08/07/2013 Italian Political Science: The Arab Spring: when democracy meets global protest*

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The Professional Review Of The Italian Political Science Association

The  Arab  Spring:  when  democracy  meets
global  protest*
by  Stefania  Panebianco  |  Published  in  issue7  /  Research

Not  so  many  events  attracted  the  scholarly  debate  and  the  attention  of  the  wide  public  as  the  Arab  Spring1

did  in  the  last  couple  of  years.  The  wave  of  popular  protests  that  started  in  Tunisia  in  January  2011  and  then
spread  all  over  the  Arab  world  unsettled  decades  of  stability  of  the  Arab  authoritarian  regimes.  Inevitably,
many  Political  Science  assumptions  have  been  discussed,  rediscovered,  or  challenged.  In  the  short-­term  this
revival   of   democracy   studies   has   led   to   a   flourishing   of   books,   international   seminars   and   conference
panels.   In   the   mid-­   to   long-­term   the   discipline   will   have   to   draw   from   these   events   to   elaborate   new
paradigms.  Some  suggestions  are  here  provided,  aiming  to  open  a  focus  of  discussion  that  can  profit  of  the
on-­line  distribution  of  IPS.

Many  sub-­fields  of  the  discipline  have  investigated  these  events  challenging  or  supporting  widely  accepted
claims.  This  article  aims  at  highlighting  the  emerging  trends  in  the  academic  debate.  First  of  all,  the  2011

Arab  revolutionary  wave  challenged  the  assumption  of  the  so-­called   ‘Arab  exceptionalism’2  and  provided
evidence  for  those  IR  scholars  that  explain  democratization  as  a  global  process.  Studies  on  democracy  as  a
global  issue  deny  that  Middle  East  and  North  African  (MENA)  countries  are  destined  to  remain  untouched  by
democratic   processes,   for   cultural   or   other   reasons.   According   to   the   Globalist   Approach,   instead,
democratization  –  being  a  global  process  –  will  eventually   involve  the  MENA  countries   in  the  medium  or
long-­term.  Secondly,  a  widely  shared  conceptual  definition  of  democracy  is  being  investigated.  A  (Western)
value-­laden  definition  of  democracy  is  being  progressively  replaced  by  a  procedural  concept  of  democracy,
which   stresses   the   functioning   of   a   political   system   ensuring   democratic   rules   and   norms   instead   of
(culturally  imbued)  principles.  Many  scholars  of  political  theory  are  re-­discussing  the  ontological  definition  of
democracy,  taking  also  into  account  the  delicate  role  (if  any)  of  the  Islamic  religion.  Thirdly,  the  literature  on
transnational  social  movements  is  exploring  social  movement  networks  and  demonstrations  against  national
governments  and  policies,  to  grasp  the  linkage  between  the  transnational  dimension  of  the  protest  and  its
effectiveness  at  domestic  level.  Finally,  the  literature  on  democratization  is  arguing  again  about  the  positive
sum  game  between  domestic  actors  and  the  international  dimension.

1.  Global  Democracy  and  the  need  to  overcome  the  ‘Arab  exceptionalism’
concept
The  popular  uprisings  that  stirred  the  Arab  World  in  2011  have  urged  the  revision  of  the  existing  literature
on  the  lack  of  democracy  in  the  MENA  area  which  developed  around  the  concept  of  ‘Arab  exceptionalism’.
The  most  debated  issue  concerns,  instead,  the  conditions  for  MENA  countries  to  be  eventually  affected  by
democracy  diffusion.  Being  aware  that  the  short-­term  changes  in  MENA  political  systems  cannot  progress
steadily   along   pre-­determined   stages   or   within   a   path   dependent   process,   democratization   can   be

interpreted  and  conceived  as  a  ‘long-­term  Democracy  Diffusion  Process’  (Rossi,  2012)3.

