Microsoft Word - PDF_Issue_16_3_Improta_220-240.docx Italian Political Science, VOLUME 16 ISSUE 3 Published in 2021 under Creative Commons BY-NC-ND license by: Italian Political Science. ISSN 2420-8434. All copyrights of article contents are retained by the authors. Volume 16, Issue 3, 220–240. Contact Author: Marco Improta, LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome E-mail address: mimprota@luiss.it Inside Technocracy: Features and Trajectories of Technocratic Ministers in Italy (1948–2021) Marco Improta LUISS GUIDO CARLI UNIVERSITY, ROME Abstract In recent times, technocratic transformations occurring in the governmental arena of European political systems have prompted growing scholarly interest. This study aims to contribute to this flourishing research agenda by examining the features of Italian technocratic ministers, the underpinnings of their government involvement, and the trajectories they have followed after ruling responsibility from 1948 to 2021. The main findings of the study show that: (a) there is a clear gendered pattern in technocratic appointments; (b) university professors are the most common professional category involved in technocratic appointments; (c) parties are gradually ceding core executive positions to technocratic ministers; (d) technocratic appointments are mainly driven by expertise-re- lated considerations; (e) cases of technocratic ministerial reappointments are negligible; and (f) technocratic ministers take a formal political affiliation, or join top private or public companies after government participation. 1. Introduction n 13 February 2021, Mario Draghi was sworn in as Italy’s new prime minister. Al- most ten years after the formation of the technocratic cabinet guided by Mario Monti, the President of the Republic once again entrusted a non-partisan expert to lead the government. In this vein, Italy confirms its place as the promised land of tech- nocracy, not only of populism (Piccolino and Puleo 2021). From a comparative perspective, Italy is witnessing some of the highest shares of technocratic personnel in government (Cotta 2018), both in the so-called ‘core executive’ positions (Strøm 2000; Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006) and in prime ministerial posts, with five technocratic heads from 1992 to 2021. Among the recent developments in Italian politics, the gradual reduction of the par- tyness of governments (Katz 1987) must be carefully considered to properly gauge the transformations occurring in the Italian governmental arena. On the one hand, the de- cline in partisan presence among Italian executives signals the growing complexity parties are facing in effectively handling the responsibility–responsiveness dilemma thoroughly examined by Peter Mair (2009; 2013). In their ruling activities, government parties are indeed confronted with several constraints posed by external actors, requiring such parties to be responsible towards supranational institutions, particularly for issues of budget and fiscal consolidation (Cavalieri 2020; Capati and Improta 2021). At the same time, ruling parties still need to pursue their electoral goals and policy objectives to O MARCO IMPROTA 221 survive in office and to be re-elected. To do so, they must satisfy citizens’ demands and be responsive to them. On the other hand, the increased share of technocratic figures in the government undermines party centrality in the country’s political life. Contemporary parties, indeed, are confronted with important challenges, from downward trends in their membership (Van Biezen et al. 2012) and relentless distrust towards them (Berg- man et al. 2020). Such challenges can pave the way for non-partisan experts to enter the government and replace parties when it comes to ruling responsibility. Recently, the formation of technocratic governments in Italy has attracted growing scholarly interest. Mario Monti’s cabinet involvement rekindled the discussion on the role of technocracy after the difficulties experienced by party-based governments. Ac- cording to Verzichelli and Cotta (2018: 78), the formation of the Monti cabinet in 2011 stands as the most extreme case of party abdication, demonstrating the ‘bad health’ of Italian party government. Such a conclusion is based on the high potential of policy au- tonomy granted to Monti and his ministers, called to tackle the economic crisis through several important legislative initiatives to achieve financial stability and avoid default. Therefore, almost four years ago, scholars were concerned about ‘this palpable sign of weakness of the political system [that] says a lot about the difficult state of Italian parties, twenty years after the crisis of the 1990s’ (Verzichelli and Cotta 2018: 78). After a brief interlude of partisan cabinets, Italy quickly returned to the hands of technocratic figures, demonstrating that the weakness of parties is becoming a structural problem of the Ital- ian political system. This study contributes to the flourishing literature on technocracy by exploring tech- nocratic ministers’ professional background and characteristics, expertise, and reappointment patterns, as well as trajectories in terms of career path after government responsibility. It does so by examining the entire life span of Italy’s Republican experi- ence, differentiating between three periods, according to the changes and developments of the Italian party system, particularly regarding the governmental arena. Such a differ- entiation helps to better identify patterns of technocratic ministerships. The first phase, from 1948 to 1993, is that of ‘polarised multipartism’ (Sartori 1976). The second phase is known as ‘fragmented bipolarism’ (D’Alimonte 2005), covering the 1994–2010 period. Finally, the last phase begins in 2011 and terminates in 2021. This pe- riod is characterised by ‘volatile tripolarism’ (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2013) marked by the entrance of new figures in the governmental arena (Monti) and in the parliamen- tary one (Grillo’s M5S) in the first stages of this period, and culminating in the appointment of Mario Draghi (D’Alimonte and Mammarella 2022). This research strategy aims to address three interrelated research questions. First, the article aims to understand who the technocratic ministers are, and what their back- ground and characteristics are in terms of profession and gender. Second, it investigates whether their appointment is based on the expertise acquired in their professional activ- ities or whether there are cases of misplacement in portfolio allocation. In addition, the article focuses on their reappointments, to understand whether their government partic- ipation occurs just for a single occasion or whether they remain actively involved. Third, it aims to understand their paths after political experience. Do they take up political affil- iation? Do they return to their professional lives? Do they join public or private institutions from a ‘revolving doors’ perspective? Inside technocracy 222 The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The second section presents the theoretical framework of the analysis. The third section outlines the research design. The fourth section analyses issues related to technocratic ministers, focusing on five main di- mensions. First, it explores background and portfolio allocation. Second, it examines technocratic ministers’ expertise and patterns of reappointment. Third, it investigates their career paths and trajectories after cabinet appointment. Finally, the last section dis- cusses the implications for future research and concludes the paper. 