’s agenda setting. he inaugurated a thoroughly presidential style of communication: constantly – and emphatically – identifying his own profile and the contents of his message with palazzo chigi (calise 2016). in this respect he surpassed even the italian premiership after berlusconi 190 berlusconi, who had not been as effective in the transition from electoral to governmental communication (campus 2010). this process of identification between the prime minister and the electorate, held together by a populist strategy, allowed him to enter government and stay there for almost three years. but his experience showed that however strong the identification of the leader with his public and however deeply his personalization is anchored in government, populism entails risks. however, the italian government found itself faced with populism again in the first two governments of the new legislature following the elections of 2018. the executive led by law professor giuseppe conte started in june 2018 after the longest bargaining process since the collapse of the party system in the early 1990s. the coalition was formed of two populist parties, the m5s and the lega, which had completely opposed positions during the electoral campaign, but managed to find a government agreement, known as a contract. this relatively new form of programmatic platform created a compromise between the two parties and most of their ‘policy space’ (valbruzzi 2018), which was extremely precarious, even though they both had strong anti-establishment positions and used populist rhetoric.
 this last aspect became very explicit in prime minister conte’s first speech in parliament for the vote of confidence.
he based his speech on the people vs establishment rhetoric, focusing on the needs of citizens. he asked for greater openness towards ‘the real demands that come from those who live outside the palazzi’. he presented himself as a citizen with no previous political experience whose role was to underwrite the governing agreement, and as a ‘lawyer who will defend the interests of the italian people’. he confirmed that his government was a break with ‘the institutional practices that have marked the republic’s history up to now; almost an attack on the unwritten conventions that have characterized the ordinary institutional development of our country’. it was innovative because ‘the people have spoken: they have asked for change’. his was a political programme that was neither right-wing nor left-wing, aiming to introduce new mechanisms of direct democracy, and to abolish the economic privileges of the political class.
and to those who defined the new government as populist and antisystem he said: ‘if populism is the attitude of the ruling class of listening to the needs of the people – […] – if anti-system means aiming to introduce a new system that removes old privileges and encrustations of power, well, these political forces deserve both of these qualifications’. in a number of other speeches conte would claim the themes of populism and sovereignty by recalling (e.g. at the un general assembly in new york, september 2018) that the concept of sovereignty and the exercise of it by the people is found in the italian constitution, or by declaring that he was a populist if this meant ‘healing the rift between the political elite and civil society’ (press conference introducing the northern league’s political training school, october 2018). and in response to european commissioner pierre moscovici’s criticism of his government for being populist, he replied: ‘european institutions should be more populist, trying to understand better the demands of the people’. in his second government, conte used this populist rhetoric throughout the covid19 emergency, at a time when addressing citizens directly seemed fundamental for annarita criscitiello 191 ensuring the effectiveness of the containment rules, and for ensuring the social and psychological stability of the population. however, while the speeches of his first government follow a populist register very close to the m5s, focusing on the two essential elements of the centrality of the people and anti-elitism, his speeches during the pandemic were completely different. he almost abandoned the anti-systemic character of his earlier rhetoric, shifting instead towards a process of direct identification between leader and people. thus the monocratic management of the emergency (criscitiello 2021; rullo 2021) was added to the ‘integrative condition’ of conte’s political discourse, making it clearly populist: an increasingly charismatic leadership allowing for the personification of the will of ordinary people and the ability to speak in the name of the people (caiani 2020). conte’s communication strategy clearly evolved, especially in its tone: from a very formal and restrained style, made up of essential information and live press conference broadcasts useful for demonstrating that the government was active and vigilant, he moved over time towards a much more personal and emotional style, culminating in his speeches to the nation, most notably that of 11 march 2020. unlike his previous communications, this was not a press conference streamed on facebook but a broadcast in which the prime minister spoke directly to the citizens. there is no doubt that the pandemic crisis contributed to the construction of an increasingly personal and monocratic leadership in the executive through direct, immediate interaction with the nation, with unquestionably populist traits (ventura 2021). differently, no populist traits marked mario draghi’s language. his first year in government was characterised by a very sober communication style, limited to a few institutional occasions and without any use of social media. he has more than once been criticised by the mainstream press for his meagre communication regarding government decision-making, and for not granting interviews. from this point of view, he would seem to be an anti-leader. yet draghi’s popularity is high in the opinion polls and 70% of italians say they would have wanted him to be president of the republic. this finding could be explained in terms of ‘negative resources’: shortcomings that he successfully transformed into positive resources that could benefit his status as prime minister (helms 2019). 5. concluding remarks the process of the personalization of politics, as we saw it between the mid-1990s and the early years of the new century, is changing form. the case of the italian government is particularly interesting in this respect. berlusconi, on the strength of his personal party founded in 1993, managed to set a new record as the longest-serving prime minister in the second republic. he was a sort of presidential prime minister whose power was based on the absolute control of his personal party, on highly professional and centralized electoral communication, and on populist rhetoric. in addition to all of this, he was convincingly anti-political from the start (campus 2010), emphasizing the importance of non-political experts and technical competence, and thus paving the way for technopopulism in italy (bickerton and invernizzi accetti 2021). berlusconi followed the same slow and laborious process of strengthening the executive as his predecessors. in particular, he managed the presidency of the council of ministers by fully exploiting his the italian premiership after berlusconi 192 prerogatives as prime minister, resorting extensively to dpcms. thus, at various times the administrative presidency was enhanced and adapted according to the different needs of the premier. but, just like his predecessors (and his successors in the decade between 2011 and 2021, which we have analysed in this article), berlusconi introduced reforms that had ‘strength without form’, thus giving rise to organizational reinforcement without institutionalization. dpcms, particularly as they have been used recently in the management of the pandemic, are an incredibly flexible regulatory tool, and are not subject to control by parliament or other constitutional bodies. they allow the head of the executive to manage important aspects of decision-making in a monocratic way, also through the autonomous and personal organization of the policy structures of the presidency of the council. however, this extreme flexibility is also its weakness, because it does not allow for the institutionalization of the prime minister’s office. alongside this, the process of presidentialization, which went on for almost twenty years, had to reckon – like berlusconi himself – with the inexorable disintegration of the political parties. as we have seen, the problem of the last ten years is that the new parties, even the personal ones, are born weak, are excessively fragmented, and are short-lived, facing many obstacles and continuous splits. this process has resulted in mild, if not completely absent political support for the prime minister (barbieri and vercesi 2022). as this article has attempted to show, the political system and its changes are very closely connected with the role of the premier and the organization of the presidency of the council. after berlusconi, and with the exception of renzi, who lost his government when he lost his party, the prime ministers of the last ten years have, to a large extent, been prime ministers without parties. in spite of the strongly presidentialist image that berlusconi gave of his premiership, the six italian cabinets considered here (draghi, the seventh, is still in office, and so we take only his first year into account) have been able to count on a limited presidential legacy. in different ways and with differing levels of intensity, they have made extensive use of the administrative and organizational opportunities of the office of prime minister. some of them have skillfully commanded resources grounded in populist rhetoric, but without having access to the resources of party leadership. these governments have had premiers who have been stronger than prime ministers were in the past. but in relation to the core executive, this strength has not been accompanied by a process of institutionalization. furthermore, they are weaker in the face of increasingly fragmented and individualized parties. this has significantly --and worryingly – changed the presidentialization of government into a process of monocratization. and if in the past the italian institutional system always proved its democratic resistance, today, after the experience of the pandemic, we can 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(2019), i leader e le loro storie, bologna, il mulino. verzichelli, l., and marangoni, f. (2019), il governo tra norma e mutamento istituzionale, in f. musella (a cura di), il governo in italia. profili costituzionali e dinamiche politiche, bologna, il mulino, pp. 71-93. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 11–14. gender and political science: lessons from the french case catherine achin université paris-dauphine n this paper, i present some of the arguments put forward with my colleague, laure bereni, in the introduction of the dictionary we edited, dictionnaire genre et science politique: concepts, objets, problèmes, concerning the links between gender and political science (achin and bereni, 2013). with this book, we aimed to offer a practical and accessible guide for the studies on gender and politics and to further the integration of gender studies in the discipline of political science. we sought to demonstrate how a gender approach challenges and breathes new life into the main issues of political science and to summarize in 40 entries related developments in terms of knowledge, findings, innovative research, and new tools. the book also provides an extensive bibliography, comprising mostly books and articles written in french or english. the 40 entries reflect different areas of political science in france: political sociology, public policies, political theory, and international relations. they map some canonical concepts and objects of the discipline (democracy, political parties, institutions, representation…) but also some topics and concepts drawn up by gender specialists or re-addressed from a gender perspective (feminism, care, intersectionality, body, globalization, and so on). the articles were written by french-speaking specialists on these issues, mostly from the field of political science, but also from history, philosophy, and sociology. we asked for contributions from a diverse range of authors who have developed various approaches but share a critical concept of gender. in the different articles, gender is considered as a category for critical analysis and as a power relationship constructed, relational, and embedded in other social power relationships. i will first review the main factors that may explain the strong and long resistance of political science to gender studies in france. i will then highlight the structural conditions that have allowed a relative recognition of this approach in the last 15 years. finally, i will set out what the gender perspective has done to political science (and vice versa) and all that remains to be done. the resistance of political science to gender studies three main factors can be identified. first, the time it took for political science to become recognized as an independent field of study (in comparison with others, like history, sociology or law) and the fact that political science was for a long time considered as a science “at the service of the state”. this prescriptive and strongly institutionalized view is aimed i achin, gender and political science 12 at forming the political, administrative and diplomatic elites of the state. furthermore, this state’s elite was masculine. second, in the 1980s, a “critical turn” occurred in french political science that represented a missed opportunity for the gender perspective. indeed, the development of a critical political sociology allowed the elaboration of studies focused on the production and reproduction of relationships of social domination (and not domination based on gender, race or nationality). the “social class” perspective has thus masked the specific working of male domination of the political field. gender hierarchies were still excluded from the field and relegated to the private (personal, affective) sphere or to economical determinism. third, the late feminization of teaching-research personnel in political science must be noted. in 2011, in political science departments of french universities 40% of assistant professors and 23% of full professors were women, but these rates have been achieved only in recent years. thus in france, political science has been built as an eminently masculine discipline, male-dominated and based on an androcentric vision of political phenomena. moreover, unlike what happened in sociology or in history where feminist activists could extend issues arising from the social movement into the academic arena, there was no direct link between the feminist movements of the 1970s and academic research in political science. the conditions of a relative acclimatization several triggers exist for the relative establishment of a gender approach in political science. the role of electoral sociology and of the analyses of women’s political behavior in the 1950s must be underlined. those studies provided a first denaturalization of the female citizen’s behavior, which was however linked to exogenous explanations (socialization and family structure). later in the 1980s and 1990s, the pioneering work of mariette sineau and janine mossuz-lavau (1988) analyzed women’s relationship to politics by emphasizing the role of social and economic inequalities between men and women. significantly, the development of a reflection on the nexus between “women and power” found place outside the discipline. the role of the bicentenary of the french revolution in 1989 was decisive. it allowed the development of new questions about the place of women in the founding moments of the country’s democratic modernity, fostering research conducted mostly in history and philosophy (for example fauré 1985, fraisse 1989, rosanvallon 1992). moreover, debates around the demand for gender parity in the late 1990s, which were accompanied by the mobilization of academics (gaspard 1992, riotsarcey 1995, scott 1998) led to a questioning of the links between gender and politics. another important factor was research carried out in countries where the institutionalization of gender studies occurred earlier (in the united states, canada, and great britain), which began to structure an international space for dialog (in english) on gender and politics. frenchspeaking researchers from quebec, switzerland, and belgium, more directly connected to this discursive space, played the role of “mediators”, or “translators” between the two linguistic and cultural areas. gender research has been conducted in different sectors relevant to political science: in political theory (elshtain, pateman), post-structuralist feminism (landes, butler and gender and politics 13 scott, benhabib), but also in empirical political science (carroll, sapiro, norris, etc.), feminist sociology of organizations (kanter, acker, etc.) and institutions (freeman, lovenduski, ferguson, etc.), and finally in international relations (enloe, tickner, etc.) in france, the passing of the parity law in 2000 placed the issue of women and politics at the heart of the functioning of political institutions. studies concerning the effects of a change in electoral laws on political competition, politicians, and public policy were widely conducted, and produced a favorable environment for the establishment of gender studies in political science. some events can be highlighted to illustrate this gradual institutionalization. in 2002, a symposium on “gender and power” was organized at sciences po paris with the support of the french association of political science. in 2004, a standing group on “gender and politics” was founded within the same association. moreover, in the 2000s, many theses were defended in political science adopting a gender perspective (first in political sociology and public policy analysis, then in political theory and cultural areas, and international relations). this new generation of scholars is finally obtaining long-term research-based positions in french universities and in the centre national de la recherche scientifique. what a gender approach has done to political science (and all that remains to be done) two classic but fundamental contributions can be highlighted. on the one hand, many studies have contributed to demonstrating the political production of gender, and the gendered production of politics. they have highlighted how gender “fits” into the political system (its history, institutions and mechanisms that structured the field). it was brilliantly proved that by giving different political rights to men and women, modern politics in france has served to differentiate men and women and has mostly contributed to giving a political significance to the difference between the sexes. thus, the gender perspective has contributed to characterizing political institutions and organizations as not neutral and as deeply gendered; while a gendered grammar impregnates their organization and, at the same time, produces gender. gender is thus a political language that is central to political competition and structures all public actions. on the other, research on gender and politics has helped to rethink and question the boundaries of politics. it has questioned the gap between the public sphere and the private one, by showing the political dimension of what is called ‘private‘ and the role of gender in giving credence to the hierarchical separation of the two areas and in the ‘naturalization‘ of this boundary. this research has succeeded in making the political dimension of political behavior visible outside the conventional political field (for example the role of women mobilizations in religious, social or philanthropic organizations). finally, the gender perspective has contributed to a different definition of the meaning and borders of political activities. despite these major contributions, the legitimacy of such an approach is still to be defended and guaranteed. today the standing working group on gender and politics in the french association of political science no longer exists. however, in every scientific congress, sessions are regularly dedicated to gender, sexuality, and intersectionality issues. in this “normalization” process, the role of international associations must be underlined. the european consortium for political research (ecpr) standing group on achin, gender and political science 14 gender and politics forms a broad-based network on issues relating to the study of gender and sexuality in politics and world politics, and contributes actively to encouraging workshops, panels and research groups with an emphasis on gender. while the main political science journals (in french) have devoted some themed issues to gender and politics (including a regular and specialized “book review” in the revue française de science politique), there is no journal in french political science specially dedicated to gender. french journals on issues relating to gender are transdisciplinary or mostly inscribed in history and sociology (nouvelles questions féministes; les cahiers du genre; travail genre et société; clio; genre sexualités et société). two developments must be noted concerning specialized university courses on gender and politics. some courses about gender have been created in political science curricula (in universities and at science po); while in transdisciplinary master courses on gender there are courses dedicated to the links between gender and politics (université paris 8, ehess, paris 5, lyon and bordeaux). all these developments concerning gender issues have produced a dynamic area of research that remains, nonetheless, diverse and confrontational. the main controversies concern the various definitions of “gender” (a term of critical analysis versus a “mainstream category”), and the different ways to think the relationship between gender and other social power relations (class, “race”, sexuality, age). in conclusion, we should not minimize recurring obstacles on the road to the institutionalization of a gender approach in political science. this perspective remains poorly integrated in non-specialist research and is always suspected of “activism” and “subjectivity”. recognizing the consubstantial links between gender and politics continues to be a challenge. nothing is guaranteed, but a positive outlook is to be found on the part of students’ appreciation and interest (courses relating to gender are much in demand), and of consolidating international research networks. references achin, catherine, and laure bereni, 2013, “comment le genre vint à la science politique”, in genre & science politique. concepts, objets, problèmes, paris, presses de science po, p. 13-41. fauré, christine, la démocratie sans les femmes. essai sur le libéralisme en france, paris, puf, 1985. fraisse, geneviève, muse de la raison. démocratie et exclusion des femmes en france, paris, gallimard, 1995 [1989]. gaspard, françoise, anne le gall, and claude servan-schreiber, au pouvoir, citoyennes! liberté, égalité, parité, paris, seuil, 1992. mossuz-lavau, janine, and mariette sineau, enquête sur les femmes et la politique en france, paris, puf, 1983. riot-sarcey, michèle (dir.), démocratie et représentation, paris, kimé, 1995. rosanvallon, pierre, le sacre du citoyen. histoire du suffrage universel en france, paris, gallimard, 1992. scott, joan w., la citoyenne paradoxale. le féministes françaises et les droits de l’homme, paris, albin michel, 1998 [1996]. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_3_improta_220-240.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 3 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 3, 220–240. contact author: marco improta, luiss guido carli university, rome e-mail address: mimprota@luiss.it inside technocracy: features and trajectories of technocratic ministers in italy (1948–2021) marco improta luiss guido carli university, rome abstract in recent times, technocratic transformations occurring in the governmental arena of european political systems have prompted growing scholarly interest. this study aims to contribute to this flourishing research agenda by examining the features of italian technocratic ministers, the underpinnings of their government involvement, and the trajectories they have followed after ruling responsibility from 1948 to 2021. the main findings of the study show that: (a) there is a clear gendered pattern in technocratic appointments; (b) university professors are the most common professional category involved in technocratic appointments; (c) parties are gradually ceding core executive positions to technocratic ministers; (d) technocratic appointments are mainly driven by expertise-related considerations; (e) cases of technocratic ministerial reappointments are negligible; and (f) technocratic ministers take a formal political affiliation, or join top private or public companies after government participation. 1. introduction n 13 february 2021, mario draghi was sworn in as italy’s new prime minister. almost ten years after the formation of the technocratic cabinet guided by mario monti, the president of the republic once again entrusted a non-partisan expert to lead the government. in this vein, italy confirms its place as the promised land of technocracy, not only of populism (piccolino and puleo 2021). from a comparative perspective, italy is witnessing some of the highest shares of technocratic personnel in government (cotta 2018), both in the so-called ‘core executive’ positions (strøm 2000; amorim neto and strøm 2006) and in prime ministerial posts, with five technocratic heads from 1992 to 2021. among the recent developments in italian politics, the gradual reduction of the partyness of governments (katz 1987) must be carefully considered to properly gauge the transformations occurring in the italian governmental arena. on the one hand, the decline in partisan presence among italian executives signals the growing complexity parties are facing in effectively handling the responsibility–responsiveness dilemma thoroughly examined by peter mair (2009; 2013). in their ruling activities, government parties are indeed confronted with several constraints posed by external actors, requiring such parties to be responsible towards supranational institutions, particularly for issues of budget and fiscal consolidation (cavalieri 2020; capati and improta 2021). at the same time, ruling parties still need to pursue their electoral goals and policy objectives to o marco improta 221 survive in office and to be re-elected. to do so, they must satisfy citizens’ demands and be responsive to them. on the other hand, the increased share of technocratic figures in the government undermines party centrality in the country’s political life. contemporary parties, indeed, are confronted with important challenges, from downward trends in their membership (van biezen et al. 2012) and relentless distrust towards them (bergman et al. 2020). such challenges can pave the way for non-partisan experts to enter the government and replace parties when it comes to ruling responsibility. recently, the formation of technocratic governments in italy has attracted growing scholarly interest. mario monti’s cabinet involvement rekindled the discussion on the role of technocracy after the difficulties experienced by party-based governments. according to verzichelli and cotta (2018: 78), the formation of the monti cabinet in 2011 stands as the most extreme case of party abdication, demonstrating the ‘bad health’ of italian party government. such a conclusion is based on the high potential of policy autonomy granted to monti and his ministers, called to tackle the economic crisis through several important legislative initiatives to achieve financial stability and avoid default. therefore, almost four years ago, scholars were concerned about ‘this palpable sign of weakness of the political system [that] says a lot about the difficult state of italian parties, twenty years after the crisis of the 1990s’ (verzichelli and cotta 2018: 78). after a brief interlude of partisan cabinets, italy quickly returned to the hands of technocratic figures, demonstrating that the weakness of parties is becoming a structural problem of the italian political system. this study contributes to the flourishing literature on technocracy by exploring technocratic ministers’ professional background and characteristics, expertise, and reappointment patterns, as well as trajectories in terms of career path after government responsibility. it does so by examining the entire life span of italy’s republican experience, differentiating between three periods, according to the changes and developments of the italian party system, particularly regarding the governmental arena. such a differentiation helps to better identify patterns of technocratic ministerships. the first phase, from 1948 to 1993, is that of ‘polarised multipartism’ (sartori 1976). the second phase is known as ‘fragmented bipolarism’ (d’alimonte 2005), covering the 1994–2010 period. finally, the last phase begins in 2011 and terminates in 2021. this period is characterised by ‘volatile tripolarism’ (chiaramonte and emanuele 2013) marked by the entrance of new figures in the governmental arena (monti) and in the parliamentary one (grillo’s m5s) in the first stages of this period, and culminating in the appointment of mario draghi (d’alimonte and mammarella 2022). this research strategy aims to address three interrelated research questions. first, the article aims to understand who the technocratic ministers are, and what their background and characteristics are in terms of profession and gender. second, it investigates whether their appointment is based on the expertise acquired in their professional activities or whether there are cases of misplacement in portfolio allocation. in addition, the article focuses on their reappointments, to understand whether their government participation occurs just for a single occasion or whether they remain actively involved. third, it aims to understand their paths after political experience. do they take up political affiliation? do they return to their professional lives? do they join public or private institutions from a ‘revolving doors’ perspective? inside technocracy 222 the remainder of this study is structured as follows. the second section presents the theoretical framework of the analysis. the third section outlines the research design. the fourth section analyses issues related to technocratic ministers, focusing on five main dimensions. first, it explores background and portfolio allocation. second, it examines technocratic ministers’ expertise and patterns of reappointment. third, it investigates their career paths and trajectories after cabinet appointment. finally, the last section discusses the implications for future research and concludes the paper. 2. theoretical framework for a long time, cabinets in democratic systems have generally been perceived as partisan cabinets – that is, cabinets composed of partisan personnel who have taken seats in national parliaments (brunclík 2015). however, in recent times, the enhanced presence of technocratic representation in government (wratil and pastorella 2018; vittori et al. 2020) has prompted growing scholarly interest. notably, political scientists have started to examine technocracy’s impact in reshaping traditional patterns of democratic governance, underlining its challenges to the party government model (costa pinto et al. 2018) and its role as an alternative to both populism and party government (caramani 2017). before entering the political discourse, technocratic ideals of societal management characterised the organisational transformations deriving from industrialisation and taylorism in the 1920s and 1930s in the united states and europe (caramani 2017). technocracy then became a new form of governance in representative democracies, spreading first in latin america (centeno 1994). according to caramani (2017), technocratic representation becomes prominent as a consequence of a number of factors. on the one hand, parties are increasingly accused of ‘electoralism’ – of abandoning their governing roles in favour of the goal of boosting their vote share (vote-seeking perspective), achieving governmental posts (office-seeking perspective), and distributing the spoils of victory (policy-seeking perspective). such goals ‘involve patronage, monitoring electorates through increasingly sophisticated polling instruments as well as policies aimed at short-term results to secure re-election’ (caramani 2017: 58). on the other hand, parties suffer from critiques related to their governance style. from a technocratic viewpoint, policy-making has become more complex, and parties are not equipped to effectively guide such processes. in addition, their decreased ability to rule with expertise places the government in dangerous situations vis-à-vis supranational institutions, which pose several policy constraints limiting the parties’ room for manoeuvre. along these lines, it is argued that complex policy-making should be entrusted to technocrats, endangering the very legitimacy of party ruling (caramani 2017). a number of studies have dealt with the critical consequences of technocratic appointments, focusing on the impact of technocracy on democratic governance (mcdonnell and valbruzzi 2014), citizens’ preferences regarding technocratic decisionmaking (bertsou and caramani 2020; chiru and enyedi 2022), and the role of technocratic personnel in the italian context (valbruzzi 2018; verzichelli and cotta 2018). additional examinations have paid attention to the reasons behind technocratic involvement in government, highlighting financial and economic explanations (alexiadou and marco improta 223 gunaydin 2019), institutional determinants (amorim neto and strøm 2006), and electoral-related motives (emanuele et al. 2022). so far, studies have investigated both the demand and supply sides of the electoral market. as regards the former, citizens’ preferences and attitudes towards technocracy have been analysed, showing that citizens may demand expert involvement in political decision-making processes to ensure effective governance, yet they can also be distrustful of experts and reject their unaccountable governance (bertsou 2022). chiru and enyedi (2022) further noticed that individual-level characteristics, such as low political efficacy and authoritarian values, trigger strong support for the replacement of politicians with experts. furthermore, technocracy appeals to citizens of countries where the quality of democracy is poor. on the supply side, research has emphasised parties’ difficulties in managing treacherous crises, diluting governing responsibility towards technocratic figures, especially during electoral turbulence (emanuele et al. 2022) and economic turmoil (wratil and pastorella 2018). in particular, the need for the appointment of non-partisan members in government lies in the fact that parties must preserve their electoral appeal vis-à-vis voters but struggle to do so when required to implement unpopular reforms in times of electoral or economic instability. a third line of research stresses the role of institutions in explaining technocratic appointments. in systems in which presidential powers are greater, the involvement of non-partisan personnel should be easier, as the delegation process would overcome the control of parliamentary parties (cotta 2018). specifically, the role of the head of state can influence the government formation process and elite selection (schleiter and morgan-jones 2009). as noted by verzichelli and cotta (2018: 79), ‘this aspect is particularly relevant in a country [such as italy], where political crises have recurrently determined the conditions for an active role of the president of the republic in the choice of some key ministerial candidates’.1 the formation of technocratic cabinets and the presence of non-partisan ministers in government in italy have been examined in several studies (cotta and verzichelli 2002; marangoni 2012; giannetti 2013; castaldo and verzichelli 2020; garzia and karremans 2021). scholars have particularly focused on mario monti’s government involvement in managing the financial crisis (marangoni 2012; giannetti 2013), comparing such ruling experience with that of mario draghi (garzia and karremans 2021). other efforts have been made in relation to the use of non-partisan ministers in italy, demonstrating the parties’ need of technocratic appointments when policy-making becomes more complex, leading to a progressive deviation from the party government model (verzichelli and cotta 2018). in the 1950s and 1960s, parties had full control over policy-making, particularly during fanfani’s management of the italian political system’s pivotal party of that time, i.e., the christian democracy (dc). during that period, dc membership played a key role in influencing portfolio allocation. in addition, dc’s leaders were also deeply involved in the management of several public authorities, such as eni, iri, and cassa per il mezzogiorno (vassallo 2016). timewise, the enlargement of the ‘pool of ministrables’ (verzichelli and cotta 2018) started in the late 1980s, marking the tipping point for italian party government. however, existing 1 the veto on paolo savona as minister of economy and finance in the first conte cabinet is the most recent instance of the president of the republic’s key role in ministerial selection. inside technocracy 224 scientific endeavours have indicated that the trend of a technocratic presence in italy followed predictable paths in terms of government experience, cabinet portfolios, and specific junctures in italian history. specifically, technocrats have mostly been appointed in full-technocratic (or caretaker) governments (mcdonnell and valbruzzi 2014). also, they have been selected for guiding specific portfolios, e.g., finance, justice, treasury. finally, a technocratic presence was particularly frequent in periods of turmoil, during which greater expertise was demanded (verzichelli and cotta 2018). to guide exploration the article differentiates between three crucial junctures concerning the transformations of the italian party system and governmental dynamics. this allows patterns of technocratic ministerships to be gauged. as anticipated, the first period is that of the so-called ‘polarised multipartism’ (sartori 1976) of 1948 to 1993 (from de gasperi to ciampi). this period is widely recognised as the golden age of party government (partitocrazia), lasting until the political earthquake brought about by the mani pulite scandal, which prompted the formation of the first technocratic cabinet (ciampi). the second period considered is ‘fragmented bipolarism’ (d’alimonte 2005), which started with the formation of the first berlusconi cabinet in 1994 and ended with his last government experience. this phase was characterised by the formation of the technocratic cabinet led by dini (1995) and by a (timid) government alternation model between centre-left and centre-right coalitions. the third and last period is that of ‘volatile tripolarism’ (chiaramonte and emanuele 2013), which ran from the establishment of the technocratic government headed by monti (2011) to the (less)2 technocratic government led by draghi (2021), currently in office (d’alimonte and mammarella 2022). in this time span, the italian political system experienced two electoral earthquakes (chiaramonte and de sio 2014; schadee et al. 2019) that profoundly reshaped its features.3 importantly, all periods considered are characterised by a different degree of party centrality. along these lines, we should expect dissimilar patterns of technocratic recruitment over time in both general cabinet offices and key positions. specifically, we expect the first period to record a limited technocratic presence with substantial party control over core executive posts. moreover, the second period should be characterised by an enhanced technocratic presence and a decrease in the party control of top governmental positions. finally, considering the increased turbulence in the governmental arena of recent times (chiaramonte and de sio 2014), we expect the last period to record technocratic pervasiveness in cabinet and party ‘abdication’ of core executive positions, as the literature on technocracy highlights that technocratic appointments are more frequent in times of economic (wratil and pastorella 2018) and electoral turmoil (emanuele et al. 2022). 2 in terms of share of government positions held by technocratic ministers. 3 in particular, the bipolar dynamics of the second phase were undermined by monti’s appointment and ultimately interrupted by the emergence of the five star movement (m5s). in this way, the party system structure became volatile and tripolar (chiaramonte and emanuele 2013). marco improta 225 3. design this study expands the scientific investigation of technocratic ministers in italy by focusing on the professional background, gender, expertise, reappointment, and career path of each appointed technocratic minister in italian governments from 1948 to 2021. figure 1. share of technocratic positions in italy source: own elaboration of original data. as shown in figure 1, technocrats achieved full control of cabinet positions on two occasions (dini 1995 and monti 2011). moreover, the technocratic presence has grown in the last decade. all cabinets that have recently held government responsibility, i.e. monti, letta, renzi, gentiloni, conte and conte ii, have indeed appointed technocratic ministers. this pattern is reinvigorated by the share of technocrats that can be recorded in the current draghi cabinet (37.5%). therefore, looking at recent trends, the established tradition of party government in italy seems to have been interrupted. since the definitions of technocratic minister and technocratic governments have been discussed in relevant studies (mcdonnell and valbruzzi 2014), it is important to clarify their meaning. specifically, technocratic ministers are defined as ministers with no partisan affiliation at the time of appointment, holding relevant policy expertise. therefore, the objects of analysis of this study are non-partisan ministers. however, while all technocratic ministers are non-partisan ministers, the opposite is not true, as there is the possibility that non-partisan ministers do not necessarily hold specific expertise.4 the 4 such phenomena were investigated by marsh et al. (2010), who explored features of so-called ‘celebrity politicians’. inside technocracy 226 article explores patterns of expertise by looking at possible misplacements in cabinet portfolios, such as non-partisan personnel with no expertise in their portfolios of appointment, who could have used their expertise in different cabinet positions. this study aims to examine five different dimensions characterising italian technocratic ministers. to do so, five variables are considered. first, similar to alexiadou and gunaydin (2019), the study looks at the professional background of technocratic ministers to both trace their network and environment and grasp their expertise in specific policy areas. second, to investigate whether there were gendered patterns in technocratic ministerial appointments, a binary variable indicating the gender of the ministers is included. third, to examine ministers’ expertise and potential issues of misplacement in portfolio allocation, the article studies professional background to understand whether technocratic ministers are appointed to cabinet positions related to their expertise, or occupy posts that are not related to their previous professional activity.5 fourth, the interest lies in the exploration of the patterns of reappointment or reconfirmation of technocratic ministers. are they appointed just once? or do they experience multiple appointments after their initial involvement? finally, the fifth dimension considers technocratic ministers’ career paths and trajectories. what are the consequences of ruling responsibility for such figures? do they remain in politics after government participation, or do they return to their professional lives? and, most importantly, are ‘revolving door’ phenomena (shepherd and you 2020) occurring in the alternation between governmental and professional activities? to investigate such issues, information is collected on the first professional experience of technocratic ministers immediately after their first cabinet appointment. the study relies on the following sources: to trace technocratic participation in government, an original dataset is used, comprising 64 italian governments from 1948 to 2021. specifically, data on government composition are derived from casal bértoa (2021)6 and sonntag (2015). then, to dig deeper into the characteristics of technocratic ministers, the study relies on the official websites of the italian chamber of deputies, senate, and italian government. finally, the study benefits from history-oriented efforts retrievable in bartolotta (1971), ginsborg (1989), and mack smith (1997). 4. analysis 4.1. background and portfolio allocation table 1 shows the professional background, gender, and portfolios of technocratic ministers in the first period considered (1948–1993). technocratic ministers are present in just seven cabinets out of 47: six are led by partisan prime ministers, and one is led by a technocratic prime minister (ciampi). almost 46% of technocratic ministers in this period were appointed as ciampi’s executive, while the remaining part mostly joined dcled cabinets. as mentioned earlier, during the first period portfolio allocation was largely managed by the parties. on this basis, technocratic ministers were in charge of differing 5 information on the coding scheme adopted for analysing congruence between profession and ministries is available in the appendix. 6 casal bértoa’s dataset (2021) constitutes the main source, while sonntag (2015) was used to doublecheck government composition. marco improta 227 portfolios in terms of relevance; that is, core executive positions were still in the hands of partisan personnel, with the exception of a few cases, such as the finance ministry entrusted to franco reviglio in the first cossiga executive and to franco gallo in the ciampi government. other key positions, such as the ministries of interior and justice, remained firmly in the parties’ control for the whole period, except in the case of giovanni conso’s recruitment as minister of justice in the ciampi government. this signals the ironclad party centrality of that specific period of italian history. table 1. profession, gender, and portfolio of technocratic ministers (1948-1993) minister portfolio gender profession cabinet year giovanni porzio deputy prime minister m lawyer de gasperi 1948 cesare merzagora foreign trade m banker de gasperi 1948 costantino bresciani turroni foreign trade m professor pella 1953 franco reviglio finance m professor cossiga 1979 massimo severo giannini civil service m professor cossiga 1979 massimo severo giannini civil service m professor cossiga ii 1980 ermanno gorrieri labour and social welfare m trade unionist fanfani vi 1987 giovanni travaglini transport m engineer fanfani vi 1987 mario sarcinelli foreign trade m banker fanfani vi 1987 mario di lazzaro tourism and entertainment m professor fanfani vi 1987 livio paladin regional affairs and civil service m professor fanfani vi 1987 gaetano gifuni parliamentary relations m civil servant fanfani vi 1987 alberto ronchey culture m journalist amato 1992 adriano bompiani social affairs m medical doctor amato 1992 luigi spaventa budget and economic planning m professor ciampi 1993 franco gallo finance m professor ciampi 1993 giovanni conso justice m professor ciampi 1993 umberto colombo university and research m professor ciampi 1993 maria pia garavaglia health f professor ciampi 1993 alberto ronchey culture and environmental heritage m journalist ciampi 1993 paolo savona industry, trade and crafts m professor ciampi 1993 paolo baratta foreign trade m manager ciampi 1993 valdo spini environment m professor ciampi 1993 sabino cassese civil service m professor ciampi 1993 paolo barile parliamentary relations m professor ciampi 1993 source: own elaboration of casal bértoa (2021), sonntag (2015), bartolotta (1971), ginsborg (1989), mack smith (1997). regarding professional background, 14 out of 24 technocratic ministers were university professors. notably, in the ciampi government composition, almost 82% of technocratic recruitment involved university professors. the remaining positions in the first period were occupied by bankers, lawyers, and journalists. unsurprisingly, male figures dominated technocratic appointments. thus, there was a clear gendered pattern in technocratic ministerial participation; from 1948 to 1993, only maria pia garavaglia was involved in government and nominated minister of health. such trends are very much in line with that of other european countries, such as france (bruyère and gaxie 2018). moving to the second phase, table 2 confirms the trend observed in the previous period in terms of female underrepresentation in government. however, it should be noted that in the dini technocratic cabinet, a core executive position was entrusted to susanna agnelli, the first female minister of foreign affairs in italian republican history. with the shift from the first to the second period, the technocratic presence inside technocracy 228 increased. once again, almost half of the technocratic ministers in the 1994–2010 phase were involved in a technocratic cabinet (dini), although the recourse to technocracy was pervasive in a considerable number of partisan cabinets, notably in the first d’alema cabinet and in the second berlusconi and prodi government experiences. the increased presence of technocratic figures signals a growing party weakness in managing ruling positions. this is particularly evident in the appointment of non-partisan experts to key government posts. for instance, the ministry of treasury, budget, and economic planning – a relevant portfolio when it comes to policy-making – was in the hands of technocrats in the first prodi executive (1996) and in all d’alema cabinets (1998, 1999a, 1999b). however, this trend had already begun with lamberto dini’s appointment as minister of treasury in the first berlusconi experience (1994) and rainer masera’s nomination as minister of budget and economic planning in the technocratic dini government (1995). economic and financial tasks were also entrusted to a technocrat in the last governments of this period. two economists were appointed ministers of economy and finance, specifically in the third berlusconi cabinet (domenico siniscalco in 2005) and one year after in the second prodi government (tommaso padoa schioppa in 2006). differently from the first period, other core executive positions were delegated to technocrats for the first time. filippo mancuso and giovanni maria flick became ministers of justice, whereas antonio brancaccio and giuliano amato were nominated ministers of the interior. the gradual reduction in the presence of partisan ministerial personnel in key government positions, in particular in economy-related ministries, should be interpreted as a party strategy, with the goal of preserving their appeal vis-àvis voters in times of increased economic and electoral turbulence. table 2. profession, gender, and portfolio of technocratic ministers (1994-2010) minister portfolio gender profession cabinet year lamberto dini treasury m economist berlusconi 1994 sergio berlinguer italians overseas m diplomat berlusconi 1994 susanna agnelli foreign affairs f entrepreneur dini 1995 rainer masera budget and economic planning m professor dini 1995 augusto fantozzi finance m professor dini 1995 filippo mancuso justice m prosecutor dini 1995 domenico corcione defence m military dini 1995 tiziano treu labour and social welfare m professor dini 1995 giancarlo lombardi public education m engineer dini 1995 giorgio salvini university and research m physicist dini 1995 elio guzzanti health m medical doctor dini 1995 walter luchetti agriculture, food and forestry resources m agronomist dini 1995 antonio paolucci culture and environmental heritage m art historian dini 1995 giovanni caravale transport and navigation m professor dini 1995 alberto clò industry, trade and crafts m economist dini 1995 paolo baratta environment and public works m manager dini 1995 agostino gambino posts and telecommunications m lawyer dini 1995 franco frattini civil service and regional affairs m prosecutor dini 1995 giovanni motzo institutional reforms m professor dini 1995 antonio brancaccio interior m prosecutor dini 1995 carlo azeglio ciampi treasury, budget and economic planning m banker prodi 1996 giovanni maria flick justice m professor prodi 1996 antonio di pietro public works m prosecutor prodi 1996 carlo azeglio ciampi treasury, budget and economic planning m banker d'alema 1998 marco improta 229 paolo de castro agriculture m professor d'alema 1998 giuliano amato institutional reforms m professor d'alema 1998 giuliano amato treasury, budget and economic planning m professor d'alema ii 1999 paolo de castro agriculture m professor d'alema ii 1999 giuliano amato treasury, budget and economic planning m professor d'alema iii 1999 laura balbo equal opportunities f professor d'alema iii 1999 tullio de mauro public education m professor amato ii 2000 umberto veronesi health m medical doctor amato ii 2000 renato ruggiero foreign affairs m diplomat berlusconi ii 2001 girolamo sirchia health m medical doctor berlusconi ii 2001 piero lunardi infrastructures and transport m engineer berlusconi ii 2001 domenico siniscalco economy and finance m economist berlusconi iii 2005 giuliano amato interior m professor prodi ii 2006 tommaso padoa schioppa economy and finance m economist prodi ii 2006 paolo de castro agriculture, food and forestry m professor prodi ii 2006 alessandro bianchi transport m professor prodi ii 2006 ferruccio fazio health m medical doctor berlusconi v 2010 source: own elaboration of casal bértoa (2021), sonntag (2015), mack smith (1997), italian chamber of deputies official website, senate official website, italian government official website. looking at professional backgrounds, the share of university professors remained high in the second period, yet new professional figures emerged. in particular, medical doctors (elio guzzanti, umberto veronesi, girolamo sirchia, and ferruccio fazio) started to lead the ministry of health, while an increased number of prosecutors (filippo mancuso, franco frattini, antonio brancaccio, and notably antonio di pietro) entered the political scene. this is of particular relevance, as the judicial scandal of mani pulite played a critical role in (informally) reshaping the structure of the italian political system (guarnieri 2002), and the events that occurred in the country’s judiciary arena prompted prosecutors to enter politics and pursue a political career. the volatile and tripolar period (2011–2021), recently labelled ‘italia della svolta’ by d’alimonte and mammarella (2022), started with the formation of a full-technocratic government headed by mario monti and comprised eight university professors, two public managers, and other professional categories. however, the technocratic presence was spread across all cabinets of this period, with no full-partisan cabinet sworn in for over ten years. indeed, technocratic ministers were present in all seven cabinets formed from 2011 to 2021. importantly, economyand finance-related portfolios were mostly delegated to technocratic figures in all cabinets, not only in the full-technocratic monti executive, but also in partisan governments: fabrizio saccomanni in the letta cabinet (2013), pier carlo padoan in the renzi cabinet (2014), who was then confirmed as minister of economy and finance two years later in the gentiloni executive (2016), giovanni tria in the first conte cabinet (2018) and, finally, daniele franco in the current draghi government (2021). the only exception to this trend was the pd’s roberto gualtieri in the first conte cabinet. table 3. profession, gender, and portfolio of technocratic ministers (2011-2021) minister portfolio gender profession cabinet year giulio terzi di sant'agata foreign affairs m diplomat monti 2011 annamaria cancellieri interior f prefect monti 2011 paola severino justice f lawyer monti 2011 giampaolo di paola defence m admiral monti 2011 inside technocracy 230 elsa fornero labour and social policy f professor monti 2011 francesco profumo education, university and research m professor monti 2011 renato balduzzi health m professor monti 2011 mario catania agriculture, food and forestry m civil servant monti 2011 lorenzo ornaghi culture m professor monti 2011 corrado clini environment m public manager monti 2011 corrado passera economic development m banker monti 2011 enzo moavero milanesi european affairs m professor monti 2011 piero gnudi regional affairs, tourism and sport m public manager monti 2011 fabrizio barca territorial cohesion m professor monti 2011 dino piero giarda parliamentary relations m economist monti 2011 andrea riccardi international cooperation and integration m professor monti 2011 filippo patroni griffi public administration and semplification m prosecutor monti 2011 fabrizio saccomanni economy and finance m banker letta 2013 annamaria cancellieri justice f prefect letta 2013 enrico giovannini labour and social policy m professor letta 2013 pier carlo padoan economy and finance m professor renzi 2014 giuliano poletti labour and social policy m agri-expert renzi 2014 federica guidi economic development f manager renzi 2014 pier carlo padoan economy and finance m professor gentiloni 2016 giuliano poletti labour and social policy m agri-expert gentiloni 2016 enzo moavero milanesi foreign affairs m professor conte 2018 giovanni tria economy and finance m professor conte 2018 marco bussetti education, university and research m teacher conte 2018 sergio costa environment m military conte 2018 paolo savona european affairs m professor conte 2018 luciana lamorgese interior f prefect conte ii 2019 sergio costa environment m military conte ii 2019 luciana lamorgese interior f prefect draghi 2021 daniele franco economy and finance m economist draghi 2021 marta cartabia justice f professor draghi 2021 patrizio bianchi public education m economist draghi 2021 enrico giovannini infrastructure and transport m professor draghi 2021 roberto cingolani environment m professor draghi 2021 vittorio colao technological innovation m manager draghi 2021 maria cristina messa university and research f professor draghi 2021 source: own elaboration of casal bértoa (2021), sonntag (2015), italian chamber of deputies official website, senate official website, italian government official website. unlike in the first period, core executive positions shifted from the parties’ hands to technocratic centrality. in all cabinets, core executive posts were ceded to non-partisans. from 2011, the ministry of justice was in the hands of technocrats on three occasions: paola severino (monti 2011), annamaria cancellieri (letta 2013), and marta cartabia (draghi 2021). likewise, the ministry of the interior was headed by a technocrat in 2011 (annamaria cancellieri), 2019, and 2021 (luciana lamorgese). regarding professional background, the presence of university professors is still pervasive. almost 41% of monti’s ministers were professors, and monti himself served as university professor during his career. marco improta 231 figure 2. professional background of technocratic ministers (1948-2021) source: own elaboration of bartolotta (1971), ginsborg (1989), mack smith (1997), italian chamber of deputies official website, senate official website, italian government official website. moreover, relative to the first and second periods, the last period displayed a less unbalanced situation in terms of the genders of technocratic ministers. from 2011 to 2021, seven female technocratic ministers out of a total of 33 ministers were appointed, compared to three out of 58 from 1948 to 2010. while the disparity is still evident, more female technocratic ministers have been appointed in ten years than in sixty years. yet, the overall picture – i.e., considering all technocratic appointments from 1948 to 2021 – is clear: 88.7% of the technocratic ministers appointed have been male. finally, considering the whole time span, figure 2 shows that 40% of technocratic ministers had a university professorship background, followed by economists, bankers, managers, prosecutors, medical doctors, and prefects. this result confirms what cotta and verzichelli (2002: 148) noted back in the day, namely that university professors are ‘principal amongst the technocratic elite’. interpreting the results in a comparative perspective, it can be noted that in the transition from the first to the two last periods italy has gradually deviated from the french model, i.e., party control and a negligible technocratic presence (bruyère and gaxie 2018), becoming more similar to portugal and spain, whose systems are characterised by a more accentuated presence of technocrats, especially in recent decades (costa pinto and tavares de almeida 2018; rodriguez teruel and jerez mir 2018). 4.2. expertise and reappointments after having explored the background and portfolio allocation of technocratic ministers, we now shift our attention to additional investigations related to technocratic inside technocracy 232 appointments. specifically, the study investigates whether such appointments were based on the expertise acquired in the technocrats’ professional activities or whether there could be cases of misplacement in portfolio allocation. for instance, are diplomats appointed as ministers of foreign affairs? or are they ‘misplaced’ in ministries that require different expertise? this is crucial, because non-partisan ministers are not necessarily technocrats; some are just ‘celebrity politicians’ (marsh et al. 2010). most of the literature, however, defines technocrats as politically independent ministers who also hold particular expertise over specific policy areas (e.g., mcdonnell and valbruzzi 2014). to capture both dimensions – independence and expertise – this study explores cabinet appointments by detecting cases of misplacement in portfolio allocation. in addition, interest is also in understanding whether the government participation of technocrats occurs just on a single occasion, as noted by verzichelli and cotta (2018), or whether technocratic ministers are frequently solicited through multiple cabinet appointments. figure 3. expertise and reappointments of technocratic ministers (1948-2021) source: own elaboration of casal bértoa (2021) and sonntag (2015). figure 3 helps us to understand the patterns of technocratic ministerial expertise and reappointments. from 1948 to 2021, 87% of technocratic ministers were appointed in ministries related to their expertise, which matured during previous professional activities. the remaining 13%, however, were appointed in portfolios that were not related to their specific expertise. among such cases, there are two misplacements during the first period: mario di lazzaro and valdo spini. the former was a university professor of mathematics, who had the role of minister of tourism and entertainment in the sixth fanfani government (1987). the latter was a university professor of the history of international relations, who was in charge of the minister of environment in the ciampi technocratic executive (1993). in the second period, cases of misplacement escalated. the entrepreneur susanna agnelli became minister of foreign affairs in the dini cabinet (1995), prosecutor franco frattini was appointed minister of civil service and regional affairs (dini 1995), and the ministry of transport and navigation was entrusted to fiscal policies expert giovanni caravale in the same cabinet. finally, in the third period, five cases of misplacement took place. public managers corrado clini and piero gnudi were appointed, respectively, minister of environment and minister of regional affairs, tourism, and sport in the monti cabinet (2011). in the same cabinet, responsibility for the ministry of parliamentary relations was delegated to economist dino piero giarda. three years later, a notable case was renzi’s cabinet portfolio allocation. agri-expert giuliano poletti was appointed minister of labour and social policy. poletti was then reappointed to the same government portfolio in the marco improta 233 subsequent executive, gentiloni 2016. all in all, while the vast majority of portfolio allocation decisions were based on expertise (87%), this is not the only concern of parties and party leaders when it comes to technocratic appointments. indeed, they might be also interested in involving independent figures due to their personal loyalty, as commonly happens in spain (rodriguez teruel and jerez mir 2018). in figure 3, the share of technocratic ministers appointed just once and those appointed multiple times can also be observed. as noted by verzichelli and cotta (2018), the overwhelming majority of technocratic ministers held governing responsibility on a single occasion (83%), while the remaining 17% were appointed in two or more government formations. looking at the different time spans under investigation, reappointments involved three ministers in the first period: massimo severo giannini as minister of civil service (cossiga and cossiga ii cabinets), alberto ronchey as minister of culture (amato and ciampi cabinets), and paolo savona, who was first appointed minister of industry, trade, and crafts in the ciampi cabinet and then nominated as minister of european affairs in the first conte executive almost 25 years later. during the second period, giuliano amato was stably involved in several governmental positions: as minister of institutional reforms in the first d’alema government, then as minister of treasury, budget, and economic planning in the second d’alema experience, and finally as minister of the interior in the second prodi government, after heading palazzo chigi as prime minister in 2000. finally, in the third period, seven reappointments occurred, in line with the record of the previous period, yet increased compared to the first period. against this backdrop, data indicate that italian parties do not tend to reappoint technocrats after their first experience in government. in a comparative perspective, italy is not an outlier, as this trend is observable in other european countries as well, such as spain (rodriguez teruel and jerez mir 2018). 4.3. is there life after government? career paths and trajectories of technocratic ministers as we have seen so far, technocratic ministers are mostly appointed only once, displaying a low reappointment rate. this section investigates the consequences of governing responsibility for technocratic ministers. specifically, what do technocrats do after their cabinet involvement? do they take up political affiliations, or do they return to their professional lives? the career path of technocratic ministers after government may follow three distinct trajectories, which have important implications for understanding technocrat behaviour. first, technocratic ministers deciding to join a party after holding cabinet offices might signal that parties simply hide themselves behind non-partisan figures but still receive the lion’s share when it comes to ruling. along these lines, technocratic appointments should be understood as a party-driven process of recruitment of personnel who are outside the parties’ governing elite yet willing to pursue a more formalised political career. in this way, the decline in the partyness of governments (katz 1987) should be interpreted as a mere sign of a numerical decrease in partisan membership in cabinet, but not as a sign of party decline. inside technocracy 234 second, technocratic ministers could also opt to maximise their government experience in light of professional benefits. in particular, experts may join relevant industries to exploit the knowledge acquired when holding ruling-responsibility positions in portfolios related to issues of importance for specific industries. political science defines such situations as ‘revolving doors’ (shepherd and you 2020). in this vein, technocrats utilise politics as a jumping-off point for reaching top managerial positions in private companies. finally, technocratic ministers may follow a third avenue: returning to their pregovernment professional activities. this option signals the technocrats’ ability (and willingness) to intermittently serve the country’s political institutions without particular aspirations to a political or managerial career. table 4. career paths of technocratic ministers after government participation (1948-2021) 1948–1993 1994–2010 2011–2021 minister career after appointment minister career after appointment minister career after appointment giovanni porzio political affiliation (liberal) lamberto dini political affiliation (ri) giulio terzi di sant'agata political affiliation (fdi) cesare merzagora political affiliation (pli) sergio berlinguer political affiliation (ri) annamaria cancellieri prefect costantino bresciani turroni ceo, bank of rome susanna agnelli entrepreneur paola severino rector, luiss franco reviglio board member, edipower rainer masera chairman, lehman brothers giampaolo di paola member, trilateral commission massimo severo giannini political affiliation (sir) augusto fantozzi political affiliation (ri) elsa fornero professor ermanno gorrieri political affiliation (dc) filippo mancuso political affiliation (fi) francesco profumo president, escp business school giovanni travaglini political affiliation (dc) domenico corcione retirement renato balduzzi political affiliation (sc) mario sarcinelli public manager tiziano treu political affiliation (ri) mario catania political affiliation (sc) mario di lazzaro chief, consob giancarlo lombardi political affiliation (ppi) lorenzo ornaghi professor livio paladin professor giorgio salvini professor corrado clini director, sd and climate dg gaetano gifuni civil servant elio guzzanti medical doctor corrado passera ceo, illimity alberto ronchey journalist walter luchetti agronomist enzo moavero milanesi political affiliation (sc) adriano bompiani political affiliation (dc) antonio paolucci director, vatican museums piero gnudi board member, confindustria luigi spaventa chief, consob giovanni caravale professor fabrizio barca political affiliation (pd) franco gallo constitutional judge alberto clò professor dino piero giarda president, bpm (surveillance) giovanni conso professor agostino gambino president, aida andrea riccardi political affiliation (sc) umberto colombo professor franco frattini political affiliation (fi) filippo patroni griffi sg, privacy guarantor maria pia garavaglia political affiliation (ppi) giovanni motzo professor fabrizio saccomanni president, unicredit bod paolo savona professor antonio brancaccio died shortly after resignation federica guidi member, trilateral commission paolo baratta public manager carlo azeglio ciampi president of the republic enrico giovannini professor valdo spini political affiliation (psi) giovanni maria flick italian representative, echr pier carlo padoan board member, unicredit sabino cassese professor antonio di pietro political affiliation (idv) giuliano poletti political affiliation (pd) paolo barile professor giuliano amato political affiliation (pd) maria cristina messa currently in office ferruccio fazio senior advisor, mckinsey & co. patrizio bianchi currently in office paolo de castro political affiliation (pd) vittorio colao currently in office laura balbo professor roberto cingolani currently in office tullio de mauro professor giovanni tria professor umberto veronesi political affiliation (pd) marco bussetti head teacher renato ruggiero political affiliation (psi) sergio costa consultant on environmental issues, carabinieri girolamo sirchia medical doctor daniele franco currently in office pietro lunardi political affiliation (fi) luciana lamorgese currently in office domenico siniscalco manager, morgan stanley marta cartabia currently in office tommaso padoa schioppa advisor, imf alessandro bianchi political affiliation (pd) source: own elaboration of bartolotta (1971), ginsborg (1989), mack smith (1997), italian chamber of deputies official website, senate official website, italian government official website. table 4 shows technocratic ministers’ careers after cabinet appointments. starting from the first period, the three avenues described are essentially all represented. eight marco improta 235 technocratic ministers decided to join parties: three of them joined the dc (adriano bompiani, ermanno gorrieri, giovanni travaglini), while two became members of liberal formations (giovanni porzio, cesare merzagora). in the final years of the first period, maria pia garavaglia joined the italian popular party (ppi), one of the dc’s successor parties, while valdo spini was actively involved in the socialist party’s (psi) transformations. moreover, four technocratic ministers achieved managerial positions after government involvement. in particular, mario di lazzaro and luigi spaventa became chiefs of consob, an independent administrative authority for market surveillance. the former minister of foreign trade in the pella government, costantino bresciani turroni, was nominated chief executive officer of the bank of rome, while franco reviglio became a board member of edipower, one of the largest producers of electric power in italy. a not insignificant number of technocratic ministers, however, returned to their past professional lives. notably, after having managed the ministry of culture on two occasions, journalist alberto ronchey returned to the publishing industry. however, he was appointed president of the rizzoli-corriere della sera editorial group immediately after the end of his mandate in office. moving to the second period, almost 41% of technocratic ministers took up political affiliation after their first cabinet appointment. lamberto dini formed his own party, italian renewal (ri), gaining support from sergio berlinguer, augusto fantozzi, and tiziano treu. similarly, former prosecutor antonio di pietro established his italy of values (idv), leaving his professional activities to pursue a political career. technocratic ministers joined both centre-left and centre-right parties. the democratic party (pd) was joined by giuliano amato, paolo de castro, umberto veronesi, and alessandro bianchi, whereas berlusconi’s forward italy (fi) obtained the participation of filippo mancuso, franco frattini, and pietro lunardi. interestingly, the technocratic ministers of the 1994–2010 governments reached high ranking positions in relevant institutions. rainer masera became chairman of the italian branch of lehman brothers, while giovanni maria flick was nominated italian representative in the european court of human rights (echr). moreover, after serving as minister of health in the 2011 berlusconi cabinet, medical doctor ferruccio fazio was hired as senior advisor at mckinsey & company. economist domenico siniscalco left berlusconi’s third government in 2005, serving as managing director and vice president at morgan stanley the year after. finally, tommaso padoa schioppa, minister of economy and finance in the second prodi cabinet, was appointed advisor for the international monetary fund. in the third period, the share of technocrats joining parties following a cabinet appointment decreased. most of them were involved in mario monti’s civic choice (sc), a pattern echoing dini’s ri. regarding professional activities, technocratic ministers of the third period mostly joined the banking system. in particular, fabrizio saccomanni became president of unicredit’s board of directors in 2018, while pier carlo padoan joined unicredit’s board of members two years later. moreover, the banking system has attracted additional technocratic figures. dino piero giarda was nominated president of the popular bank of milan (bpm) with surveillance tasks, and corrado passera became chief executive officer of illimity bank. nevertheless, other technocratic ministers returned to their original careers. elsa fornero and lorenzo ornaghi returned to inside technocracy 236 university after having participated in the monti government, whereas annamaria cancellieri returned to her prefectural career. overall, table 4 displays a fragmented picture when it comes to technocratic ministers’ career paths and trajectories after cabinet appointment. while some nonpartisan figures opt to start a political career by joining a political formation, others exploit their governmental experience to reach top positions in major public and private companies. finally, the remaining technocratic ministers returned to their original positions. temporal variation in such trends suggests that parties still exert some sort of appeal over technocrats, yet such appeal is mainly driven by political entrepreneurial efforts made by technocratic prime ministers such as lamberto dini and mario monti. as political careers might be deemed risky and transient by technocrats, achieving highranking positions in industry is a clear option for maximising the knowledge gained when in government without being exposed to voters’ fluctuations. 5. conclusions this study explored the patterns of technocratic ministerial recruitment in italy from 1948 to 2021, focusing on five dimensions: background, portfolio allocation, expertise, reappointment, and career paths. albeit remaining at a descriptive level, the findings show insightful elements. first, there is a clear gendered pattern among technocratic ministers. the overwhelming majority of appointments have regarded male personnel, relegating female technocratic ministers to evident underrepresentation. second, the examination of technocrats’ professional backgrounds reveals that university professors are the most common professional category involved in non-partisan appointments, followed by other high-skilled occupational groups, such as economists, bankers, managers, prosecutors, medical doctors, and prefects. moreover, regarding portfolio allocation patterns, a gradual decline in party management over core executive positions can be observed. as expected, during the first period, core executive positions were mainly controlled by partisan personnel in a pure ‘party government’ perspective. after the collapse of the old italian party system, technocratic ministers started to occupy core executive positions. the increased presence of technocratic figures in such positions mainly regarded economyand finance-related office posts, yet other key portfolios, e.g., interior and justice, also witnessed technocratic involvement. concerning expertise trajectories, insights derived from our investigation clearly show that the large majority of portfolio allocation considerations were mainly driven by technocrats’ expertise in the specific ministerial policy area. however, not all technocratic appointments have followed this pattern, as cases of misplacement are marginal but not absent. as noted by costa pinto et al. (2018), experts are generally appointed to ministerial portfolios that correspond to their specialised skills and professional training. nonetheless, they are sometimes chosen regardless of the specific policy areas of government and, to some extent, precisely because they do not have a ‘party stigma’. furthermore, as for reappointments, technocratic ministers display a low confirmation rate, as already emphasised by verzichelli and cotta (2018). data revealed that most technocrats were appointed just once. reappointments, however, increased in frequency from the first to the last two periods considered. this finding suggests that marco improta 237 parties do not build strong ties with technocrats, creating high technocratic ministerial turnover. finally, this study overviewed the career patterns of technocratic ministers after holding government positions. in this regard, the investigation showed that technocrats might pursue three different goals. on the one hand, they can decide to become an active part of a political formation, running for elections that are subject to popular scrutiny. on the other hand, they can opt to join private or public companies to professionally maximise their governmental experience. finally, they can return to their original professional activity, interpreting ruling responsibility as a transient step in their life. results show that all options have been considered viable by technocrats. adopting a comparative perspective, italian technocracy shares differences and similarities with other countries. in france and sweden, for instance, parties have managed to preserve their centrality in government. specifically, despite increasing levels of distrust towards them, french political parties maintain their control over cabinet posts (bruyère and gaxie 2018). similarly, evidence from sweden suggests ‘a continued strong role for politically experienced ministers’ (bäck and persson 2018). on the other hand, technocratic transformations occurring in the italian governmental arena are visible in spain and portugal as well. costa pinto and tavares de almeida (2018) noted that technocracy is a persistent feature of portuguese democracy, and has its roots in the late democratisation of the country. in spain, technocratic recruitment is often the outcome of prime ministers’ strategic considerations. in particular, when the prime minister envisages risks for the government and needs personal loyalty and technical abilities, she/he prefers to source ministers from outside the parliamentary party (rodriguez teruel and jerez mir 2018). technocracy is a growing area of interest for political scientists. this phenomenon is indeed provoking profound transformations in european political systems, undermining the persistence of the party government model. italy is among the countries in europe most affected by this evolution (valbruzzi 2018). to grasp the causes and consequences of technocracy, scholars are increasingly directing their efforts to multiple related aspects. in particular, scholars have investigated technocracy both quantitatively (wratil and pastorella 2018; alexiadou and gunaydin 2019) and qualitatively (costa pinto et al. 2018). understanding the background and appointment patterns of technocratic ministers in italy may lay the groundwork for a comparative research agenda going beyond a single case study. in this regard, comparable cases in europe might allow the detection of common and divergent trajectories in technocratic ministers’ characteristics and government involvement. for instance, comparative analyses may investigate whether the italian gendered pattern in technocratic recruitment is exceptional from a comparative perspective. in addition, researchers may examine whether italian technocrats’ career paths are visible in different political systems, thus contributing to enriching the investigation on this less explored matter. such scholarly efforts are much needed, as they would provide a wider-ranging investigation of the phenomena studied in this article. inside technocracy 238 references alexiadou, d. and gunaydin, h. 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(2018). dodging the bullet: how crises trigger technocrat-led governments. european journal of political research, 57(2), 450-472. http://www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson/ microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 1–6. political scientists as consultants and advisors: stefano sacchi stefano sacchi is an associate professor at the university of milan and a non-resident research fellow at collegio carlo alberto. he is a comparative political economist, with a specific interest in the social and labor policies. stefano holds a phd in political science (university of pavia) and a degree in economics (bocconi university). he has been visiting scholar at uc berkeley, cornell, and the university of washington. during the last two years he has worked as a policy advisor for the italian government on social and labor policies, in particular the so-called jobs act, renzi’s government reform of the labor market. between november 2014 and december 2015 he was the chief policy advisor of the labor minister (poletti) and in that capacity he designed, evaluated the financial impact and drafted the reform of unemployment benefits and short-time work (cassa integrazione). he also drafted chapters of the budget law for 2016, including those introducing a new minimum income scheme as well as active aging measures. since january 2016 he has been the special commissioner of isfol, italy’s national research institute on social, labor, and vocational training policies, employing 600 workers, and overseen by the labor ministry. he was also appointed as an economic advisor to the italian prime minister’s office. ips: can you briefly describe your typical tasks and working day? i have to distinguish the period when i was advisor of the labor minister from the current activity as special commissioner of isfol and advisor to the pm’s office. when i was at the labor ministry i used to go to the ministry, where i had an office, or to inps (national social security institute) where i met with the institute’s statisticians for working out how to estimate the financial impact of the reforms i had planned, as well as discussing with those who manage and administer the social programs. i spent large portions of time, either in meetings or on the phone, discussing with the general accounting office, as well as ministerial legislative offices and chiefs of ministerial staff at the labor ministry and the treasury, on aspects concerning the policy content and design, as well as decision making. i met with representatives of the social partners and stakeholders on behalf of the minister. i was also often in parliament where i kept made contact with influential legislators, the committee chairs and the rapporteurs of the pieces of legislation i had drafted. in other words, i interacted with all actors who were involved in the decision making by moving between the ministry, palazzo chigi (namely the pm’s office), inps, and the parliament. the working day started at six a.m. and was very long; it was during the very special period of the approvals, first of the jobs act, and then of the stability act (budgetary law). with reference to the jobs act you should remember that it was a delegating law that provided a framework and bestowed upon the government the powers of enacting legislative decrees that, on their turn, required the compulsory opinion of the ips interviews stefano sacchi 2 parliamentary committees. indeed, the opinions were often negotiated. we (government “actors”) suggested in several cases that parliamentary committees should ask the government for clarifications or changes of aspects that we had not fully figured out when we introduced the draft pieces of legislation, or that it was politically more appropriate that the parliament should ask and the government introduce in response. the isfol typical day is very different. i work at my office between 8 am and 10 pm, then send emails and whatsapp messages about next day’s tasks with my general manager well into the night, as well as preparation for next day’s meetings. i have much contact with other authorities, with the minister, the chief of ministerial staff, the pm’s office. personally or via my spokesman i establish relationships with the press, and i personally take care of relationships with the trade unions. a profound reorganization of isfol is taking place. it involves the transfer of some resources and staff to the new agency anpal; the introduction of a new statute and reinvigorating the institute also through a new mission; new focused recruitments. these issues oblige me to very intense and continuous interactions with the general manager and the human resources manager and to keep in contact with other administrations such as, for example, the state general accounting office and the ministry of public service. sometimes, much less often than i would like i hold meetings with the researchers to steer the research carried out by isfol and to collect information on what they are already doing. then there are the conferences in which i participate not only in my academic role, but also in my capacity as special commissioner of isfol. finally, i participate both in the isfol delegation, and in the delegation of the ministry of labor, to meetings with representatives of international and supranational institutions (european commission, oecd etc.) during their regular fact-finding missions. i also continue, but at a lower intensity, my work as advisor, now at the prime minister’s office on pensions, income transfers, and social safety nets. ips: are you happy with this mix of activities? now less than before. as a policy advisor i enjoyed my time a lot. i was at the heart of policymaking. the reform of unemployment benefits was a policy that i had planned for several years; implementing it was fulfilling a dream. the reform of short-time work (cassa integrazione) was much more difficult and i cannot yet believe we were able to achieve it. being isfol commissioner is not a fun job. it is a service that i fulfill, a duty. isfol is an agency that would have great potential but is held back by many problems. it is my mandate to overcome these problems and change it, but it is a lot of “dirty,” tough work, including many unpleasant interactions: something between the work of a diplomat and that of a chief executive officer of a large company, with strained industrial relations. being policy advisor of the pm’s office is still fun but it is a marginal activity compared to in the past. i am no longer at the heart of the policy process. ips: is your job the result of a tenaciously pursued project, or rather of an opportunity you seized? i leave it to the policy results to ascertain whether there is “virtù,” but certainly there is a lot of “fortuna,” to borrow from machiavelli. i was working for a while on a very informal basis with the democratic party. above all, after the publication in 2009 of a book of mine on “flex-insecurity” that conpolitical scientists as consultants and advisors 3 tained concrete proposals about the labor market policies, the parliamentary group started inviting me to give presentations and seminars on labor and welfare policies. when renzi, whom i did not know, became leader of the democratic party, he appointed a secretariat and he assigned the labor department to marianna madia (current minister of public service), whom i knew. marianna asked me to prepare a reform of work-related income transfers (ammortizzatori sociali), as part of the more general reform of the labor market that renzi had intended to provide to the letta government as the party’s contribution, the so-called jobs act. i designed the reform, especially the reform of unemployment benefits, with the help also of research assistants in collegio carlo alberto to assess its financial impact, while that of cassa integrazione was left at the level of general principles. when renzi becomes prime minister, this reform enters the overall package of the labor market reform and will be introduced in parliament for approval of the delegation law. after a period abroad, as a visiting scholar at cornell university, while the law is getting close to final adoption i am formally appointed by the minister of labor, poletti, as his chief policy advisor. previously, during the letta government, i was a member of an advisory panel on the “minimum income scheme,” with other (more senior) academics. nevertheless, that experience has been overall marginal and it has not led to concrete results in policy terms. in sum a new secretary of the ruling party who little later will become premier, brings with him to the secretariat and then to the pm’s office a group of young people who in turn call peers they know, people who have researched and published on public policies in which they are interested, proposing reforms they are sympathetic with. here the leaders of the group were filippo taddei at the party and tommaso nannicini (now undersecretary of state at the pm’s office) as the chief economic advisor to renzi. we were seen as “barbarians” by high-ranked civil servants, brought by renzi from academia into the public administration because he knew that with the administration’s forces alone it would not be possible to produce the change he had in mind. a change that he figured out in general terms, while for crucial details he relied upon trustworthy experts. ips: had you planned this type of career while you were studying because you were attracted by it, or rather is it the result of a later choice? honestly the possibility to carry out these tasks has not ever crossed my mind during my university training. but, nevertheless, i always thought that whoever studies social sciences wants to change the world, or more modestly to ameliorate the existing one. in my field, they want to affect public policies, and to improve them according to their system of values. in the public action the anchorage to a system of values is very important, as obviously you often have to come to big compromises. having opportunities to intervene with concrete proposals in policymaking is perhaps easier for those who study public policies. but these opportunities are not entirely precluded also for other specialists, as for example the experts in electoral systems or in public administration or scholars who study the judicial systems. i truly believe that political science can be very useful for policymaking. following lindblom and cohen, you can provide “usable knowledge” to improve policies. ips interviews stefano sacchi 4 ips: did studying political science matter? i think it mattered. unfortunately, those of us (political scientists) involved in policymaking are very, very few. political science is an empirical science that inspires the taste for the knowledge of processes, the knowledge of “how” things take place. this is an advantage over, for example, economists and lawyers. we are on one hand more aware of the constraints on the action and on the other hand we focus more on the real consequences of policies and not on what is desirable in an ideal world or on what “logically” should come down from the institutional design. the majority of academics involved in policymaking are economists who, during policymaking, realize what we as political scientists know before the process starts: the reality is much more complicated than the models. we suffer, particularly compared to the economists of a reputational disadvantage, not so much with civil servants in the public administration but with other actors in the policy networks. they are in fact mostly economists, and the economists tend, at least initially, only to consider other economists. afterwards, sometimes, they change their minds. ultimately, it is their problem. ips: is there anything not written in textbooks that you have learned thanks to your work experience, and that you would recommend should be taught to politics and policy students? in fact, i did not learn new things in general terms, but i have observed at first hand the strength of some descriptions and explanations that are already well known among scholars. first, the very limited rationality of policy processes. sometimes they are really the “garbage can” type; often they are incremental. in all cases, to borrow from krasner, policy processes are “non-ergodic”: random events may lead the decision making toward unwanted and costly paths that are very difficult to abandon and reverse, no matter how many good arguments and empirical evidence you can show. often the policy actors have little time, they do not have sufficient knowledge, they have a busy schedule and they want to consider as addressed and resolved as many issues as possible, as soon as possible, even if they are not. moreover, even when you can resort to authority resources, of course i do not speak of my own authority, when for example you may appeal directly to the support of a prime minister, it is very hard to shake a recently reached equilibrium, even if such an equilibrium is a bad equilibrium. a connected aspect, that heclo mentioned and i found crucial, is the importance of presiding over all meetings. if you are not present, then decisions you dislike may be made and it is very difficult to change them later. not only the physical presence but also mental brightness is important, and after several long, exhausting meetings in a single day you cannot take it for granted. moreover, you have to know very well the files, the details of what you are discussing, to be able to lead the discussion in the preferred direction from the beginning, with arguments that are convincing both with respect to the policy goals and with regard to the political convenience of the actors who are involved in the decision-making process. you have to show the ultimate decision makers that the losers are few and the winners are many, and that they can explain this to the public opinion in simple and effective terms. political scientists as consultants and advisors 5 ips: can you identify who has an academic background similar to yours on the basis of their approach to problem setting and problem solving? or rather do you think that other differences/similarities (e.g., personality, political orientation, other peculiarities) matter more than academic background? i did not interact with other political scientists. however, i interacted with some economists with keen sensitivity for political science and the reciprocal understanding was immediate and profitable. then of course also other aspects matter as, for example, being from the same generation and living a very similar experience, understanding that this was a unique opportunity to introduce long-awaited reforms. ips: how would you re-organize (if needed) courses in political science (including its sub-disciplines) in order to structure a curriculum that could naturally lead to your current job? i think policy actors should be more often involved to provide testimonies of the strategies, the efforts and the tools that they use to push through a policy decision. at the same time these testimonies should always be filtered by instructors who subsume the first hand information under an analytical framework. there is always the risk of over-involvement, even when you are a scholar as i am. currently i do suffer from over-involvement—sometimes i am not sufficiently detached from the flow of processes and every policy detail seems to me important. in particular, for master and phd students, internships at institutions (parliament, the pm’s office, ministries) would be very useful for realizing how and when decisions occur. ips: should political science scholars “get their hands dirty,” i.e., intervene more in politics and policy making, so that they gain in relevance? it is a choice to be left to the individual scholar and to their inclinations. as i said before, for me to be a social scientist means not only describing and understanding phenomena but also using this knowledge to intervene. but i do not want to impose this view on other social scientists. ips: as far as your activity domain is concerned, is it possible and necessary to distinguish between technical knowledge on the one hand, and political values and policy preferences on the other? i do not believe it is possible, let alone necessary.�that said, often in politics you do things you do not approve of. i sometimes found myself helping, even drafting provisions on which i disagreed. i did not want them designed that way, or i did not want them at all. it is part of the “getting your hands dirty with politics.” you are doing things that you, as scholar, do not approve of even if you understand the meaning and sometimes the utility in the political game. however, an anchorage to a value system must be present. otherwise it is only sheer cynicism, action that pursues short-term benefits, the thrill of victory over the opponent, devoid of any value content. ips: did you find it easier to research or to be policy advisor? and why? now i appreciate research activity even more. it is certainly tiring, at least for me. it usually takes me a long time before starting writing, in the preliminary phase when ips interviews stefano sacchi 6 i organize the evidence i collected and build the argument, then i am very quick at actual writing, but it all takes time and focus and now i lack both. still, now, when i manage to have a couple days in a row to get back to some unfinished matters and papers, i confess that i am even happier than i was before.�the job as policy advisor, under the conditions in which i play this role, is pure adrenaline. participating in the decision-making process that lead to the stability act was an extreme experience—exhausting but also exciting. everything happens very quickly and you have to be there. i was in the office into the night and early morning, i was consulted while decisions were being taken at the highest level. the risk is that this sort of inebriation takes over, a frequent phenomenon among politicians, and that the effects and nature of the provisions you carry through, the policy contents, matter less, and less compared to winning political battles. it is the kind of cynicism i mentioned above. you can defeat it by preserving a framework of values that allows you to put in the right perspective what you do, what you can do and what it is appropriate to reach or to oppose. ips: did you have the opportunity to compare your experience with that of other academic experts, political scientists from other european countries in a condition similar to yours? do you think the policy process and your role, for example, during the approval of the italian stability act, are also detectable in other european experiences? i have not had yet the chance to meet other similar experts from other countries. let me say that my experience as a consultant has been very peculiar. i found myself imposed on the administration by a prime minister who wanted to make changes. he was aware that those changes would not have come if he had relied upon that structure. it is hard to repeat such an experience. indeed, the ministerial administrations are taking up the leeway, the room for maneuver they had initially lost. perhaps the role that i played in those days would no longer be possible. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 36–39. beyond the obvious: whose gender studies? flavia monceri university of molise he situation of gender studies in italy is still quite troubling for a number of reasons, but in this brief commentary i will touch on only one from the standpoint of a political philosopher who also teaches gender studies (studi di genere). to come directly to the point, the most urgent question to address, if we really want gendersensitive research to develop across disciplines, concerns who is entitled to perform that kind of research and for whom. in fact, i find that if we try to “move beyond the obvious”, as the subheading of our international seminar suggested, we discover that italian gender studies is still dominated by certain implicit presuppositions concerning the kind of people fully entitled to become researchers in gender issues. such presuppositions may also become, if unwittingly, a powerful means to exclude all non-fitting people through a mild form of epistemicide by the part of the relating “scientific community”, one of whose tasks is to police the borders of admissible knowledge about “gender”. i will try to briefly argue for the previous statements, although i am very well aware that a much more detailed analysis would be needed, moving from my personal experience as a researcher and teacher in the field. as far as i see it, anyone should be entitled in principle to engage in gender studies and gender-sensitive research, not least because all of us are assigned, are, have, and perform a (particular kind of) gender. moreover, both gender studies and gendersensitive research should be performed in principle in the service of all concrete individuals, in that they also are assigned, are, have, and perform a (particular kind of) gender. however, this is not what happens, at least not in italy, where gender research seems to have become, and still is a prerogative of “women”, both as researchers and as a target group. in a sense, it could probably be stated that in italy (although not only) gender studies and women’s studies run often the risk of overlapping, with the result that the very term “gender” becomes an equivalent for “women”. as a philosopher, i find that the most dangerous outcome of such an overlap is that this renders it no longer necessary just to “move beyond the obvious” in order to give a precise definition of the two notions, let alone of their privileged relationship, to the extent that when you say the word “genere” (gender) the image immediately is evoked of “donna” (woman), without any doubts that all the speakers and listeners immediately understand what properly a “woman” is and therefore also what “gender” means. this implies that if you are usually identified by others as a woman, as happens to me, no one asks you anymore if you are satisfied with such an identification, and you become part of the group, without having the possibility to put in question that identification. t gender and politics 37 of course this has the advantage of entitling you to “do” gender studies, because you have the right physique du rôle, so to speak. but the other side of the coin is that if you dare to question that original “obvious” identification you immediately find yourself marginalized. to give only one instance, it may happen because you feel a much greater affinity with research and teaching fields such as queer and transgender theories that refuse sexual and gender binaries and hence a stable and definite identification as one sex and one gender of the only two currently allowed. in short, it is my contention that far from being open to all possible genders, gender studies are generally the realm of researchers who are identified or (accept to) self-identify as women. it would not be so difficult for anyone interested in the matter to find out that the overwhelming majority of those engaging in gender studies are identified or self-identify as women, as it is the case with the members of the various research centers, institutions, journals, etc., in which the words “gender” or “genere” appear. when conferences, workshops, and seminars are held on “gender issues,” it usually happens that the vast majority of speakers, as well as most of the audience, are “women”. this has the side-effect of reaffirming the by now stereotypical idea that “gender issues” are something pertaining primarily or especially to women, something that is “reserved” for them, because the addressed issues are “women’s issues” or issues on which women give their (womanly) point of view when relating to the only other accepted gender, that is to say “men”. it might seem strange that women themselves do not fight against such an automatic and uncritical association between gender and women, but here a political philosopher may have something appropriate to say. as a matter of fact, that association reinforces the sense of belonging to an identity group, that of “women”, which can be put in the service of an identity politics activated by, and targeted to, women in order to promote and campaign for women-oriented policies under the label of “gender-oriented policies”. the same goes with the audience that gender studies, and generally gender issues, are able to attract in italy. the students attending my classes are almost all women (at least at first sight), even if my radical and unconventional position is well known and the classes themselves include lectures and activities on queer theories, transgender theories, (critical) disability studies, crip theories, as well as on non-mainstream case studies, such as sadomasochism, disability, sexuality, intersexuality and the like. the same happens when i give lectures or seminars in other universities, or in courses on, say, gender violence: the vast majority of the people looking at me can be inserted, according to the prevailing sexual and gender norms for stereotypical classification, in the category of women. now, i must confess that this is a problem to me, urging me to ask why it is (still) so. i am aware that i could find a reassuring answer in putting the blame on the so-called patriarchal society, which keeps “men” far from gender issues because they are none of their business. i might also find some relief in believing that things will change in the future, as soon as “women” succeed in dismantling that society and in convincing “men” that being gendersensitive is also in their interest. unfortunately, these and similar answers are not enough to me and asking “why?” immediately brings me back to the questions of “who” and “for whom”, and hence to the responsibility of those who “do” gender studies in deconstructing the stereotypical association between gender and women. in fact, a great part of the difficulties that gender studies are currently undergoing in italy lies in a widespread defensive and exclusive, if monceri, beyond the obvious: whose gender studies? 38 not “isolationist”, attitude by the part of many women researchers. this does not mean that people not identified as women are banished, but that those perceived as “outsiders” are requested to follow the rules set up by the in-group of women regarding the correct way to perform research about gender issues and the results it should achieve. i tend to suppose that this holds true also for the few “men” researching gender issues, although i would prefer reading, and listening to, what they have to say about the issue, before taking a position. be it as it may, such an attitude lets some unintended consequences emerge that make the theoretical and political potential of gender studies vanish. i will mention only two of them. the first has to do with the reaction by those who are not engaged in, or are suspicious toward, gender studies, especially people identified or self-identified as “men”. the association between gender and women, as well as the above-mentioned defensive attitude, may and do have the undesired outcome to reinforce the idea that “gender affairs” are actually “women’s affairs” and that therefore men should rather keep at arm’s length, so to speak. this is something quite typical of an oppositional group-dynamics such as the one currently at play both within academic circles and the wider public discourse when it comes to gender issues. in other terms, when women researchers reiterate the idea that the primary focus of the discipline should be women, though adding that this does not mean to exclude men, they are giving men good reasons not only to consider gender as a womanly affair, but even not to feel themselves curious to better understand what “gender” is about, eventually becoming interested in gender by being explicitly involved on equal terms. in a sense, then, i am suggesting that the lack of “men’s” involvement in developing gender studies might be ascribed, at least partially, to an inability to show how gender affects all of us in that it is a social construction of roles, practices, and so on to which all of us have been, are being, and will be subject to, independently of our anatomy. but this cannot be done until women themselves give up the association between gender as a general category and only one particular gender. until then, things will not change that much, for all the attempts to dismantle “patriarchal society” through gender/women-oriented policies, laws, and rules. the second unintended consequence has to do with the exclusion of people who, like me, maintain that gender studies can show its usefulness and potential only if it is able to open to a pluralism of genders, by shifting to “genders” studies. and i must also confess that sometimes i wonder if it would not be rather the case to simply overcome this by now seemingly exploited discipline to replace it with something different. what leads me to this discomforting conclusion is something my personal experience of epistemic marginalization simply because i take other theoretical options, such as queer and transgender theories, so seriously as to state that not only genders, but also sexes and sexualities are nothing more than cultural co-constructs built up by people who have the power to do so at the expenses of all those who are still, and will probably remain, a minority. i understand that this form of exclusion originates from the adherence to a notion of (collective) identity functional to the performances required by identity politics, but still i find that this implies diminishing the role of “gender” for a “progressive” politics. therefore, i would suggest, by way of a provisional conclusion, that accepting to enter an unbiased dialog with non-mainstream and sometimes even “heretical” positions comgender and politics 39 ing from outside the somehow established front of gender-as-women’s-studies could result in building a wider front, more capable to campaign and fight for a greater and greater acknowledgment of the role that gender-sensitive research might play for all of us, independently of our identification in a stable identity. this is not meant to imply that “women’s issues” should be downplayed or considered irrelevant: just the opposite. it is rather meant to suggest the usefulness of building flexible networks of alliances among different and even divergent approaches to gender issues that will never converge or unify, but would nonetheless be able to fight together toward less and less exclusion. this is also the main goal that i still believe, although from a radically critical perspective, was the one dreamed about by the original pioneers of the notion of gender. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 10–13. political scientists as consultants and advisors: marco cacciotto marco cacciotto is 47 years old and a political consultant since 1996, one of the first in italy, giving strategic advice to parties, candidates, public administrations, interest groups and labor unions. he graduated in political sciences at the university of milan, with a thesis on the presidential election campaigns in the united states. he wrote a handbook on political marketing in 2011 for the il mulino publishing company. he teaches “political marketing and public affairs” in the post graduate program in “public and corporate communication” of the university of milan and he is a board member of the iapc (international association of political consultants) and the eapc (european association of political consultants). he is also a founder of public, a network of professionals and firms specialized in public interest strategies, communication, and research. ips: can you briefly describe your typical tasks and working day? are you happy in your current job? there is not a typical day and no fixed hours. i spend a lot of time on the phone and in meetings. during campaigns i usually travel a lot because i advise more than one campaign at the same time (an average of four or five, my “record” is 12 campaigns being run simultaneously in 2014). i’m quite happy, but in the last two years i have worked less on electoral campaigns and moved toward grassroots campaigning and applying my experience to corporate needs. political consulting is a relatively new profession that evolves and redefines itself at every electoral cycle. the birth and definition of the modern political consultant are strictly linked to the transformations produced by radio, cinema, and particularly, television. today, we are seeing yet a new transformation with the rising importance of the internet and digital technologies, the wide use of political marketing (and analytic measuring systems), and with new and advanced techniques of segmentation and micro targeting of the constituency. there are several factors that represent significant challenges for the political consulting industry in the years to come, and which could bring the profession to be redefined, once again: momentous technological advances; the extending of campaigning in public affairs and policy consulting; more services and clients from the private industry as an extension of voter/consumer segmentation and innovative approaches developed for political campaigns; the increasing need for continuous campaigning (which usually results in either a long-term and stable work relationship with the elected candidate or a temporary “settling” in institutions until the next electoral campaign). political scientists as consultants and advisors 11 ips: is your job the result of a tenaciously pursued project, or rather of an opportunity you seized? had you planned this type of career whilst you were studying because you were attracted by it, or rather is it the result of a later choice? did studying political science matter? yes, it was my dream and my goal. i discovered the political consultant role while i was writing my thesis dissertation on “the role of the media in us presidential campaigns from 1952 to 1996.” i bet on a profession that was not present in italy and a lot of people in the communication sector tried to discourage me, by saying that it was an american job and it would never work in italy. i graduated in political sciences with the “political science” professor because there was not a political communication teaching block during those years. now i teach “political marketing,” which has been defined as a marriage between marketing and political science. political marketing is created by applying marketing concepts from business to politics, but not by simply imposing one over the other.�i believe that studying political science is fundamental for everyone that is willing to become a political consultant. ips: people you work with often have a different educational background to you. what are the competing academic backgrounds in your working environment? do you perceive you have an advantage or disadvantage vis-à-vis these colleagues? what does such advantage or disadvantage consist of? political campaigning is an art, but a scientific approach is needed. my advantage consists in being not just an expert in communications or marketing: i know political rules, and i know how the political system has developed and works. you cannot prepare an effective campaign if you do not know laws on political procedures that shape campaigns and the political market. ips: is there anything not written in textbooks that you have learned thanks to your work experience, and that you would recommend should be taught to politics and policy students? political consultants measure public opinion, target and identify likely voters, craft messages and strategies, design television and print advertisements, build websites, and decide how to adapt the overall theme and strategy of the campaign for the digital media formats. books are often theoric and for scientific purposes divide in clear and subsequent stages the preparation and the running of a campaign. reality is more chaotic and less predictable; it is possible to learn only through practice and experience to govern a dynamic environment. ips: how would you re-organize (if needed) courses in political science (including its sub-disciplines) in order to structure a curriculum that could naturally lead to your current job? politics have entered the “fast” era of communication, like companies did before: 24-hour news cycles; fast diffusion of messages; media used for engaging citizens, as well as sending messages; personalized communication; segmentation of voters by lifestyles with the use of databases and measuring systems that are ever more sophisticated. data-driven politics is changing the way parties and candidates are campaigning, requiring new skills for political consultants. the obama 2012 campaign recruited some of the best young minds in the booming fields of analytics and behavioral science and placed them in a room they called “the cave” for up to 16 ips interviews marco cacciotto 12 hours a day over the course of roughly 16 months. they developed a host of highly effective marketing techniques that were either entirely new or had never been tried on such a grand scale. social strategists and data analytics experts become a fundamental part of campaigns that aimed to tailor message and activities to a particular person’s interest through the use of digital information and computer algorithms. political sciences classes should reflect those changes, teaching, for instance, data analytics, but at the same time give an overall view on marketing, political institutions and the electoral system. students should know how the parliament operates, how legislative procedures shape outcomes, and how entities like the executive, lobbyists, and organized citizens influence the work of the legislature. how can you be a strategist if you do not know the impact of a different electoral law on political supply, the limitations to campaigning that comes from laws on political communications? ips: should political science scholars “get their hands dirty,” i.e., intervene more in politics and policy making, so that they gain in relevance? as far as your activity domain is concerned, is it possible to distinguish easily between technical knowledge on the one hand, and political values and policy preferences on the other? yes, i think that political scientists should be more involved. in 2012 nate silver set off a modest paradigm shift in political journalism and brought the rules of political science to beltway journalism. his blog “fivethirtyeight”—which was acquired by espn in 2013—quickly attracted imitators and competitors. mr. klein started vox, the new york times established a new quantitatively minded section, called “the upshot,” and the washington post annexed a blog, called “the monkey cage,” dedicated to political science. what was once mr. silver’s lonely crusade soon became an echo chamber. although these sites occasionally conducted their own statistical studies, they mostly relied on existing academic work, giving political scientists an audience of unprecedented scale. the monkey cage blog on the washington post website has published more than 8000 articles, featuring nearly 1.500 political scientists. academic engagement can shape the terms of public discourse, providing information, and analytical models. ips: for a political science scholar who wants to be active and produce an impact on policy making, is it easier to do it by studying the policy process or rather by being fully part of the process as decision maker? it is better to do it by studying the political process, otherwise the risk is that you will become part of the game. a political scientist should be independent and not become a pundit. once, at an international conference of political consultants, they asked me, “do you prefer be introduced as a professor or as a consultant?” i answered “you can say that i’m a consultant when i win elections and a professor when i lose.” they still remember the joke. in italy being a professor is often an advantage when you talk to a journalists or a potential client because you are perceived as more authoritative, but it can become a risk to be perceived as someone that is not practical, out of touch with reality. there is a gap that must be voided. political scientists as consultants and advisors 13 ips: what is the added value of the political science scholar to the job of policy practitioner? i think that political scientists should defend the need for a quality work. if i think of polling, i saw so many polls that were conducted in a bad way using small samples to draw conclusions and estimates electoral outcomes. public polls are used as a political communication tool but the result is becoming the perception that all the polls are bad and not reliable. now the trend is doing research online and using data from social networks but some outputs are really not scientific. political scientists should help political professionals that need accurate data if they want to prepare the best strategy to win. if you start a campaign with a wrong map your road to victory could be long or without an end. analytical tools and the measurement of every single aspect of a campaign is the latest trend coming from the usa: jim messina, obama’s former campaign manager that now is working also for renzi, represents a new generation of consultants that are fond of metrics. messina is convinced that modern presidential campaigns, unlike what is found in history books, are comparable to fast-growing technology companies, and the presidential job position is like that of the company executives. big data allows campaign executives and strategists to measure and therefore manage campaigns more precisely than ever before. political scientists can help to measure the effectiveness of communication activities and help strategists and politicians to make decisions based on numbers and not only on intuition. data-driven politics is changing the way parties and candidates are campaigning, requiring new skills for political consultants and represents a huge opportunity for political scientists. ips: and, vice versa, how is the profession of policy practitioner improving the academic work? i started to work in 1996 and to teach at a university in 2005. my first approach with political communication models and studies of electoral campaigns has been not easy. often i thought that academic models and a lot of assumptions were not correct because reality was quite different. i think that is very important that a scientific approach must be tested on the ground. when i developed the cda approach to campaigns, my work started from my practical experience: i had the opportunity to test it on several campaigns and make it better year after year. in the last ten years a lot of things have changed and in my field political marketing studies and models have played an important role. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_1_capati_improta.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 1 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 1, 1–22. contact author: marco improta, luiss guido carli university, rome. e-mail address: mimprota@luiss.it dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? the approaches of the conte governments to the european union andrea capati marco improta luiss guido carli university, rome abstract over the past few years, interdependence and the increasing importance of external constraints on member state governments’ domestic policies have deepened relations between the european union (eu) and european cabinets. this article investigates the conte i and conte ii governments’ approach to the eu. drawing on cleavage theory, we hypothesise that the pd exercised a ‘mitigation effect’ on m5s euroscepticism, leading to a change in the government’s attitude towards the eu. we test this hypothesis through a small-n comparative analysis based on the two governments’ political programmes, composition, and budgetary policy in the framework of the european semester. the article is structured as follows: first, we build the theoretical framework on cleavage theory and the ‘mitigation effect’ hypothesis. second, we illustrate the transition from the conte i to the conte ii government. third, we discuss the method and research strategy. finally, we examine the conte governments’ political programmes, composition and budgetary policy with a view to testing the ‘mitigation effect’. our analysis shows that a shift in italy’s orientation towards the eu occurred in the transition from conte i to conte ii, owing much to the pd’s involvement in the latter. 1. introduction n the xviii parliamentary term, italy has already had three governments. two of them were headed by giuseppe conte, a nonpartisan figure who previously worked as a lawyer and academic. the first coalition government was formed in june 2018 by the five star movement (m5s) and the league, and fell after the government crisis of august 2019. the subsequent cabinet, composed of m5s, democratic party (pd), italy alive (iv), and free and equals (leu), took office one month after that crisis. several studies have investigated the formation of the first conte government (marangoni and verzichelli 2019), its policy agenda (giannetti et al. 2020), and early termination (conti et al. 2020). others have discussed the relationship between italy and the european union (eu), highlighting patterns of ‘continuity and change’ (quaglia 2007). to this effect, silvio berlusconi’s government represents the first shift in italy’s traditionally europeanist orientation, standing in sharp contrast to the europeanist approach of the previous prodi government (carbone 2009). the literature has recently emphasised the discontinuity between the conte i and gentiloni governments in their relations with the eu (fabbrini and zgaga 2019). in addition to european dynamics, the study of italian governments’ approaches towards the eu also helps to shed light on i dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 2 domestic politics. the link between the two has become apparent over time, fostering increasing academic attention (fabbrini and piattoni 2008). this article analyses the approach of the conte governments vis-à-vis the eu. it raises a two-fold research question: did italy’s approach to the european union change in the transition from the conte i to the conte ii government? and if so, why? building on cleavage theory, we hypothesise that the pd exercised a ‘mitigation effect’ on m5s euroscepticism, leading to a change in the government’s attitude towards the eu. specifically, we expect the conte ii government to adopt a more europeanist approach compared to the previous government, due to the pd’s involvement in the second coalition. we test this hypothesis through a small-n comparison based on the two governments’ political programmes, composition, and budgetary policy in the framework of the european semester. the remainder of this article is organised as follows. the second section presents the theoretical framework of the analysis. the third section deals with the turbulent transition from conte i to conte ii. the fourth section illustrates the method and research strategy. the fifth and sixth sections analyse the political programme, composition and budgetary policy of conte ii and conte i respectively. the final section discusses implications for future research and concludes. 2. theoretical framework: cleavage theory meets mainstreameurosceptic coalition governments for many years, the european integration project had little impact on national party systems (mair 2000) while enjoying widespread approval among citizens. such a ‘permissive consensus’ (hooghe and marks 2009) owed much to the european public’s scarce perception of european integration outcomes (carrieri 2020a). however, the 1992 maastricht treaty fostered the emergence of the eu as a relevant policy issue for member states domestically, standing out as a ‘critical juncture’ (fabbrini 2015). moreover, the euro crisis further consolidated the eu as a positional issue, thus ‘awakening the sleeping giant’ (carrieri 2019). for its part, italy has long been one of the most euroenthusiastic countries in the union (conti 2003). however, despite a pro-integrationist tradition, italian public attitudes towards the eu have recently declined (conti and memoli 2015). also, party positioning along the eu issue has been crucial in italy’s government formation process over the last few years. specifically, a common anti-eu sentiment among the league and the m5s paved the way for the yellow-green coalition (giannetti et al. 2018). overall, the italian party system has been characterised by an increasing politicisation of the eu issue, leading to polarised eu-based competition (carrieri 2020b). interestingly, cleavage theory contends that mainstream parties have escaped such politicisation (carrieri 2020b). these parties, defined as ‘the electorally dominant actors in the centre-left, centre and centre-right blocs on the left-right political spectrum’ (hooghe et al. 2002), originated from four dividing lines: centre versus periphery, state versus church, industry versus land, owners versus workers. such a long-standing system of social cleavages has constrained mainstream parties’ attitudes towards the eu. mainstream parties have historically taken centre stage in the launch and advancement of european integration, thus incorporating pro-europeanism into their traditional ideological commitments. in the european parliament, mainstream parties form the backbone of the capati and improta 3 european people’s party (epp), the party of european socialists/progressive alliance of socialists and democrats (pes/s&d), the alliance of liberals and democrats for europe/renew europe (alde/re), and the greens/european free alliance (greensefa). because of their ideological uniformity regarding the eu issue, these formations are invariably defined as ‘mainstream pro-european parties’ (carrieri 2020b). cleavage theory suggests that mainstream parties cannot move along the eu issue dimension. they hold an inflexible pro-european position due to embedded reputations, ideological commitments and government responsibility. in this light, party system change did not occur because mainstream parties reneged on europeanism, but because voters rewarded parties with strong views on the new pro/anti-eu cleavage (hooghe and marks 2018). as a matter of fact, even during the euro crisis, mainstream parties showed continued responsibility to the eu by supporting and implementing austerity policies (carrieri 2020b). cleavage theory thus implies that mainstream parties are not willing to negotiate on pro-europeanism when holding government office. we ask whether this applies to coalitions between mainstream and eurosceptic parties, with italy’s conte ii government between the pd and the m5s as a case study. from a comparative perspective, the conte ii’s governing formula does not constitute a rarity in western europe.1 indeed, as table 1 shows, eurosceptic parties are in coalition governments with mainstream parties in spain and finland. specifically, we can (podemos) in spain and the left alliance (vasemmistoliitto) in finland both stand as junior coalition partners to the social democrats i.e., the spanish socialist workers’ party (psoe) and the finnish social democratic party (sdp). such government experiences suggest that when a mainstream party joins a coalition with a eurosceptic party, that government ends up with a pro-european approach. specifically, in spain, the eurosceptic we can underwent a normalization process during its partnership with the psoe (mazzolini and borriello 2021) while the marin government in finland adopted the pro-eu programme of the previous rinne cabinet (palonen 2020). along these lines, we hypothesise that the pd exercised a ‘mitigation effect’ on m5s euroscepticism, leading to a change in the government’s attitude towards the eu. specifically, we expect the conte ii government to adopt a more europeanist approach compared to conte i, due to the pd’s involvement in the second coalition. to be sure, such a ‘mitigation effect’ does not imply that the pd turned the m5s into a pro-eu party. it does imply, however, that the pd was able to induce a pro-eu shift in the coalition government. we identify three observable implications of the ‘mitigation effect’. first, we expect conte ii to emphasise pro-europeanism as a key component of its political programme following negotiations between the m5s and the pd. second, we expect conte ii to appoint pd members to key government positions in relations with brussels and to nominate a pd member for the post of european commissioner. third, we expect conte ii to adopt an accommodating approach to the eu in negotiations over budgetary policy within the european semester and to show a clear commitment to the commission's country-specific recommendations and stability and growth pact (sgp) rules. 1 in attributing the ‘eurosceptic’ and ‘mainstream’ categories, we rely on rooduijn (2019) and taggart and szczerbiak (2004) for the former, and döring and manow (2020) for the latter. we have considered both the mainstream partiesa of the centre-left and centre-right, based on the parlgov party family identifier. dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 4 table 1. party composition of 16 west european governments. country prime minister cabinet parties eurosceptic in government mainstream in government austria kurz austrian people's party the greens ◉ belgium croo party of liberty and progress reformist movement christian democratic and flemish greens socialist party socialist party differently ◉ cyprus anastasiades democratic rally ◉ denmark frederiksen social democrats ◉ finland marin social democratic party centre party green league left alliance swedish people's party ◉ ◉ france castex the republic on the move democratic movement radical movement act germany merkel christian democratic union of germany christian social union in bavaria social democratic party of germany ◉ greece mitsotakis new democracy ◉ ireland martin republican party united ireland green alliance ◉ italy conte five star movement democratic party free and equals italy alive ◉ ◉ luxembourg bettel democratic party socialist workers' party the greens ◉ malta abela labour party ◉ netherlands rutte people's party for freedom and democracy christian democratic appeal democrats 66 christian union ◉ portugal costa socialist party ◉ spain sánchez spanish socialist workers' party we can communist party of spain united left ◉ ◉ sweden löfven social democrats green party ◉ sources: own elaboration of original data; rooduijn (2019); taggart and szczerbiak (2004); döring and manow (2020). note: date of observation is january 2020. capati and improta 5 3. the fall of conte i and the birth of the eurosceptic-mainstream coalition in recent years, italy and other european countries have experienced turbulent times, particularly in the electoral arena (chiaramonte and emanuele 2019). the increasing levels of electoral volatility and the emergence of new parties have led to the formation of innovative government coalitions, reshaping the patterns of political competition. in italy, new challenger parties, such as the m5s, have obtained enough electoral support to reach governmental office. the 2013 general election and, to a greater extent, the 2018 election have ushered in what has been labelled as the ‘third republic’.2 while the former was an ‘electoral earthquake’ (chiaramonte and de sio 2014), the two elections’ combined effect was deemed ‘the apocalypse of the italian democracy’ (schadee et al. 2019). following the 2018 general election, many scholars emphasised the success of new challenger parties (bellucci 2018), the role of social media, new communication strategies (bobba and roncarolo 2018), and increasing polarization (bobba and seddone 2018). forza italia’s silvio berlusconi, until then the undisputed leader of the centreright coalition, was blatantly outclassed by the league’s matteo salvini in the intra-coalitional competition. the m5s obtained almost 33% of the votes, gaining electoral support in many areas of the country, especially in the south (d’alimonte 2018; emanuele and maggini 2018). the pd obtained most of its vote share from the upper middle class, thus overturning the class vote (de sio 2018). however, it bore the costs of governing and lost votes to the m5s. the outcome of the 2018 general election confirmed the italian political system’s fluidity (chiaramonte et al. 2018), bringing to the office the so-called ‘governo del cambiamento’ (pedrazzani 2018), formed by the m5s and the league, and headed by giuseppe conte. the formation of this unprecedented coalition government prompted a considerable scholarly interest. while some authors have considered the conte i cabinet as ‘populist’ and ‘nationalist’ (kriesi 2018), others have preferred the ‘sovereigntist’ label (fabbrini 2019). the conte i political experiment had a short life: the cabinet remained in office from june 2018 to september 2019. during the bargaining process, a coalition agreement was drawn up and then subscribed to in may 2018 by luigi di maio and matteo salvini. however, such a coalition agreement (‘contratto per il governo del cambiamento’) turned out to be ineffective in curbing squabbles between the ruling parties (conti et al. 2020). to explain the reasons underpinning the conte i government formation, scholars have emphasised the role of office-seeking considerations (gianfreda and carlotti 2018), issues related to european integration and immigration (giannetti et al. 2018), and the parties’ policy positions along multiple dimensions (giannetti et al. 2021). from the early stage of the cabinet’s life, its durability was constantly at risk, particularly considering delays in bargaining, and conflicts with the quirinale regarding ministerial appointments (marangoni and verzichelli 2019). 2 it is worth noting that in republican italy no radical regime change occurred. therefore, such terminology is often overused in the public and political debate. as pasquino noted (2016), political and institutional changes have not caused any changes in the republic, thus any new ‘number’ is not justified. dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 6 the increasing levels of popular consent obtained by matteo salvini in the opinion polls during his time in office ultimately undermined the coalition’s stability. in particular, the electoral success of the league and the simultaneous collapse of the m5s in the 2019 european election were significant factors in the reversal of the coalition’s informal balance of power. to exploit the large vote share gained in may, salvini decided to break the deal with his coalition partner and threatened a vote of no confidence against the government. this event led pm giuseppe conte to resign on 20 august, 2019. thus, as has been noted, internal competition contributed to undermining the already fragile coalition (giannetti et al. 2020). these incidents opened up the 2019 italian government crisis. while the league’s salvini asked the president of the republic to call a snap election, the m5s struck a coalition agreement with the pd, which led to the formation of a new conte government. the conte ii cabinet was hailed with relief and satisfaction by international and european political leaders (fabbrini 2021), who particularly welcomed the appointment of roberto gualtieri as minister of economy and finance (mef) (ansa 2019). table 2. features of the conte cabinets. conte i conte ii formation 2018 2019 deputy prime ministers luigi di maio matteo salvini composition m5s, league m5s, pd, leu, iv opposition parties pd, fi, fdi, leu league, fi, fdi minister of economy and finance giovanni tria roberto gualtieri minister of european affairs paolo savona* lorenzo fontana vincenzo amendola total number of ministers 20 23 technocrats in government (%) 30 8.7 left parties’ weight in government (%) 0 43.5 leading party m5s m5s number of ministers of the leading party 9 10 governing formula innovative innovative effective number of government parties 2.82 2.86 seat share (%) 53.8 55 pre-election coalition no no coalition agreement yes no source: own elaboration on original data; note: seat share (lower house); *until 8 march, 2019. although the prime minister did not change, the features of conte ii are quite different compared to the previous executive. table 2 shows a decreased presence of technocratic ministers in the government from 30% to 8.7%. crucially, the key cabinet capati and improta 7 office of minister of economy and finance went back to a partisan figure after being entrusted to a technocrat in the first conte government. moreover, despite the increased number of ministers and government fragmentation, conte was able to achieve greater autonomy by reinforcing the position of palazzo chigi, as displayed by the absence of ‘watchdog’ deputy prime ministers. table 3. party orientations (1-7 scale) on european integration and eu authority over budgetary policy party 2014 2019 eu position eu budgets eu position eu budgets m5s 1.42 1.28 3.47 2.21 pd 6.57 5.14 6.78 5.75 source: chapel hill expert survey trend file (bakker et al. 2020). note: strongly opposed (1), opposed (2), somewhat opposed (3), neutral (4), somewhat in favour (5), in favour (6), strongly in favour (7). numerous studies have shown the conte i government’s negative attitudes towards the eu (basile and borri 2018; fabbrini and zgaga 2019). such a government was supported by a ‘populist’ majority in parliament, as the two coalition parties took strong anti-europe stances before and after the election (pedrazzani 2018). with the transition from conte i to conte ii, italy witnessed the formation of the first coalition government between a mainstream and a eurosceptic party in its recent history. table 3 shows the orientations of the yellow-red coalition partners, i.e., m5s and the pd, towards european integration and eu authority over budgetary and economic policies in 2014 and 2019.3 interestingly, it emerges that while the m5s became slightly more pro-europeanist over time, it remained ‘somewhat opposed’ to european integration and ‘opposed’ to eu authority over national budgets throughout 2019. on the other hand, and in line with its pro-eu tradition, the pd favoured both european integration and eu power over national budgetary policies throughout. m5s support for ursula von der leyen’s appointment to the post of european commission president in 2019 is in line with its positional shift along the eu dimension. such a decision was not without consequence, as it led to party members voting against it and to subsequent defections from the parliamentary group. to defuse a party crisis, the m5s published an official blog post highlighting the vote’s strategic nature and its unaltered will to set their agenda in europe.4 in line with their continued anti-europeanism, the pentastellati tried to establish an agreement with several eurosceptic formations during that election campaign. on 9 february 2019, luigi di maio and other m5s representatives liaised with leading figures of the french anti-eu and anti-establishment movement ‘gilet jaunes’. after further negotiations, the m5s established a formal alliance called ‘pan-european electoral alliance’ with four eurosceptic parties: 3 the chapel hill expert surveys estimate party positioning on european integration, ideology and policy issues for national parties in a variety of european countries (bakker et al. 2020). 4 see ‘la verità sulla von der leyen votata anche dai sovranisti’, available at: https://www.ilblogdellestelle.it/2019/07/la-verita-sulla-von-der-leyen-votata-anche-dai-sovranisti.html. dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 8 zivi zid (croatia), kukiz ‘15 (poland), liike nyt (finland), and akkel (greece). due to an unsuccessful electoral performance, such a coalition was not able to form a party in the european parliament, confining the m5s to the non-inscrits group. 4. methods and research strategy this article adopts a qualitative research method. it embarks on a small-n comparative analysis of the conte i and conte ii governments, focussing on a) the political programme and composition of each cabinet and b) their budgetary policy in the framework of the european semester. the comparison aims to understand what approach the two governments adopted in relation to the eu, whether that changed in the transition from conte i to conte ii, how it changed and why. since research on party attitudes towards the eu has highlighted the importance of pre-existing ideological position constraints (marks and wilson 2000; marks et al. 2002), the analysis considers the cabinets’ preferences by investigating political programmes and composition. moreover, the paper includes budgetary policy in the framework of the european semester for analysing the relationship between the eu and national governments consistently with the previous literature focussing on the italian case (fabbrini and zgaga 2019). the period considered goes from june 2018 to december 2018 (for conte i) and from september 2019 to march 2020 (for conte ii), as the outbreak of covid-19 forced the italian government into continued revisions of its fiscal targets throughout the 2020 european semester’s second half. the article relies on both primary and secondary sources. primary sources include: official political programmes and policy statements of the two governments; the european commission’s 2018 and 2019 country-specific recommendations for italy; italy’s 2019 and 2020 draft budgetary plans and italy’s 2020 revised budgetary plan; the commission’s opinion on italy’s 2019 and 2020 draft budgetary plans and on italy’s 2020 revised budgetary plan; letters from the european commission to italy and from italy to the european commission; statements of the economic and financial affairs council; european council conclusions; the treaty on the functioning of the european union (tfeu); the sgp, and the treaty on stability, coordination and governance in the economic and monetary union (fiscal compact). secondary sources consist of: news reports; academic books and articles; newspaper articles; and existing interviews with eu authorities. 5. the conte ii cabinet and the eu: a pro-european turn? 5.1. political programme and composition after turbulent weeks of back-room negotiations between the quirinale and parliamentary delegations, the conte ii government formally took office on 5 september 2019. the previous conte-led coalition government between the m5s and the league split up over nominations to the post of european commission president (fabbrini 2019). on that occasion, conte and the m5s aligned with mainstream groups at the eu level in supporting former german defence minister ursula von der leyen. in an attempt to call for snap elections and gain more power, the league’s secretary matteo salvini stepped back from the coalition, triggering a government crisis. despite this, the centre-left procapati and improta 9 european pd joined forces with the m5s and replaced the league in conte ii. this ushered in the first italian ruling alliance between a mainstream party and a self-declared populist movement (barigazzi and brown 2019). the joint ‘yellow-red’ policy programme of conte ii was the first sign of the government’s changing orientation towards the eu. in his policy statement to the chamber of deputies on 9 september, pm giuseppe conte set out a clear pro-eu agenda. while stressing the need for a ‘more solid, more inclusive’ europe, conte conceded that rising economic and environmental challenges ‘can only be addressed with success, to the benefit of the national interest, if european institutions come out strengthened’ (conte 2019). in his speech to the lower house, conte framed the concept of national interest within the broader european governance system, breaking with previous isolationist tendencies. he emphasized he had been able to avoid two infringement proceedings on the part of the eu, and concluded that the wellbeing of italians is to be found ‘within the perimeter of the european union’ (ibidem 2019). the government’s new attitude towards the eu owes much to the role of the coalition’s junior partner: the pd. by the time the conte i government formally stepped down, pd secretary nicola zingaretti had already laid down the negotiating policy guidelines with the m5s for the upcoming coalition. as the pd made clear, europe was to be the undisputed pillar of the new government’s actions. the pressing challenge of migration flows and the economic downturn were now to be discussed in a spirit of open cooperation with the eu, ending the populist drift of the previous coalition. zingaretti stressed the need for shared policy objectives to be in line with the principles of liberal democracy and the european perspective. in particular, he reiterated italy’s continued ‘commitment and loyal belonging to the eu’ as a top policy marker (la repubblica 2019). the pd made pro-europeanism a precondition for joining the coalition partnership with the m5s. it was able to realise its ‘coalition-bargaining potential’ (sartori 1976, 108) on the european issue for its ‘clearance’ was key to ruling out snap elections. conte and the m5s found themselves faced with a choice between ending their government experience or giving in to the democrats’ demands. this seems to confirm our expectation that the pd exercised a ‘mitigation effect’ on m5s euroscepticism, urging its coalition partner to adopt a pro-eu political programme. if anything, the composition of the new cabinet further underscores the new government’s changing stance on the eu. as anticipated, the pd was able to secure two top government positions. roberto gualtieri, a long-time mep and former chair of the economic and monetary affairs committee of the european parliament, was appointed minister of economy and finance. gualtieri is an experienced brussels insider who knows european institutions and how they work. european central bank president christine lagarde soon welcomed gualtieri’s appointment as a ‘good thing for italy and europe’ (ansa 2019a). then european commissioner pierre moscovici also congratulated gualtieri, tweeting he was ‘looking forward to seeing [him] in helsinki and to working closely with [him] in the coming weeks’ (moscovici 2019). conte sent another signal of change appointing a pro-european pd member, vincenzo amendola, formerly responsible for foreign affairs, as european affairs minister in the new government. amendola succeeded league’s lorenzo fontana, an ultraconservative who set out to defend italy’s national interests in europe (carli 2019). dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 10 overall, the conte ii cabinet consisted of 10 ministers from the m5s, including luigi di maio as minister of foreign affairs, seven ministers from the pd, four independents, including pm giuseppe conte; two ministers from italy alive, and one from free and equals. following the new government’s first cabinet meeting, conte officially proposed former italian premier paolo gentiloni (pd) for the post of european commissioner. a long-time europeanist, gentiloni boasted very good relationships with both german chancellor angela merkel and french president emmanuel macron. after talks with ursula von der leyen, paolo gentiloni was nominated european commissioner for economy, and started his mandate in december 2019. days before taking office in brussels, he declared: ‘i am a patriot and i will try to make it clear that the best way to protect the national interest is to do so in the european dimension’ (gentiloni 2019). the conte ii government was hailed with favour by eu policymakers. conte’s political programme and the composition of the new cabinet contributed to reassuring supranational leaders as to the accommodating line of conte ii in its relations with brussels. on the same day as the government took office, the then european commission president jean-claude juncker sent a letter of congratulations to giuseppe conte saying he was ‘convinced that italy will be able to play an important role in addressing european challenges’ and will ‘live up to its responsibility as a founding member of our union’ (ansa 2019b). such an endorsement from juncker is all the more remarkable since it came from an outspoken critic of the previous conte i government. vice president of the european commission, frans timmermans, whose relations with conte i and its budgetary policy was at least as tumultuous, also greeted the new government, acknowledging ‘it is good for europe that we’ve got a government in italy that is clearly committed to pro-european lines and finding common solutions with the rest of the european union’ (timmermans 2019). the pd’s impact on the composition of the cabinet and on the nomination of italy’s european commissioner reinforces our ‘mitigation effect’ hypothesis. the pd’s ‘mitigation effect’ on m5s euroscepticism is also reflected in how eu authorities welcomed the formation of conte ii, despite troubled relations with the previous conte government. conte ii’s political programme and composition pointed to the government’s changed orientation towards the eu. however, in his inaugural address to parliament, conte did not provide any clarity as to actual budgetary policy choices in view of the italian draft budget due by october 2019 as per the european semester. the next paragraph explores the conte ii government’s approach to the eu with reference to its budgetary policy. 5.2. budgetary policy and the european semester during conte ii while monetary policy is centralised in the european central bank (ecb), eu member states retain responsibility over their budgetary policies. these, however, are integrated at the eu level within the intergovernmental governance framework of the european semester. a six-month cycle of economic policy coordination and surveillance, the european semester aims, inter alia, to ensure sound public finances and prevent capati and improta 11 excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the eu.5 with respect to the european semester, the european council (or euro summit for the eurozone) and the economic and financial affairs council (ecofin, or eurogroup for the eurozone) – two intergovernmental fora – exercise core decision-making functions, while the european commission deals with technical implementation, surveillance and monitoring. the european parliament is confined to a marginal, often consultative role,6 and the european court of justice adjudicates on inter-state disputes. to ensure that the underlying fiscal position of member states is conducive to fiscal sustainability, the european semester is based on three macroeconomic criteria, enshrined in the sgp and the fiscal compact. first, the annual nominal deficit to gdp ratio must not exceed 3%; second, the annual government debt to gdp ratio must not exceed 60%; third, the annual structural deficit to gdp ratio must not exceed 0.5% and must aim at a balance or surplus. to this effect, the ecofin may initiate, on a commission proposal, an excessive deficit procedure (edp) against any member state found in significant deviation from such targets. on 5 june 2019, the european commission released its country-specific recommendations for all member states. the recommendations were discussed and approved by the european council on 20 june. the ecofin later approved the economic and budgetary parts on 8 july, before the council adopted the final version of the recommendations on 9 july. the council’s adoption of country-specific recommendations on the initial commission proposal is the final phase of the 2019 european semester, and sets the stage for member states’ draft budgetary plans (dbps) due in october (start of the 2020 european semester).7 the commission’s recommendation to italy required a nominal reduction of net government expenditure of 0.1% in 2020, amounting to an annual structural adjustment of 0.6% of gdp, and the reduction of the general government debt ratio (european commission 2019a). on 16 october, roberto gualtieri submitted italy’s dbp, which planned a deterioration of the annual structural balance of 0.1% of gdp and a nominal growth of net primary government expenditure of 1.9% in 2020. the dbp requested a margin of flexibility to recognise the budgetary impact of exceptional circumstances, such as seismic and meteorological events, amounting to 0.2% of gdp (ministry of the economy and finance 2019). five days later, in a joint letter to gualtieri, the vice president of the european commission valdis dombrovskis and pierre moscovici (2019) asked for clarifications regarding italy’s dbp. they noted that, as it stood, the plan fell short of the budgetary policy requirements as per the country-specific recommendations, pointing to a risk of significant deviation in 2019 and 2020. italy’s response was not long in coming. the following day, gualtieri (2019) sent a letter of reply, reiterating the italian government’s commitment to the medium-term budgetary objectives (mtos) of the sgp. while 5 see ‘the european semester goals’ available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoringprevention-correction/european-semester/framework/european-semester-why-andhow_en. 6 art. 121(2) tfeu states: ‘the european council shall […] discuss a conclusion on the broad guidelines of the economic policies of the member states and of the union. on the basis of this conclusion, the council shall adopt a recommendation setting out these broad guidelines. the council shall inform the european parliament of its recommendation’. 7 see ‘european semester’ at https://consilium.europa.eu. dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 12 confirming a ‘slight deterioration’ in the structural balance of 0.1% of gdp in 2020, the italian minister claimed ‘the dbp then foresees a subsequent reduction in the deficit to 1.8% of gdp in 2021 and 1.4% in 2022, which would entail structural improvements of 0.2% per annum’ (gualtieri 2019). in the letter, gualtieri recalled italy’s application for a margin of flexibility worth 0.2% of gdp in 2020, sure that such additional fiscal space would prevent a significant deviation in the annual structural balance. on 20 november 2019, the european commission issued its formal opinion on italy’s dbp. based on the commission forecast, both the expenditure benchmark and the structural balance pointed to a risk of a significant deviation in 2020 and over 2019 and 2020 as a whole. the adjustment path towards italy’s 2020 mto was also at risk of significant deviation, and this would not change even if the requested additional fiscal space of 0.2% of gdp was accorded for 2019 and 2020. according to the commission, italy was not in the process of complying with the debt reduction benchmark in 2019, nor in 2020. overall, the commission’s opinion of italy’s dbp prefigured a risk of non-compliance with the requirements of the sgp (european commission 2019b). despite the clear warning, the european commission eventually gave the ‘green light’ to italy’s dbp, acknowledging the italian government’s progress with respect to the structural side of the country-specific recommendations and inviting italian authorities to take further action. during the elaboration of the commission’s opinion, pierre moscovici had already announced that it would not result in the rejection of the budget or the opening of a procedure (reuters 2019), as was instead the case with the previous 2018 italian dbp presented by the conte i government a year before (see further below). arguably, the conte ii government’s accommodating approach to the eu and its renewed commitment to the european semester’s budgetary policy requirements played a role in the commission’s decision not to ask for a resubmission of the dbp. while the dbp was not quite in line with the requirements of the sgp, the italian government remarked that it ‘dutifully [takes] note of the council recommendation’ (gualtieri 2019) throughout its exchange with the european authorities. moscovici himself revealed that ‘discussions with the current government have been much easier on the 2020 budget than with the previous government on the 2019 draft’, noting that ‘this government has a pro-european stance, knows what the rules are about and wants to be compliant’ (strupczewski 2019). on behalf of the european commission, moscovici appreciated italy’s efforts to foster economic growth and to respect the rules of the sgp (ibidem 2019). the outbreak of covid-19 in europe in early march 2020 significantly altered the normal course of the european semester. on 5 march, in a letter to dombrovskis and gentiloni (by this time serving as commissioner for economy), roberto gualtieri (2020) informed the commission of the government’s intention to deviate from structural deficit targets in response to the health crisis, while reiterating its commitment to resuming the debt-reduction strategy after the crisis. the following day, dombrovskis and gentiloni (2020) expressed their solidarity with the country, and stressed that any one-off budgetary measure in response to covid-19 would be excluded from the compliance assessments of the eu. after yet another letter exchange between march 10 and 12, and as covid-19 turned into a global pandemic on march 11, european authorities opted for an extraordinary measure. on 23 march, acting on a commission proposal, the capati and improta 13 ecofin (2020) triggered the ‘general escape clause’, thus temporarily suspending the budgetary requirements of the sgp for the whole union. importantly, the analysis of the conte ii’s budgetary policy validates our hypothesis that the pd was able to exercise a ‘mitigation effect’ on the coalition partner’s euroscepticism. the italian government took the commission’s country-specific recommendations and sgp rules seriously, showing a clear commitment to the european semester’s parameters. despite the fact that italy’s dbp failed to meet such parameters adequately, the eu acknowledged the conte ii’s accommodating approach to europe and decided not to ask for a resubmission of the budget. 6. a brief window of discontinuity: the ‘sovereigntist’ coalition goes to brussels 6.1. political programme and composition the italian general elections of march 2018 witnessed the emergence of the m5s and the league as the leading parties in the country. combined, they obtained 50.3% of the people’s votes and 56% of seats in the chamber of deputies, while the outgoing centre-left coalition which had supported the previous gentiloni government stopped at 22.85 and 19.86 percent respectively. after almost three months of tight negotiations, an unprecedented coalition government was sworn in on 1 june 2018 with giuseppe conte at its head. the m5s populist programme and the league’s nationalist claims laid the groundwork for the first ‘sovereigntist’ government experience in western europe. conte i was born out of a ‘contract of the government of change’ (hereafter, ‘contract’), which di maio and salvini signed on 17 may 2018. although several policy divergences emerge from an in-depth read of the governing parties’ electoral manifestos, their common ground concerned their adverse orientation towards the eu. indeed, when the government took office, italy’s relationship with europe became the most salient issue in the public debate (d’alimonte 2019). while downplaying their anti-eu positions during the electoral campaign, the m5s and the league later put euroscepticism at the service of the former’s claims about direct democracy and of the latter’s intention to restore full national sovereignty. the contract itself testified to the important bridging role anti-europeanism played in the governing coalition’s action, particularly with respect to budgetary policy. the contract envisaged the parties’ intention to boost economic growth through public investments, increased welfare and tax cuts,8 in open contrast to sgp rules. in order to foster domestic demand and support families’ purchasing power, it also hinted at an ‘appropriate and limited recourse to deficit spending’ (contract 2018). but it is with respect to the broader question of the eu’s economic governance that conte i’s euroscepticism became apparent. the governing parties committed themselves to reforming the treaties in order to exclude public investments from the commission’s assessments of annual structural deficits. the m5s and the league agreed to re-negotiate the eu’s multiannual financial framework (mff) to make it consistent with the contract’s 8 the contract provided for the introduction of a 15% ‘flat tax’ in a broader mechanism of progressive deductions. dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 14 objectives. they also set out to revise the economic governance architecture at the eu level, including monetary policy, the sgp, fiscal compact and european stability mechanism (esm), which were seen as ‘based on the market’s predominance over the wider economic and social dimension’ (contract 2018). the cabinet’s composition also speaks to the government’s adverse attitude to the eu (fabbrini and zgaga 2019). luigi di maio and matteo salvini took office as minister of economic development and minister of the interior respectively, in addition to both serving as deputy prime ministers to giuseppe conte. paolo savona, an anti-eu hardliner, became european affairs minister after his appointment to the ministry of economy and finance was vetoed by italy’s head of state sergio mattarella over fears that this could lead to italy’s exit from the currency union (capussela 2018). savona had widely expressed his euroscepticism in interviews, papers and books (savona 2018), going so far as to define the eurozone as ‘a german cage’ (rachman 2018). the conte i cabinet comprised eight ministers from the m5s; five to six ministers from the league;9 and five to six independents,10 including pm conte, minister of foreign affairs enzo moavero milanesi, and minister of economy and finance giovanni tria. it is to the latter that the government entrusted responsibility for the italian budget. 6.2. budgetary policy and the european semester during conte i on 23 may 2018, the commission published its country-specific recommendations, requiring italy to ensure that the growth of net primary government expenditure would not exceed 0.1% in 2019, amounting to an annual structural adjustment of 0.6% of gdp. it also called upon italy to reduce the government debt ratio (european commission 2018a), which had reached a peak of around 130% of gdp. on 4 october, in an unprecedented move before the submission of italy’s 2019 dbp, economy and finance minister tria notified the european commission of the government’s intention to alter italy’s fiscal targets, envisaging an increase in the nominal deficit to 2.4% of gdp in 2019, and an increase in the annual structural balance of 0.8% of gdp (tria 2018a). m5s members blatantly celebrated such a turnaround on the balcony of palazzo chigi, the official residence of the prime minister (fabbrini and zgaga 2019). the following day, in a letter to italy on behalf of the commission, dombrovskis and moscovici took note of tria’s update but said any formal exchanges in the framework of the european semester would only take place after italy’s submission of its 2019 dbp. they limited themselves to observing that the country-specific recommendations were unanimously endorsed by the european council on 28 june and approved by the council on 13 july, with italy’s consent. they concluded that ‘italy’s revised budgetary targets appear prima facie to point to a significant deviation from the fiscal path recommended by the council’ (dombrovskis and moscovici 2018a). on 15 october, italy submitted its official 2019 dbp, which confirmed the announced deviation from the country-specific recommendations the italian government itself had endorsed a few months earlier at the eu level. in a letter ahead of its formal opinion on italy’s dbp, the commission addressed giovanni tria in search of reasons 9 in july 2019, then minister for family and disability lorenzo fontana (league) replaced paolo savona (independent) as european affairs minister. 10 see footnote 6. capati and improta 15 behind such a significant deviation from both the recommendations and the sgp, underlining that the italian budget was a source of serious concern (dombrovskis and moscovici 2018b). italy replied on 22 october, recognising that its dbp would not fulfil the rules of the sgp while adding that ‘it was a difficult but necessary decision’ in a context of prolonged economic crisis (tria 2018b). italy’s obstinate approach paved the way for the commission’s opinion, which came on 23 october. the commission found in italy’s dbp a ‘particularly serious non-compliance’ with the country-specific recommendations in relation to both the expenditure benchmark and the structural balance. according to the commission’s opinion, italy was not projected to comply with the debt reduction target either. it therefore rejected italy’s dbp, and allowed the italian government three weeks to present a new one (european commission 2018b). this was the first time the european commission had formally turned down a member state’s budget in the framework of the european semester. on 13 november, italy resubmitted its 2019 dbp, which provided for an increase in the target for the sale of public assets to 1% of gdp in order to expedite the reduction of the government debt ratio. it also included exceptional expenditures of around 0.2% of gdp in 2019, 2020 and 2021, due to extraordinary events that exposed italy’s hydrogeological vulnerability (ministry of the economy and finance 2018). in a letter attached to the revised budget, giovanni tria reiterated that ‘the fiscal expansion decided by the government is confined to what is strictly necessary to counter the slowdown in the business cycle’ (tria 2018c). a few days later, in its formal opinion of italy’s revised dbp, the commission noted that changes to the previous version were ‘very limited, mainly consisting in a higher privatisation target for 2019’ (european commission 2018c). it thus confirmed that both the expenditure benchmark and the structural balance pointed to a serious non-compliance with the country-specific recommendations, and that the government debt ratio would in any case not decrease at a sufficient pace. along with its opinion, and under art. 126(3) tfeu, the commission presented italy with a formal report on the debt criterion, which represents the first step in the edp. the report remarked italy’s lack of compliance with the debt reduction benchmark, pointing to the existence of an excessive deficit as per the sgp. net of all relevant factors, the report concluded that the debt criterion ‘should be considered as not complied with, and that a debt-based edp is thus warranted’ (european commission 2018d). the economic and financial committee and the eurogroup also endorsed the commission’s report while welcoming the ongoing dialogue between italian authorities and the commission itself. after an initial phase of outright contestation on the part of government leaders,11 the threatening prospect of an edp, as well as fast-rising bond yields, pushed the italian government to give in to european demands. on 18 december, in a letter to the commission, the government said it was willing to intervene and adjust its budgetary policy in line with the commission’s opinion. in particular, it set out to reduce its net primary expenditure and to increase its fiscal revenue. given the circumstances, the letter was exceptionally signed by pm conte, along with minister of the economy tria (conte and tria 2018). the following day, the commission replied to italy, appreciating the italian government’s efforts to amend the draft budget consistently with eu rules. while 11 following the commission’s opinion of italy’s revised dbp, matteo salvini sarcastically declared he was ‘also waiting for a letter from santa’ (il messaggero 2018). dr. jekyll and mr. hyde? 16 remaining committed to monitoring budgetary developments in the country, the commission said italy’s announced measures would allow for a stop to the edp if approved before the end of the year (juncker et al. 2018). despite a last-minute deal between eu authorities and the italian government, conte i’s relationship with europe was pretty turbulent overall. born as an unprecedented sovereigntist coalition, the conte i government gave ample proof of its euroscepticism in the definition of its budgetary policy. not only did italy’s 2019 dbp flout the commission’s country-specific recommendations and sgp rules, but the government’s approach to the eu remained confrontational throughout the european semester. 