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http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/issue7/the-arab-spring-when-democracy-meets-global-protest
http://www.italianpoliticalscience.eu/contributors/stefania-panebianco
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Following  the  long-­term  perspective,  democracy  can  be  considered  at  the  global  level  as  a  social  innovation

of  political  change4.  According  to  George  Modelski,  democratization  is  strictly  related  to  the  evolution  of  the
global   political   system   and   the   creation   of   a   global   community   and   world   public   opinion.   Beyond   the
evolution  of  global  politics  and  global  economy,  there  is  an  evolution  of  global  community  and  world  public
opinion.  Since  the  moment  when  democratization  as  a  social   innovation  has  been  introduced,  democratic
practices  have  been  disseminated  on  a  global  scale.  This  process  can  be  represented  by  a  learning  curve
that  shows  a  growing  proportion  of  the  population  living  in  democratic  countries  (Modelski  and  Perry  1991).
The  contemporary  phase  is  called  “democratic  transition”  (decisive  or  selectional)  and  prepares  what  will  be
the  next  phase,  building  the  foundations  for  a  future  democratic  governance.  In  the  current  stage,  radical
Islamist   movements   seem   to   be   the   forces   that   try   to   defy   the   contemporary   global   support   for

democratization5  (Modelski  2008).  Among  the  co-­evolutionary  trends  identified  by  Modelski,  world  opinion  –
a   social   construction   characterized   by   strong   and   active   media   –   is   becoming   increasingly   important   in
“defining  global  problems”  (Modelski  and  Thompson  2002;;  Attinà  2011).  The  specific  role  of  information  and
media  during  the  Arab  Spring  days  may  be  seen  as  part  of  such  a  rise  of  an  informed  world  public  opinion,
even  if  it  is  difficult  to  assess  their  specific  influence  in  the  development  of  the  uprisings  (Rossi,  2012).

The  transitions  underway  in  some  MENA  countries  may  also  be  considered  as  part  of  a  political  change  of
short  duration  –  in  other  words  as  “conjunctures  of  events”  (Attinà  2011,  cit.  in  Rossi  2012)  –  and  hence
such  change  should  be  nested  within  the  above  long  term  evolutionary  process.

2.  Conceptualizing  democracy:  the  need  for  overcoming  cultural  borders
The  conceptualization  of  democracy  has   traditionally  attracted  scholarly  attention.  The   inherent  difficulty
consists   of   finding   a   definition   which   –   overcoming   any   cultural   specificity   –applies   to   different   regional
contexts.  The  Arab  revolts  indicate  that  a  common  definition  of  democracy  can  be  shared  as  long  as  this
implies  periodic,  free,  fair,  effective  elections  for  choosing  parliamentary  and  executive  institutions;;  a  true
multi-­party  system;;  together  with  freedom  of  assembly,  association  and  speech,  also  implying  the  free  use

of  new  media6.

De  facto  Arab  protesters  seem  to  have  agreed  upon  a  shared  definition  of  democracy  that  is  both  procedural
and  participatory,  thus  based  both  upon  political  rights  and  individual  liberties.  The  procedural  definition  of
democracy  drawing  from  the  tradition  of  Joseph  Schumpeter  and  Robert  Dahl  is  not  in  contrast  with  a  plural
political  society  that  is  not  necessarily  expressed  by  secular  forces  or  pro-­Western  civil  society.  Conversely,
the  coexistence  of  various  social  and  political  forces  (including  Islamist  parties)  can  only  be  the  guarantee  of
a  plural  liberal  democracy.  Tolerance  and  respect  of  various  forces  can  be  guaranteed  only  through  legal
institutions.  Hence,   to  ensure  a  competitive,   responsive  and  participatory  democracy,   the   rule  of   law   is
required  as  a  guarantor  of  democratic  institutions  (O’Donnell,  2001).

Scholars  of  democracy  are  well  aware  of  what  democracy   is   (or   is  not)  and  have  almost  agreed  on  a
distinction   between   democratic   regimes,   authoritarian   regimes   and   post-­authoritarian   regimes,   or
‘democracies   with   adjectives’,   as   Collier   and   Lewitsky   called   them   (1997).   The   ‘minimal’   conditions   of
democracy  indicated  by  Dahl  (1971)  are  a  valid  instrument  to  identify  a  threshold  that  allows  distinguishing
authoritarianism   from   democracy.   Dahl   regards   both   liberalization   (or   competition)   and   participation   (or
inclusiveness)   as   fundamental   conditions   to   establish   a   poliarchy,   therefore   he   identifies   the   following
political   institutions   as   necessary   conditions   for   democracy:   elected   rulers;;   free,   correct   and   frequent
elections;;   freedom   of   expression;;   access   to   multiple   sources   of   information;;   freedom   of   association;;
universal   suffrage   (ibidem).   All   these   elements   individually   taken   are   necessary,   but   not   sufficient   to
establish  a  democratic  regime.