2. Theoretical framework For a long time, cabinets in democratic systems have generally been perceived as partisan cabinets – that is, cabinets composed of partisan personnel who have taken seats in na- tional parliaments (Brunclík 2015). However, in recent times, the enhanced presence of technocratic representation in government (Wratil and Pastorella 2018; Vittori et al. 2020) has prompted growing scholarly interest. Notably, political scientists have started to examine technocracy’s impact in reshaping traditional patterns of democratic govern- ance, underlining its challenges to the party government model (Costa Pinto et al. 2018) and its role as an alternative to both populism and party government (Caramani 2017). Before entering the political discourse, technocratic ideals of societal management characterised the organisational transformations deriving from industrialisation and Taylorism in the 1920s and 1930s in the United States and Europe (Caramani 2017). Technocracy then became a new form of governance in representative democracies, spreading first in Latin America (Centeno 1994). According to Caramani (2017), technocratic representation becomes prominent as a consequence of a number of factors. On the one hand, parties are increasingly accused of ‘electoralism’ – of abandoning their governing roles in favour of the goal of boosting their vote share (vote-seeking perspective), achieving governmental posts (office-seek- ing perspective), and distributing the spoils of victory (policy-seeking perspective). Such goals ‘involve patronage, monitoring electorates through increasingly sophisticated polling instruments as well as policies aimed at short-term results to secure re-election’ (Caramani 2017: 58). On the other hand, parties suffer from critiques related to their governance style. From a technocratic viewpoint, policy-making has become more com- plex, and parties are not equipped to effectively guide such processes. In addition, their decreased ability to rule with expertise places the government in dangerous situations vis-à-vis supranational institutions, which pose several policy constraints limiting the parties’ room for manoeuvre. Along these lines, it is argued that complex policy-making should be entrusted to technocrats, endangering the very legitimacy of party ruling (Ca- ramani 2017). A number of studies have dealt with the critical consequences of technocratic ap- pointments, focusing on the impact of technocracy on democratic governance (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014), citizens’ preferences regarding technocratic decision- making (Bertsou and Caramani 2020; Chiru and Enyedi 2022), and the role of techno- cratic personnel in the Italian context (Valbruzzi 2018; Verzichelli and Cotta 2018). Additional examinations have paid attention to the reasons behind technocratic involve- ment in government, highlighting financial and economic explanations (Alexiadou and MARCO IMPROTA 223 Gunaydin 2019), institutional determinants (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006), and elec- toral-related motives (Emanuele et al. 2022). So far, studies have investigated both the demand and supply sides of the electoral market. As regards the former, citizens’ preferences and attitudes towards technocracy have been analysed, showing that citizens may demand expert involvement in political decision-making processes to ensure effective governance, yet they can also be distrust- ful of experts and reject their unaccountable governance (Bertsou 2022). Chiru and Enyedi (2022) further noticed that individual-level characteristics, such as low political efficacy and authoritarian values, trigger strong support for the replacement of politi- cians with experts. Furthermore, technocracy appeals to citizens of countries where the quality of democracy is poor. On the supply side, research has emphasised parties’ diffi- culties in managing treacherous crises, diluting governing responsibility towards technocratic figures, especially during electoral turbulence (Emanuele et al. 2022) and economic turmoil (Wratil and Pastorella 2018). In particular, the need for the appoint- ment of non-partisan members in government lies in the fact that parties must preserve their electoral appeal vis-à-vis voters but struggle to do so when required to implement unpopular reforms in times of electoral or economic instability. A third line of research stresses the role of institutions in explaining technocratic appointments. In systems in which presidential powers are greater, the involvement of non-partisan personnel should be easier, as the delegation process would overcome the control of parliamentary parties (Cotta 2018). Specifically, the role of the head of state can influence the government formation process and elite selection (Schleiter and Mor- gan-Jones 2009). As noted by Verzichelli and Cotta (2018: 79), ‘this aspect is particularly relevant in a country [such as Italy], where political crises have recurrently determined the conditions for an active role of the President of the Republic in the choice of some key ministerial candidates’.1 The formation of technocratic cabinets and the presence of non-partisan ministers in government in Italy have been examined in several studies (Cotta and Verzichelli 2002; Marangoni 2012; Giannetti 2013; Castaldo and Verzichelli 2020; Garzia and Karremans 2021). Scholars have particularly focused on Mario Monti’s government in- volvement in managing the financial crisis (Marangoni 2012; Giannetti 2013), comparing such ruling experience with that of Mario Draghi (Garzia and Karremans 2021). Other efforts have been made in relation to the use of non-partisan ministers in Italy, demonstrating the parties’ need of technocratic appointments when policy-mak- ing becomes more complex, leading to a progressive deviation from the party government model (Verzichelli and Cotta 2018). In the 1950s and 1960s, parties had full control over policy-making, particularly during Fanfani’s management of the Italian po- litical system’s pivotal party of that time, i.e., the Christian Democracy (DC). During that period, DC membership played a key role in influencing portfolio allocation. In ad- dition, DC’s leaders were also deeply involved in the management of several public authorities, such as ENI, IRI, and Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Vassallo 2016). Timewise, the enlargement of the ‘pool of ministrables’ (Verzichelli and Cotta 2018) started in the late 1980s, marking the tipping point for Italian party government. However, existing 1 The veto on Paolo Savona as Minister of Economy and Finance in the first Conte cabinet is the most recent instance of the President of the Republic’s key role in ministerial selection. Inside technocracy 224 scientific endeavours have indicated that the trend of a technocratic presence in Italy followed predictable paths in terms of government experience, cabinet portfolios, and specific junctures in Italian history. Specifically, technocrats have mostly been ap- pointed in full-technocratic (or caretaker) governments (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). Also, they have been selected for guiding specific portfolios, e.g., Finance, Justice, Treasury. Finally, a technocratic presence was particularly frequent in periods of tur- moil, during which greater expertise was demanded (Verzichelli and Cotta 2018). To guide exploration the article differentiates between three crucial junctures con- cerning the transformations of the Italian party system and governmental