7. conclusions this article has compared the conte i and conte ii governments’ orientation towards the eu. with an eye to the composition of the two cabinets, their political programme and their budgetary policy in the framework of the european semester, the article has argued that a shift in the italian government’s approach to the eu occurred in the transition from conte i to conte ii, due to the pd’s involvement in the latter. we showed that the pd exercised a ‘mitigation effect’ on the government’s euroscepticism, leading to a more accommodating relationship with eu authorities. in particular, we identified three manifestations of such a ‘mitigation effect’. first, the political programme of the conte i cabinet offered clear evidence of that government’s euroscepticism. the contract envisaged recourse to deficit spending and committed the parties to a radical review of the eu’s economic governance. by contrast, upon the inauguration of his second government experience, conte’s policy statements to the chamber of deputies pointed to a pro-european turn, emphasising the need to address rising policy challenges in a fully european perspective. the pd exercised a ‘mitigation effect’ by making pro-europeanism a precondition for joining the coalition partnership with the m5s. second, the unprecedented party composition of conte i earned it the label of ‘sovereigntist’ government as it combined two anti-eu groupings and included figures such as paolo savona, an anti-europeanist who served as european affairs minister. the later changeover from league to pd ministers brought with it a europeanist breath in the conte ii government. roberto gualtieri, a brussels insider with previous working experience in eu institutions, became minister of economy, while pro-european vincenzo amendola took office as minister of european affairs. the conte ii government soon proposed long-time europeanist paolo gentiloni for the post of european commissioner, a clear sign of the government’s changing attitude towards the eu and of the ‘mitigation effect’ provided by the pd. third, in terms of budgetary policy, both conte i and conte ii fell short of the commission’s country-specific recommendations and sgp rules. however, their draft budgets were received differently by european authorities. found to be in serious noncompliance, conte i’s 2019 dbp was rejected by the european commission in its formal opinion, which was without precedent in the history of the european semester. as italy’s revised dbp was almost unchanged from the previous version, the commission took the first step towards the opening of an edp against the country. by contrast, despite finding conte ii’s 2020 dbp at risk of non-compliance, the commission did not ask for a capati and improta 17 resubmission of the budget, appreciating italy’s commitment to eu rules. arguably, the two governments’ approach to europe played a role in the commission’s evaluations. conte i acted in open defiance of european authorities, displaying an obstinate attitude throughout its exchanges with the european commission. on the contrary, while not meeting the relevant macroeconomic benchmarks, conte ii maintained an accommodating line in its relations with brussels, and proved willing to adjust its budgetary position consistently with the commission’s requirements. this offers final evidence of the pd’s ‘mitigation effect’ on the government’s euroscepticism. understanding the causes of italy’s changed approach to the eu in the transition from conte i to conte ii may lay the groundwork for a comparative research agenda with a focus on western europe. comparable cases in western europe might help to explain how and why government reshuffles lead to changed orientations towards the eu. specifically, our ‘mitigation effect’ hypothesis may be tested on other governing coalitions which include both a eurosceptic and a mainstream party. finally, further research may investigate this issue by adopting different methodologies, particularly by using quantitative techniques. acknowledgements this article is the outcome of an equal collaboration between the authors. we are grateful to the editors and the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. we also wish to thank vincenzo emanuele, luca carrieri, and tiziano zgaga for providing us with helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. references ansa (2019a). ‘lagarde, gualtieri ministro? bene per l’italia e ue’, available at: https://www.ansa.it/europa/notizie/rubriche/altrenews/2019/09/04/lagarde-gualtieri-ministro-bene-per-italia-e-ue_d6ec5352-c268-415b-ac53-3e771e8c2a3e.html. ansa (2019b). ‘certain italy important 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(2018c). ‘italy letter to commission’, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economyfinance/tria_letter_to_ec_13_nov_2018_en.pdf.. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_2_ceron_zarra.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 2 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 2, 74–99. contact author: matilde ceron, university of pavia. e-mail address: matilde.cer@gmail.com women’s substantive representation in the pandemic: assessing the parliamentary debates on the italian recovery plan matilde ceron university of pavia antonella zarra institute of law and economics, hamburg university abstract during the covid-19 emergency, women have been largely under-represented in decision-making concerning the health crisis and the recovery effort. this dynamic complements growing pressure from women’s interest groups against the scarce attention to issues relevant to the achievement of gender parity in the pandemic. as a result, the outbreak and its response raise the question of the importance of women’s representation for the saliency of policies directly supporting their empowerment. the parliamentary debate on the italian national recovery and resilience plan (nrrp) offers a well-defined case for assessing the relevance of substantive representation in italy within the covid-19 recovery. position papers and proposals from women’s interest groups vocally campaigning for parity offer the benchmark against which we code over 200 parliamentary speeches for their gender parity-relevant content. the analysis compares the different prevalence of parity-relevant issues across women and men members of parliament (mps), accounting for ideological differences. we argue that representation matters for women’s empowerment policies, as women policymakers within the parliament, are those primarily raising such concerns in parliamentary debates over the italian nrrp. the paper contributes to the extant literature on women’s representation by evidencing a stark gender gap in the saliency of parity-related issues. 1. introduction he covid-19 pandemic has posed an abrupt halt to, if not reversal of, the improvement of gender parity in many domains of our society. extensive evidence has emerged of the detrimental effect of the outbreak and prolonged lockdown on women, who have endured increased episodes of violence and additional overwhelming care responsibilities deriving from school closures and work-from-home arrangements (adams-prassl et al., 2020; boca et al., 2020; mongey & weinberg, 2020; alon et al., 2020). from this perspective, covid-19 has been claimed to represent a tale of two pandemics from a gendered perspective (ceron and zarra, 2021). by the same token, women have been scarcely represented in the management of the health crisis and the subsequent reconstruction phase. henceforth, the pandemic provides a critical case to assess the contribution of women in putting forward parity-relevant issues in the policy debate. t ceron and zarra 75 the topic of substantive representation of women, through analysing to what extent the involvement of women leads to more equal policies, is particularly salient because of the unique opportunity offered by the national recovery and reconstruction plans (nrrps). on the one hand, gender parity and its mainstreaming are among the mandated guidelines member states are committed to in the drafting of national plans within the scope of next generation eu (ngeu),1 with the explicit acknowledgement of the additional toll the pandemic has imposed on women. on the other, the national implementation of next generation eu through the nrrps, mobilizes an unprecedented magnitude of investments, especially in a country like italy. as a result, the nrrp is well-suited to deliver substantial progress toward gender parity, raising the question both of whether such an opportunity was fully capitalised on in national choices over the plan, and the role of women in pushing towards such an objective. additionally, the discussion on the nrrp is a well-delimited policy-debate in comparison, for example, to the covid-19 response measures. nevertheless, the policy process in italy saw substantial changes in key actors with the end of the conte government and the inception of the draghi premiership, under which auspices the final version of the plan was submitted to the european commission. the parliamentary debate over the plan, while not per se fully reflecting the policy outcomes, presents a stable and distinct arena in which to assess the saliency of equality and its gender divide. against this background, our work considers the prevalence of parity-relevant issues among parliamentary debates on the key document preceding the official presentation of the italian nrrp. by manually coding 226 parliamentary speeches from four plenary debates between october 2020 and april 2021, we conduct a text analysis to study women’s substantive representation. the work scrutinises the main parliamentary debates relating to the three key documents reflecting the evolution of the nrrp, from the initial guidelines submitted to parliament by the government to the conte and draghi iteration of the nrrp. we derive the key parity-relevant issues from the position papers and hearings of women’s interest groups, proceeding then to code accordingly over 200 parliamentary speeches. the focus on parliamentary debates, in line with a stream of the literature on substantive representation (e.g. wängnerud, 2006), does not contemplate the impact of the gender of members of parliament (mps) on policy outcomes, but rather it measures gender gaps in issues relevant to parity raised in mps’ speeches. we then compare the saliency of equality measured by the prevalence of parity-relevant issues across the gender divide overall and within parties. on such premises, we provide descriptive statistics and run a logistic regression to assess whether the gender of mps and their political group membership play a role on the extent to which their speeches include any parity-relevant issue. specifically, we test whether gender differences arise in the prevalence of equality concerns and whether they remain robust at the party level. our hypothesis is that parity-related issues are more prevalent among the speeches of women mps, in line with the expectation that descriptive representation matters substantively. we choose not to refer to our dependent variable as ‘women’s issues’ but rather ‘parityrelevant issues’, as it includes all policies with implications for gender equality (e.g. school 1 next generation eu, the common post-pandemic reconstruction initiative, is an umbrella term for measures and funding sources, whose main component is the recovery and resilience facility (rrf) which finances nationally drafted nrrps subject to their approval at the eu level. women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 76 and early childcare intervention). in the same vein, in our analysis we refer to ‘women’s empowerment’ as ‘the process by which women gain power and control over their own lives and acquire the ability to make strategic choices’ and to ‘gender mainstreaming’ as ‘a strategic approach to policy-making that aims to achieve equality of opportunity between women and men in all spheres of society and to integrate a gender perspective into policy-making activities’.2 the analysis shows that women play a central role in advocating for gender mainstreaming within the italian parliamentary debate in the nrrp, corroborating the argument that their under-representation negatively affects progress on gender parity within the policy agenda. results confirm that the limited overall saliency of gender parity is driven predominantly by women mps, with a gender divide that extends to most political parties regardless of their different overall sensitivity to equality. the contribution of the analysis to the extant literature on women’s representation is twofold. first, it pinpoints the relevance of substantive representation in the parliamentary debate over the italian nrrp. second, it indicates whether and to what extent women’s representation (under-representation) may foster (hinder) the inclusion of parity-relevant issues within the parliamentary debate on the nrrp, supporting further analysis of the broader implications for the prospects of prioritisation of gender equality in the overall policymaking process outside parliament, as well as the post-pandemic reconstruction at large. our in-depth assessment of the italian case stresses how women’s politicians and descriptive representation within parliament may be crucial for advocating more equal policies. the derived implication is that women’s empowerment in the aftermath of the health emergency heavily hinges on women's voices and their representation. the work is in line with cross-country studies of gender equality in the nrrps indicating that against the objective of gender mainstreaming mandated by ngeu, parity plays a marginal role (zarra and ceron, 2021). such dynamics raise particular concerns for countries relatively lagging behind in terms of gender parity, such as italy within the eu27. 2. substantive representation: expectations for parity-relevant issues the representation of women in parliaments and other decision-making bodies is increasing worldwide (wängnerud, 2009). in the last elections, for a few seats, iceland missed the chance to become the first european country with a majority of women in the parliamentary seats (‘iceland misses out on europe’s first female-majority parliament after recount’, 2021). on average, as of october 2021, the proportion of women in national parliaments is 25.8% globally, with an increase of more than 6 percentage points in 10 years (ipu, 2021). this upward trend can be attributed to several factors, including (i) the transition to proportional electoral systems (rule, 1994), (ii) the inclusion of gender quotas in constituencies, and (iii) the early empowerment of women (mcallister & studlar, 2002). more broadly, the upward trend in welfare state spending as a percentage of gdp recorded in the past half-century also plays a role in achieving a more balanced political 2 both definitions are retrieved from the taxonomy provided by the european institute for gender equality (eige). see: https://eige.europa.eu/taxonomy/term/1185 and https://eige.europa.eu/taxonomy/term/1102 . ceron and zarra 77 representation: more welfare spending leads to a better socio-economic status for women, which enhances their chances of getting elected (krook, 2010; mcdonagh, 2010; rosenbluth et al., 2006; siaroff, 2000; thames & williams, 2010). a last relevant driver can be traced to changing social and gender norms which, along with increasing pressure from women's interest groups, have been contributing to the more meaningful participation of women in politics (wängnerud, 2009). when it comes to the theorisation of women’s representation, the literature traditionally distinguishes between descriptive and substantive representation, where the former concentrates on the proportion of women elected and the latter on the effects of more balanced parliaments, investigating to what extent the involvement of women in the war room leads to more equal policies and better democracies. wängnerud (2009) argues that the renowned theory of the politics of presence by phillips (1995), which suggests that women politicians are better equipped to represent women’s interests as they – at least to some extent – share the experiences of other women, constitutes the link between the two types of representation. to provide an example of such a connection, countries’ and parties’ implementation of quotas contributes to the enhancement of ‘the quality of decision making on a substantive level’ (celis, 2006). while the research on descriptive representation enjoys a longer and richer tradition, it is only recently, thanks to a greater number of seats held by women mps, that the scholarship on substantive representation has flourished, producing extensive empirical evidence. however, it is worth emphasising that the study of substantive representation is strictly intertwined with key concepts such as ‘gender equality’ and ‘women’s interests’ and their definition and meaning; hence any related study should also be evaluated in light of the connotation of such terms given by the authors (wängnerud, 2009). for instance, the very concept of women’s interests is questioned by some scholars, who argue that their definition should not be provided in a top-down fashion, but rather subjectively determined by women themselves (celis, 2006). all in all, however, any attempt to catalogue what women’s interests are and how gender equality should be understood results in overlapping lists of topics, ranging from the division of paid and unpaid labour, women’s exclusion from political and economic leadership, sexual harassment and gender-based violence, and family and social policies (phillips, 1995). because of such a context, the approach we follow in our analysis consists in inferring key themes of relevance to gender parity from women’s interest groups which, as further elaborated in the section to follow, contributed to the debate over post-pandemic management. when it comes to the evidence on the extent to which the number of women elected affects their interests, existing empirical works suggest that, despite a wide variation across regions of the world, there is a positive correlation between countries’ overall performance in gender equality and their increased proportion of women in decision-making bodies. a stream of the literature suggests that more elected women lead to significant advancements in policies that specifically concern them (schwindt-bayer, 2006; thomas, 1991), such as family policies (wilensky, 1990) or abortion legislation (berkman & o’connor, 1993). also, higher proportions of women in parliaments translate into more laws that benefit children (besley & case, 2003; lijphart, 1991). wängnerud (2006) investigated mps’ priorities in sweden across a 20-year timeframe and found that women politicians were more likely to prioritise issues belonging to domains of social policy, family policy and care for the elderly women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 78 compared to men politicians. observational studies from several eu countries show that the introduction of gender quotas was associated with measures supporting maternal employment and work-family policies (weeks, 2019). in the same vein, elected women are more likely to interact and have contact with women’s organisations outside parliament. looking at quasi-experimental settings that allow for the identification of causal relationships between women elected and policy outcomes, the evidence is still limited in terms of geographical coverage and does not follow clear patterns (hessami & da fonseca, 2020). the randomized assignment of gender quotas in india allowed scholars to identify the effect of women’s leadership in shaping policies in areas such as health and education (beaman et al., 2006; chattopadhyay & duflo, 2004). at the local level, research on municipalities in italy (baltrunaite et al., 2019), spain (bagues & campa, 2021) and norway (geys & sørensen, 2019) found no significant effect of women’s representation on public spending. two recent contributions, however, showed that instead of focusing on public expenditure, the impact of substantive representation can be demonstrated by uncovering dynamics within the policy process and looking at women politicians’ behaviour. in france, women politicians were more likely to draft amendments on parity-relevant topics than men (lippmann, 2020). at the regional level, in germany, a study analysing council meetings found that the presence of women led to increased discussions on childcare and the increased participation of other elected women (hessami & baskaran, 2019). conversely, however, opposite results from another stream of scholarship have stressed that more women in parliaments can lead to detrimental effects on their substantive representation. hawkesworth (2003) found that the increased number of women mps negatively affected the behaviour of men mps, who act as bottlenecks for the access of women to positions of power within the assembly as well as for policies favourable to women. in the same vein, carroll (2001) argues that more women enhance heterogeneity in the parliamentary forum, thus pushing other women mps to focus on other (not gendered) policy subjects, thinking that others will take care of women’s issues. kathlene (1994) found that as the number of women increased, men mps became more aggressive and obstructive towards legislative proposals by women. crowley (2004) pointed out that fewer women in parliaments can be more effective in representing women’s issues since they look less threatening. finally, other research highlights that women politicians may be more prone to work on women’s issues because men mps tend to dominate the other topics (heath et al., 2005; schwindt-bayer, 2006). hence, particularly in a delicate moment such as the covid-19 crisis, it is of sheer interest to assess to what extent women’s participation in the policy process is key to advocating for parity-relevant issues and gender mainstreaming. 3. covid-19 and its decision-making through gendered lenses the covid-19 crisis has negatively impacted progress toward gender equality by disproportionately affecting women, who have suffered the harshest consequences of the recession in areas that go far beyond the labour market. the pandemic has caused a reduction in women’s employment rates in many advanced economies, including italy, where a real ‘she-cession’ is taking place, with 72.9% of the jobs lost in the country in 2020 being women’s (lippmann, 2020). moreover, being the main caregiver of the household in a country where stereotypical gender norms are still predominant, women ceron and zarra 79 experienced increased care duties due to the closure of schools and childcare institutions. a survey carried out during the first wave of the outbreak confirmed that in italy work from home arrangements and housework responsibilities fell mainly to women, although men enjoyed more time with children to the benefit of more gratifying family work (del boca et al, 2020). in addition, by forcing millions of individuals to stay at home, the covid-19 emergency contributed to more domestic abuse, with a drastic increase in the number of reports to the police authorities and helplines: calls reporting abuses increased by 72% in march and april 2020 compared to 2019 according to the italian national statistics institute (istat). against the context of such detrimental dynamics, the scarce representation of women in the decision-making bodies ruling on the measures to contain the contagion and provide economic relief to the population, particularly in the early months of the pandemic, revamped the debate on women’s leadership and its substantive effects on policies. though compared to men they tend to perceive the pandemic as a serious problem (galasso et al., 2020), and although they have been lauded for their collaborative and collective managerial style (hong fincher, 2020; zednik, 2020), their inclusion in the strategic management of the pandemic was relatively limited. thus, similarly to previous crises such as the great recession (kantola & lombardo, 2017), the scarce representation of women at leadership levels may have impinged on the presence of recovery policies that could directly cater to their needs. in the italian case, women have been excluded from decision-making bodies established specifically for covid-19. during the spring of 2020, the former government chaired by conte established two main strategic bodies in charge of containing the contagion while designing post-pandemic measures. on the one hand, the scientific technical committee (comitato tecnico scientifico) advises the head of the civil protection department on the adoption of prevention measures necessary to cope with the spread of the virus. on the other hand, the committee of experts in economic and social issues (comitato di esperti in materia economica e sociale, hereinafter colao task force) was established in the spring of 2020 to lead the post-covid reconstruction. the former body was made up exclusively of men while the latter included 17 members, of which only four were women. the striking gender imbalance within the task forces led to protests from women’s interest groups and politicians and the creation of petitions and the organisation of flash mobs such as ‘dateci voce’, with which women from civil society asked the government to restore gender parity in the composition of advisory bodies. after the movement's appeal, the former head of government intervened by supplementing the groups with 11 women. the initial severe imbalance may suggest that gender parity and women’s representation in crisis management were not a priority for the italian leaders given the highly men-dominated 16 task forces convened. the only exception was the task force ‘women for the renaissance’ chaired by the minister for gender parity elena bonetti, launched by the italian department for equal opportunities, composed by a team of women entrusted with proposals for enhancing gender equality. these proposals put at the forefront women’s representation across all domains within the workforce – including in stem – with a pillar devoted to women’s leadership and its monitoring through an observatory on gender equality tasked with gender impact assessments and the women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 80 extension of gender quotas in a broad array of bodies (dipartimento per le pari opportunità, 2020). specifically, the task force report proposed five areas of intervention to promote women’s leadership, enhance women’s participation in the workforce, empower women’s skills in stem, eradicate gender stereotypes and promote financial independence. while these actions cover a wide range of areas where the gender gap is significant, the related areas reflected in the nrrp formulation predominantly concern women’s participation in the workforce and the promotion of female entrepreneurship. the entry of more women in the task forces contributed to flagging gender equality as one of the three axes of the colao task force plan ‘initiatives for the relaunch of italy 2020-2022’. in parallel, at the european level, while the mep alexandra geese launched ‘half of it’, a petition calling for half of the funds of ngeu to be devoted to women, the european commission announced that national plans would be assessed through gendered lenses: ‘[...] member states should demonstrate that the objectives of gender equality and equal opportunities for all are mainstreamed into the plan’ (european commission, 2021). these factors contributed to the saliency of gender equality within the public debate, suggesting there may still be a fundamental role played by women in voicing parity-relevant issues, which may extend to parliamentary policy-makers. 4. gender parity in ngeu and the italian nrrp against the backdrop of the gendered implications of the pandemic, the eu response offers a well-defined case for the evaluation of equality concerns in the recovery phase. following an initial period in which the member states were left entirely on their own to sustain their economy through the crisis and fuel reconstruction, and after months of divisive negotiation, a common recovery instrument (i.e. ngeu) found political agreement in july 2020. the programme, and more specifically its financing instrument (i.e. the recovery and resilience facility (rff)), underwent a lengthy legislative process requiring not only the green light of the eu institutions but also the ratification of the national parliaments. its complex form, however, is of value given that priorities – including the transversal one of gender equality – should generally direct those of all eu member states. gender mainstreaming has long been within eu policy priorities. currently, the gender equality strategy 2020-2025 drives eu policy on the matter, complementing mainstreaming with intersectionality as horizontal principles guiding its implementation (european commission, 2020). its objectives are five-fold. the first three – (1) being free from violence and stereotypes; (2) thriving in a gender-equal economy; (3) leading equally throughout society – reflect specific areas of policy intervention which can be summarized respectively as dedicated to the area of gender-based violence, economic empowerment and political representation. two further points – (4) gender mainstreaming and an intersectional perspective in eu policies and (5) funding actions to make progress in gender equality in the eu – reflect its implementation stage which, beyond the financing of the strategy, stresses indeed the two above-mentioned horizontal principles. such an approach has been included within ngeu. in this context, the commonly defined priorities within the ngeu regulatory framework foresee the mainstreaming of gender equality. the rrf regulation (regulation (eu) 2021/241) refers to gender in recital 28 which, acknowledging the uneven burden of the pandemic on ceron and zarra 81 women, calls for gender-mainstreaming within the plans. recital 39 likewise calls for the detailing of expected contributions to gender equality within the nrrp, which is also recalled in article 4 among the elements for the member states to include for the plan to be ‘duly reasoned and substantiated’. the italian nrrp, which was approved on 13 july 2021, requires the country to implement reforms and investments in response to the pandemic crisis. the plan is envisioned for the 2021-2026 timeframe and it is part of a broader set of measures, including inter alia ngeu and the european cohesion policy funding for 2021-2027. the plan revolves around three intervention areas, namely digitalization and innovation, ecological transition and social inclusion. according to the italian government’s forecasts, the nrrp will lead to a 3.6% increase in gdp and a 3.2% increase in employment. more in detail, the nrrp develops along 16 components. these components are grouped into six core missions. each mission indicates the reforms necessary to more effectively implement the measures. the plan includes 63 reforms in total, which can be divided into: • horizontal reforms, namely structural innovations of the system aimed at improving equity, efficiency, competitiveness and the country's economic framework; • enabling reforms, functional to ensure the implementation of the plan and to remove administrative, regulatory and procedural obstacles that affect economic activities and the quality of services provided; • sectoral reforms (included in the individual missions), namely regulatory innovations in specific areas of intervention or economic activities, designed to introduce more efficient regulatory and procedural regimes in the respective sectoral areas; • competing reforms, i.e. measures not directly included in the plan, but necessary for the achievement of its general objectives. against this backdrop, the italian nrrp considers gender as a cross-cutting priority within the broad category of ‘social inclusion’. such a role for gender equality was introduced in the last iteration of the plan, under the auspices of the draghi government in april 2021. in the final stage, the saliency of parity increased in terms of financial commitments. the first version of the plan presented by the conte government devoted only 4.52 billion euros to gender equality out of the 209 billion, which were deemed insufficient to address the gap. the draft was received with sharp criticism from women’s interest groups, denouncing insufficient funding and prioritisation of parity-relevant measures, especially in light of the detrimental effect and additional burden of the pandemic. the final version of the plan increased parity-relevant funding to 7 billion. specifically, it contains two mechanisms to reduce gender gaps. on the one hand, it envisages direct investments to stimulate women’s employment – for instance through a fund for women’s entrepreneurship. on the other, it allocates funds to sectors that are particularly relevant for women’s empowerment, such as 4.6 billion for childcare facilities. nevertheless, the evolution of the plan, which especially in the early stages was negatively evaluated by women’s interest groups, begs the question of the centrality of women actors in raising concerns for parity-relevant issues. indeed, such activism was widely present within civil society. while assessment of the impact of women’s interest women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 82 groups on the overall policy process is beyond the scope of the analysis, gender-based dynamics within the parliamentary arena offer a first well-defined step in assessing the gender divide over parity-relevant issues. as such, it offers the opportunity to evidence the relevance of substantive representation in the specific case of the italian nrrp parliamentary debate, with broader implications for the policy process and pandemic reconstruction at large. 5. research design: delimiting the corpus and the codebook the research question of the substantive representation of women in the parliamentary debates on the italian nrrp is assessed through a manual content analysis. the research design hinges on three key aspects in relation to the data and methods: delimiting the corpus of speeches on the nrrp, selecting the codebook of parity-relevant issues and identifying how to assess the gender gap in the prevalence of the latter. in the first account, the debate over ngeu and the italian plan within parliament is composite, spanning across the different phases in the process of delineating the nrrp and arenas, ranging from floor debates, a multitude of committee meetings, formal and informal hearings, to q&a with ministers and communications of the prime minister. for the research question at hand, it is of value to be widely inclusive in terms of the timeframe of the debate across the various iterations of the plan, presented in figure 1, especially given the changes in governing coalition. conversely, minimising heterogeneity of the fora and procedures yields a more consistent corpus in which to minimise potential bias linked, for example, to the specific policy domain and (gender) composition of a committee or actor in the case of hearings and q&a. figure 1. timeline of the phases in the delineation of the italian nrrp accordingly, debates are selected – with the reference document as an object – to cover all three phases across the senate and chamber of deputies considering: ● debate on the guidelines in the senate: relazione delle commissioni riunite 5ª e 14ª sulla proposta di «linee guida per la definizione del piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza» (doc. xvi n. 3) ● debate on the conti proposal in the chamber of deputies: discussione della relazione della v commissione sulla proposta di piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza (doc. xxvii n. 18-a) debate on the guidelines in the senate 13 oct. 2020 debate on the conte proposal 31 mar. 2021 debate on the draghi proposal 27 apr. 2021 eu greenlight on the italian plan 13 july 2021 ceron and zarra 83 ● debate on the draghi proposal in the chamber of deputies: comunicazioni del presidente del consiglio dei ministri in vista della trasmissione alla commissione europea del piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza ai sensi dell'articolo 18 del regolamento rrf (ue) 2021/241. ● debate on the draghi proposal in the senate: comunicazioni del presidente del consiglio dei ministri in vista della trasmissione alla commissione europea del piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza e conseguente discussione the resulting sample of 226 speeches does not allow us to overtly assess differences across the drafting phases or prime ministerships and related majorities. however, the potentially evolving cleavages imply that it is of great importance to capture within the analysis both the early and the late phases of drafting. the first allows for a broader emergence of parity-relevant themes that may have initially been given low priority in the recovery. the latter captures mps’ prioritising within their speech, either welcoming the gender parity-relevant content of the final plan or signalling insufficient progress. concomitantly, the life-cycle of the nrrp approval provides for comprehensive coverage of gender and party differences concerning the saliency of equality. against this background, the selection of the documents within the corpus includes the three phases in the delineation of the nrrp, namely the early guidelines communicated by the government to parliament, the first plan presented under the auspices of the conte government and its final iteration presented by draghi. the second step in the analysis is the selection of the codebook through which the dependent variable of the analysis is constructed, capturing whether each speech refers to parity-relevant issues. the codebook is generated on the basis of two levels of sources. firstly, the parliamentary dossier on the final plan provides an overview of how the transversal priority of equality is translated into practice within the nrrp (documentation services of the chamber of deputies, 2021). the document offers the classification of which measures are considered parity-relevant within the plan, as summarised in the previous section. the policy content of the plan itself offers guidance on the overarching classification of parity-relevant measures to guide the measurement strategy in coding speeches. we derive a complementary source for parity-relevant concerns by considering the priorities of the main advocates for equality: women’s interest groups. arguably, their position offers a hard test of parity-relevant priorities regarding the nrrp overall, as well as the least consensual components of a recovery catering equality, hence included in their platform for gender mainstreaming within the plan. additionally, going beyond the final policy outcome in the nrrp allows us to include within the coding strategy also parity-relevant issues which were not successfully included in the plan. the complementary approach is facilitated by the saliency of parity-relevant concerns within the policy and public debate surrounding the italian nrrp. indeed, women’s interest groups active in the arena of gender parity have participated in parliamentary hearings on the nrrp. besides, ad-hoc associations and petitions emerged. specifically, two key associations founded during the covid-19 crisis – il giusto mezzo and half of it – put forward a joint petition #unavocenonbasta (il giusto mezzo, 2021a) endorsed by a multitude of women’s interest groups. beyond such text, half of it (2021) put forward a manifesto. il giusto mezzo (2021b) developed proposals on the nrrp together with a technical (gendered) analysis of how to mainstream parity across all pillars women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 84 within ngeu. on this account, il giusto mezzo mobilised other women’s interest groups through a jointly undersigned letter to the government voicing those concerns and proposals, along with the parallel request of equal representation in committees dedicated to the pandemic and recovery effort. as mentioned, the lack of women representation in task forces for crisis management led to a petition endorsed by 86 organisations (dateci voce, 2020). in addition to the petitions and policy proposals, three women’s interest groups took part in the parliamentary hearings, also supplying written documentation to the committees, namely il giusto mezzo (2021c), ladynomics (2021) and ingenere (2021). because of such widespread endorsement of the key petitions emerging from women’s interest groups, their policy documents are representative not only of the position of the specific organisation but rather of a broader constellation of organisations promoting gender parity. the documents mentioned above and presented systematically in table a1 in the appendix offer the reference for outlining parity-relevant concerns against which parliamentary speeches can be classified. the mapping exercise delineates the primary parity-relevant elements within the plan along with concerns and policy proposals advanced by key civil society organisations. themes include: ● employment, firms with references to sectors and the crisis; ● services and infrastructures; ● social policies, assistance and instruments; ● investments and evaluation; ● youth and education. more specifically, certain terms related to the categories above are highly recurrent within the policy documents referring to the above-mentioned categories. the most relevant examples within the employment arena are women’s entrepreneurship/ employment and maternity, especially in connection to leave. another cluster refers to children, childcare and early education services, referring both to kindergartens and facilities for the 0-3 age group. a further arena is that of stereotypes, completed by terms relating to gender-based violence. on such a basis, we selected a coding strategy which delineates the near-automatic positive coding as parity-relevant of speeches containing the following terms, presented in alphabetical order in the original language: asilo/i (kindergarten/s); bambino/i (child/ren); cura (care); donna/e (woman/en); famiglia/e (family/ies); femminile/i (feminine); femminicidi (feminicide); figlie/i/o/a (offspring); genere (gender); lavoratrice/i (female worker/s); maternità (maternity); nido/i (nursery/ies); parità (parity); scuola/e (school/s); stereotipo/i (stereotype/s); violenza/e (violence). a broad classification which may be derived can distinguish across: (i) interventions aimed at supporting employment, both directed at workers and employers (ii) policies aimed at supporting care responsibilities, lessening a burden predominantly falling on women’s shoulders and (iii) gender-based violence, which remains, however, only a secondary focus within the position papers of the key interest groups and the plan. these themes and terms constitute the benchmark against which we code the parliamentary speeches as raising parity-relevant issues. all speeches are coded manually and independently by the two authors over their parity-relevant content to account for interceron and zarra 85 coder reliability, leading to an agreement of over 95%.3 it should be noted that the approach followed by the authors gives priority to the parity-relevant implications of the speeches rather than the mere presence of the terms potentially associated with equality. a glaring example is the use of a generally parity-relevant term without any specific concerns for equality. school, a particularly divisive element in pandemic management, is at times not mentioned in connection with the highly parity-relevant policy choices of closures. rather, for example, schools may be mentioned in contesting infrastructural and procurement choices such as the provision of ad-hoc desks to facilitate distancing. the choice of the authors – which always aligned empirically in the coding – was that of giving primacy to the substantive content of the speech, hence not classifying as parityrelevant those speeches merely using some of the above-highlighted terms in ways unrelated to equality. the final step concerns the operationalisation of the independent variable and controls. for each speech we account for speaker gender and party. excluding the two speeches by members of the government, table a2 shows the gender distribution of the mp who took the floor in those debates. overall, women mps within the sample amount to 37.5%, spanning at the party level from the lowest proportion of lega of 25% to the highest of 58% for iv. accordingly, the proportion of women mps within parliament overall and in each party is not necessarily reflected in the corpus considered for the analysis. nevertheless, the analysis does not consider the absolute number of parity-relevant speeches among women and men mps or in each party. rather, it considers its relative proportion comparing the percentage of women and men overall or in a specific party mentioning parity-relevant issues. accordingly, we analysis the data through descriptive statistics of the prevalence of parity-relevant issues across women and men mps overall and within each party. additionally, we employ a logistic regression assessing whether the emerging gender gap remains when controlling for the party of the mps. 6. results: the gender gap in parity-relevant issues the analysis reveals substantial differences across gender and party of the actors voicing parity relevant concerns. as shown by figure 2, the overall gender divide is stark and significant when considering a t-test comparing, overall, the proportion of parity-relevant speeches across men and women. indeed, nearly half of speeches by women mention parity-relevant concerns, while the proportion falls under 20% for men. 3 in one instance, a discrepancy between the two independent coding exercises was found. the term ‘school’ was classified as gendered by only one author, but then it was decided to remove it from the gendered speeches as the term was used in the context of architectural barriers. women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 86 figure 2. proportion of parity-relevant mps’ speeches by gender note: on the left the proportion of men (m) mentioning themes related to gender equality, on the right the proportion across women (f). the overall gender divide over equality speeches may, however, derive from crossparty differences in the makeup of women and men mps as table a2 shows heterogeneous gender balances within the corpus across political groups. indeed, the most balanced representation of speakers in the corpus clusters at the centre, with italia viva (iv) reaching nearly 60%, followed by forza italia (fi) with nearly 45%. conversely, the right has among the lowest scores of women mps within the speakers considered, notably, only 25% for lega and 32% for fratelli d’italia (fdi), respectively holding the two bottom rankings. as a result, the pool of women and men mps is ideologically heterogeneous, potentially contributing to the overall divide shown in figure 2. indeed, more women belong to the centre to the centre-left side of the spectrum, while less represented among speeches by lega and fdi, hence implying that the ideological heterogeneity in the saliency of equality may be at play rather than substantive representation per se. figure 3 reinforces such a concern, highlighting substantial differences in parityrelevant speeches across party lines. the highest proportion (above 60 per cent) of speeches calling for gender equality is associated with the mps of the democratic party (pd), closely followed by the left (leu) and centre. on the opposite end of the spectrum, the far (fdi) and centre-right (fi) obtain the lowest score for mentioning parity-relevant issues. against this backdrop, robust evidence pointing towards the importance of substantial representation in the making of the nrrp would be represented by a gender divide at the party level in the saliency of equality within the parliamentary debate. 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 m ea n of c od ed g en de re d_ sp ee ch m f ceron and zarra 87 figure 3. proportion of gendered speeches by the party of the mps note: proportion of mps mentioning themes related to gender equality across political party. figure 4 below shows there is indeed such a gender divide also across parties. with the sole exception of leu and the centre, consisting, in both instances, of a very limited number of speeches (9 and 4 respectively), all parties show a gap in the saliency of equality across women and men mps in favour of the former. moreover, the effect is robust to differences in overall sensitivity across parties. on one side, we have the party shown in figure 2 as the one with the lowest proportion of equality speeches overall (fdi) for which any parity-relevant issue is driven entirely by women. on the other, we have the party marked by figure 2 as the most sensitive to equality (pd) where all women mps mention parity-relevant issues in their speeches on the nrrp while that is the case for only half of the men. similarly, only 7% of speeches by men mps from fi concern parity-relevant issues compared to 25% of those by women within the same party. lega displays a divide that is somewhat narrower, amounting to nearly 24% for men which almost doubles for women mps at nearly 43%. moving towards the centre, the iv gap is more marked, with men scoring substantially below 14% while women reach 40%. conversely, the m5s is among those with the smallest gender gap with a proportion of 22% for men and only 36% for women. the emerging picture is that while cross-party differences are substantial, they do not alone drive the gender divide in the saliency of equality as gaps in parity-relevant speeches remain across women and men mps of the same party. 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 m ea n of c od ed g en de re d_ sp ee ch centro fdi fi iv lega leu m5s misto pd women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 88 figure 4. proportion of gender parity-relevant speeches across party and gender of mps source: own elaboration. results show that the substantive representation of gender equality in the context of the italian nrrp is overwhelmingly driven by women. at the same time, this is not to discount the remaining relevance of heterogeneous saliency across parties: men from the party with the highest prevalence overall of parity-relevant concerns (pd) – which, overall, mentions equality 67% of the times – display sensitivity for such themes more often than women in all other parties other than leu and the centre. nevertheless, the more worrying dynamic is that even within the context of a party that does display a sensitivity to equality, the gender divide remains well-marked and even larger than in some instances in which saliency is lower overall. in this context, it may be likewise of value to briefly go beyond the numerical comparison of the frequency with which women and men mention parity-relevant issues across party lines. that is, the themes themselves that are most common may likewise translate into substantive differences in which types of concerns are raised and the extent to which those are translated into support for policies fostering gender equality. specifically, certain themes, such as families, a generic reference to children and the call for support for increased natality is prominent within right-wing parties (fdi, lega), yet also in this instance carried predominantly if not exclusively (e.g. fdi) by women. in this context, references to parity-relevant terms – which do often result in coding within the equality camp – may at times align with policy concerns voiced by women’s interest groups (e.g. supporting families with children) while displaying rhetoric that may not be fully consistent with the promotion of women’s empowerment (e.g. focusing on improving birth rates rather than, for example, the expansion of care services or women’s 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 m ea n of c od ed g en de re d_ sp ee ch centro fdi f iv lega leu m5s misto pd m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f i ceron and zarra 89 employment opportunities). as a result, assessed through the lenses of concerns of women’s interest groups, the contribution of some parity-relevant speeches to advocating women’s empowerment within the nrrp may be minimal. nevertheless, against the research question at hand, the gender divide between mps in voicing such concerns, even in a weak form, remains. findings, hence, evidence substantive representation even in the context of low overall saliency of equality. moving to the opposite end of the spectrum, in the centre-left party (pd) more frequent reference to equality is paired with greater alignment with the policy proposals and concerns raised by women’s interest groups overall. an overt reference to gender parity, and its mainstreaming within the nrrp and women’s empowerment, is more prominent within the discourse of pd mps. once again, however, not only is the proportion of women mps raising such concerns greater, but also the scope of their support for empowerment policies is more extensive. women mps within such parties are more prone to referring to specific policies in support of equality, especially as regards the strengthening of care services and parental leave, as well as highlighting the impact of the pandemic on equality and the related need for intervention in the prevention of gender-based violence. as a result, men and women mps not only display a different saliency overall for equality, persistent when considering ideology, but the associated narrative and level of alignment with women’s interest groups also differ, providing robust support for substantive representation within the parliamentary debates relating to the italian nrrp. the characteristics and structure of the datasets offer a warning against deriving conclusions on the size of the gender gap. in line with the hypothesis under consideration, the key element of interest is, however, directional: namely, whether women mps display higher saliency of parity-relevant themes. in such a context, going beyond the significant differences in the proportion of parity-relevant speeches overall and at the party level reported above, controlling for gender and party concomitantly allows for robust conclusions of whether indeed such a trend is pervasive across party lines. figure 5 reports the marginal effect by gender and party of a logit model with the dummy reflecting whether each speech is parity-relevant as a dependent variable, and as independent variables a dummy distinguishing between women and men mps and a categorical variable capturing political group membership. marginal effects only by gender overall and by parties without distinguishing between men and women mps are reported in the appendix in figure a1 and figure a2 respectively. a significant gender difference is confirmed, as shown by figure a1 and table a3 in the appendix. the democratic party is confirmed as the party with the most sensitivity to the themes, with all other parties displaying significantly lower saliencies. when pitted against the pd all parties indeed perform worse. figure 5 highlights that the left-right gradient is not fully reflected in terms of sensitivity to parity. indeed, considering fi as a reference, the league displays a significantly higher saliency of gender. additionally, a gender gap emerges across party lines, albeit more markedly in some instances rather than others: at a 10 percent level differences are not significant only for iv, fi and fdi. women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 90 figure 5. proportion of parity-relevant speeches by gender and party of the mps note: marginal effects for women (f) and men (m) mps of the parties for which a sufficient number of speeches across gender is available. additionally, a brief comparison of the nature of parity-relevant themes which are more pervasive across different political parties shows that saliency of equality may not reflect the same priorities across political groups. an in-depth analysis of what we include within parity-relevant discourse may further discount the scoring of some parties overall and the contribution of men in more equality-oriented parties. as a result, further research is warranted comparing at a more granular level the specific keywords emerging across speeches. nevertheless, the hypothesis of a gender gap within the parliamentary debate on the nrrp is indeed supported: across party lines a higher proportion of women mps included within the corpus speak in support of gender parity compared to the proportion of men. 7. final remarks: the equality cost of women’s under-representation in italy, the pandemic has profoundly impacted women, who bore the cost of forced lockdowns and the closure of schools and childcare facilities with an increased level of domestic violence and unemployment. at the same time, while the race for gender parity has been halted by the outbreak, it regained centre stage in the public debate, with women’s interest groups fiercely contesting the lack of women’s representation in decision-making. initially, the country scored the highest with regard to the restrictiveness of its covid-19 management, putting forward measures that heavily penalise women, such as school closures (hale et al., 2020). down the line of crisis management and in the recovery effort, the prioritisation of gender equality in the italian nrrp has similarly been deemed insufficient by women’s interest groups, especially in its early iterations. 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 p r( ge nd er ed . s pe ec h) pd m5s iv fi lega fdi political group m f adjusted predictions with 95% cis ceron and zarra 91 against such a benchmark, our text analysis shows that women played an important role in advocating for parity-relevant issues in the parliamentary debate on the formulation of the nrrp. parity-relevant issues are mentioned in nearly half of the speeches by women mps while only less than 20% in those by men parliamentarians, proving that parity-relevant concerns are highly women-driven. although men mps are nearly twice as numerous as women within the corpus of nrrp speeches, they account for only 28 parity-relevant speeches out of 226. conversely, the sparser women mps account for 39 out of the 67 parity-relevant speeches. such an overall gender difference has been assessed in the analysis across party lines, indicating that it is not entirely driven by the heterogeneous ideological composition of the mps pool. at the institutional level, women mps were, overall, those contributing the most to the advancement of themes relating to women’s empowerment within parliamentary debates. albeit sensitivity to equality varies substantially across parties, the gender gap in concerns over parity and women’s empowerment remains and is robust to accounting concomitantly for gender and party of mps. our analysis based on manual coding of the corpus of over 200 speeches allowed us to account for irrelevant or biased uses of terms associated with potentially parity-relevant issues. nevertheless, our findings provide only a limited overview of differences in the content and priorities within gender parity-relevant speeches across men and women mps as well as party lines. further exploration of the corpus of nrrp speeches may be warranted to better delineate such differences. at the same time, in broad terms, the analysis already highlighted the predominance of women mps, especially within the centre-left, in raising concerns which more closely align with the petitions and hearing contributions of women’s interest groups, in particular concerning childcare and employment. the implication is that within the parliamentary debate on the nrrp, women played a key role in raising parity-relevant concerns, pointing especially in the direction of mitigating the most detrimental legacies of the pandemic for equality. the broader policymaking process – albeit beyond the focus of the research question at hand – further reinforces the centrality of women in promoting gender mainstreaming in the nrrp. campaigns of women’s interest groups over gender equality in the nrrp may indeed further compound the contribution of women policy actors to advocating for parity within parliamentary debates. a broader analysis of the whole policy cycle may indeed uncover further arenas in which gender gaps emerge over the saliency of equality. the parliamentary scope of our preliminary analysis is a limitation which, however, reinforces the need for further research to verify whether throughout the policy network women remain central in flooring concerns over equality. our findings of gender differences in advocating women’s empowerment should be read against a broader policy outcome within the nrrp. the overview of the evolution of the plan through gendered lenses suggests a substantial progress from the early stages of the italian nrrp. the improvement from the conte to the draghi plan is undeniable in terms of funding, growing from 4.5 to 7 billion, an amount that from the perspective of the interest groups nevertheless pales against the scale of the overall plan worth 204.5 billion. the resulting allocations for parity remain indeed far below the ‘half of it’ demanded by women’s interest groups. given the gender divide in advocating for gender mainstreaming in the parliamentary debate, the improvement of funding throughout women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 92 the policy cycle raises two further key questions. on one hand is the extent to which such progress saw the contribution of women policy actors and women’s interest groups; on the other, the extent to which the under-representation of women in the policy network – evident, for example, in the context of task forces – contributed to a prioritisation of parity-relevant issues deemed unsatisfactory by women’s interest groups. the contribution of this work is twofold. firstly, it confirms the peril of women under-representation for gender parity (hessami & da fonseca, 2020), with implications that may well expand beyond the nrrp and post-covid reconstruction. additionally, the analysis paves the way for further in-depth assessment not only of the saliency of concerns raised by women’s interest groups in the parliamentary chamber but also, more broadly, of actors within the policy network, of particular relevance given the governmental nature of the nrrp. in this respect, future research on the social media debate around the nrrp may help better identify policy-makers and interest groups raising concerns on parity-relevant issues, outlining their contribution to shaping the plan. additionally, further research may likewise expand the institutional analysis in scale – considering pandemic decision-making beyond the nrrp – and scope – providing a richer understanding of gender and party differences in the discourse surrounding equality. as a result, the analysis not only opens 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(1991). the impact of women on state legislative policies. the journal of politics, 53(4), 958–976. https://doi.org/10.2307/2131862 wängnerud, l. (2009). women in parliaments: descriptive and substantive representation. annual review of political science, 12(1), 51–69. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.123839 wängnerud, l. (2006). a step-wise development: women in parliament in sweden. women in parliament: beyond numbers, 238–248. weeks, a. c. (2019). quotas matter: the impact of gender quota laws on work-family policies. mimeo. women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 96 wilensky, h. l. (1990). common problems, divergent policies: an 18-nation study of family policy. public affairs report, 31(3), 1–3. zarra, a. and ceron, m. (2021). covid-19: the place for women in pandemic response in the eu. apsa preprints. https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2021-r44lc zedník, r. (2020, april 15). a shaken world demands balanced leadership. medium. https://medium.com/@rickzednk/a-shaken-world-demands-balanced-leadershipef140e658579. ceron and zarra 97 appendix table a1. corpus of official and interest groups’ documents used for the generation of parity-relevant issues organisation document type datecivoce letter camera dossier pnrr gender parity in the nrrp giustomezzo analysis giustomezzo hearing giustomezzo letter giustomezzo manifesto giustomezzo proposals halfofit manifesto ingenere hearing ladynomics hearing table a2. gender of mps by group and overall number of speeches in the corpus group proportion of women mps total speeches centro 0.5 4 fdi 0.3214286 28 fi 0.4615385 26 iv 0.5882353 17 lega 0.25 28 leu 0.4444444 9 m5s 0.3333333 33 misto 0.3673469 49 pd 0.3666667 30 total 0.375 224 women’s substantive representation in the pandemic 98 figure a1. marginal effects on whether a speech mentions equality across gender of the mps within the corpus figure a2. marginal effects on whether a speech mentions equality across the political group of the mps within the corpus .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 p r( ge nd er ed s pe ec h) m f gender of mps predictive margins with 95% cis 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 p r( ge nd er ed s pe ec h) pd m5s iv fi lega fdi political groups predictive margins with 95% cis ceron and zarra 99 table a3. gender of mps by group and overall number of speeches in the corpus (1) (2) (3) reference: fdi reference: fi reference: pd parity-relevant speech parity-relevant speech parity-relevant speech f 1.689*** f 1.689*** f 1.689*** (0.429) (0.429) (0.429) pd 2.766*** pd 2.926*** m5s -1.876*** (0.718) (0.735) (0.598) m5s 0.889 m5s 1.050 iv -2.219*** (0.706) (0.713) (0.736) iv 0.546 iv 0.706 fi -2.926*** (0.801) (0.798) (0.735) fi -0.160 lega 1.295* lega -1.631*** (0.802) (0.741) (0.609) lega 1.135 fdi 0.160 fdi -2.766*** (0.729) (0.802) (0.718) constant -2.566*** constant -2.726*** constant 0.200 (0.621) (0.649) (0.420) observations 162 observations 162 observations 162 notes: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. logistic regression including parties with non-negligible number of speeches. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 35–37. political scientists as public intellectuals: sofia ventura sofia ventura is an associate professor at university of bologna and adjunct professor at school of government – luiss guido carli of rome. she is a political scientist, with a specific interest in comparative politics, italian and french politics, political leadership and political communication. she holds a phd in political science (university of florence). from 1997 to 2007, she taught at the eastern college consortium composed of vassar college, wellesley college, wesleyan university based in bologna. she has held seminars and lessons at the faculty of political sciences of the sapienza university of rome, at the italian institute of human sciences (sum) in florence, at the universities of pavia and urbino, at the sciences-po paris and at the université paris xii. she has been a member of editorial staff of the «rivista italiana di scienza politica» (january 2007 december 2009) and from 2010 is a member of the editorial board of the «rivista di politica – rdp» directed by alessandro campi. she has been a columnist for the corriere della sera of bologna, the weekly l’espresso and the monthly magazine of il sole 24 ore. now she is a columnist of qn – quotidiano nazionale. she is regularly invited as a political analyst in leading radio and tv channels. ips: you are a scholar that is also an active participant in public and political debates through commentaries in radio and tv programs. is your public engagement a result of fortuitous circumstances or something that you deliberately chose to do? i would say that it is the result of a great interest i have always had for politics, which is the main thing that led me to choose political science as a graduate student. it is the same interest that led me to take part in the gioventù liberale and to build political connections over time. when you are intensively interested in an area, it is almost inevitable that you will end up working in it. ips: do you think it is possible to keep academic knowledge apart from personal preferences and political inclinations? and does it make sense to keep them separate? this is the problem for all scholars that want to engage and shape the public debate. what i mean is that, in principle, it is possible to be “objective” based on the technical knowledge that derives from academic work. however, the danger is always looming that we will use the same knowledge for serving the political convenience or political sympathy of the time. this risk gets magnified when vanity kicks in the motivations that lead scholars in the public arena. ips interviews sofia ventura 36 ips: basically we run the risk of quickly turning from useful to dysfunctional participants in the public debate? i think it is important to remember that our science is not an exact science. as a result, if we want to be “correct” we should not liken our knowledge to a mathematical equation. what we can say is that our knowledge leads us to make probabilistic conclusions about political phenomena. the problem arises when we try to elevate our knowledge to some kind of universal truth. when this happens, i think that our value to the public debate significantly diminishes. ips: well, let’s assume a “benevolent” scenario where scholars engage with public debates with the aim of contributing to improve them. what are the most important contributions that political scientists can bring to the table? i think that political scientists can really provide a useful contribution in a number of important respects. first, we can improve public understanding of the complexities that characterize political and social phenomena. specifically, we can bring in a systemic approach that helps shed light on the interconnections among the various parts of the political and social system and how change in one part affects the others. second, political scientists can alert the public and policymakers about the risk of unintended consequences that stem from political and constitutional choices. third, political scientists have a lot to say about the impact of public policies—and this is a key contribution. in doing that, political scientists can be of help in fostering a more informed public debate, especially at a time in which such a debate is particularly poor (probably not just in italy, but particularly so in our country). our methodological toolkit is also important here. for instance, when i write for newspapers or participate in tv programs—and at risk of appearing boring—i adopt the methodological tools that come from the study of political science. i can give you an example that builds from my work on political narratives. as public debate is replete with narratives, what i try to do in my public appearances is to show that these narratives are far from providing causal explanations and that more attention should be devoted to clearly establishing lines of causation when explaining political outcomes. ips: until now we have been discussing the contributions of political science to public and political debates. what about the other line of causation? in what respect does public involvement improve academic work and how? well, the first answer is that public engagement drains off a lot of resources from academic work! in general, however, more than improving academic work, public engagement with the world we study provides a deeper knowledge of it. then, of course, it very much depends on the research object. in my case, being immersed in a network of people that makes the political communication is of great advantage as i get close to the object of study. in a certain sense, it is a kind of participatory observation. ips: what is your take on the relevance of political scientists to the public debate? do you think that public engagement is a recipe for relevance or not? yes, i think it is. of course, getting outside a university class to the public debate requires personal inclinations and not all academics might be willing to do that. yet it is necessary to exit from our offices to comment in a newspaper at least. it is also necessary to bear in mind that when we address non-academic communities, it is of political scientists as public intellectuals 37 utmost importance to use different linguistic codes’ and make the results of our research appealing and accessible. moreover, this, of course, requires a lot of effort. ips: what about our relationship with policymakers and their choices? are we able to be heard, particularly as compared to academics working in other fields as lawyers or economists? a general problem in our country is that politics tends to rely on political scientists, economists or lawyers only at the point in which political choices need to be legitimized. policymakers do make a selective use of technical competences. in other words, they approach us already with an idea of what they want to do rather than with the question of how to reach a specific goal. having said that, for political scientists the other challenge is that we cannot provide policymakers with definitive answers on the courses of action they want to pursue. furthermore, we find ourselves operating in a cultural tradition that attributes lawyers’ pride of place in the management of “cosa pubblica”. ips: a not too favorable environment to get a hearing, right? yes, but the problems are also of our making. for instance, our quest for specialization risks denting the very contributions we can make to public and political debate. as the doctor that knows everything about one part of the body is not necessarily able to cure a fever, so an excessively specialized political science risks losing understanding about how political systems operate. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 * the views expressed by the author are personal. they do not reflect necessarily the position of the institutions in which he is active. © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 22–25. political science and the professions of political scientists: eu officials pierpaolo settembri* european commission hen a former student once asked me whether the phd helped me get the job i have today, i replied without any hesitation with a resounding “no”. now that i am given the opportunity, i would like to elaborate further on how, in my personal experience, an education in political science was important for my job as an official of the general secretariat of the eu council and then of the european commission. in doing so i would like to discuss both (1) the access to the european public service and (2) the daily work as an eu official. in addition it may be useful to say a few words on (3) how an eu official may interact with academia and vice versa.1 1. getting an eu job with a background in political science the way i ended up working for the european union has little to do, directly, with my decision, at the age of 19, to embark on a university degree in political science. at the time of making that choice the eu was hardly on my radar screen. yet, it would be unfair to say that this choice has not played any role, albeit an indirect one. my interest in the eu came a couple of years later when, as an erasmus student in sweden (uppsala university), i became fascinated by the academic and human diversity to which i was suddenly exposed. this was also when i was required to identify a topic for my undergraduate dissertation. at that moment, still under the influence of that erasmus experience, i picked a research topic that would have allowed me to continue to enjoy that european flavour. this is how i ended up writing on the party system in the european parliament. from that moment onwards – as a good illustration of path dependence – i never studied or worked on anything that was not related to the eu. yet that did not immediately translate into a job in the eu institutions. for about five years i continued to train as a political scientist specialising in various european topics. it was not at all clear to me, then, what i would do afterwards. i thus embarked on a master programme and then a phd programme as if i were going to pursue an academic career. however, as the end of the phd came closer, it became less obvious that i would seek a job 1 i am grateful for the comments and suggestions to earlier drafts received from alberto alemanno, samuele dossi, daria santucci, gianluca sgueo and martin westlake. the views expressed here are only mine. w political scientists as politicians and public officials 23 in academia as my ultimate goal. in the meantime, especially for personal reasons, brussels had become the centre of gravity of my life and as a result i started to look for opportunities there. having worked so much on the eu, the eu institutions became the primary target of my job hunt. access to the eu public service was (and still is) conditional on succeeding in an open competition whose main elements have evolved over time. when i sat that exam, the hardest part was a multiple choice questionnaire on verbal, numerical and abstract reasoning. the only part in which the education in “european studies” played a role was a subsequent written essay and the oral exam, which were specific to the field (european public administration and human resources). in subsequent reforms of the competition system, the specific knowledge of a field was replaced by an assessment of certain competencies, so that the specific knowledge of the eu and its policies became of secondary importance. to summarise, studying political science made me interested in the eu, but working for the eu required (also) other skills that i acquired separately. 2. working for the eu as a political scientist let’s start with the good news: far from being the dominant background, a degree in political science / international relations is common to many eu officials (approximately 15% of the total). hussein kassim et al. offer some interesting figures in their 2013 book on “the european commission of the twenty-first century”, including the fact that an overwhelming majority (69%) have completed degrees in either social sciences or law, with economics and business comprising alone 29% of the total (p. 40). based on my personal experience, i found my education in political science well suited for many daily tasks in the eu institutions. thanks to the wide range of topics it covers – from philosophy to statistics, from law to economics, from history to public policy – it makes you confident in many positions, especially those entailing coordination activities. in addition, with the recommendation for eu staff to change job after a certain number of years (usually five), a political science graduate is often considered well-versed to adapt to a new policy area and to new tasks. at the same time, many eu jobs require specific knowledge and training that no political scientist, however versatile and skilled, can improvise or acquire “on the job”. lawyers and economists, although appreciative of your efforts, will hardly take you very seriously in a discussion that concerns only their domain and will not spare you a condescending look if you ever try to venture into their waters. interaction with other profiles such as engineers and scientists is more sporadic but subject to similar dynamics. fortunately for political scientists, very few discussions are only technical or requiring just one kind of expertise, as there is always a political/procedural dimension that makes their point of view relevant and useful. a separate issue is to assess whether a person with an academic background in political science – e.g. with a phd and possibly research/teaching experience – is better equipped to work for the eu public service compared to someone without that same training. here again, the answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. based on my experience, on the positive side, the phd proved helpful on a number of fronts, for example to build a certain resilisettembri, political science and the professions of political scientists: eu officials 24 ence to stress, to work autonomously, to be rigorous on methodology, to have an eye for detail, to present arguments based on evidence and examples, to draft rapidly. but there are also limitations. coming from academia, i used to enjoy significant freedom, both of reflection and action. as a researcher, you define your own agenda, you can afford to have strong opinions and preferences on what you investigate and therefore you take responsibility (and credit) for your research. moreover, i was also somehow trained to believe that, if i wanted to write on any issue, i was expected to get to the bottom of it, read all that had ever been written about it and scrupulously reference the work done by others when presenting my own contribution. academia is a world where quality should prevail over speed: your work is only made public when it has reached the required standard level. this is epitomised by the long process to have an article published in a peer-reviewed journal. it is of course very different when you work for a large organisation like the eu whose aim is to deliver public policies and where there is usually strong pressure to deliver quickly. to begin with, however important your role, you are only one part of a large machine whose direction is decided at higher levels. secondly, you do not choose but are assigned tasks, such as drafting a speech, replying to a parliamentary question, providing comments to a new initiative that is being prepared. third, you are not supposed to feed your personal ideas into performing your duties. in fact, you receive guidance on what should be the line to follow when attending to these tasks and on that basis you prepare your contribution, which is then processed by your hierarchy. you may not even be aware of the final shape of the contribution you worked on initially. your gratification mostly comes from the recognition by your hierarchy (and possibly your aspiration to contribute to a project you believe in) rather than your external visibility. moreover, unlike what occurs in an academic environment, sticking to a deadline and consulting all those concerned is as important as and sometimes even more important than the actual substance of your contribution. providing solutions to problems is the key priority and, sometimes, extreme focus on the detail or on hypothetical issues may be counterproductive and unhelpful (and will certainly not be appreciated). “academic” is often said, almost pejoratively, about discussions that have got lost in secondary questions and are not helping to move a process forward. of course, these differences do not come as a surprise to those who choose to work for the eu but the transition from academia to the eu public service does require a mental shift that, if underestimated or overlooked, could lead to frustration. in other words, if you have joined the eu institutions because you were fascinated by the field of “european studies”, you may be disappointed to find out that not only does your daily job not entail discussing these topics, but that you may even lose track of the academic dimension of the eu institutions once you are embedded in their daily operation. you are so focused on your area of responsibility that you risk losing perspective. 3. interaction between academia and eu public service is it then all lost for erstwhile academics who end up working for the eu? not entirely. in fact, one of the most dynamic aspects of the scholarly production on the eu is the close interaction between academics and practitioners. over the years i have had the privilege to experience both directions of this relationship, with equally enriching results. political scientists as politicians and public officials 25 for my phd (i wrote on the farm lobby in the eu) as well as for other research work, i benefitted enormously from the input and the viewpoints of the many eu officials i met and interviewed over the years. i have always considered the exchange of views with them as an inescapable “reality check” for the credibility of my work. more often than not, they challenged the ideas and hypotheses i submitted to them. they provided plenty of examples contradicting or invalidating my suppositions, shared different ideas and offered alternative interpretations of the same phenomena. the more i was into a topic and i could reply to their objections, the deeper the interaction. today, as an eu official, i am equally grateful for the value academics bring to my daily work when they reach out to me for their research. the questions they raise often provide a refreshing opportunity to look at my tasks from a different perspective and to put them in a broader context. as most of the work in the eu institutions is highly specialised, an external observer is – perhaps paradoxically – best placed to identify patterns that cut across policy areas and to understand their deeper implications, which may be less visible to the insiders. the same benefits would come, of course, from regularly reading scholarly publications on the eu or from actively taking part in the academic debate through the many conferences and seminars dedicated to the eu. in reality, however, it is hardly possible to combine proper research activities with the ordinary workload as an eu official. personal interaction is a more convenient and common way for academics and practitioners to support each other.2 at the same time, there is a long tradition of eu officials engaging in academic activities, including teaching in academic institutions that offer graduate courses on the eu. there are also several examples of eu officials that present/discuss papers at academic conferences and publish books and articles in peer-reviewed journals. it is no coincidence that the first two books i bought for my undergraduate dissertation on the european parliament were written by eu officials (and a member of the european parliament): the seminal “a modern guide to the european parliament” by martin westlake and the popular “the european parliament” by richard corbett (the mep), francis jacobs and michael shackleton. as a former academic who strives to keep up with the academic debate and to carry out some teaching activities, i am fully convinced of the mutual benefit of the academicspractitioners relationship and of their virtuous contamination. academics and practitioners complement and improve each other in their respective endeavours and, together, they do a better job at understanding and explaining how the eu works than they would do separately. 2 the interaction between academic ideas and eu policy-making is of course a much broader and complex issue, which i cannot afford to address in any detail here. i would only highlight the many formal and informal opportunities offered to stakeholders, including academics, to contribute to the eu policy process as well as the evidence-based approach to policy-making embraced by the commission, which often relies on the contribution of academics for studies, evaluations and impact assessments. microsoft word pdf_issue_12_1.docx italian political science, volume 12, issue 1, june 2017 © 2017 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 12, issue 1, pp. 36–45. the french her system and the issue of evaluation catherine paradeise université paris est-marne-la-vallée 1. a historical overview the french higher education and research system is based on a double divide of missions, statuses and recruitment procedures. on one side, over 30 public research organizations – whose permanent scientific staff varies from about 300 to over 12.000 – differentiate themselves from higher education (he) institutions. on the other, the he sector itself is made of about 80 universities and about 200 grandes écoles.1 the structure of the system results from the french history of universities, which were suppressed as territorial entities then recreated as a collection of disciplinary ‘faculties’ co-managed from paris and settled in about 13 big cities during the napoleonic times. grandes écoles (named schools below) were created at the turn of the nineteenth century to educate state engineers on a very selective basis. a school of public administration was added to the list in 1945. business schools were added in the seventies. research organizations were built up after the second world war to face the weaknesses of both types higher education institutions in research. since the 1990s, various reforms have first incrementally contributed to integrate education and research in both schools and universities, then radically pushed towards building consortia or even entering mergers between higher education institutions. although interrelations between these poles developed over time and job contents to a certain extent became more similar, this historical divide remains. radical reforms occurred at the turn of the twentieth century, which drew these institutions and their evaluation systems nearer to each other but, although they experienced some convergence, they still remain institutionally distinct. regarding research units located in higher education institutions, no formal assessment took place outside the “associated research centers” (ura) between universities and cnrs, which emerged in 1965 and largely muted to stronger partnership in “joint research centers” (umr) between centre national de la recherche scientifique (cnrs) and he institutions (umr account for about 90% of all cnrs research centers at the turn of the 2000s). such units were subjected to a four-year assessment according to cnrs procedures. no other assessment was required, except by ad hoc committees for individual 1 this number refers to the grandes écoles that are accredited by the conference des grandes écoles among over 400 which deliver post-baccalaureate education. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 37 scholars applying for recruitment and promotion, or public research call for tenders. this state of affairs changed with the radical reforms of the 2000s.2 for its part, not much has changed in the evaluation of teaching. although rules changed several times since the sixties, recruitment and promotion in universities are basically handled at two levels. first, a national body, the conseil national des universités (cnu) subdivided into partly-elected, partly appointed disciplinary committees, is in charge of awarding “qualifications” to candidates on top of their doctorate (for associate professors) or habilitation (for full professors). second, local disciplinary ad hoc committees are in charge of recruiting single faculty members (paradeise esf 2010). most schools employ a small permanent faculty and a large number of high-level adjuncts who are hired on short-term contracts while being permanent members of universities, research centers, administration, business and industry. as in universities, the academic staff is usually not assessed after recruitment, except for promotion. evaluation occurs at recruitment and promotion only. should they not fit the needs of the school and students’ evaluations, their contracts would not be renewed. research organizations are the only institutions, which carry out a periodical formal assessment since their foundation. they evaluate both their research centers and their full-time researchers, usually on a four-year basis, based on partly peerelected, partly appointed committees in each large disciplinary field. as elsewhere in europe and in many countries worldwide, radical reforms followed, starting 2006, the incremental phase of the 1980-90s. the issue of evaluation had already been considered in the 1970s and more and more in the 1980s. yet the need to assess all academics, universities and research centers only became consensual in the 1990s (merindol 2008). consensus developed as a counterpart of a rising awareness that more autonomy would benefit all stakeholders of universities, which were still highly dependent from state authorities. in 1983, four-year contracts on research and teaching were first introduced between the state and each university, bringing the latter to be identified as an assessable organizational body of its own, able to strategize and plan its future and to argue for its funding application. the comité national d’évaluation (cne) was set up in 1985 – with little resources and major ambitions – to improve transparency on he institutions performance. an observatory of sciences and techniques (ost) was founded in 1990 to forge indicators of performance, with the purpose to progressively better support allocation decisions. the 2006,3 2007,4 and 20135 legislative acts ruled on the autonomy and accountability of universities. although it was at first perceived as a major break-through, it only granted a limited autonomy as compared to other european countries (eua 2011), but it did impel the foundation of systematic tools and methods backing assessment on performance, and allocation on assessment. 2 cnrs is the largest basic research organization. it is followed, in term of scientific staff numbers, by two targeted research centers, the institut national de la recherche agronomique and the institut national de la recherche médicale (inserm). 3 loi de programme no. 2006-450 du 18 avril 2006 pour la recherché. 4 loi no. 2007-1199 du 10 août 2007 relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités (so-called lru). 5 loi n° 2013-660 du 22 juillet 2013 relative à l’enseignement supérieur et à la recherché (so-called loi esr). paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 38 on the one side, a national funding agency, agence nationale de la recherche (anr) was set up in 2006 with the purpose to increase the share of competitive public funding of research, partially based on research programs and partly on open programs. moreover, the creation of a commissariat aux investissements d’avenir (cia, general commission for future investments) in 2012, stressed the importance of large competitive funding of many institutional and operational levels of excellence consortia of universities (idex), laboratories of excellence (labex), excellence facilities (equipex), etc. this investment program, which starts its third round in 2017, has already dedicated 22 billion euros to “excellence initiatives” in higher education and research across the country. on the other side, public authorities set up in 2007 an evaluation agency, agence d’évaluation de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche (aeres) renamed in 2013 haut comité à l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche (hceres). its main duty is to assess all components of public higher education in all fields and at all levels outside individual scholars (he institutions, research organizations, research centers and degrees). a (poorly) called “sympa formula” was elaborated at the same time by the ministry bureaus to translate performance in terms of funding allocation. it was intended to base a proportion of universities block grants (about 20%) on their outputs in teaching and research, in addition to the 80% based on their inputs (number of students in various fields, etc.). the internal allocation of university block grants was to be handled by the single universities themselves. 2. reception and impact of assessment the accountability turn accelerated the production of tools as a basis for resource allocation. in addition to the introduction of cost accounting, autonomous universities created their own management dashboards to back their strategic decision-making. the evaluation agency disseminated its own lists of detailed indicators on universities, research centers and curricula,6 in order to assess their organization, governance, funding and performance.7 indeed such indicators inform the assessment, which is yet based on the evaluation drawn up every four years by ad hoc visiting committees using basically few metrics. as far as universities are concerned, such committees are required to synthetize their evaluation under a set of dimensions, covering governance, leadership and management, and strategy in research, knowledge transfer, teaching, student life, external and international relationships and communication. curricula are assessed according to their goals, context, organization and results. research centers are assessed on six dimensions: scientific production and quality, reach and attractiveness, interaction with the social, economic and cultural environments, internal organization and life, involvement in teaching research, and strategy and five-years programme. 6 more units are assessed, where for instance federal structures or consortia of universities (and possibly schools) have been set up. 7 such as number and status of academic and management staff, organizational chart, decision-making procedures, etc.; attractiveness and placement of curricula; grants captured, patents and publications (based on a list of ranked refereed journals built up by disciplinary ad hoc committees), etc. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 39 2.1. reception of assessment and its consequences on assessment tools and processes is the assessment agency legitimate? a heated debate first developed about the issue of accountability. each discipline used its own channels of influence to seek better arrangements for itself. strong and politically threatening lobbies such as sauvons la recherche brought together individual and collective discontent, based on shared protest against the so-called neo-managerial or neoliberal turn in higher education. such pressure groups resisted the use of assessment tools as a basis for funding, and they claimed the need to adjust evaluation criteria to the specificities of disciplines. the most radical individuals and groups disseminated the recommendation to boycott invitations to join ad hoc committees or to resist english speaking in such committees. at the end of the day, they organized political pressure to get rid of the agency and its tools. collectively, the attractiveness of protest varied depending on how much assessment was individually and collectively considered as a threat. collectively, the less accessible the fields to international journal rankings – either because they belong to “non-nomothetic fields” such as the social sciences and humanities (passeron 1991) or because they deal with professional knowledge as in law studies, accounting and engineering prone to pragmatic knowledge rather than academic publications – the more threatened they felt. individually, the more scholars cumulated disadvantages such as being low-publishers and having lower academic statuses, the more they were likely to reject the assessmentdriven model. the more disturbing reforms for the social exchange model they had built up with their own university, the more they were likely to raise their voice (table 1). table 1. contributions of scholars, expected returns and reception of assessment. the assessment frame evolved over time under such pressures, but the general rationale of the reform remained untouched. indeed the assessment agency (aeres) was theoretically discontinued to comply with lobbies during the 2012 presidential campaign, but was practically immediately reopened under the 2013 esr act with a new name (hceres) and with a slightly renewed legal status, which kept though almost exactly the same jurisdiction as before. paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 40 what should be assessed at the national level? one first struggle about assessment concerned the selections of entities to be assessed by aeres/hceres. each institutional actor – research organizations, the university system and schools – argued that it already implemented its own individual assessment. their coalition, backed by individual scholars, led to finally leave them out of reach. the same fight occurred on research centres, but it was unsuccessful. it was indeed a major stake for the government to arrange uniform tools allowing for the development of research incentives, whether or not associated with any public research organizations. by linking part of block grants to the university outputs in research as measured by formal indicators such as number of patents and rates of publications in so-called best international journals, it was supposed to encourage individual scholars to improve their own performance and good research centers and universities to select best-performing scholars. the development of research performance-based funding, however limited it actually remained, disrupted the traditional allocation scheme, by making it clear which centers and universities concentrated good publishers and which did not, thus reconsidering their bases of reputation (paradeise and thoenig 2015). many scholars – individual academics or subgroups – felt they might be stigmatized as low research-performers. they also feared that such uniform indicators, which might not fit their ways of publicizing their research, would erode their disciplinary and cultural specificities and ostracize their field, by for instance favoring journals against books or memoires, and english-written publications against their native language. such reactions mostly took place among lowor nonpublishers, and among humanities and social scientists. should assessment by made public and how? making assessment reports and ratings public was a major change introduced with the creation of aeres. used to shame or, rather, legitimize policies and funding, no one in the same field or in the same institution could ignore the comparative performance of research units or institutions. this would allegedly help the state decide upon resource allocation across universities, universities decide upon resource allocation between its sub-units, research groups and departments strategize8 in order to try get rid of nonpublishers or improve their scores through better recruitments, etc. academics feared a mechanical implementation of scoring on decision-making, while management dashboards could be used in many other ways, for instance to reinforce a poorly performing discipline which, for some reason, was considered important by a given university. protest denounced the illegitimacy of such publicity. for these reasons, they first opposed synthetic scores on a scale of five, (from a to e) which the visiting committees were required to deliver. soon after the first round of assessment, the agency decided to buckle under this pressure and reconsidered ratings as a list of itemized non-additive scores on each of the dimensions under evaluation. finally, it was invited to totally renounce and frankly discontinue any form of scoring. 8 we have shown elsewhere how much the strategizing capacity varies from one place to the other within a single country (thoenig and paradeise 2016). the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 41 how should journals be assessed? one important issue emerged that was about the ranking of journals in certain fields, which feared inadequacy of the uniform criteria applied in assessing publication performance (table 2). “there is a classification of journals in natural and life sciences… (which is) mostly based on english-written journals. such a classification does not exist in the social sciences and humanities. and it seems to poorly fit academic outputs in these fields, largely french-written” (glaudes 2014). as a result, the behavior of disciplinary communities varied widely about the injunction to list reference journals in their field and even rate them on a three steps scale. table 2. disciplinary publication cultures. certain disciplines, such as economy or management, simply replicated lists built elsewhere, for instance by public research organizations or international newspapers such as the financial times. others, such as law, built up their own list, based on the empirical signals of reputation established by their representative authorities. others used their own indicators without any effort to link them with those of others. philosophers defined for instance their own four specific criteria (requirement to principally publish articles in philosophy, existence of a scientific committee and an editorial board, including nonfrench members, doubleblind evaluation, selectiveness). on top of similar criteria, communication scientists added up a list of other items such as regularity of publication and size of articles, restriction of auto-publication, institutional links with the discipline and indexation in international databases.9 methodological diversity added up to differences in the established lists. several disciplinary committees in the field of arts, social sciences and humanities (for instance in sociology, political science, theology, philosophy, anthropology, geography and urban planning, history, arts and law studies) simply refused to set up journal rankings. some contributed by listing journals that belonged to their scientific perimeter. they promised to, and did progressively develop their own rankings (communication studies, psychology), each with its own scale. finally, a series of disciplines (concentrating in languages, literature and civilizations) totally rejected the very notion of a list, arguing that they were irrelevant in their field. the aeres finally took notice of this resistance and, since 2010, started rebuilding the lists, including other items based on a more cautious typology of media, such as scien 9 see online http://www.aeres-evaluation.fr/publications/methodologie-de-l-evaluation/listes-derevues-shs-de-l-aeres. paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 42 tific books (based on publishers, signatures, purposes and editorial work). it made it clear that it did not favor quantitative evaluation but followed the moderate recommendations of the french academy of science10 by more generally restricting the use of bibliometrics to the assessment of entities which size exceeds 30 scholars, and systematically referring bibliometric results to their average values and to the 10% top values in a given field. in addition, experts – who are always peers in the fields under assessment – were invited to be cautious about possible biases of such results. thus aeres fostered a non-mechanic use of bibliometric indicators and insisted that they should be contextualized and interpreted, and should not replace the reading of papers in order to assess their actual scientific interest. what should be the performance of a “publisher”? lobbies paid attention to the norm set up to define what to be a “publisher” means. they also insisted that this norm should vary according to the publication tradition of each field. they worked at lowering the threshold and finally ended up in the social sciences and humanities accepting a (very) light norm of 4 articles for a full-time researcher or 2 articles for a professor in a four-year period, with indeed very little variation from one field to the other. overall strength of assessment in france to tell the truth, protesters over-emphasized the threats of assessment, at least during the current stage of reforms. on the one hand, a recent eua survey shows that the impact of evaluation of teaching is comparatively very low in france (table 3). on the other hand, research outputs are regularly assessed, have gained influence on recruitment and promotion, but have no impact whatsoever on tenure and salaries of academics who remain civil servants paid according to a fixed national grid of statuses. table 3. how much is assessment actually developed in france? (source: eau) in addition, the impact of evaluation by the assessment agency on resource allocation remains limited. yet, other forms of evaluation play a major role in differentiating individuals, research centers and universities in the competition for grants. 10 see online http://www.academiesciences.fr/activite/rapport/avis170111.pdf. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 43 2.2. the impact of assessment on funding the impact of aeres/hceres performance evaluation by assessment agencies was developed as a tool of accountability for a better governance of the new autonomous universities. it justified building all sorts of indicators intended to inform the sympa formulae mentioned above. this topdown tool however remained ineffective until 2017. first, it took time to set up the required databases. second, many universities considered that a top-down approach to the building of indicators would not be able to capture their actual performance. third, in a context of stability and even reduction of higher education public budgets, the government did not dare bypassing the established distribution of block grants. in other words, the topdown approach, which prevailed in the sympa formulae as a link between performance and allocation, was discarded almost as soon as it was created. starting in 2016, a new bottom-up approach by sector, developed with the collaboration of her institutions, is supposed to design a new formula that should better fit the specificities of each field. to put it in a nutshell, the output-based assessment by aeres/hceres has since its foundation proved rather ineffective operationally. nevertheless, its symbolic impact has been enormous by making publicly known the strengths and weaknesses of units and subunits in the system of he and research, by fostering strategic moves at each level, by setting up the issue of publication and by insisting on its contribution to the missions of academics, etc. the impact of anr and cia on the contrary, the development of project-based grants over the last ten years has had major operational impacts on the dynamics of universities, research centers and to a certain extent individual careers, first with the funding of research projects by anr programs and increasingly with the substantial sums supplied by the cia institutional excellence initiatives. three waves of funding have been set up since 2012, covering a variety of large projects involving not only research but also the founding of new institutional bodies – laboratories of excellence (labex), excellence facilities (equipex), excellence institutions (idex). the cia program progressively diversified it funding streams, which now include innovation in teaching as well as incentives targeting the development of specific niches of excellence within universities with the initiatives science-innovationterritoires-economie (i-site). the international high-level evaluation committee pays much attention to the relevance of projects in scientific and operational terms but also to their feasibility in terms of governance. the important resources procured by such programs operate as very strong incentives that also encourage the development of projectbased consortia and even mergers between research centers, departments, universities and schools. the cia programs have thus come to play a key role in the current on-going stratification of french higher education and the restructuring of the national landscape, both at the institutional level and between and within disciplines. by concentrating important resources on specific territories, these programs favor the visibility and attractiveness of certain universities or certain niches within universities. paradeise, the french her system and the issue of evaluation 44 2.3. the impact of assessment on the profession the development of assessment has provided a rationale for the redistribution of resources between universities and between disciplines. it may not have had much impact upon individual salaries and national careers of academics, who remain civil servants, but it has positively changed working conditions of the best-performing units, whatever the discipline. altogether, humanities and social sciences have received less budgetary resources than hard sciences, partly because they display lower needs than experimental sciences, partly because assessment tools too often have difficulties grasping their specificities. but, as shown by the relative growth of their memberships, being in line with the massification of higher education in a non-selective system, they have not been ostracized as such (table 4). table 4. size of permanent academic staff by discipline. 1992-2013 (source: dgrh, french ministry of higher education and research), mentioning the position of political science and the highest and smallest growth in each large field. yet, political scientists have been impacted, as have other scholars especially in the social sciences and humanities. the development of performance-based assessment, however limited if compared to some other european countries, has revealed a more visible hierarchy between scholars. reputations and statuses have been tested by performance as measured by “excellence” metrics (paradeise and thoenig 2015). the worldwide generalization of accountability is segmenting the academic population, building up a pecking order between first-class and second-class scholars, publishers and non-publishers, members of top, secondand third-tier institutions. as stratification between universities increases, one may expect that the best-rated departments and/or universities will increasingly attract firstclass scholars, who are also chased on the international market and whose salaries may become much more flexible and substantial. two labor markets are thus being created. roughly speaking and with several exceptions, the international one increasingly takes care of the “stars” while the national one takes care of the others. since french civil servants’ salaries are all but competitive, institutional reputation will not be enough in the future to prevent more academics to leave the country, a tendency already confirmed by a still limited but increasing trend among younger scholars. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 45 3. conclusion: pros and cons of research assessment when considered at the systemic level, the obsession of he policies to make french universities “visible from shanghai” could endanger universities and departments which have no hope of accessing the walhalla of world excellence, but place a major emphasis on the higher education of large segments of the young population. thus, france should remain cautious not to concentrate evaluation solely on cutting-edge research. as other european countries, it should take care to preserve and encourage the many and varied “excellences” that are needed to face the various missions of universities. for all these reasons, it is difficult to sum up and provide a uniform overall assessment of research assessment in france. the reception of assessment mostly co-varies with the opportunities it provides and the threats it involves for universities, faculties, research centers and individuals. the analysis of such opportunities and threats does not identify disciplines and scholars that would uniformly be the losers or the winners of the new rules of the academic game but rather cuts across all of them (table 5). table 5. reception and impact of assessment in france. a synthesis. references du bon usage de la bibliométrie pour l’évaluation individuelle des chercheurs, académie des sciences, janvier 2011. glaudes, p. 2014. l’évaluation de la production scientifique en france par l’agence d’évaluation de la recherche et de l’enseignement supérieur?, mélanges de la casa de velázquez, 2, tome 44, 293-300. merindol 2008 mérindol j.-y. 2008. comment l’évaluation est arrivée dans les universités françaises, revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 55-4bis, 7-27. passeron j.-cl. 1991. le raisonnement sociologique. l’espace non-poppérien du raisonnement naturel, paris, nathan essais et recherches. paradeise c. 2011. 2011. higher education careers in the french public sector, permanence and change, in avedduto s. (ed.), convergence or differentiation. human resources for research in a changing european scenario, scriptweb: napoli, 159-184. paradeise and thoenig 2015. in search of academic quality, london: palgrave-macmillan. thoenig j.-c. and paradeise c. 2016. the strategic capacity of academic institutions, minerva, 54(3), 293-324. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 24–30. young women’s subjectivities and new feminisms in the neo-liberal age carmen leccardi università di milano bicocca he generations of young women raised between the last decade of last century and this century inherited from second wave feminism (the feminism of the 1960s and 1970s), the expression of subjectivity as a taken for granted right. nonetheless, there are important differences between the ways in which women who considered themselves a part of the second wave of the feminist movement used this right and its dynamics today, in a time when the neo-liberal values of the market and of individualization, of the emphasis on freedom of choice and enjoyment, redefine the meaning of agency (and of the political) for everyone, but for young women in a special way. for women in the 1970s, expressing their own subjectivity was first of all a political issue as it was able to bring the dominant social roles back into question (ferree and hess 2000; bertolotti and scattigno 2005), but new scenarios take shape for women in younger generations. the following notes are intended to pause upon these transformations, to draw attention to the importance of placing the subjectivity and ambivalences its expression entails at the center of analysis.1 subjectivity and the women’s movement while identity is an issue viewed as part of social sciences’ tradition, and gender identities were analyzed and widely debated in the late 20th century, subjectivity has usually remained excluded from this analysis. analyses of modernity have focused on the triumph of rationality and disenchantment, marginalizing the subjective dimension. in this frame, subjectivity is generally considered as the equivalent of the subject’s intimate dimension, a manifestation of its consciousness, and therefore stripped of any social meanings. according to martuccelli (2002, 437), on the contrary, subjectivity and the social world are strictly connected as the first is “marked by the ideal of a domain of self subtracted to the social”. in other words, subjectivity is fully expressed where public identities are brought into question. this dynamic, and the significant role it plays in creatively reworking existing 1 the writer is scientific director of the interuniversity centre for women’s studies “culture di genere” (“gender cultures”) at the university of milan-bicocca. since it was founded in 2013, the centre has promoted a systemic reflection on the daily lives of women from different generations, with particular attention focused on the relationship between forms of subjectivity and public space. t gender and politics 25 social conditions, rose to the fore with the movements of the 1960s and 1970s—the students’ movement and feminism in particular. second wave feminism broke the male monopoly on subjectivity and focused public attention on women’s ability to reject any form of social fixity, including identitarian and institutional fixity. the political nature of this exercise of subjectivity is thus obvious. no connotation of introspection and intimacy can be related to it. thanks to this collective and political exercise, subjectivity is about more than just forming a personal critique of the social world; it is connected to a genuine project of the self. this is in turn necessarily bound up with forming a relationship with otherness. indeed, it is the exercise of subjectivity that enables people to relate to others. above all, for the women involved in second wave feminism, subjectivity comes about thanks to relationships with other women; through the communication, dialog, and “thinking and acting together” that these enable. and through these relationships the bond between the body, sexuality, and the construction of new forms of knowledge, capable of challenging established knowledge of the social world, can be explored. this subjectivity finds its strategic arena for expression in the public sphere. as it has been so often underlined, the personal dimension is far removed from the intimate sphere of life (“the personal is political”). the personal is inseparable from the political, being a strategic arena for political action, as the patriarchal oppression and power dynamics that underpin it are reproduced in the personal sphere. for the women’s movement subjectivity is an explicit form of resistance to the normalization of behaviors. involving the subjective viewpoint is a way to challenge dominant world visions and belief systems. as martuccelli (2002) points out, reflexivity and subjectivity appear to be inseparably linked. on a general level, in the women’s movement reflexivity is an everyday social practice that changes the relationship with action. women treat themselves and their status as an object of knowledge, thus making room for forms of experience capable of challenging power relations. in a nutshell, reflexivity enables subjectivity to distance itself from givens. forms of knowledge that are produced in this way, shaped by a critical vision of the self and one’s social setting, represent an opportunity to gain control over one’s life and rethink one’s political role. reflexivity thus reinforces the arena of subjectivity through an ongoing process of critical formulation. the method of self-awareness practiced by the women’s movement in the 1970s, and centered around starting from one’s experiences, effectively exemplifies both the bond between the personal and the political, and the strict link between subjectivity and reflexivity. this shapes the critique of the capitalist society through which women define themselves as subjects. these remarks set out to highlight the strands that link the second and third waves of feminism. these strands, given the known differences between the two waves (gillies, howie and munford 2007), are distinguished by a common reference to the assertion of subjectivity even though in a very different social scenario. this is characterized, especially in southern europe (murgia and poggio 2014), by widespread job insecurity even for highly-educated young people. in recent years, for example, the numerous organized groups of young feminists in precarious jobs (e.g., sexyshock, fiorelle, sconvegno, precas: see fantone 2011b, 32) in italy, probably the backbone of feminism in the new century (fantone 2007; galetto et al. 2007; reale, 2008), describe themselves as a “plurality of leccardi, young women’s subjectivities and new feminisms in the neo-liberal age 26 subjectivities in relation”, and “unclassifiable subjects”. through this description they wish to indicate their separation from institutional politics and other institutional expressions. they lay claim to multiple belongings, fragmented identities, and forms of organization that are experimental and open. individuals can belong to one group or another, but are free to experiment when it comes to politics. these young feminists describe their subjectivities as “nomadic” (braidotti 2011) and exploit their employment insecurity as leverage for the exercise of subjectivity. in the groups, which do not have (do not want to have and do not intend to create) a collective identity, diverse identities come together. what connects the young women in each group is a common culture based on the recognition of diversity and their self-determination as subjects. where identities exist they are not set in stone but positively asserted as mutable. they arise from practices of creative experimentation, like those developed by the queer movement for example. the imagination comes to the fore, challenging stereotypes and conventional mind sets. what these practices have in common is taking a critical distance from the existing world through irony, avoiding self-pity for the problems occasioned by existential precariousness, the so-called “victim mentality” often attributed to second wave feminism. this precariousness thus reveals ambivalent traits: while it is bound up with a negative lexicon (morini, karls, and armani 2014) such as instability, impermanence, fragility, on the other hand it is linked with an idea of flux, possibility, and redefinition. by definition these practices are immersed in the present and do not look to the future; they have to enable, above all, forms of self-narrative able to guarantee selfrecognition. in the foreground there is a resilient subjectivity that tries to resist the attempts to assimilate it. the link between these different subjectivities, for which the web is the chosen political tool, is their common reference to a life shaped by intermittent work (a condition that is both personal and generational), by financial freedom that is extremely difficult to obtain, but also the idea that “the pleasurable is political” (jamie pond). and also, the ability to recognize one another, and to attribute value one another. most of these women do not call themselves feminists (with many actively rejecting the label: see aronson 2003); and when the term is used it is in the plural (they talk about feminisms), in order to avoid pigeonholing, labels and limitations. yet they do assert their generation as a political generation, in search of new practices and new modes of expression for the political. unlike the women of the second wave, these young women no longer define themselves in relation to the world of men; it is their own subjectivity that defines them. new gender identities, new gendered subjectivities the analysis by the norwegian scholars bjerrum nielsen and monica rudberg (1994), of the various historical stages in the construction of gender identity, gives us a useful analytical framework to complete the reflections on young women’s subjectivities. according to these scholars, in the second half of the last century, at least up to the 1970s, the phase of gender polarization was followed by a stage of open gender battle that we can link to socalled second wave feminism. the following phase, the one we are currently in, is instead centered on the process of female individualization, which can in a way be linked to third wave feminism. gender and politics 27 as highlighted by elisabeth beck-gernsheim (2003) among others, the prevailing desire among generations of young women in recent decades is that of building “a life of one’s own”: no longer exclusively bound up with the family, but centered around the individual, a life that can also be constructed without a stable male presence. in the temporal architecture that is thus defined, a strategic role is played by “time for oneself”—time devoted to the subjective exploration of one’s own needs and desires outside a logic of selfsacrifice (bryson 2007, 134–136; odih 1999; piazza 2006). it follows that women are plagued not only by continuing worries over achieving the right work-life balance, so elusive especially in southern european countries; for younger women, the main concern seems to be achieving recognition of their right to be present in various different worlds simultaneously, without necessarily having to choose one or another: in other words, without being denied the right to exercise active ambivalence (libreria delle donne 2008). nielsen and rudberg’s reflections (1994) offer another valid element when it comes to concluding our analysis. although their considerations relate to the 1990s, they include many of the characteristics highlighted in contemporary studies and empirical researches concerning young women. to comprehend processes of social change as intertwined with gender relations, the norwegian academics suggest taking three different aspects into account: gender identity (the gender i have), gender subjectivity (the gender i am) and the social and cultural resources that the environment offers to express these. the generation of women growing up in the 1940s and 1950s experienced the contradiction between a modernized gender identity and a lack of adequate social and cultural resources to implement it. the generation of young women growing up in the 1960s and 1970s had to come to terms with a different contradiction, namely between a modernized gender identity and a subjectivity still linked to the relationship with the male sphere. second wave feminism broke this bond, enabling young women to practice self-determination in full. starting from this time, the “assumption that women do not need a career because they derive their livelihood from a man, as well as a complete identity from the heterosexual nuclear family has been challenged” (harris 2004: 6). the contemporary generations of young women therefore feel able to act in complete freedom. characterized by a strong need for independence, these young women set out to leave the mark of their subjectivity on the world (thomson 2009). however, the life plans to which the new levels of education lend legitimacy are beginning to come up against limitations, clashing with the lack of social resources available to enable this form of selfexpression. while they cultivate the belief that they can fulfill their objectives with no impediments whatsoever, the generations we are talking about are starting to experience increasingly adverse conditions in reality. the employment precariousness we talked about earlier effectively exemplifies these limitations. with reference to the ideal type of young woman of these last generations, nielsen and rudberg write: “she wants everything and believes she can do anything. but is that possible?” (1994: 111). these are the women of “making it”: intended as the art of inventing oneself and solving one’s own problems. self-fulfillment is considered exclusively an issue of individual responsibility, the product of a do-it-yourself attitude. while inequalities of class and race continue to exert a concrete influence on people’s lives, the “can-do girl” ideology is taking hold. leccardi, young women’s subjectivities and new feminisms in the neo-liberal age 28 concluding remarks for some time now the young women of europe have been getting to grips with these cultural representations, now increasingly explicitly bound up with the neo-liberal ideal of a flexible, self-governing, and self-realizing individual. in this scenario, as emphasized by wyn and dwyer (1999), it is therefore fundamental that researchers do not remain anchored to issues that only marginally affect the lives of young men and women today (for example the question of citizenship in abstract terms). young women’s subjectivities call for the creation of a different agenda of issues; taking account, for example, of their deferral of long-term relationships and their later-life motherhood; of their wish, and need, of social recognition here and now (starting from the social networks: see e.g., mainardi 2015). after reflecting on the many aspects and nuances of young women’s existential conditions and experiences, anita harris (2004: 186) writes: “it is important to honor young women’s own capacities to make positive meaning in their lives, to enjoy the agency they have, and to respect their strategies for doing the best they can”. those who recognize themselves in this exhortation feel themselves part of the job of defending young women’s choices of self-determination. these choices are realized despite the heavy threat, which young women experience daily, of an uncertain and ever more presentified existence, the result of the new capitalist economy and of neo-liberal values of efficiency, competition, and speed that accompany them. this process, as is known, can create the conditions for an annulment of critical thought, and can preclude the elaboration of collective responses. if this does not happen and, instead, types of social critique and openly gendered mobilizations grow, it is certainly thanks to the specific ability of new generations of young women to express forms of political subjectivity (magaraggia e vingelli 2015), in particular through forms of presence on the public space connected to the fight against precariousness and the oppression of institutional identities. as has been underlined (harris and dubson, 2015; mcrobbie, 2007), this representation can easily be confused with the neo-liberal ideal of a flexible individual, who is always able to self-govern, despite external circumstances. an ungendered individual, who looks with detachment upon group movements, and considers his/herself self-sufficient; who does not recognize the power that social structures have in conditioning life paths; who considers political mobilization superfluous. in this respect, it is important to be aware of that which angela mcrobbie (2007) defines as the “new sexual contract” according to which the new degrees of freedom young girls have, together with access to consumer culture, are today exchanged with the marginal role assigned to a critical vision of the relationships of power. being aware of this risk, and of the ambivalence that marks the expression of subjectivity by young women of recent generations, can help us to better understand the “indirect” character of some forms of resistance that they express, and the redefinition of politics they practice. references aronson, pamela. 2003. ‘feminists or ʺpostfeministsʺ? young women’s attitudes toward feminism and gender relations.’ gender & society 17(6): 903-922. gender and politics 29 beck-gernsheim, elisabeth. 2003. ‘from ‘living for others’ to ‘a life of one’s own’: individualization and women’, 54-84. in ulrich beck and elisabeth beck-gernsheim, individualization. institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences. london: sage. bertilotti, teresa and anna scattigno. 2005. il femminismo degli anni settanta. roma: viella. braidotti, rosi. 2011. nomadic subjects: embodiment and sexual difference in contemporary feminist theory. new york: columbia university press. bryson, valerie. 2007. gender and the politics of time: feminist theory and contemporary debates. bristol: policy press. fantone, laura. 2007. ‘precarious changes: gender and generational politics in contemporary italy’. feminist review 87(1): 5-20. fantone, laura. 2011. ‘una precarietà differente’. in genere e precarietà, edited by laura fantone, 13-40. napoli: scriptaweb. ferree, marx myra and beth hess. 2000. controversy and coalition: the new feminist movement across three decades of change. new york: routledge. galetto, manuela, chiara lasala, sveva magaraggia, chiara martucci, elisabetta onori and francesca pozzi. 2007. ‘a snapshot of precariousness: voices, perspectives, dialogues’. feminist review 87(1): 104-112. gillis, stacy, gillian howie and rebecca munford, eds. 2007. third wave feminism: a critical exploration. london: palgrave. harris, anita. 2004. future girl: young women in the twenty-first century. new york – london: routledge. harris, anita and amy schields dubson. 2015. ‘theorizing angency in post-girlpower time.’ continuum: journal of media & cultural studies 29(2): 145-156. libreria delle donne. 2008. il doppio sì. lavoro e maternità. milano: quaderni di via dogana. magaraggia, sveva and giovanna vingelli, eds. 2015. genere e partecipazione politica. milano: francoangeli. mainardi, arianna (2015) ‘le adolescenti e le performance di genere online: oltre il panico morale’, 209-218. in violenza di genere e percorsi mediterranei. voci, saperi e uscite, edited by iganazia bartholini. milano: guerini. martuccelli, danilo. 2002. grammaires de l’individu. paris: gallimard. mcrobbie, angela. 2007. ‘top girls. young women and the post-feminist sexual contract.’ cultural studies 21(4): 718-737. morini, cristina, kristin carls and emiliana armano. 2014. ‘precarious passion or passionate precariousness? narratives from co-research in journalism and editing’, recherches sociologiques et anthropologiques [on line] 45(2), available at: http://rsa.revues.org/1264 murgia, annalisa and barbara poggio. 2014. ‘the passion trap. experiences of precariousness by highly-educated young people in italy, spain and united kingdom’, 62-86. in young people and social policy in europe. dealing with risk, inequality and precarity in times of crisis, edited by myra hamilton, lorenza antonucci and steven roberts. london: palgrave macmillan. nielsen, bjerrum harriet and monica rudberg. 1994. psychological gender and modernity. oxford: oxford university press. odih, pamela. 1999. gendered time in the age of deconstruction.’ time & society 8(1): 9-38. piazza, marina. 2006. un po’ di tempo per me. milano: mondadori. leccardi, young women’s subjectivities and new feminisms in the neo-liberal age 30 reale, paola. 2008. passioni e ragioni nelle voci del femminismo dal dopoguerra ad oggi. roma: luca sossella. thomson, rachel. 2009. unfolding lives: youth, gender and change. bristol: policy press. wyn, johanna and peter dwyer. 1999. ‘new directions in research on youth in transition.’ journal of youth studies 2(1): 5-21. microsoft word pdf_issue_16_3_campus_et_al_157-178.docx italian political science, volume 16 issue 3 published in 2021 under creative commons by-nc-nd license by: italian political science. issn 2420-8434. all copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. volume 16, issue 3, 157–178. contact author: donatella campus, university of bergamo e-mail address: donatella.campus@unibg.it celebrity politics and changing performances over time. the case of italian populist leaders donatella campus university of bergamo marco mazzoni university of perugia abstract celebrity may be a successful strategy for political leaders. the article intends to detail how this happens, what specific styles are adopted, how they are differentiated and especially how they have changed over time. we will argue that, while legacy media have produced certain models of political celebrity, the opportunities offered by the communicative structures of social media have encouraged the introduction of new elements. starting from the assumption that celebrity may help leaders to reinforce their claim of closeness to the people, the article focuses on italian populist leaders. it discusses commonalities and differences with the aim of advancing the comprehension of how celebrity operates in political contexts. the choice of covering two distinct periods – from the early 1990s to the 2000s, and from the 2010s to the present – allows a diachronic comparison with the aim of identifying possible trends. 1. introduction ccording to the relevant literature (street 2004, wheeler 2013), the primary feature of the phenomenon of celebrity politics is that politicians use formats and codes of popular culture and promote themselves in a way that has many points in common with the approach of the stars of the media and entertainment industry. t’hart and tindall (2009, p. 258) have distinguished between celebrity politicians, who enter politics with a visibility and popularity previously gained in a non-political field, and politician-celebrities, who are office-holders ‘whose public behaviour, purposeful association with celebrities, and/or private life’ project them ‘into the celebrity sphere’. in this article we will refer to both categories simply as ‘celebrity leaders’. as street (2019, p. 6) has pointed out, ‘celebrity-ness can adopt a range of styles’ and we need to be sensitive as to ‘how celebrity politics might operate’. a step forward in this direction is the typology proposed by wood, corbett and flinders (2016), who distinguished two types in terms of the strategies employed to acquire and embody celebrity. superstar celebrity politicians use traditional broadcast media; act in controlled settings designed to enhance their appeal; present themselves as exceptional, strong leaders; maintain a distance from ordinary citizens. everyday celebrity politicians privilege interactive media, like social media or reality television; pursue spontaneity; they engage in ad a celebrity politics and changing performances over time 158 hoc visits; take photos with ordinary people; make gaffes; try to appear as authentic individuals. in this article we intend to explore the nature of political celebrity not only by expanding the analysis on what differentiates leaders, for instance based on nationality and ideology, but also by looking at how celebrity has evolved over time. as ryfe (2001, p. 408) argues, historical enquiry and historical methods may ‘invigorate’ the research agenda in many areas of political communication. in our view, time appears to be a crucial variable to better understand forms of celebrity politics, especially if one considers that, in recent years, online culture has transformed the public sphere. as p. david marshall (2014), a pioneer of the studies on celebrity and power, observes, our celebrities have been reconstituted to adapt to the transformation of the media environment and in particular to the world of social networks. wood et al. (2016, p. 595) make the point clear: “the openness and accessibility of contemporary social media may open up opportunities for pushing the ‘everyday’ element of celebrity further and potentially enable a more thoroughgoing democratisation in the process”. the goal of the present article is to develop this line of analysis. starting from the assumption that celebrity can be identified in terms of strategies, choice of platforms, storytelling and so on, we intend to highlight possible trends over time by comparing two generations of leaders. we choose one country, italy, and select a number of leaders with a distinguishing feature in common, that of being leader of a populist party or movement according to the classification proposed by rooduijn et al. (2019). we are well aware that not all celebrity leaders are populist. indeed, as ceccobelli et al (2020) stress, it is important not to confuse the two phenomena or take for granted that populist politicians use popularization more effectively than others. outside the circle of leaders of populist parties and movements, we could find examples of potential celebrities, like matteo renzi, who would certainly have been an interesting case study. however, we based the choice of focusing on leaders of populist parties on two considerations. first, it serves a methodological purpose. selecting leaders who have a common trait allows us to hold some variables as constant in order to facilitate the unveiling of empirical relationships among other variables. thus, a set of populist leaders in the same country consists of the most similar cases that may be analysed. moreover, this choice responds to our goal of carrying out an analysis that covers two distinct periods. according to lijphart (1971), a way of achieving comparability is to analyse a single country diachronically. in this sense, italy is an especially suitable case, being a true laboratory for populism (tarchi 2015, p. 7). several authoritative accounts have thoroughly investigated and illustrated the conditions and the reasons for the surge of populist parties, such as the northern league; and of populist leaders, such as silvio berlusconi, in the nineties (ruzza and fella 2009, albertazzi and mcdonnell 2015, tarchi 2015). but populism has also dominated the scenario of recent years with the ascent of a new influential populist actor like the 5-star movement (biorcio and natale 2013).1 moreover, as shown by the seminal study of mazzoleni and sfardini (2009), the italian scenario has been a fertile field for any 1 for a well-organized and extended review of the research on populism in italy see bobba and legnante (2017). campus and mazzoni 159 form of popularization of politics or ‘pop politics’, intended as the increasing symbiosis between political communication and popular culture. the second reason we are focusing on populist leaders is that we agree with moffitt (2016, p. 83) that celebrity may well be a key strategy for such leaders, who are ‘incredibly opportunistic about media appearances, particularly those that ostensibly bring them closer to the people’. they may draw advantage from certain aspects of celebrity, specifically those in which they are represented in non-elitist media and content, such as tabloids, entertainment tv, pop music, etc. in other terms, if a wide variety of leaders, not just populists, may engage in performative acts that mix together politics and entertainment in order to gain visibility and, sometimes, a star aura, populist leaders are especially interested in using the formats and codes of popular culture to affirm their proximity to ordinary citizens. it is worth remembering that a typical feature of populism is anti-elitism (mudde 2004). in the juxtaposition between the good people and the bad elites, obviously populist leaders must represent the values of the people (meny and surel 2000) and be of the people and beyond the people at the same time (moffitt 2016). jagers and walgrave (2007) propose considering populism as a communication style. but do leaders actually communicate their ‘being of the people’ only through their speech and declarations? or do they also use their performance in a broader sense? regarding this, their concrete communicative repertoires need to be thoroughly investigated. schneiker (2020) suggests turning to the literature on celebrity politics. as argued by some pioneers in the field, such as van zoonen (2005) and dahlgren (2009), mass culture and entertainment media may serve well the goal of mobilizing citizens insofar as they create an emotional bond. therefore, although being ‘pop’ is not an indicator of populism (bracciale and martella 2017, 1314; ceccobelli et. al 2020, 448), analysing how populist leaders establish an emotiondriven connection may help to highlight aspects of the celebritization of politics. in light of all the above considerations, we have selected six italian populist leaders, as listed in table 1, belonging to two different phases of italian politics. our primary aim is to detail what type of celebrities they are, what specific styles are adopted, how they are differentiated and especially how things have changed over time. in particular, we will argue that, while legacy media have produced certain models of political celebrity, the opportunities offered by the communicative structures of social media have encouraged the introduction of new elements that we will illustrate in the following sections. table 1. italian populist leaders leader socio-demographic information party in office fi rs t p h as e (e ar ly 1 99 0s – 20 09 ) umberto bossi born: 1941 place of birth: cassano magnago education: high school diploma professional politician lega nord (northern league) 1989–2012 silvio berlusconi born: 1936 place of birth: milano education: law degree outsider (entrepreneur) forza italia (go italy) 1994–now antonio di pietro born: 1950 place of birth: montenero di bisaccia education: law degree outsider (public prosecutor) italia dei valori (italy of values) 1998–2013 (previously pm) celebrity politics and changing performances over time 160 s ec o nd p h as e (2 01 0 – no w ) beppe grillo born: 1948 place of birth: genova education: high school diploma outsider (comedian) movimento 5 stelle (five star movement) 2008–2014 matteo salvini born: 1973 place of birth: milano education: high school diploma professional politician lega (league) 2013–now giorgia meloni born: 1977 place of birth: roma education: high school diploma professional politician fratelli d’italia (brothers of italy) 2014–now source: own elaboration. 2. research questions and methods the first question addressed is whether the six selected leaders may be regarded as celebrity politicians according to the characteristics proposed by the existing literature (street 2004; t’hart and tindall 2009; wheeler 2013) (rq1). to answer this question, in section 3 we describe their style of communication based on a heterogeneous set of data: from autobiographies and books written by the leaders themselves to the works of political observers; from existing scholarly research to newspapers and media reports of events; from interviews to other types of documentary evidence (see appendix for a complete list of sources). it must be observed that it was not possible to make a direct comparison for all items taken into consideration. for instance, autobiographies were not available for all; for others we analysed other types of hagiographical materials, such as the magazine una storia italiana that berlusconi delivered to italian citizens. as for gossip media and social media contents, we relied on existing research and on our direct observation of relevant examples. having shown that celebrity status could be attributed to all six leaders and how they express their celebrity status, in section 4 we compare them with the aim of answering the research question of whether some different traits emerge between the two historical phases under analysis (rq2). we look at two relevant aspects: the first is the overall image of the leader, that is to say if he/she appears as a superstar, a figure of destiny, true diva or, to the contrary, an ordinary person, a common man or woman. this dimension corresponds closely to wood et al’s (2016) ‘performative role’, one of the three dimensions of their typology of superstar/everyday celebrity politicians.2 our goal is to shed light on what image the six leaders want to project. therefore, the operationalization of this aspect is based on two indicators: 1) storytelling, i.e., how leaders narrate themselves explicitly but also through the exhibition of their lifestyle; 2) channels of intimization, i.e., what platforms and outlets leaders use to disseminate pieces of personal information, for instance autobiographies, gossip media, social 2 while wood et al.’s (2016) typology was an important source of inspiration, it is important to stress that we are not adopting their analytical approach since we are not trying to classify our leaders in predefined categories. rather, we intend to describe in detail the leadership image that our six cases project and what media and tools they use to talk about their intimacy. analogously, the second aspect we take into consideration – vertical/horizontal interaction – is not used to classify leaders as closer to a superstar or an everyday model, as wood et al. (2016) interpret their own dimensions of media outlet and marketing techniques. rather we are interested in highlighting if the two groups of populist leaders, whatever the celebrity role they choose to perform, show some clear differences in their way of relating with citizens. campus and mazzoni 161 media. we refer here to stanyer’s (2013) concept of intimization, intended as the process through which the personal life of politicians is disclosed in the mediated public sphere and to the concept of private self-personalizaton online (metz et al. 2019). the second aspect by which we will examine the six leaders is the vertical/ horizontal relationship. we will look at leaders’ ways of communicating: television and/or social media and/or interpersonal offline interaction, with the aim of revealing changes in the channels that leaders use to relate to citizens and so presumably nurture their leader/fans bond. in particular, we consider if leaders make the attempt to have a direct and sometimes interactive contact with citizens or prefer top-down messages. comparing two temporal phases allows us to highlight the changing function of social media, which help politicians to create connectedness (ekman and widholm 2017) and ‘performative intimacy’ (marvick and boyd 2011) with citizens. 3. populist celebrities, italian style this section will explore if the leaders, albeit different in many respects, may all be considered as celebrities, and what their celebrity repertoires are. the first group we analyse are all leaders connected to the political earthquake that occurred in italy in the early nineties, following huge scandals and corruption trials. umberto bossi, the leader of the northern league who defied the old parties and survived their collapse, may be seen as an instance of a new breed of politician, whose primary goal was to mark a difference from the old political class. from the very beginning bossi appeared to be an unconventional politician, evident in his casual and crumpled clothes – one of his iconic hallmarks became the ‘canottiera’, a white vest (belpoliti 2012). bossi used provocative language that, according to biorcio (2003, p. 89), was a break from the language of the italian political class. in general, the communication style of the northern league had two characteristics: first, it relied on elements of everyday language reinterpreted in political terms (ruzza and fella 2009, p. 101); second, dirty talk allowed it to appear anti-establishment. on several occasions bossi exhibited these ‘bad manners’ that can be seen as an aspect of a populist “disregard for ‘appropriate’ ways of acting in the political realm” (moffitt and tormey 2014, p. 392). if at the beginning the northern league was ignored by the media, after the first electoral successes, the party started receiving more coverage (biorcio 2003, p. 79 and ff.). bossi was the face of the party and became a recurrent guest on tv programmes (fatelli and norci 1995, p. 85, tab.1) where he could display his outspokenness and spontaneity. in a phase in which the evolution of political television was marked by the advent of new programmes and talk-shows aimed at giving voice to the people, bossi’s unconventional style appeared more acceptable to, and compatible with the new tv formats. in such a changing scenario, as calabrese wrote (1998, p. 39), he actually became a very effective actor in the spectacle of politics. bossi can also be seen as a pioneer of other aspects of celebritization and intimization. in 1991, well before berlusconi removed the line of division between public and private spheres in italian politics, he had pictures taken in his pyjamas in a hospital bed, recovering from an illness. belpoliti (2012) observes that this can be seen as ‘pop behaviour’, anticipating much of what would follow. celebrity politics and changing performances over time 162 in sum, it can be argued that the emerging popularization of political media formats and the birth of infotainment were functional in amplifying bossi’s anti-establishment message. if his followers saw him as a charismatic leader with ‘a political sixth sense as to the tactics that need to be employed to defend their interests’ (ruzza and fella 2009, p. 71), before the wider public his image was forged by some typical features of the celebrity politician, included a remarkable acting ability (belpoliti 2012). first and foremost, silvio berlusconi was a celebrity well before entering politics thanks to his background as the tycoon of commercial tv and the owner of one of the most successful football teams, ac milan. berlusconi used marketing techniques to project the image of the ‘italian dream’. in 2001, he sent to millions of italian citizens copies of the pamphlet ‘una storia italiana’ (an italian story), whose incipit was: “chi è veramente il leader di forza italia, come vive l’uomo che vuole cambiare il paese? abbiamo ripercorso la sua vicenda umana, dall’infanzia milanese al liceo dei padri salesiani. e poi, l’università, il lavoro, le sfide e le vittorie. ma, soprattutto, vi raccontiamo gli affetti, le passioni, le amicizie, gli amori di silvio berlusconi” (what is the leader of fi really like? how does he live, the man who wants to change the country? we tell his story, from his early years in milan to his salesian high school. and then university, work, the challenges, the victories. but, above all, we will tell you about silvio berlusconi himself, his passions, his friends, his relationships’ (p. 4). undoubtedly it was a large-scale experiment of entertaining politics both for the format – a glossy magazine – and for the content, as it was narrated like a fairy tale (amadori 2002). this kind of storytelling is evidence of berlusconi’s ability to embody the role of the superstar celebrity politician and, in particular, of the television star. as mancini (2011, p. 21) illustrates well, berlusconi is not just the owner of television channels: ‘he is the television, in particular commercial tv, with its culture, values, discourses, practices, and aspirations’. berlusconi has always been well aware of being a performer before an audience: his message is accurately crafted; his communication is mainly top-down. but the popular press gave its contribution to his marketing strategies as well. a good example of the celebration of his achievements is found in the photo-news magazine oggi, whose cover displayed berlusconi impersonating humphrey bogart in a 1980 photo.3 an 11-page feature followed, in which the leader talked about his youth, his enterprises and ac milan football club. on other occasions, he used the gossip press to disclose details of his private life and introduce his family members, showing how much he cared about his children and grandchildren. for example, the gossip magazine chi published pictures taken at the traditional christmas lunch at berlusconi’s luxury home, where he had gathered all the members of his family (mazzoni and ciaglia 2015). the personal history of antonio di pietro is crucial to understanding the essence of his celebrity. he became famous as a public prosecutor involved in the clean hands corruption trials of the early 90s. di pietro became a national hero and the recipient of the italian people’s trust and high hopes. he was actually revered, as shown by the numerous writings on the walls of milan: ‘forza di pietro’ (come on di pietro), ‘grazie di pietro’ (ceccarelli 2018, p. 320). he received a multitude of letters thanking him for his battle 3 ‘le foto mai viste dall’album privato di berlusconi’, 11 july 2010, ‘oggi’. campus and mazzoni 163 against corrupt politicians (carlucci and di pietro 1995). television played a remarkable role in transforming him into a superstar: his consecration as a hero is also related to the cusani televised trial, which involved a number of important political leaders of the first republic and was a media event ‘avidly followed by public’ (giglioli 2001). in 1996 di pietro decided to end his career as prosecutor. he entered politics and then founded his personal party, italia dei valori (italy of values). what kind of celebrity leader was di pietro? as already said, his enormous popularity and his key role in clean hands conferred upon him an aura of exceptionality. as for his style, he spoke with a strong southern accent, in a way that was “colourful and informal, free of technicalities, flavoured with proverbial sayings and idioms, a language that was quickly dubbed in the media ‘dipietrese’” (newell, 2015, p. 218). his physical appearance – often unshaven, in crumpled suit and short socks – was particularly well-suited to elicit identification mechanisms with ordinary people (ceccarelli 2018, p. 322). in sum, he was the hero who had courageously fought political corruption in italy, but, at the same time, he was also the country boy, who was born into a rural family in a small village. such a powerful narrative of the national folk hero (pozzi 1997, p. 317) was extensively diffused by the press. perhaps the most symbolic portrait of di pietro that appeared in the press shows him driving a tractor near his country house in molise.4 to conclude, di pietro was a star, whose personal narrative exalted the popular values with which a multitude of italian citizens could identify. this was huge capital when he sought political office. in the subsequent years, he remained a celebrity but his ability to renew his bond with the italian people gradually diminished. his image had been forged as that of the leader of a nation, not of a political group (pozzi 1997, p. 339); thus, when he became party leader, his symbolic impact was somehow reduced. in recent years new populist actors have joined the political scenario. above all is the 5star movement, an interesting example of a populist movement born on the internet through the initiatives of an unconventional leader, beppe grillo. the comedian grillo became a very popular tv star in the 1970s and 1980s. amidst controversies, he was then removed from public television. in the following years, his theatre shows revolved more and more around the themes of environmental issues and protest the political and economic establishment (biorcio and natale 2013). in contrast to berlusconi and di pietro, for quite a long time grillo was a celebrity politician of the second type according to street’s (2004) definition – supporting political causes, organizing mass protests (the v-days) and offering his well-known blog as an instrument to a network of fans that started forming lists and running for local elections. even after the official birth of the 5-star movement in 2009, he still remained an anomalous leader, as he has never been a candidate for any political office. on the other hand, especially until the 2013 elections, his role was paramount as he was entirely in charge of communication as the spokesperson of the movement. grillo is a very gifted showman. more than any other, he is a performer of the spectacle of politics. nevertheless, he is not a typical celebrity. for instance, his personal narrative is not a central element of his communication. if berlusconi embodies the role of the great entrepreneur and di pietro that of the humble hero, it is difficult to match 4 see: https://www.corriere.it/gallery/politica/vuoto.shtml?2008/06_giugno/dipietro/1&1 (accessed on 2 april 2022). celebrity politics and changing performances over time 164 grillo with some archetypal character. perhaps, being a comedian, he regards the stage as his natural environment, and he does not need a special part to play. this does not mean that he is less captivating and persuasive. if his personal disclosures are limited – brief mentions during his speeches or in interviews – grillo, nonetheless, uses his persona as a powerful means, starting from his flamboyant body language to the crafting of media events like swimming across the strait of messina.5 as for his communication style and strategies, in the 2013 campaign, grillo’s tsunami tour around the country marked a return to the politics of rallies, of direct interaction with the public. on those occasions, grillo sought physical contact with people. ‘grillo’s complete, almost physical fusion with his audience depends on his extreme body language: he is not content with looking at his interlocutors, but if there are just a few he gets very close to them, touching and hugging them; whereas when he is on stage in front of thousands of people, he always leans forward as if he wanted to fling himself into the crowd’ cosenza (2014, p. 94-95). in short, whatever grillo does in such live performances reinforces a horizontal relationship with his followers and fans, even a sort of identification. “’i am you’, says grillo in his public speeches. yet also: ‘you can trust me as i trust you’” (95). a peculiar aspect of grillo’s communication has been the choice of deserting television, the broadcast media par excellence. however, the emphasis of the 5-star movement on digital politics has not automatically led him to adopt a conversational model. in the 2013 campaign, his use of twitter followed a broadcast scheme: he posted announcements of the tsunami tour and re-launched tweets by 5-star followers (bentivegna 2014). another leader of the new era is matteo salvini. he became leader of the italian northern league in 2013, when the party was undergoing a severe crisis, and led it to a sort of resurrection. arguably a component of what albertazzi, giovannini and seddone (2018, p. 645) call a ‘personal style of leadership’ is his celebrity status, achieved through his storytelling, his ability to attract large, appreciative audiences and, last but not least, the coverage received by entertainment media outlets. salvini is often a guest on tv talk shows and mingles with people at public events, appearing in dozens of selfies, which are a crucial communicative practice in the process of political celebritization (ekman and widholm 2017). he wrote an autobiographical book, secondo matteo (according to matteo) (salvini et al. 2016). he is very popular on social media (bobba 2018), which has provided him with a powerful tool for appearing genuine and authentic. a hallmark of his online communication is his intimization: he talks about his role as a father, makes comments about sports events or song contests, and above all posts pictures of what he is about to eat. in short, salvini projects the image of an ordinary man, ‘un uomo normale’, as he defines himself (salvini et al. 2016, p. 9), close to the citizens, who enjoys their same simple pleasures and shares their same tastes. but the most paradigmatic example of his celebrity strategies online is the ‘vinci salvini’ (win salvini) contest. during the 2018 campaign, he launched a contest whose 5 see: https://www.corriere.it/cronache/12_ottobre_09/grillo-gli-allibratori-scettici-sulla-riuscita della-traversata_95a19b90-121f-11e2-919a-606647d2c25a.shtml (accessed on 2 april 2022). campus and mazzoni 165 prize was the opportunity to meet salvini himself or talk on the phone with him. people could participate by liking the posts on his facebook page. in such a way, salvini was able to meet both the goal of increasing his webpage online interactions and that of reinforcing his bond with his followers and fans (carone and cavallaro 2018, p. 66-7). a key role in establishing salvini’s status of celebrity has been played by photo-news and gossip magazines. the front-cover of oggi (10 december 2014) featured him barechested, with only a green tie, the colour symbol of the league. indeed, salvini auctioned five of these photos on his e-bay account: bidders received a signed photo with a personal message. just as in the case of ‘win salvini’ the leader of the league has demonstrated acumen with the logic of consumption underlying the world of fandom, whose members appreciate such forms of personal contact with their stars. salvini presents himself as an ordinary man but does not disdain attending showbiz events that may give him visibility. this is, for example, the case of the festival di sanremo, the most popular italian song contest that he attended together with his exgirlfriend elisa isoardi, a television showgirl, in february 2018, a few weeks before the elections of 4 march. photographs of the couple in the festival’s audience were featured in popular magazines (mazzoni and mincigrucci 2021, p. 56). to conclude, together with social media, the italian world of entertainment has contributed to the portrayal of salvini as a celebrity closely in tune with italian people. another example of his way of interacting with his public is the party that he attended at a trendy beach club, papeete, on the adriatic coast in the summer of 2019. salvini enjoyed himself, took selfies and stood at the dj stand. during the party people around him sang and danced to the notes of the national anthem.6 at the same beach club he also held a press conference, thus neatly displaying the complete overlap between the spaces of power and of entertainment.7 but while playing the role of ‘one of us’, salvini does not underestimate the need to appear as a strong leader. he is called ‘capitano’ (captain), a nickname launched by his spin doctor, luca morisi, reputed to have been the strategist behind salvini’s presence on social media,8 in an attempt to strike a balance between his personal (but politicized) sphere and his public image (mazzoni and mincigrucci 2021). giorgia meloni, the leader of the right-wing party fratelli d’italia (brothers of italy) is the latest addition to the group of italian political celebrities. since 2014 meloni has been the president of fdi, and one of the few women party leaders seen in the country. in this capacity, she has gained considerable visibility: she regularly appears on tv; she is increasingly popular on social media; electoral posters with her portraits – so polished that they are mocked for being excessively photoshopped (cheles 2020, p. 248) – have lined italian streets in recent campaigns. last but not least, during the summer of 2020, meloni appeared on the cover of novella 2000,9 a gossip magazine, sunbathing in a green, white and red swimsuit, a clear reference to the colours of the italian flag. 6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amavroslv34 (accessed on 2 april 2022). 7 https://www.giornalettismo.com/conferenza-papeete-beach-salvini/ (accessed on 2 april 2022). 8 https://www.panorama.it/news/politica/salvini-intervista-luca-morisi-web-facebook/. 9 ‘giorgia. la sirena tricolore’, 13 august 2020, ‘novella 2000’. celebrity politics and changing performances over time 166 an interesting feature of meloni’s communication is her aptitude for playing with the popularization of politics. she indulges in some forms of intimization, as shown by her exhibition of herself in the role of mother (moroni 2018, p. 114). for instance, at christmas 2019, she released an interview to chi,10 where she appeared together with her partner and young daughter. but her most forceful marketing action was the publication of an autobiography, where she disclosed a great deal of her private life (meloni 2021). one of meloni’s traits is to stress her origins, having grown up in a popular roman neighbourhood: “la garbatella è il mio quartiere non solo perchè lì sono cresciuta e ho vissuto per lunghi anni, ma perchè abitare in un determinato luogo non ci è mai indifferente, imprime dentro di noi un certo modo di stare al mondo” (garbatella is my neighbourhood, not only because i grew up and lived there for many years, but because living in a certain place does not leave us indifferent: it impresses on us our way to be in the world) (meloni 2021, p.16 ebook). one of her most distinctive traits is that of sending more or less explicit political messages through characters, symbols, and stories from popular culture. once she dressed up as spiderman;11 another time, to support her anti-immigration stance, she posted images of herself impersonating a game of thrones’ character fighting the ‘others’ (mazzoleni and bracciale 2019, p. 99). in a speech in parliament she compared the prime minister giuseppe conte to a smurf.12 meloni has often become a good subject for memes. this has happened with her posters. but the most famous meme is the video ‘io sono giorgia’ (i am giorgia), dance music accompanied by extracts from one of her passionate speeches. the video, intended to mock her conservative views on traditional families, went viral. the times13 included her among the ten faces to look out for in 2020. meloni herself declared she liked the meme, perhaps understanding that the jingle could serve to spread her fame. to conclude, meloni has been following salvini’s path insofar as she also uses the popularization of politics to win over the sympathies of the public. however, she has a different style, less exuberant and light-hearted, and more ironic. especially, in contrast to salvini, meloni does not play (at least not yet) the role of a ‘captain’ and, therefore, offers the best instance of a performance centred on ordinariness and normal lifestyle. 4. features and trends of italian populist celebrity leadership the descriptive analysis in section 3 allows us to answer the rq1 positively: all six leaders fit the definition of celebrity politician. section 3 has served to (a) confirm that populism and celebrity go well together; (b) show that there are differences and nuances in the way to be a celebrity, and different celebrity strategies. we will proceed now with discussing findings (see a synthesis in table 2) by focusing on the aspects of image and relationship with citizens in order to answer rq2: have there been changes in the way of building and maintaining a celebrity status across time? 10 ‘con ginevra è sempre natale’, 24 december 2019, ‘chi’. 11 see: https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2018/09/08/meloni-versione-spider-man-mistero sui-social_weq0pfo2yhwwu6ctuailqm.html (accessed on 2 april 2022). 12 see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkqshio-ppk (accessed on 2 april 2022). 13 ‘rising stars: twenty faces to look out for in 2020’, 2 january 2021, ‘the times’. campus and mazzoni 167 table 2. leaders along the continua superstar/ordinary and vertical/horizontal relationship source: own elaboration. as regards the celebrity role, what we have called the superstar/ordinary dimension, the first row of table 2 shows leaders’ storytelling about themselves, the second row the main channels of their self-induced intimization. berlusconi appears to be the greatest superstar of all, because of his personal history and flamboyant lifestyle. grillo’s performances are also supposed to garner an aura of exceptionality, from his captivating shows on stage to the creation of sensational media events like the crossing of the strait of messina. di pietro appeared as the ‘folk’ superhero of mani pulite. it is worth stressing that, in his case, the process of intimization started well before he entered politics and was due to the almost hagiographic attitude of the press (ceccarelli 2018, p. 324). from this point of view, berlusconi and di pietro have the superstar image in common. marco tarchi (2015, 314) stresses that they both perform the role of man of action (in contrast to the inactivity of professional politicians). closer to the common citizen role, on the contrary, are the politicians who have turned into celebrities. bossi and salvini belong to different generations, but both are good interpreters of the common man. however, they are both far from complete ordinariness: bossi never hid his role as the indisputable chief of the northern league; salvini is the ‘captain’. by contrast, meloni is the true prototype of the ordinary leader, spontaneous and, in all and for all, similar to an average woman, intent on balancing family and professional life. in addition, she has certainly shown herself to be an able player with popular and entertainment culture. therefore, we may conclude that exceptionality prevails in the first phase and ordinariness in the second phase, but in fact the two performative models coexist in both groups. as regards the vertical/horizontal relationship with citizens, in the third row of table 2 we identified the six leaders’ preferred tools for interacting and consequently for nurturing the relationship with their followers/fans. television was essential in the image-building of di pietro, who, however, from the second half of the 2000s, showed interest in social media as well. for berlusconi the pulpit has been television while grillo prefers the stage before an audience. in both cases, the message is mostly top-down. on the other hand, it is to be stressed that the 5-star movement was born on the internet and promotes online grassroots participation, grillo made the choice of deserting tv programmes, and during his electoral tour had direct contact with his followers. celebrity politics and changing performances over time 168 television is supposed to have given bossi visibility. however, he is also the leader of rallies in the north of italy such as the famous pontida, where he met ‘his people’. his example has been followed by his successor salvini: one of his specific traits is that of mingling with the crowd and taking selfies. he reinforces the bond with his followers through social media as well. digital platforms offer the leader of the league the means to cultivate and mobilize his fan communities. his continuous flux of posts showing his intimate life pursues at least the appearance of authenticity. meloni as well makes an intensive use of social platforms where she employs popular culture to define her style. in her case, the key to putting herself on the same level as the public is also found in the spontaneity with which she speaks in her roman accent, jokes on social media, and responds to mockery with humour. popular origins are for her, as for di pietro, a powerful means of communicating horizontally with the public. we have focused on two different generations of populist leaders in order to carry out a diachronic comparison. our first observation concerns the evolution of celebrity strategies over time. the broadcast model based on television appearances is no longer the predominant formula to create celebrities. the advent of social media has offered a new communicative arena where politicians may have broadcast communication, but also experiment forms of interaction with their public and where they may stage their ‘authentic’ life. infotainment and television entertainment also offer audiences the possibility of meeting politicians in (virtual) person; however, social media do more by giving political fans the impression of greater proximity to their idols. thus, it is not surprising that the younger generation of leaders, like salvini and meloni, matches the horizontal model better than the others. it is worth noting, however, that social media can produce intimization and horizontality through different strategies. our analysis has shown the existence of different styles. our opinion, for instance, is that salvini and meloni use popular culture in a different way: the former is more self-centred (‘win salvini’ contest is a good example) and his ‘personal’ posts do not always have a political undertone, while the latter’s messages are likely to have an ideological connotation, as when she posts videos where she prepares typical italian dishes to complain about the european market.14 as regards the differences between the two generations of leaders, it is quite revealing to compare bossi and salvini. both leaders played the card of intimization, but in different ways. for bossi details like the canottiera were parts of the role of the politician rebellious to conventions. salvini showing the human side seems to suggest the adoption of an opposite strategy, that of softening an aggressive image. does this different approach depend on the personalities of the two leaders or on a different political strategy? it is worth noting that salvini’s league is appealing to a centre-right electorate while bossi was more interested in differentiating himself from berlusconi. a parallel with marine le pen and her strategy of dedemonization (campus 2017) may suggest that, when a rightist populist party tries to expand its consensus beyond initial constituencies, its leader may wish to present a less provocative and radical image. being an affectionate parent, loving children and pets cannot be of harm, as it may raise sympathies also among non-supporters. in principle, then, analysing a leader’s ways of incarnating 14 see: https://video.repubblica.it/embed/politica/italia-contro-europa-giorgia-meloni-prepara-la caprese-nella-cucina-di-casa/283671/284282 (accessed on 2 april 2022). campus and mazzoni 169 celebrity should not focus only on personal backgrounds and qualities, but also must take into account what voters he/she is addressing and if their ideological alignments make a difference. 