A  paradigm  of  political  change  acknowledging  a  stop-­and-­go  dynamic,  or  even  reverse  trends  in  the  short  to
medium  term,  is  much  more  useful  to  understand  the  political  processes  involving  the  MENA  area  rather
than  a  deterministic   transition  paradigm.  The  current  political  ambiguity  might   lead   to  stable  democratic
regimes  or,  conversely,  turn  into  new  types  of  authoritarian  regimes.  Being  democratization  such  a  complex

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process,   blocked   democratic   transitions   might   lead   to   the   instauration   of   ‘hybrid   regimes’,   i.e.   regimes

characterized  by  uncertainty  and  ambiguity  (Morlino  2011:  49),  instead  of  democratic  regimes.7

The  delicate  relationship  between  religion  and  democracy  is  another  crucial  issue  –  traditionally  debated  in
political  theory  –  that  has  acquired  today  a  new  flair.  The  most  common  claim  of  a  presumed  incompatibility
between  Islam  and  democracy  recalls  Samuel  Huntington’s  argument  about  a  clash  of  civilization  (1996).
Undoubtedly,  in  some  cases  (as  Senegal  or  Mali)  coexistence  between  Islam  and  democracy  is  not  easy,  but
in  other  cases  (as  Turkey  or  Indonesia)  coexistence  was  feasible.  Democracy  and  Islam  can  coexist  when
institutions   as   such   are   guaranteed   and   are   not   questioned   by   a   religiously   inspired   government.   The
guarantee  of  democracy  relies  upon  the  respect  of   institutions,  as  a  more  important  value  than  religious
principles.  In  this  respect,  the  Turkish  case  is  particularly  relevant,  being  a  secular  state  (by  constitution)
with  a  Muslim  majority  population  that  is  ruled  by  a  Muslim  majority  party.  As  an  Islamic  country  that  has
experienced   a   democratic   transition   process,   Turkey   has   successfully   achieved   a   compromise   between
secular  institutions  and  a  religiously  inspired  government.  In  Turkey,  modernization  is  not  accompanied  by
secularization  of  state  and  society;;  on  the  contrary,   it   is  being  marked  by  a  renewed  Islamic  religiosity
(Ozzano,  2012).  Again,  a  Schumpeterian  concept  of  procedural  democracy  seems  to  prevail  in  Turkey  over
a   normative   definition   of   democracy   based   upon   the   a-­religiosity   of   a   secularistic   state.   Many   scholars
consider  the  Turkish  experience  as  a  successful  ‘model’  for  the  MENA  countries  timidly  experiencing  political
change  processes.

3.  Popular  mobilization  in  the  MENA  area:  protesters  as  actors  of
democratic  change
The  2011  popular  mobilization  represents  the  highest  level  of  mobilization  ever  registered  in  the  Arab  world.
Considering   that   political   participation   represents   a   fundamental   democracy   condition,   studies   on   social
movements   are   devoting   much   attention   to   the   popular   dimension   of   the   Arab   upheavals   to   grasp   any
potential  of  democracy  diffusion  through  a  bottom-­up  strategy.  While  persistent  authoritarian  regimes  had
flourished  with  the  silent  responsibility  –  if  not  even  support  –  of  the  Western  world,  widespread  popular
uprisings  and  the  high  number  of  casualties  occurred   in  the   last  eighteen  months   in  the  MENA   countries
indicate  that  democracy,  freedom  and  justice  are  regarded  as  vital  values  worth  fighting  for.