dynamics. This allows patterns of technocratic ministerships to be gauged. As anticipated, the first period is that of the so-called ‘polarised multipartism’ (Sartori 1976) of 1948 to 1993 (from De Gasperi to Ciampi). This period is widely recognised as the golden age of party government (partitocrazia), lasting until the political earthquake brought about by the Mani Pulite scandal, which prompted the formation of the first technocratic cabinet (Ciampi). The second period considered is ‘fragmented bipolarism’ (D’Alimonte 2005), which started with the formation of the first Berlusconi cabinet in 1994 and ended with his last government experience. This phase was characterised by the formation of the technocratic cabinet led by Dini (1995) and by a (timid) government alternation model between centre-left and centre-right coalitions. The third and last period is that of ‘vola- tile tripolarism’ (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2013), which ran from the establishment of the technocratic government headed by Monti (2011) to the (less)2 technocratic gov- ernment led by Draghi (2021), currently in office (D’Alimonte and Mammarella 2022). In this time span, the Italian political system experienced two electoral earthquakes (Chiaramonte and De Sio 2014; Schadee et al. 2019) that profoundly reshaped its fea- tures.3 Importantly, all periods considered are characterised by a different degree of party centrality. Along these lines, we should expect dissimilar patterns of technocratic re- cruitment over time in both general cabinet offices and key positions. Specifically, we expect the first period to record a limited technocratic presence with substantial party control over core executive posts. Moreover, the second period should be characterised by an enhanced technocratic presence and a decrease in the party control of top govern- mental positions. Finally, considering the increased turbulence in the governmental arena of recent times (Chiaramonte and De Sio 2014), we expect the last period to record technocratic pervasiveness in cabinet and party ‘abdication’ of core executive positions, as the literature on technocracy highlights that technocratic appointments are more fre- quent in times of economic (Wratil and Pastorella 2018) and electoral turmoil (Emanuele et al. 2022). 2 In terms of share of government positions held by technocratic ministers. 3 In particular, the bipolar dynamics of the second phase were undermined by Monti’s appointment and ultimately interrupted by the emergence of the Five Star Movement (M5S). In this way, the party system structure became volatile and tripolar (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2013). MARCO IMPROTA 225 3. Design This study expands the scientific investigation of technocratic ministers in Italy by fo- cusing on the professional background, gender, expertise, reappointment, and career path of each appointed technocratic minister in Italian governments from 1948 to 2021. Figure 1. Share of technocratic positions in Italy Source: own elaboration of original data. As shown in Figure 1, technocrats achieved full control of cabinet positions on two occasions (Dini 1995 and Monti 2011). Moreover, the technocratic presence has grown in the last decade. All cabinets that have recently held government responsibility, i.e. Monti, Letta, Renzi, Gentiloni, Conte and Conte II, have indeed appointed technocratic ministers. This pattern is reinvigorated by the share of technocrats that can be recorded in the current Draghi cabinet (37.5%). Therefore, looking at recent trends, the estab- lished tradition of party government in Italy seems to have been interrupted. Since the definitions of technocratic minister and technocratic governments have been discussed in relevant studies (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014), it is important to clarify their meaning. Specifically, technocratic ministers are defined as ministers with no parti- san affiliation at the time of appointment, holding relevant policy expertise. Therefore, the objects of analysis of this study are non-partisan ministers. However, while all techno- cratic ministers are non-partisan ministers, the opposite is not true, as there is the possibility that non-partisan ministers do not necessarily hold specific expertise.4 The 4 Such phenomena were investigated by Marsh et al. (2010), who explored features of so-called ‘celebrity politicians’. Inside technocracy 226 article explores patterns of expertise by looking at possible misplacements in cabinet port- folios, such as non-partisan personnel with no expertise in their portfolios of appointment, who could have used their expertise in different cabinet positions. This study aims to examine five different dimensions characterising Italian tech- nocratic ministers. To do so, five variables are considered. First, similar to Alexiadou and Gunaydin (2019), the study looks at the professional background of technocratic minis- ters to both trace their network and environment and grasp their expertise in specific policy areas. Second, to investigate whether there were gendered patterns in techno- cratic ministerial appointments, a binary variable indicating the gender of the ministers is included. Third, to examine ministers’ expertise and potential issues of misplacement in portfolio allocation, the article studies professional background to understand whether technocratic ministers are appointed to cabinet positions related to their exper- tise, or occupy posts that are not related to their previous professional activity.5 Fourth, the interest lies in the exploration of the patterns of reappointment or reconfirmation of technocratic ministers. Are they appointed just once? Or do they experience multiple appointments after their initial involvement? Finally, the fifth dimension considers technocratic ministers’ career paths and trajectories. What are the consequences of rul- ing responsibility for such figures? Do they remain in politics after government participation, or do they return to their professional lives? And, most importantly, are ‘revolving door’ phenomena (Shepherd and You 2020) occurring in the alternation be- tween governmental and professional activities? To investigate such issues, information is collected on the first professional experience of technocratic ministers immediately after their first cabinet appointment. The study relies on the following sources: to trace technocratic participation in gov- ernment, an original dataset is used, comprising 64 Italian governments from 1948 to 2021. Specifically, data on government composition are derived from Casal Bértoa (2021)6 and Sonntag (2015). Then, to dig deeper into the characteristics of technocratic ministers, the study relies on the official websites of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and Italian government. Finally, the study benefits from history-oriented efforts retrievable in Bartolotta (1971), Ginsborg (1989), and Mack Smith (1997). 4. Analysis 4.1. Background and Portfolio Allocation Table 1 shows the professional background, gender, and portfolios of technocratic min- isters in the first period considered (1948–1993). Technocratic ministers are present in just seven cabinets out of 47: six are led by partisan prime ministers, and one is led by a technocratic prime minister (Ciampi). Almost 46% of technocratic ministers in this pe- riod were appointed as Ciampi’s executive, while the remaining part mostly joined DC- led cabinets. As mentioned earlier, during the first period portfolio allocation was largely managed by the parties. On this basis, technocratic ministers were in charge of differing 5 Information on the coding scheme adopted for analysing congruence between profession and ministries is available in the Appendix. 