5. concluding remarks and directions for future research in this article we have selected a number of populist leaders operating in a country, italy, in which populism is now a constant trait and presents multiple facets. we have compared two generations of leaders in order to offer reflections on possible changes and trends over time. the description of their communication strategies has confirmed the views of scholars such as van zoonen and moffitt that entertaining politics suits populism well and celebrity may be a resource for populist leaders. our main goal, however, was to go beyond and analyse the different ways in which our six populist leaders perform celebrity. a main finding has been the existence of a trend towards a more horizontal model of interaction between leaders and followers. what is the implication for celebrity roles? the pure broadcast and top-down model have perhaps waned as the celebrity-fans relationship itself requires reconceptualization in the era of digital politics. this does not imply that broadcast television does not contribute to the acquisition of celebrity status, but, in the era of hybrid communication (chadwick 2013), this no longer represents the main route as it was for a leader like berlusconi. and, certainly, it is not the only available path for superstar celebrities: grillo, for instance, never exploited television. horizontality has been enhanced by the contemporary media system especially through social media. we have entered the era of private self-personalizaton online (metz et al. 2019). that being said, research should focus on the different ways in which it is operated. our suggestion is that this can be done by means of different performative styles, as the comparison between salvini and meloni suggested. we believe that the comparison between the different celebrity styles of bossi and salvini also highlights an important nexus with the ideological alignment of prospective voters. if we assume that celebrity is a communicative strategy, then this suggests that future work should extend the focus beyond leaders’ personalities and personal history and direct attention to the ideology of their potential target of voters. leaders may choose to shape their celebrity performance according to what voters are supposed to appreciate more. targeting radical voters or rather making an appeal to the wider public makes a difference in their choice of exploiting their celebrity. finally, we encountered some apparently country-specific features, like the lack of superstar celebrities among italian professional politicians. this is in contrast with other national contexts in which superstar celebrities are sometimes career politicians – see, for example, barack obama and nicolas sarkozy (wheeler 2013). might this depend on countryspecific features of the cultural and media contexts? or are there institutional factors that make some political systems more permeable to superstar celebrities? more cross-countries analyses are necessary to fully explain the emergence of some types of celebrity leaders. a comparison with other populist leaders in other countries, especially professional politicians, would also be important to highlight specific aspects of celebrity populism. celebrity politics and changing performances over time 170 acknowledgement the article originates from the presentation by d. campus and m. mazzoni ‘italy: a fertile field for populist celebrities’, asmi conference, ‘promised land of populism? populist culture and politics in italy, 1800-2019’, london 19-30 november 2019. it also includes some 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forms of celebrity in celebrity politics. political studies review, 17 (1), 3-13. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929918772995 street, j., 2004, celebrity politicians: popular culture and political representation. the british journal of politics and international relations, 6 (4), 435-452. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467856x.2004.00149.x tarchi, m., 2015. italia populista: dal qualunquismo a beppe grillo. bologna: il mulino. ‘t hart, p. and tindall., k., 2009. leadership by the famous: celebrity politics in democracy. in: j. kane, h. patapan and p. ‘t hart, eds. dispersed democratic leadership. oxford: oxford university press, 255-278. van zoonen, l., 2005. entertaining the citizen: when politics and popular culture converge. lanham: rowman & littlefield publishers. wheeler, m., 2013. celebrity politics: image and identity in contemporary political communication. cambridge: polity press. wood, m., corbett, j. and flinders, m., 2016. just like us: everyday celebrity politicians and the pursuit of popularity in an age of anti-politics. the british journal of politics and international relations, 18 (3), 581-598. https://doi.org/10.1177/136914811663218 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584600152647119 http://www.popu-list.org/ https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321720916604 https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929918772995 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2004.00149.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2004.00149.x https://doi.org/10.1177/136914811663218 campus and mazzoni 173 annex 1. list of sources hereafter are listed the multiple sources on which we based our descriptions and interpretations in the article “celebrity politics and changing performances over time. the case of italian populist leaders”. we confined the analysis to the period when the six leaders were politically active, with the partial exception of di pietro, of whom we took into consideration also the process of celebrity-building prior to his direct political involvement. the list includes also relevant sources and references that are not directly quoted in the text but contributed to our narratives on the six leaders. umberto bossi (lega nord/northern league) autobiographical books and/or other materials • bossi, u. & vimercati, d. (1992). vento dal nord. sperling & kupfer. political observers/journalists’ book and editorials • ceccarelli, f. (2018). invano: il potere in italia da de gasperi a questi qua. feltrinelli. • decrestina, p. (2016, august 17). dalla canottiera alla maglietta della polizia. la lega e la politica nel «look», corriere della sera. https://www.corriere.it/politica/cards/dalla-canottiera-maglietta-polizia-lega-politica-look/buonannomaglietta-merkel-parlamento-europeo.shtml (accessed on 8 july 2022). • lerner, g. (2019, may 28), da bossi a salvini la lingua leghista non è mai cambiata, la repubblica. https://www.repubblica.it/commenti/2019/05/28/news/lega_matteo_salvini_bossi_calderoli_pontida_alberto_giussano_padania_nord-300997602/ (accessed on 8 july 22022). media reports and documentaries • bossi and his “canottiera”: https://www.corriere.it/gallery/politica/082010/bossi/1/bossi-canottiera_db36162e-a573-11df-80bf-00144f02aabe.shtml (accessed on 8 july 2022). • bossi and “his people” (pontida): https://nuovabrianza.it/lettera-aperta-montilega-brianza-massimiliano-romeo/umberto-bossi-pontida-150607/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). research belpoliti, m. (2012). la canottiera di bossi. guanda. biorcio, r. (2003). the lega nord and the italian media system, in g. mazzoleni, j. stewart, & b. horsfield (eds.), the media and neo-populism (pp. 71-94). praeger. calabrese, o. (1998). come nella boxe: lo spettacolo della politica in tv. laterza. cedroni, l., & dell’era t. (2002). il linguaggio politico. carocci. dematteo, l. (2011). l’idiota in politica. feltrinelli. https://www.corriere.it/politica/cards/dalla-canottiera-maglietta-polizia-lega-politica-look/buonanno-maglietta-merkel-parlamento-europeo.shtml https://www.corriere.it/politica/cards/dalla-canottiera-maglietta-polizia-lega-politica-look/buonanno-maglietta-merkel-parlamento-europeo.shtml https://www.corriere.it/politica/cards/dalla-canottiera-maglietta-polizia-lega-politica-look/buonanno-maglietta-merkel-parlamento-europeo.shtml https://www.repubblica.it/commenti/2019/05/28/news/lega_matteo_salvini_bossi_calderoli_pontida_alberto_giussano_padania_nord-300997602/ https://www.repubblica.it/commenti/2019/05/28/news/lega_matteo_salvini_bossi_calderoli_pontida_alberto_giussano_padania_nord-300997602/ https://www.corriere.it/gallery/politica/08-2010/bossi/1/bossi-canottiera_db36162e-a573-11df-80bf-00144f02aabe.shtml https://www.corriere.it/gallery/politica/08-2010/bossi/1/bossi-canottiera_db36162e-a573-11df-80bf-00144f02aabe.shtml https://nuovabrianza.it/lettera-aperta-monti-lega-brianza-massimiliano-romeo/umberto-bossi-pontida-150607/ https://nuovabrianza.it/lettera-aperta-monti-lega-brianza-massimiliano-romeo/umberto-bossi-pontida-150607/ celebrity politics and changing performances over time 174 fatelli, g., & norci, e. (1995). il palcoscenico dei politici in tv. in m. morcellini (ed.), elezioni di tv. televisione e pubblico nella campagna elettorale ’94 (pp. 83-88). costa&nolan. marini, r. (1993). generi, attori e temi nella programmazione elettorale delle reti nazionali. in p. mancini (ed.), la campagna elettorale 1992 in televisione (pp. 95-200). nuova eri. silvio berlusconi (forza italia/go italy) autobiographical books and/or other materials • “una storia italiana” (2001, mondadori) popular and gossip press • “festa in famiglia”, 18 january 2015, “chi” reportage. • “le foto mai viste dall’album privato di berlusconi”, 11 july 2010, “oggi” reportage. • “sono loro il mio futuro”, 27 september 2016, “chi” reportage. political observers/journalists’ book and editorials • ceccarelli, f. (2018). invano: il potere in italia da de gasperi a questi qua. feltrinelli. • gramellini, m. (2009, may 6). va in onda lo statista pop. la stampa. https://www.lastampa.it/opinioni/buongiorno/2009/05/06/news/va-in-ondalo-statista-pop-1.37065051 (accessed on 8 july 2022). research amadori, a. (2002). mi consenta. metafore, messaggi e simboli. come silvio berlusconi ha conquistato il consenso degli italiani. libri scheiwiller. mazzoni, m., & ciaglia a. (2015). il gossip al potere: il politico celebrità nell’era della politica pop. maggioli. mancini, p. (2011). between commodification and lifestyle politics. does silvio berlusconi provide a new model of politics for the twenty-first century? reuters institute for the study of journalism. mazzoni, m., & ciaglia a. (2014). how italian politics goes popular: evidence from an empirical analysis of gossip magazines and tv shows. international journal of cultural studies, 17(4), 381-398. https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877913496199 antonio di pietro (italia dei valori/italy of values) autobiographical books and/or other materials • carlucci, a., & di pietro, a. (1995). grazie tonino. baldini & castoldi. political observers/journalists’ book and editorials • ceccarelli, f. (2018). invano: il potere in italia da de gasperi a questi qua. feltrinelli. https://www.lastampa.it/opinioni/buongiorno/2009/05/06/news/va-in-onda-lo-statista-pop-1.37065051 https://www.lastampa.it/opinioni/buongiorno/2009/05/06/news/va-in-onda-lo-statista-pop-1.37065051 campus and mazzoni 175 • maltese, c. (2001), di pietro, il robin hood in gara contro i due poli, la repubblica. https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2001/05/07/dipietro-il-robin-hood-in-gara.html?ref=search (accessed on 8 july 2022). media reports and documentaries • di pietro on the tractor: https://www.corriere.it/gallery/politica/vuoto.shtml?2008/06_giugno/dipietro/1&1 (accessed on 8 july 2022). • di pietro and “second life”: https://www.lastampa.it/tecnologia/2007/03/01/news/antonio-di-pietro-approda-su-second-life-1.37131038 (accessed on 8 july 2022). research bordignon, f. (2014). il partito del capo: da berlusconi a renzi. maggioli. newell, j. l. (2015). magistrates going into politics: antonio di pietro and italy of values. in a. mammone, e. g. parini, & g. a. veltri (eds.), the routledge handbook of contemporary italy. history, politics, society (pp. 215-224). routledge. pozzi, e. (1997). antonio di pietro: invenzione di un italiano. in s. berilli (ed.), la chioma della vittoria: scritti sull’identità degli italiani dall’unità alla seconda repubblica (pp. 316-53). ponte alle grazie. giglioli, p. (2001). ritual degradation as a public display: a televised corruption trial. in l. cheles & l. sponza (eds.), the art of persuasion. political communication in italy from 1945 to the 1990s (pp. 299-311). manchester university press. treccani neologismi, dipietrese, https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/dipietrese_%28neologismi%29/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). beppe grillo (movimento 5 stelle/five star movement) popular and gossip press • “in vacanza con grillo”, 17 july 2013, “oggi” reportage. political observers/journalists’ book and editorials • ceccarelli, f. (2018). invano: il potere in italia da de gasperi a questi qua. feltrinelli. media reports and documentaries • grillo and the crossing of the strait of messina: https://www.corriere.it/cronache/12_ottobre_09/grillo-gli-allibratori-scettici-sulla-riuscita-dellatraversata_95a19b90-121f-11e2-919a-606647d2c25a.shtml (accessed on 8 july 2022). • grillo’s “tsunami tour” (documentary): http://filmup.com/sc_tsunamitour.htm (accessed on 8 july 2022). • grillo and his people: https://video.repubblica.it/dossier/scontro-favia-grillocasaleggio-movimento-5-cinque-stelle/spoleto-grillo-come-una-rockstar-dopoil-comizio-si-lancia-sul-pubblico/114624/113027 (accessed on 8 july 2022). https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2001/05/07/di-pietro-il-robin-hood-in-gara.html?ref=search https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2001/05/07/di-pietro-il-robin-hood-in-gara.html?ref=search https://www.corriere.it/gallery/politica/vuoto.shtml?2008/06_giugno/dipietro/1&1 https://www.corriere.it/gallery/politica/vuoto.shtml?2008/06_giugno/dipietro/1&1 https://www.lastampa.it/tecnologia/2007/03/01/news/antonio-di-pietro-approda-su-second-life-1.37131038 https://www.lastampa.it/tecnologia/2007/03/01/news/antonio-di-pietro-approda-su-second-life-1.37131038 https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/dipietrese_%28neologismi%29/ https://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/dipietrese_%28neologismi%29/ https://www.corriere.it/cronache/12_ottobre_09/grillo-gli-allibratori-scettici-sulla-riuscita-della-traversata_95a19b90-121f-11e2-919a-606647d2c25a.shtml https://www.corriere.it/cronache/12_ottobre_09/grillo-gli-allibratori-scettici-sulla-riuscita-della-traversata_95a19b90-121f-11e2-919a-606647d2c25a.shtml https://www.corriere.it/cronache/12_ottobre_09/grillo-gli-allibratori-scettici-sulla-riuscita-della-traversata_95a19b90-121f-11e2-919a-606647d2c25a.shtml http://filmup.com/sc_tsunamitour.htm http://filmup.com/sc_tsunamitour.htm https://video.repubblica.it/dossier/scontro-favia-grillo-casaleggio-movimento-5-cinque-stelle/spoleto-grillo-come-una-rockstar-dopo-il-comizio-si-lancia-sul-pubblico/114624/113027 https://video.repubblica.it/dossier/scontro-favia-grillo-casaleggio-movimento-5-cinque-stelle/spoleto-grillo-come-una-rockstar-dopo-il-comizio-si-lancia-sul-pubblico/114624/113027 https://video.repubblica.it/dossier/scontro-favia-grillo-casaleggio-movimento-5-cinque-stelle/spoleto-grillo-come-una-rockstar-dopo-il-comizio-si-lancia-sul-pubblico/114624/113027 celebrity politics and changing performances over time 176 research barbieri, g. (2014). lo tsunami tour. comunicazione politica, 1(1), 171-186. doi: 10.3270/76594 biorcio, r., & natale p. (2013). politica a 5 stelle. feltrinelli. bordignon, f. (2014). il partito del capo: da berlusconi a renzi. maggioli. cosenza, g. (2014). grillo’s communication style: from swear words to body language. contemporary italian politics, 6(1), 89-101. https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2014.886417 musso, m., & maccaferri, m. (2018). at the origins of the political discourse of the 5-star movement (m5s): internet, direct democracy and the future of the past. internet histories, 2(1-2), 98-120. https://doi.org/10.1080/24701475.2018.1457295 matteo salvini (lega/league) autobiographical books and/or other materials • salvini, m., pandini, m. & sala, r. (2016). secondo matteo. follia e coraggio per cambiare il paese. rizzoli. popular and gossip press • “salvini desnudo”, 10 december 2014, “oggi” reportage. political observers/journalists’ book and editorials • ceccarelli, f. (2018). invano: il potere in italia da de gasperi a questi qua. feltrinelli. • pucciarelli, m. (2019, may), europee, la lega punta sul gioco social "vinci salvini": utenti a rischio privacy, la repubblica. https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2019/05/11/news/europee_la_lega_punta_sul_gioco_social_vinci_salvini_utenti_a_rischio_privacy225976714/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). • cavallo, a. (2019, september), salvini, il foodblogger che manca all’italia, ilpost. https://www.ilpost.it/ariannacavallo/2019/09/07/il-foodblogger-chemanca-allitalia/ • piacenza, d. (2018, december), capire salvini attraverso il cibo che posta sui social, wired. https://www.wired.it/lol/2018/12/05/salvini-pasta-ragu-5-cibosocial/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). • cipolla, a. (2019, 29 may) perché salvini lo chiamano “capitano”? come è nato il soprannome del leader della lega. money.it. https://www.money.it/perchesalvini-chiamato-capitano-motivi-soprannome (accessed on 8 july 2022). media reports and documentaries • salvini and the papeete beachclub: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amavroslv34 (accessed on 8 july 2022). • https://www.giornalettismo.com/conferenza-papeete-beach-salvini/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2019/05/11/news/europee_la_lega_punta_sul_gioco_social_vinci_salvini_utenti_a_rischio_privacy-225976714/ https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2019/05/11/news/europee_la_lega_punta_sul_gioco_social_vinci_salvini_utenti_a_rischio_privacy-225976714/ https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2019/05/11/news/europee_la_lega_punta_sul_gioco_social_vinci_salvini_utenti_a_rischio_privacy-225976714/ https://www.ilpost.it/ariannacavallo/2019/09/07/il-foodblogger-che-manca-allitalia/ https://www.ilpost.it/ariannacavallo/2019/09/07/il-foodblogger-che-manca-allitalia/ https://www.wired.it/lol/2018/12/05/salvini-pasta-ragu-5-cibo-social/ https://www.wired.it/lol/2018/12/05/salvini-pasta-ragu-5-cibo-social/ https://www.money.it/perche-salvini-chiamato-capitano-motivi-soprannome https://www.money.it/perche-salvini-chiamato-capitano-motivi-soprannome https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amavroslv34 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amavroslv34 https://www.giornalettismo.com/conferenza-papeete-beach-salvini/ campus and mazzoni 177 • “vinci salvini” (win salvini): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atwldbxcfpc (accessed on 8 july 2022). • salvini auctions his photos: https://www.oggi.it/attualita/notizie/2014/12/15/matteo-salvini-mette-allasta-le-sue-foto-nudo-tutte-leimmagini-mai-viste-in-esclusiva-su-oggi/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). • salvini and festival di sanremo: https://www.ansa.it/sanremo_2018/notizie/2018/02/09/matteo-salvini-a-sanremo-con-elisa-isoardi_16be2659-3b30429d-b584-09fd8ca1399a.html (accessed on 8 july 2022). • salvini and selfies: https://www.wired.it/lol/2020/09/17/salvini-selfie-spalla/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). • https://www.dw.com/en/matteo-salvini-sweeping-to-power-with-selfies/a47657196 (accessed on 8 july 2022). • https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2019/08/19/la-strategia-di-salvini-per-evitarele-burle-dei-contestatori-selfie-a-raffica-e-li-scatta-di-persona/5395467/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). research albertazzi, d., giovannini, a., & seddone, a. (2018). ‘no regionalism please, we are leghisti!’ the transformation of the italian lega nord under the leadership of matteo salvini. regional & federal studies, 28(5), 645-671. carone, m., & cavallaro, m. (2019). salvini social. in g. diamanti & l. pregliasco (eds.), fenomeno salvini (pp. 45-83). castelvecchi. mazzoni m., & mincigrucci, r. (2021). the representation of matteo salvini in gossip magazines: the ‘ordinary super leader. contemporary italian politics. 13(1), 49-63 https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2020.1857537 giorgia meloni (fratelli d’italia/brothers of italy) autobiographical books and/or other materials • meloni, g. (2021). io sono giorgia. le mie radici le mie idee. rizzoli. popular and gossip press • “con ginevra è sempre natale”, 24 december 2019, “chi” reportage. • “giorgia. la sirena tricolore”, 13 august 2020, “novella 2000” reportage. political observers/journalists’ book and editorials • altinier, a., d’angelo a. (2019, november), social monitor: meloni sempre più “regina dei social”, youtrend. https://www.youtrend.it/2019/11/12/social-monitor-meloni-sempre-piu-regina-dei-social/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). • cosimi, s. (2019, november), io sono giorgia è il manifesto involontario della nostra idiozia, wired.it. https://www.wired.it/attualita/media/2019/11/11/io-sonogiorgia-idiozia-youtube/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atwldbxcfpc https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atwldbxcfpc https://www.oggi.it/attualita/notizie/2014/12/15/matteo-salvini-mette-allasta-le-sue-foto-nudo-tutte-le-immagini-mai-viste-in-esclusiva-su-oggi/ https://www.oggi.it/attualita/notizie/2014/12/15/matteo-salvini-mette-allasta-le-sue-foto-nudo-tutte-le-immagini-mai-viste-in-esclusiva-su-oggi/ https://www.oggi.it/attualita/notizie/2014/12/15/matteo-salvini-mette-allasta-le-sue-foto-nudo-tutte-le-immagini-mai-viste-in-esclusiva-su-oggi/ https://www.ansa.it/sanremo_2018/notizie/2018/02/09/matteo-salvini-a-sanremo-con-elisa-isoardi_16be2659-3b30-429d-b584-09fd8ca1399a.html https://www.ansa.it/sanremo_2018/notizie/2018/02/09/matteo-salvini-a-sanremo-con-elisa-isoardi_16be2659-3b30-429d-b584-09fd8ca1399a.html https://www.ansa.it/sanremo_2018/notizie/2018/02/09/matteo-salvini-a-sanremo-con-elisa-isoardi_16be2659-3b30-429d-b584-09fd8ca1399a.html https://www.wired.it/lol/2020/09/17/salvini-selfie-spalla/ https://www.dw.com/en/matteo-salvini-sweeping-to-power-with-selfies/a-47657196 https://www.dw.com/en/matteo-salvini-sweeping-to-power-with-selfies/a-47657196 https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2019/08/19/la-strategia-di-salvini-per-evitare-le-burle-dei-contestatori-selfie-a-raffica-e-li-scatta-di-persona/5395467/ https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2019/08/19/la-strategia-di-salvini-per-evitare-le-burle-dei-contestatori-selfie-a-raffica-e-li-scatta-di-persona/5395467/ https://www.youtrend.it/2019/11/12/social-monitor-meloni-sempre-piu-regina-dei-social/ https://www.youtrend.it/2019/11/12/social-monitor-meloni-sempre-piu-regina-dei-social/ https://www.wired.it/attualita/media/2019/11/11/io-sono-giorgia-idiozia-youtube/ https://www.wired.it/attualita/media/2019/11/11/io-sono-giorgia-idiozia-youtube/ celebrity politics and changing performances over time 178 • rising stars: twenty faces to look out for in 2020, the times. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rising-stars-twenty-faces-to-look-out-forin-2020-kwcmc8mzf (accessed on 8 july 2022). media reports and documentaries • spiderman meloni: https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2018/09/08/meloni-versione-spider-man-mistero-suisocial_weq0pfo2yhwwu6ctuailqm.html (accessed on 8 july 2022). • meloni compares the prime minister giuseppe conte to a character of the cartoons the smurfs: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkqshio-ppk (accessed on 8 july 2022). • meloni and her memes: https://www.wired.it/lol/2018/01/23/meme-manifestogiorgia-meloni/ (accessed on 8 july 2022). • meloni and “io sono giorgia” (i am giorgia): https://www.adnkronos.com/iosono-giorgia-meloni-gongola-su-instagram_uncacdztvetsnlrgrig3y (accessed on 8 july 2022). • meloni “nationalistic” chef: https://video.repubblica.it/politica/italia-controeuropa-giorgia-meloni-prepara-la-caprese-nella-cucina-di-casa/283671/284282 (accessed on 8 july 2022). • meloni and the times: https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/times-giorgia-melonii-20-personaggi-che-potrebbero-plasmare-mondo-acxowt9?refresh_ce=1 (accessed on 8 july 2022). research moroni, c. (2018). instagram e le immagini della politica al femminile. in g. fiorentino & c. moroni (eds.), immagini dello spazio pubblico, immagini nello spazio pubblico (pp. 99137). settecittà. cheles, l. (2020). from reticence to excess. political portraiture in italy from the fall of fascism to the present. in l. cheles & a. giacone (eds.), the political portrait. leadership, image and power (pp. 232-260). routledge. mazzoleni, g., & bracciale, r. (2019). la politica pop online. il mulino. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rising-stars-twenty-faces-to-look-out-for-in-2020-kwcmc8mzf https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/rising-stars-twenty-faces-to-look-out-for-in-2020-kwcmc8mzf https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2018/09/08/meloni-versione-spider-man-mistero-sui-social_weq0pfo2yhwwu6ctuailqm.html https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2018/09/08/meloni-versione-spider-man-mistero-sui-social_weq0pfo2yhwwu6ctuailqm.html https://www.adnkronos.com/fatti/politica/2018/09/08/meloni-versione-spider-man-mistero-sui-social_weq0pfo2yhwwu6ctuailqm.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkqshio-ppk https://www.wired.it/lol/2018/01/23/meme-manifesto-giorgia-meloni/ https://www.wired.it/lol/2018/01/23/meme-manifesto-giorgia-meloni/ https://www.adnkronos.com/io-sono-giorgia-meloni-gongola-su-instagram_uncacdztvetsnlrgrig3y https://www.adnkronos.com/io-sono-giorgia-meloni-gongola-su-instagram_uncacdztvetsnlrgrig3y https://video.repubblica.it/politica/italia-contro-europa-giorgia-meloni-prepara-la-caprese-nella-cucina-di-casa/283671/284282 https://video.repubblica.it/politica/italia-contro-europa-giorgia-meloni-prepara-la-caprese-nella-cucina-di-casa/283671/284282 https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/times-giorgia-meloni-i-20-personaggi-che-potrebbero-plasmare-mondo-acxowt9?refresh_ce=1 https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/times-giorgia-meloni-i-20-personaggi-che-potrebbero-plasmare-mondo-acxowt9?refresh_ce=1 microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 26–29. political scientists as research and training experts: angela liberatore angela liberatore has a phd in political and social science from the european university institute, and is now head of unit at the european research council, european commission. ips: could you please briefly describe your professional role and your main responsibilities? i lead the unit on social sciences and humanities at the european research council (erc) executive agency. the erc manages the excellence ‘pillar’ of the eu framework research and innovation programme “horizon 2020”. it funds frontier research in all scientific domains (social sciences, life sciences, physical sciences) in a bottom up way (topics are chosen by the researchers themselves) and the grants can cover any part of the life cycle of a researcher’s career (from starting grants to advanced grants). the unit, composed of twenty-five colleagues, provides support to the scientific council on any matter related to the evaluation of proposals, monitoring of research projects, tackling cross-cutting issues (from gender dimensions to open access, interdisciplinarity or widening participation) in relation to social sciences and humanities. currently we are working, also with units in other scientific domains, on a conference on science diplomacy. this is an emerging topic in the eu and beyond, and one that i have been working on also in my previous job as deputy head of the unit on international cooperation –with focus on european neighbourhood, africa and the gulfat the directorate general for research and innovation of the european commission (from which i am currently seconded).during more than twenty years at the european commission i had several jobs, all related to supporting research in europe and internationally, and linking research with policy and societal needs and actors. for example, i was part of the commission team at the kyoto conference on climate change, served as rapporteur of the group on ‘democratising expertise’ for the commission’s white paper on governance and co-organised with eeas conferences on the regulation of private security companies, on the impacts of climate change impacts in the middle east and on eu-us relations. my background in political and social sciences –and philosophyhas been a key asset in all jobs i took on, including my current one. it provided me with basic knowledge, analytical tools and critical mindset to initiate and implement initiatives on a range of research and policy issues in a complex –and very diverse and interestinginstitution. political scientists as research and training experts 27 ips: have you ever thought of doing your current work while you were a phd student? frankly speaking, during my phd – earned at the european university institute – many of my friends had as a goal to work in a eu institution, while i was rather thinking about a research career. i simply love research and the cooperation in an international research project with harvard university/kennedy school of government –where i also spent a semester with a fulbright fellowshipgave me even more appetite for further research. back to italy the options to pursue research were not very bright though. i was told that i was too interdisciplinary (surely this would be much less of an issue now) as the phd was in political and social sciences, my first degree was in philosophy – with application to economic theory, and i had been working on issues that at the time were seen as non-mainstream such as environmental policy and risk management… so i started considering the ‘classic option’ of migrating to the usa. but then i saw an announcement in the newspapers about the european commission looking for candidates to work on a to-be-launched new research programme on socio-economic and policy aspects of the environment. initially i was not sure i wanted to pursue a career at the commission, even if the position looked interesting and somehow ‘matching’ my cv, and i also thought it was probably not worth trying given the very harsh competition (later i learned that there were 600 applications for one post – it can be even worse...). but some friends encouraged me, i started liking the idea to work in the institution that has been driving european integration (yes, this has been a main motivation) and i considered (with my partner) that migrating to brussels was less far away from my beloved bologna and florence than going anywhere in the usa. so i decided that i should not have to regret -one daynot having even tried! so i did, and got the job – temporary first and then permanent. i do not regret the choice, and when i felt tired with the job i had (yes, it happened –as in most jobs probably), i found ways to move to another, and also got a fellowship to do research again for one academic year. ips: have your political science studies influenced your career? what can be the competitive advantage of a background like yours in your profession? yes, my studies in political (and social) sciences made me interested in and familiar with european integration and institutions; the first was the basis for the motivation to join the commission, the second gave me a competitive advantage when applying to my initial position as well as the following ones. by knowing eu institutions, policies, decision making i have been able to contribute to various eu initiatives (e.g. kyoto protocol and white paper, mentioned above, but also in linking research to policies in the fields of foreign affairs and home affairs) and somehow find my space in our admittedly not always easy administration. also in my current job, more focused on curiosity-driven research, my background provides a very good basis to guide my team, keep an overview of the research we support and work on issues such as science diplomacy. a background in political science can be seen as a specialist one (to deal with issues such as citizenship, democracy, elections, international relations, etc.) but also as a generalist one (having the tools to tackle a wide range of policy areas, institutions, levels of governance, stakeholders’ positions and interests). both aspects are useful! ips interviews angela liberatore 28 ips: what kind of interaction do you think there can be between your professional community and the academia? well, all my work has been characterized by links between eu policy (research policy and, through it, several other policy domains) and academia. universities are the main beneficiaries of eu funding in the social sciences and humanities (whether in collaborative research under the ‘societal challenge’ part of the framework programme or research funded by the erc). academics can choose what kind of interactions they want to have with the european commission and erc: get the funding to do their research and advance the frontier of knowledge or also engage in using knowledge for policy advice and respond to social needs. for political scientists it is maybe easier than for academics with other backgrounds (let’s say anthropology, linguistic or psychology) to pursue also policy advice. however, this is an ‘art’ in itself that requires deep knowledge of the policies and actors to be advised, good skills in ‘translating’ scientific evidence in useful (avoiding ‘reinventing the wheel’ kind of papers…) and usable information and recommendations (if this is the problem, what are the options to tackle it?). surely these are obvious issues for the readers of this journal… ips: from your perspective, what skills would you recommend should not be missing in a political scientist curriculum nowadays? flexibility! go international and for ‘brain circulation’! let me explain… flexibility relates to the content of knowledge, the links with other disciplines and communities, the choice of profession. one may start focusing on any topic during phd studies, but then it is important to be able and willing to explore (the links with) other topics; the point is not to replace ‘deepening’ with ‘widening’ (to take a dichotomy often used concerning european integration) of knowledge, but to push the frontier of knowledge and also identify other users or even co-producers of knowledge beyond academia. many issues need cooperation with other disciplines to be seriously addressed: european integration itself can hardly be understood without links with law, economic, sociology or history; the same applies to the development of international environmental negotiations and agreements or of migration policies –just to mention some examples. and one may start thinking of a profession in academia and then pursue one in diplomacy, policy or business – or vice versa – depending on opportunities that may arise, if one is ready to see and size them. in this regard, communication skills as well as language and it skills and the ability to work in multicultural environments can turn out to be very useful for many different professional venues. ‘go international’ means that without some study and research experience abroad and some publications in english, the opportunities become much more narrow (whether one likes or resent the ‘lingua franca’, the need to know it is a fact of scientific life –quite obvious to readers of this journal as we are mostly italians writing and reading in english…). it also means to develop networks that help expanding one own research, professional and personal horizons. it does not mean ‘brain drain’ but rather ‘brain circulation’: in many cases and countries (while admittedly not all), an experience abroad and a good cv with publications in english is an asset and ‘return’ of qualified researchers is actively promoted. as italy has a long tradition of ‘brain drain’, i would like to conclude with a constructive note: some measures have been taken to encourage return of researchers and recent debates political scientists as research and training experts 29 indicate that while problems persist, attention is being devoted to this. in addition, measures to engage with italian ‘scientific diasporas’ abroad can enhance mobility, knowledge sharing, networking and innovation (here one could also learn from the experience of other countries such as ireland or, not to look too ‘eurocentric’, india). similarly, engaging with ‘knowledge workers’ who came to italy from other countries, can be one of the useful ways of harvesting the potential of migration and gain first-hand knowledge of their countries of origin; something that can, in turn, have broader cultural, economic, policy implications. perhaps a topic for further study by political scientists? microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 14–16. political scientists as politicians and public officials: elisabetta gualmini elisabetta gualmini is a full professor of political science at the university of bologna. she holds a phd in political science (university of florence) and has been visiting scholar at the wzb in berlin, the humboldt universitat in berlin, the london school of economics, the uc berkeley and the uc los angeles. between 2011 and 2014 she was the president of the istituto carlo cattaneo. she has written almost 10 monographies in the filed of labour policies and comparative public administration and more than 30 essays. in 2015 she has been appointed vice-president of the emilia romagna regional government, so she is temporarily on a leave from the university. ips: can you give us a glimpse into a typical work day of yours? well, my day starts quite early as i have go through the national and local press and help my children get ready for school. after that, i usually arrive at my office around 9.30 am where i hold regular meetings with several stakeholders in social and housing policies, trade unions, associations, mayors, and other public administrators. my agenda also includes formal political meetings, for example with the regional legislative assembly. once day per week i organize meetings outside bologna to meet with local stakeholders and policymakers, in order to explain what we do at the regional level and get feedback on how to improve our legislative activity. let me add that many meetings—the crucial ones—are usually scheduled late in the evening. not exactly an easy situation for a woman who is also a mother. a bad habit, unfortunately widespread not only in political activity. ips: reflecting on the process that led you to hold a critical position for the public administration of the regione emilia-romagna, would you characterize such an outcome as the result of fortuitous circumstances or something that you deliberately chose to do? well, i never ruled out working in public administration. actually, i have always thought i would like that. at the same time, i think it is not possible to think of a political career as a long-term one. hence, i am grateful to my academic job as it offers me the chance of gaining an extraordinary first-hand experience of a world i have always studied. as for my current position, this is an opportunity that opened up suddenly. at the beginning i was left wondering whether to accept the offer, because i wanted to conclude my term at the istituto cattaneo. i ultimately decided to give it try when i was offered the vice-president position: a position that offers me the possibility to oversee all public policies that are formulated at the regional level. political scientists as politicians and public officials 15 ips: as a political scientist and a scholar of public policy, what do you conceive as the most important contributions that our profession brings to the political table? i think we bring significant contributions. let me offer a couple of examples based on my recent experience at the regione. in my experience, knowing about how public policies are formulated and adopted, as well as their implementation, has certainly been a useful tool and a personal contribution to the political processes i participate in. furthermore, our skills to collect evidence, organize and present arguments is important for engaging public audiences. our theoretical background allows us to make connections among seemingly different issues and is a skill that citizens appreciate. i think voters have become more demanding and are no longer satisfied with slogans: they look for serious interlocutors and political scientists can provide citizens with insights on the political and social reality of our time. in spite of all the potential advantages that stem from our professional activity, we should also be aware of the risks. specifically, people that come from academia can often be perceived as too theoretical and thus detached from reality. as a result, i think it is important to maintain a pragmatic approach to politics even if we rely on our theoretical and methodological toolkit. in other words, we should remember that our knowledge is not written in stone, but that pragmatism is required to reach those compromises at the heart of political decisions. ips: keeping with the theme regarding the two-way relationship between academic work and political engagement, in what respects does public involvement improve academic work and how? political experience provides political scientists with enormous knowledge about the objects they study. to start with, and again based on my experience, active involvement means getting a hand on the veto powers and points that hinder the working of public administrations, stifling ideas and innovation. still, this experience provides practical knowledge of how to solve problems that citizens care about. i think that it will be useful to go back to an academic class and tell students about the changes in the social-economic fabric of our country that i am presiding over in my role. over the past few years, the social system we used to know has significantly been transformed as the categories of wealth and poverty have changed, with enormous consequences for how to formulate social policies. again, however, caution is needed. what i mean is that moving back from the political arena to academia requires leaving aside all the ideologies that characterize the former setting. ips: what is your take on the relevance of political scientists to the public and political debate? do you think that public engagement is a recipe for relevance or not? i think that there is nothing wrong with political scientists becoming actively engaged in politics. we can provide some important value by sharing our knowledge and passion with the political communities we live in. furthermore, as we have the luxury (and i think it really is so) to take a sabbatical from our profession to participate in political life, we can still preserve the boundary that separates the academic work from the political one. but let me reiterate that i think it is important for political scientists to make their voices heard, especially at a time when we are going through historical socio-economic changes. ips interviews elisabetta gualmini 16 ips: but are our voices heard? or are those of colleagues from other disciplines “more heard” than ours? well, i think it is fair to say that political scientists are not generally given pride of place in political debates and decisions in italy, especially as compared to lawyers and economists. when institutional reforms are on the political agenda, policymakers tend to rely on legal scholars rather than on political scientists. in general, there is a widespread interpretation of political scientists as scholars working almost exclusively on electoral systems or public opinion analyses. and this, of course, does not give justice to our discipline. furthermore, if we think of the range of policies that policymakers deal with, then political scientists have certainly more to say than legal scholars. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 17–21. political scientists as politicians and public officials: luca martinelli luca martinelli is an official of the european commission. after completing his phd in political science in the university of florence in 1995, he undertook research at the university of bologna (centre for public policy analysis in the department of organization and political system), on projects related to public administration and public policy analysis. in 1997 he joined the european commission, working first in public health policy and then (since 2001) in information society and media. he then worked as policy officer for digital libraries, open data, and public sector information within the information society and media directorate general, before taking up his current role as the assistant to the director general of the publications office of the european union in late 2012. his experience as researcher and policy practitioner ranges across issues as diverse as environment, transport, public health, broadcasting, ict research and deployment. his current research interests focus on the policies defined by the digital agenda for europe (dae), the commission strategy to deliver social and economic benefits through ict. ips: can you briefly describe your typical tasks and working day? are you happy in your current job? i have been working as assistant to the director-general of the publications office of the european union since 2012. this is a position closely associated with the operational management of an organisation of about 600 staff and with an overall budget of € 130 million. our mission is to produce, to publish and to provide access to the publications and official information (e.g. legislation) of the european union institutions. these tasks are rapidly changing in the context of the digital revolution, and more and more of the services that we provide are web-based and paperless: for example, since 2013 only the online edition of the official journal of the eu is authentic and has legal value. within the commission, dg assistants (often referred to as “policy assistants”) are a typical “staff function” charged to support and advise the director-general on any possible matter. my daily tasks therefore include taking part in management and senior management activities and strategic discussions, both internally and at interinstitutional level. the publications office is governed by a management board where all eu institutions (commission, council, parliament, court of justice, etc.) are represented at the level of secretary general. strategic orientation, as well as management and negotiation skills are important in my job. although the mission of the organisation is clear and well defined, the political, institutional and technological environment in which we operate is changing rapidly and is often uncertain. this makes my current job both challenging and very interesting, and i can definitely say i am happy to work for the eu citizens in this position. ips interviews luca martinelli 18 ips: is your job the result of a tenaciously pursued project, or rather of an opportunity you seized? had you planned this type of career whilst you were studying because you were attracted by it, or rather is it the result of a later choice? did studying political science matter? i started studying political science at the university of bologna in 1985 with the idea of becoming a journalist. coming from the liceo classico, i was fascinated by the concept of “polis”, the public good, and i liked writing. while studying, i progressively enlarged my range of future professional options. what interested me was the political phenomenon, in particular its policy and public administration dimensions, which could be approached from different professional angles. while working for my phd i had, of course, also considered the possibility of an academic career. in the mid-90s the chances of a research position in an italian university were rather poor, unless one was ready to accept scholarships and temporary positions which could last for many years. after completing my doctorate in 1995 i therefore applied for, and succeeded in, competitions for posts in public service organisations both in italy and at european level. my first postdoc job was at the council of the autonomous province of trento, the legislative assembly in my region of origin. i was the official responsible for one of the permanent legislative committees (environment and land planning) and for a special inquiry committee. although rather short (i worked there for less than two years), this was an enriching and very interesting experience, as one could really observe a “micro” political system in action. in 1997 i was then hired by the european commission, as a policy officer at the public health directorate in luxembourg. since then i have changed job and department every 5 years on average within the commission. internal mobility is highly supported as part of the human resources policy for management and sensitive functions. my academic background was instrumental in allowing me such changes of policy area. after public health, i worked as an evaluation officer in the context of the research framework programmes, and then again as policy officer in the area of the digital agenda for europe (access to cultural and scientific information; public sector information; open data), until i was offered my present position in 2012. having a background in political science has been really important, both in terms of providing a successful “knowledge key” for my initial recruitment and also for facilitating my move to different positions throughout my career. ips: people you work with often have a different educational background. what are the competing academic backgrounds in your working environment? do you perceive you have an advantage/disadvantage vis-à-vis these colleagues? what does such advantage/disadvantage consist of? the academic background of the administrator-grade employees of the european commission is very diverse. besides those with a qualification in political science, there are also lawyers, economists and linguists. there are also many other specialised profiles, such as engineers and information technology specialists, which i have particularly encountered both in my present job at the publications office and in my previous job at the information society and media directorate general (now dg connect). a considerable number of my colleagues at the public health directorate (my first appointment), were medical doctors, epidemiologists and public health specialists. although i am not particularly keen on the distinction between political scientists as politicians and public officials 19 “generalists” and “specialists”, i would place myself in the former group – although i like to consider myself as a specialist in public administration. moreover, i believe a key feature of a performing administration is to strike the right mix between the different types of competence required. as regards the advantages that a background in political science brings, i would mention: understanding the general context, complexity analysis, flexibility and adaptability. one disadvantage is perhaps the dependence from domain-specific knowledge. ips: is there anything not written in textbooks that you have learned thanks to your work experience, and that you would recommend should be taught to politics and policy students? i had a comprehensive exposure to and understanding of empirical approaches to politics, society and organisations before i started work within the sphere of public administration. i was therefore quite familiar with concepts like unexpected consequence, perverse result, organised anarchy, implementation gap, etc. the perception of a hiatus between what is taught in books and the reality experienced when working is probably more obvious for a law student. the only recommendation i have would be to encourage traineeships for master level students, so that they get exposed the reality they study at an earlier stage. ips: can you identify who has an academic background similar to yours on the basis of his/her approach to problem setting and problem solving? or rather do you think that other differences/similarities (e.g. personality, political orientation, other peculiarities) matter more than academic background? in my experience, i would say that “education matters” particularly in the way problems are set, conceptualised and analysed. however, i have doubts that academic background can be a predictor of the type of solutions that are proposed to a given problem. probably other factors play a more important role in this, for example being more or less creative and innovative. my experience at the commission concerns rather technical policy domains, and i can say that political orientation does not appear to me as an important variable to explain the approach to problems. the most relevant factor is probably the mix of competences that are brought to the game, as problem solving at commission always stresses interdisciplinary approaches and team work. ips: how would you re-organize (if needed) courses in political science (including its sub-disciplines) in order to structure a curriculum that could naturally lead to your current job? in my opinion, the undergraduate and graduate courses which fall under the general grouping of political science disciplines that are offered by italian universities are incredibly rich and diversified. the situation has changed dramatically since the second half of the 1980s, when i took my old “laurea”. at the time, the offer was rather simple: five specialisations were possible after the first year common core: sociology, history, economics, international relations and public administration. at phd level, we normally referred to three sub-disciplines: 1) political theory/political system; 2) international relations; 3) public administrations/public policy. i chose the last area both for the laurea and the doctorate. i do not have sufficient knowledge about the results of the italian university reform process to formulate any specific recommendations as to how it should be reorganips interviews luca martinelli 20 ised. i believe the process of diversification of the offer is probably irreversible, but in general terms i tend to have reservations about excessively specialised approaches at first degree level. i am personally in favour of a solid, common and interdisciplinary academic basis at first degree level, followed by more specialised and profession-oriented master level. a master level degree that could have naturally prepared me for my career at the commission might have been labelled “european institutions and policies” or “european administrative studies”. ips: should political science scholars “get their hands dirty”, i.e. intervene more in politics and policy making, so that they gain in relevance? as far as your activity domain is concerned, is it possible to distinguish easily between technical knowledge on the one hand, and political values and policy preferences on the other? this is the dilemma, “social engineering vs ivory tower syndrome”. i personally was always more interested and fascinated by the “practical side” of politics and by the possibility of using knowledge to produce socio-economic and environmental results and impacts. this is probably why i went for public policy and public administration studies, and why i have chosen a policy practitioner career. at the same time, i think it is neither necessary nor possible to provide behavioural recommendations for political science scholars. as for the “facts vs values” issue, i believe it is possible to distinguish them. at the same time, as i mentioned before, the policy areas in which i have worked have been rather technical, and it is quite rare that political preferences play a relevant role in my work. certainly the traditional “right-left” continuum is less relevant than the “provs anti-european integration”. ips: for a political science scholar who wants to be active and produce an impact on policy making, is it easier to do it by studying the policy process or rather by being fully part of the process as decision maker? my feeling is that by becoming a decision maker (e.g. by engaging directly in politics or public administration), the scholar tends to lose social recognition as a source of independent knowledge, and therefore he/she loses an important power resource. i tend to conclude that it is easier to do it by studying the policy process. ips: what is the added value of the political science scholar to the job of policy practitioner? and, vice versa, how is the profession of policy practitioner improving the academic work? keeping the two sides in connection is difficult but necessary; i see mutual benefits if this is done correctly. the practical side would gain in terms of the quality of the decisions and evidence-based policy making. the research work would improve its societal relevance, although not necessarily its quality. at the commission there is currently a strong emphasis on evidence-based policy, including the use of social sciences. i would like to signal the fellowships initiatives available to commission administrators to keep in contact with academia: the eu fellowships consists of an annual programme offered by many universities around the world, most of which are in the us. it includes the weatherhead center for international affairs at harvard and yale university, as well as the european university institute in florence. i am policy fellowship alumnus at the centre for science and policy, university of cambridge. political scientists as politicians and public officials 21 ips: what are the disadvantages of mixing up theoretical knowledge and “practice”? i see no disadvantages as such. it is rather a question of time, resources and how the mixing up is done. the policy practitioner is often result-oriented, and it is very difficult for him/her to align with the stricter methodological requirements of the academia. the quality and independence of science should not be diverted by the imperatives of the practice. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 30–34. when political scientists meet eu negotiation and negotiators: francesco marchi francesco marchi is a phd at sciences po, irene-essec, and the director of the «negotiators of europe» research and training program. an introduction from our contributor since the beginning of the fifties, the european union has developed through successive rounds of negotiations in which member states were sitting around the table to take common decisions and address joint problems. negotiation thus represents an essential element of the eu process of integration and an inbuilt feature of the eu institutional system.1 negotiations take place within the eu institutions, between eu institutions and its member states, and also between the eu and third countries or international organisations. the eu is also exposed to challenges of the “age of negotiation”,2 in which the global systems of rules are constantly put into question, ideological barriers have progressively faded away and sovereign states have to address joint problems such as trade, climate change, terrorism, migration fluxes, and regulatory issues. in today’s world, negotiation is such a diffuse activity that international organisations and public administrations need to rely on an important number of experts on policy content. however, they also need experts of the processes through which these issues have to be negotiated. content expertise is no longer sufficient for finding an agreement; it is necessary to have some professional figures who are able to steer the effective processes of dialogue and negotiation that aim to reconcile divergent interests across the table. the recent “brexit” case will certainly require some additional negotiation expertise from the eu. * * * ips: could you please briefly describe your professional role and your main responsibilities? my work consists in helping the eu institutions increase the negotiation capabilities of their officials by organising a series of actions that range from training seminars, workshops and conferences, to the development of e-learning tools and a community of practice. at the institute for research and education on negotiation 1 brunazzo m. & p. settembri (2012) experiencing the european union, rubbettino editore, soveria mannelli. 2 zartman w. (2007) negotiation and conflict management: essays on theory and practice, routledge, london. when political scientists meet eu negotiation and negotiators 31 – irene,3 based at the department of public policies of the essec business school, i am the director of the “negotiators of europe” research and training program. within that framework, in collaboration with eipa (european institute of public administration, netherlands) and the college of europe (belgium), i have responsibility for undertaking training needs analysis in close cooperation with the eu institutions and their human resources departments. my task is then to elaborate and propose training activities specifically designed for the target audience of different eu institutions such as the commission, the eeas, the european parliament or the general secretariat of the council. since 2008 our institute irene has progressively created the “negotiators’ learning path” in cooperation with the dg hr of the european commission.4 this training curriculum is structured around seven seminars dedicated to negotiation skills development, covering the following thematic areas: basic courses advanced courses negotiation skills difficult and complex negotiations multilateral negotiations cross-cultural negotiations legislative negotiations between commission, european parliament and council negotiating with the usa negotiating with china the seven seminars represent a total amount of teaching hours that amount to 120, divided into 14 full days of training. the negotiators’ learning path is organised through a system of compulsory courses (negotiation skills and multilateral negotiations) that give access to the advanced courses dealing with specific thematic areas. the pedagogy used in the seminars is strongly based on an inductive approach consisting of three sequential steps: ▪ experiential learning through simulations. in each of the half-day thematic sessions, participants engage in an exercise or a simulation pertaining to a key aspect of negotiation in the eu. ▪ debriefing, feedback & self-examination. after the practice, the instructor leads a debriefing discussion for analyzing participants’ performance, so that the class can identify the relationship between different negotiation strategies and outcomes and learn from everyone’s experiences. this stage is a key instrument for stepping back from daily practice and understanding the driving factors that influence the negotiators’ behaviours and negotiation outcomes. ▪ discussion of research findings. during the last part of each session, the instructor discusses with participants the relevant research findings connected with the key learning points of the seminar. the aim of this part is to look at how those findings may help to identify solutions applicable to real situations of negotiation in which the participants are involved. 3 since 1996, and following operations in 72 countries to date, essec’s institute for research and education on negotiation (irene paris, singapore & brussels) has developed as a centre of expertise in negotiation, conflict resolution and mediation. 4 directorate general of human resources – european commission. ips interviews francesco marchi 32 ips: have you ever thought of doing your current work while you were a phd student? while i was a master student at the university of catania, i attended a summer university in cluny (burgundy) in which i had the chance of following, for the first time, a negotiation workshop led by prof. stephen goldberg (dispute resolution research centre of the kellogg school of management, northwestern university). that experience exposed me to a series of new concepts and analytical perspectives5 that i found useful to complement my master’s thesis on institutional reform of the eu. i then decided to continue this research with a phd, focusing on the european convention on the future of europe and the impact of this new institutional context on the negotiation behaviour of member states’ governments. deepening my knowledge of negotiation theories also gave me the opportunity to become familiar with new pedagogical tools based on an inductive approach and the use of simulation exercises. i then started to progressively introduce some of these elements of negotiation analysis into the courses on eu policies and institutions that i was teaching at my university in france. the combination of my expertise in the eu system, negotiation theories and active learning methodology gave me the opportunity to join the irene institute while i was still doing my phd studies. this was a unique chance to discuss my research findings and refine some of the hypotheses of my phd research at that time. the regular contacts with eu negotiators and officials were a sort of reality check for what i was trying to demonstrate in my research.6 ips: have your political science studies influenced your career? what can be the competitive advantage of a background like yours in your profession? training eu officials and diplomats is a very challenging job because you need first to have a deep understanding of their daily working environment and then you need to provide concrete answers to their problems. today, the great majority of negotiation skills seminars rely heavily on the classic harvard program on negotiation approach of “principled negotiation”, whose famous manifesto is the textbook “getting to yes” by fischer and ury.7 this approach is certainly one of the most operational and highly efficient for teaching negotiation skills; however, it needs to be adapted by taking into consideration the specific aspects and features of the negotiation environment in which participants in the seminar will have to operate, if this is a public, international organisation such as the eu. the first challenge i encountered for this adaptation is that negotiation is not an autonomous discipline in itself, but is rather a field of research to which different disciplines are contributing with their theoretical and research traditions:8 disciplines such as game theory, bargaining analysis, organisational studies, 5 lewicki r., d. saunders, et al. (1997) essentials of negotiation, irwin/mcgraw-hill: boston; hopmann, p.t. (1996) the negotiation process and the resolution of international conflicts, columbia, sc: south carolina university press; fischer w. and r. ury (1981) getting to yes, harvard university press: boston. 6 marchi f. (2015) the convention on the future of europe: how states behave in a new institutional context of negotiation, peter lang, brussels. 7 fischer w. and r. ury (1981) getting to yes, harvard university press: boston. 8 druckman, d. (2010) negotiation, in n. young (ed.) the international encyclopaedia of peace, new york: oxford university press. when political scientists meet eu negotiation and negotiators 33 international relations and political science. however, in the last few years a growing scientific literature has started blending together negotiation analysis traditions with political science for analysing the functioning of the eu system,9 with interesting results. my knowledge of this body of literature was an extremely important asset because it allowed me to integrate eu specific aspects into my negotiation training and teaching activity. the second challenge was that exercises and simulations need to be in line with the principle of the “right distance”.10 this means that you cannot train eu officials with simulation exercises that are about the selling of a restaurant or a real-estate transaction; this scenario would certainly be too distant from their real professional life. at the same time, it would be of relatively low utility to train eu officials with a simulation exercise that repeats precisely the kind of situations and procedural rules they are exposed to on a daily basis; this would simply reproduce their routine, in an artificial way, without giving them the possibility to challenge their practices and reflexes. the “right distance” consists of working with scenarios that are fairly similar to the daily practices of the participants but at the same time present relevant differences that may stimulate changes in their reflexes. ips: what kind of interaction do you think there can be between your professional community and the academia? many scholars have emphasised how important is the distance between those who practice negotiation and those who study it. researchers have no direct access to negotiations, and they often have to rely on interviews, questionnaires, official documents or experimental work carried out in a laboratory with students. for example, experimental research findings are certainly valuable, but one question remains open: how would these findings change if the participants in these experiments were real diplomats or eu officials? would they have the same reflexes as the students? what would be the effect of their professional eu experience? moreover, researchers do not necessarily make the effort to translate their findings into operational and applicable solutions for real life negotiators. practitioners, for their part, are often trapped in severe time constraints, and they do not necessarily take the time to look at the interesting findings that research is producing. academic research is perceived as complicated, not operational and too theoretical to bring any concrete help to their professional life. a more effective dialogue between these different worlds would certainly benefit both sides: researchers could reinforce their contacts with the field and its actors; practitioners could learn many lessons from research findings. the way forward would be a circular approach helping researchers, practitioners and trainers to profit from each other’s’ experience by breaking the existing glass walls. ips: from your perspective, what skills would you recommend should not be missing in a political scientist curriculum nowadays? in today’s world, any political science curriculum should include activities based on active pedagogy that stimulate the problem-solving skills of students such as simu 9 dur a. , g. mateo & d. thomas (2010) negotiation theory and the eu : the state of the art, in ‘journal of european public policies’, vol. 17:5, pp. 613-618. 10 colson a. (2013) l’usage des simulations de négociation, in balzacq t. and ramel f., traité de relations internationales, paris : presses de sciences po, pp. 1081-1095. ips interviews francesco marchi 34 lations, group projects, international exchanges and workshops with practitioners. the acquisition of knowledge represents the bedrock of any curriculum at the university. but what makes the difference is the development and acquisition of soft skills. we have to acknowledge that the most prestigious european universities have integrated, in their political science programs, a few key principles around which they have built their reputation: ▪ a compulsory period to be spent abroad that ranges from 6 to 12 months; ▪ some group project or simulation to stimulate creativity and active learning skills; ▪ the introduction of a compulsory internship of 6 to 12 months; ▪ contact with practitioners or professionals that share their experience with students; ▪ increased use of english as a teaching language; ▪ the introduction of “clinical programs” in which students have to advise professionals; ▪ investment in the “high-technology literacy” of students. this may not be possible everywhere, and we know that costs, in terms of human resources and mentality change, may be high for teachers as well as for students. however, the effort is certainly worth trying. bibliography brunazzo m. and p. settembri (2012) experiencing the european union, rubbettino editore, soveria mannelli; colson a. (2013) “l’usage des simulations de négociation”, in balzacq t. and ramel f., traité de relations internationales, paris: presses de sciences po, pp. 1081-1095; druckman, d. (2010) negotiation, in n. young (ed.) the international encyclopedia of peace, new york: oxford university press; dur a., g. mateo and d. thomas (2010) “negotiation theory and the eu: the state of the art”, in journal of european public policies, vol. 17:5, pp. 613-618; elgstrom, o. and jonsson, c. (2000) ‘negotiation in the european union: bargaining or problem-solving?’ journal of european public policy, vol. 7(5), pp. 684–704; fischer w. and r. ury (1981) “getting to yes”, harvard university press: boston; lewicki r., d. saunders, et al. (1997) “essentials of negotiation”, irwin/mcgraw-hill: boston; marchi f. (2015) the convention on the future of europe: how states behave in a new institutional context of negotiation, peter lang, brussels; raiffa, h. (1982) the art and science of negotiation, cambridge, ma: harvard university press; zartman w. (1994) “introduction: two’s a company more’s a crowd: the complexities of multilateral negotiations”, in zartman w. (ed) international multilateral negotiation: approaches to the management of complexity, jossey-bass: san francisco; zartman w. (2007) negotiation and conflict management: essays on theory and practice, routledge, london microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_2i.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. 19–35. * contact author: andrea pedrazzani, university of bologna. e-mail address: andrea.pedrazzani@unibo.it italian candidates under the rosato law andrea pedrazzani luca pinto university of bologna paolo segatti university of milan abstract candidates for public office are part of the politically ‘active minority’ that serve as a fundamental link between voters and the ruling class. the selection of candidates can also define the traits of political personnel in the major political institutions and, more in general, the very nature of democratic representation. the study of candidates is particularly interesting in the case of the 2018 italian elections as it allows us to understand the extent to which italian citizens are willing to run for office despite a negative climate towards politics, and despite parties’ choices under the new mixed electoral system – the so-called ‘rosato law’. this article investigates a number of key characteristics of the italian candidates running for a seat in the chamber of deputies in 2018 and compares them with those who stood for office in the past elections from 1976 onwards. in particular, we focus on the following aspects: the overall number of candidacies and party lists, the use of multiple candidacies by different parties, and some relevant traits of candidates such as their age, gender and past experience as candidates. results highlight the impact of the new electoral institutions, as in 2018 the overall number of italian candidates and lists has decreased if compared to the 2013 elections. however, the new rules have not substantially reduced the number of those who run for office without any reasonable possibility of obtaining a parliamentary seat. in addition, the population of italian would-be deputies has become more balanced in terms of gender – though not any younger – and the turnover rate among italian candidates seems to be somewhat lower than in 2013. furthermore, moving from 2013 to 2018, the leaders of italian parties have made more moderate use of multiple candidacies as a tool for controlling party members. in the last elections, multiple candidacies were employed mostly for safeguarding the election of some prominent politicians. 1. introduction andidate selection received extensive attention during the campaign preceding italy’s 2018 general elections. this is unsurprising, as the identity of candidates for parliament and the way in which they are selected are considered by most commentators to be newsworthy. first of all, candidates are part of what we could label a politically ‘active minority’ in society – i.e., those citizens whose level of political participation is neither simply restricted to a periodic act of voting, nor equals that of active party supporters or party members. in this sense, candidates for elective offices serve as a fundamental link between voters and the ruling class and are part of what, about a century ago, gaetano mosca (1982: 1015) defined as the ‘second stratum’ of the political class. candidates’ social and intellectual profiles provide an insightful view of the linkage connecting society at large with the political realm. in addition, the recruitment of c pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 20 candidates is ‘the secret garden’ (gallagher and marsh 1988) of any party democracy, as the outcome of the selection process can affect the traits of political personnel in the major legislative and executive institutions and, more in general, can define the very nature of democratic representation (di virgilio and segatti 2016). parties are the gatekeepers of that garden and the electoral system is the context defining the incentives for the gatekeeping role parties have. if, then, candidacies are always an important topic in any study of nation-wide elections, they should be extremely interesting in the case of the 2018 italian elections, in particular for two reasons. on the one hand, analysing candidates allows us to understand the extent to which italian citizens are willing to participate in politics by running for office, and to identify the would-be representatives (at least in terms of some basic traits such as age and gender). this is especially interesting in the current phase, which in many accounts appears to be a turning point in national history: evaluations of parties and political institutions are starkly negative in public opinion, but new parties seem to be a venue for novel political mobilisation. on the other hand, the new mixed electoral system (the so-called ‘rosato law’) provides parties with new incentives to fulfil their role as gatekeepers. this article aims to analyse several key characteristics of the candidates running in the 2018 italian general elections and compares the 2018 candidates with those who stood for office in past italian elections from 1976 onwards. in so doing, we concentrate on the candidates for a seat in the lower house of the italian parliament (the chamber of deputies), for which data are available for a longer time period. in particular, we expect that the new electoral system has affected candidacies in 2018 with regard to three main aspects. the first is the overall number of candidates, which can be considered as a proxy of italian citizens’ willingness to participate in politics, in spite of a popular climate that is negative towards politics. has the rosato law increased or decreased the size of the active minority of the italian population? the second relates to multiple candidacies. is there any variation in the use of multiple candidacies among parties? and what are the differences from the past? the third concerns some key traits of candidates such as their age, gender and past experience as candidates. how have the new electoral incentives affected the recruitment choices made by party leaders? the article is organized as follows. the next section summarizes the main features of the electoral system that can affect the choice of candidates. the third section presents a longitudinal analysis of the number of party lists and candidates that have participated in general elections in italy over the 1976-2018 period. in the fourth section we concentrate on the 2018 election and analyse how party leaders made use of multiple candidacies. the fifth section deals with the age and gender of italian would-be representatives. moreover, we assess the degree of renewal of the population of candidates in italy. the last section concludes and discusses some possible avenues for future research. 2. the new electoral system providing a full account of the new electoral system is clearly outside the scope of the present article. however, it is worth highlighting some peculiarities of the new electoral who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 21 rules that can be hypothesized to substantially affect the process of candidate selection.1 one of these key features is the mixed nature of the new electoral system, whereby 37% of legislative seats (232 out of 630 in the chamber of deputies, 116 out of 315 in the senate) are assigned by plurality and 61% of seats (386 and 193, respectively) are allocated through pr in multi-member constituencies. in each chamber, the remaining 2% of seats are elected by italian voters living abroad. although largely based on a proportional principle, the new electoral system could be expected to limit the number of party lists participating in the elections as well as the number of parties actually entering parliament. this is mostly because the presence of a plurality tier should drive parties to coordinate and build electoral alliances in order to present common candidates in each single-member district.2 a second element which shaped parties’ decisions concerning candidacies is related to the representation threshold established by the new electoral law. according to the previous italian electoral system (the ‘calderoli law’), parties could enter parliament only if they achieved at least 2% of votes (if part of an electoral coalition) or 4% of votes (if they ran alone). moreover, thanks to the so-called ‘best loser’ clause, also the largest coalesced party below the threshold was entitled to enter parliament. the rosato law establishes instead a single threshold that corresponds to 3% of votes for both coalesced and non-coalesced parties. as a consequence, under the new rules, the best way in which the leaders of minor parties can win a legislative seat is by participating in an electoral alliance with larger parties and negotiating with them the possibility of running as candidates in a supposedly safe single-member district. on the whole, we expect that the new threshold might reduce the number of electoral lists compared to 2013. third, multiple candidacies are still allowed by the new rules. in particular, the same candidate can run for office in a single-member district and, at the same time, can be included in a party list in up to five multi-member constituencies. although multiple candidacies were allowed also by the previous electoral system, in 2018 they seem to have been used by party leaders also as an instrument for securing the election of prominent members of the party (see below). indeed, several well-known politicians who ran in a single-member district managed to win a seat only because, while defeated in the district, they had also been nominated at the top of their party’s list in one or more constituencies in the pr tier. by the same token, the inclusion of high-ranking politicians at the top of (short) party lists forced party leaders to make hard choices between potential candidates, thus excluding some eminent members of the party. fourth, the rosato law features a set of provisions aimed at balancing the presence of men and women in the italian parliament. more precisely, party lists in multi-member constituencies must be filled in such a way that each candidate cannot be followed by a candidate of the same gender. moreover, neither male candidates nor female 1see pedrazzani and pinto (2015) for a review of studies of how electoral rules can be expected to shape the selection of candidates and their behaviour. 2as for the pr part of the new electoral system, the relatively small magnitude of multi-member constituencies (about 4) might be in principle expected to reduce the fragmentation in the electoral supply (carey and hix 2011; cox 1997). however, it should be taken into account that such a hypothesized effect on fragmentation is moderated by the provision of a top-down seating allocation system: the percentage considered for the allocation of seats is not calculated in the single multi-member constituency, but on the basis of the votes obtained by party lists at the national level (for the election of the chamber of deputies) or at the regional level (for the election of the senate). pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 22 candidates from the same party can be at the top of the list in more than 60% of the multimember constituencies. similarly, for any party neither gender can be present in singlemember districts more than 60% of the times. a further aspect that received considerable media attention before the vote concerns the formal requirements that parties had to fulfil in order to participate to the elections. indeed, the rules that applied to newcomers are substantially different from those that applied to the parties that were already in parliament at the end of the 17thlegislature (2013-2018). while incumbent parties were exempted from collecting signatures, a new party that wanted to run in the whole country had to collect a minimum of 20,000 signatures. moreover, it had to present lists in at least two-thirds of the multi-member constituencies in a region.3 although the required number of signatures was certainly accessible, new parties had a relatively short time period for collecting them: the deadline for presenting the collected signatures was on 29 january 2018, one month after the day in which the president of the republic sergio mattarella dissolved parliament (28 december 2017). such rules hindered the participation of several small parties that were not already in parliament, while favouring some minor groups that were in parliament during the 17th legislature. in this respect, a particularly illuminating example is +europa, a new party headed by emma bonino. this party was encountering difficulties in collecting the required number of signatures and was eventually able to participate in the 2018 elections only when bruno tabacci ‘offered’ the symbol of his party (centro democratico, cd), which was already present in parliament, to bonino’s list. finally, the general elections of march 2018 were the first in which italian parties were not entitled to receive any refund from the state for the expenses sustained during their electoral campaign. the so-called ‘electoral refunds’ were introduced in 1999 as a ‘disguised’ form of public financing of parties, and regarded any party achieving at least 4% of votes in the general elections. this relatively low threshold, which was subsequently lowered to 1% and then raised to 2% in 2012, had allowed many minor parties to obtain public funds. a law cutting electoral refunds was enacted in 2014, and public refunds were totally abolished from 2017 onward. the absence of electoral refunds increased the costs of participation in 2018, especially for smaller parties. our goal is, then, to assess how these provisions affected candidacies in the 2018 elections. has the new system increased or decreased the size of the active minority of the italian population that is willing to run for parliamentary office? how have party leaders made use of multiple candidacies? have the new rules increased the presence of women in the italian parliament? have they contributed to a renewal of candidacies in general? 3. candidates and party lists in italy: a longitudinal analysis a first element that is worth emphasizing concerning candidacies in italy is the relatively high number of those who run for office at election time. in march 2018, as many as 5,058 candidates grouped in 28 party lists were in the running for the election of the italian chamber of deputies. as illustrated in table 1, in absolute terms this figure is 3 according to the rosato law, the whole territory of italy is divided into 27 broad regional constituencies, and each of these is divided into a number of multi-member constituencies. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 23 higher than the number of candidates in any other european country. according to the reported data, which are taken from the comparative candidate survey (ccs), the number of candidates for the lower chamber was slightly above 4,000 in austria (2008) and the united kingdom (2010).4 those who stood as candidates in the general elections were about 3,900 in sweden (2014) and switzerland (2015), and 2,700 in germany (2013). in other terms, the absolute number of candidates in italy is higher than in those european countries that adopt a pure pr system, as well as in the uk where a plurality system is in place. also, the number of italian candidates is about twice the number of candidates in germany, where a mixed electoral system is in place. of course, the number of candidates fielded by parties also depends on the overall number of legislative seats that are at stake, as well as on the type of electoral system. if we divide the number of candidates by the number of available seats, we can note that the number of candidates per seats in italy 2018 is clearly below that observed in purely pr systems like austria and switzerland. however, this does not disprove our findings about the huge volume of italian citizens that are willing to stand as candidates. how can we then account for such a marked propensity to run for public office in italy? and to what extent may this be related to institutional factors, i.e. the characteristics of the electoral system? table 1. number of candidates for the lower or only chamber in european democracies country year number of candidates candidates per seat austria 2008 4,080 22.30 denmark 2011 784 4.38 estonia 2011 789 7.81 finland 2011 2,315 11.58 germany 2013 2,776* 4.41* greece 2015 1,384* 4.61* hungary 2014 840* 4.22* iceland 2009 756* 12* ireland 2007 466 2.95 italy 2018 5,058 (1,957*) 8.18 (3.17*) netherlands 2006 489 3.26 norway 2009 1,972* 11.67* portugal 2011 1,150* 5.00* romania 2016 1,928* 5.86* sweden 2014 3,888 11.14 switzerland 2015 3,873 19.36 united kingdom 2010 4,042 6.21 notes: data are taken from the comparative candidate survey, module i and ii (http://www.comparativecandidates.org/). for more details, see di virgilio and segatti (2016). * data refer to all the candidates of the parties represented in the lower house, and not to the entire universe. for italy both the data are provided. 4 these data are taken from module 1 and 2 of the ccs. more recent data about candidates in several european countries cannot be discussed as comprehensive data from module 2 are not yet available. pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 24 the choice of entering the electoral arena can be understood as a strategic decision where those who are thinking of becoming a candidate weigh up the expected costs and benefits deriving from creating a party list and running for public office (cox 1997; hug 2001; tavits 2006). in this calculation, benefits and costs are prominently determined by key aspects of the electoral rules. more precisely, benefits are the payoffs expected from winning a certain number of legislative seats and depend on the chance that the party list gains enough votes to see some of its members elected to parliament. such a chance is in turn conditional on the electoral norms adopted in a given country. costs are related to the formal requirements that have to be met in order to participate in the electoral competition – that is, the collection of a certain number of signatures and possible monetary payments. the higher the costs, the greater are the resources that potential candidates have to spend. costs can be lower when party lists have access to public funds dispensed by the state as a way of sustaining parties’ electoral campaigns. as for the 2018 italian election, we can argue that, compared to the electoral rules in place in 2013, the rosato law has raised the costs and reduced the expected benefits of participating in the electoral competition. generally speaking, in 2018 costs were higher than in the previous election because of the new rules concerning signature requirements and the abolishment of electoral refunds. newcomers were indeed discouraged from participation. at the same time, the new representation threshold has reduced small parties’ chances of entering parliament. it does not come as a surprise, then, that from 2013 to 2018 both the number of lists and individual candidates have markedly decreased. party lists amounted to 47 in 2013, while being just 28 five years later. likewise, candidates for the chamber of deputies have declined from 9,897 to 5,058. the impact of the new italian electoral system can, however, be better understood by comparing 2018 data with a longer time period. for this purpose, figure 1 graphically illustrates the trends in the number of lists and candidates per election over the last four decades. as stated above, only candidates and lists presented for election of the chamber of deputies are considered. the 1976-2018 period covers elections regulated by several electoral systems. in particular, a pr system with open lists was in place until 1993, a mixed member majoritarian system (the mattarella law) was used in the elections of 1994, 1996 and 2001, a pr system with majority bonus (the calderoli law) was adopted for the elections of 2006, 2008 and 2013, and finally a new mixed system was established by the rosato law in 2018.5 as the black solid line in the right panel of figure 1 shows, the number of candidates for the italian chamber has almost always been greater than 5,000. there were more than 5,500 would-be deputies in 1976, about 6,500 in the 19791983 elections, and slightly fewer than 8,000 in 1987. the number of candidates reached an approximate total of 9,000 in 1992, when the last parliamentary elections of the socalled italian first republic took place. roughly the same figures were observed in the elections under the calderoli law: the candidates for the chamber numbered more than 8,500 in 2006, about 6,000 in 2008 and as many as 10,000 in 2013. the number of candidates was significantly smaller in the 1994-2001 years, when a mixed member majoritarian system was in place. according to the mattarella law, 75% of the seats (475 5 our analysis does not consider the ‘italicum’ electoral system (pr with majority bonus and possibility of run-off between the two most voted party lists), which was approved by the italian parliament in 2015 but has never been used in any election. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 25 over 630 in the chamber) were allocated by plurality in single-member districts, and 25% of seats (155) were assigned through pr in 27 multi-member constituencies. in the three elections held under this system, the number of candidates was very low, remaining between 2,000 and 2,500. this is because italian parties faced strong incentives to coordinate and form pre-electoral coalitions to run in single-member districts (di virgilio 2002). as the right panel of figure 1 shows, the mixed nature of the current italian electoral system has had some effect in reducing the number of candidates. its impact is, however, weaker than the impact of the mattarella law, which is probably due to the smaller size of the plurality quota in the new electoral system. figure 1. number of candidates for the lower or only chamber in european democracies notes: data cover only candidates for the chamber of deputies. with regard to the elections of 1994, 1996, 2001 and 2018, the number of party lists and the number of candidates in lists with at least one elected mp were calculated by considering only the pr tier of the electoral system. multiple candidacies are counted just once. italian candidates running in the abroad constituency are excluded. source: authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the ministry of interior. a similar trend can be observed if we consider the number of lists presented at the time of general elections. the solid black line in the left panel of figure 1 shows that the historically minimum number of lists for the chamber was recorded when the mattarella law was in place (just 18 lists in 1996), while the two maximum peaks were reached under pr systems: 50 lists in 1992 and 47 lists in 2013. the dotted lines in figure 1 correspond to the number of party lists that obtained at least one seat in the chamber (left panel) and the number of candidates included in those lists (right panel). the number of lists that were able to enter parliament increased during the last period of the first republic, thus signalling the growing fragmentation of pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 26 the party system that had been established in italy soon after the second world war. the same occurred with the number of candidates included in lists with at least one seat. the trend was interrupted by the adoption of the mixed member majoritarian system in 1994. in 1994 and 1996 we observe the historically minimum number of lists obtaining representation in the chamber (5). the party lists that entered the chamber increased again in number with the calderoli pr system, although not reaching the same figures of the last period of the first republic. under the rosato law, just seven lists have been able to obtain a seat in the chamber – the same value recorded in 1996 and 2008. the seven parties that have achieved representation in 2018 constitute 25% of the total lists that participated in the election. as the right panel of figure 1 illustrates, in 2018 about 3,700 candidates (out of a total of 5,058) were members of lists that have not gained representation. this value is remarkable and is not so distant from those observed in the two previous elections (about 3,100 in 2008 and 4,800 in 2013). the huge volume of would-be deputies who run for office in lists that do not enter the italian parliament seems to suggest that simplistic rational accounts, where the choice of running as a candidate depends on institutionally determined benefits and costs as well as on the probability of success, do not fully account for candidates’ individual decisions. there are indeed a variety of further motivations that could be added to the picture in order to better explain italian candidates’ decisions. among these are attempts to build a personal reputation as a loyal member of the party or as a prominent personality in a given geographical territory (pedrazzani, pinto and segatti 2016; pinto 2016). 4. the use of multiple candidacies so far, we have talked about candidacies, presuming that each individual candidate runs for office in a particular election and therefore presents her/his own candidacy in a given territorial constituency. however, some candidates – the so-called ‘multi-candidates’ – play their cards in more than one electoral arena. the italian electoral system allows the same candidate to run in a plurality district and in up to five multi-member constituencies. let us note that the possibility of multiple candidacies is not new to electoral competition in italy, as they have been admitted by all the electoral rules adopted by the italian republic. the pr system that was in place over the entire first republic allowed candidates to run in up to three multi-member constituencies. however, the same system enabled voters to cast preferences for candidates in open party lists, which seriously hindered any strategic use of multiple candidacies by party leaders. multiple candidacies were allowed also under the mixed member majoritarian system employed for the 1994, 1996 and 2001 elections. a candidate for a seat in the chamber could appear in her/his party list in up to three multi-member constituencies. remarkably, the same candidate could run both in the proportional tier and in the plurality tier. in 2005, the enactment of the calderoli law eliminated any limit in the number of multiple candidacies: a candidate could appear in her/his party list in every multi-member constituency at the same time. this provision transformed multiple candidacies into a powerful instrument in the hands of party leaders, who could design the (blocked) lists of their party in such a way as to favour the election of those candidates who were most loyal to the leader. this is because multiple candidacies create a pool of who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 27 vacant parliamentary seats, whose allocation depends mostly on party leaders’ choices. this phenomenon was so relevant that in the 2006 elections, 40 candidates were elected in more than one constituency, thus controlling as many as 261 seats in the chamber. in 2008, 19 deputies elected in more than one constituency controlled 137 seats (pinto 2017).6 these candidates, who turn out to be simultaneously elected in more than one constituency, have to choose just one of them. as a consequence, a pool of seats remains vacant and will be assigned to the first among those candidates in the party list who were initially not elected. in other terms, multiple candidacies increase the centralization of the candidate selection process, granting leaders greater post-election influence: once in parliament, those legislators whose parliamentary office depends mostly on the leaders’ choices will be particularly unlikely to vote against party line, as shown by analysing the records of roll-call votes in the italian parliament (pinto 2017). these considerations lead us to examine how multiple candidacies have been used by italian parties in the general elections of 2018.how many multi-candidates were there in the last election? and which combinations of multiple candidacies were used most? tables 2 and 3 report these types of data for the electoral coalitions running in singlemember districts and for all the parties that passed the 3% threshold for obtaining representation in the chamber. table 2. distribution of candidates across singleand multi-member constituencies by coalition and party list (%) constituency centre-right centre-left leu m5s fi+fdi+lega+others pd+others only multi-member 70.81 65.53 36.39 45.41 only single-member 13.77 17.29 44.50 41.18 both 15.42 17.18 19.11 13.41 total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 notes: data cover only candidates for the chamber of deputies. candidates in single-member constituencies supported by a coalition of parties are classified under ‘centre-left’ or ‘centre-right’ labels. party acronyms: forza italia (fi, go italy), fratelli d’italia (fdi, brothers of italy), lega (league, former northern league), liberi e uguali (leu, free and equal), movimento 5 stelle (m5s, five star movement), partito democratico (pd, democratic party). source: authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the ministry of interior. table 2 provides information about the distribution of candidacies across the two tiers of the new electoral system, i.e. singleand multi-member constituencies. liberi e uguali (leu, free and equal) was the party that most used the possibility to nominate candidates both in singleand multi-member constituencies. leu was also the party with the highest number of candidates running only in one single-member constituency. the latter choice possibly cost re-election for many prominent politicians, such as massimo d’alema, former leader of pd and co-founder of leu, who ranked last in the 6 in 2013, the larger parties intentionally chose to moderate the use of multiple candidacies for two main reasons. the first was to counter the popular argument that the members of the italian parliament were largely nominated by party leaders, rather than directly elected by people. second, several parties such as partito democratico (pd, democratic party), sinistra ecologia libertà (sel, left ecology freedom) and movimento 5 stelle (five star movement, m5s) organized primary elections for selecting their candidates (di gregorio and de vitis 2013). pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 28 district where he ran. conversely, centre-left and centre-right coalitions present the lowest proportion of candidates running only in single-member constituencies. however, these figures depend mostly on the fact that single-member candidates of the two main electoral alliances are the result of a process of coordination between the parties forming them. for this reason, it is probably better to exclude from the analysis the candidates running only in single-member districts and concentrate on those competing in multi-member constituencies, as in table 3, for whom it is possible to identify with precision to which party list they belong.7 table 3. multiple candidacies by party (%) formula fi fdi lega leu m5s pd 1+0 77.00 84.24 76.85 65.57 77.20 75.56 1+1 10.33 3.94 8.87 24.06 22.80 19.11 2+0 6.10 4.93 6.40 4.72 0.00 1.78 2+1 2.82 1.97 3.45 1.42 0.00 0.89 3+0 0.94 0.00 0.49 0.47 0.00 0.89 3+1 2.35 0.99 0.49 0.94 0.00 0.00 4+0 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.47 0.00 0.00 4+1 0.00 0.49 1.48 1.89 0.00 0.44 5+0 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5+1 0.47 1.97 0.99 0.47 0.00 1.33 total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 notes: data cover only candidates for the chamber of deputies. in the first column reporting the possible combinations of multiple candidacies, the number on the left indicates the number of multi-member constituencies where a candidate ran, while the number on the right indicates whether or not a candidate stood in a single-member district. for instance, 2+1 refers to the percentage of candidates from the party who ran as candidates in two multi-member constituencies and at the same time as candidates in a plurality district. for each party (column), percentages are calculated considering only those candidates who were present in multi-member constituencies. candidates who only ran in a single-member district are not considered. party acronyms: forza italia (fi, go italy), fratelli d’italia (fdi, brothers of italy), lega (league, former northern league), liberi e uguali (leu, free and equal), movimento 5 stelle (m5s, five star movement), partito democratico (pd, democratic party). source: authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the ministry of interior. each row of table 3 corresponds to a possible combination of multiple candidacies for a candidate whose name was present at least in a multi-member constituency: being a candidate only in a multi-member constituency (1+0), being a candidate both in a multi-member constituency and in a single-member district (1+1), being a candidate in two multi-member constituencies (2+0), being a candidate in two multi-member constituencies and at the same time in a single-member district (2+1), and so on. the most ‘extreme’ formula is when a candidate appears in five multi-member constituencies and at the same time in a single-member district (5+1). as shown in the table, the right-wing fratelli d’italia (fdi, brothers of italy) is the party that made the least extensive use of multiple candidacies in 2018: about 84% of those who ran in multi-member 7 quite interestingly, some recent analyses of the 2018 elections show a very limited degree of ‘personalized’ vote. only about 1,200,000 italian voters cast their vote just for a candidate in a single-member district – and not for any specific party list associated with that candidate (fruncillo and giannatiempo 2018). who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 29 constituencies under the fdi label stood as candidates only in one constituency. leu was instead the party that made the largest use of multiple candidacies: two-thirds of leu candidates in multi-member constituencies ran in just one district, while one-third of them were multi-candidates. albeit the party with the lowest number of multi-candidates, fdi is at the same time the party with the largest use of ‘extreme’ multiple candidacies. four of the fdi extreme multi-candidates are female candidates, among whom the leader of the party giorgia meloni. another well-known – and criticized by the media – instance of extreme multicandidacies regards the outgoing pd minister maria elena boschi, who ran as a candidate in bolzano single-member district and, at the same time, in five multi-member constituencies (one in lombardy, one in latium and three in sicily). however, let us underline that the use of extreme multiple candidacies is to be considered as a marginal – albeit meaningful – phenomenon, as it regarded at most 2% of the candidates of a party. generally speaking, the most used combination of multiple candidacies is the 1+1 formula: one-fourth of leu and m5s candidates, one-fifth of pd candidates, and about one-tenth of forza italia (fi, go italy) and lega (league, former northern league) candidates appeared at the same time in one single-member district and in one multimember constituency. in this regard, it is worth noting that the 1+1 combination was the only type of multiple candidacy employed by the m5s in 2018. in particular, the m5s used the 1+1 formula for those candidates who were already members of the italian parliament during the 17th legislature (52% of m5s multi-candidates were incumbent legislators). this presumably indicates an attempt to secure the presence of a group of m5s with some legislative experience in the new parliament. the preference of italian parties for a ‘moderate’ form of multiple candidacy – the 1+1 formula – suggests a change in party leaders’ strategies from the recent past. in 2018, multiple candidacies were used as an instrument for controlling party members only to a limited extent. this may of course be related to the fact that, while under the past electoral rules a candidate elected in more than one constituency could choose the constituency in which she/he would be proclaimed as winner, the rosato law no longer allows this. if the same candidate is elected in more than one multi-member constituency, she/he now wins the seat in the constituency where her/his party has obtained the lowest percentage of votes. moreover, a candidate elected both in a single-member district and in one or more multi-member districts automatically wins the seat that was at stake in the single-member district. in 2018, multiple candidacies have been used mostly as a ‘parachute’ for prominent – but presumably not so popular – politicians whose success in a single-member district was considered uncertain by the party leadership. among those who lost in their singlemember district but were elected anyway because they were included at the top of their party list in (at least) one multi-member constituency, let us recall some ministers of the gentiloni cabinet (dario franceschini, marco minniti and roberta pinotti, from pd), the outgoing speakers of the chamber and senate (laura boldrini and pietro grasso, leu), as well as a number of well-known politicians such as matteo orfini (pd president), pier luigi bersani (formerly pd secretary and currently one of the leu leaders), mara carfagna and stefania prestigiacomo (former ministers in the centre-right cabinets, fi). at the same time, some particularly appealing candidates have been placed in pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 30 the party lists of more than one multi-member constituency in order to attract votes in certain geographical areas. this is the case of the abovementioned fdi leader meloni. a further element that is worth pointing out with regard to multiple candidacies is the rather high number of female candidates among the multi-candidates (above 50%). this may also indicate that party leaders have used multiple candidacies in such a way as to meet the formal requirements of the rosato law concerning gender equality in the selection of candidates. reasonably, the seats left vacant by a woman elected in more than one constituency are probably assigned to a male candidate placed after her in the party list. these considerations bring us to one of the topics of the next section. 5. the profile of italian candidates: gender, age and past experience the present section deals with three key traits of the candidates running for office in 2018: their age, gender and past experience as candidates. throughout the article we have presumed that the new electoral rules give extensive powers to party leaders in the selection of candidates. what kind of candidate, then, has been selected? as discussed in the second section of this article, the rosato law includes a number of provisions aimed at balancing the presence of men and women in the lists that participate in the general elections as well as in the italian parliament.8 has the presence of women grown among elected politicians? in addition, the topic of the renewal of italian politics has been around for a long time in the public debate. how old is the minority that actively participates in italian general elections? how many of the italian candidates of 2018 are really new to politics? starting with the italian candidates’ gender, figure 2 shows the percentage of women among candidates for the chamber and among elected deputies from 1976 to 2018. as illustrated by the solid black line, in four decades the percentage of female candidates has increased fourfold. while in the 1976 elections just 12% of italian would-be deputies were women, in march 2018 women were 44% of the total pool of candidates for the chamber. let us note that the proportion of female candidates gradually grew until 1992, but subsequently decreased in the 1994-2001 period under the mixed member system established by the mattarella law. this system forced party leaders to coordinate and to accurately choose the candidates (one for each pre-electoral coalition) to be presented in the plurality districts. this reduced the percentage of women candidates, especially in single-member districts. for instance, in 1994 female candidates made up 45% of the candidates in multi-member constituencies, but just 8% of the candidates in singlemember districts. the percentage of female candidates started to grow again in 2006, after the adoption of a pr system, approaching half of the overall number of italian candidates under the rosato law. although the rosato law has broadly balanced the presence of males and females among italian candidates, things are substantially different if we look at the presence of women in the italian parliament. the dotted line in figure 2 shows a general growth in the percentage of female deputies after 1976: the percentage of women elected in the chamber 8 see norris (1985, 2004) for analyses of the composition of political elites in terms of gender in contemporary democracies. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 31 in 2018 is three times that observed forty years ago. however, in 2018 the percentage of women among elected deputies is just 36%, which is well below the percentage of female candidates (44%). whereas up until 2013 the percentage of female deputies was close to the percentage of female candidates (and indeed the former was greater than the latter in the 2006-2013 period), in 2018 the two have become distant from each other. in other terms, the increase in the percentage of female candidates artificially produced by the rosato law has not been paralleled by a similar increase in the percentage of female deputies. figure 2. percentage of women among candidates and elected deputies, 1976-2018 notes: data cover only candidates for the chamber of deputies. multiple candidacies are counted just once. italian candidates running in the abroad constituency and deputies elected in the abroad constituency are excluded. source: authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the ministry of interior. this adds to a couple of elements that we have discussed above. one is the ‘gender penalty’ that seems to affect female candidates in single-member districts (herrnsson et al. 2003), as happened in italy under the mixed system employed during the 19942001 period. the other is the high number of female candidates among the multi-candidates in 2018. the seats left vacant by elected women are presumably assigned to male candidates from the same party. these considerations imply that formal rules are not enough to grant a more equal representation of men and women in parliament. probably only party leaders’ choices concerning the selection of candidates could definitely reduce the representation gap between genders. with regard to italian candidates’ age, table 4 reports the median value calculated in each election since 1994 for the entire population of candidates for the chamber of deputies. as the data for the last 25 years demonstrate, we cannot detect a specific historical trend. in spite of the shift from the first to the second republic (and for some pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 32 observers even to a third republic), the almost complete restructuring of the party system and the reorganization of electoral supply, and the success of new political formations such as the m5s, the median age of italian candidates in the 2018 election is 47, which is indeed two years older than the median age of those who aspired to a seat in the chamber in 1992. the lowest value in the 1992-2018 period was observed in 2013 (44 years) and was mainly due to the young age of m5s candidates: only individuals with no previous parliamentary experience could be included in the m5s lists. the overall increase in the median age of italian candidates from 44 to 47 may then depend on a ‘cohort effect’, as at least part of the ‘freshmen’ who made their first appearance in an electoral list in 2013 stood again for office in 2018. table 4. median age of italian candidates, over time year of election age (median) 1992 45 1994 46 1996 46 2001 48 2006 47 2008 45 2013 44 2018 47 notes: data cover only candidates for the chamber of deputies. source: authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the ministry of interior. another factor is crucial in understanding the extent of renewal in the population of italian candidates: the proportion of those with some past experience as a candidate. in this regard, figure 3 displays two relevant pieces of data: the percentage of candidates for the chamber who ran as candidates in the past election (the solid line), and the percentage of candidates for the chamber who have run as candidates at least once since 1976 (the dashed line). the two indicators follow the same trend. in particular, a cautious renewal of italian candidates seems to have been in place towards the end of the first republic. the adoption of a mixed electoral system in 1994 (with a lower number of available posts in the party lists) forced party leaders to make hard choices between potential candidates, which brought about an increase in the fraction of candidates with some past experience. under the calderoli law, the number of available posts in the party lists increased again, leading to particularly low percentages of would-be deputies with past experience as candidates. an actual renewal of the population of italian candidates took place in 2013, when several parties selected their candidates through primary elections. as a result, just 13% of the 2013 candidates had some past experience as candidates, and only 7% had run in 2008. the renewal rate shrank again in 2018: about one-fifth of the 2018 candidates had participated in at least one election in the past, and 13% of them had stood as a candidate in 2013. this may be related to a mix of factors: the smaller number of posts available in the party lists under the rosato law, the above-mentioned decision of the m5s to rely on a cohort of experienced parliamentarians, and the very limited use of party primaries before the 2018 elections. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 33 figure 3. candidates with past experience as candidates, 1979-2018 notes: data cover only candidates to the chamber of deputies. in the case of the 1979 elections the two indicators present the same values because both of them were calculated by comparing 1979 with 1976. no data for candidacies are available before the 1976 elections. source: authors’ elaboration using data taken from the website of the ministry of interior. 6. concluding remarks studying candidates for public offices provides considerable insights into what can be considered as a politically active minority in society, as candidates help to connect citizens with political institutions and determine the profile of representatives. a first message that can be drawn from our analysis is the relatively huge size of such an active minority in italy. despite the fact that the general climate is negative towards politics, and politicians’ privileges are harshly stigmatized by the media, there are still many who aspire to become part of the ‘casta’ (the ‘clique’) in italy. for sure, the new electoral system – the rosato law – has reduced the overall number of italian candidates compared to the 2013 elections. however, the new rules have not substantially decreased the number of those who run for office without any reasonable possibility of obtaining a parliamentary seat. this seems to suggest that any explanation of candidates’ participation which is based on merely institutional factors is insufficient in accounting for the propensity of italian citizens to enter the electoral arena. let us also note that, compared to the past, the pool of italian would-be representatives has become more balanced in terms of gender, but has not become younger. in addition, the turnover rate among italian candidates seems to be somewhat lower than in 2013. however, it should be noted that the electoral earthquake associated with the 2013 and 2018 elections, although similar in magnitude to the one registered in 1994, is different when the political personnel turnover is taken pedrazzani, pinto and segatti, italian candidates under the rosato law 34 into consideration. in1994 and the following elections, voters seemed to have moved, while candidates changed only in part. on the contrary, in 2013 and 2018 voters switched as candidates changed. candidates, however, do not run as single individuals in the electoral arena, but as members of a team. the rosato law provides party leaders with some powerful instruments for controlling and steering the population of candidates, including the possibility of multiple candidacies. this article has shown that, moving from 2013 to 2018, the leaders of italian parties have made a more moderate use of multiple candidacies as a tool for controlling party members. in the last elections, multiple candidacies were mostly employed for safeguarding the election of some prominent politicians. our analyses have also pointed out that, in spite of the presumably genuine intentions of its proposers, the rosato law has increased the presence of women in the italian parliament to a much lesser degree than might have been expected. in practice, several provisions of the law have been applied by party leaders, whether or not on purpose, in such a way as to penalize female candidates. in providing an overview of italian candidacies in the 2018 elections, this article opens up some interesting avenues for future research. a first avenue of investigation originates from the need for a better understanding of how the provisions of the rosato law have been applied by different parties, each with a specific organizational structure and leaders oriented towards particular aims. secondly, the degree of renewal of the italian parliament undoubtedly deserves greater attention. to this purpose, the new cohorts of candidates should be analysed in depth. are newcomers different from those candidates who have already run for office or who have already been in parliament? a further avenue for future research is to look at the conduct of candidates once elected. for example, candidates elected in plurality districts could be expected to behave differently from candidates elected in multi-party constituencies in terms of their loyalty to the party in legislative votes, or with regard to the type of legislation they promote, or considering how much they engage in constituency service. hopefully, further answers to these questions will be provided by new survey data collected from among italian candidates. references carey, j.m., hix, s. (2011), the electoral sweet spot: low-magnitude proportional electoral systems, in ‘american journal of political science’, vol, 55, n. 2, pp. 383–397. cox, g.w. (1997), making votes count, new york, cambridge university press. di gregorio, l., de vitis, m. (2013), il meccanismo delle multicandidature alle elezioni 2013: autoreferenzialità o semplificazione?, in sondaggi ed elezioni: le regole del gioco e della comunicazione, edited by i. diamanti and l. ceccarini, firenze, società italiana di studi elettorali (sise), pp. 268–298. di virgilio, a. (2002), l’offerta elettorale: la politica delle alleanze si istituzionalizza, in maggioritario finalmente? la transizione elettorale 1994-2001, edited by r. d’alimonte and s. bartolini, bologna, il mulino, pp. 79-129. di virgilio, a. (2007), nuovo sistema elettorale e strategie di competizione: quanto è cambiata l’offerta politica?, in proporzionale ma non solo: le elezioni politiche del 2006, edited by r. d’alimonte and a. chiaramonte, bologna, il mulino, pp. 191-241. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 35 di virgilio, a. (2010), cambiare strategia a regole invariate: la rivoluzione dell'offerta, in proporzionale se vi pare: le elezioni politiche del 2008, edited by r. d’alimonte and a. chiaramonte, bologna, il mulino, pp. 33-73. di virgilio, a. (2014), offerta elettorale 2013: elusiva ma ancora decisiva, in terremoto elettorale: le elezioni politiche del 2013, edited by a. chiaramonte and l. de sio, bologna, il mulino, pp. 41-74. di virgilio, a., segatti, p. (eds) (2016), la rappresentanza politica in italia. candidati ed elettori nelle elezioni politiche del 2013, bologna, il mulino. fruncillo, d., giannatiempo, m. (2018), la personalizzazione antipolitica. la competizione nei collegi uninominali alle elezioni del 2018. paper presented at the meeting of itanes sise sisp-pope ‘elezioni politiche e regionali 2017/2018’, università degli studi di salerno, fisciano, 10-11 may 2018. gallagher, m., marsh, m. (1988), candidate selection in comparative perspective: the secret garden of politics, london, sage. herrnson, p.s., lay, j.c., stokes, a.k., (2003), women running as women: candidate gender, campaign issues, and voter-targeting strategies, in ‘journal of politics’, vol. 65, n. 1, pp. 244–255. hug, s. (2001), altering party systems, ann arbor, university of michigan press. mosca, g. (1982), elementi di scienza politica, in scritti politici, g. mosca, edited by g. sola, vol. 2, torino, utet. norris, p. (1985), women in european legislative elites, in ‘west european politics’, vol. 8, n. 4, pp. 90-101. norris, p. (2004), electoral engineering. voting rules and political behaviour, cambridge, cambridge university press. pedrazzani, a., pinto, l. (2015), the study of political candidates, in ‘italian political science’, vol. 10, n. 1, pp. 23-29. pedrazzani, a., pinto, l., segatti, p. (2016), i candidati nel tempo: un'analisi longitudinale delle candidature in italia dal 1976 ad oggi, in la rappresentanza politica in italia. candidati ed elettori nelle elezioni politiche del 2013, edited by a. di virgilio and p. segatti, bologna, il mulino, pp. 36–60. pinto, l. (2016), la personalizzazione della campagna elettorale in un contesto partito-centrico: frequenza, qualità e determinati, in la rappresentanza politica in italia. candidati ed elettori nelle elezioni politiche del 2013, edited by a. di virgilio and p. segatti, bologna, il mulino, pp. 117–147. pinto, l. (2017), candidacy rules and party unity: the impact of multiple candidacies on legislative voting behaviour in italy, in ‘actapolitica’, vol. 52, n. 1, pp. 43–63. pinto, l., verzichelli, l. (2016), la ‘scelta prima della scelta’: profilo dei candidati, selezione e percorsi di carriera politica, in la rappresentanza politica in italia. candidati ed elettori nelle elezioni politiche del 2013, edited by a. di virgilio and p. segatti, bologna, il mulino, pp. 61–89. segatti, p. (2016), introduzione, in la rappresentanza politica in italia. candidati ed elettori nelle elezioni politiche del 2013, edited by a. di virgilio and p. segatti, bologna, il mulino, pp. 11–34. tavits, m. (2006), party system change: testing a model of new party entry, in ‘party politics’, vol. 12, n. 1, pp. 99-119. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_1.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 11-26 contact author: bruno marino, scuola normale superiore. e-mail address: bruno.marino@sns.it from demolition to re-composition? the 2018 italian lower house mps and their careers: novelty and continuity bruno marino unitelma – sapienza university and scuola normale superiore nicola martocchia diodati scuola normale superiore luca verzichelli university of siena abstract the 2018 italian general election marked the consolidation of a three-pole party system. however, the contours of parliamentary elites seem to be still in motion. this article aims, at first, to describe the main features of italian lower house mps by recurring to a five-fold classification, where different mps’ career features are taken into consideration. then, it puts forward an analysis of the connection between this classification and the tool of multi-candidacies. subsequently, the article presents the features of parliamentarian and governmental elites, before concluding by underlying the presence of both innovations and traditional patterns of career and pointing towards future avenues of research. introduction he rates of electoral change and volatility in the 2018 italian general election (chiaramonte and emanuele 2018; emanuele 2018) mark it as a patent example of a critical election. this immediately leads us to raise questions about related changes in the features of the parliamentary elites and, consequently, in the whole profile of the ruling class. indeed, the notion of critical election has always been associated with the problem of elite change, from the pioneering study produced more than one century ago by pareto on political circulation to the modern comparative assessments on the longterm transformation of political elites (for a recent review, see verzichelli 2018). articulated theories have been developed about the linkages between party and party system changes on the one hand, and the changing structure of opportunities for the political elites (norris 1997; cotta and best 2007) on the other, with important implications for the effective qualities of representatives (for a review, see best and vogel 2014). the effects of the economic crisis (e.g., see hernández and kriesi 2016) and the growth of populist and challenger parties (e.g., see pappas and kriesi 2015) have recently triggered a quest for the persistence of the traditional patterns of elite formation and circulation, producing empirical and normative analyses of the prospective evolution of the democratic ruling class (for instance, see caramani 2017). many wonder what the future t marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli, from demolition to re-composition? 12 of representative elites will be without some iron law of oligarchy (cordero and coller 2018). however, it is precisely the consolidation of the new actors and their access to the executive institutions that are supposed to stabilise some kinds of new pattern of elite circulation. these implications look particularly relevant in the analysis of the italian parliamentary ruling class after the 2018 italian general election. several pundits have stressed interesting pieces of evidence: among them, a new step in the path of gender balance among the candidates to parliament (pedrazzani, pinto and segatti 2018), a very relevant rate of parliamentary turnover (salvati and vercesi 2018), and new and significant records of rejuvenation of the political personnel (marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli forthcoming). however, can these signs be considered as a prelude to a significant transformation of parliamentary democracy in italy? indeed, one may stress the contradiction between the extraordinary parliamentary turnover rate and the persistence of some traditional features of parliamentary recruitment, like the ‘consensus control’ in the hands of a significant number of local politicians and the frequent accumulation of different political mandates. this dilemma certainly cannot be solved in a few pages on the basis of limited data groundwork. however, we can raise a few specific questions concerning the limited or controversial implications of such an important electoral turning point. such questions are, in short, related to the most relevant political-experience-related characteristics of the members of parliament belonging to the lower house after the 2018 italian general election, to the relationship between these different clusters and the features of their candidacy, and to the new structure of opportunities opened to the parliamentary elites in terms of (parliamentary and governmental) career prospects. such questions are particularly timely in the italian scenario. in this short contribution, we argue that, notwithstanding the manifest novelties that have emerged in the selection of the parliamentary elite, the consolidation of a remarkably diverse ruling class seems to be far from taking place. the ‘revolutionary’ changes, stressed by the same party actors and by some observers of the descriptive representation (see salvati and vercesi 2018, marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli forthcoming), can be scaled down to a sort of ‘adaptive’ pattern of differentiation. in other words, all the parties – including those supporting the governo del cambiamento (the government of change), i.e. the coalition between the movimento cinque stelle (m5s) and the lega (league), since june 2018 – have proven themselves unable to radically transform the nature of the patterns of circulation of their political representatives. this does not mean that changes have not occurred at all, but that a sort of resilient power of highly-ranked politicians concerning, say, parliamentary or governmental offices can still be found. the article is organised as follows: in the next section, we discuss some innovative characteristics in the profiles of the 2018 italian lower house mps and put forward a five-fold typology able to distinguish between different clusters of parliamentarians. we focus on the lower house both for data-availability reasons and to foster comparisons with other western lower houses and mps. the second section is instead devoted to a more in-depth analysis of the tool of multi-candidacies and its link with different mp profiles. the third section explores the patterns of elite circulation from the same chamber to the ‘inner circle’ of institutional leaders both in parliament and in the new conte ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 13 government. the concluding section discusses some of the implications deriving from our analysis in light of foreseeable future research. 1. the new lower house parliamentary elite the primary empirical question we aim to answer in this section is the following: what are the most innovative characteristics of the 2018 italian lower house mps? to detect possible differences or similarities between parties in the italian lower house after the 2018 general election, we have relied on the classification put forward in marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli (forthcoming), based on different clusters of mps: the intruders, the local party machine mps, the local untouchables, the national untouchables, and, finally, the national mandarins. we have relied on the data on italian lower house mps collected by the circap, the university of siena’s centre for the study of political change, focusing on the six largest political formations in the italian lower house in terms of seats held: the movimento cinque stelle (m5s), the partito democratico (pd), the lega (the league), forza italia (fi), the far left cartel of liberi e uguali (leu), and fratellid’italia (fdi), a small extreme right party included in the centre-right coalition. moreover, special attention is paid to the two parties supporting the government of change, i.e. the league and the m5s. as more extensively shown in marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli (forthcoming), the five mutually-exclusive categories have been formed starting with three mp features1: in particular, each category has been defined by taking into consideration each mp’s experience at the local government level (e.g., having been a mayor, or a regional mp), each mp’s career within political parties (e.g., having been part of a central organ of a political formation, like national direction or a national executive office), and, finally, each mp’s parliamentary tenure. starting with the intruders, these represent a type of parliamentarian which goes against the classic stereotype of the partycareer politician: indeed, they are mps without local-government or party-related positions and who had also never been elected to parliament before 20182. their profile could, therefore, resemble that of ‘technocrats’ attracted by the political arena, or also that of a prominent representative of civil society. the second class, the local party machine mps, includes those lower house parliamentarians who have not had experience in local governments or parliament, but instead have held some positions within a political party (from the local to the regional level), thus capturing the exclusive role of grassroots party activism in providing a chance for being recruited as a prospective parliamentarian. two clusters have been labeled as untouchables to stress the robustness of mps’ backgrounds from the viewpoint of a more traditional pattern of political career. on the one hand, we find the local untouchable cluster, made up of mps with local government 1 such features are related to the moment parliamentarians entered parliament for the first time. we have classified mps according to the highest office ever held both at the party and the institutional level. 2 other authors, such as samuels and shugart (2010) or carreras (2012), use the term ‘outsider’, although there are differences between our definition and theirs. unlike samuels and shugart (2010), we do not consider politicians with subnational party-related experience as intruders (see discussion in samuels and shugart 2010: 67; carreras 2012: 1456); moreover, unlike carreras (2012: 1456), we do not include contesting elections as independents or with new political formations as one of the possible characteristics of intruders. marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli, from demolition to re-composition? 14 experience who might have had party experience up to the regional offices. in this cluster, we find those mps endowed with specific partyor local-government-related characteristics that make them potential protagonists of the parliamentary life of a party. for instance, parliamentarians with experience as regional mps could be extremely useful for parties because of their competence concerning specific pieces of legislation. conversely, the national untouchables cluster is composed of two different groups of mps: on the one hand, those who have not had parliamentary experience but have held national office in a political party; on the other hand, those parliamentarians who have served one term in the italian parliament but who are not professional politicians (i.e. their main profession before entering the parliament was not politics). finally, the cluster we have called national mandarins includes parliamentarians who are already professional politicians and well known as such. two types of mps are included in this cluster: either parliamentarians who have served one term in parliament but are indeed professional politicians (i.e. they lived off politics for a significant time span before entering parliament), or those mps who have already been in the italian parliament for more than one term. figure 1. clusters of 2018 italian lower house mps per party. 5. national mandarins 3. local untouchables 4. national untouchables 1. intruders 2. local party machine 0 20 40 60 0 20 40 60 fdi fi lega leu m5s pd fdi fi lega leu m5s pd fdi fi lega leu m5s pd % mps per category ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 15 figure 1 above reports the percentage of lower house mps who are members of the abovementioned five clusters and belong to the main political formations which ran in the 2018 italian general election. notice that, overall, 23.7% of the mps are intruders, while 9.1% are local party machine, 18.8% are local untouchables, 30.7% are national untouchables, and, finally, 17.8% are national mandarins. as figure 1 above shows, there are interesting differences between the main parties in the italian lower house in the aftermath of the 2018 general election. starting from some general considerations, despite the rhetoric surrounding the 18th italian legislature concerning the rate of renewal of the parliamentary class, what emerges from figure 1 is that there is undoubtedly a high degree of intruder mps, especially for the m5s, but two phenomena have tempered such renewal. on the one hand, other parties show a substantially lower degree of intruders (in particular, leu, the pd, and the league). on the other hand, despite the partial exception of the m5s, mps belonging to the national untouchables and national mandarins clusters – that is, the two categories including wellestablished politicians at the national level – still constitute a noticeable proportion of the italian lower house’s 18th parliamentary class. let us now turn to the analysis of parties. one interesting piece of evidence emerging from figure 1 is that, on the centre-left flank of the political spectrum, the pd and leu parliamentary groups are somewhat similar to one another. despite the presence of some intruders and local party machine mps in the pd group (while such clusters have no parliamentarians coming from the smaller leu group), a wide proportion of mps coming from centre-left parties are, to a small extent, local untouchables and, to a much larger extent, national untouchables and national mandarins. in other words, many centre-left mps are politicians with specific parliamentary or party-related experience, and this might signal the fact that the formation of the new pd and leu parliamentary groups has followed a rather traditional pattern of party ‘central control’ (wertman 1988) in the selection of representatives. the picture is entirely different if one looks at the centre-right: the parliamentary groups of the three parties that contested the 2018 italian general election under the centre-right flag do not have a very compatible profile concerning the five clusters under examination. finally, the m5s group shows a very peculiar composition: more than 50% of its lower house mps are people with no previous experience whatsoever (intruders), paired with a certain percentage of national untouchables and also a lower proportion of party machine parliamentarians3. in this regard, and from a speculative viewpoint, a ‘top-down’ perspective of political selection might help us to decipher the situation of m5s parliamentary elite. indeed, the confirmation of a substantial number of mps elected in 2013 who had remained loyal to the party provides the core of a bunch of national untouchables, but the impressive increase in the number of seats for the m5s after the 2018 italian general election gave many people who were substantially unknown to local government structures, to the party (in the sense they did not hold any office), and to parliament, the chance to enter the lower house (the intruders). again, this very last point could also be understood, for the time being only at the speculative level, by 3 to account for the peculiar party structure of the m5s, in the circap dataset, when dealing with partyrelated experience, m5s mps who were at the top of a party’s local meet-up have been categorised as if they had a city-level office in the party. marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli, from demolition to re-composition? 16 connecting it with the relevance of central party organs (in this case the party leadership and possibly top party cadres as well) in the selection of candidates. indeed, intruder mps would have had little chance of entering parliament on their own (given the constraints imposed by the electoral law), while top party cadres had many incentives to select these people and favour their election. more in detail, despite the fact that m5s repeated, before the 2018 general election, the same candidate selection procedure of 2013, the parlamentarie, where ‘certified members’ could preliminarily select the candidates for the general election (movimento 5 stelle, 2018b), the final decision on the party’s lists remained in the hands of luigi di maio (movimento 5 stelle, 2018a), who was able to personally select a group of ‘high profile’ personalities, such as university professors or entrepreneurs. this type of selection could have been made for a number of reasons: to polish the public image of the party and make it appear a more competent and trustworthy actor also from a governmental viewpoint, or even to present viable candidates in some specific arenas of competition (e.g., single-member districts), where some argue it is important for parties to put forward ‘high-valence candidates’ (galasso and nannicini 2011). this sort of ‘personalised’ parliamentary party model, involving mps’ qualities and also leaders’ powers in selecting them, is not surprising when one refers to the m5s (e.g., see vignati 2015). finally, and this is another hint that could be confirmed in future empirical analyses, the selection of m5s candidates and would-be mps who could not revert to partyor local-government-related resources could also be seen as a way of building a more loyal parliamentary group: indeed, intruders would be more likely to be loyal to the party majority or the party whip so as to increase the chances of continuing their parliamentary career (see also the discussion in marino and martocchia diodati 2017). other compelling considerations can be drawn if we move closer to the other party forming the parliamentary basis of the governo del cambiamento (government of change), that is, the league. indeed, the parliamentary group of matteo salvini’s party seems to have a more ‘bottom-up’ composition of the parliamentarian class, where localgovernment or subnational party-related experience might have played an important role. there is an extremely low percentage of intruders and, conversely, a very high proportion of mps who are local or national untouchables (along with a certain percentage of highly ranked national mandarins). this model might resemble what has happened in the italian seconda repubblica (i.e. the period from 1994-today), concerning the connection either with local rank-and-file or specific experience with the party machinery (e.g., see verzichelli 2010). all in all, the league seems to have a parliamentary party structure with solid local-government-related and party-related roots, where experience gained, say, as a regional mp or as a mayor is extremely important for mps with specific connections with their constituencies and party structures. this might also resemble a sort of cursus honorum of professional politicians which was, especially in the past, almost necessary to have specific parliamentary or governmental careers (verzichelli 2010; see also marino and martocchia diodati 2017; martocchia diodati and verzichelli 2017). finally, it is worth noting that the importance of local government experience and presence in party structures is not surprising when connected to the league given, for instance, the persistence of a particular net of local organisational structures within the party (e.g., see mcdonnell and vampa 2016). ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 17 all in all, in this section, we have tried to tackle some interesting features of mps belonging to the most important parties represented in the italian lower house after 4th march 2018. nonetheless, there is one further element which has not yet been analysed and could give us further food for thought when analysing the italian parliamentary elite: multi-candidacies. in the next section, we try to sketch some connections between such tools and the five clusters of mps we have presented. 2. multi-candidacies and mp clusters is it possible to find interesting differences in the connection between, on the one hand, multi-candidacies and, on the other, the proportion of intruders, local party machine mps, local and national untouchables, and national mandarins for the parties under consideration in the 18th italian lower house legislature? let us first clarify the issue of multi-candidacies under the rosatellum law, i.e. the electoral law used to select italian parliamentarians on 4th march 2018 (for more information, see chiaramonte and d’alimonte 2018). let us distinguish between, on the one hand, those mps who were candidates in just a single-member district or in a single multi-member constituency and, on the other, those mps who were candidates in more than one multi-member constituency (or at least in one constituency and one single-member district). indeed, the rosatellum allowed each prospective mp to be a candidate just in a single-member district, or just in one or more multi-member constituencies (up to five), or in both a single-member district and in one or more (up to five) multi-member constituencies (see again chiaramonte and d’alimonte 2018). all in all, multi-candidacies could easily have been put forward, in different fashions. multi-candidacies can be approached from different viewpoints. for small parties, like leu or fdi, this tool can be used in order to maximise the exposure of the few appealing national party leaders while securing, at the same time, a seat for (almost) all of them. this applies particularly to leu, whose party group in the lower chamber, as shown above, is almost entirely composed of national untouchables and national mandarins, i.e. by top national politicians who had joined this little cartel either from the pd or the far-left galaxy. conversely, for bigger parties, a multi-candidacy is a good way to ‘protect’ a politician against the risk of losing a specific race in a single-member or a multi-member constituency. in other words, multi-candidacies can represent, on the one hand, the willingness of party leaders and elites to increase the chances of election for a particular candidate but can also be, on the other, a sign of the noticeable bargaining power of a single candidate, who could more easily secure his/her re-election (for more information on multi-candidacies in the 2018 italian general election, see for instance pinto, tronconi, and valbruzzi 2018). all in all, the analysis of multi-candidacies, connected to parties’ specific clusters of mps, can lead to useful insights concerning the phase preceding 4th march 2018. figure 2 shows the percentage of mps, for each party and each of the five clusters under analysis, who received a multi-candidacy, while the vertical red line represents marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli, from demolition to re-composition? 18 the mean percentage of each party’s mps who received a multi-candidacy4. for instance, approximately 40% of fi intruder mps were multi-candidate. on the contrary, approximately 25% of all fi mps received a multi-candidacy. figure 2. percentage of 2018 lower house mps with a multi-candidacy, per category let us start with a general consideration concerning all mps coming from each party. there seems to be a clear distinction between, on the one hand, fdi and leu and, on the other, fi, the league, m5s, and the pd. in the former cases, either slightly less than 40% (fdi) or more than 60% (leu) of mps received a multi-candidacy, while in the latter cases this percentage goes from 18% to 27%. this is possibly in line with the discussion that introduced our section 2: such a difference between smaller and bigger parties could be related to a different use of the multi-candidacies. all in all, it could be argued that, for fdi and leu, multi-candidacies have represented a way to secure the (re)-election of some crucial figures. indeed, given the projected small share of votes that these formations would have received, it could have been necessary to protect some candidates from the uncertainty of the electoral process. this is also possibly shown by the high percentage of untouchables and national mandarins from fdi and leu who had a multicandidacy at their disposal. a different discourse can be made with reference to the other four parties: the pd has only slightly more than 20% of its national untouchables and national mandarins who received a multi-candidacy (while mps belonging to these two clusters represent an extremely high percentage of the total parliamentary group of the party, see figure 1 above); conversely, among the less numerous pd intruders and local untouchables, 4 notice that no intruder mps belonging to the league, no party machine mps belonging to fi and the pd, no local untouchable mps belonging to leu have received a multi-candidacy. leu m5s pd fdi fi lega 0 20 40 60 0 20 40 60 0 20 40 60 1. intruders 2. local party machine 3. local untouchables 4. national untouchables 5. national mandarins 1. intruders 2. local party machine 3. local untouchables 4. national untouchables 5. national mandarins % mps with a multi−candidacy ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 19 there are many mps who were multi-candidate. the high percentage of intruders with a multi-candidacy makes the pd similar to fi (despite silvio berlusconi’s party showing a more homogeneous distribution of multi-candidacies among the five clusters). these elements might signal that a ‘top-down' attempt of renewal could have been put in place by each party's leadership, favouring the entrance of newcomers endowed with the parachute of a multi-candidacy. finally, concerning the m5s and the league, it is interesting to note that, for both parties, the cluster with the highest percentage of mps with a multi-candidacy is a top-national one: the national untouchables for the m5s and the national mandarins for the league. in this sense, the attempt to ‘protect’ the national politicians of the parties under consideration might be something worth analysing in future empirical research, possibly in connection with (multi-)candidacies in safer or riskier districts or constituencies. 3. towards the governo del cambiamento: career prospects within the new parliamentary elite we have reached the final level of our analysis, in our attempt to assess the effective impact of the 2018 italian general election on the structure of the italian parliamentary ruling class. we now focus on the formation of an ‘inner circle’ of institutional leaders, both in parliament and the executive. this exploration could allow us to answer two other fundamental questions about the true meaning of the 2018 italian general election: to what extent does the renewal of the overall parliamentary class correspond to an effective change in the patterns of selection for parliamentary or governmental offices? finally, is there any difference in the pattern of selection for parliamentary and governmental offices according to the five-fold typology used in this contribution? to answer these questions, we started with the same circap dataset (see section 1) but, this time, controlling our descriptive data for a narrower population of mps who have been promoted to certain parliamentary and governmental positions. more precisely, we considered 119 mps elected to different offices of the lower house5 and 34 deputies included in the different positions – full minister, minister without portfolio, vice-minister, undersecretary – of the new conte government. figure 3 below reports the differences between the mean seniority (in parliamentary terms) of all the mps (by party) and that of mps who have been appointed within the core of parliamentary/executive institutions (called institutional leaders). moreover, the ratio (again, in parliamentary terms) between the mean seniority of the former and that of the latter is also provided (orange points). for instance, the league’s institutional leaders have a mean seniority which is twice as large as the seniority of all mps coming from matteo salvini’s party (see the orange dot for the league positioned above 2). the figure provides a preliminary but incontestable answer to the first question cited above: the rule of seniority is still quite evident in the circulation of the parliamentary elite. 5 we have considered the following institutional apical positions: chairman of the lower chamber, vicechairmen, quaestors and secretaries, the chairman of a legislative committee, vice-chairmen and the secretaries of legislative committees, the chairman and vice-chairmen of the parliamentary party group. notice that the distribution of offices (and the related ratio between institutional leaders and all mps) of the parties included in the analysis could also be influenced by belonging to a governing party or not. marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli, from demolition to re-composition? 20 indeed, mps with parliamentary or executive offices are much more experienced in comparison to the whole cohort of mps. figure 3. average seniority of 2018 lower house mps (all mps vs institutional leaders) quite an interesting take from figure 3 is that the higher seniority of those we have called institutional leaders applies to all parliamentary groups, with the sole exception of the small group of leu. in short, there is a tendency to appoint more experienced mps to important parliamentary or governmental positions. more in detail, noticeable differences can be found between institutional leaders and mps of the m5s (average tenure of institutional leaders of 0.73 vs. average tenure of all mps of the party equal to 0.26), the league (0.89 vs. 0.39), or fdi (2.11 vs. 0.81). this is not surprising and is consistent, after all, with the classic idea of institutionalisation of parliamentary actors (e.g., see polsby 1968). however, the comparative analysis concerning the m5s and the league, the two parties now in government, looks somewhat surprising. indeed, notwithstanding the noticeable percentage of newcomer mps from the m5s (see above), its institutional leaders have a mean seniority which is almost three times higher than that of all the mps coming from the party. notice also that the difference in the m5s between the average seniority of institutional leaders and that of all mps is the highest among all the parties considered in this analysis. all in all, incumbency seems to have played an important role within the m5s ranks (given that m5s mps entered parliament for the first time, at best, after the 2013 italian general election). this partly applies to the league as well, where the ratio between institutional leaders and the whole parliamentary party group is quite high (2.3), albeit not as high as in the case of the m5s. ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 0 1 2 fdi fi lega leu m5s pd av er ag e se ni or ity label tenure institutional leaders tenure all mps ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 21 we conclude with two figures which analyse parliamentary and governmental offices in greater detail and connect them with our five clusters of lower house mps. more in detail, figure 4 below reports the relevance of the parliamentary offices (x-axis), for each party under consideration, held by each mp cluster (y-axis). we have assigned a value of 0 to mps without any parliamentary office, 1 to mps selected for a collective office (like quaestors), 2 to vice presidents of parliamentary groups and committees and the vice president of the chamber, and 3 to the president of groups, committees, and of the chamber. the red vertical line indicates, for each party, the mean relevance of parliamentary offices held. figure 4. relevance of the parliamentary offices held by the five mp clusters, per party, 2018 lower house mps figure 4 above tells us that if we consider the relevance of parliamentary offices, top national politicians get the lion’s share: indeed, especially national untouchables and national mandarins occupy, on average, very relevant offices, regardless of the parties under analysis. the figure above shows that the six parties considered in this article have parliamentary office distributions substantially skewed towards such highly ranked politicians. this might indeed be another element to consider when analysing the rate of change brought about by the 2018 italian general election: when one deals with parliamentary offices, it seems that clusters of more prominent and experienced politicians obtain, on average, more important positions than lower-level clusters of parliamentarians. all in all, even from this viewpoint, the renewal of mps has also been tempered by the ‘old-style politics' centrality of highly-ranked and more tenured parliamentarians (see cotta 1982, verzichelli 2006). leu m5s pd fdi fi lega 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 1. intruders 2. local party machine 3. local untouchables 4. national untouchables 5. national mandarins 1. intruders 2. local party machine 3. local untouchables 4. national untouchables 5. national mandarins relevance in parliament marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli, from demolition to re-composition? 22 figure 4 is related to parliamentary offices. is it possible to find some differences, or similarities, when dealing with governmental offices? figure 5 below attempts to answer this question by reporting, for the two governing coalition partners, the league and the m5s, the relevance of governmental positions held by each one of the five clusters considered here. more in detail, we have assigned to the undersecretaries of the government a value of 1, while to vice ministers we have given a value of 2, and to ministers a value of 3. the other members of the parliamentary groups that have not been appointed to a governmental office have been given 0. finally, the vertical red line is the mean of the relevancy of governmental positions held by each party. figure 5. relevance of the governmental offices held by the five mp clusters, for the league and the m5s, 2018 lower house mps figure 5 shows that, as expected, the predominance of the highest clusters of nationwide established mps is quite evident. in other words, also when dealing with governmental offices, more important and ranked parliamentarians obtain more central offices in government. more in detail, the league’s national mandarins have been given, on average, the most relevant governmental positions, followed by the national and local untouchables. a somewhat different picture is that of the movimento cinque stelle, where it is the national untouchables cluster to have received the most important offices in the conte government (followed by local untouchables and intruders). let us remember that national untouchables are, for the m5s, basically incumbent mps (see section 1): this cluster is, on average, the typical target of the ‘super-selection' to apical governmental offices, while the league presents a more mixed model. summarising the results of this section, it is of course too early to provide an ultimate assessment, but it seems that there might be some signs of a sort of resilience of a more classical framework of political careers (see de winter 1991). indeed, party elites, lega m5s 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1. intruders 2. local party machine 3. local untouchables 4. national untouchables 5. national mandarins relevance in government ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 23 in charge of the parliamentary and ministerial selection, seem to be able to recompose and conduct the pattern of elite circulation even among the new ‘populist’ actors emerging in italy (i.e., the m5s and the new ‘nation-wide’ league led by matteo salvini, see the discussion in ivaldi, lanzone and woods 2017). however, we also note that, as far as the m5s is concerned, the control operated by the party leadership (however we define it, see for instance tronconi 2018) seems to be oriented towards establishing a rigid pattern of circulation based on parliamentary incumbency (also given the thin organisational structure of the party), while the framework of career opportunities within the league appears much more compound, with a relevant role played by long-term mps, by professional party functionaries, and also by territorial leaders with relevant local administrative experience. 4. conclusions in this article, we have analysed the main features of the italian lower house parliamentary elite after 4th march 2018. we have focused on the movimento cinque stelle (m5s), the partito democratico (pd), the lega (the league), forza italia (fi), liberi e uguali (leu), and fratellid’italia (fdi). more in detail, after having described the main features of lower house mps in section 1 by reverting to a five-fold typology, in section 2, we investigated the use of the tool of multi-candidacies in each of the main parties according to this typology. finally, section 3 has been devoted to the analysis of patterns of selection for parliamentary and governmental offices. a preliminary element to underline is that the rate of parliamentary turnover brought about by the 2018 italian general election has inevitably determined a number of interesting elements of innovation in the parliamentary elite. a relevant number of newcomer mps have entered the lower house, and this is surely something worth underlining. moreover, the use of multi-candidacies has been somehow differentiated between smaller (leu and fdi) and bigger parties, and also among more prominent political formations, where different clusters of parliamentarians have been differently ‘protected’ by the use of this tool (more experienced and central mps have, from a very general point of view, received many multi-candidacies, notwithstanding party-related differences, as for the pd). finally, concerning the selection for parliamentary and governmental offices, the relevance of top politicians remains evident, even if the different features of the league and the m5s – the two parties included in the coalition supporting the conte government – determine some differences in their patterns of elite circulation. however, ‘more traditional’ parliamentary seniority and parliamentary or partyrelated centrality are important characteristics showing that the pattern of elite formation does not seem to have changed in a univocal and dramatic way (see also pasquino 1999; verzichelli 2010). so, what are the tentative conclusions? let us start with the innovative hints. at first, a clear differentiation can be seen by looking at the number in parliamentary groups of external ‘genuine’ newcomers. these are strongly represented within the m5s ranks and almost absent among the mps from the league. smaller parties are also committed to offering a considerable bulk of the available spoils to more experienced and central politicians and, generally, to candidates coming from party or local government structures. these latter received, on average, also more multi-candidacies before the marino, martocchia diodati and verzichelli, from demolition to re-composition? 24 general election, and this is extremely interesting when analysing both smaller and larger political formations and also different parties. all in all, some kinds of mixed model have emerged: there is undoubtedly the absence of a clear framework of change but also the (maybe declining yet still relevant) importance of top parliamentarians, in line with more classic accounts of elite circulation and selection. furthermore, the selection for parliamentary and ministerial offices clearly shows the ambivalence in the procedure of formation of the government of change. on the one hand, the formation of the conte government is without any doubt a rather innovative episode in the italian constitutional and political chronicles. on the other hand, the mechanisms of political selection behind such an important event unveil the signs of a more traditional, accommodative process. both party delegations (the m5s and the league) show a noticeable weight given to more experienced and central parliamentarians: the mps elected in 2013 among the m5s ranks, and a more compound list of topexperienced politicians among the ministers and junior ministers of the league. to sum up, the analysis carried out in this article leads us to conclude by pointing at some implications for future analyses. for instance, future research could investigate the path towards the formation of a robust and more stable parliamentary elite, able to project a selected set of national rulers in future parliamentary or governmental offices. despite the presence of central and more experienced politicians also within the ranks of the m5s and the league, there are other elements to be taken into consideration. indeed, a more consolidated elite circulation is connected to the stability of the party system, but also to other conditions, both general (i.e. the features of electoral rules) or party-specific ones (i.e. the persistence of primary elections to select candidates for general elections). the fuzziness of the italian political scenario after the 2018 general election does not allow us to envisage a clear-cut forecast. it might indeed be possible that in the (more or less) near future we will witness a period of very uncertain and permeable models of political representation, possibly with noticeable differences between italian parties. references caramani, d. 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(1988) ‘italy: local involvement, central control’, in m. gallagher and m. marsh (eds.) candidate selection in comparative perspective: the secret garden of politics, london, sage, pp. 145-168. 08/07/2013 italian political science: europeanizing legislatures (and beyond) www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/europeanizing-legislatures-and-beyond 1/3 the professional review of the italian political science association europeanizing  legislatures  (and  beyond) by  francesco  zucchini  and  marco  giuliani  |  published  in  issue7  /  research this  international  research  project  is  a  follow  up  to  a  previous  research  involving  a  european  network  of scholars   in  the  field  of   legislative  studies.  this  network  has  just  released   its  first  collective  product  –  an edited   volume   for   springer   –   and   is   now   looking   for   new   avenues   of   research   complementing   its   past accomplishments.  the  italian  team  is  mainly  based  at  the  university  of  milano  statale. it  is  worthwhile  to  go  back  to  the  origins  of  the  research  network  and  to  its  main  research  goals.  everything started  in  2008  as  a  sort  of  side-­product  (or  search  for  synergy)  of  the  bigger  comparative  study  on  policy agenda-­setting  (http://www.comparativeagendas.org/).  at  the  margin  of  one  of  its  regular  annual  meeting, it  was  proposed  to  organize  a  supplementary  and  informal  seminar.  this  seminar  was  held  in  bordeaux,  and included  european  scholars   from  a  wide   range  of   countries,   some  of  whom  not  directly   involved   in   the “mother-­project”.   the  starting  idea  was  extremely  simple.  according  to  the  so-­called  “delors-­prophecy”  the  european  union would  soon  be  at  the  origin  of  80%  of  the  domestic  normative  production.  the  research  network  wanted  to test  empirically  this  prediction  in  a  number  of  countries  for  some  twenty  years  (in  italy  the  exact  period  was 1987-­2006,  with  a  clear  overlap  with  the  legislatures  from  the  10th  to  the  14th).  further  specifications  would have  included  the  type  of  law,  its  origin  (government  or  private  member  bills),  the  policy  sector  (taken  from the  twenty  macro-­categories  used  in  the  comparative  policy  agenda  project)  and  other  variables  according to  the  datasets  available  in  the  different  member  states. the  research  design  seemed  at  first  only  explorative  but  the  ongoing  cooperation  and  discussion  among  the research   teams   offered   the   opportunity   to   think   about   several   methodological   problems,   test   different techniques   (including   alternative   coding   protocols),   gain   insights   on   unexplored   topics,   and   contribute indirectly  to  the  literature  on  europeanization  and  to  the  field  of  legislative  studies.   in  fact,  the  research  question  is  far  more  tricky  than  it  appears  at  first  sight.  first  of  all,  the  choice  of  the unit  of  analysis,  the  law,  is  not  an  unproblematic  decision.  