The  tragic  self-­burning  of  Mohamed  Bouazizi  (a  26  years  old  unemployed  graduate),  which  took  place  in  the
Tunisian  inland  rural  town  of  Sidi  Bouzid  on  17  December  2010,  determined  a  sort  of  ‘domino  effect’,  i.e.  a
contagious  popular  mobilization   favored  by  new  media  and  nourished  by  socio-­economic  dissatisfaction,
rising   unemployment   (particularly   youth’s   and   middle   class’   unemployment),   long-­lasting   authoritarian
political  control  and  denial  of  civil  liberties.  Starting  in  Sidi  Bouzid,  a  wave  of  protests  quickly  spread  all  over
the  MENA  area  (in  Tunisia,  Egypt,  Yemen,  Bahrain  and  Syria,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  also  in  Algeria,  Morocco,
Jordan  and  Mauritania)  conveying  both  political  and  socio-­economic  requests,  with  freedoms  and  liberties
alongside  better  employment,  all  regarded  by  protesters  as  goals  worth  dying  for.

The  2011  popular  mobilization  was  strongly  different  from  previous  Arab  experiences.  These  uprisings  were
neither   ideological   nor   religiously   inspired   and   had   essentially   domestic   origins.   This   was   not   a   protest
against  the  West,  nor  did  external  actors  instill  it.  Protesters  in  Tunisia  and  Egypt  were  not  raising  Islamic
claims   nor   demanding   the   Shari’a   law.   In   most   cases,   these   popular   revolts   started   as   peaceful
demonstrations  characterized  by  slogans  pleading   for   freedom  and  political   reforms  and  were  organized
independently  from  Islamic  extremists  or  anti-­Western  groups.  This  was  not  a  protest  of  the  poor  people;;  it
was   rather   the   revolt   of   the   educated   middle   class.   These   spontaneous   protests   were   the   result   of   a
contextual  situation:  they  depended  on  severe  political  and  economic  conditions,  but  were  facilitated  and
acquired  such  proportion  thanks  to  the  new  communication  tools.

Investigating  features  and  actors  of  the  protest,  scholars  devoted  specific  attention  to  the  role  of  new  media
among  the  most   important   factors   favoring  the   ‘domino  effect’  of   the  popular  mobilization,  with  protests
quickly  becoming  a  transnational  phenomenon.  New  media  were  used  to  organize  the  popular  protests  by

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putting   together  heterogeneous  groups  sharing   the  same   (res)sentiment  against   the  political   leadership.
Internet  could  easily  transmit  this  common  feeling  that  was  widely  shared  in  most  MENA  countries;;  it  was  an
effective  instrument  for  mass  political  mobilization,  a  better  and  faster  way  to  leverage  widespread  popular
dissatisfaction.   Internet   and   mobile   phones   were   used   as   innovative   tools   to   organize   demonstrations,
coordinate  activists  and  exchange  information.  On-­line  activism  accompanied  and  sustained  street  activism.
Thanks   to   the   new   technological   instruments,   popular   mobilization   acquired   an   impressive   transnational
dimension.

Alongside   the   organizational   added   value,   new   media   were   also   extremely   useful   in   increasing   the
awareness  of  the  Arab  public  opinion  and  of  the  international  community  in  general.  Local  and  international
media  played  an   important   role   in  either  manipulating   information  or  broadcasting   the  brutal   repression
internationally   (like   in   the   Syrian   case   or   with   the   riots   taking   place   in   the   weeks   before   the   Egyptian
elections).  Media,  in  particular  satellite  televisions  such  as  Al  Jazeera  and  Al  Arabiya,  and  social  networks
such  as  Facebook  and  Twitter,  became  an  effective  political  actor  denouncing  the  repressive  action  of  the
authoritarian  regimes   in   the  area.   Internet  became  an   instrument   to  denounce  police  abuse  and  human
rights   violations:   videos   posted   on   YouTube   from   mobile   phones   were   essential   vehicles   to   broadcast
information   in   real   time,   bypassing   the   institutional   regime-­controlled   media.   ‘Cybernauts’   succeeded   in
avoiding  censorship  and  posted  videos  with  a  high  emotional  impact,  thus  increasing  at  least  virtually  the
opposition’s  power.

Thus,  technology  represents  a  serious  challenge  for  authoritarianism,  as  it  allows  to  denounce  any  kind  of
violations  globally,  de  facto  spreading  democracy  as  a  global  process.  Free  information  has  then  become
both  a  democratic  tool  and  value.