6 Casal Bértoa’s dataset (2021) constitutes the main source, while Sonntag (2015) was used to double- check government composition. MARCO IMPROTA 227 portfolios in terms of relevance; that is, core executive positions were still in the hands of partisan personnel, with the exception of a few cases, such as the Finance Ministry entrusted to Franco Reviglio in the first Cossiga executive and to Franco Gallo in the Ciampi government. Other key positions, such as the Ministries of Interior and Justice, remained firmly in the parties’ control for the whole period, except in the case of Gio- vanni Conso’s recruitment as Minister of Justice in the Ciampi government. This signals the ironclad party centrality of that specific period of Italian history. Table 1. Profession, Gender, and Portfolio of Technocratic Ministers (1948-1993) Minister Portfolio Gender Profession Cabinet Year Giovanni Porzio Deputy Prime Minister M Lawyer De Gasperi 1948 Cesare Merzagora Foreign Trade M Banker De Gasperi 1948 Costantino Bresciani Turroni Foreign Trade M Professor Pella 1953 Franco Reviglio Finance M Professor Cossiga 1979 Massimo Severo Giannini Civil Service M Professor Cossiga 1979 Massimo Severo Giannini Civil Service M Professor Cossiga II 1980 Ermanno Gorrieri Labour and Social Welfare M Trade Unionist Fanfani VI 1987 Giovanni Travaglini Transport M Engineer Fanfani VI 1987 Mario Sarcinelli Foreign Trade M Banker Fanfani VI 1987 Mario Di Lazzaro Tourism and Entertainment M Professor Fanfani VI 1987 Livio Paladin Regional Affairs and Civil Service M Professor Fanfani VI 1987 Gaetano Gifuni Parliamentary Relations M Civil Servant Fanfani VI 1987 Alberto Ronchey Culture M Journalist Amato 1992 Adriano Bompiani Social Affairs M Medical Doctor Amato 1992 Luigi Spaventa Budget and Economic Planning M Professor Ciampi 1993 Franco Gallo Finance M Professor Ciampi 1993 Giovanni Conso Justice M Professor Ciampi 1993 Umberto Colombo University and Research M Professor Ciampi 1993 Maria Pia Garavaglia Health F Professor Ciampi 1993 Alberto Ronchey Culture and Environmental Heritage M Journalist Ciampi 1993 Paolo Savona Industry, Trade and Crafts M Professor Ciampi 1993 Paolo Baratta Foreign Trade M Manager Ciampi 1993 Valdo Spini Environment M Professor Ciampi 1993 Sabino Cassese Civil Service M Professor Ciampi 1993 Paolo Barile Parliamentary Relations M Professor Ciampi 1993 Source: own elaboration of Casal Bértoa (2021), Sonntag (2015), Bartolotta (1971), Ginsborg (1989), Mack Smith (1997). Regarding professional background, 14 out of 24 technocratic ministers were uni- versity professors. Notably, in the Ciampi government composition, almost 82% of technocratic recruitment involved university professors. The remaining positions in the first period were occupied by bankers, lawyers, and journalists. Unsurprisingly, male fig- ures dominated technocratic appointments. Thus, there was a clear gendered pattern in technocratic ministerial participation; from 1948 to 1993, only Maria Pia Garavaglia was involved in government and nominated Minister of Health. Such trends are very much in line with that of other European countries, such as France (Bruyère and Gaxie 2018). Moving to the second phase, Table 2 confirms the trend observed in the previous period in terms of female underrepresentation in government. However, it should be noted that in the Dini technocratic cabinet, a core executive position was entrusted to Susanna Agnelli, the first female Minister of Foreign Affairs in Italian Republican his- tory. With the shift from the first to the second period, the technocratic presence Inside technocracy 228 increased. Once again, almost half of the technocratic ministers in the 1994–2010 phase were involved in a technocratic cabinet (Dini), although the recourse to technocracy was pervasive in a considerable number of partisan cabinets, notably in the first D’Alema cabinet and in the second Berlusconi and Prodi government experiences. The increased presence of technocratic figures signals a growing party weakness in managing ruling positions. This is particularly evident in the appointment of non-partisan experts to key government posts. For instance, the Ministry of Treasury, Budget, and Economic Plan- ning – a relevant portfolio when it comes to policy-making – was in the hands of technocrats in the first Prodi executive (1996) and in all D’Alema cabinets (1998, 1999a, 1999b). However, this trend had already begun with Lamberto Dini’s appointment as Minister of Treasury in the first Berlusconi experience (1994) and Rainer Masera’s nom- ination as Minister of Budget and Economic Planning in the technocratic Dini government (1995). Economic and financial tasks were also entrusted to a technocrat in the last governments of this period. Two economists were appointed Ministers of Econ- omy and Finance, specifically in the third Berlusconi cabinet (Domenico Siniscalco in 2005) and one year after in the second Prodi government (Tommaso Padoa Schioppa in 2006). Differently from the first period, other core executive positions were delegated to technocrats for the first time. Filippo Mancuso and Giovanni Maria Flick became Min- isters of Justice, whereas Antonio Brancaccio and Giuliano Amato were nominated Ministers of the Interior. The gradual reduction in the presence of partisan ministerial personnel in key government positions, in particular in economy-related ministries, should be interpreted as a party strategy, with the goal of preserving their appeal vis-à- vis voters in times of increased economic and electoral turbulence. Table 2. Profession, Gender, and Portfolio of Technocratic Ministers (1994-2010) Minister Portfolio Gender Profession Cabinet Year Lamberto Dini Treasury M Economist Berlusconi 1994 Sergio Berlinguer Italians Overseas M Diplomat Berlusconi 1994 Susanna Agnelli Foreign Affairs F Entrepreneur Dini 1995 Rainer Masera Budget and Economic Planning M Professor Dini 1995 Augusto Fantozzi Finance M Professor Dini 1995 Filippo Mancuso Justice M Prosecutor Dini 1995 Domenico Corcione Defence M Military Dini 1995 Tiziano Treu Labour and Social Welfare M Professor Dini 1995 Giancarlo Lombardi Public Education M Engineer Dini 1995 Giorgio Salvini University and Research M Physicist Dini 1995 Elio Guzzanti Health M Medical doctor Dini 1995 Walter Luchetti Agriculture, Food and Forestry Resources M Agronomist Dini 1995 Antonio Paolucci Culture and Environmental Heritage M Art historian Dini 1995 Giovanni Caravale Transport and Navigation M Professor Dini 1995 Alberto Clò Industry, Trade and Crafts M Economist Dini 1995 Paolo Baratta Environment and Public Works M Manager Dini 1995 Agostino Gambino Posts and Telecommunications M Lawyer Dini 1995 Franco Frattini Civil Service and Regional Affairs M Prosecutor Dini 1995 Giovanni Motzo Institutional Reforms M Professor Dini 1995 Antonio Brancaccio Interior M Prosecutor Dini 1995 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning M Banker Prodi 1996 Giovanni Maria Flick Justice M Professor Prodi 1996 Antonio Di Pietro Public Works M Prosecutor Prodi 1996 Carlo Azeglio Ciampi Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning M Banker D'Alema 1998 MARCO IMPROTA 229 Paolo De Castro Agriculture M Professor D'Alema 1998 Giuliano Amato Institutional Reforms M Professor D'Alema 1998 Giuliano Amato Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning M Professor D'Alema II 1999 Paolo De