in  spite  of  the  apparent  formal  similarity,  “law”  is an  intrinsically  ambiguous  concept  when  applied  to  different  constitutional  setups  that  offer  varying  degrees of  freedom  to  the  action  of  executives  and  parliaments.  for  explicit  comparisons  this  problem  of  equivalence should  be  tackled  directly,  but  in  our  explorative  analysis,  once  acknowledged,  each  national  team  had  the opportunity  to  extend  its  own  analysis  in  different  directions.  the  italian  team  did  it  by  exploring  secondary legislation,  i.e.  analyzing  ministerial  decrees,  government  regulations  etc.,  for  a  collective  article  published in  an  italian  journal,  and  it  paid  a  specific  attention  to  legislative  decrees  for  the  italian  chapter  in  the  edited international  volume.   secondly,  the  operationalization  of  the  so-­called  “eu-­link”  deserves  a  careful  investigation.  in  other  terms how   to   trace   back   the   european   origin   of   a   domestic   act   ?   the   research   network,   agreed   on   twelve keywords  (e.g.  european  union,  single  market,  european  monetary  system,  etc.)  and  some  abbreviations (like  eu,  ecsc,  emu,  etc)  that  had  to  be  present  either  in  the  whole  text  (as  in  the  italian  case)  or  in  the summary/preamble  of  the  law  which,  in  some  countries,  was  extensive  enough  to  sufficiently  represent  the entire  act.   http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/europeanizing-legislatures-and-beyond http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/contributors/francesco-zucchini http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/contributors/marco-giuliani http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/category/research/ http://www.comparativeagendas.org/ 08/07/2013 italian political science: europeanizing legislatures (and beyond) www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/europeanizing-legislatures-and-beyond 2/3 thirdly,  but  not  the  least  important  aspect,  it  has  become  increasingly  clear  over  time  that  our  empirical  test ended   up   underestimating   the   effect   of   the   european   union   and   the   far   reaching   consequences   of europeanization  for  member  states.  in  fact,  we  are  able  only  to  recognize  the  impact  of  the  eu  on  laws  (i.e. positive  integration  law-­making),  but  we  cannot  observe  law  prevention  (i.e.  the  impossibility  of  adopting norms  contrasting  with  the  treaties  or  the  acquis  communautaire)  and  the  effects  of  negative  integration (e.g.  liberalizations  due  to  rulings  of  the  european  court  of  justice)1.   the  results  confirmed  that  the  amount  of  legislation  originated  by  eu  acts  is  far  from  delors’  target  (it  is irregularly  increasing,  but  only  in  two  years  overcomes  the  threshold  of  25%),  but  that  the  eu  impact  is more  relevant  for  secondary  legislation  and,  most  of  all,  for  legislative  decrees  (always  between  40%  and 90%,  on  a  yearly  basis,  since  1991).  the  europeanization  process  seems  to  empower  the  executive  as  a result  of  information  asymmetry  and  direct  formal  competencies.  in  the  italian  case,  the  annual  community act   –   which   largely   delegates   the   implementation   of   eu   directives   to   the   executive   –   and   a   reluctant parliament  further  contributed  to  that  process.  all  the  chapters  compared  the  presence  of  the  “european link”  for  policies  belonging  to  different  sectors.  in  addition  the  italian  one  explored  the  role  of  the   initial sponsor  of  the  bill  and  the  differentiated  presence  of  amendments. for  a  more  explicitly  comparative  approach,  the  final  chapter  of  the  volume  took  the  legislative  national  data in  order  to  build-­up  a  cross-­country  time-­series  dataset,  and  test  some  institutional  hypotheses  regarding the  variable  distribution  of  the  eu-­links  across  countries,  sectors  and  years. where  are  we  going  from  here?  the  first  steps  took  us  approximately  four  years,  from  the  initial  informal seminar   to   the  publication  of   the  edited  volume.   it  has  been  a  minor   involvement   for  all   the  partners, without  any  explicit  funding.  in  june  2012  some  members  of  the  original  network  and  some  new  ones,  took the  opportunity  of   the  ecpr   research   sessions   organized   at   the   european   university   institute   for   some brainstorming  and  for  planning  further  stages  of  the  research.  all  national  teams  agreed  that  it’s  impossible to  replicate  the  “no-­funds”  experience  of  the  past,  and  it’s  probably  too  early  to  draft  a  new  “big”  european project  (even  because  we  fall  between  the  last  tenders  of  the  fp7  and  the  future  horizon  2020  program). nevertheless   we   decided   to   refine   and   extend   our   first   experience   in   order   to   prepare   for   a   major submission.   if  the  initial  thrust  was  to  test  what  has  been  then  dubbed  “the  delors  myth”,  our  further  steps  will  be  to investigate  into  the  europenization  of  legislatures  more  in  general,  by  paying  attention  to  features  different from  the  laws.  the  general  idea  would  be  always  to  perform  some  country-­specific  analysis  on  eu  influenced parliamentary  behavior  and  then  to  test  comparatively  the  factors  affecting  the  observed  variance  between countries,  sectors  and  periods.  however  in  the  next  investigations  we  will  take  into  consideration  bills  and, above   all,   parliamentary   questioning.   if   information   asymmetry,   mixed   with   the   direct   presence   in   eu legislative  arena,  lies  at  the  origin  of  the  uneven  role  of  executives  in  eu  influenced  domestic  policy-­making, then  mps  may  try  to  regain  the  control  (and  activism)  they  seem  to  have  lost  in  law-­making  by  a  different type  of  behavior.  we  will  explore  this  hypothesis  through  an  analysis  of  written  questions  advanced  to  the executives.   these   explorations   would   be   just   an   intermediate   step   towards   a   much   more   complex   and   ambitious research   design   that   could   involve   in   the   future   all   the   traditional   (bagehot’s)   functions   of   national parliaments.  differently  from  the  already  existing  studies  our  approach  to  the  europeanization  of  legislatures (and  parliaments)  would  be  based  on  a  systematic  comparative  quantitative  analysis  of  parliament’s  tasks  in a  longitudinal  perspective.  we  believe  that  the  result  of  our  analysis  could  further  provide  an  empirical  basis to  the  debate  on  the  sovereignty  issues  and  the  democratic  deficit.  is  it  a  zero-­sum  game  between  member states  and  eu  or  not?  what  is  the  role  of  elective  assemblies  in  the  eu  ?  is  the  institutional  position  of  the european  parliament  really  the  main  problem  ?  or  rather  the  loss  of  influence  of  legislatures  ?. if  the  research  direction  is  clear  it  is  nevertheless  impossible  up  to  now  to  draw  a  coherent  and  wide-­range research   design   without   knowing   if   we   could   rely   on   an   appropriate   funding.   the   research   network   is expanding  (see  below),  and  shares  the  same  attitude  towards  data  collection  and  analysis.  we  believe  we have   the   opportunity   to   provide   major   insights   on   how   in   a   multi-­level   political   environment   we   are governed  and  how  the  public  problems  are  tackled.  we  hope  that  also  the  potential  financing  bodies  share the  same  firm  belief. http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/europeanizing-legislatures-and-beyond#fn714318137508583c182632 08/07/2013 italian political science: europeanizing legislatures (and beyond) www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/europeanizing-legislatures-and-beyond 3/3 notes 1  the  same  reinforced  rules  of  the  monetary  union,  including  the  new  european  fiscal  compact  treaty,  via budget  limitations,  may  deeply  influence  non-­decisions-­making  in  each  and  every  domestic  policy  sector. furthermore,  even  the  impact  of  eu  soft  laws  and  of  voluntary  coordination  (like  the  lisbon’s  omc)  may  be difficult  to  trace  with  the  chosen  proxies. the   italian   research   group   includes:   enrico   borghetto,   marco   giuliani,   francesco   zucchini   and, prospectively,  federico  russo. the  network  included  scholars  from:  university  of  milano,  university  of  mannheim,  sabanci  university  of instanbul,   university   of   bordeaux,   university   of   vienna,   university   of   turku,   university   of   tampere, university   of   luxembourg,   university   of   leiden,   wageningen   university,   university   of   barcelona   and university  of  geneva.  some  other  scholars,  e.g.  from  the  uk,  participated  to  the  working  seminars  without contributing  with  a  chapter  but  will  be  included  in  the  next  steps,  as  well  as  scholars  with  expertise  in  the “new”   eu   member   states   (such   as   malta,   or   central-­eastern   european   countries)   or   in   other   non-­eu countries  (e.g.  norway,  and  some  candidate  country). next  meetings  will  be  in  mannheim  in  november  2012,  and  probably  amsterdam  in  june  2013. relevant  italian  publications: e.  borghetto,  m.  giuliani  and  f.  zucchini,  quanta  bruxelles  c’è  a  roma?  l’europeizzazione della  produzione  normativa  italiana,  in  “rivista  italiana  di  politiche  pubbliche”  (2009),  n.  1, pp.  135-­162. e.  borghetto.  m.  giuliani  and  f.  zucchini,  leading  governments  and  unwilling  legislators: the  european  union  and  the  italian  law-­making  (1987-­2006),  in  s.  brouard,  o.  costa  and  t. könig  (eds),  the  europeanization  of  domestic  legislatures,  new  york,  springer  2012,  pp. 109-­130. 08/07/2013 italian political science: two italian political scientists in the governing body of the european consortium for political research www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/two-italian-political-scientists-in-the-governing-body-of-the-european-consortium-for-political-research 1/3 the professional review of the italian political science association two  italian  political  scientists  in  the governing  body  of  the  european consortium  for  political  research by  ips  |  published  in  issue7  /  political  science  community an  interview  of  ips  to  professor  simona  piattoni  (university  of  trento),  the  new  chairperson  of  ecpr  and  to professor  luca  verzichelli  (university  of  siena)  new  italian  member  of  the  ecpr  executive  committee. professor  simona  piattoni ips:  simona,  if  we  are  not  wrong  you  are  the  third  italian  chair  of  the  ecpr  executive  after  freddi and  bardi  and  the  first  woman.  this  is  an  important  achievement  for  italian  political  science  and for  you  personally.  can  you  comment  on  this  and  tell  also  on  the  basis  of  your  previous  experience as  a  member  of  the  executive  committee  what  is  the  situation  of  ecpr,    the  future  challenges, your  projects,  etc… sp:  it  is  an  honor  for  me  to  follow  in  the  steps  of  giorgio  freddi  and  luciano  bardi  as  chair  of  the  ecpr,  and i  am  particularly  happy  to  be  the  first  woman  ever  to  be  elected  chair  of  the  ecpr!  i  have  made  myself available  for  this  role  as  a  service  to  the  community  of  political  scientists  in  europe  and  elsewhere,  and  this is  the  spirit  with  which  i  intend  to  fulfill  my  duties.  the  ecpr  is  by  now  a  very  large  organization,  with  lots  of activities  (conferences,  schools,  standing  groups,  research  sessions,  publications,  etc.).  the  role  of  the  chair is   to   make   sure   that   these   activities   are   performed   to   the   satisfaction   of   the   membership   and   that exchanges  between  european  and  international  political  scientists  are   increasingly  frequent  and  fruitful.  i believe  that   the  main  challenges   for   the   future  of   the  ecpr  are:  1)   to  keep  these  activities  going  while securing  their  increased  quality;;  2)  to  expand  membership  in  those  countries  whose  political  scientists  are not   yet   fully   integrated   in   international   scholarly   circles;;   3)   to   promote   political   science   (while   it   is   still considered  in  an  “ancillary”  role  to  other  sciences)  and  to  protect  it  from  the  funding  cuts  that  are  planned  a bit  everywhere  (also  in  europe). ips:  what  role  has  played  ecpr  in  your  formation  as  a  political  scientist? sp:  i  remember  attending  both  the  research  sessions  and  the  joint  sessions  at  a  very  early  stage  in  my career   as   a   political   scientist.   i   was   trained   in   the   united   states,   so   my   first   professional   association experience  was  with  apsa.  however,  as  soon  as  i  came  back  to  europe  (norway  at  the  time),  i  became involved   with   the   ecpr   (and   with   the   sisp!).   i   remember   my   first   joint   sessions   in   oslo:   i   was   very impressed  by  the  quality  of  my  workshop  and  i  literally  loved  the  idea  of  meeting  for  three-­four  days  to discuss   in   depth   one   topic   rather   than   delivering   a   paper   in   10-­15   minutes   (as   is   common   at   large conferences).  unfortunately,  i  never  attended  the  famous  summer  school  in  methods  and  techniques,  but  if i  could  express  a  wish,  it  would  be  that  “refresher  courses”  could  be  offered  also  for  senior  scholars  who desire  to  bring  their  methodological  skills  up  to  date! http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/two-italian-political-scientists-in-the-governing-body-of-the-european-consortium-for-political-research http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/contributors/ips http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/category/political-science-community/ 08/07/2013 italian political science: two italian political scientists in the governing body of the european consortium for political research www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/two-italian-political-scientists-in-the-governing-body-of-the-european-consortium-for-political-research 2/3 ips:  ecpr  in  europe:    where  it  is  still  weak  and  what  can  be  done? sp:   yes,   our   plan   is   to   strengthen   political   science   throughout   europe   and   to   extend   ecpr membership  particularly  to  eastern  europe,  to  russia  but  not  only  russia.  we  realize  that  there  is  a  great potential  for  political  science  in  countries  in  which  the  social  sciences  have  been  kept,  for  a  long  time,  on  the back-­burner.   we   would   also   like   to   extend   our   reach   to   north   africa,   even   though   that   is   a   bit   more complicated  (although  interesting!)  right  now. ips:  ecpr  in  global  political  science.  what  about  the  relationship  with  american  political  science (apsa),  and  with  other  international  organizations  active  in  our  field? sp:  ecpr  has  already  fairly  established  collaborations  with  apsa,  ipsa,  isa,  eusa,  etc.  which  it  wishes  to keep  up  and  expand  on. ips:  what  can  you  say  about  the  presence  of  italian  political  scientists  in  ecpr?  is  it  adequate? sp:  italians  attend  ecpr  events  in  great  numbers,  particularly  italian  graduate  students.  however,  italian political  scientists  do  not  propose  workshops  (at  the  joint  sessions  or  the  research  sessions)  to  the  same extent  as  other  political  scientists  particularly  from  northern  european  countries  nor  are  italian  universities particularly  forthcoming  in  offering  to  host  ecpr  events.   ips:  thank  you  simona! professor  luca  verzichelli ips:  luca,  you  are  a  new  member  of  the  executive  committee  of  ecpr  and  you  were  assigned  a specific  portfolio.  how  was  your  impact  with  this  new  experience,  what  are  your  duties  and  goals? lv:  the  work  as  an  ec  member  is  very  demanding  but  very  stimulating  at  the  same  time.  i  started  a  couple of  months  ago  and  i  am  still  learning  about  procedures,  priorities  and  duties  of  the  executive  committee.  at this  moment,  my  responsibilities  are  “publications”,  a  huge  portfolio  which  i  will  share  with  other  colleagues, and  the  “research  sessions”,  an  old  ecpr  activity  which  has  been  recently  re-­launched,  with  very  good feedbacks  i  have  to  say.   at  the  induction  meeting  of  the  new  ec,  in  colchester,  we  had  an  interesting  kick  off  session  during  which each  ec  member  could  introduce,  by  way  of  an  electronic  forum,  ideas  and  expectations  for  the  years  to come.  significantly,  there  was  a  good  convergence  of  views  on  a  few  items.  among  them,  creating  a  good inter-­generational   dialogue,   helping   young   scholars   to   socialize   with   the   european   political   science, preserving   the   traditional   mission   of   ecpr   (mainly   the   diffusion   and   the   dissemination   of   good   political science   all   around   europe)   without   ignoring   new   themes,   new   techniques   and   cooperation   with   extra-­ european  communities. of  course  we  will  have  to  discuss  about  other  crucial  aspects  and  challenges,  including  the  role  of  epcr  in the  other  areas  of  the  planet.  governing  ecpr  is  more  and  more  challenging,  since  we  have  to  consider  a system   of   complex   relationships   with   individuals,   academic   institutions   (which   are   traditionally   our organizational   “units”)   and   other   national   or   regional   communities   of   scholars.   we   are   talking   of   an organization  formed  today  by  more  than  400  institutional  members  and  having  to  deal  with  more  than  50 national  communities.  however,  i  think  this  is  a  motivated  group  of  people  and  we  have  the  chance  to  make a  great  job.  personally,  i  am  very  honored  to  be  included  in  such  a  group  and  i  am  sure  i  will  learn  a  lot form  this  experience. ips:  what  role  has  played  ecpr  in  your  formation  as  a  political  scientist? lv:  ecpr  has  always  been  very  much  present  in  my  life  as  a  political  scientist,  and  i  perceived  its  crucial role   since   the   beginnings   of   my   career.   i   was   in   the   methods   summer   school   in   1990,   and   my   first experience  in  a  ecpr  workshop  was  in  1994.  since  then,  i  have  attended  10  joint  sessions,  plus  a  number of   other   events   like   general   conferences   and   summer   schools.   i   think   i   was   very   lucky   to   have   the opportunity   to   get   in   touch   with   a   good   number   of   “ecpr   people”.   this   allowed   me   to   be   included   in important  research  projects  and,  above  all,   to  observe  what  the  best  professional  social  scientists  do   in order  to  develop  a  better  research. 08/07/2013 italian political science: two italian political scientists in the governing body of the european consortium for political research www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/two-italian-political-scientists-in-the-governing-body-of-the-european-consortium-for-political-research 3/3 from  my  ecpr  experiences  i  did  not  simply  learn  “substantive”  political  science:  a  fundamental  aspect  of such  an  organization  is  the  impressive  stimulation  it  can  provide,  putting  old  and  new  scholars  at  the  same table.   indeed,   the   ecpr   experience   helps   avoiding   parochialism   and   prevents   us   from   developing extrapolations  based  on  limited  confrontations.  this  is  particularly  true  in  my  specific  field,  the  analysis  of comparative  political  institutions,  which  is  at  the  core  of  the  ecpr  mission  of  “real  word  comparison”,  this  is a  simple  but  crucial  lesson  i  learnt  from  one  of  my  mentors,  jean  blondel,  many  years  ago.  and  it’s  time  to get  back  to  europe  to  tell  this  story  to  the  young  fellows. ips:  what  can  you  say  about  the  presence  of  italian  political  science  in  ecpr?  is  it  adequate,  or what? lv:  over   the  years,  many  ec  members  and   three  chairpersons  have  been  elected   from  among   italian scholars.  this   is  a  good   indicator  of   the  credibility  of  our  community  within   the  ecpr  organization.  the italian  presence  at  the  ecpr  events  and  within  the  standing  groups  is  also  very  relevant.  however,  i  think we  can  still  improve.  particularly,  we  should  make  an  effort  to  link  the  younger  generation  of  scholars  to  the ecpr   organization   and   to   help   them   to   publish   at   the   international   level,   perhaps   using   the   different opportunities  offered  by  the  ecpr  series  and  journals.  this  is  one  of  my  goals  for  the  years  to  come,  and  i do  hope  to  give  a  little  contribution  in  this  perspective. ips:  thank  you  luca  and  good  luck  to  both  of  you! microsoft word pdf_issue_13_1_5.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 1, may 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 1, pp. 63–81. contact author: aldo paparo, luiss guido carli university, rome. e-mail address: apaparo@luiss.it challenger’s delight: the success of m5s and lega in the 2018 italian general election aldo paparo luiss guido carli university, rome abstract the results of the 2018 general election were shocking. although the main competitors were the same as in 2013 (the centre-right coalition, the centre-left coalition, and the movimento 5 stelle), great uncertainty surrounded the electoral outcome because of the application of a new electoral system, and polls data indicating the competitiveness of the multiple political formations and the high number of undecided voters. for the first time in western european history, a successful debutant managed not to lose votes in the subsequent election. in 2013 the movimento 5 stelle had actually been the most successful debutant in western europe since 1945, and it gained over 7 percentage points, coming close to one third of the votes. at the same time, the lega (nord) achieved the best result in its history, with 17.3% of the national votes. thus, these two challenger parties combined received over 50% of votes, while the two mainstream parties, national wings of the major european parliament party families, both hit their historical lows, together winning less than a third of the votes. the election resulted in a hung parliament. the centre-right coalition was first, but with far from a majority of seats. the movimento 5 stelle was the most voted party, finishing second, but close to the centre-right. the centre-left was outdistanced. in this article we describe and discuss the 2018 electoral results and their strange, largely unexpected outcome. more specifically, we look at voter turnout and the results of the vote, both at the overall national level and with a geographical breakdown, comparing and contrasting them with italian electoral history and the 2013 results in particular. finally, we conclude by analysing survey data and vote shifts between 2013 and 2018 to assess the electoral dynamics behind the results. 1. introduction n this article we present the results of the 2018 italian general election and interpret them by placing them in the context of italian electoral history and analysing sociodemographic survey data and electoral shifts between 2013 and 2018. in short, we will show the unprecedented success of challenger parties, confirming the extraordinary intensity of the turbulence which has shaken the italian party system in recent years, and provide some preliminary arguments about how this came to be. a series of historical events occurred in the election, not just as regards italian electoral history, but in a western european comparative perspective. first, the two main challenger parties (movimento 5 stelle, m5s, and lega nord, ln – now running without the ‘nord’ in its symbol) received the majority of the votes and, as a consequence, they eventually appointed the first cabinet in western europe to include no national wing of the european parliament (ep) mainstream party families. secondly, a successful debutant managed not to lose votes in the subsequent election. actually, the 2013 m5s has been the single most successful debutant in the whole of western europe since the end of ww2, and not only did it manage not to lose votes, it gained over 7 percentage points, coming just short of one third of the votes. at the same time, i paparo, challenger’s delight 64 the ln reached the best result in its history, with 17.3% of the national votes while the two mainstream parties (partito democratico, pd, and forza italia, fi), national wings of the major ep party families, both hit their historical lows and received, combined, fewer votes than the m5s alone. the election yielded a hung parliament. although the centre-right coalition was first, it had nowhere near a majority of seats in either house. the m5s was the most voted party, finishing second, close to the centre-right. the centre-left coalition was outdistanced. as anticipated above, the m5s and the ln would then form a coalition government, after a three-month gestation period. the article is structured as follows. in the next section we discuss voter turnout and its variations compared to the 2013 election. we then move to the electoral results: we look at vote and seat distribution, for both the chamber and the senate. finally, we present vote shifts in selected italian cities and survey data on socio-demographics, to assess the electoral dynamics that generated such results. the conclusions follow. 2. the italian political system from 2013 to 2018 before entering into a discussion of the results, let us briefly introduce the political context in which they happened, by summarizing the main political developments characterizing italian politics since the previous general elections. in 2013, the italian party system suffered a massive earthquake, which wiped out the fragile transition towards a bipolar pattern of competition (d’alimonte 2013). the most successful debutant party in post-ww2 western europe emerged (m5s), and no pre-electoral coalition secured a majority of seats in either parliament branch, despite the majority bonuses then granted by the electoral law (pasquino 2007; renwick, hanretty and hine 2009). consequences were just as unprecedented. first, there was the first-ever re-election of a president of the republic, after parliament had wrapped itself in a dangerous gridlock. the first post-electoral grand coalition cabinet of the history of the republic was then formed. the whole legislature was made up of cabinets supported by the pd and (parts of) berlusconi’s pdl (popolo della libertà), after the main part of the party left the government following berlusconi’s request in september 2013, to recreate fi. electoral results during the xvii legislature followed the typical u-shaped pattern for the pd, parallel to the popularity trend of centre-left-led cabinets. this was extremely evident in the spring of 2014, when the pd achieved historic success in the ep election (segatti, poletti and vezzoni 2015). then it gradually declined, and electoral outcomes for the centre-left were more and more disappointing in regional and municipal elections up to the crucial 2016 constitutional referendum (ceccarini and bordignon 2017). although their popularity rating was a little better during the gentiloni cabinet, in the municipal elections held in the spring of 2017, those immediately preceding the 2018 general election, results for the centre-left did not improve, and in fact the centre-right re-established itself as a contender for the national government, especially by re-establishin its unity. it is worth mentioning that the ln, under the leadership of the new leader salvini, abandoned the pro-north platform to become a classic nationalist radical right-wing party (tarchi 2018), which proved quite successful in electoral terms, and was important for the re-establishment of the centre-right as a potential winner. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 65 the main achievements of the legislature were the constitutional reform, rejected by italian voters in december 2016, and the electoral reform, ruled unconstitutional in january 2017. in order to avoid holding the elections under two different systems (none of which was designed by parliament) in the two branches, a new electoral law was approved in november 2017, featuring a mix of roughly one third of fptp (first-past-thepost) smds (single-member districts) and two thirds of pr (proportional representation) mmds (multi-member districts) for both the chamber and the senate (chiaramonte and d’alimonte in this journal). as a consequence of the new electoral system, both centre-left and centre-right preelectoral coalitions were formed to support common candidates in smds, while the m5s ran on its own. however, while the centre-right presented a unified front, the centre-left failed to do so. the pd and its various left-wing fractions that split during the xvii legislature ran separately. the latter federated with other left parties in a list called liberi e uguali (leu) running on its own, while the pd formed a coalition with three minor centrist parties. 3. voter turnout we begin our enquiry by looking at voter turnout. overall, at the national level, it was 72.9%, the lowest in the history of the italian republic, 2.3% down compared to 2013 (figure 1). however, if we consider the historical turnout trend, the observed drop is absolutely in line with the physiological drop rate of a little less than half a point per year, due to the effect of generational replacement – older cohorts voting more than new ones replacing them in the electorate. thus, while the 2013 election saw a particularly substantial fall (-5.3% compared to 2008), the 2018 election was, in terms of turnout, back to normal after the shock of 2013 (chiaramonte and de sio 2014). we will see shortly that results tell a different story. turnout geography is in line with italian electoral history (figure 2, left map). a higher turnout is concentrated in the central and northern parts of the country. in particular, all 18 provinces in the first sextile are in the zones in the past characterized by either red or white subcultures (galli 1968; diamanti 2009). turnout remains relatively quite high in the rest of the north, while it decreases gradually moving south, to reach its minimum in the extreme periphery of the peninsula and the island regions. all 16 provinces with the lowest turnout are in calabria, sicily, or sardinia. if we turn to turnout variations from 2013 (figure 2, right-hand map), however, we notice that the 2.3-point drop recorded at the national level was not uniform. actually, the pattern appears quite symmetrical to the map with turnout level on its left. smaller drops (and some actual turnout increases) are concentrated in the south, although with the visible exception of rome. turnout drops are more visible but still below average up to the apennines. further north, we find the areas where turnout shrank most: this was particularly concentrated throughout emilia-romagna, lombardy, veneto, and liguria. paparo, challenger’s delight 66 figure 1. voter turnout in legislative elections for the chamber of deputies, 1948–2018 percentages of voters going to the polls out of overall registered voters. data are relative to the whole set of registered voters between 1979 and 2001, to only registered voters living in italy until 1976 and since 2001. for 2001, then, we report both percentages: 85.3 is relative to italian residents only, 81.4 is relative to the whole set of registered voters (thus both those living in italy and abroad). this is done to show the negative effect on turnout which the inclusion of the latter constituency had in the previous period. figure 2. voter turnout in the 2018 italian general election (left map), and variations from 2013 (right map), province-level sextiles source: ministry of the interior. the south sardinia province was established in 2016: this is why the ministry does not provide the 2013 turnout and the province appears blank (missing data) on the right-hand map. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 67 as a consequence, although the turnout rate in the south has remained lower than in the rest of the country, the gap closed somewhat in 2018. in the south turnout dropped 1.6%, from 69.8% to 68.2% (with a variation rate of -2.4%), while elsewhere the drop was 2.8% (-3.5%). as a consequence, the participation gap between south and centre-north moved from 9.8% in 2013 to 8.6% in 2018. this evidence represents the renewal of a trend observed throughout the whole of the second republic, but also a reverse from 2013, when, on the contrary, the abovementioned national 5.3-point drop compared to 2008 was smaller than that in the centrenorth and larger in the south. such gap enlarging was then attributed to the reduction of resources available for patronage, and the disappearance of the ‘southern issue’ from the national political agenda (tuorto 2014). it is reasonable to believe, in particular in light of the electoral results and our analyses of electoral shifts (see below), that in 2018 the m5s had a higher mobilizing appeal for southern voters. this might be due to the presence of di maio as political leader, the first southern candidate for leading the cabinet and with a chance of actually doing so, since when, in 1994, elections came close to a direct appointment of the prime minister. a second factor which might account for the higher mobilizing role of the m5s in the south is its signature campaign issue – the basic income, which is particularly appealing where unemployment is higher. all this considered, it appears quite difficult to interpret the gap closing observed in 2018, and consequently predict whether it will continue in the future (thus yielding a further homogenization of the country in terms of participation) or was rather driven by these specific features of this election. 4. the electoral results the centre-right coalition won a plurality of the votes, with 37% (table 1),1 gaining almost 8% (table 3), and increasing its vote total by over 2 million compared to the 2013 election. the ln achieved the historic overtaking of fi as the most-voted party of the coalition (17.3% and 13.9%, respectively). fratelli d’italia (fdi) received 4.4%, thus overcoming the 3% national threshold to gain pr seats, which the ‘fourth leg’ of the coalition (noi con l’italia-unione di centro, nci-udc) failed to do. the latter was chosen by 1.3% of voters, enough for its votes to be useful to coalitional parties.2 compared to 2013, the ln gained over 13%, multiplying its votes fourfold. fdi more than doubled its results, both percentagewise and in vote number. by contrast, berlusconi’s party, down by over 7%, lost over a third of its votes. although since 2013 the party had suffered the split of the alfano-led wing, given the low results of both parties to emerge after it – nci and civica popolare (cp) who together took less than 2% of the votes – and the significant overall increase of the coalition so far led by berlusconi, fi’s electoral retreat is definitely something worth stressing. the m5s was the largest party, with 32.7% of the votes, gaining 2 million votes, and advancing 7%. this unprecedented trend for a debutant party indicates both the 1 in italy, thus including votes in the aosta valley but not those cast in the italian-abroad constituency. 2 the electoral law states that parties in coalitions receiving between 1% and 3% of the votes do not win any pr seats, but their votes are summed to coalitional partners above the threshold to determine coalitional overall results, which are used in the pr seat allocation. paparo, challenger’s delight 68 intensity of the systemic turbulence the italian political system is undergoing, and the ability of the m5s to strategically adapt to this turbulent environment. the centre-left coalition scored historically disappointing results. the coalition as a whole received 22.9% of the votes, losing 2.5 million votes (a quarter of the total), and roughly 7%. the pd maintained the position of second-most-voted party, but it stopped at 18.7%. no other party in the coalition managed to overcome the 3% threshold.3 furthermore, two minor centre-left parties (cp and insieme) failed to meet the 1% threshold. thus, their votes were not useful at all for seat allocation. conversely, votes received by +europa (between 1 and 3% – 2.6% to be exact) were counted for the purposes of pr seat allocation and they were considered exactly as if they were pd votes.4 the other party that won pr seats was leu. it received 3.4% of national votes, thus significantly improving the result achieved in 2013 by the list then running to the left of the centre-left coalition, namely rivoluzione civile. however, it failed to meet pre-electoral expectations, and the actual result was considered quite disappointing.5 minor parties outside coalitions received 4.1% of the votes,6 with two parties on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum getting the most. the extreme left potere al popolo was voted by 1.1% of voters; while ‘third-millennium fascist’ casapound italia was just a little short of 1%. table 1 also reports, on the right, the results for the senate elections. only citizens who are at least 25 years old can vote for the senate. as a consequence of the different voting age requirements, almost 4 million citizens who vote for the chamber are not eligible to vote for the senate: 8% of the total chamber voters. overall, senate results are extraordinarily similar to those observed in the chamber. the centre-right moves from 37% to 37.5%, with both fi and ln slightly larger, while the m5s loses half a point in the senate – from 32.7% to 32.2%. virtually no difference between the two houses emerges for the centre-left as a coalition, although the pd is slightly larger among senate voters. this generalized homogeneity appears quite surprising if we consider that italian electoral history has been characterized, especially in recent years, by visible discrepancies between the results for the two houses. for instance, in 2013 the m5s was about 2 pp. smaller in the senate than in the chamber, which clearly indicated its better electoral performance among younger voters (de sio and cataldi 2014). the great similarity between chamber and senate results in 2018, on the contrary, indicates that this time younger voters have voted very similarly to the rest of the electorate. moreover, this homogeneity, which is also replicated at the district level, might be considered an indication that the role of candidates in smds was very limited in determining electoral choices. 3 the svp, although not meeting the 3% threshold, was able to participate in pr allocation thanks to a clause in the electoral law guaranteeing parties representing linguistic minorities. as a consequence, it won two pr seats in the trentino-alto adige/south tyrol region in the chamber and one in the senate. 4 see footnote 2. 5 this was stated by grasso himself. see http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/grasso-delusi-risultatoleu-va-avanti-1501320.html. 6 thus, the overall quota of valid votes not being used in the pr seat distribution amounts to just over 5%. this means a 5% over-representation for parties above the threshold. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 69 table 1. results of 2018 general election (chamber of deputies and senate) chamber of deputies senate votes seats votes seats lists and coalitions no. % pr fptp abroad total no. % pr fptp abroad total lega nord (ln) 5,705,925 17.3 73 50 2 125 5,334,049 17.6 37 21 58 forza italia (fi) 4,586,672 13.9 59 43 1 103 4,358,101 14.4 33 22 2 57 fratelli d'italia (fdi) 1,440,107 4.4 19 13 32 1,286,887 4.3 7 11 18 noi con l'italia-unione di centro (nci-udc) 431,042 1.3 0 5 0 5 362,131 1.2 0 4 0 4 fi-fdi-mov.nuova valle d'aostaa 5,533 0.0 0 0 5,223 0.0 0 0 total centre-right 12,169,279 37.0 151 111 3 265 11,346,391 37.5 77 58 2 137 movimento 5 stelle (m5s) 10,748,372 32.7 133 93 1 227 9,747,701 32.2 68 44 0 112 partito democratico (pd) 6,153,081 18.7 86 21 5 112 5,788,103 19.1 43 8 2 53 +europa 845,406 2.6 0 2 1 3 716,136 2.4 0 1 0 1 insieme 191,489 0.6 0 1 1 163,903 0.5 0 1 1 civica popolare (cp) 180,539 0.5 0 2 0 2 152,505 0.5 0 1 0 1 svp-patt 134,613 0.4 2 2 4 128,336 0.4 1 2 3 pd-uv-uvp-epavb 14,429 0.0 0 0 15,958 0.1 1 1 total centre-left 7,519,557 22.9 88 28 6 122 6,964,941 23.0 44 14 2 60 liberi e uguali (leu) 1,114,298 3.4 14 0 0 14 990,715 3.3 4 0 0 4 others 1,354,919 4.1 0 0 2 2 1,226,064 4.0 0 0 2 2 total 32,906,425 100 386 232 12 630 30,275,812 100 193 116 6 315 source: supreme court for results in the domestic arena (except aosta valley), ministry of the interior for results in aosta valley and seats abroad. a electoral coalition among fi, fdi and a local movement in aosta valley. b electoral coalition among pd and ethno-regionalist parties in aosta valley. paparo, challenger’s delight 70 in the smd-fptp arena (figure 3), again, the centre-right coalition won, with the m5s second, and the centre-left third, a long way behind. out of 232 chamber smds, centre-right candidates won 111 times (48%), while in the senate they won exactly 50% of the smds. looking at the internal distribution, ln candidates won 50 chamber smds, and fi candidates 44. by contrast, in the senate, fi had more winning candidates in smds than ln (22 v. 21). the centre-right won virtually all smds in the north and expanded in the red zone, while they had very few victories in the south.7 m5s candidates won 40% of the chamber smds (93), and 38% of senate districts (44). this result is particularly surprising as it was widely expected that the new electoral system would damage their performance in the plurality arena, given the party’s choice not to form a coalition. on the contrary, the m5s won a higher fraction of fptp seats compared to pr seats – 34% and 35% in the two parliament branches. this happened thanks to the geographical concentration of m5s votes in the south, where it got more than 40% of the votes (tab. 3), thus recording a landslide victory. the centre-left performed poorly in the smds. overall, its candidates won 12% in both houses: 28 in the chamber, 14 in the senate. their victories are concentrated in the core of the red zone, and in the central smds of metropolitan areas, especially in the north with not a single victory in either house south of rome. figure 3. map of winners in chamber smds in 2018 (left), and 2013 most-voted coalition in the territories forming 2018 smds (right) overall, in the south (the largest of the three zones), centre-left candidates were either first or second in only five chamber smds out of a total of 101 (table 2). moreover, the centre-left lost its advantage in the red zone: in both houses centre-right candidates 7 the red zone is composed of emilia-romagna, tuscany, marches, and umbria. the north is made up of the 7 regions further north than this ‘red belt’, while the south is made of the 9 regions south of it. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 71 won a plurality of the smds, three more than the once hegemonic coalition. furthermore, considering the m5s hegemony in the south (over 80% of the smds in both houses, with the centre-right a distant second – 15% on average), and the even stronger centre-right dominion in the north (over 85% of smds, with m5s and centre-left alternating as further distant second – 20% on average), the red zone is now the most competitive part of the country. no coalition won a majority of smds in either house, all three contenders have significant portions of both first and second places, and on average victory margins are much smaller (7%). table 2. competition patterns in smds firstand second-most-voted coalitions/parties in smds geo-political area italy north red zone south c ha m be r of d ep ut ie s m5s first, centre-right second 3 5 83 91 centre-right first, m5s second 47 9 13 69 centre-right first, centre-left second 32 10 0 42 centre-left first, centre-right second 8 14 4 26 centre-left first, m5s second 0 2 0 2 m5s first, centre-left second 1 0 1 2 total 91 40 101 232 s en at e m5s first, centre-right second 1 3 40 44 centre-right first, m5s second 22 4 8 34 centre-right first, centre-left second 18 6 0 24 centre-left first, centre-right second 5 7 1 13 centre-left first, m5s second 1 0 0 1 total 47 20 49 116 the geographical analysis of smd competition patterns leads us to the more general discussion of the electoral results in geographical terms (table 3). compared to 2013, the m5s is basically stable in the centre-north, while it grows substantially in the south, gaining 16%, from 27.3% to 42.3%. conversely, the centre-right is basically stable in the south, and it increases by over 10% in the rest of the country. this is mostly due to the ln. fi went down quite evenly in the different areas (7/8%), maintaining its 2013 geography, characterized by relative strength in the south. the ln gained just enough to keep the coalition stable in the south, and 10 points more than that in the rest of the country. salvini’s party is now the largest party in the north (with 27.3%), quite strong in the red zone (18.7%, which, curiously, is exactly the national result for the pd), and definitely relevant in the south as well (8%). these results indicate the (remarkable though partial) success of salvini’s strategy to transform the ln from an ethno-regionalist party of the north into a national radical right-wing party. paparo, challenger’s delight 72 the pd and its coalition have proven to be more resilient in the north, where they lost about 5%, compared to the red zone and the south where their losses have been twice as high. in table 3 we can observe the end of the left hegemony in red zone. we have seen above that centre-right candidates won a plurality of smds there. now we can see that, in terms of votes received, the pd comes behind the m5s in both houses for mostvoted party, and the centre-left coalition is behind the centre-right as well. table 3. electoral results in 2018, 2013 for major coalitions and parties by geopolitical area party/ coalition geopolitical area italy north red zone south 2018 % 2013 % δ % 2018 % 2013 % δ % 2018 % 2013 % δ % 2018 % 2013 % δ % c ha m b er o f d ep ut ie s ln 27.3 9.4 17.9 18.7 1.5 17.2 8.0 0.2 7.8 17.3 4.1 13.3 fi (pdl) 12.7 19.4 -6.7 10.2 17.1 -6.9 17.5 25.6 -8.1 13.9 21.6 -7.6 centre-right 44.1 31.2 12.9 33.0 21.1 11.9 31.8 30.8 1.0 37.0 29.2 7.8 m5s 23.5 23.7 -0.2 27.7 25.7 2.0 43.4 27.3 16.1 32.7 25.6 7.1 pd 19.5 24.3 -4.8 26.7 35.4 -8.7 14.2 22.0 -7.8 18.7 25.4 -6.7 centre-left 25.4 28.1 -2.7 30.6 38.9 -8.3 17.6 26.8 -9.2 22.9 29.6 -6.7 s en at e ln 27.3 9.9 17.4 18.8 1.6 17.2 8.5 0.2 8.3 17.6 4.3 13.3 fi (pdl) 13.0 19.8 -6.8 10.4 17.7 -7.3 18.3 26.4 -8.1 14.3 22.1 -7.8 centre-right 45.2 32.9 12.3 33.9 22.1 11.8 33.2 33.3 -0.1 37.5 31.0 6.5 m5s 23.9 21.8 2.1 27.7 24.2 3.5 42.8 25.2 17.6 32.2 23.6 8.6 pd 19.8 26.1 -6.3 27.3 37.6 -10.3 14.8 23.7 -8.9 19.1 27.3 -8.2 centre-left 25.2 29.6 -4.4 31.3 40.6 -9.3 18.1 28.9 -10.8 23.0 31.4 -8.4 the combination of the seat distribution for the two arenas (smd-fptp and mmdpr) generated a hung parliament in both the chamber and the senate. in both arenas, the centre-right turned out to win a plurality of seats, with a little over 40% of the total. the m5s won 36%, and the centre-left a little less than 20%. 5. beyond the results: vote shifts and socio-demographics in this final section we move beyond the electoral results, to investigate the dynamics generating them. looking merely at the electoral results in 2018 and 2013, the minimum portion of voters who have changed their vote is slightly larger than a quarter, which is quite high even for the recent turbulent times in italy (chiaramonte et al. forthcoming). however, this does not give us the whole picture of vote transitions. in order to have a more complete understanding of such phenomena, we have estimated the transition matrices in 11 large italian cities using the goodman (1953) model.8 in short, our 8 the methodological challenge to estimate these transition matrices lies in the ecological fallacy – the error of trying to infer individual-level behaviour from population-level data (robinson 1950). the classic method to overcome this fallacy was proposed by goodman (1953, 1959). goodman’s model formalizes the logic of ecological inference in a simple regression model where the relationship to be studied is a linear one. more recently, alternative techniques have been developed to overcome the ecological fallacy issue when studying non-linear relationships as well. in this article, we employ the classic goodman model in order to maintain comparability of our findings with the italian vote shift who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 73 estimates show that overall volatility is actually quite a bit larger than the one measured by the pedersen (1979) index: close to 33%. in addition to providing a more complete picture of volatility, the analysis of the electoral shifts between the 2013 and the 2018 italian general election allows us to answer several crucial research questions, such as: what are the most relevant paths for the third of voters who changed their vote? or, where do new voters of the m5s and the ln come from? in this regard, from our analyses two main phenomena emerge. there were relevant transitions of voters from the 2013 centre-left to the 2018 m5s, while in turn the 2013 m5s lost relevant portions of its 2013 voters to the 2018 ln. with reference to the ability of the m5s to increase votes from the 2013 centre-left coalition, we can see that between 20% and 30% come from voters who preferred the centre-left in 2013, especially in the central and northern cities, while the further south you go, fewer left voters in 2013 chose the m5s in 2018 (tab. 4). in the north between 15% and 20% of 2013 centre-left voters preferred the m5s in 2018 (tab. 5). conversely, in the south, the m5s was able to remobilize voters who did not participate in the 2013 elections, and to attract some votes also from the centre-right. turning to the ln, our analyses indicate that between 40% and 50% of its votes come from 2013 centre-right voters. in the central and northern cases between 30% and 40% of ln votes come from voters who chose the m5s in 2013: there, between 18% and 30% of 2013 m5s voters chose the ln in 2018. in the south this source is much less relevant, though always significant: between 15% and 20% of the (though smaller) southern ln electorate comes from 2013 m5s voters. in the north-west there are also significant shifts from 2013 centre-left voters to the ln, and these are even greater in emilia-romagna. pd votes show quite a stable pattern: around 70% voted for parties in the coalition led by bersani in 2013, 20% for monti, a little less than 10% for berlusconi. the plurality of monti’s voters voted for the pd almost everywhere, sometimes even a majority (messina), or more than 2013 centre-left voters themselves (naples). furthermore, literature (micheli 1976; schadee and corbetta 1984; corbetta, parisi and schadee 1988; mannheimer 1993, de sio and paparo 2014). it is important to stress that among the assumptions for the model to generate reliable estimates, coefficients have to be constant among the units. this means that, in all the different polling stations, transition rates are the same (corbetta and parisi 1990). this is realistic only in very homogenous areas, such as within a single municipality. this is why the analyses are conducted city by city. furthermore, with specific reference to the 2018 italian general election, we should also consider the electoral supply varied by smd. as a consequence, we performed separate analyses in each of the smds of the chamber in naples, turin, and genoa, then re-aggregated into the city the estimates reported here. cities were selected according to availability of data at the polling station level, and in order to provide a balanced mix of cities in the different geographical parts of the country. furthermore, we only present those analyses for which the vr values were overall acceptable. row and column-variables were selected according to their electoral size. estimates for too small groups are not reliable, so we unified the coalitions in 2013, as each of them only had one large party. in 2018, however, the four selected parties all had sufficient electoral size, and we could estimate separate transition towards each of them, which is particularly interesting. following schadee and corbetta (1984), in each city we eliminated electoral polls with fewer than 100 voters (in the 2013 or the 2018 general election), and those whose variation rate in the number of registered voters was above 15% (both increasing and decreasing). average vr values are 12.6, 14.4, and 13.3 in naples, turin, and genoa respectively. municipal territory for each of the remaining cities is part of a single smd, so a single matrix was estimated. values of the vr index are 12.9 in cagliari, 15.3 in venice, 14.1 in messina, 15.3 in prato, 8.8 in reggio calabria, 17.6 in padua, 16.5 in rimini, 16.4 in reggio emilia. paparo, challenger’s delight 74 coefficients from 2013 centre-right to 2018 centre-left are, with few exceptions, significant. this indicates that the strategy aimed at gaining moderate votes in the centre of the ideological spectrum has somewhat succeeded. however, in a system which has lost its bipolar configuration, this is definitely not a sufficient condition to win elections. and our data, showing the much larger losses to the m5s all over the country, and those to the ln in the historical left strongholds of the red belt and northern industrial cities, contain the answer to why this was not the case. fi received around 70% of its votes from past centre-right voters. our analyses also show fi’s ability to remobilize voters who did not turn out in 2013, and to attract some voters from the 2013 centrist coalition – although not in the south, and generally less so than the pd. table 4. electoral shifts between 2013 and 2018 general elections for the chamber of deputies in selected italian cities (sources) city party results, % on voters 2013 electorates centre-left centre centre-right m5s non-voters tu ri n pd 17.9% 67% 23% 9% 0% 0% fi 8.3% 2% 15% 66% 1% 13% ln 11.5% 9% 1% 47% 39% 4% m5s 17.2% 22% 0% 2% 69% 7% g en oa pd 14.6% 72% 20% 7% 1% 0% fi 7.1% 2% 14% 62% 1% 15% ln 11.4% 11% 5% 39% 38% 7% m5s 21.8% 20% 0% 0% 77% 3% v en ic e pd 15.0% 71% 20% 5% 0% 0% fi 6.0% 0% 29% 62% 0% 0% ln 15.8% 0% 0% 53% 37% 6% m5s 20.2% 26% 0% 3% 71% 0% p a d ua pd 17.6% 68% 28% 3% 0% 0% fi 7.4% 0% 17% 63% 0% 2% ln 16.5% 0% 0% 68% 32% 0% m5s 15.7% 30% 0% 4% 66% 0% r eg gi o e m ili a pd 21.3% 84% 11% 1% 3% 0% fi 6.5% 0% 5% 66% 7% 13% ln 10.6% 28% 4% 36% 30% 0% m5s 20.9% 28% 0% 9% 60% 4% r im in i pd 16.6% 69% 18% 13% 0% 0% fi 8.4% 7% 8% 72% 0% 13% ln 13.5% 22% 0% 37% 36% 5% m5s 23.0% 14% 0% 4% 80% 2% p ra to pd 22.0% 83% 8% 5% 3% 0% fi 8.2% 0% 12% 77% 0% 6% ln 12.5% 5% 0% 53% 38% 5% m5s 18.1% 32% 0% 0% 51% 15% who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 75 c ag lia ri pd 11.0% 70% 11% 19% 0% 0% fi 9.5% 0% 0% 84% 1% 10% ln 6.9% 0% 4% 47% 20% 18% m5s 22.3% 21% 0% 0% 63% 16% n ap le s pd 8.4% 68% 22% 7% 1% 0% fi 9.4% 1% 13% 77% 4% 4% ln 1.5% 33% 16% 30% 15% 0% m5s 31.2% 13% 0% 11% 39% 29% r eg gi o c al ab ri a pd 7.7% 78% 11% 7% 4% 0% fi 10.9% 0% 0% 61% 0% 28% ln 3.8% 2% 12% 48% 21% 17% m5s 23.3% 0% 0% 2% 60% 31% m es si na pd 9.6% 45% 41% 4% 0% 0% fi 12.1% 0% 0% 70% 1% 26% ln 3.1% 26% 0% 40% 14% 0% m5s 27.4% 0% 0% 4% 55% 42% percentages indicate the portion of row-party votes in 2018 coming from the column 2013 coalition/party electorate. table 5. electoral shifts between 2013 and 2018 general elections for the chamber of deputies in selected italian cities, (destinations) city party 2013 electorates centre-left centre centre-right m5s non-voters tu ri n pd 47% 45% 9% 0% 0% fi 1% 13% 32% 0% 4% ln 4% 1% 32% 23% 2% m5s 15% 0% 2% 61% 5% g en oa pd 41% 39% 8% 1% 0% fi 0% 14% 32% 0% 4% ln 5% 7% 33% 18% 3% m5s 17% 0% 0% 72% 2% v en ic e pd 41% 36% 4% 0% 0% fi 0% 20% 22% 0% 0% ln 0% 0% 50% 28% 4% m5s 20% 0% 4% 68% 0% p ad ua pd 46% 43% 2% 0% 0% fi 0% 11% 23% 0% 1% ln 0% 0% 56% 30% 0% m5s 18% 0% 3% 59% 0% r eg gi o e m ili a pd 49% 29% 2% 3% 0% fi 0% 4% 31% 3% 5% ln 8% 5% 27% 18% 0% m5s 15% 0% 12% 68% 4% paparo, challenger’s delight 76 r im in i pd 45% 40% 12% 0% 0% fi 2% 9% 33% 0% 5% ln 12% 0% 26% 21% 3% m5s 13% 0% 4% 79% 2% p ra to pd 59% 27% 6% 4% 0% fi 0% 14% 38% 0% 2% ln 2% 0% 39% 26% 3% m5s 18% 0% 0% 51% 12% c ag lia ri pd 35% 17% 12% 0% 0% fi 0% 0% 45% 0% 3% ln 0% 4% 18% 7% 4% m5s 21% 0% 0% 74% 12% n ap le s pd 33% 35% 3% 1% 0% fi 0% 23% 41% 2% 1% ln 3% 5% 3% 2% 0% m5s 22% 3% 20% 86% 22% r eg gi o c al ab ri a pd 38% 18% 3% 2% 0% fi 0% 0% 38% 0% 7% ln 1% 9% 10% 5% 2% m5s 0% 0% 2% 82% 18% m es si na pd 27% 64% 2% 0% 0% fi 0% 0% 46% 1% 8% ln 5% 0% 7% 3% 0% m5s 0% 0% 6% 90% 28% percentages indicate the portion of column 2013 coalition/party electorate voting for row-party in 2018. to try to understand the social dynamics behind the observed electoral transitions, we report survey data concerning vote choice by socio-demographic characteristics (tab. 6), which can tell us which social groups changed their vote. in general, the m5s has become more socially cross-cutting, by growing more in those groups where it was weaker in 2013. for instance, it is still below average among older, or low-education, or retired, or highly-religious voters, but much less than it was in 2013, having gained more than 10% in each of these groups. these are the groups providing the m5s with most of its new votes, along with women. thus, the m5s now shows very stable results, between 30% and 37% across all groups, with only public-sector employees above 40%, and older voters and retired below 30%. the gap between m5s’s results among publicand private-sector employees is the only one opening up in 2018, as in 2013 the two groups showed no difference in their favour towards the m5s. students are the only group voting in fewer numbers in 2018 for the m5s than in 2013 (-5%), while also among college graduates no increase is found. the ln has grown at least 9% among each group. particularly high increases are visible for blue-collar and self-employed workers (roughly 20%), so that it is now larger than fi among the latter, and twice as large as the pd among the former. the ln has also increased substantially among voters holding a lower-secondary diploma, and those between 50 and 64 years old. for the latter, the who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 77 strong campaign emphasis by the ln on the abolition of the pension reform gradually increasing pension age according to life expectancy might provide an explanation. the pd has lost everywhere, but particularly so among its traditional sociodemographic strongholds, both those already unsteady in recent elections (such as blue collars or unemployed), and those still standing in 2013 (such as retired, or older, or public-sector, or less religious voters). on the contrary it was basically stable among managers, entrepreneurs, and lost little among the self-employed and highly religious voters. as a consequence, the pd is now the most-voted party only among the oldest class of voters, and those who are retired; it no longer shows any increase among public-sector employees compared to private-sector ones, and it is significantly stronger among the most religious voters. this data seems to indicate that the adversarial stance adopted by renzi in pushing certain reforms (for the job market or public education) might have had a significant electoral cost for the party among the social groups traditionally closest to it. fi has definitively lost its prevalence among housewives, by losing more than 13%, almost half of its votes. it is now basically voted by housewives to the same extent as the pd, and much less than the ln. fi has halved its votes from private-sector employees, blue-collar workers, and the least-educated voters. it is the most-voted party of the centre-right only among managers, or particularly religious voters, as well as among inactive sectors, such as retired (and oldest), and the unemployed. 6. conclusion: the success of challengers in a dealigning political landscape the results of the 2018 italian general election we have discussed in this article saw the unprecedented success of challenger parties. the m5s and the ln combined received the majority of the votes, while the two principal mainstream parties, the cores of the two coalitions dominating the bipolar politics of italy since 2013, amounted to less than a third of the votes, actually less than the m5s alone. to recap, the m5s was the first successful debutant in western europe to gain in its second election (+7%). the electoral growth of the m5s was concentrated in the south (+16%), where it won virtually all smds in both houses (over 80%), thus overcoming the potential underrepresentation issue posed by the new electoral law. the centre-right coalition was the most-voted one, with 37% of the votes, and an even larger increase from 2013 than the m5s (+8%). their candidates won more than 85% of smds in the north, and a plurality of those in the red zone. overall, the four centre-right parties won over 40% of the parliamentary seats, but not enough to form a government. fi lost between 7 and 8% with no relevant geographical variations, while the ln gained 13% nationwide (thus becoming the largest centre-right party). the ln has grown much less in the south (+8%) than in the rest of the country (+18%). as a consequence, the centre-right was stable in the south and gained more than 10% elsewhere. the centre-left coalition was the clear loser of the election. it lost almost 7% compared to 2013, won only a tiny minority of smds (in the red zone and nonsouthern metropolitan areas), and was outdistanced by the other two poles. paparo, challenger’s delight 78 table 6. electoral results by socio-demographic characteristics, 2018 and 2013 pd fi ln m5s 2018 2013 δ% 2018 2013 δ% 2018 2013 δ% 2018 2013 δ% whole sample 18.8 25.5 -6.7 14.0 21.6 -7.6 17.4 4.1 13.3 32.9 25.5 7.4 gender male 18.9 25 -6,1 13.8 20 -6,2 17.1 4 13,1 32.8 29 3,8 female 18.7 26 -7,3 14.1 24 -9,9 17.6 5 12,6 32.9 22 10,9 age class 18-34 15.3 19.7 -4.4 12.4 20.9 -8.5 17.8 4.6 13.2 35.3 31.4 3.9 35-49 15.9 20.4 -4.5 13.9 19.4 -5.5 17.6 4 13.6 35.4 33.2 2.2 50-64 16.5 27.8 -11.3 13.0 21.2 -8.2 19.7 3.4 16.3 34.0 24.6 9.4 65 or more 27.3 37 -9.7 16.1 27 -10.9 14.6 4 10.6 27.1 10 17.1 education level elementary-school diploma 25.2 29 -3.8 12.9 27 -14.1 17.6 8 9.6 30.0 14 16.0 lower-secondary diploma 15.9 23 -7.1 15.2 23 -7.8 22.4 4 18.4 33.3 18 15.3 high-school diploma 16.1 25 -8.9 14.3 18 -3.7 14.3 2 12.3 36.1 31 5.1 university degree 21.8 27 -5.2 12.1 15 -2.9 11.3 2 9.3 29.3 29 0.3 profession entrepreneurs, managers 22.5 23 -0.5 13.4 17 -3.6 12.9 3 9.9 31.2 25 6.2 self-employed 11.7 15 -3.3 17.6 20 -2.4 23.6 3 20.6 31.8 29 2.8 teachers, clerks 18.9 25 -6.1 8.6 15 -6.4 14.5 5 9.5 36.1 31 5.1 blue-collar workers 11.3 20 -8.7 12.5 24 -11.5 23.8 5 18.8 37.0 29 8.0 unemployed 10.3 18 -7.7 20.4 25 -4.6 18.2 4 14.2 37.2 33 4.2 students 17.1 23 -5.9 11.7 11 0.7 15.0 1 14.0 32.3 37 -4.7 housewives 15.4 22 -6.6 15.7 29 -13.3 19.8 5 14.8 36.1 21 15.1 retired 27.6 37 -9.4 16.1 25 -8.9 14.6 4 10.6 26.4 11 15.4 employment sector public-sector employees 17 29 -12.0 8.7 14 -5.3 12.8 4 8.8 41.6 31 10.6 private-sector employees 17.6 21 -3.4 10.5 20 -9.5 18.7 5 13.7 34 30 4.0 church attendance never 19.8 28 -8.2 10.8 17 -6.2 15.9 2 13.9 33.7 32 1.7 seldom 16.4 27 -10.6 13.3 22 -8.7 19.3 4 15.3 34.9 26 8.9 monthly 13.9 21 -7.1 17.9 25 -7.1 19.5 4 15.5 31.4 26 5.4 weekly 22.4 25 -2.6 16.2 23 -6.8 15.7 6 9.7 30.9 19 11.9 source: ipsos public affairs. digits indicate the percentages of the socio-demographic row category intending to vote for the party in the column. data were collected from 29 january to 2 march on 16,626 respondents (out of 75,609 contacts) for 2018, and 11,026 respondents (out of 107,229 contacts) in 2013. samples are representative of the italian voting-age population for gender, age, education, occupational status, region and demographic class of municipality. respondents were interviewed using a mixed methodology including computer-assisted web interviewing (cawi), computer-assisted telephone interviewing (cati), and computer-assisted mobile interviewing (cami). the margin of error for a same-n probabilistic sample with reference to a population as large as the italian voting-age population would be between +/0.2% e +/2.8%. samples were weighted according to the actual electoral results. who’s the winner? an analysis of the 2018 italian general election 79 these are just the highlights of the electoral results. in this article, however, we have also discussed additional features of what happened. for instance, we have underlined some elements potentially indicating a stabilization of the italian party system, such as the homogenization of turnout among different geographical areas (participation is still lower in the south, but less so than in 2013), and of electoral results between chamber and senate (indicating that, contrary to what happened in 2013, 18-24-year-old voters voted like the rest of the electorate). nevertheless, we have also observed quite numerous elements indicating that a new stable pattern does not appear to have been achieved yet. for instance, volatility has remained quite high, marking, for the first time, two consecutive elections in italian history. the minimum portion of voters who changed their vote is 26.7%, but it is in fact quite a bit larger than that. in particular, our analyses of vote shift have repeatedly shown relevant transitions across various italian cities from the 2013 centre-left to the 2018 m5s, and from the 2013 m5s to the 2018 ln. furthermore, looking at the social characteristics of the electorate of the main parties, we have witnessed the erosion of traditional alignments between social groups and political parties. the pd lost blue-collars a long time ago (corbetta and ceccarini 2010) but is now not even the favourite of public-sector employees (42% of which voted for the m5s). fi was defeated by the ln (in addition to the m5s) among housewives, and it was below average and only the fourth party among uneducated voters. the political landscape emerging after the 2018 elections is completely unprecedented. bipolarism, at least the one we had known for the past 25 years, is definitely over. the consolidation of the m5s in the south has brought the end of competitiveness in an area that has been pivotal until now for winning elections, and at the same time we observe the rise in competitiveness of the red zone, where the centre-left is not only no longer hegemonic but is actually not winning. this is now the only competitive part of the country. overall, these pieces of evidence seem to indicate that the italian party system might being experiencing a dealignment process (dalton et al. 1984). in this volatile, unstable context, it is very hard to determine what the future might hold. in particular, the formation of the conte cabinet, supported by m5s and ln, and its political activity will have a crucial role in shaping future developments. for instance, we have seen that most of the new m5s voters come from a previous centre-left political background. it would not be surprising if they were to abandon the m5s in consequence of this national alliance. for the ln there are risks as well. although many of its voters voted for the m5s in 2013, most come from the berlusconian centre-right. thus, governing with the m5s might be costly unless policies desired by centre-right voters are enacted. references ceccarini, l. and bordignon, f. 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(eds) terremoto elettorale. le elezioni politiche del 2013, bologna, il mulino, pp. 75–96. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_7.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 * the authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable advice and comments on previous versions of this article. © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 104-114 contact author: federico toth, university of bologna. e-mail address: federico.toth@unibo.it the yellow-green government and the thorny issue of routine childhood vaccination mattia casula ca’ foscari university, venice federico toth university of bologna abstract during recent years, routine childhood vaccination has become a divisive and politically salient topic in italy. during the spring of 2017, for example, the lorenzin decree (no. 73 of 2017), which contained urgent provisions on vaccination prevention, divided public opinion and national political forces. in particular, both the league and the five star movement immediately opposed the introduction of ten mandatory vaccinations. moreover, the routine child immunization topic was once again at the centre of the political debate during the summer of 2018. the aim of this article is to present the contours of the problem relating to childhood vaccinations in italy, and to reconstruct the current debate on mandatory vaccinations. it is not yet clear how the newly elected yellow-green government intends to tackle the problem: in the conclusions we will try to formulate some hypotheses. introduction n the last few years, routine childhood vaccination has become a divisive and politically salient topic in italy. during the spring of 2017, the lorenzin decree (decree law no. 73), which increased the number of compulsory vaccinations, divided public opinion and political parties. opposing the lorenzin decree were, above all, the league and the five star movement, the two parties currently in government. when the conte government took office in june 2018, the issue of childhood vaccination returned to the centre of the debate. both the coalition partners are in favour of modifying the lorenzin decree, but they do not seem to agree on the strategy to follow. the league has always opposed the vaccination obligation and believes that information and persuasion strategy should be preferred over the use of obligations and sanctions: parents must be free to decide what is best for their children. in relation to vaccines, the five star movement has so far assumed an ambivalent position. especially before the 2018 elections, several exponents of the five star movement showed scepticism towards vaccinations, expressing opinions very similar to those of the ‘no-vax’ movement. after the elections, some leaders of the movement instead issued more cautious statements: the five star movement declares itself in favour of childhood vaccination, but believes that the provisions contained in the lorenzin decree should be made more flexible and should differentiate from region to region. i ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 105 the aim of this article is to trace the contours of the problem related to childhood vaccination in italy, and to describe the current debate on mandatory vaccinations. it is not yet clear how the newly elected yellow-green government intends to tackle the problem. we will try in the conclusions to formulate some hypotheses about it. 1. the problem: an overview of childhood vaccination coverage in italy childhood vaccinations are considered among the most effective, and cost-effective, public health interventions to prevent infectious diseases [ehreth 2003; bloom et al. 2005; andre et al. 2008; doherty et al. 2016]. according to the world health organization, routine childhood vaccinations make it possible to avoid between 2 and 3 million deaths in the world every year due to diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis and measles [who 2017]. nonetheless, over the past few years in italy a substantial decrease in immunization coverage has been recorded [who 2017; epicentro 2018; ministry of health 2018]. the decreasing trend in immunization coverage is fuelled by the belief that vaccines are not effective and might instead cause serious adverse effects [montanari vergallo et al. 2018]. the decrease in vaccination coverage is a concern not only for non-immunized individuals, but also for society as a whole. as a matter of fact, so-called herd immunity is reached only when a high percentage of the population is immune to a given infectious disease. once herd immunity is achieved, a given pathogen cannot spread further [fox et al. 1971; anderson and may 1985; fine 1993; john and samuel 2000; fine et al. 2011]. herd immunity is therefore a form of indirect protection against infectious diseases, since it also preserves the few individuals who have not been immunized [fine 1993; john and samuel 2000; doherty et al. 2016]. world health organization recommendations [who 2013, 2014] indicate that herd immunity of some infectious diseases is reached when the vaccination coverage achieves 95% of each birth cohort. this is, for example, the case of measles. despite the recommendations of the world health organization, in the last few years vaccination coverage in italy has not reached the recommended 95% threshold. for example, in 2016, coverage of the so-called ‘hexavalent vaccines’ ‒ i.e., anti-polio, antidiphtheria, anti-tetanus, anti-pertussis, anti-hepatitis b, and anti-type b haemophilus influenzae ‒ stood at around 93.4% as national average [ministry of health 2018]. vaccination coverage, however, was not uniform all over the country: while some regions exceeded the 95% threshold, others were far below it [montanari vergallo et al. 2018]. the vaccination coverage for measles, mumps and rubella was much lower: as a national average, in 2016, coverage was around 87%, and no italian region reached the recommended threshold of 95%. moreover, the anti-chickenpox (varicella) coverage rate was around 46% as a national average. the data just reported are the consequence of a decrease in childhood vaccination coverage in italy over the last decade or so. while the coverage rates for vaccinations included in the hexavalent vaccines were around 96.5% in 2006, from 2008 onwards the coverage rates have been decreasing. while measles, mumps and rubella vaccinations exceeded 90.5% of coverage in 2010, they were around 87% in 2016. casula and toth, the yellow-green government and the thorny issue of routine childhood vaccination 106 finally, measles epidemics are a particular cause for concern. in fact, in the year 2017, the recorded cases of measles in the eu/eea area were just under 14,500, of which more than a third were in italy. there were 82 cases of measles per million inhabitants in italy, compared to a european average equal to 28 cases per million [ecdc 2018]. in proportion to the population, only romania and greece report more cases of measles than italy. 2. the lorenzin decree law of june 2017 in may 2017, on the impulse of the italian minister of health, beatrice lorenzin, the gentiloni government approved a decree law containing ‘urgent provisions on vaccination prevention’. with the general aim of reversing the decline in immunization coverage, the lorenzin decree (decree law no. 73) increased the number of mandatory vaccinations for children. the decree law was passed by the council of ministers on 19 may, and it was then signed by the president of the republic on 7 june. the innovations introduced by the lorenzin decree are described below. compulsory vaccinations. until decree law no. 73 came into effect, there were four mandatory vaccinations (against poliomyelitis, tetanus, diphtheria, and hepatitis b). by virtue of the lorenzin decree the number of mandatory vaccinations was increased from four to twelve. the eight additional vaccinations were those against pertussis, haemophilus influenzae type b (hib), measles, rubella, mumps, chickenpox (varicella), meningococcus b and meningococcus c. most of these were previously considered as merely ‘recommended’ by italian legislation. these twelve vaccinations would have been compulsorily administered to all children born from 2017 onwards and would have become a mandatory requirement to access nursery schools and kindergartens. economic penalties. in addition to the exclusion of children from pre-school educational services, the violation of the vaccination mandate would have also involved the application of pecuniary sanctions to be paid by defaulting parents. the economic penalties could have varied from a minimum of 500 euros up to a maximum of 7,500 euros. exemptions. the lorenzin decree envisaged that two categories of children would be exempt from the vaccination obligation: 1) those already immunized as a result of natural illness (such as children who have already contracted the disease); and 2) those who are in specific clinical conditions that represent a contraindication to vaccinations (such as, immunocompromised children). both exemptions should be attested by the family doctor. public communication campaigns. the decree law attributed to the ministry of health the task of promoting initiatives of public communication to spread the culture of vaccination among the population. in particular, the ministry of health had to agree with the ministry of education on some awareness-raising initiatives for pupils and teaching staff in schools. for these initiatives, 200,000 euros were allocated for the year 2017. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 107 3. the conversion law (and the main differences with the decree law) in italy, decree laws expire within sixty days unless converted into law by parliament. as a consequence, the lorenzin decree should have obtained the approval of both the chamber of deputies and the senate by 6 august 2017. during the examination of the conversion law in the senate, several amendments to the original text of the decree law were approved within the ‘hygiene and health’ committee. the conversion law containing these amendments was voted on 20 july 2017. the votes in favour were 171, while those against were 63, with 19 abstainers. the democratic party, alternativa popolare and the group for autonomy voted in favour of the conversion law, as well as most of the senators of forza italia, ala-scelta civica, and art.1-mdp. on the contrary, the league and the five star movement voted against it. after senate approval, the bill passed to the chamber of deputies. to prevent the expiration of the lorenzin decree 60 days after its approval, no further changes were made to the text, and the government opted for a vote of confidence. on 28 july, the same draft previously passed by the senate was approved by the chamber as well. the votes in favour were 292, while those against were 92, with 15 abstainers. as in the case of the senate vote, while the democratic party, alternativa popolare, ala-scelta civica and the majority of the deputies of forza italia and art.1-mdp voted in favour of the conversion law, the five star movement and the league voted against. sinistra italiana and fratelli d'italia abstained. 3.1 differences between the conversion law and the original text of the lorenzin decree as already mentioned, in the course of the examination in the senate committee, the original draft of the lorenzin decree underwent some substantial changes. the main differences between the two texts are as follows. compulsory vaccinations: 6+4. the mandatory vaccinations would no longer be twelve as required by the decree law but ten, namely: anti-polio, anti-diphtheria, antitetanus, anti-hepatitis b, anti-pertussis, anti-haemophilus influenzae b, in addition to vaccinations against measles, rubella, mumps and varicella. the compulsoriness of the last four is, however, to be reviewed every three years, based on data on vaccination coverage and any reported adverse reactions. moreover, the conversion law made explicit that the compulsory vaccines also applied to unaccompanied foreign minors. four ‘recommended’ vaccinations. in addition to the ten mandatory vaccinations, four vaccines are considered ‘recommended’. this means that the public health service will offer them free of charge, but without any obligation. the recommended vaccinations are now anti-meningococcal b, anti-meningococcal c, anti-pneumococcal, and anti-rotavirus. sanctions. the conversion law confirmed that compulsory vaccinations constitute a requirement to access kindergartens and nursery schools, but not for other degrees of education (such as primary and secondary school). the economic penalties which can be levied in case of failure to comply with the mandate were significantly reduced: by casula and toth, the yellow-green government and the thorny issue of routine childhood vaccination 108 virtue of the conversion law, the minimum penalty is now 200 euros, while the maximum fine is 500 euros (instead of 7,500). exemptions. as far as the exemptions are concerned, the conversion law confirms what was already stated by the decree law, namely that the following categories are exempted from the obligation: 1) children affected by health problems for which vaccination is contraindicated; and 2) children already immunized as a result of natural illness. tasks assigned to aifa. the conversion law attributes to aifa (the italian medicines agency) some tasks that were not mentioned in the previous decree law. first, aifa is required to prepare an annual report – to be submitted to the ministry of health and then to the chambers – on the outcomes of the vaccination programmes and on the impact of adverse reactions to vaccines. aifa is also responsible for negotiating the prices of vaccines with pharmaceutical companies. compensation for vaccine damage. the conversion law includes some provisions, which did not appear in the decree law, regarding compensation for damage caused by vaccines. approximately one and a half million euros are allocated for the years 2017 and 2018 to meet any compensation claims. national vaccine registry. a final provision included in the conversion law is the establishment of a national vaccine registry within the ministry of health, with the aim of monitoring the implementation of the vaccination programmes. this would be a national computerized tracking system through which all vaccinated children are registered, as well as those not yet vaccinated, the doses and timing of vaccine administration, and any undesired effects recorded. for the realization of this national vaccine registry, 300,000 euros are made available (for the year 2018). 4. the parliamentary debate: favourable, sceptical and contrary parties to the lorenzin decree the main parties represented in the italian parliament were divided between those that supported the conversion law, and those that never shared its basic approach and voted against it. in addition, it is possible to identify a third group of parties who voted in favour of the conversion law, despite having shown scepticism towards the approach inspiring the lorenzin decree. the democratic party, alternativa popolare and ala-scelta civica were in favour of the introduction of the vaccination obligation. they immediately promoted public campaigns to raise awareness about the safety of vaccines and also the usefulness of herd immunity. even though they share the approach of the lorenzin decree, these parties positively welcomed the changes introduced during the senate discussion, considering the amendments the result of a constructive parliamentary debate. on the contrary, the five star movement and the league are the main parties that had been opposed to the use of coercive measures since the presentation of the lorenzin decree. in their opinion, the strategy to follow must rely on information and persuasion, not on obligation and sanctions. they thus required a ministerial information campaign to inform parents about the benefits and potential side effects of childhood vaccinations. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 109 in this way, families would be given freedom of choice in deciding about the vaccination of their children. finally, forza italia, fratelli d’italia and art.1-mdp can be included in a third group of parties which, though initially sceptical towards the lorenzin decree, finally voted in favour of the conversion law. they recognized that the parliamentary debate led to the introduction of relevant amendments that greatly improved the bill. in addition, they were aware that a rejection of the conversion law would have given their electorate the impression of being against vaccines. 5. the league’s position on vaccination the league's position on the issue of routine childhood vaccination has remained unchanged since the presentation of the lorenzin decree. during the parliamentary debate, the league expressed opposition to the decree, accusing it of violating article 32 of the italian constitution, as it infringes on the freedom of care of minors. for this reason, the league’s parliamentarians voted against the conversion law. in particular, they declared themselves to be against the sanctions foreseen by the decree in the case of non-compliance with the vaccination obligation. the national leaders of the league have repeatedly stated that they are supporters of the strategy adopted in veneto. the latter is one of the two italian regions (the other is lombardy) currently governed by a league politician. the veneto region, in accordance with regional law no. 7/2007, has abolished any form of vaccination mandate. this means that from 2007 to the approval of the lorenzin decree, four vaccinations (anti-polio, anti-diphtheria, anti-tetanus and antihepatitis b) were mandatory in most italian regions, but not in veneto. the advantages of the veneto model have been repeatedly underlined by the president of this region, luca zaia (one of the most influential leaders of the league): ‘veneto is not against vaccines, but we are convinced that obligation is counterproductive, and leads to increased scepticism towards vaccines. veneto is the only italian region that does not provide mandatory vaccinations. we prefer to convince parents, leaving them free to choose. this is the strategy adopted in other 15 european countries, including germany, spain, the united kingdom and many northern european countries’ (interview with il sole 24 ore, 6 july 2017). in luca zaia’s opinion, the veneto region model, based on the removal of the vaccination mandate and the elimination of any sanctions, should be extended to the entire nation. this position continues to be supported by league members, as stated on different occasions by its leader, matteo salvini. the latter has publicly said that ten vaccines are ‘too many’ and that the choice over whether or not to vaccinate children should be left to parents. ‘like many doctors, i believe that it is better to educate to vaccines than to oblige’, said salvini during an interview with the economic newspaper il sole 24 ore (june 22, 2018). ‘i vaccinated my children. some vaccines save lives, but ten vaccines for some children are useless and even dangerous. i'm not anti-vaccination, but there are so many documented adverse reactions to vaccines. no child should be excluded from school or kindergarten’. casula and toth, the yellow-green government and the thorny issue of routine childhood vaccination 110 the league’s position against the vaccination obligation was revealed by a tweet released by matteo salvini on january 2018, in the middle of the election campaign. salvini wrote: ‘we will delete lorenzin rules. vaccines yes, obligation no’. this tweet generated strong friction with forza italia and its leader silvio berlusconi, who expressed his total opposition to the opinion expressed by his coalition ally. this explains the decision not to include any reference to the issue of vaccines within the centreright coalition’s electoral programme for the march 2018 general elections (the league did not present its own separate electoral programme, but a unique coalition programme, together with forza italia and fratelli d’italia). 6. the five star movement and its ambivalence about vaccination similarly to the league, the five star movement has also maintained a position against the lorenzin decree. the parliamentarians of the five star movement declared themselves against the sanctions envisaged by the lorenzin decree and by the respective conversion law. to better understand the position of the five star movement in relation to vaccinations, it is worth making a brief reference to the ‘no-vax’ movement. the no-vax movement. for some years now, the movement in italy against vaccination has become increasingly important. the so-called ‘no-vax’ movement initially developed on the internet and on social networks, but later also organized public meetings, events, and supported the publication of some books against vaccines and vaccination obligations. as the no-vax movement has no recognized leader and has fed on the web, it does not have a univocal and official position on the issue of vaccines. different opinions and arguments coexist within the movement. in general, no-vax supporters believe that vaccines are potentially dangerous, and therefore childhood immunization should not be mandatory. some believe there is a link between immunization and serious diseases, such as autism. others believe that vaccines are part of a conspiracy orchestrated by pharmaceutical companies, and that the strategy of vaccination obligation is actually dictated by economic interests. most believe that the state should not interfere with the freedom of individuals, and that the choice to vaccinate children belongs to their parents. according to some commentators, two factions can be distinguished within the movement: on the one hand are those who are properly ‘novax’ (vaccinations are harmful and must therefore be avoided); on the other hand are those who are simply ‘free-vax’ (vaccines are not dangerous, but they do not have to be mandatory). the five star movement is the party that appears to be closer to the anti-vaccination movement, but it is not clear whether the movement belongs to the ‘no-vax’ faction or to the ‘free-vax’ one. the five stars seem to deliberately maintain an ambiguous position. the official position of the five star movement towards the thorny issue of childhood vaccination was recently made explicit by the leader of the movement, luigi di ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 111 maio. he stated that the five star movement is not against immunization, but rather the introduction of a vaccination mandate: ‘i want to silence some unhealthy ideas about vaccines. since i have been the political leader of the movement, we have never been against it, we want it to be done. what we are not in favour of is linking obligation to school attendance, instead of introducing it when there is a risk of epidemics’ (corriere della sera, august 13, 2018). this clarification must be interpreted as di maio’s willingness to respond to the accusations directed at the movement of supporting and sharing the positions of antivaccination activists. in may 2017, an article published in the new york times accused the five star movement of promoting an online anti-vaccine campaign, raising the fear of a link between vaccines and autism. beppe grillo, the founder of the five star movement, responded to this attack by accusing the nyt of ‘fake news’, and claiming that ‘there is no campaign promoted by the five star movement against vaccines’. later, the movement published on its blog a statement in which the official position of the movement on the subject of vaccinations was made explicit. the five star movement declares itself in favour of vaccinations, and to make vaccines mandatory just in the case of a genuine epidemic emergency. moreover, the movement is in favour of the creation of a national vaccine registry, through which immunization coverage would be monitored in real time at both national and regional level. despite official denials, the impression is that both during the 2018 election campaign and in the early months of the yellow-green government some members of the five star movement have expressed opinions very similar to those of anti-vaccination activists. the five star movement seems deliberately ambiguous with regard to vaccinations: on the one hand, it reassures public opinion with moderate official statements (in favour of immunization), on the other hand it winks at anti-vaccination activists. 7. health minister giulia grillo and the ‘flexible obligation’ with the establishment of the new yellow-green government led by giuseppe conte, giulia grillo, previously the five star movement whip in the chamber of deputies, was appointed as minister of health. it is not easy to understand whether the league and the five star movement have a shared position on routine vaccinations. regarding this issue, the ‘government contract’ is rather ambiguous. as stated in the ‘contract for the government of change’ signed by matteo salvini and luigi di maio: ‘with the aim of protecting individual and collective health, guaranteeing the necessary vaccination coverage, the issue of the right balance between the right to education and the right to health will be addressed, protecting pre-school and school children who may be at risk of social exclusion’. it is not clear what this means in practice. in recently released interviews, the new health minister giulia grillo advocates the introduction of a ‘flexible obligation’, which should result in differentiated measures according to the rate of vaccination coverage registered at regional level. casula and toth, the yellow-green government and the thorny issue of routine childhood vaccination 112 as emphasized by the minister herself: ‘there are regions which reach 97% of immunization coverage, and other regions with just 87%. hence the need for a flexible obligation, the most rational thing to do’ (interview with the la7 tv channel). while waiting for the proposal for the ‘flexible obligation’ to materialize in a bill, so far the new yellow-green government has not approved any substantial changes to the lorenzin decree. a recent ministerial circular (july 2018) envisages the extension of self-certification for the 2018-2019 school year (the possibility of self-certificating vaccinations was already envisaged by the lorenzin decree, but only for the 2017-18 school year). 8. conclusions: what will the yellow-green coalition government do about vaccines? on the basis of what has been illustrated in the previous sections, it is natural to ask what measures the newly elected yellow-green government will adopt on the subject of infant vaccinations. at present, it is legitimate to hypothesize four alternative scenarios. first option: to leave the situation as it is, without modifying the lorenzin decree. the issue of vaccines, as we said, is politically delicate and divisive. one can assume that the majority of italians are in favour of infant vaccinations: this emerges from some recent surveys [observa 2017; giambi et al. 2018] and it is shown by the fact that, even before the lorenzin decree, the vast majority of italian children received vaccines that were just ‘recommended’ (but not mandatory). abolishing the lorenzin decree could then turn out to be a boomerang: to pursue a no-vax minority, the yellow-green government could displease the majority of voters. second option: to introduce the principle of ‘flexible obligation’. it is not yet completely clear what the minister giulia grillo intends with this expression. the logic should, however, be the following: the obligation to vaccinate children is introduced only when the immunization coverage (for a given disease) falls below a certain threshold of alarm (that of herd immunization). as soon as the coverage threshold is reached, the vaccination obligation can be removed. the decisions regarding the introduction or elimination of the vaccination mandate would be taken on the basis of the national vaccine registry data, which should allow the monitoring, in real time, of immunization coverage all over the country. the ‘flexible obligation’ principle should also include the possibility of adopting differentiated measures depending on the region. third option: return to the situation prior to the lorenzin decree, repealing the latter. the situation before the decree provided for only four mandatory vaccinations (and not ten), without the sanction of the exclusion of unvaccinated children from kindergartens. given the high number of cases of measles recently registered in italy, some speculate that in this third option the mandatory vaccines could become five, including that against measles. fourth option: extend to the whole country the model adopted since 2007 by the veneto region. this would mean approving a new law that transforms the ten currently mandatory vaccinations into ‘recommended’ (and therefore voluntary) ones. it’s not easy at this stage to predict which of the four options will eventually be adopted by the yellow-green government. the decision could depend on the balance of power within the conte government. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 113 matteo salvini and the league seem to favour the fourth option, but maybe also the third one. the five star movement, on the subject of vaccination, may not share a common position. one faction (presumably a minority) of the movement seems close to ‘no-vax’ positions and considers vaccines dangerous: this faction is in favour of the fourth option (no mandatory vaccination). the majority of the five star movement – among them the leader di maio and the minister grillo – have more moderate positions: they declare themselves in favour of vaccinations, and they seem to support the second option, that of ‘flexible obligation’. if the authors of this article had to bet a euro on one of the four options, we would perhaps bet on the first solution (to do nothing). in recent polls, both the five star movement and the league have seen their popularity grow: intervening on a sensitive issue such as that of vaccines could prove to be an own goal, which could lead both coalition partners to lose consensus. why would they risk that? references anderson r.m., may r.m. 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(2018), parental vaccine hesitancy in italy. results from a national survey, in vaccine, 36 (6), pp. 779-787. ecdc (2018), monthly measles and rubella monitoring report, stoccolma, european centre for disease prevention and control. epicentro (2018), le vaccinazioni in italia, roma, istituto superiore di sanità centro nazionale per la prevenzione delle malattie e la promozione della salute. http://www.epicentro.iss.it/temi/vaccinazioni/dati_ita.asp ehreth j. (2003), the global value of vaccination, in vaccine, 21(7-8): 596-600. fine p. (1993), herd immunity: history, theory, practice, in epidemiologic reviews, 15 (2), pp. 265-302. fine p., eames k., heymann d.l (2011), ‘herd immunity’: a rough guide, in clinical infectious diseases, 52 (7), pp. 911-916. fox j.p., elveback l., scott w., gatewood l., ackerman e. (1971), herd immunity: basic concept and relevance to public health immunization practices, in american journal of epidemiology, 94 (3), pp. 179-189. john t.j., samuel r. (2000), herd immunity and herd effect: new insights and definitions, in european journal of epidemiology, 16 (7), pp. 601-606. ministero della salute (2018), vaccinazioni dell’età pediatrica e dell’adolescente, roma, ministero della salute – direzione generale prevenzione sanitaria. casula and toth, the yellow-green government and the thorny issue of routine childhood vaccination 114 http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/documentazione/p6_2_8_3_1.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=20 montanari vergallo g., zaami s., cocchiara r.a., la torre g., marinelli e. (2018), the reform of the italian legislation on childhood immunization, in epidemiology biostatistics and public health, 15 (1). observa (2017), osservatorio scienza tecnologia e società, vicenza, observa science in society. who (2013), the guide to tailoring immunization programmes, copenhagen, world health organizationregional office for europe. who (2014), european vaccine action plan 2015-2020, copenhagen, world health organizationregional office for europe. who (2017), assessment report of the global vaccine action plan, ginevra, world health organization. . microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_4.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 * this work has been supported by the portuguese national funds through the fundação para a ciência e a tecnologia (fct) within the project if/00926/2015. © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 64-77 contact author: elisabetta de giorgi, fcsh-nova university of lisbon. e-mail address: elisabettadegiorgi@gmail.com standing apart together? analysing lega (nord) and movimento 5 stelle as new challenger parties in parliament elisabetta de giorgi antónio dias fcsh-nova university of lisbon abstract following the 2018 election and a long phase of negotiations, lega and the five star movement (fsm) appointed the first cabinet in western europe that does not include any mainstream party family. the ‘elective affinities’ between the electorates of these two challenger parties had been quite evident for some time, but in the present work we argue that there are further traits that the two parties had shared well before 2018 that could help to further prove their proximity. we propose a new dimension of analysis that should be taken into consideration when studying (new) challenger parties: their relationship vis-à-vis the other opposition parties. we would expect them to enter parliament for the first time with both the goals usually related to the two different opposition status (temporary vs. permanent) in mind: leaving the opposition and exploiting the opposition. furthermore, we would expect them to stand apart from the other parties, no matter whether the latter are in government or in opposition. this is, in fact, one of the main reasons for their electoral success and, in the end, their essence. we will test these expectations by employing social network analysis methods and analysing and comparing the cooperation attitudes of the lega and fsm with the other opposition parties, using as an indicator the amount of legislative co-sponsorship during their first term in parliament (respectively 1992-1994 and 2013-2018) and the amount passed together while in opposition (2013-2018). introduction he political landscape across europe has changed remarkably in recent years. the most visible change has been the fall of mainstream parties and the rise of challenger parties in several european countries. examples of such an escalation in the aftermath of the crisis are many and include both the success of new challenger parties and the rise in support for older radical (right-wing) parties (hobolt and tilley 2016). within the category of challenger parties, in fact, we find very different actors, some of them whom were already present on the european scene before the eurozone crisis, others appearing only afterwards. italy is a good example of such a transformation of the party and parliamentary landscapes, as it has recently witnessed both the success of a new strong challenger party and the rise in support of an old one. the 2013 election saw the fall of both the centre left and the centre right mainstream parties and, simultaneously, the emergence of the new five star movement (m5s). in 2018 the tripolar competition resulting from that election t ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 65 was consolidated (de giorgi 2018), but with the balance of power among the three political poles radically changed. the two main challenger parties – the m5s and the lega1 – achieved the majority of votes and no government was possible without the support of at least one of the two (chiaramonte et al. 2018). after a long phase of negotiations, the two parties were able to appoint the first cabinet in western europe that does not include any mainstream party family (paparo 2018). what do these two new government partners have in common? despite their apparent programme differences, the ‘elective affinities’ between the electorates of these two challenger parties had been evident for some time,2 above all as regards their common anti-system profile based on a distrust of both national and european institutions (franchino and negri 2018). but the two parties also share the capacity to transform widespread feelings of insecurity and discomfort in different fields – economic, cultural, etc. but all attributable to the effects of globalisation – into consensus (bordignon and ceccarini 2017). furthermore, starting from a green, libertarian platform, the m5s ‘has gradually evolved, incorporating issues such as anti-taxation and euroscepticism that could also attract right-wing voters, while remaining rather elusive on the crucial issue of immigration’ (mosca and tronconi 2017, p.1). the movement’s turn to the right was, in a sense, preceded also by its agreement with the uk independence party (ukip) in the european parliament in 2014, although, at the same time, it ‘has maintained typical leftist positions on the issue of guaranteed minimum income, as well as continuing to hold its environmentalist stance’ (ibid., p.1). so, despite a further shift to the right of the lega and its voters in recent years (passarelli 2013), the ambiguous and contradictory ideological positioning of the m5s (bordignon and ceccarini 2013; mosca 2014; manucci and amsler 2017) together with its electorate’s preferences in terms of party alliances3, has favoured the achievement of an agreement between the two parties built on common or negotiated policy goals. besides these considerations, and the political opportunity that clearly neither party wanted to miss, we argue that further traits have been shared by the two actors since well before 2018 that could help further prove their proximity. these traits are related to the strategy adopted by the two parties once in parliament and are ascribable to their (initial) nature as challenger parties. although in different periods, in fact, both the lega and the m5s entered the italian parliament as new challenger parties. the political and economic crisis of the late 1980s/early 1990s saw the rise of the lega nord, while the political and economic crisis beginning in 2008 facilitated the success of the five star movement. we propose a new dimension of analysis that should be taken into consideration when studying this type of party, i.e. their relationship vis-à-vis other opposition actors. how do they behave once the representation threshold has been crossed? do they tend to remain isolated or do they start some kind of socialisation process, meaning increased collaboration with some of the other opposition forces? we assume that, albeit in very different political periods, the two parties, on entering parliament, adopted a 1 running for the first time without the word nord (north) in its symbol, with the aim of expanding its electoral support. 2 see, among others, the results of the polls administered by demos & pi in 2016 (http://www.demos.it/a01374.php) and 2017 (http://www.demos.it/a01396.php). 3 see also the results of the polls administered by demos & pi in 2016 (http://www.demos.it/a01374.php) and 2017 (http://www.demos.it/a01396.php). de giorgi and dias, standing apart together? 66 highly similar strategy in their relationship with the other political actors, and in particular with the other opposition parties, attempting to send the same message to their respective electorates: we represent an alternative to the existing political parties, regardless of whether they are in government or in opposition, and we will behave accordingly in parliament. furthermore, we assume that salvini’s lega revived this strategy, trying to go back to the party origins in the last legislature (2013-2018), i.e. the one that directly followed the eurozone crisis and saw the entrance of the m5s in the parliamentary arena. we will test these expectations by analysing and comparing the attitudes to cooperation of the two challenger parties with the other opposition groups, using as an indicator the amount of legislative co-sponsorship during their first term in parliament (respectively, in 1992-1994 and 2013-2018) and in the term they spent together in opposition that preceded their government agreement. since we are fundamentally interested in a relational dimension, that is the relationship between the new challenger parties and the other opposition parties in parliament, we will employ social network analysis (sna) methods. these methods have been applied in the context of bill proposals in other parliaments (fowler 2010; kirkland 2011) and have unearthed novel dynamics that lie beneath parliamentary activity. thus, we expect that sna will give us new insights also into new challenger parties’ behaviour and, in particular, into the two new government partners in italy. the objective of this work is twofold: first, to verify whether the lega and m5s have shown similar behaviour during their first years in parliament and, in so doing, to contribute to the knowledge of the nature of such an unprecedented coalition in italy and second, to understand whether we can employ this possible common behaviour as one further variable for distinguishing the new challenger parties from others in parliament. 1. how challenger parties behave when they enter the parliamentary arena: expectations following hobolt and tilley (2016), we define challenger parties as those parties that ‘seek to challenge the mainstream political consensus and do not ordinarily enter government’ (p.972). challenger parties may be on the right, left, or even neither of the two, as their ideological position does not contribute to the definition of their challenger status; their non-involvement in government does.4 reams of articles, academic and nonacademic, have been written on these (new) protagonists of the political scenario and the reasons for their electoral success, but there is still little knowledge of the behaviour of these parties once in parliament.5 the main purpose of this paper is to start filling this gap through the analysis of the case of the italian lega and m5s when they first entered the parliamentary arena, respectively in 1992 and 2013. as we said, we aim to introduce a new dimension of analysis into the study of this kind of party, i.e. their relationship with the other opposition actors. no matter how much consensusor conflict-oriented their action in parliament,6 we expect all 4 there are some exceptions, of course, mainly in central and eastern europe (grotz and weber 2016). 5 with some exceptions such as albertazzi and mcdonnell 2005 or pinto and pedrazzani 2015. 6 some studies have already proven the tendency of these parties to behave in a rather adversarial way in parliament (de giorgi 2016; de giorgi and ilonszki 2018). ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 67 challenger parties to adopt one distinctive strategy: to stand apart from other parties, no matter whether the latter are in government or in opposition. this is, in fact, one of the main reasons for their electoral success and, in the end, their essence. hence, we expect them to keep a distance from and not cooperate with either the temporary or the permanent opposition parties. in other words, we expect to find a significant distance between them and the other opposition parties in terms of action in parliament and how this action is (or better, is not) related to the others. we will measure the new challenger parties’ distance from the other opposition parties and its possible evolution over time by employing a social network analysis of bill cosponsorship during the 11th (1992-1994) and 17th (2013-2018) legislatures, i.e. the first legislative terms in parliament of the lega nord and five star movement respectively. many studies, mainly focused on the us context, have shown that co-sponsorship is related to ideological proximity (braton and rouse 2011; aléman et al. 2009) but it is also a moment for representatives to signal other political actors (wilson and young 1997). so, we expect that the new challenger members of parliament (mps) will collaborate less with the other opposition parties, as a way of signalling their distinctiveness. other research has shown that in parliamentary systems with unified parties, co-sponsorship is mainly driven by specialisation: mps introduce resolutions and amendments together with those who work on similar topics (louwerse and otjes 2015). this can be one further reason for the isolation of the new challenger parliamentary party groups (ppgs) who have no previous experience and are not well known by the other ppgs members, as they have entered parliament for the first time and with lack of experience as their best calling card against the established political parties. of course, also the other parties matter. how established parties react to the challengers’ presence in parliament is equally important. despite their ideological proximity, in fact, parties are not always inclined to collaborate with the new challengers,7 although they might try to react to their issue attention, notably when in opposition (van de wardt 2015) if they see the possibility of some electoral benefit (meguid 2005). for all these reasons, we will test two main research hypotheses: first, the new challenger parties – and in our case the lega (nord) and m5s – do not co-sponsor the other opposition parties’ legislative initiative much during their first legislature in parliament; second, the other parties do not collaborate either with the new challenger parties and their respective legislative proposals. 2. data and methods our empirical analysis focuses on legislation co-sponsorship and relies on one source of data, i.e. the italian lower chamber’s (camera dei deputati) data archive.8 as we said, in this paper we consider two main periods of analysis: the first legislature of the lega nord in parliament, the 11th (1992-1994), and the first legislature of the m5s in parliament, the 17th (2013-2018), divided into individual governments for each term.9 7 see the attitudes of the centre-right parties towards the extreme right, as in germany since the recent entrance of alternative for germany in the bundestag or in belgium with the principle of non-collaboration of all parties with the vlaams blok/vlaams belang. 8 data was collected by the project “opposition parties in europe under pressure. far from power, close to citizens?” (if/00926/2015). source: www.dati.camera.it. 9 amato i and ciampi in the period 1992-1994 and letta, renzi and gentiloni in the period 2013-2018. de giorgi and dias, standing apart together? 68 we ran two different kinds of analysis. first, we employed a simple sna representation to draw a graph showing the co-sponsorship network of the italian parliament in the 11th and 17th legislatures. this simple exercise is quite helpful in showing the party cooperation attitude, or its absence, when proposing new bills. in our graphs each node, or point, represents an mp, whose colour represents her/his party, and each line between nodes, edges, represents the co-sponsorship of a certain bill. for an easier representation of the co-sponsorship patterns we employed the fruchterman and reingold (1991) algorithm to distribute the different nodes along the graph. using this algorithm, the position of each node is determined by its connections, in a fashion similar to that of recoil springs. if two mps share a connection they will be drawn closer together, while other mps that do not share any connection with these two are drawn further away. by calculating all these relative positions and combining the results, these graphs can be intuitively read as placing closer together those nodes that have connections while drawing apart those that do not share connections. though very informative, these graphs fail to present a clear and systematic point of reference which is needed in order to compare the different parties more precisely. to do this, we created an index of intra-opposition party bill differentiation. this index is a simple sum, for each period, of two different percentages. the first is the percentage of co-sponsors (altri firmatari) of bills initiated by party x that belong to the same party, i.e. the percentage of co-sponsors that are from the same party as the bill’s initiator (primo firmatario). the second percentage represents, of all the bills co-sponsored by mps of party x, the percentage of those initiated by party x. the combination of these two percentages can vary from 0, in cases where no bill presented by a member of party x is cosponsored by any member of party x and members of party x are only co-sponsors of bills that were not introduced by party x, to 2 in cases where all co-sponsorship connections are made by members of party x. to ensure the statistical significance of these indices, we also ran a regression analysis that tested whether co-sponsorship with these parties was in fact lower during their first term. 3. analysis turning our attention to the empirical analysis, we plotted the social network by connecting each mp, represented by a dot (node), with any other mp that also signed a bill proposed by her/him. in all plots, the colours represent the parties and the position of each mp in the graph is related to his/her relationship with other mps, with cooperation bringing mps closer to each other. figures 1 to 5 plot the co-sponsorship network during each government within the 11th and the 17th legislatures. in both figures 1 and 2,10 lega nord clearly stands apart from the rest of the opposition parties’ mps. when compared to the other opposition parties, the lega’s mps 10 for the 11th legislature the party acronyms refer to: centro cristiano democratico (christian democratic centre – ccd); democrazia cristiana partito popolare italiano (christian democracy italian popular party – dc-ppi); federalisti europei (european federalist – fe); lega nord (northern league – lega); movimento per la democrazia: la rete (movement fo democracy the net – rete); movimento sociale italiano destra nazionale (italian social movement national right – msi-dn); partito democratico della sinistra (left democratic party – pds); partito liberale italiano (italian liberal party – pli); partito repubblicano italiano (italian republican party – pri); partito socialista democratico ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 69 cooperate less when it comes to jointly proposing legislation with other parties, and vice versa: the other opposition parties are not inclined to collaborate with the lega’s mps when the latter initiate their own legislation. the distinction between the new challenger lega nord at that time and the other parties is particularly noteworthy when compared with other permanent (radical) opposition parties: in both figures, we can observe that both the communist refoundation party (rifondazione comunista rc) and the radicals (federazione europa – fe) are more inclined to propose new legislation with other opposition parties. the only party that seems to adopt similar, whilst more moderate behaviour in the 11th legislature is the extreme right italian social movement (msi-dn), which had a history of non-collaboration with the other ppgs, and vice versa, since the beginning of the so-called first republic. in figures 3, 4 and 5,11 the m5s is equally, if not more, distinguishable in the cosponsorship dimension, notably during the gentiloni government. all throughout the legislature, its mps were internally quite cohesive when introducing legislative proposals and very rarely cooperated with other parties. so, when comparing the first legislative term in parliament of the two challenger parties we find a similar distinctive pattern in the behaviour of the lega and m5s. figure 1. social network plot of bill co-sponsorship during the first amato government. italiano (italian social democratic party – psdi); partito socialista italiano (italian socialist party – psi); rifondazione comunista (communist refoundation party – rc); verdi (greens). 11 for the 17th legislature the party acronyms refer to: nuovo centro destra (new centre right – ncd); articolo 1 movimento democratico e progressista (article 1 democratic and progressive movement – mdp); democrazia solidale centro democratico (supportive democracy democratic centre – demsol); forza italia il popolo della liberta' (forza italia freedom people – fi); fratelli d'italia (brothers of italy – fdi); lega nord (northern league lega); movimento 5 stelle (five star movement – m5s); scelta civica per l'italia (civic choice for italy – scpi); partito democratico (democratic party – pd); sinistra ecologia libertà (left ecology and freedom sel); civici e innovatori (civic and innovator – ci). de giorgi and dias, standing apart together? 70 figure 2. social network plot of bill co-sponsorship during the ciampi government. figure 3. social network plot of bill co-sponsorship during letta government ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 71 figure 4. social network plot of bill co-sponsorship during renzi government figure 5. social network plot of bill co-sponsorship during gentiloni government. de giorgi and dias, standing apart together? 72 a different and more systematic way of analysing this data is to look at the percentages of co-sponsorships between members of the same party. hence, we calculated an intra-opposition party bill differentiation index for each party in both legislatures. the results for the 11th and 17th legislatures are respectively shown in tables 1 and 2. looking at the first table, we find once again that between 1992 and 1994 the lega relied on intraparty co-sponsorship more than any other opposition party group, achieving almost a perfect score of 2 during both the amato and ciampi governments. the only party with a similar score is the msi-dn, while other opposition parties, even the radicals or rc, cooperated more with each other. when comparing this table with figure 1 we can conclude that, during its first legislature in parliament, the lega’s strategy was to distinguish itself by standing apart from and not collaborating with any of the other opposition parties (and vice versa). a very similar conclusion can be drawn from table 2. between 2013 and 2018, the m5s was the party that cooperated the least when presenting bills throughout, with only one party exceeding its score during letta’s government. it is striking how high the indexes for m5s remain during the legislature when the size of their group in parliament is taken into consideration. when compared with the figures for fi-pdl, which started with about the same number of mps, or even with pd, which had a group twice as big, m5s scores do still seem to stand out. it is crucial to point out that even small differences in these indexes can have big effects on the social network plots. the centrifugal effect witnessed in the figures above does not correspond solely to these scores, which indicate that relational factors, including the size of the party and the variety of parties or mps that cooperated with the lega and m5s during their parliament debut, are also relevant. table 1. intra-opposition bill differentiation index for each party during the 11th legislature. lega msi-dn dc-ppi pds rc psi pri verdi psdi fe rete pli amato 1.983 1.956 1.893 1.749 1.507 1.476 1.674 1.295 1.596 0.746 0.555 1.449 ciampi 1.984 1.915 1.787 1.785 1.803 1.530 1.674 1.480 0.813 1.210 1.234 0.236 table 2. intra-opposition bill differentiation index for each party during the 17th legislature. m5s lega pd sel fdi fi-pdl ci demsol letta 1.948 1.970 1.865 1.637 1.784 1.495 1.434 0.609 renzi 1.900 1.847 1.773 1.596 1.416 1.395 0.994 0.701 gentiloni 1.953 1.950 1.849 1.645 1.649 1.706 1.341 1.320 so far, we have overlooked the lega’s performance during the 17th legislature. but it should be noted that this party’s behaviour was similar to that during its first term in parliament in the period 2013-2018. albeit overshadowed by m5s, the lega shows high scores in the dimension taken into consideration here. this raises the question: is this ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 73 intra-opposition party differentiation a consistently distinctive feature of this party or only a strategy recently reintroduced to improve its electoral performance? figure 5 would indicate the second option. this behaviour, in fact, seems rather strategical. in this last figure, we plot the evolution of the lega’s intra-opposition party bill differentiation index since its debut in parliament. we can see that while, in general, the lega cooperated very little over the years, it behaved more similarly to the other parties during the governments led by dini (1995-1996) and prodi ii (2006-2008). so, it seems that its tendency to differentiate itself from the other (opposition) parties has been mainly tactical over the years. it was revived, in particular, after the outbreak of the eurozone crisis, which coincided with the party’s return to opposition – first with the monti government and then with the grand coalition led by the democratic party following the 2013 electoral earthquake and the entrance of the m5s in parliament – and the change in the party leadership, with the election of matteo salvini. one last noteworthy point is that, despite sharing a similar differentiation strategy during the 17th legislature, there was almost no collaboration between the lega and m5s during the whole legislative term. neither of the two parties co-signed any single bill initiated by the other during the renzi and gentiloni governments. the only two exceptions to this pattern were two bills proposed by the m5s, co-sponsored respectively by one and three lega mps and concerning regional identity and banking issues. neither bill reached the final voting stage and in both cases mps from other parties had also cosponsored them. it seems that the non-cooperation strategy that the two new government partners shared in the 17th legislature applied also to each other. figure 6. evolution of intra opposition bill differentiation index for lega from the 11th to the 17th legislature. finally, to ensure the statistical significance of this new challenger effect we employed a simple multilinear regression, based on a poisson distribution for each legislature, in which the dependent variable was the number of bills co-sponsored between each possible pair of legislators. our main independent variable of interest is a dummy variable that differentiates if one of the two mps in each possible pair was from de giorgi and dias, standing apart together? 74 the lega, in the 13th legislature, or m5s in the 17th. to control for other factors that might also have an effect on co-sponsorship relations between mps, we included further variables, namely one dummy variable considering the case of both mps belonging to the same party; one dummy variable considering the case of one of the mps being a newcomer; one dummy variable considering the case of both mps coming from the same constituency and one variable representing an absolute ideological difference between the two mps’ respective parties.12 table 3. summary results of regression analysis with number of co-sponsorships between each possible pair of mps as the dependent variable. dependent variable: number of co-sponsorships (1) (2) same party 3.347*** 3.435*** (0.013) (0.013) same constituency 0.314*** 0.467*** (0.013) (0.009) l-r distance13 -0.010*** 0.029*** (0.001) (0.001) new mp -0.328*** -0.366*** (0.007) (0.005) new challenger -2.368*** -2.011*** (0.065) (0.033) constant -2.972*** -3.265*** (0.013) (0.013) observations 394,384 643,204 log likelihood -301,599.700 -494,214.600 akaike inf. crit. 603,211.300 988,441.200 note: *p**p***p<0.01 the results from both regression models, presented in table 3, do support the hypothesis that both lega and m5s mps cooperated less with other parties during their first legislature in parliament. any possible connection that involves one mp from each party has a statistically significant lower probability of co-sponsorship. moreover, this effect does not seem to be only attributable to their lack of previous experience, as the effect persists even when controlling for this variable. 12 a table with more details about the variables just mentioned can be found in annex (table 4). 13 we based our analysis on the comparative manifesto project (marpor) dataset, which only analyses ideological variation based on the economic dimension. this might generate some problems. for instance, during the 17th legislature the m5s is placed more to the left than sinistra ecologia e libertà (sel) with a score that is twice as high. we expect that this might impact the real ideological differences between parties and lead to misleading coefficients. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 75 of course, these results should be read with caution. first, we are only looking at a single country during two different time periods. while there might be some evidence that the patterns exhibited by the lega and m5s are also present in other opposition parties in other countries, a further and larger analysis is necessary to evaluate how this hypothesis scales to a regional scope. secondly, in both regression models we assume that co-sponsorship between each pair of mps is independent, which might not be the case. since these are social relationships, they can have some reciprocal effects. for instance, we should expect reciprocity, i.e. if mp y supports a bill proposed by mp x, then it might be more likely that mp x supports a bill proposed by mp y. still, the figures, the indexes and these results point to the same phenomenon: both the lega and m5s began their parliamentary experience in quite a distinctive way. 8. conclusions this work had two main aims: first, we wanted to prove the existence of one further trait that the new italian government partners might have in common, as a result of the nature of (new) challenger parties they shared when they entered parliament for the first time. what we expected to find was a common tendency of the lega and m5s to distinguish themselves in parliament by standing apart from the other party groups, regardless of whether the latter are in government or in opposition. second, we aimed to understand whether we can employ this possible common behaviour as one further variable for distinguishing the new challenger parties from others in parliament. we have tried to do so by introducing a new dimension of analysis – that is, the relationship between the new challenger parties and the other opposition parties – and applying that to the study of the lega and m5s. we measured the distance between the lega and m5s on the one hand and the traditional opposition parties on the other, and its possible evolution over time, by employing a social network analysis of bill co-sponsorship during their respective first legislative term in parliament. the data employed gave clear support to our main expectations: once in parliament, the lega and m5s pursued a very similar strategy. they tried to stand out by keeping their distance from and not cooperating with any of the other opposition parties. and while the lega’s history shows that this strategy may not necessarily be permanent, it also shows that it can be revived when needed. going by their recent electoral performance it is still a successful one. in fact, the behaviour of salvini’s lega during the 17th legislature (2013-2018) proved very similar to both that of its first legislature in parliament and that of the m5s. so, besides the elective affinities shared by the two parties before 2018, they also shared very similar behaviour in parliament as far as their (non-)relationship with the other parties is concerned. further research is undoubtedly required to confirm the results obtained so far – above all, a comparative analysis would clearly be crucial to corroborate our findings. nonetheless, results on the two italian parties taken into consideration here have proved sufficiently effective to suggest that this relational dimension might be employed in future research as one further variable for distinguishing the new challenger parties from the other opposition parties in parliament and, in so doing, contributing to a new empirically based definition of this party type. de giorgi and dias, standing apart together? 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(1997) cosponsorship in the u.s. congress, legislative studies quarterly, 22(1), 25-43. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_3_bozzini.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 3, december 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 3, pp. 33-43 contact author: emanuela bozzini, university of trento. e-mail address: emanuela.bozzini@unitn.it the difficult harmonisation of eu policies: insights into the implementation of eu pesticide policy in italy emanuela bozzini university of trento abstract the eu pesticide policy is informed by a one-fits-all logic: scientific guidelines as well as procedural norms have been harmonised and centralised at eu level. yet member states have adopted very different institutional models to contribute to implementation. the paper provides an analysis of the institutional model in place in italy and advances two main arguments. first, some of the features of the italian model prevent national experts from fully contributing to eu common procedures; second, because of the harmonised nature of eu pesticide policy, inefficiencies at national level have the potential to directly affect the overall capacity of the eu to achieve policy results. the paper concludes by suggesting some potential directions for the reform of the italian system. 1. introduction cholars working on multilevel governance (mlg) have observed that the dispersion of policy making across territorial levels can be an effective arrangement for a polity as diverse as the european union (eu) (piattoni, 2010). they also observe that the eu strongly endorses this principle by requiring the decentralisation of policy competence in a number of sectors (newig & koontz, 2014). the water framework directive, cohesion policy, and air quality directive are relevant examples in this respect. notably, a push for a re-scaling of policy competence has been observed in the supranational sector par excellence: the common agricultural policy (garzon, 2006; greer, 2005). increasingly, eu policies have been adopted with a built-in specified multilevel governance architecture: provisions require cooperation at vertical and horizontal levels from a variety of institutional, civic and social actors. on a less positive note, scholars also observe that, while desirable in principle, ‘it cannot be taken for granted that operational designs based on mlg bring necessarily to the desired improvements in implementation performance’ at national level (domorenok, 2017, p. 667) and point out that a variety of multi-level institutional arrangements with different degrees of efficiency have been adopted across europe. this paper builds on these insights from mlg literature on the variety and performance of institutional arrangements for policy implementation to expand the analysis to fully centralised and harmonised eu policies. it takes as a starting point the observation that the trend towards decentralisation is likely predominant but not ubiquitous. a push for centralisation and harmonisation at eu level can also be observed: reach, food safety and pesticide policy are cases in point. these are areas largely characterised s the difficult harmonisation of eu policies 34 by a ‘one-fits-all’ logic, intended to define common regulatory standards that are valid across all member states (mss) and implement them according to uniform procedures. the eu also prescribes a specific governance architecture for these areas, requiring strong convergence in institutional arrangements and procedural norms (knill, 2005). yet research shows that harmonised eu policy might be characterised by relevant differences in national institutional arrangements and that, as in decentralised policies, institutional arrangements have different implementation performances (bozzini, 2017). this paper argues that, unlike in decentralised sectors, in the case of a one-fits-all eu policy, inefficiencies at national level do have direct consequences for other mss and for eu institutions, affecting the overall regulatory regime and its capacity to fully achieve policy results. to illustrate the argument, the paper provides an in-depth analysis of the model adopted in italy to deliver eu pesticide policy. pesticide regulation1 in particular is a good example in the context of centralised, one-fits-all sectors. to list but a few features included in regulation (ec) 1107/2009: chemical substances to be employed in the production of pesticides receive a single ‘pan-european’ approval; the assessments are jointly carried out by authorities from all 28 mss and the european food safety authority (efsa) in a common procedure; shared protocols and guidelines prescribe in fine detail how scientific information must be gathered, evaluated, reported, and discussed in hazard and risk assessments. to some extent the allocation of workload across mss is decided by the european commission (ec), which also dictates the timing and content of assessments. regulation 1107/2009 also foresees a specific governance arrangement at national level: each ms must designate a competent authority (ca) to contribute ‘with one voice’ to eu processes at efsa and the directorate-general for health and food safety of the ec (dg sante). the paper describes the complex institutional arrangement in italy and discusses the advantages and disadvantages in relation to eu harmonised goals. it argues that some of the institutional features of the italian system prevent an effective contribution to common regulatory goals and, because of the one-fits-all logic of pesticide policy, have the potential to negatively affect eu procedures and policy results. the argument of the paper is structured as follows. the first section sets the context and illustrates the main defining goals of eu pesticide policy. the second section describes policy outputs and the contribution of italian authorities to these, providing empirical evidence to show that italy has had a low degree of involvement in common eu procedures. the third section focuses on italian institutional arrangements in the sector as the main explanatory factor for the limited input to eu processes. the final section provides some concluding remarks on the potential implications of the italian institutional model for the overall eu regulatory regime and suggests some directions for reform.2 1 regulation (ec) no 1107/2009 of the european parliament and of the council of 21 october 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing council directives 79/117/eec and 91/414/eec. 2 the empirical base for the analysis was collected in the context of two research projects carried out by the author in the period 2015-2018: ‘law, science and interests in european policy-making' (lasi) funded by the erc and the evaluation of implementation of regulation 1107/2009 carried out on behalf of the european parliament research service (bozzini 2018). the research design involved semi-structured interviews with cas across 28 mss, efsa and eu commission officials. in addition, an extensive documentary analysis was performed. specifically, the empirical documentary research for this paper emanuela bozzini 35 2. features of the eu pesticide regulation in the eu the first common pesticide policy was introduced in 1991 (european union, 1991) and later reformed in 2009 (european union, 2009). since its inception the eu pesticide legislation has had a clear harmonisation character: main goals are to define shared, uniform scientific criteria and common regulatory procedures for the evaluation and approval of active substances that can be put safely in use in all 28 mss (bozzini, 2017).3 there are strong arguments to favour harmonisation in pesticide policy: to avoid market fragmentation and remove possible obstacles to trade are among the most important ones. further, it is widely recognised that health and environmental protection goals are best served by the application of a ‘one-fits-all’ logic (frank & ottoboni, 2011). in particular the assessment of the safety of active substances is informed by the principle ‘one substance, one assessment’ (united nations, 2017). it means that the inherent properties of a chemical are assessed once at eu level and are valid across all 28 eu mss. from a toxicological point of view, this approach makes sense because the – let’s say – carcinogenicity potential of a substance does not vary according to the national origins of individuals.4 a similar point can be made for the environmental fate of chemicals or for ecotoxicology: if a substance is persistent in the environment or if it threatens the health of bees, this is because of the intrinsic characteristics of the chemical that do not change depending on the location. last but not least, shared ethical norms require the minimal use of laboratory animals (joint research centre, 2016), and therefore there is a need to avoid unnecessary repetitions of testing across mss (annys et al., 2014; scholz et al., 2013). the eu goals proved very ambitious, requiring the assessment of a wide range of hazards and risks according to stringent criteria.5 as the ec observed ‘in many instances, the risk assessment methodologies required for the evaluations did not exist and had to be developed. it was necessary to develop new science, and then to ensure agreement on its application’ (european commission, 2001, p. 4). the criteria for carrying out assessments have been harmonised (hardy, bopp, & egsmose, 2012): over the years eu and national experts have adopted guidelines to establish what laboratory tests need to be taken into consideration for the evaluation of, for example, mutagenicity or genotoxicity, the protocols for their study design as well as quality criteria for the validation of testing (brooks, koch, wathen, & valley, 2015).6 further, similarly to scientific guidelines, procedural rules have gone through a process of harmonisation (bozzini, 2018). regulation (ec) 1107/2009 prescribes that ‘in the interest of predictability, efficiency and consistency, a detailed procedure should be laid includes interviews with five officers at the ministry of health and experts based at two certified research centres, an elaboration of data gathered from the eu pesticide database and an analysis of dossiers published in the efsa register of pesticide dossiers. 3 it goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth mentioning that commercial formulations containing one or more active substances approved at eu level must obtain a second ‘zonal’ authorization. the entire eu territory is divided into three zones, north, central and south. italy is included in the south zone together with bulgaria, greece, spain, france, cyprus, malta, portugal, and croatia. 4 indeed, the un advocate a global, harmonised system of hazard assessment. 5 the eu legislation on pesticides is usually considered the most stringent and restrictive one. see (pelaez, 2013). 6 for a more informed overview of progress in the harmonisation of scientific guidelines see (bozzini, 2018). it should be noted that regulators must (try to) keep pace with advances in scientific understandings; therefore, guidelines are always ‘in progress’ and their adequacy is often a matter of discussion. the difficult harmonisation of eu policies 36 down for assessing whether an active substance can be approved’ (regulation (ec) 1107/2009 preamble 12). the assessment of hazards and risks associated with active substances to be used in the production of pesticides is therefore centralised at efsa, with the fundamental involvement of designated experts from all mss who are required to contribute to the common eu assessments. today there are guidelines that regulate all the different steps in the process, like the format of evaluation reports, the timing of procedures, how to organise the expert discussion for the interpretation of results, how to make information available to the general public. all these and other aspects have been painstakingly defined over the years by scientists and regulators at efsa, dg sante and mss. as mentioned, the procedure relies on the joint cooperation between efsa and national cas that are required to take part in common eu procedure. specifically, the procedure for the assessment of an active substance starts at the national level: a manufacturer who want to market its pesticide in the eu submits an application to the ms of its choice or, if the substance is already on eu markets and its approval must be renewed, to an ms indicated by the ec.7 the chosen ms becomes the rapporteur member state (rms) for that specific active substance. it works on behalf of efsa to perform a first evaluation of data and produce a draft assessment report (dar) on the active substance. this is arguably one of the most demanding tasks for cas: legal requirements prescribe the analysis of data gathered from over 400 different tests in areas as diverse as chemistry and toxicology (kaltenhauser, kneuer, & marx-stoelting, 2017), and the dar can total thousands of pages. the dar, therefore, is resource-intensive: it entails the involvement of experts from different scientific backgrounds and specifically trained on regulatory issues.8 further, according to regulation (ec) 1107/2009, the dar must be finalised by national cas within a specified time-limit: 12 months, possibly extended to 18 if additional data are needed to further clarify the risk profile of the chemical under evaluation. the existence of precise time limits is an extremely important point: deadlines make the procedure predictable to interested manufacturers as well as to other cas who need to plan their activities in advance. indeed, after this first evaluation on the part of one ms, the dar, as well as the raw data, are made available to efsa and to the other 27 cas, who are required to step in and contribute to the assessment. this second stage in the evaluation takes place at efsa, which organises the socalled ‘peer-review procedure’ on the dossier. in this context, the peers who are required to review the dar are mainly experts from the other cas.9 they have two months to read and send comments to the various part of the assessment report, according to a specified format, to double check the interpretation of evidence advanced by the rms and assess the preliminary conclusions on the hazards and risks associated with the substance under discussion. in a third stage all the comments are subsequently discussed in common meetings at efsa in parma. the discussion between experts from 28 mss and efsa must be finalised within four months and terminate with the delivery of the document 7 approvals of active substances are temporary. after 10 years, manufacturers must submit a request for renewal updating the existing dossier. see regulation (ec) 844/2012. 8 space limitations prevent a discussion on this important point. suffice to note that one thing is to have expertise in toxicology, another is being knowledgeable in the eu version of regulatory toxicology. 9 a so-called ‘sanitized’ version of the dossier – clear of confidential information relevant to patent rights – is made available to external experts, stakeholders and the general public for comment. as might be expected, public participation is de facto non-existent on these highly technical dossiers. emanuela bozzini 37 reporting efsa conclusions on the active substance. the publication of the ‘efsa conclusion’ is the final act in the scientific assessment of risks associated with a specific chemical and reflects the shared expert opinion as developed in the context of the eu procedure.10 finally, it is important to note that to ensure transparency and traceability, all documents relative to an active substance are subsequently made available to the public in the efsa register of questions and in the eu pesticide database run by dg sante.11 the latter represents the unique, pan-eu list of approved active substances which, as mentioned above, has always been the ultimate policy output in the context of pesticide regulation. at the time of writing (january 2019) the eu pesticide database collects the scientific and legal documents published over the years on the safety of around 1400 chemicals. of these, 490 have been considered safe and are therefore included in the list of active substances approved for use; those remaining are banned from the eu pesticide market. to sum up, strong efforts have been sustained over the years to achieve ambitious policy goals in terms of harmonisation and in so doing, ensure timely, transparent and scientifically accurate assessments.12 harmonisation requires the contribution of all mss to joint evaluation processes carried out according to common rules and procedures as well as specific deadlines. the next section illustrates to what extent the italian authorities have contributed to such policy efforts. 3. the italian involvement towards common policy outputs in eu pesticide regulation as noted in the preceding section, the most relevant – and demanding – tasks for national cas in the implementation of eu pesticide legislation are the delivery of the dars and participation in efsa peer-review processes. in this section i illustrate the involvement of italian authorities in these two tasks. to start with, it is important to stress that mss have, as might be expected, different interest in the pesticide sector. this is evident if we consider that not all 490 approved active substances are in use in all eu countries. mss have different agronomic and climatic conditions as well as agricultural productions and are therefore differentiated in terms of their crop protection needs. error! reference source not found. shows in the second column the number of active substances in use in each of the 28 mss, to provide evidence of the variation in terms of range of pesticides needed in each eu country. of interest in the context of this paper is the fact that italy, with 335 different chemicals in use, is first in this specific ranking. the high number of pesticides required by italian farmers reflects the highly diversified agricultural production of the country, as well as its peculiar climatic conditions that make crops highly vulnerable to, for example, 10 the efsa conclusions are then sent to dg sante, and findings are discussed in the context of the comitology committee scopaff. a final decision on risk management is taken by a qualified majority and adopted in the form of an implementing regulation. 11 see the document available online: http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/eu-pesticides-database/public/?event=homepage&language=en. 12 the effective capacity of the eu regulatory system to meet its ambition is a matter of debate. see (european parliament research service, 2018; scientific advice mechanism, 2018). the difficult harmonisation of eu policies 38 bacteria and fungi. in short, italy has a strong interest in the eu pesticide regulation and the importance of this sector for the country cannot be underestimated. table 1. number of active substances in use, number of dossiers processed by each eu country, and the ratio between these two measures. country number of active substancesa total number of dossiersa ratio uk 275 152 1.8 se 142 61 2.3 at 266 103 2.6 de 265 98 2.7 nl 266 98 2.7 fr 317 115 2.8 es 304 70 4.3 it 335 74 4.5 be 287 57 5.0 el 287 57 5.0 fi 148 29 5.1 ie 215 42 5.1 dk 153 26 5.9 pl 257 33 7.8 hu 266 25 10.6 cz 261 22 11.9 pt 254 18 14.1 ee 149 9 16.6 lv 149 9 16.6 si 204 10 20.4 sk 221 7 31.6 hr 197 4 49.3 bg 204 4 51.0 lt 162 2 81.0 ro 224 1 224.0 cy 189 0 lu 219 0 mt 54 0 total 1126 a source: own elaboration from eu pesticide database the third column of table 1 provides information on the division of workload among cas, in terms of the number of dars delivered. data show that out of a total of 1126 dossiers processed, italy has been in charge of 74. the fourth column of the table synthetizes the data between national demands for pesticides and level of involvement in the regulatory effort. specifically, the table reports the ratio between the number of active substances in use in a country and the number of dossiers processed by that same country. data show that the ratio for italy is 4.5, meaning that for each dossier delivered, italian authorities ‘receive’ 4.5 in return. in other words, without the common eu regime italian authorities would have to process 4.5 more dossiers to have the same number of 335 authorised chemicals in the country as they have today. in this sense the emanuela bozzini 39 ratio provides an indication of the added value of the eu regulatory regimes for each mss: the higher the ratio, the greater the advantage for the country. this means that in relation to the national demand for active substances, italy commits itself to a low number of evaluations. in terms of participation in efsa peer-review procedures, data show that the contribution of the italian ca is extremely limited. the analysis of documents relative to the 49 procedures finalised at efsa in 2016 and 2017 reveals that italy wrote comments on two substances only: one for which it was rms and one for which it acted as co-rms, meaning that it cooperated with the official rms in the drafting of the dar.13 on all other occasions the italian authority sent no written contributions to comment on draft evaluations. this represents a serious limit, since – as noted – the peer-review procedure at efsa is essential to achieve a shared, consistent assessment of the hazards poses by a chemical. it seems safe to argue that italy has had an overall low level of involvement in common eu pesticide regulation: it takes advantage of the input of other mss in a significant measure while it provides a partial contribution, both in terms of dars and participation in efsa processes. this paper suggests that italy’s low performance in contributing to the common pesticide regulatory effort is due to the features of the institutional model in place in the country, as illustrated in the next section. 4. the italian institutional model article 75 of regulation (ec) 1107/2009 establishes that each ms must designate a ca to deal with the obligations laid down by the legislation in terms of approvals of active substances and authorization of ppps. all mss are obliged to observe this requirement, and it is therefore possible to identify who is responsible for the implementation of regulation (ec) 1107/2009 in each of the 28 eu countries plus norway. each country can adopt its own institutional arrangements and previous research indicates that there is significant variation between mss in this respect (bozzini, 2018). as far as italy is concerned, it adopts an institutional model that foresees the cooperation between a governmental body and external research institutes and universities. assessments are outsourced to research centres which are in charge of evaluations of part of the dossier according to their competence. this means that the system is based on a vast network of institutional and research actors that have to coordinate to deliver pesticide policy. to start with the governmental body, the institution officially identified as ca for the country is an administrative structure established in the context of the ministry of health and more specifically within the ‘direzione generale per l’igiene e la sicurezza degli alimenti e della nutrizione’ (dgsan). dgsan is therefore formally responsible for pesticide policy. more specifically, the ‘ufficio 7’ within dgsan deals with all matters related to plant protection products, having responsibility for all eu legislation that covers the entire ‘pesticide chain’, from authorizations to factories, to market authorizations 13 italy was rms for the active substance linuron, a herbicide. it was co-rms for iprovalicarb, a fungicide. the difficult harmonisation of eu policies 40 and labelling, to controls of residues on food. officials from ufficio 7 also participate in comitology procedures in brussels. as far as the scientific assessment of active substances is concerned, it is of note that officials at ufficio 7 mainly guarantee administrative support and do not deal with the merits of evaluations, which are outsourced to certified research institutes. specifically, eleven different centres and/or universities replied to a public procedure last launched by dgsan in 2014 and have been selected to provide scientific advice and perform evaluation on behalf of the italian ca.14 centres meet a wide range of requirements; in particular they must possess expertise in all the disciplines included in the eu assessment of pesticides (chemistry, toxicology, ecotoxicology, endocrinology, environmental fate, etc.) as well as being familiar with eu regulatory guidelines and procedures. every year the centres sign a financial agreement, ‘convenzione’, with dgsan and when an application is delivered to italy, ufficio 7 allocates it to one of the centres. the allocation of dossiers depends on the availability and competence of the selected centres. for example, the scuola superiore sant’anna and the fondazione mach have specific expertise on biopesticides, while the others are generally in charge of the assessment of conventional chemicals. there is no official information available on the allocation of dossiers; as a consequence, it is not possible to track with certainty the process for each active substance and reconstruct ‘who did what’. according to interviewees, most evaluations are carried out by the university of milan, icps and iss. further on this point, it is of note that research centres can also decide not to carry out the evaluation in-house but, for example, to recruit ad-hoc external personnel to perform these tasks. finally, it is important to note that dgsan allocates to external centres only dossiers for which italy is rms and for which it receives a fee from manufacturers, while there are no procedures in place (or resources) to identify experts who can contribute to efsa peer-review processes. once the centre has the dar ready, it is sent to the ‘commissione consultiva prodotti fitosanitari’ (ccpf). the ccpf is one of the five sub-committees dealing with food safety and was created in its current form in 2013.15 it comprises representatives from four different ministries that have a policy interest in the authorization of pesticides: health, environment, agriculture and economic development. members are both public servants employed at the ministries and experts appointed by each ministry, for a total of 32. the ccpf has a wide variety of different functions, reflecting the complexity of tasks related to pesticide policy. it is of interest here to note that it should review assessment reports delivered by external centres to double-check conclusions. however, there are no indications of the ccpf’s systematic involvement on this front. first, it might be noted that internal procedural rules at dgsan prescribe very tight deadlines for this particular task: ccpf members have 10 days to submit comments on the 14 the list was revised and confirmed in 2018. it includes: istituto zooprofilattico sperimentale della lombardia ed emilia romagna; centro internazionale per gli antiparassitari e la prevenzione sanitaria (icps); università cattolica sacro cuore di piacenza; arpa emilia romagna; istituto superiore di sanità (iss); scuola superiore sant’anna; fondazione mach; dipartimento di scienze farmacologiche e biomolecolari dell’università di milano; istituto zooprofilattico sperimentale del lazio e toscana; università di milano bicocca; istituto zooprofilattico sperimentale dell’abruzzo e del molise ‘g. caporale’. 15 dpr 28 march 2013, n. 44, ‘regolamento recante il riordino degli organi collegiali ed altri organismi operanti presso il ministero della salute, ai sensi dell'articolo 2, comma 4, della legge 4 novembre 2010, n. 183’. emanuela bozzini 41 draft assessment which, as noted, includes the analysis of hundreds of laboratory tests. second, the remit of the ccpf is very broad and includes urgent tasks like the management of emergencies resulting from pest outbreaks.16 as a result, ccpf mainly focuses on ‘national’ issues, leaving eu procedures at the margin. 5. discussion and conclusion the data illustrated in the preceding sections suggest two main considerations with regard to italy. first, the regulation of pesticides is of relevant national interest for a country with strong and variegated agricultural production and where the use of pesticides is among the highest in europe in terms of number of active substances needed by farmers. second, the involvement of italian authorities in eu assessments, measured in terms of number of dossiers and contributions to efsa procedures, is significantly limited. my argument is that the reason for italy’s low involvement is to be found in the peculiar institutional arrangement for the delivery of assessments that prevents a greater contribution of the italian ca to eu procedures. the implications of this argument are that the italian institutional arrangement presents relevant shortcomings that have an impact beyond the domestic arena; because of the one-fits-all logic of pesticide policy that requires common procedures as well as deadlines, such shortcomings have the potential to affect the workings of the eu system. in fact, italy delivers dossiers on behalf of the entire eu. if italy has an opaque procedure and does not send contributions to the efsa peer-review procedure, this works to the detriment of the entire eu process of evaluation. this concluding section points out some of the most relevant consequences for the overall policy goals in the sector, focusing on the transparency, timing and consistency of eu evaluation procedures. as noted, in italy there is a fundamental lack of transparency in the pesticide system, since it is not possible to identify with precision who has performed the scientific assessment of a specific active substance. it might be argued that this lack of transparency on actual assessors is not an issue, since the final responsibility for the content of the dar lies with the ministry of health which is formally accountable as ca for the country. however, two considerations emerge. first, lack of information on who is in charge of evaluations discourages manufacturers to apply to italy, since this increases the overall uncertainty of a process that, as noted above, is very demanding and time consuming. second, it should be noted that transparency and traceability are fundamental principles for efsa. the eu authority publishes in the dedicated ‘register of questions’ the working material on each active substance, to make it possible for external interested parties to trace the entire process and the role of each actor in it, including minority opinions on specific aspects of the evaluations. in this sense, the opacity that characterises italian assessment negatively affects the level of publicity sought at eu level. the need for a public procedure to allocate the drafting of assessment reports is time-consuming and might have the effect of slowing down the substantial evaluation. delays in the delivery of dars to efsa and to other cas are not uncommon, and by no means limited to italy. however, it is relevant to note that delays on the part of one ms 16 the most dramatic and known emergency is that of xylella in apulia. however, in italy there are dozens of smaller, less damaging outbreaks that need emergency legislation. see http://www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1110&area=fitosanitari&menu=autorizzazioni. the difficult harmonisation of eu policies 42 affect the entire eu regulatory regime because the smooth implementation of a one-fitsall pesticide policy requires the careful planning of activities at the national level. in particular, national cas have to schedule well in advance their assignments in efsa written peer-review procedures that involve reading and commenting on dars from other countries. delays ‘disrupt’ such planning and therefore result in inefficiencies at eu level. the italian system also discourages the participation of italian authorities in the efsa written peer-review procedure which, as noted above, is one of the most crucial processes to achieve a eu-wide validation of scientific assessment. ufficio 7 firstly allocates to external centres dossiers for which italy is the rms, but there is no identification of experts in charge of the review of dars that are delivered by other countries. as a result, the italian ca intervenes on a very limited number of active substances under discussion at efsa. this holds back the valuable contribution of italian experts to the common eu evaluations and potentially negatively affects the consistency and the strength of the efsa procedures that rely on inputs from, ideally, all mss to properly assure multidisciplinarity and pluralism. italian officers understandably tend to defend the system in place. yet the analysis presented in this paper suggests that italy is performing at a level lower than should be expected based on the relevance of the pesticide sector and the range of expertise possessed by the country. the analysis also reveals that improvements are possible, and that institutional reforms could be useful to achieve a better implementation performance. in this regard, it seems safe to argue that some of the shortcomings in the system could be easily solved. in particular, the lack of transparency and the low participation in eu procedures could be addressed in a relatively straightforward way, without substantial institutional reforms. the mandatory publication of information on risk assessors would allow stakeholders and interested parties to trace procedures. a specific provision to systematically identify experts who could participate in efsa procedures could also be decided at dgsan. a more radical innovation could be the creation of an independent regulatory agency to conduct evaluations in-house. this could be an important – albeit expensive – improvement in the risk assessment of pesticides and more broadly in evaluations in ‘cognate’ sectors like biocides, cosmetics, and all the chemicals under reach. references annys, e., billington, r., clayton, r., bremm, k. d., graziano, m., mckelvie, j., . . . woodward, k. n. (2014). advancing the 3rs in regulatory toxicology carcinogenicity testing: scope for harmonisation and advancing the 3rs in regulated sectors of the european union. regulatory toxicology and pharmacology, 69(2), 234-242. doi: 10.1016/j.yrtph.2014.04.009 bozzini, emanuela. (2017). pesticide policy and politics in the european union. regulatory assessment, implementation and enforcement. london: palgrave macmillan. bozzini, emanuela. (2018). assessing criteria and capacity for reliable and harmonised ‘hazard identification’ of active substances. bruxelles: european parliament research service. brooks, a. m., koch, m. a., wathen, a. b., & valley, t. (2015). good laboratory practices (glps) research regulatory compliance (pp. 277-295). emanuela bozzini 43 domorenok, e. (2017). traps of multi-level governance. lessons from the implementation of the water framework directive in italy. journal of european integration, 39(6), 657-671. doi: 10.1080/07036337.2017.1322076 european commission. (2001). technical annex to report on the evaluation of the active substances of plant protection products (vol. com(2001) 444). european parliament research service. (2018). regulation (ec) 1107/2009 on the placing of plant protection products on the market. european implementation assessment (vol. pe 615.668 april 2018). brussels: eprs. council directive of 15 july 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, directive 414/91 c.f.r. (1991). regulation (ec) no 1107/2009 of the european parliament and of the council of 21 october 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing council directives 79/117/eec and 91/414/eec (2009). frank, patricia, & ottoboni, alice m. (2011). the dose makes the poison. a plain-language guide to toxicology (3rd ed.). hoboken, nj: john wiley & sons. garzon, isabelle. (2006). reforming the common agricultural policy: history of a paradigm change. houndsmill: palgrave macmillan. greer, alan. (2005). agricultural policy in europe. manchester: manchester university press. hardy, t., bopp, s., & egsmose, m. (2012). risk assessment of plant protection products efsa journal, 10(10). doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2012.s1010 joint research centre. (2016). analysis of carcinogenicity testing for regulatory purposes in the eu. review of the current demand of in vivo carcinogenicity studies across sectors. luxembourg: european commission. kaltenhauser, j., kneuer, c., & marx-stoelting, p. (2017). relevance and reliability of experimental data in human health risk assessment of pesticides. regulatory toxicology and pharmacology, 88, 227-237. knill, christoph (2005). introduction: cross-national policy convergence: concepts, approaches and explanatory factors. journal of european public policy, 12(5), 764 774. newig, j., & koontz, t.m. (2014). multi-level governance, policy implementation and participation: the eu’s mandated participatory planning approach to implementing environmental policy. journal of european public policy, 21(2), 248-267. pelaez, v. (2013). regulation of pesticides: a comparative analysis. science and public policy, 40, 644-656. piattoni, simona. (2010). the theory of multi-level governance. conceptual, empirical and normative challenges. oxford: oxford university press. scholz, stefan, sela, erika, blaha, ludek, braunbeck, thomas, galay-burgos, malyka, garcíafranco, mauricio, . . . winter, matthew j. (2013). a european perspective on alternatives to animal testing for environmental hazard identification and risk assessment. regulatory toxicology and pharmacology, 67(3), 506-530. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yrtph.2013.10.003 scientific advice mechanism. (2018). eu authorisation processes of plant protection products (vol. 5/2018). bruxelles: group of scientific advisors. united nations. (2017). globally harmonized system of classification and labelling of chemicals. new york and geneva: united nations. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_0.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 1–10 contact author: andrea pedrazzani, university of milan. e-mail address: andrea.pedrazzani@unimi.it introduction to the special issue: ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government andrea pedrazzani university of milan guest special issue editor an exceptional government coalition? he general elections of march 2018 opened, once again, a turbulent phase in italian politics. while no coalition or party obtained an absolute majority of parliamentary seats, both the five star movement (movimento 5 stelle, m5s) and the league (lega) claimed a win in the wake of the elections. the m5s turned out to be the most voted party in italy, with as much as one-third of the popular vote. surpassing its traditional coalition partner forward italy (forza italia, fi), the league became the leader of the most voted electoral cartel, as the centre-right bloc received as a whole about 37% of the vote. after a long government-formation process characterised by many twists and turns, a new cabinet was sworn in june 2018, including the m5s and the league as coalition partners and featuring law professor giuseppe conte as prime minister (pm). to mark a difference with the party system and policy processes which had characterised italian political life since the mid-1990s, the leaders of the two ruling parties – m5s’s luigi di maio and the league’s matteo salvini – defined the new cabinet as the ‘government of change’. the latter was indeed formed by parties that were (the m5s) or had recently been (the league) outside the mainstream of the italian party system. for the first time, the two political forces which had shaped electoral competition and had alternated in government almost uninterruptedly since 1994 – centre-right forward italy and centre-left democratic party (partito democratico, pd) and its forerunners – were together put out of power. the novelty of the conte government, also known as the ‘yellow-green’ government, captured the attention of political observers around the world. in this regard, the headlines of some prominent newspapers published the day after conte took the oath of office – ‘people power’ (the times, june 2 2018), ‘italy’s populists take power’ (washington post, june 2 2018) – are telling. following the elections, di maio himself had stated: ‘today the third republic commences, which will be at last the republic of italian citizens’ (march 5 2018). in a comparative perspective, the outcome of the italian elections of march 2018 and the formation of a ‘populist’ executive potentially fit well into more general patterns of restructuring of well-established party systems across europe, especially as a t pedrazzani, introduction to the special issue 2 consequence of the ‘great recession’ (chiaramonte and emanuele 2017; hernández and kriesi 2016; hooghe and marks 2018). moreover, these developments seem consistent with the increasing politicisation of issues other than the economic left-right in the most recent period in italy and in the rest of europe (giannetti, pedrazzani, and pinto 2017; kriesi et al. 2012). nonetheless, leaving aside the rhetoric of party leaders and possible media sensationalism, the formation of the so-called ‘government of change’ has undoubtedly introduced several novel elements into the italian political system. the first and most apparent ‘change’ with the past is the (almost) unprecedented nature of the coalition members. the conte government is supported by a ‘populist’ majority in the parliament, as the two coalition parties took strong anti-europe and anti-establishment stances before and after the elections. the distinction between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ (mudde 2004) is coupled with a call for instruments of direct democracy in the case of the m5s (bordignon and ceccarini 2013; corbetta 2017), and with nativist, anti-immigration attitudes in the case of the league (passarelli and tuorto 2018). in an attempt not to become part of the casta, the former seems to have retained some of its original characteristics and aspirations of radical renovation of the political process (tronconi 2018). the latter, which was previously known as the northern league (lega nord, ln), is indeed the oldest party in the italian party system. however, it chose to remain outside the government starting from the end of 2011, when technocrat mario monti was appointed pm during the most acute phase of the economic crisis. under the leadership of salvini, the league gradually turned from a federalist party to a typical nationalist, radical right force. in the 2018 elections, both the m5s and the league succeeded in channelling citizens’ frustrations with italian traditional parties and with the european union (eu) (itanes 2018; valbruzzi and vignati 2018). a second point of discontinuity regards the peculiar ministerial composition of the conte cabinet, where a number of technocrats stand beside ministers coming from the two ‘populist’ coalition parties. to begin with, the two ruling parties chose as pm a virtually unknown figure without any previous political or parliamentary experience. the appointment of a non-partisan pm is not new in italy. however, unlike carlo azeglio ciampi, lamberto dini and monti – who headed a semi-technocratic cabinet in 1993 and fully technocratic cabinets in 1995 and 2011, respectively –conte is neither a high-ranking bureaucrat nor a renowned economist. his primary task seems to be that of ensuring coordination between the two coalition partners in the course of day-to-day policymaking. as a whole, the yellow-green cabinet has a strong technocratic connotation, as it presents the highest share of ‘technical’ ministerial personnel among all the italian partisan governments (valbruzzi 2018). besides the pm office, five of the nineteen ministerial positions were given to non-partisan figures. in particular, to ensure the credibility of italy abroad, two independents were appointed in the key portfolios of foreign affairs and economy. the latter element is actually in line with the past, as the economic portfolios of italian governments have been heavily controlled by non-partisan ministers since the 1990s (verzichelli and cotta 2018). however, the ministerial personnel of the m5s-league cabinet exhibits the highest degree of volatility – i.e., a share of ministers belonging to parties that were not in power in the previous cabinet – in italy’s post-war history (calossi and cicchi 2018). ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 3 compared with the usual patterns of government formation in italy, the presence of a formal coalition contract represents a third innovation. the government formation process bringing to the conte cabinet was similar to the process leading to the letta cabinet in many respects. just as in the spring of 2013, the yellow-green government coalition was not based on an alliance formed before the election, but was built after a long bargaining period in which one of the pre-electoral coalitions was broken and the president of the republic played a crucial role (curini and pinto 2017). yet, for the first time in italian republican history, the yellow-green cabinet relies upon a formal postelectoral contract signed by the leaders of the coalition parties. while absent until 1994, some forms of coalition agreements made their appearance in italy during the second republic. however, these were much less formalised than the coalition treaties that can be found in other european countries. in fact, they were simply the joint electoral manifesto that the winning coalition had issued before the election (cotta and marangoni 2015; moury 2013). the coalition contract between the m5s and the league is more similar to the pacts that are common in countries like belgium, germany and the netherlands. not only is it a public document officially signed by the two party leaders after the election, but it also sets up mechanisms for handling possible conflicts within the coalition along with a list of policy priorities. shifting the focus from the executive to legislative institutions, a fourth change with the recent past is a regained congruence in the partisan composition of the two houses of the italian parliament. while being almost perfectly congruent throughout the first republic, starting from 1994 the chamber of deputies and the senate had increasingly diverged in terms of the distribution of seats among parties owing to the electoral reforms of 1993 and, above all, of 2005 (zucchini 2013). as a result, less than half of the cabinets from 1994 onward controlled a majority of seats in both houses(pedrazzani 2017). the new electoral system used in march 2018 – the rosato law – produced very limited distortion in the translation of votes into seats (chiaramonte and d’alimonte 2018), creating two congruent houses in terms of partisan composition. consequently, the conte government is a minimal winning coalition in both the chamber and the senate. finally, a fifth novelty in the political landscape under the yellow-green cabinet deals with the big policy reforms that the m5s’s and league’s leaders pledged to enhance. during the electoral campaign, the m5s promised a universal scheme of basic income while the league outlined a block of immigration and tax cuts in the form of a flat tax on income. both parties were committed to repealing several policy measures adopted by previous governments: among these, an unpopular pension restructuring that was enacted under the monti executive and a controversial law increasing compulsory vaccinations that was approved under the outgoing gentiloni cabinet. although the leaders of m5s and the league did not openly declare to be willing to abandon the euro currency, they also vowed to use tough tactics to force the other eu members to accept italy’s new spending plans. the reforms promised by the yellow-green coalition would then radically change the status quo in several crucial policy domains. why this special issue for all the above-mentioned reasons, the birth of the ‘government of change’ can be a true turning point in the most recent evolution of the italian political system. moreover, the pedrazzani, introduction to the special issue 4 ‘populist’ government coalition formed in italy can be an extremely interesting object of study also in comparative perspective. the aim of this special issue is to shed some initial light on the new political phase under the m5s-league government. we make no claim to provide a comprehensive account of the formation, dynamics and policy production of the new cabinet, as just a few months have passed since its swearing in on 1 june 2018. nonetheless, this special issue can offer to the scholarly community in italy and abroad some analytic tools and initial empirical findings to develop further research. the special issue consists of seven research articles analysing a number of topics related to the functioning of the italian political system under the ‘government of change’: the traits of the new parliamentary class elected in march 2018, the restructuring in the party system and in the space of party competition, the organisational evolution of the m5s in its route to power, the differences and commonalities of the two ruling parties along new salient dimensions of competition and in terms of their behaviour in parliament, the characteristics of the coalition contract upon which the yellow-green government is based, and some initial assessment of the way the m5s and the league are about to implement the new policy priorities in the government’s agenda. in spite of the different theoretical and methodological approaches, all the articles offer fresh, descriptive (but theory grounded) accounts that help us to understand italian politics under the ‘government of change’. on the whole, this special issue can give some useful hints about the degree of cohesiveness of the yellow-green government and the issues that might put the coalition under strain. content and findings of the special issue the analysis of the italian political system under the ‘government of change’ provided by this special issue starts with an evaluation of some key characteristics of the parliament which gave birth to that government – in particular, the traits of the new parliamentary class elected in march 2018. in their article, bruno marino, nicola martocchia diodati and luca verzichelli analyse data on members of the chamber of deputies taken from the database of the centre for the study of political change (circap), showing that the general elections of 2018 did not engender any radical renewal of italian parliamentary class. the authors put forward a typology of members of parliament (mps) based on their previous experience at the local government level, career within the party and parliamentary seniority, which is used as an analytical tool to explore patterns of elite recruitment and circulation. although a noticeable number of fresh new parliamentarians were elected in march 2018 (especially within the m5s ranks), well-established politicians at the national level currently represent more than half of italian deputies. newcomers are almost absent in the league’s group, where experience in sub-national governments or in the local party appears to be extremely relevant in order to be recruited and become an mp. for most italian parties, mps who are more experienced and central in the party organisation also benefited from the use of multi-candidacies in the last election. with regard to the selection of parliamentary and ministerial offices, the analysis reveals that, in spite of parties’ rhetoric associated with the ‘government of change’, the patterns adopted by the two coalition partners are rather traditional. the most prestigious offices tend to be given to those mps who had already been elected in 2013 in the case of the m5s, and to top-experienced politicians in the case of the league. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 5 a crucial task in a study of italian politics under the ‘government of change’ is to understand the very birth of the yellow-green cabinet in light of well-grounded theoretical perspectives developed in the scholarly literature on government formation. to this purpose, the article by daniela giannetti, andrea pedrazzani and luca pinto offers an account of the formation of the conte cabinet based on a spatial approach to party competition and on the policy-seeking motivations of the parties involved in the coalition bargaining process. the authors assess the dimensionality of italian policy space and build bi-dimensional maps of party competition on the basis of the salience parties attribute to various issues and the parties’ positions on those issues. the analysis relies on original expert survey data on italian parties collected by the authors following the election of march 2018. the 2018 data are compared with similar data covering italian national elections since 2001. as the authors point out, the formation of the m5s-league cabinet can hardly be explained if we assume that the classical economic left-right represented the main axis of party competition in the general election of 2018. indeed, the policy platforms of the two ruling parties are far from each other in economic terms. however, a diachronic analysis highlights dramatic changes in italy’s policy space, with a decline of economic issues and a significant rise in the salience of non-economic issues such as european integration and immigration. the formation of the conte government was then decisively influenced by long-term processes in italian politics, and can be explained in light of the policy positions held by the m5s and the league on non-economic domains. the differences and commonalities between the m5s and the league are investigated more in depth by two articles in this special issue. one of these is the contribution by benedetta carlotti and stella gianfreda, who analyse how two highly politicised topics connected to the general integration-demarcation cleavage – the eu and immigration – are framed by the two coalition partners in the legislative arena. the authors outline a multi-dimensional (re-)conceptualisation of the eu and immigration issues aimed at untangling the various specific aspects of these two multi-faceted dimensions. to assess possible differences between the two coalition parties in the political arguments used to frame european integration and immigration, an original dataset was constructed comprising the legislative speeches delivered by m5s and league representatives in the italian and european parliament. the data, which cover debates held between may 2014 and december 2016, were coded through computer-assisted discourse analysis. results highlight that m5s legislators tend to emphasise an anti-elite position when talking about immigration and the eu, while the league’s speeches reflect more of a cultural-identitarian and sovereigntist framing strategy. in particular, the league opposes immigration, relying most of all on arguments related to nativism and law and order logics. moreover, salvini’s party criticises the eu from a typically sovereigntist point of view, whereby supra-national institutions are blamed for seizing fundamental decision-making powers from the member states. conversely, the m5s frames its opposition to european integration by stressing the lack of democratic accountability of the eu-level elites, while m5s’s speeches about immigration tend to focus on the mismanagement of the refugee crisis. the analysis also shows the movement’s adaptation to different institutional settings, as its members frame immigration-related topics using distinct arguments in the italian parliament and in the european parliament. such differences in how the two parties pedrazzani, introduction to the special issue 6 position themselves on the integration-demarcation dimension can point to possible ‘wedges’ in the current governing coalition in italy. the common traits and differences between the two ruling parties are the primary object of study of another contribution in this special issue. in particular, the article by elisabetta de giorgi and antónio dias compares the legislative activities of the m5s and the league when these parties entered parliament as new challengers. as underlined by the authors, the m5s entered the italian parliament after the start of the great recession. similarly, the (northern) league had crossed the representation threshold more than twenty years previously, amid italy’s political and economic crisis of the late 1980s-early 1990s. the authors apply social network analysis to bill proposals in order to empirically evaluate the extent to which each of the two parties cooperated with other opposition groups during its first term in the italian parliament – that is, the 1992-1994 legislature for the league and the 2013-2018 legislature for the m5s. the analysed patterns of bill cosponsorship in the chamber of deputies highlight strong similarities in the legislative behaviour of the m5s and the league when they first entered parliament as new challengers, as both parties chose to stand apart from the other parliamentary groups, whether in government or in opposition. such a strategy served the same purpose: both the m5s and the league sought to present themselves to voters as an alternative to all the existing political parties. interestingly, under salvini the league revived this strategy in the 2013-2018 legislature, in an attempt to (re-)build for itself a reputation as an anti-establishment political force. altogether, these findings suggest that the new ‘relational’ dimension investigated by the authors – i.e., the patterns of cooperation with other parties in the legislative arena – can be fruitfully employed as a further dimension of analysis in future research on new challenger parties. whereas the league has long experience in political institutions and has consequently been extensively studied by scholars in italy and abroad, the m5s is a much newer political actor and hence is a much less known subject in the political science literature. to help fill this gap, the article by davide vittori provides a theory-grounded account of the organisational evolution of the movement from its early days before the economic crisis to its participation in the conte executive. in analysing the transformation of the m5s from a challenger party into a government member, the author makes a compelling comparison with the greek syriza, whose route to power has been very similar to that of the m5s in spite of a different ideological profile. as demonstrated in the article, for these two (formerly) anti-establishment parties, elections represented a crucial factor for bringing change within the party organisation. although a link between electoral shocks and internal reforms is normally found also in the case of mainstream parties, for syriza and the m5s party change was triggered by an unexpected good performance (in 2012 and 2013, respectively) rather than by an electoral defeat. following electoral breakthrough, both policy-seeking syriza and democracy-seeking m5s became more oriented towards a purely vote-seeking strategy. in both cases, internal reforms were introduced in an attempt to anticipate future challenges coming from a new electoral shock – i.e., an even better electoral result and possible participation in the government. the author also underlines that organisational changes in syriza and the m5s followed the same pattern characterising mainstream parties, as centralisation was strengthened and the institutionalisation process was steered by the most powerful party face at the time of the ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 7 internal reform. in the case of the m5s, internal reforms reinforced a structure based on dual leadership: an organisational leadership (the internet and publishing company casaleggio associati) that controls the party in central office, and a political leadership (di maio, who has replaced belle grillo) that controls the party in public office. in many respects, then, anti-establishment parties do not really differ from mainstream parties when it comes to taking or managing power. as discussed above, the presence of a formal post-electoral contract between the m5s and the league undoubtedly represents a major innovation in the patterns of government formation in italy. the article by josé santana-pereira and catherine moury is devoted precisely to such an agreement, which was dubbed ‘contract for the government of change’ (contratto per il governo del cambiamento) by its drafters. as the authors stress, the coalition agreement at the basis of the yellow-green coalition is exceptional in several ways in the italian context: it is the first post-electoral coalition treaty in italy’s republican history, and came out of negotiations between parties that had very different policy priorities and no record of cooperation in the past. in this article, the 2018 coalition contract is compared with former coalition documents adopted in italy since the mid-1990s as well as with the party manifestos issued by the m5s and the league before the 2018 general elections. during the italian second republic, the joint electoral programme of the winning pre-electoral coalition – often a long, comprehensive but vague document – served also as a bargaining platform for the government. although no less vague, the m5sleague agreement contrasts with those documents because it was formalised after the election and was specifically conceived of as a programmatic basis for the government. both the m5s and the league had to compromise in the 2018 contract, in which they also toned down their euroscepticism. altogether, the authors suggest that the lack of precision in the coalition contract may grant a great deal of autonomy to cabinet ministers in the course of the legislative term. certainly, the label ‘government of change’ itself hints at big policy reforms that, according to the public pledges of the m5s’s and league’s leaders, the conte cabinet is willing to bring about. since just six months have passed since the birth of the government, it is of course too early to evaluate the implementation of its new policy agenda. however, some initial clue about how the two coalition partners are about to enact the promised changes can already be found. in this regard, the final article in this special issue deals with one of the policy fields in which the yellow-green government is supposed to alter the status quo – that is, childhood vaccination. in particular, mattia casula and federico toth analyse how the two ruling parties are coping with a possible reform of the controversial ‘lorenzin decree’, which was approved in 2017 and increased the number of compulsory vaccinations. as illustrated by the authors, both the m5s and the league are in favour of modifying the lorenzin decree, but they do not agree on the strategy to be followed. the article provides a rich account of the debate surrounding mandatory vaccination in italy, a topic that has divided both the public opinion and the political parties. in this debate, the m5s was apparently on the same side of the league, although the former seemed to wink at the so-called ‘no vax’ movement, and the latter held a much more pragmatic position. in addition, the authors formulate some plausible hypotheses about how the yellow-green government will tackle the issue of infant vaccinations, suggesting that the choice will probably depend on the balance of power within the coalition. pedrazzani, introduction to the special issue 8 although focusing on a single policy topic, this article may be useful for understanding how the m5s-league coalition will deal with other controversial issues such as the construction of high-speed rail networks (tav) and the building of a natural gas pipeline (tap) on italian territory. open issues and avenues for future research summing up, the articles of this special issue have sketched a tentative account of the italian political system under the ‘government of change’. although a number of crucial topics have been touched upon, the picture is of course far from being complete. this is because just a few months have passed since the swearing in of the conte executive. moreover, a final word on the functioning of the political system under the m5s-league government cannot be provided as italy’s political situation is still evolving in many respects. in particular, several important issues remain uncertain and may open up avenues for future enquiry. first, the italian party system may undergo further transformations. at the time of writing, it seems indeed hard to tell whether the tripolar party system that has emerged since 2013 will stabilise or a new bipolar phase will begin. in this regard, much will depend on the electoral rules as well as on the relevance of the ‘integration-demarcation’ cleavage, whose salience appears to have increased in italy in the most recent period. second, the fundamental actors in the party system are themselves subject to a process of internal change: the m5s is experiencing the evolution from an anti-establishment political force to a government party, the league seems oriented to fully becoming a right-wing party seeking votes on the entire national territory, the pd is in search of a new leader and fi is coping with the decline of its historical leader. third, the possible duration of the m5s-league cabinet is uncertain. on the one hand, tensions in the dayto-day relationships between the two coalition parties are not unexpected. on the other hand, the outcome of the european parliament election of may 2019 can open up new possibilities for either the m5s or the league, which can undermine the stability of the government. fourth, and related to the former point, it is unclear which model of decision-making will prevail in the coalition. while a prime ministerial model does not seem to apply to the conte cabinet, it is probably too early to know whether individual ministers are left free to set policy in their department or ministerial discretion is somehow mitigated through specific mechanisms. so far, a lot of ‘position-taking’ activity can be observed, as salvini and di maio tend to publicly take positions that please their own party constituency, sometimes in spite of the agreed-on coalition compromise. at the same time, the ‘conciliation committee’, an instrument specifically established for settling intra-cabinet divergences, does not seem to have been used yet to enforce the m5s-league contract. the most severe conflicts within the coalition are handled through semi-informal meetings involving di maio, salvini and the pm, and possibly other key ministers. fifth, at the time of writing it is not possible to know if the ‘government of change’ will indeed be able to enact the promised radical policy reforms. the process of approval of the government’s budgetary bill that is currently taking place in the italian parliament is highlighting not only the importance of external ‘hurdles’ such as economic and financial constraints, but also the policy divergences between the two coalition partners. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 9 furthermore, the implementation of the coalition treaty can be hindered by the appearance of unexpected new issues on the policy agenda. finally, it is not clear whether the government will try to make only reforms at the policy level or it will also – and more ambitiously – attempt to change the ‘rules of the game’, modifying the electoral system and the constitution. references bordignon, fabio and luigi ceccarini. 2013. ‘five stars and a cricket. beppe grillo shakes italian politics’. south european society and politics 18(4):427–49. calossi, enrico and lorenzo cicchi. 2018. ‘the italian party system’s three functional arenas after the 2018 election: the tsunami after the earthquake’. journal of modern italian studies 23(4):437–59. chiaramonte, alessandro and roberto d’alimonte. 2018. ‘the new italian electoral system and its effects on strategic coordination and disproportionality’. italian political science 13(1). chiaramonte, alessandro and vincenzo emanuele. 2017. ‘party system volatility, regeneration and de-institutionalization in western europe (1945–2015)’. party politics 23(4):376–88. corbetta, piergiorgio, ed. 2017. m5s. come cambia il partito di grillo. bologna: il mulino. cotta, maurizio and francesco marangoni. 2015. il governo. bologna: il mulino. curini, luigi and luca pinto. 2017. l’arte di fare (e disfare) i governi. milano: egea. giannetti, daniela, andrea pedrazzani, and luca pinto. 2017. ‘party system change in italy: politicising the eu and the rise of eccentric parties’. south european society and politics 22(1):21–42. hernández, enrique and hanspeter kriesi. 2016. ‘the political consequences of the financial and economic crisis in europe: electoral punishment and popular protest’. european journal of political research 55(2):203–24. hooghe, liesbet and gary marks. 2018. ‘cleavage theory meets europe’s crises: lipset, rokkan, and the transnational cleavage’. journal of european public policy 25(1):109–35. itanes. 2018. vox populi. il voto ad alta voce del 2018. bologna: il mulino. kriesi, hanspeter et al. 2012. political conflict in western europe. cambridge: cambridge university press. moury, catherine. 2013. coalition government and party mandate. how coalition agreements constrain ministerial action. london: routledge. mudde, cas. 2004. ‘the populist zeitgeist’. government and opposition 39(4):542–63. passarelli, gianluca and dario tuorto. 2018. la lega di salvini. estrema destra di governo. bologna: il mulino. pedrazzani, andrea. 2017. fare le leggi nella seconda repubblica. come cambia il parlamento. milano: egea. tronconi, filippo. 2018. ‘the italian five star movement during the crisis: towards normalisation?’ south european society and politics 23(1):163–80. valbruzzi, marco. 2018. ‘when populists meet technocrats. the italian innovation in government formation’. journal of modern italian studies 23(4):460–80. valbruzzi, marco and rinaldo vignati, eds. 2018. il vicolo cieco. le elezioni del 4 marzo 2018. bologna: il mulino. pedrazzani, introduction to the special issue 10 verzichelli, luca and maurizio cotta. 2018. ‘shades of technocracy: the variable use of nonpartisan ministers in italy’. pp. 77–110 in technocratic ministers and political leadership in european democracies, edited by a. costa pinto, m. cotta, and p. tavares de almeida. palgrave macmillan. zucchini, francesco. 2013. la repubblica dei veti. un’analisi spaziale del mutamento legislativo in italia. milano: egea. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_6.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 92 contact author: josé santana pereira, iscte – instituto universitário de lisboa. e-mail address: jose.santana.pereira@gmail.com planning the ‘government of change’: the 2018 italian coalition agreement in comparative perspective josé santana pereira iscte – instituto universitário de lisboa catherine moury universidade nova de lisboa abstract coalition agreements in the italian second republic have traditionally been pre-electoral, often long, comprehensive but vague documents serving also as electoral manifestos for centre-right or centre-left coalitions. in this article, we analyse the 2018 post-electoral coalition agreement between the movimento cinque stelle and lega in comparative perspective, contrasting this agreement with former coalition programmes enforced since the mid-1990s in italy and the pre-election manifestos published by these two political parties. the analysis reported here allows us to conclude that the first post-electoral coalition agreement in italy is shorter than most centre-left documents, as vague as previous agreements, and constitutes a compromise committing the lega to less right-wing positions, the ‘grillini’ to less progressive stances, and both political forces to tone down their euroscepticism. the extent to which these commitments are solid and longstanding is unknown. 1. introduction oalition agreements are binding written documents composed of policy intentions endorsed by parties involved in a coalition government solution before they take office, thus constituting a key feature of coalition governance (strøm and müller 1999, müller and strøm 2000, 2008, moury and timmermans 2013). initially seen by the coalition politics literature as window dressing, composed of general statements aimed at winning everyone’s agreement (e.g. luebbert 1986, laver and budge 1992), more recent empirical research has portrayed coalition agreements rather differently, stressing their importance both in communicating with voters and binding the decision-making process within the coalition (e.g. müller and strøm 2000, 2008, timmermans 2006, moury 2013, eichorst 2014). italy has often been the focus of individual or comparative studies of coalition agreements (e.g. moury, 2010, 2011a, moury and timmermans 2008, 2013). the country has been described as an underdeveloped system of coalition agreements, unlike polities such as belgium and the netherlands (vassallo 2007, moury and timmermans 2008). this is both due to the number of coalition agreements drafted (virtually none during the first republic and only four since 1994) and the features of the negotiation process (moury, 2010, 2011a). it is noteworthy that, with the exception of the 2018 document, coalition c ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 93 agreements in italy have been pre-electoral, serving as electoral manifestos and, when victory is secured, as a bargained basis for government. the 2018 coalition agreement, dubbed contratto per il governo del cambiamento (contract for the government of change) by its drafters movimento cinque stelle (m5s, five star movement) and lega (league), is an exceptional document in the italian context both due to its post-electoral nature and the distinct nature of the parties involved in the negotiation. the former is an anti-establishment populist party not easily positioned in the left-right continuum (d’alimonte 2013), while the latter, under the leadership of matteo salvini, abandoned its pro-north stance and became a classic nationalist radical right-wing party (tarchi 2018). except for their euroscepticism and populist stances and style, these parties are ideologically quite distinct, and during the campaign both had refused the possibility of reaching an agreement after the election. the aim of this article is to report a comparative analysis of this exceptional 2018 post-election coalition agreement in italy, resorting to existing knowledge on the nature and features of these agreements in italy and elsewhere. this article is structured as follows. first, we review the main steps of the coalition agreement specification process and the core roles that these documents fulfil in terms of coalition governance and electoral politics. second, we present an overview of coalition agreements in the italian second republic before 2018 and discuss the literature that explored them in longitudinal and comparative terms. we then describe the 2018 coalition formation process and the contents of the m5s-lega coalition agreement, comparing some of its features to those of previous documents and also to the electoral manifestos published by the incumbent parties during the campaign. the article ends with some remarks on the future prospects of the incumbent coalition. 2. coalition agreements: goals and process coalition agreements are, in several consensual democracies, a common instrument of coalition governance. strøm and müller (1999) show that, in a sample of 223 western european coalition cabinets in office between 1945 and 1996, 61 per cent have produced an identifiable coalition agreement, more often after the elections (post-electoral agreements took place almost two-thirds of the time) than before election day. their longitudinal analysis disclosed that there is a trend of greater use of coalition agreements over time, with the proportion of coalitions based on written agreements shifting from less than 50 per cent in the late 1940s to 70 per cent in the early 1990s. when coalitional agreements are pre-electoral, they have an important informative role during the campaign. electoral manifestos are assumed to be the best indicators of what parties communicate to the voters, not because voters actually read them, but because they determine the political discourse of party officials (klingemann et al. 1994). in ireland and the netherlands, for instance, media coverage of the campaign often includes a considerable amount of information on the specific pledges of the main political parties (timmermans 2003, costello and thomson 2008). the importance of this informative role is linked with the ‘promissory representation model’ by mansbridge (2003). the model describes a system where voters choose parties according to the policies they propose and, once in power, the parties enact these policies. consequently, it is the voters’ choice in the santana pereira and moury, planning the ‘government of change’ 94 elections that indirectly controls political decisions, given that the political party fulfils their pledges (pierce, 1999, klingemann et al. 1994, royed 1996, thomson 2001). the communicational or advertising role of coalition agreements is important during the electoral campaign (in the case of pre-electoral agreements, such as those of the italian second republic until 2018) but also afterwards, since ‘voters can use them to make relatively accurate predictions regarding the direction of government policy, and retrospectively judge the completion of those promises that served as the basis of the coalition’ (eichorst, 2014, p. 99). it is therefore not surprising to find that more than 80 per cent of the coalition agreements drafted by western european coalitions in the second half of the twentieth century were intended for publication (strøm and müller 1999). coalition agreements also serve a second, perhaps more important, purpose: they list the policy intentions to which the parties in the coalition are committed, binding them to this commitment. in strøm and müller’s (1999) words, such an agreement is ‘the most authoritative document that constrains party behaviour’ (pp.263-265). parties anticipate conflict and commit to deals on major policy issues, while maintaining the ability to differentiate their party positions over issues that were not included in the agreement. in most countries, common policy platforms effectively help coalition parties to accommodate their differences and produce decisions (de winter et al. 2000; timmermans 2006). in terms of coalition performance, these agreements include policy conflicts, commit parties to their contents, are key instruments in reducing within-party and interparty conflict (namely by limiting agency loss in the process of delegation from parties to individual ministers), are good predictors of the legislative agenda and a majority of the testable claims within these documents become formal cabinet decisions (timmermans 2003, walgrave et al. 2006, moury and timmermans 2008, müller and strøm 2008, moury 2011a, 2013). coalition agreements are mostly devoted to policy deals, but may also contain other relevant compromises, such as the procedural rules the coalition partners agree to respect and the distribution of offices and competencies. in the cited strøm and müller’s (1999) comparative work, portuguese and austrian agreements devoted on average almost onethird of their space to laying out the procedural rules of the coalitional game, while references to the distribution of offices and competences between the coalition partners are much less common. but how do coalition agreements come to be? in countries in which coalitions are common, the formation of coalition governments is preceded by extensive negotiations, led by party leaders who often become ministers and are subsequently designated to guide the cabinet’s actions. often, the main negotiators for the coalition agreements are party leaders, accompanied by party members who are experts in different policy domains and are subsequently given cabinet portfolios (müller and strøm 2000). the resulting document is then presented to the parties for ratification. this process fosters commitment due to two reasons: first, drafters of the coalition agreement, as party leaders, can impose commitment to the ratified document; second, ministers who participate in the drafting of the document internalize the deals, being therefore more likely to implement them (timmermans 2006). in the next section we show that in the case of italy the patterns of coalition agreement specification have often been different. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 95 3. coalition agreements in italy in the italian first republic, party leaders usually dedicated much more attention to the allocation of ministries than the definition of policy, given the executive’s difficulty in controlling its own parliamentary majority and adopting significant reforms (di palma 1977). unsurprisingly, coalition agreements were virtually non-existent in italy until the mid-1990s (strøm and müller1999). the electoral reform of 1993 profoundly changed the italian political system, having a strong impact in terms of party system and electoral competition dynamics (bartolini et al. 2004). the first republic was over, and a second republic was born. in the succeeding elections, two coalitions (centre-left and centreright) were presented to the voters, often with a common electoral platform. this manifesto fulfilled the role of coalition agreement for the winners of the 1996, 2001 and 2006 elections. the first coalition agreement in the italian second republic was prepared and implemented by the prodi i government (1996-1998). after losing the 1994 election, the partito democratico della sinistra (pds, democratic party of the left) decided to open up to the centre and accepted romano prodi’s proposal of a coalition between several parties, named ulivo (olive tree) (di virgilio 1996). six months before the elections, prodi and a group of seven ‘wise men’ started to prepare the common electoral programme: the ‘tesi dell’ulivo’. none of these former technocratic ministers and university professors had a leading role in their parties, but all became ministers. this ambitious and very long programme (more than 40,000 words), covering a broad range of issues, was presented to the pre-electoral coalition parties’ congresses for ratification. it was rejected by three small parties, which, nevertheless, stayed in the coalition and obtained seats in government (moury 2011a). the second coalition agreement (berlusconi ii) was drafted before the general election of june 2001 by the six parties comprising the casa delle libertà (house of freedoms) coalition: silvio berlusconi’s forza italia (fi; forward italy), the post-fascist alleanza nazionale (an, national alliance), the right-wing ethno-regionalist lega nord (ln, northern league) and three other very small parties. this centre-right coalition presented several electoral programmes, including a letter to the italian people (sent to centre-right activists and published on fi’s website) and a contract with the italian people (signed live on television by berlusconi himself), composed of five broad pledges and berlusconi's commitment to abandon politics in the case of non-fulfilment. the official coalition agreement was, however, published only a few days before the elections, after centre-left politicians had accused fi of not having a programme. this comparatively short manifesto (less than 10,000 words) was later recognized by all coalition parties as their official manifesto, but never formally ratified by their rank and file. it represented a compromise between fi and the other parties, with the country’s federalization (‘devolution’), ln’s central claim, included in the programme along with certain elements of the other parties’ demands (diamanti 2007, moury 2010, 2011a). the prodi ii coalition agreement was enacted by the government elected in 2006, based on a coalition between the former ulivo partners and other parties, for a total of nine independent political forces with considerable ideological differences. the extremely long (92,000 words) coalition agreement of this unione (union) was prepared one year before the elections by its disputed leader, romano prodi. he coordinated santana pereira and moury, planning the ‘government of change’ 96 several workshops aimed at drafting the programme, which was finally amended by prodi, party leaders and specialists, being ratified by all coalition members except one (moury 2010). the history of formal pre-electoral coalition agreements ends here. the 2008 elections gave the victory to popolo della libertà (pdl), resulting from the merger of fi and an, coalescing only with the ln. there was no pre-electoral agreement, as both parties drafted their independent manifestos. by and large, the pdl’s programme was adopted, with a few fundamental claims by the lega. berlusconi himself, together with a handful of future cabinet members, conducted a very hierarchical process, generating a short document (nine pages) with specific proposals. the governments that followed have not produced coalition agreements. as mentioned above, there is a difference in the process of coalition agreement drafting in italy, when compared with the common practice of consensual democracies such as the netherlands or belgium. to be sure, the process has seldom included all coalition party leaders and the documents have rarely been ratified by party bodies. as we have seen, the common manifesto of the prodi i government was drafted by prodi himself and a group of seven experts that did not include the party leaders, though they all became ministers. negotiators internalized the policies included in the document but lacked the authority to impose a strong commitment to these deals. also, the fact that some coalition parties refused to ratify the resulting manifesto paved the way for disloyal behaviour afterwards. the formulation of the prodi ii common manifesto resembled the common practice in countries such as belgium and the netherlands more closely, as it involved both experts and party leaders, most of whom became members of the cabinet. nevertheless, again, not all parties ratified the document which had been prepared over one year of negotiations. instead, the berlusconi ii agreement was mainly drafted by berlusconi’s collaborators, in just seven days, and was not formally ratified by the other coalition partners. in terms of fulfilment of pledges in the coalition agreements, italian institutional features are seen as obstacles: the constitution, the electoral law and the parliamentary procedure rules contribute to the existence of two parliamentary chambers with inconsistent majorities, in which each law must be passed and within which individual mps and group leaders and committees enjoy substantial prerogatives (capano and giuliani 2003). additionally, researchers have shown that congruence – measured by party seat distribution or legislative data such as the time for adopting legislation in both chambers – has declined since 2001 (zucchini 2008, pedrazzani 2017). interestingly enough, moury (2013) shows that almost all (former) ministers or junior ministers she interviewed feel constrained, at least to some extent, by the coalition agreement when making decisions, a finding that underlines the relevance of the institutional framework as a constraining factor. but just how limited has pledge fulfilment been? looking at the prodi i and ii and berlusconi ii governments, moury (2010) observed that important pledges, recurrently emphasized during the campaign, were not adopted. governments fulfilled – at least partially – on average half of all their pledges, with a minimum for the short-lived prodi i cabinet (40.7 per cent) and a maximum for berlusconi ii (58.7 per cent). unsurprisingly, the fulfilment score of the prodi i and ii governments, which were minority (or quasi-minority) governments that did not ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 97 complete their mandates, is lower than that of the berlusconi ii government, which relied on a large parliamentary majority and lasted four years. nevertheless, in a comparative study of coalition agreements and records in italy, belgium and the netherlands, moury (2011b) found that around 60 per cent of all cabinet decisions originated in the coalition agreements, this figure being similar for the seven coalitions analysed (including the prodi i and berlusconi ii governments). the remarkable difference in length between common centre-left and centre-right manifestos illustrates their different approach in addressing voters: in the first case, long before the elections, voters are presented with a book-length document – obviously very difficult to read and understand; in the second, a few days before election day, citizens receive a short and well-structured programme through the mailbox. interestingly enough, in a comparative study of coalition agreements in belgium, the netherlands, italy and germany, the italian documents are outliers due to their dimension – the prodi ii document is the largest of the eleven considered, and the berlusconi ii agreement the second shortest (moury and timmermans 2013). not surprisingly, long documents like these are remarkably complete; however, they tend to lack precision (moury 2010). although the prodi i and ii and berlusconi ii coalition agreements contained more pledges than the average (due, of course, to their length), they also had a lower number of very precise pledges: an average of 13%, vis-à-vis a total average of almost 40% in the eleven documents analysed in moury and timmermans’s (2013) comparative study. this inverse relationship between size and precision in the italian documents may be due to the fact that these are pre-electoral agreements, which discourages parties from presenting the voters with clear commitments on key issues – and thus risking punishment by the electorate (moury and timmermans 2013). coalition agreements have been, of course, different for centre-right and centre-left coalitions not only in communication terms but also with regard to coalition governance. the centre-left, due to the fragmentation of the coalitions, was very aware of the necessity to draft a long and precise coalition agreement in order to foster the efficiency of the governmental and legislative decision-making process. on the centre-right, given the larger ideological coherence of the coalition and the lower number of actors involved, the question on whether ministers and mps committed to the coalition programme was indeed less of an issue. nevertheless, their role in terms of management of interpartypolicy conflict has been portrayed as inefficient. given the nature of the negotiating process, italian common manifestos do not represent an obligation for parliamentary parties to deliver. conflict is often followed by non-decision, even when disagreement regards deals included in the coalition agreement (moury 2010). finally, it is worth noting that coalition agreements are not the only tool for a coalition to put its priorities on the agenda: government speeches might serve a similar purpose. the prime minister, before the investiture, has to deliver official speeches in the lower and upper house. on both occasions, the premier expounds in detail the government’s future policy proposals and, after each speech, party representatives are allowed to speak and comment (curini 2011). this investiture speech addresses a wide range of issues that disclose policy proposals of the future government (ieraci 2006, cotta and marangoni 2015). in that line, for example, borghetto and al. (2017) have santana pereira and moury, planning the ‘government of change’ 98 shown that governments with different ideologies will prioritize different policy issues in their government speeches. 4. the 2018 coalition agreement in the italian general election of 4 march 2018, no political group or party was able to secure an outright majority. the centre-right alliance composed of silvio berlusconi’s fi, matteo salvini’s lega and giorgia meloni’s fratelli d’italia (fdi, brothers of italy, named after the country’s national anthem) won a plurality of seats in the chamber of deputies and the senate, while the m5s, led by luigi di maio, was the party with the largest number of votes (paparo 2018). no clear government solution arose from these elections, and a process of almost three months of negotiations was necessary for the formation of a coalition cabinet. during this period, several possibilities – including new elections or the establishment of a technical government – were discussed. both di maio and salvini asked for the president to recognize their prerogatives as formateurs as, respectively, leaders of the most voted party and pre-electoral coalition. the m5s assumed a leading role in the government formation process, and march-april saw the implementation of its ‘two oven’ (due forni) strategy, the grillini being open to negotiations both with the lega (but not the centre-right coalition as a whole) and the centre-left partito democratico (which was divided regarding this matter). in early may, lega and m5s asked the president for some additional time to come up with a government agreement. on 13 may, they reached an agreement about procedures and policies, described in a document entitled ‘contract for the government of change’ (contratto per il governo del cambiamento), but an agreement on who would be the prime minister and the other cabinet members was harder to reach. the final version of this document1 was published on 18 may and approved by a majority of the m5s and lega electorates (in online and offline consultations, respectively) shortly afterwards. the process of coalition agreement drafting was, of course, rather different from the ones described in the previous section. first, it took place after the elections and involved two political forces which were apparently rather unwilling to govern together, at least according to the declarations made during the election campaign. the agreement drafting process was much quicker than those of the prodi agreements (six months to one year), but nevertheless longer than the drafting of the definitive berlusconi ii agreement: di maio and salvini needed about three weeks to come up with their coalition government programme. while this is a relatively short period of time, it does not denote carelessness in this process, since, unlike the other italian agreements, drawn up from scratch, the m5s-lega contract was informed by the electoral manifestos and pledges of both parties before the elections. therefore, most of this time was presumably not spent in drafting realistic/sophisticated pledges but in reaching agreements regarding which individual party pledges could be adopted, in part or completely, by the coalition. the contratto per il governo del cambiamento is a 58-page, 18,500-word document covering 30 specific topics. in comparative terms, it is notably longer than the berlusconi ii agreement (twice as long) but shorter than the centre-left documents. the 1 available here: http://download.repubblica.it/pdf/2018/politica/contratto_governo.pdf. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 99 document focuses mainly on policy, but the first section is devoted to procedure: readers are informed of how cooperation between the two parties and their parliamentary groups will take place (for instance, there is a conciliation committee – comitato di conciliazione – to solve divergences and find agreement on controversial topics), as well as the political coordination with the european institutions. this section also comprises an ethical code for government members and the promise that the cabinet’s record will be assessed after the first half of the current legislature. the policy areas are not organized according to their relevance for the parties (as in the two parties’ electoral platforms)2, but in alphabetical order – from public water (acqua pubblica) to university and research (università e ricerca). the coalition agreement encompasses several concepts that are dear to the m5s, such as green economy, a state owned and controlled investment bank (even if the word bank appears between quotation marks), conflicts of interest, the reddito di cittadinanza (a sort of basic income policy), direct democracy and cuts in the ‘costs of politics’. instead, one of the main ideas of the lega’s electoral manifesto, the flat tax, is central in this coalition agreement, although two tax rates are proposed, instead of one, which is obviously a stretching of the flat tax concept. on issues such as pensions, the need to discuss european treaties or immigration, the ideas of both parties were congruent enough (even though lega tends to be more extreme and make these issues more salient in the public arena). the title of the section devoted to the last of these issues actually reproduces two m5s electoral platform sound bites: to end the ‘immigration business’ and the repatriation of irregular immigrants. as regards saliency attributed to specific issues, the analysis carried out by the istituto cattaneo3 shows that the coalition programme confers much less space to law and order issues (16.2 vs. 40 per cent of quasi-sentences) and much more to welfare and education (27.6 vs. 13.3 per cent) than the lega manifesto. instead, it devotes a smaller proportion of space to environmental issues than the m5s electoral programme. this same analysis places this coalition agreement almost to the centre within the left-right and pro-/anti-eu dimensions and shows that it is closer to the positions held by m5s that to those of the lega. the main features of this centrist position are the statist approach to welfare and the economy, a dilution of the most drastic securitarian measures initially proposed by salvini and a moderation of the euroscepticism present in both manifestos. nevertheless, the agreement moves away from m5s and becomes closer to lega on the progressive-conservative axis, resulting from the disappearance of the grillini’s expansion of a civil rights agenda. still according to the istituto cattaneo’s report, 56 per cent of the contents of this agreement are very general, which resonates with moury’s (2010) conclusion regarding the lack of precision of pre-electoral agreements in the italian second republic. indeed, most pledges are presented in a very general fashion, lacking precision, which will make pledge fulfilment assessments – by experts and the citizenry – rather tricky. generally speaking, vagueness is also the main trait of the investiture speech made by giuseppe 2 for instance, the first four topics of lega’s programme were the most salient issues for this party: taxes, pensions, immigration and europe. 3 available here: http://www.cattaneo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/analisi-istituto-cattaneo-ilgoverno-m5s-e-lega-23-maggio-2018-1.pdf. santana pereira and moury, planning the ‘government of change’ 100 conte in the two chambers of the italian parliament.4 however, a comparison between the 2018 coalition agreement and the electoral manifestos published by m5s and lega shows that the degree of concreteness of the former is considerably higher – in fact, about three in every four quasi-sentences5 in the electoral manifestos were generic. the coalition agreement is remarkably specific on issues such as law and order (in which the lega’s contribution is clear) and institutional and public administration reform (with one in every two quasi-sentences presenting policy proposals), and considerably vague on issues such as welfare, employment and foreign policy. the relative lack of precision in this agreement makes it less useful than necessary both in terms of communication with voters and coalition governance. not only do italian citizens not know exactly what to expect in several policy areas (namely welfare, employment and foreign policy), but also individual ministers from both parties have more room for manoeuvre, with the corollary risk of conflict and dissidence. the deplorable mid-october 2018 scandal over the pace fiscale agreement, with di maio accusing a ‘little hand’ of having changed the final law proposal in accordance with the lega’s initial stance on this issue, is an example of how easily dissidences and conflicts may arise and be made public in the current coalition cabinet. the generic nature of the coalition agreement also blurs analysis of the extent to which the coalition has governed in accordance with what was promised. this is despite political declarations such as those of the vice prime-minister di maio who states that in four months of government, half of the policies contained in the m5s manifesto6 had been delivered (interestingly enough, the comparison was made with his manifesto and not with the coalition agreement). 5. concluding remarks the 2018 italian coalition agreement is exceptional in several ways: it is the first postelectoral coalition agreement in the history of this consensual democracy, and required negotiations between parties that had no record of cooperation nor willingness to govern together, as well as completely different positions in the conservative-progressive and left-right policy dimensions, though being similarly eurosceptic.7 the post-electoral negotiations resulting from a hung parliament granting political prominence to m5s (the most voted party) and lega (the largest party within the most voted pre-electoral coalition), led to the establishment of an unexpected coalition cabinet and the publication of a comparatively long and complete, but imprecise, coalition agreement. the grillini seem to have been able to place the policy proposals closer to their own position in the left-wing spectrum, but the lega’s intervention in this process has caused the agreement to be more conservative and therefore more distant from the moderate to progressive 4 speech given on 5 june 2018, available here: https://documenti.camera.it/leg18/resoconti/assemblea/html/sed0011/stenografico.pdf. 5the istituto cattaneo adopted the concept of quasi-sentences used in the comparative manifesto project, meaning one bit of text regarding one specific political object. some natural sentences are quasisentences, others contain two or more quasi-sentences. 6 available here: https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2018/10/29/m5s-di-maio-vili-attacchi-contro-di-noirestiamo-compatti-come-una-testuggine-romana-chi-attacca-m5s-attacca-litalia/4727012/. 7 according to the analysis carried out by istituto cattaneo based on their 2018 electoral manifestos, available here: http://www.cattaneo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/analisi-istituto-cattaneo-il-govern o-m5s-e-lega-23-maggio-2018-1.pdf. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 101 m5s stances. these negotiations, and arguably the interventions of the president of the republic, has also caused both parties to shift from a position of blatant euroscepticism to a slightly more moderate critical stance towards the eu. in comparative terms, the 2018 coalition agreement is shorter than centre-left deals and longer than centre-right deals and resulted from a rather quick process which benefited from the fact that there were already two consolidated pre-election manifestos to work from. in spite of this, and similarly to the pre-electoral coalition agreements implemented in the previous two decades, the m5s-lega agreement lacks precision, which gives a great deal of room for manoeuvre to cabinet members and makes conflict resolution slightly trickier. over and above these patterns, it is worth mentioning that the extent to which this coalition agreement will indeed be the basis for the government of italy in the next years is unknown. on the one hand, two of the most important pledges – the flat tax and the basic income – require an increase in public expenditure that fails to comply with european requirements in terms of deficit. in late october 2018, the european union indeed rejected the italian 2019 budget proposed by the incumbent coalition on these grounds.8 on the other, the polls have shown that lega is increasing its electoral appeal (going from 20 per cent of vote intentions in late march to 31 per cent in late october 2018), while m5s is losing consensus (from 34 to 28 per cent in the same time span), in a context in which all the other electoral forces display some degree of stability.9 this may hinder the coalition’s 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(2008). dividing parliament? italian bicameralism in the legislative process (1987–2006). south european society & politics, 13(1), 11-34. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_3_mancosu.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 3, december 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 3, pp. 44-60 contact author: moreno mancosu, collegio carlo alberto, turin. e-mail address: moreno.mancosu@carloalberto.org the deep roots of populism: protest, apathy and the success of movimento 5 stelle in the 2013 italian elections moreno mancosu collegio carlo alberto, turin abstract previous studies have argued that voters’ attitudes of apathy and protest towards the italian party system, triggered by the economic crisis of 2011, were exploited by movimento 5 stelle to increase its support in the 2013 elections. however, little attention has been paid to the determinants of dissatisfaction that voters showed even before the sovereign debt crisis. in addition to providing a thorough geographical exploration of the party’s geographical scattering (with the aid of global and local indicators of spatial autocorrelation), this article tests the relationship between the strength of the movimento in 2013 and apathy and protest indicators in the pre-crisis period. sar (spatial auto-regressive) regression models will be employed in order to avoid biased estimates due to spatial autocorrelation. results show that indicators of apathy or protest represent significant predictors of the movimento 5 stelle’s geographical distribution. 1. introduction he italian national election of 2013 represented a sudden discontinuity with respect to the balance of power that ruled in the so-called italian second republic (itanes 2013; vegetti, poletti and segatti, 2013). election results analyses showed that about 40% of voters changed their preferences with respect to previous elections (itanes, 2013). scholars also witnessed a dramatic decrease in support for the two main parties, albeit with their names changed, that had ruled the italian political landscape in the previous 20 years: the centre-left partito democratico (democratic party, pd) experienced a loss of almost 3.5 million votes from previous elections, and the rightwing competitor, berlusconi’s popolo della libertà (people of freedom, pdl), reported a loss of more than 6.2 million votes. a large number of these votes were collected by a new populist party that ran for the first time in a national election and gained 25% of valid votes: movimento 5 stelle (five star movement, m5s). as has been underlined many times in the recent literature (corbetta and gualmini, 2013), one of the main characteristics of the ideological apparatus of the movimento is the rejection of traditional political cleavages, starting from the difference between ‘left’ and ‘right’. the main cleavage that the movimento theorises is that between the ‘people’ and the ‘caste’ of politicians, considered as a close, self-referenced group of corrupt people, unfit to govern the country (biorcio and natale, 2013). a crucial element that intersects both the electoral earthquake of 2013 and the claims of movimento 5 stelle is the economic and political context in which the 2013 elections took place, characterized by a harsh economic crisis (triggered by the sovereign debt crisis t moreno mancosu 45 of 2011), which led the italian electorate to develop much more critical attitudes towards politicians and the traditional party system (itanes, 2013; bellucci and maraffi, 2014). as previous research has stressed, the ability of the movimento and its leader, the former comedian beppe grillo, to exploit the disenchanted and anti-political feelings of part of the electorate (tronconi, 2013; vegetti, poletti and segatti, 2013) contributed to increasing electoral support for the party. several studies (mosca, 2014; bordignon and ceccarini, 2014; mosca and quaranta, 2017; biorcio, 2014) underline the relationship between indicators that measure protest and propensity to vote for the movimento 5 stelle. in particular, bellucci and maraffi (2014) show quite clearly that the 2011 sovereign debt crisis and the related voters’ feelings of disenchantment towards the political system largely affected italians’ choices in 2013 (for similar results, see vezzoni, 2014; itanes 2013). the elections of 2013 and the emergence of movimento 5 stelle are thus important for understanding today’s political trends in italy because they represent a ‘unicum’, a realigning election (d’alimonte, 2013), happening in a context of profound economic crisis. if previous studies allow us to assess the relationship between protest and the movimento’s support in a cross-sectional fashion, they do not tell us much about the roots of this protest. feelings of protest, indeed, did not start with the 2011 crisis and can be traced back to the first republic era (mannheimer and sani, 2001; tuorto, 2006). this paper aims to account for these ‘protest’ roots, by arguing that pre-crisis elements of discontent might be relevant in explaining the movimento’s success in 2013. consistent with previous literature (see martini and quaranta, 2015), it is argued that a part of the electorate was already dissatisfied with democracy and the party system way before the debt crisis unfolded, and that this same quota of voters was already looking for a political actor that would be able to transform that dissatisfaction into actual preferences and support. the debt crisis, together with the appearance of movimento 5 stelle, provided the ‘perfect storm’ for a situation that had been simmering below the surface for a long time.1 to test our theoretical argument, election results (before and after the 2011 sovereign debt crisis) at the municipal level will be employed. these data, indeed, allow us to measure the characteristics of the contexts in which people are embedded over time, providing regression coefficients in which the independent variable is, by design, exogenous.2 2. background 2.1. movimento 5 stelle: a new italian populism? as stressed above, the national elections of 2013 were held in a general climate of – economic and political – turmoil. the political system instability period started in november 1 an additional indirect proof of this argument is the national elections of 2018 that showed that, even if the economic crisis was not as harsh as in 2013, the movimento succeeded in increasing its share of votes (gaining almost 33% of valid votes). 2 this work aims at identifying evidence of the connection between contextual political protest and apathy before the start of the economic crisis and contextual levels of support for the movimento during the zenith of the political and economic crisis in which the party emerged. for our aims, thus, subsequent results obtained by the party (such as the european elections of 2014 and general elections of 2018) would lead us far away from the topic of the paper, since they were held in qualitatively different moments (namely, in contexts of economic and post-economic crisis). the deep roots of populism 46 2011, in which the sovereign debt crisis and an increasingly weak majority forced berlusconi’s government to resign. after a year and a half ruled by the technocratic government headed by former eu commissioner mario monti (and a set of austerity reforms), the 2013 elections presented several surprises: in a partially unexpected way, movimento 5 stelle became the largest party in parliament with about 25.5% of valid votes, mainly at the expenses of traditional parties (itanes, 2013). also, results showed the second most important vote-swing in the post-war electoral history of the country, with an index of aggregate volatility of 39.1% (bellucci, 2014; emanuele, 2015). the electoral campaign of the m5s in the 2013 election was based on accessible and captivating claims, such as, for instance, the institution of a basic income for the unemployed or the fight against corruption in public administration (itanes, 2013). also, the image of the movimento was promoted by means of the selection process of mps: in order to signal the distance between the movimento and the old political elite, a troop of young citizens who had never experienced militancy in classic parties were selected by means of web-based polls (biorcio, 2015; caruso, 2015). the strategic choices of the movimento, taken together, caused analysts to borrow taggart’s (1995) classification and to define it as a populist (or neopopulist) party (corbetta and gualmini, 2013; biorcio and natale, 2013; diamanti, 2014). two primary characteristics, typical of a populist party or movement, can be detected for m5s: first, the explicit reference to the struggle between ‘the people’ and a (corrupt and unfit) political elite and second, the evocation of direct contact between the charismatic leader and his people (corbetta and gualmini 2013, 202–205). 2.2. political dissatisfaction and abstention in italy: between apathy and protest dissatisfaction with the political system, acknowledged as one of the main determinants of the movimento’s success, is not a phenomenon born during the debt crisis of 2011. despite italy being, in the post-war period, one of the countries with the highest turnout (more than 9 italians out of 10 went to the polling station between 1948 and 1976, see mannheimer and sani, 2001; corbetta and tuorto, 2004), starting from the 1979 national election, and for all the 1980s, the tradition of high levels of turnout started to fade. during the 1990s and the 2000s, the diminishing trend became even stronger: in 1996 turnout was about 83% and in 2008 the percentage of voters was even lower (80.5%). the 2013 elections presented the lowest turnout level ever in a national election in italy until then: only 75.2% of the electoral body went to the polls. this 30-year-long trend, an 18 percentage point drop from 1979 to 2013, is partly consistent with what happened in other european countries (franklin, 2004). scholars argue that one of the determinants of the negative trend could be due to changes that hit european societies in general, such as the crisis of the mass parties, the disappearance of the classic cleavages that had ruled european politics since the end of world war ii, and the increasing individualization of the political masses (corbetta and tuorto, 2004; steinbrecher, huber and rattinger, 2007, powell, 1986; pattie and johnston, 1998). the literature identifies two main elements as determinants of abstention, apathy and protest (see tuorto, 2006). as regards apathy attitudes, voters do not go to the polls because parties fail to mobilise them. their vote is thus a mere non-action (corbetta and tuorto, 2004) rather than an ‘active’ refusal of the political supply. on the contrary, with protest attitudes, voters do not vote to signal dissatisfaction towards alternatives that official politics offers them moreno mancosu 47 and, to some extent, refuse to be part of the electoral game (mannheimer and sani, 2001; corbetta and tuorto, 2004; tuorto, 2006). it is common opinion (corbetta and tuorto, 2004; tuorto, 2006) that, in general, the sentiment of apathy might be the primary driver of the vast majority of italian abstainers. socio-demographic characteristics can determine sentiments of apathy or protest: as pointed out by mannheimer and sani (2001), detachment from politics and abstention propensity can be increased by gender or age. the antipolitical protest, on the other hand, has been demonstrated to be positively correlated with age: young voters, indeed, tend to protest more than their parents and grandparents (mannheimer and sani, 2001). another way to signal protest attitudes through voting behaviour is to void the ballot (knack and kropf, 2003). previous literature has empirically shown that ballot spoiling is consistent with a form of protest voting. more precisely, it is a clear and relatively cheap way of signalling discontent with all the political alternatives (damore, waters, and bowler, 2012). however, a void ballot does not only signal political discontent, rather, it can be an involuntary consequence of the voter’s incapacity to follow voting instructions correctly (stiefbold, 1965; knack and kropf, 2003; mannheimer and sani, 2001). the history of void ballots in italy follows an entirely different path compared to that of abstention (tuorto, 2008). the number of blank and void ballots increased during the first republic and reached 2.9 million votes in 1996 – 6% of the electoral body (tuorto, 2008). in the 2006 and 2008 elections, the number of void and blank votes rapidly decreased, passing from more than 2.5 million between 1994 and 2001 to just 1.2 million in 2006, probably because of the simplification of the voting procedure introduced with the new electoral law and the removal of preference voting (tuorto, 2008). however, it is beyond doubt that a component of protest, independent of involuntary annulment, remains in the void votes’ stock (knack and kropf, 2003; damore, waters, and bowler, 2012). 2.3. hypotheses the aim of this work, in addition to providing descriptive insight into the movimento 5 stelle geographical scattering in 2013, is to explain the geographical trends of the movimento’s results in italy using indicators of apathy and protest. in particular, we want to test whether pre-crisis protest and apathy indicators can explain the 2013 achievement of the movimento. this would be consistent with the argument according to which exogenous ‘pockets’ of discontent, already present in the country before the crisis, were able to contribute to the movimento’s success. the first hypothesis connects apathy, measured with the levels of turnout in the national election of 2008, the first preceding the debt crisis of 2011, with movimento 5 stelle’s performance. the hypothesis, thus, reads as follows: hp1. the lower the turnout in 2008, the better the performance of movimento 5 stelle in 2013.3 3 this expectation has also been tested with different data by riera and russo (2016), who demonstrate that the larger the drop in turnout in previous elections, the higher is the prevalence at the local level of the movimento in the 2014 european elections. the deep roots of populism 48 as regards protest, we argue, drawing upon previous literature, that the void ballot level can be partly connected with protest attitudes. the second hypothesis can be written as follows: hp2. the higher the percentage of void ballots in 2008, the better the performance of movimento 5 stelle in 2013. 3. data, measures and models 3.1. data and measures the data employed to test our expectations are drawn from official data provided by the italian ministry of the interior and the national institute of statistics (istat). analyses will be performed at the municipality level, the lower geo-referenced level available. in sum, we will deal with 8,020 cases (valle d’aosta has been expunged from the analysis given that, as an autonomous region, it has a different party system).4 the geographical scattering of the movimento 5 stelle will be measured by the percentage of the movimento at the municipality level in the 2013 elections. the two measures presented above – that is, abstention and void ballots before the crisis – will be treated as possible determinants of the success of the movimento in the italian geographical space. as pointed out above, abstention and void ballots are measured in the elections held in 2008. in this way, in addition to the exogeneity of our independent score, we have another advantage, namely, that the 2008 elections were held before the crisis started. by employing 2008 aggregate measures, we can provide insights into the relationship between the movimento’s support and a set of explanatory variables that measure the level of apathy/protest in non-exceptional conditions, that is, a physiological level of apathy/protest. as an additional control variable, we will insert the number of eligible voters (in logarithm), the sex ratio and the percentage of over-85 voters (those two latter variables extracted from the 2011 italian census). measures such as those proposed above are not immune to drawbacks. the first, and most important, is related to the validity of our measures. as pointed out before, stocks of abstainers in each election, as well as void votes, can be related to different individual behaviours and motivation: people can abstain by signalling a protest against the political system or, instead, because they have not been mobilised. moreover, people can abstain because they are unable to go to the polls – for instance, because of disability or illness (mannheimer and sani, 2001). at the same time, people who cast a void ballot might signal protest or, rather, may not be able to cast their vote correctly. however, once the age and gender composition and the dimension of the municipalities have been controlled, the geographical scattering of the involuntary quota of invalid ballots should be randomly dispersed. as pointed out before, gender and age can affect the involuntary behaviour prevalence in the electoral population. 4 since we will employ measures of two different elections (2008 and 2013), some small administrative adjustments to the structure of the municipalities (some municipalities merged, others split) have been made to harmonize the data. these adjustments, however, involve few municipalities and have been handled by finding a least common geographical arrangement that could preserve the structure of the municipalities in the 2013 elections. moreno mancosu 49 in addition, while bias related to involuntary behaviour can be kept under control, the issue related to the validity of abstention stocks is much more difficult to solve. the abstention measure, although proven by scholars to be mainly related to individual apathy behaviours, represents, indeed, a measure of two different types of behaviour, that is, the aforementioned apathy and protest. here, however, we have to remember that we are working with aggregate data. thus, it is possible to state that, even if the stock of abstention represents different individual behaviour, at the municipality level, it just represents an environment more prone to protest or apathy and, we hypothesize, more prone to support movimento 5 stelle (in this respect, see agnew, 2002; goodin and tillie, 2008; pattie and johnston, 1998). before investigating the relationship between the movimento and the measure of protest and apathy in italy, it is useful to assess whether these measures are scattered over the territory.5 the most straightforward way of measuring the non-randomness of the geographical distribution of a variable is moran’s i. it allows us to calculate the correlation between the level of a specific variable in an ecological unit and its nearby locations, the so-called autocorrelation (moran, 1950, anselin, 1988). moran’s i is a standardized measure, in which 1 means perfect autocorrelation (that is, given the level of a variable in a point in space, all nearby points present the same level as the variable), 0 means that the levels of the variable in space are distributed randomly and -1 means perfect negative autocorrelation. moran’s i presents a local variant –the local moran’s i (anselin, 1995). local moran’s i identifies outliers of ‘pockets of nonstationarity’ (anselin, 1995, 93). in this way, combining local moran’s i with descriptive results of the variable, it is possible to assess where clusters of support (or lack of support) are located. in order to assess the relationship and the magnitude of the effect that links movimento 5 stelle support and measures of apathy and protest, we will employ multivariate regression models. the first model that will be fitted is a simple ols model. this type of model, however, presents the main drawback, that is, the aforementioned spatial autocorrelation. ols models assume independence of observations and the presence of spatial autocorrelation will lead to biased estimates. in order to solve this problem, and take into account the geographical scattering of the dependent variable, a sar (spatial auto-regressive) model will be fitted (for more information, see anselin, 1988; ward and gleditsch, 2008). 4. results 4.1. descriptive analysis a simple analysis of the strength of the party in different geo-political zones, such as that presented in table 1, shows performances of the movimento during 2013 elections in part of the country. the table shows that the movimento is stronger in the centre and in the islands of the country. 5 appendix 1 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables taken into account in the paper. the deep roots of populism 50 table 1. distribution of movimento 5 stelle’s strength in 2013 by geo-political zone. m5s % n municipalities north-west 22.4 2,987 north-east 24.0 1,132 red belt 25.0 966 centre 27.4 683 south 22.8 1,485 islands 31.2 767 total 24.7 8,020 note: percentages calculated on voters a more thorough analysis of the geographical distribution of the movimento in 2013 is plotted in figure 1.6 the distribution of the party is significantly autocorrelated over the territory (moran’s i is equal to .70) and presents original characteristics: traditional electoral italian studies (see galli, 1968; diamanti, 2003) used to split the italian territory into different ‘sub-cultures’, in which one of the two main parties of the so-called prima repubblica (the communist party and the christian democrats) was dominant. for instance, the ‘red zone’, a strip of the region in the central part of italy, used to present long-standing and strong electoral support for the communist party (and saw high levels of support for centreleft parties, such as the partito democratico della sinistra, lately partito democratico). the north-east part of the country, on the contrary, used to be ruled by the christian democrats, which was subsequently substituted by the forza italia/pdl-northern league alliance. as pointed out by other contributions (see cataldi and emanuele, 2013) the pattern of movimento 5 stelle is new; that is, no other party in the italian republican history seems to behave geographically like the movimento. in general, several characteristics of this geographical pattern can be stressed: in the centre-north of the country, the movimento’s pattern seems to break the existing sub-cultural zones. in the north-western part of the country (which encompasses piedmont, lombardy and liguria), the movimento is strong in the four provinces of liguria, in the province of turin (but the average level is high in the whole of piedmont) and is poorly supported in west lombardy. this is surprising, since west lombardy and piedmont, during the first and the second republic, tended to behave similarly. the north-east of the country, which encompasses east lombardy, veneto and friulivenezia giulia, used to vote solidly for centre-right parties, shifted and supported the movimento in 2013. also, the centre of the country witnessed an upheaval. the so-called red zone – which encompasses tuscany, emilia-romagna, marche and umbria and has, for almost a century, seen a robust left-wing majority – was broken by the new movimento’s rise of support. in umbria and marche, the movimento has, almost everywhere, over 28% of valid votes, while in emilia-romagna and tuscany the average level of support is lower. moreover, the northern part of lazio shows high levels of support for the movimento. the other two clusters of strength are situated in the south of sardinia and almost all of sicily. 6 the classes in all the maps were obtained by dividing the distributions into 5 quantiles. moreno mancosu 51 figure 1. movimento 5 stelle percentage of valid votes, geographical distribution (moran’s i: 0.70). the deep roots of populism 52 figure 2. movimento 5 stelle 2013 results local moran’s i and statistical significance. moreno mancosu 53 figure 3. 2008 turnout geographical distribution. the deep roots of populism 54 figure 4. 2008 void ballots geographical distribution. moreno mancosu 55 figure 2 gives us results for the local moran’s i and shows a very similar situation (the parts of the country in which local moran’s i is not significant to 10% are coloured grey). a high level of autocorrelated, statistically significant support is in south and west sicily (in particular the province of trapani), in south and north-west of sardinia, the coast of marche (especially ancona), in northern lazio. by comparing figure 2 with the previous one, it is possible to detect also clusters of low support, such as that in the southern part of campania, north lombardy and südtirol. summarising, the geography of the movimento, in its first electoral competition, is entirely different from that of other parties, present or past. as regards specific local outbreaks, however, it is possible to hypothesise determinants given by the particular situation of those places. for instance, in the province of turin, and in particular in susa valley, the public work of high-speed rail (the tav) to connect turin with lyon, has produced, for about 20 years, a movement against the construction of the line. movimento 5 stelle and beppe grillo himself have repeatedly underlined solidarity towards the notav movement (tronconi, 2013, biorcio and natale, 2013). thus, it is possible to expect that citizens of these zones, massively against the public works, would support the only party that was explicitly hostile to it. similarly, the cluster of support in southern sardinia can be related to the struggle of sulcis miners who, again, received beppe grillo’s solidarity (tronconi, 2013). these local peculiarities should not challenge our main argument: if localised protests can account for localised outbreaks, our aim is to find a general, spatially coherent relationship between high (or low) levels of pre-crisis protest/apathy and high (or low) levels of movimento 5 stelle support. before examining the regression models, it seems useful to assess the descriptive situation of void ballots and turnout (that is the hundredcomplement of abstention) in the 2008 elections. figures 3 and 4 present the spatial distribution of the two measures. for instance, we can say that both measures present a clear north-south difference: in most of the south, the prevalence of void ballots is higher, and turnout is lower. piedmont, liguria, friuli-venezia giulia, and the province of belluno, moreover, present lower levels of turnout and higher levels of invalid ballots. some differences, also, can be found by comparing the two apathy/protest measures. for instance, there is a relative absence of void ballots in the north-west, where there is a cluster of low turnout. sardinia, also, presents medium-high levels of abstention (under 76% of turnout) and low levels of void ballots. in general, we can state that void ballots scattering is less clear than that of ‘turnout. 4.2. testing the relationship between void ballots, turnout and m5s geographical distribution two models will be treated in order to test the relationship between movimento support and measures of apathy/protest. the second model presents the same parameters but is fitted as a sar model. coefficients for both models can be seen in table 2. it can be seen that in both models, the parameters are significant and follow our expectations. the sar model presents smaller coefficients, once corrected for autocorrelation. the expected change in the movimento’s support with respect to a one-unit increase in turnout is -.06 percentage points for the sar model. although significant, it is not big. if we think that the central 90% of the distribution of turnout is around 18 the deep roots of populism 56 points (from 69% to 89%), the difference in the predicted values of the dependent variable of a 5th-95th percentile-change of the turnout is something more than 1.2 percentage points. more interesting is the effect of invalid ballots. keeping other variables constant (included age and gender controls) in the sar model, the predicted rise of movimento 5 stelle’s support with respect to a rise of 1 point in the level of void ballots is of .61 (the parameter is significant). table 2. ols and spatial lag regression model ols model sar model predictors coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 2008 turnout (in %) -0.10*** (0.01) -0.06*** (0.01) 2008 void ballots (in %) 1.51*** (0.08) 0.61*** (0.05) eligible voters (n. logarithm) 1.33*** (0.06) 0.42*** (0.04) sex ratio 0.08*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) over-85 persons (in %) 0.10* (0.05) -0.21*** (0.03) rho 0.77 *** (0.01) constant 9.82*** (1.90) 1.24 (1.17) observations 8,020 8,020 r-squared (or nagelkerke) 0.10 0.60 notes: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 the predicted difference for the 5th percentile to the 95th one is of 1.7 points (a bit less than 10% of the dependent variable’s central 90% range). thus, even if we are not dealing with big effects, we can say that part of the geographical variance of movimento 5 stelle is explained by measures of political apathy or protest.7 5. discussion in 2013, movimento 5 stelle, a new populist party, ran for the first time in a national election, gaining 25% of valid votes one of the most striking successes of all times in mature democracies. the aim of this work was twofold. firstly, except for few contributions (cataldi and emanuele, 2013), the literature lacked an accurate geographical analysis of this unique phenomenon. in this article, by employing local and global measures of autocorrelation, and with the help of municipality-level maps, we now have a clearer idea of the scattering of the territory of the movimento in that crucial election. second, we stressed that the relationship between apathy/protest and the strength of movimento 5 stelle was only tested with reference to the exceptional situation of 2013, 7 there are two additional alternative hypotheses that might undermine the results presented here. first, apathy, in addition to other individual mechanisms, might be due to the medium/long-term local traditions of political engagement/disengagement that are typical of a certain area. second, the economic conditions of the local context might change the structure of the coefficients that we see in table 2. in appendix 2 there are two additional models: the first model measures the gap in turnout between 2006 and 2008 (in a way that negative values of the variable represent a decrease in turnout). the second model adds an economic control variable (the average income for each municipality in 2012 source: italian revenue agency). as can be seen, the two models do not show significant differences with respect to those shown in the main text, further confirming the overall pattern of the results. moreno mancosu 57 implicitly addressing the success of the party led by beppe grillo as a fortuitous combination of events that led to its achievement. little evidence was committed to finding more profound relationships between what we can call a ‘traditional’ level of apathy/protest and the result of the movimento in 2013. our basic expectation was that in places where measures of protest and apathy were stronger in non-exceptional moments, the support for the movimento would have found fertile soil. as concerns the first aim, and consistent with previous results (cataldi and emanuele, 2013), results showed entirely new electoral geopolitics. geographical cleavages that lasted during the first and second republic are not traceable in any way in the movimento’s geographical scattering. instead, old sub-cultures seem to be broken by the movimento’s support: the example of low movimento support in tuscany and high support in neighbouring umbria – which used to be part of the same sub-culture is enlightening. geography, also, helps us to recognise clusters of support that are mainly due to particular local situations (such as the aforementioned susa valley and the south of sardinia). at the same time, by means of regression models, we have seen that the engine of high-level support for the movimento is not only related to a number of local issues but also has a systematic nature: in places where, even before the economic crisis, the level of protest and apathy (measured with abstention and void ballots percentages) was high, the level of support for the movimento has been high too. moreover, it seems that a clearer protest measure – invalid ballots percentage at the municipal level – has higher effects with respect to measures that do not tap precisely the concept of protest but are in-between to measure protest or apathy (that is, abstention). this could be indirect evidence that protest attitudes were activated in the 2013 national elections and that the success of the movimento has deep roots, partly founded in traditional levels of apathy and protest. m5s success, thus, seems not to be produced entirely by a fortuitous series of circumstances (the crisis of representation and the economic crisis) that crystallised in more structured partisan support during the 2013-2018 electoral cycle. instead, it seems that the routes of success were (at least in part) based on pockets of discontent that existed even before the intricate pattern of crises broke out. these pockets, geographically scattered, contributed to form the first kernel of the movimento’s support. this paper presents at least three shortcomings: first of all, the variables employed to measure apathy and protest – though being the only ones available that, according to the literature, can tap the two concepts – present sizeable potential distorsions. although we have tried to refine the analysis by adding possible confounders to the relationship (the percentage of female and over-85 voters, as well as other measures of apathy and economic wealth measures, see appendix 2), we must take into account that our coefficients might be biased because of the fact that the levels of void ballots and abstention do not overlap completely with the concepts of protest and apathy. second, as concerns the relationship between protest attitudes and the movimento’s support, it must be stressed that the analysis investigated just the aggregate levels of this support. this does give us clues as to individual-level mechanisms. an analysis that encompasses both the geographical and the individual levels would be able to present more explicit evidence on the past (and future) of the movimento 5 stelle. third, the paper only takes into account the 2013 elections: although the choice is justified by the relevance of this election as a the deep roots of populism 58 turning point in italian political history (in which profound economic and representative crises happened at the same time), future research should be devoted to assessing how the relationship between apathy/protest feelings and anti-system parties and, in particular, the movimento – has changed. has the increasing institutionalization of the movimento during the 2013-2018 cycle (see ceccarini and bordignon, 2018) led to a lowering of the protest component of its quota of support, or, rather, is the party still considered a viable option for expressing protest and discontent? future research will be able to answer this crucial question for the future of the party. appendix 1 table a1. the variables involved: descriptive statistics. variables minimum maximum mean std, dev. 5 perc 95 perc m5s 2013 results 0.1 56.5 22.7 6.9 11.9 33.9 pdl 2013 results 0.3 57.1 20.8 6.8 10.9 32.8 pd 2013 results 0.9 56.6 22.9 7.7 12.4 37.5 2008 void ballots % 0.0 11.1 2.1 0.9 1.0 3.7 2008 turnout % 17.8 100.0 81.2 6.3 69.1 89.1 eligible voters (logarithm) 3.4 14.6 7.6 1.3 5.5 9.9 sex ratio 67.8 190.9 97.1 6.3 88.8 106.8 over-85 (in %) 0.5 18.5 3.4 1.7 1.5 6.5 appendix 2 table a2. alternative sar models. original sar model (see table 2) alt. model (with turnout gap) alt. model (with income) predictors coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. 2008 turnout (in %) -0.06*** (0.01) -0.09*** (0.01) 2008 void ballots (in %) 0.61*** (0.05) 0.71*** (0.05) 0.69*** (0.05) 2006-08 turnout gap (in %) -0.12*** (0.01) eligible voters (n. logarithm) 0.42*** (0.04) 0.42*** (0.04) 0.35*** (0.04) sex ratio 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) 0.04*** (0.01) over-85 persons (in %) -0.21*** (0.03) -0.14*** (0.03) -0.19*** (0.03) average income in thousands € (2012) 0.11*** (0.02) rho 0.77 *** (0.01) 0.77 *** (0.01) 0.77 *** (0.01) constant 1.24 (1.17) -4.19*** (1.06) 2.05** (0.96) observations 8,020 8,020 8,020 nagelkerke r2 0.60 0.60 0.60 standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 moreno mancosu 59 references agnew, j. a. 2002. place and 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(2014). italian national election survey 2013: a further step in a consolidating tradition. rivista italiana di scienza politica, 44(1), 81-108. ward, m. d., gleditsch, k. s. 2008. spatial regression models. los angeles: sage. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_5.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 78-91 contact author: davide vittori, luiss guido carli university, rome. e-mail address: dvittori@luiss.it party change in ‘populist’ parties in government: the case of the five star movement and syriza davide vittori luiss guido carli university, rome abstract fsm and syriza are the main anti-establishment parties which seized power during the great recession. as in the greek case in 2015, when syriza coalesced with right-wing party anel, fsm coalesced with a radicalright party (the league). regardless of their different ideological backgrounds, both syriza and fsm were relatively ‘new’ parties at the time of their first relevant electoral performance. while the literature has sofar tackled the issue of the growth of these two parties in their political system, their organizations and their electorates, little has been said in comparative perspective on the internal reforms that the two parties undertook and their institutionalization process. the aim of this paper is to enquire into the nature of the party reforms within those parties, which the literature has labelled as anti-establishment or populist. to what extent do their reforms correspond to the theoretical frameworks that were designed in the past for mainstream parties? and, secondly, are these changes that the parties have undergone similar? in what ways? the findings show that, albeit following different paths, party changes in the two parties followed the same pattern as mainstream parties. introduction n january 2015, for the first time since greece’s transition to democracy, the coalition of the radical left (syriza) obtained a relative majority in the greek parliament and made an alliance with a newly-established radical-right party, the independent greeks (anel) (katsourides 2015). three years later, another ‘populist’ (vittori 2017a) party in italy, the five star movement (m5s), had the same result and allied with a radical-right party (the league), the main difference from the greek case being the enduring bargain between fsm and the league for government formation. however, just as for syriza, the m5s electoral success in 2018 was preceded by another outstanding performance in the 2013 elections (see below). regardless of their different ideological backgrounds, both syriza and m5s were relatively ‘new’ parties (for a precise classification of party newness, see bartolini and mair 1990, bolleyer 2013, mainwaring et al. 2017, powell and tucker 2014) at the time of their first relevant electoral performance. syriza had existed as a coalition since 2004, but it became a unified party only in 2013; m5s was founded in 2009. while the literature has so far tackled the issue of the growth of these two parties in their political systems, their organizations and their electorates (see among others bordignon and ceccarini 2015, katsourides 2016, gualmini and corbetta 2013, tronconi 2015), little has been said from a comparative perspective on the internal reforms that the two parties have undergone and their institutionalization process. the aim of this paper is to enquire into the nature of the reforms within those parties, which the literature has labelled as populist (stavrakakis and katsambekis 2014, vittori 2017b). firstly, to what extent do their reforms correspond to i ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 79 the theoretical frameworks designed in the past for mainstream parties? and, secondly, are the changes (and the institutionalization processes) similar? in what ways? the article proceeds as follows: drawing from the main work in the field, the first part is devoted to the analytical framework of party changes. the second part contextualizes the italian and greek cases. the third and fourth parts are the core of the paper, as both provide an analysis of the main party changes occurring within the two organizations in recent years. finally, i draw some tentative conclusions with regard to party change in anti-establishment parties. the most important of these is that, albeit following different paths, party changes followed the same pattern as those of mainstream parties, since in both cases the party reforms and the institutionalization process followed the desiderata of the party faces which held most power in its hand. 1. party change: how? when? despite being ‘conservative’ organizations, which tend to resist change (panebianco 1982, harmel and janda 1994), parties do change. most of the time they adjust slowly to either internal or external changes. following harmel and janda (1994), party change can occur when the leadership changes, when the dominant faction is overturned by a new majority within the party or when external stimuli force party change. more recent contributions (webb et al. 2012) have emphasized that the analysis of party change should also include the growing relevance of ‘presidentialized’ (poguntke and webb 2005) or ‘personalized’ (blondel et al. 2012) leadership within the party. the fact that party leaderships tend to be more unconstrained and, accordingly, tend to concentrate power into their own hands, may hamper internal changes. be as it may, three patterns of change may be identified: internally induced changes, externally induced changes and a combination of the two. in a ground-breaking analysis on party change, which included mainstream parties both big and small from an electoral standpoint, harmel et al. (1995) found that external factors, notably poor electoral performance, are crucial drivers for change, but sub-party factors may play a role as well. still, for ‘new’ parties, more than any embryonal form of factionalism, it is the first electoral breakthrough that represents a crucial phase in the internal life of the party, since new demands emerge from within and outside the party and considerable adaptation is required for the party’s survival (bolleyer 2013: 4). party reforms and institutionalization processes have so far been analysed using mainstream parties as points of reference. from the seminal work by michels to the more recent work on party organizations (panebianco 1982, harmel and tan 2003, gauja 2015), scholars take mainstream parties into consideration, while less attention has been given to non-mainstream party families (with the notable exceptions of pedersen 1982, bolleyer 2013, scarrow et al. 2017). this gap is unsurprising: mainstream and old-established parties are usually where a) information is available more easily and b) it is possible to compare party reforms diachronically, since they are usually older (levitsky 1998). party institutionalization is a crucial component for organization survival. still, new parties are more exposed to both external and internal shocks, due to their lack of institutionalization. when shocks occur, the most likely reaction for the party elite is either to implement change or resist/anticipate the attempts to change, which are supposed to come from inside and/or outside. here i define institutionalization as a vittori, party change in ‘populist’ parties in government 80 process involving a) the routinization of political practice, through which the rules and norms applied within the party become internalized and routinized by members and the élite, and b) value infusion, through which the perpetuation of the organization becomes a value in itself. while previous work on mainstream parties is useful for analysing party reforms of non-mainstream parties, (see bolleyer 2013), it should not be taken as a given that ‘new’ parties behave similarly to ‘old’ parties; nor should it be assumed that their institutionalization is a process which is in all ways similar to older counterparts. since ‘new’ parties tend to campaign by arguing their more or less radical difference from traditional parties, it may be the case that they prefer stressing their differences even in organizational aspects. nonetheless, change and the institutionalization processes for both traditional and non-traditional parties do not occur in a vacuum. firstly, parties, like any other complex organizations, are path-dependent, i.e. their genesis and first internal power configuration matter when it comes to the options of party elites (panebianco 1982). these factors narrow down even further when the party faces the heterogony of its ends, i.e. the survival of the organization becomes an end in itself, while the primary policy goals lose their centrality. secondly, there must be a clear reason for change and a power configuration that facilitates it (harmel and tan 2003). thirdly, party goals, according to harmel and janda (1994: 281), determine the nature of the party change: ‘for vote-seeking parties [...], the more pronounced their electoral failure, the more likely they are to change’. for officeseeking parties, the pressure for change is higher when they achieve executive office, for policy-seeking parties the failure to accommodate their clientele drives change, while for democracy-seeking parties, dissatisfaction with party procedures leads to party change. party goals, following harmel and janda, are crucial for detecting the nature of changes within the party. the cause of the changes may be either internal or external, since parties may be forced to change even when the external conditions do not ‘require’ the organization to adapt to the new context. what the authors assume is that, regardless of the primary party goal at t0, i.e. before the external or internal shock, the consequence of a given shock, i.e. electoral performance, impacts in t1 more significantly on a party whose primary goal is related to that shock, i.e. vote-seeking goal. when this happens, the magnitude of the change should be greater than in other cases. 2. external shocks and emergence of new parties: the financial crisis in italy and greece in order to grasp the nature of change within the two parties under analysis it is crucial to start with the major external shock, the great recession, behind the political changes which occurred in greece in 2012 and in italy in 2013. both parties were founded either before (syriza, as a coalition of parties) or in the immediate aftermath of the crisis (m5s). greece greece is the european country where the great recession had the heaviest impact on both society and the political system. the four greek governments in charge from 2009 to september 2015 signed three memoranda of understanding (mou) through which they agreed to implement heavy fiscal adjustments to receive financial assistance. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 81 on 4 october 2009, the greek pm, george papandreou, announced that the annual deficit of the state would be 12.7%, instead of 6.7%. in a few months, the greek economy collapsed. the consequence of the crisis was a private lenders’ debt haircut (50%) in 2011. however, the syriza electoral breakthrough occurred four years after the outburst of the crisis (may-june 2012). between 2009 and 2012 three elections took place: one legislative (2009), one at the european level (2009) and elections in thirteen administrative regions (2010). in the 2009 legislative election (october 2009), the panhellenic socialist movement (pasok) obtained an absolute majority in parliament (43.92% of votes) and syriza 4.6%. previously, in the european elections (june 2009), syriza had a similar share of votes (4.7%). despite the financial turmoil, the regional elections held in 2010 guaranteed to pasok control over seven regions, while the conservative new democracy (nd) won in five. the syriza result was unsatisfactory (gemenis 2012). the intensification of the financial crisis and the failed attempt by socialist pm george papandreou to call for a referendum on the mou caused his resignation (november 2011). the provisional government supported by pasok, nd and the popular orthodox rally (laos) and led by the former governor of the bank of greece, lucas papademos, lasted about six months. in the may 2012 elections (table 1), syriza (16.79%) was the second most voted party, behind nd (18.85%). figure 1. total volatility in greece and italy legislative elections (1990–2018) source: own elaboration from emanuele (2015). legend: total volatility: total electoral volatility in the party system. the greek political system was revolutionized in less than three years (figure 1). after being almost stable for two decades, total volatility in the 2012 election rose to 48.5. the three parties which participated in the last government were severely punished by the electorate: pasok lost 30.7% of the votes, nd 14.6% and laos 2.74%. syriza’s leader, alexis tsipras, refused to participate in any pro-austerity government, thus using its blackmail potential to force new elections (june 2012). syriza increased its share of votes (26.89%). thanks to the support of pasok and dimar, a social democratic split from syriza, nd (29,66%) formed a new governing coalition. the following regional elections (18 may 2014) were problematic for syriza. despite good results in the ionian 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 f i g . 1 t o ta l v o l at i l i ty i n g r e e c e a n d i ta ly l e g is l at iv e e l e c i o n s ( 1 9 9 0 20 1 8 ) greece (tv) italy (tv) vittori, party change in ‘populist’ parties in government 82 islands and in attica, syriza lost about 9% of the votes (17.7%) with respect to the previous legislative elections. nonetheless, in the following european elections (22-25 may 2014) syriza was the most voted party (26.6%). the legislative election in january 2015 gave to syriza (36.3%) a relative majority, very close to an absolute majority in parliament. kke refused to enter into coalition with syriza. thus, out of the only two antimemorandum parties in parliament, anel and golden dawn (xa), only anel was a ‘coalitionable’ partner under a shared anti-austerity programme. italy the intensification of the great recession in italy (2009-2011) and the doubts cast by the european institutions as well as by heads of states of european countries, namely france and germany, over the berlusconi government’s (2008-2011) ability to pursue a fiscal adjustment generated a large-scale panic in the markets. the crisis reached its zenith in november 2011 with berlusconi’s resignation. in the meantime, the already huge public debt (103.3% in 2007) skyrocketed to an unprecedented 132.6% in 2011. accordingly, the annual public deficit endangered public finance stability (it was -5.25% in 2009, -4.21% in 2010 and -3.68% in 2011). although italy avoided a european bailout programme, the chronically weak economic growth and the rise of total and youth unemployment cast doubts over italian recovery. m5s became a relevant player in the italian political system in 2013. leaving aside the early and somewhat successful attempts to participate in local elections with civic lists associated with the beppe grillo symbol, the very first significant sub-national elections for m5s were the regional ones in 2010. the most encouraging results for m5s were in piedmont (3.67 %, sixth most voted list) and emilia-romagna (6%, fifth most voted list). in 2012, m5s became the most voted party (18.17%) in the sicilian regional elections, but the centre-left coalition obtained a relative majority (30.47 %) and formed a minority government led by rosario crocetta. table 1. syriza and m5s electoral results. syriza m5s 5% (2007) p 3.4% (2010) ** r 4.6% (2009) p 14.9 (2012) *** r 4.7% (2009) e 25.56% (2013) p 4.1% (2010) *† r 16.2(2014) *** r 16.8% (may 2012) p 21.16% (2014) e 26.9% (june 2012) p 15.7% (2015) *** r 17.7% (2014) r 32.7% (2018) p 26.57% (2014) e 36.3% (january. 2015) p 35.5% (september 2015) p source: own elaboration from greek and italian ministries of internal affairs. * % with allies; †% of total vote; ** % vote list obtained in 5 regions in which m5s participated to the elections; *** % of list vote. legend: r= regional elections, e = european elections; p = parliamentary elections. the 2013 legislative elections (table 1) – along with three regional elections (lombardy, lazio and molise) – marked a breakthrough for m5s and, consequently, an ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 83 earthquake for the italian political system. total volatility in the elections reached the 1994 level, when forza italia erupted onto the italian political system (figure 1). m5s (25.56% in the lower chamber) was the most voted party before the partito democratico (pd). m5s blackmail potential was used to force traditional parties to form an oversized coalition government between centre-left and centre-right parties. m5s made it even clearer to the electorate that the party was unwilling to pursue a political agreement with the other traditional and non-traditional parties. m5s performance in the following elections – european and local – was unsatisfactory. in the european elections, pd reached the best result (40.81%) in its history, while m5s performed considerably worse (21.16%). its second electoral breakthrough in the 2018 legislative elections granted to m5s a relative majority in parliament (32.7%). 3. party reforms within syriza: the government takes all? syriza was officially founded in 2004 as a multifaceted coalition of political parties, social movements and leftist associations (tsakatika and eleftheriou 2013). the participants within syriza have changed over time, even though the most relevant party, and the protagonist of the unification of this coalition into a political party, synaspismos (syn), has never abandoned the coalition. syriza, thus, relied mainly on the resources provided by syn, the only political force to have had political representation in parliament. an analysis of syn transformation is beyond the scope of this paper. however, in line with the theoretical framework provided by janda and harmel (1994), the main driver behind the creation of a coalition of different organizations to the left of pasok and in competition with the ‘anti-system’ (march 2011) greek communist party (kke), was the decreasing electoral support that syn had suffered between 1991 and 2004 (davellanos 2016). the 4th syn congress in december 2004 marked a watershed for the greek left. it is called the leftturn congress, since a radical faction headed by alecos alavanos won the congress, thus marginalizing the reformist group. the latter founded a new party (dimar) in contraposition to the overly confrontational posture of syriza vis-à-vis pasok. syriza strategy was based on the creation of a new organizational tool which was able to reconnect the left with society and its lower strata (spourdoulakis 2014). as a coalition of different organizations, syriza’s founders retained their own structures, while obtaining representation in the highest political organ of syriza (nikolakakis, 2016). due to the pre-eminence of an old-established and ideologized party (syn) (tsatatika and eleftheriou 2013), value infusion was not a primary concern for syriza, despite enduring differences within the greek left (kalyvas and marantzidis 2002). rather, routinization was the main obstacle to institutionalization. contrary to traditional communist guiding principles, syriza rejected democratic centralism in order to make the coalition more fluid and more representative of all sensibilities within the greek left. whatever the definition used to describe syriza – party movement, community organizer or mass connective party (della porta et al. 2017, damiani 2016, spourdalakis 2014) – scholars agree that the organizational structure of syriza on the eve of the great recession was weak, lacking both a defined hierarchy and financial resources compared to other mainstream parties (for the latter point see vernadakis 2014). vittori, party change in ‘populist’ parties in government 84 while organizationally weak, syriza, through syn, was able to rejuvenate its leadership. in 2007, syn leader alecos alavanos stepped back during the 5th party congress to favour the ascendancy of alexis tsipras. during the second within-crisis elections (may 2012), syriza performed outstandingly and in the following election (june 2012) overcame pasok, becoming the main party of the left. while not as unexpected as in the case of m5s, the good electoral results of two consecutive elections posed a conundrum for the party, i.e. either to maintain a poorlyorganized structure or to transform itself into a party with its autonomous structures. syriza opted for the latter, while trying to counterbalance centralization, allowing the syriza founders to dissolve their own organization only in a second phase (see davanellos 2016 and syriza statute 2013). in the first congress (2013), tsipras had the absolute majority, while the left factions, which grouped the syn leftist faction and left-to-syn movements, won representation in the central committee. before the great recession, syn and syriza were primarily policy-seeking organizations, since both staunchly opposed what they called pasok’s path towards neoliberalism (nikolakakis 2016) and, more importantly, they lacked the electoral support to be considered ‘relevant’ in the greek political system. the policy-seeking strategy was pursued also in the first phase of the great recession since syriza participated in several anti-austerity protests, the most relevant being the so-called indignant (aganaktismeni) protest (simiti 2014 and tarditi 2015). however, the policy-seeking strategy was counterbalanced by a more voteseeking oriented strategy, which included the introduction of an inclusive populist discourse (starvakais and katsambekis 2014) aimed at counterbalancing the image of the party as a marginal radical socialist party. moreover, since the electoral law gives a majority bonus for the most voted party, syriza had no incentives to merge with other centre-left parties: indeed, the polls suggested that the party would be the most voted. this centralization was criticized by minority factions, which were worried about party institutionalization where the previous porous and poorly-organized structure was only formal. the central committee, controlled by tsipras and by the syn majority faction, organized the party following the classic mass-membership organization, despite the relatively low number of party members (tsatatika and eleftheriou, 2013). the party on the ground, thus, was relatively limited and the party in public office (ppo) was mostly new, since syriza had never had a relevant parliamentary group before 2012: the party in central office (pco) emerged from the founding congress as the main party face and, consequently, the main protagonist of party centralization. the planned dissolution of the former components of syriza served this purpose, i.e., allowing the pco to better control centrifugal forces within the party, including the one coming from the minority factions. the second phase of syriza institutionalization started when the party won a relative majority in the january 2015 elections and formed a coalition government with the right-wing party independent greeks (anel). in a few months, the new pm, alexis tsipras, started difficult negotiations with eu institutions and the imf concerning the conditions for new loans to greece. the mou was rejected by tsipras, who called for a referendum in july, endorsing the no-position. once the no prevailed, tsipras signed a new memorandum, which the leftist factions within syriza considered too prone to austerity. after the referendum, 38 of syriza’s 149 mps voted against the new ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 85 memorandum, threatening the syriza-led majority in parliament, while another group called 53+ backed the government, albeit expressing concerns about the consequences of the memorandum. syriza, as a new governing party, faced a new external stimulus, this time related to policy-making rather than elections, i.e. disagreement on a crucial party programme: grexit and relations with the eu. the party in government needed a new value infusion in order to make the pog and pco accept the agreement. tsipras forced new snap elections in september, whose outcome was a new coalition government with anel. the main leftist faction left the party before the elections, forming a new party (popular unity), which eventually failed to reach the electoral threshold. once the leftist faction had abandoned the party, value infusion was eased as no formally structured opposition remained within the party. in this troublesome phase, it was the ppo and the party government that emerged as the most relevant actors within syriza. following the september 2015 elections, syriza held a new congress, in which it continued its path towards centralization. tsipras kept his position as party leader, while serving as pm, thus implicitly linking the destiny of syriza with the government. the renewal of the composition of the central committee was the most critical issue for the leadership. tsipras managed to reduce the total number of central committee members, while at the same time guaranteeing up to 25% of such members to government officials. considering the large number of mps in the remaining 75%, the overlap between ppo/party in government and the pco becomes evident (tarditi and vittori 2017). tsipras was the only candidate for party leadership: he was re-elected with 93.5% of the total votes. since the left platform had left the party, there were no minority factions that openly questioned party leadership. this second congress may have marked a new phase for syriza, in which the routinization of decision-making and value infusion were both finally accomplished. the extent to which both aspects will resist external stimuli is nonetheless difficult to predict. 4 party reforms within m5s: from a failed institutionalization attempt to new party leadership? officially founded in october 2009, the m5s organizational structure had been drafted by grillo and gianroberto casaleggio a few years previously. this was due to grillo’s blog, whose platform was managed by the casaleggio associati, a new media company founded by g. casaleggio, and to the online platform meetup.com, which allowed the formation of informal grillo supporters at the local level. grillo's blog became known to a wider public after the success of nationwide rallies, named vaffanculo day (fuck-off day), in bologna (2007) and turin (2008). these first years were characterized by expansion through penetration (panebianco 1982), i.e. from the centre to the periphery. local members were free to organize and establish local units through the meet-up platform and to stand for sub-national elections once their list had obtained certification from the casaleggio associati (vittori 2017a). value infusion was only partial in this phase: the only programme drafted by m5s was the firenze chart, a very concise manifesto for local elections and grillo’s blog. the firenze chart resembled a pro-environmentalist attitude with a focus on sustainable environment, transparency and the promotion of direct-democracy procedures vittori, party change in ‘populist’ parties in government 86 (especially within the party) (gualmini and corbetta 2013). casaleggio associati and beppe grillo registered the m5s logo as a trademark, whose rights belonged to them. in this phase, the supporting staff were people working within casaleggio associati: thus, the pco – as intended by katz and mair (1994) – overlapped entirely with the dual party leadership, while the ppo was absent. although the structure of m5s was not yet developed, the main focus of m5s was direct democracy as envisaged by articles 1 and 5 of the first version of the statute of the party (movimento 5 stelle, 2009). despite its populist vote-seeking appeal, m5s could be considered a democracy-seeking movement in this phase. still, the lack of any formal procedure for the implementation of direct democracy (vittori 2017b), made routinization impossible to achieve at that time. moreover, the expulsion of several prominent local figures and the voluntary departure of others highlighted internal tensions over the alleged lack of democracy and transparency with regards to rules. in a nutshell, the routinization of party rules had far to go. the external shock – i.e. the results of the 2013 elections – forced m5s leadership to implement party changes in order to accelerate the party’s institutionalization. the worsening health conditions of g. casaleggio, as well as the fact that it was impossible for grillo to oversee the functioning of the party (grillo 2014), accelerated the first attempt to institutionalize the party through the formation of a ‘real’ party in central office, the socalled direttorio, whose aim, among others, was to coordinate parliament and the local level. the direttorio was not included in the first version of the statute of the party. however, the institutionalization process was not yet complete: firstly, value infusion was still incomplete, since no detailed party programmes were presented with the exception of the 2013 manifesto and 7-bullet points that served as the party programme for the european elections. furthermore, the rules in the internal life of the party were not yet routinized, since the direttorio was soon dissolved. the other relevant (and permanent) party change was the elimination, voted by m5s membership, of the website name (beppegrillo.it) from the party symbol. before the new elections (2018), m5s undertook a more resilient institutionalization process. firstly, after two reforms of the statute (2015-2016), the first of which added one article comprising an online link to the internal rule of the party (movimento 5 stelle 2016), m5s started its routinization process, which increased the asymmetry between the leadership and the other party faces (vittori 2017a). secondly, m5s implemented another statute reform in 2017-2018. as di maio (2018) stated when introducing the online consultation for the new statute of the party, ‘it’s time to think big: new statues and rules for the candidates’. di maio argued that the party was ready to govern and, consequently, the change in the statute served to unify into one person the pm candidate and the political leader of the party. after the 2013 electoral shock, thus, the party made internal changes in order to comply with a renewed vote-seeking strategy. the 2017 version of the statue was drafted by the leadership and introduced a distinction between the capo politico (head of the party) and the guarantor (beppe grillo). the capo politico, thanks to the new internal rule for the m5s parliamentary group, controls ppo (movimento 5 stelle 2018). still, along with the guarantor, d. casaleggio and the newly created associazione rousseau (see below) represent de facto the organizational leadership of the party. curiously enough, the m5s head of the party exists only as long as this figure is necessary to compete in the election (art. 7a, movimento 5 stelle ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 87 2017). though an unstable position, she/he has extensive power within the party since she/he leads the party in all internal aspects of the organization. however, this power is counterbalanced by the guarantor (beppe grillo). contrary to the head of the party, who can serve only for two consecutive mandates, the guarantor has a limitless mandate. apart from these statute reforms, routinization comprised another crucial aspect for the party, i.e. the introduction of a new party online platform, called rousseau, which replaced the less user-friendly lex. rousseau is the operating system through which members vote, discuss issues with elected representatives, make donations to the party and share best practices. rousseau is not controlled by m5s; rather it belongs to an external association, founded by d. casaleggio, local councillor and pm-assistant massimo bugani and former mep david borrelli. value infusion was improved – at least formally – through two documents: a) the first is the party programme, the longest (about 350 pages) and the most elaborate among italian political parties in the 2018 elections, which was voted issue by issue by the membership and b) the so-called governing contract signed by m5s and the league when the two parties formed a coalition government. the party programme was drawn up long before the elections (the first online consultation took place in april 2017) and it took almost eight months to complete. as for the statute reform, this party manifesto was more than a programme: it was meant to be a governing programme for the party. m5s organized a three-days conference in pescara before the elections (january 2018) aimed at training participants in what m5s called a ‘governing programme’. table 2. party reforms and party change in syriza and five star movement. party stimuli party primary goal in t0 and t1 what changed after the reform procedure driver of the change consequences of the change five star movement electoral breakthrough (2013) from democracy-seeking to vote-seeking strengthening centralization party’s statue changes (2016 and 2017) through internal consultations party leadership (2013, 2016 and 2017) dual leadership: • party organizational leadership (casaleggio associati) controls the pco. • the political leadership (di maio) controls the ppo. syriza electoral breakthrough (2012) from policyseeking to vote-seeking strengthening centralization founding congress (2013) and post-referendum congress (2016) party in central office (2013) and party in government (2015-2016) the party leadership (tsipras) controls both pco and ppo. source: own elaboration. vittori, party change in ‘populist’ parties in government 88 5. conclusions the aim of this paper was twofold. it was intended to a) enquire whether anti-establishment parties followed mainstream patterns when introducing internal reforms and b) attempt to analyse the similarities and differences between the institutionalization processes of syriza and m5s. as relatively new parties, external stimuli (i.e. elections) were the main drivers of party change in both cases, even though the institutionalization process within syriza suffered a main setback after the referendum. as in mainstream parties, elections represent a crucial variable for bringing about change within the party. the peculiarity here is that rather than electoral defeat, unexpected good performances pushed the two parties to start a process of internal reforms and institutionalization. in both cases this was mainly due to the young age of the organizations, whose value infusion (m5s) and routinization (m5s and syriza) were not completed before their success. furthermore, party changes followed the same pattern as mainstream parties, since in institutionalization, processes were led by the most powerful party-face at the time of the internal reforms, i.e. the party leadership in the m5s case and the pco (2013) and the party in government (2015-2016) in syriza. however, contrary to the harmel and janda framework, for which the strategy of the party influences party change when facing either an external or internal shock, in these two cases the external stimuli were not in line with the party strategy and they led to a substantial modification of the overall party strategies, shifting party priorities from t0 to t1 towards a more voteseeking strategy (see table 2). in both cases the party changes were oriented to the anticipation of a likely new electoral shock, i.e. victory in the election and participation in the government. both m5s and syriza, rather than being passive actors, pro-actively attempted to modify the organization of the party in order to anticipate challenges coming from new external stimuli. what is more surprising is that, despite their departure from different ideological and organizational backgrounds, in both cases the institutionalization process led to the centralization of the competences into the most relevant party face. despite the similarities between the two parties (first three columns in table 2), syriza and m5s followed different paths towards institutionalization (fourth to sixth columns in table 2). as panebianco (1982) points out, different genetic traits and different organizations impact on both the procedures through which change is pursued and on the drivers of the change. m5s’s unbounded leadership (vittori 2017a) was able through internal consultation to modify the statute without calling for a congress, while it took two congresses (and one internal split) for syriza to complete its institutionalization attempt. in the latter case, it was the pco (1st congress) and the party government (2nd congress) which led the process. finally, the consequences of the change were different. m5s was founded through an entrepreneurial leadership, one political (grillo) and one organizational (g. casaleggio/casaleggio associati). the outcome of its internal changes did not modify the structure of internal power, which at the time of writing has a new political leader (di maio) and a new organizational 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(2012). the presidentialization of party leadership? evaluating party leadership and party government in the democratic world. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 91 in helms, ludger (ed.). comparative political leadership. basingstoke: palgrave macmillan, 77-98. vittori, d. (2017a) podemos and the five-star movement: populist, nationalist or what?, contemporary italian politics, vol.9(2): 142-161. vittori, d. (2017b). podemos and five stars movement: divergent trajectories in a similar crisis? constellations, vol. 24(3): 324-338. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_1.docx italian political science, volume 11 issue 1, june 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 1, pp. 38–53. book reviews section edited by carla monteleone and stefania panebianco maurizio carbone and jan orbie, the trade-development nexus in the european union. differentiation, coherence and norms (london, new york: routledge, 2015). 132 pp., £95,00 (hardback), isbn: 9781138816701 the nexus between trade and development has been crucial within the european union (eu)’s common commercial policy since at least the first lomé convention in 1976. under the convention, the eu essentially granted preferential access, aid, and investment to former colonies in africa, the caribbean, and the pacific (acp). in the 1990s, the neoliberal agenda encapsulated in the world trade organization (wto) agenda reduced the policy space for these kinds of agreements, forcing the eu to substitute the lomé conventions with the cotonou agreement in the year 2000. in general, the pervasiveness of the neoliberal discourse and the rising diversification of development paths in developing countries have somehow led the european union to rethink its approach to preferential trade agreements, aid for trade, and the complex dynamics between development imperatives and commercial interests at large. a very rich and detailed account of all these issues is presented in this book edited by maurizio carbone and jan orbie, which is actually a reprinting of a special issue (march 2014) of the journal contemporary politics. we learn from the itroduction that differentiation, policy coherence, and norms are the focus of the collective work, with the purpose of assessing the evolution of the nexus between trade and development while at the same time shedding light on the challenges the eu has to address in order to increase the credibility, and thus the effectiveness, of its trade policy vis-à-vis developing countries. as far as differentiation is concerned, it seems that since the adoption of eu commissioner peter mandelson’s global europe agenda in 2006, on the one hand, the eu has put economic interests above other considerations, favoring free trade agreements with emerging powers, and on the other hand, brussels has shifted toward reciprocity in dealings with the developing world and also gradually phasing out the general system of preferences for upper-middle income countries (stephen book reviews 39 woolcock and gabriel siles-brügge respectively address these aspects in their chapters). on coherence—or rather, (not surprisingly) incoherence—between trade policy and other policies of the european union, the volume examines horizontal, multilateral, and partner coherence. for instance, tensions between directorate general trade and directorate general development are highlighted in carbone’s chapter, while patrick holden underlines how different discourses on regional integration, the free market, and pro-poor actions often collide, an exception being high coherence in the policy of sanctions between trade, development, and foreign policy (clara portela and jan orbie). multilateral coherence (referring to the eu’s relationship with international organizations) is examined under the lenses of international labour organization policies (mark langan on decent work) or the oecd development assistance committee (carbone on untying aid), but it is logically intertwined with partner coherence (the need to offer partners a practice in line with official discourse), such as in patrick holden’s chapter on the wto and the eu’s aid for trade policy. a third and final dichotomy in the book regards norms and interests because in the literature, some influential voices argue that the eu has become more similar to a self-interested realist power, thereby de facto abandoning (or at least strongly qualifying) its stance as a normative power or a “benign partner” (see anders ahnlid and ole elgström’s contribution), which has always presumably been the defining feature of the eu as a global actor. in other words, the eu seems more and more interested in promoting its commercial interests at the expense of meaningful and sustainable development of local economies. why is this so? apart from the self-evident need after the great recession to tap into external markets’ demand to help the recovery of the european economies, the authors offer some tentative explanations. for example, siles-brügge puts forward a political economy explanation, arguing that the eu is in search of open markets for its companies, and everything else is subordinated to acquiring and keeping leverage in free trade negotiations. ahnlid and elgström look to role theory to explain how the new eu realism might be seen as a reaction to the increasing role emerging economic giants claim on the global scene. tony heron refers to constructivist and historical arguments to explain how the problems with the reform of the acp trade regime were caused by a divergence between institutional paths and ideas, with the former prevailing over the latter. holden makes use of critical discourse analysis to give evidence of the deep undercurrent tensions in the eu’s flow of policies and discourses on development and trade. finally, under a “moral economy” perspective, langan shows how the economic partnership agreements will have “deleterious consequences for the lives of many poorer producers and workers in acp countries,” and he points out that a serious reflection on possible alternative instruments is needed in order to overcome the “normativity-outcomes gap” that is weakening the eu’s foreign policy consistency. the general impression the reader gets from the valuable contribution to the literature found in this fascinating book is that political and economic differentiation among developing countries has found the european union rather unprepared to ips, volume 11, issue 1 40 smoothly adjust its trade and development nexus, and, consequently, the eu reaction (also influenced by the eu’s own internal dynamics) has led to general incoherence in a general environment of norm confusion, to the extent that alasdair r. young in the conclusive chapter talks about “a lack of common understanding of what a norm is.” this seems to be quite a poor achievement for a regional bloc that is, as carbone and orbie pointedly remark in the introduction, “‘the world’s largest trading power…, the biggest importer of products from developing countries…, [and] the largest provider of development assistance.” indeed, the eu looks like a confused actor striving to find its way within a rapidly evolving international order, with a real gap between (strong) power resources and (weak) effectiveness. it might also be the case that beyond the pro-poor rhetoric, the european trade policy under the present commission, made explicit by the 2015 communication “trade for all,” has a real focus on delivering economic opportunities’ for “consumers, workers and small companies” alike within the eu market, sending development concerns to the margins of the discourse. the eu, in fact, seems to be aware of contradictions in the trade-development nexus given that the new horizon 2020 call for research projects also includes the specific theme of assessing the coherence of the eu trade policy with all other relevant eu policies. this is a welcoming sign: as carbone and orbie write at the end of their conclusion, it is necessary “to move beyond brussels-centric analyses and concentrate on the effective impact of the eu’s trade-development policies on the ground,” adopting a clear interdisciplinary approach. in the meantime, this volume provides a wealth of knowledge and a true starting point for future research. giuseppe gabusi, university of turin * * * lorenzo cladi and andrea locatelli, international relations theory and european security. we thought we knew (london, new york: routledge, 2016). 246 pp., £90,00 (hardback), isbn: 9781138847279 european security and defense policies have been an object of analysis among international relations (ir) scholars for decades. however, it was the end of the cold war that brought about a resilient cooperation on security and defense among european union (eu) member states: beginning in the 1990s, the cfsp and the esdp (both renamed csdp, the common security and defence policy, by the lisbon treaty) emerged as key policies of european external action. the renewed military ambitions of the civilian power, as the eu as an international actor was initially understood, contributed to the creation of a number of institutions and agencies. accordingly, in the last twenty-five years, the process of integration in the sphere of high politics (defense and security) after the remarkable integration of low politics (common market) inevitably attracted the attention of ir scholars. book reviews 41 notwithstanding the considerable amount of academic literature and scholarship devoted to the topic, the eu’s foreign and security policies still constitute an empirical puzzle. the phenomenon is too complex (due to the multiplicity of actors and institutions involved) and too new (since the eu is neither a state nor a traditional international organization but a new-flanged supranational political body) to be easily grasped by a single theoretical perspective. above all, the hybrid political nature of the eu hinders analysis, and this is particularly true for the two main traditional paradigms of ir: realism that relies on state-centrism and liberalinstitutionalism focused on international organizations. however, the eu is neither a cohesive political unit nor an inter-governmental organization. the peculiarity of the european integration was captured by kenneth waltz in 1993 (and his words are still meaningful today) when he contended that “[m]any believe that the ec [european community] has moved so far toward unity that it cannot pull back, at least not very far back. that is probably true, but it is also probably true that it has moved so far toward unity that it can go no farther. the easier steps toward unity come earlier, the harder ones later, and the hardest of all at the end”.1 in this view, the authors adopted an original theoretical perspective, inspired by analytic eclecticism, an epistemological approach that was recently suggested by sil and katzenstein.2 it is particularly suitable for analyzing complex phenomena that are marked by multiple interactions in which different mechanisms and processes (drawn from different paradigms) are at play and that raise both practical dilemmas for decision-makers and academic debates. the csdp comprises all these features. thus, following this epistemological line, the book looks at the csdp through the theoretical lenses of the main ir research traditions. analytic eclecticism applied to the csdp could have ended up merely adding theoretical complexity to the complexity of the object of analysis. however, that risk was avoided—and this is the primary merit of the volume—for a number of reasons. first, even though the contributions differ on the theoretical perspective adopted, they are consistent on one point: in coming to terms with the csdp, a single paradigm as a catch-all explanation is not convincing. put differently, indulging in parsimony for theoretical elegance is not an appropriate starting point for seriously grasping the csdp. second, the complexity of the csdp and the hybrid character of the european integration clearly invite a problem-driven approach rather than a theory-driven methodology based on a single paradigm. in this view, analytic eclecticism is neither a way to evade theoretical analysis nor an excuse for theoretical inaccuracy. on the contrary, its aim is to make inter-paradigmatic dialogue fruitful for investigating the causal drivers behind a complex phenomenon. third, the book effectively uses the ir research traditions (and the possible dialogue among them) to shed light on three dichotomies concerning the drivers of the csdp: material vs. ideational factors; national vs. systemic variables; and state vs. society interests. throughout the book, the relative role of—and interplay between—material and ideational variables is touched on. even if the editors and contributors do not aim to ascertain whether a paradigm is better than others, they show how both material and ideational factors shape the csdp. more empirical inquiries are needed, as the ips, volume 11, issue 1 42 editors admit in the conclusion, but it is important to stress how the volume represents a promising starting point for using the dialogue between different paradigms to explain when, how, and why material or ideational factors prevail over the others. chapters 2, 5, 6, and 10 already do that, but the same approach can be fruitfully applied to other policies related to the csdp. the same argument can be used for the state vs. society dichotomy to determine when, how, and why states behave as unitary actors or how societal demands (within a state) affect government decisions. from this point of view, the volume offers a resilient, original, and promising contribution to the literature on eu security and defense policies and, potentially, on the european integration in general. however, the distinction between levels of analysis—systemic vs. national—is more ambiguous. the editors and some contributors rightfully assert that both systemic and national variables are at play in the csdp. however, even chapters that address domestic aspects (chapter 3 and 4) concede that systemic changes, particularly the end of the cold war, cannot be easily discharged as negligible explanatory variables. conversely, they seem to recognize, in part implicitly, that the new security environment has been the permissive condition for european cooperation on security and defense policies. domestic factors were decisive for the csdp’s development but probably thanks to the opportunities offered by the new international scenario. in this case, the contribution of inter-paradigmatic dialogue between systemic and reductionist theories to grasp the csdp are more elusive. andrea carati, university of milan * * * fabrizio coticchia and francesco n. moro, the transformation of italian armed forces in comparative perspective. adapt, improvise, overcome? (london, new york: routledge, 2015). 162 pp., £95,00 (hardback), isbn: 9781472427519 after the end of the cold war, western armed forces changed dramatically. the international context as well as the threats those armies were designed to face became increasingly nuanced and unpredictable. in particular, because the mutable nature of war is well-known among decision makers and military élites, adaptation became a sort of mantra in the process of reframing the most important western defense bodies. after more than forty years of stability—or at least a clear and relatively static scenario—after september 11, western armed forces entered into an era of relentless deployment vis-à-vis insurgencies, regional rivalries, and humanitarian emergencies. this transformation, however, did not follow a linear path. based on some of the authors’ prior studies on the italian army and, implicitly, on the strategic narrative of the italian decision makers, the transformation of the italian armed forces investigates how that process concerned the italian armed forces. a similar framework of analysis was also applied in part to the french and book reviews 43 british cases. the main scientific outcome of the manuscript is thus a clear and almost comprehensive overview of the ongoing evolution of the so called european way of war. the preliminary assumption of fabrizio coticchia and francesco n. moro’s study is that the evolution of western armed forces requires interaction between macro and meso levels of analysis. these means of investigation are complemented with interviews and primary sources. the first part of the book (chapters 1 and 2) highlights the dimensions of the transformation of the armed forces, and the following sections (chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6) are focused on the process itself and its dynamics. the third chapter is an exhaustive assessment of the defense transformation and its peculiarities in italy, france, and the uk. key official documents illustrate the main doctrinal changes that occurred in these countries both in the nineties and after 9/11. one merit of the coticchia-moro study is that its analysis also involves budget transformations and the role played by nato and the eu defense policy in the process of adaptation and, excluding libya, operational convergence. the empirical part of the work illustrates the italian military operations undertaken since 2001. with the valuable aim of filling a gap in the security studies literature through an innovative approach, in chapter 4 the authors observe the degree of coherence along three different dimensions: a) the force deployment with the type of mission; b) the adaptation to the environment through the existing doctrines as well as the learning on the field; and c) the channels of communication among strategic levels. in the following sections, coticchia and moro summarize and discuss the contents of chapters 3 and 4 in order to subsequently illustrate the defense model that emerged in the last decades and some of the risks related to the ongoing international scenario and that way of war. through this study, coticchia and moro have pursued—successfully indeed—the valuable aim of filling the gap between the operational reality of the italian armed forces (involved in a range of military operations abroad such as isaf, antica babilonia, operation leonte, and unified protector) and domestic indifference or misperception about their international stance. a mixed explanatory and analytical intent shapes the entire book. fresh empirical sources and a unique access to military and official documents, complemented by selective interviews with the key personalities involved in transforming the italian army, enhance western war-making literature with a nuanced picture of twenty years of activity among the three most important european defense forces in their relations with both the united states and the non-state actors of the 21st century international system. although the transformation of the italian armed forces in comparative perspective does not entirely fill the existing gap in this field of analysis, it of course serves as useful reading for those scholars and practitioners who aim at developing a critical view of the role of coercion in italian foreign and military policy. marco valigi, university of bologna ips, volume 11, issue 1 44 * * * manlio graziano, guerra santa e santa alleanza. religioni e disordine internazionale nel xxi secolo (bologna: il mulino, 2015). 360 pp., €25,00 (paperback), isbn: 9788815254382 in october 2015, prime minister benjamin netanyahu of israel, in a speech to the zionist congress, said that “hitler didn’t want to exterminate the jews…he wanted to expel the jews.” netanyahu was referring to a supposed conversation in which the grand mufti of jerusalem, haj amin al-husseini, had protested to hitler that “they’ll all come here,” referring to palestine. netanyahu then quoted hitler asking husseini, “so what should i do with them?” and husseini as answering, “burn them!” this controversial speech came at a time of spiraling violence in which the israeli leader had repeatedly accused palestinians of lying, mainly about israel’s actions at a contested holy site in the old city. most of the israeli historians and some israeli politicians joined palestinians in denouncing netanyahu for falsity in saying it was the mufti who gave hitler the idea of annihilating european jews during world war ii. in a place among the nations. israel and the world (1993), netanyahu had already argued against the perfidious west and the untrustworthy arabs, affirming that the question of what to do with the large arab population in israel would be solved by massive jewish immigration. the view that netanyahu holds of middle eastern history is quite simple: endless betrayal by the west of promises made to the jewish people, ferocious hostility by the arabs, and heroic achievements by the israelis. undoubtedly, the main quality of manlio graziano’s book is to suggest a more complex view of middle eastern and world history. as graziano underlines, husseini was first appointed grand mufti by the british, then he joined the axis powers, and finally he became a third-world leader. the roots of his various “holy wars,” proclaimed from time to time against the enemies of his patrons of the moment, lie in the foreign offices of the most developed nations rather than in the sands where the muslim tradition emerged. his commitment was part of a sort of pedagogy of hate that was paving the way for our times, when religions re-emerge instrumentally or by filling the political vacuum left by the de-secularization of the world. facing the declining pillars of the westphalia temple, also israeli politicians are not unfamiliar with this post-secular trend in international relations. graziano’s book is divided into four sections. the first three cover, respectively, the theoretical, historical, and analytical perspectives on the “holy war” as a potential occurrence. the final section is devoted to the book’s main thesis, namely, the possibility of a “holy alliance.” the theoretical section revolves around two discursive hinges or pivotal reasoning. first, the turning point of modern secularization started with the displacement of the geopolitical axis of the world from the mediterranean to the atlantic and indian oceans. the powers confined to the mediterranean, i.e., the italian city-states and the ottoman empire, saw the beginning of their decline, and with that, the two religions that had their territorial center in the region started to decline. second, the book reviews 45 theory of secularization with its two corollaries about the autonomy of the political and the sovereignty of the state are currently challenged by the “return of god.” this development takes place in today’s globalized world that was shaped by the decolonization process. post-secularism is already visible in megacities, where—as a consequence of massive rural exodus and urbanization—there has been a revival of “universal morality” in the heart of the polis. the end of the capitalist expansion of the west that characterized the so-called trente glorieuse and the recent rise of islamic capitalism both contributed to this outcome. the historical part of the book is a broad and rich overview of the religious great awakenings that began in the seventies, although a sort of preview had already occurred in indonesia (1965). these developments are manifest in the islamization of egypt (1971) and pakistan (1973), in israel and india since religious parties conquered the public sphere (1977), in the iranian revolution (1979), but also in sri lanka, burma, and even the united states. in particular, graziano focuses on the case of afghanistan (1979), where he observes the potential for international disorder or the coming of a holy war. he also puts the “catholicization of modernity” that arose after the election of pope john paul ii (1978) in the context of this religious revival. in the analytical part, graziano overturns most of the stereotypes on which huntington’s thesis of a “clash of civilizations” is based, but he also lays the foundation for criticizing the opposite commitments to dialogue or alliance of civilizations because these help spread the belief that the world is divided along religious fault lines. in particular, graziano dwells upon the invention of the west, the supposed monolithic nature of islam, the reality of bloody boundaries along huntington’s fault lines (including buddhism and hinduism), and the features of religious terrorism. this part of the book is a general analysis of the nexus between religion and politics far beyond the study of international relations. the last part of the book presents the thesis of the holy alliance. according to graziano, in the post-secular world, the decisive fault line is global in scope, and it divides the last warriors of the westphalia temple on one side from the new religious forces that are reshaping the globalized world on the other. to confront international disorder, the only possible way out would seem to be that of a holy alliance guided by a catholic alliance. the thesis of a holy alliance led by the papal hegemony is twofold. on the one hand, it is based on the vatican narratives, beginning with papal encyclicals. on the other, it depends on the nature of the holy see, in particular its “power of statelessness” that makes the pope a geopolitical pivot. if the first three parts are an excellent and essential discussion on the geopolitics of religions, the final argument seems rather an exercise in the “cosmopolitics” of religions. in 1990, stephen toulmin stated that the hidden agenda of modernity was a vision of cosmopolis as a material society rationally ordered. can the vision of cosmopolis as a spiritual society morally ordered be considered the hidden agenda of post-modernity? aside from the exclusion of other civilizations, can this project be implemented in the holy see of rome instead of in the old city of jerusalem? emidio diodato, università per stranieri di perugia ips, volume 11, issue 1 46 * * * simona piattoni, the european union. democratic principles and institutional architectures in times of crisis (oxford: oxford university press, 2015). 320 pp., £55,00 (hardback), isbn: 9780198716273 since its foundation, the european union (eu) has been an innovative experiment that challenged many traditional principles of western politics such as sovereignty and statehood. from the perspective of political science, the eu is a formidable research lab for a long list of classical topics. among these, one of the most exciting exercises for scholars is to determine “the nature of the beast” by finding a new or existing political and institutional format that fits with the characteristics of the european union. a second “cool” topic is the legitimacy of the eu in terms of both common values and democracy in the political processes. nevertheless, in the last years, the crisis has presented complex challenges to the european union and to scholars involved with analyzing its political system. moreover, the euro crisis necessitated a joint response to save the single currency, and european politics became more salient; for the first time, it was collectively perceived as strongly intertwined with domestic politics by european citizens. this edited volume explores the impact of the euro crisis on the institutional structure of the eu and proposes a theoretical frame for understanding the institutional changes that should take place in response to the existential threat that the eurozone crisis represented. the book’s basic contention is that the crisis was a push factor for reforming the institutional structures of the eu and for increasing the level of citizens’ participation. simona piattoni, editor of the book and an italian scholar with deep knowledge of and research experience on the european union, has framed contributions from outstanding scholars in order to connect the topic of the eu’s institutional and governance structure with the problem of legitimacy and accountability of the union’s political system, taking into account the shock effect the last economic crisis had on the people and governments of the member states. based on the premise that in time of crisis, “the future of [the] eu will depend on its capacity to address broad societal problems in a way which is consistent with eu citizens’ preferences,” this book challenges the theoretical perspective of the eu’s “output legitimacy” and stresses the need to “stick to democracy as a basis for legitimacy.” the substantive scope of this analysis means that the book addresses a number of ongoing debates in eu political science scholarship by providing a common frame for the analysis and evaluation of the quality of eu democracy. in her introduction, simona piattoni identifies six democratic principles, delegation, accountability, representation, transparency, responsiveness, and participation that serve as theoretical and methodological guides for contributors. the classical debate on the eu’s democratic deficit is discussed by fossum and pollak with a new perspective. they evaluate the democratic performances of the eu in the light of the six abovementioned principles without underestimating the challenge of “accommodating diversity” that the eu must face in designing its institutional book reviews 47 structure. agné and neyer debate the notion of legitimacy in two different chapters. agné’s contribution criticizes the actual institutional architecture of the eu because this latter does not provide citizens with the power to influence the common institutions and their work. neyer argues that the eu should increase the role of national parliaments in order to legitimize policy outputs, with particular regard to monetary and finance policy. crum and curtin and nicolaïdis, burgess, and fabbrini analyze the union’s actual institutional structure. in particular, crum and curtin evaluate the accountability of the eu by analyzing executive power and decision-making procedures. they argue that the eu suffers from institutional and political ambiguities that determine lack of accountability. nicolaïdis applies the notion of “demoicracy” to the eu’s political system in order to highlight the eu’s specific needs in organizing its political system, with particular regard to the necessity of conciliating different and, in some cases, opposite requirements. burgess approaches the democratic dilemma of the european union from a federal perspective that is combined with a revisited version of historical institutionalism. in this perspective, he argues that some federal objectives as stated by the founding fathers marked a path that is still valid and they could contribute to establishing a political and institutional strategy for moving the eu forward. fabbrini, in his contribution, focuses on the double logic underpinning the eu’s actual institutional arrangements: the supranational union and the intergovernmental organization. both logics coexist in the treaty, but in times of crisis, they can be uncomfortable for the system in terms of both effectiveness and democracy. in this perspective, fabbrini argues the need for a treaty reform in order to substitute the double logic of intergovernativism and supranationalism with a coherent model of compounded democracy that can reconcile the union of states and the union of citizens. smismans and kröger analyze the union’s interest representation system. smismans, in his contribution, discusses the main debates on modes of participation in the eu and identifies some basic principles that should be considered for every future reform of the eu’s institutional architecture. kröger frames the topic of democratic representation in the larger perspective of political equality and introduces the issue of representation deficit in the eu policy process as one of the main concerns for the eu’s political system. benz’s chapter is focused on a further classical concept in eu studies: the multi level governance model (mlg). his analysis is centered on the reconciliation between representative democracy and the multilevel governance system in order to demonstrate that that mlg can be a democratic mode of governance. the main value of this text is that it incorporates the institutional analysis of the eu into the debate on the legitimacy of the integration process with particular attention paid to the challenge posed by the economic crisis. it highlights the crisis’s crucial role, not only showing that the crisis determined a request for more participation but also investigating how and by whom the institutional architecture of the eu should be reformed in order to face the new european environment. ips, volume 11, issue 1 48 the result is a collective volume that makes compelling reading and that will prove a valuable resource not only for eu scholars but more broadly for researchers in comparative politics. francesca longo, university of catania * * * andrea pritoni, poteri forti? banche e assicurazioni nel sistema politico italiano (bologna: il mulino, 2015). 256 pp., €24,00 (paperback), isbn: 9788815257468 located in the research tradition developed in the department of political and social sciences of the university of bologna, which in recent years has been an important driving force for a renewed attention to “interest politics,” which had never found a solid base in italy, andrea pritoni’s book attempts to give an answer to the classic lasswellian question “who gets what, when and how?” in order to do that, he focuses on the associazione bancaria italiana (abi–italian bank association) and the associazione nazionale fra le imprese assicuratrici (ania–national association of insurance companies), two actors that so far had not been closely analyzed but that have always been identified as having “strong powers,” that is, powers that often if not always make them capable of enforcing their preferences and specific interests in decision-making processes that may be of concern to them. the research objective of this book is to identify and measure these two actors’ access to policy making and to transform this access into a true influence on outcomes by focusing attention on three extremely important decision-making processes in the policy fields of credit and insurance: the conversion of decree law n° 223/2006 into law n° 248/2006 (“bersani’s first ‘lenzuolata’ of liberalizations”), the conversion of decree law 7/2007 into law n° 40/2007 (“bersani’s second ‘lenzuolata’ of liberalizations”), and the conversion of decree law n° 1/2012 into law n° 27/2012 (the liberalizations made by the technical government headed by professor mario monti). before presenting the results of his empirical research, in the first two chapters pritoni suggests a thorough review of the international literature on the lobbying capacities and strategies that groups may adopt. in particular, in the first chapter, the author, embraces the idea that before being a (more or less) relevant actor in the policy-making process, every group is also and above all a complex organization that needs a certain structure and specific resources. he then proceeds by classifying and identifying four ideal types of groups, each of which insists on a certain segment of representation and has a prevailing organizational mission. the second chapter explains the research strategy and the methodology used. here an interesting review of the literature regarding lobbying and policy analysis is proposed. moreover, after having identified some approaches that in his opinion are book reviews 49 best suited to achieve the goals set, the a. elaborates some research hypotheses to explain the influence that specific groups have on decision-making and does that by looking at the relationships between organizational resources held by specific groups and the characteristics of the policy issues analyzed. finally, pritoni presents a series of proposals for operationalizing the concepts used. the other chapters show the results of the research: the third describes the structure and the organizational resources; the fourth shows the lobbying strategies used; and the fifth focuses on the influence of groups in the three processes previously mentioned. as for the structure and organizational resources, the data used are easily accessible (different groups’ statutes, the central and territorial organizational articulation, the number and types of bureaucrats, the extent of membership, representativeness, expertise, and skills that groups can mobilize, the symbolic resources, the confidence in the organization as assessed through surveys). pritoni analyzes the type of lobbying and the tactics and strategies of influence in the decision-making process by looking at the activities of two groups in a specific year (2012) and, to identify these tactics, strategies and types of lobbying, conducts semistructured interviews with the leaders of the organizations. furthermore, the author attempts to reconstruct a series of group actions (mobilizations, civil disobedience, appeals to civil and administrative justice to change wrong policies, strikes, etc.). with regard to the problem of influence in the three decisional processes that were previously analyzed, pritoni, perfectly aware of the difficulty of measuring this influence, opts for a minimalist strategy of research by suggesting control over the results of the decisional process, which measures the influence in terms of distance between the outcomes that have occurred and the demands expressed by all participating actors. to calculate this distance, the a. uses both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the content of important documents, especially the articles and subsections related to the issues to which the groups are considered most susceptible, and asks eight experts to estimate the innovations introduced by the legislation analyzed despite the presence of group preferences in favor of the status quo. it must be said that only three of the experts responded positively to the request for cooperation and evaluation, and this made the effort to attempt a quantitative analysis “disproportionate”. overall, the results of the empirical research showed that the analyticalconceptual schema proposed in chapter one holds. the third chapter, in particular, shows a new image of the organizational traits of the two actors studied, and the hypothesized proximity to the ideal type of corporate interest group of both associations is confirmed by most of the empirical dimensions analyzed. as for lobbying and the logics of strategic action, although they show some contradictions, the collected data validate the roles of the insiders in both associations, including their possession of vast economic, political, and informational resources that allow the leaders constant access to both political and bureaucratic policy makers. this access, however, does not seem to turn into influence in any decision-making process analyzed in chapter five: in fact, the empirical analysis shows that neither the abi nor ania were able to exert any influence. pritoni considers that because the three decision-making processes were not particularly complex and they concerned exips, volume 11, issue 1 50 tremely important policy issues on which public attention is rather high, the lack of influence can be considered not surprising. he also considers that the abi and ania could nevertheless be considered strong powers but not always strong: especially when the issues are very important and/or poorly specific and technical, they appear to be forced to accept unwanted policy results. as plausible as it is, this interpretation does not seem to be sufficient to eliminate some small doubt about the adequacy of the data collection tools and approaches used. it does not seem daring to assume that the relations between political actors and interest groups deserve more attention and that more attention should be given to that gray area between the “visible policy of the invisible policy,” which is definitely not detectable through the interviews with the organizations’ leaders but is also not absent. none of this, however, calls into question the scientific relevance and usefulness of the fine work of pritoni, especially the theory and methodology discussions. in conclusion, we can only agree with pritoni, who considers his research to be the beginning of a study that has significant empirical evidence on two actors that political analysis neglected and that uncovers a reality that needs further investigation. orazio lanza, università di catania * * * donatella m. viola, routledge handbook of european elections (london, new york: routledge, 2016). 