4.  The  Arab  Spring  and  political  change:  an  actor-­centred  versus  a  system
explanation?
The  Arab  Spring  has  attracted   the  scholarly  attention  –  of   comparative  politics   in  particular  –  upon   the
linkage  between  domestic  and  international  actors.  The  European  experience,  of  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal
in  the  1980s,  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  in  the  1990s,  evidenced  a  positive  sum  game  between  domestic
and  international  dimension.  Does  a  comparison  between  these  different  areas  show  similar  trends?  So  far
political  change  in  the  MENA  has  been  explained  primarily  through  an  actor-­centred  rather  than  a  system-­
explanation,  seeing  domestic  actors’  involvement  as  a  condicio  sine  qua  non  of  local  change.

The  Arab  Spring  has  brought   to   the   fore   the   traditional  debate  on   the  determinants  of  democracy.  The
literature  on  the  international  determinants  envisaged  diffusion  at  the  global,  regional  and  neighbor  state
level  (Starr,  1991:  356).  Undeniably,  in  the  last  decades  globalization  has  become  an  important  feature  of
the  global  political  system,  fostering  the  diffusion  of  democracy  both  as  a  political  regime  and  as  a  set  of
principles  and  values  (see  §  1  above).  However,  the  different  outcomes  of  political  change  registered  so  far
in  the  MENA  countries  suggest  that  the  primary  responsibility  for  the  establishment  of  a  democratic  regime
relies  upon  local  actors.

The   short-­term   analysis   of   change   in   the   MENA   region   has   singled   out   the   local   political   leadership   as
prevailing  over  the  regional  context  in  determining  the  outcome  of  the  popular  requests  for  political  change.
Although  the  wave  of  protests  has  touched  almost  all  MENA  countries,  only  few  regimes  fell.  Namely,  Ben  Ali
and   Mubarak   were   overthrown,   and   Quadhafi   was   killed   during   the   civil   war,   while   Bashar   Al-­Assad   is
violently  reacting  against  his  people,  trying  to  keep  his  power  despite  a  bloody  civil  war.  Arab  monarchies
proved  to  be  more  stable.  In  Jordan  and  Morocco,  the  ruling  dynasties  demonstrated  to  rely  upon  strong
popular  support  and  legitimacy.

Without  neglecting  the  importance  of  the  international  arena  during  the  democratic  consolidation  phase,  the
Arab  experience  points  to  regime  change  as  a  mainly  domestic  political  choice.  It  is  only  when  the  Tunisian
and  Egyptian  masses  started  their  violent  protests  that  the  old  authoritarian  regimes  were  defeated.  The



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international   support   can   help   afterwards,   in   the   phase   of   instauration   and   consolidation   of   a   new
(democratic)  regime.  Therefore,  a  distinction  between  short-­  to  mid-­  and  long-­term  political  change  appears
essential   to  understand  possible  modes  of  change.  An  actor-­centered  explanation  applies   in  the  short   to
medium  term,  while  a  system  explanation  can  apply  considering  the  long  cycle  of  change.  This  indicates  that
the  transition  to  democracy  must  be  primarily  an  endogenous  process,  ultimately  supported  by  external
actors.

Another   relevant   assumption   concerns   the   key   domestic   actors   of   change.   In   the   short   term,   mass
mobilization  is  a  relevant  driver  of  change,  with  new  actors  such  as  bloggers  and  social  networks  playing  a
major  role.  In  the  medium  to  long-­term,  political  leadership  and  civil  society  networks  have  a  much  bigger
responsibility  for  the  establishment  of  the  arenas  of  democracy  as  identified  by  Linz  and  Stepan  (1996).  The
former  have  a  role  to  play  as  pars  destruens  denouncing  and  defeating  the  authoritarian  regime;;  the  latter
are  relevant  as  pars  costruens   for  elaborating  new  norms  and   institutions.  The  general  public  mobilizing
against   the   regime   requires   elite   actors   guiding   the   democratic   transition   through   the   setting   up   of
democratic  institutions.

Popular  mobilization  from  below  can  be  effective  in  the  short  run  to  overcome  the  existing  regime  (as  in  the
case  of  Egypt),  while  elites  play  a  key  role  in  establishing  the  new  (democratic)  regime  in  the  medium  to
long  term.  Popular  mobilization  can  remove  authoritarian  regimes,  but  it  is  not  apt  to  set  up  new  institutions.
For  democratization  to  be  successful,  since  it  is  commonly  accepted  that  no  universal  model  of  democracy
exists,   a   procedural   democratic   model   can   be   envisaged   and   applied   to   culturally,   socially,   ethnically,
economically  different  contexts.