Castro Agriculture M Professor D'Alema II 1999 Giuliano Amato Treasury, Budget and Economic Planning M Professor D'Alema III 1999 Laura Balbo Equal Opportunities F Professor D'Alema III 1999 Tullio De Mauro Public Education M Professor Amato II 2000 Umberto Veronesi Health M Medical doctor Amato II 2000 Renato Ruggiero Foreign Affairs M Diplomat Berlusconi II 2001 Girolamo Sirchia Health M Medical doctor Berlusconi II 2001 Piero Lunardi Infrastructures and Transport M Engineer Berlusconi II 2001 Domenico Siniscalco Economy and Finance M Economist Berlusconi III 2005 Giuliano Amato Interior M Professor Prodi II 2006 Tommaso Padoa Schioppa Economy and Finance M Economist Prodi II 2006 Paolo De Castro Agriculture, Food and Forestry M Professor Prodi II 2006 Alessandro Bianchi Transport M Professor Prodi II 2006 Ferruccio Fazio Health M Medical doctor Berlusconi V 2010 Source: own elaboration of Casal Bértoa (2021), Sonntag (2015), Mack Smith (1997), Italian Chamber of Deputies official web- site, Senate official website, Italian government official website. Looking at professional backgrounds, the share of university professors remained high in the second period, yet new professional figures emerged. In particular, medical doctors (Elio Guzzanti, Umberto Veronesi, Girolamo Sirchia, and Ferruccio Fazio) started to lead the Ministry of Health, while an increased number of prosecutors (Filippo Mancuso, Franco Frattini, Antonio Brancaccio, and notably Antonio Di Pietro) entered the political scene. This is of particular relevance, as the judicial scandal of Mani Pulite played a critical role in (informally) reshaping the structure of the Italian political sys- tem (Guarnieri 2002), and the events that occurred in the country’s judiciary arena prompted prosecutors to enter politics and pursue a political career. The volatile and tripolar period (2011–2021), recently labelled ‘Italia della svolta’ by D’Alimonte and Mammarella (2022), started with the formation of a full-technocratic government headed by Mario Monti and comprised eight university professors, two pub- lic managers, and other professional categories. However, the technocratic presence was spread across all cabinets of this period, with no full-partisan cabinet sworn in for over ten years. Indeed, technocratic ministers were present in all seven cabinets formed from 2011 to 2021. Importantly, economy- and finance-related portfolios were mostly dele- gated to technocratic figures in all cabinets, not only in the full-technocratic Monti executive, but also in partisan governments: Fabrizio Saccomanni in the Letta cabinet (2013), Pier Carlo Padoan in the Renzi cabinet (2014), who was then confirmed as Min- ister of Economy and Finance two years later in the Gentiloni executive (2016), Giovanni Tria in the first Conte cabinet (2018) and, finally, Daniele Franco in the current Draghi government (2021). The only exception to this trend was the PD’s Roberto Gualtieri in the first Conte cabinet. Table 3. Profession, Gender, and Portfolio of Technocratic Ministers (2011-2021) Minister Portfolio Gender Profession Cabinet Year Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata Foreign Affairs M Diplomat Monti 2011 Annamaria Cancellieri Interior F Prefect Monti 2011 Paola Severino Justice F Lawyer Monti 2011 Giampaolo Di Paola Defence M Admiral Monti 2011 Inside technocracy 230 Elsa Fornero Labour and Social Policy F Professor Monti 2011 Francesco Profumo Education, University and Research M Professor Monti 2011 Renato Balduzzi Health M Professor Monti 2011 Mario Catania Agriculture, Food and Forestry M Civil Servant Monti 2011 Lorenzo Ornaghi Culture M Professor Monti 2011 Corrado Clini Environment M Public Manager Monti 2011 Corrado Passera Economic Development M Banker Monti 2011 Enzo Moavero Milanesi European Affairs M Professor Monti 2011 Piero Gnudi Regional Affairs, Tourism and Sport M Public Manager Monti 2011 Fabrizio Barca Territorial Cohesion M Professor Monti 2011 Dino Piero Giarda Parliamentary Relations M Economist Monti 2011 Andrea Riccardi International Cooperation and Integration M Professor Monti 2011 Filippo Patroni Griffi Public Administration and Semplification M Prosecutor Monti 2011 Fabrizio Saccomanni Economy and Finance M Banker Letta 2013 Annamaria Cancellieri Justice F Prefect Letta 2013 Enrico Giovannini Labour and Social Policy M Professor Letta 2013 Pier Carlo Padoan Economy and Finance M Professor Renzi 2014 Giuliano Poletti Labour and Social Policy M Agri-expert Renzi 2014 Federica Guidi Economic Development F Manager Renzi 2014 Pier Carlo Padoan Economy and Finance M Professor Gentiloni 2016 Giuliano Poletti Labour and Social Policy M Agri-expert Gentiloni 2016 Enzo Moavero Milanesi Foreign Affairs M Professor Conte 2018 Giovanni Tria Economy and Finance M Professor Conte 2018 Marco Bussetti Education, University and Research M Teacher Conte 2018 Sergio Costa Environment M Military Conte 2018 Paolo Savona European Affairs M Professor Conte 2018 Luciana Lamorgese Interior F Prefect Conte II 2019 Sergio Costa Environment M Military Conte II 2019 Luciana Lamorgese Interior F Prefect Draghi 2021 Daniele Franco Economy and Finance M Economist Draghi 2021 Marta Cartabia Justice F Professor Draghi 2021 Patrizio Bianchi Public Education M Economist Draghi 2021 Enrico Giovannini Infrastructure and Transport M Professor Draghi 2021 Roberto Cingolani Environment M Professor Draghi 2021 Vittorio Colao Technological Innovation M Manager Draghi 2021 Maria Cristina Messa University and Research F Professor Draghi 2021 Source: own elaboration of Casal Bértoa (2021), Sonntag (2015), Italian Chamber of Deputies official website, Senate official website, Italian government official website. Unlike in the first period, core executive positions shifted from the parties’ hands to technocratic centrality. In all cabinets, core executive posts were ceded to non-parti- sans. From 2011, the Ministry of Justice was in the hands of technocrats on three occasions: Paola Severino (Monti 2011), Annamaria Cancellieri (Letta 2013), and Marta Cartabia (Draghi 2021). Likewise, the Ministry of the Interior was headed by a techno- crat in 2011 (Annamaria Cancellieri), 2019, and 2021 (Luciana Lamorgese). Regarding professional background, the presence of university professors is still pervasive. Almost 41% of Monti’s ministers were professors, and Monti himself served as university pro- fessor during his career. MARCO IMPROTA 231 Figure 2. Professional background of Technocratic Ministers (1948-2021) Source: own elaboration of Bartolotta (1971), Ginsborg (1989), Mack Smith (1997), Italian Chamber of Deputies official website, Senate official website, Italian government official website. Moreover, relative to the first and second periods, the last period displayed a less unbalanced situation in terms of the genders of technocratic ministers. From 2011 to 2021, seven female technocratic ministers out of a total of 33 ministers were appointed, compared to three out of 58 from 1948 to 2010. While the disparity is still evident, more female technocratic ministers have been appointed in ten years than in sixty years. Yet, the overall picture – i.e., considering all technocratic appointments from 1948 to 2021 – is clear: 88.7% of the technocratic ministers appointed have been male. Finally, consid- ering the whole time span, Figure 2 shows that 40% of technocratic ministers had a university professorship background, followed by economists, bankers, managers, pros- ecutors, medical doctors, and prefects. This result confirms what Cotta and Verzichelli (2002: 148) noted back in the day, namely that university professors are ‘principal amongst the technocratic elite’. Interpreting the results in a comparative perspective, it can be noted that in the transition from the first to the two last periods Italy has gradually deviated from the French model, i.e., party control and a negligible technocratic presence (Bruyère and Gaxie 2018), becoming more similar to Portugal and Spain, whose systems are charac- terised by a more accentuated presence of technocrats, especially in recent decades (Costa Pinto and Tavares de Almeida 2018; Rodriguez Teruel and Jerez Mir 2018). 