786 pp., £150,00 (hardback), isbn: 9780415592031 this book, edited by donatella viola, is a remarkable work for a number of reasons: first, for its size—786 pages (in addition to the 36 pages of prefaces and the prologue) organized into 32 chapters plus a synoptic appendix on european politics and an analytic index; second, for its content. the heart of the book (“part ii – country reviews”) consists of 27 chapters concerning the eu member states written by academic experts from various countries. the different national cases are classified according to the historical evolution of the eu building process and of the chronology of the various enlargements. only the case of croatia, which joined the eu in 2013, is not analyzed because the book was originally an analysis of the 2009 ep (european parliament) elections. the 2014 elections, however, are explained in a supplementary chapter written by the editor (where the croatian case is included). these last elections appear crucial because of the electioneering process and the problematic outcomes in the context of the deepest economic crisis since the postwar period. these chapters are organized according to a standard structure: after a brief but useful country-specific profile (geography, history, geopolitical profile, political parties, electoral system, and form of government), the results of all the european book reviews 51 elections (from 1979 to 2009) are retraced and usefully compared with the results of the national elections. overall, this long section of the book precisely constitutes a valuable “handbook” of european politics and elections. but there is more: it also offers a specific interpretation that is well underlined in the foreword by j.h.h weiler, one of the main scholars on the politics of the european union. in particular, he writes, “it is a virtue of this project that it understands that europe in general, and the machinations of european democracy in particular, can only be understood by close attention to the specificities of the national member states” (p. xxviii, emphasis added). in brief, the national context is important, and indeed, the national dimension and the supranational dimension interact constantly. this fact does not mean that we should forget that the supranational level has its own “emerging qualities”; it is also true that institutions matter. however, there is no doubt that the handbook describes a variety of features and specific outcomes of the single countries that highlight the differences between old and new member states (chapter 31). but the routledge handbook of european elections is also important for its specific topic. in this regard, the three chapters in part i in with viola outlines the general framework of the entire work are particular useful and interesting. chapter 1 retraces a brief history of the european parliament, underlining its transformation from an “appointed consultative assembly” to a “directly elected legislative body” and from a legislative body without powers to an institution with greater ability to influence european politics, that is, from a functioning to a functional body. chapter 2 addresses the classical structural and functional analysis of the ep emphasizing the specificity of a supranational assembly, starting from aspects such as the ep’s location in strasbourg and brussels (but also the luxembourg headquarters of the general secretariat of the ep) and multilingualism. from this chapter there emerges the exceptional nature of an elected international body that, having the role of representing many nationalities, has increasingly become a composite assembly in terms of size and number of states: from 142 seats of the six members in 1958 to 751 seats of the 28 member states in 2014. the chapter then addresses the political groups in the ep, identifying them as forms of transnational political protoorganizations. the dynamics of european parliamentary groups, especially if analyzed in the long run, are interesting in a number of respects: a) the evolution of the main european ideological families, 2) their internal variance, and 3) the instability of their composition during the same legislature. photographs of european politics tell us much about the structural transformation of national politics. the first part of the book ends with a chapter that looks at two main theoretical perspectives that have characterized the international debate on european elections: the second-order election model (soe; also applied to regional and local elections, as well as to the mid-term elections in the united states) and the europe salience (es). the first theory emphasizes national voters’ perceptions of the european elections. this leads to identifying some typical characteristics of european elections (that tell us a great deal about the deficit of institutionalization in the eu as a polity): “1) low turnout; 2) focus on national issues rather than european issues; 3) the defeat of government parties; 4) defeats of major parties; and 5) the ips, volume 11, issue 1 52 impact of timing of ep contest within the domestic electoral cycle on the results for ruling and big parties” (p. 41). this voting pattern is closely associated with the distinction between expressive voting and strategic voting, where the voter’s choice is influenced by the expectations of a candidate or a party’s success. these expectations are usually higher in the proportional systems (generally used for european elections). however, with the progressive evolution of european integration, although the soe model has not disappeared, the europe salience theory has gained ground; europe-related issues increasingly have bearing on political parties’ programs and voters’ preferences. in particular, the salience theory involves three hypotheses regarding european elections: we have 1) better performances by green parties; 2) gains by extreme parties; and 3) success of anti-european parties. after the economic crisis of 2007–08, the salience theory gained greater prominence, and the 2014 elections have been read as a success of the anti-european attitudes. at this point, it is appropriate to shift the focus on chapter 31 (“final remarks”). this chapter explicitly and systematically compares the first seven european elections (it would have been useful to also include the 2014 election, which instead is analyzed in the chapter that closes the volume) based on some divergent key features, i.e., whether the 27 member states are big or small (under the geopolitical profile), old or new democracy (pre or post-1974), pro-eu/euro or anti-eu/euro (soft or hard euro-skepticism), but the chapter also aims to verify the soe and es models. essentially, “the core postulates of the second-order election theory continued to be upheld, even following the subsequent treaty changes that have gradually expanded the role of the european parliament” (p. 696). european elections continue to work as a rematch over national competition. at the same time, “[the] european salience theory has gained some ground, since voters’ choices have slowly been directed to movements that confer an increasing relevance to europe” (ibid.). that means the increasing diffusion of eurosceptic and populist parties. particularly, after the long and intense economic crisis of 2007–08, the last european elections showed the existence of some fractures or structural conflicts that may harm the eu’s existence: between euro-zone and non-euro-zone countries (united kingdom, scandinavia); between weak (southern european democracies plus ireland) and strong (continental democracies) euro-zone countries; between western and eastern countries; and between the stronger states such as france and germany that struggle for hegemony. ultimately, the volume is important because it draws attention to other issues related to european politics starting from the paradox between powers (increased) and legitimacy (in decline) of the european parliament and of the eu itself. this raises some questions. how can a polity without politics exist, especially if the policies are perceived in a negative way by citizens? what is the relationship between parlamentarization and the “constitutional” equilibria that occur in the quadrangle made up of the supranational institutions (parliament and commission) and the intergovernmental institutions (european council and council of ministers)? are most decisive elections sufficient to ensure accountable and representative institutions? more generally, will they strengthen the eu’s legitimacy? in conclusion, book reviews 53 regarding the tower of babel depicted on the cover of the book, will there the negative side of the conflicts prevail or the positive side of the opportunities? more generally, the book, edited by donatella viola, leaves us with a (implicit) question: does the eu mark a further development in democracy, from the city-states to the national states and, therefore, to a supranational order? in other words, does the eu herald the advent of a post-democracy? francesco raniolo, university of calabria * microsoft word pdf_issue_13_3_borghetto.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 3, december 2018 the author would like to thank elisabetta de giorgi for contributing to the first draft of this article, lorenzo andraghetti for his research assistance, and the two anonymous reviewers and the editors for their valuable comments. this study was supported by the fundação para a ciência e tecnologia (fct) through the fct investigator contract if/00382/2014. © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 3, pp. 19-32 contact author: enrico borghetto, universidade nova de lisboa. e-mail address: enrico.borghetto@fcsh.unl.pt challenger parties in parliament: the case of the italian five star movement enrico borghetto universidade nova de lisboa abstract in 2013, the five star movement (m5s) won representation for the first time in the italian parliament, the heart of the institutions they criticised and aimed to reform. with parliamentary ranks filled mostly with inexperienced politicians and a strong identification with the role of outsiders challenging the mainstream political consensus, the expectation is that their opposition style should differ substantially from that of other parties. this article explores this question by comparing the policy content of oral parliamentary questions submitted by the m5s with that of other italian opposition parties during the 17th legislature (2013-2018). it analyses to what extent the m5s’s issue profile 1) overlaps more with parties of either the left or the right side of the political spectrum, 2) is more likely to deal with matters emphasised in its electoral platform, and 3) is more likely to address issues not attended to by other parties. the results provide new insights into the behaviour of new challenger parties in parliament. 1. introduction t the time of their first entry into the national parliament, in 2013, the five star movement (movimento 5 stelle, m5s) was described as a ‘strange animal’ wandering around ‘the zoo of italian politics’ (corbetta, 2013; 197). although other italian parties had made recourse to anti-establishment rhetoric in the past, the m5s brought the critique of corrupted party elites to a whole new level. it presented itself as an alternative to all political forces and it did not identify with any traditional cleavages, especially the socio-economic distinction between left and right. to further stress its distinctiveness, its parliamentary ranks were filled with non-professional politicians, presenting themselves as citizens and party delegates rather than representatives. all in all, the distance from past and current parliamentary parties could not have been any greater, so much so that it utterly rejected the ‘party’ label (tronconi, 2018). according to hobolt and tilley (2016), the m5s should not be considered an outlier in either italian or european politics but rather a successful example of a new type of opposition party, which they label ‘challenger party’. similar to podemos in spain or the front national in france, the m5s managed to attract disaffected voters by offering ‘a clear alternative narrative to the mainstream consensus’ (2016: 975) and by stressing its extraneousness to those political elites which were in office when the euro crisis struck europe. these parties are well-known for using traditional tools (e.g. protests and rallies) a challenger parties in parliament 20 and new ones (e.g. the web) to challenge the mainstream consensus and influence the political agenda. however, little is yet known on how they employ more institutional channels such as the opposition activity of their mps in parliament. the main goal of this research article is to contribute to existing knowledge about the m5s and, more in general, new challenger parties, by analysing their opposition style in parliament. the expectation is that the m5s will attempt to mark its distinctiveness from the other opposition parties (see also de giorgi and dias 2018). when entering representative institutions, challenger parties as a rule must walk a thin line. they must prove that they are effective at representing the interests of their voters and militants, while at the same time avoiding being assimilated into the party system, thus losing their alleged purity. building on the literature on party issue competition (e.g. green-pedersen, 2007; green-pedersen and mortensen, 2010), this article contends that one way to achieve this goal is to emphasise issues which are different from your competitors. while research shows that all parties practise some form of selective issue emphasis, this article’s argument is that new opposition parties have a greater incentive to set themselves apart than the other opposition parties. to test this hypothesis, the following analysis will look at the issues opposition parties in the 17th legislature (2013-2018) decided to bring to the fore in their parliamentary oversight activities, more specifically during the so-called weekly question time (russo and cavalieri, 2016, borghetto and russo 2018). admittedly, this is just one of the arenas where opposition parties are active. yet, monitoring and challenging the government is one of their core functions (martin, 2011). additionally, the stake should be higher when the opposition is given the chance to ask questions on the floor and during a weekly televised debate in the presence of members of the cabinet. thus, weekly question time represents an important stage where the opposition gains visibility and is able to signal to its voters. the analysis is set up in two parts. the first step entails a comparison of the movement’s issue profile during the 17th legislature with that of opposition parties active from the 13th to the 17th legislatures and asks whether it overlaps more with parties of the left or the right side of the political spectrum. this way i can test whether the m5s lives up to its word of being indifferent to the socio-economic cleavage (h1). second, i look closely at the agenda choices of the movement in comparison with those of other opposition parties during the 17th legislature. on the one hand, the commitment to introduce some form of imperative mandate (which is prohibited by the italian constitution) for its mps should make adherence to the party programme a relevant criterion for selecting the topic of parliamentary questions. h2 expects that the m5s should ask more questions on the key topics in its electoral manifesto than other parties. on the other hand, parties are strategic actors and do not act in a void. if most of their competitors in parliament ask questions on the issue of the day, it would be difficult for a party to avoid it. i argue that this should be less relevant in the case of the m5s. because of its intention to portray itself as distinct and uncompromising, h3 expects that the m5s will choose topics which are different from the majority of other parties during a specific session. i argue that this issue-based perspective and the choice to look closer at this less publicised side of the m5s – which is more well-known to the public for its town square rallies, social media campaigns and disruptive protests in parliament (bordignon and enrico borghetto 21 ceccarini, 2015) – can provide important insights into the evolution of the movement, from the pariah in italian politics to main government partner in the current legislature (18th, which started in 2018). many important studies have already analysed the movement from different perspectives, bringing under the lens its communication strategy, organisational profile, charismatic leader and ideology. on the other hand, there is still little knowledge about the behaviour of its elected mps in parliament (an exception is pinto and pedrazzani, 2015, and de giorgi and dias, 2018); in other words, on the behaviour of the party in public office, rather than the party on the ground and in central office (katz and mair 2003). 2. the m5s outside and inside parliament in the context of the ongoing transformations in contemporary democracies, italy, for once, is no exception, but rather the place where some of the trends observable in most other european countries are amplified and, at times, anticipated. these include the sharp drop in the governing parties’ level of support, the rise of new political forces that are often anti-establishment and with a strongly populist rhetoric (bosco and verney, 2012), and the increasing divide between parties that govern but are seen as incapable of representing, and parties that mostly do not govern, but that claim to represent (mair 2011). until its entry in 2018 into a government coalition with the league (which is still too early to assess) the m5s constituted a remarkable example of the latter type of party, that is, a typical challenger party (hobolt and tilley, 2016). not tainted by government responsibility during the euro crisis, it managed ‘to monopolise the theme of protest against the establishment at a time when political elites reached their lowest level of popularity’ (tronconi 2018: 178). eventually, the defiance of the mainstream consensus coupled with a capacity to politicize issues mostly neglected by its competitors (conti and memoli, 2015, passarelli and tuorto, 2016) paid off. a party at its first electoral competition at national level, it gathered a level of consensus equal, when not superior, to that of the two mainstream parties from the centre right and centre left.1 immediately after their entry into the parliamentary arena, m5s mps rushed to stress their non-involvement in the old party dynamics. in particular, they denied their availability to post-electoral alliances which would have helped overcome the political paralysis that had hit parliament (and the country) following the 2013 electoral results. the m5s wanted to convey the image of a movement from the bottom, close to the citizens and far from traditional party logics. indeed, such a postideological positioning had been functional in their electoral success, since it allowed them to attract voters from all existing parties (russo et al. 2017). therefore, their mps made an effort to appear in the parliamentary arena as an opposition that was alternative to all political forces – regardless of their position on the traditional socio-economic dimension – and with a declared mission to conquer alone the majority of seats and the government in the near future. thus, the first demarcation line with other parties is that the m5s’s issue profile during question time should be equally distinct from that of other opposition parties, whether they come from the left, centre or right pole of the political spectrum. 1 only thanks to the electoral system, which rewarded the winning coalition and not the winning party, the centre-left democratic party (partito democratico, pd) obtained a majority prize in seats, succeeding in overtaking the m5s in the chamber of deputies (d’alimonte, 2013). challenger parties in parliament 22 h1 – the difference between the issue profile of the m5s and that of other opposition parties should not be correlated with their position on the socio-economic cleavage. from a programmatic point of view, the first battles of grillo and his supporters – from whom a large part of the new parliamentary elite is derived – can be traced back to the so-called ‘new politics’ (poguntke, 1987). the key themes, at the origin of the movement, concerned primarily environmentalism and renewable energy, issues of poverty and precarious employment, battles against the power of large enterprises and the effects of globalisation, the morality of politics, civil rights and, in particular, the pledge to open access to specific services and, above all, the internet to everyone (bordignon and ceccarini, 2015: 460). these very issues found space also in their electoral manifesto. on the other hand, their greatest innovation is probably not in the themes, which clearly lean towards the extreme left (tronconi, 2016: 220) but in the interpretation given to the role of the representative in parliament. since its founding in 2009 by the comedian, activist and blogger beppe grillo and the entrepreneur gianroberto casaleggio, the m5s has been a fierce critic of the delegation principle on which political representation is based. in their view, it inevitably leads to the betrayal of the citizens’ will. from an organisational point of view, the movement’s self-declared inspiration is ‘the horizontal network’. they claim that this same model should be applied to italian political institutions through an increasing recourse to direct democracy and the exploitation of internet capabilities, especially social networks (bickerton and accetti 2018). being connected in the network is considered by its founders as one of the essential tools to reform the model of representative democracy from the bottom. it is the only effective means through which citizens can keep control of their representatives and avoid the risk of being ‘betrayed’. mps, in turn, should be considered as temporary ‘employees’ bound by an ‘imperative mandate’. betrayal of the spirit of the mandate should be punished with expulsion from the parliamentary group. although most parties nowadays stress the importance of mandate fulfilment, i expect that these constraints hold even more true in the case of the m5s. so, the second hypothesis reads as follows: h2 – the congruence between the m5s issue profile during question time and in their electoral manifestos should be higher than for other opposition parties. their anti-elitist stance indisputably moulded their repertoire of action in parliament, which consisted of virulent protests and constant attacks against the ‘caste’ in their parliamentary interventions (bordignon and ceccarini, 2015; tronconi, 2018). the goal was to convey to the media and the public at large an image of uncompromising opposition, marking a difference from the rest of the political forces. this distance is also visible in their collaborative stance towards other parties. de giorgi and dias (2018) provided evidence that m5s (likewise another anti-establishment party, the northern league, ln, lega nord) tended to be less cooperative (measured as number of bills co-sponsored with other parties’ mps) than the average. on the other hand, there is still little research on their use of oversight tools such as parliamentary questions and their explicit issue choice in parliament. another way to present themselves as extraneous to the system is, i expect, to address topics that are different from those most debated during a specific question time session. thus, the final hypothesis reads: enrico borghetto 23 h3 – the m5s should be less prone than other opposition parties to asking a question on the most debated topic of the day. 3. data and analysis the study presented in this article relies on the content-coding of oral parliamentary questions on the floor of the chamber of deputies during the 17th legislature. according to the rules of procedures, each parliamentary group is allowed only one question for each weekly session, regardless of the size of its delegation in parliament (russo and cavalieri 2016). authorship was attributed on the basis of the party membership of the first signatory at the moment the question was presented; i.e. i do not consider the party affiliation of the remaining co-sponsors. to each question was attributed one of the 230 policy codes making up the italian policy agendas codebook (borghetto et al., 2018). these comprehensive range of topics can be aggregated into 21 policy topic areas.2 figure 1 selects the ten most frequent topics (out of 21, counts on all topics are reported in appendix a) addressed by the m5s and shows the share of attention devoted by the m5s (triangle) and on average by the other four main opposition parties (circle) during the 17th legislature: go italy (fi, forza italia), ln, left, ecology and liberty (sel, sinistra [ecologia] e libertà) and brothers of italy (bi, fratelli d’italia).3 the start and end of the dashed line around the circle represent the opposition party with respectively the lowest and highest attention share. the first finding worthy of note is that ‘government operations’ is by far the topranked issue: with its 41 questions, the m5s clearly stands out from the other parties (bi=15, fi=26, ln=9, sel=19). ‘government operations’ is a rather heterogeneous category including political, institutional and public administration issues as well as scandals and corruption connected with public offices. for the most part, this emphasis is driven by m5s's populist attacks against the so-called ‘political caste’: 32 percent of the questions (n=13) challenge government appointments to public offices; 34 percent (n=14) question the executive conduct from a political and legal perspective; finally, 12 percent (n=5) deal with electoral matters. overall, it seems that the message they want to pass on is that their mission is to act as the watchdog of the ‘elites’ on behalf of the ‘people’. as regards other issues, the movement does not differ remarkably from the average opposition party and this holds true regardless of the importance of the issue in the electoral programme. for instance, ‘justice and crime’, which ranked 13th in terms of importance in its manifesto, is the second main topic addressed by the m5s during question time. vice versa, even for a signature issue of the m5s, clean energy and environment, they do not differ significantly from the average (a decline in the salience 2 the italian policy agendas project has been part of the comparative agendas research network since 2009 (borghetto and carammia 2010). for more information, visit: www.comparativeagendas.net. the data and r code used to conduct the analysis are made available by the author upon request. 3 sel was part of the centre-left alliance supporting luigi bersani as candidate for prime minister which won the relative majority of seats in both houses of the italian parliament in 2013. after bersani’s failure to garner a majority in the senate led to his resignation and the creation of a grand coalition led by prime minister enrico letta, sel decided to move to the opposition in april 2013. at the beginning of the legislature, also fi, then called ‘people of freedom’ (pdl) was part of the ‘grand coalition’ supporting the letta cabinet. however, in september 2013, the pdl was dissolved and berlusconi decided to launch a new ‘go italy’ party in the opposition. challenger parties in parliament 24 of these issues was already detected by manucci and amsler 2018, 123). these findings suggest that issue selection during question time responds to a strategic reasoning. there are issues which parties cannot entirely ‘disregard’ because of their centrality in the public debate. not focusing on them would mean surrendering the power of framing the issue to competitors. although m5s mps would theoretically prefer to focus exclusively on issues that are advantageous to them, they cannot entirely avoid issues ‘owned’ by their opponents (an emblematic case is ‘justice and crime’ which is a signature issue for the ln). from an issue competition perspective (green-pedersen, 2007; greenpedersen and mortensen, 2010), the m5s does not seem to behave differently from other parties. figure 1. distribution of attention across issues to gain further insight into how different the movement behaved in comparison with other opposition parties and the extent to which its opposition style was innovative, i proceed in two steps. the first question i address is to what extent the overall issue profile of the m5s differs from the one adopted by other opposition parties, both on the left and right wing of the ideological spectrum. to answer this question, i merged the data on the 17th legislature with a database containing the content coding of all parliamentary oral questions submitted on the floor of the chamber of deputies during question time from the 13th to the 16th legislature (russo and cavalieri, 2016). for each legislature and opposition party, i calculated the share of questions devoted to a specific topic (using one of the 230 subtopics) and compared it to the issue distribution of the m5s in the 17th legislature. in order to measure the overall difference for each pair of issue profiles, i use issue convergence scores as developed by sigelman and buell (2004). this index sums the absolute differences in attention proportion for each of the issues included. this sum is subtracted from 100 and divided by 2, so that the index goes from 0, when the distribution of attention diverges completely, to 100, indicating a perfect overlap between the enrico borghetto 25 two agendas. for instance, a value of 40 means that 40 percent of the party agenda is similar to the agenda of the m5s. figure 2 plots on the y-axis convergence scores and on the x-axis the position of opposition parties on the left (0) – right (10) dimension. the estimation of party positions for each legislative term relies on various waves of the chapel hill expert surveys (bakker et al., 2015; polk et al., 2017).4 a regression line was drawn to fit the data. if one just considers parties from the 17th legislature, it does seem that the issue profile of m5s during question time is equally as close to that of parties from the leftand right-side of the political spectrum. for instance, both sel and fi share more than 50 percent of the agenda with the m5s.5 on the other hand, incorporating the comparisons with parties of past legislatures yields a different picture. overall, the relationship between issue convergence and party position on the left-right axis is negative (the more we move to the right, the smaller the convergence score) and it reaches a conventional 0.05% level of significance if we remove the comparisons with parties of the 17th legislature (coefficient = -1.82, standard deviation = 0.72). the highest convergence scores are with italy of values (italia dei valori, idv) in the 16th legislature (45 percent).6 moreover, there is some overlap with the pd in the 14th legislature (43 percent), communist refoundation party (partito della rifondazione comunista, prc) in the 13th legislature (43 percent) and both pd and the union of the centre (unione di centro, uc) in the 16th legislature (around 40 percent). vice versa, the m5s differs the most from both the ln (17 percent) and the uc (19 percent) in the 15th legislature. although comparisons across time should be treated with caution, it appears that the m5s agenda tends to share more issues with that of left-wing parties. the rest of the analysis implements a multivariate regression design, where the unit of analysis is the individual question. two different models were developed, each testing one of the two remaining hypotheses. model h2 tests the effect of the questioner’s party affiliation on the probability of a question being about one of the top three topics in the party platform (h2). to measure topic salience in electoral platforms, each manifesto was divided into (quasi)sentences and to each of them was attributed one of the 21 topics of the italian comparative agendas reflecting its policy content.7 once the share of sentences for each topic in each manifesto was computed, i assigned 1 to questions falling into the three most important topics, 0 to others (appendix b lists the top three topics for each party). 4 i use the question ‘position of the party in year in terms of its overall ideological stance. 0 = extreme left : 5 = center : 10 = extreme right’. 5 by default, agenda overlap between the m5s with parties from the same legislative term (17th) should be higher, regardless of the ideological leaning, because parties are responding to the same range of contingent events (such as media pressures and domestic/international events). 6 the proximity between the m5s and the idv comes as no surprise given that both are protest parties sharing a ‘populist/anti-party elite’ discourse. in 2009 grillo expressed his support for two independent candidates in the idv lists in the european elections, see: http://www.beppegrillo.it/2009/03/comunicato_poli_14.html. 7 a similar approach was applied by carammia et al. (2018). note that fi and ln ran on a common platform in the 2013 general elections. challenger parties in parliament 26 figure 2. agenda convergence between m5s and other opposition parties note: sel (sinistra ecologia e libertà); prc (partito rifondazione comunista); ds (democratici di sinistra); pd (partito democratico); dl-m (margherita); idv (italia dei valori); uc (unione di centro); ln (lega nord); fi-pdl (forza italia, popolo della libertà); an (alleanza nazionale); ccd+cdu (centro cristiano democratico); bi (fratelli d’italia). model h3 tests the party impact on the likelihood of a question being about the topic receiving the most questions in that weekly session (h3). since during a session each parliamentary group is allowed one question, i tallied all questions addressed by majority and opposition groups by topic (always out of 21 topics) and gave 1 to those questions related to the most popular topic(s) that week (i.e. receiving more questions), 0 to the rest. the main predictor of model h2 and h3 is the party membership of the questioner, considering only the five main opposition parties analysed in figure 1. this predictor was fitted as a categorical variable with the m5s as the reference category. furthermore, both models incorporate a control for the timing of the question, measured as the legislature year (it equals 1 for the first year since the elections, 2 for the second year, etc.). in model h2 this is introduced as both a control (h2a) and moderating (h2b, in interaction with party authorship) variable, as it is likely that the probability of a party addressing one of enrico borghetto 27 its three most important electoral topics during question time will decrease as we move away from elections and new priorities hit the agenda.8 all models fit a binary dependent variable, so the recommended model specification is a multivariate logistic regression. all models fit clustered standard errors with the week as the cluster variable. the model results are presented in table 1. table 1. logistic regression model testing h2 and h3 h2a h2b h3 1 if the question is about one of the top three topics in the party platform, 0 otherwise 1 if the question is about the topic receiving more questions in a session, 0 otherwise (intercept) -0.59 * (0.23) -0.03 (0.38) -0.69 ** (0.25) bi -0.21 (0.24) -0.72 (0.56) 0.37 (0.26) fi 0.00 (0.23) -0.96 (0.55) 0.50 (0.26) ln -0.33 (0.24) -1.35 * (0.58) 0.21 (0.27) sel -0.81 ** (0.26) -1.04 (0.60) 0.42 (0.26) year in the legislature -0.09 (0.06) -0.30 * (0.13) -0.27 *** (0.06) year*bi 0.19 (0.19) year*fi 0.35 (0.18) year*ln 0.37 * (0.19) year*sel 0.08 (0.21) n 867 867 867 aic 974.35 976.34 959.35 bic 1002.94 1023.99 987.94 pseudo r2 0.03 0.04 0.04 note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. week-level clustered standard errors are reported inside parentheses starting from h2a, namely the first model in table 1, all coefficients (except for fi) are negative, meaning that the odds that the m5s asks questions on one of the three most salient topics in the electoral platform is greater than the odds for other parties. the coefficient for fi is 0, meaning that the odds are the same as those for the m5s. on the other hand, none of the party effects, except the one concerning sel, are significant at a conventional 95 percent confidence level, meaning that i can reject the null hypothesis of independence only for the pair m5s-sel. to summarise, while the difference in odds between m5s and fi is nil, it increases when i compare m5s and, respectively, bi and ln, and it is statistically significant only between m5s and sel. this first piece of evidence provides us with some clue that the m5s does differ from other opposition parties, although for the most part this claim is not statistically supported. another interesting effect is the interaction of year in the legislature and party effects (h2b). only the interaction terms of ln and the negative constitutive term ‘year in the 8 i do not have theoretical expectations about the impact of time on the probability of addressing ‘popular issues’. furthermore, none of the interaction terms between time and party factors are significant in case h3. as a result, i did not include it in the analysis. challenger parties in parliament 28 legislature’ (which is the marginal impact of time when all other categorical variables equal to 0, namely in the case of the m5s) are statistically significant. since interactions are difficult to interpret in logistic regression, i plot the predicted probabilities. figure 3 reports the predicted probability of the impact of time since the start of the legislature (in years) on the probability of asking a question on the top three electoral topics by party. the difference between the m5s and the other opposition parties stands out, especially in the case of the ln. at the beginning of the 17th legislature, the predicted probability of the m5s asking such questions is the highest, around 42 percent, and it decreases sharply as time goes by, so much so that at the end of the legislature the odds drop to only 18 percent. i interpret this finding as evidence of the progressive learning process undertaken by m5s mps over the course of the legislature. at the outset, at their first mandate in parliament, and lacking in experience, they stuck firmly to the topics emphasised on the party platform, which is the pattern expected by h2. next, as new topics reached the public agenda and started being discussed on the web, they showed a greater propensity to embark on new topics. figure 3. predicted probability of asking a question on one of the top three electoral topics at different times in the legislative term by party membership note: figure derived from table 1, model h2b model h3 tests which parties show a greater tendency to ask questions on topics that are ‘hot’ (receive the most questions) in a specific weekly session (recall that each parliamentary group is allowed only one question per week). as in the previous model, none of the party coefficients is statistically significant, which suggests that we cannot reject the hypothesis of independence between the m5s and the other parties. indeed, this is what we observe in figure 4, which plots the predicted probabilities for our categorical party predictors. the m5s occupies the lower end of the spectrum, with a probability of asking enrico borghetto 29 this type of questions of around 19 percent. as expected by h3, the odds of m5s mps asking a question on popular topics are the lowest in the cluster of parties. on the other hand, the probabilities for other parties are rather close, hovering between 23 and 28 percent. figure 4. predicted probability of asking a question on the most debated issue in question time note: figure derived from table 1, model h3 4. conclusions more than five years after the 2013 elections, the m5s is no longer the unidentified political actor it used to be at its origins. more and more pieces of the puzzle have been collected over the years, providing increasing insights into this new and successful actor in italian politics. this research article has tried to contribute to this endeavour by casting light on its opposition activity in parliament during the 17th legislature. it argues that learning about the m5s can provide insights into the wider category of challenger parties (hobolt and tilley 2016), which are currently on the rise in european politics. in particular, starting from the premise that an issue-based perspective allows us to bring to the surface a rather unexplored side of the communication and political strategy of the party in public office, it focuses on the policy content of its parliamentary oversight activities. descriptive results reveal that the m5s stands out for its emphasis on political-administrative issues. in particular, it shows a tendency to question cabinet appointments and general conduct, especially when a potential scandal is in sight. this issue selection strategy is indicative of an attempt to portray itself as the ‘watchdog’ of the elites on behalf of the ‘people’. on the other hand, it does not altogether disregard issues such as ‘law and order’, which have been salient in the political discussion but that are not its ‘signature’ issues. as far as the descriptive evidence is concerned, the agenda profile of the m5s challenger parties in parliament 30 does not differ substantially from that of other parties. this can be interpreted as a sign that the m5s is not oblivious to considerations of issue competition (green-pedersen, 2007). it also confirms previous findings pointing at the ‘ideological flexibility of m5s and its ability in strategically raising different topics at different times in order to remain constantly attuned to the people’s mood and the ou tcome of the latest polls’ (manucci and amsler, 2018: 127). these results were refined by means of a statistical analysis. first, i set out a comparison between the m5s thematic profile during question time and that of current and past opposition parties. i found that the issue focus of the m5s crosscuts the left-right divide when taking into consideration parties from the 17th legislature, thus confirming grillo's portrait of the movement as ‘post-ideological’. on the other hand, when the comparison is limited to opposition parties from past legislatures, there is a slightly stronger convergence with parties on the left side of the political spectrum. this finding corroborates previous studies showing that the identity of the m5s parliamentarians is ‘ideologically much closer to the left on both socio-economic and socio-cultural issues’ (farinelli and massetti, 2015: 222). second, i found some limited evidence that, compared to most other opposition parties of the 17th legislature, the m5s tends to ask more questions about the three most salient topics of its political platform (h2) and about topics that do not attract a lot of attention from other party actors (h3). on the other hand, these findings should be treated with extra care due to their lack of statistical significance. another interesting finding – one that warrants more attention in future research – is the impact of time on the behaviour of the m5s’s agenda decisions: the emphasis on the most salient electoral priorities declined dramatically as the time of the legislature went by. of course, one can only speculate on the reasons accounting for such a pattern. i suggest that it might indicate the learning process m5s mps have gone through. at the same time, it might reveal a change of communication strategy in the movement, which was forced to progressively switch attention to new issues to stay in tune with the requests of its very heterogeneous electorate. be that as it may, these results speak to previous studies that point to a normalisation of the movement (tronconi, 2018) and an increasing capacity to flexibly adapt its message to changes in the public mood (manucci and amsler, 2018). one can conjecture that this careful adjustment of its image over the course of the legislature played a role in the broadening of its electoral base during the 2018 elections. although more research is needed to generalise this finding beyond the italian case, this flexibility in issue emphasis paired with a radical anti-elitism might be one of the distinctive characteristics of challenger parties’ opposition style in parliament. both untarnished by the stigma of holding office before or during the recent euro crisis and unafraid of damaging their coalition potential by taking extreme or risky political stances, challengers are in a better position to engage the priorities of a changing public opinion while preserving their distinctiveness in the party system. references bakker r, vries c de, edwards e, et al. 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10.1080/13608746.2018.1428889. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_3.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 45-63 contact author: stella gianfreda, scuola superiore sant’anna, pisa. e-mail address: s.gianfreda@sssup.it the different twins: a multilevel analysis of the positions of the northern league and the five star movement on the integration-demarcation dimension stella gianfreda scuola superiore sant’anna, pisa benedetta carlotti scuola normale superiore, florence abstract according to several scholars, the politicization of issues connected to immigration and the european union (eu) has generated a new cleavage that now structures political competition in western europe. italy is an interesting case for studying this process, as two ‘different’ populist-eurosceptic parties, namely the northern league (ln) and the five star movement (m5s), significantly increased their share of votes in the last round of national elections and eventually managed to form a governmental coalition by politicizing these two issues. this paper proposes a multifaceted conceptualisation of the eu and immigration issues in order to investigate how ln and m5s position themselves across their multiple sub-dimensions. the empirical analysis is based on an original dataset of parliamentary speeches delivered by the two parties’ representatives in two distinct institutional arenas: the italian one and the european parliament. the results show that ln’s positions are guided by culturalidentitarian and sovereignist arguments, while m5s mobilizes the two issues to boost its anti-elitist claims. therefore, the paper claims that the governmental coalition between the two parties is driven by office-seeking motivations, rather than by a policy-seeking strategy. 1. introduction ecent studies show that political conflicts over supranational issues have transformed the structure of political competition, giving birth to a new ‘integrationdemarcation’ cleavage, opposing the ‘winners’ and the ‘losers’ of globalisation (kriesi et al. 2012, 73). in particular, ‘european integration and immigration correspond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalization’ (kriesi et al. 2006, 924). in this vein, hooghe and marks (2018) claim that the impact of immigration and european integration has been no less disruptive on european politics than the previous junctures identified by lipset and rokkan (1967) as cleavage politics. in their words: ‘just as the bolshevik revolution was a critical juncture in the expression of the class cleavage, so the euro crisis and the migration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a transnational cleavage’ (p. 116) according to several scholars, the politicization of this transnational cleavage is a key factor in explaining the electoral success of so-called eurosceptic/populist parties, r gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 46 generally excluded from the governmental arena (akkerman et al. 2016; wolinetz and zalslove 2018). italy is a privileged case for observing these trends given that two different populist parties, namely the league (former northern league – ln1) and the five star movement (m5s), significantly increased their share of votes in the last round of general elections (march 2018) by mobilizing immigration and european affairs. the literature agrees that these two parties form a coalition that transcends the left-right ideological continuum. in fact, the demarcation-integration divide is a more suitable explanation for this type of coalition. our work provides a multidimensional empirical assessment of ln and m5s positions along this divide by comparing their stances on issues relating to immigration and the european union in two distinct political arenas: the national parliament and the european parliament (ep). in so doing, it answers the following research questions: what arguments do ln and m5s use to talk about the eu and migration? do they hold similar positions? do they frame the two issues differently between the two arenas? the paper starts by presenting a multidimensional (re-)conceptualisation of both the eu (section 2) and immigration issues (section 3). it then applies a computer-assisted discourse analysis (cada) (partington 2010) method to an original dataset of 533 speeches delivered in the national and the supranational parliamentary arenas. the paper compares the two issues from a multilevel perspective: 1) an inter-parties comparison within the national arena; 2) an inter-parties comparison within the supranational arena, and 3) an inter-arenas comparison, between the national and the supranational parliaments. a conclusive section summarizes the obtained findings. 2. the eu as a multi-dimensional issue academics in the field have generally regarded party positioning on the eu as a manichean concept, distinguishing parties either as critical (eurosceptic) or as supporters (europeanist) of the european integration process. however, the distinction euroscepticism/europeanist is generally too limited to understand the variegated nature of the phenomenon. nonetheless, researchers widely rely on the dichotomous distinction elaborated by taggart and szczerbiak (2001), distinguishing parties either as ‘hard’ or as ‘soft’ eurosceptics, the former rejecting the very idea of the eu and european integration, the latter proposing a softer criticism of both the policies and the architecture of the eu. several categories have been formulated to disentangle and better define the phenomenon of euroscepticism from both a popular and a party-based perspective (see vasilopoulou 2013 for an extensive review). although these efforts increase our knowledge of euroscepticism, they ‘differentiate between the degrees of the phenomenon without formulating satisfactory definitions’ (crespy and verschueren 2009, 381). instead of proposing a new category, this chapter relies on the assumption that the eu is a political system (kreppel 2002; brack 2018) constituted by a set of political objects (easton 1965, 436) that parties may support or oppose to define their overall positioning vis-à-vis the eu. in particular, we classify the targets of party positioning as the eu-elite; 1 the party changed its name in 2017. for simplicity we use its former denomination throughout the paper. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 47 the eu-institutions; the eu-community and eu-policies. as emerges from table 1 below, the eu issue is constituted by two broad dimensions: ‘what the eu does’ identifying the output of the eu-political system and ‘what the eu is’ referring to the components of the eu-political system. table 1. eu issue dimensions ‘what the eu does’ ‘what the eu is’ policy dimension elite dimension institutional dimension community dimension eu-policies: • objectives • instruments. • financial endowments. eu-elite: performance and moral characteristics: • bureaucrats. • politicians. • functionaries eu-regime: performance, values and norms: • european commission (ec). • european parliament (ep). • council of ministers (council). • other institutions. eu-community: • eu values and norms (identity). • eu-competencies (deepening). • eu-enlargement (widening). sub-dimensions of the eu-community: territorial areas of application of some specific eu-policies: • euro-area: common monetary policy. • schengen area: protection of both internal and external borders. eu-policies are conceived as the eu political system’s output: parties can either support or criticise a specific policy, its objectives, the implied instruments and its financial endowment. the eu-elite dimension refers to the complex of ‘public officials and institutional actors that exercise eu governance’ (serricchio, tsakatica and quaglia 2013). the eu-regime is constituted by the institutions composing the eu (the ep, the european commission, the council of ministers and so on). parties can evaluate both the performance (krouwel and abts 2007) and the values and norms underpinning the eu institutions (e.g., rule of law, representativeness, democracy). the eu-community dimension is intended as the physical community composed of member states. when taking a stance on the eu community, parties refer to its competencies (along the national-supranational axis), to its potential enlargement to new member states (widening), or to their country’s membership in the community on the basis of identitarian or cost-benefit arguments. the eu community entails two further sub-dimensions identifying the two main territorial areas of application of some specific eu-policies: the euro-area and the schengen area (carlotti 2017). 3. immigration as a multidimensional issue immigration has also been widely regarded as a multi-dimensional concept (e.g. givens and luedtke 2005). the widely accepted conceptualization by hammar (1985) distinguishes between ‘immigration control policies’ and ‘immigrant policies’ (table 2 below). gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 48 table 2. the immigration issue’s dimensions. control dimension integration dimension measures regulating immigrants: • admission and entrance. • residence status. • expulsion. measures regulating immigrants’ integration: • civic rights. • socio-economic rights. • cultural and religious rights. • political rights. immigration control policies refer to the normative framework regulating the selection, admission, settlement and deportation of foreign citizens, defining the degree to which a nation opens its borders to the entry and residence of foreign citizens. on the contrary, immigrant policies regulate third-country nationals’ socio-economic, culturalreligious and political integration in the host society and define the degree of membership in the host society. in particular, integration is composed of three elements (marshall & bottomore, 1992): the civic element includes individual freedoms, e.g. freedom of the person, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, right to justice. the social element encompasses the right to share the welfare of the receiving society, namely access to social services, healthcare, housing, labour market, education, etc. finally, the political element refers to the right to vote and to citizenship. 4. ln and m5s: eurosceptic, populist, or anti-immigration? this work is a comparative case study of the currently italian governing parties (ln and m5s). although ln and m5s differ in terms of both their origins and ideological orientations and belong to different ep party groups (eppgs), they are widely regarded as eurosceptic and populist parties (bulli and soare 2018). ln was first founded as an alliance of regionalist leagues in the north of italy2 in 1989, merging into the northern league in 1991 (tarchi 2002). ln’s history can be summarized along three main phases: during the first two decades of its evolution, the party advocated the secession of so-called padania (a ‘mythological region’ in the north of italy) from the rest of the country. from the ‘90s onwards, due to the growth of immigration flows from eastern european countries, immigration became ln’s main concern. in addition, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, anti-immigration claims assumed a strong islamophobic character, connected to an appeal to security and the defence of italian christianity (ignazi 2005). during this second phase, ln strengthened its already critical position vis-à-vis the european integration process and the adoption of the euro, perceived as a threat to national customs and values (pirro and van kessel 2018). finally, under the leadership of matteo salvini (from 2013 onwards), the party completed a process of nationalization: the reference community has been strategically broadened to include all native italians, and the economic, cultural and political immigration threat has been linked to the collusion of the roman elite with eu technocrats and criminal networks, which penalise native italians (bulli and soare 2018, 141). in line 2 the alliance was composed of: lega lombarda, lega veneta, piemontautonomista, unione ligure, lega emiliano romagnola and alleanza toscana. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 49 with this nativist turn, since june 2015 the ln has been allied with the french front national (fn) in the europe of the nations and freedom eppg. as this brief overview shows, ln can be classified as belonging to the populist family particularly within the sub-group of radical-right populists combining nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (mudde 2007). differently, the m5s grew as a response to a general dissatisfaction with national politics. it mainly advocates for direct democracy (under the mantra of ‘everyone is worth one’)3, overcoming the mechanism of representation through the use of the internet. even if the party is identified under several labels– ‘anti-party’ (diamanti and natale 2013), ‘anti-establishment party’ (mosca 2014), ‘strange animal’ or ‘web-populist’ (corbetta and gualmini 2015) – scholars agree on its populist features, i.e. antielitism, emphasis on direct democracy, manichean visions, charismatic leadership, etc. (taggart 1995, mosca 2014). after the last ep election, the party became a member of the europe of freedom and direct democracy eppg (efdd), together with the eurosceptic united kingdom independence party (ukip). m5s’s position on immigration is not clear: while some empirical analyses suggest a discrepancy between the more conservative party leadership and the more liberal party activists (bulli and soare 2018, 147; ivaldi, lanzone and sozzi 2016), the party’s official message does not contain any expressions of xenophobia or socio-cultural discrimination (lanzone 2014, 61) but rather endorses an instrumental approach to immigration. in other words, opposition to immigration is not based on xenophobic, welfare-chauvinist or nationalistic arguments, as in ln’s case, but rather denounces the political mismanagement of the res publica and the elite’s alleged collusion with organized crime (bulli and soare 2018, 148). even if the major targets of m5s criticism have always been the banks and big economic and political elites, since 2011 the party has directed its criticism toward italy’s membership in the eurozone and the legitimacy of eu institutions in general. by the end of 2011, m5s had held an internal referendum concerning withdrawal from the eurozone (pirro and van kessel 2018). in this article, we hypothesise a relation between the ideological natures of ln and m5s and their positions on immigration and the eu. being a populist radical right party, the ln is expected to talk about issues relating to immigration, mainly using culturalidentitarian, law and order and securitarian arguments (h1). similarly, we expect this party to reject the project of european integration in the name of sovereignist claims (h2). on the contrary, since m5s is a purely populist party, we expect it to mobilize issues relating to immigration and the eu to boost its anti-elitist claims, highlighting corruption and mismanagement of the national elite as well as the lack of legitimacy and democratic accountability of the eu-elite (h3).the last formulated hypothesis (h4) aims at assessing whether there is homogeneity in the two parties’ framing strategies between the national and the supranational arena. in line with previous research in the field (e.g. mcelory and benoit 2011), we expect ln and m5s delegations in the ep to hold positions similar to their national counterparts with regard to the eu and the immigration issues. 3 this mantra is also the title of the m5s anthem as reported in the movement’s official blog http://www.beppegrillo.it/movimento/2010/07/ognuno-vale-uno.html gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 50 5. research design and method parliament is chosen as a privileged viewpoint, as the institution par excellence where political conflicts on legislation and governmental policies unfold. both the italian and the european parliaments function as decision-making institutions at the heart of democratic representation: directly elected arenas where parties’ representatives work together on the same topic at the same time, having access to a public profile that is of great importance when there is media attention on some specific issues (usherwood 2017). previous literature concerning parties’ position-taking in parliaments usually relies on patterns of voting behaviour as an empirical data-source. however, roll call votes (rcvs) are not free from problems (see carrubba et al. 2006 for an exhaustive review). therefore, we believe that parliamentary speeches are a fine-grained and less-biased source of data to assess parties’ positions (wendler 2014). even if, differently from rcvs, speeches do not result in tangible conclusions, participating in plenary debates is an opportunity for parliamentarians to provide a public justification for the entirety of the legislative process (e.g. lord 2013, 253). ln and m5s representatives’ speeches delivered between may 2014 and december 20164 are analysed in both the italian and the european parliaments (mps and meps respectively). during this period, two specific events took place: the peak of the migration crisis in mid-2015and the brexit referendum in june 2016. analysing ln’s and m5s’s speeches in this time frame allows us to provide an in-depth description of their stances towards the two issues studied. we used a list of keywords related to both the eu and the immigration issue to select and retrieve the speeches from the official webpages of both the ep and the italian parliament5. the collected speeches are organised in four corpora6: one for each issue and level of observation (see table 1in the appendix presenting the four corpora’s descriptive statistics). a total of 533 speeches were collected for both parties in both parliamentary arenas. speeches are divided into natural sentences and manually codified using maxqda7 on the basis of a codebook that assigns to each dimension, detailed in sections 2 and 3, three categories expressing the ‘direction’ of the positioning: positive, negative or neutral for the eu issue and permissive, restrictive or neutral for the immigration issue (see table 2in the appendix for more details about the coding procedure8). the coding procedure recognizes the character of the expressed positioning either as principled or as pragmatic. sentences coded as pragmatic refer to ‘[m]eans-ends type of rationality where actors are considered to take decisions made on calculations of utility based on a given set of interests’ (sjursen 2002, 494). on the contrary, sentences expressing a principled positioning refer to normative arguments based on claims about values or moral standards of justice and legitimacy (wendler 2016). the 4 this period corresponds to the first two years of the viii ep legislature, which is also the first legislature of the m5s. 5 detailed information about speech selection and analysis (codebook and coding criteria) are available upon request. 6 a corpus is a collection of texts in machine-readable format. 7 further information at https://www.maxqda.com/ 8 a detailed version of the applied codebook is available upon request. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 51 pragmatic/principled distinction is made by assigning to each sentence a value of 1 in the case of principled character and of 0 otherwise. the analysis assumes that the more a specific dimension of the two issues is important to the parties, the more they emphasise it. in the same way, a lack of reference towards one of the specific dimensions signals a lack of saliency to the party of that specific dimension (budge 1994; lowe et al. 2011). the frequencies of coded sentences are then used to build an additive index of party positioning on each of the theorised issues’ targets that sum both the direction (opposition or support) and the character (principled or pragmatic) of party position. to construct the index we firstly considered the frequency of coded sentences to assess the direction of party positioning as: ! = #$% '()*#$%+)* − #$%'-)* #$%+)* (1) where cx represents the total number of sentences coded negatively/restrictively for each of the analysed categories, cy is the total number of coded positively/permissively sentences in each of the analysed categories, and n is the total number of coded sentences (including neutral sentences). the proposed formula is an adaptation of prosser’s re-elaboration of lowe et al.’s ‘logit scale of position’ (lowe et al. 2011; prosser 2014) which is, in turn, an improvement of the comparative manifesto project’s left-right scale (the socalled rile index)9. the value of 1 is added to each index component to keep them consistently 0, since ./0(*) = 0 (prosser 2014). the result is a continuous variable ranging between 1 and -1 indicating the highest opposition or the highest support for the considered targets respectively. whenever the variable takes the value of 0, it indicates either a lack of salience to the party of the specific target or that the same proportion of coded negative/positive or coded restrictive/permissive sentences is present. secondly, to complete the positioning index we included a value indicating the character: principled or pragmatic. to assign this we look at the resulting direction: if a party displays a positive direction (denoting opposition) and if the majority of the coded-negative/restrictive sentences are principled in character (value of 1), then the party is exercising a principled opposition and vice-versa: (! ± 5) ∗ 100(2) where q represents the continuous variable mentioned above and q refers to the character of the expressed positioning. the formula presents the ± operator to obtain a symmetric scale of positioning: if q is positive the value of q is added whereas, if q is negative, the value of q is subtracted. the index ranges between +200 and -200 indicating the maximum degrees of principled opposition and principled support respectively, whereas a value of +100 or -100 indicates the maximum degree of pragmatic opposition or pragmatic support respectively. if the index takes the value of 0 it indicates a neutral position of the parties. 9 the comparative manifesto project provides researchers with party positioning on several issues deriving from the content analysis of their electoral manifestos. further information at https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/ gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 52 the obtained index is used to graphically represent m5s’s and ln’s positioning on the two issues studied (see spider-plots in section 5). furthermore, using wmatrix10 we perform keywords-analysis allowing the identification of keywords11 for each corpus avoiding potential biases in their selections since wmatrix objectively establishes the keywords according to their statistical significance or ‘keyness’12. the identified keywords are used to report quotes from the analysed speeches in an objective way, providing the reader with a qualitative hint of party positioning. 6. results this section compares the indexes of positioning obtained for ln and m5s, relying on spider plots (fig. 1-4). to each plot’s vertex corresponds one target of positioning while the coloured lines report – in green for ln and in yellow for m5s – the party positioning towards the observed targets. on the black continuous line (the 0 line), the index takes the value of 0. whenever opposition to the target is present, the coloured lines are drawn on the positive side of each graph. the black patterned lines highlight the distinction between the principled and pragmatic character of party positioning (principled positioning above ± 100). starting from m5s’s and ln’s positions on the eu (fig. 1 and 2 below), the two parties behave similarly in the national arena. they are both principally opposed to the eucommunity, the eu-regime and the eu-elite. however, m5s’s opposition towards the eu-elite target is higher (+ 132). interestingly, both parties use populist arguments to oppose eu polity: they both criticize the technocratic nature and lack of democratic accountability of the eu (see the presence of cittadini – citizens and popolo – people, among the keywords in table 5 below). ‘according to the ln, there is a genetic bias in this europe: it has been founded on flexibility but without the people, without democracy’ (giancarlo giorgetti, ln’s mp, 16/09/2014)13 ‘[…] it is enough to observe what is happening nowadays. the eu is strictly tied to finance, banks, big powers, to this absolute technocracy. everything is possible under the guide of this european government ruled by banks […]’ (daniele pesco, m5s’s mp, 30/06/2015) nevertheless, while m5s endorses a pragmatic opposition towards eu-policies (+ 45), ln opposes this target in a principled way (+ 138). moreover, m5s focuses its attention on two targets, namely the euro area (+145) and the schengen area (+106), which are not salient for the ln. 10 wmatrix is an open-source software for corpus analysis and comparison. see http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ 11 a keyword is ‘a word which occurs with unusual frequency in a given text. this does not mean high frequency but unusual frequency, by comparison with a reference corpus of some kind’ (scott 1997: 236). 12 a high value of ‘keyness’ indicates a prototypical word in a given corpus. we consider as statistically significant only those items with a ‘keyness’ value over 7, since 6.63 is the cut-off point for 99% confidence of significance (rayson 2012). 13 from now on, keywords are in italics. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 53 ‘we want a government that strongly advocates against the fiscal compact, against the budgetary equilibrium, in order to give to italy the possibility to regain its monetary sovereignty, because this is the key of our future: sovereignty!’ (luca frusone, m5s’s mp, 14/10/2015) table 3. top 10 keywords by arena (eu-issue) national arena ep keywords keyness keywords keyness m5s unione piano dublino cittadini europea euro europa banche italia moneta 21.751 20.657 20.463 19.616 19.571 19.267 18.761 18.729 18.329 15.493 austerità europeo sociale crisi istituzioni greca mafia rubato misure politica 31.934 17.195 17.195 16.299 14.739 12.282 12.282 12.282 11.86 11.86 ln problema europa popolo consenso immigrazione parte fenomeno risposte priorità modo 32.82 24.998 22.49 21.62 19.727 19.258 17.018 17.018 16.239 15.524 europa qualcuno zero europea immigrazione isis commissione palazzo turchia difesa 46.867 21.757 19.581 17.101 15.877 15.23 13.902 13.054 13.054 10.879 note: keywords are ordered according to ‘keyness’. only items with log likelihood (ll) value ≥ 7 are reported. looking at the spider-plot concerning the eu issue at supranational level (fig. 2 below), it is noteworthy that ln’s stance does not change much. the party’s euroscepticism remains almost unchanged between the two levels with principled criticism toward eu-policies (+168); the eu-community (+167), and the eu-regime (+130). ln opposes the eu-regime and the eu-community using sovereignist arguments related both to the eu power-grab vis-à-vis member states and the lack of democracy at the eu level and heavily criticising the lack of electoral accountability of the eu-regime visà-vis democratically elected national authorities. ‘this surreal debate confirms that those who govern this europe – the european commission – are strong powers and a few dangerous subjects’ (matteo salvini, ln’s leader) while m5s and ln are similar in their critique of the eu in the national arena, m5s’s position is different in the ep. its criticism is, in fact, pragmatic and focused on eu-policy (+49) using reformist arguments to criticize both the eu-community (+65) and the eu-regime (+29). m5s stresses the need to inject democracy at the supranational level but does not reject the existence of the union. on the contrary, it proposes gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 54 alternatives to reform the eu-community starting from its core values (e.g., solidarity) expressed in the treaties (see the presence of sociale – social – among the keywords in table 5 below): ‘we want to change: we want a different europe, firstly and foremost in terms of treaties, agreements, and policies. we have fervently talked about treaties such as the fiscal compact, but we have never heard a speech on the social compact or on some social measure of rebalancing, a subject that you obviously do not care about’ (ignazio corrao, m5s’ mep) figure 1. spider-plot of ln’s and m5s’ positions on the eu-issue. national arena. both parties are equated by a similarly strong and principled criticism of the euelite, contesting its moral values and its alleged connections with lobbies and big financial/economic powers to the detriment of eu citizens. furthermore, both parties reject on a principled basis the euro area geometry (scoring +130 and +146 respectively), considered to be the cardinal mistake of the eu causing macro-economic divergences between member states, and propose an exit from it. ‘one single road is left to rebuild a europe of peoples from its foundations: abandoning the crazy project of the euro that has accelerated its disintegration instead of reducing divergences among member states […]. markets have blackmailed and dismantled the european project that can now be rebuilt only by -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 eu-policies eu-regime eu-community eu-elite schengen euro ms ln 0 line max opp. pragmatic max supp. pragmatic ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 55 betting on democracy, common goods, real economy, labour and social welfare’ (marco valli, m5s’s mep) similarly to the national arena, ln does not consider the schengen area geometry a salient target. on the contrary, m5s’s principled opposition to the schengen area in the national parliament is transformed into a lack of salience of this target within the supranational arena. figure 2. spider-plot of ln and m5s’ positions on the eu-issue. ep arena. moving our attention to the immigration issue, figure 3 below shows that ln and m5s frame migration in two substantially different ways in the national context. ln advocates stronger border control (-157) and expresses a principled opposition towards the socio-economic (+149), cultural-religious (+140), and civic integration (+135) of migrants. it frames the ‘immigration fluxes’ as an ‘invasion’ threatening the national and cultural unity of the country. indeed, words such as ‘illegal immigrants’ (clandestini in italian), ‘invasion’, ‘deportation’ are among the top 10 keywords used by ln mps to talk about migration (table 6 below). ‘the victims of immigration are a collateral effect of an emergency created by those who did not want to manage the immigration flows which have now become a true invasion’ (marco rondini, ln’s mp, 12/04/2014) -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 eu-policies eu-regime eu-community eu-elite schengen euro ln fsm 0 line max opp. pragmatic max supp. pragmatic gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 56 table 4. top 10 keywords by arena (immigration-issue) national arena ep keywords keyness keywords keyness m5s minori migranti accompagnati accoglienza stranieri italia età prima sistema bambini 212.373 113.222 107.244 89.848 79.253 48.934 48.193 43.036 41.081 40.696 membri stati solidarietà ricollocazione equa responsabilità ripartizione meccanismo permanente ricollocare 31.934 17.195 17.195 16.299 14.739 12.282 12.282 12.282 11.86 11.86 ln clandestini immigrazione immigrati clandestina paese cittadini invasione cento cie espulsione 150.191 115.117 105.343 77.066 72.277 71.375 63.234 59.455 59.119 52.413 europa immigrazione clandestini milioni persone politica immigrati mare guerra confini 46.867 21.757 19.581 17.101 15.877 15.23 13.902 13.054 13.054 10.879 note: keywords are ordered according to ‘keyness’. only items with log likelihood (ll) value ≥ 7 are reported. differently from the ln, the m5s holds a more ambiguous position towards migration, scoring values close to 0 on all the targets with the sole exception of humanitarian migration, which is endorsed on a principled basis (-119). indeed, table 6 above shows that m5s mps often refer to ‘minors’ and ‘children’. ‘let’s start from a basic concept: in this parliament we all agree that human rights and, as a consequence, migrants’ lives must be protected’ (manlio di stefano, m5s’s mp, 16/10/2014) in particular, with reference to the socio-economic dimension of migrants’ integration, ln is concerned with the redistribution of national services perceived to be unfairly allocated in favour of irregular migrants, at the expense of italians. ‘you exercise a form of reverse racism: who cares about the old retired man of lecco, who after having been evicted from his house has killed himself? your priority is to recognize the victims of immigration’ (polo grimoldi, ln’s mp, 15/04/2015) another category that plays a central role in the national debate is the reception of migrants. both parties endorse a restrictive pragmatic stance toward this category, associating the mismanagement of the reception system to the corruption of the national political elite (gianfreda 2018). ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 57 mineo14 is the centre of illicit interests. it is the most relevant example of how the migration phenomenon can be exploited by those who want to earn from emergencies. mineo represents the complete failure of the reception system, both from an economic and from a human rights perspective. (marialucia l’orefice, m5s mp, 10/03/2016) figure 3. spider-plot of ln and m5s positions on the migration-issue. national arena. looking at both parties’ positions in the ep (see fig. 4 above), we observe a substantial confirmation of ln’s positioning with a strong principled endorsement of border control (-177) and a strong principled opposition to the cultural/religious (+136) and socio-economic (+140) integration of migrants. however, ln is opposed in principle to the reception of migrants in the eu territory, differently from the national level where the party endorses a more moderate approach. ‘years and years of foolish reception, without the necessary checks, have allowed thousands of illegal migrants (clandestini) to enter europe, without leaving any record. […] illegal migrants and islamic terrorists wander around unhindered’ (mara bizzotto, ln mep) 14 mineo is the name of a reception centre in the province of catania (sicily), which has been in the spotlight for corruption and human rights violations. for further details: https://www.theguardi an.com/news/2018/feb/01/migrants-more-profitable-than-drugs-how-mafia-infiltrated-italy-asylumsystem. -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 borders control economic migration humanitarian migration receptioncitizenship socio-economic integration cultural-religious integration m5s ln 0 line max opp. pragmatic max supp. pragmatic gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 58 differently from the national arena, the m5s position on the migration issue is more delineated in the ep. the m5s delegation places little emphasis on immigration control (+16), while it holds a positive and principled stance towards humanitarian migration (147) and socio-economic integration of migrants (-142). indeed, as already noticed, in the national arena m5s often stresses the need to address the root causes of migration – namely wars and weapons trade – and enforce human rights protection across the eu. ‘the socio-economic integration of refugees is a complex process that needs to be based on the principles of solidarity and fair distribution of responsibilities among member states. […]. refugees’ access to the labour market […] can reduce the costs of reception […] and contribute to the economy of host societies’ (laura ferrera m5s mep) figure 4. spider-plot of ln and m5s positions on the migration issue. ep arena. two further considerations are noteworthy: firstly, m5s’s pragmatic opposition towards the reception system at the national level (+16) is turned into pragmatic support in the european arena (-33). secondly, the ‘citizenship’ target is not salient either for m5s or for ln in the ep. this hints at the influence of institutional settings on parties’ framing strategies. while ln’s positioning across institutional arenas seems to be driven by its ideological characterization – a radical-right populist party with nativist and xenophobic claims – m5s’s framing strategies appear to be influenced by the institutional settings in which the party operates. indeed, if at the national level the party mainly frames immigration issues in terms of opposition to the government, in the ep normative arguments, such as respect for human rights, prevail. similarly, the lack of salience of the citizenship target is strictly connected to the fact that naturalization is a typical issue dealt by sovereign states (brubakar 2010). -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 borders control economic migration humanitarian migration receptioncitizenship socio-economic integration cultural-religious integration ln m5s 0 line max opp. pragrmatic max supp. pragmatic ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 59 7. conclusions the empirical analysis conducted in this paper has shown that ln and m5s hold different positions vis-à-vis the eu and immigration issues. in particular, as expected (h1), ln opposes immigration mainly relying on cultural identitarian, securitarian and law and order arguments in both the observed arenas, thus confirming itself as a populist radical-right party (mudde 2007). similarly, ln frames its opposition to the eucommunity within sovereigntist arguments and accusing the eu of grabbing power visà-vis sovereign member states and authorities (h2 confirmed). conversely, the m5s mobilizes the issues studied to boost its anti-elitist claims (h3), focusing on the mismanagement of the immigration crisis (and in particular the reception system) by the national elite and on the technocratic nature of the european institutions that lack democratic accountability. interestingly, in the national parliament, both the m5s and the ln use populist rhetoric to attack mainstream governing parties, following a government vs. opposition dynamic. on the contrary, at the supranational level the two parties behave differently. while the m5s proposes a principled attack on the eu-elite but pragmatic and constructive opposition to eu-policies, the ln endorses principled criticism toward the eu-elite, the eu-regime and the eu-community, thus constituting a sort of anti-systemic opposition to the eu (mair 2007). consequently, h4 is confirmed only with reference to the ln that combines nativism, welfare chauvinism and principled opposition to the eu in both arenas. in other words, ln behaves as an opposition, anti-immigration and eurosceptic party both at the national and at the supranational level. conversely, m5s adapts itself to the institutional setting in which it operates. furthermore, the analysis shows marked differences between ln and m5s euroscepticism. while the former sees the eu as a threat to national territorial/cultural unity, the latter mainly stresses the lack of democracy and democratic accountability of the eu-elite, highlighting the elite vs. people distinction typical of a populist party (mudde 2007). given the substantial differences that exist between ln’s and m5s’s positions on the ‘integration-demarcation’ axis of the political competition, we suggest that this divergence might lead to the formation of possible ‘wedges’ in the current yellow-green italian governmental coalition, something that might be consequential for its duration. appendix 1 table a1. corpora’s descriptive statistics eu-issue immigration issue party name total number of speeches average speech length in tokens (standard deviation in parenthesis) total number of speeches average speech length in tokens (standard deviation in parenthesis) corpora national parliament m5s 44 878 (695) 112 820 (745) ln 27 946 (1129) 137 458 (491) total 71 249 gianfreda and carlotti, the different twins 60 corpora ep m5s 47 285, 5 (145) 66 252 (103) ln 19 282 (141) 81 192 (102) total 66 147 total overall 137 -396 - table a2. coding scheme (the full coding scheme can be obtained upon request) variable category definition example coding rules eu community a1: negative opposition to the eu community, which means: • to be against further european integration; • to be against the process of eu enlargement; • to be against the transfer of competences towards the eu; • to be against eu values and identity. ‘we are tired of europe imposing illogical rules on us’ paola carinelli, m5s, 19/03/2014 all four aspects of the definition need to point to strong opposition. otherwise a2: neutral a2: neutral neither opposition to nor support of the eu community, which means: • to affirm a matter of fact • to describe situations in an ‘objective’ manner • to report statements by other mps/ministers/journalists ‘the economic crisis has affected the european union as a whole’ sergio battelli, m5s, 27/06/2016 if not all aspects of definition point to ‘opposition’ or ‘support’ a3: positive support of the eu community, which means: • to be in favour of further eu integration; • to be in favour of the process of eu enlargement; • to be in favour of eu values and identity. ‘the europe we want is the citizens’ europe. we must build it together!’ sergio battelli, m5s, 6/08/2015 all three aspects point to ‘support’, otherwise a1: opposition. immigration control b1: restrictive support for immigration control, which means: • to be in favour of stricter borders controls; • to advocate for stricter immigration rules and procedures; • to be in favour of administrative detention of migrants. ‘a dignified reception must be reserved for those who have the right to stay and not forall foreign minors without any distinction’ marco rondini, ln, 24/10/2016 all four aspects of the definition need to point to strong opposition. otherwise b2: neutral a2: neutral neither opposition to nor support for the eu community, which means: • to affirm a matter of fact • to describe situations in an ‘objective’ manner • to report statements by other mps/ministers/journalists ‘94% of unaccompanied minor refugees are men, while 5.7% are women’. marco rondini, ln, 26/10/2016 if not all aspects of definition point to ‘opposition’ or ‘support’ b3: permissive against immigration control, which means: • to be in favour of save and rescue operations; • to stress the need to respect international law and conventions; • to advocate for the respect of migrants’ rights. ‘the northern league speaks of closing the borders without having any idea of the international agreements that italy has signed in the eu’. maria edera spadoni, m5s, 21/05/2015 all three aspects point to ‘support’, otherwise b1: opposition. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 61 references akkerman, tjitske, sarah l. de lange, and matthijs rooduijn, eds. 2016. radical right-wing populist parties in western europe: into the mainstream? routledge studies in extremism and democracy. london; 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new york: rowman & littlefield international, ltd. microsoft word pdf_issue_11_2.docx italian political science, volume 11, issue 2, december 2016 © 2016 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 11, issue 2, pp. 40–61. book reviews section edited by carla monteleone and stefania panebianco silvia bolgherini, navigando a vista: governi locali in europa tra crisi e riforme (bologna: il mulino, 2015). 225 pp., €20.00 (paperback), isbn: 9788815258267 navigando a vista: governi locali in europa tra crisi e riforme by silvia bolgherini is a compelling book that provides an analysis on a topic still developing: the evolution of local government restructuring in three countries. in photographic terms, in this book the author applies the technique of “panning” that is particularly useful in capturing any fast-moving subject. the basic idea behind panning is that you pan your camera along in time with the moving subject and end up getting a relatively sharp subject but a blurred background. this gives the shot a feeling of movement and speed. despite in the book a comparison is accomplished, the study of “new local government,” the “new local politics” would have been worthwhile even if focused only on the italian case. it represents a crucial case for the important reforms experienced and the central role played by local governments. in addition, the wave of decentralization and strengthening of local authorities has affected, in turn, all the general administrative structures. if this set of reforms have succeeded in pushing changes, albeit unevenly, among local governments, it is because the reorganization of the relationship between politics and administration began previously. the process started with a reform of local self-government (law no. 142/1990), which included a number of ground-breaking provisions aimed at improving the efficiency of the comuni (municipalities) and province (provinces). law no. 81/1993 was politically a very significant step toward raising awareness of local self-government, with the introduction of direct elections for mayors and president. the law was followed by a new reform of the budget structure (legislative decree no. 77/1995). the political and administrative reforms culminated in the changes in title v of the italian constitution, made in 2001 (constitutional law 3/2001) and the law on fiscal federalism (no. 42/2009), “the last great policy clearly connected with the decentralizing and federalist trend” (p. 128). book reviews 41 but the bolgherini book is not bound to the italian case but carries out a comparison between the three great democracies, italy, spain, and germany, that, in some respects, seem similar—all have three levels of government; a considerable share of small and very small municipalities; an intermediate provincial level with a long and consolidated historical traditions; the recent spread of unions of municipalities; recent reform of local authorities—and, in other respects, seem different from each other. first, regarding the institutional framework: “germany represents a case of cooperative federalism model par excellence, spain introduced with the constitution of 1978 the so-called state of autonomies and as a result of this is not a fullyfledged federal system, but a strongly regionalized state, italy with the constitutional reform of 2001 has definitively confirmed its regionalized structure” (p. 58). second, according to the distribution of competences, unlike in italy and spain where the local government is a matter under state legislative powers and only partially it may delegate them to the regions, in germany the individual landers are vested with this competence. furthermore, the three countries underwent reforms recently approved (as in the italian and spanish case) or are still under discussion (as in german case) and thus any assessment on the ongoing transformation of local authorities is hard: it is “currently still all in evolving and there are not few blurring areas” (p. 170). the book is organized into six chapters. the first chapter examines the successful decentralization model in the decades from the 1970s to 2000, when it seems that decentralization was more likely to show up shortcomings. the economic crisis that began in the second half of the 2000s highlights, in fact, the weaknesses of this pattern and increases the role of some challenges to decentralization and local authorities: the challenge of the overload—the progressive increase of the demands and the expectations toward local governments from the citizens and the political system in general; the challenge of the budget—management of resources gradually declining in the face of growing demands; the challenge of optimal-sized local government—the search for a balance between competence and services management and the size, as well as the degree of democracy (p. 40 ff.) the second chapter analyzes the organization and the characteristics of local government in the three countries, from municipalities and the sharp problem of municipal fragmentation (“one of the problems to be solved in order to meet the challenges of the overload, of the budget and of the optimum size,” p. 67) and the so-called meso-level institutions, namely the provinces (“intermediate bodies of government are vested with the major changes and play a leading role in the political-institutional debate of the latter years”, p. 53). finally, the third chapter discusses the emerging inter-municipal associations, unione dei comuni, which “despite having a more recent development, have come to play an increasingly important role, whereas provinces have lost most of the original powers in all three countries” (p. 104). the fourth chapter introduces the concept of institutional sustainability: “an institution should be deemed sustainable if it has the strength to survive and develop to fulfill its functions on a permanent basis with decreasing levels of external support,” norad in 2000, cit. p. 110. starting from main dimensions of analysis (selfreproducibility, fulfillment, self-sufficiency and political legitimacy) it tries to asips, volume 11, issue 2 42 sess “the well-being” of local governments, particularly municipalities, provinces, inter-municipal associations (and metropolitan cities?), in the three countries studied before (and after) the reforms. in the fifth chapter, the most recent reforms are considered and analyzed according to the concept of “institutional sustainability”: “throughout the analysis the level of institutional sustainability –despite enjoying moderate levels so far –as a consequence of recent reforms drops out in the italian case mainly in relation with small municipalities and provinces whereas inter-municipal associations increase their sustainability. in spain and germany, in contrast, the reduction in the sustainability concerns only the small municipalities and the same has not occurred in the provinces and the inter-municipal associations” (pp. 173–174). in the first part of the sixth chapter, the goals of the reforms are considered, mainly to assess their impact on the institutional sustainability and in relation to the three challenges of local governments. the second part (which i would have turned into a new section of the conclusion) includes “a sum up of assumptions elaborated and states some conclusions on the comparison of local governments in the three countries and more generally, on the prospects of local governments in europe” (p. 167). the main argument is that the “financial and economic storm” was a “turning point”, a “critical juncture,” which affected negatively some consolidated dynamics. it showed the weaknesses of the decentralization model and by increasing the impact of existing challenges paved the way for the reforms. rightfully, the crisis has posted new challenges for local governments. instead, one may wonder if the crisis has enhanced the reforms. bolgherini underlines that the reforms are like a pendulum oscillating between the center-periphery model that currently resulted in moving toward a centralizing trend, and toward a real re-centralization. the economic and financial shocks and the consequent fiscal austerity as commitments by european and international institutions has decreased the centrality of territorial dimension, and reduced the room for maneuver of local and regional authorities. the internal stability agreement and large cuts in financial resources clearly resulted in a shift of paradigm from territorial autonomy toward other aims. as suggested by the title (navigando a vista), this interesting book promotes the view that italy and spain (using dante’s words, “ship(s) without a pilot in great tempest” [purg. 6. 77]), in which “the local government’s reforms were largely inspired by a process of adaptation to new challenges, aimed at addressing adjustments to the financial situation and in particular to stem, in both cases, the sovereign debt crisis and the country’s possible collapse” (p. 181), are juxtaposed to the german case. in germany (focusing on brandenburg land), “the outcome is to have local authorities close to citizens, more efficient and cost-effective and virtuous. this implies a division of powers between the various levels of government politically well-organized and well-conceived. […] the proposal of reform has clearly this goal, and only incidentally including some financial aspects” (pp. 182–183). interestingly, in germany the crisis might offer a window of opportunity and has been a determining factor for latent or potential changes and thus reforms, whereas in the other two countries, it is “further evidence of the rambling character and limbook reviews 43 ited focus of local government reforms without inspiring by a policy agenda stable over time” (p. 187). in italy, the future prospect of local government reform is still uncertain, depending on the result of the referendum on 4 december 2016 on constitutional reform proposed by renzi-boschi (particularly, the revised title v of the constitution and the abolition of provinces). maurizio cerruto, università della calabria * * * nicolò conti and francesco marangoni (eds.), the challenge of coalition government. the italian case (london, new york: routledge, 2015). 174 pp., £24.49 (e-book), isbn: 9781138815100 this is a book on the challenges of coalition governments. in fact the coalition as a ‘temporary alliance for combined action’ (oxford dictionary) is a challenge by definition. a theme all the more stimulating because about 60 per cent of the democracies since 1945 have had coalition governments. among these, as wellknown, the italian case is the most interesting: 63 governments since 1948, most of them based on coalitions and no alternation in government in the so-called first republic. a group of young scholars from seven different italian and foreign universities, coordinated by nicolò conti and francesco marangoni has addressed this issue in order to assess whether coalition politics in italy has really changed. they start with an analysis of the institutions and their changes after the important turning point of the mid-nineties, to reach their focus on the activity of governments. the authors, while recognizing the importance of literature on coalition politics in italy and from a comparative perspective, do note however that most of the studies on governments are limited to the analysis of their formation, or their first stage of government, without going into all that follows. the aim of the book is to make an in-depth analysis – and with a new and significant data collection – that covers all the various aspects of government: the agenda, the implementation of priority policies, the management of inter partisan coalition conflicts, relations with parliament in the legislative process and the relationship between government and citizens. as far as concerns the institutional ambit, the turning point, of course, was the choice of the new almost-majoritarian electoral system in 1993 that projected italy for the first time towards a new model of coalition politics. this new system encouraged the formation of coalitions before the elections and not after, as was the procedure in the previous forty years; it also introduced the presentation of a common electoral program and, more importantly, the indication of a common leader as the future prime minister. the larger question behind the book is to see if these changes have led to the abandonment of the old model of an «input democracy» in ips, volume 11, issue 2 44 which the main objective of the parties «was simply to provide citizens with en ‘entrance’ into the circuit of representation through the parliament» to arrive to a complete «output democracy» where the government becomes a major player able to «provide citizens with tangible output through policies» (p. 6). in order to understand if and how the new politics of coalition and formation of governments, the bipolar party system and the presidentialisation of executives produced more efficient and accountable governments, the authors decided to focus their analysis on the performance and results of the activities of governments through an empirical analysis of six dimensions: coalition conflictuality, the executive agenda, the implementation of government agreement, the consensual approval of government legislation, the post-enactment legislative revision, and the citizens’ support for the government. in regard to the intra-coalitional conflictuality, marangoni and vercesi highlight the discontinuities of the second republic from the first, starting from the practice of coalition agreements made by electoral governments. but at the same time, through a very precise and detailed analysis of the government conflicts, they underline the difficulties of transformation of the italian political system into a true output democracy. the rate of fragmentation of policy decisions, in fact, continues to adversely affect the government’s action. in the chapter on the formation of the executive agenda, borghetto and carammia, as part of a larger comparative project on this topic, study the evolving agenda of political parties from the election manifestos right up to the formation of the government’s agenda. although the introduction of the second republic’s coalition agreements is an important factor, the authors do not actually find any correspondence between the pre-electoral commitments and the cabinet priorities. in the third chapter nicolò conti documents the achievements of the italian government in pledge fulfillment and reaches fairly negative conclusions – especially in the case taken as an example, the fourth berlusconi cabinet – where achievements were not distributed among the policy field that were announced in the government agenda. so, the mandate model of the second republic is not enough to overcome the centrifugal tendencies of coalitions. in the fourth chapter andrea pedrazzani investigates the complex issue of government bills in parliament, with special attention to the final voting stages, highlighting in his conclusions how the mechanisms of their approval are actually consensual even in the second republic. the fifth chapter, by enrico borghetto and francesco visconti, is the most original of the book. it deals with legislative revision as an instrument of government, studying the post-enactment policy change in italy and its dynamics from the first to the second republic. surprisingly the advent of alternation in government did not involve an increase in the revisions of the previous majorities. the legislative process, undergoing massive party fragmentation, became more complex: «intra-coalition bargaining might have moved from the pre-enactment to the post-enactment phase, leaving majorities with the option of governing by revising» (p. 124). book reviews 45 finally, the last chapter, by vincenzo memoli, making use of multi-variate analyses, investigates the impact of institutional efficiency, together with morality and legality on the citizens’ declining support for the italian government. to conclude, each author, by focusing on the single challenges posed by the coalition government, describes italy as a case that has not yet become an actual output democracy. this is a fairly ambitious book because, beyond the widely shared conclusions, it puts together chapters with different methodologies and often with time spans that do not perfectly coincide. this is why the work of the editors has been all the more valuable in coordinating themes that often reproduce repeated statements (such as the differences between the first and second republic). with its interesting findings, and in the light of the recent redefinition of the italian political system in a tri-polar sense, it may offer an inspiring research agenda for the future. annarita criscitiello, university of naples federico ii * * * sergio fabbrini, which european union? europe after the euro crisis (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2015). 376 pp., €25.37 (paperback), isbn: 9781107103948 how many visions of the european union (eu) are being propounded in europe today? can they coexist or do they rather collide? has the euro crisis made them more or less plausible? these are the questions that sergio fabbrini asks and answers in this book, which has received already wide acclaim, in addition to providing his own vision of the eu of the future. given the complexity of the questions raised, the answers are also necessarily complex and demand attentive reading. in order to answer these questions, fabbrini adopts a comparative politics approach he contrasts to the still largely hegemonic (in eu studies) international relations approach, and which he organizes in a very personal manner by creating analytical categories and producing a distinct vocabulary the reader needs to acquire in order to follow the argument. the book is divided into three parts. part i is an analytical account of the evolution of the eu. part ii focusses on the three perspectives that have vied for hegemony throughout the eu’s existence, economic community, supranational union, and intergovernmental union, and which have emerged with particular clarity during three critical junctures, the failure of edc in 1954, the maastricht treaty of 1991, and the euro crisis of 2009. part iii looks at likely future development of the eu to which fabbrini contraposes his own vision, a compound union for the euro-area member states. ips, volume 11, issue 2 46 i will reproduce the backbone of fabbrini’s complex argument by organizing it into ten steps, asking some questions of my own along the way. 1. currently the eu is governed by a dual constitution that was introduced in maastricht when the treaty on the eu regulated the single market through a supranational constitution and the common foreign and security policy (cfsp) and justice and home affairs (jha) through an intergovernmental constitution. the coexistence of these two constitutional regimes is a problematic feature of the eu. economic and monetary union (emu) fell, as it were, between the cracks sharing features of both constitutional regimes. 2. the main cleavages in today’s europe are still interstate cleavages—a statement that could be more problematized—and consequently the units of fabbrini’s analysis are member states, treated as if they had preferences, visions, and wills of their own. 3. a fundamental analytical distinction is drawn between nation-states and union of states and particularly between federal states and federal unions, the former being the result of the disaggregation of formerly unitary states and the latter the result of the aggregation of formerly distinct states (federal theory, according to fabbrini, does not entertain this distinction but implicitly assumes that all federations are federal states). the reader must accept this somewhat apodictic dichotomy in order to follow the rest of the argumentation, but one is left wondering whether federal states and federal unions are not in fact the same constructs at two different stages of their development. 4. in federal unions, power is separated along two fundamental dimensions: a vertical dimension, between the federal center and the federated units (of different sizes), and a horizontal dimension, among institutions representing different aggregations of citizens at the center. fabbrini insists that the different population size of the constituent units of federal unions requires a careful balancing of states’ and citizens’ interest representation at the center through multiple separations of powers. the two examples of federal unions that fabbrini produces, the united states and switzerland, are characterized by many common traits (among which the original need to defend themselves against an external threat) but display a lower degree of dishomogeneity among federated states/cantons than the current eu (which for fabbrini is so crucial). the original 13 colonies that federated into the united states had populations ranging between 442,000 (virginia) and 46,000 (delaware) (less than 10:1) according to the 1790 national census, hardly a huge disparity; while the difference between the most populous canton (bern) and the least populous canton (züg) in 1815 was of 291,000 to 12,500 (more than 23:1) according to official historical statistics, a somewhat more significant disparity although compensated for by other features such as a common language. given the delicate and difficult balance, fabbrini claims that a written constitution is necessary to regulate the decisionmaking powers of each component of these multiple separation of powers systems. book reviews 47 5. the eu is in fact a union of states and potentially a federal union, but it is not organized as such because it lacks a proper constitution that orders the functioning of the political system not only by apportioning competences between levels but also by attributing and regulating powers among different institutions. the eu, rather, has a material constitution, given by the constitutionalization of the treaties, which however is not conceived as a basic law, but rather as a text that disciplines decision-making in different policy areas (and for this reason, and for the way in which the treaties are interpreted by the european court of justice, it is a material or empirical constitution). 6. therefore, the multiple europes of which the book title talks about are not different-speed europes, but fundamentally different visions of what the eu should be. by and large, in fabbrini’s analysis each member state subscribes to one and only one vision of europe and is enlisted in one and only one constitutional camp, an aspect of the argument that descends from electing states as units of analysis and which could perhaps be more nuanced. 7. the main critical junctures that have marked the life of the eu are: a. the postwar period and particularly the fateful decision of the french parliamentary assembly to vote against the creation of a european defense community, which would have consolidated the supranational vision of the community (instead, only the economic—common market—aspect of the community could be pursued, which induced other member states to embrace this purely economic community vision as the only desirable vision); b. the maastricht treaty which, while extending the competences of the union to areas close to core state functions, entrusted these policy areas to an intergovernmental regime, thus inaugurating the dual constitution later confirmed by the lisbon treaty, which also runs through the emu; c. the euro crisis, which impressed a new spin onto the intergovernmental management of emu, by increasingly entrusting the management of monetary policy to a ruled-based economic creed and to technocratic institution and the management of fiscal and budgetary policies to the (hopefully loyal) coordination among euro-area member states’ executives, thus shielding both from accountability checks at either eu or member state level. 8. the three visions recalled above—economic community, supranational union, and intergovernmental union—are ruled by different principles: while the economic community and the intergovernmental union visions require simple cooperation among member states, which remain fully sovereign and legitimately so in all other areas, the intergovernmental union vision requires coordination among member states. and while sovereignty is simply shared in the first two cases (a term drawn from federalist theory), it is pooled in the third (a term used by liberal intergovernmentalists to denote a less intense kind of communalization of the respective spheres of authority). ips, volume 11, issue 2 48 9. fabbrini’s main, but certainly not only, argument is that the last critical juncture, the euro crisis, has induced heads of state and government to adopt a decision-making strategy that has given a new spin to the intergovernmental union perspective, basically recalling all decision-making powers to the council and the newly institutionalized european council (which should properly be conceived as an executive and not as a legislative body) and marginalizing both the european parliament and the european court of justice. this apparently expedient decision, contrary to expectations, has proven both ineffective and illegitimate: ineffective because coordination is more easily pledged than practiced and illegitimate because it has blurred the necessary distinction between executive and legislative powers. 10. fabbrini’s suggestion is to restore the rightful distinction between executive (european council and commission) and legislative (council and european parliament) institutions so as to allow them to check each other out and find a modus decidendi – the essence of a compound democracy. this should however happen only within the limited circle of the euro-area member states, as these alone are supposedly interested in creating a union of states and in operating as a compound democracy. apart from possibly finding some of the analytical distinctions created along the way difficult to grasp and to retain, the reader is also left wondering whether it is really reasonable to impute such clear preferences and visions to member states, for example to the uk or denmark (supposedly proponents of an economic community), to germany (supranationalist until maastricht but then increasingly more intergovernmentalist), or to france (mostly intergovernmentalist), without exploring the many other sources of disagreement that cut across them and all other member states or without wondering whether the euro-area member states are really so internally cohesive or they are not also traversed by many other debilitating cleavages. while this is by now the standard manner in which, even in academic debates, we discuss the eu—imputing singular preferences to member states and national constituencies as if they were individuals—readers with an interest in how these preferences emerge, are negotiated and adjudicated and hence interested in the politics of european integration, may be slightly disappointed. but since this was not fabbrini’s aim, which was rather that of exposing the inner working of the institutional logic inherent in different constitutional regimes, he can hardly be criticized for not providing such analysis and rather for sticking to a comparative institutional analysis. the book however makes for an absolutely compelling read and represents a strong and distinctive voice in the debate on today’s eu. simona piattoni, university of trento * * * book reviews 49 hanspeter kriesi and takis s. pappas (eds.), european populism in the shadow of the great recession (harbour house, colchester: ecpr press, 2016). 394 pp., €71.20 (hardback), isbn: 9781785521249 reviewing a book comprising 16 chapters, each devoted to a country’s experience with populism, plus an introduction and a conclusion by the two editors is a very difficult task indeed. there is no way to do justice to all the chapters, praising specifically some of them, criticizing others, mentioning them all, and, what counts more, their authors. i will begin by saying that this is an excellent collection of highly informative essays devoted to the appearance and the dynamics of populist parties in all european democracies, with the unexplained exception of spain and portugal. all the contributors were asked to deal with four major hypotheses formulated by the editors. first, does a deep economic crisis enhance the antagonism between “the people” and some political or economic elite leading to populist mobilization and to the electoral success of populist parties? second, can one explain the success of populist parties with reference to political crises? third, is the combined effect of political and economic crises particularly conducive to populism? fourth, will populist parties that acquire political power moderate their discourse and their behavior when in office? attempting, with a remarkable scholarly “discipline,” to explore whether and how the four hypotheses are confirmed or falsified in the populist experience of their respective country, all the contributors provide interesting and useful information on the politics and the economics of those countries. while the economic indicators are classic and easy to find (variations in the gnp, in the rates of unemployment and in the size of the national debt), and provide reliable inter-temporal and cross-country measures, political indicators appear, at least to me, to be taken and interpreted with more caution and greater attention to the peculiarities of the different countries. kriesi and pappas have chosen to focus on three political indicators: electoral volatility, trust in parliament and satisfaction with democracy. an increase in electoral volatility is bound to destabilize the party system, while a decrease “serves as a sign of party system stabilization” and, somewhat more controversial in my opinion, that “the party system might have been going through an unstable period before and unrelated to the great recession” (p. 14). leaving aside the impossible task to deal with each chapter, all well worth reading (i have learned a lot from many of them, especially those on nordic countries), i will offer some disjointed, but, i hope, useful remarks and criticisms hidden in the guise of requests for more elaboration. in the concluding chapter, the editors stress more than once that their initial hypotheses have encountered “partial confirmation”, which is, of course, “partially” true. what, then, becomes truly important is to explore more in depth those cases not confirming the hypotheses, highlighting which among the hypotheses have been more significantly challenged and explaining how and to what extent they should be revised or dropped. on the basis of what i have read, the least impact on populism has been produced by the great recession, that is, the appearance, the dynamics, the ascent to office of populism are not relatips, volume 11, issue 2 50 ed, not significantly conditioned, even less, determined by economic factors. at most, these factors add something to a populist phenomenon in the making. in some geo-political areas there may exist more favorable factors conducive to populism. for instance, ann-cathrine jungar declares that “the nordic region has been a fertile soil for populism” (p. 42). according to giuliano bobba and duncan mcdonnell, italy “continues to offer excellent market conditions for populism” (p. 179), although i have lived most of my italian life in a situation characterized by partitocrazia. on their part, eoin o’malley and john fitzgibbon almost seem proud of ireland because its political system is in fact resplendent with populist actors and rhetoric” (p. 288). on the whole, however, i believe it would be a mistake to overemphasize the “threat” of populism to european democracies. there is not a single case in which one could confidently state that had the economic crisis not appeared no populist phenomenon/party would materialize. however, some of the chapters hint, never in very strong terms, that a rise in unemployment, a decline of gdp, and a growing public debt may have been conducive to higher electoral volatility, to decreasing trust in parliament and to a lower level of satisfaction with democracy. if democratic parties, whose prestige, incidentally, is rather low and still declining in most countries, are unable to provide solutions, especially to competently manage the economy, the voters, or at least a sizable portion, will look for populist alternatives. then, the search for alternatives will translate itself into high electoral volatility and into a growing pool of available voters. but high electoral volatility may mean just changing voting behavior among the existing parties, that is, shifting from one party to another, frequently and in significant numbers, without necessarily rewarding populist parties because—and here is my main point—populist parties may not exist. in the 1950s the party system of the fourth french republic was in shambles. yet the only populist attempt by pierre poujade proved to be not very successful and quite short-lived. in the early 1980s, jean-marie le pen could launch his populist challenge (and vehicle) because two opportunities were offered to him by changes in the political structure: i) the pr law used for european elections (1984) and reintroduced by president mitterrand in national elections (1986); and ii) the direct popular election of the president of the fifth republic. i still harbor several doubts regarding the definition and classification of the front national among populist parties made without hesitations or qualifications by hans-georg betz because it has and it exhibits many features of “mainstream” parties. moreover, and more generally, i would put a lot of emphasis on the quality of the (would-be) populist leader(s). also, while i am not certain that the lega nord, forza italia, and the five stars movement are all populist parties in the same analytical and political bag, i see in italy an element that appears to be of the utmost importance in practically all the other cases of populism as well. yes, the populist political discourse is important. it is always based on a confrontation between the people and the elite: political, economic, intellectual, in the mass media. in some cases, the jews occupy a place among the enemies of populism. at this point in time, two issues figure prominently in the populist discourse: immigration and europe (that is, of course, anti-europeanism). but at the end of the day, the book reviews 51 more i kept reading the excellent chapters of this book and going back and forth to the editors’ introduction and conclusions, the more i became convinced that schumpeterian and sartorian perspectives throw vivid light on populist leadership and parties. no matter how significant may be the economic factors in creating discontent, dissatisfaction, distrust in those who hold political and economic power, unless a populist leader appears no one will be in a position to exploit all those favorable conditions. populism emerges, wins, consolidates itself and lasts if, when, and as long as there is a populist political entrepreneur. all chapters are replete with names of more or less successful populist political entrepreneurs: orbán, haider, tsypras, fortuyn, wilders, blocher, and to some extent farage. most certainly, silvio berlusconi’s trajectory, from media entrepreneur to extremely successful political entrepreneur to poorly performing head of government, exemplifies the various phases of the populist experience. beppe grillo’s experience ought to be situated on a different level where one could put together anti-political appeals, delegitimization of the political class, anti-system sentiments, hostility to the european union and the dream of web-democracy. this is an unprecedented combination of elements that have little to do with nationalism and immigration. but grillo’s role of political entrepreneur who found a political space, entered into it, and exploited it, is undeniable. what makes of a man (i apologize to marine lepen; contrary to matthew goodwin, i would not consider populist either margaret thatcher or, even less, tony blair), of a personality a populist political entrepreneur? this is the question lingering in practically all chapters of this book. my tentative answer is that in addition to the structure of political opportunities, duly stressed by the editors as well as by several contributors, there may exist some cultural country-specific factors. i would also suggest that future studies on populist parties ought to focus on the impact (as done by zsoly enyedi in the chapter on hungary and, to some extent, by kurt richard luther in his analyzed of austria) those parties in government have produced both on the institutions on the political system and the culture of their citizens. populism is an integral part of the democratic discourse: how much has populism already changed it and/or will it succeed in changing it in the near future? gianfranco pasquino, university of bologna and johns hopkins university * * * patrizia nanz and claus leggewie, die konsultative. mehr demokratie durch bürgerbeteiligung (berlin: klaus wagenbach, 2016). 108 pp., €9.90 (paperback), isbn: 9783803127495 post-democracy, populism, crisis of representative democracy: the buzzwords that dominate much of the ongoing discussion on the state of democracy in germaips, volume 11, issue 2 52 ny and beyond form the building blocks of patrizia nanz and claus leggewie’s diagnosis of the current malaise of representative institutions and the proposal for their renewal that follows from it. the authors manage, in the space of just under 100 pages of text, to present a concise and coherent plea for the institutionalization of a “consultative” dimension of representative democracy, not only as a rechanneling of the “anti-political passions” behind populism into participatory outlets but also as a means of incorporating the normative principle of inter-generational justice into the decision-making logic of representative democracy. the account begins in chapter 1 with what appears to be an all too familiar crisis diagnosis: increasing numbers of citizens across western democracies have become disaffected with democracy; crouch’s post-democracy thesis has proven correct to the extent that “the uncontrolled power of large businesses accountable only to their shareholders” has hollowed out the decision-making capacity of representative institutions. it is against this background, the authors argue, that populism manages to tap into people’s “growing anti-capitalist affect” and disaffection with the technocratic “passionlessness of this ‘executing’ politics.” populism, then, is not only about the articulation of a people-elite antagonism—as a wide range of scholars of populism have pointed out—but also an emotional regime that brings “passion” back into politics. the authors highlight numerous pathological expressions of this phenomenon such as the “electronic populism” of conspiracy theories circulated in the “echo chambers” of social media or the “authoritarian democracy” of populists in power from putin to erdoğan to orbán. the key premise here is that the drivers of populism can ultimately be rechanneled by institutional means: the “anti-political passions” can be “civilized” and the “de-politicization of party competition” counteracted by offering citizens the right outlets for confronting one another “in the political arena in a different way ‘with passion and judgment.” in the sections that follow (chapters 2–5), nanz and leggewie proceed to outline the contours of their consultative democracy. they identify a considerable potential for participatory mechanisms that give citizens a say on matters directly impacting their local communities and/or requiring long-term planning—examples from recent german experience being stuttgart 21 and the energy transition. these cases and others, in their own ways, speak to the need for participatory channels that allow value conflicts to be brought into the open, competing conceptions of the good to be articulated, questions of cost (of infrastructural projects, energy sustainability, etc.) to be deliberated and decided equitably, and the interests of future generations (“generational justice”) to be incorporated into the decision-making calculi of the present. on the basis of their empirical diagnosis (continued from chapter 1) and normative underpinnings, the authors (chapter 4) propose a system of “future councils” situated at the municipal or city-district level with the task of identifying “important future problems” and presenting “solution proposals.” the authors specify a number of features conceived to make these councils workable: the 15–20 members of each future council are to be selected randomly in order to overcome selectivity barriers and allow for the representation of a diversity of opinions, generations, and other demographics; the councils, with fixed two-year terms, are book reviews 53 to convene regularly and receive support from a team of professionally trained public administrators and moderators, all with a view to securing their institutional anchorage as the “fourth power” or “fourth estate” (vierte gewalt) of representative democracy. nanz and leggewie present a lucid vision of a possible institutional innovation within representative democracy that ties directly into their diagnosis of the current malaise of the democratic system. there remains a number of questions, however, related to both the practical workings of these councils and their place in the wider diagnosis. on one level, there is lingering skepticism in the deliberative democracy literature about the extent to which problems of social selectivity can be overcome by random selection and professional moderation: merkel, for instance, identifies a “first selection barrier” in citizens’ differing extents of willingness to participate once chosen (especially due to unequal time resources) and a “second selection barrier” in participants’ unequal “argumentative resources” (due to differing levels of education).1 to what extent this could be compensated for by professionally trained moderators is likewise an open question (“who guards the guardians and who moderates the moderators?”). a set of more fundamental questions concerns the extent to which the authors’ concrete institutional vision does justice to their underlying diagnosis of the malaise of representative democracy. one possible objection would be that the citizens’ councils should be tasked not only with brainstorming “future problems” and proposing solutions to them, but also with more substantive issues of (re-)distribution and spending, at least if one takes seriously the authors’ diagnosis of a hollowing out of democratic institutions by the “uncontrolled power of large businesses” (in line with crouch) and the resulting “anti-capitalist affect” that fuels populism. if the underlying problem of representative democracies is the distorted relationship between capitalism and democracy, as has been widely pointed out,2 approaches to revitalizing democratic participation should then be aimed at strengthening economic decision-making instruments in particular. while this is admittedly easier said than done, herzberg’s concept of solidarkommune illustrates by example how participatory budgeting schemes in european cities, while falling short of the porto alegre paradigm in terms of redistributive scope, might nonetheless integrate dimensions of administrative modernization, social justice, and environmental sustainability, such as in the seville model of municipal investments based on citizens’ proposals and distributed according to social and environmental criteria.3 (it is worth noting that the wide 1 wolfgang merkel, nur schöner schein? demokratische innovationen in theorie und praxis, frankfurt (main), otto-brenner-stiftung, 2015 (p. 61); wolfgang merkel, ‘the limits of democratic innovations in established democracies,’ the governance report 2017, berlin, hertie school of governance, 2017 (forthcoming). 2 colin crouch, post-democracy, malden, ma, polity, 2004; wolfgang streeck, gekaufte zeit. die vertagte krise des demokratischen kapitalismus, berlin, suhrkamp, 2013; wolfgang merkel, ‘is capitalism compatible with democracy?’ zeitschrift für vergleichende politikwissenschaft, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 109–128. 3 carsten herzberg, von der bürgerzur solidarkommune. lokale demokratie in zeiten der globalisierung, hamburg, vsa, 2009; yves sintomer, carsten herzberg and anja röcke, der bürgerhaushalt in ips, volume 11, issue 2 54 ranging mosaic of participatory budgeting (bürgerhaushalt) schemes in germany falls well short of even this benchmark.) in addition, it is highly questionable that the “anti-political passions” driving populism can be redirected and remedied by institutional channels alone, especially if the latter’s scope does not extend onto questions of (re-)distribution and spending that are a not unimportant dimension of conflict too often left unarticulated by “depoliticiz[ed] party competition.” what has too often been overlooked in discussions of “input legitimacy” is that the input of democratic political systems concerns not only institutional participatory instruments, but also the key question of the extent to which social antagonisms are articulated via the party system.4 mouffe’s critique of the “post-politics” is particularly insightful in this regard: the underlying tension at the heart of democracy’s problems is not only that of capitalism and democracy, but also that of a “liberal” pursuit of universal consensus and the “democratic” articulation of conflict and difference.5 according to mouffe, social-democratic parties’ abandonment of an adversarial politics under neo-liberalism and the blurring of left-right distinctions have given rise to a “post-political” condition in which right-wing populists articulate conflict in exclusionary terms in the absence of larger competing projects of the left and right. mouffe’s concept of agonistics as the normative response to this predicament is remarkably similar to nanz and leggewie’s vision of a civilized articulation of conflict within a shared framework of pluralist participation;6 yet what her analysis helps understand is that this project cannot be limited to institutional engineering via new participatory instruments alone, but must extend onto (the more difficult task of) a fundamental rethinking and renewal of party-political competition. seongcheol kim, wzb berlin social science center and humboldt university, berlin * * * daniela piana, uguale per tutti? giustizia e cittadini in italia (bologna: il mulino, 2016). 232 pp., €20.00 (paperback), isbn: 9788815264336 the italian judicial system is commonly regarded, by domestic and international observers alike, as tardy, inefficient, and unduly selective in several respects. even if one does not consider the negative feelings of italian citizens and firms, such a picture generates severe consequences for both the country’s global economic competitiveness (with regard to its capacity to attract foreign resources) and italy’s europa – eine realistische utopie? zwischen partizipativer demokratie, verwaltungsmodernisierung und sozialer gerechtigkeit, wiesbaden, vs verlag für sozialwissenschaften, 2010. 4 fritz scharpf, demokratietheorie zwischen utopie und anpassung, konstanz, scriptor, 1975. 5 chantal mouffe, the democratic paradox, london, verso, 2000; chantal mouffe, on the political, london, routledge, 2005. 6 chantal mouffe, agonistics: thinking the world politically, london, verso, 2013. book reviews 55 international standing in terms of democratic quality and legitimacy. daniela piana’s newly published book (uguale per tutti? giustizia e cittadini in italia, mulino, 2016, 226 pages) supplies a comprehensive review that covers the weaknesses and actual performance of italian judicial system, as well as reform attempts and their results. the volume is addressed to specialists in the first place, but can be fruitfully read also by non-specialists. piana starts from the assumption of an “implicit agreement” between the citizens and the state, according to which not only the law is expected to be impartial as such, but it should also be impartially applied. the state is supposed to have assumed a commitment toward each citizen: “whatever your position will be tomorrow, the legal norms will not be applied in a certain way because you are ‘you,’ but rather because they happen to regulate in a general way the given situation in which you are, or the specific behavior that you chose’” (p. 8). however, as already suggested in the title of the book, remarkable differences can be observed in the way citizens’ rights and claims are actually dealt with by italian courts. therefore, the principle of equality before the law is not always respected in practice. this is shown mainly through the analysis of statistical data concerning workload, speediness, personnel and performance at the three levels (first degree, appellate, cassation court). now and then some stylized cases are also presented as examples, without any reference to real trials and names. piana underlines that between 1959 and 2014 italy was sanctioned 1189 times (france 482, germany 102, netherlands 8) by the strasbourg court, given the excessive length of its judicial proceedings. as emphasized by international observers (such as the oecd, or the world bank in the doing businessreport), on average the performance of tribunals is low. in the mezzogiorno it is much lower compared to the rest of the country. but it is not true that all the courts in the south are more inefficient. moreover, some courts in the center-north are also significantly below the average. the same lawsuit might be managed differently by two courts in the same regione or provincia. one chapter is devoted to access to justice and communication about the law. the beliefs of citizens, their understanding of the system’s functioning is very relevant for the decision to start a judicial proceeding or for the way they react when they are summoned. informational, physical, linguistic, and economic aspects of access are therefore treated. the legitimation of the system by the citizens as well as their trust in it are generally low. their satisfaction for the services received is not systematically surveyed. other chapters discuss organizational aspects related to the management of judicial offices. the operating style of the heads of such offices is a very relevant variable, given the remarkable differences in performance between courts. such differences emerge even when we restrict the focus to cases located in neighboring areas, thereby exhibiting similar degrees of civicness. piana tests the usual explanations, and shows that by focusing on the workload, given the actual size of the judicial staff, we do not always get the same results. in some of the courts where several staff positions are vacant, the ability to treat cases is among the highest; while in some courts where there are far fewer empty positions, productivity is low. ips, volume 11, issue 2 56 when we consider the different levels of civicness/social capital, we also see that they are not strictly, systematically and consistently correlated with different judicial performances. the role of administrative officers (by and large severely understaffed) can be relevant, if they are actually involved in executive offices of the trial court. until recently such offices had been established only in a few courts. decree-law 50/2014 required their creation in each appellate court and ordinary tribunal. other recent innovations addressed the telematic trial, the digitalization of documents, and more generally the use of icts. they require, in the author’s opinion, a regulatory center, so to avoid disparities between territories and enhance transparency, accountability, and traceability in the way resources are used. the higher council of the judiciary is its self-governing body, whose competences expanded conspicuously over time. the ministry of justice also has some relevant powers. according to piana, the center is weak, and one of the reasons is the presence of two heads, which frequently do not appear to be mutually coordinated. in some cases, the presidents of the tribunal or the public prosecutors pursued successful strategies of performance improvement. after 2007 also the european union supported, through the social fund, the diffusion of best practices concerning, among other things, application forms, costs, timing, and results. this is in itself a good thing, but—according to piana—might result in an increase of previous disparities and imbalances. what is needed, therefore, would be a blanket coverage, in order to obtain the general adoption of certain good practices by all courts. the demand of justice is also relevant in a country where almost 250,000 lawyers have to make a living. some demands are filtered, supported, and channeled through the aid of grassroots associations. litigation is not spread homogeneously all over italy. relevant attempts at diverting it from judges were made, including the introduction of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. the last chapter stresses the difficulty of evaluating the many reforms enacted between 1992 and 2012. the general feeling is that they did not manage to affect the problems to any great extent. more recently, many other innovations were introduced on the basis of a somehow different and hopefully better method, based on reflections on past experiences and new approaches to impact monitoring. this book, which also contains a comparative chapter showing that italy is not an unicum, is an essential companion for reformers, legal professionals, and citizens alike (and also for non-italian readers), because it offers an original, clear, and deep analysis of the relevant interpretations and data, convincing explanations of the crucial weaknesses, paths, and leverages for further reforms. antonio la spina, luiss guido carli university, rome * * * book reviews 57 paolo rosa, strategic culture and italy’s military behavior. between pacifism and realpolitik (lanham: lexington books, 2016). 158 pp., $80.00 (hardback), isbn: 9781498522816 the analysis of italian foreign and security policy has recently gained the attention of italian political scientists. paolo rosa’s book contributes to this new wave of analysis, in that it aims to analyze how strategic culture has affected italian behavior (p. 1). the introduction provides a review of competing explanations of italian foreign policy, based on international and domestic factors, to eventually claim that they are indeterminate and fail to consider the ideational dimension and the effects of the belief systems shared by the leaders on italian international behavior. part i is dedicated to the study of strategic culture in international relations. chapter two is devoted to the sociological turn in international relations, focusing on social constructivism, sociological institutionalism, and the relationship between learning and foreign policy, and suggests the usefulness of security culture as a theoretical “bridge” (p. 27). chapter three is specifically dedicated to strategic cultures. the author adopts johnston’s definition of strategic culture as “a system of symbols that expresses a society’s prevailing ideas” about the role of war in international relations, the nature of the adversaries, the efficacy of the use of force, and the ranking of the various strategic options (p. 54). accordingly, the author applies the following research scheme to italy’s strategic culture: 1) identification of the main cultural elements (images of war, of the adversary and of the role of force held by the political and military elites); 2) identification of the preferred strategic options; 3) analysis of the actual military behavior. part ii engages with the analysis of italy’s strategic culture and of italian security policy. chapter four is specifically dedicated to the identification of the characteristics of italian strategic culture, providing an overview of the images of war and of adversaries, an assessment of the military instrument, and of italian strategic preferences. in particular, the author highlights that during the liberal period italy shared with the other european powers the “cult of the offensive.” during the fascist period, italy showed a greater adherence to realpolitik tenets, viewed war as a natural event, and relationships with opponents as zero-sum games. it also expressed a clear preference for offensive military plans. world war ii, however, was “a fundamental watershed that led to the emergence of a strategic culture diametrically opposed to that of the previous era,” leading to the “emergence of an elite that refused the use of military force as a means for solving international problems” (p. 70). after 1945, italy’s national identity was heavily affected, and nationalism, militarism, unilateralism, and offensive strategies were refused. italy adopted strict limits to the use of force in its constitution, strongly supported multilateral organizations, reorganized its armed forces on the basis of a conscription army and, certain that its actual defense would have been guaranteed by the united states, it rescaled its military-industrial complex, and created a “mito autoassolutorio”, in an attempt to distance itself from, and delegitimize, fascist rule. all of this contributed to the stabilization of a non-militarized strategic culture. although with important differences (that tended to fade away over time), this non-militarized strategic culture was shared by both christian democrats and left-wing parties, and translated ips, volume 11, issue 2 58 into an anti-war attitude and the possibility of using military force only in a defensive or multilateral framework. accommodation strategies were preferred to defensive strategies and offensive strategies became residual. chapter five assesses the impact of strategic culture on italy’s military behavior. after defining hypotheses based on a neorealist perspective versus a cultural approach, the author proposes a quantitative analysis elaborating data from the correlates of war project on militarized interstate disputes (mid) (version 3.0, with data up to 2001). through a cross-national comparison of nations’ involvement in mids in the period 1946–1992, the author shows that italy is not a warprone state, and this is confirmed also in the post-cold war period when comparing italy to the other medium-sized powers. a longitudinal comparison of four subperiods (liberal, fascist, republican, and post-cold war) confirms a resistance toward realpolitik practices (p. 98), and comparing preand post1945 this resistance becomes more evident. the author then concentrates on the level of violence, on the presence of revisionist objectives, and on the type of conflictual actions used by italy, all supporting evidence of the strategic culture approach. finally, he moves on to analyze armed forces and military spending, and highlights the importance of the lebanon mission (1982–1984) in restoring a positive role for armed forces within a society in which strong antimilitarist feelings were present, and the inclusion of international security actions in the 1985 white paper on defense still met a robust political opposition, evidence of the strong constraints still posed by its strategic culture. however, after the end of the cold war, italy’s military spending decreased less than other european countries, the country became increasingly involved in international crises showing an increased activism, and its armed forces moved from conscription to a professional army. all of this shows the inclination to give italy a greater capacity for force projection. nevertheless, as the author points out, changes occurred “within the parameters determined by the strategic culture, sometimes pushing these parameters to their limits, but never breaking them” (p. 109). the strong support to multilateral security organizations has been internalized and italian involvement in multilateral peacekeeping missions has increased. finally, the author analyzes the eight military operations in which italy has been involved in the period 1990–2008 to highlight elements of the political debates held. while sharing with other scholars the relevance of the identification of this involvement as international policing or peace operations, the author reverses the explanations given so far, advancing the idea that caveats and limitations in the use of force were intentionally imposed, in line with the italian idea that peacekeeping operations are intended as a contribution to reconstruction and pacification. accordingly, the author concludes that, despite italy’s greater assertiveness in the post-cold war period, its behavior still shows “the decisive weight of a nonmilitarized strategic culture” (p. 132–133). throughout the book, the author effectively makes the case for the importance of ideational factors. he devotes less attention (although he does devote some) to fully enlighten why existing explanations based on material factors and other explanations based on ideational factors are unsatisfactory. this is surely fine, because the assembled evidence is noteworthy and confirms his stance. still, at times the colbook reviews 59 lected evidence leaves room for competing explanations (as the author admits). for instance, all european countries have shown, to a greater or lesser extent, restraints on the use of force since the end of world war ii, so it is possible that the european dimension (and a european security culture) have interacted with and strengthened italian strategic preferences. moreover, the reduction of interstate wars and the rise of intrastate conflicts (protracted and with different dynamics) may have created different incentives regarding the instruments to be more effectively used and the chosen framework. finally, the overall increase in peace operations may be useful in better explaining italian behavior in the post-cold war period. this is not to say that these are better explanations, but just to suggest that, for as ambitious a goal as it is, explaining whether and how a combination of different explanations (based on both material and ideational factors) is possible would have also been a useful contribution not only to our understanding of italian security policy, but also to the strand of literature dealing with strategic culture. another element, hardly explored by the literature, that could have benefited from receiving more space is the “obsessive focus” on balance of power in italian political thought (endnote 52, p. 94). as the author explains, strategic culture influences the means (diplomatic versus military actions) rather than the ends that policy-makers try to accomplish. however, there is a tension between the two, because balance of power can be not only a goal, but also a lens through which policymakers read the world to decide whether they should enact balancing policies or otherwise. if they believe (correctly or not) that their survival is at stake, it may become more difficult to ignore calls for the use of military means. accordingly, this would have made an even stronger case for the author’s argument. as for the data used, rosa uses one of the most authoritative databases. this choice, however, only allows him to cover until 2001,7 and therefore to compare a significantly shorter sub-period (post-cold war) with longer ones (liberal, fascist, and cold war), leaving occasional doubts on the interpretation of data regarding italian choices in the post-cold war sub-period (for instance, italy’s involvement in mids per year in the post-cold war sub-period is quite close to the one during the liberal sub-period; likewise, the level of violence used by italy in the post-cold war sub-period is rather close to the liberal and fascist sub-periods). now that a newer version (4.1) is available and covers until 2010, it would be interesting to see whether the observation of a longer period is helpful in clarifying the occasional doubts. rosa has made an original, interesting, and very useful contribution to our understanding of italian security policy, and has brought attention to the importance of the analysis of the impact of strategic culture on the italian policy-makers’ choices. carla monteleone, university of palermo 7 probably because the book was originally published in italian in 2012 as tra pacifismo e realpolitik: cultura strategica e politica estera in italia, rubbettino. ips, volume 11, issue 2 60 giulia sandri, antonella seddone, and fulvio venturino (eds.), party primaries in comparative perspective (london: routledge, 2015). 248 pp., £67.99 (hardback), isbn: 9781472450388 this book’s aim is to explore the adoption, functioning, and consequences of party primaries, an instrument quickly spreading through advanced and new democracies and used to increase intra-party democracy. the emergence of party primaries is studied in its origins and mechanics as well as in its consequences on parties’ organizational strength, cohesion and electoral results. accordingly, the volume provides a first descriptive account of the main rules (formal and practical) governing primaries elections in the selected cases, and then attempts to assess the effects of the adoption and use of primaries on party membership and electoral performance. the need for such a research is evident from the beginning: the literature has not yet come to a commonly agreed definition of what a primary election is and what is not. so, we are still left with the doubt of what can be included under this concept. unfortunately, although chapter two is dedicated to differences and similarities between leadership selection and candidate selection methods, the book accepts this shortcoming and does not explore the definitional logic using the sartorian ladder of abstraction. thus, the research focuses on open and closed primaries to select both candidates and party leaders. some scholars may question this choice, asking if leader selection can be subsumed under the umbrella of a primary election. while the debate on the concept of primary elections is still open, a better understanding of the phenomenon cannot avoid a serious attempt to find a univocal definition of the phenomenon climbing or descending the ladder of abstraction. the book tries to give an answer to three very fundamental research questions: “rq1: what are the main factors that lead parties to use inclusive procedures to select their leaders and candidates? rq2: what are the main features of the primary election process, particularly in terms of formal rules, degree of participation in internal elections and competitiveness? rq3: what effect, if any, do primaries have on parties in terms of electoral performance and membership appeal?” (p. 16) the editors admit that the research framework, while offering a great amount of new data and information on party primaries, does not allow them to give a conclusive answer regarding the consequences of primaries on membership and electoral performances. actually, a pre-and-post study suffers from some analytical shortcomings (e.g., too many intervening variables to be taken into account) that cannot be overcome without, for example, comparing cases of primaries with cases of nonprimaries. however, future inferential studies will undoubtedly benefit from sandri, seddone, and venturino’s explorative study on the causes and consequences of party primaries. the volume, unlike the average customary edited books, is really well structured as each chapter is “disciplined” in its comparative analytical framework. while chapters 2 and 3 provide the basis for data collection and the framework for the comparative analysis, subsequent chapters adopt the following structure. in the inbook reviews 61 troduction, they analyze the political context showing the main explanatory factors at political and party system level for the adoption of primary elections (political culture, electoral system, party system format, etc.). in the second part, the context and rationale for adopting primaries is explored (degree of decision-making centralization, role of the leader and of the dominant coalition, etc.). the third part provides a detailed description of the process of primary elections (formal rules, degree of participation, and degree of competitiveness). finally, the study of the consequences of primary elections focuses on two main variables: the evolution of overall membership figures and parties’ electoral performance in general elections before and after primaries. case selection has been developed under the method of the most similar system design. each chapter (apart from the one on iceland) is designed as a paired empirical comparison exploring two countries that are similar in several political system features (electoral system, party system, form of government, level of concentration of executive power, etc.) in order to control for those variables. the proposed comparisons concern three cases of leadership selection, spain and portugal, belgium and israel, japan and taiwan, and three cases of candidate selection, italy and france, romania and slovakia, iceland, although the former concerns cases of selection of candidates to the role of chief executive. after a well-conceived analysis of the cases, sandri, seddone and venturino offer, in the final chapter, some analytical conclusions. the aim of clarifying “why and how political parties in different countries choose to reform their methods of selecting candidates and leaders in an inclusive direction, and what the effects brought about by that choice are” (p. 181) is pursued at three levels: political system, party system and intra-party level. at the political system level, parties choose primaries as an instrument providing a new source of legitimacy for party leaders and candidates. at the party system level, parties adopt primaries after an electoral defeat or due to a sort of contagion effect. at the intra-party level, primaries can be an instrument for party elites to retain power and/or a strategy for reactivating relationships with activists and enrolling new members. “in sum, primaries have a positive effect on public opinion and therefore on the citizens’ perceptions of the party. for this reason, the contagion effect at the party system level represents an effective incentive for the adoption of inclusive tools. however, [the book concludes] this does not directly correspond to a positive impact at electoral or organizational level” (p. 192). marta regalia, luiss guido carli university, rome microsoft word pdf_issue_13_2_2.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 2, october 2018 © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 2, pp. 27-44 contact author: andrea pedrazzani, university of milan. e-mail address: andrea.pedrazzani@unimi.it the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions and the formation of the conte government in italy daniela giannetti university of bologna andrea pedrazzani university of milan luca pinto university of bologna abstract due to key differences in the policy priorities of the league and the five star movement, the formation of the yellow-green cabinet, appointed in italy after the general election of march 2018, cannot adequately be explained by interpreting the main axis of party competition in terms of the classic left-right divide. relying on a multi-dimensional spatial approach to party competition, this paper attempts to account for the formation of the conte cabinet by looking at the policy positions of political parties on a number of substantive policy dimensions. we analyse changes in the dimensionality of the policy space of party competition by using data from an expert survey fielded in the aftermath of the 2018 election and by comparing these data with similar expert survey data collected since 2001. results highlight dramatic changes in the last two decades, showing a gradual decline in the salience of economic issues vis-à-vis an increase in the salience of non-economic domains such as european integration and immigration. we show that the formation of the conte executive can be understood in light of the closeness of the positions of the two coalition partners on non-economic policy dimensions. 1. introduction fter three months of negotiations following the italian general election of march 4, 2018, the five start movement (movimento 5 stelle, m5s) and the league (lega) agreed on the formation of a government which was regarded as ‘populist’ by many observers. such a judgement is due to the fact that the two coalition partners share a common view that pits ‘a virtuous and homogenous people’ against elites and dangerous ‘others’ (mudde 2004). elites and ‘others’ are together blamed for ‘depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice’(albertazzi and mcdonnell 2015:5). indeed, the m5s and the league often mark the distinction between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’, each seen as a homogeneous group with contrasting interests and values. both parties speak of the people as a ‘pure’ entity whose general will and ‘common sense’ should be translated into political choices. in their communication strategy, the elite is depicted as a major enemy of the people because of its corruption or its technocratic nature (bobba and roncarolo 2018). this applies to the elite operating in the supranational a giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto, the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions… 28 institutions of the european union (eu) and – especially in m5s rhetoric – to the politicians belonging to the mainstream italian parties. apart from sharing a common anti-establishment rhetoric, the ‘thin-centred ideology’ of populism (mudde 2004) appears in combination with different features and ideological traditions of the members of the so-called yellow-green government.1 the two parties do not seem to have much in common in programmatic terms. this is particularly apparent in the key areas of fiscal and welfare policies, as during the campaign the league promised a flat tax rate on income while the m5s pledged to establish a universal scheme of basic income (‘citizens basic income’).2 because of such differences between the league and the m5s, the formation of the conte government might simply be attributed to the shared anti-establishment attitudes of the two coalition partners, as well as to their party leaders’ desire to obtain prestigious offices in the new cabinet. in this view, the cohesion of the cabinet would rest exclusively upon a shared opposition to traditional political and economic elites.3 the so-called ‘government of change’ would hence be bound to encounter enormous difficulties when making crucial decisions of public policy. however, before labelling the conte executive a mere populist cabinet and/or a government formed on the basis of a purely office-seeking logic, it is worth analysing the policy positions of the two coalition partners in a more systematic way. to this purpose we adopt a spatial approach to party competition and coalition formation. in particular, we rely on expert survey data collected in march 2018 to assess the dimensionality of the policy space in the last general election and estimate the policy positions of italian parties in a two-dimensional space. to analyse changes in the policy space of party competition, we compare the 2018 data with similar data collected since the 2001 italian general elections. our findings highlight major changes in the policy space, with a significant rise in the importance of non-economic issues. the formation of the conte government can hence be explained in light of the policy positions of the two key political actors, i.e. the m5s and the league, on those issues. this article is organized as follows. the next section introduces the spatial approach to party competition, while the third one discusses the expert survey methodology. the following two sections are empirical and illustrate the data on policy space in italy. more precisely, in the fourth section we highlight the main changes occurring over time, while in the fifth section we show how the italian parties were located within the policy space. concluding remarks follow in the final section. 1 the nativist and anti-immigration attitudes of the league make this party an example of exclusionary populism, while the call for instruments of direct democracy as a way to return power to the people moves the m5s towards an inclusionary form of populism (mudde and rovira kaltwasser 2013). scholars noted that, starting from 1994, italy can be considered a sort of ‘laboratory’ for the study of populism due to the numerous parties defined as populist that entered the party system (albertazzi and mcdonnell 2015). 2the importance of programmatic differences between the m5s and the league seems to be demonstrated by the fact that the two coalition partners signed a formal coalition treaty before reaching an agreement on the new government. 3 according to chapel hill expert survey data, the league and m5s are very close to each other on a 0-10 scale measuring parties’ anti-elitist attitudes (polk et al. 2017). ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 29 2. the spatial approach to party competition rational choice approach to party competition is grounded on the assumption that candidates/parties attempt to maximize their electoral support by positioning themselves along one or more policy dimensions that are meaningful for voters (downs 1957).voters evaluate candidates on the basis of their policy positions and select candidates who are closer to their policy preferences (proximity theory). models based on these assumptions are labelled spatial theories as they assume that each policy issue or cluster of related issues can be represented on a single dimension or axis (e.g., from most liberal to most conservative), that each voter/candidate has a preferred position on each issue or dimension (e.g., a point on that axis), and that distances between voters/candidates or between candidates themselves can be calculated from the vectors of their policy positions.4 uni-dimensional spatial models represent the policy space in terms of a single underlying axis or policy dimension, typically understood as ‘left-right’. this axis has been defined in terms of both economic and social policies. such a dimension has been considered accurate enough to analyse party competition in most western countries at least up to the 1990s (bartolini and mair 1990). a single dimension is not always sufficient to provide a valid representation of politics in a given context. two-dimensional models of party competition have proven to be more persuasive in analysing electoral and post-electoral politics in multi-party systems (laver and shepsle 1996). using comparative expert survey data, benoit and laver (2006) estimated two-dimensional maps of policy spaces for most european countries on the basis of their salience for political actors. the authors showed that issues relating to the economy defined the most salient policy dimension in nearly all western european democracies. they also singled out a second relevant policy dimension labelled as social liberalism identifying a liberal-conservative divide on social policies. such two-dimensional maps were generated using an a priori approach for comparative purposes, as the aim of the authors was to provide a data-set of party positions within common policy spaces. however, they also provided examples of two-dimensional policy spaces generated through an inductive approach, i.e. by empirically examining the relative salience of different issues or set of issues and their degree of correlation in a given setting. benoit and laver (2006) aptly stressed the point that ascertaining the dimensionality of the policy space is an empirical matter, as a dimension may assume different meanings across time and space and new dimensions may become salient, redefining the policy space of party competition. more recently, a number of studies have highlighted the rise of policy dimensions related to the opening up of national borders in economic, political and cultural terms due to globalization processes. these dimensions have been conceptualized and labelled in various ways by scholars: as ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ (kitschelt 1994), as ‘green/alternative/libertarian vs traditional/authoritarian/nationalist’ (gal-tan) (hooghe, marks and wilson 2002), as ‘cultural’ contrasting universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values (bornschier 2010), and finally as ‘demarcation-integration’ incorporating social liberalism vs social conservatism, provs anti-immigration positions, and provs antieu attitudes (kriesi et al. 2012). while the 4within this approach a policy dimension (for example social policy) can be generated by looking at a set of correlated preferences over similar issues (same sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia, etc.). see benoit and laver (2006) for a discussion. giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto, the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions… 30 increasing politicisation of new dimensions has given rise to a tri-polar party configuration – including the left, the moderate right and the populist radical right – in northwestern europe, the same does not seem to have occurred in southern european countries. since the onset of the eurozone crisis, party competition in southern europe appears dominated by an economic conflict over austerity and an often overlapping conflict over political renewal (hutter, kriesi, and vidal 2018). recent research on the dimensionality of policy space in italy highlighted not only the restructuring of the competitive space brought about by new challenger parties such as the m5s (conti and memoli 2015), but also the emergence of a distinct pro-/anti-eu axis of competition, orthogonal to the socio-economic divide in the 2013 election (giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto 2017; di virgilio et al. 2015). focusing on the 2018 elections, this paper attempts to assess to what extent the formation of the conte cabinet may be explained on the basis of shifting policy positions of political parties along with significant changes of the main dimensions defining policy space. 3. the expert survey methodology to assess the dimensionality of policy space in italy we use data from an expert survey fielded in march 2018. several methods have been used to estimate the policy positions of political actors. one prominent source of data is the manifesto research group/comparative manifestos project, which has been manually coding the electoral platforms of parties in 60 countries since 1945 (budge et al. 2001). the content of party manifestos has also been coded by using techniques of computerized text analysis (laver, benoit, and garry 2003; slapin and proksch 2008). data on legislative voting behaviour have been used to infer party positions (poole and rosenthal 1997), while other scholars have relied on surveys administered to voters, political elites or experts (laver and budge 1992). in this paper we examine party system change in italy using expert survey data collected by following the format used by benoit and laver (2006). the expert survey methodology is characterized by an a priori approach whereby policy dimensions or scales are predefined and parties are located on these scales by country experts. estimates of party positions are therefore the aggregated results of expert judgements. following the research methodology developed by benoit and laver, a survey among italian experts was fielded in march 2018. we asked political experts to locate italian parties on the general left-right axis as well as on a set of substantive policy issues or dimensions using 20-point scales. the nine dimensions are as follows: taxes vs spending (measuring parties’ support for public spending [1] vis-à-vis lower taxes [20]), deregulation (capturing the preferred degree of state regulation of the market, from full control [1] to complete deregulation [20]), decentralization (ranging from territorial decentralization [1] to full centralization [20] of decision-making), civil rights (promotion of liberal [1] vs conservative [20] policies on matters such as abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia), immigration (level of support for integration of immigrants into society, from high [1] to low [20]), environment (environmental protection [1] vs economic growth [20]), eu authority (scope of eu intervention, from broad [1] to narrow [20]), eu accountability (role of the european parliament [1] vs national governments [20] as democratic accountability mechanisms), and eu security (parties’ support for italy’s involvement in ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 31 european military operations, from high [1] to low [20]).5 for each of these nine policy domains, experts were also asked to give each party a score on a scale measuring the importance or salience of the dimension for that party. this scale ranges from ‘1’ (not important at all) to ‘20’ (very important). italian experts were asked to locate on the above-mentioned scales the most politically relevant parties – that is, only those parties that won at least one percent of the popular vote in the 2018 elections.6 table 1 presents some summary statistics from the survey data reporting the mean and the standard error of the expert placements for each party on each policy dimension. in addition, the first column of the table reports the overall importance score of each dimension, as well as the associated standard error. we measured the overall salience for each policy dimension in the 2018 election by computing, for each issue, the mean of the party-specific salience scores and weighting it by the vote share received by each party. table 1. experts’ placement of parties and salience of policy dimensions in the italian general election of 2018 votes/policy dimensions importance +eu fdi fi leu lega m5s nci pap pd vote share 2018 2.56 4.35 14.00 3.39 17.35 32.68 1.30 1.13 18.76 taxes vs spending mean 13.94 11.97 11.31 15.35 5.46 14.43 9.74 11.83 3.94 9.36 se 0.21 0.55 0.42 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.57 0.34 deregulation mean 12.68 14.74 10.18 16.90 4.83 13.54 8.69 10.79 2.34 10.33 se 0.22 0.51 0.53 0.29 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.36 0.20 0.39 decentralization mean 10.34 10.17 13.20 8.70 12.88 5.17 11.22 11.61 15.07 10.59 se 0.36 0.62 0.64 0.42 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.68 0.47 civil rights mean 11.47 3.29 17.15 13.44 4.77 16.30 9.52 16.78 3.67 5.74 se 0.32 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.40 0.48 0.47 0.45 immigration mean 15.09 5.28 19.00 16.30 4.11 19.43 13.82 12.41 2.85 7.13 se 0.32 0.44 0.17 0.30 0.38 0.13 0.39 0.47 0.34 0.43 environment mean 10.45 9.68 15.25 16.94 6.44 16.49 5.76 13.64 5.67 9.34 se 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.35 0.44 0.39 0.51 0.41 0.62 0.36 eu authority mean 15.38 3.20 17.99 14.47 9.48 18.79 15.69 10.53 14.60 7.59 se 0.19 0.48 0.37 0.41 0.39 0.32 0.42 0.47 0.72 0.42 eu accountability mean 12.53 3.48 16.82 14.65 7.67 17.34 11.74 10.68 10.10 7.31 se 0.17 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.72 0.48 1.08 0.45 eu security mean 10.77 3.71 11.98 7.46 11.98 13.52 14.74 8.00 17.59 4.96 se 0.16 0.51 0.72 0.51 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.56 0.72 0.40 left-right mean – 9.66 18.38 15.27 4.31 18.32 11.52 12.71 1.92 7.99 se – 0.34 0.29 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.38 0.25 0.30 0.25 notes: expert survey data gathered by the authors in march 2018 using benoit and laver’s (2006) format. vote share refers to the election of the chamber of deputies (source: ministry of interior). 5 see appendix 1 for the exact phrasing of the survey’s questions. 