All  in  all,  a  persistent  long-­term  feature  seems  to  have  emerged.  A  new  political  competition  replaced  the
former  stability  and  the  supposed  political  apathy  of  the  citizens  living  in  authoritarian  countries.  Islamist
actors,   in  particular,  proved  to  possess  a  relevant  political  power.  Although  it   is  still  unsure  whether  any
democratic  transition  will  succeed   in  the  area,  the  Islamist  parties  will  have  an   important  role  to  play   in
these   political   processes,   as   they   are   getting   a   large   electoral   support   (e.g.   in   Tunisian,   Egyptian   and
Moroccan  elections).  Islamists  as  determinant  actors  of  the  transformation  of  authoritarian  regimes  might
suggest  unusual  paths  to  democratic  change.  And  the   international  community  (and  the  EU)  will  have  to
regard  non-­violent  Islamist  actors  as  political   interlocutors,  particularly   if  they  are  democratically  elected

and  represent  a  large  part  of  the  Arab  political  realm  and  societies.8

If  we   first  of  all  consider  democracy   in   terms  of  democratic  procedures  and  respect  of   the  rules  of   the
game,  or  as  Linz  and  Stepan  (1996)  claimed  there  is  an  agreement  on  the  ‘democratic  pact’,  democratic
procedures  can  be  present  to  the  same  degree  among  those  who  favor  secular  democracy  and  those  who
favor  a  political  system  that   is  both  democratic  and  Islamic.  The  international  community  should  support
these  political   changes  without  exacerbating  cultural  or   religious  differences,  by  developing  political  and
economic  cooperation  with  the  local  actors,  irrespectively  of  their  political  or  religious  faith.  As  I  said  above
(§  2),  the  Turkish  case  proves  that  an  Islamist  party  ruling  the  country  can  be  compatible  with  democratic
institutions  and  procedures.

Domestic   determinants   (protests   originated   by   socio-­economic   dissatisfaction   and   authoritarian   rule)
appeared   to   be   much   more   effective   in   the   fight   against   authoritarianism   than   the   external   dimension.
Diffusion  or  contagion  can  take  place  if  a  functioning  regional  institutional  network  exists  and  helps  to  share

and  consolidate  democratic  practices,  as  it  was  the  case  with  EU  enlargement9.  It  is  misleading  to  talk  about
a  ‘fourth  wave  of  democratization’,  since  the  political  change  process  appears  too  ambiguous  and  is  based
on  a  case-­to-­case  basis.  The   ‘wave’  metaphor  suggests  a  sort  of  democratic  diffusion/democratic  effect
process.   But   democratization   is   not   an   automatic   process.   Contrary   to   what   happened   in   the   1990s   in
Central   and   Eastern   Europe,   when   due   to   a   sort   of   domino   effect   all   communist   regimes   turned   into
democratic  regimes  based  on  market  economy,  the  Arab  countries  map  shows  a  leopard  spot-­like  political
change.

This   does   not   mean   that   the   MENA   area   has   to   remain   untouched   from   the   global   trend   towards

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democratization.  Simply,  international  forces  and  actors  can  foster  the  democratization  process  at  a  later
stage,  once  local  actors  (either  power  elites  or  opposition  movements  or  both)  take  the  lead  for  political
change.  Yet,  once  transition  starts,  there  is  no  inevitable  move  towards  democracy  consolidation,  being  the
transition  paradigm  not  empirically  tested  as  a  global  trend.  The  outcomes  of  these  political  processes  are
uncertain  and  depend  on  how  actors  deal  with  structural  conditions,  which  are  out  of  their  control  but  can  be
tackled  with  different  strategies  and  options.  In  this  sense,  democratic  transition  cannot  be  –  and  never  is  –
inevitable.  Conversely,  democratization  is  a  dynamic  process  risking  to  be  reversed  by  de-­democratization
processes  (Tilly,  2007).