4.2. Expertise and reappointments After having explored the background and portfolio allocation of technocratic ministers, we now shift our attention to additional investigations related to technocratic Inside technocracy 232 appointments. Specifically, the study investigates whether such appointments were based on the expertise acquired in the technocrats’ professional activities or whether there could be cases of misplacement in portfolio allocation. For instance, are diplomats appointed as Ministers of Foreign Affairs? Or are they ‘misplaced’ in ministries that re- quire different expertise? This is crucial, because non-partisan ministers are not necessarily technocrats; some are just ‘celebrity politicians’ (Marsh et al. 2010). Most of the literature, however, defines technocrats as politically independent ministers who also hold particular expertise over specific policy areas (e.g., McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014). To capture both dimensions – independence and expertise – this study explores cabinet appointments by detecting cases of misplacement in portfolio allocation. In ad- dition, interest is also in understanding whether the government participation of technocrats occurs just on a single occasion, as noted by Verzichelli and Cotta (2018), or whether technocratic ministers are frequently solicited through multiple cabinet ap- pointments. Figure 3. Expertise and Reappointments of Technocratic Ministers (1948-2021) Source: own elaboration of Casal Bértoa (2021) and Sonntag (2015). Figure 3 helps us to understand the patterns of technocratic ministerial expertise and reappointments. From 1948 to 2021, 87% of technocratic ministers were appointed in ministries related to their expertise, which matured during previous professional ac- tivities. The remaining 13%, however, were appointed in portfolios that were not related to their specific expertise. Among such cases, there are two misplacements during the first period: Mario Di Lazzaro and Valdo Spini. The former was a university professor of mathematics, who had the role of Minister of Tourism and Entertainment in the sixth Fanfani government (1987). The latter was a university professor of the history of inter- national relations, who was in charge of the Minister of Environment in the Ciampi technocratic executive (1993). In the second period, cases of misplacement escalated. The entrepreneur Susanna Agnelli became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Dini cabi- net (1995), prosecutor Franco Frattini was appointed Minister of Civil Service and Regional Affairs (Dini 1995), and the Ministry of Transport and Navigation was en- trusted to fiscal policies expert Giovanni Caravale in the same cabinet. Finally, in the third period, five cases of misplacement took place. Public Managers Corrado Clini and Piero Gnudi were appointed, respectively, Minister of Environment and Minister of Regional Affairs, Tourism, and Sport in the Monti cabinet (2011). In the same cabinet, responsibility for the Ministry of Parliamentary Relations was delegated to Economist Dino Piero Giarda. Three years later, a notable case was Renzi’s cabinet portfolio allocation. Agri-expert Giuliano Poletti was appointed Minister of Labour and Social Policy. Poletti was then reappointed to the same government portfolio in the MARCO IMPROTA 233 subsequent executive, Gentiloni 2016. All in all, while the vast majority of portfolio allo- cation decisions were based on expertise (87%), this is not the only concern of parties and party leaders when it comes to technocratic appointments. Indeed, they might be also interested in involving independent figures due to their personal loyalty, as commonly happens in Spain (Rodriguez Teruel and Jerez Mir 2018). In Figure 3, the share of technocratic ministers appointed just once and those ap- pointed multiple times can also be observed. As noted by Verzichelli and Cotta (2018), the overwhelming majority of technocratic ministers held governing responsibility on a single occasion (83%), while the remaining 17% were appointed in two or more govern- ment formations. Looking at the different time spans under investigation, reappointments involved three ministers in the first period: Massimo Severo Giannini as Minister of Civil Service (Cossiga and Cossiga II cabinets), Alberto Ronchey as Minis- ter of Culture (Amato and Ciampi cabinets), and Paolo Savona, who was first appointed Minister of Industry, Trade, and Crafts in the Ciampi cabinet and then nominated as Minister of European Affairs in the first Conte executive almost 25 years later. During the second period, Giuliano Amato was stably involved in several governmental posi- tions: as Minister of Institutional Reforms in the first D’Alema government, then as Minister of Treasury, Budget, and Economic Planning in the second D’Alema experi- ence, and finally as Minister of the Interior in the second Prodi government, after heading Palazzo Chigi as Prime Minister in 2000. Finally, in the third period, seven re- appointments occurred, in line with the record of the previous period, yet increased compared to the first period. Against this backdrop, data indicate that Italian parties do not tend to reappoint technocrats after their first experience in government. In a comparative perspective, It- aly is not an outlier, as this trend is observable in other European countries as well, such as Spain (Rodriguez Teruel and Jerez Mir 2018). 4.3. Is There Life After Government? Career Paths and Trajectories of Technocratic Ministers As we have seen so far, technocratic ministers are mostly appointed only once, display- ing a low reappointment rate. This section investigates the consequences of governing responsibility for technocratic ministers. Specifically, what do technocrats do after their cabinet involvement? Do they take up political affiliations, or do they return to their pro- fessional lives? The career path of technocratic ministers after government may follow three distinct trajectories, which have important implications for understanding tech- nocrat behaviour. First, technocratic ministers deciding to join a party after holding cabinet offices might signal that parties simply hide themselves behind non-partisan figures but still receive the lion’s share when it comes to ruling. Along these lines, technocratic appoint- ments should be understood as a party-driven process of recruitment of personnel who are outside the parties’ governing elite yet willing to pursue a more formalised political career. In this way, the decline in the partyness of governments (Katz 1987) should be interpreted as a mere sign of a numerical decrease in partisan membership in cabinet, but not as a sign of party decline. Inside technocracy 234 Second, technocratic ministers could also opt to maximise their government expe- rience in light of professional benefits. In particular, experts may join relevant industries to exploit the knowledge acquired when holding ruling-responsibility posi- tions in