6 experts were selected from members of the italian political science association (sisp). we sent an email invitation to 316 experts, 71 of whom completed the questionnaire, with a response rate of about 22.5 percent. giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto, the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions… 32 as table 1 shows, none of the two policy issues dealing with economic matters – taxes vs spending and deregulation – was judged by our sample of experts to be the most salient dimension in italian politics during the 2018 general election. the two most important policy domains were instead not (directly) related to the economy: eu authority, measuring parties’ propensity to increase/reduce the set of areas subject to european intervention, and immigration, capturing parties’ support for policies designed to help asylum-seekers and integrate immigrants into italian society. the fact that the latter two issues – and not the economic ones – were the top-rated ones in march 2018 give a first hint of the dynamics underlying the formation of the conte government. a quick glance at table 1 suggests for example that, while being far from each other on the taxes vs spending domain, the m5s and the league were rather close on all the eu-related issues except for eu accountability. before attempting to account for the formation of the m5sleague coalition government from a spatial perspective, we provide a more systematic analysis of the evolution of the policy space in italy. 4. the changing salience of policy dimensions over time as parties attach different degrees of importance to various policy issues, party salience scores enable us to understand which dimensions are the most relevant at the time of a given election. the fact that the space of party competition in march 2018 seems structured by non-economic issues rather than by economic ones may certainly help to explain the formation of a government coalition between parties that are relatively distant in terms of fiscal and welfare policies. however, any account of the formation of such an unusual cabinet would benefit from understanding whether the configuration of italian policy space in 2018 was historically exceptional or was rather the outcome of a long-term process of change. to answer this question, we rely on a time series of surveys administered to italian experts covering the last five elections (2001, 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2018).7 in each study, experts were asked to place the most significant political parties competing in the elections on the general left-right scale as well as on the nine substantive policy dimensions mentioned above, and to give each party a score expressing the salience the party attributes to every dimension. therefore, the five surveys together allow us to trace the evolution of policy space in italy over a relatively long time span. in what follows, we use the salience scores attached by each party to the nine specific policy dimensions to understand how the relative salience of the policy domains has changed in the last two decades. for each election covered by the data we rank the various policy domains according to their overall importance. we obtain the overall salience for each policy dimension in a given election by calculating, for each dimension, the mean of the party-specific salience scores and weighting it by the vote share received by each party. figure 1 displays the ranking of the above-mentioned nine policy dimensions for each election from 2001 to 2018. generally speaking, we can observe that the space of party competition in italy has changed substantially in less than two decades. the relevance of the two issues dealing with the economy – taxes vs spending and deregulation, both referring to the 7 see appendix 2 for further details. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 33 traditional opposition between state and market – has declined over time. such a trend has been countervailed by an increase in the salience of the issues related to the functioning of the european union – eu authority and, to a much lesser degree, eu accountability. the decline of economic domains, starting after 2008, is rather surprising in light of the dramatic impact that the eurozone crisis had on the party system and the functioning of political institutions in italy and in other southern european countries (bosco and verney 2016; charalambous, conti, and pedrazzani 2018; conti, hutter, and nanou 2018; moury and de giorgi 2015; pedrazzani, pellegata, and pinto 2018). although we could have expected an increase in the salience of economic matters in times of severe economic hardship, the simultaneous increase in the emphasis on eurelated issues signals the peculiar ways in which italian parties have framed domestic economic problems connected to the great recession. indeed, several parties put the blame much more on the euro currency and european institutions than on italy’s fiscal and budgetary weaknesses. figure 1. ranking of policy domains according to their salience in italy, 2001-2018. figure 1 also shows that immigration has always been among the top three dimensions of competition among italian parties, with the only exception being the 2013 election. in contrast, the civil rights domain has waned in importance after a peak observed in 2006, when social policy issues were politicised from a liberal point of view by the radical-socialist rose in the fist (rosa nel pugno, rnp) and from a conservative perspective by the christian democratic centrist union (unione di centro, udc). a general decline over time can be observed also in the relevance of the dimension capturing the parties’ degree of support for military operations involving italy together with other eu member states (eu security). this trend parallels the gradual disengagement of the italian armed forces from iraq and afghanistan and is not affected by the outbreak of more 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 r an ki ng 2001 2006 2008 2013 2018 election dimension: taxes vs spending deregulation decentralization civil rights immigration environment eu authority eu accountability eu security ranking of policy dimensions giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto, the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions… 34 recent political crises in a number of non-democratic regimes in north africa and the middle east, implying the potential military involvement of european countries. environment and decentralization have constantly been at the bottom of the issues’ salience ranking. the environmental domain has always been last or second to last except for 2013, when it was particularly important for the leftist left ecology freedom (sinistra ecologia libertà, sel) and most of all for the m5s. in its electoral manifesto, the latter put primary emphasis on topics such as the protection of common goods and the environment, sustainable development, and support of eco-friendly lifestyles (bordignon and ceccarini 2013; pedrazzani and pinto 2015).8 the territorial decentralization of administration and decision-making has traditionally been promoted by the league, which was known as the northern league (lega nord, ln) until the 2018 electoral campaign. indeed, since matteo salvini was appointed secretary of the party in the late 2013, the league has moved away from its original federalist commitment typical of a party representing northern italy and has become a radical right party with a national message (passarelli and tuorto 2018).9 looking at the ranking of policy issues election by election, we observe that party competition in italy was largely shaped by economic issues up to the 2008 elections. in 2001, taxes vs spending represented the most salient issue ahead of immigration, and deregulation was the third most salient domain. five years later, taxes vs spending was still at the top of the ranking, followed by civil rights and immigration. the policy ranking of 2008 was very similar to that estimated for the 2001 elections, with taxes vs spending, immigration and deregulation being the three most relevant issues. a substantial change occurred in 2013, when one of the issues relating to the eu (eu authority) replaced taxes vs spending at the top of the policy ranking. before 2013, the only party attaching high salience scores to eu-related matters was the league, which has also expressed fairly eurosceptic positions. in 2013, the eu authority domain was judged as particularly salient also for two pro-eu parties: the democratic party (partito democratico, pd) and – even more – civic choice (scelta civica, sc) founded by the technocrat and former prime minister mario monti (giannetti et al. 2017). eu authority remained at the top of the ranking also in 2018, when it resulted particularly relevant – with a salience score greater than 15 on a 1-20 scale – for most italian parties. these include the pd and its electoral ally +europe (+europa, +eu) on the proeuropean side, and the league, the m5s, the radical right-wing brothers of italy (fratelli d’italia, fdi) and the radical left power to the people (potere al popolo, pap) on the much more populated and heterogeneous anti-european side. remarkably, in 2018 eu authority was followed in the policy ranking not by the taxes vs spending domain as it was in 2013, but by another non-economic issue (immigration). this marks a further discontinuity with the past, implying that in less than two decades the structure of the italian policy space changed dramatically, with a decline in the importance of economic issues – typically considered as crucial and associated with the general left-right axis – and the 8 after entering the legislative arena in 2013, the m5s seems to have undergone a process of normalization from an institutional and a programmatic point of view (tronconi 2018). 9 such a shift is reflected in the expert survey data. the salience score attached to decentralization by the league was 15.9 in 2018, while it was never below 18.5 in all the elections from 2001 to 2013. ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 35 increasing salience of non-economic issues such as attitudes towards the eu and immigration. 5. the structure of policy space in the 2013 and 2018 italian elections salience scores can be combined with party position estimates to build spatial maps of policy space in italy. accordingly, we now look at the policy positions of the main political parties on the most salient dimensions structuring the policy space, focusing on the two most recent elections. in particular, for the elections of 2013 and 2018 we analyse the positions of the most relevant italian parties in two-dimensional spaces constructed using the three most salient dimensions identified in the previous section. these policy spaces are represented in figures 2 and 3. for each election we build two policy spaces: one built using the first and second most salient domains (left panel of each picture) and one built using the first and third most salient domains (right panel). these graphs also hint at the extent to which the most important dimensions of party competition are related to each other and shed some light on the dynamics underlying the formation of italian governments.10 party positions in the 2013 italian elections are illustrated in figure 2. the left and right panels show that the two dimensions dealing with economy – taxes vs spending and deregulation – almost perfectly overlapped, while being completely unrelated to the eu authority domain which was found to be by far the most important dimension in 2013.11 the main actors of the 2013 elections were three multiparty pre-electoral coalitions and a number of other single-party lists, among which the m5s. the centre-left cartel was located in the pro-eu and economically leftist quadrant of the policy space, with the pd more on euro-enthusiastic positions and sel more on the economic left. the members of the centre-right coalition shared a weaker or stronger anti-eu stance, in spite of holding heterogeneous positions concerning taxation and market deregulation. while people of freedom (popolo della libertà, pdl) and ln were judged to be anti-taxes, fdi was rather centrist in economic terms and the post-fascist the right (la destra, dx) was clearly against market deregulation and slightly in favour of increasing taxation to increase public spending. the members of the centrist coalition headed by monti – sc, udc and future and freedom for italy (futuro e libertà per l’italia, fli) – were more or less neutral on the trade-off between increasing taxes and cutting public services, as well as on the scale measuring the desired degree of state regulation of markets. however, they were slightly more heterogeneous in terms of their attitudes towards the eu. the m5s was placed by italian experts among the most anti-eu parties: beppe grillo’s movement was judged to be just marginally less in favour of reducing eu authority than ln and dx. the position of the m5s on economic matters was slightly to the left of the centre, although with a very large standard deviation (3.82 on tax vs spending, 4.38 10 for ease of exposition, our discussion of the process of government formation in italy only marginally draws on well-established formal spatial models based on policy-seeking assumptions. see laver (1998) for a review. 11 the pearson correlation is 0.015 between eu authority and taxes vs spending (0.304 if we calculate the correlation weighting parties by their vote shares), -0.183 (0.102 weighted) between eu authority and deregulation, and 0.972 (0.975 weighted) between taxes vs spending and deregulation. giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto, the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions… 36 on deregulation). the economic liberal act to stop the decline (fare per fermare il declino, fare) and the left-wing civil revolution (rivoluzione civile, riv) – which did not enter parliament and disappeared soon after the election – were on opposite sides in economic terms. however, they shared a similar neutral position on increasing the scope of eu authority. figure 2. two-dimensional maps of italian policy space in 2013 notes: data taken from di virgilio et al.’s (2015) expert survey. the size of the markers varies according to party vote share. after an attempt to involve the m5s in the government, the pd formed a ‘grand coalition’ cabinet together with pdl, sc and udc. the legislative majority supporting enrico letta’s executive was rather divided on the main policy issues (di virgilio et al. 2015). the letta cabinet lasted indeed less than 10 months. during this period, the pdl withdrew from the government, renaming itself fi and matteo renzi became secretary of the pd. a new cabinet headed by renzi formed in early 2014, relying on the parliamentary support of pd, sc, udc and a new centrist party called new centre-right (nuovo centrodestra, ncd), a pdl splinter. figure 3 represents policy positions along the most salient dimensions in the italian elections of 2018. two electoral cartels contested the march 2018 election. the centreright cartel led by fi and the league included the extreme right fdi and a centrist list named us with italy (noi con l’italia, nci). the centre-left coalition led by the pd involved several minor lists among which the radical euro-enthusiastic +europe. the election was also contested by a number of single-party lists like the m5s, extreme left pap and a left-wing pd splinter called free and equal (liberi e uguali, leu). as we discussed earlier, the most salient policy issue in march 2018 was eu authority, followed by another non-economic policy (immigration) and then by the taxes vs spending domain. the two graphs of figure 3 suggest that the positions of italian parties on the scope of eu authority were strongly related to their attitudes towards immigrants, but not to their positions on the trade-off between increasing services and cutting taxes. at the same time, there was some correlation between immigration and taxes vs spending.12 12 correlation is 0.712 between eu authority and immigration (0.901 weighted), 0.174 between eu authority and taxes vs spending (0.445 weighted), and 0.766 between immigration and taxes vs spending (0.753 weighted). ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 37 figure 3. two-dimensional maps of italian policy space in 2018 notes: expert survey data gathered by the authors in march 2018 using benoit and laver’s (2006) format. the size of the markers varies according to party vote share. if we look at the left panel of figure 3 – where the two most salient issues are represented – we observe that most italian parties lie on a hypothetical 45-degree line. this indicates that, in march 2018, parties that were more against immigration also tended to support reductions in the range of areas in which the eu can set policy. conversely, parties more in favour of immigration were also likely to promote an expansion of the policy areas decided at the eu level. the significant overlapping of immigration and european integration may provide a clue to the likely emergence of a ‘demarcationintegration’ axis of political competition in italy, which would capture parties’ attitudes on the so-called ‘new cultural issues’ (kriesi et al. 2012). in march 2018, italian parties seemed to be grouped in two distinct clusters. on the one hand, there appeared to be a cluster of pro-eu and pro-immigration parties: pd, +europe and leu. on the other hand, a cluster of anti-eu and anti-immigration parties included all the parties belonging to the centre-right electoral cartel plus the m5s. even more than in 2013, in 2018 the m5s was closer to the centre-right parties than to the pd and other centre-left lists in policy terms. within the ‘pro-demarcation’ cluster, we can further distinguish between extreme parties like the league and fdi and a bunch of parties – fi, nci and m5s – holding more moderate positions about immigration and the eu. in the 2018 elections, the main ‘outlier’ in the positioning of italian parties was represented by pap, which had the most pro-immigration position but at the same time was as eurosceptic as fi. the right panel of figure 3 reveals that, according to italian experts, pd and m5s had virtually the same position on key economic matters. on the taxes vs spending tradeoff, both parties were slightly in favour of expanding social services even at the cost of increasing taxes. the other two large parties – league and fi – were instead more prone to reducing public spending in order to cut taxes. the configuration of italian policy space can help explain some crucial choices made by key political actors after the elections of march 2018 and the outcome of negotiations over government formation. although particularly cohesive in policy terms, the centre-right coalition failed to obtain a majority of seats in parliament. this led the giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto, the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions… 38 largest member of the centre-right coalition – the league – to search for possible coalition partners outside the centre-right bloc, starting with the m5s. despite being close to centre-right parties on the main axes of policy competition – european integration and immigration – the m5s refused to negotiate over a new government with fi because of the numerous judicial scandals involving its leader silvio berlusconi. this broke the centre-right cartel and finally led to a deal between the m5s and the league (valbruzzi 2018). during the long bargaining process, the m5s always seemed to prefer the league over the pd as a coalition partner. the spatial analysis of party competition shows that the m5s strategy was not only due to a refusal to make an agreement with a party which had been in government since 2011, but was also grounded on policy concerns about the most salient issues shaping italian politics.13 figure 4. m5s’s distance from league and pd on nine policy dimensions, italy 2018 the radar plot in figure 4 shows how distant the m5s was in absolute terms from the league and the pd, along the nine policy dimensions considered in the 2018 expert survey. the m5s was certainly closer to the pd than to the league on a number of domains such as the economic ones: the m5s had almost the same position of the pd on the taxes vs spending dimension and was very close to the party led by renzi on deregulation (less than two points on a 1-20 scale). furthermore, the m5s and the pd shared roughly the same position on territorial decentralization of decision-making and the distance between the two was lower than 4 points if we consider civil rights and the environment. on these dimensions, the m5s was much farther from the league. however, all these issues were not so relevant in the aftermath of the 2018 elections. on the most important domains, the m5s was closer to the league than to the pd. in particular, m5s’s distance 13see valbruzzi (2018) for an account of the formation of the conte government emphasizing the strategies of party leaders and the role of the president of the republic. decentralization civil rights immigration environment eu authorityeu accountability eu security taxes vs spending deregulation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 distance from league distance from pd ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 39 from the league was just three points on eu authority (the most prominent dimension in 2018) while being eight points from the pd, and was 5.6 points on immigration while being 6.7 from the pd.14 8. conclusions clear differences in the economic platforms of the league and the five star movement have led many commentators to call into question the cohesion of the conte government as well as its possible duration in office. indeed, the very birth of the yellow-green cabinet is inadequately explained by adopting a uni-dimensional model of electoral and post-electoral politics based on the classical left-right divide. relying on a more persuasive twodimensional approach to party competition, this paper has offered a simple account of the formation of the league-m5s government by looking at the closeness of the two coalition partners’ policy positions on substantive domains other than the economic ones. we analysed the dimensionality of italian policy space using data from an expert survey conducted in the aftermath of the election of march 2018 and compared these data with similar expert survey data collected in the past. our study emphasizes major changes in the last two decades, with a decline in the salience of economic issues and a simultaneous increase in the salience of non-economic issues such as european integration and immigration. such an analysis of the evolution of policy space in italy resonates with the literature showing the recent emergence of an integration-demarcation axis of party competition in western europe. the emergence in italy of a new political dimension that is primarily centred on cultural issues helps explain the formation of the conte executive, whose coalition members are far from each other on the (relatively less salient) economic dimension, but much closer on particularly important domains like european integration and immigration. however, other factors have contributed to the formation of the yellow-green government, such as m5s’s abandonment of their previous uncompromising position towards entering any coalition. several findings of this study deserve further investigation. to begin with, a deeper analysis of the relations between the several policy domains covered by expert surveys is needed. although we showed that the economic domains have gradually become less salient, the policy issue that seems to have replaced them as the most prominent one deals with the scope of eu authority, which has clearly some fundamental economic implications. we leave to future work the task to specify the extent to which party positions on policies aimed at regaining national sovereignty vis-à-vis the eu are related to financial and monetary aspects. moreover, our analysis showed that the issues dealing with the eu do not necessarily overlap, as for example the m5s’s position was judged by experts close to that of the league on two eu-related domains, but not on the domain concerning democratic accountability in the eu. a second research avenue we leave for future work has to do with the growing importance of valence issues or non-policy factors (social identities, personalities and so on) in explaining party competition. we believe that, as the proximity theory of party 14 these considerations hold if we use 2017 chapel hill expert survey data to measure distances among parties’ positions. correlations between chapel hill data and ours range from 0.95 for the economic dimension to 0.99 for the left-right continuum. giannetti, pedrazzani and pinto, the rising importance of non-economic policy dimensions… 40 competition upon which the spatial approach is based is definitely an essential step in analysing electoral and post-electoral parties’ behaviour, it needs to be complemented by a focus on valence effects or non-policy information. these aspects appear to be strongly related to the populist attributes that many scholars correctly point out as important features in explaining the conte government’s formation. appendix 1: italian expert survey policy dimensions taxes vs. spending • promotes raising taxes to increase public services. (1) • promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (20) deregulation • favours high levels of state regulation and control of the market. (1) • favours deregulation of markets at every opportunity. (20) decentralization • promotes decentralization of all administration and decision-making. (1) • opposes any decentralization of administration and decision-making. (20) civil rights • favours liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (1) • opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (20) immigration • favours policies designed to help asylum-seekers and immigrants integrate into italy’s society. (1) • favours policies designed to help asylum-seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. (20) environment • supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. (1) • supports economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment. (20) eu: authority • favours increasing the range of areas in which the eu can set policy. (1) • favours reducing the range of areas in which the eu can set policy. (20) eu: accountability • promotes the direct accountability of the eu to citizens via institutions such as the european parliament. (1) • promotes the indirect accountability of the eu to citizens via their own national governments. (20) eu: security • favours italy’s involvement in european security and peacekeeping missions. (1) • opposes any italian involvement in european military affairs. (20) the general left–right dimension please locate each party on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account: • left. (1) • right. (20) ‘governo del cambiamento’? italian politics under the yellow-green government 41 appendix 2: some details of the italian expert surveys, 2001-2018 criteria 2001 2006 2008 2013 2018 n. relevant parties 13 16 8 12 9 n. of respondents 54 40 54 95 71 n. of dimensions 10 10 10 10 10 survey type web web web web web election date may 2001 apr 2006 apr 2008 feb 2013 mar 2018 field sep-dec 2003 mar-may 2006 jul-aug 2008 feb-mar 2013 mar-apr 2018 notes: data on 2001 were taken from benoit, k. and laver, m. (2006). party policy in modern democracies. london: routledge. data on 2008 were taken from curini, l. and iacus, s. (2008). ‘italian spatial competition between 2006 and 2008: a changing party system?’ paper presented at the xxii congress of the italian political science society (sisp), pavia, 5-8 september 2008. we thank kenneth benoit for sharing with us expert survey data for the 2006 election. data on 2013 were taken from di virgilio, a., giannetti, d., pedrazzani, a. and pinto, l. 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discipline had simply not lived up to the high hopes of c. wright mills for the social sciences – as set out in the sociological imagination (1959) – but had, if anything, become ensnared in a trap of its own making. in 1967 the caucus for a new political science (cnps) was created in the united states in order to encourage social engagement and activism amongst political scientists in direct rejection of the american political science association’s (apsa) commitment to political neutrality and refusal to engage in major social debates. the ‘tragedy’ as both david ricci and the cnps argued was that at a historical point when american society desperately needed the evidence and insights that political science could deliver the discipline apparently either did not want to engage or had little to say. political science – to paraphrase c. wright mills – had failed to deliver on its early promise. to offer this disciplinary narrative is to offer little that is novel or new. the flaying of political science has emerged into a popular intellectual pastime in recent years and there are clear exceptions to this broad account in the form of individual scholars or subdisciplines that have retained a clear social connection. engaged scholars, however, arguably became very much the exception rather than the rule in a profession that incentivised sub-disciplinary balkanisation, methodological hyper-specialism, theoretical fetishism and the development of esoteric discourses. this is, of course, an account of american political science that came to a head with the emergence of the perestroika movement in 2000 with its demands for greater methodological pluralism (within the discipline) and greater social engagement (beyond the discipline). while political science beyond the united states was never quite so seduced by the promises of rat-choice, quantitative, largen, mathematical methodologies to fuel a ‘raucous rebellion’, the issue of whether and how the discipline should be required to demonstrate its non-academic relevance, social impact or public value has become a global challenge for the discipline. this, in turn, has spawned a growing pool of scholarship on the structural and contextual factors underlying t the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 5 political science’s apparent ‘relevance gap’ and, from this, how to ‘make political science relevant’ (gilberto capano and luca verzichelli (2016; see also 2010). the focus of this article is more specific, provocative and future focused. it concerns an analysis of the impact of arguably the most explicit and potentially far-reaching externally-imposed research audit process in the world – the united kingdom’s research excellence framework (ref). as such this article reviews the ref assessment process before then exploring the impact and unintended consequences of this incredibly dominant and demanding ‘meta-governance’ framework for british higher education. it then locates the ‘politics of’ research assessment within a far broader and innovative account of the changing nature of scholarship in the united kingdom. the core argument is that over thirty years since the publication of ricci’s tragedy of political science it is now more appropriate to survey the tragedies of political science in the sense of an apparent failure by the discipline to adopt a strategically selective and politically astute approach to navigating a changing socio-political context. political science, put simply, frequently appears very poor at utilising the insights of its own discipline. the tragedies of political science therefore exposes the discipline’s own lack of political guile. could it be that this analysis makes the classic mistake of over-generalising from a single case study? what relevance does the ref have for scholars based beyond the shores of an island of less than a quarter-of-a-million square kilometres off the coast if northern europe? the answer is simple. as already mentioned, concern regarding the social benefit of publicly funded scholarship has moved up the political agenda in recent years and shows no sign of abating (quite the opposite). add to this the fact that the uk has for some decades been a world-leader in terms of imposing market-based managerialist reforms in higher education that often have a subsequent ripple-effects beyond its shores and the relevance of this article for debates about scholarly relevance becomes clear. ref-like – or what might more accurately be described as ref-lite – procedures have or will be implemented in a large number of countries during the next decade and to be forewarned is to be forearmed. it is for this reason that this article is divided into three main parts. part i provides a descriptive account of the introduction and evolution of research assessment frameworks in the united kingdom. part ii then dissects this chronological account to expose the unintended consequences and intellectual pathologies of this process. the argument is not that research assessment frameworks are a ‘bad thing’ of that they do not deliver positive impacts but it is to emphasise the manner in which new frameworks have to be very carefully calibrated in order to avoid negative over-steers and short-term gaming of the system. the final section – part iii – argues that any understanding of the impact of research assessment frameworks has to be located within an account of the wider context of higher education and the rapidly shifting sands of scholarship. the main concluding argument is therefore not about research assessment per sebut about how research assessment is contributing to the break-up of academe and the splintering of disciplines along diverging pathways. the tragedies of political sciences are therefore converging to create the unravelling or unbundling of both the discipline and the nature of scholarship. it is this innovative macro-political argument that forms the main contribution of this article. flinders, the tragedies of political science 6 1. the meta-governance of research although a far simpler and more accurate title for this section might be ‘tragedy and farce’, the main argument is simply that it is impossible to separate the introduction of externally imposed assessments of research by governments (either directly or indirectly) from broader debates concerning the distribution of political power in a polity. therefore, although apsa may well have been at fault for failing to position political science more strategically or to ensure that evidence of clear social benefit and relevance for the discipline was not always conveniently at hand it is also true that large sections of the rightwing political elite in the united states treated universities, in general, and political science departments, in particular, with a mixture of disdain and distrust. the attempts between 2009 and 2014 to block or restrict federal funding to political science in the united states may therefore have been couched in terms of economic prioritisation in times of austerity but they actually veiled deeper ideological views about the role and independence of scholars and universities. in many ways, the decision by the conservative government to introduce a new research selectivity exercise in 1986 was a similarly charged exercise in pressure politics. mrs thatcher had become prime minister in 1979 on the basis of a need for public sector control, discipline and cutbacks. the belief in the capacity of the market over the state led to what david marquand (2014) termed ‘the decline of the public’ in the sense of an assault on those basic anchor institutions within society that were designed and intended to promote collective values over individualised notions of society. the politics of ‘the public’ was rapidly eviscerated by a new politics of ‘the private’ that not only limited the powers of collective-bargaining institutions such as the trade unions but that also imposed neo-liberal values across the public sector in the guise of ‘new public management’ (npm). npm was a broad set of managerial methods that all shared a simple faith in the capacity of the market to drive-up performance, increase efficiency and expose shirking. the promise was ‘a government that worked better and cost less’ but – as the prizewinning scholarship of christopher hood and ruth dixon (2015) has revealed – rarely lived up to its rhetorical promises. a neo-liberal philosophy of management that was supposed to banish bureaucracy and increase dynamism actually gave birth to new forms of ever more elaborate and organisationally suffocating rules, regulations and red tape. the universities were, however, more of a challenge to the conservative governments of the 1980s due to their historically embedded independence from direct government control. but mrs thatcher was very much a conviction politician. her time at the university of oxford has convinced her that universities were complacent institutions that were overly protected from market forces. the public deserved better – in terms of both performance and accountability – and it was her job as prime minister to find a way to make that happen. constrained by intra-party tensions during her first government (1979-1983) her capacity to intervene was limited to introducing fees for overseas students in 1981. by her second term in office – 1983-1987 – mrs thatcher was in a far stronger position in terms of her grip on the conservative party and could therefore use this stable foundation in order to institute more radical measures. lacking direct control capacity the obvious lever for affecting change lie in relation to public funding. in short, if mrs thatcher (or, more precisely her government) could not easily impose reforms on the governance of universities she could impose requirements the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 7 and controls upon the distribution and use of public money. the shift was therefore one of meta-governance (i.e. ‘the governance of governance’ or ‘rules of the game’). the university grants committee (ugc) had existed since 1918 with a remit to act as a buffer between higher education and the government of the day. its main role had been to distribute block treasury grants to universities (with the remainder of university funding coming from tuitions fees paid in full one every student’s behalf by his or her local authority). the ugc was, thatcher believed, a committee made-up of academics to distribute large amounts of public money to academics and although the body did oversee the implementation of the first ‘research selectivity exercise’ in 1986 it was abolished in 1989 with its power transferring to a new university funding council (ufc) on which academics were a minority. the shadow of central government control had therefore become far tighter and the ufc oversaw the introduction of a classic npm framework involving contracts, performance monitoring and league tables. with the benefit of hindsight it is possible to suggest that one historical tragedy was the failure of british universities to divert, subvert or shape that thatcherite revolution; their general position of obstinacy combined with predictions of impending crisis that ultimately proved woefully inaccurate simply reinforced the conservative governments’ belief that universities leaders were out of touch and radical reform was necessary. and while possibly not immediately interpreted as a radical act the introduction of the first research selectivity exercise (rse) in 1986 can now be viewed as a crucial initial wedge or crack in the governance of universities that has subsequently developed into a core feature of academic life in the uk. the degree to which this initial ‘crack’ or ‘wedge’ has been expanded is clear from the manner in which the rse involved the ugc creating subject specific sub-committees that would review just five research outputs – books, articles, papers, etc. – from the past five years on which the department in question would be ‘content for its total output to be assessed’. in addition to these outputs departments were invited to submit up to four pages of general description about their research strengths. this really was ‘light touch’ to the extent that one subject committee was so confident that it already knew all it needed to know about each university’s departmental quality, it produced a provisional classification before it received any submissions and ‘when it got all the extra evidence it saw no reason at all to alter any of the classifications’.1 as a point of comparison the most recent assessment (ref2014, discussed below) required four outputs for every member of staff returned, plus extensive datasets on a whole range of topics, plus a range of environment documents plus a number of independently verifiable ‘impact case studies’. it is therefore possible to identify a rather rapid process of ‘regulatory creep’ with all the usual unintended bureaucratic and organisational implications. the existence of an academic ‘expert body’ (i.e. the ugc) controlling a process that was implicitly designed to shed light on the previously murky world of academic funding allocation did not go unnoticed. in 1986 this was exactly the insider-elite sort of horse-trading, pork-barreling that mrs. thatcher was so personally committed to abolish across the public sector. by 1989 the ugc had been abolished and replaced by a ‘non-expert’ ufc and by the 1989 exercise – now labeled the research assessment exercise (rae) – universities were permitted to return two pieces of work for each member of staff and information was also sought on the total volume of a department’s research outputs. other changes involved as shift from the flinders, the tragedies of political science 8 original 37 subject specific sub-committees were replaces by 152 subject units assessed by nearly 70 panels who would, in turn, apply a new five-point scale to assess the quality of research. (interesting a recommendation made by the chief executive of the ufc for nonacademic impacts achieved by each department to be evaluated and therefore incentivized was rejected.) the decision to end the binary division between research-focused universities and teaching teaching-focused polytechnics in 1992 created new challenges for the assessment of research. some ‘new’ universities were clearly committed to developing researchrelated reputations in some fields but the overall pot of research funding was not going to be increased. the rae therefore had to become far more robust and rigorous which, in effect, meant the rapid creation of a body of administrative law around higher education research assessment. some of the decisions that were produced by the 1992 rae were subject to challenge in the courts and although the ufc successfully defended their decisions the view of the judiciary was clear: academics could no longer make decisions of what was ‘good’ or ‘bad’ research based upon their claimed professional expertise and subjective judgements. the response was a doomed attempt to replace normative judgement with administrative and technical precision. rules, regulations and methodologies were codified and procedures and processes formalized but all this achieved was an ever-greater bureaucratic burden on universities, research managers and academics. peer review by specialist disciplinary panels remained the core method for assessing research quality. moreover, as the results of rae developed important (indirect) league-table implications for the recruitment of students, particularly international students, it became clear that a footballlike transfer market was emerging within higher education. inflated salaries could be demanded by a small number of research-intensive scholars who would, in turn, secure research-only positions that effectively ensured their ‘elite’ status, insulated them from pressures (such as teaching or administration) that might threaten their position and thereby reinforced their high-market value. by the 2001 rae new rules were therefore being implemented about universities ‘poaching’ staff towards the end of an assessment period in order to claim outputs that had in reality been researched and written at a different institution. by 2008 the situation had become even more complex with an attempt to attempt to disaggregate departmental performances. prior to this date all departments received a simple assessment grade – with 1* being the lowest and 5* the highest – but there was widespread game-playing in the sense that the overall grade could hide a multitude of weaknesses within a department. many departments would have ‘a long tail’ in the sense of a fairly large number of staff who were simply not research active or undertaking work that was deemed of insufficiently quality. in 5* departments these ‘long tail’ staff would effectively be over-graded and over-funded because the department received (and were funded based upon) a flat score (i.e. 4*). conversely in a largely teaching-focused department that did have a small number of excellent research active staff these academics would be unfairly penalized (and under-funded) by being captured within the overall grade of a weak department. the answer was to adopt a more refined process based upon ‘quality profiles’ that reflected the performance of all staff and made more refined calculations on the basis of excellent research performance even if it was found in relatively small pockets. the aim the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 9 being to encourage dynamism and to penalize those departments that did in effect carry ‘a long tail’. the problem was that as the research assessment process became more ‘robust’, ‘fine-grained’ and ‘professional’ it also became more demanding upon academics and universities in terms of both administrative costs and emotional distraction. the benefit of this historical ‘long view’ is that it provides an almost perfect representation of parkinson’s law of bureaucracy – that every reform to reduce bureaucracy and increase organizational performance will inevitably have the opposite effect. the rae had become ‘the tail that wags the dog’ (a typically befuddling english phrase that simply means that a secondary or subservient object, process or operation is in fact dominating an issue). a major review was initiated under the chairmanship of professor sir gareth roberts in 2003 and led to the recommendation that teaching-focused universities be given the opportunity to opt out of the rae in return for a guaranteed base level of funding. this was rejected by the institutions it was intended to help due to a concern by them that taking such an ‘opt out’ would send out the wrong message to potential students and research funders. put slightly differently, the roberts’ ‘opt out’ was interpreted as reflecting a lack of ambition by any university who opted for it and in an increasingly aggressive and market-driven environment this could be a suicidal strategy. even the efforts of the treasury failed to trim the bureaucratic costs of research assessment and in 2008 the government estimated that simply participating in the exercise was costing english (note, not irish, welsh or scottish universities) nearly 50 million pounds of public funding that could otherwise have been dedicated to the primary tasks of the institutions (i.e. research and teaching). the treasury did, however, isolate a new option in the form of metrics that could in theory reduce the bureaucratic burdens on universities. this would involve the adoption of a set of metrics such as citation statistics, journal impact-factor scores, and other quantitative methods as proxies for research quality therefore removing the need for time-consuming and elaborate procedures for peer review that were in themselves highly normative. the constant analysis of specific metrics could even remove the need for five-yearly research assessment cycles and provide more accurate and up to date information on which funding decisions could be made. in 2006 the then chancellor of the exchequer, gordon brown, made a surprise announcement that the next rae was to be a metric only exercise and that it would be for the higher education funding council for england (hecfe) to decide the specific details for this process. unfortunately the chancellor had not forewarned hefce (which had itself been created in 1992 to assume the functions of the ufc) of this announcement and a period of intense confusion reigned until a compromise situation was agreed whereby although it was too late to change the criteria for the 2008 rae the 2014 exercise – now retitled the ‘research excellence framework’ (ref) in an attempt to escape from some of the negativity that had emerged around the rae – would for the first time include a new ‘impact’ component in return for the treasury dropping its proposals for metrics. the meta-governance of research funding within higher education has therefore been transformed since the mid-1980s from essentially an internal, informal and elitist system of financial distribution (i.e. the ugc) through to the external imposition of an incredibly extensive audit and assessment framework with huge associated costs. flinders, the tragedies of political science 10 table 1. the evolution of research assessment exercises in the uk, 1986-2014. the evolution of this framework was criticized by the unions as little more than the advancement of marketization into the university sector but was reluctantly accepted by university leaders who seemed almost unable to frame a coherent response or to influence the agenda in a manner that may have smoothed some of the rough edges of the process. however, before examining some of these costs and ‘the politics of’ this process in more detail, and therefore how the nature of academic life and scholarship has and is changing in the uk, it is worthwhile briefly charting the ref2014 framework and results. with this in mind, possibly the most significant element of ref2014 was the introduction of a significant assessment component for the social impact of scholarship (see figure 1, below). each department or unit would now have to deliver a number of ‘impact case studies’ that could be independent verified and clearly demonstrated the link between research outputs and some significance element of non-academic impact. this was significant for a number of reasons but not least due to the simple fact that ‘impact’ was a new and potentially game-changing part of the assessment process. most institutions had become adept at managing the publication profiles of its staff, of managing the existence of ‘long tails’ and making claims regarding the existence of a dynamic, collegial and stimulating research environment. demonstrating non-academic impact was a new piece of the assessment framework that would dwarf the marginal gains delivered by tinkering with publications management and could therefore transform the results and subsequent league tables. how exactly the introduction of this major new component could be reconciled with ref2014’s stated objective of ‘[reducing] significantly the administrative burden on institutions in comparison to the rae’ was unknown but would (perhaps not surprisingly) surface as a major issue in the wake of the process. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 11 figure 1. the ref2014 assessment structure. in order to fulfil the assessment framework each ‘unit of assessment’ (i.e. a department or part of an academic school that wished to be assessed in a certain discipline) was expected to make a formal submission consisting of five main elements. part 1 related to information and data regarding the number of staff that were being submitted (proportions, exemptions, etc.); part 2 detailed the publications (up to four) that were being submitted for assessment by each member of staff. part 3 then required the submission to describe the unit’s approach to enabling non-academic impact from its research and case studies providing specific examples. part 4 harvested a range of data about the broader research environment of an institution such as the number of research degrees awarded, research income, etc. part 5 featured a narrative statement prepared by each unit about the research culture, environment and momentum that was in place (plus strategies for development in the future). as table 1 illustrates, the scale of the exercise was extensive with 154 universities making nearly 2,000 submissions involving over 50,000 staff. the results were interesting in general terms and very positive for politics and international studies as a discrete discipline due to the manner in which more than sixty-eight per cent of the overall research quality of the discipline was assessed as 4* or 3* (i.e. either ‘world-leading’ or ‘internationally recognised’). when the various percentages are combined to produce a grade-point average (gpa) – a simple measure of the overall or average quality of research, which takes no account of the number or proportion of staff submitted -the overall score for the discipline of 2.90 reflects a marked increase on the comparable score of 2.34 in the 2008 rae. moreover, nearly all politics departments witnessed substantial improvements on their 2008 scores, with those at leeds, strathclyde, southampton, westminster and york enjoying the biggest increases. and, on the basis of the discipline’s gpa score of 3.22 flinders, the tragedies of political science 12 in the specific area of ‘impact’, political scientists demonstrated that their research has real-world meaning and relevance. table 2. ref2014 politics and international studies: top ten institutions. not surprisingly, however, a number of alternative formulae have been developed in order to tease out the deeper insights of the basic ref 2014 data. ‘research power’, for example, relates to issues of scale and provides a measure of volume of research multiplied by quality. the effect, as shown in the first column of table 3, is to reward the largest departments, with king’s college london jumping to top of the rankings thanks to the 98 researchers submitted to the politics and international relations sub-panel. ‘research intensity’ takes into account the proportion of full-time staff that were returned to the ref2014 process by a department and therefore attempts to correct for strategic submissions in which a significant number of staff are left out of the audit process. table 3. ref2014 ‘research power’ and ‘research intensity’: top ten institutions. debates concerning the most appropriate or credible way of understanding and presenting research assessment data has almost spawned its own sub-field of political science. the simple facts are that: (1) no research assessment process is perfect; (2) different formulae will inevitably produce different results; and (3) institutions will cherry pick the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 13 those interpretations of performance that benefit them the most. but the problem is that the debates go far beyond the analysis and presentation of the results and down into procedural issues of ‘measurement controversy’ over how specific outputs are graded by a ref sub-panel (procedures for the ‘double-weighting’ of books, for example); through to ‘patronage controversy’ over who was appointed to serve on or chair the sub-panels; and ‘sampling controversy’ over who was selected by departments to form part of the submission, and on what basis. some departments were inclusive and returned almost 100 per cent of staff on the basis of a mixture of collegiality and confidence. in some cases, ‘universal returns’ were the product of a failure of senior staff to make tough decisions and ‘blaming the ref’ became a useful lightning-rod for long-standing institutional weaknesses. in other departments a rather centralized and uniform decision-making system was imposed whereby anyone with outputs that were deemed to fall below the 3* threshold were simply not returned. under ‘research intensity’ those departments that were more selective fell back down the rankings but the long-and-short of it is that due to institutional selectivity the units of assessment were not being assessed on ‘a like-for-like’ basis as that would have required all units to return all eligible staff. what then does this largely descriptive account of research events in the uk tell us about the tragedy of political science? the main answer to this question must be that there has been no one singular ‘tragedy’ and it might therefore be more appropriate to explore the existence of an inter-woven set of tragedies. • tragedy 1: the inability of british university leaders to influence, shape, moderate or control the evolution of increasingly bureaucratic research assessment processes since 1986 [t1]. • tragedy 2: the manner in which playing the research assessment ‘game’ has arguably become more important than promoting the vibrancy of scholarship itself [t2]. • tragedy 3: the failure of political science to utilize the insights of the discipline in order to challenge the imposition of an assessment model that was infused with neo-liberal values [t3]. • tragedy 4: the manner in which political science has (and is) going mad [t4]. • tragedy 5: disappointment in the sense that political science has not developed a ‘new politics of political science’ in order to turn challenges and problems into positive opportunities for the discipline [t5]. it is neither possible nor necessary to examine each of these tragedies in turn apart from noting the manner in which some relate to the broader qualities of higher education in the uk and are not discipline-specific (t1, t2) whereas others are more disciplinary focused (t3, t4, t5). at the broadest level, there is little doubt that the professional representation of higher education to the government (i.e. its ability to speak to power with one clear and loud voice) has been and remains hampered by the existence of a number of university groupings that, in effect, attempt to protect the interests of their members rather than of the university sector as a whole. this was to some extent acknowledged with the creation of the council for the protection of english universities in 2012 but the pressure politics landscape for higher education remains fragmented and therefore diluted. the second tragedy is hard to substantiate in solid, data-driven form but as c wright mills flinders, the tragedies of political science 14 argued, ‘scholarship is a choice of how to live as well as a choice of career; whether he knows it or not, the intellectual workman forms his own self as he works toward the perfection of his craft… you must learn to use your life experience in your intellectual work’. with this sentiment echoing in my mind i can say with some confidence that a second tragedy, particularly for political science, is the manner in which it has allowed itself to become – whether it admits it or not – a ref-driven discipline. it is far from unique in this regard but there is something slightly more troubling about a discipline that was born with a commitment to engaged scholarship and contributing to the broader health of democracy being so easily and compliantly trapped within an external assessment process. it might be thought that those full-time students of politics who stake their claims to professional respect and credibility on having a sophisticated grasp of both politics ‘in theory’ and politics ‘in practice’ might have been slightly better equipped to shape, respond and in some cases reject some of the external pressures that have been brought to bear. to some extent that professional collective spirit was being undermined by the introduction of a brand of managerialism in which academics and academic institutions were implicitly incentivized to compete and not to share best practice, research capacities, impact networks, etc. that is not to say that the shared public ethos of british universities was or has been wiped away but it is to make a strong argument that it has been eroded and replaced by an ever more aggressive form of ‘gaming in targetworld’. phrased slightly differently it could be argued that one of the tragedies of political science is therefore how it has succumbed to a form of professional madness. mad in this sense being an acronym for the phenomenon known as ‘multiple accountabilities disorder’ which hollows-out and undermines institutions or disciplines by ensuring that their time is spent accounting to an ever-growing number of political, professional, regulatory and bureaucratic organisations to the detriment of being able to focus on their core and primary tasks. failure, frustration and disillusionment are therefore almost the guaranteed symptoms of going mad. the final tragedy is therefore one that focuses on the adaptive capacity of political science in the sense of developing a ‘new politics of political science’ that is vibrant and sophisticated and recognizes both the opportunities and challenges for the discipline presented by the changing contextual landscape. this ‘new politics of political science’ is something that will be discussed in more detail in part iii (below) but the next section explores some of the unintended consequences of the research assessment framework in the uk. 2. unintended consequences the aim of this article is not to offer a polemical critique of the research assessment process in the uk. there is no doubt that the evolution from rse to rae and most recently to ref has delivered some positive outcomes in terms of acting as a driver of research quality, delivering greater public accountability and the opportunity to lever new funding resources through partnerships. within organisations research assessment has also led to the recalibration of resources in order to maximize the value of funding in an increasingly constrained financial environment. whether this process is viewed as ‘fine tuning’ or crude short-term intellectual engineering is a matter of intense debate but there seems little doubt that there has been an overall upturn in the quality of the uk research base (e.g. articles in the top 1% of citations up from 11% in 1996 to 16% in 2012). and yet to asthe impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 15 sume an obvious causal link between the introduction of external research assessment processes and these performances based statistical indicators arguably reflects the nature of the problem – the adoption of an incredibly narrow, technical and arguably selfdefeating view of scholarship. this is, if anything, the deeper tragedy that risks polluting each and every discipline due to the almost dampening effect that the assessment process can have on what c wright mills would call ‘the sociological imagination’ – that intellectual spirit of curiosity and freedom, the ability to trespass across inter-disciplinary and professional boundaries, a belief in the innate value of knowledge and learning without needing to rationalize each and every module against the demands of the economy. when stripped down to a core and basic conclusion the main unintended consequence of the research assessment process has arguably been the imposition (and academic acceptance) of a brand of academic managerialism that is almost designed to squeeze-out intellectual innovation, creativity and flair in favour of a ‘tick box’ ‘ref-return-first’ mentality. this is, of course, my own and highly personalised view of the impact of research assessment processes in the uk. it could be completely wrong but i would argue that there is sufficient evidence to underpin my position. indeed, it would be possible to make an even stronger argument and suggest that ‘the politics of the rae, ref (or whatever it will be called in the future)’ has never been sufficiently exposed in ways that combine to facilitate a fundamental challenge of the process itself. that is not to say that some form of research assessment is not completely legitimate in light of the public funds committed to university research or that such processes cannot have positive outputs and outcomes. it is, however, to suggest that the experience of the uk provides a salutary tale of a process of bureaucratic creep, accretion and sedimentation to the extent that its impact upon research and universities risks becoming dysfunctional – ‘mad’. the aim of this section is therefore to shed light on the ‘hidden politics’ of research assessment in the uk but in many ways this is just the precursor to a far larger argument about the changing nature of academic life that is made in the next and final section. what then does the ‘hidden politics’ of research assessment look like? what are its main components? table 4 provides some answers to these questions and the remainder of this section looks at each of them in turn. the main issue to understand from table 4 is that none of the themes are isolated issues, they are interwoven into the fabric of the research assessment process and to some extent they are the natural consequences of the imposition of a crude bureaucratic structure upon higher education. take, for example, theme 1 ‘bureaucracy’ – the original architects of the research selectivity exercise had no intention of creating a system of assessment that would by 2014 cost universities around a quarter of a billion pounds (£246m to be precise) to administer. that the 2008 rae imposed an administrative burden of around £66m on universities provides some sense of the manner in which a reform that was intended to increase organizational efficiency and effectiveness has actually spawned a bureaucratic leviathan. and yet to some extent the research assessment process is actually no longer simply about ‘research’; the league tables and rankings that are generated from the assessment process have actually become more like proxies of overall institutional standing that, in turn, are critical in terms of the recruitment of international students and recruiting the very best academic staff. this is a critical point: the politics of research assessment has expanded far beyond research itself. flinders, the tragedies of political science 16 table 4. unintended consequences: the politics of research assessment in the uk. this flows into our second themes and the notion of shadows (t2, table 4). to some extent mrs thatcher’s initial foray into increasing central government’s grip on british universities was a classic example of the manner in which governance really does take place in the shadow of hierarchy. but the shadows of the research assessment process are particularly long and distinctive in the sense that not only do departments become almost ‘ref-driven’ to the extent that all procedures and processes are designed to (implicitly or explicitly) feed into a carefully managed ref planning process but that the rules, expectations and standards of the assessment process are to some extend imbibed by those institutions. recruitment panels do not appoint the ‘best’ candidate but the ‘safest’ candidate when assessed through a ref lens; decisions about the use of new resources or funding are rarely taken on the basis of pure unadulterated intellectual ambition but on the basis of providing an evidence base for claims that were either made in the environment statement (i.e. the ‘ref5’ document within submissions) of the previous assessment or might be made in the next. the sphere of scholarly thinking has, i would argue, narrowed as a direct result of the research assessment processes that have cast an ever greater and direct shadow over the nature of higher education in the uk. there is, so it is said, a silver-lining to all clouds but when it comes to shadows i am told they are completely dark and in relation to research assessment there is a dark side that has received incredibly little open discussion – the impact of rejection (t3, table 4). what happens if your research is judged to be of an insufficient quality to form part of an assessment return? the formal position has always been that rae/ref processes are completely separate to institutional promotion systems but the reality is far more comthe impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 17 plex. rejection (i.e. theme 3, table 4, above) can have significant career implications. as tables 1, 2 and 3 each in their own ways demonstrate, different universities and departments have come to very different conclusions about the inevitable quality-quantity tradeoff that any exercise like rae/ref inevitably brings with it. the rational actor model would incentivise a unit ‘going tight’ and putting in the smallest number of staff with the highest perceived quality rating (i.e. focusing down on the narrow gpa score and ranking); however, an equally rational actor model might consider that the short-terms gains of ‘going tight’ did not outweigh the ‘long-term’ gains of ‘going broad’ in terms of potential ‘research power’ and ‘research intensity’. but there is another reason for being inclusive in research assessment planning in the sense that ‘cutting off a tail’ in the sense of rejecting members of staff from a submission is potentially an incredibly divisive decision. moreover, those staff who do not ‘make the cut’ (usually at the 3* border) are inevitably likely to face potentially unfair knock-on consequences from this decision. ‘if professor x was not returned at the last ref why should we want to appoint them?’ if dr. y’s research was not viewed as being ref’able then on what basis should they really be considered for promotion?’ there are, of course, lots of reasons beyond a scholar’s relationship with a fairly arbitrary five-year research assessment process should not prevent them either being promoted or moving institutions but – just has occurred at the wider institutional level – it is possible to suggest that an individual’s ref status has assumed a far broader significance as a proxy of overall scholarly status. the problem with this development is that whether the research excellence framework actually identifies and rewards ‘excellence’ (i.e. t4, above) is a moot point (but one that rarely finds expression in open academic debates). the research assessment frameworks in the uk prioritise and therefore incentivize a very specific definition of research excellence that is generally a narrowly scientific idiom encased in verbosity and jargon and that speaks to a tiny scholarly audience. to publish in the types of scholarly outlets that are likely to be highly prized in the assessment process is to narrow ones focus to a level of hyper-specialisation or methodological masturbation. peer review is taken as a sign of quality despite the well-known risk-averse, conservative predilections of such processes and in this context single-author books become (ironically) almost risky, especially if claims for double-weighting are rejected. contributions to edited collections are the intellectual equivalent of persona non grata as are generally articles in special editions of journals (due to concerns about the rigor of review processes around commissioned articles on a specific theme). it is therefore with a mixture of great sadness and regret that i cannot help but agree with the argument made by michael billig in his book learn to write badly: how to succeed in the social sciences (2013). as chair of the political studies association of the uk i received several informal complaints and request for advice in the wake of ref2014 from academics whose research had been assessed at achieving the 3* standard that was widely used as an institutional boundary for submission but they had still been left out of their university’s submission to the politics and international studies panel due to a perception amongst senior staff that it did not quite ‘fit’ the profile the institution was trying to offer. the research might not have been published in the ‘right’ journal or might actually be adopting an unorthodox position in relation to major themes and issues. in some cases universities made strategic decisions to submit eligible political flinders, the tragedies of political science 18 scientists to cognate assessment panels – such as area studies or business and management studies – due to a belief that these were ‘softer’ sub-fields in terms of assessment. the point being made is simple: although research assessment processes have undoubtedly incentivized a strong focus on research and publication within higher education, the definition of ‘excellence’ is arguably fairly narrow. it deifies a specific type of scholarship to the detriment of other equally valid forms of research (a point discussed in some detail in part iii, below). the impact of this – to come to our fifth theme (t5, table 4, above) – is that scholars who do not or refuse to work within this fairly narrow idiom of highly technocratic impenetrable scholarship are put at a significant disadvantage. and yet what was unique about ref2014 was the inclusion of an explicit component of assessment based upon the non-academic value, social impact or public value of research. in many ways the introduction of an impact component, as demonstrated through the submission of ‘impact case studies’, was an attempt to re-orientate research back towards having some applied, engaged or real-world relevance. the challenge, however, is that the dominant notion of impact was derived from the stem subjects (i.e. science, technology, engineering, mathematics) and embraced a rather simple and linear process of knowledge production through to knowledge application that can be traced and demonstrated through the creation of new products, patents or medications. only very rarely does the social sciences have such direct and clear impacts on society and yet the research assessment process is almost forcing scholars to either gravitate their choice of research topics to those where demonstrable impact might arise or to play a more dubious game in the sense of making rather doubtful claims about the links between a specific research project and some claim to socio-political change or legislative amendment. once more the argument is not that the requirement to demonstrate the nonacademic impact of publicly funded research is a ‘bad’ thing – many of the impact case studies submitted to the politics and international studies panel offered convincing narratives of positive social engagement. nevertheless there is a need to be aware of the risks of politicizing political science by over-incentivising user-engagement around a fairly narrow definition of impact which itself must be linked to a fairly narrow definition of research ‘excellence’. the creation of perverse incentives is actually likely to stimulate a set of strategic responses that political science, notably within the fields of public administration, governance and public policy, has spent several decades studying and warning against. extensive ‘gaming’ of the research assessment framework is therefore the sixth (t6, table 4, above) unintended consequence and takes a number of forms from ‘buying in’ research grants and publications through high-level appointments, by closing down departments or units where staff are viewed as never going to be able to play the ‘ref game’, using rolling-temporary contracts to reduce the number of formally ‘eligible’ staff. other elements of gaming include basing returns not on assessments of research quality but on assessments of how many viable impact case studies a unit has and working backwards from that to assess the optimum of staff that should be submitted (a classic example of ‘a tail wagging the dog’). the selective submission of only a small proportion of staff is one of the most common gaming strategies as is hiring a number of overseas research ‘superstars’ on fractional contracts in order for them to be able to be returned within the hiring institution’s submission. this is generally a very positive development for the overseas scholar who is effectively ‘double-dipping’ in terms of the utilization of their research the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 19 but it is bad news for early career researchers who cannot get tenure or even a first step on the professional career ladder. as the next and final section will highlight, one major element of this gaming is that academics whose research is deemed to be only ‘recognised internationally’ (i.e. 2* or less) may be pressurized into accepting teaching-track positions in order to make them illegible for external assessment processes. these pressures are particularly problematic for scholars who work at the nexus or intersection of different disciplines. the research assessments in the uk have always adopted traditional disciplinary silos as their main tool of sifting and assessing research and this is a major problem for inter-disciplinary or simply less orthodox scholars who wish to range across intellectual landscapes. this is a particular puzzle given the emphasis of the uk funding councils in research years and their emphasis on encouraging interdisciplinary research because those scholars who do actually respond to the signals, take risks and refuse to be intellectual pigeon-holed then find themselves defined as ‘high risk’ in assessment terms. therefore the politics of research assessment contains a whole set of embedded inequalities that almost prevent an open, dynamic and inclusive approach to intellectual diversity – at exactly a point in history when such approaches are badly needed. moreover these inequalities are not just disciplinary. the research assessment process arguably maintains a set of gender-based and ethnicity orientated inequalities that have not yet been the topic of sustained analyses or discussion. long-standing concerns about political science in the uk in terms of social representation and diversity were to some extent replicated within ref2014 returns. women were less likely to be returned than me, as were scholars from black or other ethnic minority backgrounds. male professors submitted more monographs, female professors more co-authored articles. the fragmentary force of external research assessments upon the discipline and upon higher education is the focus of the next and final section but before proceeding to that topic is it necessary to comment upon the ninth and final theme from table 4 (above) – ‘over-steer’. one of the most important insights from recent experience in the uk is that research assessment has not evolved as research evaluation exercise: it has evolved into a powerful incentive system that sets the ‘rules of the game’ (the meta-governance) that institutions feel they must play. it is not a survey and evaluation of research outputs but has come to signify a proxy rating of institutional excellence. the language and terminology of ref was particularly significant in the sense that it was a ‘framework’ (i.e. a permanent incentive structure intended to shape the sector) rather than a more isolated or discrete ‘exercise’ as was the case with the rae. furthermore, it could (and has) been suggested that the dominant interpretation of ‘excellence’ encourages a scholarship of risk-averse mediocrity rather than a scholarship of discovery that challenges foundational ways of understanding the world. but in many ways the introduction of research assessment processes has certainly succeeded in its core aim of encouraging universities to think about the management and governance of research funding. the unintended consequence, however, was a perception that an ‘over-steer’ had occurred within the sector whereby research became the focus and teaching became almost a nuisance or a distraction, something to be avoided or undertaken at the lowest common denominator in order to maximize research focus. unsurprisingly, whether this ‘over-steer’ has actually occurred and whether students are actually disappointed in the standard of teaching they have received is a contested flinders, the tragedies of political science 20 issue. my own personal experience over the past twenty years would definitely lead me to support an argument that suggested research was very much the primary focus within the main established universities in the uk. that does not mean that teaching standards were not upheld or that academics did not attain a huge amount of satisfaction from teaching but it is to admit that the realpolitik of university life meant that tenure and promotion were driven by research assessments not teaching evaluations. teaching did not enjoy equal status with research but was almost a second-class endeavour. the perception of the current conservative government in the uk is certainly that a significant degree of rebalancing is required and in november 2015 the universities and science minister, jo johnson, announced plans for the introduction of a teaching excellence framework (tef). the aim of this new initiative being to ‘build a culture where teaching has equal status with research, with great teachers enjoying the same professional recognition and opportunities for career and pay progression as great researchers’. not surprisingly the announcement that in future the ref would be partnered by a parallel teaching-focused assessment called tef was not met with rejoicing in the lecture theatres or seminar rooms. even students were unconvinced that there was a major problem with teaching standards that required such potentially drastic action. the government has promised to ensure that the tef is a ‘light touch’ review process but similar commitments were made about research assessment when it was first introduced in the mid-1980s. moreover, the politics of tef has links to broader concerns about the impact of ref in terms of increasing central government control over universities and facilitating a market-based managerialist logic. the introduction of tef is therefore attached to plans to lower the bar to ‘market entry’ in order to allow new universities to emerge; as well as potentially allowing institutions to increase tuition fees where they are assessed to be delivering a particularly high standard of teaching. the introduction of research assessment in the uk has therefore led to a range of ‘negative externalities’ that have come as no surprise to scholars of public administration or regulatory governance. the tragedies of political science – like so many other disciplines and with the universities as a collective institutional endeavor – revolve around a failure to mount a politically astute strategy that may have framed or managed the imposition of these external pressures in a more appropriate, sensitive or proportionate manner. and yet the final argument of this article is that it is very difficult to understand the impact and implications of research assessment without having some broader grasp of how it forms just one element of a ‘bigger picture’ that highlights a set of issues that when taking together focus attention on a potentially catastrophic tragedy for political science in the future. that is the unbundling or unraveling of the discipline. 3. gaps and splinters in order to fully understand and expose the politics of research assessment it is necessary to stand back from a focus on tools of research assessment or specific governance frameworks in order to reflect upon how this topic sits within a far broader professional profile. by this i mean the manner in which the nature of scholarship has and is changing and therefore how the notion or meaning of being a ‘university professor of politics’ – to use the phrase adopted by bernard crick in his ‘rallying cry to the university professors of politics’ that formed a new part of the second edition of his classic in defence of politics in the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 21 1981 – is also changing. how can scholars understand their role within and beyond academe? why and in what ways have the professional pressures placed upon academics altered? what can they do to stop themselves going mad? to make this apparently flippant statement about madness is actually to provide a link into an important topic – the rise of mental illness amongst uk academics. a study of academics discovered that job stresses had increasing significantly in recent years and levels of job satisfaction and professional support had declined (see, for example, kinman and jones 2010). what this seam of scholarship reveals is that the introduction of research assessments in the uk is just one part of a broader story concerning the gradual imposition of an ever-expanding array of expectations and responsibilities upon university staff. i sometime find myself envying former colleagues who now enjoy a more leisurely existence as emeritus professors and who held tenured appointments when the pace of academic life was certainly slower. this ‘slowness’ may well have been exactly what mrs thatcher interpreted as a rather over-protected and under-productive charmed scholarly life but my deeper concern rests with the manner in which scholarship is being stretched to breaking-point and one way of understanding and conceptualizing this role expansion is through the notion of an expectations gap (figure 2 below). as the most eagle-eyed reader will immediately have spotted, this is a rather simple heuristic that is never likely to be judged complex enough for a ref’able piece of work. but the simplest frameworks are often the best and in this regard figure 2 illustrates how a ‘gap’ might be formed by the variance between the realistic level of capacity given the available resource package (i.e. lower bar) and the public or political expectations placed upon an individual, organisation, community, discipline, etc. figure 2. the expectations gap it could be argued that the existence of a small ‘expectations gap’ may well be positive in the sense that it encourages ambition, reflects external confidence, forces institutions to consider innovations and adaptations, etc. and yet the existence of a large expectations gap also risks becoming pathological in the sense that institutional overload and burnout flinders, the tragedies of political science 22 become real risks. placed in the context of academe, in general, and political science, in particular, figure 2 encourages a form of ‘gap analysis’ whereby the demands and pressures placed upon academics and their disciplines (i.e. upper bar) is assessed against some reasonable conception of realistic capacity (i.e. lower bar). as already mentioned, the breadth of this article in terms of ‘the future of political science’ embraces a broad range of countries, sub-fields and institutions. the pressures on predominantly teaching-only universities or liberal arts colleges, for example, are likely to be very different (but not necessarily less) than those facing ivy league, group of eight or russell group universities in the united states, australia and united kingdom (respectively). indeed, the ‘expectations gap’ might be quite different in nature or size in different parts of the world or between different parts of the higher education landscape within a polity. but the simple fact is that from sheffield to sydney vice chancellors are increasingly speaking out about the existence of an untenable gap between supply and demand (see, for example, burnett, 2016).2 in this context the options for closing the gap include: • option 1: increasing supply (moving the bottom-bar up); • option 2: reducing demand (moving the top-bar down); • option 3: a combination of options 1 and 2 (closing the gap from above and below) the argument in relation to the uk is that an ‘expectations gap’ as emerged within british higher education and that this is having a splintering affect upon academic careers that has not been fully acknowledged. the simple position is that over recent decades the upper bar has been pushed upwards without a significant increase in resources. higher education expansion underlines this claim. in 1950 just 3.3 per cent of young people in the uk went to university; by 1970 the rate was 8.4 per cent; and in 2015 the rate was nearer fifty per cent (over half a million young people taking up a university place). in the 1960s and 1970s small group teaching would generally take place in an academic’s office and involve no more than a handful of students; in the 1990s small groups had expanded to ten or twelve students; and today small groups are often closer to twenty-five or thirty students in number. (the one-to-one tutorial system that has been at the heart of oxbridge teaching system for centuries is under increasing financial strain.) one early impact of the tef is that universities have engaged in almost a bidding war to increase levels of teaching contact time for students that will have obvious knock-on consequences for staff research capacity. the research assessment processes therefore form just one element of this gradual process of role accretion or sedimentation. take, as a starting point, the five main components of an academic position in a british university: 1. research: as displayed through international peer-reviewed publications and significant external research grant income. 2. teaching: evidence of excellence in teaching as displayed through student feedback and external audit processes. 3. administration: the capacity to undertake significant administrative and managerial responsibilities within and beyond your home department. 4. impact: the ability to demonstrate that your research has achieved a clear, direct and auditable ‘impact’ on non-academic research-users and/or the public. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 23 5. citizenship: a clear contribution to professional ‘good citizenship’ through activities such as journal editing, external examining, pastoral responsibilities, government or parliamentary service, leadership of learned societies, etc. to undertake world-class 4* research, to demonstrate ‘excellence’ in relation to the teaching of evermore demanding students, to successfully apply for competitive research funding and fellowships while also managing an ever-increasing bureaucratic burden… while also delivering ‘impact case studies’ that could withstand almost forensic analysis as to their veracity and showing evidence of professional engagement beyond your own university. the new work demands in higher education are possibly becoming untenable and to some extent the splintering or fragmentary effect that forms the focus of this final section is a fairly obvious consequence. for those readers who think that it is me that is overinflating the contemporary situation in the uk it is worth thinking in a little more detail about the expectations placed upon early career researchers in political science: • to trespass across disciplinary and professional boundaries while also displaying increased hyper-specialisation; • to enjoy ‘academic autonomy’ and ‘intellectual freedom’ in an increasingly directive and constrained environment; • to increasingly engage with quantitative methods and ‘big data’ while also producing nuanced, accessible and fine-grained analyses; • to manage the temporal misalignment between academe timescales and politics in practice; • to be able to ‘talk to multiple publics in multiple ways’ while acknowledging a constant pressure to ‘tech-up’ within political science; • to cope with a system where the incentive structure still pushes scholars towards ‘pure’ scholarship and peer reputation rather than ‘applied’ scholarship or public reputation; • to navigate the problematic relationship between facts and values, and the prevailing rhetoric of neutrality in research; • to innovate and share ‘best practice’ while also working in a competitive market environment; • to deliver world-class research and writing while also providing excellence in teaching; • to provide a personalized student-centred learning experience in a climate of mass and often digitally refracted access; • to take risks in what is generally a risk-averse professional environment; • to balance a traditional focus on ‘problem-focused’ political science with external demands for ‘solution-focused’ political science; • to ensure that research informs public debate without being ‘dumbed down’ or co-opted by partisan actors; • to be responsive to ‘students-as-customers’ while upholding academic standards and relationships; and • to achieve some notion of a personal, private or family life while fulfilling the demands of the role. flinders, the tragedies of political science 24 turning back to the focus of part ii (above) what has in reality occurred in the uk in recent years is a ref-driven focus (bordering on obsession) with research as the primary component of an academic role. the tef is therefore an attempt to rebalance higher education back towards teaching while both tef and ref will inevitably increase the administrative burden on individuals and departments. it would at this point be possible to locate this shift in the context of ernest boyer’s ‘taxonomy of scholarly endeavour’s’ but i have done this elsewhere (flinders, 2017) and the real focus of this section is on professional splintering as both a gaming strategy and a personal coping strategy. what i mean by this splintering is that the notion of an ‘all rounder’ scholar who undertakes research, teaches and plays a leading role in the administration of either their department or their disciplinary learned society is eroding and is being replaced by an increasingly fragmented community of political scientists – the modern ‘specialist scholar’. traditionally british universities have maintained a broadly egalitarian approach whereby all staff are expected to undertake at least some element of teaching and administration. the exception to this was generally where staff had secured teaching ‘buy outs’ through external research grants but in the last two or three years a bifurcation between teaching-only and research-only staff is beginning to emerge. between and betwixt these two extremes exists an increasingly large academic ‘precariat’ consisting generally of younger new entrants to the profession who are expected to accept either a succession of temporary (and generally teaching-focused) contracts or to undertake an even more precarious academic existence on the basis of a portfolio of fractional roles undertaken concurrently at several different universities. escaping ‘the precariat’ revolves around securing tenure but even here a professional pathology exists in the form of a pressure to ‘publish or perish’ that inevitably incentivizes a combination of hyper-specialisation and self-plagiarism. this, in turn, does little to nurture intellectual ambition and even less in terms of building confidence amongst non-academic user-groups that political science has the capacity to respond to allegations of irrelevance. the flip-side is that exploring new approaches, developing new theories, demonstrating relevance or public value, investigating the nexus between disciplines, etc. – all of those main activities that funders, researchusers and governments around the world prioritise – demand time and the acceptance of positive inefficiencies (e.g. risks that do not pay off, roads to relevance that turn out to be cul de sacs, etc.). the contemporary tragedy of political science – to paraphrase ricci (above) – is double-edged: the young fresh minds with the most to offer are immediately squeezed into a system that could have been designed to squeeze-out ambition and creativity and incentivizes ‘playing safe’; while the profession as a whole offers little space for positive inefficiency, no matter how positive the returns might be. 4. conclusions, and few suggestions those with an awareness of very recent shifts within british higher education might respond that my analysis is out-dated. ‘doesn’t he know that ‘publish or perish’ has been replaced by ‘quality over quantity’? i hear them cry. this is certainly the new mantra amongst vice chancellors and deans but the reality beneath this rhetoric is a professional sphere in which very few academics are brave enough (or have the intellectual headspace) to step-off the publication production line. and yet at the other end of the spectrum it is possible to identify the recent emergence of a very small cadre of tenured ‘high impact’ the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 25 academics who enjoy a visibility within the practitioner and media spheres. the ‘stretch’ or ‘span’ of an academic career has therefore widened significantly in response largely to the imposition of external audit regimes and higher expectations. the malleability of some institutions has reached breaking point and this is reflected in the manner in which some teaching focused universities have dropped out of the ref process and some research-focused universities are threatening to boycott the forthcoming tef process (see havergal, 2016). and yet my sense is that this fragmentation appears to be locking-in rather than challenging a number of pre-existing inequalities within the discipline. for example, the research professors and ‘high-impact’ professors generally make little contribution in the sphere of institutional or academic governance and undertake little (if any) teaching. they are also generally men. the real tragedy of political science (or a central tragedy for political science) is that is has so far failed to acknowledge the existence of the politics and management of this expectations gap surrounding scholars, or to acknowledge its splintering dynamic which leads me to suggest that the future of political science depends upon the emergence of ‘a new politics of political science’ that seeks to control and manage external pressures – to somehow close the expectations gap – for the collective good of the discipline. this would involve a new professionalism that permeates down from national learned societies, professional associations and funders, through institutional units and to individual scholars. that is a new politics that is – quite simply – more aware of the external context in which sciences takes place and that balances internal expertise and external engagement. more specifically the nexus between academe and society must form the focus of greater attention and, as a result, the role of an academic is likely to change. as the brexit debate in the uk illustrated, politicians will always ignore or seek to reinterpret research that does not suit their partisan needs but there is a far wider community of potential research users than the discipline generally recognises. the dominant perception of a clear qualitative distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ research will have to be re-cast in a more dynamic mode of understanding. more specifically, there will have to be some understanding of the manner in which ‘impact’ can actually underpin, nourish and nurture excellence in terms of both research and teaching. once again, the ‘new politics’ or ‘new professionalism’ will have to understand the knowledge ecosystem in ways that have largely been forgotten but must now be rediscovered if the discipline is to prosper. the exact nature of this new disciplinary strategy will be for national associations and institutions to decide, but in terms of offering elements of this ‘new politics’ the following ideas are worthy of consideration. firstly, political science cannot and should not adopt a victim mentality but a more robust and confident professional persona. in this regard, the role of the main learned societies is vital as the source of external promotional activities and more specifically as the driver of proactive knowledge-brokerage, knowledge-filtering and knowledge-framing activities. put within the framework of figure 1, the role of learned societies and professional associations has to support the discipline in terms of raising the lower bar of realistic capacity where possible while paying far more attention to their external/strategic role in actually managing the expectations of the public and policy makers vis-à-vis the upper bar (i.e. option 3, above). simply stated, learned societies and professional associations must take the lead in closing the expectations gap from above and below. in this regard, relatively simple steps can yield significant returns. of particular flinders, the tragedies of political science 26 significance, for example, given the temporal misalignment between academe timescales and politics in practice is a clear approach to horizon-scanning so that translated packages of research can be prepared and delivered to research users (media, practitioners, etc.) at specific ‘windows of opportunity’ when the demand for such information will be high. moreover, learned societies, in partnership with funders and research-users, should also take the lead in terms of innovating in relation to both training and bridging activities. take, for example, the political studies association of the united kingdom’s annual total exposure competition.1 it would be almost impossible to design a more simple initiative: academics receive support, training and guidance on how to ‘pitch’ an idea to broadcasters based around translating their research into a documentary or series of documentaries for television or radio. academics can submit ideas on their own or in small teams, interdisciplinary ideas are encouraged and the overall emphasis is on creativity and intellectual energy. a panel of senior commissioning executives then sifts applications and selects twelve finalists who are then invited to london to make their pitches in person during a face-to-face sixty second slot in front of the broadcast specialists. there is no ‘prize’. no broadcaster is ever going to guarantee to commission a project through an open competition. but what total exposure does achieve is an opportunity for academics to learn new translational skills and to expose themselves – personally and intellectually – to a new professional audience who approach the value of scholarship from a very different perspective. three things are worth noting about total exposure. first, it has proved to be an incredible success. of the twelve pitches shortlisted in 2016 nine received ‘call backs’ to discuss their ideas in more detail with commissioners and one pitch was taken straight into production (cathy gormley-heenan’s documentary on ‘the politics of peace walls’ around the world); in 2017 eight of the nine short-listed pitches received call-backs and several look likely to move into production. secondly, just like politics a lot of the real work takes place not within the sixty-second pitch or the subsequent discussion but in the coffee breaks and over lunch. the commissioners often have ideas for new programmes and are looking for new faces, new voices and new talents with the capacity to engage, inform and entertain in equal measure. rejected pitches may well lead to unexpected opportunities at a later date. the final twist of total exposure takes us back to the issue of equality and diversity and flows into a set of debates concerning demographic change. younger scholars, women and individuals from black or ethnic minority backgrounds have dominated the list of finalists. as such, the social composition of the short-listed candidates tends to be far more representative of society at large and therefore decidedly unrepresentative of the political science community in the uk. total exposure therefore not only takes the very best social and political science and translates it for dissemination through mass access broadcasting platforms but it also appears to have somehow short-circuited some of the traditional professional blockages that prevent equality of participation and opportunity. put slightly differently, projects such as total exposure, led by the national learned society, begin to add tone and texture, even substance, to a ‘new politics of political science’ that is founded on an understanding of the manner (1) the discipline has evolved to contain and sustain significant structural inequalities, (2) that these inequalities cannot 1 see also: https://www.psa.ac.uk/totalexposure. the impact of research assessment on the profession and the discipline of political science 27 be ignored and that (3) each of boyer’s forms of scholarship are mutually supportive and combine to sustain a rich intellectual ecosystem. a second element of this ‘new politics of political science’ might take this more ambitious, coherent and holistic approach one step further through a generational approach to student recruitment that moves the focus down the educational pipeline so that students in schools and colleges appreciate exactly what the study of politics involves and why it matters, its potential in both intellectual and vocational terms and the available professional career paths via higher education. this educational pipeline provides a critical tool through which to understand and address long-standing issues concerning diversity and inequality and – beyond this – to democratise the study of politics to exactly those sectors of society who appear to have become disenchanted. scholars in the field of political (dis)engagement have for some years outlined a shift in modes of political expression and activity from traditional party-based, mass member, formalized, etc. [i.e. ‘old’ modes] towards more individualized, issue-based, direct, digital and informal ‘new’ modes. but political science has arguably failed to utilize these insights when it comes to proactively promoting or demonstrating the value of their discipline. school ‘outreach’ events therefore tend to continue to be held in the traditional institutions of politics – the city halls and parliaments – but rarely exhibit the creative dynamism that young people crave by ‘reaching-out’ within exactly those new political arenas, like music, film or literature festivals, where debates, discussion and recruitment takes place. even the language of politics needs to be considered within this new politics of political science. ‘outreach’ and ‘reaching-out’ arguably bring with them subtle but subliminal connotations, the former somewhat cold, formal, distant (exactly those characteristics that ‘disaffected democrats’ level at politics) the latter perhaps far warmer, friendly, engaging. a third element is highly political and involves the colonisation of the broader research community in terms of places on the boards of research bodies, government advisory bodies, international non-governmental organisations, media organisations, etc. my sense is that other disciplines have been far more professional and ambitious in terms of monitoring when places on influential organisations are advertised and then encouraging (and supporting) members of their discipline to apply. this allows the discipline to be embedded and have tentacles far beyond the university sector and to have ambassadors in key posts. once again, this regular vacancy monitoring and proactive encouragement is fairly low cost but potentially incredibly important for the external profile and visibility of a discipline. the targeting of professional appointments can also be built into a more ambitious equality and diversity agenda, while also being of value to the individual academic in terms of their ‘good citizenship’ requirements and the need for impact-related or research-related networks. (this targeted approach to recruitment also works in the opposite direction in the sense that professional associations and learned societies might also usefully include a number of non-academic research users on their boards.) what these three elements really point to is the manner in which the ‘scientific’ and the ‘political’ (or the ‘academic’ and the ‘public’) components are both mutually inter-dependent – almost positively parasitical in the sense that they feed upon each other – within a modern academic career where the professional responsibilities of academics to the public who fund their work are increasingly explicit. in this regard claims to be delivering more research of a higher quality will carry little weight if that research does not percolate through flinders, the tragedies of political science 28 into the public sphere in accessible and purposeful ways. without this ‘new politics’ political science will be politically disadvantaged (and therefore structurally disadvantaged in resource terms) vis-à-vis other disciplines in a climate of already shrinking resources. that really would be a tragedy. references almond, g. (1990) a discipline divided. new york: sage. barrow, c. (2008) ‘the intellectual origins of new political science’, new political science, 30:2, 215-244. burnett, k. (2016) ‘cast starved campuses must raise fees or drop standards’, times higher education, 1 september. capano, g and verzichelli, l. (2016) ‘looking for eclecticism? structural and contextual factors underlying political science’s relevance gap’, european political science, 1-22. capano, g and verzichelli, l. (2010). ‘good but not good enough: recent developments in political science in italy’, european political science, 9:1, 102-107. easton, d (1969) ‘the new revolution in political science’, apsr, 63:4, 1051-61. farr, j. (1988) ‘the history of political science’, american journal of political science, 32:4, 1175-1195. flinders, m and kelso, a. (2011) ‘mind the gap’, british journal of politics and international relations, 13(2), 249-268. flinders, m. (2013) ‘the tyranny of relevance and the art of translation’, political studies review, 11(2), 149-167. flinders, m and dommett, k. (2013). ‘the politics and management of public expectations’, british politics, 9:1, 29-50. flinders, m. (2013) ‘the politics of engaged scholarship’, policy & politics, 41:4, 621-642. flinders, m savigny, & k awesti, a. (2016) ‘pursuing the diversity and inclusion agenda’, european political science. ginsberg, r. (1999) ‘conceptualizing the european union as an international actor’, jcms, 37:3, 429-454. hay, c. (2009) ‘academic political science’, political quarterly, 80:4, 587. havergal, c. ‘some russell group universities ‘could opt out of tef’, times higher education, 1 september. kinman, g and jones, f. 2010. ‘‘running up the down escalator’ stressors and strains in uk academics’, quality in higher education 9(1), 21-38. king, g schlozman, k and nye, n. eds. (2009) the future of political science, london: routledge. pielke, r. (2003) the honest broker: making sense of science in policy and politics, cambridge: cambridge university press. schmitter, p. (2002) ‘seven (disputable) theses concerning the future of ‘transatlanticised’ or ‘globalised’ political science’, european political science, 1:2, 23-39. toje, a. (2008) ‘the consensus-expectations gap’, security dialogue, 39:1, 121-141. trent, j. (2011) ‘should political science by more relevant?’ european political science, 10, 191-209. microsoft word pdf_issue_13_3_basileborri.docx italian political science, volume 13 issue 3, december 2018 this project has received funding from the european union's horizon 2020 research and innovation programme no 649281 — euengage — h2020 euro-2014-2015 h2020euro-society-2014. © 2018 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 13, issue 3, pp. 1-18 contact author: linda basile, university of siena. e-mail address: basile7@unisi.it till policy do us part: what unites (and divides) the five star movement and lega electorates linda basile rossella borri university of siena abstract coalition governments are sometimes made up of parties with sharply differing priorities and policy preferences. this is the case of italy’s governing alliance between the lega and the five star movement, hailed by the media as populist. relying upon pledges of change, and seemingly united by the sovereigntist claim to ‘take back control’, this unprecedented coalition has been called upon to address the promises to upend ‘the system’. whether this would be a doable task for the government or would, rather, turn into a likely loss of votes for the two parties, however, will largely depend on the extent to which the ideas of ‘desired change’ of the two different electorates might actually converge. on examining survey data, we find that m5s and lega voters are likely to share antiestablishment, conspiracy rhetoric and sovereigntist attitudes, but have diverging views on domestic economic policies, migration, and cultural issues. these findings provide empirical grounds to advance, in the concluding remarks, some tentative scenarios for the likely developments of a governing coalition between different allies, whose direction would ultimately hinge upon the strategic options available to them. 1. introduction n 1 june 2018, the movimento 5 stelle (five star movement, or m5s) and the lega (the league) finally reached an agreement to form a coalition government, after weeks of tense negotiations. the event was hailed as a populist breakthrough, though populist parties are not new to governing roles (kaltwasser 2016; de lange 2012). the italian ‘yellow-green’ government features an alliance between two ideologically distinct actors, drawing on different electoral bases, apparently bound together just by their appeal to the ‘popular will’ and the anti-elite rhetoric. but will such shared populist discourse be enough to ensure a stable governing coalition, despite the differences between the two allies? will it be possible for these parties to reconcile their policy priorities without alienating their voters? in this article, by analysing the attitudes and the policy preferences of the m5s and lega electorates, we seek to assess whether and to what extent this coalition is called upon to respond to converging or conflicting demands from their respective supporters. this will allow us, in the concluding remarks, to formulate some speculations about the responsiveness, either supportive or hostile, of the two parties’ voters to the policy choices undertaken by the governing coalition. we also explore the possible governing strategies, o till policy do us part 2 patterns of policy bargaining, and potential tensions that might emerge in italy’s populist government. in so doing, we draw on previous research (bellucci 1991; powell and whitten 1993; plescia 2016), which shows that, in highly complex coalition contexts, voters’ rewards or punishments of governing parties in subsequent elections are likely to be related to the clarity of responsibility for different policy outputs. 2. so near, so far? there is little doubt that the actors who signed the governing deal are profoundly different from one another. on the one hand, the m5s began as an anti-establishment party, based on a protest against the ‘old parties’ and the ‘political class’, and claiming a ‘post-ideological’ nature (passarelli and tuorto 2018; vittori 2017; gerbaudo and screti 2017), which rejects any classification fitting the traditional left-right political divide (isernia et al. 2018). on the other hand, the lega is the oldest party in the italian parliament, with a long experience of participation in national and regional governments, decidedly rightwing oriented, and standing out as a regionalist movement turned into a fully-fledged nationalist party (albertazzi, giovannini and seddone 2018). this then begs the question: what might hold together such diverse actors? do they appeal to values and promote policies that could be shared by both electorates? or, on the contrary, do the two governing allies have to deal with irreconcilable, diverging policy priorities? the affinity, or at least compatibility, of the policy priorities promoted by coalition parties is a crucial issue, since they have to achieve an equilibrium between their electoral pledges and likely intra-cabinet tensions (klüver and spoon 2017, 794). when affinities emerge, allies can easily coordinate in decision-making and comply with their electoral commitments. however, when policy priorities diverge, each actor is faced with the likely consequences of their strategic choices: on the one hand, failing to reach an agreement could be punished by the electorate, as both parties would not deliver on their policy promises; on the other hand, if one party succeeds in the intra-cabinet conflict by pushing ahead its policy, it would be rewarded by its electoral base, but would increase the likelihood of alienation of the other party’s voters, with the consequent withdrawal of support. the strategy followed by actors in this chess-like game will also depend on the model of coalition government adopted, either collegial – i.e. when policies are the result of intraparty coordination and bargaining, or ministerial – i.e. when offices are allocated among coalition partners, who enjoy wide autonomy and independence in decision-making on those policies under their direct control (ibidem). 2.1. the common populist framework of the ‘government of change’ despite their differences, the m5s and lega leaders achieved a deal, whose title ‘contract for italy’s government of change’, significantly epitomizes their common will to upend the italian system. it is precisely their appeal to the people’s will, their claims to radically change the rules and defy the establishment that have strengthened the ties between two otherwise strange bedfellows. the anti-elite rhetoric was present in the cabinet’s inaugural speech pronounced by the prime minister giuseppe conte: ‘if populism means the ruling class listening to people’s needs ... (and) if anti-system means aiming at introducing a new system, able to remove old, encrusted privileges and power, then these political forces deserve both these epithets’. in a similar vein, the lega’s leader matteo salvini, linda basile and rossella borri 3 deputy prime minister and interior minister, asserted that ‘there is no right and there is no left, there is only the people against the elites’;1 similarly, his m5s counterpart luigi di maio, serving as deputy prime minister and minister of economic development, labour and social policies, said that ‘it’s going to be a hot autumn: the powers are rallying against us!’2 the anti-elitist message of the lega and the m5s is centred on the typical rhetorical construction used by all populist political actors: a simple binary framing which juxtaposes an ill-defined, homogenous group, i.e., ‘the innocent people’, with another equally vague category, i.e., the obscure holders of economic and political power, lumped together in a single, unified bloc (kriesi 2014; mudde 2016 and 2004; absts and rummens 2007). this narrative, in turn, rests upon a paranoid, conspiratorial reasoning that is inherent in the very (dualistic) logic of populism (castanho silva, vegetti, and littway 2017; mueller 2016) and that also represents a useful strategic and political device. it allows the simplifying of the complexity of political and social problems, also favouring the intertwining of heterogenous issues (ibid.) and consolidates the idea of the ‘we’, that is the ‘victims of the system’, against the ‘other’, the elites. conspiracy thinking, in this respect, is closely related to the populist anti-elitist rhetoric, since the deterioration of the bond of trust between the represented (i.e. the citizen) and their representatives (i.e. the elite) incentivizes people to blame the current mechanisms of decision-making and advance claims for alternative solutions. this popular disenchantment, in turn, serves the populist parties’ purpose to hold people together around the shared belief that the truth has been kept secret by the liberal elites, while pledging to help them unveil the truth, to show ‘how the world really works’, against what the elites want people to believe. besides the ‘people vs. elites’ dichotomy or the conspiracy belief, however, populism is above all a matter of moral self-representation (mueller 2016). by adopting such manichean rhetoric, in fact, populist actors portray themselves as the only ones who are morally entitled to represent the will (and defend the interests) of the disempowered people. it is in their name that they promise to exert a change in the way things currently stand and to take back control from the deceptive elites (ibid.). this perfectly applies to italy’s two coalition partners, whose appeal to the regaining of the share of national sovereignty transferred to supranational elites is commonly framed as the only possible precondition for the real exercise of the people’s sovereign power to decide. the sovereignty claim has thus become the common nucleus for the ‘thin’ populist ideology of the lega and the m5s and their ‘government of change’. this has definitely provided the two parties and their supporters with a fundamental trait d’union, and a common battlefield. at the same time, it has conferred political legitimation to a post-electoral alliance that was not directly sanctioned by the popular vote. these considerations lead us to formulate the first hypothesis: h1: support for populist and conspiratorial arguments is higher among voters of lega and m5s than of other parties. the two electorates converge in a ‘us vs. 1 available online at: https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2018-05-24/salvini-maio-e-falso-mitopopolo-contro-elite-140704.shtml?uuid=aelnp4te. 2 available online at: https://www.iltempo.it/politica/2018/08/26/news/di-maio-autunno-caldo-leggebilancio-salvini-1082260/. till policy do us part 4 them’, manichean rhetoric, hostility and widespread mistrust of the elites, and claims for reaffirming popular sovereignty. 2.2. what divides them? although both lega and m5s converge in the sovereigntist ‘take back control’ claim and in hostility to elitism, their ideas of sovereignty do not always overlap. in particular, they are likely to diverge in the way they construct the so-called ‘populist heartland’ (taggart 2004), namely that virtuous and idealised territory where the sovereign rule of the people should be realised. on the one hand, the lega’s conception of the sovereign people has an evident nativist, exclusionary nature (albertazzi, giovannini, and seddone 2018; bulli and soare 2018; verbeek and zaslove 2016). indeed, under salvini’s leadership, the boundaries of the lega’s (until 2018 named ‘lega nord’, northern league) ideal territory definitely widened: from those of the wealthy northern regions (the area of the so-called ‘padania’) to those of the italian nation state (albertazzi, giovannini, and seddone 2018). in line with the far-right ethnic conception of nationhood as a natural division between people, the lega’s heartland is now clearly inhabited by the italians, the natives. the lega has thus seized attention for its political agenda on migration, framed as a main threat to italian cultural sovereignty and as a primary security issue, and advocated a hard-line immigration platform (passarelli and tuorto 2018). on the other hand, m5s has adopted a rather fluctuating and ambiguous stance on cultural sovereignism, and in particular regarding the migration issue (bulli and soare 2018; pirro 2018), also probably because of its ideologically heterogeneous electoral support, which crosses the traditional left-right divide. accordingly, we advance a second hypothesis: h2: feelings of exclusivist identity, and hostility to migration, will prevail more among lega voters than other parties, including the m5s. cultural sovereignism will therefore mark a distance between the lega and m5s electorates. a different picture emerges when it comes to the economic dimension of these parties’ sovereignty claims. both the lega and the m5s share the idea that italy should regain its power to decide on economic policies (pirro 2018, 10) and portray the eu as ‘the locus of real power’ (albertazzi, giovannini, and seddone 2018, 649), a technocratic superpower that constrains nation states from using the necessary means to protect their own sovereign people (ibid.; passarelli and tuorto 2018). however, though both parties conceive the nation state as a common, economic heartland, they hold different visions of domestic economic policy. on the one hand, the lega would stick to right-wing economic positions, based on economic liberalism and limited state intervention (otjes et al. 2018). on the other hand, the m5s advocates redistributive policies and state intervention. the post-electoral deal offers some interesting clues as to the actual policy preferences of the two parties. in particular, two policy proposals stand out from the others, as they were the two parties’ flagship policies during the electoral campaign: the ‘citizens’ income’, promoted by the m5s, and a two-rates flat-tax, sponsored by the lega. the former aims at redistributing wealth to the poorest sectors of the society, thus mostly impacting the impoverished southern regions, where the movement gained more votes (passarelli 2018). on the contrary, the lega’s flat tax is centred linda basile and rossella borri 5 on the expectation that the benefits generated for the wealthier people by tax reduction will ‘trickle down’ to the society at large, as they would encourage investments. this is clearly in line with both the lega’s pro-market positions (verbeek and zaslove 2016) and the configuration of its traditional main pool of votes, namely the rich northern areas of small and medium-sized enterprises (passarelli 2018). hence, we formulate the following hypotheses on economic preferences: h3a: in line with the anti-elitist perspective, lega and m5s voters show greater hostility against eu authority over domestic economic policy than supporters of other parties, thus converging on economic sovereignism. h3b: the lega and m5s voters have divergent policy preferences on domestic economic policies, with the former being more oriented towards pro-market positions, and the latter more inclined towards redistributive measures. 3. from common ties to diverging interests: exploring the preferences of m5s and lega voters to test our hypotheses, we use data for italian public opinion from the euengage panel survey,3 carried out between 2016 and 2017. it should be noted that, although the euengage sample slightly underestimates the actual votes won by the m5s and lega at the general elections held in march 4, 2018 (with 21% voting intentions for m5s and 13% for the lega),4 this result is in line with other surveys conducted in the same period5 and captures an increasing voting trend for these two parties in the months that preceded the general election. in order to gauge similarities and differences in the preferences of the m5s and lega voters, we first considered voting preferences as potentially exercising a cueing effect on policy preferences. to this purpose, we identified three groups of survey items,6 according to the three dimensions we focus on in our hypotheses, namely: populist and conspiracy arguments, culture and identity issues, and economic issues. for comparability’s sake, we recoded all items into a 0-1 scale, where 0 corresponds to a more ‘sovereigntist’, ‘exclusionary’ or ‘populist’ stance, and 1 otherwise. we then compared the mean scores of the answers provided by the m5s and lega voters on each item. in order to provide comparisons also with other party groups not in government, we further recoded each variable into a categorical one, and cross tabulated them by vote preferences expressed for the main italian parties.7 3 a two-wave survey was conducted on a panel of respondents in june-july 2016 and june-october 2017 in ten eu countries, interviewed using computer assisted web interviewing (cawi). respondents were selected from an online panel. a specific set of weights, based on internet usage, gender, age, region, and education, was used to correct any likely misbalance due to the online sampling design. the italian panel sample used in this study (people responding to both 2016 and 2017 waves) includes 1,210 cases. 4 results at general elections were instead: m5s 33%; lega 17% (source: https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=c&dtel=04/03/2018&tpa=i&tpe=a&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=s&ms=s ). 5 see for instance the average of electoral surveys calculated by the website ‘termometro politico’ (https://www.termometropolitico.it/2018-11-17-sondaggi-politici-elettorali). 6 see the appendix for a full description of the survey items used. 7 survey question: ‘if the general election was tomorrow, which party would you be most likely to vote for?’ parties were recoded according to coalition patterns at the 2018 elections, the only exception being the lega, considered separately from the centre-right coalition, which it had joined before the elections till policy do us part 6 statistically significant differences in both kinds of bivariate analyses were then examined by using appropriate post-hoc comparisons.8 3.1. the ‘people’ vs. the ‘greedy, evil elites’: populism and conspiracy thinking among m5s and lega voters the first hypothesis postulates a convergence between m5s and lega supporters on populist and conspiracy claims. populist claims typically feature two core issues: first, dissatisfaction with the current democratic institutions, both at eu and national level, perceived as unresponsive, untrustworthy, and systematically betraying the ‘popular will’; and, second, the quest for more direct procedures of decision-making, as opposed to the traditional, liberal mechanisms of representative democracy, which is perceived as no longer effective and reliable. on the other hand, by ‘conspiracy thinking’, we refer to people’s general perception that a hidden power of elites is secretly and opaquely ruling the world. this is measured through an index that combines respondents’ answers to a set of statements concerning the allegedly closed and obscure nature of politics (cronbach’s alpha= 0.87). figure 19 shows the average scores with standard deviations for the answers on populist and conspiratorial arguments, by focusing only on the m5s and lega voters while table 1 cross tabulates10 the same variables by all party groups. average scores and cross tabulations show that the supporters of the two coalition partners converge on all aspects considered, although with some distinctions. for instance, dissatisfaction with the way eu democracy works, which combines criticism towards liberal representative democracy with frustration with the eu project itself, is double among lega voters (0.24), compared to the m5s group (0.12), although the latter is more spread out than the former. post-hoc comparisons, however, reveal that the differences between the two groups under scrutiny are not statistically significant, while they are both markedly different from the other party groups, and especially from the centre-left. the m5s-lega gap narrows on the lack of trust in government, while it widens between the two allies, on the one hand, and all the other party groups on the other, and, remarkably, with the partito democratico (pd)/centre-left. however, since the survey was conducted when the pd was in government, it could be also possible that answers refer to a critical evaluation of that government’s performance, rather than to a general lack of trust in a democratic institution. (frequency in brackets): a) pd/centre-left [223]: pd (208), alternativa popolare (which joined civica popolare: 4), sudtirol volskpartei (1), centro democratico and radicali italiani (forming ‘+europa’: 9), union valdotaine (1). centre-right coalition [133]: forza italia (81), fratelli d’italia (39) scelta civica (5); others/ra[331]; no vote [128]. 8 for categorical variables, post-hoc comparisons were carried out after running the crosstabulation (e.g. analysis of residuals and partitioning) (sharpe 2015). for continuous variables, post-hoc comparisons were carried out after running analysis of variance (anova) comparing the means (e.g. bonferroni, tukey, sidak). 9 to obtain these average scores, all continuous variables were recoded into a 0-1 scale, while categorical variables were recoded as dummies; in the latter case, data display the proportions. the same procedure applies also to figures 2 and 3 for, respectively, cultural and economic issues. 10 to run cross-tabulations, continuous variables were recoded as categorical variables, by grouping values into three modalities, with 1 indicating a more populist attitude, 2 somewhat neutral, and 3 less populist. the same procedure applies to tables 2 and 3 for, respectively, cultural and economic issues. linda basile and rossella borri 7 the voters of the two governing parties overlap on support for direct democracy and for conspiratorial arguments. here again, post-hoc comparisons reveal that voters of m5s and lega solidly align on these issues, together with the people with no party attachment, while they significantly differentiate from all other party groups. overall, these findings confirm our first hypothesis: the gloomy perception of the mechanisms of liberal and representative democracy, seen as opaquely managed by a small group of unresponsive elites, provides a common set of values and beliefs that unites two otherwise distinct electorates. figure 1. average scores for answers on populist and conspiracy arguments, by voting preferences (m5s and lega) 0.24 0.14 0.45 0.31 0.12 0.07 0.46 0.28 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 m5slega populist and conspiracy arguments trust in government satisfaction with eu democracy conspiracy thinking direct vs. representative democracy sd: m5s=0.34 lega=0.26 sd: m5s=0.27 lega=0.26 sd: m5s=0.17 lega=0.20 sd: m5s=0.43 lega=0.33 till policy do us part 8 table 1. populist and conspiracy arguments, by voting preferences (% weighted) m 5s le ga p d /c en tr e le ft co al iti on c en tr eri gh t co al iti on o th er p ar tie s n o vo te p ea rs on 's χ 2( 5) satisfaction with eu democracy % of ‘very/somewhat dissatisfied’ 76 88 50 81 75 84 χ2(5)=103.2915, p<0.001 trust in government: % of ‘never/only sometimes’ 86 93 53 80 87 87 χ2(5)=167.5130, p<0.001 preferences for direct vs. representative democracy: % support for direct democracy (values from 0 through 0.4 on a 0-1 scale). 36 32 13 22 27 35 χ2(10)=65.1515, p<0.001 conspiracy thinking: % of ‘high conspiracy’ (values from 0 through 0.4 on a 0-1 scale). 72 68 37 58 52 53 χ2(10)= 115.3946, p<0.001 n 267 128 223 133 331 128 total 100 100 100 100 100 100 3.2. will culture tear them apart? in the second hypothesis, we postulated a divergence between m5s and lega on cultural and identity issues. in particular, we examine two core aspects of exclusionary feelings respectively: the support for restrictive policies on migration, and people’s ‘cultural sovereignism’, which defines those attitudes aimed at protecting national identity and culture against any interference from outside. as figure 2 and table 2 clearly show, both aspects mark relevant differences between the two political communities. majorities among m5s voters would support policies of assistance to people seeking a better standard of living (the so-called ‘economic migrants’), as compared to 44% among lega voters. post-hoc comparisons confirm that m5s are significantly different from their coalition partners, while showing similarities with voters of other party groups, especially those leaning to the centre-left. on the other hand, the lega group significantly aligns with the centre-right pole on migration policies. the picture remains almost the same when assistance is directed to people seeking international protection (i.e. refugees), although in this case support for assistance policies slightly increases among the lega voters by 15 percentage points. moving to ‘cultural sovereignism’, we measured this through an index that combines items on the perception of migrants and attitudes towards the eu authority on migration (cronbach’s alpha = 0.79). once again, the two groups show significant differences. the m5s voters have moderate stances on cultural sovereignism, although not as inclusionary as the centre-left supporters; their moderation, rather, gets close to that of the ‘no vote’ group. on the contrary, strong exclusionary attitudes clearly prevail among lega supporters, showing the highest scores on the cultural sovereignty claim. these findings therefore confirm our second hypothesis concerning divergence between m5s and lega constituencies on cultural and identity issues. linda basile and rossella borri 9 figure 2. average scores for answers on cultural and identity items, by voting preferences (m5s and lega) table 2. cultural and identity issues, by voting preferences (% weighted) m 5s le ga p d /c en tr ele ft co al iti on c en tr eri gh t co al iti on o th er p ar tie s n o vo te p ea rs on 's χ 2( 5) assistance to economic migrants: % of ‘completely/tend to disagree’. 30 56 22 54 33 35 χ2(5)=85.5008 p<0.001 assistance to refugees: % of ‘completely/tend to disagree’. 23 41 15 26 27 25 χ2(5)=55.4266, p<0.001 cultural sovereignism: % of ‘high cultural sovereignism’ (values from 0 through 0.4 on a 0-1 scale). 42 84 14 62 35 47 χ2(10)=212.8447, p<0.001 n 267 128 223 133 331 128 total 100 100 100 100 100 100 0.70 0.77 0.43 0.44 0.59 0.23 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 m5slega culture and identity issues sd: m5s=0.46 lega=0.49 sd: m5s=0.41 lega=0.49 culture and identity issues assistance to refugees assistance to economic migrants cultural sovereignism sd: m5s=0.46 lega=0.49 sd: m5s=0.41 lega=0.49 sd: m5s=0.21 lega=0.15 till policy do us part 10 3.3. held together by the common eu-enemy, divided by economic policies finally, we test the economic hypotheses by focusing first on the role and nature of the state intervention on economy and, second, on the degree of the supranational authority over national economic policy (figure 3 and table 3). figure 3. average scores for answers on economy, by voting preferences (m5s and lega) on domestic economic policies, lega and m5s voters seem to look at two alternative models. on the one hand, m5s voters stand out as strong supporters of redistributive policies to reduce income inequalities. post-hoc comparisons reveal a significant difference with the lega group on support for redistributive measures, like the ‘citizens’ income’, while getting close to the preferences of the centre-left camp. on the other hand, lega voters neatly advocate traditional liberal, right-wing economic policies, like cutting public services to reduce tax, showing similarities with other centre-right supporters. 0.36 0.52 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.61 0.40 0.27 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 m5slega economic issues public investment vs. cut taxes redistributive measures austerity economic sovereignism sd: m5s=0.24 lega=0.30 sd: m5s=0.21 lega=0.22 sd: m5s=0.28 lega=0.30 sd: m5s=0.18 lega=0.21 linda basile and rossella borri 11 table 3. economic issues, by voting preferences (% weighted) m 5s le ga p d /c en tr e le ft co al iti on c en tr eri gh t co al iti on o th er p ar tie s n o vo te p ea rs on 's χ 2( 5) redistribution: % of ‘in favour of redistribution’ (values from 0 through 0.4 on a 01 scale). 64 45 67 45 58 56 χ2(10)=65.7156, p<0.001 public services vs. cut taxes: % of ‘public services increased’ (values from 0 through 0.4 on a 0-1 scale). 26 17 30 21 39 15 χ2(10)=43.1294, p<0.001 austerity: % of ‘increase public investments’ (values from 0 through 0.4 on a 01 scale). 66 75 70 48 55 39 χ2(10)=66.9842 , p<0.001 economic sovereignism: % of ‘high sovereignism’ (values from 0 through 0.4 on a 0-1 scale). 67 83 26 64 39 59 χ2(10)=191.7314, p<0.001 n 267 128 223 133 331 128 total 100 100 100 100 100 100 however, when it comes to support for public investments, as opposed to austerity measures aimed at balancing the budget, the differences between the m5s and lega electorates significantly narrow (although public investments seem popular also among voters of other parties, especially on the left). actually, rather than measuring just preferences for domestic policies, this item seems to tap attitudes towards eu ‘interferences’ on national policy making, since the balance of budget closely recalls the eu-mandated tough austerity measures adopted in 2011. this links to our findings deriving from a more accurate measure of ‘economic sovereignism’. it combines items on eu authority over the country’s economic and budgetary policies, people’s perception of the eu as endangering the country’s welfare system and economic growth, and attitudes towards globalisation (cronbach’s alpha=0.71). once again, this index shows a substantial agreement between salvini’s and di maio’s supporters, although economic sovereignism significantly prevails among lega voters, as compared to m5s voters. this dimension, however, marks a significant difference between the m5s-lega electorates and the other parties’ supporters, especially on the centre-left, where economic sovereignism is supported only by a minority. according to these findings, hypotheses h3a and h3b are confirmed, since m5s and lega voters diverge on the models of domestic economic policy, but largely converge on the need to shield the national economy from any outside interference. 4. united by the common enemy, divided over domestic and cultural policies in order to provide further robustness to our empirical analysis, we regressed people’s attitudes on populist, cultural, and economic issues, as well as left-right ideology, on the vote for m5s and lega, with the vote for other parties as reference category, by using multinomial logistic regression. this analysis would allow us to test our hypotheses from a different perspective, namely, whether and to what extent the interplay of people’s till policy do us part 12 preferences on economic, cultural, and populist issues is likely to orient people’s voting choices, here considered as dependent variable. as argued above, all independent variables were recoded into a 0-1 scale, where 0 corresponds to ‘sovereigntist’, ‘exclusionary’ or ‘populist’ positions, and 1 otherwise.11 accordingly, a negative coefficient in the regression means that a sovereignist/populist attitude increases the likelihood of a vote for lega and/or m5s as compared to the other groups; on the contrary, a positive sign indicates that the lega and m5s vote is explained by inclusionary or mainstream attitudes. table 2. multinomial logistic regression of policy attitudes on vote for lega and m5s other parties=reference category m5s (1=vote for m5s) lega (2=vote for lega) coef. se coef. se populist and conspiracy issues satisfied with the way the eu democracy works 0.14 (0.21) -0.32 (0.26) direct vs. representative democracy -1.15*** (0.23) -0.38 (0.25) trust -0.39 (0.31) -0.38 (0.25) conspiracy -1.37*** (0.36) -1.04** (0.36) culture and identity issues assistance to economic migrants 0.33*** (0.08) 0.17 (0.14) assistance to refugees -0.08 (0.13) 0.23 (0.17) cultural sovereignism 1.18* (0.52) -4.7*** (0.45) economic issues economic sovereignism -2.42*** (0.32) -1.33** (0.46) austerity (0=public investments; 1=austerity) -1.29*** (0.29) -2.47*** (0.42) public services vs. cut taxes -0.18 (0.29) 0.85* (0.38) redistribution -0.46* (0.23) -0.07 (0.33) left-right (centre = reference category) left -1.29* (0.51) -1.60* (0.63) centre-left -1.17*** (0.31) -14.11*** (1.14) centre-right -0.46 (0.66) 1.07 (0.71) right 0.09 (0.65) 1.557* (0.62) constant 1.24 (1.17) 0.93 (1.05) notes: n=1170; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 overall the multinomial findings (figure 4 and table 4) uphold the results obtained with the bivariate analyses, where voting preferences represented the main explanatory variable. electoral support for m5s and lega is more likely, as compared to other party groups, when the following attitudes and beliefs emerge among voters: hostility against eu-mandated austerity measures and economic sovereignism, and conspiracy thinking. this implies that both parties could increase their chances of keeping the support of 11 except for the variable on austerity measure, where 0 represents ‘pursuing a policy to balance budget’ (i.e. austerity) and 1 ‘increasing public investments’. linda basile and rossella borri 13 their electoral bases by fuelling people’s mistrust of the elites, and especially of the technocratic elites interfering with the national economy from brussels. other issues would represent a potential source of support for the m5s only: the promotion of forms of participation alternative to representative democracy, like direct democracy, and support for measures of assistance to economic migrants. likewise, liberal right-wing policies of tax reduction stand out as potentially feeding the lega’s electoral consensus, although not significantly opposed by the m5s electorate, while redistributive policies would reward the m5s. we note that, for each issue, coefficients are statistically significant for one party only, respectively the lega and the m5s. this suggests that each group strongly supports only one of these issues, and moderately opposes (m5s) or neglects (lega) the other’s preferred solution. nonetheless, divisions become sharp and potentially influential on voting choices on cultural sovereignism, where exclusionary policies would appeal significantly to the lega voters, but would alienate m5s supporters. figure 1. multinomial logistic regression of policy attitudes on vote for lega and m5s (predicted probabilities 5. conclusions: the chess-like game of the m5s-lega coalition in this article, we tested three hypotheses to unveil the shared preferences and the areas of conflict between the m5s and lega voters. empirical results clearly revealed that the strong, common baseline that unites the two electoral bases is not what people strive for, but rather, what or whom they fight against. the common enemy are the obscure elites, and especially those based in brussels, who operate according to secretive and hidden practices that serve only the economic sovereignism austerity measures public services vs. cut taxes redistribution of income assistance to economic migrants assistance to refugees cultural sovereignism satisfied with the way eu democracy works direct vs. representative democracy trust in government conspiracy thinking left center-left center-right right -1 -.5 0 .5 m5s lega till policy do us part 14 interests of small interest groups, at the expenses of the citizens, who are the actual ‘victims’ of the system. accordingly, a first scenario would be that the m5s-lega coalition will seek to exploit the populist rhetoric of the contraposition between the (eu) elite and the people to further strengthen the electoral consensus of their electoral bases (scenario 1: the common [eu] enemy). indeed, this scenario has already emerged since the early, frantic days of the government’s formation, when a popular online blog leaked a first version of the contract outlining references to procedures to leave the common currency and questioning italy’s membership in the eurozone, if not the eu (basile 2018). this raised many eyebrows in brussels and among international investors about the potential of the new italy’s ‘populist’ government to blatantly challenge, if not break, the eu rules. the final version of the government contract at least removed any openly eurosceptic claim. yet, the two coalition partners seem constantly eager to goad some eu reactions, for instance by defying the eu budget rules with the big-spending strategy envisaged in the draft budget plan for 2019.12 when it comes to divisive issues, however, the delights of the ‘honeymoon’ between the two allies seem to fade. for instance, the redistributive measure of the ‘citizens’ basic income’, strongly advocated by the m5s, would potentially alienate the lega electorate, especially the voters in the industrial areas of northern italy, who would perceive it as an ‘incentive for unemployed people to stay at home on their sofa’,13 with likely revivals of south-north divides. on the other hand, a compromise solution14 to the implementing decrees on this policy, due to a collegial model, would likely cause a loss of votes for the m5s, for having failed to fulfil a flagship electoral promise (scenario 2a: inconclusive bargaining over redistributive policies). on the contrary, if a ministerial model of government should prevail, then the m5s might have greater control over this kind of measure, since the movement’s political chief luigi di maio holds key competencies on social security measures within the government. this would ultimately reward the m5s, as its supporters would clearly identify it as the actor to whom to attribute the credit for the positive policy output. (scenario 2b: the m5s push for redistributive policies). another area of potential conflict is that of migration issues. lega’s leader matteo salvini, ministry of the interior with competences on migration policies, has often vowed a hard line against the influx of migrants, even by adopting blatant measures such as the block of migrant rescue ships from italian ports. in this case, such a policy would serve the electoral purposes of the lega, as cultural sovereignty represents a crucial issue for its voters, but it would most probably alienate part of the m5s electorate. here again, while the collegial model, and the related lack of decision-making, would be harmful for salvini’s party (scenario 3a: the moderating compromise over migration), the ministerial model would likely be advantageous for the lega, although at the expenses of m5s (scenario 3b: lega’s hard line on migration policies). 12 in november 2018, since italy’s government failed to fully address the eu’s concerns over the high deficit budget plans for 2019, the eu formally opened a disciplinary procedure against italy, which was finally solved in december 2018 with an agreement to cut down expenses. 13 available online at: https://www.dw.com/en/italys-5-star-movement-defends-guaranteed-incomepledge/a-43323755. 14 at the time of writing, the citizens’ income has already been approved by the council of ministers, although it is too early to evaluate the concrete implementation and effects of this measure. linda basile and rossella borri 15 clearly, these are just some of the possible developments of an unprecedented coalition experiment, although predicting the future is beyond the purposes of this article, if not of the tasks of political science. nonetheless, these scenarios suggest that coalition governments look like a chess game, where each player carefully ponders the next move. like the knight, the coalition partner’s actions might be largely unpredictable, and suddenly change direction from the expected one to minimise detrimental consequences at the next elections. appendix. survey items used in the analysis (euengage data) satisfaction with eu democracy: ‘on the whole, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in the eu?’ [ 1/2 (recoded as 1): very/somewhat dissatisfied; 3/4 (recoded as 0): very/somewhat dissatisfied]. trust in government: ‘how much of the time do you think you can trust the italian government to do what is right?’ [always, often, sometimes, never] preferences for direct vs. representative democracy: ‘which number from 0 to 10 best represents how you think the system of governing europe should work? ordinary people making all decisions on their own (0); elected politicians and officials making all decisions on their own (10, recoded as 1).’ conspiracy thinking: ‘to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?’ index based on 9 items: q1: ‘we would be much better off now if our foreign affairs were conducted out in the open, for all to see, rather than secretly.’ q2: ‘most of the news we get from the press and the radio is deliberately slanted to mislead us.’ q3: ‘i often feel that the really important matters are decided behind the scenes, by people we never even hear about.’ q4: ‘the people think they govern themselves, but they really don't.’ q5: ‘a secretive power elite with a globalist agenda is conspiring to eventually rule the world through an authoritarian world government, or new world order.’ q6: ‘actually, it is not the government that runs the country: we don’t know who pulls the strings.’ q7: ‘some people say officials of the european union are gradually seeking to take over all law-making powers in this country.’ q8: ‘the us administration of president trump/ russian administration of president putin is behind the migrant crisis because it is in its interest to create chaos in europe and split the union’s 28 member states over the issue.’ q9: ‘the italian government/eu institutions is/are deliberately hiding the truth about how many immigrants really live in this country.’ ‘for each of these statements, please indicate whether you completely agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or completely disagree.’ [answers: 1/2: completely/tend to agree (recoded as 1); 3/4: completely/tend to disagree (recoded as 0)] assistance to economic migrants: ‘italy should offer assistance to people seeking a better standard of living’. till policy do us part 16 assistance to refugees: ‘italy should offer assistance to people seeking a better international protection’. cultural sovereignism: index based on 6 items: q1: can you please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements about the general impact of immigration on [country] and [nationality] people? [answer options: 1. strongly agree, 2. somewhat agree, 3. somewhat disagree, 4. strongly disagree] ‘immigrants increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack in italy’. q2: can you please indicate… ‘immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare services’ (answer order reversed). q3: can you please indicate… ‘immigration in general will improve our culture with new ideas and customs’(answer order reversed). q4: can you please indicate… ‘the religious practices of immigrants are a threat to the italian way of life and its traditions’. q5: can you please indicate… ‘immigrants are a significant cause of crime in italy’. q6: for each of the following policy alternatives, please position yourself (...): italy should decide for itself how many immigrants to accept each year (9); the eu should decide how many immigrants should be accepted by each member state each year. (10, recoded as 1). redistribution: ‘redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor: fully in favour vs. fully opposed. where would you place your views on this scale? fully in favour of redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor (0) vs. fully opposed to redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor (1).’ public services vs. cut taxes: ‘public services should be increased by raising taxes (0) vs. public services should be cut in order to reduce taxes. where would you place your views on this scale? public services should be increased by raising taxes (0), public services should be cut in order to reduce taxes (1).’ austerity: ‘for each of the following policy alternatives, please position yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, increasing public investment in the coming years (0) vs. pursuing a policy to balance the budget (1).’ economic sovereignism: index based on 4 items: q1: for each of the following policy alternatives, please position yourself (...): giving the european union more authority over member states' economic and budgetary policies (0) vs. retaining full powers for economic decision-making in each member state (10, recoded as 1). q2: some people say that the european union might endanger some important aspects of the nation. for each of the following aspects, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree that they are endangered by the european union [answers: strongly/somewhat agree, strongly/somewhat disagree]: ‘achievements of the welfare system in italy’. [answer options: 1/2. strongly/somewhat agree, 3/4. strongly/somewhat disagree]. q3: some people say that the european union might endanger (...): ‘economic growth in italy’. [answer options: 1/2. strongly/somewhat agree, 3/4. strongly/somewhat disagree]. q4: do you think that, overall, globalisation has a positive (0, recoded as 1) or negative effect (10, recoded as 0) on italian citizens? references linda basile and rossella borri 17 abts, koen, and stefan rummens. 2007. ‘populism versus democracy’. political studies 55(2): 405–424. albertazzi, daniele, arianna giovannini, and antonella seddone. 2018. ‘ “no regionalism please, we are leghisti !” the transformation of the italian lega nord under the leadership of matteo salvini’. regional & federal studies 28 (5): 645–71. basile, linda. 2018. ‘italy’s election: a shock or a shake for the european union? clingendael spectator’. 18 june 2018. bellucci, paolo (1991), ‘italian economic voting: a deviant case or making a case for a better theory?’, in h. norpoth, m.s. lewis-beck and j.-d. lafay (eds), economics and politics: the calculus of support, ann arbor, michigan: university of michigan press, pp. 63–84. bordignon, fabio, and luigi ceccarini. 2013. ‘five stars and a cricket. beppe grillo shakes italian politics’. south european society and politics 18 (4): 427–49. bulli, giorgia, sorina christina soare. 2018. ‘immigration and the refugee crisis in a new immigration country.’ croatian and comparative public administration 18(1): 127–156 castanho silva, bruno, federico vegetti, and levente littvay. 2017. ‘the elite is up to something: exploring the relation between populism and belief in conspiracy theories’. swiss political science review 23 (4): 423-443 de lange, sara. 2012. ‘new alliances: why mainstream parties govern with radical rightwing populist parties’. political studies 60(4): 899-918. gerbaudo, paolo, and francesco screti. 2017. ‘reclaiming popular sovereignty: the vision of the state in the discourse of podemos and the movimento 5 stelle’. javnost the public 24 (4): 320–35. isernia, pierangelo, maurizio pessato, gianluca piccolino, and andrea scavo. 2018. ‘cinque stelle o millefoglie?’ la rivista il mulino. kaltwasser, cristóbal rovira, and paul taggart. 2016. ‘dealing with populists in government: a framework for analysis’. democratization 23 (2): 201–20. krastev, ivan. 2017. ‘after europe’. pennsylvania: university of pennsylvania press. kriesi, h. (2014). ‘the populist challenge.’ west european politics 37(2): 361–378. manucci, luca, and michi amsler. 2018. ‘where the wind blows: five star movement’s populism, direct democracy and ideological flexibility’. italian political science review / rivista italiana di scienza politica 48 (1): 109–32. mudde, cas. 2004. ‘the populist zeitgeist’. government and opposition 39(4): 542-563. mudde, cas. 2016. ‘the study of populist radical right parties: towards a fourth wave’, crex working paper series n. 1. müller, jan-werner. 2016. ‘what is populism?’ pennsylvania: university of pennsylvania press. otjes, simon, gilles ivaldi, anders ravik jupskasn and oscar mazzoleni. 2018. ‘it’s not economic interventionism, stupid! reassessing the political economy of radical rightwing populist parties.’ swiss political science review 24(3): 270-290. passarelli, gianluca, and dario tuorto. 2018. ‘the five star movement: purely a matter of protest? the rise of a new party between political discontent and reasoned voting.’ party politics 24 (2): 129–40. piccolino, gianluca, andrea scavo, maurizio pessato, and pierangelo isernia. 2018. ‘l’elettorato 5 stelle reggerà alla prova del governo?’ il mulino, no. 5/2018. pirro, andrea l. p. 2018. ‘the polyvalent populism of the 5 star movement’. journal of contemporary european studies (online first) till policy do us part 18 plescia, carolina (2017). portfolio-specific accountability and retrospective voting: the case of italy. italian political science review/rivista italiana di scienza politica, 47(3), 313336 powell, bingham g. and guy d. whitten (1993), ‘a cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context’, american journal of political science 37(2): 391–414.� taggart, paul. 2004. ‘populism and representative politics in contemporary europe.’ journal of political ideologies 9(3): 269-288 verbeek, bertjan and andrej zaslove. 2016. ‘italy: a case of mutating populism?’. democratization 23(2): 304-323. vittori, davide, 2017. ‘podemos and the five-star movement: populist, nationalist or what?’ contemporary italian politics 9(2): 142-161. 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 1/8 the professional review of the italian political science association the  arab  spring:  when  democracy  meets global  protest* by  stefania  panebianco  |  published  in  issue7  /  research not  so  many  events  attracted  the  scholarly  debate  and  the  attention  of  the  wide  public  as  the  arab  spring1 did  in  the  last  couple  of  years.  the  wave  of  popular  protests  that  started  in  tunisia  in  january  2011  and  then spread  all  over  the  arab  world  unsettled  decades  of  stability  of  the  arab  authoritarian  regimes.  inevitably, many  political  science  assumptions  have  been  discussed,  rediscovered,  or  challenged.  in  the  short-­term  this revival   of   democracy   studies   has   led   to   a   flourishing   of   books,   international   seminars   and   conference panels.   in   the   mid-­   to   long-­term   the   discipline   will   have   to   draw   from   these   events   to   elaborate   new paradigms.  some  suggestions  are  here  provided,  aiming  to  open  a  focus  of  discussion  that  can  profit  of  the on-­line  distribution  of  ips. many  sub-­fields  of  the  discipline  have  investigated  these  events  challenging  or  supporting  widely  accepted claims.  this  article  aims  at  highlighting  the  emerging  trends  in  the  academic  debate.  first  of  all,  the  2011 arab  revolutionary  wave  challenged  the  assumption  of  the  so-­called   ‘arab  exceptionalism’2  and  provided evidence  for  those  ir  scholars  that  explain  democratization  as  a  global  process.  studies  on  democracy  as  a global  issue  deny  that  middle  east  and  north  african  (mena)  countries  are  destined  to  remain  untouched  by democratic   processes,   for   cultural   or   other   reasons.   according   to   the   globalist   approach,   instead, democratization  –  being  a  global  process  –  will  eventually   involve  the  mena  countries   in  the  medium  or long-­term.  secondly,  a  widely  shared  conceptual  definition  of  democracy  is  being  investigated.  a  (western) value-­laden  definition  of  democracy  is  being  progressively  replaced  by  a  procedural  concept  of  democracy, which   stresses   the   functioning   of   a   political   system   ensuring   democratic   rules   and   norms   instead   of (culturally  imbued)  principles.  many  scholars  of  political  theory  are  re-­discussing  the  ontological  definition  of democracy,  taking  also  into  account  the  delicate  role  (if  any)  of  the  islamic  religion.  thirdly,  the  literature  on transnational  social  movements  is  exploring  social  movement  networks  and  demonstrations  against  national governments  and  policies,  to  grasp  the  linkage  between  the  transnational  dimension  of  the  protest  and  its effectiveness  at  domestic  level.  finally,  the  literature  on  democratization  is  arguing  again  about  the  positive sum  game  between  domestic  actors  and  the  international  dimension. 1.  global  democracy  and  the  need  to  overcome  the  ‘arab  exceptionalism’ concept the  popular  uprisings  that  stirred  the  arab  world  in  2011  have  urged  the  revision  of  the  existing  literature on  the  lack  of  democracy  in  the  mena  area  which  developed  around  the  concept  of  ‘arab  exceptionalism’. the  most  debated  issue  concerns,  instead,  the  conditions  for  mena  countries  to  be  eventually  affected  by democracy  diffusion.  being  aware  that  the  short-­term  changes  in  mena  political  systems  cannot  progress steadily   along   pre-­determined   stages   or   within   a   path   dependent   process,   democratization   can   be interpreted  and  conceived  as  a  ‘long-­term  democracy  diffusion  process’  (rossi,  2012)3. http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/contributors/stefania-panebianco http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/category/research/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn128458454650857f29d753e http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn143292085950857f29d8457 http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn90410192050857f2a01592 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 2/8 following  the  long-­term  perspective,  democracy  can  be  considered  at  the  global  level  as  a  social  innovation of  political  change4.  according  to  george  modelski,  democratization  is  strictly  related  to  the  evolution  of  the global   political   system   and   the   creation   of   a   global   community   and   world   public   opinion.   beyond   the evolution  of  global  politics  and  global  economy,  there  is  an  evolution  of  global  community  and  world  public opinion.  since  the  moment  when  democratization  as  a  social   innovation  has  been  introduced,  democratic practices  have  been  disseminated  on  a  global  scale.  this  process  can  be  represented  by  a  learning  curve that  shows  a  growing  proportion  of  the  population  living  in  democratic  countries  (modelski  and  perry  1991). the  contemporary  phase  is  called  “democratic  transition”  (decisive  or  selectional)  and  prepares  what  will  be the  next  phase,  building  the  foundations  for  a  future  democratic  governance.  in  the  current  stage,  radical islamist   movements   seem   to   be   the   forces   that   try   to   defy   the   contemporary   global   support   for democratization5  (modelski  2008).  among  the  co-­evolutionary  trends  identified  by  modelski,  world  opinion  – a   social   construction   characterized   by   strong   and   active   media   –   is   becoming   increasingly   important   in “defining  global  problems”  (modelski  and  thompson  2002;;  attinà  2011).  the  specific  role  of  information  and media  during  the  arab  spring  days  may  be  seen  as  part  of  such  a  rise  of  an  informed  world  public  opinion, even  if  it  is  difficult  to  assess  their  specific  influence  in  the  development  of  the  uprisings  (rossi,  2012). the  transitions  underway  in  some  mena  countries  may  also  be  considered  as  part  of  a  political  change  of short  duration  –  in  other  words  as  “conjunctures  of  events”  (attinà  2011,  cit.  in  rossi  2012)  –  and  hence such  change  should  be  nested  within  the  above  long  term  evolutionary  process. 2.  conceptualizing  democracy:  the  need  for  overcoming  cultural  borders the  conceptualization  of  democracy  has   traditionally  attracted  scholarly  attention.  the   inherent  difficulty consists   of   finding   a   definition   which   –   overcoming   any   cultural   specificity   –applies   to   different   regional contexts.  the  arab  revolts  indicate  that  a  common  definition  of  democracy  can  be  shared  as  long  as  this implies  periodic,  free,  fair,  effective  elections  for  choosing  parliamentary  and  executive  institutions;;  a  true multi-­party  system;;  together  with  freedom  of  assembly,  association  and  speech,  also  implying  the  free  use of  new  media6. de  facto  arab  protesters  seem  to  have  agreed  upon  a  shared  definition  of  democracy  that  is  both  procedural and  participatory,  thus  based  both  upon  political  rights  and  individual  liberties.  the  procedural  definition  of democracy  drawing  from  the  tradition  of  joseph  schumpeter  and  robert  dahl  is  not  in  contrast  with  a  plural political  society  that  is  not  necessarily  expressed  by  secular  forces  or  pro-­western  civil  society.  conversely, the  coexistence  of  various  social  and  political  forces  (including  islamist  parties)  can  only  be  the  guarantee  of a  plural  liberal  democracy.  tolerance  and  respect  of  various  forces  can  be  guaranteed  only  through  legal institutions.  hence,   to  ensure  a  competitive,   responsive  and  participatory  democracy,   the   rule  of   law   is required  as  a  guarantor  of  democratic  institutions  (o’donnell,  2001). scholars  of  democracy  are  well  aware  of  what  democracy   is   (or   is  not)  and  have  almost  agreed  on  a distinction   between   democratic   regimes,   authoritarian   regimes   and   post-­authoritarian   regimes,   or ‘democracies   with   adjectives’,   as   collier   and   lewitsky   called   them   (1997).   the   ‘minimal’   conditions   of democracy  indicated  by  dahl  (1971)  are  a  valid  instrument  to  identify  a  threshold  that  allows  distinguishing authoritarianism   from   democracy.   dahl   regards   both   liberalization   (or   competition)   and   participation   (or inclusiveness)   as   fundamental   conditions   to   establish   a   poliarchy,   therefore   he   identifies   the   following political   institutions   as   necessary   conditions   for   democracy:   elected   rulers;;   free,   correct   and   frequent elections;;   freedom   of   expression;;   access   to   multiple   sources   of   information;;   freedom   of   association;; universal   suffrage   (ibidem).   all   these   elements   individually   taken   are   necessary,   but   not   sufficient   to establish  a  democratic  regime. a  paradigm  of  political  change  acknowledging  a  stop-­and-­go  dynamic,  or  even  reverse  trends  in  the  short  to medium  term,  is  much  more  useful  to  understand  the  political  processes  involving  the  mena  area  rather than  a  deterministic   transition  paradigm.  the  current  political  ambiguity  might   lead   to  stable  democratic regimes  or,  conversely,  turn  into  new  types  of  authoritarian  regimes.  being  democratization  such  a  complex http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn165282880850857f2a02705 http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn104296297650857f2a0275e http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn5898731150857f2a2f748 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 3/8 process,   blocked   democratic   transitions   might   lead   to   the   instauration   of   ‘hybrid   regimes’,   i.e.   regimes characterized  by  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  (morlino  2011:  49),  instead  of  democratic  regimes.7 the  delicate  relationship  between  religion  and  democracy  is  another  crucial  issue  –  traditionally  debated  in political  theory  –  that  has  acquired  today  a  new  flair.  the  most  common  claim  of  a  presumed  incompatibility between  islam  and  democracy  recalls  samuel  huntington’s  argument  about  a  clash  of  civilization  (1996). undoubtedly,  in  some  cases  (as  senegal  or  mali)  coexistence  between  islam  and  democracy  is  not  easy,  but in  other  cases  (as  turkey  or  indonesia)  coexistence  was  feasible.  democracy  and  islam  can  coexist  when institutions   as   such   are   guaranteed   and   are   not   questioned   by   a   religiously   inspired   government.   the guarantee  of  democracy  relies  upon  the  respect  of   institutions,  as  a  more  important  value  than  religious principles.  in  this  respect,  the  turkish  case  is  particularly  relevant,  being  a  secular  state  (by  constitution) with  a  muslim  majority  population  that  is  ruled  by  a  muslim  majority  party.  as  an  islamic  country  that  has experienced   a   democratic   transition   process,   turkey   has   successfully   achieved   a   compromise   between secular  institutions  and  a  religiously  inspired  government.  in  turkey,  modernization  is  not  accompanied  by secularization  of  state  and  society;;  on  the  contrary,   it   is  being  marked  by  a  renewed  islamic  religiosity (ozzano,  2012).  again,  a  schumpeterian  concept  of  procedural  democracy  seems  to  prevail  in  turkey  over a   normative   definition   of   democracy   based   upon   the   a-­religiosity   of   a   secularistic   state.   many   scholars consider  the  turkish  experience  as  a  successful  ‘model’  for  the  mena  countries  timidly  experiencing  political change  processes. 3.  popular  mobilization  in  the  mena  area:  protesters  as  actors  of democratic  change the  2011  popular  mobilization  represents  the  highest  level  of  mobilization  ever  registered  in  the  arab  world. considering   that   political   participation   represents   a   fundamental   democracy   condition,   studies   on   social movements   are   devoting   much   attention   to   the   popular   dimension   of   the   arab   upheavals   to   grasp   any potential  of  democracy  diffusion  through  a  bottom-­up  strategy.  while  persistent  authoritarian  regimes  had flourished  with  the  silent  responsibility  –  if  not  even  support  –  of  the  western  world,  widespread  popular uprisings  and  the  high  number  of  casualties  occurred   in  the   last  eighteen  months   in  the  mena   countries indicate  that  democracy,  freedom  and  justice  are  regarded  as  vital  values  worth  fighting  for. the  tragic  self-­burning  of  mohamed  bouazizi  (a  26  years  old  unemployed  graduate),  which  took  place  in  the tunisian  inland  rural  town  of  sidi  bouzid  on  17  december  2010,  determined  a  sort  of  ‘domino  effect’,  i.e.  a contagious  popular  mobilization   favored  by  new  media  and  nourished  by  socio-­economic  dissatisfaction, rising   unemployment   (particularly   youth’s   and   middle   class’   unemployment),   long-­lasting   authoritarian political  control  and  denial  of  civil  liberties.  starting  in  sidi  bouzid,  a  wave  of  protests  quickly  spread  all  over the  mena  area  (in  tunisia,  egypt,  yemen,  bahrain  and  syria,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  also  in  algeria,  morocco, jordan  and  mauritania)  conveying  both  political  and  socio-­economic  requests,  with  freedoms  and  liberties alongside  better  employment,  all  regarded  by  protesters  as  goals  worth  dying  for. the  2011  popular  mobilization  was  strongly  different  from  previous  arab  experiences.  these  uprisings  were neither   ideological   nor   religiously   inspired   and   had   essentially   domestic   origins.   this   was   not   a   protest against  the  west,  nor  did  external  actors  instill  it.  protesters  in  tunisia  and  egypt  were  not  raising  islamic claims   nor   demanding   the   shari’a   law.   in   most   cases,   these   popular   revolts   started   as   peaceful demonstrations  characterized  by  slogans  pleading   for   freedom  and  political   reforms  and  were  organized independently  from  islamic  extremists  or  anti-­western  groups.  this  was  not  a  protest  of  the  poor  people;;  it was   rather   the   revolt   of   the   educated   middle   class.   these   spontaneous   protests   were   the   result   of   a contextual  situation:  they  depended  on  severe  political  and  economic  conditions,  but  were  facilitated  and acquired  such  proportion  thanks  to  the  new  communication  tools. investigating  features  and  actors  of  the  protest,  scholars  devoted  specific  attention  to  the  role  of  new  media among  the  most   important   factors   favoring  the   ‘domino  effect’  of   the  popular  mobilization,  with  protests quickly  becoming  a  transnational  phenomenon.  new  media  were  used  to  organize  the  popular  protests  by http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn134525371950857f2a30d3a 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 4/8 putting   together  heterogeneous  groups  sharing   the  same   (res)sentiment  against   the  political   leadership. internet  could  easily  transmit  this  common  feeling  that  was  widely  shared  in  most  mena  countries;;  it  was  an effective  instrument  for  mass  political  mobilization,  a  better  and  faster  way  to  leverage  widespread  popular dissatisfaction.   internet   and   mobile   phones   were   used   as   innovative   tools   to   organize   demonstrations, coordinate  activists  and  exchange  information.  on-­line  activism  accompanied  and  sustained  street  activism. thanks   to   the   new   technological   instruments,   popular   mobilization   acquired   an   impressive   transnational dimension. alongside   the   organizational   added   value,   new   media   were   also   extremely   useful   in   increasing   the awareness  of  the  arab  public  opinion  and  of  the  international  community  in  general.  local  and  international media  played  an   important   role   in  either  manipulating   information  or  broadcasting   the  brutal   repression internationally   (like   in   the   syrian   case   or   with   the   riots   taking   place   in   the   weeks   before   the   egyptian elections).  