5.  Preliminary  conclusion  to  foster  the  discussion
No  deterministic  vision  can  be  applied  to  explain  recent  upheavals  in  MENA  countries.  A  paradigm  of  change
that  can  identify  the  possible  evolution  of  these  trends  is  certainly  more  useful  than  the  transition  paradigm
(Rossi,  2012).  The  metaphor  of  winds  of  democratic  change  blowing  in  the  MENA  indicates  the  plurality  of
challenges  and  perspectives  of  these  trends,  and  in  such  way  proposes  to  cover  both  the  potentialities  and
uncertainties   of   political   change.   There   is   not   only   one   wind,   as   a   unique   and   straightforward   political
transition   does   not   exist.   A   “wind”   derives   from   the   struggle   between   two   pressures   striving   to   find   a
dynamic  equilibrium.  Similarly,  political  transformations  in  MENA  countries  follow  some  key  “differences  in
pressure”  or  “differences  of  focus”  in  the  move  to  new  potentially  dynamic  political  orders  (ibidem).

Structural  explanations  of  democratization  would  suggest  a  causal  mechanism  that  risks  becoming  a  sort  of

deterministic   process   that   is   far   from   being   real10.   Structural   conditions   can   favor   the   stabilization   of
democracy,  but  rarely  can  –  on  their  own  –  allow  democratization.  The  democratization  experiences  suggest
that  –  since  there  are  various  historical,  institutional  and  structural  conditions  for  regime’s  change  –  there
are  no  fixed  prerequisites  of  democratization;;  the  local  actors’  will  is  instead  essential  for  the  beginning  of
the  democratization  process.

What  the  Arab  uprisings  suggest   is  the  need  for  a  combination  of  pro-­democratic  social  forces  and  class
action,   together  with  active  elite  actors.  Yet,   the  popular  mobilization   in  the  MENA  area  created  volatile,
collective  identities  that  collapsed  easily  without  proposing  a  valid  ruling  alternative.  Social  forces  such  as
university  students  or  human  rights  activists  effectively  used  the  new  media  to  organize  the  protest,  but
then  proved  weak  to  propose  a  political  program.  This  suggests  that  collective  action  can  provide  indications
to  rulers  but  cannot  rule.  In  Tunisia  and  Egypt,  large  parts  of  the  population  participated  in  the  protests,  but
were  not  organized  in  groups  that  could  express  a  political  project.  Spontaneous  groups,  also  created  via
the  Internet,  have  then  left  place  to  more  structured  actors  such  as  Islamist  parties  (Ennahda  in  Tunisia  and
Muslim  Brotherhood  in  Egypt),  which  confirmed  their  large  popular  support  with  an  extraordinary  electoral
result.

This   region-­based   analysis   does   not   aim   to   provide   a   general   theory   of   democratization,   but   empirical
references  to  test  some  determinants  of  democratization   identified  by  the   literature.  The  analysis  of   the
Arab  democratic  uprisings   in  2011  suggests   that   the  actor-­centered  approach   is  better  suited   to  explain
democratic  change   than  system  approaches.  Further   research  and  a  comparison  between  regions  might
further  foster  the  theory  of  democratization.

Predictions  concerning  a  democratic  transition  are  shortsighted.  An  important  lesson,  though,  can  be  drawn
from  popular   revolts   in   the  Arab  countries:   religious   traditions  prevailing   in  most  Arab  countries  do  not
inhibit  the  emergence  of  a  democratic  culture  as  an  ensemble  of  attitudes,  beliefs  and  values  of  the  ordinary
citizens.   Empirical   studies   have   already   demonstrated   that   public   opinion   is   aware   of   the   value   of   civil
liberties  and  political   rights;;  what  has   instead  been  missing   in   the  area   is   the   institutional  dimension  of
democracy  (Tessler  2002:  338).  The  relationship  between  democracy  and  Islam  has  been   long  debated,
arguing  in  favor  or  against  the  compatibility  between  them.  There  is  not  a  clear-­cut  position  on  that,  because
the   influence   of   the   Muslim   religion   depends   to   a   very   considerable   extent   on   how   and   by   whom   it   is
interpreted  (Tessler  2002:  340).

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Even  though  the  outcome  of  stable  democratic  regimes  is  far  from  certain,  winds  of  political  change  are
blowing.  Historically,  the  path  to  democracy  has  been  variegated.  The  MENA  countries  are  not  an  exception.