portfolios related to issues of importance for specific industries. Political science defines such situations as ‘revolving doors’ (Shepherd and You 2020). In this vein, tech- nocrats utilise politics as a jumping-off point for reaching top managerial positions in private companies. Finally, technocratic ministers may follow a third avenue: returning to their pre- government professional activities. This option signals the technocrats’ ability (and willingness) to intermittently serve the country’s political institutions without particu- lar aspirations to a political or managerial career. Table 4. Career Paths of Technocratic Ministers after Government Participation (1948-2021) 1948–1993 1994–2010 2011–2021 Minister Career after appointment Minister Career after appointment Minister Career after appointment Giovanni Porzio Political affiliation (Liberal) Lamberto Dini Political affiliation (RI) Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata Political affiliation (FDI) Cesare Merzagora Political affiliation (PLI) Sergio Berlinguer Political affiliation (RI) Annamaria Cancellieri Prefect Costantino Bresciani Turroni CEO, Bank of Rome Susanna Agnelli Entrepreneur Paola Severino Rector, LUISS Franco Reviglio Board Member, Edipower Rainer Masera Chairman, Lehman Brothers Giampaolo Di Paola Member, Trilateral Commission Massimo Severo Giannini Political affiliation (SiR) Augusto Fantozzi Political affiliation (RI) Elsa Fornero Professor Ermanno Gorrieri Political affiliation (DC) Filippo Mancuso Political affiliation (FI) Francesco Profumo President, ESCP Business School Giovanni Travaglini Political affiliation (DC) Domenico Corcione Retirement Renato Balduzzi Political affiliation (SC) Mario Sarcinelli Public Manager Tiziano Treu Political affiliation (RI) Mario Catania Political affiliation (SC) Mario Di Lazzaro Chief, CONSOB Giancarlo Lombardi Political affiliation (PPI) Lorenzo Ornaghi Professor Livio Paladin Professor Giorgio Salvini Professor Corrado Clini Director, SD and Climate DG Gaetano Gifuni Civil Servant Elio Guzzanti Medical Doctor Corrado Passera CEO, Illimity Alberto Ronchey Journalist Walter Luchetti Agronomist Enzo Moavero Milanesi Political affiliation (SC) Adriano Bompiani Political affiliation (DC) Antonio Paolucci Director, Vatican Museums Piero Gnudi Board Member, Confindustria Luigi Spaventa Chief, CONSOB Giovanni Caravale Professor Fabrizio Barca Political affiliation (PD) Franco Gallo Constitutional Judge Alberto Clò Professor Dino Piero Giarda President, BPM (Surveillance) Giovanni Conso Professor Agostino Gambino President, AIDA Andrea Riccardi Political affiliation (SC) Umberto Colombo Professor Franco Frattini Political affiliation (FI) Filippo Patroni Griffi SG, Privacy Guarantor Maria Pia Garavaglia Political affiliation (PPI) Giovanni Motzo Professor Fabrizio Saccomanni President, UniCredit BoD Paolo Savona Professor Antonio Brancaccio Died shortly after resignation Federica Guidi Member, Trilateral Commission Paolo Baratta Public Manager Carlo Azeglio Ciampi President of the Republic Enrico Giovannini Professor Valdo Spini Political affiliation (PSI) Giovanni Maria Flick Italian Representative, ECHR Pier Carlo Padoan Board Member, UniCredit Sabino Cassese Professor Antonio Di Pietro Political affiliation (IDV) Giuliano Poletti Political affiliation (PD) Paolo Barile Professor Giuliano Amato Political affiliation (PD) Maria Cristina Messa Currently in office Ferruccio Fazio Senior Advisor, McKinsey & Co. Patrizio Bianchi Currently in office Paolo De Castro Political affiliation (PD) Vittorio Colao Currently in office Laura Balbo Professor Roberto Cingolani Currently in office Tullio De Mauro Professor Giovanni Tria Professor Umberto Veronesi Political affiliation (PD) Marco Bussetti Head teacher Renato Ruggiero Political affiliation (PSI) Sergio Costa Consultant on environmental issues, Carabinieri Girolamo Sirchia Medical Doctor Daniele Franco Currently in office Pietro Lunardi Political affiliation (FI) Luciana Lamorgese Currently in office Domenico Siniscalco Manager, Morgan Stanley Marta Cartabia Currently in office Tommaso Padoa Schioppa Advisor, IMF Alessandro Bianchi Political affiliation (PD) Source: own elaboration of Bartolotta (1971), Ginsborg (1989), Mack Smith (1997), Italian Chamber of Deputies official website, Senate official website, Italian government official website. Table 4 shows technocratic ministers’ careers after cabinet appointments. Starting from the first period, the three avenues described are essentially all represented. Eight MARCO IMPROTA 235 technocratic ministers decided to join parties: three of them joined the DC (Adriano Bompiani, Ermanno Gorrieri, Giovanni Travaglini), while two became members of Lib- eral formations (Giovanni Porzio, Cesare Merzagora). In the final years of the first period, Maria Pia Garavaglia joined the Italian Popular Party (PPI), one of the DC’s suc- cessor parties, while Valdo Spini was actively involved in the Socialist Party’s (PSI) transformations. Moreover, four technocratic ministers achieved managerial positions after government involvement. In particular, Mario Di Lazzaro and Luigi Spaventa be- came chiefs of CONSOB, an independent administrative authority for market surveillance. The former Minister of Foreign Trade in the Pella government, Costantino Bresciani Turroni, was nominated chief executive officer of the Bank of Rome, while Franco Reviglio became a board member of Edipower, one of the largest producers of electric power in Italy. A not insignificant number of technocratic ministers, however, returned to their past professional lives. Notably, after having managed the Ministry of Culture on two occasions, journalist Alberto Ronchey returned to the publishing indus- try. However, he was appointed President of the Rizzoli-Corriere della Sera editorial group immediately after the end of his mandate in office. Moving to the second period, almost 41% of technocratic ministers took up political affiliation after their first cabinet appointment. Lamberto Dini formed his own party, Italian Renewal (RI), gaining support from Sergio Berlinguer, Augusto Fantozzi, and Tiziano Treu. Similarly, former prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro established his Italy of Val- ues (IDV), leaving his professional activities to pursue a political career. Technocratic ministers joined both centre-left and centre-right parties. The Democratic Party (PD) was joined by Giuliano Amato, Paolo De Castro, Umberto Veronesi, and Alessandro Bianchi, whereas Berlusconi’s Forward Italy (FI) obtained the participation of Filippo Mancuso, Franco Frattini, and Pietro Lunardi. Interestingly, the technocratic ministers of the 1994–2010 governments reached high ranking positions in relevant institutions. Rainer Masera became chairman of the Italian branch of Lehman Brothers, while Gio- vanni Maria Flick was nominated Italian representative in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Moreover, after serving as Minister of Health in the 2011 Ber- lusconi cabinet, medical doctor Ferruccio Fazio was hired as Senior Advisor at McKinsey & Company. Economist Domenico Siniscalco left Berlusconi’s third government in 2005, serving as managing director and vice president at Morgan Stanley the year after. Finally, Tommaso Padoa Schioppa, Minister of Economy and Finance in the second Prodi cabinet, was appointed advisor for the International Monetary Fund. In the third period, the share of technocrats joining parties following a cabinet ap- pointment decreased. Most of them were involved in Mario Monti’s Civic Choice (SC), a pattern echoing Dini’s RI. Regarding professional activities, technocratic ministers of the third period mostly joined the banking system. In particular, Fabrizio Saccomanni became president of UniCredit’s board of directors in 2018, while Pier Carlo Padoan joined UniCredit’s board of members two years later. Moreover, the banking system has attracted additional technocratic figures. Dino Piero Giarda was nominated President of the Popular Bank of Milan (BPM) with surveillance tasks, and Corrado Passera became Chief Executive Officer of Illimity Bank. Nevertheless, other technocratic ministers re- turned to their original careers. Elsa Fornero and Lorenzo Ornaghi returned to Inside technocracy 236 university after having participated in the Monti government, whereas Annamaria Can- cellieri returned to her prefectural career. Overall, Table 4 displays a fragmented picture when it comes to technocratic min- isters’ career paths and trajectories after cabinet appointment. While some non- partisan figures opt to start a political career by joining a political formation, others ex- ploit their governmental experience to reach top positions in major public and private companies. Finally, the remaining technocratic ministers returned to their original po- sitions. Temporal variation in such trends suggests that parties still exert some sort of appeal over technocrats, yet such appeal is mainly driven by political entrepreneurial ef- forts made by technocratic prime ministers such as Lamberto Dini and Mario Monti. As political careers might be deemed risky and transient by technocrats, achieving high- ranking positions in industry is a clear option for maximising the knowledge gained when in government without being exposed to voters’ fluctuations. 5. Conclusions This study explored the patterns of technocratic ministerial recruitment in Italy from 1948 to 2021, focusing on five dimensions: background, portfolio allocation, expertise, reappointment, and career paths. Albeit remaining at a descriptive level, the findings show insightful elements. First, there is a clear gendered pattern among technocratic ministers. The overwhelming majority of appointments have regarded male personnel, relegating female technocratic ministers to evident underrepresentation. Second, the examination of technocrats’ professional backgrounds reveals that university professors are the most common professional category involved in non-partisan appointments, fol- lowed by other high-skilled occupational groups, such as economists, bankers, managers, prosecutors, medical doctors, and prefects. Moreover, regarding portfolio al- location patterns, a gradual decline in party management over core executive positions can be observed. As expected, during the first period, core executive positions were mainly controlled by partisan personnel in a pure ‘party government’ perspective. After the collapse of the old Italian party system, technocratic ministers started to occupy core executive positions. The increased presence of technocratic figures in such positions mainly regarded economy- and finance-related office posts, yet other key portfolios, e.g., Interior and Justice, also witnessed technocratic involvement. Concerning expertise trajectories, insights derived from our investigation clearly show that the large majority of portfolio allocation considerations were mainly driven by technocrats’ expertise in the specific ministerial policy area. However, not all techno- cratic appointments have followed this pattern, as cases of misplacement are marginal but not absent. As noted by Costa Pinto et al. (2018), experts are generally appointed to ministerial portfolios that correspond to their specialised skills and professional train- ing. Nonetheless, they are sometimes chosen regardless of the specific policy areas of government and, to some extent, precisely because they do not have a ‘party stigma’. Fur- thermore, as for reappointments, technocratic ministers display a low confirmation rate, as already emphasised by Verzichelli and Cotta (2018). Data revealed that most technocrats were appointed just once. Reappointments, however, increased in fre- quency from the first to the last two periods considered. This finding suggests that MARCO IMPROTA 237 parties do not build strong ties with technocrats, creating high technocratic ministerial turnover. Finally, this study overviewed the career patterns of technocratic ministers after holding government positions. In this regard, the investigation showed that technocrats might pursue three different goals. On the one hand, they can decide to become an active part of a political formation, running for elections that are subject to popular scrutiny. On the other hand, they can opt to join private or public companies to professionally maximise their governmental experience. Finally, they can return to their original pro- fessional activity, interpreting ruling responsibility as a transient step in their life. Results show that all options have been considered viable by technocrats. Adopting a comparative perspective, Italian technocracy shares differences and similarities with other countries. In France and Sweden, for instance, parties have man- aged to preserve their centrality in government. Specifically, despite increasing levels of distrust towards them, French political parties maintain their control over cabinet posts (Bruyère and Gaxie 2018). Similarly, evidence from Sweden suggests ‘a continued strong role for politically experienced ministers’ (Bäck and Persson 2018). On the other hand, technocratic transformations occurring in the Italian governmental arena are visible in Spain and Portugal as well. Costa Pinto and Tavares de Almeida (2018) noted that tech- nocracy is a persistent feature of Portuguese democracy, and has its roots in the late democratisation of the country. In Spain, technocratic recruitment is often the outcome of prime ministers’ strategic considerations. In particular, when the prime minister en- visages risks for the government and needs personal loyalty and technical abilities, she/he prefers to source ministers from outside the parliamentary party (Rodriguez Te- ruel and Jerez Mir 2018). Technocracy is a growing area of interest for political scientists. This phenomenon is indeed provoking profound transformations in European political systems, under- mining the persistence of the party government model. Italy is among the countries in Europe most affected by this evolution (Valbruzzi 2018). To grasp the causes and conse- quences of technocracy, scholars are increasingly directing their efforts to multiple related aspects. In particular, scholars have investigated technocracy both quantitatively (Wratil and Pastorella 2018; Alexiadou and Gunaydin 2019) and qualitatively (Costa Pinto et al. 2018). Understanding the background and appointment patterns of techno- cratic ministers in Italy may lay the groundwork for a comparative research agenda going beyond a single case study. In this regard, comparable cases in Europe might allow the detection of common and divergent trajectories in technocratic ministers’ charac- teristics and government involvement. For instance, comparative analyses may investigate whether the Italian gendered pattern in technocratic recruitment is excep- tional from a comparative perspective. In addition, researchers may examine whether Italian technocrats’ career paths are visible in different political systems, thus contrib- uting to enriching the investigation on this less explored matter. 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