media,  in  particular  satellite  televisions  such  as  al  jazeera  and  al  arabiya,  and  social  networks such  as  facebook  and  twitter,  became  an  effective  political  actor  denouncing  the  repressive  action  of  the authoritarian  regimes   in   the  area.   internet  became  an   instrument   to  denounce  police  abuse  and  human rights   violations:   videos   posted   on   youtube   from   mobile   phones   were   essential   vehicles   to   broadcast information   in   real   time,   bypassing   the   institutional   regime-­controlled   media.   ‘cybernauts’   succeeded   in avoiding  censorship  and  posted  videos  with  a  high  emotional  impact,  thus  increasing  at  least  virtually  the opposition’s  power. thus,  technology  represents  a  serious  challenge  for  authoritarianism,  as  it  allows  to  denounce  any  kind  of violations  globally,  de  facto  spreading  democracy  as  a  global  process.  free  information  has  then  become both  a  democratic  tool  and  value. 4.  the  arab  spring  and  political  change:  an  actor-­centred  versus  a  system explanation? the  arab  spring  has  attracted   the  scholarly  attention  –  of   comparative  politics   in  particular  –  upon   the linkage  between  domestic  and  international  actors.  the  european  experience,  of  greece,  spain  and  portugal in  the  1980s,  of  central  and  eastern  europe  in  the  1990s,  evidenced  a  positive  sum  game  between  domestic and  international  dimension.  does  a  comparison  between  these  different  areas  show  similar  trends?  so  far political  change  in  the  mena  has  been  explained  primarily  through  an  actor-­centred  rather  than  a  system-­ explanation,  seeing  domestic  actors’  involvement  as  a  condicio  sine  qua  non  of  local  change. the  arab  spring  has  brought   to   the   fore   the   traditional  debate  on   the  determinants  of  democracy.  the literature  on  the  international  determinants  envisaged  diffusion  at  the  global,  regional  and  neighbor  state level  (starr,  1991:  356).  undeniably,  in  the  last  decades  globalization  has  become  an  important  feature  of the  global  political  system,  fostering  the  diffusion  of  democracy  both  as  a  political  regime  and  as  a  set  of principles  and  values  (see  §  1  above).  however,  the  different  outcomes  of  political  change  registered  so  far in  the  mena  countries  suggest  that  the  primary  responsibility  for  the  establishment  of  a  democratic  regime relies  upon  local  actors. the   short-­term   analysis   of   change   in   the   mena   region   has   singled   out   the   local   political   leadership   as prevailing  over  the  regional  context  in  determining  the  outcome  of  the  popular  requests  for  political  change. although  the  wave  of  protests  has  touched  almost  all  mena  countries,  only  few  regimes  fell.  namely,  ben  ali and   mubarak   were   overthrown,   and   quadhafi   was   killed   during   the   civil   war,   while   bashar   al-­assad   is violently  reacting  against  his  people,  trying  to  keep  his  power  despite  a  bloody  civil  war.  arab  monarchies proved  to  be  more  stable.  in  jordan  and  morocco,  the  ruling  dynasties  demonstrated  to  rely  upon  strong popular  support  and  legitimacy. without  neglecting  the  importance  of  the  international  arena  during  the  democratic  consolidation  phase,  the arab  experience  points  to  regime  change  as  a  mainly  domestic  political  choice.  it  is  only  when  the  tunisian and  egyptian  masses  started  their  violent  protests  that  the  old  authoritarian  regimes  were  defeated.  the 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 5/8 international   support   can   help   afterwards,   in   the   phase   of   instauration   and   consolidation   of   a   new (democratic)  regime.  therefore,  a  distinction  between  short-­  to  mid-­  and  long-­term  political  change  appears essential   to  understand  possible  modes  of  change.  an  actor-­centered  explanation  applies   in  the  short   to medium  term,  while  a  system  explanation  can  apply  considering  the  long  cycle  of  change.  this  indicates  that the  transition  to  democracy  must  be  primarily  an  endogenous  process,  ultimately  supported  by  external actors. another   relevant   assumption   concerns   the   key   domestic   actors   of   change.   in   the   short   term,   mass mobilization  is  a  relevant  driver  of  change,  with  new  actors  such  as  bloggers  and  social  networks  playing  a major  role.  in  the  medium  to  long-­term,  political  leadership  and  civil  society  networks  have  a  much  bigger responsibility  for  the  establishment  of  the  arenas  of  democracy  as  identified  by  linz  and  stepan  (1996).  the former  have  a  role  to  play  as  pars  destruens  denouncing  and  defeating  the  authoritarian  regime;;  the  latter are  relevant  as  pars  costruens   for  elaborating  new  norms  and   institutions.  the  general  public  mobilizing against   the   regime   requires   elite   actors   guiding   the   democratic   transition   through   the   setting   up   of democratic  institutions. popular  mobilization  from  below  can  be  effective  in  the  short  run  to  overcome  the  existing  regime  (as  in  the case  of  egypt),  while  elites  play  a  key  role  in  establishing  the  new  (democratic)  regime  in  the  medium  to long  term.  popular  mobilization  can  remove  authoritarian  regimes,  but  it  is  not  apt  to  set  up  new  institutions. for  democratization  to  be  successful,  since  it  is  commonly  accepted  that  no  universal  model  of  democracy exists,   a   procedural   democratic   model   can   be   envisaged   and   applied   to   culturally,   socially,   ethnically, economically  different  contexts. all  in  all,  a  persistent  long-­term  feature  seems  to  have  emerged.  a  new  political  competition  replaced  the former  stability  and  the  supposed  political  apathy  of  the  citizens  living  in  authoritarian  countries.  islamist actors,   in  particular,  proved  to  possess  a  relevant  political  power.  although  it   is  still  unsure  whether  any democratic  transition  will  succeed   in  the  area,  the  islamist  parties  will  have  an   important  role  to  play   in these   political   processes,   as   they   are   getting   a   large   electoral   support   (e.g.   in   tunisian,   egyptian   and moroccan  elections).  islamists  as  determinant  actors  of  the  transformation  of  authoritarian  regimes  might suggest  unusual  paths  to  democratic  change.  and  the   international  community  (and  the  eu)  will  have  to regard  non-­violent  islamist  actors  as  political   interlocutors,  particularly   if  they  are  democratically  elected and  represent  a  large  part  of  the  arab  political  realm  and  societies.8 if  we   first  of  all  consider  democracy   in   terms  of  democratic  procedures  and  respect  of   the  rules  of   the game,  or  as  linz  and  stepan  (1996)  claimed  there  is  an  agreement  on  the  ‘democratic  pact’,  democratic procedures  can  be  present  to  the  same  degree  among  those  who  favor  secular  democracy  and  those  who favor  a  political  system  that   is  both  democratic  and  islamic.  the  international  community  should  support these  political   changes  without  exacerbating  cultural  or   religious  differences,  by  developing  political  and economic  cooperation  with  the  local  actors,  irrespectively  of  their  political  or  religious  faith.  as  i  said  above (§  2),  the  turkish  case  proves  that  an  islamist  party  ruling  the  country  can  be  compatible  with  democratic institutions  and  procedures. domestic   determinants   (protests   originated   by   socio-­economic   dissatisfaction   and   authoritarian   rule) appeared   to   be   much   more   effective   in   the   fight   against   authoritarianism   than   the   external   dimension. diffusion  or  contagion  can  take  place  if  a  functioning  regional  institutional  network  exists  and  helps  to  share and  consolidate  democratic  practices,  as  it  was  the  case  with  eu  enlargement9.  it  is  misleading  to  talk  about a  ‘fourth  wave  of  democratization’,  since  the  political  change  process  appears  too  ambiguous  and  is  based on  a  case-­to-­case  basis.  the   ‘wave’  metaphor  suggests  a  sort  of  democratic  diffusion/democratic  effect process.   but   democratization   is   not   an   automatic   process.   contrary   to   what   happened   in   the   1990s   in central   and   eastern   europe,   when   due   to   a   sort   of   domino   effect   all   communist   regimes   turned   into democratic  regimes  based  on  market  economy,  the  arab  countries  map  shows  a  leopard  spot-­like  political change. this   does   not   mean   that   the   mena   area   has   to   remain   untouched   from   the   global   trend   towards http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn30510815050857f2a4bf60 http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn36174281350857f2a4d63b 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 6/8 democratization.  simply,  international  forces  and  actors  can  foster  the  democratization  process  at  a  later stage,  once  local  actors  (either  power  elites  or  opposition  movements  or  both)  take  the  lead  for  political change.  yet,  once  transition  starts,  there  is  no  inevitable  move  towards  democracy  consolidation,  being  the transition  paradigm  not  empirically  tested  as  a  global  trend.  the  outcomes  of  these  political  processes  are uncertain  and  depend  on  how  actors  deal  with  structural  conditions,  which  are  out  of  their  control  but  can  be tackled  with  different  strategies  and  options.  in  this  sense,  democratic  transition  cannot  be  –  and  never  is  – inevitable.  conversely,  democratization  is  a  dynamic  process  risking  to  be  reversed  by  de-­democratization processes  (tilly,  2007). 5.  preliminary  conclusion  to  foster  the  discussion no  deterministic  vision  can  be  applied  to  explain  recent  upheavals  in  mena  countries.  a  paradigm  of  change that  can  identify  the  possible  evolution  of  these  trends  is  certainly  more  useful  than  the  transition  paradigm (rossi,  2012).  the  metaphor  of  winds  of  democratic  change  blowing  in  the  mena  indicates  the  plurality  of challenges  and  perspectives  of  these  trends,  and  in  such  way  proposes  to  cover  both  the  potentialities  and uncertainties   of   political   change.   there   is   not   only   one   wind,   as   a   unique   and   straightforward   political transition   does   not   exist.   a   “wind”   derives   from   the   struggle   between   two   pressures   striving   to   find   a dynamic  equilibrium.  similarly,  political  transformations  in  mena  countries  follow  some  key  “differences  in pressure”  or  “differences  of  focus”  in  the  move  to  new  potentially  dynamic  political  orders  (ibidem). structural  explanations  of  democratization  would  suggest  a  causal  mechanism  that  risks  becoming  a  sort  of deterministic   process   that   is   far   from   being   real10.   structural   conditions   can   favor   the   stabilization   of democracy,  but  rarely  can  –  on  their  own  –  allow  democratization.  the  democratization  experiences  suggest that  –  since  there  are  various  historical,  institutional  and  structural  conditions  for  regime’s  change  –  there are  no  fixed  prerequisites  of  democratization;;  the  local  actors’  will  is  instead  essential  for  the  beginning  of the  democratization  process. what  the  arab  uprisings  suggest   is  the  need  for  a  combination  of  pro-­democratic  social  forces  and  class action,   together  with  active  elite  actors.  yet,   the  popular  mobilization   in  the  mena  area  created  volatile, collective  identities  that  collapsed  easily  without  proposing  a  valid  ruling  alternative.  social  forces  such  as university  students  or  human  rights  activists  effectively  used  the  new  media  to  organize  the  protest,  but then  proved  weak  to  propose  a  political  program.  this  suggests  that  collective  action  can  provide  indications to  rulers  but  cannot  rule.  in  tunisia  and  egypt,  large  parts  of  the  population  participated  in  the  protests,  but were  not  organized  in  groups  that  could  express  a  political  project.  spontaneous  groups,  also  created  via the  internet,  have  then  left  place  to  more  structured  actors  such  as  islamist  parties  (ennahda  in  tunisia  and muslim  brotherhood  in  egypt),  which  confirmed  their  large  popular  support  with  an  extraordinary  electoral result. this   region-­based   analysis   does   not   aim   to   provide   a   general   theory   of   democratization,   but   empirical references  to  test  some  determinants  of  democratization   identified  by  the   literature.  the  analysis  of   the arab  democratic  uprisings   in  2011  suggests   that   the  actor-­centered  approach   is  better  suited   to  explain democratic  change   than  system  approaches.  further   research  and  a  comparison  between  regions  might further  foster  the  theory  of  democratization. predictions  concerning  a  democratic  transition  are  shortsighted.  an  important  lesson,  though,  can  be  drawn from  popular   revolts   in   the  arab  countries:   religious   traditions  prevailing   in  most  arab  countries  do  not inhibit  the  emergence  of  a  democratic  culture  as  an  ensemble  of  attitudes,  beliefs  and  values  of  the  ordinary citizens.   empirical   studies   have   already   demonstrated   that   public   opinion   is   aware   of   the   value   of   civil liberties  and  political   rights;;  what  has   instead  been  missing   in   the  area   is   the   institutional  dimension  of democracy  (tessler  2002:  338).  the  relationship  between  democracy  and  islam  has  been   long  debated, arguing  in  favor  or  against  the  compatibility  between  them.  there  is  not  a  clear-­cut  position  on  that,  because the   influence   of   the   muslim   religion   depends   to   a   very   considerable   extent   on   how   and   by   whom   it   is interpreted  (tessler  2002:  340). http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest#fn166272468050857f2a5619c 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 7/8 even  though  the  outcome  of  stable  democratic  regimes  is  far  from  certain,  winds  of  political  change  are blowing.  historically,  the  path  to  democracy  has  been  variegated.  the  mena  countries  are  not  an  exception. notes *   this   article   draws   from   a   research   conducted   within   the   framework   of   the   12-­month   jean   monnet information  and  research  activity   ‘eu  foreign  policy  and  democracy  promotion’  (eudem)   funded   by   the european  commission  through  the  llp  (project  n°  2010-­3285).  more  extensively  panebianco  (2012). 1  since  the  early  2011  both  scholars  and  media  have  been  talking  about  an   ‘arab  spring’   to  stress  the awakening   of   the   arab   world   from   long-­lasting   authoritarianism.   one   year   later,   facts-­based   analyses discard  the  initial  optimism  and  unveil  ambiguous  realities.  i  will  refer  here  to  ‘arab  spring’  being  aware  of the  conceptual  weakness  of  this  concept  and  of  the  uncertainty  of  this  process. 2   in   the   early   1990s   the   spread   of   democracy   seemed   to   be   inevitable,   particularly   with   the   fall   of communism   (see,   for   instance,   fukuyama   1992)   and   the   diffusion   of   democracy   that   was   promoted   in europe  through  the  eu’s  enlargement  process  (schimmelfennig  and  scholz  2008).  yet,  this  global  movement towards  democracy  left  the  arab  world  untouched,  with  old  authoritarian  regimes  stably  in  place  until  2011. this  phenomenon  is  at  the  basis  of  the  ‘arab  exceptionalism’  concept.  some  scholars  brought  this  concept  to an  extreme  and  even  argued  that  there  is  something  inherently  undemocratic  about  islam  as  a  religious doctrine,  or  the  way  in  which  islamic  societies  are  organized  (huntington,  1996).  on  the  arab  exceptionalism see  –  among  others  –  stepan  and  robertson  (2003;;  2004),  diamond  (2010). 3  for  the  differences  and  relationship  between  short-­term  and  long-­term  change  perspective  of  analysis  see attinà  (2011:  71-­83). 4  this  reconstruction  of  democratization  as  a  long-­term  process  draws  from  rossi  (2012).  with  modelski  and thompson’s  terms  (2002:  128,  cit.  in  rossi  2012):  “if  democracy  is  not  a  western  universalist  pretension  … but  a  potent  social  innovation,  a  generally  applicable  technology  for  effective  cooperation,  then  its  continued future  spread  might  be  estimated  on  the  basis  of  well-­established  laws  of  diffusion  of  innovation”. 5   however,   according   to   the   author   it   is   required   that   the   world   system   reaches   “a   condition   of overwhelming  majority  for  democracies,  accounting  for,  say,  90  percent  of  the  world  population”  —  which will  not  be  reached  before  the  middle  of  this  century  (around  year  2075)  (modelski  2012)  —  to  register  an influence  on  the  coming  macro-­decision  phase,  aiming  to  reach  a  systemic  democratic  peace. 6  in  this  respect  the  definition  of  democracy  elaborated  by  robert  dahl  in  the  1970s  seems  still  adequate  to the  needs  and  demands  formulated  during  the  revolts. 7  the  definition  of  hybrid  regimes  provided  by  morlino  (2011:  56),  includes  both  ambiguity  and  some  sort  of stabilization  or  duration. 8   at   the   recent   elections,   islamists   performed   very   well,   disappointing   those   inattentive   observers   who wrongly  believed  that  the  arab  spring  was  paving  the  way  for  secular  democratic  rule.  protesters  made  use of  new  media  and  technology  to  bypass  the  domestic  censorship,  but  never  made  reference  to  western values  or  habits. 9  the  fundamental  role  of  eu  institutions  in  providing  a  framework  for  the  democratic  change  of  central  and eastern  european  countries  was  played  essentially  via  the  enlargement  process;;  this  was  also  experienced in  the  turkish  reform  process  (schimmelfennig  and  scholtz  2008). 10  seymour  lipset’s  work  (1959)  is  at  the  origins  of  the  modernization  theory  claiming  that  countries  that have  undergone  a  more  extensive  process  of  societal  modernization  are  more  likely  to  be  democratic. 08/07/2013 italian political science: the arab spring: when democracy meets global protest* www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest 8/8 references attinà,  f.,  2011.  the  global  political  system.  houndmills,  baisngstoke:  palgrave  macmillan. collier,  d.  and  levitsky,  s.,  1997.  “democracy  without  adjectives.  conceptual  innovation  in comparative  research”.  world  politics,  49  (3),  pp.  430-­451. dahl,  r.a.,  1971.  poliarchy.  participation  and  opposition.  new  haven:  yale  university  press. diamond,  l.,  2010.  “why  are  there  no  arab  democracies”.  journal  of  democracy,  21(1),  pp. 93-­104. fukuyama,  f.,  1992.  the  end  of  history  and  the  last  man.  new  york,  ny:  free  press. huntington,  s.p.,  1996.  the  clash  of 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microsoft word pdf_issue_14_1_profeti.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 1, march 2019 * this article is based on a research carried out within the research project of national relevance (prin) 2015 titled «i comuni come sistemi di contratti? il governo locale italiano alla prova della governance» (20157c4h4m). © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 1, 21-37. contact author: stefania profeti, university of bologna. e-mail address: stefania.profeti@unibo.it reshaping policy solutions through local implementation: the rationalization of municipal corporations in leghorn and the case of aamps stefania profeti university of bologna abstract within the context of the austerity policies introduced in italy over the last decade, a major role has been played by the top-down driven “rationalisation” of public spending and organisations, particularly in terms of the country’s local authorities and of the plethora of companies in which such authorities hold interests. against this backdrop, and through the analysis of what happened in an "extreme" case such as the leghorn municipality, the essay aims to analyse how and how much the rationalisation ‘recipe’ promoted by the central government is transformed when it is prepared at lower levels. the analysis brings to light not only the importance of local politics in the transfer of policy ideas, but also the role played by both the characteristics of the implementation structure developed around the municipal rationalization plan, as well as some sudden changes to the contextual conditions. in fact, the interweaving of these two dimensions – the endogenous and exogenous to the policy process – plays a key role in redirecting the declared strategies of local decision makers during the course of operations, and in redefining problems and solutions in the transition from the centre to the periphery. 1. introduction ithin the context of the austerity policies introduced in italy over the course of the last decade, a major role has been played by the ‘rationalisation’ of public spending and organisations (bolgherini et al. 2019), particularly in terms of the country’s local authorities and of the plethora of companies in which such authorities hold interests (citroni et al. 2019). starting with decree law 78/2010, ‘urgent measures regarding financial stabilisation and economic competitiveness’, followed by the spending review proposals submitted by the special commissioner cottarelli in 2014, and the more recent ‘consolidated act on state-controlled enterprises’ implementing the so-called ‘madia law’, numerous legislative measures have in fact been introduced in an effort to reduce the number of state-controlled enterprises and to rationalise this instrument and its use. on the basis of this latter legislation, as from 2015 local authorities – just like other public administrations – are required to draw up special and annual plans for the rationalisation of their own state-controlled enterprises, in accordance with a series of criteria and requirements expressly established by central government, regarding w reshaping policy solutions through local implementation 22 both the sectors in which such enterprises operate, and their organisational and financial characteristics. the present essay aims to analyse what happens to the rationalisation ‘recipe’ promoted by the central government when it is translated at lower levels. as a starting point, i assume that together with the instructions received from the centre, other ‘ingredients’ of an eminently local nature (mclaughlin 1987; barrett 2004), coupled with strategic political considerations (yin 1981; howlett and mukherjee 2017), contribute towards the (re)formulation of the imperatives of rationalisation during the drafting and implementation of local plans. more precisely, since in multi-layered institutional settings, central policy guidelines require ‘a secondary policy formation activity on the part of local government’ (hupe et al. 2014), i consider implementation as a part of an ongoing process of policy making which physiologically implies some adaptations (howlett 2018). furthermore, due to the thorny nature of the rationalisation issue and the complex network of actors involved therein, i treat implementation as an iterative process made up of several decisional rounds, each of which may ‘change the direction of the match, new players can appear, and in some cases the rules of the game can even be changed’ (teisman 2000, 939). based upon these premises, the analysis presented here goes beyond the outputdriven objective of measuring and explaining the implementation gap between central provisions and local practices –whose existence is somewhat taken for granted – but rather focuses on the drivers that may concur in (re)shaping problems, solutions and actors’ strategies as implementation goes on. to this purpose, besides taking into account specific contextual conditions which are key in the bottom-up approach to implementation (such as policy legacy, the local nature of political competition, the relative salience of the issue, as well as the multiple stakes involved in the policy subsystem), attention is paid to the different streams of actors, problems and events that go along with the drafting and execution of local rationalisation plans, eventually triggering subsequent rounds of policy calibration. the analysis of the implementation process focuses on a single pilot case study (yin 1994; 2003) so as to achieve the greatest possible amount of information and theoretical insights in view of future comparative research on the topic (flyvbjerg 2011).1 indeed, the objective of this essay is exploratory by nature since on the one hand there is no consolidated framework to analyse implementation out of the success/failure paradigm (howlett 2018) or beyond deficit analysis (hupe et al. 2014; sausman et al. 2016) and, on the other, the policy under scrutiny – i.e. the rationalisation of municipal corporations in italy – is quite recent and poorly understood so far. the choice fell on the city of leghorn because, as will be discussed below, the peculiarity of its politics, the salience of state 1 in the analysis i made recourse to classic case-study instruments, relying on data source triangulation. in addition to the electoral programmes and official statements by candidates and political representatives, i examined the operating plans for rationalisation of the state-controlled enterprises approved by leghorn municipality in 2015 and 2017, the corresponding accompanying technical reports, as well as other primary sources such as contract services, local administrative courts’ judgments and aamps annual reports. furthermore, around 150 articles published in the local edition of the major newspapers (il tirreno, la nazione, la repubblica, corriere della sera) and local information websites between january 2014 and august 2018 were selected through keyword search and examined manually. three face to face in-depth interviews with municipal officers (environment and organisation departments) and trade unionists, lasting about an hour each, were personally conducted between march and april 2019 to fill the gaps and check the accuracy of inference. stefania profeti 23 controlled enterprises in the public debate and the conditions of municipal corporations maximise the likelihood of strategic local action. after a brief overview of the criteria of rationalisation established at national level (section 2), aimed at reconstructing the causal theory that guided the formulation of the government’s policy recipe, the essay reconstructs the decisional rounds that accompany the implementation of the rationalisation plans within the municipality of leghorn (section 3) with specific focus on the measures adopted in regard to one company in particular, aamps s.p.a. the concluding section 4 discusses the results of the analysis, and offers a number of hypotheses which could be tested in future studies of a comparative nature. 2. designing rationalisation at the centre from the 1990s onwards, the debate over italy’s municipally-controlled enterprises was linked to the broader debate regarding the reform of the local authorities and public services (citroni et al. 2019; 2018). the introduction of enterprises owned wholly or largely by the state among the various forms of services management that local authorities were permitted to adopt under italian law 142/90, for example, clearly reveals the close relationship between autonomist euphoria and managerial inspiration that accompanied those civil service reforms at that time, characterised by a generalised recourse to private-law instruments in the exercise of functions that had traditionally been reserved for the public administration. at the same time, however, both political discourse and the legislation introduced in the following decade, leading to the disorderly regulation of local public services, reflected the decision makers’ greater interest in promoting the principle of competitiveness in the assignment of services than in establishing any limits to the corporate instrument itself, which, as a consequence, developed rapidly in the absence of any true ‘theory of change’ (weiss, 1995). the number of limited companies established and controlled by local authorities in fact grew exponentially from a handful in the early 1990s to almost 5,000 in 2015 (see ifel 2015). such companies ended up not only operating in the utilities sector (the management of which, in virtue of their industrial character, was entrusted to third-party private concerns), but also, in approximately 40% of all cases, in some policy domains (such as care services) where the use of the corporate instrument appears unnecessary, or even in sectors which had nothing to do with the municipalities’ institutional purposes (see ifel 2015). as various studies have shown, the growth of state-controlled enterprises well beyond the ideal level leads to the assumption that they were being used not so much for managerial purposes, but rather as a means by which to take advantage of the formally private nature of the enterprises in order to circumscribe certain restrictions on public administrations: both financial constraints (e.g. compliance with the internal stability pact) and limits on the hiring of staff, the choice of suppliers and contractual partners, and the transparency and disclosure of decisional processes (galanti 2016). furthermore, several scholars – as well as a great deal of public opinion – read the growth of municipal corporations as the effect of pervasive political/partisan appointments within stateowned enterprises, that led to the proliferation of patronage dynamics, especially at the sub-national level (di mascio 2014). reshaping policy solutions through local implementation 24 it has only been over the last decade, when faced with the worsening of the global economic crisis and the political importance given in italy to the question of the costs of politics – which was added to the public agenda in particular following the early electoral success of the five star movement (5sm) – that the phenomenon of state-controlled enterprises has been the subject of a series of ad hoc laws designed to better regulate the use of this particular instrument. in a first phase (2007-2014) these provisions, which continued to be of a largely disjointed nature as they were often part of omnibus legislation (citroni and di giulio 2016; galanti 2016), were set against a background of a general call for the containment of civil service spending (di mascio and natalini 2014), following a strategy of ‘maintaining’ (pollitt and bouckaert 2004). for instance, the 2007 financial bill put a limit on the number of members of company boards, and decree law 78/2010 envisaged a 10% cut in their pay; on the other hand, starting with the 2008 financial bill, several provisions prevented local governments from creating new companies, in order to freeze the number of municipal corporations (bonura 2017). it was only in 2014, however, that a streamlining approach to the rationalisation of state-controlled enterprises began to develop, as they received specific attention within the spending review operations conducted by the special commissioner carlo cottarelli, who was entrusted by the then prime minister, matteo renzi, with the task of drafting a report on this phenomenon and of outlining a number of possible solutions to the problem. the programme of rationalisation of state-controlled enterprises provided for by the so-called ‘cottarelli report’ delivered in august 2014 was designed to reduce the ‘morass’ of state-controlled enterprises (some 7,762 in number, of which 5,000 were controlled by local authorities), many of which were in the red. the commissioner’s proposal, which was largely incorporated into the 2015 finance bill, recouped many of the ingredients previously introduced in a rather fragmented fashion, and transformed them into a more organic approach centred around three aspects of the problem, each with its own proposed solution, as follows: a) the stunted nature of the enterprises in question, their fragmentation and their failure to pursue economies of scale when managing their assigned services. these problems could be countered by reducing the number of such enterprises and by encouraging and facilitating processes of corporate aggregation, particularly in the utilities sector. b) the inefficiency and financial weakness of the enterprises. in this regard, the proposed solution consists in the introduction of specific economic-financial parameters to be employed in order to assess whether or not the existing state-controlled enterprises should be maintained, with those enterprises that have been operating at a loss for some considerable time to be sold off, and with the elimination of ‘shell companies’ (i.e. those state-controlled enterprises with very few employees and low turnover, but nevertheless requiring an administrative structure). the so-called ‘micro-holdings’, that is, interests too small to be of strategic importance for the municipalities concerned, would be sold. c) the ‘distorted’ use of the corporate instrument. in response to this an attempt was made on the one hand to limit the operation of state-controlled enterprises exclusively to the institutional tasks of the municipal stakeholders, and on the other hand to bring the functioning of such enterprises back to the scope of public law. stefania profeti 25 this would be achieved by establishing, for example: an obligation to hire personnel through transparent, non-discriminatory procedures; the inclusion of statecontrolled enterprises within the scope of local authorities’ consolidated financial statements; disclosure and transparency requirements as a means to preventing corruption; and a ban on the assignment of senior posts to persons who have held political office in public entities. in accordance with this project, the 2015 finance act (italian law no. 190/2014) established that each public administration, including municipalities, had to formulate and approve an operating plan by 31 march 2015, containing an overview of all stakes held and of the characteristics of the enterprises concerned, together with a programme for the reduction in the number of (directly and indirectly) state-controlled enterprises that takes account of certain specific guidelines: • the elimination of those enterprises and shareholdings that are not indispensable for the pursuit of institutional purposes; • the abolition of enterprises composed solely of directors, or of more directors than employees; • the elimination of shareholdings in enterprises that carry out similar types of business, including by means of mergers; • the aggregation of enterprises operating in the utilities sector, with the aim of increasing their dimensions and of favouring the achievement of economies of scale; • the containment of running costs, also through the reorganisation of administrative and control bodies, and of business units, and through a reduction in the corresponding levels of remuneration. the consolidated act on state-controlled enterprises, which was part of the madia law on civil service reform, was approved in 2016 (law decree 175/2016) and preserved exactly the same guidelines, introducing stricter rules on the dimensional and economicfinancial aspects to be taken into account when deciding on whether or not to preserve a company. however, it had to be revised shortly after the constitutional court struck down some key parts of the reform on the grounds that they should have been approved by regional governments. the renewed decree 100/2017 partially relaxed the rationalisation requirements for local authorities, as far as it postponed several deadlines (e.g. for the adaptation of companies’ statutes and for the approval of rationalisation plans), extended the scope of admissible activities, and halved the turnover threshold to avoid restructuring from 1 million euro to 500,000 euro. in addition to softening the rationalisation criteria, such changes and postponements noticeably introduced some uncertainty in the national regulatory framework, thus reducing the pressure to stick to the rule and paving the way to wider discretion in local implementation strategies. 3. when rationalization goes local: municipal corporations in leghorn and the case of aamps however, what happens to the principles coming from the centre when they reach the peripheral decision-making arenas? what factors come into play in the decodification and reshaping policy solutions through local implementation 26 recodification of the guidelines received? furthermore, which drivers accompany the transition from the choice of local solutions, to the implementation of those solutions? this essay intends to reconstruct the transformation of the rationalisation imperatives between centre and periphery, looking at the intertwining of different streams of actors, problems and events that go along with the local implementation process in a pilot case. as said in the introduction, the choice of a pilot case study is justified by the fact that no systematic research has been carried out so far on the topic. the objective is to explore if, when and how factors endogenous to the local context and environmental conditions, such as the onset of changes within the economic, political and legislative context, combine together in reshaping policy problems and solutions when a top-down designed rationalisation programme is transferred at lower levels, so as to identify some hypotheses to be tested through future comparative research. from this point of view leghorn undoubtedly represents an ideal observational context, since on the one hand, its legacy in terms of municipal corporations provides a fertile ground for rationalisation measures and, on the other, the characteristics of the local political system maximise the likelihood of divergent implementation strategies. in 2014, i.e. the year in which the census was conducted in order to comply with the requirements of the 2015 finance act, the municipality in fact held investments in quite a number of enterprises (a total of 28, with the municipality holding direct interests in 17 of them), of which a substantial share (10) had made losses over the previous three years, some (5) were already in liquidation, and none had provided the municipality with any profit. the indebtedness of certain leghorn companies had already come to the attention of the ministry of the economy and finance prior to the cottarelli report, revealing a critical situation and thus one that had to be addressed in terms of rationalisation. at the same time, in 2014 the city’s government dramatically changed political colours when, after years of centre-left government, the 5sm candidate filippo nogarin was elected mayor. indeed, as numerous studies have shown (see, among others, mosca 2013), since its very inception the 5sm has always been contrary to the privatisation of certain public services (first and foremost, the water service), while at the same time clearly opposing the political ‘caste’ and the improper costs of political bodies, and this has had a number of potentially ambivalent implications in terms of the decisions to be made regarding state-controlled enterprises. this section will reconstruct the rationalisation process of those enterprises in which the municipality of leghorn holds investments, with a specific focus on the measures adopted in regard to one company in particular, aamps s.p.a. since implementation is understood here as a dynamic process, the analysis identifies four different decisional rounds (teisman 2000), each one leading to some reshaping of formerly set strategies: the definition of the new mayor’s agenda; the approval of the first rationalisation plan; the selection of an ad-hoc solution for aamps; and the entry into force of that decision. for each round, the key events, the most relevant concurring processes and the network of actors involved have been identified, as summarised in table 1. table 1. decisional rounds in the rationalisation of aamps: a summary decision-making rounds relevant events relevant concurring events key actors implementation (sub)strategy stefania profeti 27 definition of mayor’s agenda (summer autumn 2014) mayor’s decision to cut municipal corporation directors’ pay by 20%; resolution by the municipal council amending former decision to merge aamps with retiambiente. publication of the cottarelli report mayor; 5sm national leaders strategic reframing approval of 1st rationalization plan (january-november 2015) changes at the head of aamps approval of the aamps draft budget for 2014 postponed the board of auditors rejects aamps financial records for 2014 pending approval of the national decree on local government finance decree 78/2015 on local govt. finance allows the transfer of unpaid claims from aamps to the municipality mayor; councillors for the environment and the accounts; 5sm councillors; aamps managers cherry-picking identifying the solution for aamps: the arrangement with creditors (end 2015-2016) dismissal of 3 councillors from 5sm group resignation of the councillor for the environment; revocation of the aamps chairman and board administrative appeals with the coastal ato judicial inquiry ‘clean town’ on aamps mismanagement between 2012 and 2016; discovery of new legal options for bankruptcy (then acknowledged in the consolidated act on state-controlled enterprises); forthcoming local elections in some other capital cities mayor; councillors for the environment and the accounts; aamps managers; 5sm national leaders; legal advisors; coastal ato; trade unions; local magistrates; creditors adjustment to environmental changes entry into force of the arrangement with creditors (2017-ongoing) administrative appeals with regional govt. and coastal ato the council approves the arrangement with creditors (oct. 2017) final approval of the consolidated act on state-controlled enterprises; resignation of 2 councillors from the 5sm group (the 5sm loses self-sufficient majority); suspension of tender procedure in the coastal ato; local elections and changing majorities in neighbouring municipalities mayor; councillor for the accounts; aamps managers; legal advisors; regional government; coastal ato; local administrative court; mayor consolidation and local grounding 3.1. round 1: setting the 5sm’s agenda for leghorn as just mentioned, the imperative rationalisation of state-controlled enterprises, which started from the spring of 2014, coincided with elections in many municipalities. in leghorn, the 5sm candidate nogarin included local state-controlled enterprises among the key issues of his electoral campaign, defining them as examples of the ‘system of patronage inherited from the democratic party (pd)’,2 and framing them as a problem not only 2 ‘nogarin: “a livorno dal pd abbiamo ereditato il sistema clientelare, adesso basta”, la nazione-livorno, 5 september 2014. reshaping policy solutions through local implementation 28 of a financial nature, but also of improper privileges: ‘over the years, these companies have totted up considerable debts (tens of thousands of euro), and yet those people appointed (by politicians) to run these companies, have been paid amounts that are not in keeping with the actual performance of the companies themselves’.3 three solutions to this problem, defined in these terms, were proposed, namely: ‘cutting the costs of politics, reducing waste, and ensuring the utmost transparency of public resource management’.4 this was to be achieved through a series of proposals specifically addressed to statecontrolled enterprises, as set out in the 5sm electoral programme. these proposals included: a) the creation of the ‘citizen controller’ figure on the boards of enterprises in which municipal government has a controlling interest; b) the creation of a system of citizen participation through online meetings and consultations, in view of substantial spending and works involving state-controlled companies; c) guaranteeing the utmost transparency regarding appointments, through the creation of a technical advisory committee tasked with the evaluation of candidates’ cvs, ‘thus favouring meritocracy over the existing patronage-based system’.5 in the course of the electoral campaign, and during his first months in office, on several occasions mayor nogarin came out against the privatisation of certain local statecontrolled companies, in line with the 5sm national policy and in clear contrast with the policies implemented by the pd in tuscany, and in previous years in the city of leghorn itself.6 furthermore, the line set out in the programme with regard to the reduction of waste was confirmed in the summer of 2014 (thus concurrently with the release of the cottarelli report), when the newly-elected mayor launched an ‘independent’ rationalisation plan involving a 20% cut in the pay of the companies’ directors.7 the newly-elected leghorn council thus operated a sort of strategic reframing (boxembaum 2006) of the rationalisation imperatives, garnishing its proposals with the standard 5sm rhetoric against the traditional political caste, while completely ignoring problems such as the fragmentation of state-controlled enterprises, their inefficiency, and the need to generate economies of scale in local utilities. all these topics were, on the other hand, key aspects of the policy promoted by the national government in the 2015 finance act. 3.2. round 2: the approval of the first rationalisation plan leghorn municipality’s strategy in the first rationalisation plan approved in 2015 appears very much in keeping with the new mayor’s programme, while respecting some selected national indications in a cherry-picking fashion. on the one hand, the idea was to sell off those of the municipality’s interests in the directly and indirectly controlled enterprises that were deemed not to be indispensable to institutional functioning (as with the ‘fidi toscana’), and to close all of those that had already been wound up by the 3 the leghorn 5sm’s 2014-2019 electoral programme (www.livorno5stelle.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/programma1.7.pdf) 4 facebook post by filippo nogarin, 15 may 2014 5 see: www.livorno5stelle.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/programma1.7.pdf 6 ‘nogarin: “la nostra mission: cambiare, cambiare, cambiare”, quotidiano.net, 24 december 2014. 7 ‘ridotti del 20 per cento i compensi degli amministratori delle società controllate dal comune’, leghorn municipality press release, 4 july 2014. stefania profeti 29 previous council, with a view to reducing costs and eliminating waste. on the other hand, in the case of all those state-controlled enterprises that it had been decided to maintain, operating costs were to be contained, in particular through cuts in staff costs. in no case, however – contrary to the guidelines issued by the central government – was the path of aggregation or merger with other companies chosen. this decision appears particularly significant in the case of aamps, the nature of which would have led one to assume that it was to be merged with other companies. the independent municipal public services company (azienda autonoma municipale dei pubblici servizi aamps) was founded in 1949 following a decision taken by the municipal council. in 1996 it was changed into a special company, and then transformed again in 1998, to become a limited company in which the municipality of leghorn held 100% interest. over the years, the council has always entrusted the waste management service to the company; the last direct award dates from 2008, during the first of the two terms of office of the then mayor alessandro cosimi of the pd. provision of this service by the company was envisaged up until the year 2030. however, in the intervening period a number of changes were made to both national and regional law. tuscany regional law 69/2011, in particular, provided for the creation of local integrated public services areas (ambiti territoriali ottimali ato) on a macro-provincial scale, tasked with the management of waste collection and disposal services, and required a unique operator for each such area. to this end, under the guidance of the tuscany regional government, those municipalities coming within the coastal area ato (including leghorn), benefiting from a strong degree of centre-left political homogeneity, launched the merger of their state-controlled enterprises into one single company, retiambiente, initially 100% publicly owned but due to become a joint private-public enterprise through the selection, by tender, of a private minority shareholder. in 2011, leghorn municipal council approved the idea of transferring aamps to retiambiente; and with its resolution no. 503/2012, it established that the contract for the provision of services stipulated with aamps, notwithstanding its duration until 2030, was to lose validity as soon as retiambiente had become operative. these decisions would seem to indicate that the fate of aamps had already been decided in 2012. the 2014 rationalisation requirements became even more imperative given the extremely critical financial position of the company which, over the course of the years, had accumulated enormous debts to suppliers and external companies, largely due to uncollected customer charges.8 falling within the category of utilities companies, and being among those such companies in financial difficulty, according to the criteria established at national level aamps should have been merged with, or incorporated in, other companies. however, the new majority leading leghorn municipal council decided to go a different route, by questioning the original plan for the merger of aamps with retiambiente in its council resolution no. 225 of 23 december 2014, which was passed thanks to the votes of the 5sm and of other majority civic lists. in this resolution, the mayor undertook to ‘take steps, using all means at his disposal’, to annul or amend the decision taken by the previous council, and to follow one of two alternative paths: either save aamps by recapitalising the company using municipal funds, so as to continue the 8 ‘aamps è malata di debiti, la medicina amara di rosi’, il tirreno livorno, 1 may 2012; interview 3 environment department. reshaping policy solutions through local implementation 30 in-house service provision independently; or to have aamps become part of retiambiente, but only if the new service management enterprise remained totally in public hands. indeed, the two alternative solutions to save aamps divided the majority. on the one hand, during the early months of 2015 (i.e. at the time of the submission to the council of the draft operating plan for the rationalisation of municipal companies) most of the 5sm’s councillors strongly opposed the hypothesis to keep the door open for retiambiente, and suspended the approval of the plan asking for a more explicit break with past administrations.9 on the other, both the aamps management (which was changed three times by the mayor in the first half of 2015 alone, in line with his propensity to spoils system practices)10 and the councillor responsible for the environment, privileged the hypothesis of a gradual relaunch of the company through a new industrial plan, in view of the possible merger. the industrial plan delivered by aamps in the summer of 2015 was nevertheless rejected by the 5sm national tiers as it was deemed to be ‘not in line with the 5sm’s programme’ and too close to the pd’s approach to waste management.11 at the same time, the councillor responsible for the accounts (who in 2017 would leave leghorn to join mayor raggi’s rome city executive committee) began to question the possibility of recapitalising the company, since the operation would have endangered the stability of the council’s budget and the financial sustainability of other policies, in particular social services.12 all these episodes occurred against the turbulent (and late) approval process of the aamps budget for 2014. this had been postponed several times during 2015 while waiting for the possible novelties introduced by the pending national law on local finances with respect to the transfer of unpaid claims from the company to the municipality. in october 2015, after this was deemed possible with decree 78/2015, about 11 million euro of unpaid claims were transferred from aamps to the municipal budget.13 in spite of the adverse opinion of the aamps board of auditors, who were questioning the fairness of such an operation, on 19 november, the municipal council approved the company’s budget in the absence of any sound hypotheses on the company’s future. a decision had thus to be made shortly to avoid failure, amidst uncertainty and rival solutions. 3.3. round 3: another solution for aamps at the end of november 2015 the final decision was given which removed all of the alternative solutions considered up until then: so as ‘to avoid the reorganisation plan hitting the pockets of leghorn’s citizens’,14 the council decided not to recapitalise the company, but chose to go with the solution of an arrangement with creditors aimed at continuing 9 ‘società comunali, il m5s ferma il piano della giunta’, il tirreno livorno, 31 march 2015 10 interview 2 organization department. 11 ‘i parlamentari m5s bocciano il piano industriale di aamps’, il tirreno livorno, 10 august 2015. 12 ‘when companies decide that recapitalisation is the only possible instrument the council can employ in a reorganisation plan, i say no’, interview with city councillor lemmetti, reported in the article entitled ‘tregua finita, aamps verso lo sciopero’, il tirreno livorno, 18 october 2015. 13 council resolution n. 453/2015. 14 ‘nogarin: “aamps, il concordato non peserà né sulle tasche dei cittadini né sulle casse comunali”’, il tirreno livorno, 11 june 2016. stefania profeti 31 business operations, pursuant to section 186-bis of the bankruptcy law.15 actually, the pre-bankruptcy procedure for settlement with creditors had not been a legal option for public enterprises until a case law of the supreme court of cassation in late 201316 paved the way to that possibility. that solution was proposed by the councillor for the accounts following legal advice by the law firm lanzalone & partners, and it was suddenly supported by mayor nogarin. although enabling aamps to continue operations, the prebankruptcy procedure placed the company’s operations under the strict surveillance of a court-appointed official receiver, thus restricting in many ways the municipal council’s control and room for manoeuvre as owner of the company. besides the apparent aim of saving aamps from dismissal, this solution had some less declarable advantages for the municipality: on the one hand the company would be legally forced to stick to efficiency principles,17 thus reducing the need of continuous negotiations between the municipal executive council and the aamps management; and on the other the municipality could ‘shift the blame’ for any unpopular decisions or outcomes.18 whatever the reasons behind that choice, the announcement of the pre-bankruptcy solution kicked up a real storm: within the council – basically excluded from the decision – three members of the 5sm voted against the proposal and left the party’s group. within the municipal executive committee itself, which had been kept in the dark about this possibility until it was announced, the councillor for the environment – who had voted against the motion – was suspended from office.19 the unions, who feared the repercussions of ‘receivership’ on working conditions inside the company, called a strike of waste collection service workers.20 finally, in terms of inter-institutional relations, the coastal local area ato and the tuscany regional government saw the arrangement with creditors as the premise for aamps continuing to manage the service in-house for the further six years required to implement the recovery plan, and for this reason – or rather, owing to the failure to meet the deadline for the merger of aamps with retiambiente – lodged a series of administrative appeals. the solution of an arrangement with creditors was supported not only by the mayor and the councillor responsible for the accounts, but also by the national leadership of the 5sm21 (specifically, roberto fico, luigi di maio, alessandro di battista and beppe grillo himself), in view of the local elections to be held in 2016, with voting in a number of 15 by means of this type of procedure, a company in crisis may arrange for settlement of its debt situation without having to stop operations. in practical terms, it is assumed that the debtor submits an application for admittance to the procedure, to the court, and that it undertakes to deliver a given series of documents (the plan, the proposal, a professional expert’s report, etc.) by a set deadline established by the court itself. as with all arrangements with creditors, the application also has to be accepted by the creditors concerned. 16 judgement no. 22209/13. the bankruptcy option was subsequently introduced into law with the consolidated law on state-controlled enterprises in 2016. 17 interview 3 environment department 18 interview 1 trade unions. 19 ‘sette giorni per la decisione. gordiani si dimette, tre m5s si staccano. per un voto il consiglio non esclude il concordato’, il tirreno livorno, 1 december 2015. 20 ‘nogarin contestato da 200 lavoratori in consiglio comunale’, la repubblica firenze, 27 november 2015; ‘perché la livorno di nogarin è sommersa dai rifiuti’, nextquotidiano, 29 november 2015. 21 ‘di battista (m5s) speaking about the aamps case: “that’s enough of the inefficiencies of politics and the trade unions”’, quilivorno.it, 30 november 2015; ‘aamps, di maio (m5s): “sindacati e pd hanno spadroneggiato”’ (the unions and the pd have called the shots), in il tirreno-livorno, 4 december 2015. reshaping policy solutions through local implementation 32 important capital cities, the outcome of which was going to be of national political importance. hence the idea of entrusting to the courts the destiny of a company whose debts had always been presented as the responsibility of the previous administration, and of proceeding to save that company (at least apparently) without burdening the municipal council’s coffers, appears to be solutions that the public can be more easily persuaded to accept, rather than paying off that company’s debts with public moneys.22 the support of the 5sm national leadership was also forthcoming in the subsequent months, when both mayor nogarin and the councillor for the accounts (together with the former mayor cosimi of the pd and various aamps directors) were under criminal investigation on charges of fraudulent bankruptcy and abuse of office in relation to the aamps affair (of which they were subsequently cleared). the chairman and the board of directors of the company in office at the time expressed their concern about the recourse to an arrangement with creditors, and they asked the municipal council to reconsider its position and not to proceed hastily with the chosen course of action. the result of this was that all board of directors posts were cancelled by revocation without cause on the part of the mayor, in january 2016.23 the local newspapers at the time, and the documents relating to the dismissal of the aforementioned criminal charges, also highlight the rather unclear role played by the legal advisor, luca lanzalone (who subsequently made the news in 2018 in relation to the scandals surrounding the proposed construction of the new rome football club stadium), in the process leading up to the municipal council’s decision. in particular, the cooperation between lanzalone and leghorn municipal council, although initially of an informal nature, appears to date back to 2015, and seems to have played a key role in the proposal for the arrangement with creditors, and in the dismissal of the board of directors in office at the time,24 in close conjunction with the then national leaders of the 5sm responsible for relations with local authorities.25 all in all, the decision was made in a context of urgency and under the external pressure of various concurrent events. in this sense the replacement of the previously promised recapitalisation with the pre-bankruptcy procedure can be interpreted as an adaptation of the original preferences to environmental challenges. 22 ‘livorno, approvato il concordato per l’azienda dei rifiuti’, in il corriere fiorentino, 1 december 2015. 23 ‘iacomelli passa alle vie legali: “revoca illegittima e errata”’, in the leghorn edition of la nazione, 15 january 2016. 24 ‘l’avvocato di nogarin smentisce l’assessore: “ho scritto io la revoca di iacomelli”’, il tirreno-livorno, 23 january 2016; ‘sulla vicenda aamps non si muoveva foglia se non voleva lanzalone’, la repubblica, 14 june 2018. 25 ‘di maio e bonafede hanno un problema “professionale” con lanzalone. storia di due email’, il foglio, 8 september 2018. stefania profeti 33 3.4. round 4: the entry into force of the arrangement with creditors the plan for the arrangement with creditors, which was deemed admissible by the court of leghorn in july 2016, accepted by creditors in january 2017 and then finally approved by the municipal council in october 2017, covers the period from 2016 to 2021. it contains the undertaking that the existing jobs at aamps are to be preserved, and it also provides for the settlement in full of all debts, the payment of 80% of proven amounts due within a period of 5 years, at an estimated cost to the council of around 13 million euro (which, according to the opposition parties and the unions, is higher than the amount that would have been necessary to recapitalise the company),26 to be recouped through waste collection charges between 2018 and 2021, and through raising company efficiency. the launch of the arrangement, insofar as it enables the company to continue operations, thus puts off the possibility of any merger of aamps with the single service provider retiambiente, at least until 2021. all the more so because in january 2017, the coastal area ato cancelled the tender procedure launched 5 years earlier, for the selection of a private partner to join retiambiente as a minority shareholder. the reasons given for said cancellation included the risk of giving rise to illegal operations as a result of excessive time delays, due to ‘repeated amendments to the legislative framework’ and to ‘the substantial change made to the extension of local integrated public services area’, together with the opposition raised by certain councils, that of leghorn first and foremost.27 the suspension of the tender procedure opened the way to a reconfiguration of relations between the mayors who were members of the ato assembly,28 which in the meantime witnessed a break-up of the political homogeneity of the centre-left that had characterised it until just a few years before. the 2017 and 2018 local elections, in fact, saw some of the larger municipalities within the ato (and thus those with greater weight in the construction of voting majorities at council meetings) going over to the 5sm (carrara) and to the centre-right (pisa and massa), thus resulting in a united front large enough to be able to counter the pressure in favour of a merger, coming from the regional government (led by the pd). as a matter of fact, in spite of persistent turmoil in the governing majority due to the protests (and then resignation) of some 5sm councillors against the continuous interference of national party leaders and the decision to ‘sell’ the councillor for the accounts to the raggi administration in rome,29 external concurring events have thus provided the leghorn municipality with the opportunity to consolidate its decision over the fate of the aamps. indeed, at the moment, despite the fact that retiambiente has been officially established and provided with governing bodies, its operations in the coastal area ato remain extremely limited, and thus represent no challenge – at least in the immediate future – to leghorn municipal council’s preservation of the in-house management. 26 interview 1 trade unions 27 ‘rifiuti, ato costa annulla gara per il privato. nogarin “sistema toscano pd fallimentare”‘, il fatto quotidiano, 13 january 2017. 28 interview 3 environment department. 29 interview 2 organisation department reshaping policy solutions through local implementation 34 4. concluding remarks the reconstruction of the rationalisation process undertaken by leghorn municipality offers initial confirmation of this essay’s underlying premise, namely that once central government’s policies are transposed to the periphery, they may be reformulated in order to adapt them to the specific political needs of the actors operating at local level. in the case analysed here, local politics’ interference in the strategic reframing of rationalisation strategies is particularly clear from the sudden change in the political colours of the municipal council, and from the considerable political importance that the 5sm mayoral candidate gave to the question of state-controlled enterprises, as he focused on their mismanagement as one of the principal arguments underlying his electoral campaign against the outgoing centre-left administration (round 1). consequently, the newly-elected council led by the 5sm, in drawing up its plan for the rationalisation of state-controlled enterprises, adopted a cherry-picking approach to the criteria for rationalisation established by national legislation, choosing only those (such as the containment of operating costs) that appear more in keeping with the 5sm agenda, whilst discarding those solutions that are more in line with the legacy of the previous administration, and with the solutions promoted by the tuscan centre-left in general, such as aggregation and merger operations involving companies operating in the utilities sector (round 2). the diachronic analysis of the specific measures adopted in relation to one such company – aamps s.p.a. – has revealed, however, that other factors besides local politicians’ preferences have led to the reformulation of problems and solutions during the course of implementation, thus redefining the council’s agenda and strategies to a certain extent. to begin with, the whole implementation process was marked by high uncertainty due to the incremental development of national legislation on state-owned enterprises and the various administrative appeals lodged by the regional government and by the ato management – two typical elements of italian decision making that hamper the stability of any policy solution (capano and giuliani 2001). in such an undetermined context, the critical juncture of political and policy streams (howlett 2018) swayed the municipality towards the reformulation of problems and strategies. on the one hand, the political salience attributed to the 2016 local elections by the national m5s leaders, coupled with the intervening availability of policy solutions that had not been thought of before (i.e. the pre-bankruptcy procedure), paved the way to the adaptation of previously designed solutions for aamps to the environmental changes (round 3). on the other, local elections held in 2017 and 2018 in neighbouring municipalities resulted in a radical shift in the balance of power within the coastal ato assembly, with leghorn being brought in from the cold, no longer politically isolated, and thus able to consolidate the arrangement with creditors and present it as a locally grounded solution to rationalise the company (round 4). actually, if one looks at the network of actors involved in each decisional round, the constant influence of the 5sm national leadership over local choices is more than evident. it also appears clear if account is taken of the style in which the key decisions were made (basically of an exclusive nature and in the shade of the ‘official’ debate in the council chambers), and of the political role played by advisors. of course such an stefania profeti 35 interference had been facilitated by the already mentioned political isolation of leghorn within the framework of the regional governance of waste management. however, it may also be explained by the peculiar organisational features of the 5sm party: indeed, although at its very beginning the movement was marked by a very loose party structure and high level of autonomy of local meetups, the more it became institutionalised the more it experienced a centralisation of power in the hands of the so called ‘direttorio’ (i.e. the central executive body of the movement), together with increasingly rigid control over party discipline and less room for manoeuvre of the local party representatives (passarelli et al. 2018; biancalana and piccio 2017). to sum up then, notwithstanding all the limitations inherent in a pilot case study, the analysis of the rationalisation of aamps has brought to light some key factors that have impacted upon local choices along with the implementation of the national guidelines: • first, local political/ideological preferences did influence the transfer of policy ideas from the centre to the periphery, leading to a strategic reframing of the problem in the rhetoric used by the new elected council, as well as to a cherrypicking approach in the identification of policy solutions to be put in place; • next, some sudden changes to the environmental conditions due to the interweaving of legal uncertainty and concurring political and policy streams, coupled with the (scarce) autonomy of local m5s party leaders, played a key role in redirecting the declared strategies of local decision makers during the various rounds of the implementation process, leading them to adapt policy solutions to renewed decisional contexts; • finally, during the entire implementation process, local decision makers could not ignore the eventual political consequences of their choices in terms of public support and perceived legitimacy. indeed, just like in any organisation, leaders should confer on their decisions a meaning which is coherent with their declared objectives and consistent with citizens’ expectations (selznick 1957). in this sense, as the implementation process proceeded, the pre-bankruptcy solution began to look like a solution that the public could accept more easily, rather than paying off company’s debts with public moneys and/or through cutting other budget headings (such as social measures). hence, local policy makers made their decisions not only following an instrumental logic, but also taking into account legitimacy considerations (capano and lippi 2017), in order to establish solutions that were, at one and the same time, technically feasible, politically sustainable and socially acceptable (wilder and howlett 2014). a more thorough formulation of this analytical framework and of the corresponding causal hypotheses is for the moment deferred until future studies of a comparative nature are conducted. references barrett s. 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(2003), case study research: design and methods, thousand oaks, ca, sage. microsoft word pdf_issue_14_1_cremonesi.docx italian political science, volume 14 issue 1, march 2019 © 2019 italian political science. issn 2420-8434. volume 14, issue 1, 50-67. contact author: cristina cremonesi, university of turin. e-mail address: cristina.cremonesi@unito.it the influence of media messages on populist attitudes: state of the art and insights from experimental research on the italian case cristina cremonesi university of turin abstract despite the growing interest of political and communication scholars in populism in italy, there is still little knowledge of italian voters’ populist attitudes and whether and how they are connected to media communication. the purpose of this article is to pave the way for the study of this salient topic also with reference to the italian case. thus, it both presents the main existing studies on the measurement of populist attitudes and the impact of populist media messages on them, as well as reconstructing the literature on the topic concerning italy. moreover, it shows the preliminary results concerning the italian case of a comparative experimental study on the impact of media messages on voters’ populist attitudes conducted within the framework of the cost action is1308 ‘populist political communication in europe’. the article is a first step towards the comprehension of the impact of populist media messages on italians’ populist attitudes. it contributes to the study of populist attitudes in italy by providing a new operationalization which is reliable in the italian context and offering a comparable measurement of the strength of populist attitudes among italian voters. 1. introduction he rise of populism around the globe has attracted the attention of a growing number of studies aimed at understanding the spread of populist ideas among citizens (e.g. norris, 2005; norris and inglehart, 2018; tsatsanis, andreadis and teperoglou, 2018; elchardus and spruyt, 2016; andreadis, stavrakakis, and demertzis, 2018) and verifying whether political communication plays a role (e.g., hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2017; matthes and schmuck, 2017; müller et al., 2017). it has already been ascertained that certain media outlets report or directly express populist messages (e.g. mazzoleni, 2003; mazzoleni, 2008; akkerman, 2011; bos, van der brug, and de vreese, 2013; bos and brants, 2014; kramer, 2014) and the literature on media effects has highlighted that media messages may forge, activate and reinforce political beliefs (e.g. bennett and iyengar, 2008; holbert, garrett, and gleason, 2010). however, the impact of populist media messages on voters’ populist attitudes is currently a debated research subject, especially because there is no agreement on how to operationalize populist attitudes (e.g. castanho silva et al., 2018; hameleers and de vreese, 2018) and how strongly these may be affected by populist political communication (e.g. matthes and schmuck, 2017; müller et al., 2017; hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2018b). t cristina cremonesi 51 this article aims to pave the way for the study of the effects of populist media messages on populist attitudes with reference to the italian case. thus, it both presents the main existing studies on the measurement of populist attitudes and the impact of populist media messages on them as well as reconstructing the literature on the topic concerning italy. moreover, it presents a comparative experimental study on the impact of media messages on voters’ populist attitudes conducted in the framework of the cost action is1308 ‘populist political communication in europe’ and shows its preliminary results concerning the italian case.1 2. state of the art on the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 2.1. existing operationalizations regarding populist attitudes in social science literature, populism has been conceived in different ways, but the recent and most relevant studies agree in considering it as a thin-centred ideology (or a set of ideas) about how politics should function (e.g., mudde, 2004; stanley, 2008; mudde and rovira kaltwasser, 2013; aalberg et al, 2017; engesser, fawzi and larsson, 2017). following this view, populism can be embraced not only by politicians and the media but also by ordinary citizens, and it can be measured among them through opinion surveys investigating their attitudes. in recent years, many efforts have been made to identify populist attitudes, but their operationalization has proved challenging. there is no full agreement either as to what the dimensions of populist attitudes are, or the best indicators to measure them. however, the main operationalizations of this concept may be grouped into two sets according to the definition of populism considered. in fact, while the central and undoubted characteristic of populism is the positive valorisation of the people, different definitions of populism consider other aspects to be part of the populist set of ideas, such as criticism of the elite, the manichean opposition between these two groups, the need to guarantee the sovereignty of the people (e.g. mudde, 2004), and also the exclusion of horizontal outgroups like immigrants (jagers and walgrave, 2007). the first and most numerous group of studies that operationalize populism refers back to mudde’s (2004, p. 453) definition of populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”. for example, the operationalization of populist attitudes by hawkins, riding and mudde (2012) individuated three dimensions of populism: ‘manichaean view of politics’, ‘reified popular will’ and ‘belief in a conspiring elite’ and defined a consequent set of indicators that were tested on a representative sample of the u.s. population during the 2008 electoral campaign. stanley (2011) then applied the measure of populist attitudes to the context of the 2010 slovak election, his 1 the italian participants in the cost action is-1308 ‘populist political communication in europe’(for more information visit: https://www.ntnu.edu/populistcommunication/populist-political-communication-in-europe) were giuliano bobba, cristina cremonesi, antonella seddone (university of turin) and guido legnante (university of pavia). for this first and single authored publication, the scholars involved in the study agreed to disclose only the preliminary results of the study. the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 52 operationalization of populism being organised in four dimensions. three of these (‘positive valorisation of the people and denigration of the elite’, ‘popular sovereignty’, ‘antagonistic relationship between the people and the elites’) were very similar to those of hawkins, riding and mudde of 2012, while the fourth focused on a different aspect of populism: the perception of the people and the elite as two homogeneous groups. akkerman, mudde, and zaslove (2014) merged the two previously presented operationalization attempts, returning to a three dimension operationalization of populist attitudes (‘sovereignty of the people’, ‘opposition to the elite’, ‘manichean division between “good people” and “evil elite”’), without completely renouncing references to the homogeneity of the two antagonist groups by considering the indicator ‘the political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people’. this operationalization was firstly applied to a representative sample of the dutch population in 2013 and was then adopted in several research projects such as the british and german national election studies.2 finally, castanho silva et al. (2018) elaborated a similar operationalization. they considered as dimensions of populism criticism towards the elites (‘antielitism’) and the manichean conception of politics (‘manichaean outlook’),3 and a third dimension named ‘people centrism’, which measured citizens’ opinions of the fact that politicians should be close to the people and committed to realizing the people’s will (just as akkerman, mudde and zaslove’s (2014) dimension ‘popular sovereignty’ did). this operationalization was tested and proved reliable on seventeen samples belonging to thirteen countries, including italy. the second set of operationalizations regarding populist attitudes includes a small number of more recent studies that in addition to some elements of populism individuated by mudde (2004)’s definition (i.e. ‘sovereignty of the people’, ‘anti-elitism’, ‘manichean division between good people and evil elite’) consider also the exclusionist dimension of populism. this dimension is stressed both by the seminal definition of populism by jagers and walgrave (2007: 323): “when political actors talk about the people and combine this with an explicit anti-establishment position and an exclusion of certain population categories, one can talk of thick populism”, and by the work of the cost action is1308, that in the book ‘populist political communication in europe’ affirms: “‘the people’ should be regarded as the key component of populist messages, with anti-elitism and anti-out-group stances serving as optional additional elements. these elements can be combined in various ways, resulting in different types of populism” (reinemann et al.’s, 2017: 23-24). the operationalization proposed by hameleers and de vreese (2018) belongs to this group. according to them, populist attitudes are organised into two dimensions: ‘anti-establishment’ and ‘exclusionism’. this operationalization was tested empirically on the netherlands voters: it not only demonstrated a good fit with the data, 2 for more information on these surveys see: fieldhouse, e., j. green., g. evans., h. schmitt, c. van der eijk, j. mellon and c. prosser (2015) british election study internet panel wave 10. doi: 10.15127/1.293723; and roßteutscher, sigrid; schmitt-beck, rüdiger; schoen, harald; weßels, bernhard; wolf, christof; bieber, ina; stövsand, lars-christopher; dietz, melanie; scherer, philipp (2018): pre-election cross section (gles 2017). gesis data archive, cologne. za6800 data file version 3.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.12990 3 it is important to highlight that castanho et al. (2018) are the first authors that consider the populist manicheism in terms of ‘opposition between different political views’, instead of ‘opposition between the elite and the people’, as all the previous theoretical studies have done (see castanho silva et al., 2018: 153). cristina cremonesi 53 but it also proved that differently from what is usually assumed in the literature, populist exclusionist attitudes do not coincide with nativist perceptions (hameleers and de vreese, 2018: 10-11). last but not least, also the studies by hameleers and schumck (2018) and by hameleers, bos and de vreese (2017a and 2018b) adopted the same twodimensional operationalization for investigating the influence of media communication on populist attitudes. 2.2. the role of media messages in influencing populist attitudes among the factors that may impact the level of populist attitudes in the population, media exposure plays a relevant role. in fact, not only are populist attitudes associated with enduring factors such as socio-economic characteristics (i.e. being male, with a low educational level and a weak economic position), psychological traits (i.e. the feeling of relative deprivation), and ideological inclinations (i.e. the fact of being on the left or right margin of the political continuum) (e.g., elchardus and spruyt, 2016; andreadis, stavrakakis, and demertzis, 2018; tsatsanis, andreadis and teperoglou, 2018), but are also connected to the more mutable factor of media communication. recent studies have revealed that both one-time consumption and repeated exposure to messages containing populist cues may affect people’s political attitudes (e.g., hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2017a and 2017b; müller et al., 2017). as regards one-time consumption, the experimental-design studies of matthes and schmuck (2017) and of hameleers, bos and de vreese (2017b) are of primary importance. the former proved that political advertisements with a negative portrayal of immigrants strengthen voters’ exclusionism attitudes. the latter demonstrated that political news items blaming the national or eu elites for citizens’ problems foster both the citizens’ perception that the ordinary people’s will is not represented by politicians, and their belief that society is divided between ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elites’ (hameleers, bos and de vreese 2017b: 890). concerning repeated exposure, the real-setting research by müller et al. (2017) showed that the influence of media messages displaying populism depends on media users’ prior attitudes: when exposed to a larger amount of populist messages, citizens with anti-populist attitudes became less populist, while populist ones became more so (müller et al., 2017: 984). finally, in their studies on populist voters’ media diets and selective exposure to populist communication, hameleers, bos and de vreese (2017a; 2018b), found that populist attitudes both drive the selection of specific communication contents (such as tabloids and media that use populist frames) (hameleers, bos and de vreese 2017a), and influence the effects of populist communication, since voters with populist attitudes are more prone to being convinced by populist messages (hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2018b). regardless of whether exposure is once-off or repeated and of the level of prior populist attitudes, the psychological mechanisms behind the influence of media messages on populist attitudes are the same. as explained by hameleers et al. (2019) in the second (forthcoming) book of the cost action is-1308 ‘communicating populism. comparing interactions between politicians, media, and citizens across europe’, ‘cognitive priming of social identity’ and ‘blame attribution’ drive the impact of populist messages on voters’ attitudes. according to the literature on trait activation and cognitive priming (richey, 2012; hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2018b), the way media present a social group (as well as an event or a political actor, etc.) may influence audience’s perception of it. for example, a media message that the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 54 focuses on the national aspect of social identity and praises the national-people may activate a positive evaluation of this group and of its homogeneity (reinemann et al., 2017; andreadis et al., 2019). as regards blame attribution, this rhetorical device has proven to activate in the audience a negative evaluation of the actors indicated as responsible for an undesirable situation (e.g., marsh and tilley, 2010; hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2017b; hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2018a). consequently, we can assume that this mechanism is at play in the effects of populist rhetoric that is centred on the depiction of the people’s wellbeing as threatened by political elites and social out-groups (such as immigrants or the super-rich). 3. the influence of media messages on populist attitudes in italy: preliminary results from comparative research 3.1. current knowledge on the italian case the considerable and repeated success of populist forces in italy (e.g. bobba and mcdonnell, 2015; tarchi, 2015; bobba and legnante, 2016) – culminating in the formation of a populist government in march 2018 – has raised scholars’ interest in italian populism. however, while italian populist parties and leaders have been investigated thoroughly (e.g. boni, 2008; biorcio, 2010; bordignon and ceccarini, 2013; bracciale and martella, 2017; bobba, 2018), so far the populist attitudes of italian voters have received almost no attention. moreover, despite the fact that the italian media are often accused of being accomplices in the success of populist political forces (as for example berlusconi’s go italy or, more recently, salvini’s league), the relation between populist media messages and populist attitudes in italy has not been tested until now. as far as the spread of populism among the italian population is concerned, only biorcio (2007) has addressed the topic. biorcio elaborated and tested a measure of populist attitudes articulated in three dimensions: ‘anti-politics’ (similar to akkerman, mudde, zaslove (2014)’s dimension ‘opposition to the elite’), ‘ethnocentrism’ (like hameleers and de vreese (2018)’s dimension ‘exclusionism’), and ‘authoritarianism’ (which can be interpreted as a sort of side-effect of the populist request for more popular-sovereignty – see for example tarchi, 2015). following this operationalization, biorcio found that the penetration of populist attitudes in italy was particularly strong in the sectors of the population distant from the democratic political life, with a weak economic position (e.g. selfemployed, unemployed, pensioners, etc.) and a low level of education (biorcio, 2007). although the studies on media populism stemmed from the research of an italian scholar (mazzoleni, 2003; mazzoleni 2008; mazzoleni 2014), hardly any research has investigated populism with reference to the italian media. only one recent contribution addressed the topic. it investigated how often the italian press outlets mentioned populist stances and whether journalists simply reported or also supported them (cremonesi, 2018). this study confirmed that some media outlets in italy promote populism, but no research has addressed the topic of the impact of media populist messages on the populist attitudes of italian voters. the study presented below is the first experimental design research investigating the topic with reference to italy. cristina cremonesi 55 3.2. research design in order to shed light on the diffusion of populist attitudes in italy and to test the influence of media messages on them, italy took part in a comparative research study that involved 16 european countries conducted within the framework of the cost action is 1308 ‘populist political communication in europe’.4 the aim of the study was to explore the effects of populist communication on voters and in particular to verify whether, and to what extent, media messages with different populist elements (i.e. people centrism, anti-elitism, right-wing or left-wing anti-outgroup cues) could affect voters’ populist attitudes. the research study adopted an experimental design, asking respondents (14,499 overall)5 to read a manipulated version of a short news item on the economic crisis and then to answer a series of questions regarding their populist attitudes. as far as italy is concerned, the data were collected in april 2017, by the polling firm research now. a sample of 858 respondents, representative of the italian voting population, was selected and interviewed through an online survey. the survey included three phases. first, participants were asked to give their informed consent and to fill in a pretest questionnaire about their socio-demographic characteristics and general political opinions. second, respondents were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions6 and were instructed to read a news article (the stimulus of this experimental study) for at least 20 seconds. third, participants had to answer a series of questions about their political attitudes and behaviours, as well as about their level of agreement with the news, and also to some questions (manipulation checks) aimed at verifying their understanding of the news article (for an in-depth description of this experimental study and of the variables included in the survey, see hameleers et al, 2018: 525). the news item given to the respondents differed slightly for each condition. in fact, while all the stimuli presented the same story and visual elements, the text for six of them was altered, and various combinations of populist elements inserted. the first and basic control stimulus consisted of a piece of news allegedly published in a fictional online newspaper (news.com) created on the model of euronews.com. the news story was about the future decline of purchasing power in the country and presented the picture of an empty wallet (figure 1). the second stimulus used as a control condition was created by adding to the text the sole blame attribution to politicians, i.e., national politicians were accused of being responsible for the decrease in purchasing power in the 4 the comparative experiment design study was coordinated by the cost action’s working group ‘citizens and populism’; cristina cremonesi (university of turin) was in charge of the italian version of the experiment; the department of political and social science of the university of pavia financed its realisation. the other countries involved in the comparative experiment were austria, france, germany, greece, ireland, israel, netherlands, norway, poland, portugal, romania, spain, sweden, switzerland, united kingdom. 5 after a data cleaning procedure, low-quality responses were removed from the original sample counting 17,597 cases. as better detailed in appendix c of the article ‘start spreading the news: a comparative experiment on the effects of populist communication on political engagement in sixteen european countries’ (hameleers et al., 2018), the criteria applied for individuating the low-quality responses were: 1) completion time, 2) straightlining, 3) item nonresponse, 4) incorrect answers to manipulation checks. as regards the italian case, 198 low-quality responses were excluded from the analysis. 6 a randomization check shows that the eight conditions do not differ significantly with regards to age (f=0.277, p=0.963), gender (f=0.447, p=0.872), education (f=0.678, p=0.690) and ideology (f=0.749, p=0.631). the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 56 country. while no element of populism was inserted in these control stimuli, in the six treatment conditions either single populist elements or combinations of them were introduced. figure 1. screenshot of the news item administered to the italian respondents as experiment stimulus (control condition with no populism elements) in this way, six populist versions of the news item were created, mirroring the different types of populism individuated by jagers and walgrave’s (2007) definition. they are: (1) positive valorisation of the people (i.e. empty populism), (2) positive valorisation of the people and blame attribution to politicians (i.e. anti-elitist populism), (3) positive valorisation of the people and blame attribution to immigrants (i.e. right-wing populism), (4) positive valorisation of the people and blame attribution to both politicians and immigrants (i.e. complete right-wing populism), (5) positive valorisation of the people and blame attribution to the super-rich (i.e. left-wing populism), (6) positive valorisation of the people and blame attribution to both politicians and super-rich people (i.e. complete left-wing populism)7 (table 1). regarding the measurement of populist attitudes, the experiment adopted a fourdimensional operationalization combining the classical dimensions of populism derived from mudde’s definition (2004) – ‘popular sovereignty’, ‘people homogeneity’, ‘anti-elitism’ – with the dimension ‘exclusionism’ taken from jagers and walgrave’s (2007) conceptualization of thick populism. in order to measure the level of populism in each of these dimensions, respondents were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed, on a scale from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree) with a series of statements. table 2 reports the items employed for measuring participants’ attitudes towards these dimensions and indicates for each of them the average level of agreement of the italian respondents. 7 the exact wording (in english and italian) of the media messages used as stimuli for this experiment is reported in the appendix 1 ‘wording of the treatment messages’ included with this article cristina cremonesi 57 table 1. experiment conditions conditions with populism (pro-heartland is a constant) no anti-elite anti-elite no outgroup (1) empty populism (2) anti-elitism populism outgroup ‘immigrants’ (3) right-wing outgroup populism (4) complete right-wing populism outgroup ‘the wealthy 1%’ (5) left-wing outgroup populism (6) complete left-wing populism control conditions no heartland (control 1) no populism/ rational (control 2) only anti-elitism table 2. descriptive statistics of populist attitudes items among the italian respondents (1 completely disagree; 7 completely agree) dimension/items n mean sd popular sovereignty the people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums 852 5.52 1.69 the people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken 851 6.07 1.22 the politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people 852 5.56 1.64 people homogeneity although the [country members, e.g. british] are very different from each other, when it comes down to it, they all think the same 852 4.35 1.79 ordinary people all pull together 852 4.64 1.61 ordinary people share the same values and interests 852 4.56 1.66 ordinary people are of good and honest character 852 4.59 1.60 anti-elitism politicians in government are corrupt 857 5.58 1.46 politicians make decisions that harm the interests of the ordinary people 858 5.64 1.42 politicians are not really interested in what people like me think 858 5.83 1.44 mps in parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people 857 6.11 1.24 the people instead of politicians should make our most important policy decisions 857 5.13 1.75 the ordinary people should have more influence in political decision making than large corporations 857 5.45 1.44 the differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people 858 5.77 1.32 people like me have no influence on what the government does 858 5.71 1.49 poor people should have a greater voice in politics 858 5.28 1.53 international financial institutions have colonized our country 855 5.44 1.40 a bunch of rich families are really running this country 855 5.17 1.56 big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people 858 5.57 1.42 exclusionism immigrants are responsible for a lot of our nation’s problems 851 4.20 2.04 people who are not originally from our country should have no rights to our social benefits 852 4.04 1.99 immigrants are threatening the purity of our culture 852 4.42 2.08 immigrants cost our country a lot of money that should rather be invested in our own people 851 5.02 1.97 the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 58 3.3. preliminary findings in order to verify the validity of the proposed operationalization of populist attitudes for the italian case, i investigated the internal consistency of the indicators of each dimension and of the whole set of items through a reliability measure (cronbach’s alpha). the positive result of this check (cronbach’s alpha>0.70)8 allowed me to create four additive indices of populist attitudes (‘popular sovereignty’ index; ‘people’s homogeneity’ index; ‘anti-elitism’ index; ‘exclusionism’ index) and an overall aggregate index of populism; all the indexes were normalized resulting in five continuous variables ranging from 0 to 1. table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of these indices. from these data, all types of populist attitudes proved to be widespread in italy: among the italian respondents the mean value of the populism index was 0.68, and all the indexes measuring the specific dimensions of populist attitude presented a mean value higher than 0.5 (table 3). particularly strong among italians were the populist attitudes referring to the dimensions ‘popular sovereignty’ and ‘anti-elitism’: the indexes of these dimensions showed a mean value equal respectively to 0.79 and 0.76. this is revealing of the italian voters’ dissatisfaction with the country’s economic and political establishment and of their perception of elected politicians as being out-of-touch and insensitive to italian citizens’ requests, as if they had failed in their representative function. table 3. descriptive statistics of populist attitudes indexes (0-1) among italian respondents index/populism dimension n mean sd popular sovereignty index 851 0.79 0.23 people’s homogeneity index 852 0.59 0.25 anti-elitism index 851 0.76 0.17 exclusionism index 850 0.57 0.30 populism index 842 0.68 0.18 besides looking at the populism indexes on the whole sample, i also conducted a preliminary analysis aimed at revealing the impact on the respondents’ level of populism of the different media populist messages used as stimuli. in table 4, i report the mean value assumed by the indexes of populist attitudes among the respondents exposed to each of the six experimental conditions and to the two control conditions (table 1). i noticed that the mean values of the indexes did not change markedly according to the conditions and a one-way anova test confirmed this perception: none of the populist attitudes’ indexes differed in a statistically significant way between the experiment conditions (table 4). this preliminary result contrasted with those of previous experimental studies, which found that a single populist message may have a relevant effect on voters’ populist attitudes. based on these studies, the media messages containing the blaming of the elite 8 popular sovereignty (cronbach's alpha = 0.885); people homogeneity (cronbach's alpha = 0.913;); anti-elitism (cronbach's alpha = 0.905; excluding outgroups (cronbach's alpha = 0.916); populism index (cronbach's alpha =0.921). cristina cremonesi 59 (conditions 2, 4, and 6 ) and of immigrants (conditions 3 and 4)9 were expected to have an impact on the corresponding subcomponent of populist attitudes, i.e. ‘exclusionism’ and ‘anti-elitism’ (matthes and schmuck, 2017; hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2017b). table 4. descriptive statistics of populist attitudes indexes (0-1) according to the experiment conditions and connected anova test results index popular sovereignty homogeneity of the people anti-elitism exclusionism populism index condition mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. (1) empty populism 0.84 0.20 0.60 0.24 0.77 0.16 0.59 0.30 0.70 0.17 (2) anti-elitism populism 0.77 0.25 0.62 0.26 0.77 0.17 0.59 0.30 0.69 0.19 (3) right-wing outgroup populism 0.80 0.23 0.58 0.25 0.75 0.17 0.60 0.28 0.68 0.17 (4) complete right-wing populism 0.80 0.22 0.58 0.25 0.76 0.18 0.59 0.33 0.68 0.18 (5) left-wing outgroup populism 0.78 0.24 0.61 0.25 0.76 0.18 0.56 0.31 0.68 0.19 (6) complete left-wing populism 0.79 0.22 0.60 0.24 0.78 0.17 0.57 0.30 0.68 0.17 (control1) no populism/rational 0.77 0.24 0.55 0.25 0.74 0.18 0.52 0.30 0.65 0.18 (control2) no populism/only antielitism 0.74 0.24 0.58 0.24 0.75 0.15 0.54 0.29 0.66 0.18 f sig f sig f sig f sig f sig one-way anova between conditions 1.442 0.185 0.675 0.694 0.681 0.689 1.029 0.409 0.935 0.479 in order to better understand this unexpected result, i also tested whether at least significant single item differences existed between respondents assigned to control groups and treatment conditions. the one-way anova test performed on the 23 items of populism confirmed that all the indicators of the dimensions ‘exclusionism’ and ‘antielitism’ did not vary significantly between conditions, confirming the lack of impact of a single media populist message on these indexes (table 5). however, the same test also revealed that the item “the politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people” which belongs to the populism dimension ‘popular sovereignty’, differed significantly between treatment conditions (table 5). therefore, i checked the average level of agreement with this statement among the respondents exposed to the different stimuli. the values reported in table 6 suggest that the media message most effective in activating this populist trait was the one containing the positive valorisation of the people (condition 1).10 it lets us hypothesise that in the case of italy the positive priming of national identity does not influence italians’ perception of themselves as a homogeneous group (hameleers et al., 2019), but directly triggers the italians’ request for a political class that truly takes care of them. it probably occurs because of the long-lasting fracture between politics and citizens in italy. 9 for the wording of the media messages used as stimuli for these conditions, see appendix a ‘wording of the treatment messages’ included with this article. 10 for the wording of this treatment message, see appendix a ‘wording of the treatment messages’ included with this article the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 60 table 5. anova test results of populist attitudes items according to experiment conditions dimension/items f sig popular sovereignty the people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums 0.72 0.65 the people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken 1.51 0.16 the politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people 2.09 0.04 people homogeneity although the [country members, e.g. british] are very different from each other, when it comes down to it, they all think the same 1.30 0.25 ordinary people all pull together 0.48 0.85 ordinary people share the same values and interests 0.66 0.71 ordinary people are of good and honest character 0.57 0.78 anti-elitism politicians in government are corrupt 0.38 0.92 politicians make decisions that harm the interests of the ordinary people 0.93 0.49 politicians are not really interested in what people like me think 0.25 0.97 mps in parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people 0.83 0.56 the people instead of politicians should make our most important policy decisions 1.49 0.17 the ordinary people should have more influence in political decision making than large corporations 0.73 0.65 the differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people 0.42 0.89 people like me have no influence on what the government does 0.59 0.77 poor people should have a greater voice in politics 0.87 0.53 international financial institutions have colonized our country 1.47 0.17 a bunch of rich families are really running this country 1.61 0.13 big corporations accumulate wealth by exploiting the people 0.75 0.63 exclusionism immigrants are responsible for a lot of our nation’s problems 1.19 0.31 people who are not originally from our country should have no rights to our social benefits 0.79 0.60 immigrants are threatening the purity of our culture 0.74 0.64 immigrants cost our country a lot of money that should rather be invested in our own people 1.41 0.20 table 6. descriptive statistics of popular sovereignty indicator “the politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people” (1 completely disagree; 7 completely agree), according to experiment condition condition mean st. dev. (1) empty populism 6.46 0.84 (2) anti-elitism populism 5.94 1.33 (3) right-wing outgroup populism 6.10 1.29 (4) complete right-wing populism 6.08 1.25 (5) left-wing outgroup populism 6.06 1.27 (6) complete left-wing populism 6.08 1.16 (control1) no populism/rational 5.96 1.31 (control2) no populism/only anti-elitism 5.88 1.19 cristina cremonesi 61 4. conclusions despite the growing interest of political and communication scholars in populism in italy (e.g., bordignon and ceccarini, 2013; tarchi, 2015; bobba and legnante, 2016; bracciale and martella, 2017), there is still little knowledge of the populist attitudes of italian voters and whether and how they are connected with media communication. the purpose of this article was to pave the way for the study of this salient topic (e.g., hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2017a and 2017b; müller et al., 2017) also with reference to the italian case. for this reason, the article presented the preliminary results concerning italy of a european comparative experimental study investigating the effects of different populist media messages on voters’ populist attitudes. the findings revealed the presence of strong populist attitudes among italian citizens but provided only limited support to the commonplace that the media are accomplices of the success of populism in italy. the analysis revealed that a single populist media message does not activate the populist attitudes of italian voters. in fact, only the news item containing the positive valorisation of the italian people (stimulus ‘empty populism’) affected the respondents, and only with reference to their agreement with the statement “the politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people”. the other stimuli included in the experiment proved to have no effect on the indexes of populist attitudes. while this result came as unexpected, being in contrast to previous experimental studies on the topic (matthes and schmuck, 2017; hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2017b), two interpretations may explain it. on the one hand, it could be that only specific segments of the italian electorate are affected by the populist messages. even if on the whole sample the impact of populist messages is not significant, voters with certain political and psychological traits may be particularly prone to their influence (e.g. hameleers and de vreese, 2018). in order to verify this, further studies should test the impact of populist media messages while considering the moderating effect of a series of characteristics, such as ideology, level of prior populist attitudes, and perception of relative deprivation (see for example hameleers, bos and de vreese, 2018b, and hameleers and de vreese, 2018). on the other hand, the lack of effect may be due to the high level of populist attitudes registered among the italian respondents: a single populist message may not affect italian voters since they are already strongly populist. in this case, a comparative study should verify whether the effect of populist media messages varies between countries according to their citizens’ prior level of populist attitudes. while further research is needed to clarify the impact of media populist messages on italians’ populist attitudes, this article is a first step in this direction. moreover, it contributes to the study of populist attitudes in italy by providing a new operationalization with regard to populist attitudes that has proved reliable in the italian context and offering a comparable measurement of the strength of populist attitudes among italian voters. the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 62 appendix 1. condition 1 empty populism eng headline: purchasing power of [nationals] will decline – foundation futurenow releases new report text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘the common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. so many people in [country] are working so hard every day to have a good life. there is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. action has to be taken now to address this threat to the wellbeing of our people.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto degli italiani si ridurrà – la fondazione futuroora rilascia un nuovo rapporto testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, in italia il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà nei prossimi anni. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘i cittadini italiani devono essere informati del fatto che avranno meno soldi da spendere. in italia così tanta gente lavora duramente ogni giorno per avere una vita migliore. è profondamente ingiusto che questi sforzi non siano ripagati. bisogna agire ora per affrontare questa minaccia al benessere della nostra gente’. leggi di più… condition 2 anti-elitism populism eng headline: purchasing power will decline for [nationals] – foundation futurenow blames politicians in new report text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘the common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. so many people in [country] are working so hard every day to have a good life. there is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. it is obvious that politicians are to blame. they have been too short-sighted, self-serving, and corrupt in recent years. they don’t care about anyone but themselves and are too detached from the people. action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà per gli italiani – il nuovo rapporto della fondazione futuroora incolpa i politici testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, in italia il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà nei prossimi anni. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘i cittadini italiani devono essere informati del fatto che avranno meno soldi da spendere. in italia così tanta gente lavora duramente ogni giorno per avere una vita migliore. è profondamente ingiusto che questi sforzi non siano ripagati. è ovvio che la colpa è dei politici: negli ultimi anni sono stati troppo miopi, opportunisti e corrotti. non si preoccupano di nessuno se non di loro stessi e sono troppo distanti dal popolo. bisogna agire ora per affrontare questa minaccia al benessere dalla nostra gente’. leggi di più… condition 3 right-wing outgroup populism eng headline: purchasing power will decline for [nationals] – foundation futurenow blames immigrants in new report text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘the common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. so many people in [country] are working so hard every day to have a good life. there is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. it is obvious that immigrants are to blame. they are too demanding, they exploit our system and are hard to integrate. action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà per gli italiani – il nuovo rapporto della fondazione futuroora incolpa gli immigrati testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, in italia il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà nei prossimi anni. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia, ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘i cittadini italiani devono essere informati del fatto che avranno meno soldi da spendere. in italia così tanta gente lavora duramente ogni giorno per avere una vita migliore. è profondamente ingiusto che questi sforzi non siano ripagati. è ovvio che la colpa è degli immigrati: sono troppo esigenti, sfruttano il nostro sistema e si integrano con difficoltà. bisogna agire ora per affrontare questa minaccia al benessere dalla nostra gente’. leggi di più… condition 4 complete right-wing populism eng headline: purchasing power will decline for [nationals] – foundation futurenow blames politicians and immigrants in new report cristina cremonesi 63 text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘the common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. so many people in [country] are working so hard every day to have a good life. there is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. it is obvious that politicians and migrants are to blame. politicians have been too short-sighted, self-serving, and corrupt in recent years. migrants are too demanding, they exploit our system and are hard to integrate. and still, politicians only take care of the migrants instead of our own people. action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà per gli italiani – il nuovo rapporto della fondazione futuroora incolpa i politici e gli immigrati testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, in italia il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà nei prossimi anni. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘i cittadini italiani devono essere informati del fatto che avranno meno soldi da spendere. in italia così tanta gente lavora duramente ogni giorno per avere una vita migliore. è profondamente ingiusto che questi sforzi non siano ripagati. è ovvio che la colpa è dei politici e degli immigrati: i politici negli ultimi anni sono stati troppo miopi, opportunisti e corrotti. gli immigrati sono troppo esigenti, sfruttano il nostro sistema e si integrano con difficoltà. bisogna agire ora per affrontare questa minaccia al benessere della nostra gente’. leggi di più… condition 5 left-wing outgroup populism eng headline: purchasing power will decline for [nationals] – foundation futurenow blames wealthy in new report text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘the common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. so many people in [country] are working so hard every day to have a good life. there is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. it is obvious that the super-rich are to blame. they have been too egotistic, self-serving and corrupt in recent years and do not care about anyone but themselves. action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà per gli italiani – il nuovo rapporto della fondazione futuroora incolpa i ricchi testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, in italia il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà nei prossimi anni. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘i cittadini italiani devono essere informati del fatto che avranno meno soldi da spendere. in italia così tanta gente lavora duramente ogni giorno per avere una vita migliore. è profondamente ingiusto che questi sforzi non siano ripagati. è ovvio che la colpa è dei ricchi: negli ultimi anni sono stati troppo egoisti, opportunisti e corrotti, e non si preocupano di nessuno se non di loro stessi. bisogna agire ora per affrontare questa minaccia al benessere della nostra gente’. leggi di più… condition 6 complete left-wing populism eng headline: purchasing power will decline for [nationals] – foundation futurenow blames politicians and the wealthy in new report text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power in [country] will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘the common citizens in [country] need to be made aware of the fact that they will have less money to spend. so many people in [country] are working so hard every day to have a good life. there is something profoundly wrong when these efforts do not pay off. it is obvious that politicians and the super-rich are to blame. politicians and the super-rich have been too short-sighted, self-serving, and corrupt in recent years. and still, politicians only take care of the super-rich instead of the common people. action has to be taken now to address this threat to the well-being of our people.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà per gli italiani – il nuovo rapporto della fondazione futuroora incolpa i politici e i ricchi testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, in italia il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà nei prossimi anni. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘i cittadini italiani devono essere informati del fatto che avranno meno soldi da spendere. in italia così tanta gente lavora duramente ogni giorno per avere una vita migliore. è profondamente ingiusto che questi sforzi non siano ripagati. è ovvio che la colpa è dei politici e dei ricchi: i politici e i ricchi negli ultimi anni sono stati troppo miopi, opportunisti e corrotti. inoltre, i politici si curano solo dei ricchi anziché delle persone comuni. bisogna agire ora per affrontare questa minaccia al benessere della nostra gente’. leggi di più… the influence of media messages on populist attitudes 64 control 1 no populism/rational eng headline: purchasing power will decline – foundation futurenow releases new report text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘we have to raise awareness about what this prospect means. there will be less money to spend. action has to be taken now to address this threat.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà – la fondazione futuroora rilascia un nuovo rapporto testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, nei prossimi anni il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘noi dobbiamo aumentare la consapevolezza su ciò che questa direzione comporta: ci saranno meno soldi da spendere. bisogna agire ora per far fronte a questa minaccia’. leggi di più… control 2 only anti-elitism eng headline: purchasing power will decline – foundation futurenow blames politicians in new report text: according to a new report by futurenow purchasing power will decline in the coming years. a spokesperson for the independent foundation that has been monitoring economic developments for years comments on the report: ‘we have to raise awareness about what this prospect means for [country]. there will be less money to spend. it is obvious that politicians are to blame. they have been too short-sighted, self-serving, and corrupt in recent years. they don’t care about anyone but themselves and are too detached. action has to be taken now to address this threat.’ read more… ita titolo: il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà – il nuovo rapporto della fondazione futuroora incolpa i politici testo: secondo un nuovo rapporto di futuroora, nei prossimi anni il potere d’acquisto si ridurrà. un portavoce di questa fondazione indipendente che da anni monitora l’andamento dell’economia ha commentato così il rapporto: ‘noi dobbiamo aumentare la consapevolezza su ciò che questa direzione comporta per l’italia: ci saranno meno soldi da spendere. è ovvio che la colpa è dei politici: negli ultimi anni sono stati troppo miopi, opportunisti e corrotti. non si preoccupano di nessuno se non di loro stessi e sono troppo distanti. bisogna agire ora per far fronte a questa minaccia’. leggi di più… references aalberg, t., esser, f., reinemann, c., stromback, j., and de vreese, c. 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(2011) 'populism, nationalism, or national populism? an analysis of slovak voting behaviour at the 2010 parliamentary election', communist and post-communist studies, 44(4), 257-70. tarchi, m. (2015). italia populista: dal qualunquismo a beppe grillo. il mulino. tsatsanis, e., andreadis, i., and teperoglou, e. (2018). socioeconomic and ideological correlates of populism in greece: a demand-side perspective. south european society and politics. 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 1/10 the professional review of the italian political science association political  science  in  italy  after  the  last university  reform by  ips  |  published  in  issue7  /  political  science  community in   2010   the   italian   parliament   approved   the   reform   of   the   university   system   proposed   by   maria   stella gelmini,   education   minister   of   the   fourth   berlusconi   cabinet.   this   major   reform   affects   primarily   the governance  system  of  universities  by  strengthening   the  powers  of   the  rectors  and  of   the  administrative boards  (consiglio  di  amministrazione)  responsible  for  university  finances.  it  changes  also  significantly  the whole  structure  of  universities.  while  in  the  past  the  main  peripheral  units  of  italian  universities  used  to  be the  faculties,  large  and  multidisciplinary  bodies  in  charge  of  all  teaching  and  recruitment  matters,  after  the reform  departments  (which  already  existed  but  with  a  lesser  role)  become  the  predominant  organizational and  take  over  all  the  functions  of  faculties.  faculties  or  schools  might  survive  but  only  as  secondary  bodies with  functions  delegated  by  the  departments. as  the  reform  prescribes  that  departments  should  be  formed  by  at  least  35  professors,  it  is  impossible  in most  of  the  cases  to  have  homogeneous  single  discipline  departments.  more  than  one  discipline  have  to  be aggregated   to   reach   the   threshold.   since   the   numbers   of   political   scientists   are   in   italian   universities generally  small  they  have  to  join  forces  with  other  disciplines  (sociology,  anthropology,  history,  etc.).  ips has  asked  to  representatives  of  some  of  the  italian  universities  where  political  science  has  a  particularly strong  tradition  to  describe  the  new  environment.  we  have  here  the  answers  of  professor  marco  giuliani  of the  university  of  milano  statale,  filippo  andreatta  of  the  university  of  bologna,  fulvio  attinà  of  the  university of  catania,  alessandro  chiaramonte  of  the  university  of  florence,  pierangelo  isernia  of  the  university  of siena,  and  luigi  bobbio  of  the  university  of  torino. political  science  in  milan:  three  elements  and  four  scenarios1 marco  giuliani though  policy  scientists  always  warn  against  the  possibility  of  evaluating  the  effects  of  a  policy  immediately after   its   first   implementation,   it   is   fair   to  say   that   the  law  240/2010  (legge  gelmini)  and   its  connected decrees   deeply   impacted   on   the   organization   of   the   faculty   of   political   sciences   of   milano   and   on   our discipline.  at  the  mid  of  july  2012  most  of  the   institutional  adaptations  to  the  new  normative  framework have  been  introduced  and  the  constitutive  phase  is  slowly  moving  to  its  end  with  the  election  of  the  new rector  due  in  october  2012  and,  immediately  after,  the  composition  of  the  new  administrative  board. three  elements  may  be  peculiar  to  how  the  new  policy  has  been  translated  into  the  pre-­existing  academic framework  of  the  university  of  milano:  1)  the  continuous  regulative  drive  coming  from  the  highest  academic position  of  the  university;;  2)  the  features  of  the  faculty  of  political  sciences  and  3)  the  evolution  of  the discipline  of  political  science  in  the  last  two  decades  in  that  same  faculty.   first  element.  the  rector  of  the  university  of  milano  used  to  be  the  president  of  the  crui  (the  conference  of the  rectors  of  italian  universities)  at  the  time  of  the  approval  of  the  legge  gelmini,  and  he  often  shouldered http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/contributors/ips http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/category/political-science-community/ http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform#fn153236471150857f4c2cf17 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 2/10 the  minister,  arguing   in   favor  of  a  reform  that  would  have  prized  merit  and  excellence   in  research  and teaching.  once  approved,  he  aimed  at   implementing  the   law  as  soon  as  possible   in  spite  of  the  obvious difficulties  (e.g.  the  dimension  of  the  university  of  milano,  its  generalist  character  that  includes  humanities and  hard  sciences,  the  competitive  metropolitan  context  with  several  others  private  and  public  universities like  bocconi,  cattolica,  iulm,  milano-­bicocca,  politecnico  and  san  raffaele).  the  ”one-­size-­fits-­all”  strategy that  was  followed  during  the  approval  of  the  university  statute,  in  the  name  of  an  increased  accountability  of the  new  departments,  met  severe  opposition  especially   from  the  faculties  with  a  clearer   interdisciplinary character.  political  sciences  was  obviously  among  them,  and  not  because  of  a  peculiar  choice,  but  because of  the  specific  rules  governing  the  adoption  and  approval  of  ba  and  ma  programs  in  the  class  of  political  and international   sciences.   nevertheless,   the   university   statute   was   eventually   approved   and,   after   “minor” remarks   received   from   the   minister,   formally   adopted   and   implemented   through   a   tight   schedule   for establishing  departments,  electing  their  heads,  appointing  the  respective  departmental  giunta,  and  selecting the  representatives  who  nominate  the  president  for  the  coordinating  institutions  (facoltà  or  schools),  etc.  the swiftness  of  the  whole  process  contributed  to  disregarding  a  series  of  organizational  problems,  like  a  clearer definition  of  the  allocation  of  competencies  between  university  as  a  whole,  departments  and  schools;;  the reassignment   or   redesigning   of   technical   and   administrative   staff   (especially   those   of   the   former presidencies   of   the   faculties);;   the   resolution   of   all   the   technical   problems   connected   with   the   unique university  budget,  etc.  formally,  the  new  departments  are  already  responsible  for  research  and  teaching but,  at  least  in  this  transition  period,  they  lack  the  human  and  financial  resources  to  perform  those  tasks,  in a  situation  of  still  ambiguous  local  regulative  framework.   second  element.  the  former  faculty  of  political  sciences  of  milano  (now,  faculty  of  political,  economic  and social  sciences)  was  probably  the  purest  expression  of  the  original  maranini-­miglio  project  for  the  faculties of  political  sciences  (plural),  with  the  accent  on  the  plurality  of  potential  declinations  of  an  undefined  core  of political  science  (singular).  the  typical  consensus-­oriented  decision-­making  structures  of  each  faculty  was magnified   by   the   almost   perfectly   balanced   situation   between   disciplines.   symbolically   it   could   have represented  a  laboratory  for  interdisciplinary  research  and  teaching,  and  partly  it  even  managed  to  fulfill this  ambition,  but  as  a  matter  of   fact   it  was  mostly  a  very  complex  organization  with  clear  disciplinary factions  and  constituencies,  which  were  the  dominant  actors  in  each  decision  regarding  the  distribution  of resources.  the  result  was,  especially  in  periods  in  which  merit,  evaluation  and  internationalization  were  not ideas  in  good  currency,  logrolling  and  pork-­barrel  decisions.  some  argued  that  this  outcome  was  the  logical consequence  of   the   faculty  based  organization  of   the  university.   in   fact,   in   the  absence  of  any  kind  of premiality,   no   one   wanted   to   run   the   risk   of   breaking   a   consensus   system   that   regularly   assured   the distribution  of  a  certain  amount  of  spoils. jeopardizing  the   implicit   rules  of   the  game  could  have   led  to   inferior  results.  thanks  to  some  additional resources  of  the  university  of  milano,  the  faculty  of  political  sciences  proliferated  through  the  years  (and  in spite  of  two  marginal  disciplinary  secessions  among  economists  and  sociologists,  that  contributed  to  the  birth of  the  university  of  milano-­bicocca)  becoming  one  of  the  biggest  faculties  of  political  sciences  in  italy,  both in   terms   of   professors   and   of   students.   in   its   last   period   it   had   almost   200   professors   and   lecturers, organized   into   seven   departments:   social   and   political   studies,   labor   studies   and   welfare,   economics, history,  law,  international  studies  and  languages.  each  of  them  represented  a  fierce  stakeholder,  often  with recognized   intra-­departmental   factions,  mostly  endowed  with  veto  power.  given   the  plural   status  of   the faculty,  the  bologna  process  further  promoted  a  proliferation  of  ba  and  then  ma  programs,  each  of  them magnifying  some  elements  of  a  particular  discipline.  eventually,  the  old  4-­years  course  in  political  sciences, produced   seven   new   ba   programs,   eight   ma   programs,   plus   four   in   cooperation   with   other   faculties   or universities.   in   the   academic   year   2011/12,   this   meant   more   than   4000   students   enrolled   in   programs entirely  held  in  via  conservatorio  (the  traditional  location  of  the  faculty).   in  spite  of  the  high  rate  of  drop-­outs,  the  ba  program  in  political  sciences  (officially  the  heir  of  the  old  four-­ years  course,   initially  believed   to  quickly  become  a   residual   choice  after   the  new  post  bologna-­process teaching   offer)   continues   to   have   the   highest   number   of   students,   and   to   propose   a   multidisciplinary balanced   formation,   organized   into   four   curricula.   its   capacity   to   attract   is   quantitatively   high,   but   on average   its   freshmen  don’t  have  a  particularly  brilliant  high-­school  background,  risk   to  drop-­out  already 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 3/10 before  the  end  of  the  first  year,  and  comparatively  take  a  long  time  before  graduating  with  low  marks.  but the  variance  around  the  average  student  in  political  sciences  is  very  high,  and  those  who  “survive”  are  often as  brilliant  as  students  following  a  more  regular  career  in  other  ba  programs,  included  those  that  rely  on  a selective  admission.  since  then,  the  core  teaching  in  via  conservatorio  has  remained  almost  unchanged. the  new  accreditation  systems  and  criteria  put  forward  by  the  national  agency  for  evaluation  will  probably represent   the   first   challenge   to   its   overall   organization.   more   generally,   in   the   medium   term,   there   will probably  be  an  indirect  impact  because  of  the  “property  rules”  defined  by  the  new  statute  of  the  university of  milano.  each  teaching  program  (corsi  di  laurea)  has  been  assigned  (possibly)  to  one  department  on  the basis  of  the  various  percentages  of  teaching  duties.  majoritarian  (or  largely  pluralitarian)  departments  have the  responsibility  of  the  program  as  principals,  although  there  may  be  other  associate  departments  if  they teach  more  than  15%  of  the  credits.  only  in  a  couple  of  cases  it  has  been  impossible  to  identify  a  majority department,  and  in  that  event  (included  the  ba  in  political  sciences)  the  program  has  been  assigned  to  an interdepartmental  committee.   following  the   law,  and  the  stricter  rules  of   the  statute,   the  number  of  departments   in  via  conservatorio came  down  to  three:  social  and  political  sciences  (sps),  economics,  management  and  quantitative  methods (demm),   and   international   studies,   law   and   political   history   (dilphs).   there   are   both   explicit   rules   and implicit  incentives  for  departments  to  assign  the  teaching  duties  of  their  professors  and  lecturers  on  their own   programs,   leaving   the   teaching   of   their   disciplines   included   in   other   programs   to   internal   extra-­ assignments  (affidamenti)  or  external  contracts.  these  will  be  probably  paid  by  the  department  hosting  the program  and  not  by  that  providing  the  teacher,  with  the  result  of  an  overall  “pass-­the-­buck”  non-­cooperative game.  as  i  said,  in  the  mid-­term,  this  should  provide  the  incentives  for  a  further  departmentalization  of  the teaching  programs,  reducing  the  level  of  interdisciplinarity,  in  spite  of  the  hybrid  education  that  seems  to  be required  in  the  new  complex  labour  market.  it  is  evident  that  not  all  the  disciplines  can  easily  follow  that strategy.  if  the  ba  (or  even  ma)  courses  in  political  sciences  (plural)  still  follow  the  legacy  of  the  maranini-­ miglio  model  (for  good  or  for  wrong),  in  a  system  that  favors  “tit-­for-­tat”  games  between  departments,  they could  remain  in  the  bermuda  triangle  of  high  numbers,  low  quality  and  deadlock,  because  of  the  structure  of interdepartmental  committees  in  a  context  that  will  gradually  lose  its  consensual  imprinting.   third  element.  political  science  (singular)  in  milano  is  a  happy  story  with  an  uncertain  “ending”.  not  more than  25  years  there  wasn’t  a  single  course  in  political  science  in  the  public  university  of  milano,  in  a  faculty whose  unique  teaching  program  was  called  “political  sciences”.  now  we  teach  around  40  courses  from  the ba  to  the  doctoral  level.  probably  a  garbage-­can  interpretation  of  this  proliferation  would  not  be  fair  enough with  regard  to  the  efforts  and  strategies  brought  forward  by  a  number  of  agents,  but  their  entrepreneurship was  certainly  facilitated  by  a  set  of  contingent  windows  of  opportunity,  started  by  the  3+2  reform  and  the norms   regulating   the   programs   in   each   class   of   study.   given   the   structure   of   many   programs   and   the number  of  their  students,  we  now  offer  six  parallel   introductory  courses  in  political  science  (included  one taught   in   english).   everything’s   fine   then?   it’s   not   so   simple.   firstly,   it   should   not   have   been   very complicated  to  regroup  all  political  scientists  in  a  unique  department  (formerly  we  were  separated  in  three different  ones),  but  for  different  legacies  it  was  only  partially  possible.  if  the  department  is  the  new  basic organizational  block  in  the  academic  architecture,  being  partially  dispersed  will  probably  be  a  disadvantage. secondly,  the  structure  of  opportunity  provided  by  the  national  rules  defining  how  to  construct  a  teaching program  (at  ba  or  ma  level)  are  different  for  each  discipline,  and  particularly  damaging  for  political  science.   its  “natural  home”  is  conflated  by  other  disciplines  according  to  the  original  cognitive  model  derived  by  the marinini-­miglio’s   imprinting,   and   since   all   political   scientists   belong   to   the   same   scientific   sector,   it’s impossible  to  try  to  “control”  some  other  programs.  as  a  result,  though  we  participate  in  quite  a  few  corsi  di studio,  we  have  very  limited  chances  of  having  the  leadership  any  of  them.  as  a  matter  of  fact,  there  isn’t any  political  scientist  directing  one  of  the  new  teaching  committees,  or  guiding  the  newly  established  faculty of   political,   economic   and   social   sciences.   thirdly,   whereas   other   disciplines   have   several   overlapping scientific  sectors  (e.g.  law,  with  several  sectors  in  the  fields  of  public,  private  and  international  law),  in  fact, the  sps04  (political  science)  sector  masks  non  overlapping  trainings  and  capacities  going  back  to  the  three original   subsectors:   ir,   public   administration   and   public   policy,   domestic   and   comparative   politics.   in   a situation  of  scarce  resources,   future  retirements  and  a  block  of   turnover,   this  could   represent  a   further 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 4/10 setback  for  our  discipline.  without  the  possibility  of  even  partially  substituting  retiring  professors  (usually teaching  2-­3  courses  at  all  levels)  with  colleagues  of  contiguous  sectors  (as  done  by  economists,  sociologists and  jurists),  the  risk   is  that  of  gradually  abandoning  our  presence   in  those  teaching  programs  which  we were  not  able  to  deeply  characterize,  but  still  see  our  qualified  presence.  deciding  the  “core  business”  in teaching  will  be  a  common  task  for  all  disciplines,  but  in  the  context  we’ve  just  described,  it  risks  to  be  a retreat  without  strategy  and  without  any  safe  haven. having  said  this  regarding  the  impact  of  the  new  reform  for  our  discipline  in  the  university  of  milano,  which could  be  the  potential  scenario  for  the  future?   scenario  a:  “gattopardo’s  rule”  (10%):  nothing  will  actually  change.  the  usual  italian-­style  adagio  could again  prevail  over  the  many  reforms  put  in  place.  in  spite  of  the  abolition  of  the  intermediary  level  between the  university  and  the  departments,  which  assured  the  typical  room  for  compensating  opposing  tendencies, the  consensus-­oriented  legacy  of  the  (ex-­)  faculty,  inspired  by  the  original  plural  model  of  political  sciences, will  survive  as  an  institutionalized  practice.  in  this  scenario,  political  science  (singular)  has  nothing  to  gain and  nothing  to   lose,  compared  to   the  status  quo.  an  opportunity  would  be   lost,  and  a  risk  avoided.  my personal  perspective  is  that  this  scenario  has  few  chances  to  be  realized,  because  of  the  new  structure  of opportunity  which,  as  i  tried  to  demonstrate,  is  biased  in  favor  of  certain  disciplines  and  programs. scenario  b:  “departments  rule”  (40%):  because  of  the  aforementioned  opportunity  structure,  maybe  not  in the   near   future,   but   already   in   the   medium   period,   all   the   teaching   programs   intrinsically   based   on   an interdisciplinary  (and  thus  interdepartmental)  cooperation  will  suffer  a  disinvestment  of  resources.  firstly,  in terms  of  human  resources  because  departments  will  first  assign  the  teaching  duties  to  their  own  programs (and  possibly  to  their  best  teachers),  and  secondly  of  financial  resources  (with  no  one  wanting  to  pay  the  bill –  contracts,  teaching  assistants,  marketing,  placement  strategies,  time,  energies,  etc.  –  for  someone  else). ba   and   ma   programs   without   any   clear   departmental   “owner”   risk   the   most,   but   even   the   others   will probably  experience  a  decrease  in  their  interdisciplinary  character,  insofar  as  the  national  rules  permit.  (a “tragedy   of   the   commons”   translated   into   our   academic   organization).   unfortunately,   this   is   the   worst scenario   for   political   science   in  milano.   being  still   a   minoritarian  discipline,   fragmented  and  divided   into several   departments   and   teaching   programs,   there   is   not   the   possibility   of   retreating   to   a   more homogeneous   political   science   program   (that   cannot   exist).   political   science   risks,   in   the   long   term,   to become  a  supplementary  discipline,  relegated  to  first  year  classes  in  order  to  fulfill  the  minimal  ministerial requirements.   scenario   c:   “a   new   constitutive   pact”   (20%):   the   old   faculty   was   built   on   the   basis   of   mutual   non-­ interference.  in  a  period  of  sufficient  resources,  no-­one  was  interested  in  questioning  the  assignment  of  a new  position  or  even   the   record  of   research  and  publications  of  a  colleague.  there  wasn’t   the  need   to choose,  and  quarreling  was  counterproductive  (the  gain  would  have  been  marginal,  and  could  have  negative feedbacks   for   the   future).   without   any   clear   central   strategy   or   evaluating   agency,   the   mutual   non-­ interference  has  been  applied  even  to  teaching  programs.  milano  is  probably  the  only  faculty  of  political sciences  in  italy  that  managed  to  increase  its  offer  in  the  last  five  years,  whereas  all  the  others  decided  to close  or  aggregate  some  programs.   
being  impossible  to  keep  up  to  that  attitude,  and  with  the  diffusion  at each   level  of   the   logic  of  evaluation,   the  old   logrolling  habits  could  be  substituted  by  a  new,  commonly agreed,  constitutive  pact.  for  example,  the  three  departments  could  decide  to  reorganize  and  reduce  the offer  of  ba  level  courses  on  the  basis  of  a  common  commitment  assuring  proportional  human  and  financial resources.  at  the  same  time,  there  could  be  free,  and  even  bitter  competition  at  the  ma  level.  the  problem is  that  exactly  the  most  departmentalized  ba  programs  should  restructure  themselves  in  favor  of  the  most interdisciplinary  ones:  something  that  goes  against  the  present  drift.  in  any  event,  this  scenario  offers  some chances   for   political   science,   especially   in   terms   of   saving   human   resources   employed   in   introductory courses  in  order  to  reorient  our  presence  in  more  politological  ma  programs  (or  curricula).   scenario  d:  “variable  geometry”  (30%):  it  is  no  more  the  time  for  a  global  logrolling  alliance:  spoils  are  too 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 5/10 low  for  avoiding  redistributive  choices.  but  this  could  not  necessarily  mean  an  hobbesian  competition  among departments,  each  one  with  its  stronghold.  there  could  still  be  place  for  common  projects,  for  ideas  and programs  that  rise  above  disciplinary  barriers.  welfare  and  labor  studies  is  a  pragmatic  example  of  this  type of  program  that  we  inherited  from  the  past  faculty;;  economics  and  political  science   is  a  more  theoretical oriented  example  of  an  internationalized  ma  program  entirely  taught  in  english,  which  nicely  represents  a niche  of   cooperation  between   “sects”  of   two  different  departments.  the   idea  of  variable  geometries   for innovative  and  possibly   international  programs  could  appeal   to  a  variety  of  stakeholders   inside  different departments.  it  is  not  necessary  to  share  everything  with  everyone,  but  it  could  make  sense  to  reduce  the overall  effort  in  ba  programs  in  favor  of  some  well-­conceived  experiments  at  the  ma  level.  along  the  same line,  new  projects  should  start  together  with  foreign  partners  already  from  the  beginning  (double  or  joint degrees),  in  order  to  increase  the  visibility,  share  the  costs,  and  raise  the  indices  of  internationality.  they shouldn’t  be  necessarily  relegated  at  the  second  level  of  university  education.  it  is  possible  to  conceive  even internationally   oriented   english-­speaking   ba   programs   in   political   sciences   sidelining   the   pre-­existing traditional  ones:  the  first  one  would  be  more  clearly  inclined  towards  the  social  sciences,  whereas  the  others would  preserve  the  tradition  of  the  humanities.  this  last  scenario  is  not  without  costs,  especially  in  terms  of risks.  but  the  search  for  innovative  paths  is  probably  the  only  one  that  will  permit  to  our  discipline  to  avoid playing  an  ancillary  role  in  the  reformed  italian  university.   social   sciences   are   certainly   the   most   innovative   disciplines   among   the   broader   field   of   humanities characterizing  the  original  organization  of  the  faculties  of  political  sciences.  on  the  one  side,  the  university reform  impacts  on  the  interdisciplinary  character  of  our  programs,  but  on  the  other  it  may  represent  the opportunity   for   investing   in   qualitatively   different   projects:   more   scientific,   open   to   evaluations   and internationally   oriented.   political   science,   among   the   social   sciences,   is   well   equipped   to   accept   the challenge. political  science  in  bologna:  from  the  old  “social  contract”  to  a  new scenario filippo  andreatta political  science  at  the  university  of  bologna  had,  among  others,  two  main  peculiarities.  on  the  one  hand, the  departments  were  more  autonomous  than   in  other  universities,  with   informal  rules  allowing  them  to control  recruitment  and  with  the  faculty  assembly  limited  to  a  ratification  role.  since  their  inception,  the  four founding  institutes,  which  eventually  developed  into  pre-­reform  departments,  were  largely  autonomous  and shared  on  an  equal  base  resources  according  to  an  original  agreement,  named  «the  social  contract».  these departments  were  therefore  already  in  tune  with  the  shift  dictated  by  the  gelmini  reform  giving  them  more responsibility,  even  if  their  established  tradition  made  them  reluctant  to  revise  their  composition.  on  the other  hand,  because  of  the  multicampus  organization  of  the  university  of  bologna  which  had  disseminated  a series  of  new  faculties  in  the  romagna  region,  there  were  two  faculties  of  political  sciences,  including  the one  in  forlì.  this  characteristic,  which  had  generated  unusual  amount  of  resources,  had  also  created  a  sense of  territorial  identity  verging  on  competition. of  the  four  departments  –  economics,  sociology,  politics  and  history,  political  science  –  only  the  first  one, with  approximately  100  units  from  various  faculties,  had  a  sufficient  dimension  for  the  threshold  of  50  which the  university  of  bologna  had  adopted  (raising  it  from  the  number  prescribed  in  the  gelmini  reform).  the other  three  departments  had  each  about  40  members  from  the  two  faculties,  making  it  necessary  to  reduce the  number  to  two  departments  at  most.  there  could  have  been  two  possible  solutions  which  proved  to  be unfeasible  due  to  past  legacies  and  difficulties  in  the  negotiations.  first,  it  would  have  been  possible  to  follow a  territorial  and  teaching  criterion  by  establishing  two  (very  similar)  departments  out  of  the  old  faculties,  one in   bologna   and   one   in   forlì.   second,   following   a   disciplinary   and   research   criterion   it   would   have   been possible  to  unite  the  40  sociologists  from  the  political  science  faculty  with  the  about  20  sociologists  teaching in  other   faculties,  allowing   the   remaining   two  departments   (politics  and  history,  and  political   science)   to merge  given  their  cultural  proximity.  given  the  problems  which  made  either  solution  impossible,  the  most 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 6/10 ambitious  objective  of  a  single  department  was  even  more  out  of  reach. since  no  top-­down  solution  could  be  found,  one  group  of  professors  launched  a  bottom-­up  initiative,  inviting all  of  their  colleagues  which  either  taught  in  one  of  the  political  science  faculties  or  were  specialized  in  a socio-­political   discipline   to   join   a   new   department   of   social   and   political   sciences   (sps).   overall,   this invitation  reached  about  150  individuals:  little  more  than  90  who  had  both  characteristics,  about  30  who  met the  teaching  criterion  and  30  who  met  the  disciplinary  one.  about  half  (73)  replied  positively,  including  all those  from  the  political  science  department,  about  a  third  of  the  politics  and  history  department,  a   little contingent   from   the   sociology   department   and   a   dozen   of   those   coming   from   other   faculties.   in   the meantime,  the  sociology  department  had  reached  an  agreement  with  one  of  the  law  departments,  leaving without  a  solution  only  about  20  professors  from  the  old  politics  and  history  department,  who  were  assigned to  the  sps  department  by  the  academic  senate. the  new  sps  department  is  therefore  composed  of  about  90  professors.  little  more  than  40%  of  these  are political  scientists  stricto  sensu  reunited  after  having  traditionally  belonged  to  two  distinct  departments.  most political  scientists  came  from  the  department  of  political  science  which  had  a  monodisciplinary  character, while  a  smaller  but  significant  contingent  had  belonged  to  the  multidisciplinary  department  of  politics  and history.  even  if  there  is  no  longer  an  almost  monodisciplinary  department  of  political  science,  the  discipline is  conspicuous  in  the  new  department  and  there   is  the  further  advantage  of  having  all  political  scientists within  the  same  institution.  there  are  also  about  fifteen  sociologists  (about  a  quarter  of  the  university  total), a  dozen  historians  of  political  thought  or  of  specific  geographic  areas  (almost  all  of  the  university  total),  nine contemporary  historians,  ten  scholars  of  public  law,  and  a  few  more  belonging  to  other  disciplines  (linguistics and  social  psychology).  the  dimension  of   the  department   is  analogous   to   that  of   traditionally   important departments  such  as  economics  or  business  and  this  should  enhance  the  influence  of  the  discipline  within the  university  as  a  whole.  this  has  already  happened  on  the  teaching  side,  as  the  department  is  primarily responsible  for  two  bachelor  degrees  (one  in  forlì)  and  7  masters  degree  (three  in  forlì),  and  it  participates to  10  bachelor  and  9  master  degrees,  offering  courses  well  beyond  the  confines  of  the  two  old  faculties. political  science  in  catania:  a  ten  percent  minority  in  the  new  department   fulvio  attinà the  university  of  catania  (unict)  moved  fast  and  stubbornly  to  adopt  the  main  aspects  of  the  reform.  the new  statute   incorporated   the   important   reform  principles   concerning  department   reorganization  and   the establishment   of   the   new   teaching   structures,   generally   known   as   the   schools.   but   only   the   school   of medicine  has  been  put  in  place,  and  no  other  school  is  in  sight,  at  present.  undergraduate  and  graduate courses  are  organized  by  the  departments.  the  end  of  the  faculty  of  political  sciences  and  of  two  of  the three  departments  previously  existing  within  it  brought  to  the  incorporation  of  all   institutional  and  human resources   in  the  dappsi,   the  department   for   the  analysis  of  political,   institutional  and  social  processes, probably  to  be  renamed  in  the  future  as  the  political  sciences  department.  the  merger  had  the  positive effect  of  drawing  in  one  department  the  thirteen  political  scientists  formerly  affiliated  to  the  dappsi  and  the political  studies  department.  the  political  science  share  of  the  dappsi  scientific  staff  is  a  little  bit  over  10  %. it  falls  behind  the  sociologists’  share,  who  have  the  largest,  and  the  lawyers’  one.  history,  economics,  law, sociology  and  other  social  and  human  studies  are  represented  at  the  same  time  in  the  dappsi  and  in  other departments.  with  regard  to  teaching,  the  political  science  share  of  cfu/ects  is  also  around  10  %  of  the dappsi’s  total.  the  undergraduate  political  science  course  on  politics  and  international  relations  has  given way  to  an  interdisciplinary  (history  &  political  science)  course  due  to  the  constraints  imposed  by  university laws.   the   existing   graduate   political   science   course   (lm   62)   on   global   politics   and   euro-­mediterranean relations   (known  as   the  glopem)  has  36  cfu/ects   in  political   science  and   is  entirely  given   in  english. briefly,  the  reform  did  not  bring  any  remarkable  transformation  to  the  affiliation  and  teaching  tasks  of  the political  scientists.   the  small  reorganization  of  the  departments,  however,   is  a  true  failure.  at  mid-­large  italian  universities, academics  missed  the  opportunity  to  reorganize  the  departments  by  strengthening  the  scientific  coherence and   the  homogeneity   the   reform   law  wanted.   in  such  universities,   the  minimum  number  of  department http://www.fscpo.unict.it/europa/glopem/index.htm 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 7/10 members  required  by  the  law  is  a  hard  obstacle  to  those  who  want  to  make  homogeneous  social  science departments  staffed  by  political  scientists,  sociologists,  political  philosophers  and  the  other  scientists  of  the area  14.  the  scientific  coherence  of  the  department  is  key  to  enhance  political  and  social  science  research in   italy.   political   scientists   share   few   research   interests   with   lawyers   and   economists   but   many   with sociologists  and  other  social  scientists.  homogeneous  departments  are  good  to  research  as  well  as  teaching. they   will   offer   curricula   more   up   to   date   than   the   multidisciplinary   curricula   of   the   faculty   of   political sciences  that  belong  to  obsolete  notion  of  education  in  political  science. political  science  in  florence:  saving  the  “cesare  alfieri”  tradition alessandro  chiaramonte according  to  the  “gelmini  reform”,  approved  in  december  2010,  broader  and  more  coordinated  functions  of teaching   and   research   are   allocated   to   the   new   departmental   structures.   in   the   following   months,   the governing  academic  bodies  of  the  university  of  florence  began  to  discuss  and  work  on  its  implementation.   on  the  24th  of  september  2011,  the  senato  accademico  and  the  consiglio  di  amministrazione  approved  the guidelines  for  the  departmental  reorganization.  the  main  points  decided  were: the  membership  of  each  new  department  should  be  such  as  to  ensure  not  only  the  minimum requirement  of  35  components  established  by  the  law  240/2010,  but,  taking  into  account  the planned  retirements,  a  higher  minimum  of  50  components  (counting  full  and  associate professors,  and  researchers).  to  ensure  a  better  management  and  a  fair  representation  in the  higher  bodies,  the  new  departments  should  not  have,  generally,  a  number  of  members three  times  higher  than  the  minimum  for  activation. the  fourteen  research  areas  defined  by  the  cun  (national  university  council)  should  be  the first  reference  point  for  the  establishment  of  departments.  in  other  words,  the  new departments  should  be  established  by  aggregating  scientific  sectors  in  the  same  cun  area  or sub-­area.  only  reasonable  exceptions  to  this  rule  would  be  allowed  (see  later).  moreover, professors  and  researchers  of  the  same  scientific  sector  should  belong  to  only  one department. for  the  coordination  of  teaching  activities  and  for  the  management  of  related  facilities,  the departments,  individually  or  jointly,  should  establish  connected  structures  (what  the  new statute  would  later  call  the  “schools”).  the  schools  would  play  a  primary  role  in  the  case  of degree  courses  in  which  multiple  departments  contributed  significantly. in   accordance   with   the   guidelines   and   rules   for   the   establishment   of   new   departmental   structures,   in december   2011   the   professors   and   researchers,   belonging   to   the   fields   of   political   science,   sociology, political  philosophy,  history  of  political   ideas,  history  of   institutions,  history  of   international  relations,  and contemporary  history  proposed  to  establish  the  department  of  political  and  social  sciences.  the  promoters came  from  different  departments  and  faculties,  but,  except  for  contemporary  history,  belonged  to  the  same cun   research   area   (area   14:   political   and   social   sciences).   the   primary   scientific   objective   of   the   new department   is   to   provide   a   qualified   contribution   to   the   study   of   contemporary   political   and   social phenomena,   of   their   interdependence,   and   of   their   historical   roots.   taking   into   account   this   scientific objective,  it  is  clear  why  the  presence  of  contemporary  history  has  been  considered  necessary  for  the  new department,  even  though  its  scientific  sector  belongs  to  a  different  cun  research  area.  a  number  of  inter-­ university  and  inter-­departmental  research  centers,  previously  based  in  other  departments,  will  join  the  new department. the   official   constitution   of   the   new   department   of   political   and   social   sciences   will   take   place   at   the beginning  of  2013,  while  the  election  of  the  director  is  scheduled  for  october  2012.  subsequently,  the  new departments  will  work  on  the  creation  of  the  schools  as  the  structures  in  charge  for  coordinating  teaching activities.  the  department  of  political  and  social  sciences  is  expected  to  join  forces  with  the  departments  of law  and  of  economics  in  order  to  create  a  school  in  continuity  with  the  cultural  inheritance  and  tradition  of 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 8/10 the  “cesare  alfieri”  faculty,  the  first  school  of  political  and  social  sciences  in  italy. political  science  in  siena:  sentiments,  rational  calculations  and  windows of  opportunity pierangelo  isernia having,  over  the  years,  developed  a  modicum  of  skepticism  about  the  “reforming”  spirit  that  periodically animates  the  italian  political  and  administrative  system,  i  am  quite  reluctant  to  step  into  the  discussion  of what  the  gelmini  reform  might  imply  for  the  small  group  of  political  scientists  in  siena,  for  their  role  in  the university  of  siena  and,  even  less,  for  the  italian  university  system  as  a  whole.  to  meet  the  kind  invitation of  ips’s  editor,  however,   i  will   first   tell   the  story  of  goals,  calculations,  and  strategic  moves  behind  the decision  of  the  siena  team  in  political  science  to  help  setting  up  a  brand  new  department  hosting  together, for  the  first  time,  most  of  the  social  sciences  present  in  our  university.  second,  i  will  offer  a  few  disparate thoughts  about  the  future.  for  the  sake  of  clarity,  i  will  use  the  capital  letters  to  indicate  our  discipline  and the  lower  letters  to  indicate  the  late  faculty  of  political  sciences. political  science  in  the  city  of  palio  is  a  very  tiny  reality,  made  of  just  5  people  –  4  full  professors  and  an assistant   professor   –   surrounded   in   the   old   faculty   of   political   sciences   by   historians,   lawyers   and economists.  once  faculties  were  doomed  to  disappear  by  gelmini’s  fiat  two  alternatives  faced  us.  the  first option  was  to  simply  transpose  the  faculty  into  the  new  department.  this  was  a  tempting  option  indeed. over   the   last   two   years   political   science   had,   in   fact,   come   to   play   a   crucial   and   visible   role   in   the management  of  both  the  department  and  the  faculty  of  political  sciences.  both  the  director  of  department and  the  dean  of  faculty  were  two  political  scientists  coming  from  our  small  group.  should  we  have  tried  to preserve  this  leading  role  and  influence  more  than  anything  else?  the  alternative  was  to  create  something new.  and  being  political  science  a  party  of  five,  this  immediately  raised  another  question:  with  whom?  we were  not,  flattering  as  it  might  be,  short  of  offers,  coming  especially  from  the  two  economics  departments. so  what  was  to  be  done? our  story  is  made  of  three  elements:  sentiments,  rational  calculations  and  windows  of  opportunity  and,  of course,  it  did  not  unfold  in  the  rational,  coherent  way  i  pretend  it  did,  but  very  much  in  bits  and  pieces.   starting  with  the  cool,  rational  calculations,  three  considerations  were  up  in  our  minds.  first,  an  assessment of  the  structural  context.  as  others  might  have  experienced,  when  political  science  –  as  a  discipline  –  is  a minority,   life   is  not  easy  in  political  sciences  –  as  a  faculty.  life  for  political  science  in  a  world  in  which others  play  the  hegemon  can  be  nasty  and  brutal  (how  short  we  do  not  know  yet,  in  siena…).  not  being  able (for  lack  of  resources,  not  for  lack  of  lust  for  aggrandizing  the  power  of  political  science  in  siena)  to  become an   hegemon,   we   thought   that   life   would   have   probably   been   better   in   a   multipolar   world   (pace mearsheimer…),   in   which   you   compete   with   other   disciplines   more   or   less   of   you   size.   and   to   add   a constructivist  twist,  if  the  system  had  a  common  culture  (especially  in  methodological  terms),  such  as  the one  that  is  shared  by  social  sciences,  we  could  have  come  to  live  in  an  age  quite  similar  to  the  golden  one  of the  balance  of  power  in  the  nineteenth  century;;  admittedly  not  an  era  of  peace,  but  of  limited  conflicts  and cross-­cutting  alliances. assuming  that  life  would  have  been  better  in  a  multipolar  world,  which  partners  should  we  have  chosen?  we did   choose   partners   whose   methodological   underpinnings   were   as   homogeneous   as   possible   (given   the available  options,  of  course)  to  ours.  we  did  so  for  two  reasons;;  or,  if  you  like,  under  a  couple  of  working hypotheses   that  are,  as   such,   still   untested  and  only   time  will   tell  whether   they  were  correct.  the   first hypothesis  is  that  we  need  to  rethink  how  political  science  –  as  a  set  of  teaching  curricula  –  was  taught  in siena,  injecting  into  it  a  greater  dose  of  scientific  and  empirical  research  and  less  “interdisciplinarity”  à   la carte.   siena   is   a   medium-­size   university   that   has   not   the   luxury   of   a   vast   endowment   of   young   and ambitious  would-­be  students   to  draw  upon.   it   crucially  depends  on   its  capacity   to  attract  students   from tuscany  and  outside  (around  35%  of  our  students  come  from  other  regions  of  italy).  we  hypothesized  that making  the  teaching  offer  (the  so  called  offerta  formativa)  more  coherent,  scientific  and  empirical   could possibly   capture  an   increasing  share  of   this  mobile  group  of   italian  students.  unfortunately,  not  all   our 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 9/10 colleagues  in  the  old  faculty  of  political  sciences  shared  this  conviction.  on  the  contrary,  for  many  of  them the  core  teaching  component  of  a  strong  political  sciences  department  was  and  still  is  a  solid  formation  in legal  and/or  historical  disciplines  and,  the  more  of  them  the  better.  we  believe  otherwise.   the  second  hypothesis  (or  bet?)  is  that,  in  the  future,  the  results  of  the  evaluation  system  for  both  teaching and  research  will  play  a  greater  role   in  allocating  resources,   in   influencing  recruitment  and   in  catalyzing projects  and  initiatives.  any  future  department  will  actively  compete  in  an  environment  in  which,  at  both  the local  (i.e.  siena)  and  national  level,  the  results  of  the  evaluation  process  will  determine  its  growth.  in  this connection,  we  thought  that  we  needed  to  join  with  people  that  appreciated  the  need  to  carry  forward  a vibrant  research  program.   these  calculations  were  met  by  a  sentiment:  the  human  desire  for  change.  having  (some  of  us)  spent  20  to 30  years  with  the  same  old  chaps,  political  scientists  wanted  to  try  new  ones.  in  marriage,  this  is  not  always seen  as  positive.  we  think  it  has  a  positive  side  in  other  contexts. as  in  the  garbage  can  model  of  decision  making  (not  incidentally  first  conceived  to  explain  the  university system)   sentiments   and   calculations   –   no   matter   how   strongly   shared   by   our   small   group   of   political scientists  –  had  to  find  a  window  of  opportunity  to  transform  themselves  into  an  institutional  program.  and here  the  window  came,  when  we  were  approached  by  a  group  of  social  scientists,  based  respectively  in  the department   of   communication   and   of   social   sciences   and   philosophy   (both   located   in   the   faculty   of humanities),  who  invited  us  to  consider  the  possibility  of  joining  forces  in  creating  for  the  first  time  a  social science  department  at  the  university  of  siena.   to  go  down  this  road  was  quite  a  departure  from  our  initial,  incremental,  plans.  it  implied,  in  organizational term,  to  fuse  scientific  groups  coming  from  different  walks  of  life,  never  used  to  work  together  and  to  face resistances  (that  indeed  quickly  materialized)  from  those  sectors  of  the  old  faculty  of  political  sciences  less eager   to   see   legal   and   historical   studies   being   “diluted”   into   the   larger   (and   turbulent?)   sea   of   social sciences.  and  here  the  major  debate  came.  it  was  acrimonious,  but  at  time  also  passionate  and  articulated, both  within  the  old  faculty  –  on  what  political  sciences  should  offer  both  in  terms  of  training  for  students  and research  –  and  among  those  keener  to  follow  the  new  project  –  on  what  a  department  of  social  sciences means  in  siena  and  what  it  should  and  could  offer  in  terms  of  teaching  and  research.  let  me  add  that  the political   science   team,   as   always   working   hand   in   hand,   played   a   key   role   in   making   all   this   possible, following  to  the  word  the  teachings  of  strategists  like  thomas  schelling  and  alexander  george. the  results  are  not  exactly  what  an  olympic  mind  would  have  designed.  part  of  the  reason  is  that  in  siena we  are  short  of  gods,  and  professors  (myself  first  in  the  row)  are  much  more  at  ease  in  teaching  strategy than   in   actually   practicing   it,   but   this   is   what   happened:   the   old   faculty   of   political   sciences   split   itself. approximately  one  third  of  it  (including  all  those  trained  in  social  sciences  and  some  historians  more  used and  keen  to  work  with  the  other  social  sciences)  decided  to  join  the  project  of  a  new  department,  quickly named  the  department  of  social,  political  and  cognitive  sciences  (dispoc),  while  those  remaining  set  up another  department  (also  with  political  sciences   in  the  title).  and  here  we  are,  ready  to  roll   in   this  new department,  made  of  more  than  40  people,  ranging  from  psychology,  to  economics,  from  political  science  to anthropology,  from  sociology  to  geography,  with  some  engineers  and  computer  scientists  as  well.  too  early to  say  whether  the  bird  will  fly  high.  we  will  definitely  try  hard.  in  all  cases,  we  look  forward  to  the  fun  as well  as  the  debates  and  controversies  and,  alas,  the  bureaucratic  hurdles. what  have  i  learned  from  this  experience  that  can  be  relevant  for  others?  some  lessons  are  more  personal and,  may  be,  harder  to  generalize.  first  and  foremost  that  leadership,  when  you  embark  yourself  upon  the task  of  changing  (no  matter  how  little)  things,  is  more  about  patience  and  tolerance  for  your  counterpart’s arguments  than  about  power  and  influence.   what  role  for  political  science  (the  discipline)  in  the  future  of  siena?  my  impression  is  that  the  reform,  at least  as  interpreted  locally,  makes  the  future  of  political  science  possibly  more  problematic,  especially  when it   will   come   to   the   recruitment   stage   (a   prospective   quite   far   away   in   the   future   as   far   as   siena   is concerned).  in  the  past,  at  least  in  siena,  major  decisions  about  recruitment  were  taken  through  logrolling and  bargaining  first  at  the  faculty  level  and  then  at  the  senate  level.  it  is  not  clear  how  all  this  process  will unfold  in  the  future.  for  sure,  departments  will  not  have  anymore,  like  old  faculties  had,  a  sounding  board like  the  academic  senate  to  make  the  voices  of  different  institutions  and  interests  heard.  in  siena,  as  an example,  out  of  13  departments  no  more  than  8  will  find  a  seat  in  the  senate,  2  for  each  of  the  four  big 08/07/2013 italian political science: political science in italy after the last university reform www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/political-science-in-italy-after-the-last-university-reform 10/10 “areas”  in  which  sciences  have  been  divided  in  siena.   in  the  new  gelmini  system,  i  suspect  that  small  size  disciplines  like  ours  that  cannot  play  the  hegemon  will be  able  to  make  themselves  heard  both  in  the  departments  and  at  the  university  level  only  through  two indirect  channels:  students  and  research;;  how  many  students  you  attract  and  how  much  money  you  bring  to the  university.  this  might  be  good  or  bad,  as  far  as  it  goes.  political  science  is  no  match  for  natural  science departments   (although   dispoc   budget,   based   on   the   last   three   years   average,   in   terms   of   financial resources   ranks   first   among   the   soft   sciences   and   fifth   overall).   but   we   do   feel   we   can   compete   for excellence  and  quality.  however,  for  leveling  the  playing  field  we  need  a  strong  and  independent  evaluation system,   able   to   take   into   account   the   specificities   of   the   different   disciplines   and   to   reward   those departments  that  do  good  and  to  punish  those  that  do  badly,  with  a  view  to  encouraging  them  to  do  better next  time.  how  much  the  anvur  system  is  able  to  deliver  such  a  result  it  is  probably,  like  for  the  french revolution,  too  soon  to  say,  but  it  is  something  that  deserves  a  careful  monitoring  by  all  of  us  in  political science,  the  discipline. political  science  in  turin:  three  departments  into  one luigi  bobbio there  are  at  present  16  political  scientists  at  the  university  of  turin  (5  ordinari,  1  associato,  10  ricercatori). fifteen  of  them  are  classified  in  the  sector  sps/04  (political  science)  and  one  in  the  sector  sps/11  (political sociology).   in  a   couple  of  months  we  will   have   four  new  entries   (three  sps/04   and   one   sps/11)   –   as temporary  “gelmini”  researchers  –  and  the  overall  number  of  political  scientists  will  rise  to  twenty.   all  political  scientists  were  part  of  the  faculty  of  political  sciences  which  is  soon  going  to  disappear.  political science  was  taught  only  in  courses  run  by  this  faculty. the  new  department.  a  new  large  department  has  been  set  up,  through  the  fusion  of  three  pre-­existing departments  (political  studies,  social  sciences,  and  anthropology).  the  new  department  of  “cultures,  politics and   society”   gathers   sociologists,   political   scientists,   anthropologists,   political   philosophers,   historians   of political   thought,   some  historians,   some  geographers  and  some   foreign   language  specialists.  all  political scientists  but  one  have  joined  the  new  department.  they  are  then  15  over  a  total  membership  of  97.  the director  of  the  new  department   is  a  sociologist.  there  are  two  vice-­directors:  a  political  scientist  and  an anthropologist. nothing  changed  in  the  courses  that  are  at  present  run  by  the  department  often  in  cooperation  with  other departments  (mainly  law  and  economics). phd  program.  the  institution  of  the  new  department  has  entailed  a  change  in  the  phd  program,  that  from the  next  year  will  be  called  “doctoral  school  in  sociology  and  political  studies”  and  will  gather  sociologists, political  scientists,  political  philosophers  and  historians  of  political  thought. perspectives.  perspectives  for  political  science  at  the  university  of  turin  seem  to  be  not  too  bad. notes 1  the  views  expressed  in  this  paper  are  entirely  personal,  and  do  not  institutionally  involve  any  academic organization  to  which  the  author  belongs.