Notes
*   This   article   draws   from   a   research   conducted   within   the   framework   of   the   12-­month   Jean   Monnet
Information  and  Research  Activity   ‘EU  Foreign  Policy  and  DEMocracy  Promotion’  (EUDEM)   funded   by   the
European  Commission  through  the  LLP  (Project  n°  2010-­3285).  More  extensively  Panebianco  (2012).

1  Since  the  early  2011  both  scholars  and  media  have  been  talking  about  an   ‘Arab  Spring’   to  stress  the
awakening   of   the   Arab   world   from   long-­lasting   authoritarianism.   One   year   later,   facts-­based   analyses
discard  the  initial  optimism  and  unveil  ambiguous  realities.  I  will  refer  here  to  ‘Arab  Spring’  being  aware  of
the  conceptual  weakness  of  this  concept  and  of  the  uncertainty  of  this  process.

2   In   the   early   1990s   the   spread   of   democracy   seemed   to   be   inevitable,   particularly   with   the   fall   of
communism   (see,   for   instance,   Fukuyama   1992)   and   the   diffusion   of   democracy   that   was   promoted   in
Europe  through  the  EU’s  enlargement  process  (Schimmelfennig  and  Scholz  2008).  Yet,  this  global  movement
towards  democracy  left  the  Arab  world  untouched,  with  old  authoritarian  regimes  stably  in  place  until  2011.
This  phenomenon  is  at  the  basis  of  the  ‘Arab  exceptionalism’  concept.  Some  scholars  brought  this  concept  to
an  extreme  and  even  argued  that  there  is  something  inherently  undemocratic  about  Islam  as  a  religious
doctrine,  or  the  way  in  which  Islamic  societies  are  organized  (Huntington,  1996).  On  the  Arab  exceptionalism
see  –  among  others  –  Stepan  and  Robertson  (2003;;  2004),  Diamond  (2010).

3  For  the  differences  and  relationship  between  short-­term  and  long-­term  change  perspective  of  analysis  see
Attinà  (2011:  71-­83).

4  This  reconstruction  of  democratization  as  a  long-­term  process  draws  from  Rossi  (2012).  With  Modelski  and
Thompson’s  terms  (2002:  128,  cit.  in  Rossi  2012):  “if  democracy  is  not  a  Western  universalist  pretension  …
but  a  potent  social  innovation,  a  generally  applicable  technology  for  effective  cooperation,  then  its  continued
future  spread  might  be  estimated  on  the  basis  of  well-­established  laws  of  diffusion  of  innovation”.

5   However,   according   to   the   author   it   is   required   that   the   world   system   reaches   “a   condition   of
overwhelming  majority  for  democracies,  accounting  for,  say,  90  percent  of  the  world  population”  —  which
will  not  be  reached  before  the  middle  of  this  century  (around  year  2075)  (Modelski  2012)  —  to  register  an
influence  on  the  coming  macro-­decision  phase,  aiming  to  reach  a  systemic  democratic  peace.

6  In  this  respect  the  definition  of  democracy  elaborated  by  Robert  Dahl  in  the  1970s  seems  still  adequate  to
the  needs  and  demands  formulated  during  the  revolts.

7  The  definition  of  hybrid  regimes  provided  by  Morlino  (2011:  56),  includes  both  ambiguity  and  some  sort  of
stabilization  or  duration.

8   At   the   recent   elections,   Islamists   performed   very   well,   disappointing   those   inattentive   observers   who
wrongly  believed  that  the  Arab  Spring  was  paving  the  way  for  secular  democratic  rule.  Protesters  made  use
of  new  media  and  technology  to  bypass  the  domestic  censorship,  but  never  made  reference  to  Western
values  or  habits.

9  The  fundamental  role  of  EU  institutions  in  providing  a  framework  for  the  democratic  change  of  Central  and
Eastern  European  countries  was  played  essentially  via  the  enlargement  process;;  this  was  also  experienced
in  the  Turkish  reform  process  (Schimmelfennig  and  Scholtz  2008).

10  Seymour  Lipset’s  work  (1959)  is  at  the  origins  of  the  modernization  theory  claiming  that  countries  that
have  undergone  a  more  extensive  process  of  societal  modernization  are  more  likely  to  be  democratic.



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